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diff --git a/1735.txt b/1735.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2419b58 --- /dev/null +++ b/1735.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6074 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Sophist, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Sophist + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: November 7, 2008 [EBook #1735] +Release Date: May, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOPHIST *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +SOPHIST + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +The dramatic power of the dialogues of Plato appears to diminish as +the metaphysical interest of them increases (compare Introd. to the +Philebus). There are no descriptions of time, place or persons, in the +Sophist and Statesman, but we are plunged at once into philosophical +discussions; the poetical charm has disappeared, and those who have no +taste for abstruse metaphysics will greatly prefer the earlier dialogues +to the later ones. Plato is conscious of the change, and in the +Statesman expressly accuses himself of a tediousness in the two +dialogues, which he ascribes to his desire of developing the dialectical +method. On the other hand, the kindred spirit of Hegel seemed to find in +the Sophist the crown and summit of the Platonic philosophy--here is the +place at which Plato most nearly approaches to the Hegelian identity of +Being and Not-being. Nor will the great importance of the two dialogues +be doubted by any one who forms a conception of the state of mind and +opinion which they are intended to meet. The sophisms of the day were +undermining philosophy; the denial of the existence of Not-being, and +of the connexion of ideas, was making truth and falsehood equally +impossible. It has been said that Plato would have written differently, +if he had been acquainted with the Organon of Aristotle. But could +the Organon of Aristotle ever have been written unless the Sophist +and Statesman had preceded? The swarm of fallacies which arose in the +infancy of mental science, and which was born and bred in the decay of +the pre-Socratic philosophies, was not dispelled by Aristotle, but +by Socrates and Plato. The summa genera of thought, the nature of +the proposition, of definition, of generalization, of synthesis and +analysis, of division and cross-division, are clearly described, and +the processes of induction and deduction are constantly employed in the +dialogues of Plato. The 'slippery' nature of comparison, the danger of +putting words in the place of things, the fallacy of arguing 'a dicto +secundum,' and in a circle, are frequently indicated by him. To all +these processes of truth and error, Aristotle, in the next generation, +gave distinctness; he brought them together in a separate science. But +he is not to be regarded as the original inventor of any of the great +logical forms, with the exception of the syllogism. + +There is little worthy of remark in the characters of the Sophist. The +most noticeable point is the final retirement of Socrates from the field +of argument, and the substitution for him of an Eleatic stranger, who +is described as a pupil of Parmenides and Zeno, and is supposed to have +descended from a higher world in order to convict the Socratic circle of +error. As in the Timaeus, Plato seems to intimate by the withdrawal of +Socrates that he is passing beyond the limits of his teaching; and in +the Sophist and Statesman, as well as in the Parmenides, he probably +means to imply that he is making a closer approach to the schools of +Elea and Megara. He had much in common with them, but he must first +submit their ideas to criticism and revision. He had once thought as +he says, speaking by the mouth of the Eleatic, that he understood their +doctrine of Not-being; but now he does not even comprehend the nature +of Being. The friends of ideas (Soph.) are alluded to by him as distant +acquaintances, whom he criticizes ab extra; we do not recognize at +first sight that he is criticizing himself. The character of the Eleatic +stranger is colourless; he is to a certain extent the reflection of his +father and master, Parmenides, who is the protagonist in the dialogue +which is called by his name. Theaetetus himself is not distinguished +by the remarkable traits which are attributed to him in the preceding +dialogue. He is no longer under the spell of Socrates, or subject to the +operation of his midwifery, though the fiction of question and answer is +still maintained, and the necessity of taking Theaetetus along with him +is several times insisted upon by his partner in the discussion. There +is a reminiscence of the old Theaetetus in his remark that he will not +tire of the argument, and in his conviction, which the Eleatic thinks +likely to be permanent, that the course of events is governed by the +will of God. Throughout the two dialogues Socrates continues a silent +auditor, in the Statesman just reminding us of his presence, at the +commencement, by a characteristic jest about the statesman and the +philosopher, and by an allusion to his namesake, with whom on that +ground he claims relationship, as he had already claimed an affinity +with Theaetetus, grounded on the likeness of his ugly face. But in +neither dialogue, any more than in the Timaeus, does he offer any +criticism on the views which are propounded by another. + +The style, though wanting in dramatic power,--in this respect resembling +the Philebus and the Laws,--is very clear and accurate, and has +several touches of humour and satire. The language is less fanciful and +imaginative than that of the earlier dialogues; and there is more of +bitterness, as in the Laws, though traces of a similar temper may also +be observed in the description of the 'great brute' in the Republic, +and in the contrast of the lawyer and philosopher in the Theaetetus. +The following are characteristic passages: 'The ancient philosophers, +of whom we may say, without offence, that they went on their way rather +regardless of whether we understood them or not;' the picture of the +materialists, or earth-born giants, 'who grasped oaks and rocks in their +hands,' and who must be improved before they can be reasoned with; and +the equally humourous delineation of the friends of ideas, who defend +themselves from a fastness in the invisible world; or the comparison of +the Sophist to a painter or maker (compare Republic), and the hunt after +him in the rich meadow-lands of youth and wealth; or, again, the +light and graceful touch with which the older philosophies are painted +('Ionian and Sicilian muses'), the comparison of them to mythological +tales, and the fear of the Eleatic that he will be counted a parricide +if he ventures to lay hands on his father Parmenides; or, once more, +the likening of the Eleatic stranger to a god from heaven.--All these +passages, notwithstanding the decline of the style, retain the impress +of the great master of language. But the equably diffused grace is gone; +instead of the endless variety of the early dialogues, traces of the +rhythmical monotonous cadence of the Laws begin to appear; and already +an approach is made to the technical language of Aristotle, in the +frequent use of the words 'essence,' 'power,' 'generation,' 'motion,' +'rest,' 'action,' 'passion,' and the like. + +The Sophist, like the Phaedrus, has a double character, and unites two +enquirers, which are only in a somewhat forced manner connected with +each other. The first is the search after the Sophist, the second is the +enquiry into the nature of Not-being, which occupies the middle part of +the work. For 'Not-being' is the hole or division of the dialectical +net in which the Sophist has hidden himself. He is the imaginary +impersonation of false opinion. Yet he denies the possibility of false +opinion; for falsehood is that which is not, and therefore has no +existence. At length the difficulty is solved; the answer, in +the language of the Republic, appears 'tumbling out at our feet.' +Acknowledging that there is a communion of kinds with kinds, and not +merely one Being or Good having different names, or several isolated +ideas or classes incapable of communion, we discover 'Not-being' to be +the other of 'Being.' Transferring this to language and thought, we have +no difficulty in apprehending that a proposition may be false as well +as true. The Sophist, drawn out of the shelter which Cynic and Megarian +paradoxes have temporarily afforded him, is proved to be a dissembler +and juggler with words. + +The chief points of interest in the dialogue are: (I) the character +attributed to the Sophist: (II) the dialectical method: (III) the nature +of the puzzle about 'Not-being:' (IV) the battle of the philosophers: +(V) the relation of the Sophist to other dialogues. + +I. The Sophist in Plato is the master of the art of illusion; the +charlatan, the foreigner, the prince of esprits-faux, the hireling who +is not a teacher, and who, from whatever point of view he is regarded, +is the opposite of the true teacher. He is the 'evil one,' the ideal +representative of all that Plato most disliked in the moral and +intellectual tendencies of his own age; the adversary of the almost +equally ideal Socrates. He seems to be always growing in the fancy +of Plato, now boastful, now eristic, now clothing himself in rags of +philosophy, now more akin to the rhetorician or lawyer, now haranguing, +now questioning, until the final appearance in the Politicus of his +departing shadow in the disguise of a statesman. We are not to suppose +that Plato intended by such a description to depict Protagoras or +Gorgias, or even Thrasymachus, who all turn out to be 'very good sort +of people when we know them,' and all of them part on good terms with +Socrates. But he is speaking of a being as imaginary as the wise man +of the Stoics, and whose character varies in different dialogues. Like +mythology, Greek philosophy has a tendency to personify ideas. And the +Sophist is not merely a teacher of rhetoric for a fee of one or fifty +drachmae (Crat.), but an ideal of Plato's in which the falsehood of all +mankind is reflected. + +A milder tone is adopted towards the Sophists in a well-known passage of +the Republic, where they are described as the followers rather than +the leaders of the rest of mankind. Plato ridicules the notion that +any individuals can corrupt youth to a degree worth speaking of in +comparison with the greater influence of public opinion. But there is +no real inconsistency between this and other descriptions of the Sophist +which occur in the Platonic writings. For Plato is not justifying the +Sophists in the passage just quoted, but only representing their power +to be contemptible; they are to be despised rather than feared, and are +no worse than the rest of mankind. But a teacher or statesman may be +justly condemned, who is on a level with mankind when he ought to be +above them. There is another point of view in which this passage should +also be considered. The great enemy of Plato is the world, not exactly +in the theological sense, yet in one not wholly different--the world as +the hater of truth and lover of appearance, occupied in the pursuit of +gain and pleasure rather than of knowledge, banded together against the +few good and wise men, and devoid of true education. This creature has +many heads: rhetoricians, lawyers, statesmen, poets, sophists. But the +Sophist is the Proteus who takes the likeness of all of them; all other +deceivers have a piece of him in them. And sometimes he is represented +as the corrupter of the world; and sometimes the world as the corrupter +of him and of itself. + +Of late years the Sophists have found an enthusiastic defender in the +distinguished historian of Greece. He appears to maintain (1) that the +term 'Sophist' is not the name of a particular class, and would have +been applied indifferently to Socrates and Plato, as well as to Gorgias +and Protagoras; (2) that the bad sense was imprinted on the word by the +genius of Plato; (3) that the principal Sophists were not the corrupters +of youth (for the Athenian youth were no more corrupted in the age of +Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles), but honourable and estimable +persons, who supplied a training in literature which was generally +wanted at the time. We will briefly consider how far these statements +appear to be justified by facts: and, 1, about the meaning of the word +there arises an interesting question:-- + +Many words are used both in a general and a specific sense, and the +two senses are not always clearly distinguished. Sometimes the generic +meaning has been narrowed to the specific, while in other cases the +specific meaning has been enlarged or altered. Examples of the former +class are furnished by some ecclesiastical terms: apostles, prophets, +bishops, elders, catholics. Examples of the latter class may also be +found in a similar field: jesuits, puritans, methodists, and the like. +Sometimes the meaning is both narrowed and enlarged; and a good or bad +sense will subsist side by side with a neutral one. A curious effect +is produced on the meaning of a word when the very term which is +stigmatized by the world (e.g. Methodists) is adopted by the obnoxious +or derided class; this tends to define the meaning. Or, again, the +opposite result is produced, when the world refuses to allow some sect +or body of men the possession of an honourable name which they have +assumed, or applies it to them only in mockery or irony. + +The term 'Sophist' is one of those words of which the meaning has been +both contracted and enlarged. Passages may be quoted from Herodotus +and the tragedians, in which the word is used in a neutral sense for a +contriver or deviser or inventor, without including any ethical idea of +goodness or badness. Poets as well as philosophers were called Sophists +in the fifth century before Christ. In Plato himself the term is applied +in the sense of a 'master in art,' without any bad meaning attaching to +it (Symp.; Meno). In the later Greek, again, 'sophist' and 'philosopher' +became almost indistinguishable. There was no reproach conveyed by the +word; the additional association, if any, was only that of rhetorician +or teacher. Philosophy had become eclecticism and imitation: in the +decline of Greek thought there was no original voice lifted up 'which +reached to a thousand years because of the god.' Hence the two words, +like the characters represented by them, tended to pass into one +another. Yet even here some differences appeared; for the term 'Sophist' +would hardly have been applied to the greater names, such as Plotinus, +and would have been more often used of a professor of philosophy in +general than of a maintainer of particular tenets. + +But the real question is, not whether the word 'Sophist' has all these +senses, but whether there is not also a specific bad sense in which +the term is applied to certain contemporaries of Socrates. Would an +Athenian, as Mr. Grote supposes, in the fifth century before Christ, +have included Socrates and Plato, as well as Gorgias and Protagoras, +under the specific class of Sophists? To this question we must answer, +No: if ever the term is applied to Socrates and Plato, either the +application is made by an enemy out of mere spite, or the sense in which +it is used is neutral. Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates, Aristotle, all give +a bad import to the word; and the Sophists are regarded as a separate +class in all of them. And in later Greek literature, the distinction +is quite marked between the succession of philosophers from Thales to +Aristotle, and the Sophists of the age of Socrates, who appeared like +meteors for a short time in different parts of Greece. For the purposes +of comedy, Socrates may have been identified with the Sophists, and +he seems to complain of this in the Apology. But there is no reason to +suppose that Socrates, differing by so many outward marks, would really +have been confounded in the mind of Anytus, or Callicles, or of any +intelligent Athenian, with the splendid foreigners who from time to time +visited Athens, or appeared at the Olympic games. The man of genius, the +great original thinker, the disinterested seeker after truth, the master +of repartee whom no one ever defeated in an argument, was separated, +even in the mind of the vulgar Athenian, by an 'interval which no +geometry can express,' from the balancer of sentences, the interpreter +and reciter of the poets, the divider of the meanings of words, the +teacher of rhetoric, the professor of morals and manners. + +2. The use of the term 'Sophist' in the dialogues of Plato also shows +that the bad sense was not affixed by his genius, but already current. +When Protagoras says, 'I confess that I am a Sophist,' he implies that +the art which he professes has already a bad name; and the words of the +young Hippocrates, when with a blush upon his face which is just seen +by the light of dawn he admits that he is going to be made 'a Sophist,' +would lose their point, unless the term had been discredited. There is +nothing surprising in the Sophists having an evil name; that, whether +deserved or not, was a natural consequence of their vocation. That they +were foreigners, that they made fortunes, that they taught novelties, +that they excited the minds of youth, are quite sufficient reasons to +account for the opprobrium which attached to them. The genius of Plato +could not have stamped the word anew, or have imparted the associations +which occur in contemporary writers, such as Xenophon and Isocrates. +Changes in the meaning of words can only be made with great difficulty, +and not unless they are supported by a strong current of popular +feeling. There is nothing improbable in supposing that Plato may +have extended and envenomed the meaning, or that he may have done the +Sophists the same kind of disservice with posterity which Pascal did to +the Jesuits. But the bad sense of the word was not and could not have +been invented by him, and is found in his earlier dialogues, e.g. the +Protagoras, as well as in the later. + +3. There is no ground for disbelieving that the principal Sophists, +Gorgias, Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, were good and honourable men. +The notion that they were corrupters of the Athenian youth has no real +foundation, and partly arises out of the use of the term 'Sophist' in +modern times. The truth is, that we know little about them; and the +witness of Plato in their favour is probably not much more historical +than his witness against them. Of that national decline of genius, +unity, political force, which has been sometimes described as the +corruption of youth, the Sophists were one among many signs;--in these +respects Athens may have degenerated; but, as Mr. Grote remarks, there +is no reason to suspect any greater moral corruption in the age of +Demosthenes than in the age of Pericles. The Athenian youth were not +corrupted in this sense, and therefore the Sophists could not have +corrupted them. It is remarkable, and may be fairly set down to their +credit, that Plato nowhere attributes to them that peculiar Greek +sympathy with youth, which he ascribes to Parmenides, and which was +evidently common in the Socratic circle. Plato delights to exhibit +them in a ludicrous point of view, and to show them always rather at +a disadvantage in the company of Socrates. But he has no quarrel with +their characters, and does not deny that they are respectable men. + +The Sophist, in the dialogue which is called after him, is exhibited in +many different lights, and appears and reappears in a variety of forms. +There is some want of the higher Platonic art in the Eleatic Stranger +eliciting his true character by a labourious process of enquiry, when he +had already admitted that he knew quite well the difference between +the Sophist and the Philosopher, and had often heard the question +discussed;--such an anticipation would hardly have occurred in the +earlier dialogues. But Plato could not altogether give up his Socratic +method, of which another trace may be thought to be discerned in his +adoption of a common instance before he proceeds to the greater matter +in hand. Yet the example is also chosen in order to damage the 'hooker +of men' as much as possible; each step in the pedigree of the angler +suggests some injurious reflection about the Sophist. They are both +hunters after a living prey, nearly related to tyrants and thieves, and +the Sophist is the cousin of the parasite and flatterer. The effect of +this is heightened by the accidental manner in which the discovery is +made, as the result of a scientific division. His descent in another +branch affords the opportunity of more 'unsavoury comparisons.' For he +is a retail trader, and his wares are either imported or home-made, like +those of other retail traders; his art is thus deprived of the character +of a liberal profession. But the most distinguishing characteristic of +him is, that he is a disputant, and higgles over an argument. A feature +of the Eristic here seems to blend with Plato's usual description of +the Sophists, who in the early dialogues, and in the Republic, are +frequently depicted as endeavouring to save themselves from disputing +with Socrates by making long orations. In this character he parts +company from the vain and impertinent talker in private life, who is a +loser of money, while he is a maker of it. + +But there is another general division under which his art may be also +supposed to fall, and that is purification; and from purification +is descended education, and the new principle of education is to +interrogate men after the manner of Socrates, and make them teach +themselves. Here again we catch a glimpse rather of a Socratic or +Eristic than of a Sophist in the ordinary sense of the term. And Plato +does not on this ground reject the claim of the Sophist to be the true +philosopher. One more feature of the Eristic rather than of the Sophist +is the tendency of the troublesome animal to run away into the darkness +of Not-being. Upon the whole, we detect in him a sort of hybrid or +double nature, of which, except perhaps in the Euthydemus of Plato, +we find no other trace in Greek philosophy; he combines the teacher of +virtue with the Eristic; while in his omniscience, in his ignorance +of himself, in his arts of deception, and in his lawyer-like habit of +writing and speaking about all things, he is still the antithesis of +Socrates and of the true teacher. + +II. The question has been asked, whether the method of 'abscissio +infinti,' by which the Sophist is taken, is a real and valuable logical +process. Modern science feels that this, like other processes of formal +logic, presents a very inadequate conception of the actual complex +procedure of the mind by which scientific truth is detected and +verified. Plato himself seems to be aware that mere division is an +unsafe and uncertain weapon, first, in the Statesman, when he says that +we should divide in the middle, for in that way we are more likely to +attain species; secondly, in the parallel precept of the Philebus, +that we should not pass from the most general notions to infinity, but +include all the intervening middle principles, until, as he also says +in the Statesman, we arrive at the infima species; thirdly, in the +Phaedrus, when he says that the dialectician will carve the limbs of +truth without mangling them; and once more in the Statesman, if we +cannot bisect species, we must carve them as well as we can. No better +image of nature or truth, as an organic whole, can be conceived than +this. So far is Plato from supposing that mere division and subdivision +of general notions will guide men into all truth. + +Plato does not really mean to say that the Sophist or the Statesman +can be caught in this way. But these divisions and subdivisions were +favourite logical exercises of the age in which he lived; and while +indulging his dialectical fancy, and making a contribution to logical +method, he delights also to transfix the Eristic Sophist with weapons +borrowed from his own armoury. As we have already seen, the division +gives him the opportunity of making the most damaging reflections on +the Sophist and all his kith and kin, and to exhibit him in the most +discreditable light. + +Nor need we seriously consider whether Plato was right in assuming that +an animal so various could not be confined within the limits of a +single definition. In the infancy of logic, men sought only to obtain +a definition of an unknown or uncertain term; the after reflection +scarcely occurred to them that the word might have several senses, which +shaded off into one another, and were not capable of being comprehended +in a single notion. There is no trace of this reflection in Plato. +But neither is there any reason to think, even if the reflection had +occurred to him, that he would have been deterred from carrying on the +war with weapons fair or unfair against the outlaw Sophist. + +III. The puzzle about 'Not-being' appears to us to be one of the most +unreal difficulties of ancient philosophy. We cannot understand the +attitude of mind which could imagine that falsehood had no existence, if +reality was denied to Not-being: How could such a question arise at +all, much less become of serious importance? The answer to this, and to +nearly all other difficulties of early Greek philosophy, is to be sought +for in the history of ideas, and the answer is only unsatisfactory +because our knowledge is defective. In the passage from the world +of sense and imagination and common language to that of opinion and +reflection the human mind was exposed to many dangers, and often + + 'Found no end in wandering mazes lost.' + +On the other hand, the discovery of abstractions was the great source +of all mental improvement in after ages. It was the pushing aside of +the old, the revelation of the new. But each one of the company of +abstractions, if we may speak in the metaphorical language of Plato, +became in turn the tyrant of the mind, the dominant idea, which would +allow no other to have a share in the throne. This is especially true of +the Eleatic philosophy: while the absoluteness of Being was asserted +in every form of language, the sensible world and all the phenomena of +experience were comprehended under Not-being. Nor was any difficulty or +perplexity thus created, so long as the mind, lost in the contemplation +of Being, asked no more questions, and never thought of applying the +categories of Being or Not-being to mind or opinion or practical life. + +But the negative as well as the positive idea had sunk deep into the +intellect of man. The effect of the paradoxes of Zeno extended far +beyond the Eleatic circle. And now an unforeseen consequence began to +arise. If the Many were not, if all things were names of the One, and +nothing could be predicated of any other thing, how could truth be +distinguished from falsehood? The Eleatic philosopher would have +replied that Being is alone true. But mankind had got beyond his barren +abstractions: they were beginning to analyze, to classify, to define, +to ask what is the nature of knowledge, opinion, sensation. Still less +could they be content with the description which Achilles gives in Homer +of the man whom his soul hates-- + +os chi eteron men keuthe eni phresin, allo de eipe. + +For their difficulty was not a practical but a metaphysical one; and +their conception of falsehood was really impaired and weakened by a +metaphysical illusion. + +The strength of the illusion seems to lie in the alternative: If we once +admit the existence of Being and Not-being, as two spheres which exclude +each other, no Being or reality can be ascribed to Not-being, and +therefore not to falsehood, which is the image or expression of +Not-being. Falsehood is wholly false; and to speak of true falsehood, as +Theaetetus does (Theaet.), is a contradiction in terms. The fallacy +to us is ridiculous and transparent,--no better than those which +Plato satirizes in the Euthydemus. It is a confusion of falsehood and +negation, from which Plato himself is not entirely free. Instead of +saying, 'This is not in accordance with facts,' 'This is proved by +experience to be false,' and from such examples forming a general notion +of falsehood, the mind of the Greek thinker was lost in the mazes of the +Eleatic philosophy. And the greater importance which Plato attributes +to this fallacy, compared with others, is due to the influence which +the Eleatic philosophy exerted over him. He sees clearly to a certain +extent; but he has not yet attained a complete mastery over the ideas of +his predecessors--they are still ends to him, and not mere instruments +of thought. They are too rough-hewn to be harmonized in a single +structure, and may be compared to rocks which project or overhang in +some ancient city's walls. There are many such imperfect syncretisms or +eclecticisms in the history of philosophy. A modern philosopher, though +emancipated from scholastic notions of essence or substance, might +still be seriously affected by the abstract idea of necessity; or though +accustomed, like Bacon, to criticize abstract notions, might not extend +his criticism to the syllogism. + +The saying or thinking the thing that is not, would be the popular +definition of falsehood or error. If we were met by the Sophist's +objection, the reply would probably be an appeal to experience. Ten +thousands, as Homer would say (mala murioi), tell falsehoods and +fall into errors. And this is Plato's reply, both in the Cratylus +and Sophist. 'Theaetetus is flying,' is a sentence in form quite as +grammatical as 'Theaetetus is sitting'; the difference between the two +sentences is, that the one is true and the other false. But, +before making this appeal to common sense, Plato propounds for our +consideration a theory of the nature of the negative. + +The theory is, that Not-being is relation. Not-being is the other of +Being, and has as many kinds as there are differences in Being. +This doctrine is the simple converse of the famous proposition of +Spinoza,--not 'Omnis determinatio est negatio,' but 'Omnis negatio est +determinatio';--not, All distinction is negation, but, All negation is +distinction. Not-being is the unfolding or determining of Being, and is +a necessary element in all other things that are. We should be careful +to observe, first, that Plato does not identify Being with Not-being; he +has no idea of progression by antagonism, or of the Hegelian vibration +of moments: he would not have said with Heracleitus, 'All things are +and are not, and become and become not.' Secondly, he has lost sight +altogether of the other sense of Not-being, as the negative of Being; +although he again and again recognizes the validity of the law of +contradiction. Thirdly, he seems to confuse falsehood with negation. Nor +is he quite consistent in regarding Not-being as one class of Being, and +yet as coextensive with Being in general. Before analyzing further the +topics thus suggested, we will endeavour to trace the manner in which +Plato arrived at his conception of Not-being. + +In all the later dialogues of Plato, the idea of mind or intelligence +becomes more and more prominent. That idea which Anaxagoras employed +inconsistently in the construction of the world, Plato, in the Philebus, +the Sophist, and the Laws, extends to all things, attributing to +Providence a care, infinitesimal as well as infinite, of all creation. +The divine mind is the leading religious thought of the later works of +Plato. The human mind is a sort of reflection of this, having ideas +of Being, Sameness, and the like. At times they seem to be parted by a +great gulf (Parmenides); at other times they have a common nature, and +the light of a common intelligence. + +But this ever-growing idea of mind is really irreconcilable with the +abstract Pantheism of the Eleatics. To the passionate language of +Parmenides, Plato replies in a strain equally passionate:--What! has +not Being mind? and is not Being capable of being known? and, if this +is admitted, then capable of being affected or acted upon?