diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'old/thtus10.txt')
| -rw-r--r-- | old/thtus10.txt | 7231 |
1 files changed, 7231 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/old/thtus10.txt b/old/thtus10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..519ab59 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/thtus10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7231 @@ +******The Project Gutenberg Etext of Theaetetus, by Plato****** +#25 in our series by Plato + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. We need your donations. + + +Theaetetus + +by Plato + +April, 1999 [Etext #1726] + + +******The Project Gutenberg Etext of Theaetetus, by Plato****** +******This file should be named thtus10.txt or thtus10.zip****** + +Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, thtus11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, thtus10a.txt + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + +Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions, +all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a +copyright notice is included. Therefore, we usually do NOT keep +these books in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance +of the official release dates, for time for better editing. + +Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A +preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment +and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an +up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes +in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has +a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a +look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a +new copy has at least one byte more or less. + + +Information about Project Gutenberg (one page) + +We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The +fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take +to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright +searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This +projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value +per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2 +million dollars per hour this year as we release thirty-six text +files per month, or 432 more Etexts in 1999 for a total of 2000+ +If these reach just 10% of the computerized population, then the +total should reach over 200 billion Etexts given away this year. + +The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext +Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] +This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, +which is only ~5% of the present number of computer users. + +At our revised rates of production, we will reach only one-third +of that goal by the end of 2001, or about 3,333 Etexts unless we +manage to get some real funding; currently our funding is mostly +from Michael Hart's salary at Carnegie-Mellon University, and an +assortment of sporadic gifts; this salary is only good for a few +more years, so we are looking for something to replace it, as we +don't want Project Gutenberg to be so dependent on one person. + +We need your donations more than ever! + + +All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/CMU": and are +tax deductible to the extent allowable by law. (CMU = Carnegie- +Mellon University). + +For these and other matters, please mail to: + +Project Gutenberg +P. O. Box 2782 +Champaign, IL 61825 + +When all other email fails try our Executive Director: +Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com> + +We would prefer to send you this information by email. + +****** + +To access Project Gutenberg etexts, use any Web browser +to view http://promo.net/pg. This site lists Etexts by +author and by title, and includes information about how +to get involved with Project Gutenberg. You could also +download our past Newsletters, or subscribe here. This +is one of our major sites, please email hart@pobox.com, +for a more complete list of our various sites. + +To go directly to the etext collections, use FTP or any +Web browser to visit a Project Gutenberg mirror (mirror +sites are available on 7 continents; mirrors are listed +at http://promo.net/pg). + +Mac users, do NOT point and click, typing works better. + +Example FTP session: + +ftp sunsite.unc.edu +login: anonymous +password: your@login +cd pub/docs/books/gutenberg +cd etext90 through etext99 +dir [to see files] +get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] +GET GUTINDEX.?? [to get a year's listing of books, e.g., GUTINDEX.99] +GET GUTINDEX.ALL [to get a listing of ALL books] + +*** + +**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** + +(Three Pages) + + +***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** +Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. +They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with +your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from +someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our +fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement +disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how +you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. + +*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT +By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept +this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive +a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by +sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person +you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical +medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. + +ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS +This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- +tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor +Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at +Carnegie-Mellon University (the "Project"). Among other +things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright +on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and +distribute it in the United States without permission and +without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth +below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext +under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. + +To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable +efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain +works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any +medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other +things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged +disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer +codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. + +LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES +But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, +[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this +etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including +legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR +UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, +INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE +OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of +receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) +you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that +time to the person you received it from. If you received it +on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and +such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement +copy. If you received it electronically, such person may +choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to +receive it electronically. + +THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS +TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or +the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the +above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you +may have other legal rights. + +INDEMNITY +You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, +officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost +and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or +indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: +[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, +or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. + +DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" +You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by +disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this +"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, +or: + +[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this + requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the + etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, + if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable + binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, + including any form resulting from conversion by word pro- + cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as + *EITHER*: + + [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and + does *not* contain characters other than those + intended by the author of the work, although tilde + (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may + be used to convey punctuation intended by the + author, and additional characters may be used to + indicate hypertext links; OR + + [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at + no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent + form by the program that displays the etext (as is + the case, for instance, with most word processors); + OR + + [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at + no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the + etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC + or other equivalent proprietary form). + +[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this + "Small Print!" statement. + +[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the + net profits you derive calculated using the method you + already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon + University" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". + +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +THEAETETUS + +by Plato + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + +Some dialogues of Plato are of so various a character that their relation +to the other dialogues cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. +The Theaetetus, like the Parmenides, has points of similarity both with his +earlier and his later writings. The perfection of style, the humour, the +dramatic interest, the complexity of structure, the fertility of +illustration, the shifting of the points of view, are characteristic of his +best period of authorship. The vain search, the negative conclusion, the +figure of the midwives, the constant profession of ignorance on the part of +Socrates, also bear the stamp of the early dialogues, in which the original +Socrates is not yet Platonized. Had we no other indications, we should be +disposed to range the Theaetetus with the Apology and the Phaedrus, and +perhaps even with the Protagoras and the Laches. + +But when we pass from the style to an examination of the subject, we trace +a connection with the later rather than with the earlier dialogues. In the +first place there is the connexion, indicated by Plato himself at the end +of the dialogue, with the Sophist, to which in many respects the Theaetetus +is so little akin. (1) The same persons reappear, including the younger +Socrates, whose name is just mentioned in the Theaetetus; (2) the theory of +rest, which Socrates has declined to consider, is resumed by the Eleatic +Stranger; (3) there is a similar allusion in both dialogues to the meeting +of Parmenides and Socrates (Theaet., Soph.); and (4) the inquiry into not- +being in the Sophist supplements the question of false opinion which is +raised in the Theaetetus. (Compare also Theaet. and Soph. for parallel +turns of thought.) Secondly, the later date of the dialogue is confirmed +by the absence of the doctrine of recollection and of any doctrine of ideas +except that which derives them from generalization and from reflection of +the mind upon itself. The general character of the Theaetetus is +dialectical, and there are traces of the same Megarian influences which +appear in the Parmenides, and which later writers, in their matter of fact +way, have explained by the residence of Plato at Megara. Socrates +disclaims the character of a professional eristic, and also, with a sort of +ironical admiration, expresses his inability to attain the Megarian +precision in the use of terms. Yet he too employs a similar sophistical +skill in overturning every conceivable theory of knowledge. + +The direct indications of a date amount to no more than this: the +conversation is said to have taken place when Theaetetus was a youth, and +shortly before the death of Socrates. At the time of his own death he is +supposed to be a full-grown man. Allowing nine or ten years for the +interval between youth and manhood, the dialogue could not have been +written earlier than 390, when Plato was about thirty-nine years of age. +No more definite date is indicated by the engagement in which Theaetetus is +said to have fallen or to have been wounded, and which may have taken place +any time during the Corinthian war, between the years 390-387. The later +date which has been suggested, 369, when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians +disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, would make the age of Theaetetus at +his death forty-five or forty-six. This a little impairs the beauty of +Socrates' remark, that 'he would be a great man if he lived.' + +In this uncertainty about the place of the Theaetetus, it seemed better, as +in the case of the Republic, Timaeus, Critias, to retain the order in which +Plato himself has arranged this and the two companion dialogues. We cannot +exclude the possibility which has been already noticed in reference to +other works of Plato, that the Theaetetus may not have been all written +continuously; or the probability that the Sophist and Politicus, which +differ greatly in style, were only appended after a long interval of time. +The allusion to Parmenides compared with the Sophist, would probably imply +that the dialogue which is called by his name was already in existence; +unless, indeed, we suppose the passage in which the allusion occurs to have +been inserted afterwards. Again, the Theaetetus may be connected with the +Gorgias, either dialogue from different points of view containing an +analysis of the real and apparent (Schleiermacher); and both may be brought +into relation with the Apology as illustrating the personal life of +Socrates. The Philebus, too, may with equal reason be placed either after +or before what, in the language of Thrasyllus, may be called the Second +Platonic Trilogy. Both the Parmenides and the Sophist, and still more the +Theaetetus, have points of affinity with the Cratylus, in which the +principles of rest and motion are again contrasted, and the Sophistical or +Protagorean theory of language is opposed to that which is attributed to +the disciple of Heracleitus, not to speak of lesser resemblances in thought +and language. The Parmenides, again, has been thought by some to hold an +intermediate position between the Theaetetus and the Sophist; upon this +view, the Sophist may be regarded as the answer to the problems about One +and Being which have been raised in the Parmenides. Any of these +arrangements may suggest new views to the student of Plato; none of them +can lay claim to an exclusive probability in its favour. + +The Theaetetus is one of the narrated dialogues of Plato, and is the only +one which is supposed to have been written down. In a short introductory +scene, Euclides and Terpsion are described as meeting before the door of +Euclides' house in Megara. This may have been a spot familiar to Plato +(for Megara was within a walk of Athens), but no importance can be attached +to the accidental introduction of the founder of the Megarian philosophy. +The real intention of the preface is to create an interest about the person +of Theaetetus, who has just been carried up from the army at Corinth in a +dying state. The expectation of his death recalls the promise of his +youth, and especially the famous conversation which Socrates had with him +when he was quite young, a few days before his own trial and death, as we +are once more reminded at the end of the dialogue. Yet we may observe that +Plato has himself forgotten this, when he represents Euclides as from time +to time coming to Athens and correcting the copy from Socrates' own mouth. +The narrative, having introduced Theaetetus, and having guaranteed the +authenticity of the dialogue (compare Symposium, Phaedo, Parmenides), is +then dropped. No further use is made of the device. As Plato himself +remarks, who in this as in some other minute points is imitated by Cicero +(De Amicitia), the interlocutory words are omitted. + +Theaetetus, the hero of the battle of Corinth and of the dialogue, is a +disciple of Theodorus, the great geometrician, whose science is thus +indicated to be the propaedeutic to philosophy. An interest has been +already excited about him by his approaching death, and now he is +introduced to us anew by the praises of his master Theodorus. He is a +youthful Socrates, and exhibits the same contrast of the fair soul and the +ungainly face and frame, the Silenus mask and the god within, which are +described in the Symposium. The picture which Theodorus gives of his +courage and patience and intelligence and modesty is verified in the course +of the dialogue. His courage is shown by his behaviour in the battle, and +his other qualities shine forth as the argument proceeds. Socrates takes +an evident delight in 'the wise Theaetetus,' who has more in him than 'many +bearded men'; he is quite inspired by his answers. At first the youth is +lost in wonder, and is almost too modest to speak, but, encouraged by +Socrates, he rises to the occasion, and grows full of interest and +enthusiasm about the great question. Like a youth, he has not finally made +up his mind, and is very ready to follow the lead of Socrates, and to enter +into each successive phase of the discussion which turns up. His great +dialectical talent is shown in his power of drawing distinctions, and of +foreseeing the consequences of his own answers. The enquiry about the +nature of knowledge is not new to him; long ago he has felt the 'pang of +philosophy,' and has experienced the youthful intoxication which is +depicted in the Philebus. But he has hitherto been unable to make the +transition from mathematics to metaphysics. He can form a general +conception of square and oblong numbers, but he is unable to attain a +similar expression of knowledge in the abstract. Yet at length he begins +to recognize that there are universal conceptions of being, likeness, +sameness, number, which the mind contemplates in herself, and with the help +of Socrates is conducted from a theory of sense to a theory of ideas. + +There is no reason to doubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose name +survived in the next generation. But neither can any importance be +attached to the notices of him in Suidas and Proclus, which are probably +based on the mention of him in Plato. According to a confused statement in +Suidas, who mentions him twice over, first, as a pupil of Socrates, and +then of Plato, he is said to have written the first work on the Five +Solids. But no early authority cites the work, the invention of which may +have been easily suggested by the division of roots, which Plato attributes +to him, and the allusion to the backward state of solid geometry in the +Republic. At any rate, there is no occasion to recall him to life again +after the battle of Corinth, in order that we may allow time for the +completion of such a work (Muller). We may also remark that such a +supposition entirely destroys the pathetic interest of the introduction. + +Theodorus, the geometrician, had once been the friend and disciple of +Protagoras, but he is very reluctant to leave his retirement and defend his +old master. He is too old to learn Socrates' game of question and answer, +and prefers the digressions to the main argument, because he finds them +easier to follow. The mathematician, as Socrates says in the Republic, is +not capable of giving a reason in the same manner as the dialectician, and +Theodorus could not therefore have been appropriately introduced as the +chief respondent. But he may be fairly appealed to, when the honour of his +master is at stake. He is the 'guardian of his orphans,' although this is +a responsibility which he wishes to throw upon Callias, the friend and +patron of all Sophists, declaring that he himself had early 'run away' from +philosophy, and was absorbed in mathematics. His extreme dislike to the +Heraclitean fanatics, which may be compared with the dislike of Theaetetus +to the materialists, and his ready acceptance of the noble words of +Socrates, are noticeable traits of character. + +The Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the earlier +dialogues. He is the invincible disputant, now advanced in years, of the +Protagoras and Symposium; he is still pursuing his divine mission, his +'Herculean labours,' of which he has described the origin in the Apology; +and he still hears the voice of his oracle, bidding him receive or not +receive the truant souls. There he is supposed to have a mission to +convict men of self-conceit; in the Theaetetus he has assigned to him by +God the functions of a man-midwife, who delivers men of their thoughts, and +under this character he is present throughout the dialogue. He is the true +prophet who has an insight into the natures of men, and can divine their +future; and he knows that sympathy is the secret power which unlocks their +thoughts. The hit at Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was specially +committed to his charge in the Laches, may be remarked by the way. The +attempt to discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance with the +character of Socrates as he is described in the Memorabilia, asking What is +justice? what is temperance? and the like. But there is no reason to +suppose that he would have analyzed the nature of perception, or traced the +connexion of Protagoras and Heracleitus, or have raised the difficulty +respecting false opinion. The humorous illustrations, as well as the +serious thoughts, run through the dialogue. The snubnosedness of +Theaetetus, a characteristic which he shares with Socrates, and the man- +midwifery of Socrates, are not forgotten in the closing words. At the end +of the dialogue, as in the Euthyphro, he is expecting to meet Meletus at +the porch of the king Archon; but with the same indifference to the result +which is everywhere displayed by him, he proposes that they shall +reassemble on the following day at the same spot. The day comes, and in +the Sophist the three friends again meet, but no further allusion is made +to the trial, and the principal share in the argument is assigned, not to +Socrates, but to an Eleatic stranger; the youthful Theaetetus also plays a +different and less independent part. And there is no allusion in the +Introduction to the second and third dialogues, which are afterwards +appended. There seems, therefore, reason to think that there is a real +change, both in the characters and in the design. + +The dialogue is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which is +interrupted by two digressions. The first is the digression about the +midwives, which is also a leading thought or continuous image, like the +wave in the Republic, appearing and reappearing at intervals. Again and +again we are reminded that the successive conceptions of knowledge are +extracted from Theaetetus, who in his turn truly declares that Socrates has +got a great deal more out of him than ever was in him. Socrates is never +weary of working out the image in humorous details,--discerning the +symptoms of labour, carrying the child round the hearth, fearing that +Theaetetus will bite him, comparing his conceptions to wind-eggs, asserting +an hereditary right to the occupation. There is also a serious side to the +image, which is an apt similitude of the Socratic theory of education +(compare Republic, Sophist), and accords with the ironical spirit in which +the wisest of men delights to speak of himself. + +The other digression is the famous contrast of the lawyer and philosopher. +This is a sort of landing-place or break in the middle of the dialogue. At +the commencement of a great discussion, the reflection naturally arises, +How happy are they who, like the philosopher, have time for such +discussions (compare Republic)! There is no reason for the introduction of +such a digression; nor is a reason always needed, any more than for the +introduction of an episode in a poem, or of a topic in conversation. That +which is given by Socrates is quite sufficient, viz. that the philosopher +may talk and write as he pleases. But though not very closely connected, +neither is the digression out of keeping with the rest of the dialogue. +The philosopher naturally desires to pour forth the thoughts which are +always present to him, and to discourse of the higher life. The idea of +knowledge, although hard to be defined, is realised in the life of +philosophy. And the contrast is the favourite antithesis between the +world, in the various characters of sophist, lawyer, statesman, speaker, +and the philosopher,--between opinion and knowledge,--between the +conventional and the true. + +The greater part of the dialogue is devoted to setting up and throwing down +definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower to the +higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning are +successively examined, we first get rid of the confusion of the idea of +knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge,--a confusion which has been +already noticed in the Lysis, Laches, Meno, and other dialogues. In the +infancy of logic, a form of thought has to be invented before the content +can be filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of +definition has been ascertained. Having succeeded in making his meaning +plain, Socrates proceeds to analyze (1) the first definition which +Theaetetus proposes: 'Knowledge is sensible perception.' This is speedily +identified with the Protagorean saying, 'Man is the measure of all things;' +and of this again the foundation is discovered in the perpetual flux of +Heracleitus. The relativeness of sensation is then developed at length, +and for a moment the definition appears to be accepted. But soon the +Protagorean thesis is pronounced to be suicidal; for the adversaries of +Protagoras are as good a measure as he is, and they deny his doctrine. He +is then supposed to reply that the perception may be true at any given +instant. But the reply is in the end shown to be inconsistent with the +Heraclitean foundation, on which the doctrine has been affirmed to rest. +For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every +instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an +instant? Sensible perception, like everything else, is tumbling to pieces. +Nor can Protagoras himself maintain that one man is as good as another in +his knowledge of the future; and 'the expedient,' if not 'the just and +true,' belongs to the sphere of the future. + +And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? The comparison of sensations +with one another implies a principle which is above sensation, and which +resides in the mind itself. We are thus led to look for knowledge in a +higher sphere, and accordingly Theaetetus, when again interrogated, replies +(2) that 'knowledge is true opinion.' But how is false opinion possible? +The Megarian or Eristic spirit within us revives the question, which has +been already asked and indirectly answered in the Meno: 'How can a man be +ignorant of that which he knows?' No answer is given to this not +unanswerable question. The comparison of the mind to a block of wax, or to +a decoy of birds, is found wanting. + +But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before we +have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion; for the Athenian +dicasts have true opinion but not knowledge. What then is knowledge? We +answer (3), 'True opinion, with definition or explanation.' But all the +different ways in which this statement may be understood are set aside, +like the definitions of courage in the Laches, or of friendship in the +Lysis, or of temperance in the Charmides. At length we arrive at the +conclusion, in which nothing is concluded. + +There are two special difficulties which beset the student of the +Theaetetus: (1) he is uncertain how far he can trust Plato's account of +the theory of Protagoras; and he is also uncertain (2) how far, and in what +parts of the dialogue, Plato is expressing his own opinion. The dramatic +character of the work renders the answer to both these questions difficult. + +1. In reply to the first, we have only probabilities to offer. Three main +points have to be decided: (a) Would Protagoras have identified his own +thesis, 'Man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge +is sensible perception'? (b) Would he have based the relativity of +knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (c) Would he have asserted the +absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on +'Truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, +which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, +'Whether there are gods or not, I cannot tell.' Nor have we any other +trustworthy evidence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which +his words are used. For later writers, including Aristotle in his +Metaphysics, have mixed up the Protagoras of Plato, as they have the +Socrates of Plato, with the real person. + +Returning then to the Theaetetus, as the only possible source from which an +answer to these questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato had +'The Truth' of Protagoras before him, and frequently refers to the book. +He seems to say expressly, that in this work the doctrine of the +Heraclitean flux was not to be found; 'he told the real truth' (not in the +book, which is so entitled, but) 'privately to his disciples,'--words which +imply that the connexion between the doctrines of Protagoras and +Heracleitus was not generally recognized in Greece, but was really +discovered or invented by Plato. On the other hand, the doctrine that 'Man +is the measure of all things,' is expressly identified by Socrates with the +other statement, that 'What appears to each man is to him;' and a reference +is made to the books in which the statement occurs;--this Theaetetus, who +has 'often read the books,' is supposed to acknowledge (so Cratylus). And +Protagoras, in the speech attributed to him, never says that he has been +misunderstood: he rather seems to imply that the absoluteness of sensation +at each instant was to be found in his words. He is only indignant at the +'reductio ad absurdum' devised by Socrates for his 'homo mensura,' which +Theodorus also considers to be 'really too bad.' + +The question may be raised, how far Plato in the Theaetetus could have +misrepresented Protagoras without violating the laws of dramatic +probability. Could he have pretended to cite from a well-known writing +what was not to be found there? But such a shadowy enquiry is not worth +pursuing further. We need only remember that in the criticism which +follows of the thesis of Protagoras, we are criticizing the Protagoras of +Plato, and not attempting to draw a precise line between his real +sentiments and those which Plato has attributed to him. + +2. The other difficulty is a more subtle, and also a more important one, +because bearing on the general character of the Platonic dialogues. On a +first reading of them, we are apt to imagine that the truth is only spoken +by Socrates, who is never guilty of a fallacy himself, and is the great +detector of the errors and fallacies of others. But this natural +presumption is disturbed by the discovery that the Sophists are sometimes +in the right and Socrates in the wrong. Like the hero of a novel, he is +not to be supposed always to represent the sentiments of the author. There +are few modern readers who do not side with Protagoras, rather than with +Socrates, in the dialogue which is called by his name. The Cratylus +presents a similar difficulty: in his etymologies, as in the number of the +State, we cannot tell how far Socrates is serious; for the Socratic irony +will not allow him to distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom. +No one is the superior of the invincible Socrates in argument (except in +the first part of the Parmenides, where he is introduced as a youth); but +he is by no means supposed to be in possession of the whole truth. +Arguments are often put into his mouth (compare Introduction to the +Gorgias) which must have seemed quite as untenable to Plato as to a modern +writer. In this dialogue a great part of the answer of Protagoras is just +and sound; remarks are made by him on verbal criticism, and on the +importance of understanding an opponent's meaning, which are conceived in +the true spirit of philosophy. And the distinction which he is supposed to +draw between Eristic and Dialectic, is really a criticism of Plato on +himself and his own criticism of Protagoras. + +The difficulty seems to arise from not attending to the dramatic character +of the writings of Plato. There are two, or more, sides to questions; and +these are parted among the different speakers. Sometimes one view or +aspect of a question is made to predominate over the rest, as in the +Gorgias or Sophist; but in other dialogues truth is divided, as in the +Laches and Protagoras, and the interest of the piece consists in the +contrast of opinions. The confusion caused by the irony of Socrates, who, +if he is true to his character, cannot say anything of his own knowledge, +is increased by the circumstance that in the Theaetetus and some other +dialogues he is occasionally playing both parts himself, and even charging +his own arguments with unfairness. In the Theaetetus he is designedly held +back from arriving at a conclusion. For we cannot suppose that Plato +conceived a definition of knowledge to be impossible. But this is his +manner of approaching and surrounding a question. The lights which he +throws on his subject are indirect, but they are not the less real for +that. He has no intention of proving a thesis by a cut-and-dried argument; +nor does he imagine that a great philosophical problem can be tied up +within the limits of a definition. If he has analyzed a proposition or +notion, even with the severity of an impossible logic, if half-truths have +been compared by him with other half-truths, if he has cleared up or +advanced popular ideas, or illustrated a new method, his aim has been +sufficiently accomplished. + +The writings of Plato belong to an age in which the power of analysis had +outrun the means of knowledge; and through a spurious use of dialectic, the +distinctions which had been already 'won from the void and formless +infinite,' seemed to be rapidly returning to their original chaos. The two +great speculative philosophies, which a century earlier had so deeply +impressed the mind of Hellas, were now degenerating into Eristic. The +contemporaries of Plato and Socrates were vainly trying to find new +combinations of them, or to transfer them from the object to the subject. +The Megarians, in their first attempts to attain a severer logic, were +making knowledge impossible (compare Theaet.). They were asserting 'the +one good under many names,' and, like the Cynics, seem to have denied +predication, while the Cynics themselves were depriving virtue of all which +made virtue desirable in the eyes of Socrates and Plato. And besides +these, we find mention in the later writings of Plato, especially in the +Theaetetus, Sophist, and Laws, of certain impenetrable godless persons, who +will not believe what they 'cannot hold in their hands'; and cannot be +approached in argument, because they cannot argue (Theat; Soph.). No +school of Greek philosophers exactly answers to these persons, in whom +Plato may perhaps have blended some features of the Atomists with the +vulgar materialistic tendencies of mankind in general (compare Introduction +to the Sophist). + +And not only was there a conflict of opinions, but the stage which the mind +had reached presented other difficulties hardly intelligible to us, who +live in a different cycle of human thought. All times of mental progress +are times of confusion; we only see, or rather seem to see things clearly, +when they have been long fixed and defined. In the age of Plato, the +limits of the world of imagination and of pure abstraction, of the old +world and the new, were not yet fixed. The Greeks, in the fourth century +before Christ, had no words for 'subject' and 'object,' and no distinct +conception of them; yet they were always hovering about the question +involved in them. The analysis of sense, and the analysis of thought, were +equally difficult to them; and hopelessly confused by the attempt to solve +them, not through an appeal to facts, but by the help of general theories +respecting the nature of the universe. + +Plato, in his Theaetetus, gathers up the sceptical tendencies of his age, +and compares them. But he does not seek to reconstruct out of them a +theory of knowledge. The time at which such a theory could be framed had +not yet arrived. For there was no measure of experience with which the +ideas swarming in men's minds could be compared; the meaning of the word +'science' could scarcely be explained to them, except from the mathematical +sciences, which alone offered the type of universality and certainty. +Philosophy was becoming more and more vacant and abstract, and not only the +Platonic Ideas and the Eleatic Being, but all abstractions seemed to be at +variance with sense and at war with one another. + +The want of the Greek mind in the fourth century before Christ was not +another theory of rest or motion, or Being or atoms, but rather a +philosophy which could free the mind from the power of abstractions and +alternatives, and show how far rest and how far motion, how far the +universal principle of Being and the multitudinous principle of atoms, +entered into the composition of the world; which could distinguish between +the true and false analogy, and allow the negative as well as the positive +a place in human thought. To such a philosophy Plato, in the Theaetetus, +offers many contributions. He has followed philosophy into the region of +mythology, and pointed out the similarities of opposing phases of thought. +He has also shown that extreme abstractions are self-destructive, and, +indeed, hardly distinguishable from one another. But his intention is not +to unravel the whole subject of knowledge, if this had been possible; and +several times in the course of the dialogue he rejects explanations of +knowledge which have germs of truth in them; as, for example, 'the +resolution of the compound into the simple;' or 'right opinion with a mark +of difference.' + +... + +Terpsion, who has come to Megara from the country, is described as having +looked in vain for Euclides in the Agora; the latter explains that he has +been down to the harbour, and on his way thither had met Theaetetus, who +was being carried up from the army to Athens. He was scarcely alive, for +he had been badly wounded at the battle of Corinth, and had taken the +dysentery which prevailed in the camp. The mention of his condition +suggests the reflection, 'What a loss he will be!' 'Yes, indeed,' replies +Euclid; 'only just now I was hearing of his noble conduct in the battle.' +'That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?' 'I wanted him +to remain, but he would not; so I went with him as far as Erineum; and as I +parted from him, I remembered that Socrates had seen him when he was a +youth, and had a remarkable conversation with him, not long before his own +death; and he then prophesied of him that he would be a great man if he +lived.' 'How true that has been; how like all that Socrates said! And +could you repeat the conversation?' 'Not from memory; but I took notes +when I returned home, which I afterwards filled up at leisure, and got +Socrates to correct them from time to time, when I came to +Athens'...Terpsion had long intended to ask for a sight of this writing, of +which he had already heard. They are both tired, and agree to rest and +have the conversation read to them by a servant...'Here is the roll, +Terpsion; I need only observe that I have omitted, for the sake of +convenience, the interlocutory words, "said I," "said he"; and that +Theaetetus, and Theodorus, the geometrician of Cyrene, are the persons with +whom Socrates is conversing.' + +Socrates begins by asking Theodorus whether, in his visit to Athens, he has +found any Athenian youth likely to attain distinction in science. 'Yes, +Socrates, there is one very remarkable youth, with whom I have become +acquainted. He is no beauty, and therefore you need not imagine that I am +in love with him; and, to say the truth, he is very like you, for he has a +snub nose, and projecting eyes, although these features are not so marked +in him as in you. He combines the most various qualities, quickness, +patience, courage; and he is gentle as well as wise, always silently +flowing on, like a river of oil. Look! he is the middle one of those who +are entering the palaestra.' + +Socrates, who does not know his name, recognizes him as the son of +Euphronius, who was himself a good man and a rich. He is informed by +Theodorus that the youth is named Theaetetus, but the property of his +father has disappeared in the hands of trustees; this does not, however, +prevent him from adding liberality to his other virtues. At the desire of +Socrates he invites Theaetetus to sit by them. + +'Yes,' says Socrates, 'that I may see in you, Theaetetus, the image of my +ugly self, as Theodorus declares. Not that his remark is of any +importance; for though he is a philosopher, he is not a painter, and +therefore he is no judge of our faces; but, as he is a man of science, he +may be a judge of our intellects. And if he were to praise the mental +endowments of either of us, in that case the hearer of the eulogy ought to +examine into what he says, and the subject should not refuse to be +examined.' Theaetetus consents, and is caught in a trap (compare the +similar trap which is laid for Theodorus). 'Then, Theaetetus, you will +have to be examined, for Theodorus has been praising you in a style of +which I never heard the like.' 'He was only jesting.' 'Nay, that is not +his way; and I cannot allow you, on that pretence, to retract the assent +which you have already given, or I shall make Theodorus repeat your +praises, and swear to them.' Theaetetus, in reply, professes that he is +willing to be examined, and Socrates begins by asking him what he learns of +Theodorus. He is himself anxious to learn anything of anybody; and now he +has a little question to which he wants Theaetetus or Theodorus (or +whichever of the company would not be 'donkey' to the rest) to find an +answer. Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his +eagerness, he asks, 'What is knowledge?' Theodorus is too old to answer +questions, and begs him to interrogate Theaetetus, who has the advantage of +youth. + +Theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of Theodorus, i.e. +geometry and arithmetic; and that there are other kinds of knowledge-- +shoemaking, carpentering, and the like. But Socrates rejoins, that this +answer contains too much and also too little. For although Theaetetus has +enumerated several kinds of knowledge, he has not explained the common +nature of them; as if he had been asked, 'What is clay?' and instead of +saying 'Clay is moistened earth,' he had answered, 'There is one clay of +image-makers, another of potters, another of oven-makers.' Theaetetus at +once divines that Socrates means him to extend to all kinds of knowledge +the same process of generalization which he has already learned to apply to +arithmetic. For he has discovered a division of numbers into square +numbers, 4, 9, 16, etc., which are composed of equal factors, and represent +figures which have equal sides, and oblong numbers, 3, 5, 6, 7, etc., which +are composed of unequal factors, and represent figures which have unequal +sides. But he has never succeeded in attaining a similar conception of +knowledge, though he has often tried; and, when this and similar questions +were brought to him from Socrates, has been sorely distressed by them. +Socrates explains to him that he is in labour. For men as well as women +have pangs of labour; and both at times require the assistance of midwives. +And he, Socrates, is a midwife, although this is a secret; he has inherited +the art from his mother bold and bluff, and he ushers into light, not +children, but the thoughts of men. Like the midwives, who are 'past +bearing children,' he too can have no offspring--the God will not allow him +to bring anything into the world of his own. He also reminds Theaetetus +that the midwives are or ought to be the only matchmakers (this is the +preparation for a biting jest); for those who reap the fruit are most +likely to know on what soil the plants will grow. But respectable midwives +avoid this department of practice--they do not want to be called +procuresses. There are some other differences between the two sorts of +pregnancy. For women do not bring into the world at one time real children +and at another time idols which are with difficulty distinguished from +them. 'At first,' says Socrates in his character of the man-midwife, 'my +patients are barren and stolid, but after a while they "round apace," if +the gods are propitious to them; and this is due not to me but to +themselves; I and the god only assist in bringing their ideas to the birth. +Many of them have left me too soon, and the result has been that they have +produced abortions; or when I have delivered them of children they have +lost them by an ill bringing up, and have ended by seeing themselves, as +others see them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is +one of these, and there have been others. The truants often return to me +and beg to be taken back; and then, if my familiar allows me, which is not +always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. There come +to me also those who have nothing in them, and have no need of my art; and +I am their matchmaker (see above), and marry them to Prodicus or some other +inspired sage who is likely to suit them. I tell you this long story +because I suspect that you are in labour. Come then to me, who am a +midwife, and the son of a midwife, and I will deliver you. And do not bite +me, as the women do, if I abstract your first-born; for I am acting out of +good-will towards you; the God who is within me is the friend of man, +though he will not allow me to dissemble the truth. Once more then, +Theaetetus, I repeat my old question--"What is knowledge?" Take courage, +and by the help of God you will discover an answer.' 'My answer is, that +knowledge is perception.' 'That is the theory of Protagoras, who has +another way of expressing the same thing when he says, "Man is the measure +of all things." He was a very wise man, and we should try to understand +him. In order to illustrate his meaning let me suppose that there is the +same wind blowing in our faces, and one of us may be hot and the other +cold. How is this? Protagoras will reply that the wind is hot to him who +is cold, cold to him who is hot. And "is" means "appears," and when you +say "appears to him," that means "he feels." Thus feeling, appearance, +perception, coincide with being. I suspect, however, that this was only a +"facon de parler," by which he imposed on the common herd like you and me; +he told "the truth" (in allusion to the title of his book, which was called +"The Truth") in secret to his disciples. For he was really a votary of +that famous philosophy in which all things are said to be relative; nothing +is great or small, or heavy or light, or one, but all is in motion and +mixture and transition and flux and generation, not "being," as we +ignorantly affirm, but "becoming." This has been the doctrine, not of +Protagoras only, but of all philosophers, with the single exception of +Parmenides; Empedocles, Heracleitus, and others, and all the poets, with +Epicharmus, the king of Comedy, and Homer, the king of Tragedy, at their +head, have said the same; the latter has these words-- + +"Ocean, whence the gods sprang, and mother Tethys." + +And many arguments are used to show, that motion is the source of life, and +rest of death: fire and warmth are produced by friction, and living +creatures owe their origin to a similar cause; the bodily frame is +preserved by exercise and destroyed by indolence; and if the sun ceased to +move, "chaos would come again." Now apply this doctrine of "All is motion" +to the senses, and first of all to the sense of sight. The colour of +white, or any other colour, is neither in the eyes nor out of them, but +ever in motion between the object and the eye, and varying in the case of +every percipient. All is relative, and, as the followers of Protagoras +remark, endless contradictions arise when we deny this; e.g. here are six +dice; they are more than four and less than twelve; "more and also less," +would you not say?' 'Yes.' 'But Protagoras will retort: "Can anything be +more or less without addition or subtraction?"' + +'I should say "No" if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.' + +'And if you say "Yes," the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, +as Euripides would say?' 'True.' 'The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all +that can be known, would have a sparring match over this, but you and I, +who have no professional pride, want only to discover whether our ideas are +clear and consistent. And we cannot be wrong in saying, first, that +nothing can be greater or less while remaining equal; secondly, that there +can be no becoming greater or less without addition or subtraction; +thirdly, that what is and was not, cannot be without having become. But +then how is this reconcilable with the case of the dice, and with similar +examples?--that is the question.' 'I am often perplexed and amazed, +Socrates, by these difficulties.' 'That is because you are a philosopher, +for philosophy begins in wonder, and Iris is the child of Thaumas. Do you +know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?' +'No.' 'Then I will tell you; but we must not let the uninitiated hear, and +by the uninitiated I mean the obstinate people who believe in nothing which +they cannot hold in their hands. The brethren whose mysteries I am about +to unfold to you are far more ingenious. They maintain that all is motion; +and that motion has two forms, action and passion, out of which endless +phenomena are created, also in two forms--sense and the object of sense-- +which come to the birth together. There are two kinds of motions, a slow +and a fast; the motions of the agent and the patient are slower, because +they move and create in and about themselves, but the things which are born +of them have a swifter motion, and pass rapidly from place to place. The +eye and the appropriate object come together, and give birth to whiteness +and the sensation of whiteness; the eye is filled with seeing, and becomes +not sight but a seeing eye, and the object is filled with whiteness, and +becomes not whiteness but white; and no other compound of either with +another would have produced the same effect. All sensation is to be +resolved into a similar combination of an agent and patient. Of either, +taken separately, no idea can be formed; and the agent may become a +patient, and the patient an agent. Hence there arises a general reflection +that nothing is, but all things become; no name can detain or fix them. +Are not these speculations charming, Theaetetus, and very good for a person +in your interesting situation? I am offering you specimens of other men's +wisdom, because I have no wisdom of my own, and I want to deliver you of +something; and presently we will see whether you have brought forth wind or +not. Tell me, then, what do you think of the notion that "All things are +becoming"?' + +'When I hear your arguments, I am marvellously ready to assent.' + +'But I ought not to conceal from you that there is a serious objection +which may be urged against this doctrine of Protagoras. For there are +states, such as madness and dreaming, in which perception is false; and +half our life is spent in dreaming; and who can say that at this instant we +are not dreaming? Even the fancies of madmen are real at the time. But if +knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and the +false in such cases? Having stated the objection, I will now state the +answer. Protagoras would deny the continuity of phenomena; he would say +that what is different is entirely different, and whether active or passive +has a different power. There are infinite agents and patients in the +world, and these produce in every combination of them a different +perception. Take myself as an instance:--Socrates may be ill or he may be +well,--and remember that Socrates, with all his accidents, is spoken of. +The wine which I drink when I am well is pleasant to me, but the same wine +is unpleasant to me when I am ill. And there is nothing else from which I +can receive the same impression, nor can another receive the same +impression from the wine. Neither can I and the object of sense become +separately what we become together. For the one in becoming is relative to +the other, but they have no other relation; and the combination of them is +absolute at each moment. (In modern language, the act of sensation is +really indivisible, though capable of a mental analysis into subject and +object.) My sensation alone is true, and true to me only. And therefore, +as Protagoras says, "To myself I am the judge of what is and what is not." +Thus the flux of Homer and Heracleitus, the great Protagorean saying that +"Man is the measure of all things," the doctrine of Theaetetus that +"Knowledge is perception," have all the same meaning. And this is thy new- +born child, which by my art I have brought to light; and you must not be +angry if instead of rearing your infant we expose him.' + +'Theaetetus will not be angry,' says Theodorus; 'he is very good-natured. +But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this +is untrue?' + +'First reminding you that I am not the bag which contains the arguments, +but that I extract them from Theaetetus, shall I tell you what amazes me in +your friend Protagoras?' + +'What may that be?' + +'I like his doctrine that what appears is; but I wonder that he did not +begin his great work on Truth with a declaration that a pig, or a dog-faced +baboon, or any other monster which has sensation, is a measure of all +things; then, while we were reverencing him as a god, he might have +produced a magnificent effect by expounding to us that he was no wiser than +a tadpole. For if sensations are always true, and one man's discernment is +as good as another's, and every man is his own judge, and everything that +he judges is right and true, then what need of Protagoras to be our +instructor at a high figure; and why should we be less knowing than he is, +or have to go to him, if every man is the measure of all things? My own +art of midwifery, and all dialectic, is an enormous folly, if Protagoras' +"Truth" be indeed truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself +by giving oracles out of his book.' + +Theodorus thinks that Socrates is unjust to his master, Protagoras; but he +is too old and stiff to try a fall with him, and therefore refers him to +Theaetetus, who is already driven out of his former opinion by the +arguments of Socrates. + +Socrates then takes up the defence of Protagoras, who is supposed to reply +in his own person--'Good people, you sit and declaim about the gods, of +whose existence or non-existence I have nothing to say, or you discourse +about man being reduced to the level of the brutes; but what proof have you +of your statements? And yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect +whether probability is a safe guide. Theodorus would be a bad geometrician +if he had nothing better to offer.'...Theaetetus is affected by the appeal +to geometry, and Socrates is induced by him to put the question in a new +form. He proceeds as follows:--'Should we say that we know what we see and +hear,--e.g. the sound of words or the sight of letters in a foreign +tongue?' + +'We should say that the figures of the letters, and the pitch of the voice +in uttering them, were known to us, but not the meaning of them.' + +'Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and +ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?' 'Very true.' 'And he +who sees knows?' 'Yes.' 'And he who remembers, remembers that which he +sees and knows?' 'Very true.' 'But if he closes his eyes, does he not +remember?' 'He does.' 'Then he may remember and not see; and if seeing is +knowing, he may remember and not know. Is not this a "reductio ad +absurdum" of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet +perhaps we are crowing too soon; and if Protagoras, "the father of the +myth," had been alive, the result might have been very different. But he +is dead, and Theodorus, whom he left guardian of his "orphan," has not been +very zealous in defending him.' + +Theodorus objects that Callias is the true guardian, but he hopes that +Socrates will come to the rescue. Socrates prefaces his defence by +resuming the attack. He asks whether a man can know and not know at the +same time? 'Impossible.' Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is +knowing. The confident adversary, suiting the action to the word, shuts +one of your eyes; and now, says he, you see and do not see, but do you know +and not know? And a fresh opponent darts from his ambush, and transfers to +knowledge the terms which are commonly applied to sight. He asks whether +you can know near and not at a distance; whether you can have a sharp and +also a dull knowledge. While you are wondering at his incomparable wisdom, +he gets you into his power, and you will not escape until you have come to +an understanding with him about the money which is to be paid for your +release. + +But Protagoras has not yet made his defence; and already he may be heard +contemptuously replying that he is not responsible for the admissions which +were made by a boy, who could not foresee the coming move, and therefore +had answered in a manner which enabled Socrates to raise a laugh against +himself. 'But I cannot be fairly charged,' he will say, 'with an answer +which I should not have given; for I never maintained that the memory of a +feeling is the same as a feeling, or denied that a man might know and not +know the same thing at the same time. Or, if you will have extreme +precision, I say that man in different relations is many or rather infinite +in number. And I challenge you, either to show that his perceptions are +not individual, or that if they are, what appears to him is not what is. +As to your pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and you make my +writings a sport of other swine. But I still affirm that man is the +measure of all things, although I admit that one man may be a thousand +times better than another, in proportion as he has better impressions. +Neither do I deny the existence of wisdom or of the wise man. But I +maintain that wisdom is a practical remedial power of turning evil into +good, the bitterness of disease into the sweetness of health, and does not +consist in any greater truth or superior knowledge. For the impressions of +the sick are as true as the impressions of the healthy; and the sick are as +wise as the healthy. Nor can any man be cured of a false opinion, for +there is no such thing; but he may be cured of the evil habit which +generates in him an evil opinion. This is effected in the body by the +drugs of the physician, and in the soul by the words of the Sophist; and +the new state or opinion is not truer, but only better than the old. And +philosophers are not tadpoles, but physicians and husbandmen, who till the +soil and infuse health into animals and plants, and make the good take the +place of the evil, both in individuals and states. Wise and good +rhetoricians make the good to appear just in states (for that is just which +appears just to a state), and in return, they deserve to be well paid. And +you, Socrates, whether you please or not, must continue to be a measure. +This is my defence, and I must request you to meet me fairly. We are +professing to reason, and not merely to dispute; and there is a great +difference between reasoning and disputation. For the disputer is always +seeking to trip up his opponent; and this is a mode of argument which +disgusts men with philosophy as they grow older. But the reasoner is +trying to understand him and to point out his errors to him, whether +arising from his own or from his companion's fault; he does not argue from +the customary use of names, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways. +If you are gentle to an adversary he will follow and love you; and if +defeated he will lay the blame on himself, and seek to escape from his own +prejudices into philosophy. I would recommend you, Socrates, to adopt this +humaner method, and to avoid captious and verbal criticisms.' + +Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to afford to your +friend; had he been alive, he would have helped himself in far better +style. + +'You have made a most valorous defence.' + +Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and complained +of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? He meant to +intimate that you must take the place of Theaetetus, who may be wiser than +many bearded men, but not wiser than you, Theodorus. + +'The rule of the Spartan Palaestra is, Strip or depart; but you are like +the giant Antaeus, and will not let me depart unless I try a fall with +you.' + +Yes, that is the nature of my complaint. And many a Hercules, many a +Theseus mighty in deeds and words has broken my head; but I am always at +this rough game. Please, then, to favour me. + +'On the condition of not exceeding a single fall, I consent.' + +Socrates now resumes the argument. As he is very desirous of doing justice +to Protagoras, he insists on citing his own words,--'What appears to each +man is to him.' And how, asks Socrates, are these words reconcileable with +the fact that all mankind are agreed in thinking themselves wiser than +others in some respects, and inferior to them in others? In the hour of +danger they are ready to fall down and worship any one who is their +superior in wisdom as if he were a god. And the world is full of men who +are asking to be taught and willing to be ruled, and of other men who are +willing to rule and teach them. All which implies that men do judge of one +another's impressions, and think some wise and others foolish. How will +Protagoras answer this argument? For he cannot say that no one deems +another ignorant or mistaken. If you form a judgment, thousands and tens +of thousands are ready to maintain the opposite. The multitude may not and +do not agree in Protagoras' own thesis that 'Man is the measure of all +things;' and then who is to decide? Upon his own showing must not his +'truth' depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in +proportion as he has more or fewer of them? And he must acknowledge +further, that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, which is a +famous jest. And if he admits that they speak truly who deny him to speak +truly, he must admit that he himself does not speak truly. But his +opponents will refuse to admit this of themselves, and he must allow that +they are right in their refusal. The conclusion is, that all mankind, +including Protagoras himself, will deny that he speaks truly; and his truth +will be true neither to himself nor to anybody else. + +Theodorus is inclined to think that this is going too far. Socrates +ironically replies, that he is not going beyond the truth. But if the old +Protagoras could only pop his head out of the world below, he would +doubtless give them both a sound castigation and be off to the shades in an +instant. Seeing that he is not within call, we must examine the question +for ourselves. It is clear that there are great differences in the +understandings of men. Admitting, with Protagoras, that immediate +sensations of hot, cold, and the like, are to each one such as they appear, +yet this hypothesis cannot be extended to judgments or opinions. And even +if we were to admit further,--and this is the view of some who are not +thorough-going followers of Protagoras,--that right and wrong, holy and +unholy, are to each state or individual such as they appear, still +Protagoras will not venture to maintain that every man is equally the +measure of expediency, or that the thing which seems is expedient to every +one. But this begins a new question. 'Well, Socrates, we have plenty of +leisure. Yes, we have, and, after the manner of philosophers, we are +digressing; I have often observed how ridiculous this habit of theirs makes +them when they appear in court. 'What do you mean?' I mean to say that a +philosopher is a gentleman, but a lawyer is a servant. The one can have +his talk out, and wander at will from one subject to another, as the fancy +takes him; like ourselves, he may be long or short, as he pleases. But the +lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the clepsydra limiting his time, and +the brief limiting his topics, and his adversary is standing over him and +exacting his rights. He is a servant disputing about a fellow-servant +before his master, who holds the cause in his hands; the path never +diverges, and often the race is for his life. Such experiences render him +keen and shrewd; he learns the arts of flattery, and is perfect in the +practice of crooked ways; dangers have come upon him too soon, when the +tenderness of youth was unable to meet them with truth and honesty, and he +has resorted to counter-acts of dishonesty and falsehood, and become warped +and distorted; without any health or freedom or sincerity in him he has +grown up to manhood, and is or esteems himself to be a master of cunning. +Such are the lawyers; will you have the companion picture of philosophers? +or will this be too much of a digression? + +'Nay, Socrates, the argument is our servant, and not our master. Who is +the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?' + +I will describe the leaders, then: for the inferior sort are not worth the +trouble. The lords of philosophy have not learned the way to the dicastery +or ecclesia; they neither see nor hear the laws and votes of the state, +written or recited; societies, whether political or festive, clubs, and +singing maidens do not enter even into their dreams. And the scandals of +persons or their ancestors, male and female, they know no more than they +can tell the number of pints in the ocean. Neither are they conscious of +their own ignorance; for they do not practise singularity in order to gain +reputation, but the truth is, that the outer form of them only is residing +in the city; the inner man, as Pindar says, is going on a voyage of +discovery, measuring as with line and rule the things which are under and +in the earth, interrogating the whole of nature, only not condescending to +notice what is near them. + +'What do you mean, Socrates?' + +I will illustrate my meaning by the jest of the witty maid-servant, who saw +Thales tumbling into a well, and said of him, that he was so eager to know +what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his +feet. This is applicable to all philosophers. The philosopher is +unacquainted with the world; he hardly knows whether his neighbour is a man +or an animal. For he is always searching into the essence of man, and +enquiring what such a nature ought to do or suffer different from any +other. Hence, on every occasion in private life and public, as I was +saying, when he appears in a law-court or anywhere, he is the joke, not +only of maid-servants, but of the general herd, falling into wells and +every sort of disaster; he looks such an awkward, inexperienced creature, +unable to say anything personal, when he is abused, in answer to his +adversaries (for he knows no evil of any one); and when he hears the +praises of others, he cannot help laughing from the bottom of his soul at +their pretensions; and this also gives him a ridiculous appearance. A king +or tyrant appears to him to be a kind of swine-herd or cow-herd, milking +away at an animal who is much more troublesome and dangerous than cows or +sheep; like the cow-herd, he has no time to be educated, and the pen in +which he keeps his flock in the mountains is surrounded by a wall. When he +hears of large landed properties of ten thousand acres or more, he thinks +of the whole earth; or if he is told of the antiquity of a family, he +remembers that every one has had myriads of progenitors, rich and poor, +Greeks and barbarians, kings and slaves. And he who boasts of his descent +from Amphitryon in the twenty-fifth generation, may, if he pleases, add as +many more, and double that again, and our philosopher only laughs at his +inability to do a larger sum. Such is the man at whom the vulgar scoff; he +seems to them as if he could not mind his feet. 'That is very true, +Socrates.' But when he tries to draw the quick-witted lawyer out of his +pleas and rejoinders to the contemplation of absolute justice or injustice +in their own nature, or from the popular praises of wealthy kings to the +view of happiness and misery in themselves, or to the reasons why a man +should seek after the one and avoid the other, then the situation is +reversed; the little wretch turns giddy, and is ready to fall over the +precipice; his utterance becomes thick, and he makes himself ridiculous, +not to servant-maids, but to every man of liberal education. Such are the +two pictures: the one of the philosopher and gentleman, who may be excused +for not having learned how to make a bed, or cook up flatteries; the other, +a serviceable knave, who hardly knows how to wear his cloak,--still less +can he awaken harmonious thoughts or hymn virtue's praises. + +'If the world, Socrates, were as ready to receive your words as I am, there +would be greater peace and less evil among mankind.' + +Evil, Theodorus, must ever remain in this world to be the antagonist of +good, out of the way of the gods in heaven. Wherefore also we should fly +away from ourselves to them; and to fly to them is to become like them; and +to become like them is to become holy, just and true. But many live in the +old wives' fable of appearances; they think that you should follow virtue +in order that you may seem to be good. And yet the truth is, that God is +righteous; and of men, he is most like him who is most righteous. To know +this is wisdom; and in comparison of this the wisdom of the arts or the +seeming wisdom of politicians is mean and common. The unrighteous man is +apt to pride himself on his cunning; when others call him rogue, he says to +himself: 'They only mean that I am one who deserves to live, and not a +mere burden of the earth.' But he should reflect that his ignorance makes +his condition worse than if he knew. For the penalty of injustice is not +death or stripes, but the fatal necessity of becoming more and more unjust. +Two patterns of life are set before him; the one blessed and divine, the +other godless and wretched; and he is growing more and more like the one +and unlike the other. He does not see that if he continues in his cunning, +the place of innocence will not receive him after death. And yet if such a +man has the courage to hear the argument out, he often becomes dissatisfied +with himself, and has no more strength in him than a child.--But we have +digressed enough. + +'For my part, Socrates, I like the digressions better than the argument, +because I understand them better.' + +To return. When we left off, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans were +maintaining that the ordinances of the State were just, while they lasted. +But no one would maintain that the laws of the State were always good or +expedient, although this may be the intention of them. For the expedient +has to do with the future, about which we are liable to mistake. Now, +would Protagoras maintain that man is the measure not only of the present +and past, but of the future; and that there is no difference in the +judgments of men about the future? Would an untrained man, for example, be +as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who +attended him? And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be +right; or are they both right? Is not a vine-grower a better judge of a +vintage which is not yet gathered, or a cook of a dinner which is in +preparation, or Protagoras of the probable effect of a speech than an +ordinary person? The last example speaks 'ad hominen.' For Protagoras +would never have amassed a fortune if every man could judge of the future +for himself. He is, therefore, compelled to admit that he is a measure; +but I, who know nothing, am not equally convinced that I am. This is one +way of refuting him; and he is refuted also by the authority which he +attributes to the opinions of others, who deny his opinions. I am not +equally sure that we can disprove the truth of immediate states of feeling. +But this leads us to the doctrine of the universal flux, about which a +battle-royal is always going on in the cities of Ionia. 'Yes; the +Ephesians are downright mad about the flux; they cannot stop to argue with +you, but are in perpetual motion, obedient to their text-books. Their +restlessness is beyond expression, and if you ask any of them a question, +they will not answer, but dart at you some unintelligible saying, and +another and another, making no way either with themselves or with others; +for nothing is fixed in them or their ideas,--they are at war with fixed +principles.' I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in time +of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? 'Disciples! +they have none; they are a set of uneducated fanatics, and each of them +says of the other that they have no knowledge. We must trust to ourselves, +and not to them for the solution of the problem.' Well, the doctrine is +old, being derived from the poets, who speak in a figure of Oceanus and +Tethys; the truth was once concealed, but is now revealed by the superior +wisdom of a later generation, and made intelligible to the cobbler, who, on +hearing that all is in motion, and not some things only, as he ignorantly +fancied, may be expected to fall down and worship his teachers. And the +opposite doctrine must not be forgotten:-- + +'Alone being remains unmoved which is the name for all,' + +as Parmenides affirms. Thus we are in the midst of the fray; both parties +are dragging us to their side; and we are not certain which of them are in +the right; and if neither, then we shall be in a ridiculous position, +having to set up our own opinion against ancient and famous men. + +Let us first approach the river-gods, or patrons of the flux. + +When they speak of motion, must they not include two kinds of motion, +change of place and change of nature?--And all things must be supposed to +have both kinds of motion; for if not, the same things would be at rest and +in motion, which is contrary to their theory. And did we not say, that all +sensations arise thus: they move about between the agent and patient +together with a perception, and the patient ceases to be a perceiving power +and becomes a percipient, and the agent a quale instead of a quality; but +neither has any absolute existence? But now we make the further discovery, +that neither white or whiteness, nor any sense or sensation, can be +predicated of anything, for they are in a perpetual flux. And therefore we +must modify the doctrine of Theaetetus and Protagoras, by asserting further +that knowledge is and is not sensation; and of everything we must say +equally, that this is and is not, or becomes or becomes not. And still the +word 'this' is not quite correct, for language fails in the attempt to +express their meaning. + +At the close of the discussion, Theodorus claims to be released from the +argument, according to his agreement. But Theaetetus insists that they +shall proceed to consider the doctrine of rest. This is declined by +Socrates, who has too much reverence for the great Parmenides lightly to +attack him. (We shall find that he returns to the doctrine of rest in the +Sophist; but at present he does not wish to be diverted from his main +purpose, which is, to deliver Theaetetus of his conception of knowledge.) +He proceeds to interrogate him further. When he says that 'knowledge is in +perception,' with what does he perceive? The first answer is, that he +perceives sights with the eye, and sounds with the ear. This leads +Socrates to make the reflection that nice distinctions of words are +sometimes pedantic, but sometimes necessary; and he proposes in this case +to substitute the word 'through' for 'with.' For the senses are not like +the Trojan warriors in the horse, but have a common centre of perception, +in which they all meet. This common principle is able to compare them with +one another, and must therefore be distinct from them (compare Republic). +And as there are facts of sense which are perceived through the organs of +the body, there are also mathematical and other abstractions, such as +sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, which the soul perceives +by herself. Being is the most universal of these abstractions. The good +and the beautiful are abstractions of another kind, which exist in relation +and which above all others the mind perceives in herself, comparing within +her past, present, and future. For example; we know a thing to be hard or +soft by the touch, of which the perception is given at birth to men and +animals. But the essence of hardness or softness, or the fact that this +hardness is, and is the opposite of softness, is slowly learned by +reflection and experience. Mere perception does not reach being, and +therefore fails of truth; and therefore has no share in knowledge. But if +so, knowledge is not perception. What then is knowledge? The mind, when +occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion--shall we say that +'Knowledge is true opinion'? But still an old difficulty recurs; we ask +ourselves, 'How is false opinion possible?' This difficulty may be stated +as follows:-- + +Either we know or do not know a thing (for the intermediate processes of +learning and forgetting need not at present be considered); and in thinking +or having an opinion, we must either know or not know that which we think, +and we cannot know and be ignorant at the same time; we cannot confuse one +thing which we do not know, with another thing which we do not know; nor +can we think that which we do not know to be that which we know, or that +which we know to be that which we do not know. And what other case is +conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know all +things? Let us try another answer in the sphere of being: 'When a man +thinks, and thinks that which is not.' But would this hold in any parallel +case? Can a man see and see nothing? or hear and hear nothing? or touch +and touch nothing? Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing +thing? For if he thinks about nothing he does not think, and not thinking +he cannot think falsely. And so the path of being is closed against us, as +well as the path of knowledge. But may there not be 'heterodoxy,' or +transference of opinion;--I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be +another? Theaetetus is confident that this must be 'the true falsehood,' +when a man puts good for evil or evil for good. Socrates will not +discourage him by attacking the paradoxical expression 'true falsehood,' +but passes on. The new notion involves a process of thinking about two +things, either together or alternately. And thinking is the conversing of +the mind with herself, which is carried on in question and answer, until +she no longer doubts, but determines and forms an opinion. And false +opinion consists in saying to yourself, that one thing is another. But did +you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? Even in sleep, +did you ever imagine that odd was even? Or did any man in his senses ever +fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one? So that we can never +think one thing to be another; for you must not meet me with the verbal +quibble that one--eteron--is other--eteron (both 'one' and 'other' in Greek +are called 'other'--eteron). He who has both the two things in his mind, +cannot misplace them; and he who has only one of them in his mind, cannot +misplace them--on either supposition transplacement is inconceivable. + +But perhaps there may still be a sense in which we can think that which we +do not know to be that which we know: e.g. Theaetetus may know Socrates, +but at a distance he may mistake another person for him. This process may +be conceived by the help of an image. Let us suppose that every man has in +his mind a block of wax of various qualities, the gift of Memory, the +mother of the Muses; and on this he receives the seal or stamp of those +sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he +succeeds in stamping is remembered and known by him as long as the +impression lasts; but that, of which the impression is rubbed out or +imperfectly made, is forgotten, and not known. No one can think one thing +to be another, when he has the memorial or seal of both of these in his +soul, and a sensible impression of neither; or when he knows one and does +not know the other, and has no memorial or seal of the other; or when he +knows neither; or when he perceives both, or one and not the other, or +neither; or when he perceives and knows both, and identifies what he +perceives with what he knows (this is still more impossible); or when he +does not know one, and does not know and does not perceive the other; or +does not perceive one, and does not know and does not perceive the other; +or has no perception or knowledge of either--all these cases must be +excluded. But he may err when he confuses what he knows or perceives, or +what he perceives and does not know, with what he knows, or what he knows +and perceives with what he knows and perceives. + +Theaetetus is unable to follow these distinctions; which Socrates proceeds +to illustrate by examples, first of all remarking, that knowledge may exist +without perception, and perception without knowledge. I may know Theodorus +and Theaetetus and not see them; I may see them, and not know them. 'That +I understand.' But I could not mistake one for the other if I knew you +both, and had no perception of either; or if I knew one only, and perceived +neither; or if I knew and perceived neither, or in any other of the +excluded cases. The only possibility of error is: 1st, when knowing you +and Theodorus, and having the impression of both of you on the waxen block, +I, seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, put the foot in the wrong +shoe--that is to say, put the seal or stamp on the wrong object: or 2ndly, +when knowing both of you I only see one; or when, seeing and knowing you +both, I fail to identify the impression and the object. But there could be +no error when perception and knowledge correspond. + +The waxen block in the heart of a man's soul, as I may say in the words of +Homer, who played upon the words ker and keros, may be smooth and deep, and +large enough, and then the signs are clearly marked and lasting, and do not +get confused. But in the 'hairy heart,' as the all-wise poet sings, when +the wax is muddy or hard or moist, there is a corresponding confusion and +want of retentiveness; in the muddy and impure there is indistinctness, and +still more in the hard, for there the impressions have no depth of wax, and +in the moist they are too soon effaced. Yet greater is the indistinctness +when they are all jolted together in a little soul, which is narrow and has +no room. These are the sort of natures which have false opinion; from +stupidity they see and hear and think amiss; and this is falsehood and +ignorance. Error, then, is a confusion of thought and sense. + +Theaetetus is delighted with this explanation. But Socrates has no sooner +found the new solution than he sinks into a fit of despondency. For an +objection occurs to him:--May there not be errors where there is no +confusion of mind and sense? e.g. in numbers. No one can confuse the man +whom he has in his thoughts with the horse which he has in his thoughts, +but he may err in the addition of five and seven. And observe that these +are purely mental conceptions. Thus we are involved once more in the +dilemma of saying, either that there is no such thing as false opinion, or +that a man knows what he does not know. + +We are at our wit's end, and may therefore be excused for making a bold +diversion. All this time we have been repeating the words 'know,' +'understand,' yet we do not know what knowledge is. 'Why, Socrates, how +can you argue at all without using them?' Nay, but the true hero of +dialectic would have forbidden me to use them until I had explained them. +And I must explain them now. The verb 'to know' has two senses, to have +and to possess knowledge, and I distinguish 'having' from 'possessing.' A +man may possess a garment which he does not wear; or he may have wild birds +in an aviary; these in one sense he possesses, and in another he has none +of them. Let this aviary be an image of the mind, as the waxen block was; +when we are young, the aviary is empty; after a time the birds are put in; +for under this figure we may describe different forms of knowledge;--there +are some of them in groups, and some single, which are flying about +everywhere; and let us suppose a hunt after the science of odd and even, or +some other science. The possession of the birds is clearly not the same as +the having them in the hand. And the original chase of them is not the +same as taking them in the hand when they are already caged. + +This distinction between use and possession saves us from the absurdity of +supposing that we do not know what we know, because we may know in one +sense, i.e. possess, what we do not know in another, i.e. use. But have we +not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? For how can the +exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? As well +might we suppose that ignorance could make a man know, or that blindness +could make him see. Theaetetus suggests that in the aviary there may be +flying about mock birds, or forms of ignorance, and we put forth our hands +and grasp ignorance, when we are intending to grasp knowledge. But how can +he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one +to be the other? Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes +them? and another, and another? Thus we go round and round in a circle and +make no progress. + +All this confusion arises out of our attempt to explain false opinion +without having explained knowledge. What then is knowledge? Theaetetus +repeats that knowledge is true opinion. But this seems to be refuted by +the instance of orators and judges. For surely the orator cannot convey a +true knowledge of crimes at which the judges were not present; he can only +persuade them, and the judge may form a true opinion and truly judge. But +if true opinion were knowledge they could not have judged without +knowledge. + +Once more. Theaetetus offers a definition which he has heard: Knowledge +is true opinion accompanied by definition or explanation. Socrates has had +a similar dream, and has further heard that the first elements are names +only, and that definition or explanation begins when they are combined; the +letters are unknown, the syllables or combinations are known. But this new +hypothesis when tested by the letters of the alphabet is found to break +down. The first syllable of Socrates' name is SO. But what is SO? Two +letters, S and O, a sibilant and a vowel, of which no further explanation +can be given. And how can any one be ignorant of either of them, and yet +know both of them? There is, however, another alternative:--We may suppose +that the syllable has a separate form or idea distinct from the letters or +parts. The all of the parts may not be the whole. Theaetetus is very much +inclined to adopt this suggestion, but when interrogated by Socrates he is +unable to draw any distinction between the whole and all the parts. And if +the syllables have no parts, then they are those original elements of which +there is no explanation. But how can the syllable be known if the letter +remains unknown? In learning to read as children, we are first taught the +letters and then the syllables. And in music, the notes, which are the +letters, have a much more distinct meaning to us than the combination of +them. + +Once more, then, we must ask the meaning of the statement, that 'Knowledge +is right opinion, accompanied by explanation or definition.' Explanation +may mean, (1) the reflection or expression of a man's thoughts--but every +man who is not deaf and dumb is able to express his thoughts--or (2) the +enumeration of the elements of which anything is composed. A man may have +a true opinion about a waggon, but then, and then only, has he knowledge of +a waggon when he is able to enumerate the hundred planks of Hesiod. Or he +may know the syllables of the name Theaetetus, but not the letters; yet not +until he knows both can he be said to have knowledge as well as opinion. +But on the other hand he may know the syllable 'The' in the name +Theaetetus, yet he may be mistaken about the same syllable in the name +Theodorus, and in learning to read we often make such mistakes. And even +if he could write out all the letters and syllables of your name in order, +still he would only have right opinion. Yet there may be a third meaning +of the definition, besides the image or expression of the mind, and the +enumeration of the elements, viz. (3) perception of difference. + +For example, I may see a man who has eyes, nose, and mouth;--that will not +distinguish him from any other man. Or he may have a snub-nose and +prominent eyes;--that will not distinguish him from myself and you and +others who are like me. But when I see a certain kind of snub-nosedness, +then I recognize Theaetetus. And having this sign of difference, I have +knowledge. But have I knowledge or opinion of this difference; if I have +only opinion I have not knowledge; if I have knowledge we assume a disputed +term; for knowledge will have to be defined as right opinion with knowledge +of difference. + +And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true opinion, nor +yet definition accompanying true opinion. And I have shown that the +children of your brain are not worth rearing. Are you still in labour, or +have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? If you +have any more thoughts, you will be the better for having got rid of these; +or if you have none, you will be the better for not fancying that you know +what you do not know. Observe the limits of my art, which, like my +mother's, is an art of midwifery; I do not pretend to compare with the good +and wise of this and other ages. + +And now I go to meet Meletus at the porch of the King Archon; but to-morrow +I shall hope to see you again, Theodorus, at this place. + +... + +I. The saying of Theaetetus, that 'Knowledge is sensible perception,' may +be assumed to be a current philosophical opinion of the age. 'The +ancients,' as Aristotle (De Anim.) says, citing a verse of Empedocles, +'affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.' We may now examine +these words, first, with reference to their place in the history of +philosophy, and secondly, in relation to modern speculations. + +(a) In the age of Socrates the mind was passing from the object to the +subject. The same impulse which a century before had led men to form +conceptions of the world, now led them to frame general notions of the +human faculties and feelings, such as memory, opinion, and the like. The +simplest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato +seems to mean the generalized notion of feelings and impressions of sense, +without determining whether they are conscious or not. + +The theory that 'Knowledge is sensible perception' is the antithesis of +that which derives knowledge from the mind (Theaet.), or which assumes the +existence of ideas independent of the mind (Parm.). Yet from their extreme +abstraction these theories do not represent the opposite poles of thought +in the same way that the corresponding differences would in modern +philosophy. The most ideal and the most sensational have a tendency to +pass into one another; Heracleitus, like his great successor Hegel, has +both aspects. The Eleatic isolation of Being and the Megarian or Cynic +isolation of individuals are placed in the same class by Plato (Soph.); and +the same principle which is the symbol of motion to one mind is the symbol +of rest to another. The Atomists, who are sometimes regarded as the +Materialists of Plato, denied the reality of sensation. And in the ancient +as well as the modern world there were reactions from theory to experience, +from ideas to sense. This is a point of view from which the philosophy of +sensation presented great attraction to the ancient thinker. Amid the +conflict of ideas and the variety of opinions, the impression of sense +remained certain and uniform. Hardness, softness, cold, heat, etc. are not +absolutely the same to different persons, but the art of measuring could at +any rate reduce them all to definite natures (Republic). Thus the doctrine +that knowledge is perception supplies or seems to supply a firm standing +ground. Like the other notions of the earlier Greek philosophy, it was +held in a very simple way, without much basis of reasoning, and without +suggesting the questions which naturally arise in our own minds on the same +subject. + +(b) The fixedness of impressions of sense furnishes a link of connexion +between ancient and modern philosophy. The modern thinker often repeats +the parallel axiom, 'All knowledge is experience.' He means to say that +the outward and not the inward is both the original source and the final +criterion of truth, because the outward can be observed and analyzed; the +inward is only known by external results, and is dimly perceived by each +man for himself. In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? +Chiefly in this--that the modern term 'experience,' while implying a point +of departure in sense and a return to sense, also includes all the +processes of reasoning and imagination which have intervened. The +necessary connexion between them by no means affords a measure of the +relative degree of importance which is to be ascribed to either element. +For the inductive portion of any science may be small, as in mathematics or +ethics, compared with that which the mind has attained by reasoning and +reflection on a very few facts. + +II. The saying that 'All knowledge is sensation' is identified by Plato +with the Protagorean thesis that 'Man is the measure of all things.' The +interpretation which Protagoras himself is supposed to give of these latter +words is: 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they +appear to you.' But there remains still an ambiguity both in the text and +in the explanation, which has to be cleared up. Did Protagoras merely mean +to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? Or did he mean to +deny that there is an objective standard of truth? + +These two questions have not been always clearly distinguished; the +relativity of knowledge has been sometimes confounded with uncertainty. +The untutored mind is apt to suppose that objects exist independently of +the human faculties, because they really exist independently of the +faculties of any individual. In the same way, knowledge appears to be a +body of truths stored up in books, which when once ascertained are +independent of the discoverer. Further consideration shows us that these +truths are not really independent of the mind; there is an adaptation of +one to the other, of the eye to the object of sense, of the mind to the +conception. There would be no world, if there neither were nor ever had +been any one to perceive the world. A slight effort of reflection enables +us to understand this; but no effort of reflection will enable us to pass +beyond the limits of our own faculties, or to imagine the relation or +adaptation of objects to the mind to be different from that of which we +have experience. There are certain laws of language and logic to which we +are compelled to conform, and to which our ideas naturally adapt +themselves; and we can no more get rid of them than we can cease to be +ourselves. The absolute and infinite, whether explained as self-existence, +or as the totality of human thought, or as the Divine nature, if known to +us at all, cannot escape from the category of relation. + +But because knowledge is subjective or relative to the mind, we are not to +suppose that we are therefore deprived of any of the tests or criteria of +truth. One man still remains wiser than another, a more accurate observer +and relater of facts, a truer measure of the proportions of knowledge. The +nature of testimony is not altered, nor the verification of causes by +prescribed methods less certain. Again, the truth must often come to a man +through others, according to the measure of his capacity and education. +But neither does this affect the testimony, whether written or oral, which +he knows by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot escape from the laws +of his own mind; and he cannot escape from the further accident of being +dependent for his knowledge on others. But still this is no reason why he +should always be in doubt; of many personal, of many historical and +scientific facts he may be absolutely assured. And having such a mass of +acknowledged truth in the mathematical and physical, not to speak of the +moral sciences, the moderns have certainly no reason to acquiesce in the +statement that truth is appearance only, or that there is no difference +between appearance and truth. + +The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was a great +psychological discovery in the fifth century before Christ. Of this +discovery, the first distinct assertion is contained in the thesis of +Protagoras. Probably he had no intention either of denying or affirming an +objective standard of truth. He did not consider whether man in the higher +or man in the lower sense was a 'measure of all things.' Like other great +thinkers, he was absorbed with one idea, and that idea was the absoluteness +of perception. Like Socrates, he seemed to see that philosophy must be +brought back from 'nature' to 'truth,' from the world to man. But he did +not stop to analyze whether he meant 'man' in the concrete or man in the +abstract, any man or some men, 'quod semper quod ubique' or individual +private judgment. Such an analysis lay beyond his sphere of thought; the +age before Socrates had not arrived at these distinctions. Like the +Cynics, again, he discarded knowledge in any higher sense than perception. +For 'truer' or 'wiser' he substituted the word 'better,' and is not +unwilling to admit that both states and individuals are capable of +practical improvement. But this improvement does not arise from +intellectual enlightenment, nor yet from the exertion of the will, but from +a change of circumstances and impressions; and he who can effect this +change in himself or others may be deemed a philosopher. In the mode of +effecting it, while agreeing with Socrates and the Cynics in the importance +which he attaches to practical life, he is at variance with both of them. +To suppose that practice can be divorced from speculation, or that we may +do good without caring about truth, is by no means singular, either in +philosophy or life. The singularity of this, as of some other (so-called) +sophistical doctrines, is the frankness with which they are avowed, instead +of being veiled, as in modern times, under ambiguous and convenient +phrases. + +Plato appears to treat Protagoras much as he himself is treated by +Aristotle; that is to say, he does not attempt to understand him from his +own point of view. But he entangles him in the meshes of a more advanced +logic. To which Protagoras is supposed to reply by Megarian quibbles, +which destroy logic, 'Not only man, but each man, and each man at each +moment.' In the arguments about sight and memory there is a palpable +unfairness which is worthy of the great 'brainless brothers,' Euthydemus +and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the egkekalummenos ('obvelatus') +of Eubulides. For he who sees with one eye only cannot be truly said both +to see and not to see; nor is memory, which is liable to forget, the +immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies the term. Theodorus justly +charges Socrates with going beyond the truth; and Protagoras has equally +right on his side when he protests against Socrates arguing from the common +use of words, which 'the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways.' + +III. The theory of Protagoras is connected by Aristotle as well as Plato +with the flux of Heracleitus. But Aristotle is only following Plato, and +Plato, as we have already seen, did not mean to imply that such a connexion +was admitted by Protagoras himself. His metaphysical genius saw or seemed +to see a common tendency in them, just as the modern historian of ancient +philosophy might perceive a parallelism between two thinkers of which they +were probably unconscious themselves. We must remember throughout that +Plato is not speaking of Heracleitus, but of the Heracliteans, who +succeeded him; nor of the great original ideas of the master, but of the +Eristic into which they had degenerated a hundred years later. There is +nothing in the fragments of Heracleitus which at all justifies Plato's +account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two elements--first, +change, secondly, law or measure pervading the change: these he saw +everywhere, and often expressed in strange mythological symbols. But he +has no analysis of sensible perception such as Plato attributes to him; nor +is there any reason to suppose that he pushed his philosophy into that +absolute negation in which Heracliteanism was sunk in the age of Plato. He +never said that 'change means every sort of change;' and he expressly +distinguished between 'the general and particular understanding.' Like a +poet, he surveyed the elements of mythology, nature, thought, which lay +before him, and sometimes by the light of genius he saw or seemed to see a +mysterious principle working behind them. But as has been the case with +other great philosophers, and with Plato and Aristotle themselves, what was +really permanent and original could not be understood by the next +generation, while a perverted logic carried out his chance expressions with +an illogical consistency. His simple and noble thoughts, like those of the +great Eleatic, soon degenerated into a mere strife of words. And when thus +reduced to mere words, they seem to have exercised a far wider influence in +the cities of Ionia (where the people 'were mad about them') than in the +life-time of Heracleitus--a phenomenon which, though at first sight +singular, is not without a parallel in the history of philosophy and +theology. + +It is this perverted form of the Heraclitean philosophy which is supposed +to effect the final overthrow of Protagorean sensationalism. For if all +things are changing at every moment, in all sorts of ways, then there is +nothing fixed or defined at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor +any true word by which that or anything else can be described. Of course +Protagoras would not have admitted the justice of this argument any more +than Heracleitus would have acknowledged the 'uneducated fanatics' who +appealed to his writings. He might have said, 'The excellent Socrates has +first confused me with Heracleitus, and Heracleitus with his Ephesian +successors, and has then disproved the existence both of knowledge and +sensation. But I am not responsible for what I never said, nor will I +admit that my common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by +unintelligible Heraclitean paradoxes.' + +IV. Still at the bottom of the arguments there remains a truth, that +knowledge is something more than sensible perception;--this alone would not +distinguish man from a tadpole. The absoluteness of sensations at each +moment destroys the very consciousness of sensations (compare Phileb.), or +the power of comparing them. The senses are not mere holes in a 'Trojan +horse,' but the organs of a presiding nature, in which they meet. A great +advance has been made in psychology when the senses are recognized as +organs of sense, and we are admitted to see or feel 'through them' and not +'by them,' a distinction of words which, as Socrates observes, is by no +means pedantic. A still further step has been made when the most abstract +notions, such as Being and Not-being, sameness and difference, unity and +plurality, are acknowledged to be the creations of the mind herself, +working upon the feelings or impressions of sense. In this manner Plato +describes the process of acquiring them, in the words 'Knowledge consists +not in the feelings or affections (pathemasi), but in the process of +reasoning about them (sullogismo).' Here, is in the Parmenides, he means +something not really different from generalization. As in the Sophist, he +is laying the foundation of a rational psychology, which is to supersede +the Platonic reminiscence of Ideas as well as the Eleatic Being and the +individualism of Megarians and Cynics. + +V. Having rejected the doctrine that 'Knowledge is perception,' we now +proceed to look for a definition of knowledge in the sphere of opinion. +But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion +possible? For we must either know or not know that which is presented to +the mind or to sense. We of course should answer at once: 'No; the +alternative is not necessary, for there may be degrees of knowledge; and we +may know and have forgotten, or we may be learning, or we may have a +general but not a particular knowledge, or we may know but not be able to +explain;' and many other ways may be imagined in which we know and do not +know at the same time. But these answers belong to a later stage of +metaphysical discussion; whereas the difficulty in question naturally +arises owing to the childhood of the human mind, like the parallel +difficulty respecting Not-being. Men had only recently arrived at the +notion of opinion; they could not at once define the true and pass beyond +into the false. The very word doxa was full of ambiguity, being sometimes, +as in the Eleatic philosophy, applied to the sensible world, and again used +in the more ordinary sense of opinion. There is no connexion between +sensible appearance and probability, and yet both of them met in the word +doxa, and could hardly be disengaged from one another in the mind of the +Greek living in the fifth or fourth century B.C. To this was often added, +as at the end of the fifth book of the Republic, the idea of relation, +which is equally distinct from either of them; also a fourth notion, the +conclusion of the dialectical process, the making up of the mind after she +has been 'talking to herself' (Theat.). + +We are not then surprised that the sphere of opinion and of Not-being +should be a dusky, half-lighted place (Republic), belonging neither to the +old world of sense and imagination, nor to the new world of reflection and +reason. Plato attempts to clear up this darkness. In his accustomed +manner he passes from the lower to the higher, without omitting the +intermediate stages. This appears to be the reason why he seeks for the +definition of knowledge first in the sphere of opinion. Hereafter we shall +find that something more than opinion is required. + +False opinion is explained by Plato at first as a confusion of mind and +sense, which arises when the impression on the mind does not correspond to +the impression made on the senses. It is obvious that this explanation +(supposing the distinction between impressions on the mind and impressions +on the senses to be admitted) does not account for all forms of error; and +Plato has excluded himself from the consideration of the greater number, by +designedly omitting the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting; +nor does he include fallacies in the use of language or erroneous +inferences. But he is struck by one possibility of error, which is not +covered by his theory, viz. errors in arithmetic. For in numbers and +calculation there is no combination of thought and sense, and yet errors +may often happen. Hence he is led to discard the explanation which might +nevertheless have been supposed to hold good (for anything which he says to +the contrary) as a rationale of error, in the case of facts derived from +sense. + +Another attempt is made to explain false opinion by assigning to error a +sort of positive existence. But error or ignorance is essentially +negative--a not-knowing; if we knew an error, we should be no longer in +error. We may veil our difficulty under figures of speech, but these, +although telling arguments with the multitude, can never be the real +foundation of a system of psychology. Only they lead us to dwell upon +mental phenomena which if expressed in an abstract form would not be +realized by us at all. The figure of the mind receiving impressions is one +of those images which have rooted themselves for ever in language. It may +or may not be a 'gracious aid' to thought; but it cannot be got rid of. +The other figure of the enclosure is also remarkable as affording the first +hint of universal all-pervading ideas,--a notion further carried out in the +Sophist. This is implied in the birds, some in flocks, some solitary, +which fly about anywhere and everywhere. Plato discards both figures, as +not really solving the question which to us appears so simple: 'How do we +make mistakes?' The failure of the enquiry seems to show that we should +return to knowledge, and begin with that; and we may afterwards proceed, +with a better hope of success, to the examination of opinion. + +But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? The difference between +these he seeks to establish by an argument, which to us appears singular +and unsatisfactory. The existence of true opinion is proved by the +rhetoric of the law courts, which cannot give knowledge, but may give true +opinion. The rhetorician cannot put the judge or juror in possession of +all the facts which prove an act of violence, but he may truly persuade +them of the commission of such an act. Here the idea of true opinion seems +to be a right conclusion from imperfect knowledge. But the correctness of +such an opinion will be purely accidental; and is really the effect of one +man, who has the means of knowing, persuading another who has not. Plato +would have done better if he had said that true opinion was a contradiction +in terms. + +Assuming the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Theaetetus, in +answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with +definite or rational explanation. This Socrates identifies with another +and different theory, of those who assert that knowledge first begins with +a proposition. + +The elements may be perceived by sense, but they are names, and cannot be +defined. When we assign to them some predicate, they first begin to have a +meaning (onomaton sumploke logou ousia). This seems equivalent to saying, +that the individuals of sense become the subject of knowledge when they are +regarded as they are in nature in relation to other individuals. + +Yet we feel a difficulty in following this new hypothesis. For must not +opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? The difference between true +and false opinion is not the difference between the particular and the +universal, but between the true universal and the false. Thought may be as +much at fault as sight. When we place individuals under a class, or assign +to them attributes, this is not knowledge, but a very rudimentary process +of thought; the first generalization of all, without which language would +be impossible. And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which +the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a +definition? And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous +term 'elements,' or 'letters'? For there is no real resemblance between +the relation of letters to a syllable, and of the terms to a proposition. + +Plato, in the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, soon discovers a flaw in +the explanation. For how can we know a compound of which the simple +elements are unknown to us? Can two unknowns make a known? Can a whole be +something different from the parts? The answer of experience is that they +can; for we may know a compound, which we are unable to analyze into its +elements; and all the parts, when united, may be more than all the parts +separated: e.g. the number four, or any other number, is more than the +units which are contained in it; any chemical compound is more than and +different from the simple elements. But ancient philosophy in this, as in +many other instances, proceeding by the path of mental analysis, was +perplexed by doubts which warred against the plainest facts. + +Three attempts to explain the new definition of knowledge still remain to +be considered. They all of them turn on the explanation of logos. The +first account of the meaning of the word is the reflection of thought in +speech--a sort of nominalism 'La science est une langue bien faite.' But +anybody who is not dumb can say what he thinks; therefore mere speech +cannot be knowledge. And yet we may observe, that there is in this +explanation an element of truth which is not recognized by Plato; viz. that +truth and thought are inseparable from language, although mere expression +in words is not truth. The second explanation of logos is the enumeration +of the elementary parts of the complex whole. But this is only definition +accompanied with right opinion, and does not yet attain to the certainty of +knowledge. Plato does not mention the greater objection, which is, that +the enumeration of particulars is endless; such a definition would be based +on no principle, and would not help us at all in gaining a common idea. +The third is the best explanation,--the possession of a characteristic +mark, which seems to answer to the logical definition by genus and +difference. But this, again, is equally necessary for right opinion; and +we have already determined, although not on very satisfactory grounds, that +knowledge must be distinguished from opinion. A better distinction is +drawn between them in the Timaeus. They might be opposed as philosophy and +rhetoric, and as conversant respectively with necessary and contingent +matter. But no true idea of the nature of either of them, or of their +relation to one another, could be framed until science obtained a content. +The ancient philosophers in the age of Plato thought of science only as +pure abstraction, and to this opinion stood in no relation. + +Like Theaetetus, we have attained to no definite result. But an +interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passed before us. And the +negative result is not to be despised. For on certain subjects, and in +certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or clearing the ground +must go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin to +rise. Plato saw the necessity of combating the illogical logic of the +Megarians and Eristics. For the completion of the edifice, he makes +preparation in the Theaetetus, and crowns the work in the Sophist. + +Many (1) fine expressions, and (2) remarks full of wisdom, (3) also germs +of a metaphysic of the future, are scattered up and down in the dialogue. +Such, for example, as (1) the comparison of Theaetetus' progress in +learning to the 'noiseless flow of a river of oil'; the satirical touch, +'flavouring a sauce or fawning speech'; or the remarkable expression, 'full +of impure dialectic'; or the lively images under which the argument is +described,--'the flood of arguments pouring in,' the fresh discussions +'bursting in like a band of revellers.' (2) As illustrations of the second +head, may be cited the remark of Socrates, that 'distinctions of words, +although sometimes pedantic, are also necessary'; or the fine touch in the +character of the lawyer, that 'dangers came upon him when the tenderness of +youth was unequal to them'; or the description of the manner in which the +spirit is broken in a wicked man who listens to reproof until he becomes +like a child; or the punishment of the wicked, which is not physical +suffering, but the perpetual companionship of evil (compare Gorgias); or +the saying, often repeated by Aristotle and others, that 'philosophy begins +in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumas'; or the superb contempt with +which the philosopher takes down the pride of wealthy landed proprietors by +comparison of the whole earth. (3) Important metaphysical ideas are: a. +the conception of thought, as the mind talking to herself; b. the notion of +a common sense, developed further by Aristotle, and the explicit +declaration, that the mind gains her conceptions of Being, sameness, +number, and the like, from reflection on herself; c. the excellent +distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, speaking with emphasis, 'leaves +to grow') between seeing the forms or hearing the sounds of words in a +foreign language, and understanding the meaning of them; and d. the +distinction of Socrates himself between 'having' and 'possessing' +knowledge, in which the answer to the whole discussion appears to be +contained. + +... + +There is a difference between ancient and modern psychology, and we have a +difficulty in explaining one in the terms of the other. To us the inward +and outward sense and the inward and outward worlds of which they are the +organs are parted by a wall, and appear as if they could never be +confounded. The mind is endued with faculties, habits, instincts, and a +personality or consciousness in which they are bound together. Over +against these are placed forms, colours, external bodies coming into +contact with our own body. We speak of a subject which is ourselves, of an +object which is all the rest. These are separable in thought, but united +in any act of sensation, reflection, or volition. As there are various +degrees in which the mind may enter into or be abstracted from the +operations of sense, so there are various points at which this separation +or union may be supposed to occur. And within the sphere of mind the +analogy of sense reappears; and we distinguish not only external objects, +but objects of will and of knowledge which we contrast with them. These +again are comprehended in a higher object, which reunites with the subject. +A multitude of abstractions are created by the efforts of successive +thinkers which become logical determinations; and they have to be arranged +in order, before the scheme of thought is complete. The framework of the +human intellect is not the peculium of an individual, but the joint work of +many who are of all ages and countries. What we are in mind is due, not +merely to our physical, but to our mental antecedents which we trace in +history, and more especially in the history of philosophy. Nor can mental +phenomena be truly explained either by physiology or by the observation of +consciousness apart from their history. They have a growth of their own, +like the growth of a flower, a tree, a human being. They may be conceived +as of themselves constituting a common mind, and having a sort of personal +identity in which they coexist. + +So comprehensive is modern psychology, seeming to aim at constructing anew +the entire world of thought. And prior to or simultaneously with this +construction a negative process has to be carried on, a clearing away of +useless abstractions which we have inherited from the past. Many erroneous +conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies have found their +way into language, and we with difficulty disengage ourselves from them. +Mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced the minds of great +thinkers. Also there are some distinctions, as, for example, that of the +will and of the reason, and of the moral and intellectual faculties, which +are carried further than is justified by experience. Any separation of +things which we cannot see or exactly define, though it may be necessary, +is a fertile source of error. The division of the mind into faculties or +powers or virtues is too deeply rooted in language to be got rid of, but it +gives a false impression. For if we reflect on ourselves we see that all +our faculties easily pass into one another, and are bound together in a +single mind or consciousness; but this mental unity is apt to be concealed +from us by the distinctions of language. + +A profusion of words and ideas has obscured rather than enlightened mental +science. It is hard to say how many fallacies have arisen from the +representation of the mind as a box, as a 'tabula rasa,' a book, a mirror, +and the like. It is remarkable how Plato in the Theaetetus, after having +indulged in the figure of the waxen tablet and the decoy, afterwards +discards them. The mind is also represented by another class of images, as +the spring of a watch, a motive power, a breath, a stream, a succession of +points or moments. As Plato remarks in the Cratylus, words expressive of +motion as well as of rest are employed to describe the faculties and +operations of the mind; and in these there is contained another store of +fallacies. Some shadow or reflection of the body seems always to adhere to +our thoughts about ourselves, and mental processes are hardly distinguished +in language from bodily ones. To see or perceive are used indifferently of +both; the words intuition, moral sense, common sense, the mind's eye, are +figures of speech transferred from one to the other. And many other words +used in early poetry or in sacred writings to express the works of mind +have a materialistic sound; for old mythology was allied to sense, and the +distinction of matter and mind had not as yet arisen. Thus materialism +receives an illusive aid from language; and both in philosophy and religion +the imaginary figure or association easily takes the place of real +knowledge. + +Again, there is the illusion of looking into our own minds as if our +thoughts or feelings were written down in a book. This is another figure +of speech, which might be appropriately termed 'the fallacy of the looking- +glass.' We cannot look at the mind unless we have the eye which sees, and +we can only look, not into, but out of the mind at the thoughts, words, +actions of ourselves and others. What we dimly recognize within us is not +experience, but rather the suggestion of an experience, which we may +gather, if we will, from the observation of the world. The memory has but +a feeble recollection of what we were saying or doing a few weeks or a few +months ago, and still less of what we were thinking or feeling. This is +one among many reasons why there is so little self-knowledge among mankind; +they do not carry with them the thought of what they are or have been. The +so-called 'facts of consciousness' are equally evanescent; they are facts +which nobody ever saw, and which can neither be defined nor described. Of +the three laws of thought the first (All A = A) is an identical +proposition--that is to say, a mere word or symbol claiming to be a +proposition: the two others (Nothing can be A and not A, and Everything is +either A or not A) are untrue, because they exclude degrees and also the +mixed modes and double aspects under which truth is so often presented to +us. To assert that man is man is unmeaning; to say that he is free or +necessary and cannot be both is a half truth only. These are a few of the +entanglements which impede the natural course of human thought. Lastly, +there is the fallacy which lies still deeper, of regarding the individual +mind apart from the universal, or either, as a self-existent entity apart +from the ideas which are contained in them. + +In ancient philosophies the analysis of the mind is still rudimentary and +imperfect. It naturally began with an effort to disengage the universal +from sense--this was the first lifting up of the mist. It wavered between +object and subject, passing imperceptibly from one or Being to mind and +thought. Appearance in the outward object was for a time indistinguishable +from opinion in the subject. At length mankind spoke of knowing as well as +of opining or perceiving. But when the word 'knowledge' was found how was +it to be explained or defined? It was not an error, it was a step in the +right direction, when Protagoras said that 'Man is the measure of all +things,' and that 'All knowledge is perception.' This was the subjective +which corresponded to the objective 'All is flux.' But the thoughts of men +deepened, and soon they began to be aware that knowledge was neither sense, +nor yet opinion--with or without explanation; nor the expression of +thought, nor the enumeration of parts, nor the addition of characteristic +marks. Motion and rest were equally ill adapted to express its nature, +although both must in some sense be attributed to it; it might be described +more truly as the mind conversing with herself; the discourse of reason; +the hymn of dialectic, the science of relations, of ideas, of the so-called +arts and sciences, of the one, of the good, of the all:--this is the way +along which Plato is leading us in his later dialogues. In its higher +signification it was the knowledge, not of men, but of gods, perfect and +all sufficing:--like other ideals always passing out of sight, and +nevertheless present to the mind of Aristotle as well as Plato, and the +reality to which they were both tending. For Aristotle as well as Plato +would in modern phraseology have been termed a mystic; and like him would +have defined the higher philosophy to be 'Knowledge of being or essence,'-- +words to which in our own day we have a difficulty in attaching a meaning. + +Yet, in spite of Plato and his followers, mankind have again and again +returned to a sensational philosophy. As to some of the early thinkers, +amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed to be fixed, so +to a later generation amid the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the +only fixed points appeared to be outward objects. Any pretence of +knowledge which went beyond them implied logical processes, of the +correctness of which they had no assurance and which at best were only +probable. The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground; +when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the perception +of outward objects alone remained. The ancient Epicureans never asked +whether the comparison of these with one another did not involve principles +of another kind which were above and beyond them. In like manner the +modern inductive philosophy forgot to enquire into the meaning of +experience, and did not attempt to form a conception of outward objects +apart from the mind, or of the mind apart from them. Soon objects of sense +were merged in sensations and feelings, but feelings and sensations were +still unanalyzed. At last we return to the doctrine attributed by Plato to +Protagoras, that the mind is only a succession of momentary perceptions. +At this point the modern philosophy of experience forms an alliance with +ancient scepticism. + +The higher truths of philosophy and religion are very far removed from +sense. Admitting that, like all other knowledge, they are derived from +experience, and that experience is ultimately resolvable into facts which +come to us through the eye and ear, still their origin is a mere accident +which has nothing to do with their true nature. They are universal and +unseen; they belong to all times--past, present, and future. Any worthy +notion of mind or reason includes them. The proof of them is, 1st, their +comprehensiveness and consistency with one another; 2ndly, their agreement +with history and experience. But sensation is of the present only, is +isolated, is and is not in successive