--in motion, +then, and yet not wholly incapable of rest. Already we have been +compelled to attribute opposite determinations to Being. And the +answer to the difficulty about Being may be equally the answer to the +difficulty about Not-being. + +The answer is, that in these and all other determinations of any notion +we are attributing to it 'Not-being.' We went in search of Not-being and +seemed to lose Being, and now in the hunt after Being we recover both. +Not-being is a kind of Being, and in a sense co-extensive with Being. +And there are as many divisions of Not-being as of Being. To +every positive idea--'just,' 'beautiful,' and the like, there is a +corresponding negative idea--'not-just,' 'not-beautiful,' and the like. + +A doubt may be raised whether this account of the negative is really +the true one. The common logicians would say that the 'not-just,' +'not-beautiful,' are not really classes at all, but are merged in one +great class of the infinite or negative. The conception of Plato, in +the days before logic, seems to be more correct than this. For the word +'not' does not altogether annihilate the positive meaning of the word +'just': at least, it does not prevent our looking for the 'not-just' +in or about the same class in which we might expect to find the 'just.' +'Not-just is not-honourable' is neither a false nor an unmeaning +proposition. The reason is that the negative proposition has really +passed into an undefined positive. To say that 'not-just' has no more +meaning than 'not-honourable'--that is to say, that the two cannot in +any degree be distinguished, is clearly repugnant to the common use of +language. + +The ordinary logic is also jealous of the explanation of negation as +relation, because seeming to take away the principle of contradiction. +Plato, as far as we know, is the first philosopher who distinctly +enunciated this principle; and though we need not suppose him to have +been always consistent with himself, there is no real inconsistency +between his explanation of the negative and the principle of +contradiction. Neither the Platonic notion of the negative as the +principle of difference, nor the Hegelian identity of Being and +Not-being, at all touch the principle of contradiction. For what is +asserted about Being and Not-Being only relates to our most abstract +notions, and in no way interferes with the principle of contradiction +employed in the concrete. Because Not-being is identified with Other, or +Being with Not-being, this does not make the proposition 'Some have not +eaten' any the less a contradiction of 'All have eaten.' + +The explanation of the negative given by Plato in the Sophist is a true +but partial one; for the word 'not,' besides the meaning of 'other,' +may also imply 'opposition.' And difference or opposition may be either +total or partial: the not-beautiful may be other than the beautiful, or +in no relation to the beautiful, or a specific class in various degrees +opposed to the beautiful. And the negative may be a negation of fact +or of thought (ou and me). Lastly, there are certain ideas, such as +'beginning,' 'becoming,' 'the finite,' 'the abstract,' in which +the negative cannot be separated from the positive, and 'Being' and +'Not-being' are inextricably blended. + +Plato restricts the conception of Not-being to difference. Man is a +rational animal, and is not--as many other things as are not included +under this definition. He is and is not, and is because he is not. +Besides the positive class to which he belongs, there are endless +negative classes to which he may be referred. This is certainly +intelligible, but useless. To refer a subject to a negative class is +unmeaning, unless the 'not' is a mere modification of the positive, as +in the example of 'not honourable' and 'dishonourable'; or unless the +class is characterized by the absence rather than the presence of a +particular quality. + +Nor is it easy to see how Not-being any more than Sameness or Otherness +is one of the classes of Being. They are aspects rather than classes of +Being. Not-being can only be included in Being, as the denial of some +particular class of Being. If we attempt to pursue such airy phantoms +at all, the Hegelian identity of Being and Not-being is a more apt and +intelligible expression of the same mental phenomenon. For Plato has +not distinguished between the Being which is prior to Not-being, and the +Being which is the negation of Not-being (compare Parm.). + +But he is not thinking of this when he says that Being comprehends +Not-being. Again, we should probably go back for the true explanation +to the influence which the Eleatic philosophy exercised over him. Under +'Not-being' the Eleatic had included all the realities of the sensible +world. Led by this association and by the common use of language, which +has been already noticed, we cannot be much surprised that Plato should +have made classes of Not-being. It is observable that he does not +absolutely deny that there is an opposite of Being. He is inclined to +leave the question, merely remarking that the opposition, if admissible +at all, is not expressed by the term 'Not-being.' + +On the whole, we must allow that the great service rendered by Plato +to metaphysics in the Sophist, is not his explanation of 'Not-being' as +difference. With this he certainly laid the ghost of 'Not-being'; and we +may attribute to him in a measure the credit of anticipating Spinoza +and Hegel. But his conception is not clear or consistent; he does not +recognize the different senses of the negative, and he confuses +the different classes of Not-being with the abstract notion. As the +Pre-Socratic philosopher failed to distinguish between the universal and +the true, while he placed the particulars of sense under the false and +apparent, so Plato appears to identify negation with falsehood, or is +unable to distinguish them. The greatest service rendered by him to +mental science is the recognition of the communion of classes, which, +although based by him on his account of 'Not-being,' is independent +of it. He clearly saw that the isolation of ideas or classes is the +annihilation of reasoning. Thus, after wandering in many diverging +paths, we return to common sense. And for this reason we may be inclined +to do less than justice to Plato,--because the truth which he attains +by a real effort of thought is to us a familiar and unconscious truism, +which no one would any longer think either of doubting or examining. + +IV. The later dialogues of Plato contain many references to contemporary +philosophy. Both in the Theaetetus and in the Sophist he recognizes +that he is in the midst of a fray; a huge irregular battle everywhere +surrounds him (Theaet.). First, there are the two great philosophies +going back into cosmogony and poetry: the philosophy of Heracleitus, +supposed to have a poetical origin in Homer, and that of the Eleatics, +which in a similar spirit he conceives to be even older than Xenophanes +(compare Protag.). Still older were theories of two and three +principles, hot and cold, moist and dry, which were ever marrying and +being given in marriage: in speaking of these, he is probably referring +to Pherecydes and the early Ionians. In the philosophy of motion there +were different accounts of the relation of plurality and unity, +which were supposed to be joined and severed by love and hate, +some maintaining that this process was perpetually going on (e.g. +Heracleitus); others (e.g. Empedocles) that there was an alternation of +them. Of the Pythagoreans or of Anaxagoras he makes no distinct mention. +His chief opponents are, first, Eristics or Megarians; secondly, the +Materialists. + +The picture which he gives of both these latter schools is indistinct; +and he appears reluctant to mention the names of their teachers. Nor can +we easily determine how much is to be assigned to the Cynics, how much +to the Megarians, or whether the 'repellent Materialists' (Theaet.) +are Cynics or Atomists, or represent some unknown phase of opinion at +Athens. To the Cynics and Antisthenes is commonly attributed, on the +authority of Aristotle, the denial of predication, while the Megarians +are said to have been Nominalists, asserting the One Good under many +names to be the true Being of Zeno and the Eleatics, and, like Zeno, +employing their negative dialectic in the refutation of opponents. But +the later Megarians also denied predication; and this tenet, which is +attributed to all of them by Simplicius, is certainly in accordance with +their over-refining philosophy. The 'tyros young and old,' of whom +Plato speaks, probably include both. At any rate, we shall be safer in +accepting the general description of them which he has given, and in not +attempting to draw a precise line between them. + +Of these Eristics, whether Cynics or Megarians, several characteristics +are found in Plato:-- + +1. They pursue verbal oppositions; 2. they make reasoning impossible by +their over-accuracy in the use of language; 3. they deny predication; +4. they go from unity to plurality, without passing through the +intermediate stages; 5. they refuse to attribute motion or power to +Being; 6. they are the enemies of sense;--whether they are the 'friends +of ideas,' who carry on the polemic against sense, is uncertain; +probably under this remarkable expression Plato designates those who +more nearly approached himself, and may be criticizing an earlier form +of his own doctrines. We may observe (1) that he professes only to give +us a few opinions out of many which were at that time current in +Greece; (2) that he nowhere alludes to the ethical teaching of the +Cynics--unless the argument in the Protagoras, that the virtues are one +and not many, may be supposed to contain a reference to their views, as +well as to those of Socrates; and unless they are the school alluded to +in the Philebus, which is described as 'being very skilful in physics, +and as maintaining pleasure to be the absence of pain.' That Antisthenes +wrote a book called 'Physicus,' is hardly a sufficient reason for +describing them as skilful in physics, which appear to have been very +alien to the tendency of the Cynics. + +The Idealism of the fourth century before Christ in Greece, as in +other ages and countries, seems to have provoked a reaction towards +Materialism. The maintainers of this doctrine are described in the +Theaetetus as obstinate persons who will believe in nothing which they +cannot hold in their hands, and in the Sophist as incapable of argument. +They are probably the same who are said in the Tenth Book of the Laws +to attribute the course of events to nature, art, and chance. Who they +were, we have no means of determining except from Plato's description of +them. His silence respecting the Atomists might lead us to suppose that +here we have a trace of them. But the Atomists were not Materialists in +the grosser sense of the term, nor were they incapable of reasoning; and +Plato would hardly have described a great genius like Democritus in the +disdainful terms which he uses of the Materialists. Upon the whole, we +must infer that the persons here spoken of are unknown to us, like the +many other writers and talkers at Athens and elsewhere, of whose endless +activity of mind Aristotle in his Metaphysics has preserved an anonymous +memorial. + +V. The Sophist is the sequel of the Theaetetus, and is connected with +the Parmenides by a direct allusion (compare Introductions to Theaetetus +and Parmenides). In the Theaetetus we sought to discover the nature +of knowledge and false opinion. But the nature of false opinion seemed +impenetrable; for we were unable to understand how there could be any +reality in Not-being. In the Sophist the question is taken up again; the +nature of Not-being is detected, and there is no longer any metaphysical +impediment in the way of admitting the possibility of falsehood. To +the Parmenides, the Sophist stands in a less defined and more remote +relation. There human thought is in process of disorganization; no +absurdity or inconsistency is too great to be elicited from the +analysis of the simple ideas of Unity or Being. In the Sophist the same +contradictions are pursued to a certain extent, but only with a view +to their resolution. The aim of the dialogue is to show how the few +elemental conceptions of the human mind admit of a natural connexion in +thought and speech, which Megarian or other sophistry vainly attempts to +deny. + +... + +True to the appointment of the previous day, Theodorus and Theaetetus +meet Socrates at the same spot, bringing with them an Eleatic Stranger, +whom Theodorus introduces as a true philosopher. Socrates, half in jest, +half in earnest, declares that he must be a god in disguise, who, as +Homer would say, has come to earth that he may visit the good and evil +among men, and detect the foolishness of Athenian wisdom. At any rate he +is a divine person, one of a class who are hardly recognized on earth; +who appear in divers forms--now as statesmen, now as sophists, and are +often deemed madmen. 'Philosopher, statesman, sophist,' says Socrates, +repeating the words--'I should like to ask our Eleatic friend what his +countrymen think of them; do they regard them as one, or three?' + +The Stranger has been already asked the same question by Theodorus and +Theaetetus; and he at once replies that they are thought to be three; +but to explain the difference fully would take time. He is pressed +to give this fuller explanation, either in the form of a speech or +of question and answer. He prefers the latter, and chooses as his +respondent Theaetetus, whom he already knows, and who is recommended to +him by Socrates. + +We are agreed, he says, about the name Sophist, but we may not be +equally agreed about his nature. Great subjects should be approached +through familiar examples, and, considering that he is a creature not +easily caught, I think that, before approaching him, we should try +our hand upon some more obvious animal, who may be made the subject of +logical experiment; shall we say an angler? 'Very good.' + +In the first place, the angler is an artist; and there are two kinds +of art,--productive art, which includes husbandry, manufactures, +imitations; and acquisitive art, which includes learning, trading, +fighting, hunting. The angler's is an acquisitive art, and acquisition +may be effected either by exchange or by conquest; in the latter case, +either by force or craft. Conquest by craft is called hunting, and of +hunting there is one kind which pursues inanimate, and another which +pursues animate objects; and animate objects may be either land animals +or water animals, and water animals either fly over the water or live +in the water. The hunting of the last is called fishing; and of fishing, +one kind uses enclosures, catching the fish in nets and baskets, and +another kind strikes them either with spears by night or with barbed +spears or barbed hooks by day; the barbed spears are impelled from +above, the barbed hooks are jerked into the head and lips of the fish, +which are then drawn from below upwards. Thus, by a series of divisions, +we have arrived at the definition of the angler's art. + +And now by the help of this example we may proceed to bring to light +the nature of the Sophist. Like the angler, he is an artist, and the +resemblance does not end here. For they are both hunters, and hunters +of animals; the one of water, and the other of land animals. But at this +point they diverge, the one going to the sea and the rivers, and the +other to the rivers of wealth and rich meadow-lands, in which generous +youth abide. On land you may hunt tame animals, or you may hunt wild +animals. And man is a tame animal, and he may be hunted either by force +or persuasion;--either by the pirate, man-stealer, soldier, or by the +lawyer, orator, talker. The latter use persuasion, and persuasion is +either private or public. Of the private practitioners of the art, some +bring gifts to those whom they hunt: these are lovers. And others take +hire; and some of these flatter, and in return are fed; others profess +to teach virtue and receive a round sum. And who are these last? Tell me +who? Have we not unearthed the Sophist? + +But he is a many-sided creature, and may still be traced in another line +of descent. The acquisitive art had a branch of exchange as well as of +hunting, and exchange is either giving or selling; and the seller is +either a manufacturer or a merchant; and the merchant either retails or +exports; and the exporter may export either food for the body or food +for the mind. And of this trading in food for the mind, one kind may be +termed the art of display, and another the art of selling learning; and +learning may be a learning of the arts or of virtue. The seller of the +arts may be called an art-seller; the seller of virtue, a Sophist. + +Again, there is a third line, in which a Sophist may be traced. For +is he less a Sophist when, instead of exporting his wares to another +country, he stays at home, and retails goods, which he not only buys of +others, but manufactures himself? + +Or he may be descended from the acquisitive art in the combative line, +through the pugnacious, the controversial, the disputatious arts; and he +will be found at last in the eristic section of the latter, and in that +division of it which disputes in private for gain about the general +principles of right and wrong. + +And still there is a track of him which has not yet been followed out by +us. Do not our household servants talk of sifting, straining, winnowing? +And they also speak of carding, spinning, and the like. All these are +processes of division; and of division there are two kinds,--one in +which like is divided from like, and another in which the good is +separated from the bad. The latter of the two is termed purification; +and again, of purification, there are two sorts,--of animate bodies +(which may be internal or external), and of inanimate. Medicine and +gymnastic are the internal purifications of the animate, and bathing the +external; and of the inanimate, fulling and cleaning and other humble +processes, some of which have ludicrous names. Not that dialectic is a +respecter of names or persons, or a despiser of humble occupations; nor +does she think much of the greater or less benefits conferred by them. +For her aim is knowledge; she wants to know how the arts are related to +one another, and would quite as soon learn the nature of hunting from +the vermin-destroyer as from the general. And she only desires to have +a general name, which shall distinguish purifications of the soul from +purifications of the body. + +Now purification is the taking away of evil; and there are two kinds +of evil in the soul,--the one answering to disease in the body, and the +other to deformity. Disease is the discord or war of opposite principles +in the soul; and deformity is the want of symmetry, or failure in the +attainment of a mark or measure. The latter arises from ignorance, and +no one is voluntarily ignorant; ignorance is only the aberration of the +soul moving towards knowledge. And as medicine cures the diseases and +gymnastic the deformity of the body, so correction cures the injustice, +and education (which differs among the Hellenes from mere instruction in +the arts) cures the ignorance of the soul. Again, ignorance is twofold, +simple ignorance, and ignorance having the conceit of knowledge. And +education is also twofold: there is the old-fashioned moral training of +our forefathers, which was very troublesome and not very successful; and +another, of a more subtle nature, which proceeds upon a notion that +all ignorance is involuntary. The latter convicts a man out of his own +mouth, by pointing out to him his inconsistencies and contradictions; +and the consequence is that he quarrels with himself, instead of +quarrelling with his neighbours, and is cured of prejudices and +obstructions by a mode of treatment which is equally entertaining and +effectual. The physician of the soul is aware that his patient will +receive no nourishment unless he has been cleaned out; and the soul of +the Great King himself, if he has not undergone this purification, is +unclean and impure. + +And who are the ministers of the purification? Sophists I may not call +them. Yet they bear about the same likeness to Sophists as the dog, +who is the gentlest of animals, does to the wolf, who is the fiercest. +Comparisons are slippery things; but for the present let us assume the +resemblance of the two, which may probably be disallowed hereafter. +And so, from division comes purification; and from this, mental +purification; and from mental purification, instruction; and from +instruction, education; and from education, the nobly-descended art +of Sophistry, which is engaged in the detection of conceit. I do not +however think that we have yet found the Sophist, or that his will +ultimately prove to be the desired art of education; but neither do I +think that he can long escape me, for every way is blocked. Before we +make the final assault, let us take breath, and reckon up the many forms +which he has assumed: (1) he was the paid hunter of wealth and birth; +(2) he was the trader in the goods of the soul; (3) he was the retailer +of them; (4) he was the manufacturer of his own learned wares; (5) +he was the disputant; and (6) he was the purger away of +prejudices--although this latter point is admitted to be doubtful. + +Now, there must surely be something wrong in the professor of any art +having so many names and kinds of knowledge. Does not the very number of +them imply that the nature of his art is not understood? And that we +may not be involved in the misunderstanding, let us observe which of +his characteristics is the most prominent. Above all things he is a +disputant. He will dispute and teach others to dispute about things +visible and invisible--about man, about the gods, about politics, about +law, about wrestling, about all things. But can he know all things? 'He +cannot.' How then can he dispute satisfactorily with any one who knows? +'Impossible.' Then what is the trick of his art, and why does he receive +money from his admirers? 'Because he is believed by them to know all +things.' You mean to say that he seems to have a knowledge of them? +'Yes.' + +Suppose a person were to say, not that he would dispute about all +things, but that he would make all things, you and me, and all other +creatures, the earth and the heavens and the gods, and would sell them +all for a few pence--this would be a great jest; but not greater than if +he said that he knew all things, and could teach them in a short time, +and at a small cost. For all imitation is a jest, and the most graceful +form of jest. Now the painter is a man who professes to make all things, +and children, who see his pictures at a distance, sometimes take them +for realities: and the Sophist pretends to know all things, and he, too, +can deceive young men, who are still at a distance from the truth, not +through their eyes, but through their ears, by the mummery of words, +and induce them to believe him. But as they grow older, and come into +contact with realities, they learn by experience the futility of his +pretensions. The Sophist, then, has not real knowledge; he is only an +imitator, or image-maker. + +And now, having got him in a corner of the dialectical net, let us +divide and subdivide until we catch him. Of image-making there are two +kinds,--the art of making likenesses, and the art of making appearances. +The latter may be illustrated by sculpture and painting, which often use +illusions, and alter the proportions of figures, in order to adapt +their works to the eye. And the Sophist also uses illusions, and +his imitations are apparent and not real. But how can anything be an +appearance only? Here arises a difficulty which has always beset the +subject of appearances. For the argument is asserting the existence +of not-being. And this is what the great Parmenides was all his life +denying in prose and also in verse. 'You will never find,' he says, +'that not-being is.' And the words prove themselves! Not-being cannot be +attributed to any being; for how can any being be wholly abstracted from +being? Again, in every predication there is an attribution of singular +or plural. But number is the most real of all things, and cannot be +attributed to not-being. Therefore not-being cannot be predicated or +expressed; for how can we say 'is,' 'are not,' without number? + +And now arises the greatest difficulty of all. If not-being is +inconceivable, how can not-being be refuted? And am I not contradicting +myself at this moment, in speaking either in the singular or the plural +of that to which I deny both plurality and unity? You, Theaetetus, have +the might of youth, and I conjure you to exert yourself, and, if you +can, to find an expression for not-being which does not imply being and +number. 'But I cannot.' Then the Sophist must be left in his hole. We +may call him an image-maker if we please, but he will only say, 'And +pray, what is an image?' And we shall reply, 'A reflection in the water, +or in a mirror'; and he will say, 'Let us shut our eyes and open our +minds; what is the common notion of all images?' 'I should answer, Such +another, made in the likeness of the true.' Real or not real? 'Not real; +at least, not in a true sense.' And the real 'is,' and the not-real 'is +not'? 'Yes.' Then a likeness is really unreal, and essentially not. +Here is a pretty complication of being and not-being, in which the +many-headed Sophist has entangled us. He will at once point out that +he is compelling us to contradict ourselves, by affirming being of +not-being. I think that we must cease to look for him in the class of +imitators. + +But ought we to give him up? 'I should say, certainly not.' Then I fear +that I must lay hands on my father Parmenides; but do not call me a +parricide; for there is no way out of the difficulty except to show +that in some sense not-being is; and if this is not admitted, no one can +speak of falsehood, or false opinion, or imitation, without falling into +a contradiction. You observe how unwilling I am to undertake the task; +for I know that I am exposing myself to the charge of inconsistency in +asserting the being of not-being. But if I am to make the attempt, I +think that I had better begin at the beginning. + +Lightly in the days of our youth, Parmenides and others told us tales +about the origin of the universe: one spoke of three principles warring +and at peace again, marrying and begetting children; another of +two principles, hot and cold, dry and moist, which also formed +relationships. There were the Eleatics in our part of the world, saying +that all things are one; whose doctrine begins with Xenophanes, and is +even older. Ionian, and, more recently, Sicilian muses speak of a one +and many which are held together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, +ever meeting. Some of them do not insist on the perpetual strife, but +adopt a gentler strain, and speak of alternation only. Whether they are +right or not, who can say? But one thing we can say--that they went on +their way without much caring whether we understood them or not. For +tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what they mean by their assertion +of unity, or by their combinations and separations of two or more +principles? I used to think, when I was young, that I knew all about +not-being, and now I am in great difficulties even about being. + +Let us proceed first to the examination of being. Turning to the dualist +philosophers, we say to them: Is being a third element besides hot and +cold? or do you identify one or both of the two elements with being? +At any rate, you can hardly avoid resolving them into one. Let us next +interrogate the patrons of the one. To them we say: Are being and one +two different names for the same thing? But how can there be two names +when there is nothing but one? Or you may identify them; but then the +name will be either the name of nothing or of itself, i.e. of a name. +Again, the notion of being is conceived of as a whole--in the words +of Parmenides, 'like every way unto a rounded sphere.' And a whole has +parts; but that which has parts is not one, for unity has no parts. Is +being, then, one, because the parts of being are one, or shall we say +that being is not a whole? In the former case, one is made up of parts; +and in the latter there is still plurality, viz. being, and a whole +which is apart from being. And being, if not all things, lacks something +of the nature of being, and becomes not-being. Nor can being ever have +come into existence, for nothing comes into existence except as a whole; +nor can being have number, for that which has number is a whole or sum +of number. These are a few of the difficulties which are accumulating +one upon another in the consideration of being. + +We may proceed now to the less exact sort of philosophers. Some of +them drag down everything to earth, and carry on a war like that of the +giants, grasping rocks and oaks in their hands. Their adversaries defend +themselves warily from an invisible world, and reduce the substances +of their opponents to the minutest fractions, until they are lost in +generation and flux. The latter sort are civil people enough; but the +materialists are rude and ignorant of dialectics; they must be taught +how to argue before they can answer. Yet, for the sake of the argument, +we may assume them to be better than they are, and able to give an +account of themselves. They admit the existence of a mortal living +creature, which is a body containing a soul, and to this they would not +refuse to attribute qualities--wisdom, folly, justice and injustice. The +soul, as they say, has a kind of body, but they do not like to assert +of these qualities of the soul, either that they are corporeal, or that +they have no existence; at this point they begin to make distinctions. +'Sons of earth,' we say to them, 'if both visible and invisible +qualities exist, what is the common nature which is attributed to them +by the term "being" or "existence"?' And, as they are incapable of +answering this question, we may as well reply for them, that being is +the power of doing or suffering. Then we turn to the friends of ideas: +to them we say, 'You distinguish becoming from being?' 'Yes,' they will +reply. 'And in becoming you participate through the bodily senses, and +in being, by thought and the mind?' 'Yes.' And you mean by the word +'participation' a power of doing or suffering? To this they answer--I +am acquainted with them, Theaetetus, and know their ways better than you +do--that being can neither do nor suffer, though becoming may. And we +rejoin: Does not the soul know? And is not 'being' known? And are not +'knowing' and 'being known' active and passive? That which is known is +affected by knowledge, and therefore is in motion. And, indeed, how +can we imagine that perfect being is a mere everlasting form, devoid of +motion and soul? for there can be no thought without soul, nor can soul +be devoid of motion. But neither can thought or mind be devoid of some +principle of rest or stability. And as children say entreatingly, +'Give us both,' so the philosopher must include both the moveable and +immoveable in his idea of being. And yet, alas! he and we are in the +same difficulty with which we reproached the dualists; for motion and +rest are contradictions--how then can they both exist? Does he who +affirms this mean to say that motion is rest, or rest motion? 