moments. It takes the passing hour +as it comes, following the lead of the eye or ear instead of the command of +reason. It is a faculty which man has in common with the animals, and in +which he is inferior to many of them. The importance of the senses in us +is that they are the apertures of the mind, doors and windows through which +we take in and make our own the materials of knowledge. Regarded in any +other point of view sensation is of all mental acts the most trivial and +superficial. Hence the term 'sensational' is rightly used to express what +is shallow in thought and feeling. + +We propose in what follows, first of all, like Plato in the Theaetetus, to +analyse sensation, and secondly to trace the connexion between theories of +sensation and a sensational or Epicurean philosophy. + +Paragraph I. We, as well as the ancients, speak of the five senses, and of +a sense, or common sense, which is the abstraction of them. The term +'sense' is also used metaphorically, both in ancient and modern philosophy, +to express the operations of the mind which are immediate or intuitive. Of +the five senses, two--the sight and the hearing--are of a more subtle and +complex nature, while two others--the smell and the taste--seem to be only +more refined varieties of touch. All of them are passive, and by this are +distinguished from the active faculty of speech: they receive impressions, +but do not produce them, except in so far as they are objects of sense +themselves. + +Physiology speaks to us of the wonderful apparatus of nerves, muscles, +tissues, by which the senses are enabled to fulfil their functions. It +traces the connexion, though imperfectly, of the bodily organs with the +operations of the mind. Of these latter, it seems rather to know the +conditions than the causes. It can prove to us that without the brain we +cannot think, and that without the eye we cannot see: and yet there is far +more in thinking and seeing than is given by the brain and the eye. It +observes the 'concomitant variations' of body and mind. Psychology, on the +other hand, treats of the same subject regarded from another point of view. +It speaks of the relation of the senses to one another; it shows how they +meet the mind; it analyzes the transition from sense to thought. The one +describes their nature as apparent to the outward eye; by the other they +are regarded only as the instruments of the mind. It is in this latter +point of view that we propose to consider them. + +The simplest sensation involves an unconscious or nascent operation of the +mind; it implies objects of sense, and objects of sense have differences of +form, number, colour. But the conception of an object without us, or the +power of discriminating numbers, forms, colours, is not given by the sense, +but by the mind. A mere sensation does not attain to distinctness: it is +a confused impression, sugkechumenon ti, as Plato says (Republic), until +number introduces light and order into the confusion. At what point +confusion becomes distinctness is a question of degree which cannot be +precisely determined. The distant object, the undefined notion, come out +into relief as we approach them or attend to them. Or we may assist the +analysis by attempting to imagine the world first dawning upon the eye of +the infant or of a person newly restored to sight. Yet even with them the +mind as well as the eye opens or enlarges. For all three are inseparably +bound together--the object would be nowhere and nothing, if not perceived +by the sense, and the sense would have no power of distinguishing without +the mind. + +But prior to objects of sense there is a third nature in which they are +contained--that is to say, space, which may be explained in various ways. +It is the element which surrounds them; it is the vacuum or void which they +leave or occupy when passing from one portion of space to another. It +might be described in the language of ancient philosophy, as 'the Not- +being' of objects. It is a negative idea which in the course of ages has +become positive. It is originally derived from the contemplation of the +world without us--the boundless earth or sea, the vacant heaven, and is +therefore acquired chiefly through the sense of sight: to the blind the +conception of space is feeble and inadequate, derived for the most part +from touch or from the descriptions of others. At first it appears to be +continuous; afterwards we perceive it to be capable of division by lines or +points, real or imaginary. By the help of mathematics we form another idea +of space, which is altogether independent of experience. Geometry teaches +us that the innumerable lines and figures by which space is or may be +intersected are absolutely true in all their combinations and consequences. +New and unchangeable properties of space are thus developed, which are +proved to us in a thousand ways by mathematical reasoning as well as by +common experience. Through quantity and measure we are conducted to our +simplest and purest notion of matter, which is to the cube or solid what +space is to the square or surface. And all our applications of mathematics +are applications of our ideas of space to matter. No wonder then that they +seem to have a necessary existence to us. Being the simplest of our ideas, +space is also the one of which we have the most difficulty in ridding +ourselves. Neither can we set a limit to it, for wherever we fix a limit, +space is springing up beyond. Neither can we conceive a smallest or +indivisible portion of it; for within the smallest there is a smaller +still; and even these inconceivable qualities of space, whether the +infinite or the infinitesimal, may be made the subject of reasoning and +have a certain truth to us. + +Whether space exists in the mind or out of it, is a question which has no +meaning. We should rather say that without it the mind is incapable of +conceiving the body, and therefore of conceiving itself. The mind may be +indeed imagined to contain the body, in the same way that Aristotle (partly +following Plato) supposes God to be the outer heaven or circle of the +universe. But how can the individual mind carry about the universe of +space packed up within, or how can separate minds have either a universe of +their own or a common universe? In such conceptions there seems to be a +confusion of the individual and the universal. To say that we can only +have a true idea of ourselves when we deny the reality of that by which we +have any idea of ourselves is an absurdity. The earth which is our +habitation and 'the starry heaven above' and we ourselves are equally an +illusion, if space is only a quality or condition of our minds. + +Again, we may compare the truths of space with other truths derived from +experience, which seem to have a necessity to us in proportion to the +frequency of their recurrence or the truth of the consequences which may be +inferred from them. We are thus led to remark that the necessity in our +ideas of space on which much stress has been laid, differs in a slight +degree only from the necessity which appears to belong to other of our +ideas, e.g. weight, motion, and the like. And there is another way in +which this necessity may be explained. We have been taught it, and the +truth which we were taught or which we inherited has never been +contradicted in all our experience and is therefore confirmed by it. Who +can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every +moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? The +greater part of what is sometimes regarded as the a priori intuition of +space is really the conception of the various geometrical figures of which +the properties have been revealed by mathematical analysis. And the +certainty of these properties is immeasurably increased to us by our +finding that they hold good not only in every instance, but in all the +consequences which are supposed to flow from them. + +Neither must we forget that our idea of space, like our other ideas, has a +history. The Homeric poems contain no word for it; even the later Greek +philosophy has not the Kantian notion of space, but only the definite +'place' or 'the infinite.' To Plato, in the Timaeus, it is known only as +the 'nurse of generation.' When therefore we speak of the necessity of our +ideas of space we must remember that this is a necessity which has grown up +with the growth of the human mind, and has been made by ourselves. We can +free ourselves from the perplexities which are involved in it by ascending +to a time in which they did not as yet exist. And when space or time are +described as 'a priori forms or intuitions added to the matter given in +sensation,' we should consider that such expressions belong really to the +'pre-historic study' of philosophy, i.e. to the eighteenth century, when +men sought to explain the human mind without regard to history or language +or the social nature of man. + +In every act of sense there is a latent perception of space, of which we +only become conscious when objects are withdrawn from it. There are +various ways in which we may trace the connexion between them. We may +think of space as unresisting matter, and of matter as divided into +objects; or of objects again as formed by abstraction into a collective +notion of matter, and of matter as rarefied into space. And motion may be +conceived as the union of there and not there in space, and force as the +materializing or solidification of motion. Space again is the individual +and universal in one; or, in other words, a perception and also a +conception. So easily do what are sometimes called our simple ideas pass +into one another, and differences of kind resolve themselves into +differences of degree. + +Within or behind space there is another abstraction in many respects +similar to it--time, the form of the inward, as space is the form of the +outward. As we cannot think of outward objects of sense or of outward +sensations without space, so neither can we think of a succession of +sensations without time. It is the vacancy of thoughts or sensations, as +space is the void of outward objects, and we can no more imagine the mind +without the one than the world without the other. It is to arithmetic what +space is to geometry; or, more strictly, arithmetic may be said to be +equally applicable to both. It is defined in our minds, partly by the +analogy of space and partly by the recollection of events which have +happened to us, or the consciousness of feelings which we are experiencing. +Like space, it is without limit, for whatever beginning or end of time we +fix, there is a beginning and end before them, and so on without end. We +speak of a past, present, and future, and again the analogy of space +assists us in conceiving of them as coexistent. When the limit of time is +removed there arises in our minds the idea of eternity, which at first, +like time itself, is only negative, but gradually, when connected with the +world and the divine nature, like the other negative infinity of space, +becomes positive. Whether time is prior to the mind and to experience, or +coeval with them, is (like the parallel question about space) unmeaning. +Like space it has been realized gradually: in the Homeric poems, or even +in the Hesiodic cosmogony, there is no more notion of time than of space. +The conception of being is more general than either, and might therefore +with greater plausibility be affirmed to be a condition or quality of the +mind. The a priori intuitions of Kant would have been as unintelligible to +Plato as his a priori synthetical propositions to Aristotle. The +philosopher of Konigsberg supposed himself to be analyzing a necessary mode +of thought: he was not aware that he was dealing with a mere abstraction. +But now that we are able to trace the gradual developement of ideas through +religion, through language, through abstractions, why should we interpose +the fiction of time between ourselves and realities? Why should we single +out one of these abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the +others? It comes last and not first in the order of our thoughts, and is +not the condition precedent of them, but the last generalization of them. +Nor can any principle be imagined more suicidal to philosophy than to +assume that all the truth which we are capable of attaining is seen only +through an unreal medium. If all that exists in time is illusion, we may +well ask with Plato, 'What becomes of the mind?' + +Leaving the a priori conditions of sensation we may proceed to consider +acts of sense. These admit of various degrees of duration or intensity; +they admit also of a greater or less extension from one object, which is +perceived directly, to many which are perceived indirectly or in a less +degree, and to the various associations of the object which are latent in +the mind. In general the greater the intension the less the extension of +them. The simplest sensation implies some relation of objects to one +another, some position in space, some relation to a previous or subsequent +sensation. The acts of seeing and hearing may be almost unconscious and +may pass away unnoted; they may also leave an impression behind them or +power of recalling them. If, after seeing an object we shut our eyes, the +object remains dimly seen in the same or about the same place, but with +form and lineaments half filled up. This is the simplest act of memory. +And as we cannot see one thing without at the same time seeing another, +different objects hang together in recollection, and when we call for one +the other quickly follows. To think of the place in which we have last +seen a thing is often the best way of recalling it to the mind. Hence +memory is dependent on association. The act of recollection may be +compared to the sight of an object at a great distance which we have +previously seen near and seek to bring near to us in thought. Memory is to +sense as dreaming is to waking; and like dreaming has a wayward and +uncertain power of recalling impressions from the past. + +Thus begins the passage from the outward to the inward sense. But as yet +there is no conception of a universal--the mind only remembers the +individual object or objects, and is always attaching to them some colour +or association of sense. The power of recollection seems to depend on the +intensity or largeness of the perception, or on the strength of some +emotion with which it is inseparably connected. This is the natural memory +which is allied to sense, such as children appear to have and barbarians +and animals. It is necessarily limited in range, and its limitation is its +strength. In later life, when the mind has become crowded with names, +acts, feelings, images innumerable, we acquire by education another memory +of system and arrangement which is both stronger and weaker than the first +--weaker in the recollection of sensible impressions as they are +represented to us by eye or ear--stronger by the natural connexion of ideas +with objects or with one another. And many of the notions which form a +part of the train of our thoughts are hardly realized by us at the time, +but, like numbers or algebraical symbols, are used as signs only, thus +lightening the labour of recollection. + +And now we may suppose that numerous images present themselves to the mind, +which begins to act upon them and to arrange them in various ways. Besides +the impression of external objects present with us or just absent from us, +we have a dimmer conception of other objects which have disappeared from +our immediate recollection and yet continue to exist in us. The mind is +full of fancies which are passing to and fro before it. Some feeling or +association calls them up, and they are uttered by the lips. This is the +first rudimentary imagination, which may be truly described in the language +of Hobbes, as 'decaying sense,' an expression which may be applied with +equal truth to memory as well. For memory and imagination, though we +sometimes oppose them, are nearly allied; the difference between them seems +chiefly to lie in the activity of the one compared with the passivity of +the other. The sense decaying in memory receives a flash of light or life +from imagination. Dreaming is a link of connexion between them; for in +dreaming we feebly recollect and also feebly imagine at one and the same +time. When reason is asleep the lower part of the mind wanders at will +amid the images which have been received from without, the intelligent +element retires, and the sensual or sensuous takes its place. And so in +the first efforts of imagination reason is latent or set aside; and images, +in part disorderly, but also having a unity (however imperfect) of their +own, pour like a flood over the mind. And if we could penetrate into the +heads of animals we should probably find that their intelligence, or the +state of what in them is analogous to our intelligence, is of this nature. + +Thus far we have been speaking of men, rather in the points in which they +resemble animals than in the points in which they differ from them. The +animal too has memory in various degrees, and the elements of imagination, +if, as appears to be the case, he dreams. How far their powers or +instincts are educated by the circumstances of their lives or by +intercourse with one another or with mankind, we cannot precisely tell. +They, like ourselves, have the physical inheritance of form, scent, +hearing, sight, and other qualities or instincts. But they have not the +mental inheritance of thoughts and ideas handed down by tradition, 'the +slow additions that build up the mind' of the human race. And language, +which is the great educator of mankind, is wanting in them; whereas in us +language is ever present--even in the infant the latent power of naming is +almost immediately observable. And therefore the description which has +been already given of the nascent power of the faculties is in reality an +anticipation. For simultaneous with their growth in man a growth of +language must be supposed. The child of two years old sees the fire once +and again, and the feeble observation of the same recurring object is +associated with the feeble utterance of the name by which he is taught to +call it. Soon he learns to utter the name when the object is no longer +there, but the desire or imagination of it is present to him. At first in +every use of the word there is a colour of sense, an indistinct picture of +the object which accompanies it. But in later years he sees in the name +only the universal or class word, and the more abstract the notion becomes, +the more vacant is the image which is presented to him. Henceforward all +the operations of his mind, including the perceptions of sense, are a +synthesis of sensations, words, conceptions. In seeing or hearing or +looking or listening the sensible impression prevails over the conception +and the word. In reflection the process is reversed--the outward object +fades away into nothingness, the name or the conception or both together +are everything. Language, like number, is intermediate between the two, +partaking of the definiteness of the outer and of the universality of the +inner world. For logic teaches us that every word is really a universal, +and only condescends by the help of position or circumlocution to become +the expression of individuals or particulars. And sometimes by using words +as symbols we are able to give a 'local habitation and a name' to the +infinite and inconceivable. + +Thus we see that no line can be drawn between the powers of sense and of +reflection--they pass imperceptibly into one another. We may indeed +distinguish between the seeing and the closed eye--between the sensation +and the recollection of it. But this distinction carries us a very little +way, for recollection is present in sight as well as sight in recollection. +There is no impression of sense which does not simultaneously recall +differences of form, number, colour, and the like. Neither is such a +distinction applicable at all to our internal bodily sensations, which give +no sign of themselves when unaccompanied with pain, and even when we are +most conscious of them, have often no assignable place in the human frame. +Who can divide the nerves or great nervous centres from the mind which uses +them? Who can separate the pains and pleasures of the mind from the pains +and pleasures of the body? The words 'inward and outward,' 'active and +passive,' 'mind and body,' are best conceived by us as differences of +degree passing into differences of kind, and at one time and under one +aspect acting in harmony and then again opposed. They introduce a system +and order into the knowledge of our being; and yet, like many other general +terms, are often in advance of our actual analysis or observation. + +According to some writers the inward sense is only the fading away or +imperfect realization of the outward. But this leaves out of sight one +half of the phenomenon. For the mind is not only withdrawn from the world +of sense but introduced to a higher world of thought and reflection, in +which, like the outward sense, she is trained and educated. By use the +outward sense becomes keener and more intense, especially when confined +within narrow limits. The savage with little or no thought has a quicker +discernment of the track than the civilised man; in like manner the dog, +having the help of scent as well as of sight, is superior to the savage. +By use again the inward thought becomes more defined and distinct; what was +at first an effort is made easy by the natural instrumentality of language, +and the mind learns to grasp universals with no more exertion than is +required for the sight of an outward object. There is a natural connexion +and arrangement of them, like the association of objects in a landscape. +Just as a note or two of music suffices to recall a whole piece to the +musician's or composer's mind, so a great principle or leading thought +suggests and arranges a world of particulars. The power of reflection is +not feebler than the faculty of sense, but of a higher and more +comprehensive nature. It not only receives the universals of sense, but +gives them a new content by comparing and combining them with one another. +It withdraws from the seen that it may dwell in the unseen. The sense only +presents us with a flat and impenetrable surface: the mind takes the world +to pieces and puts it together on a new pattern. The universals which are +detached from sense are reconstructed in science. They and not the mere +impressions of sense are the truth of the world in which we live; and (as +an argument to those who will only believe 'what they can hold in their +hands') we may further observe that they are the source of our power over +it. To say that the outward sense is stronger than the inward is like +saying that the arm of the workman is stronger than the constructing or +directing mind. + +Returning to the senses we may briefly consider two questions--first their +relation to the mind, secondly, their relation to outward objects:-- + +1. The senses are not merely 'holes set in a wooden horse' (Theaet.), but +instruments of the mind with which they are organically connected. There +is no use of them without some use of words--some natural or latent logic-- +some previous experience or observation. Sensation, like all other mental +processes, is complex and relative, though apparently simple. The senses +mutually confirm and support one another; it is hard to say how much our +impressions of hearing may be affected by those of sight, or how far our +impressions of sight may be corrected by the touch, especially in infancy. +The confirmation of them by one another cannot of course be given by any +one of them. Many intuitions which are inseparable from the act of sense +are really the result of complicated reasonings. The most cursory glance +at objects enables the experienced eye to judge approximately of their +relations and distance, although nothing is impressed upon the retina +except colour, including gradations of light and shade. From these +delicate and almost imperceptible differences we seem chiefly to derive our +ideas of distance and position. By comparison of what is near with what is +distant we learn that the tree, house, river, etc. which are a long way off +are objects of a like nature with those which are seen by us in our +immediate neighbourhood, although the actual impression made on the eye is +very different in one case and in the other. This is a language of 'large +and small letters' (Republic), slightly differing in form and exquisitely +graduated by distance, which we are learning all our life long, and which +we attain in various degrees according to our powers of sight or +observation. There is nor the consideration. The greater or less strain +upon the nerves of the eye or ear is communicated to the mind and silently +informs the judgment. We have also the use not of one eye only, but of +two, which give us a wider range, and help us to discern, by the greater or +less acuteness of the angle which the rays of sight form, the distance of +an object and its relation to other objects. But we are already passing +beyond the limits of our actual knowledge on a subject which has given rise +to many conjectures. More important than the addition of another +conjecture is the observation, whether in the case of sight or of any other +sense, of the great complexity of the causes and the great simplicity of +the effect. + +The sympathy of the mind and the ear is no less striking than the sympathy +of the mind and the eye. Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as +an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes? +Yet how small a part of speech or of music is produced by the impression of +the ear compared with that which is furnished by the mind! + +Again: the more refined faculty of sense, as in animals so also in man, +seems often to be transmitted by inheritance. Neither must we forget that +in the use of the senses, as in his whole nature, man is a social being, +who is always being educated by language, habit, and the teaching of other +men as well as by his own observation. He knows distance because he is +taught it by a more experienced judgment than his own; he distinguishes +sounds because he is told to remark them by a person of a more discerning +ear. And as we inherit from our parents or other ancestors peculiar powers +of sense or feeling, so we improve and strengthen them, not only by regular +teaching, but also by sympathy and communion with other persons. + +2. The second question, namely, that concerning the relation of the mind +to external objects, is really a trifling one, though it has been made the +subject of a famous philosophy. We may if we like, with Berkeley, resolve +objects of sense into sensations; but the change is one of name only, and +nothing is gained and something is lost by such a resolution or confusion +of them. For we have not really made a single step towards idealism, and +any arbitrary inversion of our ordinary modes of speech is disturbing to +the mind. The youthful metaphysician is delighted at his marvellous +discovery that nothing is, and that what we see or feel is our sensation +only: for a day or two the world has a new interest to him; he alone knows +the secret which has been communicated to him by the philosopher, that mind +is all--when in fact he is going out of his mind in the first intoxication +of a great thought. But he soon finds that all things remain as they were +--the laws of motion, the properties of matter, the qualities of +substances. After having inflicted his theories on any one who is willing +to receive them 'first on his father and mother, secondly on some other +patient listener, thirdly on his dog,' he finds that he only differs from +the rest of mankind in the use of a word. He had once hoped that by +getting rid of the solidity of matter he might open a passage to worlds +beyond. He liked to think of the world as the representation of the divine +nature, and delighted to imagine angels and spirits wandering through +space, present in the room in which he is sitting without coming through +the door, nowhere and everywhere at the same instant. At length he finds +that he has been the victim of his own fancies; he has neither more nor +less evidence of the supernatural than he had before. He himself has +become unsettled, but the laws of the world remain fixed as at the +beginning. He has discovered that his appeal to the fallibility of sense +was really an illusion. For whatever uncertainty there may be in the +appearances of nature, arises only out of the imperfection or variation of +the human senses, or possibly from the deficiency of certain branches of +knowledge; when science is able to apply her tests, the uncertainty is at +an end. We are apt sometimes to think that moral and metaphysical +philosophy are lowered by the influence which is exercised over them by +physical science. But any interpretation of nature by physical science is +far in advance of such idealism. The philosophy of Berkeley, while giving +unbounded license to the imagination, is still grovelling on the level of +sense. + +We may, if we please, carry this scepticism a step further, and deny, not +only objects of sense, but the continuity of our sensations themselves. We +may say with Protagoras and Hume that what is appears, and that what +appears appears only to individuals, and to the same individual only at one +instant. But then, as Plato asks,--and we must repeat the question,--What +becomes of the mind? Experience tells us by a thousand proofs that our +sensations of colour, taste, and the like, are the same as they were an +instant ago--that the act which we are performing one minute is continued +by us in the next--and also supplies abundant proof that the perceptions of +other men are, speaking generally, the same or nearly the same with our +own. After having slowly and laboriously in the course of ages gained a +conception of a whole and parts, of the constitution of the mind, of the +relation of man to God and nature, imperfect indeed, but the best we can, +we are asked to return again to the 'beggarly elements' of ancient +scepticism, and acknowledge only atoms and sensations devoid of life or +unity. Why should we not go a step further still and doubt the existence +of the senses of all things? We are but 'such stuff as dreams are made +of;' for we have left ourselves no instruments of thought by which we can +distinguish man from the animals, or conceive of the existence even of a +mollusc. And observe, this extreme scepticism has been allowed to spring +up among us, not, like the ancient scepticism, in an age when nature and +language really seemed to be full of illusions, but in the eighteenth and +nineteenth centuries, when men walk in the daylight of inductive science. + +The attractiveness of such speculations arises out of their true nature not +being perceived. They are veiled in graceful language; they are not pushed +to extremes; they stop where the human mind is disposed also to stop--short +of a manifest absurdity. Their inconsistency is not observed by their +authors or by mankind in general, who are equally inconsistent themselves. +They leave on the mind a pleasing sense of wonder and novelty: in youth +they seem to have a natural affinity to one class of persons as poetry has +to another; but in later life either we drift back into common sense, or we +make them the starting-points of a higher philosophy. + +We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept +them;--with what limitations is this true? For we cannot use our senses +without admitting that we have them, or think without presupposing that +there is in us a power of thought, or affirm that all knowledge is derived +from experience without implying that this first principle of knowledge is +prior to experience. The truth seems to be that we begin with the natural +use of the mind as of the body, and we seek to describe this as well as we +can. We eat before we know the nature of digestion; we think before we +know the nature of reflection. As our knowledge increases, our perception +of the mind enlarges also. We cannot indeed get beyond facts, but neither +can we draw any line which separates facts from ideas. And the mind is not +something separate from them but included in them, and they in the mind, +both having a distinctness and individuality of their own. To reduce our +conception of mind to a succession of feelings and sensations is like the +attempt to view a wide prospect by inches through a microscope, or to +calculate a period of chronology by minutes. The mind ceases to exist when +it loses its continuity, which though far from being its highest +determination, is yet necessary to any conception of it. Even an inanimate +nature cannot be adequately represented as an endless succession of states +or conditions. + +Paragraph II. Another division of the subject has yet to be considered: +Why should the doctrine that knowledge is sensation, in ancient times, or +of sensationalism or materialism in modern times, be allied to the lower +rather than to the higher view of ethical philosophy? At first sight the +nature and origin of knowledge appear to be wholly disconnected from ethics +and religion, nor can we deny that the ancient Stoics were materialists, or +that the materialist doctrines prevalent in modern times have been +associated with great virtues, or that both religious and philosophical +idealism have not unfrequently parted company with practice. Still upon +the whole it must be admitted that the higher standard of duty has gone +hand in hand with the higher conception of knowledge. It is Protagoras who +is seeking to adapt himself to the opinions of the world; it is Plato who +rises above them: the one maintaining that all knowledge is sensation; the +other basing the virtues on the idea of good. The reason of this +phenomenon has now to be examined. + +By those who rest knowledge immediately upon sense, that explanation of +human action is deemed to be the truest which is nearest to sense. As +knowledge is reduced to sensation, so virtue is reduced to feeling, +happiness or good to pleasure. The different virtues--the various +characters which exist in the world--are the disguises of self-interest. +Human nature is dried up; there is no place left for imagination, or in any +higher sense for religion. Ideals of a whole, or of a state, or of a law +of duty, or of a divine perfection, are out of place in an Epicurean +philosophy. The very terms in which they are expressed are suspected of +having no meaning. Man is to bring himself back as far as he is able to +the condition of a rational beast. He is to limit himself to the pursuit +of pleasure, but of this he is to make a far-sighted calculation;--he is to +be rationalized, secularized, animalized: or he is to be an amiable +sceptic, better than his own philosophy, and not falling below the opinions +of the world. + +Imagination has been called that 'busy faculty' which is always intruding +upon us in the search after truth. But imagination is also that higher +power by which we rise above ourselves and the commonplaces of thought and +life. The philosophical imagination is another name for reason finding an +expression of herself in the outward world. To deprive life of ideals is +to deprive it of all higher and comprehensive aims and of the power of +imparting and communicating them to others. For men are taught, not by +those who are on a level with them, but by those who rise above them, who +see the distant hills, who soar into the empyrean. Like a bird in a cage, +the mind confined to sense is always being brought back from the higher to +the lower, from the wider to the narrower view of human knowledge. It +seeks to fly but cannot: instead of aspiring towards perfection, 'it +hovers about this lower world and the earthly nature.' It loses the +religious sense which more than any other seems to take a man out of +himself. Weary of asking 'What is truth?' it accepts the 'blind witness of +eyes and ears;' it draws around itself the curtain of the physical world +and is satisfied. The strength of a sensational philosophy lies in the +ready accommodation of it to the minds of men; many who have been +metaphysicians in their youth, as they advance in years are prone to +acquiesce in things as they are, or rather appear to be. They are +spectators, not thinkers, and the best philosophy is that which requires of +them the least amount of mental effort. + +As a lower philosophy is easier to apprehend than a higher, so a lower way +of life is easier to follow; and therefore such a philosophy seems to +derive a support from the general practice of mankind. It appeals to +principles which they all know and recognize: it gives back to them in a +generalized form the results of their own experience. To the man of the +world they are the quintessence of his own reflections upon life. To +follow custom, to have no new ideas or opinions, not to be straining after +impossibilities, to enjoy to-day with just so much forethought as is +necessary to provide for the morrow, this is regarded by the greater part +of the world as the natural way of passing through existence. And many who +have lived thus have attained to a lower kind of happiness or equanimity. +They have possessed their souls in peace without ever allowing them to +wander into the region of religious or political controversy, and without +any care for the higher interests of man. But nearly all the good (as well +as some of the evil) which has ever been done in this world has been the +work of another spirit, the work of enthusiasts and idealists, of apostles +and martyrs. The leaders of mankind have not been of the gentle Epicurean +type; they have personified ideas; they have sometimes also been the +victims of them. But they have always been seeking after a truth or ideal +of which they fell short; and have died in a manner disappointed of their +hopes that they might lift the human race out of the slough in which they +found them. They have done little compared with their own visions and +aspirations; but they have done that little, only because they sought to +do, and once perhaps thought that they were doing, a great deal more. + +The philosophies of Epicurus or Hume give no adequate or dignified +conception of the mind. There is no organic unity in a succession of +feeling or sensations; no comprehensiveness in an infinity of separate +actions. The individual never reflects upon himself as a whole; he can +hardly regard one act or part of his life as the cause or effect of any +other act or part. Whether in practice or speculation, he is to himself +only in successive instants. To such thinkers, whether in ancient or in +modern times, the mind is only the poor recipient of impressions--not the +heir of all the ages, or connected with all other minds. It begins again +with its own modicum of experience having only such vague conceptions of +the wisdom of the past as are inseparable from language and popular +opinion. It seeks to explain from the experience of the individual what +can only be learned from the history of the world. It has no conception of +obligation, duty, conscience--these are to the Epicurean or Utilitarian +philosopher only names which interfere with our natural perceptions of +pleasure and pain. + +There seem then to be several answers to the question, Why the theory that +all knowledge is sensation is allied to the lower rather than to the higher +view of ethical philosophy:--1st, Because it is easier to understand and +practise; 2ndly, Because it is fatal to the pursuit of ideals, moral, +political, or religious; 3rdly, Because it deprives us of the means and +instruments of higher thought, of any adequate conception of the mind, of +knowledge, of conscience, of moral obligation. + +... + +ON THE NATURE AND LIMITS Of PSYCHOLOGY. + +O gar arche men o me oide, teleute de kai ta metaxu ex ou me oide +sumpeplektai, tis mechane ten toiauten omologian pote epistemen genesthai; +Plato Republic. + +Monon gar auto legeiv, osper gumnon kai aperemomenon apo ton onton apanton, +adunaton. Soph. + +Since the above essay first appeared, many books on Psychology have been +given to the world, partly based upon the views of Herbart and other German +philosophers, partly independent of them. The subject has gained in bulk +and extent; whether it has had any true growth is more doubtful. It begins +to assume the language and claim the authority of a science; but it is only +an hypothesis or outline, which may be filled up in many ways according to +the fancy of individual thinkers. The basis of it is a precarious one,-- +consciousness of ourselves and a somewhat uncertain observation of the rest +of mankind. Its relations to other sciences are not yet determined: they +seem to be almost too complicated to be ascertained. It may be compared to +an irregular building, run up hastily and not likely to last, because its +foundations are weak, and in many places rest only on the surface of the +ground. It has sought rather to put together scattered observations and to +make them into a system than to describe or prove them. It has never +severely drawn the line between facts and opinions. It has substituted a +technical phraseology for the common use of language, being neither able to +win acceptance for the one nor to get rid of the other. + +The system which has thus arisen appears to be a kind of metaphysic +narrowed to the point of view of the individual mind, through which, as +through some new optical instrument limiting the sphere of vision, the +interior of thought and sensation is examined. But the individual mind in +the abstract, as distinct from the mind of a particular individual and +separated from the environment of circumstances, is a fiction only. Yet +facts which are partly true gather around this fiction and are naturally +described by the help of it. There is also a common type of the mind which +is derived from the comparison of many minds with one another and with our +own. The phenomena of which Psychology treats are familiar to us, but they +are for the most part indefinite; they relate to a something inside the +body, which seems also to overleap the limits of space. The operations of +this something, when isolated, cannot be analyzed by us or subjected to +observation and experiment. And there is another point to be considered. +The mind, when thinking, cannot survey that part of itself which is used in +thought. It can only be contemplated in the past, that is to say, in the +history of the individual or of the world. This is the scientific method +of studying the mind. But Psychology has also some other supports, +specious rather than real. It is partly sustained by the false analogy of +Physical Science and has great expectations from its near relationship to +Physiology. We truly remark that there is an infinite complexity of the +body corresponding to the infinite subtlety of the mind; we are conscious +that they are very nearly connected. But in endeavouring to trace the +nature of the connexion we are baffled and disappointed. In our knowledge +of them the gulf remains the same: no microscope has ever seen into +thought; no reflection on ourselves has supplied the missing link between +mind and matter...These are the conditions of this very inexact science, +and we shall only know less of it by pretending to know more, or by +assigning to it a form or style to which it has not yet attained and is not +really entitled. + +Experience shows that any system, however baseless and ineffectual, in our +own or in any other age, may be accepted and continue to be studied, if it +seeks to satisfy some unanswered question or is based upon some ancient +tradition, especially if it takes the form and uses the language of +inductive philosophy. The fact therefore that such a science exists and is +popular, affords no evidence of its truth or value. Many who have pursued +it far into detail have never examined the foundations on which it rests. +The have been many imaginary subjects of knowledge of which enthusiastic +persons have made a lifelong study, without ever asking themselves what is +the evidence for them, what is the use of them, how long they will last? +They may pass away, like the authors of them, and 'leave not a wrack +behind;' or they may survive in fragments. Nor is it only in the Middle +Ages, or in the literary desert of China or of India, that such systems +have arisen; in our own enlightened age, growing up by the side of Physics, +Ethics, and other really progressive sciences, there is a weary waste of +knowledge, falsely so-called. There are sham sciences which no logic has +ever put to the test, in which the desire for knowledge invents the +materials of it. + +And therefore it is expedient once more to review the bases of Psychology, +lest we should be imposed upon by its pretensions. The study of it may +have done good service by awakening us to the sense of inveterate errors +familiarized by language, yet it may have fallen into still greater ones; +under the pretence of new investigations it may be wasting the lives of +those who are engaged in it. It may also be found that the discussion of +it will throw light upon some points in the Theaetetus of Plato,--the +oldest work on Psychology which has come down to us. The imaginary science +may be called, in the language of ancient philosophy, 'a shadow of a part +of Dialectic or Metaphysic' (Gorg.). + +In this postscript or appendix we propose to treat, first, of the true +bases of Psychology; secondly, of the errors into which the students of it +are most likely to fall; thirdly, of the principal subjects which are +usually comprehended under it; fourthly, of the form which facts relating +to the mind most naturally assume. + +We may preface the enquiry by two or three remarks:-- + +(1) We do not claim for the popular Psychology the position of a science at +all; it cannot, like the Physical Sciences, proceed by the Inductive +Method: it has not the necessity of Mathematics: it does not, like +Metaphysic, argue from abstract notions or from internal coherence. It is +made up of scattered observations. A few of these, though they may +sometimes appear to be truisms, are of the greatest value, and free from +all doubt. We are conscious of them in ourselves; we observe them working +in others; we are assured of them at all times. For example, we are +absolutely certain, (a) of the influence exerted by the mind over the body +or by the body over the mind: (b) of the power of association, by which +the appearance of some person or the occurrence of some event recalls to +mind, not always but often, other persons and events: (c) of the effect of +habit, which is strongest when least disturbed by reflection, and is to the +mind what the bones are to the body: (d) of the real, though not +unlimited, freedom of the human will: (e) of the reference, more or less +distinct, of our sensations, feelings, thoughts, actions, to ourselves, +which is called consciousness, or, when in excess, self-consciousness: (f) +of the distinction of the 'I' and 'Not I,' of ourselves and outward +objects. But when we attempt to gather up these elements in a single +system, we discover that the links by which we combine them are apt to be +mere words. We are in a country which has never been cleared or surveyed; +here and there only does a gleam of light come through the darkness of the +forest. + +(2) These fragments, although they can never become science in the ordinary +sense of the word, are a real part of knowledge and may be of great value +in education. We may be able to add a good deal to them from our own +experience, and we may verify them by it. Self-examination is one of those +studies which a man can pursue alone, by attention to himself and the +processes of his individual mind. He may learn much about his own +character and about the character of others, if he will 'make his mind sit +down' and look at itself in the glass. The great, if not the only use of +such a study is a practical one,--to know, first, human nature, and, +secondly, our own nature, as it truly is. + +(3) Hence it is important that we should conceive of the mind in the +noblest and simplest manner. While acknowledging that language has been +the greatest factor in the formation of human thought, we must endeavour to +get rid of the disguises, oppositions, contradictions, which arise out of +it. We must disengage ourselves from the ideas which the customary use of +words has implanted in us. To avoid error as much as possible when we are +speaking of things unseen, the principal terms which we use should be few, +and we should not allow ourselves to be enslaved by them. Instead of +seeking to frame a technical language, we should vary our forms of speech, +lest they should degenerate into formulas. A difficult philosophical +problem is better understood when translated into the vernacular. + +I.a. Psychology is inseparable from language, and early language contains +the first impressions or the oldest experience of man respecting himself. +These impressions are not accurate representations of the truth; they are +the reflections of a rudimentary age of philosophy. The first and simplest +forms of thought are rooted so deep in human nature that they can never be +got rid of; but they have been perpetually enlarged and elevated, and the +use of many words has been transferred from the body to the mind. The +spiritual and intellectual have thus become separated from the material-- +there is a cleft between them; and the heart and the conscience of man rise +above the dominion of the appetites and create a new language in which they +too find expression. As the differences of actions begin to be perceived, +more and more names are needed. This is the first analysis of the human +mind; having a general foundation in popular experience, it is moulded to a +certain extent by hierophants and philosophers. (See Introd. to Cratylus.) + +b. This primitive psychology is continually receiving additions from the +first thinkers, who in return take a colour from the popular language of +the time. The mind is regarded from new points of view, and becomes +adapted to new conditions of knowledge. It seeks to isolate itself from +matter and sense, and to assert its independence in thought. It recognizes +that it is independent of the external world. It has five or six natural +states or stages:--(1) sensation, in which it is almost latent or +quiescent: (2) feeling, or inner sense, when the mind is just awakening: +(3) memory, which is decaying sense, and from time to time, as with a spark +or flash, has the power of recollecting or reanimating the buried past: +(4) thought, in which images pass into abstract notions or are intermingled +with them: (5) action, in which the mind moves forward, of itself, or +under the impulse of want or desire or pain, to attain or avoid some end or +consequence: and (6) there is the composition of these or the admixture or +assimilation of them in various degrees. We never see these processes of +the mind, nor can we tell the causes of them. But we know them by their +results, and learn from other men that so far as we can describe to them or +they to us the workings of the mind, their experience is the same or nearly +the same with our own. + +c. But the knowledge of the mind is not to any great extent derived from +the observation of the individual by himself. It is the growing +consciousness of the human race, embodied in language, acknowledged by +experience, and corrected from time to time by the influence of literature +and philosophy. A great, perhaps the most important, part of it is to be +found in early Greek thought. In the Theaetetus of Plato it has not yet +become fixed: we are still stumbling on the threshold. In Aristotle the +process is more nearly completed, and has gained innumerable abstractions, +of which many have had to be thrown away because relative only to the +controversies of the time. In the interval between Thales and Aristotle +were realized the distinctions of mind and body, of universal and +particular, of infinite and infinitesimal, of idea and phenomenon; the +class conceptions of faculties and virtues, the antagonism of the appetites +and the reason; and connected with this, at a higher stage of development, +the opposition of moral and intellectual virtue; also the primitive +conceptions of unity, being, rest, motion, and the like. These divisions +were not really scientific, but rather based on popular experience. They +were not held with the precision of modern thinkers, but taken all together +they gave a new existence to the mind in thought, and greatly enlarged and +more accurately defined man's knowledge of himself and of the world. The +majority of them have been accepted by Christian and Western nations. Yet +in modern times we have also drifted so far away from Aristotle, that if we +were to frame a system on his lines we should be at war with ordinary +language and untrue to our own consciousness. And there have been a few +both in mediaeval times and since the Reformation who have rebelled against +the Aristotelian point of view. Of these eccentric thinkers there have +been various types, but they have all a family likeness. According to +them, there has been too much analysis and too little synthesis, too much +division of the mind into parts and too little conception of it as a whole +or in its relation to God and the laws of the universe. They have thought +that the elements of plurality and unity have not been duly adjusted. The +tendency of such writers has been to allow the personality of man to be +absorbed in the universal, or in the divine nature, and to deny the +distinction between matter and mind, or to substitute one for the other. +They have broken some of the idols of Psychology: they have challenged the +received meaning of words: they have regarded the mind under many points +of view. But though they may have shaken the old, they have not +established the new; their views of philosophy, which seem like the echo of +some voice from the East, have been alien to the mind of Europe. + +d. The Psychology which is found in common language is in some degree +verified by experience, but not in such a manner as to give it the +character of an exact science. We cannot say that words always correspond +to facts. Common language represents the mind from different and even +opposite points of view, which cannot be all of them equally true (compare +Cratylus). Yet from diversity of statements and opinions may be obtained a +nearer approach to the truth than is to be gained from any one of them. It +also tends to correct itself, because it is gradually brought nearer to the +common sense of mankind. There are some leading categories or +classifications of thought, which, though unverified, must always remain +the elements from which the science or study of the mind proceeds. For +example, we must assume ideas before we can analyze them, and also a +continuing mind to which they belong; the resolution of it into successive +moments, which would say, with Protagoras, that the man is not the same +person which he was a minute ago, is, as Plato implies in the Theaetetus, +an absurdity. + +e. The growth of the mind, which may be traced in the histories of +religions and philosophies and in the thoughts of nations, is one of the +deepest and noblest modes of studying it. Here we are dealing with the +reality, with the greater and, as it may be termed, the most sacred part of +history. We study the mind of man as it begins to be inspired by a human +or divine reason, as it is modified by circumstances, as it is distributed +in nations, as it is renovated by great movements, which go beyond the +limits of nations and affect human society on a scale still greater, as it +is created or renewed by great minds, who, looking down from above, have a +wider and more comprehensive vision. This is an ambitious study, of which +most of us rather 'entertain conjecture' than arrive at any detailed or +accurate knowledge. Later arises the reflection how these great ideas or +movements of the world have been appropriated by the multitude and found a +way to the minds of individuals. The real Psychology is that which shows +how the increasing knowledge of nature and the increasing experience of +life have always been slowly transforming the mind, how religions too have +been modified in the course of ages 'that God may be all and in all.' E +pollaplasion, eoe, to ergon e os nun zeteitai prostatteis. + +f. Lastly, though we speak of the study of mind in a special sense, it may +also be said that there is no science which does not contribute to our +knowledge of it. The methods of science and their analogies are new +faculties, discovered by the few and imparted to the many. They are to the +mind, what the senses are to the body; or better, they may be compared to +instruments such as the telescope or microscope by which the discriminating +power of the senses, or to other mechanical inventions, by which the +strength and skill of the human body is so immeasurably increased. + +II. The new Psychology, whatever may be its claim to the authority of a +science, has called attention to many facts and corrected many errors, +which without it would have been unexamined. Yet it is also itself very +liable to illusion. The evidence on which it rests is vague and +indefinite. The field of consciousness is never seen by us as a whole, but +only at particular points, which are always changing. The veil of language +intercepts facts. Hence it is desirable that in making an approach to the +study we should consider at the outset what are the kinds of error which +most easily affect it, and note the differences which separate it from +other branches of knowledge. + +a. First, we observe the mind by the mind. It would seem therefore that +we are always in danger of leaving out the half of that which is the +subject of our enquiry. We come at once upon the difficulty of what is the +meaning of the word. Does it differ as subject and object in the same +manner? Can we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to +interpret another? Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought +which is introspected? Has the mind the power of surveying its whole +domain at one and the same time?--No more than the eye can take in the +whole human body at a glance. Yet there may be a glimpse round the corner, +or a thought transferred in a moment from one point of view to another, +which enables us to see nearly the whole, if not at once, at any rate in +succession. Such glimpses will hardly enable us to contemplate from within +the mind in its true proportions. Hence the firmer ground of Psychology is +not the consciousness of inward feelings but the observation of external +actions, being the actions not only of ourselves, but of the innumerable +persons whom we come across in life. + +b. The error of supposing partial or occasional explanation of mental +phenomena to be the only or complete ones. For example, we are disinclined +to admit of the spontaneity or discontinuity of the mind--it seems to us +like an effect without a cause, and therefore we suppose the train of our +thoughts to be always called up by association. Yet it is probable, or +indeed certain, that of many mental phenomena there are no mental +antecedents, but only bodily ones. + +c. The false influence of language. We are apt to suppose that when there +are two or more words describing faculties or processes of the mind, there +are real differences corresponding to them. But this is not the case. Nor +can we determine how far they do or do not exist, or by what degree or kind +of difference they are distinguished. The same remark may be made about +figures of speech. They fill up the vacancy of knowledge; they are to the +mind what too much colour is to the eye; but the truth is rather concealed +than revealed by them. + +d. The uncertain meaning of terms, such as Consciousness, Conscience, +Will, Law, Knowledge, Internal and External Sense; these, in the language +of Plato, 'we shamelessly use, without ever having taken the pains to +analyze them.' + +e. A science such as Psychology is not merely an hypothesis, but an +hypothesis which, unlike the hypotheses of Physics, can never be verified. +It rests only on the general impressions of mankind, and there is little or +no hope of adding in any considerable degree to our stock of mental facts. + +f. The parallelism of the Physical Sciences, which leads us to analyze the +mind on the analogy of the body, and so to reduce mental operations to the +level of bodily ones, or to confound one with the other. + +g. That the progress of Physiology may throw a new light on Psychology is +a dream in which scientific men are always tempted to indulge. But however +certain we may be of the connexion between mind and body, the explanation +of the one by the other is a hidden place of nature which has hitherto been +investigated with little or no success. + +h. The impossibility of distinguishing between mind and body. Neither in +thought nor in experience can we separate them. They seem to act together; +yet we feel that we are sometimes under the dominion of the one, sometimes +of the other, and sometimes, both in the common use of language and in +fact, they transform themselves, the one into the good principle, the other +into the evil principle; and then again the 'I' comes in and mediates +between them. It is also difficult to distinguish outward facts from the +ideas of them in the mind, or to separate the external stimulus to a +sensation from the activity of the organ, or this from the invisible +agencies by which it reaches the mind, or any process of sense from its +mental antecedent, or any mental energy from its nervous expression. + +i. The fact that mental divisions tend to run into one another, and that +in speaking of the mind we cannot always distinguish differences of kind +from differences of degree; nor have we any measure of the strength and +intensity of our ideas or feelings. + +j. Although heredity has been always known to the ancients as well as +ourselves to exercise a considerable influence on human character, yet we +are unable to calculate what proportion this birth-influence bears to +nurture and education. But this is the real question. We cannot pursue +the mind into embryology: we can only trace how, after birth, it begins to +grow. But how much is due to the soil, how much to the original latent +seed, it is impossible to distinguish. And because we are certain that +heredity exercises a considerable, but undefined influence, we must not +increase the wonder by exaggerating it. + +k. The love of system is always tending to prevail over the historical +investigation of the mind, which is our chief means of knowing it. It +equally tends to hinder the other great source of our knowledge of the +mind, the observation of its workings and processes which we can make for +ourselves. + +l. The mind, when studied through the individual, is apt to be isolated-- +this is due to the very form of the enquiry; whereas, in truth, it is +indistinguishable from circumstances, the very language which it uses being +the result of the instincts of long-forgotten generations, and every word +which a man utters being the answer to some other word spoken or suggested +by somebody else. + +III. The tendency of the preceding remarks has been to show that +Psychology is necessarily a fragment, and is not and cannot be a connected +system. We cannot define or limit the mind, but we can describe it. We +can collect information about it; we can enumerate the principal subjects +which are included in the study of it. Thus we are able to rehabilitate +Psychology to some extent, not as a branch of science, but as a collection +of facts bearing on human life, as a part of the history of philosophy, as +an aspect of Metaphysic. It is a fragment of a science only, which in all +probability can never make any great progress or attain to much clearness +or exactness. It is however a kind of knowledge which has a great interest +for us and is always present to us, and of which we carry about the +materials in our own bosoms. We can observe our minds and we can +experiment upon them, and the knowledge thus acquired is not easily +forgotten, and is a help to us in study as well as in conduct. + +The principal subjects of Psychology may be summed up as follows:-- + +a. The relation of man to the world around him,--in what sense and within +what limits can he withdraw from its laws or assert himself against them +(Freedom and Necessity), and what is that which we suppose to be thus +independent and which we call ourselves? How does the inward differ from +the outward and what is the relation between them, and where do we draw the +line by which we separate mind from matter, the soul from the body? Is the +mind active or passive, or partly both? Are its movements identical with +those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or is one +simply an aspect of the other? + +b. What are we to think of time and space? Time seems to have a nearer +connexion with the mind, space with the body; yet time, as well as space, +is necessary to our idea of either. We see also that they have an analogy +with one another, and that in Mathematics they often interpenetrate. Space +or place has been said by Kant to be the form of the outward, time of the +inward sense. He regards them as parts or forms of the mind. But this is +an unfortunate and inexpressive way of describing their relation to us. +For of all the phenomena present to the human mind they seem to have most +the character of objective existence. There is no use in asking what is +beyond or behind them; we cannot get rid of them. And to throw the laws of +external nature which to us are the type of the immutable into the +subjective side of the antithesis seems to be equally inappropriate. + +c. When in imagination we enter into the closet of the mind and withdraw +ourselves from the external world, we seem to find there more or less +distinct processes which may be described by the words, 'I perceive,' 'I +feel,' 'I think,' 'I want,' 'I wish,' 'I like,' 'I dislike,' 'I fear,' 'I +know,' 'I remember,' 'I imagine,' 'I dream,' 'I act,' 'I endeavour,' 'I +hope.' These processes would seem to have the same notions attached to +them in the minds of all educated persons. They are distinguished from one +another in thought, but they intermingle. It is possible to reflect upon +them or to become conscious of them in a greater or less degree, or with a +greater or less continuity or attention, and thus arise the intermittent +phenomena of consciousness or self-consciousness. The use of all of them +is possible to us at all times; and therefore in any operation of the mind +the whole are latent. But we are able to characterise them sufficiently by +that part of the complex action which is the most prominent. We have no +difficulty in distinguishing an act of sight or an act of will from an act +of thought, although thought is present in both of them. Hence the +conception of different faculties or different virtues is precarious, +because each of them is passing into the other, and they are all one in the +mind itself; they appear and reappear, and may all be regarded as the ever- +varying phases or aspects or differences of the same mind or person. + +d. Nearest the sense in the scale of the intellectual faculties is memory, +which is a mode rather than a faculty of the mind, and accompanies all +mental operations. There are two principal kinds of it, recollection and +recognition,--recollection in which forgotten things are recalled or return +to the mind, recognition in which the mind finds itself again among things +once familiar. The simplest way in which we can represent the former to +ourselves is by shutting our eyes and trying to recall in what we term the +mind's eye the picture of the surrounding scene, or by laying down the book +which we are reading and recapitulating what we can remember of it. But +many times more powerful than recollection is recognition, perhaps because +it is more assisted by association. We have known and forgotten, and after +a long interval the thing which we have seen once is seen again by us, but +with a different feeling, and comes back to us, not as new knowledge, but +as a thing to which we ourselves impart a notion already present to us; in +Plato's words, we set the stamp upon the wax. Every one is aware of the +difference between the first and second sight of a place, between a scene +clothed with associations or bare and divested of them. We say to +ourselves on revisiting a spot after a long interval: How many things have +happened since I last saw this! There is probably no impression ever +received by us of which we can venture to say that the vestiges are +altogether lost, or that we might not, under some circumstances, recover +it. A long-forgotten knowledge may be easily renewed and therefore is very +different from ignorance. Of the language learnt in childhood not a word +may be remembered, and yet, when a new beginning is made, the old habit +soon returns, the neglected organs come back into use, and the river of +speech finds out the dried-up channel. + +e. 'Consciousness' is the most treacherous word which is employed in the +study of the mind, for it is used in many senses, and has rarely, if ever, +been minutely analyzed. Like memory, it accompanies all mental operations, +but not always continuously, and it exists in various degrees. It may be +imperceptible or hardly perceptible: it may be the living sense that our +thoughts, actions, sufferings, are our own. It is a kind of attention +which we pay to ourselves, and is intermittent rather than continuous. Its +sphere has been exaggerated. It is sometimes said to assure us of our +freedom; but this is an illusion: as there may be a real freedom without +consciousness of it, so there may be a consciousness of freedom without the +reality. It may be regarded as a higher degree of knowledge when we not +only know but know that we know. Consciousness is opposed to habit, +inattention, sleep, death. It may be illustrated by its derivative +conscience, which speaks to men, not only of right and wrong in the +abstract, but of right and wrong actions in reference to themselves and +their circumstances. + +f. Association is another of the ever-present phenomena of the human mind. +We speak of the laws of association, but this is an expression which is +confusing, for the phenomenon itself is of the most capricious and +uncertain sort. It may be briefly described as follows. The simplest case +of association is that of sense. When we see or hear separately one of two +things, which we have previously seen or heard together, the occurrence of +the one has a tendency to suggest the other. So the sight or name of a +house may recall to our minds the memory of those who once lived there. +Like may recall like and everything its opposite. The parts of a whole, +the terms of a series, objects lying near, words having a customary order +stick together in the mind. A word may bring back a passage of poetry or a +whole system of philosophy; from one end of the world or from one pole of +knowledge we may travel to the other in an indivisible instant. The long +train of association by which we pass from one point to the other, +involving every sort of complex relation, so sudden, so accidental, is one +of the greatest wonders of mind...This process however is not always +continuous, but often intermittent: we can think of things in isolation as +well as in association; we do not mean that they must all hang from one +another. We can begin again after an interval of rest or vacancy, as a new +train of thought suddenly arises, as, for example, when we wake of a +morning or after violent exercise. Time, place, the same colour or sound +or smell or taste, will often call up some thought or recollection either +accidentally or naturally associated with them. But it is equally +noticeable that the new thought may occur to us, we cannot tell how or why, +by the spontaneous action of the mind itself or by the latent influence of +the body. Both science and poetry are made up of associations or +recollections, but we must observe also that the mind is not wholly +dependent on them, having also the power of origination. + +There are other processes of the mind which it is good for us to study when +we are at home and by ourselves,--the manner in which thought passes into +act, the conflict of passion and reason in many stages, the transition from +sensuality to love or sentiment and from earthly love to heavenly, the slow +and silent influence of habit, which little by little changes the nature of +men, the sudden change of the old nature of man into a new one, wrought by +shame or by some other overwhelming impulse. These are the greater +phenomena of mind, and he who has thought of them for himself will live and +move in a better-ordered world, and will himself be a better-ordered man. + +At the other end of the 'globus intellectualis,' nearest, not to earth and +sense, but to heaven and God, is the personality of man, by which he holds +communion with the unseen world. Somehow, he knows not how, somewhere, he +knows not where, under this higher aspect of his being he grasps the ideas +of God, freedom and immortality; he sees the forms of truth, holiness and +love, and is satisfied with them. No account of the mind can be complete +which does not admit the reality or the possibility of another life. +Whether regarded as an ideal or as a fact, the highest part of man's nature +and that in which it seems most nearly to approach the divine, is a +phenomenon which exists, and must therefore be included within the domain +of Psychology. + +IV. We admit that there is no perfect or ideal Psychology. It is not a +whole in the same sense in which Chemistry, Physiology, or Mathematics are +wholes: that is to say, it is not a connected unity of knowledge. +Compared with the wealth of other sciences, it rests upon a small number of +facts; and when we go beyond these, we fall into conjectures and verbal +discussions. The facts themselves are disjointed; the causes of them run +up into other sciences, and we have no means of tracing them from one to +the other. Yet it may be true of this, as of other beginnings of +knowledge, that the attempt to put them together has tested the truth of +them, and given a stimulus to the enquiry into them. + +Psychology should be natural, not technical. It should take the form which +is the most intelligible to the common understanding, because it has to do +with common things, which are familiar to us all. It should aim at no more +than every reflecting man knows or can easily verify for himself. When +simple and unpretentious, it is least obscured by words, least liable to +fall under the influence of Physiology or Metaphysic. It should argue, not +from exceptional, but from ordinary phenomena. It should be careful to +distinguish the higher and the lower elements of human nature, and not +allow one to be veiled in the disguise of the other, lest through the +slippery nature of language we should pass imperceptibly from good to evil, +from nature in the higher to nature in the neutral or lower sense. It +should assert consistently the unity of the human faculties, the unity of +knowledge, the unity of God and law. The difference between the will and +the affections and between the reason and the passions should also be +recognized by it. + +Its sphere is supposed to be narrowed to the individual soul; but it cannot +be thus separated in fact. It goes back to the beginnings of things, to +the first growth of language and philosophy, and to the whole science of +man. There can be no truth or completeness in any study of the mind which +is confined to the individual. The nature of language, though not the +whole, is perhaps at present the most important element in our knowledge of +it. It is not impossible that some numerical laws may be found to have a +place in the relations of mind and matter, as in the rest of nature. The +old Pythagorean fancy that the soul 'is or has in it harmony' may in some +degree be realized. But the indications of such numerical harmonies are +faint; either the secret of them lies deeper than we can discover, or +nature may have rebelled against the use of them in the composition of men +and animals. It is with qualitative rather than with quantitative +differences that we are concerned in Psychology. The facts relating to the +mind which we obtain from Physiology are negative rather than positive. +They show us, not the processes of mental action, but the conditions of +which when deprived the mind ceases to act. It would seem as if the time +had not yet arrived when we can hope to add anything of much importance to +our knowledge of the mind from the investigations of the microscope. The +elements of Psychology can still only be learnt from reflections on +ourselves, which interpret and are also interpreted by our experience of +others. The history of language, of philosophy, and religion, the great +thoughts or inventions or discoveries which move mankind, furnish the +larger moulds or outlines in which the human mind has been cast. From +these the individual derives so much as he is able to comprehend or has the +opportunity of learning. + + +THEAETETUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus. + +Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter +the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant. + + +EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion? + +TERPSION: No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking +for you, and wondering that I could not find you. + +EUCLID: But I was not in the city. + +TERPSION: Where then? + +EUCLID: As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus--he was being +carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth. + +TERPSION: Was he alive or dead? + +EUCLID: He was scarcely alive, for he has been badly wounded; but he was +suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army. + +TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean? + +EUCLID: Yes. + +TERPSION: Alas! what a loss he will be! + +EUCLID: Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some +people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle. + +TERPSION: No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else +of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara? + +EUCLID: He wanted to get home: although I entreated and advised him to +remain, he would not listen to me; so I set him on his way, and turned +back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how +remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe +that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a +youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to +me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said +that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived. + +TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the +conversation? can you tell me? + +EUCLID: No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes of it as soon as I got +home; these I filled up from memory, writing them out at leisure; and +whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had +forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the +whole conversation written down. + +TERPSION: I remember--you told me; and I have always been intending to ask +you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why should +we not read it through?--having just come from the country, I should +greatly like to rest. + +EUCLID: I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as +far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the +servant shall read to us. + +TERPSION: Very good. + +EUCLID: Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced +Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the +persons whom he mentioned--these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of +Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the +interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of +himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'disagreed,' in the answer, lest the +repetition of them should be troublesome. + +TERPSION: Quite right, Euclid. + +EUCLID: And now, boy, you may take the roll and read. + +EUCLID'S SERVANT READS. + +SOCRATES: If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask +you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part +of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and I +would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as +far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see +that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, +considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if +you have met with any one who is good for anything. + +THEODORUS: Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very +remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your +attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise +him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no +beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for +he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are less +marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal +attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very +large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has +a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is +exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union +of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should +scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and +ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships +without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; +and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove stupid and +cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in +the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, flowing on +silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful. + +SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he? + +THEODORUS: The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself +is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions +have been anointing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to +have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know +him. + +SOCRATES: I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of +Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as +his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a +considerable fortune. + +THEODORUS: Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the +property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is +wonderfully liberal. + +SOCRATES: He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me. + +THEODORUS: I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates. + +SOCRATES: By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection +of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if +each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned +alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who +said so was or was not a musician? + +THEAETETUS: We should ask. + +SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if +not, not? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any +interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is +a painter or not? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly we should. + +SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter? + +THEAETETUS: I never heard that he was. + +SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician? + +THEAETETUS: Of course he is, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in +general an educated man? + +THEAETETUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by +way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend +to him. + +THEAETETUS: I should say not. + +SOCRATES: But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental +endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally +desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to +exhibit himself. + +THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and +for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and +stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been +praising you. + +THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in +jest? + +SOCRATES: Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you +to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will +have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be +found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word. + +THEAETETUS: I suppose I must, if you wish it. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of +Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation? + +THEAETETUS: I do my best. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or +of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well +in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the +company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is +not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?' + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: What? + +SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly they are. + +SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my +satisfaction--What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What say +you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a +game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out his +competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have +the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases...Why is there no +reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by my love +of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable. + +THEODORUS: The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you +would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to +your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young will +be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth is +always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, I +would advise you to go on with him and not let him off. + +SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, +whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to +a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say +what you think that knowledge is. + +THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I +make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me. + +SOCRATES: We will, if we can. + +THEAETETUS: Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus-- +geometry, and those which you just now mentioned--are knowledge; and I +would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and +all of, them, are knowledge. + +SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of +your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for one +simple thing. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I +believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or +science of making shoes? + +THEAETETUS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making +wooden implements? + +THEAETETUS: I do. + +SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two +arts? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we +wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or +sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the +nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right? + +THEAETETUS: Perfectly right. + +SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask +about some very trivial and obvious thing--for example, What is clay? and +we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven- +makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be +ridiculous? + +THEAETETUS: Truly. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that +he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of +'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other +workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not +know the nature of it? + +THEAETETUS: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no +knowledge of the art or science of making shoes? + +THEAETETUS: None. + +SOCRATES: Nor of any other science? + +THEAETETUS: No. + +SOCRATES: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in +answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, +'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.' + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an +enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have +said simply, that clay is moistened earth--what sort of clay is not to the +point. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. +You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to +my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion. + +SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such +as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by the +unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen --there he stopped. Now +as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to +include them all under one name or class. + +SOCRATES: And did you find such a class? + +THEAETETUS: I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion. + +SOCRATES: Let me hear. + +THEAETETUS: We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made +up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to +square figures and called square or equilateral numbers;--that was one +class. + +SOCRATES: Very good. + +THEAETETUS: The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every +other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater +multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when +regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;--all these we compared +to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers. + +SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed? + +THEAETETUS: The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the +equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the +lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong +numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, +that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the so-called +lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the value of the +superficial content of their squares; and the same about solids. + +SOCRATES: Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises +of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness. + +THEAETETUS: But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about +knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a +deceiver after all. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to say +that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in +a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner--would the praise be any +the less true? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a +matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men +perfect in every way? + +THEAETETUS: By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection! + +SOCRATES: Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was +mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of +knowledge, as well as of other things. + +THEAETETUS: I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the +truth. + +SOCRATES: Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer +about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, +try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition. + +THEAETETUS: I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when +the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither +persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any +one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of +anxiety. + +SOCRATES: These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have +something within you which you are bringing to the birth. + +THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel. + +SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a +midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery? + +THEAETETUS: No, never. + +SOCRATES: Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not +reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and +therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and drive +men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason? + +THEAETETUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you +will see my meaning better:--No woman, as you are probably aware, who is +still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who +are past bearing. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, I know. + +SOCRATES: The reason of this is said to be that Artemis--the goddess of +childbirth--is not a mother, and she honours those who are like herself; +but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature +cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she +assigned this office to those who are too old to bear. + +THEAETETUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the +midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to +arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who +have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the +embryo in the womb. + +THEAETETUS: They can. + +SOCRATES: Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, +and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave +brood? + +THEAETETUS: No, never. + +SOCRATES: Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more +than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the +same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be +most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be +deposited. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, the same art. + +SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise? + +THEAETETUS: I should think not. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a +character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession, +because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given +to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific +way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker. + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but +not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one time +real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with difficulty +distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and +false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery--you +would think so? + +THEAETETUS: Indeed I should. + +SOCRATES: Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but +differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls +when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my +art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the +young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like +the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, +that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, +is very just--the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but +does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself at all +wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or birth of my own +soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them appear dull +enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is +gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and this in the +opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite dear that they +never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to which they +cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe their +delivery. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their +ignorance, either in their self-conceit despising me, or falling under the +influence of others, have gone away too soon; and have not only lost the +children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, but +have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil communications, being +fonder of lies and shams than of the truth; and they have at last ended by +seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristeides, the +son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many others. The truants +often return to me, and beg that I would consort with them again--they are +ready to go to me on their knees--and then, if my familiar allows, which is +not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire +are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who +consort with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day +they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of +the women. So much for them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come +to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no +need of my art, I coax them into marrying some one, and by the grace of God +I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have +given away to Prodicus, and many to other inspired sages. I tell you this +long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to +think yourself, that you are in labour--great with some conception. Come +then to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a midwife, and do your best +to answer the questions which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose +your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception +which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that +account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from +them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I +deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from +goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man--that was not within +the range of their ideas; neither am I their enemy in all this, but it +would be wrong for me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once +more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?'--and +do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the +help of God you will be able to tell. + +THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be +ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he +knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception. + +SOCRATES: Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express +your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, +and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg:--You say that +knowledge is perception? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine +about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another +way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the +existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are +not:--You have read him? + +THEAETETUS: O yes, again and again. + +SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to +you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so. + +SOCRATES: A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to +understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold +and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold? + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, +cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to +him who is cold, and not to him who is not? + +THEAETETUS: I suppose the last. + +SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.' + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and +cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to +be, to each one such as he perceives them? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as +knowledge is unerring? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras +must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, +like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth,' (In allusion to a book of +Protagoras' which bore this title.) in secret to his own disciples. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are +said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as +great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy +light--there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and change +and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, which +'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for +nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers-- +Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after +another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will agree with you in +this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry--Epicharmus, the +prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of + +'Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,' + +does he not mean that all things are the offspring, of flux and motion? + +THEAETETUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having +Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous? (Compare Cratylus.) + +THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will +show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and +inactivity of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are +supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of +movement and of friction, which is a kind of motion;--is not this the +origin of fire? + +THEAETETUS: It is. + +SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but +preserved for a long time by motion and exercise? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and +improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but when +at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is +uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as +to the body? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste +and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of all, +which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the +sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens go round in +their orbits, all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if +they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all things would be +destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down. + +THEAETETUS: I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his +meaning. + +SOCRATES: Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and +first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your +eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And you must +not assign any place to it: for if it had position it would be, and be at +rest, and there would be no process of becoming. + +THEAETETUS: Then what is colour? + +SOCRATES: Let us carry the principle which has just been affirmed, that +nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that white, black, and +every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, +and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the active nor the +passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar +to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colours appear +to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you? + +THEAETETUS: Far from it. + +SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are +you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it +never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the +same? + +THEAETETUS: The latter. + +SOCRATES: And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I +apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become +different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor +again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or hot, +could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation +or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our ordinary way of +speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most ridiculous and wonderful +contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would +remark. + +THEAETETUS: How? and of what sort do you mean? + +SOCRATES: A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here +are six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and fewer +by a half than twelve--they are more and also fewer. How can you or any +one maintain the contrary? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether +anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you +answer him, Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: I should say 'No,' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in +reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting +my former answer. + +SOCRATES: Capital! excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy! And if you +reply 'Yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will be +unconvinced, but not our mind. (In allusion to the well-known line of +Euripides, Hippol.: e gloss omomoch e de thren anomotos.) + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about +the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have +had a regular sparring-match over this, and would have knocked their +arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, +only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles,-- +whether they are consistent with each or not. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that would be my desire. + +SOCRATES: And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is +plenty of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own +thoughts, and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us +really are? If I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as +follows:--first, that nothing can become greater or less, either in number +or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself--you would agree? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no +increase or diminution of anything, but only equality. + +THEAETETUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without +becoming and having become. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, truly. + +SOCRATES: These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one +another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as +this--if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller than +you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not so +tall--not that I should have lost, but that you would have increased. In +such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I have not +become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither could I have +become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten +thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I +believe that you follow me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought +of these questions before now. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the +Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times +when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them. + +SOCRATES: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight +into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is +the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not +a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the child +of Thaumas (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation of +this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras? + +THEAETETUS: Not as yet. + +SOCRATES: Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the +hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school. + +THEAETETUS: To be sure, I shall be very much obliged. + +SOCRATES: Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated +are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in +nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow that +action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable +mortals. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the +brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first +principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which +we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing but +motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in +endless number; and out of the union and friction of them there is +generated a progeny endless in number, having two forms, sense and the +object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at +the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; +there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many +more which have names, as well as innumerable others which are without +them; each has its kindred object,--each variety of colour has a +corresponding variety of sight, and so with sound and hearing, and with the +rest of the senses and the objects akin to them. Do you see, Theaetetus, +the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument? + +THEAETETUS: Indeed I do not. + +SOCRATES: Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is +that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion +is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker; and the slower elements have their +motions in the same place and with reference to things near them, and so +they beget; but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carried to fro, and +moves from place to place. Apply this to sense:--When the eye and the +appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and the +sensation connatural with it, which could not have been given by either of +them going elsewhere, then, while the sight is flowing from the eye, +whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the colour; +and so the eye is fulfilled with sight, and really sees, and becomes, not +sight, but a seeing eye; and the object which combined to form the colour +is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but a white thing, +whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which happens to be +coloured white. And this is true of all sensible objects, hard, warm, and +the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was saying before, not +as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them of whatever kind +generated by motion in their intercourse with one another; for of the agent +and patient, as existing in separation, no trustworthy conception, as they +say, can be formed, for the agent has no existence until united with the +patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent; and +that which by uniting with something becomes an agent, by meeting with some +other thing is converted into a patient. And from all these +considerations, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, that +there is no one self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in +relation; and being must be altogether abolished, although from habit and +ignorance we are compelled even in this discussion to retain the use of the +term. But great philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the +word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this,' or +'that,' or any other detaining name to be used, in the language of nature +all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing +into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix +them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only +of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the +word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O +Theaetetus, are not these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like +the taste of them in the mouth? + +THEAETETUS: I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot +make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me +out. + +SOCRATES: You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, +anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the +barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing +after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help +to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been +accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is +only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your +spirits, and answer like a man what you think. + +THEAETETUS: Ask me. + +SOCRATES: Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what +becomes?--the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we +were just now mentioning? + +THEAETETUS: When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there +is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent. + +SOCRATES: Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; for there still +remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and +diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing +and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these cases the +esse-percipi theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since in dreams and +illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from saying that +everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which +appears. + +THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is +perception, or that to every man what appears is? + +THEAETETUS: I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, +because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse; but I certainly +cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they +imagine, some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and +are flying in their sleep. + +SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these +phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking? + +THEAETETUS: What question? + +SOCRATES: A question which I think that you must often have heard persons +ask:--How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all +our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one +another in the waking state? + +THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more +than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspond;--and +there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we have +been talking to one another in a dream; and when in a dream we seem to be +narrating dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite astonishing. + +SOCRATES: You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily +raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. +And as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking, in either +sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present +to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our lives we +affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and +are equally confident of both. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the +difference is only that the times are not equal. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time? + +THEAETETUS: That would be in many ways ridiculous. + +SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of +these opinions is true? + +THEAETETUS: I do not think that I can. + +SOCRATES: Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, +which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I +imagine--Can that which is wholly other than something, have the same +quality as that from which it differs? and observe, Theaetetus, that the +word 'other' means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.' + +THEAETETUS: Certainly, putting the question as you do, that which is +wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the same. + +SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or +another, when it becomes like we call it the same--when unlike, other? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and +patients many and infinite? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which +are not the same, but different? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:--There is +Socrates in health, and Socrates sick--Are they like or unlike? + +THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and +Socrates in sickness as a whole? + +SOCRATES: Exactly; that is my meaning. + +THEAETETUS: I answer, they are unlike. + +SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, +or in any of the states which we were mentioning? + +THEAETETUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as +he is well or ill. + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will +produce something different in each of the two cases? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and +pleasant to me? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent +meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which +are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient +makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out +of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear +sweet to the healthy tongue. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly; that has been already acknowledged. + +SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a +different person? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is +sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness +in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the +wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself become +not perception but percipient? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same +perception, for another object would give another perception, and would +make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects +me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or become similar, for that +too would produce another result from another subject, and become +different. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Neither can I by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by +itself, this quality. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: When I perceive I must become percipient of something--there can +be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the object, whether +it become sweet, bitter, or of any other quality, must have relation to a +percipient; nothing can become sweet which is sweet to no one. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then the inference is, that we (the agent and patient) are or +become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the +other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and +therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person +says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of +or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one else +to say that anything is or becomes absolutely:--such is our conclusion. + +THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no +other, I and no other am the percipient of it? + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from my own +being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is +not to me. + +THEAETETUS: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the +conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I +perceive? + +THEAETETUS: You cannot. + +SOCRATES: Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only +perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer +and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, +or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; +or with Theaetetus, that, given these premises, perception is knowledge. +Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new-born child, of which I +have delivered you? What say you? + +THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I +have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we +must run round the hearth with him, and see whether he is worth rearing, or +is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not +exposed? or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion +if I take away your first-born? + +THEODORUS: Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. But +tell me, Socrates, in heaven's name, is this, after all, not the truth? + +SOCRATES: You, Theodorus, are a lover of theories, and now you innocently +fancy that I am a bag full of them, and can easily pull one out which will +overthrow its predecessor. But you do not see that in reality none of +these theories come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. I +only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to +receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing myself, +but shall endeavour to elicit something from our young friend. + +THEODORUS: Do as you say, Socrates; you are quite right. + +SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance +Protagoras? + +THEODORUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each +one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a +declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger +monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might +have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us at +the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom he +was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men--would not +this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, +and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or has any +superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, but each, +as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and +everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should +Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve +to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is +the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in +all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own +midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to +supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious +and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; and this +must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the +philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the +shrine of his book. + +THEODORUS: He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and +therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I +agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to answer +very nicely. + +SOCRATES: If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, +would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them +making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of +judging of your own person? + +THEODORUS: Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, +in consideration of my age and stiffness; let some more supple youth try a +fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium. + +SOCRATES: Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers +say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus: Tell me, +Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not lost in wonder, +like myself, when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the level +of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?--for you would assume the +measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly I should, and I confess to you that I am lost in +wonder. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that +whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed. + +SOCRATES: Why, my dear boy, you are young, and therefore your ear is +quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, +or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,--Good +people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, whose +existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech, or you talk +about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is +a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or +demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely +you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of +probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any +other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in +geometry, would not be worth an ace. + +THEAETETUS: But neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such +arguments. + +SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the +matter in some other way? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, in quite another way. + +SOCRATES: And the way will be to ask whether perception is or is not the +same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a +view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? for +example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language +of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that we not only hear, +but know what they are saying? Or again, if we see letters which we do not +understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we aver that, +seeing them, we must know them? + +THEAETETUS: We shall say, Socrates, that we know what we actually see and +hear of them--that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour of the +letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of +them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which +grammarians and interpreters teach about them. + +SOCRATES: Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no dispute, +because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which +you will also have to repulse. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and +still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that +which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a +tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who +has learned, and remembers, can fail to know? + +THEAETETUS: Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous. + +SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, +and is not sight perception? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which +he has seen? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing? + +THEAETETUS: Of something, surely. + +SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget? + +THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so? + +SOCRATES: But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be +maintained. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you, +though I have a strong suspicion that you are right. + +SOCRATES: As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for +perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, +remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the +knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he +does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a monstrous +supposition. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, +involves a manifest impossibility? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished? + +THEAETETUS: I suppose that they must. + +SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' +and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do? + +THEAETETUS: About what? + +SOCRATES: Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory, we +walk away from the argument and crow. + +THEAETETUS: How do you mean? + +SOCRATES: After the manner of disputers (Lys.; Phaedo; Republic), we were +satisfied with mere verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this +way we could gain an advantage. Although professing not to be mere +Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen +into the error of that ingenious class of persons. + +THEAETETUS: I do not as yet understand you. + +SOCRATES: Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the +question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, +and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his +eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember +and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so the Protagorean fable +came to nought, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same +as perception. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have +been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two +brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on their +behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the +guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is one, are +unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his +cause myself, and see justice done? + +THEODORUS: Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is +guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of +dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you +assist him. + +SOCRATES: Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the +rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are +commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes +than these. Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus? + +THEODORUS: To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less +disgrace if he is discomfited. + +SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:--Can a +man know and also not know that which he knows? + +THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: He cannot, I should say. + +SOCRATES: He can, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are +imprisoned in a well, as the saying is, and the self-assured adversary +closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his +cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable +man? + +THEAETETUS: I should answer, 'Not with that eye but with the other.' + +SOCRATES: Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, in a certain sense. + +SOCRATES: None of that, he will reply; I do not ask or bid you answer in +what sense you know, but only whether you know that which you do not know. +You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already +admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not-seeing is not-knowing: I +leave you to draw the inference. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my marvel, and there might have been yet worse things in +store for you, if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a +sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at +a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on +without end. Such questions might have been put to you by a light-armed +mercenary, who argued for pay. He would have lain in wait for you, and +when you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, he would have made +an assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;--he would have +shown you no mercy; and while you were lost in envy and admiration of his +wisdom, he would have got you into his net, out of which you would not have +escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sum to be paid for +your release. Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce his +position? Shall I answer for him? + +THEAETETUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his +behalf, and then he will close with us in disdain, and say:--The worthy +Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not +know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was frightened, and +could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made fun of poor me. The +truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask questions about any +assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has +answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers +something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you really suppose +that any one would admit the memory which a man has of an impression which +has passed away to be the same with that which he experienced at the time? +Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may +know and not know the same thing? Or, if he is afraid of making this +admission, would he ever grant that one who has become unlike is the same +as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, +and not rather many and infinite as the changes which take place in him? I +speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But, O my good +sir, he will say, come to the argument in a more generous spirit; and +either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and +individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not +involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have +the word, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and +baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig, and you teach your hearers +to make sport of my writings in the same ignorant manner; but this is not +to your credit. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and +that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one +man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as different +things are and appear to him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the +wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the +evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to +him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter, but to take +the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember what has been already +said,--that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to +the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one +of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other: nor can you +assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish, and the +healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to +be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a +change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words +the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one +ever made another think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one +can think what is not, or, think anything different from that which he +feels; and this is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has +thoughts of kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to +have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain +to be only better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I +do not call wise men tadpoles: far from it; I say that they are the +physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants--for the +husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and +infuse into them good and healthy sensations--aye and true ones; and the +wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just +to states; for whatever appears to a state to be just and fair, so long as +it is regarded as such, is just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom +causes the good to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in +reality. And in like manner the Sophist who is able to train his pupils in +this spirit is a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And so +one man is wiser than another; and no one thinks falsely, and you, whether +you will or not, must endure to be a measure. On these foundations the +argument stands firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by +an opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me--a method +to which no intelligent person will object, quite the reverse. But I must +beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying +that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in +argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you do not +distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip +up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician +will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling +him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of +the company which he has previously kept. If you do so, your adversary +will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not +on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape +from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different from +what he was. But the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the +many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, +instead of turning philosopher, he will come to hate philosophy. I would +recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in +this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and +congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in +motion, and that to every individual and state what appears, is. In this +manner you will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or +different, but you will not argue, as you were just now doing, from the +customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of +ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the +very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend; had he been +living, he would have helped himself in a far more gloriose style. + +THEODORUS: You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defence of him has been +most valorous. + +SOCRATES: Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras +bidding us be serious, as the text, 'Man is the measure of all things,' was +a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of +discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his +argument; he also declared that we made a joke of him. + +THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says? + +THEODORUS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up the +argument, and in all seriousness, and ask and answer one another, for you +see that the rest of us are nothing but boys. In no other way can we +escape the imputation, that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are +making fun with boys. + +THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a +philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please +not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in my power your departed +friend; and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At any rate, my +good man, do not sheer off until we know whether you are a true measure of +diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for +themselves in astronomy and geometry, and the other branches of knowledge +in which you are supposed to excel them. + +THEODORUS: He who is sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being +drawn into an argument; and when I said just now that you would excuse me, +and not, like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I was +talking nonsense--I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw +travellers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is 'strip or depart,' +but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of Antaeus: you +will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have stripped +him, and he has been compelled to try a fall with you in argument. + +SOCRATES: There, Theodorus, you have hit off precisely the nature of my +complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I have +met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in +words, has broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough exercise, +which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to try a fall with me, +whereby you will do yourself good as well as me. + +THEODORUS: I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are +like destiny; no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for +him. But I am not disposed to go further than you suggest. + +SOCRATES: Once will be enough; and now take particular care that we do not +again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly. + +THEODORUS: I will do my best to avoid that error. + +SOCRATES: In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see +whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the +ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although +he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, +some who as he said were the wise excelled others. + +THEODORUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself, instead of +our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or +reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and some one may accuse +us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to a +clearer agreement about his meaning, for a great deal may be at stake? + +THEODORUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then let us obtain, not through any third person, but from his +own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement. + +THEODORUS: In what way? + +SOCRATES: In this way:--His words are, 'What seems to a man, is to him.' + +THEODORUS: Yes, so he says. + +SOCRATES: And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or +rather of all mankind, when we say that every one thinks himself wiser than +other men in some things, and their inferior in others? In the hour of +danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do +they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods, and expect +salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the +world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for +teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty +who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this +is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their +own opinion. + +THEODORUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance +to be false opinion. + +THEODORUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? +Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true +and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their +opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For +tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that you yourself, or any other follower +of Protagoras, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken +in his opinion? + +THEODORUS: The thing is incredible, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis +which declares man to be the measure of all things. + +THEODORUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be +true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that +this is true to you. Now, if so, you must either say that the rest of us +are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge +you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon +thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you and +are of an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely? + +THEODORUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as +Homer says, who give me a world of trouble. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you +and false to the ten thousand others? + +THEODORUS: No other inference seems to be possible. + +SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the +multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of +all things, must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote +would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this, +and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing +that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion +his truth is more untrue than true. + +THEODORUS: That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with +individual opinion. + +SOCRATES: And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of +their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that +the opinions of all men are true. + +THEODORUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he +admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true? + +THEODORUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely? + +THEODORUS: They do not. + +SOCRATES: And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this +opinion is also true. + +THEODORUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras, will contend, or +rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his +adversary has a true opinion--Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that +neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has +not learned--am I not right? + +THEODORUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true +neither to himself to any one else? + +THEODORUS: I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard. + +SOCRATES: But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. +Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And +if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have +overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for +assenting to me, and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he +is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as +they are, and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing which +no one will deny is, that there are great differences in the understandings +of men. + +THEODORUS: In that opinion I quite agree. + +SOCRATES: And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the +distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that +most things, and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are +only such as they appear; if however difference of opinion is to be allowed +at all, surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? for every +woman, child, or living creature has not such a knowledge of what conduces +to health as to enable them to cure themselves. + +THEODORUS: I quite agree. + +SOCRATES: Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, +honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state +such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these +matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers +of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not expedient +for the community one state is wiser and one counsellor better than +another--they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city enacts in +the belief that it is expedient will always be really expedient. But in +the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and +impiety, they are confident that in nature these have no existence or +essence of their own--the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of +the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the +philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here +arises a new question, Theodorus, which threatens to be more serious than +the last. + +THEODORUS: Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure. + +SOCRATES: That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation +which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the +pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear +and speak in court. How natural is this! + +THEODORUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that those who have been trained in philosophy +and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have +been knocking about in the courts and such places, as a freeman is in +breeding unlike a slave. + +THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen? + +SOCRATES: In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always +command: he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, he wanders at +will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third,--if the +fancy takes him, he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not whether +his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the +lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving +him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: and there is his +adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the indictment, which in +their phraseology is termed the affidavit, is recited at the time: and +from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is continually +disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has +the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, +but always concerns himself; and often the race is for his life. The +consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned +how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is +small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a slave from +his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness and +independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and +honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was +unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first +he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and +warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no +soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is +the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the +philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? +Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim. + +THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; +for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are +not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must +wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having any +right to censure or control us, as he might the poets? + +SOCRATES: Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for +there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, +the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their +way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political +assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are +called, of the state written or recited; the eagerness of political +societies in the attainment of offices--clubs, and banquets, and revels, +and singing-maidens,--do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any +event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have +descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of +which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many +pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his +ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a +reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the +city: his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human +things, is 'flying all abroad' as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven +and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, +interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not +condescending to anything which is within reach. + +THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the +clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he +fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was +so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what +was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all +philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next- +door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he hardly +knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the essence of +man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer +different from any other;--I think that you understand me, Theodorus? + +THEODORUS: I do, and what you say is true. + +SOCRATES: And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as +public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place +in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his +eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general +herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his +inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of +imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer +to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, +and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his +sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the +simplicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so that +he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king +eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of +cattle--a swineherd, or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, who is +congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he +remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the +wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he +observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated +as any shepherd--for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, +which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten +thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because +he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the +praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he can show +seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments +only betray a dull and narrow vision in those who utter them, and who are +not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man +has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors, and among them have +been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, innumerable. +And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of twenty-five +ancestors, which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot +understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable to calculate that +Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and +was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He amuses +himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks that a little +arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity. Now, in all these +cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is +thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before +him, and always at a loss. + +THEODORUS: That is very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and +gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice +and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another +and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of +a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government, and of human +happiness and misery in general--what they are, and how a man is to attain +the one and avoid the other--when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is +called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for +dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he looks down into +space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, +and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or +any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but +by every man who has not been brought up a slave. Such are the two +characters, Theodorus: the one of the freeman, who has been trained in +liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher,--him we cannot blame +because he appears simple and of no account when he has to perform some +menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavouring a sauce or +fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is able to do +all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his +cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse can he hymn +the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven. + +THEODORUS: If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, +of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among +men. + +SOCRATES: Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always +remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the +gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this +earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as +quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this is +possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise. But, +O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue +virtue or avoid vice, not merely in order that a man may seem to be good, +which is the reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a +repetition of an old wives' fable. Whereas, the truth is that God is never +in any way unrighteous--he is perfect righteousness; and he of us who is +the most righteous is most like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness of +a man, and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to know this is +true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of this is manifest folly and vice. +All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as the +wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. +The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better +not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever; for men glory +in their shame--they fancy that they hear others saying of them, 'These are +not mere good-for-nothing persons, mere burdens of the earth, but such as +men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that +they are all the more truly what they do not think they are because they do +not know it; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all +things they ought to know--not stripes and death, as they suppose, which +evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped. + +THEODORUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one +blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: but they do not see +them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are +growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; +and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which +they are growing like. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from +their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; +and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own +evil selves, and with evil friends--when they hear this they in their +superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots. + +THEODORUS: Very true, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one +peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about +their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument +out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with +themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as +children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or +they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you +please, we will now return. + +THEODORUS: For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for +at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to +the argument. + +SOCRATES: Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the +perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were +confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and +thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in +force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one +had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the state +thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, were +really good;--he who said so would be playing with the name 'good,' and +would not touch the real question--it would be a mockery, would it not? + +THEODORUS: Certainly it would. + +SOCRATES: He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is +contemplated under the name. + +THEODORUS: Right. + +SOCRATES: Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of +legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws +with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim? + +THEODORUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen? + +THEODORUS: Yes, I think that there are mistakes. + +SOCRATES: The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognised, if +we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or +expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are +passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time; which, in +other words, is the future. + +THEODORUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a +question:--O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, the +measure of all things--white, heavy, light: of all such things he is the +judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks that +things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what is and is true +to himself. Is it not so? + +THEODORUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further +say), to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not +only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things always +happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:--When an +ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of +heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the +contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right? +--he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not have a fever +in the physician's judgment? + +THEODORUS: How ludicrous! + +SOCRATES: And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of +the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the +harp-player? + +THEODORUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in musical composition the musician will know better than +the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think +harmonious or the reverse? + +THEODORUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a +cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in +preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing; but +can we say that every one will be to himself the best judge of the pleasure +which will seem to be and will be to him in the future?--nay, would not +you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would convince any +one of us than the ordinary man? + +THEODORUS: Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner +that he was the superior of all men in this respect. + +SOCRATES: To be sure, friend: who would have paid a large sum for the +privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that +neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be +and seem to be in the future than every one could for himself? + +THEODORUS: Who indeed? + +SOCRATES: And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the +future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often +fail of their highest interests? + +THEODORUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit +one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure: but I, +who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the +advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or +not, of being a measure of anything. + +THEODORUS: That is the best refutation of him, Socrates; although he is +also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the +lie direct to his own opinion. + +SOCRATES: There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that every +opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty +in proving that states of feeling, which are present to a man, and out of +which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also +untrue. And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them; for they +may be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear evidence of +them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in +which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he +identified perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw nearer, as +the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal +flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is +raging about it, and there are combination not a few. + +THEODORUS: No small, war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid +strides; the disciples of Heracleitus are most energetic upholders of the +doctrine. + +SOCRATES: Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the +question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves. + +THEODORUS: Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heracleitus, +which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians +themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot +talk with them on the subject. For, in accordance with their text-books, +they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a +question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they can no more do so +than they can fly; or rather, the determination of these fellows not to +have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation +can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a +quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire +the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled +word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; +their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their +arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such +principle would be stationary; for they are at war with the stationary, and +do what they can to drive it out everywhere. + +SOCRATES: I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they +were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they +are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by +them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want +to make like themselves. + +THEODORUS: Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of their sort are +not one another's disciples, but they grow up at their own sweet will, and +get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that +he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will +never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must +take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as +if we were doing geometrical problem. + +SOCRATES: Quite right too; but as touching the aforesaid problem, have we +not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in +poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are +streams, and that nothing is at rest? And now the moderns, in their +superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may +hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things +are at rest and others in motion--having learned that all is motion, he +will duly honour his teachers. I had almost forgotten the opposite +doctrine, Theodorus, + +'Alone Being remains unmoved, which is the name for the all.' + +This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who +stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained, and has no place +in which to move. What shall we do, friend, with all these people; for, +advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, +and, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our +rashness--like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, +and are dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that +we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted, 'the +river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we will help them to pull +us over, and try to get away from the others. But if the partisans of 'the +whole' appear to speak more truly, we will fly off from the party which +would move the immovable, to them. And if I find that neither of them have +anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ridiculous position, having so +great a conceit of our own poor opinion and rejecting that of ancient and +famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding +when the danger is so great? + +THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties +have to say would be quite intolerable. + +SOCRATES: Then examine we must, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, +are so eager to proceed. The nature of motion appears to be the question +with which we begin. What do they mean when they say that all things are +in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to +think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon this point in addition +to my own, that I may err, if I must err, in your company; tell me, then, +when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same +place, is not that what is called motion? + +THEODORUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing, +remaining on the same spot, grows old, or becomes black from being white, +or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, may not this be +properly called motion of another kind? + +THEODORUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then there are these +two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place.' + +THEODORUS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves +to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things +according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as +move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another in one only? + +THEODORUS: Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think they would +say that all things are moved in both ways. + +SOCRATES: Yes, comrade; for, if not, they would have to say that the same +things are in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in +saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest. + +THEODORUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of +motion, all things must always have every sort of motion? + +THEODORUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Consider a further point: did we not understand them to explain +the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as +the following:--were they not saying that each of them is moving between +the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and that the patient +ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a percipient, and the agent a +quale instead of a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange +and uncouth term to you, and that you do not understand the abstract +expression. Then I will take concrete instances: I mean to say that the +producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness but hot and +white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, +that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but when +they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the one +becomes a thing of a certain quality, and the other a percipient. You +remember? + +THEODORUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: We may leave the details of their theory unexamined, but we must +not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are +all things in motion and flux? + +THEODORUS: Yes, they will reply. + +SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, +that is to say, they move in place and are also changed? + +THEODORUS: Of course, if the motion is to be perfect. + +SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be +able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux? + +THEODORUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and +whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, +and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any colour be +rightly used at all? + +THEODORUS: How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or +of any other quality--if while we are using the word the object is escaping +in the flux? + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and +hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act +of seeing and hearing? + +THEODORUS: Certainly not, if all things are in motion. + +SOCRATES: Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not-seeing, +nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things +partake of every kind of motion? + +THEODORUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were +saying. + +THEODORUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered +what is knowledge than what is not knowledge? + +THEODORUS: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in +our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, +every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a +thing is or is not thus; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' thus; and if we say +'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest. + +THEODORUS: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'thus' and 'not thus.' But you +ought not to use the word 'thus,' for there is no motion in 'thus' or in +'not thus.' The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words in which +to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that +will suit them, except perhaps 'no how,' which is perfectly indefinite. + +THEODORUS: Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite +at home. + +SOCRATES: And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without +assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things--a +wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is +perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless +perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is. + +THEODORUS: Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the +doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering; +for this was the agreement. + +THEAETETUS: Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the +doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were +proposing. + +THEODORUS: You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your +elders to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer Socrates in the +remainder of the argument. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the +doctrine of rest. + +THEODORUS: Invite Socrates to an argument--invite horsemen to the open +plain; do but ask him, and he will answer. + +SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to +comply with the request of Theaetetus. + +THEODORUS: Not comply! for what reason? + +SOCRATES: My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for +Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest,' as for the +great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric +language he may be called;--him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit +unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, +and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid +that we may not understand his words, and may be still further from +understanding his meaning; above all I fear that the nature of knowledge, +which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by +the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, +if we let them in--besides, the question which is now stirring is of +immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; +or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the other +question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; but I +must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions +about knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: Very well; do so if you will. + +SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you +answered that knowledge is perception? + +THEAETETUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black +and white colours? and with what does he hear high and low sounds?