'No; he +means to assert the existence of some third thing, different from them +both, which neither rests nor moves.' But how can there be anything +which neither rests nor moves? Here is a second difficulty about being, +quite as great as that about not-being. And we may hope that any light +which is thrown upon the one may extend to the other. + +Leaving them for the present, let us enquire what we mean by giving many +names to the same thing, e.g. white, good, tall, to man; out of which +tyros old and young derive such a feast of amusement. Their meagre minds +refuse to predicate anything of anything; they say that good is good, +and man is man; and that to affirm one of the other would be making +the many one and the one many. Let us place them in a class with our +previous opponents, and interrogate both of them at once. Shall we +assume (1) that being and rest and motion, and all other things, +are incommunicable with one another? or (2) that they all have +indiscriminate communion? or (3) that there is communion of some and not +of others? And we will consider the first hypothesis first of all. + +(1) If we suppose the universal separation of kinds, all theories alike +are swept away; the patrons of a single principle of rest or of motion, +or of a plurality of immutable ideas--all alike have the ground cut from +under them; and all creators of the universe by theories of composition +and division, whether out of or into a finite or infinite number of +elemental forms, in alternation or continuance, share the same fate. +Most ridiculous is the discomfiture which attends the opponents of +predication, who, like the ventriloquist Eurycles, have the voice that +answers them in their own breast. For they cannot help using the words +'is,' 'apart,' 'from others,' and the like; and their adversaries are +thus saved the trouble of refuting them. But (2) if all things have +communion with all things, motion will rest, and rest will move; here is +a reductio ad absurdum. Two out of the three hypotheses are thus seen to +be false. The third (3) remains, which affirms that only certain things +communicate with certain other things. In the alphabet and the scale +there are some letters and notes which combine with others, and some +which do not; and the laws according to which they combine or are +separated are known to the grammarian and musician. And there is a +science which teaches not only what notes and letters, but what classes +admit of combination with one another, and what not. This is a noble +science, on which we have stumbled unawares; in seeking after the +Sophist we have found the philosopher. He is the master who discerns +one whole or form pervading a scattered multitude, and many such wholes +combined under a higher one, and many entirely apart--he is the true +dialectician. Like the Sophist, he is hard to recognize, though for the +opposite reasons; the Sophist runs away into the obscurity of not-being, +the philosopher is dark from excess of light. And now, leaving him, we +will return to our pursuit of the Sophist. + +Agreeing in the truth of the third hypothesis, that some things have +communion and others not, and that some may have communion with all, let +us examine the most important kinds which are capable of admixture; and +in this way we may perhaps find out a sense in which not-being may be +affirmed to have being. Now the highest kinds are being, rest, motion; +and of these, rest and motion exclude each other, but both of them are +included in being; and again, they are the same with themselves and +the other of each other. What is the meaning of these words, 'same' and +'other'? Are there two more kinds to be added to the three others? For +sameness cannot be either rest or motion, because predicated both of +rest and motion; nor yet being; because if being were attributed to both +of them we should attribute sameness to both of them. Nor can other be +identified with being; for then other, which is relative, would have the +absoluteness of being. Therefore we must assume a fifth principle, which +is universal, and runs through all things, for each thing is other than +all other things. Thus there are five principles: (1) being, (2) motion, +which is not (3) rest, and because participating both in the same and +other, is and is not (4) the same with itself, and is and is not (5) +other than the other. And motion is not being, but partakes of being, +and therefore is and is not in the most absolute sense. Thus we have +discovered that not-being is the principle of the other which runs +through all things, being not excepted. And 'being' is one thing, and +'not-being' includes and is all other things. And not-being is not the +opposite of being, but only the other. Knowledge has many branches, +and the other or difference has as many, each of which is described by +prefixing the word 'not' to some kind of knowledge. The not-beautiful is +as real as the beautiful, the not-just as the just. And the essence of +the not-beautiful is to be separated from and opposed to a certain kind +of existence which is termed beautiful. And this opposition and negation +is the not-being of which we are in search, and is one kind of being. +Thus, in spite of Parmenides, we have not only discovered the existence, +but also the nature of not-being--that nature we have found to be +relation. In the communion of different kinds, being and other mutually +interpenetrate; other is, but is other than being, and other than each +and all of the remaining kinds, and therefore in an infinity of ways 'is +not.' And the argument has shown that the pursuit of contradictions is +childish and useless, and the very opposite of that higher spirit which +criticizes the words of another according to the natural meaning +of them. Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the denial of all +communion of kinds. And we are fortunate in having established such a +communion for another reason, because in continuing the hunt after the +Sophist we have to examine the nature of discourse, and there could be +no discourse if there were no communion. For the Sophist, although he +can no longer deny the existence of not-being, may still affirm that +not-being cannot enter into discourse, and as he was arguing before that +there could be no such thing as falsehood, because there was no such +thing as not-being, he may continue to argue that there is no such thing +as the art of image-making and phantastic, because not-being has no +place in language. Hence arises the necessity of examining speech, +opinion, and imagination. + +And first concerning speech; let us ask the same question about words +which we have already answered about the kinds of being and the letters +of the alphabet: To what extent do they admit of combination? Some words +have a meaning when combined, and others have no meaning. One class of +words describes action, another class agents: 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps' +are examples of the first; 'stag,' 'horse,' 'lion' of the second. But +no combination of words can be formed without a verb and a noun, e.g. 'A +man learns'; the simplest sentence is composed of two words, and one +of these must be a subject. For example, in the sentence, 'Theaetetus +sits,' which is not very long, 'Theaetetus' is the subject, and in the +sentence 'Theaetetus flies,' 'Theaetetus' is again the subject. But the +two sentences differ in quality, for the first says of you that which +is true, and the second says of you that which is not true, or, in other +words, attributes to you things which are not as though they were. Here +is false discourse in the shortest form. And thus not only speech, +but thought and opinion and imagination are proved to be both true and +false. For thought is only the process of silent speech, and opinion is +only the silent assent or denial which follows this, and imagination is +only the expression of this in some form of sense. All of them are akin +to speech, and therefore, like speech, admit of true and false. And +we have discovered false opinion, which is an encouraging sign of our +probable success in the rest of the enquiry. + +Then now let us return to our old division of likeness-making and +phantastic. When we were going to place the Sophist in one of them, +a doubt arose whether there could be such a thing as an appearance, +because there was no such thing as falsehood. At length falsehood +has been discovered by us to exist, and we have acknowledged that the +Sophist is to be found in the class of imitators. All art was divided +originally by us into two branches--productive and acquisitive. And +now we may divide both on a different principle into the creations or +imitations which are of human, and those which are of divine, origin. +For we must admit that the world and ourselves and the animals did not +come into existence by chance, or the spontaneous working of nature, but +by divine reason and knowledge. And there are not only divine creations +but divine imitations, such as apparitions and shadows and reflections, +which are equally the work of a divine mind. And there are human +creations and human imitations too,--there is the actual house and the +drawing of it. Nor must we forget that image-making may be an imitation +of realities or an imitation of appearances, which last has been +called by us phantastic. And this phantastic may be again divided into +imitation by the help of instruments and impersonations. And the +latter may be either dissembling or unconscious, either with or without +knowledge. A man cannot imitate you, Theaetetus, without knowing you, +but he can imitate the form of justice or virtue if he have a sentiment +or opinion about them. Not being well provided with names, the former +I will venture to call the imitation of science, and the latter the +imitation of opinion. + +The latter is our present concern, for the Sophist has no claims to +science or knowledge. Now the imitator, who has only opinion, may be +either the simple imitator, who thinks that he knows, or the dissembler, +who is conscious that he does not know, but disguises his ignorance. And +the last may be either a maker of long speeches, or of shorter speeches +which compel the person conversing to contradict himself. The maker of +longer speeches is the popular orator; the maker of the shorter is +the Sophist, whose art may be traced as being the + + / contradictious + / dissembling + / without knowledge + / human and not divine + / juggling with words + / phantastic or unreal + / art of image-making. + +... + +In commenting on the dialogue in which Plato most nearly approaches the +great modern master of metaphysics there are several points which +it will be useful to consider, such as the unity of opposites, the +conception of the ideas as causes, and the relation of the Platonic and +Hegelian dialectic. + +The unity of opposites was the crux of ancient thinkers in the age of +Plato: How could one thing be or become another? That substances have +attributes was implied in common language; that heat and cold, day and +night, pass into one another was a matter of experience 'on a level with +the cobbler's understanding' (Theat.). But how could philosophy explain +the connexion of ideas, how justify the passing of them into one +another? The abstractions of one, other, being, not-being, rest, motion, +individual, universal, which successive generations of philosophers had +recently discovered, seemed to be beyond the reach of human thought, +like stars shining in a distant heaven. They were the symbols of +different schools of philosophy: but in what relation did they stand to +one another and to the world of sense? It was hardly conceivable +that one could be other, or the same different. Yet without some +reconciliation of these elementary ideas thought was impossible. There +was no distinction between truth and falsehood, between the Sophist +and the philosopher. Everything could be predicated of everything, +or nothing of anything. To these difficulties Plato finds what to us +appears to be the answer of common sense--that Not-being is the relative +or other of Being, the defining and distinguishing principle, and that +some ideas combine with others, but not all with all. It is remarkable +however that he offers this obvious reply only as the result of a long +and tedious enquiry; by a great effort he is able to look down as 'from +a height' on the 'friends of the ideas' as well as on the pre-Socratic +philosophies. Yet he is merely asserting principles which no one who +could be made to understand them would deny. + +The Platonic unity of differences or opposites is the beginning of the +modern view that all knowledge is of relations; it also anticipates the +doctrine of Spinoza that all determination is negation. Plato takes or +gives so much of either of these theories as was necessary or possible +in the age in which he lived. In the Sophist, as in the Cratylus, he is +opposed to the Heracleitean flux and equally to the Megarian and +Cynic denial of predication, because he regards both of them as making +knowledge impossible. He does not assert that everything is and is not, +or that the same thing can be affected in the same and in opposite ways +at the same time and in respect of the same part of itself. The law +of contradiction is as clearly laid down by him in the Republic, as by +Aristotle in his Organon. Yet he is aware that in the negative there is +also a positive element, and that oppositions may be only differences. +And in the Parmenides he deduces the many from the one and Not-being +from Being, and yet shows that the many are included in the one, and +that Not-being returns to Being. + +In several of the later dialogues Plato is occupied with the connexion +of the sciences, which in the Philebus he divides into two classes of +pure and applied, adding to them there as elsewhere (Phaedr., Crat., +Republic, States.) a superintending science of dialectic. This is the +origin of Aristotle's Architectonic, which seems, however, to have +passed into an imaginary science of essence, and no longer to retain +any relation to other branches of knowledge. Of such a science, whether +described as 'philosophia prima,' the science of ousia, logic or +metaphysics, philosophers have often dreamed. But even now the time has +not arrived when the anticipation of Plato can be realized. Though many +a thinker has framed a 'hierarchy of the sciences,' no one has as yet +found the higher science which arrays them in harmonious order, +giving to the organic and inorganic, to the physical and moral, their +respective limits, and showing how they all work together in the world +and in man. + +Plato arranges in order the stages of knowledge and of existence. They +are the steps or grades by which he rises from sense and the shadows of +sense to the idea of beauty and good. Mind is in motion as well as +at rest (Soph.); and may be described as a dialectical progress which +passes from one limit or determination of thought to another and back +again to the first. This is the account of dialectic given by Plato in +the Sixth Book of the Republic, which regarded under another aspect +is the mysticism of the Symposium. He does not deny the existence of +objects of sense, but according to him they only receive their true +meaning when they are incorporated in a principle which is above them +(Republic). In modern language they might be said to come first in the +order of experience, last in the order of nature and reason. They are +assumed, as he is fond of repeating, upon the condition that they shall +give an account of themselves and that the truth of their existence +shall be hereafter proved. For philosophy must begin somewhere and may +begin anywhere,--with outward objects, with statements of opinion, with +abstract principles. But objects of sense must lead us onward to the +ideas or universals which are contained in them; the statements of +opinion must be verified; the abstract principles must be filled up and +connected with one another. In Plato we find, as we might expect, the +germs of many thoughts which have been further developed by the genius +of Spinoza and Hegel. But there is a difficulty in separating the germ +from the flower, or in drawing the line which divides ancient +from modern philosophy. Many coincidences which occur in them are +unconscious, seeming to show a natural tendency in the human mind +towards certain ideas and forms of thought. And there are many +speculations of Plato which would have passed away unheeded, and +their meaning, like that of some hieroglyphic, would have remained +undeciphered, unless two thousand years and more afterwards an +interpreter had arisen of a kindred spirit and of the same intellectual +family. For example, in the Sophist Plato begins with the abstract and +goes on to the concrete, not in the lower sense of returning to outward +objects, but to the Hegelian concrete or unity of abstractions. In the +intervening period hardly any importance would have been attached to the +question which is so full of meaning to Plato and Hegel. + +They differ however in their manner of regarding the question. For Plato +is answering a difficulty; he is seeking to justify the use of common +language and of ordinary thought into which philosophy had introduced +a principle of doubt and dissolution. Whereas Hegel tries to go beyond +common thought, and to combine abstractions in a higher unity: the +ordinary mechanism of language and logic is carried by him into another +region in which all oppositions are absorbed and all contradictions +affirmed, only that they may be done away with. But Plato, unlike Hegel, +nowhere bases his system on the unity of opposites, although in the +Parmenides he shows an Hegelian subtlety in the analysis of one and +Being. + +It is difficult within the compass of a few pages to give even a +faint outline of the Hegelian dialectic. No philosophy which is worth +understanding can be understood in a moment; common sense will not teach +us metaphysics any more than mathematics. If all sciences demand of us +protracted study and attention, the highest of all can hardly be matter +of immediate intuition. Neither can we appreciate a great system without +yielding a half assent to it--like flies we are caught in the spider's +web; and we can only judge of it truly when we place ourselves at a +distance from it. Of all philosophies Hegelianism is the most obscure: +and the difficulty inherent in the subject is increased by the use of +a technical language. The saying of Socrates respecting the writings of +Heracleitus--'Noble is that which I understand, and that which I do not +understand may be as noble; but the strength of a Delian diver is needed +to swim through it'--expresses the feeling with which the reader rises +from the perusal of Hegel. We may truly apply to him the words in which +Plato describes the Pre-Socratic philosophers: 'He went on his way +rather regardless of whether we understood him or not'; or, as he is +reported himself to have said of his own pupils: 'There is only one of +you who understands me, and he does NOT understand me.' + +Nevertheless the consideration of a few general aspects of the Hegelian +philosophy may help to dispel some errors and to awaken an interest +about it. (i) It is an ideal philosophy which, in popular phraseology, +maintains not matter but mind to be the truth of things, and this not by +a mere crude substitution of one word for another, but by showing +either of them to be the complement of the other. Both are creations of +thought, and the difference in kind which seems to divide them may also +be regarded as a difference of degree. One is to the other as the real +to the ideal, and both may be conceived together under the higher form +of the notion. (ii) Under another aspect it views all the forms of sense +and knowledge as stages of thought which have always existed implicitly +and unconsciously, and to which the mind of the world, gradually +disengaged from sense, has become awakened. The present has been the +past. The succession in time of human ideas is also the eternal 'now'; +it is historical and also a divine ideal. The history of philosophy +stripped of personality and of the other accidents of time and place +is gathered up into philosophy, and again philosophy clothed in +circumstance expands into history. (iii) Whether regarded as present or +past, under the form of time or of eternity, the spirit of dialectic +is always moving onwards from one determination of thought to another, +receiving each successive system of philosophy and subordinating it to +that which follows--impelled by an irresistible necessity from one idea +to another until the cycle of human thought and existence is complete. +It follows from this that all previous philosophies which are worthy of +the name are not mere opinions or speculations, but stages or moments of +thought which have a necessary place in the world of mind. They are +no longer the last word of philosophy, for another and another has +succeeded them, but they still live and are mighty; in the language of +the Greek poet, 'There is a great God in them, and he grows not old.' +(iv) This vast ideal system is supposed to be based upon experience. At +each step it professes to carry with it the 'witness of eyes and +ears' and of common sense, as well as the internal evidence of its +own consistency; it has a place for every science, and affirms that +no philosophy of a narrower type is capable of comprehending all true +facts. + +The Hegelian dialectic may be also described as a movement from the +simple to the complex. Beginning with the generalizations of sense, (1) +passing through ideas of quality, quantity, measure, number, and the +like, (2) ascending from presentations, that is pictorial forms of +sense, to representations in which the picture vanishes and the essence +is detached in thought from the outward form, (3) combining the I and +the not-I, or the subject and object, the natural order of thought is at +last found to include the leading ideas of the sciences and to arrange +them in relation to one another. Abstractions grow together and +again become concrete in a new and higher sense. They also admit +of development from within their own spheres. Everywhere there is +a movement of attraction and repulsion going on--an attraction or +repulsion of ideas of which the physical phenomenon described under a +similar name is a figure. Freedom and necessity, mind and matter, the +continuous and the discrete, cause and effect, are perpetually being +severed from one another in thought, only to be perpetually reunited. +The finite and infinite, the absolute and relative are not really +opposed; the finite and the negation of the finite are alike lost in a +higher or positive infinity, and the absolute is the sum or correlation +of all relatives. When this reconciliation of opposites is finally +completed in all its stages, the mind may come back again and review the +things of sense, the opinions of philosophers, the strife of theology +and politics, without being disturbed by them. Whatever is, if not +the very best--and what is the best, who can tell?--is, at any rate, +historical and rational, suitable to its own age, unsuitable to any +other. Nor can any efforts of speculative thinkers or of soldiers and +statesmen materially quicken the 'process of the suns.' + +Hegel was quite sensible how great would be the difficulty of presenting +philosophy to mankind under the form of opposites. Most of us live +in the one-sided truth which the understanding offers to us, and +if occasionally we come across difficulties like the time-honoured +controversy of necessity and free-will, or the Eleatic puzzle of +Achilles and the tortoise, we relegate some of them to the sphere of +mystery, others to the book of riddles, and go on our way rejoicing. +Most men (like Aristotle) have been accustomed to regard a contradiction +in terms as the end of strife; to be told that contradiction is the life +and mainspring of the intellectual world is indeed a paradox to them. +Every abstraction is at first the enemy of every other, yet they are +linked together, each with all, in the chain of Being. The struggle for +existence is not confined to the animals, but appears in the kingdom of +thought. The divisions which arise in thought between the physical and +moral and between the moral and intellectual, and the like, are deepened +and widened by the formal logic which elevates the defects of the human +faculties into Laws of Thought; they become a part of the mind which +makes them and is also made up of them. Such distinctions become so +familiar to us that we regard the thing signified by them as absolutely +fixed and defined. These are some of the illusions from which Hegel +delivers us by placing us above ourselves, by teaching us to analyze +the growth of 'what we are pleased to call our minds,' by reverting to +a time when our present distinctions of thought and language had no +existence. + +Of the great dislike and childish impatience of his system which would +be aroused among his opponents, he was fully aware, and would often +anticipate the jests which the rest of the world, 'in the superfluity +of their wits,' were likely to make upon him. Men are annoyed at what +puzzles them; they think what they cannot easily understand to be full +of danger. Many a sceptic has stood, as he supposed, firmly rooted in +the categories of the understanding which Hegel resolves into their +original nothingness. For, like Plato, he 'leaves no stone unturned' +in the intellectual world. Nor can we deny that he is unnecessarily +difficult, or that his own mind, like that of all metaphysicians, was +too much under the dominion of his system and unable to see beyond: +or that the study of philosophy, if made a serious business (compare +Republic), involves grave results to the mind and life of the student. +For it may encumber him without enlightening his path; and it may weaken +his natural faculties of thought and expression without increasing +his philosophical power. The mind easily becomes entangled among +abstractions, and loses hold of facts. The glass which is adapted to +distant objects takes away the vision of what is near and present to us. + +To Hegel, as to the ancient Greek thinkers, philosophy was a religion, a +principle of life as well as of knowledge, like the idea of good in the +Sixth Book of the Republic, a cause as well as an effect, the source of +growth as well as of light. In forms of thought which by most of us are +regarded as mere categories, he saw or thought that he saw a gradual +revelation of the Divine Being. He would have been said by his opponents +to have confused God with the history of philosophy, and to have been +incapable of distinguishing ideas from facts. And certainly we can +scarcely understand how a deep thinker like Hegel could have hoped +to revive or supplant the old traditional faith by an unintelligible +abstraction: or how he could have imagined that philosophy consisted +only or chiefly in the categories of logic. For abstractions, though +combined by him in the notion, seem to be never really concrete; they +are a metaphysical anatomy, not a living and thinking substance. Though +we are reminded by him again and again that we are gathering up the +world in ideas, we feel after all that we have not really spanned the +gulf which separates phainomena from onta. + +Having in view some of these difficulties, he seeks--and we may follow +his example--to make the understanding of his system easier (a) +by illustrations, and (b) by pointing out the coincidence of the +speculative idea and the historical order of thought. + +(a) If we ask how opposites can coexist, we are told that many different +qualities inhere in a flower or a tree or in any other concrete object, +and that any conception of space or matter or time involves the two +contradictory attributes of divisibility and continuousness. We may +ponder over the thought of number, reminding ourselves that every unit +both implies and denies the existence of every other, and that the one +is many--a sum of fractions, and the many one--a sum of units. We may be +reminded that in nature there is a centripetal as well as a centrifugal +force, a regulator as well as a spring, a law of attraction as well as +of repulsion. The way to the West is the way also to the East; the north +pole of the magnet cannot be divided from the south pole; two minus +signs make a plus in Arithmetic and Algebra. Again, we may liken the +successive layers of thought to the deposits of geological strata which +were once fluid and are now solid, which were at one time uppermost in +the series and are now hidden in the earth; or to the successive rinds +or barks of trees which year by year pass inward; or to the ripple of +water which appears and reappears in an ever-widening circle. Or our +attention may be drawn to ideas which the moment we analyze them involve +a contradiction, such as 'beginning' or 'becoming,' or to the opposite +poles, as they are sometimes termed, of necessity and freedom, of idea +and fact. We may be told to observe that every negative is a positive, +that differences of kind are resolvable into differences of degree, and +that differences of degree may be heightened into differences of kind. +We may remember the common remark that there is much to be said on both +sides of a question. We may be recommended to look within and to explain +how opposite ideas can coexist in our own minds; and we may be told to +imagine the minds of all mankind as one mind in which the true ideas of +all ages and countries inhere. In our conception of God in his relation +to man or of any union of the divine and human nature, a contradiction +appears to be unavoidable. Is not the reconciliation of mind and body +a necessity, not only of speculation but of practical life? Reflections +such as these will furnish the best preparation and give the right +attitude of mind for understanding the Hegelian philosophy. + +(b) Hegel's treatment of the early Greek thinkers affords the readiest +illustration of his meaning in conceiving all philosophy under the form +of opposites. The first abstraction is to him the beginning of thought. +Hitherto there had only existed a tumultuous chaos of mythological +fancy, but when Thales said 'All is water' a new era began to dawn upon +the world. Man was seeking to grasp the universe under a single form +which was at first simply a material element, the most equable and +colourless and universal which could be found. But soon the human mind +became dissatisfied with the emblem, and after ringing the changes +on one element after another, demanded a more abstract and perfect +conception, such as one or Being, which was absolutely at rest. But the +positive had its negative, the conception of Being involved Not-being, +the conception of one, many, the conception of a whole, parts. Then the +pendulum swung to the other side, from rest to motion, from Xenophanes +to Heracleitus. The opposition of Being and Not-being projected into +space became the atoms and void of Leucippus and Democritus. Until +the Atomists, the abstraction of the individual did not exist; in the +philosophy of Anaxagoras the idea of mind, whether human or divine, +was beginning to be realized. The pendulum gave another swing, from the +individual to the universal, from the object to the subject. The +Sophist first uttered the word 'Man is the measure of all things,' which +Socrates presented in a new form as the study of ethics. Once more we +return from mind to the object of mind, which is knowledge, and out +of knowledge the various degrees or kinds of knowledge more or less +abstract were gradually developed. The threefold division of logic, +physic, and ethics, foreshadowed in Plato, was finally established by +Aristotle and the Stoics. Thus, according to Hegel, in the course of +about two centuries by a process of antagonism and negation the leading +thoughts of philosophy were evolved. + +There is nothing like this progress of opposites in Plato, who in the +Symposium denies the possibility of reconciliation until the opposition +has passed away. In his own words, there is an absurdity in supposing +that 'harmony is discord; for in reality harmony consists of notes of a +higher and lower pitch which disagreed once, but are now reconciled by +the art of music' (Symp.). He does indeed describe objects of sense +as regarded by us sometimes from one point of view and sometimes from +another. As he says at the end of the Fifth Book of the Republic, 'There +is nothing light which is not heavy, or great which is not small.' And +he extends this relativity to the conceptions of just and good, as well +as to great and small. In like manner he acknowledges that the same +number may be more or less in relation to other numbers without any +increase or diminution (Theat.). But the perplexity only arises out of +the confusion of the human faculties; the art of measuring shows us what +is truly great and truly small. Though the just and good in particular +instances may vary, the IDEA of good is eternal and unchangeable. And +the IDEA of good is the source of knowledge and also of Being, in which +all the stages of sense and knowledge are gathered up and from being +hypotheses become realities. + +Leaving the comparison with Plato we may now consider the value of +this invention of Hegel. There can be no question of the importance of +showing that two contraries or contradictories may in certain cases be +both true. The silliness of the so-called laws of thought ('All A = A,' +or, in the negative form, 'Nothing can at the same time be both A, and +not A') has been well exposed by Hegel himself (Wallace's Hegel), who +remarks that 'the form of the maxim is virtually self-contradictory, +for a proposition implies a distinction between subject and predicate, +whereas the maxim of identity, as it is called, A = A, does not fulfil +what its form requires. Nor does any mind ever think or form conceptions +in accordance with this law, nor does any existence conform to it.' +Wisdom of this sort is well parodied in Shakespeare (Twelfth Night, +'Clown: For as the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, +very wittily said to a niece of King Gorboduc, "That that is is"...for +what is "that" but "that," and "is" but "is"?'). Unless we are willing +to admit that two contradictories may be true, many questions which lie +at the threshold of mathematics and of morals will be insoluble puzzles +to us. + +The influence of opposites is felt in practical life. The understanding +sees one side of a question only--the common sense of mankind joins +one of two parties in politics, in religion, in philosophy. Yet, as +everybody knows, truth is not wholly the possession of either. But the +characters of men are one-sided and accept this or that aspect of the +truth. The understanding is strong in a single abstract principle and +with this lever moves mankind. Few attain to a balance of principles +or recognize truly how in all human things there is a thesis and +antithesis, a law of action and of reaction. In politics we require +order as well as liberty, and have to consider the proportions in which +under given circumstances they may be safely combined. In religion there +is a tendency to lose sight of morality, to separate goodness from +the love of truth, to worship God without attempting to know him. +In philosophy again there are two opposite principles, of immediate +experience and of those general or a priori truths which are supposed to +transcend experience. But the common sense or common opinion of mankind +is incapable of apprehending these opposite sides or views--men are +determined by their natural bent to one or other of them; they go +straight on for a time in a single line, and may be many things by turns +but not at once. + +Hence the importance of familiarizing the mind with forms which will +assist us in conceiving or expressing the complex or contrary aspects +of life and nature. The danger is that they may be too much for us, and +obscure our appreciation of facts. As the complexity of mechanics cannot +be understood without mathematics, so neither can the many-sidedness of +the mental and moral world be truly apprehended without the assistance +of new forms of thought. One of these forms is the unity of opposites. +Abstractions have a great power over us, but they are apt to be partial +and one-sided, and only when modified by other abstractions do they make +an approach to the truth. Many a man has become a fatalist because he +has fallen under the dominion of a single idea. He says to himself, for +example, that he must be either free or necessary--he cannot be both. +Thus in the ancient world whole schools of philosophy passed away in the +vain attempt to solve the problem of the continuity or divisibility of +matter. And in comparatively modern times, though in the spirit of an +ancient philosopher, Bishop Berkeley, feeling a similar perplexity, +is inclined to deny the truth of infinitesimals in mathematics. Many +difficulties arise in practical religion from the impossibility of +conceiving body and mind at once and in adjusting their movements to one +another. There is a border ground between them which seems to belong to +both; and there is as much difficulty in conceiving the body without the +soul as the soul without the body. To the 'either' and 'or' philosophy +('Everything is either A or not A') should at least be added the clause +'or neither,' 'or both.' The double form makes reflection easier and +more conformable to experience, and also more comprehensive. But +in order to avoid paradox and the danger of giving offence to the +unmetaphysical part of mankind, we may speak of it as due to the +imperfection of language or the limitation of human faculties. It is +nevertheless a discovery which, in Platonic language, may be termed a +'most gracious aid to thought.' + +The doctrine of opposite moments of thought or of progression by +antagonism, further assists us in framing a scheme or system of the +sciences. The negation of one gives birth to another of them. The double +notions are the joints which hold them together. The simple is developed +into the complex, the complex returns again into the simple. Beginning +with the highest notion of mind or thought, we may descend by a series +of negations to the first generalizations of sense. Or again we may +begin with the simplest elements of sense and proceed upwards to the +highest being or thought. Metaphysic is the negation or absorption of +physiology--physiology of chemistry--chemistry of mechanical philosophy. +Similarly in mechanics, when we can no further go we arrive at +chemistry--when chemistry becomes organic we arrive at physiology: +when we pass from the outward and animal to the inward nature of man we +arrive at moral and metaphysical philosophy. These sciences have each of +them their own methods and are pursued independently of one another. +But to the mind of the thinker they are all one--latent in one +another--developed out of one another. + +This method of opposites has supplied new instruments of thought for the +solution of metaphysical problems, and has thrown down many of the walls +within which the human mind was confined. Formerly when philosophers +arrived at the infinite and absolute, they seemed to be lost in a region +beyond human comprehension. But Hegel has shown that the absolute and +infinite are no more true than the relative and finite, and that they +must alike be negatived before we arrive at a true absolute or a true +infinite. The conceptions of the infinite and absolute as ordinarily +understood are tiresome because they are unmeaning, but there is +no peculiar sanctity or mystery in them. We might as well make an +infinitesimal series of fractions or a perpetually recurring decimal +the object of our worship. They are the widest and also the thinnest of +human ideas, or, in the language of logicians, they have the greatest +extension and the least comprehension. Of all words they may be truly +said to be the most inflated with a false meaning. They have been +handed down from one philosopher to another until they have acquired a +religious character. They seem also to derive a sacredness from their +association with the Divine Being. Yet they are the poorest of the +predicates under which we describe him--signifying no more than this, +that he is not finite, that he is not relative, and tending to obscure +his higher attributes of wisdom, goodness, truth. + +The system of Hegel frees the mind from the dominion of abstract ideas. +We acknowledge his originality, and some of us delight to wander in the +mazes of thought which he has opened to us. For Hegel has found admirers +in England and Scotland when his popularity in Germany has departed, and +he, like the philosophers whom he criticizes, is of the past. No other +thinker has ever dissected the human mind with equal patience and +minuteness. He has lightened the burden of thought because he has shown +us that the chains which we wear are of our own forging. To be able to +place ourselves not only above the opinions of men but above their +modes of thinking, is a great height of philosophy. This dearly obtained +freedom, however, we are not disposed to part with, or to allow him to +build up in a new form the 'beggarly elements' of scholastic logic +which he has thrown down. So far as they are aids to reflection and +expression, forms of thought are useful, but no further:--we may easily +have too many of them. + +And when we are asked to believe the Hegelian to be the sole or +universal logic, we naturally reply that there are other ways in which +our ideas may be connected. The triplets of Hegel, the division into +being, essence, and notion, are not the only or necessary modes in which +the world of thought can be conceived. There may be an evolution by +degrees as well as by opposites. The word 'continuity' suggests the +possibility of resolving all differences into differences of quantity. +Again, the opposites themselves may vary from the least degree of +diversity up to contradictory opposition. They are not like numbers +and figures, always and everywhere of the same value. And therefore +the edifice which is constructed out of them has merely an imaginary +symmetry, and is really irregular and out of proportion. The spirit of +Hegelian criticism should be applied to his own system, and the terms +Being, Not-being, existence, essence, notion, and the like challenged +and defined. For if Hegel introduces a great many distinctions, he +obliterates a great many others by the help of the universal solvent 'is +not,' which appears to be the simplest of negations, and yet admits +of several meanings. Neither are we able to follow him in the play of +metaphysical fancy which conducts him from one determination of thought +to another. But we begin to suspect that this vast system is not God +within us, or God immanent in the world, and may be only the invention +of an individual brain. The 'beyond' is always coming back upon us +however often we expel it. We do not easily believe that we have within +the compass of the mind the form of universal knowledge. We rather +incline to think that the method of knowledge is inseparable from actual +knowledge, and wait to see what new forms may be developed out of +our increasing experience and observation of man and nature. We are +conscious of a Being who is without us as well as within us. Even +if inclined to Pantheism we are unwilling to imagine that the meagre +categories of the understanding, however ingeniously arranged or +displayed, are the image of God;--that what all religions were seeking +after from the beginning was the Hegelian philosophy which has been +revealed in the latter days. The great metaphysician, like a prophet of +old, was naturally inclined to believe that his own thoughts were divine +realities. We may almost say that whatever came into his head seemed +to him to be a necessary truth. He never appears to have criticized +himself, or to have subjected his own ideas to the process of analysis +which he applies to every other philosopher. + +Hegel would have insisted that his philosophy should be accepted as a +whole or not at all. He would have urged that the parts derived their +meaning from one another and from the whole. He thought that he had +supplied an outline large enough to contain all future knowledge, and a +method to which all future philosophies must conform. His metaphysical +genius is especially shown in the construction of the categories--a work +which was only begun by Kant, and elaborated to the utmost by himself. +But is it really true that the part has no meaning when separated from +the whole, or that knowledge to be knowledge at all must be universal? +Do all abstractions shine only by the reflected light of other +abstractions? May they not also find a nearer explanation in their +relation to phenomena? If many of them are correlatives they are not +all so, and the relations which subsist between them vary from a mere +association up to a necessary connexion. Nor is it easy to determine +how far the unknown element affects the known, whether, for example, new +discoveries may not one day supersede our most elementary notions about +nature. To a certain extent all our knowledge is conditional upon +what may be known in future ages of the world. We must admit this +hypothetical element, which we cannot get rid of by an assumption that +we have already discovered the method to which all philosophy must +conform. Hegel is right in preferring the concrete to the abstract, +in setting actuality before possibility, in excluding from the +philosopher's vocabulary the word 'inconceivable.' But he is too well +satisfied with his own system ever to consider the effect of what is +unknown on the element which is known. To the Hegelian all things are +plain and clear, while he who is outside the charmed circle is in +the mire of ignorance and 'logical impurity': he who is within is +omniscient, or at least has all the elements of knowledge under his +hand. + +Hegelianism may be said to be a transcendental defence of the world +as it is. There is no room for aspiration and no need of any: 'What is +actual is rational, what is rational is actual.' But a good man will not +readily acquiesce in this aphorism. He knows of course that all things +proceed according to law whether for good or evil. But when he sees +the misery and ignorance of mankind he is convinced that without any +interruption of the uniformity of nature the condition of the world may +be indefinitely improved by human effort. There is also an adaptation +of persons to times and countries, but this is very far from being the +fulfilment of their higher natures. The man of the seventeenth century +is unfitted for the eighteenth, and the man of the eighteenth for the +nineteenth, and most of us would be out of place in the world of a +hundred years hence. But all higher minds are much more akin than +they are different: genius is of all ages, and there is perhaps more +uniformity in excellence than in mediocrity. The sublimer intelligences +of mankind--Plato, Dante, Sir Thomas More--meet in a higher sphere +above the ordinary ways of men; they understand one another from +afar, notwithstanding the interval which separates them. They are 'the +spectators of all time and of all existence;' their works live for +ever; and there is nothing to prevent the force of their individuality +breaking through the uniformity which surrounds them. But such +disturbers of the order of thought Hegel is reluctant to acknowledge. + +The doctrine of Hegel will to many seem the expression of an indolent +conservatism, and will at any rate be made an excuse for it. The mind of +the patriot rebels when he is told that the worst tyranny and oppression +has a natural fitness: he cannot be persuaded, for example, that the +conquest of Prussia by Napoleon I. was either natural or necessary, +or that any similar calamity befalling a nation should be a matter of +indifference to the poet or philosopher. We may need such a philosophy +or religion to console us under evils which are irremediable, but we see +that it is fatal to the higher life of man. It seems to say to us, 'The +world is a vast system or machine which can be conceived under the forms +of logic, but in which no single man can do any great good or any great +harm. Even if it were a thousand times worse than it is, it could be +arranged in categories and explained by philosophers. And what more do +we want?' + +The philosophy of Hegel appeals to an historical criterion: the ideas +of men have a succession in time as well as an order of thought. But +the assumption that there is a correspondence between the succession of +ideas in history and the natural order of philosophy is hardly true even +of the beginnings of thought. And in later systems forms of thought +are too numerous and complex to admit of our tracing in them a regular +succession. They seem also to be in part reflections of the past, and it +is difficult to separate in them what is original and what is borrowed. +Doubtless they have a relation to one another--the transition from +Descartes to Spinoza or from Locke to Berkeley is not a matter of +chance, but it can hardly be described as an alternation of opposites or +figured to the mind by the vibrations of a pendulum. Even in Aristotle +and Plato, rightly understood, we cannot trace this law of action and +reaction. They are both idealists, although to the one the idea is +actual and immanent,--to the other only potential and transcendent, as +Hegel himself has pointed out (Wallace's Hegel). The true meaning of +Aristotle has been disguised from us by his own appeal to fact and the +opinions of mankind in his more popular works, and by the use made of +his writings in the Middle Ages. No book, except the Scriptures, +has been so much read, and so little understood. The Pre-Socratic +philosophies are simpler, and we may observe a progress in them; but is +there any regular succession? The ideas of Being, change, number, seem +to have sprung up contemporaneously in different parts of Greece and we +have no difficulty in constructing them out of one another--we can see +that the union of Being and Not-being gave birth to the idea of change +or Becoming and that one might be another aspect of Being. Again, +the Eleatics may be regarded as developing in one direction into +the Megarian school, in the other into the Atomists, but there is no +necessary connexion between them. Nor is there any indication that the +deficiency which was felt in one school was supplemented or compensated +by another. They were all efforts to supply the want which the Greeks +began to feel at the beginning of the sixth century before Christ,--the +want of abstract ideas. Nor must we forget the uncertainty of +chronology;--if, as Aristotle says, there were Atomists before +Leucippus, Eleatics before Xenophanes, and perhaps 'patrons of the +flux' before Heracleitus, Hegel's order of thought in the history +of philosophy would be as much disarranged as his order of religious +thought by recent discoveries in the history of religion. + +Hegel is fond of repeating that all philosophies still live and that the +earlier are preserved in the later; they are refuted, and they are not +refuted, by those who succeed them. Once they reigned supreme, now they +are subordinated to a power or idea greater or more comprehensive +than their own. The thoughts of Socrates and Plato and Aristotle have +certainly sunk deep into the mind of the world, and have exercised an +influence which will never pass away; but can we say that they have +the same meaning in modern and ancient philosophy? Some of them, as +for example the words 'Being,' 'essence,' 'matter,' 'form,' either +have become obsolete, or are used in new senses, whereas 'individual,' +'cause,' 'motive,' have acquired an exaggerated importance. Is the +manner in which the logical determinations of thought, or 'categories' +as they may be termed, have been handed down to us, really different +from that in which other words have come down to us? Have they not +been equally subject to accident, and are they not often used by Hegel +himself in senses which would have been quite unintelligible to their +original inventors--as for example, when he speaks of the 'ground' of +Leibnitz ('Everything has a sufficient ground') as identical with +his own doctrine of the 'notion' (Wallace's Hegel), or the 'Being and +Not-being' of Heracleitus as the same with his own 'Becoming'? + +As the historical order of thought has been adapted to the logical, so +we have reason for suspecting that the Hegelian logic has been in +some degree adapted to the order of thought in history. There is +unfortunately no criterion to which either of them can be subjected, and +not much forcing was required to bring either into near relations with +the other. We may fairly doubt whether the division of the first and +second parts of logic in the Hegelian system has not really arisen from +a desire to make them accord with the first and second stages of the +early Greek philosophy. Is there any reason why the conception of +measure in the first part, which is formed by the union of quality and +quantity, should not have been equally placed in the second division of +mediate or reflected ideas? The more we analyze them the less exact does +the coincidence of philosophy and the history of philosophy appear. Many +terms which were used absolutely in the beginning of philosophy, such +as 'Being,' 'matter,' 'cause,' and the like, became relative in +the subsequent history of thought. But Hegel employs some of them +absolutely, some relatively, seemingly without any principle and without +any regard to their original significance. + +The divisions of the Hegelian logic bear a superficial resemblance to +the divisions of the scholastic logic. The first part answers to the +term, the second to the proposition, the third to the syllogism. These +are the grades of thought under which we conceive the world, first, in +the general terms of quality, quantity, measure; secondly, under the +relative forms of 'ground' and existence, substance and accidents, and +the like; thirdly in syllogistic forms of the individual mediated with +the universal by the help of the particular. Of syllogisms there are +various kinds,--qualitative, quantitative, inductive, mechanical, +teleological,--which are developed out of one another. But is there any +meaning in reintroducing the forms of the old logic? Who ever thinks +of the world as a syllogism? What connexion is there between the +proposition and our ideas of reciprocity, cause and effect, and similar +relations? It is difficult enough to conceive all the powers of nature +and mind gathered up in one. The difficulty is greatly increased +when the new is confused with the old, and the common logic is the +Procrustes' bed into which they are forced. + +The Hegelian philosophy claims, as we have seen, to be based upon +experience: it abrogates the distinction of a priori and a posteriori +truth. It also acknowledges that many differences of kind are resolvable +into differences of degree. It is familiar with the terms 'evolution,' +'development,' and the like. Yet it can hardly be said to have +considered the forms of thought which are best adapted for the +expression of facts. It has never applied the categories to experience; +it has not defined the differences in our ideas of opposition, or +development, or cause and effect, in the different sciences which make +use of these terms. It rests on a knowledge which is not the result of +exact or serious enquiry, but is floating in the air; the mind has been +imperceptibly informed of some of the methods required in the sciences. +Hegel boasts that the movement of dialectic is at once necessary and +spontaneous: in reality it goes beyond experience and is unverified +by it. Further, the Hegelian philosophy, while giving us the power of +thinking a great deal more than we are able to fill up, seems to be +wanting in some determinations of thought which we require. We cannot +say that physical science, which at present occupies so large a share +of popular attention, has been made easier or more intelligible by the +distinctions of Hegel. Nor can we deny that he has sometimes interpreted +physics by metaphysics, and confused his own philosophical fancies with +the laws of nature. The very freedom of the movement is not without +suspicion, seeming to imply a state of the human mind which has entirely +lost sight of facts. Nor can the necessity which is attributed to it be +very stringent, seeing that the successive categories or determinations +of thought in different parts of his writings are arranged by the +philosopher in different ways. What is termed necessary evolution seems +to be only the order in which a succession of ideas presented themselves +to the mind of Hegel at a particular time. + +The nomenclature of Hegel has been made by himself out of the language +of common life. He uses a few words only which are borrowed from his +predecessors, or from the Greek philosophy, and these generally in a +sense peculiar to himself. The first stage of his philosophy answers to +the word 'is,' the second to the word 'has been,' the third to the +words 'has been' and 'is' combined. In other words, the first sphere +is immediate, the second mediated by reflection, the third or highest +returns into the first, and is both mediate and immediate. As Luther's +Bible was written in the language of the common people, so Hegel seems +to have thought that he gave his philosophy a truly German character +by the use of idiomatic German words. But it may be doubted whether the +attempt has been successful. First because such words as 'in sich seyn,' +'an sich seyn,' 'an und fur sich seyn,' though the simplest combinations +of nouns and verbs, require a difficult and elaborate explanation. The +simplicity of the words contrasts with the hardness of their meaning. +Secondly, the use of technical phraseology necessarily separates +philosophy from general literature; the student has to learn a new +language of uncertain meaning which he with difficulty remembers. No +former philosopher had ever carried the use of technical terms to the +same extent as Hegel. The language of Plato or even of Aristotle is but +slightly removed from that of common life, and was introduced naturally +by a series of thinkers: the language of the scholastic logic has become +technical to us, but in the Middle Ages was the vernacular Latin of +priests and students. The higher spirit of philosophy, the spirit of +Plato and Socrates, rebels against the Hegelian use of language as +mechanical and technical. + +Hegel is fond of etymologies and often seems to trifle with words. He +gives etymologies which are bad, and never considers that the meaning of +a word may have nothing to do with its derivation. He lived before the +days of Comparative Philology or of Comparative Mythology and Religion, +which would have opened a new world to him. He makes no allowance for +the element of chance either in language or thought; and perhaps there +is no greater defect in his system than the want of a sound theory +of language. He speaks as if thought, instead of being identical with +language, was wholly independent of it. It is not the actual growth +of the mind, but the imaginary growth of the Hegelian system, which is +attractive to him. + +Neither are we able to say why of the common forms of thought some are +rejected by him, while others have an undue prominence given to them. +Some of them, such as 'ground' and 'existence,' have hardly any basis +either in language or philosophy, while others, such as 'cause' and +'effect,' are but slightly considered. All abstractions are supposed by +Hegel to derive their meaning from one another. This is true of some, +but not of all, and in different degrees. There is an explanation of +abstractions by the phenomena which they represent, as well as by their +relation to other abstractions. If the knowledge of all were necessary +to the knowledge of any one of them, the mind would sink under the load +of thought. Again, in every process of reflection we seem to require +a standing ground, and in the attempt to obtain a complete analysis we +lose all fixedness. If, for example, the mind is viewed as the complex +of ideas, or the difference between things and persons denied, such an +analysis may be justified from the point of view of Hegel: but we shall +find that in the attempt to criticize thought we have lost the power of +thinking, and, like the Heracliteans of old, have no words in which +our meaning can be expressed. Such an analysis may be of value as a +corrective of popular language or thought, but should still allow us to +retain the fundamental distinctions of philosophy. + +In the Hegelian system ideas supersede persons. The world of thought, +though sometimes described as Spirit or 'Geist,' is really impersonal. +The minds of men are to be regarded as one mind, or more correctly as +a succession of ideas. Any comprehensive view of the world must +necessarily be general, and there may be a use with a view to +comprehensiveness in dropping individuals and their lives and actions. +In all things, if we leave out details, a certain degree of order +begins to appear; at any rate we can make an order which, with a little +exaggeration or disproportion in some of the parts, will cover the whole +field of philosophy. But are we therefore justified in saying that +ideas are the causes of the great movement of the world rather than the +personalities which conceived them? The great man is the expression of +his time, and there may be peculiar difficulties in his age which he +cannot overcome. He may be out of harmony with his circumstances, too +early or too late, and then all his thoughts perish; his genius passes +away unknown. But not therefore is he to be regarded as a mere waif +or stray in human history, any more than he is the mere creature or +expression of the age in which he lives. His ideas are inseparable from +himself, and would have been nothing without him. Through a thousand +personal influences they have been brought home to the minds of +others. He starts from antecedents, but he is great in proportion as he +disengages himself from them or absorbs himself in them. Moreover +the types of greatness differ; while one man is the expression of the +influences of his age, another is in antagonism to them. One man is +borne on the surface of the water; another is carried forward by the +current which flows beneath. The character of an individual, whether he +be independent of circumstances or not, inspires others quite as much +as his words. What is the teaching of Socrates apart from his personal +history, or the doctrines of Christ apart from the Divine life in which +they are embodied? Has not Hegel himself delineated the greatness of +the life of Christ as consisting in his 'Schicksalslosigkeit' or +independence of the destiny of his race? Do not persons become ideas, +and is there any distinction between them? Take away the five greatest +legislators, the five greatest warriors, the five greatest poets, the +five greatest founders or teachers of a religion, the five greatest +philosophers, the five greatest inventors,--where would have been all +that we most value in knowledge or in life? And can that be a true +theory of the history of philosophy which, in Hegel's own language, +'does not allow the individual to have his right'? + +Once more, while we readily admit that the world is relative to the +mind, and the mind to the world, and that we must suppose a common or +correlative growth in them, we shrink from saying that this complex +nature can contain, even in outline, all the endless forms of Being and +knowledge. Are we not 'seeking the living among the dead' and dignifying +a mere logical skeleton with the name of philosophy and almost of God? +When we look far away into the primeval sources of thought and belief, +do we suppose that the mere accident of our being the heirs of the Greek +philosophers can give us a right to set ourselves up as having the true +and only standard of reason in the world? Or when we contemplate the +infinite worlds in the expanse of heaven can we imagine that a few +meagre categories derived from language and invented by the genius of +one or two great thinkers contain the secret of the universe? Or, having +regard to the ages during which the human race may yet endure, do we +suppose that we can anticipate the proportions human knowledge may +attain even within the short space of one or two thousand years? + +Again, we have a difficulty in understanding how ideas can be causes, +which to us seems to be as much a figure of speech as the old notion +of a creator artist, 'who makes the world by the help of the demigods' +(Plato, Tim.), or with 'a golden pair of compasses' measures out the +circumference of the universe (Milton, P.L.). We can understand how +the idea in the mind of an inventor is the cause of the work which is +produced by it; and we can dimly imagine how this universal frame may +be animated by a divine intelligence. But we cannot conceive how all the +thoughts of men that ever were, which are themselves subject to so many +external conditions of climate, country, and the like, even if regarded +as the single thought of a Divine Being, can be supposed to have +made the world. We appear to be only wrapping up ourselves in our own +conceits--to be confusing cause and effect--to be losing the distinction +between reflection and action, between the human and divine. + +These are some of the doubts and suspicions which arise in the mind of +a student of Hegel, when, after living for a time within the charmed +circle, he removes to a little distance and looks back upon what he +has learnt, from the vantage-ground of history and experience. The +enthusiasm of his youth has passed away, the authority of the master no +longer retains a hold upon him. But he does not regret the time spent +in the study of him. He finds that he has received from him a real +enlargement of mind, and much of the true spirit of philosophy, even +when he has ceased to believe in him. He returns again and again to his +writings as to the recollections of a first love, not undeserving of +his admiration still. Perhaps if he were asked how he can admire +without believing, or what value he can attribute to what he knows to be +erroneous, he might answer in some such manner as the following:-- + +1. That in Hegel he finds glimpses of the genius of the poet and of the +common sense of the man of the world. His system is not cast in a poetic +form, but neither has all this load of logic extinguished in him the +feeling of poetry. He is the true countryman of his contemporaries +Goethe and Schiller. Many fine expressions are scattered up and down +in his writings, as when he tells us that 'the Crusaders went to the +Sepulchre but found it empty.' He delights to find vestiges of his own +philosophy in the older German mystics. And though he can be scarcely +said to have mixed much in the affairs of men, for, as his biographer +tells us, 'he lived for thirty years in a single room,' yet he is far +from being ignorant of the world. No one can read his writings without +acquiring an insight into life. He loves to touch with the spear of +logic the follies and self-deceptions of mankind, and make them appear +in their natural form, stripped of the disguises of language and custom. +He will not allow men to defend themselves by an appeal to one-sided or +abstract principles. In this age of reason any one can too easily find +a reason for doing what he likes (Wallace). He is suspicious of a +distinction which is often made between a person's character and his +conduct. His spirit is the opposite of that of Jesuitism or casuistry +(Wallace). He affords an example of a remark which has been often made, +that in order to know the world it is not necessary to have had a great +experience of it. + +2. Hegel, if not the greatest philosopher, is certainly the greatest +critic of philosophy who ever lived. No one else has equally mastered +the opinions of his predecessors or traced the connexion of them in +the same manner. No one has equally raised the human mind above the +trivialities of the common logic and the unmeaningness of 'mere' +abstractions, and above imaginary possibilities, which, as he truly +says, have no place in philosophy. No one has won so much for the +kingdom of ideas. Whatever may be thought of his own system it will +hardly be denied that he has overthrown Locke, Kant, Hume, and the +so-called philosophy of common sense. He shows us that only by the study +of metaphysics can we get rid of metaphysics, and that those who are +in theory most opposed to them are in fact most entirely and hopelessly +enslaved by them: 'Die reinen Physiker sind nur die Thiere.' +The disciple of Hegel will hardly become the slave of any other +system-maker. What Bacon seems to promise him he will find realized +in the great German thinker, an emancipation nearly complete from the +influences of the scholastic logic. + +3. Many of those who are least disposed to become the votaries of +Hegelianism nevertheless recognize in his system a new logic supplying +a variety of instruments and methods hitherto unemployed. We may not +be able to agree with him in assimilating the natural order of human +thought with the history of philosophy, and still less in identifying +both with the divine idea or nature. But we may acknowledge that the +great thinker has thrown a light on many parts of human knowledge, +and has solved many difficulties. We cannot receive his doctrine of +opposites as the last word of philosophy, but still we may regard it as +a very important contribution to logic. We cannot affirm that words have +no meaning when taken out of their connexion in the history of thought. +But we recognize that their meaning is to a great extent due to +association, and to their correlation with one another. We see the +advantage of viewing in the concrete what mankind regard only in the +abstract. There is much to be said for his faith or conviction, that God +is immanent in the world,--within the sphere of the human mind, and not +beyond it. It was natural that he himself, like a prophet of old, should +regard the philosophy which he had invented as the voice of God in man. +But this by no means implies that he conceived himself as creating God +in thought. He was the servant of his own ideas and not the master of +them. The philosophy of history and the history of philosophy may be +almost said to have been discovered by him. He has done more to explain +Greek thought than all other writers put together. Many ideas of +development, evolution, reciprocity, which have become the symbols of +another school of thinkers may be traced to his speculations. In the +theology and philosophy of England as well as of Germany, and also in +the lighter literature of both countries, there are always appearing +'fragments of the great banquet' of Hegel. + + + + +SOPHIST + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Theodorus, Theaetetus, Socrates. An Eleatic +Stranger, whom Theodorus and Theaetetus bring with them. The younger +Socrates, who is a silent auditor. + + +THEODORUS: Here we are, Socrates, true to our agreement of yesterday; +and we bring with us a stranger from Elea, who is a disciple of +Parmenides and Zeno, and a true philosopher. + +SOCRATES: Is he not rather a god, Theodorus, who comes to us in the +disguise of a stranger? For Homer says that all the gods, and especially +the god of strangers, are companions of the meek and just, and visit +the good and evil among men. And may not your companion be one of those +higher powers, a cross-examining deity, who has come to spy out our +weakness in argument, and to cross-examine us? + +THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, he is not one of the disputatious sort--he +is too good for that. And, in my opinion, he is not a god at all; but +divine he certainly is, for this is a title which I should give to all +philosophers. + +SOCRATES: Capital, my friend! and I may add that they are almost as hard +to be discerned as the gods. For the true philosophers, and such as +are not merely made up for the occasion, appear in various forms +unrecognized by the ignorance of men, and they 'hover about cities,' +as Homer declares, looking from above upon human life; and some think +nothing of them, and others can never think enough; and sometimes they +appear as statesmen, and sometimes as sophists; and then, again, to many +they seem to be no better than madmen. I should like to ask our Eleatic +friend, if he would tell us, what is thought about them in Italy, and to +whom the terms are applied. + +THEODORUS: What terms? + +SOCRATES: Sophist, statesman, philosopher. + +THEODORUS: What is your difficulty about them, and what made you ask? + +SOCRATES: I want to know whether by his countrymen they are regarded as +one or two; or do they, as the names are three, distinguish also three +kinds, and assign one to each name? + +THEODORUS: I dare say that the Stranger will not object to discuss the +question. What do you say, Stranger? + +STRANGER: I am far from objecting, Theodorus, nor have I any difficulty +in replying that by us they are regarded as three. But to define +precisely the nature of each of them is by no means a slight or easy +task. + +THEODORUS: You have happened to light, Socrates, almost on the very +question which we were asking our friend before we came hither, and he +excused himself to us, as he does now to you; although he admitted that +the matter had been fully discussed, and that he remembered the answer. + +SOCRATES: Then do not, Stranger, deny us the first favour which we ask +of you: I am sure that you will not, and therefore I shall only beg of +you to say whether you like and are accustomed to make a long oration +on a subject which you want to explain to another, or to proceed by +the method of question and answer. I remember hearing a very noble +discussion in which Parmenides employed the latter of the two methods, +when I was a young man, and he was far advanced in years. (Compare +Parm.) + +STRANGER: I prefer to talk with another when he responds pleasantly, and +is light in hand; if not, I would rather have my own say. + +SOCRATES: Any one of the present company will respond kindly to you, and +you can choose whom you like of them; I should recommend you to take a +young person--Theaetetus, for example--unless you have a preference for +some one else. + +STRANGER: I feel ashamed, Socrates, being a new-comer into your society, +instead of talking a little and hearing others talk, to be spinning out +a long soliloquy or address, as if I wanted to show off. For the true +answer will certainly be a very long one, a great deal longer than might +be expected from such a short and simple question. At the same time, +I fear that I may seem rude and ungracious if I refuse your courteous +request, especially after what you have said. For I certainly cannot +object to your proposal, that Theaetetus should respond, having already +conversed with him myself, and being recommended by you to take him. + +THEAETETUS: But are you sure, Stranger, that this will be quite so +acceptable to the rest of the company as Socrates imagines? + +STRANGER: You hear them applauding, Theaetetus; after that, there is +nothing more to be said. Well then, I am to argue with you, and if you +tire of the argument, you may complain of your friends and not of me. + +THEAETETUS: I do not think that I shall tire, and if I do, I shall get +my friend here, young Socrates, the namesake of the elder Socrates, to +help; he is about my own age, and my partner at the gymnasium, and is +constantly accustomed to work with me. + +STRANGER: Very good; you can decide about that for yourself as we +proceed. Meanwhile you and I will begin together and enquire into the +nature of the Sophist, first of the three: I should like you to make out +what he is and bring him to light in a discussion; for at present we are +only agreed about the name, but of the thing to which we both apply the +name possibly you have one notion and I another; whereas we ought +always to come to an understanding about the thing itself in terms of a +definition, and not merely about the name minus the definition. Now the +tribe of Sophists which we are investigating is not easily caught or +defined; and the world has long ago agreed, that if great subjects are +to be adequately treated, they must be studied in the lesser and easier +instances of them before we proceed to the greatest of all. And as I +know that the tribe of Sophists is troublesome and hard to be caught, I +should recommend that we practise beforehand the method which is to be +applied to him on some simple and smaller thing, unless you can suggest +a better way. + +THEAETETUS: Indeed I cannot. + +STRANGER: Then suppose that we work out some lesser example which will +be a pattern of the greater? + +THEAETETUS: Good. + +STRANGER: What is there which is well known and not great, and is yet as +susceptible of definition as any larger thing? Shall I say an angler? +He is familiar to all of us, and not a very interesting or important +person. + +THEAETETUS: He is not. + +STRANGER: Yet I suspect that he will furnish us with the sort of +definition and line of enquiry which we want. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: Let us begin by asking whether he is a man having art or not +having art, but some other power. + +THEAETETUS: He is clearly a man of art. + +STRANGER: And of arts there are two kinds? + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: There is agriculture, and the tending of mortal creatures, +and the art of constructing or moulding vessels, and there is the art of +imitation--all these may be appropriately called by a single name. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? And what is the name? + +STRANGER: He who brings into existence something that did not exist +before is said to be a producer, and that which is brought into +existence is said to be produced. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And all the arts which were just now mentioned are +characterized by this power of producing? + +THEAETETUS: They are. + +STRANGER: Then let us sum them up under the name of productive or +creative art. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: Next follows the whole class of learning and cognition; +then comes trade, fighting, hunting. And since none of these produces +anything, but is only engaged in conquering by word or deed, or in +preventing others from conquering, things which exist and have been +already produced--in each and all of these branches there appears to be +an art which may be called acquisitive. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that is the proper name. + +STRANGER: Seeing, then, that all arts are either acquisitive or +creative, in which class shall we place the art of the angler? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly in the acquisitive class. + +STRANGER: And the acquisitive may be subdivided into two parts: there is +exchange, which is voluntary and is effected by gifts, hire, purchase; +and the other part of acquisitive, which takes by force of word or deed, +may be termed conquest? + +THEAETETUS: That is implied in what has been said. + +STRANGER: And may not conquest be again subdivided? + +THEAETETUS: How? + +STRANGER: Open force may be called fighting, and secret force may have +the general name of hunting? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And there is no reason why the art of hunting should not be +further divided. + +THEAETETUS: How would you make the division? + +STRANGER: Into the hunting of living and of lifeless prey. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, if both kinds exist. + +STRANGER: Of course they exist; but the hunting after lifeless things +having no special name, except some sorts of diving, and other small +matters, may be omitted; the hunting after living things may be called +animal hunting. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And animal hunting may be truly said to have two divisions, +land-animal hunting, which has many kinds and names, and water-animal +hunting, or the hunting after animals who swim? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And of swimming animals, one class lives on the wing and the +other in the water? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Fowling is the general term under which the hunting of all +birds is included. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: The hunting of animals who live in the water has the general +name of fishing. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And this sort of hunting may be further divided also into two +principal kinds? + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: There is one kind which takes them in nets, another which +takes them by a blow. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean, and how do you distinguish them? + +STRANGER: As to the first kind--all that surrounds and encloses anything +to prevent egress, may be rightly called an enclosure. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: For which reason twig baskets, casting-nets, nooses, creels, +and the like may all be termed 'enclosures'? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And therefore this first kind of capture may be called by us +capture with enclosures, or something of that sort? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: The other kind, which is practised by a blow with hooks and +three-pronged spears, when summed up under one name, may be called +striking, unless you, Theaetetus, can find some better name? + +THEAETETUS: Never mind the name--what you suggest will do very well. + +STRANGER: There is one mode of striking, which is done at night, and by +the light of a fire, and is by the hunters themselves called firing, or +spearing by firelight. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And the fishing by day is called by the general name of +barbing, because the spears, too, are barbed at the point. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that is the term. + +STRANGER: Of this barb-fishing, that which strikes the fish who is below +from above is called spearing, because this is the way in which the +three-pronged spears are mostly used. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, it is often called so. + +STRANGER: Then now there is only one kind remaining. + +THEAETETUS: What is that? + +STRANGER: When a hook is used, and the fish is not struck in any chance +part of his body, as he is with the spear, but only about the head +and mouth, and is then drawn out from below upwards with reeds and +rods:--What is the right name of that mode of fishing, Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: I suspect that we have now discovered the object of our +search. + +STRANGER: Then now you and I have come to an understanding not only +about the name of the angler's art, but about the definition of +the thing itself. One half of all art was acquisitive--half of the +acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force, half of this was +hunting, and half of hunting was hunting animals, half of this was +hunting water animals--of this again, the under half was fishing, half +of fishing was striking; a part of striking was fishing with a barb, +and one half of this again, being the kind which strikes with a hook +and draws the fish from below upwards, is the art which we have been +seeking, and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling +or drawing up (aspalieutike, anaspasthai). + +THEAETETUS: The result has been quite satisfactorily brought out. + +STRANGER: And now, following this pattern, let us endeavour to find out +what a Sophist is. + +THEAETETUS: By all means. + +STRANGER: The first question about the angler was, whether he was a +skilled artist or unskilled? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And shall we call our new friend unskilled, or a thorough +master of his craft? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not unskilled, for his name, as, indeed, you +imply, must surely express his nature. + +STRANGER: Then he must be supposed to have some art. + +THEAETETUS: What art? + +STRANGER: By heaven, they are cousins! it never occurred to us. + +THEAETETUS: Who are cousins? + +STRANGER: The angler and the Sophist. + +THEAETETUS: In what way are they related? + +STRANGER: They both appear to me to be hunters. + +THEAETETUS: How the Sophist? Of the other we have spoken. + +STRANGER: You remember our division of hunting, into hunting after +swimming animals and land animals? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And you remember that we subdivided the swimming and left the +land animals, saying that there were many kinds of them? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Thus far, then, the Sophist and the angler, starting from the +art of acquiring, take the same road? + +THEAETETUS: So it would appear. + +STRANGER: Their paths diverge when they reach the art of animal hunting; +the one going to the sea-shore, and to the rivers and to the lakes, and +angling for the animals which are in them. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: While the other goes to land and water of another sort--rivers +of wealth and broad meadow-lands of generous youth; and he also is +intending to take the animals which are in them. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Of hunting on land there are two principal divisions. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: One is the hunting of tame, and the other of wild animals. + +THEAETETUS: But are tame animals ever hunted? + +STRANGER: Yes, if you include man under tame animals. But if you like +you may say that there are no tame animals, or that, if there are, man +is not among them; or you may say that man is a tame animal but is not +hunted--you shall decide which of these alternatives you prefer. + +THEAETETUS: I should say, Stranger, that man is a tame animal, and I +admit that he is hunted. + +STRANGER: Then let us divide the hunting of tame animals into two parts. + +THEAETETUS: How shall we make the division? + +STRANGER: Let us define piracy, man-stealing, tyranny, the whole +military art, by one name, as hunting with violence. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: But the art of the lawyer, of the popular orator, and the art +of conversation may be called in one word the art of persuasion. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And of persuasion, there may be said to be two kinds? + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: One is private, and the other public. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; each of them forms a class. + +STRANGER: And of private hunting, one sort receives hire, and the other +brings gifts. + +THEAETETUS: I do not understand you. + +STRANGER: You seem never to have observed the manner in which lovers +hunt. + +THEAETETUS: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: I mean that they lavish gifts on those whom they hunt in +addition to other inducements. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: Let us admit this, then, to be the amatory art. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But that sort of hireling whose conversation is pleasing +and who baits his hook only with pleasure and exacts nothing but his +maintenance in return, we should all, if I am not mistaken, describe as +possessing flattery or an art of making things pleasant. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And that sort, which professes to form acquaintances only for +the sake of virtue, and demands a reward in the shape of money, may be +fairly called by another name? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And what is the name? Will you tell me? + +THEAETETUS: It is obvious enough; for I believe that we have discovered +the Sophist: which is, as I conceive, the proper name for the class +described. + +STRANGER: Then now, Theaetetus, his art may be traced as a branch of the +appropriative, acquisitive family--which hunts animals,--living--land-- +tame animals; which hunts man,--privately--for hire,--taking money in +exchange--having the semblance of education; and this is termed +Sophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank--such is the +conclusion. + +THEAETETUS: Just so. + +STRANGER: Let us take another branch of his genealogy; for he is a +professor of a great and many-sided art; and if we look back at what has +preceded we see that he presents another aspect, besides that of which +we are speaking. + +THEAETETUS: In what respect? + +STRANGER: There were two sorts of acquisitive art; the one concerned +with hunting, the other with exchange. + +THEAETETUS: There were. + +STRANGER: And of the art of exchange there are two divisions, the one of +giving, and the other of selling. + +THEAETETUS: Let us assume that. + +STRANGER: Next, we will suppose the art of selling to be divided into +two parts. + +THEAETETUS: How? + +STRANGER: There is one part which is distinguished as the sale of a +man's own productions; another, which is the exchange of the works of +others. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And is not that part of exchange which takes place in the +city, being about half of the whole, termed retailing? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And that which exchanges the goods of one city for those of +another by selling and buying is the exchange of the merchant? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And you are aware that this exchange of the merchant is of +two kinds: it is partly concerned with food for the use of the body, +and partly with the food of the soul which is bartered and received in +exchange for money. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: You want to know what is the meaning of food for the soul; the +other kind you surely understand. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Take music in general and painting and marionette playing and +many other things, which are purchased in one city, and carried away and +sold in another--wares of the soul which are hawked about either for the +sake of instruction or amusement;--may not he who takes them about and +sells them be quite as truly called a merchant as he who sells meats and +drinks? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure he may. + +STRANGER: And would you not call by the same name him who buys up +knowledge and goes about from city to city exchanging his wares for +money? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly I should. + +STRANGER: Of this merchandise of the soul, may not one part be fairly +termed the art of display? And there is another part which is certainly +not less ridiculous, but being a trade in learning must be called by +some name germane to the matter? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: The latter should have two names,--one descriptive of the sale +of the knowledge of virtue, and the other of the sale of other kinds of +knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: The name of art-seller corresponds well enough to the latter; +but you must try and tell me the name of the other. + +THEAETETUS: He must be the Sophist, whom we are seeking; no other name +can possibly be right. + +STRANGER: No other; and so this trader in virtue again turns out to +be our friend the Sophist, whose art may now be traced from the art of +acquisition through exchange, trade, merchandise, to a merchandise of +the soul which is concerned with speech and the knowledge of virtue. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And there may be a third reappearance of him;--for he may +have settled down in a city, and may fabricate as well as buy these same +wares, intending to live by selling them, and he would still be called a +Sophist? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then that part of the acquisitive art which exchanges, and of +exchange which either sells a man's own productions or retails those +of others, as the case may be, and in either way sells the knowledge of +virtue, you would again term Sophistry? + +THEAETETUS: I must, if I am to keep pace with the argument. + +STRANGER: Let us consider once more whether there may not be yet another +aspect of sophistry. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: In the acquisitive there was a subdivision of the combative or +fighting art. + +THEAETETUS: There was. + +STRANGER: Perhaps we had better divide it. + +THEAETETUS: What shall be the divisions? + +STRANGER: There shall be one division of the competitive, and another of +the pugnacious. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: That part of the pugnacious which is a contest of bodily +strength may be properly called by some such name as violent. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And when the war is one of words, it may be termed +controversy? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And controversy may be of two kinds. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: When long speeches are answered by long speeches, and there +is public discussion about the just and unjust, that is forensic +controversy. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And there is a private sort of controversy, which is cut up +into questions and answers, and this is commonly called disputation? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that is the name. + +STRANGER: And of disputation, that sort which is only a discussion about +contracts, and is carried on at random, and without rules of art, is +recognized by the reasoning faculty to be a distinct class, but has +hitherto had no distinctive name, and does not deserve to receive one +from us. + +THEAETETUS: No; for the different sorts of it are too minute and +heterogeneous. + +STRANGER: But that which proceeds by rules of art to dispute about +justice and injustice in their own nature, and about things in general, +we have been accustomed to call argumentation (Eristic)? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And of argumentation, one sort wastes money, and the other +makes money. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: Suppose we try and give to each of these two classes a name. + +THEAETETUS: Let us do so. + +STRANGER: I should say that the habit which leads a man to neglect his +own affairs for the pleasure of conversation, of which the style is +far from being agreeable to the majority of his hearers, may be fairly +termed loquacity: such is my opinion. + +THEAETETUS: That is the common name for it. + +STRANGER: But now who the other is, who makes money out of private +disputation, it is your turn to say. + +THEAETETUS: There is only one true answer: he is the wonderful Sophist, +of whom we are in pursuit, and who reappears again for the fourth time. + +STRANGER: Yes, and with a fresh pedigree, for he is the money-making +species of the Eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, +combative, acquisitive family, as the argument has already proven. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: How true was the observation that he was a many-sided animal, +and not to be caught with one hand, as they say! + +THEAETETUS: Then you must catch him with two. + +STRANGER: Yes, we must, if we can. And therefore let us try another +track in our pursuit of him: You are aware that there are certain menial +occupations which have names among servants? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, there are many such; which of them do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean such as sifting, straining, winnowing, threshing. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And besides these there are a great many more, such as +carding, spinning, adjusting the warp and the woof; and thousands of +similar expressions are used in the arts. + +THEAETETUS: Of what are they to be patterns, and what are we going to do +with them all? + +STRANGER: I think that in all of these there is implied a notion of +division. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Then if, as I was saying, there is one art which includes all +of them, ought not that art to have one name? + +THEAETETUS: And what is the name of the art? + +STRANGER: The art of discerning or discriminating. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: Think whether you cannot divide this. + +THEAETETUS: I should have to think a long while. + +STRANGER: In all the previously named processes either like has been +separated from like or the better from the worse. + +THEAETETUS: I see now what you mean. + +STRANGER: There is no name for the first kind of separation; of the +second, which throws away the worse and preserves the better, I do know +a name. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: Every discernment or discrimination of that kind, as I have +observed, is called a purification. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that is the usual expression. + +STRANGER: And any one may see that purification is of two kinds. + +THEAETETUS: Perhaps so, if he were allowed time to think; but I do not +see at this moment. + +STRANGER: There are many purifications of bodies which may with +propriety be comprehended under a single name. + +THEAETETUS: What are they, and what is their name? + +STRANGER: There is the purification of living bodies in their inward and +in their outward parts, of which the former is duly effected by medicine +and gymnastic, the latter by the not very dignified art of the bath-man; +and there is the purification of inanimate substances--to this the arts +of fulling and of furbishing in general attend in a number of minute +particulars, having a variety of names which are thought ridiculous. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: There can be no doubt that they are thought ridiculous, +Theaetetus; but then the dialectical art never considers whether the +benefit to be derived from the purge is greater or less than that to be +derived from the sponge, and has not more interest in the one than in +the other; her endeavour is to know what is and is not kindred in all +arts, with a view to the acquisition of intelligence; and having this +in view, she honours them all alike, and when she makes comparisons, she +counts one of them not a whit more ridiculous than another; nor does she +esteem him who adduces as his example of hunting, the general's art, at +all more decorous than another who cites that of the vermin-destroyer, +but only as the greater pretender of the two. And as to your question +concerning the name which was to comprehend all these arts of +purification, whether of animate or inanimate bodies, the art of +dialectic is in no wise particular about fine words, if she may be only +allowed to have a general name for all other purifications, binding them +up together and separating them off from the purification of the soul +or intellect. For this is the purification at which she wants to arrive, +and this we should understand to be her aim. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, I understand; and I agree that there are two sorts of +purification, and that one of them is concerned with the soul, and that +there is another which is concerned with the body. + +STRANGER: Excellent; and now listen to what I am going to say, and try +to divide further the first of the two. + +THEAETETUS: Whatever line of division you suggest, I will endeavour to +assist you. + +STRANGER: Do we admit that virtue is distinct from vice in the soul? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And purification was to leave the good and to cast out +whatever is bad? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Then any taking away of evil from the soul may be properly +called purification? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And in the soul there are two kinds of evil. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: The one may be compared to disease in the body, the other to +deformity. + +THEAETETUS: I do not understand. + +STRANGER: Perhaps you have never reflected that disease and discord are +the same. + +THEAETETUS: To this, again, I know not what I should reply. + +STRANGER: Do you not conceive discord to be a dissolution of kindred +elements, originating in some disagreement? + +THEAETETUS: Just that. + +STRANGER: And is deformity anything but the want of measure, which is +always unsightly? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +STRANGER: And do we not see that opinion is opposed to desire, pleasure +to anger, reason to pain, and that all these elements are opposed to one +another in the souls of bad men? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And yet they must all be akin? + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: Then we shall be right in calling vice a discord and disease +of the soul? + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: And when things having motion, and aiming at an appointed +mark, continually miss their aim and glance aside, shall we say that +this is the effect of symmetry among them, or of the want of symmetry? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly of the want of symmetry. + +STRANGER: But surely we know that no soul is voluntarily ignorant of +anything? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And what is ignorance but the aberration of a mind which is +bent on truth, and in which the process of understanding is perverted? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Then we are to regard an unintelligent soul as deformed and +devoid of symmetry? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then there are these two kinds of evil in the soul--the +one which is generally called vice, and is obviously a disease of the +soul... + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And there is the other, which they call ignorance, and which, +because existing only in the soul, they will not allow to be vice. + +THEAETETUS: I certainly admit what I at first disputed--that there are +two kinds of vice in the soul, and that we ought to consider cowardice, +intemperance, and injustice to be alike forms of disease in the +soul, and ignorance, of which there are all sorts of varieties, to be +deformity. + +STRANGER: And in the case of the body are there not two arts which have +to do with the two bodily states? + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: There is gymnastic, which has to do with deformity, and +medicine, which has to do with disease. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And where there is insolence and injustice and cowardice, is +not chastisement the art which is most required? + +THEAETETUS: That certainly appears to be the opinion of mankind. + +STRANGER: Again, of the various kinds of ignorance, may not instruction +be rightly said to be the remedy? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And of the art of instruction, shall we say that there is one +or many kinds? At any rate there are two principal ones. Think. + +THEAETETUS: I will. + +STRANGER: I believe that I can see how we shall soonest arrive at the +answer to this question. + +THEAETETUS: How? + +STRANGER: If we can discover a line which divides ignorance into two +halves. For a division of ignorance into two parts will certainly +imply that the art of instruction is also twofold, answering to the two +divisions of ignorance. + +THEAETETUS: Well, and do you see what you are looking for? + +STRANGER: I do seem to myself to see one very large and bad sort of +ignorance which is quite separate, and may be weighed in the scale +against all other sorts of ignorance put together. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: When a person supposes that he knows, and does not know; this +appears to be the great source of all the errors of the intellect. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And this, if I am not mistaken, is the kind of ignorance which +specially earns the title of stupidity. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: What name, then, shall be given to the sort of instruction +which gets rid of this? + +THEAETETUS: The instruction which you mean, Stranger, is, I should +imagine, not the teaching of handicraft arts, but what, thanks to us, +has been termed education in this part the world. + +STRANGER: Yes, Theaetetus, and by nearly all Hellenes. But we have still +to consider whether education admits of any further division. + +THEAETETUS: We have. + +STRANGER: I think that there is a point at which such a division is +possible. + +THEAETETUS: Where? + +STRANGER: Of education, one method appears to be rougher, and another +smoother. + +THEAETETUS: How are we to distinguish the two? + +STRANGER: There is the time-honoured mode which our fathers commonly +practised towards their sons, and which is still adopted by many--either +of roughly reproving their errors, or of gently advising them; +which varieties may be correctly included under the general term of +admonition. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: But whereas some appear to have arrived at the conclusion that +all ignorance is involuntary, and that no one who thinks himself wise is +willing to learn any of those things in which he is conscious of his +own cleverness, and that the admonitory sort of instruction gives much +trouble and does little good-- + +THEAETETUS: There they are quite right. + +STRANGER: Accordingly, they set to work to eradicate the spirit of +conceit in another way. + +THEAETETUS: In what way? + +STRANGER: They cross-examine a man's words, when he thinks that he is +saying something and is really saying nothing, and easily convict him +of inconsistencies in his opinions; these they then collect by the +dialectical process, and placing them side by side, show that they +contradict one another about the same things, in relation to the same +things, and in the same respect. He, seeing this, is angry with himself, +and grows gentle towards others, and thus is entirely delivered from +great prejudices and harsh notions, in a way which is most amusing to +the hearer, and produces the most lasting good effect on the person who +is the subject of the operation. For as the physician considers that +the body will receive no benefit from taking food until the internal +obstacles have been removed, so the purifier of the soul is conscious +that his patient will receive no benefit from the application of +knowledge until he is refuted, and from refutation learns modesty; he +must be purged of his prejudices first and made to think that he knows +only what he knows, and no more. + +THEAETETUS: That is certainly the best and wisest state of mind. + +STRANGER: For all these reasons, Theaetetus, we must admit that +refutation is the greatest and chiefest of purifications, and he who has +not been refuted, though he be the Great King himself, is in an awful +state of impurity; he is uninstructed and deformed in those things in +which he who would be truly blessed ought to be fairest and purest. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: And who are the ministers of this art? I am afraid to say the +Sophists. + +THEAETETUS: Why? + +STRANGER: Lest we should assign to them too high a prerogative. + +THEAETETUS: Yet the Sophist has a certain likeness to our minister of +purification. + +STRANGER: Yes, the same sort of likeness which a wolf, who is the +fiercest of animals, has to a dog, who is the gentlest. But he who +would not be found tripping, ought to be very careful in this matter +of comparisons, for they are most slippery things. Nevertheless, let us +assume that the Sophists are the men. I say this provisionally, for I +think that the line which divides them will be marked enough if proper +care is taken. + +THEAETETUS: Likely enough. + +STRANGER: Let us grant, then, that from the discerning art comes +purification, and from purification let there be separated off a +part which is concerned with the soul; of this mental purification +instruction is a portion, and of instruction education, and of +education, that refutation of vain conceit which has been discovered +in the present argument; and let this be called by you and me the +nobly-descended art of Sophistry. + +THEAETETUS: Very well; and yet, considering the number of forms in which +he has presented himself, I begin to doubt how I can with any truth or +confidence describe the real nature of the Sophist. + +STRANGER: You naturally feel perplexed; and yet I think that he must +be still more perplexed in his attempt to escape us, for as the proverb +says, when every way is blocked, there is no escape; now, then, is the +time of all others to set upon him. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: First let us wait a moment and recover breath, and while we +are resting, we may reckon up in how many forms he has appeared. In +the first place, he was discovered to be a paid hunter after wealth and +youth. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: In the second place, he was a merchant in the goods of the +soul. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: In the third place, he has turned out to be a retailer of the +same sort of wares. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; and in the fourth place, he himself manufactured the +learned wares which he sold. + +STRANGER: Quite right; I will try and remember the fifth myself. He +belonged to the fighting class, and was further distinguished as a hero +of debate, who professed the eristic art. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: The sixth point was doubtful, and yet we at last agreed +that he was a purger of souls, who cleared away notions obstructive to +knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: Do you not see that when the professor of any art has one +name and many kinds of knowledge, there must be something wrong? The +multiplicity of names which is applied to him shows that the common +principle to which all these branches of knowledge are tending, is not +understood. + +THEAETETUS: I should imagine this to be the case. + +STRANGER: At any rate we will understand him, and no indolence shall +prevent us. Let us begin again, then, and re-examine some of our +statements concerning the Sophist; there was one thing which appeared to +me especially characteristic of him. + +THEAETETUS: To what are you referring? + +STRANGER: We were saying of him, if I am not mistaken, that he was a +disputer? + +THEAETETUS: We were. + +STRANGER: And does he not also teach others the art of disputation? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly he does. + +STRANGER: And about what does he profess that he teaches men to dispute? +To begin at the beginning--Does he make them able to dispute about +divine things, which are invisible to men in general? + +THEAETETUS: At any rate, he is said to do so. + +STRANGER: And what do you say of the visible things in heaven and earth, +and the like? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly he disputes, and teaches to dispute about them. + +STRANGER: Then, again, in private conversation, when any universal +assertion is made about generation and essence, we know that such +persons are tremendous argufiers, and are able to impart their own skill +to others. + +THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly. + +STRANGER: And do they not profess to make men able to dispute about law +and about politics in general? + +THEAETETUS: Why, no one would have anything to say to them, if they did +not make these professions. + +STRANGER: In all and every art, what the craftsman ought to say in +answer to any question is written down in a popular form, and he who +likes may learn. + +THEAETETUS: I suppose that you are referring to the precepts of +Protagoras about wrestling and the other arts? + +STRANGER: Yes, my friend, and about a good many other things. In a word, +is not the art of disputation a power of disputing about all things? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly; there does not seem to be much which is left out. + +STRANGER: But oh! my dear youth, do you suppose this possible? for +perhaps your young eyes may see things which to our duller sight do not +appear. + +THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? I do not think that I understand +your present question. + +STRANGER: I ask whether anybody can understand all things. + +THEAETETUS: Happy would mankind be if such a thing were possible! + +SOCRATES: But how can any one who is ignorant dispute in a rational +manner against him who knows? + +THEAETETUS: He cannot. + +STRANGER: Then why has the sophistical art such a mysterious power? + +THEAETETUS: To what do you refer? + +STRANGER: How do the Sophists make young men believe in their supreme +and universal wisdom? For if they neither disputed nor were thought +to dispute rightly, or being thought to do so were deemed no wiser for +their controversial skill, then, to quote your own observation, no one +would give them money or be willing to learn their art. + +THEAETETUS: They certainly would not. + +STRANGER: But they are willing. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, they are. + +STRANGER: Yes, and the reason, as I should imagine, is that they are +supposed to have knowledge of those things about which they dispute? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And they dispute about all things? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And therefore, to their disciples, they appear to be all-wise? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But they are not; for that was shown to be impossible. + +THEAETETUS: Impossible, of course. + +STRANGER: Then the Sophist has been shown to have a sort of conjectural +or apparent knowledge only of all things, which is not the truth? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly; no better description of him could be given. + +STRANGER: Let us now take an illustration, which will still more clearly +explain his nature. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: I will tell you, and you shall answer me, giving your very +closest attention. Suppose that a person were to profess, not that he +could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, +by a single art. + +THEAETETUS: All things? + +STRANGER: I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, +for you do not understand the meaning of 'all.' + +THEAETETUS: No, I do not. + +STRANGER: Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and +trees. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all +creatures. + +THEAETETUS: What would he mean by 'making'? He cannot be a +husbandman;--for you said that he is a maker of animals. + +STRANGER: Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the +earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, +further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few +pence. + +THEAETETUS: That must be a jest. + +STRANGER: And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach +them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a +jest? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than +imitation? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, +which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things. + +STRANGER: We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to +make all things is really a painter, and by the painter's art makes +resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and +he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom +he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the +absolute power of making whatever he likes. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of +reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by +words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from +the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and +making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest +of men in all things? + +THEAETETUS: Yes; why should there not be another such art? + +STRANGER: But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, +and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad +experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater +part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly +entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy +difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts +of life? + +THEAETETUS: That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, +I may be one of those who see things at a distance only. + +STRANGER: And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always +will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad +reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist +is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still +disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various +matters about which he disputes? + +THEAETETUS: But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what +has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of +children's play? + +STRANGER: Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly we must. + +STRANGER: And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have +got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he +decidedly will not escape. + +THEAETETUS: What is that? + +STRANGER: The inference that he is a juggler. + +THEAETETUS: Precisely my own opinion of him. + +STRANGER: Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the +image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not +run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over +to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him; +and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes +himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some +sub-section of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each +and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape +in triumph. + +THEAETETUS: Well said; and let us do as you propose. + +STRANGER: Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I +think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am +not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found. + +THEAETETUS: Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which +you are speaking? + +STRANGER: One is the art of likeness-making;--generally a likeness of +anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the +proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, +each thing receiving also its appropriate colour. + +THEAETETUS: Is not this always the aim of imitation? + +STRANGER: Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting, +which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for +artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper +part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in +comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the +truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be +beautiful, disregarding the real ones. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly +call a likeness or image? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the +imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of +likeness-making? + +THEAETETUS: Let that be the name. + +STRANGER: And what shall we call those resemblances of the beautiful, +which appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator, +whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works +of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they +profess to be like? May we not call these 'appearances,' since they +appear only and are not really like? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and +in all imitation. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an +appearance and not an image, phantastic art? + +THEAETETUS: Most fairly. + +STRANGER: These then are the two kinds of image-making--the art of +making likenesses, and phantastic or the art of making appearances? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the +Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful +and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got +into an impossible place. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, he has. + +STRANGER: Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment +by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer? + +THEAETETUS: May I ask to what you are referring? + +STRANGER: My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult +speculation--there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear +and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, +has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can any +one say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in +a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one. + +THEAETETUS: Why? + +STRANGER: He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert +the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of +falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great +Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life +he continued to inculcate the same lesson--always repeating both in +verse and out of verse: + +'Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show that +not-being is.' + +Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when +sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the +words themselves? + +THEAETETUS: Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should +carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with +you. + +STRANGER: Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden +word 'not-being'? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly we do. + +STRANGER: Let us be serious then, and consider the question neither +in strife nor play: suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was +asked, 'To what is the term "not-being" to be applied?'--do you know +what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he +would make to the enquirer? + +THEAETETUS: That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at +all by a person like myself. + +STRANGER: There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the +predicate 'not-being' is not applicable to any being. + +THEAETETUS: None, certainly. + +STRANGER: And if not to being, then not to something. + +THEAETETUS: Of course not. + +STRANGER: It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of +being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all +being is impossible. + +THEAETETUS: Impossible. + +STRANGER: You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must +say some one thing? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Some in the singular (ti) you would say is the sign of one, +some in the dual (tine) of two, some in the plural (tines) of many? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +STRANGER: Then he who says 'not something' must say absolutely nothing. + +THEAETETUS: Most assuredly. + +STRANGER: And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he +who says 'not-being' does not speak at all. + +THEAETETUS: The difficulty of the argument can no further go. + +STRANGER: Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there +still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the +very foundation of the matter. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak. + +STRANGER: To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not? + +THEAETETUS: Impossible. + +STRANGER: And all number is to be reckoned among things which are? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence. + +STRANGER: Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number +either in the singular or plural? + +THEAETETUS: The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so. + +STRANGER: But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in +thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number? + +THEAETETUS: How indeed? + +STRANGER: When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing +plurality to not-being? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But, on the other hand, when we say 'what is not,' do we not +attribute unity? + +THEAETETUS: Manifestly. + +STRANGER: Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to +attribute being to not-being? + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be +spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, +unspeakable, indescribable? + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: But, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the +difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all. + +THEAETETUS: What! is there a greater still behind? + +STRANGER: Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that +you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of +not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon +as he makes the attempt. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? Speak more clearly. + +STRANGER: Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that +not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and +am still speaking of not-being as one; for I say 'not-being.' Do you +understand? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, +unspeakable, indescribable: do you follow? + +THEAETETUS: I do after a fashion. + +STRANGER: When I introduced the word 'is,' did I not contradict what I +said before? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +STRANGER: And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being +as one? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable +and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not +refer to not-being as one? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be +defined as one or many, and should not even be called 'it,' for the use +of the word 'it' would imply a form of unity. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: How, then, can any one put any faith in me? For now, as +always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as +I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about +not-being; but come, let us try the experiment with you. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all +your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing +into it either existence or unity or plurality. + +THEAETETUS: It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the +task when I see you thus discomfited. + +STRANGER: Say no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other +who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the +Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: And if we say to him that he professes an art of making +appearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon +ourselves; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, 'Pray what +do you mean at all by an image?'--and I should like to know, Theaetetus, +how we can possibly answer the younker's question? + +THEAETETUS: We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are +reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and +other duplicates. + +STRANGER: I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance +of the Sophist. + +THEAETETUS: Why do you think so? + +STRANGER: He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in +sculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to +scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or +of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea. + +THEAETETUS: What can he mean? + +STRANGER: The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak +of as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were +the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your +ground against him? + +THEAETETUS: How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something +fashioned in the likeness of the true? + +STRANGER: And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or +what do you mean? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance. + +STRANGER: And you mean by true that which really is? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +STRANGER: A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not +true? + +THEAETETUS: Nay, but it is in a certain sense. + +STRANGER: You mean to say, not in a true sense? + +THEAETETUS: Yes; it is in reality only an image. + +STRANGER: Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal. + +THEAETETUS: In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are +involved! + +STRANGER: Strange! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of +opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our +will, to admit the existence of not-being. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, I see. + +STRANGER: The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a +contradiction. + +THEAETETUS: How do you mean? And where does the danger lie? + +STRANGER: When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that +his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think +falsely, or what do we mean? + +THEAETETUS: There is nothing else to be said. + +STRANGER: Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the +opposite of the truth:--You would assent? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not? + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or +that in a certain sense they are? + +THEAETETUS: Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain +sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible. + +STRANGER: And does not false opinion also think that things which most +certainly exist do not exist at all? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And here, again, is falsehood? + +THEAETETUS: Falsehood--yes. + +STRANGER: And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to +be one which asserts the non-existence of things which are, and the +existence of things which are not. + +THEAETETUS: There is no other way in which a false proposition can +arise. + +STRANGER: There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements. +And indeed how can any rational man assent to them, when the very +expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to +be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his +point, Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves +when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in +words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again +to assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter +impossibility. + +STRANGER: How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a +consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we +persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, +you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will +arise are very numerous and obvious. + +THEAETETUS: They are indeed. + +STRANGER: We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and +they are really infinite. + +THEAETETUS: If that is the case, we cannot possibly catch the Sophist. + +STRANGER: Shall we then be so faint-hearted as to give him up? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not, I should say, if we can get the slightest +hold upon him. + +STRANGER: Will you then forgive me, and, as your words imply, not be +altogether displeased if I flinch a little from the grasp of such a +sturdy argument? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure I will. + +STRANGER: I have a yet more urgent request to make. + +THEAETETUS: Which is--? + +STRANGER: That you will promise not to regard me as a parricide. + +THEAETETUS: And why? + +STRANGER: Because, in self-defence, I must test the philosophy of my +father Parmenides, and try to prove by main force that in a certain +sense not-being is, and that being, on the other hand, is not. + +THEAETETUS: Some attempt of the kind is clearly needed. + +STRANGER: Yes, a blind man, as they say, might see that, and, unless +these questions are decided in one way or another, no one when he speaks +of false words, or false opinion, or idols, or images, or imitations, or +appearances, or about the arts which are concerned with them; can avoid +falling into ridiculous contradictions. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: And therefore I must venture to lay hands on my father's +argument; for if I am to be over-scrupulous, I shall have to give the +matter up. + +THEAETETUS: Nothing in the world should ever induce us to do so. + +STRANGER: I have a third little request which I wish to make. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: You heard me say what I have always felt and still feel--that +I have no heart for this argument? + +THEAETETUS: I did. + +STRANGER: I tremble at the thought of what I have said, and expect that +you will deem me mad, when you hear of my sudden changes and shiftings; +let me therefore observe, that I am examining the question entirely out +of regard for you. + +THEAETETUS: There is no reason for you to fear that I shall impute +any impropriety to you, if you attempt this refutation and proof; take +heart, therefore, and proceed. + +STRANGER: And where shall I begin the perilous enterprise? I think that +the road which I must take is-- + +THEAETETUS: Which?--Let me hear. + +STRANGER: I think that we had better, first of all, consider the points +which at present are regarded as self-evident, lest we may have fallen +into some confusion, and be too ready to assent to one another, fancying +that we are quite clear about them. + +THEAETETUS: Say more distinctly what you mean. + +STRANGER: I think that Parmenides, and all ever yet undertook to +determine the number and nature of existences, talked to us in rather a +light and easy strain. + +THEAETETUS: How? + +STRANGER: As if we had been children, to whom they repeated each his own +mythus or story;--one said that there were three principles, and that at +one time there was war between certain of them; and then again there was +peace, and they were married and begat children, and brought them up; +and another spoke of two principles,--a moist and a dry, or a hot and +a cold, and made them marry and cohabit. The Eleatics, however, in our +part of the world, say that all things are many in name, but in nature +one; this is their mythus, which goes back to Xenophanes, and is even +older. Then there are Ionian, and in more recent times Sicilian muses, +who have arrived at the conclusion that to unite the two principles is +safer, and to say that being is one and many, and that these are held +together by enmity and friendship, ever parting, ever meeting, as +the severer Muses assert, while the gentler ones do not insist on the +perpetual strife and peace, but admit a relaxation and alternation of +them; peace and unity sometimes prevailing under the sway of Aphrodite, +and then again plurality and war, by reason of a principle of strife. +Whether any of them spoke the truth in all this is hard to determine; +besides, antiquity and famous men should have reverence, and not be +liable to accusations so serious. Yet one thing may be said of them +without offence-- + +THEAETETUS: What thing? + +STRANGER: That they went on their several ways disdaining to notice +people like ourselves; they did not care whether they took us with them, +or left us behind them. + +THEAETETUS: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean to say, that when they talk of one, two, or more +elements, which are or have become or are becoming, or again of +heat mingling with cold, assuming in some other part of their works +separations and mixtures,--tell me, Theaetetus, do you understand what +they mean by these expressions? When I was a younger man, I used +to fancy that I understood quite well what was meant by the term +'not-being,' which is our present subject of dispute; and now you see in +what a fix we are about it. + +THEAETETUS: I see. + +STRANGER: And very likely we have been getting into the same perplexity +about 'being,' and yet may fancy that when anybody utters the word, we +understand him quite easily, although we do not know about not-being. +But we may be; equally ignorant of both. + +THEAETETUS: I dare say. + +STRANGER: And the same may be said of all the terms just mentioned. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: The consideration of most of them may be deferred; but we had +better now discuss the chief captain and leader of them. + +THEAETETUS: Of what are you speaking? You clearly think that we must +first investigate what people mean by the word 'being.' + +STRANGER: You follow close at my heels, Theaetetus. For the right +method, I conceive, will be to call into our presence the dualistic +philosophers and to interrogate them. 'Come,' we will say, 'Ye, who +affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the universe, +what is this term which you apply to both of them, and what do you mean +when you say that both and each of them "are"? How are we to understand +the word "are"? Upon your view, are we to suppose that there is a third +principle over and above the other two,--three in all, and not two? For +clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet +attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of +the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they +will be one and not two.' + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: But perhaps you mean to give the name of 'being' to both of +them together? + +THEAETETUS: Quite likely. + +STRANGER: 'Then, friends,' we shall reply to them, 'the answer is +plainly that the two will still be resolved into one.' + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: 'Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what +you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you +always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once +thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please +to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy +that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.' There will +be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of +the dualists or of the pluralists? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all--must +we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 'being'? + +THEAETETUS: By all means. + +STRANGER: Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is? +'Yes,' they will reply. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And there is something which you call 'being'? + +THEAETETUS: 'Yes.' + +STRANGER: And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to +the same thing? + +THEAETETUS: What will be their answer, Stranger? + +STRANGER: It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of +being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question. + +THEAETETUS: Why so? + +STRANGER: To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but +unity, is surely ridiculous? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything? + +THEAETETUS: How so? + +STRANGER: To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be +compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says that it +is the name of something, even then the name will only be the name of a +name, and of nothing else. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And the one will turn out to be only one of one, and being +absolute unity, will represent a mere name. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And would they say that the whole is other than the one that +is, or the same with it? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure they would, and they actually say so. + +STRANGER: If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings,-- + +'Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere, Evenly +balanced from the centre on every side, And must needs be neither +greater nor less in any way, Neither on this side nor on that--' + +then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also +have parts. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in +all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute +unity? + +THEAETETUS: Why not? + +STRANGER: Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one +must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will +contradict reason. + +THEAETETUS: I understand. + +STRANGER: Shall we say that being is one and a whole, because it has the +attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all? + +THEAETETUS: That is a hard alternative to offer. + +STRANGER: Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute +of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is +therefore more than one. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute +of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks +something of its own nature? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will +become not-being? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the +whole will each have their separate nature. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous +difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, +that besides having no being, being can never have come into being. + +THEAETETUS: Why so? + +STRANGER: Because that which comes into being always comes into being as +a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot +speak either of essence or generation as existing. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that certainly appears to be true. + +STRANGER: Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? +For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of +that quantity. + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +STRANGER: And there will be innumerable other points, each of them +causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or +two. + +THEAETETUS: The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this; for +one objection connects with another, and they are always involving what +has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity. + +STRANGER: We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who +treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and +proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as +the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to +comprehend as that of not-being. + +THEAETETUS: Then now we will go to the others. + +STRANGER: There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going +on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of +essence. + +THEAETETUS: How is that? + +STRANGER: Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from +the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and +oaks; of these they lay hold, and obstinately maintain, that the things +only which can be touched or handled have being or essence, because they +define being and body as one, and if any one else says that what is not +a body exists they altogether despise him, and will hear of nothing but +body. + +THEAETETUS: I have often met with such men, and terrible fellows they +are. + +STRANGER: And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend +themselves from above, out of an unseen world, mightily contending that +true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal ideas; the +bodies of the materialists, which by them are maintained to be the very +truth, they break up into little bits by their arguments, and affirm +them to be, not essence, but generation and motion. Between the +two armies, Theaetetus, there is always an endless conflict raging +concerning these matters. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Let us ask each party in turn, to give an account of that +which they call essence. + +THEAETETUS: How shall we get it out of them? + +STRANGER: With those who make being to consist in ideas, there will be +less difficulty, for they are civil people enough; but there will be +very great difficulty, or rather an absolute impossibility, in getting +an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter. Shall I tell +you what we must do? + +THEAETETUS: What? + +STRANGER: Let us, if we can, really improve them; but if this is not +possible, let us imagine them to be better than they are, and more +willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument, and then +their opinion will be more worth having; for that which better men +acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by inferior +men. Moreover we are no respecters of persons, but seekers after truth. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: Then now, on the supposition that they are improved, let us +ask them to state their views, and do you interpret them. + +THEAETETUS: Agreed. + +STRANGER: Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a +thing as a mortal animal. + +THEAETETUS: Of course they would. + +STRANGER: And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly they do. + +STRANGER: Meaning to say that the soul is something which exists? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And do they not say that one soul is just, and another unjust, +and that one soul is wise, and another foolish? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by +the possession of justice and wisdom, and the opposite under opposite +circumstances? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, they do. + +STRANGER: But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be +admitted by them to exist? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And, allowing that justice, wisdom, the other virtues, and +their opposites exist, as well as a soul in which they inhere, do +they affirm any of them to be visible and tangible, or are they all +invisible? + +THEAETETUS: They would say that hardly any of them are visible. + +STRANGER: And would they say that they are corporeal? + +THEAETETUS: They would distinguish: the soul would be said by them to +have a body; but as to the other qualities of justice, wisdom, and the +like, about which you asked, they would not venture either to deny their +existence, or to maintain that they were all corporeal. + +STRANGER: Verily, Theaetetus, I perceive a great improvement in them; +the real aborigines, children of the dragon's teeth, would have been +deterred by no shame at all, but would have obstinately asserted that +nothing is which they are not able to squeeze in their hands. + +THEAETETUS: That is pretty much their notion. + +STRANGER: Let us push the question; for if they will admit that any, +even the smallest particle of being, is incorporeal, it is enough; they +must then say what that nature is which is common to both the corporeal +and incorporeal, and which they have in their mind's eye when they say +of both of them that they 'are.' Perhaps they may be in a difficulty; +and if this is the case, there is a possibility that they may accept a +notion of ours respecting the nature of being, having nothing of their +own to offer. + +THEAETETUS: What is the notion? Tell me, and we shall soon see. + +STRANGER: My notion would be, that anything which possesses any sort +of power to affect another, or to be affected by another, if only for a +single moment, however trifling the cause and however slight the effect, +has real existence; and I hold that the definition of being is simply +power. + +THEAETETUS: They accept your suggestion, having nothing better of their +own to offer. + +STRANGER: Very good; perhaps we, as well as they, may one day change our +minds; but, for the present, this may be regarded as the understanding +which is established with them. + +THEAETETUS: Agreed. + +STRANGER: Let us now go to the friends of ideas; of their opinions, too, +you shall be the interpreter. + +THEAETETUS: I will. + +STRANGER: To them we say--You would distinguish essence from generation? + +THEAETETUS: 'Yes,' they reply. + +STRANGER: And you would allow that we participate in generation with the +body, and through perception, but we participate with the soul through +thought in true essence; and essence you would affirm to be always the +same and immutable, whereas generation or becoming varies? + +THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we should affirm. + +STRANGER: Well, fair sirs, we say to them, what is this participation, +which you assert of both? Do you agree with our recent definition? + +THEAETETUS: What definition? + +STRANGER: We said that being was an active or passive energy, arising +out of a certain power which proceeds from elements meeting with one +another. Perhaps your ears, Theaetetus, may fail to catch their answer, +which I recognize because I have been accustomed to hear it. + +THEAETETUS: And what is their answer? + +STRANGER: They deny the truth of what we were just now saying to the +aborigines about existence. + +THEAETETUS: What was that? + +STRANGER: Any power of doing or suffering in a degree however slight was +held by us to be a sufficient definition of being? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: They deny this, and say that the power of doing or suffering +is confined to becoming, and that neither power is applicable to being. + +THEAETETUS: And is there not some truth in what they say? + +STRANGER: Yes; but our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from +them more distinctly, whether they further admit that the soul knows, +and that being or essence is known. + +THEAETETUS: There can be no doubt that they say so. + +STRANGER: And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both, +or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in +either? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say +anything else, they will contradict themselves. + +STRANGER: I understand; but they will allow that if to know is active, +then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in +so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in +motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we +affirm. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion +and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can +we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful +unmeaningness an everlasting fixture? + +THEAETETUS: That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger. + +STRANGER: But shall we say that has mind and not life? + +THEAETETUS: How is that possible? + +STRANGER: Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it +has no soul which contains them? + +THEAETETUS: And in what other way can it contain them? + +STRANGER: Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed +with soul remains absolutely unmoved? + +THEAETETUS: All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational. + +STRANGER: Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is +moved. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no +motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or +belonging to any one. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are +in motion--upon this view too mind has no existence. + +THEAETETUS: How so? + +STRANGER: Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject +could ever exist without a principle of rest? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into +existence anywhere? + +THEAETETUS: No. + +STRANGER: And surely contend we must in every possible way against him +who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to +speak confidently about anything. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, with all our might. + +STRANGER: Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for these +qualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that +the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms: and he will +be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say +entreatingly 'Give us both,' so he will include both the moveable and +immoveable in his definition of being and all. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: And now, do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being? + +THEAETETUS: Yes truly. + +STRANGER: Alas, Theaetetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to +see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our +ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good? + +THEAETETUS: I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all +understand how we never found out our desperate case. + +STRANGER: Reflect: after having made these admissions, may we not be +justly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those +who said that all was hot and cold? + +THEAETETUS: What were they? Will you recall them to my mind? + +STRANGER: To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting +the same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire +opposition to one another? + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: And yet you would say that both and either of them equally +are? + +THEAETETUS: I should. + +STRANGER: And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you +mean to say that both or either of them are in motion? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you +say that they are? + +THEAETETUS: Of course not. + +STRANGER: Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, +under which rest and motion are alike included; and, observing that they +both participate in being, you declare that they are. + +THEAETETUS: Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third +thing, when we say that rest and motion are. + +STRANGER: Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but +something different from them. + +THEAETETUS: So it would appear. + +STRANGER: Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion +nor at rest. + +THEAETETUS: That is very much the truth. + +STRANGER: Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any +clear or fixed notion of being in his mind? + +THEAETETUS: Where, indeed? + +STRANGER: I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is +not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must +be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this +possible? + +THEAETETUS: Utterly impossible. + +STRANGER: Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind. + +THEAETETUS: What? + +STRANGER: When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation +of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:--do you remember? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being? + +THEAETETUS: I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which is, if +possible, even greater. + +STRANGER: Then let us acknowledge the difficulty; and as being and +not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when +the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear; +and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of +steering our way in between them, without any great discredit. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of +the same thing. + +THEAETETUS: Give an example. + +STRANGER: I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many +names--that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and +virtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand +others we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having +numberless other attributes, and in the same way anything else which we +originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many +names. + +THEAETETUS: That is true. + +STRANGER: And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or +old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be +many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that a man +is good; for man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that +you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters--they are +often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these +discoveries of theirs, which they believe to be the height of wisdom. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly, I have. + +STRANGER: Then, not to exclude any one who has ever speculated at all +upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to +our former friends. + +THEAETETUS: What questions? + +STRANGER: Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or +anything to anything, and assume that they do not mingle, and are +incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into +one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things +communicable and others not?--Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, +will they prefer? + +THEAETETUS: I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you +take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences +which follow from each of them. + +STRANGER: Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is +capable of participating in anything else in any respect; in that case +rest and motion cannot participate in being at all. + +THEAETETUS: They cannot. + +STRANGER: But would either of them be if not participating in being? + +THEAETETUS: No. + +STRANGER: Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as +well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the +doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting +kinds; for all these add on a notion of being, some affirming that +things 'are' truly in motion, and others that they 'are' truly at rest. + +THEAETETUS: Just so. + +STRANGER: Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another +resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating +infinity, or dividing them into finite elements, and forming compounds +out of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be +successive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there +were no admixture. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want +to carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because +participating in some affection from another, by the name of that other. + +THEAETETUS: Why so? + +STRANGER: Why, because they are compelled to use the words 'to be,' +'apart,' 'from others,' 'in itself,' and ten thousand more, which they +cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and +therefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy, +as the saying is, inhabits the same house with them; they are always +carrying about with them an adversary, like the wonderful ventriloquist, +Eurycles, who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them. + +THEAETETUS: Precisely so; a very true and exact illustration. + +STRANGER: And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of +communion with one another--what will follow? + +THEAETETUS: Even I can solve that riddle. + +STRANGER: How? + +THEAETETUS: Why, because motion itself would be at rest, and rest again +in motion, if they could be attributed to one another. + +STRANGER: But this is utterly impossible. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: Then only the third hypothesis remains. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: For, surely, either all things have communion with all; or +nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some +things and others not. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And two out of these three suppositions have been found to be +impossible. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Every one then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the +third and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the +case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others +do. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades +all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be +joined to another. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: But does every one know what letters will unite with what? Or +is art required in order to do so? + +THEAETETUS: Art is required. + +STRANGER: What art? + +THEAETETUS: The art of grammar. + +STRANGER: And is not this also true of sounds high and low?--Is not he +who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is +ignorant, not a musician? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the +absence of art. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of +them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would +rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the +help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the +connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all +things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal +classes, which make them possible? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not +mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences. + +STRANGER: How are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted +unwittingly upon our free and noble science, and in looking for the +Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares? + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: Should we not say that the division according to classes, +which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the +business of the dialectical science? + +THEAETETUS: That is what we should say. + +STRANGER: Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly +one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms +contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into +a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing +only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which +determines where they can have communion with one another and where not. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to +the philosopher pure and true? + +THEAETETUS: Who but he can be worthy? + +STRANGER: In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we +look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a +different reason. + +THEAETETUS: For what reason? + +STRANGER: Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, +in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered +because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true? + +THEAETETUS: It seems to be so. + +STRANGER: And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason +with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls +of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other. + +STRANGER: Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered +by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed +to escape until we have had a good look at him. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion +with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and +others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have +universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the +argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude +of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are +reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures +and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we +are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being +and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of +them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if +peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and +yet escape unscathed. + +THEAETETUS: We must do so. + +STRANGER: The most important of all the genera are those which we were +just now mentioning--being and rest and motion. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, by far. + +STRANGER: And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion +with one another. + +THEAETETUS: Quite incapable. + +STRANGER: Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both +of them are? + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: That makes up three of them. + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same +with itself. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: But then, what is the meaning of these two words, 'same' and +'other'? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of +necessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead +of three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously +speaking of one of the three first kinds? + +THEAETETUS: Very likely we are. + +STRANGER: But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the +same. + +THEAETETUS: How is that? + +STRANGER: Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be +either of them. + +THEAETETUS: Why not? + +STRANGER: Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either +of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into +the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is +either the same or the other. + +THEAETETUS: No; we must not. + +STRANGER: But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical? + +THEAETETUS: Possibly. + +STRANGER: But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion +and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same. + +THEAETETUS: Which surely cannot be. + +STRANGER: Then being and the same cannot be one. + +THEAETETUS: Scarcely. + +STRANGER: Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is +now to be added to the three others. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we +consider being and other to be two names of the same class? + +THEAETETUS: Very likely. + +STRANGER: But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are +relative as well as absolute? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And the other is always relative to other? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: But this would not be the case unless being and the other +entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well +as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not +other than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity +be what it is in relation to some other. + +THEAETETUS: That is the true state of the case. + +STRANGER: Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected +classes. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ +from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they +partake of the idea of the other. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the +five. + +THEAETETUS: How? + +STRANGER: First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely +'other' than rest: what else can we say? + +THEAETETUS: It is so. + +STRANGER: And therefore is not rest. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: And yet is, because partaking of being. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Again, motion is other than the same? + +THEAETETUS: Just so. + +STRANGER: And is therefore not the same. + +THEAETETUS: It is not. + +STRANGER: Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of +the same. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the +same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms 'same' and 'not +the same,' in the same sense; but we call it the 'same,' in relation to +itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having +communion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has +become not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as 'not +the same.' + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, +there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary. + +THEAETETUS: Quite right,--that is, on the supposition that some classes +mingle with one another, and others not. + +STRANGER: That such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had +already proved before we arrived at this part of our discussion. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than +the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and +other than rest? + +THEAETETUS: That is certain. + +STRANGER: Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not +other? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than +the three and not other than the fourth,--for we agreed that there +are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make +enquiry? + +THEAETETUS: Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it +appeared to be just now. + +STRANGER: Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than +being? + +THEAETETUS: Without the least fear. + +STRANGER: The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, +really is and also is not? + +THEAETETUS: Nothing can be plainer. + +STRANGER: Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of +every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes +each of them other than being, and so non-existent; and therefore of all +of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again, +inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent. + +THEAETETUS: So we may assume. + +STRANGER: Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of +not-being. + +THEAETETUS: So we must infer. + +STRANGER: And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many +other things as there are; for not-being these it is itself one, and is +not the other things, which are infinite in number. + +THEAETETUS: That is not far from the truth. + +STRANGER: And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the +nature of classes to have communion with one another; and if any one +denies our present statement [viz., that being is not, etc.], let him +first argue with our former conclusion [i.e., respecting the communion +of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows. + +THEAETETUS: Nothing can be fairer. + +STRANGER: Let me ask you to consider a further question. + +THEAETETUS: What question? + +STRANGER: When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of +something opposed to being, but only different. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: When we speak of something as not great, does the expression +seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +STRANGER: The negative particles, ou and me, when prefixed to words, +do not imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more +correctly from the things represented by the words, which follow them. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: There is another point to be considered, if you do not object. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into +fractions like knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: How so? + +STRANGER: Knowledge, like the other, is one; and yet the various parts +of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence +there are many arts and kinds of knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And is not the case the same with the parts of the other, +which is also one? + +THEAETETUS: Very likely; but will you tell me how? + +STRANGER: There is some part of the other which is opposed to the +beautiful? + +THEAETETUS: There is. + +STRANGER: Shall we say that this has or has not a name? + +THEAETETUS: It has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the +beautiful, not than something else. + +STRANGER: And now tell me another thing. + +THEAETETUS: What? + +STRANGER: Is the not-beautiful anything but this--an existence parted +off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of +view opposed to an existing something? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being +to being? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the +not-beautiful a less real existence? + +THEAETETUS: Not at all. + +STRANGER: And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the +great? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same +category with the not-just--the one cannot be said to have any more +existence than the other. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature +of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally +be supposed to exist. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +STRANGER: Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other, +and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, +as truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being, +but only what is other than being. + +THEAETETUS: Beyond question. + +STRANGER: What then shall we call it? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which +the Sophist compelled us to search. + +STRANGER: And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence +as any other class? May I not say with confidence that not-being has an +assured existence, and a nature of its own? Just as the great was found +to be great and the beautiful beautiful, and the not-great not-great, +and the not-beautiful not-beautiful, in the same manner not-being has +been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the +many classes of being. Do you, Theaetetus, still feel any doubt of this? + +THEAETETUS: None whatever. + +STRANGER: Do you observe that our scepticism has carried us beyond the +range of Parmenides' prohibition? + +THEAETETUS: In what? + +STRANGER: We have advanced to a further point, and shown him more than +he forbad us to investigate. + +THEAETETUS: How is that? + +STRANGER: Why, because he says-- + +'Not-being never is, and do thou keep thy thoughts from this way of +enquiry.' + +THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so. + +STRANGER: Whereas, we have not only proved that things which are not +are, but we have shown what form of being not-being is; for we have +shown that the nature of the other is, and is distributed over all +things in their relations to one another, and whatever part of the other +is contrasted with being, this is precisely what we have ventured to +call not-being. + +THEAETETUS: And surely, Stranger, we were quite right. + +STRANGER: Let not any one say, then, that while affirming the opposition +of not-being to being, we still assert the being of not-being; for as to +whether there is an opposite of being, to that enquiry we have long +said good-bye--it may or may not be, and may or may not be capable of +definition. But as touching our present account of not-being, let a man +either convince us of error, or, so long as he cannot, he too must say, +as we are saying, that there is a communion of classes, and that +being, and difference or other, traverse all things and mutually +interpenetrate, so that the other partakes of being, and by reason of +this participation is, and yet is not that of which it partakes, but +other, and being other than being, it is clearly a necessity that +not-being should be. And again, being, through partaking of the other, +becomes a class other than the remaining classes, and being other than +all of them, is not each one of them, and is not all the rest, so that +undoubtedly there are thousands upon thousands of cases in which +being is not, and all other things, whether regarded individually or +collectively, in many respects are, and in many respects are not. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And he who is sceptical of this contradiction, must think how +he can find something better to say; or if he sees a puzzle, and his +pleasure is to drag words this way and that, the argument will prove to +him, that he is not making a worthy use of his faculties; for there is +no charm in such puzzles, and there is no difficulty in detecting them; +but we can tell him of something else the pursuit of which is noble and +also difficult. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: A thing of which I have already spoken;--letting alone these +puzzles as involving no difficulty, he should be able to follow and +criticize in detail every argument, and when a man says that the same is +in a manner other, or that other is the same, to understand and refute +him from his own point of view, and in the same respect in which he +asserts either of these affections. But to show that somehow and in some +sense the same is other, or the other same, or the great small, or +the like unlike; and to delight in always bringing forward such +contradictions, is no real refutation, but is clearly the new-born babe +of some one who is only beginning to approach the problem of being. + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: For certainly, my friend, the attempt to separate all +existences from one another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an +educated or philosophical mind. + +THEAETETUS: Why so? + +STRANGER: The attempt at universal separation is the final annihilation +of all reasoning; for only by the union of conceptions with one another +do we attain to discourse of reason. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And, observe that we were only just in time in making a +resistance to such separatists, and compelling them to admit that one +thing mingles with another. + +THEAETETUS: Why so? + +STRANGER: Why, that we might be able to assert discourse to be a kind of +being; for if we could not, the worst of all consequences would follow; +we should have no philosophy. Moreover, the necessity for determining +the nature of discourse presses upon us at this moment; if utterly +deprived of it, we could no more hold discourse; and deprived of it we +should be if we admitted that there was no admixture of natures at all. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. But I do not understand why at this moment we +must determine the nature of discourse. + +STRANGER: Perhaps you will see more clearly by the help of the following +explanation. + +THEAETETUS: What explanation? + +STRANGER: Not-being has been acknowledged by us to be one among many +classes diffused over all being. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And thence arises the question, whether not-being mingles with +opinion and language. + +THEAETETUS: How so? + +STRANGER: If not-being has no part in the proposition, then all things +must be true; but if not-being has a part, then false opinion and false +speech are possible, for to think or to say what is not--is falsehood, +which thus arises in the region of thought and in speech. + +THEAETETUS: That is quite true. + +STRANGER: And where there is falsehood surely there must be deceit. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And if there is deceit, then all things must be full of idols +and images and fancies. + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +STRANGER: Into that region the Sophist, as we said, made his escape, +and, when he had got there, denied the very possibility of falsehood; +no one, he argued, either conceived or uttered falsehood, inasmuch as +not-being did not in any way partake of being. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And now, not-being has been shown to partake of being, and +therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will +probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and +that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will +still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and +phantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, +opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this +participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with +the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the +nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we +find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, +having made out the connexion of them, may thus prove that falsehood +exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, +if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what +was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily +caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, +and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man +himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first +defence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another; +for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of +language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of +defence without end. + +STRANGER: Any one, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little +ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a +little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing +a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a +city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and +what remains is easier. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception +of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for +determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether +they are both always true, and neither of them ever false. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking +of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may +be expected. + +THEAETETUS: And what is the question at issue about names? + +STRANGER: The question at issue is whether all names may be connected +with one another, or none, or only some of them. + +THEAETETUS: Clearly the last is true. + +STRANGER: I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when +in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when +in sequence cannot be connected? + +THEAETETUS: What are you saying? + +STRANGER: What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; +for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the +voice. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs. + +THEAETETUS: Describe them. + +STRANGER: That which denotes action we call a verb. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do +the actions, we call a noun. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of +verbs without nouns. + +THEAETETUS: I do not understand you. + +STRANGER: I see that when you gave your assent you had something else +in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of +nouns or of verbs is not discourse. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean that words like 'walks,' 'runs,' 'sleeps,' or any other +words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do +not make discourse. + +THEAETETUS: How can they? + +STRANGER: Or, again, when you say 'lion,' 'stag,' 'horse,' or any +other words which denote agents--neither in this way of stringing words +together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of +action or inaction, or of the existence of existence or non-existence +indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the +words fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is +the simplest and least form of discourse. + +THEAETETUS: Again I ask, What do you mean? + +STRANGER: When any one says 'A man learns,' should you not call this the +simplest and least of sentences? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation +about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. +And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with +nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connexion of +words we give the name of discourse. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And as there are some things which fit one another, and other +things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and +others which do not, combine and form discourse. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: There is another small matter. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: A sentence must and cannot help having a subject. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And must be of a certain quality. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And now let us mind what we are about. + +THEAETETUS: We must do so. + +STRANGER: I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action +are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of +whom the sentence speaks. + +THEAETETUS: I will, to the best of my power. + +STRANGER: 'Theaetetus sits'--not a very long sentence. + +THEAETETUS: Not very. + +STRANGER: Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that +is what you have to tell. + +THEAETETUS: Of me; I am the subject. + +STRANGER: Or this sentence, again-- + +THEAETETUS: What sentence? + +STRANGER: 'Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.' + +THEAETETUS: That also is a sentence which will be admitted by every one +to speak of me, and to apply to me. + +STRANGER: We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain +quality. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And what is the quality of each of these two sentences? + +THEAETETUS: The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true. + +STRANGER: The true says what is true about you? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the false says what is other than true? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And say that things are real of you which are not; for, as we +were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is +and much that is not. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: The second of the two sentences which related to you was first +of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, this was implied in recent admission. + +STRANGER: And, in the second place, it related to a subject? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Who must be you, and can be nobody else? + +THEAETETUS: Unquestionably. + +STRANGER: And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject, +for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and +not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and +truly false discourse. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +STRANGER: And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved +to exist in our minds both as true and false. + +THEAETETUS: How so? + +STRANGER: You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what +they are, and in what they severally differ from one another. + +THEAETETUS: Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain. + +STRANGER: Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that +what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with +herself? + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is +audible is called speech? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And we know that there exists in speech... + +THEAETETUS: What exists? + +STRANGER: Affirmation. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, we know it. + +STRANGER: When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in +the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion? + +THEAETETUS: There can be no other name. + +STRANGER: And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of +sense, would you not call it imagination? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought +is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of +thinking, and imagination or phantasy is the union of sense and opinion, +the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language, +should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +STRANGER: Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have +been discovered sooner than we expected?--For just now we seemed to be +undertaking a task which would never be accomplished. + +THEAETETUS: I perceive. + +STRANGER: Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but +now having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous +classification. + +THEAETETUS: What classification? + +STRANGER: We divided image-making into two sorts; the one +likeness-making, the other imaginative or phantastic. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place +the Sophist. + +THEAETETUS: We did say so. + +STRANGER: And our heads began to go round more and more when it was +asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance, +because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as +falsehood. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and +false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of +this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise. + +THEAETETUS: Quite possible. + +STRANGER: And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the +Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class, +always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the +Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and +reached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true +nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: You may remember that all art was originally divided by us +into creative and acquisitive. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive +class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the +like. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear +that we must begin by dividing the art of creation; for imitation is +a kind of creation--of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real +things. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: In the first place, there are two kinds of creation. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: One of them is human and the other divine. + +THEAETETUS: I do not follow. + +STRANGER: Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which +causes things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as +creative. + +THEAETETUS: I remember. + +STRANGER: Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants, +at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as +at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or +non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence--not having +existed previously--by the creation of God, or shall we agree with +vulgar opinion about them? + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +STRANGER: The opinion that nature brings them into being from some +spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are +created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God? + +THEAETETUS: I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my +view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them +to God, I defer to your authority. + +STRANGER: Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of +those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued +with you, and forced you to assent; but as I perceive that you will come +of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as +you say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me +suppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the +work of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of +these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and +production, the one human and the other divine. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have +already. + +THEAETETUS: How do you mean? + +STRANGER: I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of +production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one. + +THEAETETUS: I have done so. + +STRANGER: Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments--two of +them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference +to the gods and are divine. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in +the other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things +themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of +likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts. + +THEAETETUS: Tell me the divisions once more. + +STRANGER: I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out +of which things are made--fire, water, and the like--are known by us to +be each and all the creation and work of God. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: And there are images of them, which are not them, but which +correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful +skill. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +STRANGER: The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by +day, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection +which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets +on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the +opposite of our ordinary sight. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the +work of a divine hand. + +STRANGER: And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house +by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a +sort of dream created by man for those who are awake? + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +STRANGER: And other products of human creation are also twofold and go +in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is +concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned. + +THEAETETUS: Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that +there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the +lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the +vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes. + +STRANGER: And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part +was to have been likeness-making, and the other phantastic, if it could +be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real +being. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without +hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Then, now, let us again divide the phantastic art. + +THEAETETUS: Where shall we make the division? + +STRANGER: There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, +and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the +instrument. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +STRANGER: When any one makes himself appear like another in his figure +or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the phantastic art. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +STRANGER: Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the +province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and +will give that up, leaving to some one else the duty of making the class +and giving it a suitable name. + +THEAETETUS: Let us do as you say--assign a sphere to the one and leave +the other. + +STRANGER: There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of +our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you. + +THEAETETUS: Let me hear. + +STRANGER: There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and +some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be +greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: There can be no greater. + +STRANGER: Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the +imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely +know you and your figure? + +THEAETETUS: Naturally. + +STRANGER: And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of +virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge +of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this +opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they +can, in word and deed? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that is very common. + +STRANGER: And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, +when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true? + +THEAETETUS: The very opposite. + +STRANGER: Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator--to be +distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished +from him who knows? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +STRANGER: Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly +not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion +of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into +species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the +sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which +coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance--that which coexists +with science, a scientific or learned imitation. + +THEAETETUS: Granted. + +STRANGER: The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed +with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +STRANGER: Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see +whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still +some crack in him. + +THEAETETUS: Let us examine him. + +STRANGER: Indeed there is a very considerable crack; for if you look, +you find that one of the two classes of imitators is a simple creature, +who thinks that he knows that which he only fancies; the other sort has +knocked about among arguments, until he suspects and fears that he is +ignorant of that which to the many he pretends to know. + +THEAETETUS: There are certainly the two kinds which you describe. + +STRANGER: Shall we regard one as the simple imitator--the other as the +dissembling or ironical imitator? + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +STRANGER: And shall we further speak of this latter class as having one +or two divisions? + +THEAETETUS: Answer yourself. + +STRANGER: Upon consideration, then, there appear to me to be two; there +is the dissembler, who harangues a multitude in public in a long speech, +and the dissembler, who in private and in short speeches compels the +person who is conversing with him to contradict himself. + +THEAETETUS: What you say is most true. + +STRANGER: And who is the maker of the longer speeches? Is he the +statesman or the popular orator? + +THEAETETUS: The latter. + +STRANGER: And what shall we call the other? Is he the philosopher or the +Sophist? + +THEAETETUS: The philosopher he cannot be, for upon our view he is +ignorant; but since he is an imitator of the wise he will have a name +which is formed by an adaptation of the word sophos. What shall we name +him? I am pretty sure that I cannot be mistaken in terming him the true +and very Sophist. + +STRANGER: Shall we bind up his name as we did before, making a chain +from one end of his genealogy to the other? + +THEAETETUS: By all means. + +STRANGER: He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows--who, +belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing +self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from +the class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that +further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, +and not divine--any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood +and lineage will say the very truth. + +THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Sophist, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK SOPHIST *** + +***** This file should be named 1735.txt or 1735.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/3/1735/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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