--you +would say, if I am not mistaken, 'With the eyes and with the ears.' + +THEAETETUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, +is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is +pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the +answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; +for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and +with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears. + +THEAETETUS: I should say 'through,' Socrates, rather than 'with.' + +SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a +sort of Trojan horse, there are perched a number of unconnected senses, +which do not all meet in some one nature, the mind, or whatever we please +to call it, of which they are the instruments, and with which through them +we perceive objects of sense. + +THEAETETUS: I agree with you in that opinion. + +SOCRATES: The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know +whether, when we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again, +other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and +the same part of ourselves, and, if you were asked, you might refer all +such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to +answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then, are not the organs +through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the +body? + +THEAETETUS: Of the body, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty +you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, +cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing? + +THEAETETUS: Of course not. + +SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common +perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ? + +THEAETETUS: It cannot. + +SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would +admit that they both exist? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the +same with itself? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one +another? + +THEAETETUS: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them? for +neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that which +they have in common. Let me give you an illustration of the point at +issue:--If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and colours are +saline or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would consider the +question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly; the faculty of taste. + +SOCRATES: Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not +only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as +those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we +were just asking--what organs will you assign for the perception of these +notions? + +THEAETETUS: You are thinking of being and not being, likeness and +unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers +which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what +bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical +conceptions. + +SOCRATES: You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I +am asking. + +THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that +these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind, +by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things. + +SOCRATES: You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was +saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And +besides being beautiful, you have done me a kindness in releasing me from a +very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by +herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, +and I wanted you to agree with me. + +THEAETETUS: I am quite clear. + +SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, +of all our notions, is the most universal? + +THEAETETUS: I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of +herself. + +SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good +and evil? + +THEAETETUS: These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, +and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and +present with the future. + +SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by +the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one +another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself +endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are +given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on the +being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever +gained, by education and long experience. + +THEAETETUS: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being? + +THEAETETUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of +that thing? + +THEAETETUS: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in +reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth +and being can be attained? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when +there is so great a difference between them? + +THEAETETUS: That would certainly not be right. + +SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being +cold and being hot? + +THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving--what other name could be +given to them? + +SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any +more than of being? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: No. + +SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge +or science? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most +distinctly proved to be different from perception. + +SOCRATES: But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather +what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some +progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in +that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged +with being. + +THEAETETUS: You mean, Socrates, if I am not mistaken, what is called +thinking or opining. + +SOCRATES: You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again +at this point; and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, +see if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is +knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because +there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge +is true opinion: let this then be my reply; and if this is hereafter +disproved, I must try to find another. + +SOCRATES: That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and +not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one +of two advantages; either we shall find what we seek, or we shall be less +likely to think that we know what we do not know--in either case we shall +be richly rewarded. And now, what are you saying?--Are there two sorts of +opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define knowledge to be +the true? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, according to my present view. + +SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching +opinion? + +THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? + +SOCRATES: There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great +perplexity to me, both in regard to myself and others. I cannot make out +the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer. + +THEAETETUS: Pray what is it? + +SOCRATES: How there can be false opinion--that difficulty still troubles +the eye of my mind; and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the question, +or begin over again in a new way. + +THEAETETUS: Begin again, Socrates,--at least if you think that there is +the slightest necessity for doing so. Were not you and Theodorus just now +remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our own +time? + +SOCRATES: You are quite right, and perhaps there will be no harm in +retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well +done, than a great deal imperfectly. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false +opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as +though there were some natural distinction between them? + +THEAETETUS: We certainly say so. + +SOCRATES: All things and everything are either known or not known. I +leave out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting, +because they have nothing to do with our present question. + +THEAETETUS: There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that +there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing. + +SOCRATES: That point being now determined, must we not say that he who has +an opinion, must have an opinion about something which he knows or does not +know? + +THEAETETUS: He must. + +SOCRATES: He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot +know? + +THEAETETUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: What shall we say then? When a man has a false opinion does he +think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and +knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both? + +THEAETETUS: That, Socrates, is impossible. + +SOCRATES: But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as +some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither +Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, or +Socrates Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: How can he? + +SOCRATES: But surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does +not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows? + +THEAETETUS: That would be monstrous. + +SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? For if all things are either +known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under +this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing +or not knowing, into that of being and not-being. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: May we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks +about anything, that which is not, will necessarily think what is false, +whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind? + +THEAETETUS: That, again, is not unlikely, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then suppose some one to say to us, Theaetetus:--Is it possible +for any man to think that which is not, either as a self-existent substance +or as a predicate of something else? And suppose that we answer, 'Yes, he +can, when he thinks what is not true.'--That will be our answer? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this? + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing? + +THEAETETUS: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do +you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things? + +THEAETETUS: I do not. + +SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears +that which is? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and +therefore is? + +THEAETETUS: That again is true. + +SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which +is? + +THEAETETUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all? + +THEAETETUS: Obviously. + +SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a self- +existent substance or as a predicate of something else? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is +not? + +THEAETETUS: It would seem so. + +SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere +of being or of knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express +by this name? + +THEAETETUS: What? + +SOCRATES: May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of +heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and say that one +real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which +is, but he puts one thing in place of another; and missing the aim of his +thoughts, he may be truly said to have false opinion. + +THEAETETUS: Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth: when a +man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of +the base, then he has truly false opinion. + +SOCRATES: I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you +are beginning to despise me. + +THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? + +SOCRATES: You think, if I am not mistaken, that your 'truly false' is safe +from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift which +is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any other self-contradictory thing, +which works, not according to its own nature, but according to that of its +opposite. But I will not insist upon this, for I do not wish needlessly to +discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion is heterodoxy, +or the thought of something else? + +THEAETETUS: I am. + +SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of +one thing as another? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, +have a conception either of both objects or of one of them? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Either together or in succession? + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean? + +THEAETETUS: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in +considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the +soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking--asking questions of +herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has +arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at +last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, +that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,--I mean, +to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you? + +THEAETETUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying +to himself that one thing is another? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is +certainly base, or the unjust just; or, best of all--have you ever +attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in +sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or +anything of the kind? + +THEAETETUS: Never. + +SOCRATES: And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or +out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a +horse, or that two are one? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and +thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say +and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that even you, +lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word 'other' alone (i.e. +not insist that 'one' and 'other' are the same (Both words in Greek are +called eteron: compare Parmen.; Euthyd.)). I mean to say, that no one +thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind. + +THEAETETUS: I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree to what +you say. + +SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that +the one of them is the other? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the +other, can he think that one is the other? + +THEAETETUS: True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that +which is not in his thoughts at all. + +SOCRATES: Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects +in his mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who +maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for neither +in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion exist in us. + +THEAETETUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven +into many absurdities. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the +matter from every point of view. For I should be ashamed of us if we were +driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I speak. +But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard them +only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach to us. +On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be humble, +and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick passenger +is trampled upon by the sailor, and to do anything to us. Listen, then, +while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our difficulty. + +THEAETETUS: Let me hear. + +SOCRATES: I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think +what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a way in which +such a deception is possible. + +THEAETETUS: You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know +Socrates, and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me, and whom I +mistake for him--then the deception will occur? + +SOCRATES: But has not that position been relinquished by us, because +involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which +we know? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not +have a favourable issue; but as we are in a great strait, every argument +should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in +saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly you may. + +SOCRATES: And another and another? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of +man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, +moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in some +of an intermediate quality. + +THEAETETUS: I see. + +SOCRATES: Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of +the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, +or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions +and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from +the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as long +as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be taken, then +we forget and do not know. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering +something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the +following manner? + +THEAETETUS: In what manner? + +SOCRATES: When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and +sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the +possibility of this. + +THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement? + +SOCRATES: I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which +must be excluded. (1) No one can think one thing to be another when he +does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of +them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, +when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the +other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another +thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he +knows; nor (2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he +perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does +not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something +else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not +perceive is something which he perceives; nor again (3) can he think that +something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression +coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and +of which he has the impression coinciding with sense;--this last case, if +possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor (4) can he think +that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the +memorial coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows; nor so +long as these agree, can he think that a thing which he knows and perceives +is another thing which he perceives; or that a thing which he does not know +and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he does not know +and does not perceive;--nor again, can he suppose that a thing which he +does not know and does not perceive is the same as another thing which he +does not know; or that a thing which he does not know and does not perceive +is another thing which he does not perceive:--All these utterly and +absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The only cases, if +any, which remain, are the following. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you +better; but at present I am unable to follow you. + +SOCRATES: A person may think that some things which he knows, or which he +perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows and +perceives; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other +things which he knows and perceives. + +THEAETETUS: I understand you less than ever now. + +SOCRATES: Hear me once more, then:--I, knowing Theodorus, and remembering +in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort of person +Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not see them, +and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one time I may +hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another time not +perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own mind. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or +may not perceive sensibly that which he knows. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived +by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived? + +THEAETETUS: That is also true. + +SOCRATES: See whether you can follow me better now: Socrates can +recognize Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does +he perceive them in any other way; he cannot then by any possibility +imagine in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right? + +THEAETETUS: You are quite right. + +SOCRATES: Then that was the first case of which I spoke. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing +the other, and perceiving neither, can never think him whom I know to be +him whom I do not know. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, +I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do +not know. I need not again go over the catalogue of excluded cases, in +which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either when I +know both or when I am in ignorance of both, or when I know one and not the +other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me? + +THEAETETUS: I do. + +SOCRATES: The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you +and Theodorus, and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you +given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to +assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and +to fit this into its own print: if I succeed, recognition will take place; +but if I fail and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe-- +that is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong +impression, or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred +from right to left, err by reason of some similar affection, then +'heterodoxy' and false opinion ensues. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with +wonderful exactness. + +SOCRATES: Or again, when I know both of you, and perceive as well as know +one of you, but not the other, and my knowledge of him does not accord with +perception--that was the case put by me just now which you did not +understand. + +THEAETETUS: No, I did not. + +SOCRATES: I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of +you, his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never think him +to be some other person, whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of +whom coincides with his perception--for that also was a case supposed. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we +now say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both, and seeing, or having +some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over +against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall +wide of the mark--and this is called falsehood. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; it is rightly so called. + +SOCRATES: When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or +impressions but not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent +perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the mind +is deceived; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or +deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived, +but only in things which are known and perceived; in these alone opinion +turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false;--true when +the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite--false when +they go awry and crooked. + +THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said? + +SOCRATES: Nobly! yes; but wait a little and hear the explanation, and then +you will say so with more reason; for to think truly is noble and to be +deceived is base. + +THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: And the origin of truth and error is as follows:--When the wax +in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly +tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into +the heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the +likeness of the soul to wax (Kerh Kerhos); these, I say, being pure and +clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, +such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to +confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and having +clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute them into +their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. Do you +agree? + +THEAETETUS: Entirely. + +SOCRATES: But when the heart of any one is shaggy--a quality which the +all-wise poet commends, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or very +hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind--the soft are good +at learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; the shaggy +and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or dung in +their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the hard, for +there is no depth in them; and the soft too are indistinct, for their +impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the +indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which +has no room. These are the natures which have false opinion; for when they +see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right +objects to the right impressions--in their stupidity they confuse them, and +are apt to see and hear and think amiss--and such men are said to be +deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant. + +THEAETETUS: No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that. + +SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And of true opinion also? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are +these two sorts of opinion? + +THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly. + +SOCRATES: Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond +of talking! + +THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? + +SOCRATES: Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome +garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is +always arguing on all sides of a question; whose dulness cannot be +convinced, and who will never leave off? + +THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart? + +SOCRATES: I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do +not know what to answer if any one were to ask me:--O Socrates, have you +indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison of +perceptions with one another nor yet in thought, but in union of thought +and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacence of one who thinks +that he has made a noble discovery. + +THEAETETUS: I see no reason why we should be ashamed of our demonstration, +Socrates. + +SOCRATES: He will say: You mean to argue that the man whom we only think +of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see or +touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my +meaning, I shall reply. + +THEAETETUS: Quite right. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number +eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is +only thought: How would you answer him? + +THEAETETUS: I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the +eleven or twelve which are seen or handled, but that no similar mistake can +arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind +five and seven,--I do not mean five or seven men or horses, but five or +seven in the abstract, which, as we say, are recorded on the waxen block, +and in which false opinion is held to be impossible; did no man ever ask +himself how many these numbers make when added together, and answer that +they are eleven, while another thinks that they are twelve, or would all +agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not; many would think that they are eleven, and in +the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume you +to be speaking of numbers in general. + +SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply +that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, that seems to be the case. + +SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who +makes such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another +thing which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and afforded an +irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion, because otherwise +the same person would inevitably know and not know the same thing at the +same time. + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought +and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure +conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false +opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;-- +which alternative do you prefer? + +THEAETETUS: It is hard to determine, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we +are at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing? + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.' + +THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless? + +SOCRATES: You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from +the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are +assumed not to know the nature. + +THEAETETUS: Nay, but I am well aware. + +SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, +to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we +have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we +repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not +science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying to one +another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment +we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we +could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science. + +THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you +ever argue at all? + +SOCRATES: I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different if +I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for +he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he +would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But, +seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? +for I think that the attempt may be worth making. + +THEAETETUS: Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with +you for using the forbidden terms. + +SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'? + +THEAETETUS: I think so, but I do not remember it at the moment. + +SOCRATES: They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge.' + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' +knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ? + +SOCRATES: Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you +to hear my view, that you may help me to test it. + +THEAETETUS: I will, if I can. + +SOCRATES: I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for example, a +man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; +and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the garment. + +THEAETETUS: It would be the correct expression. + +SOCRATES: Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in +the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught +wild birds--doves or any other birds--and to be keeping them in an aviary +which he has constructed at home; we might say of him in one sense, that he +always has them because he possesses them, might we not? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but they are in +his power, and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, +and can take and have them whenever he likes;--he can catch any which he +likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he pleases. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen +figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man +there is an aviary of all sorts of birds--some flocking together apart from +the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying anywhere and +everywhere. + +THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary--and what is to follow? + +SOCRATES: We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that +when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has gotten +and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said to have +learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the knowledge: and +this is to know. + +THEAETETUS: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these +knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let them +go, how will he express himself?--will he describe the 'catching' of them +and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will make my meaning +clearer by an example:--You admit that there is an art of arithmetic? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd +and even in general. + +THEAETETUS: I follow. + +SOCRATES: Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not +mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit +them to another. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and +when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and when +having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know +them. + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know +all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about +him which are numerable? + +THEAETETUS: Of course he can. + +SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a +number amounts to? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows, +as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all +numbers;--you have heard these perplexing questions raised? + +THEAETETUS: I have. + +SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase +after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for +the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding in +the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has +learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the +knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his mind. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an +arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall +we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he +already knows? + +THEAETETUS: It would be too absurd, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he +does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all +numbers? + +THEAETETUS: That, again, would be an absurdity. + +SOCRATES: Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?--any one may +twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which he +likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not +the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that +which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that +which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have +the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;--when the +various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and +wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he +takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought eleven to +be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his mind, when he +wanted the pigeon. + +THEAETETUS: A very rational explanation. + +SOCRATES: But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not +deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion +may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I +dare say that you agree with me, do you not? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what +he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess +what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a +greater difficulty is looking in at the window. + +THEAETETUS: What is it? + +SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become +false opinion? + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of +anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, +but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme +absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be +another thing;--that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he +should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?--you might as well +argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as +that knowledge can make him ignorant. + +THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms +of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of +ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who +sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and +sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from +ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing. + +SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you +to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say--then, according to +you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion--am I right? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? + +THEAETETUS: Of course not. + +SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that +he knows the things about which he has been deceived? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not +ignorance? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to +face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon +us:--'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the +form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them +which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of +them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he +knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one +which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he +does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there +are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, +and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks +according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he +possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And +thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, +and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? + +THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say. + +SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly +show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what +knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false +opinion? + +THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet +gone. + +SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?--for we +are not going to lose heart as yet. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not. + +SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? + +THEAETETUS: I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: What was it? + +THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion +is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and +good. + +SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The +experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may +stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we +are, nothing will come to light. + +THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try. + +SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is +against us. + +THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean? + +SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and +lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever +they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any +teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the +truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eye- +witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not, they can only persuade them. + +SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have +an opinion? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which +you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus +judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they +judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged +well. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and +knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly +without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. + +THEAETETUS: That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by +some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined +with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was +out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no +rational account are not knowable--such was the singular expression which +he used--and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable. + +SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which +are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he +said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. + +THEAETETUS: I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person +would tell me, I think that I could follow him. + +SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:--Methought +that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters +or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, +have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can +be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the +other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if +you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be +called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these +go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from +them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a +definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But +none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for +they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, +as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the +combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the +elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined +or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and +expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any one +forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may +say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who +cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that +thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in +knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the +form in which the dream appeared to you? + +THEAETETUS: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with +definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual +manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have +grown old and have not found? + +THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present +statement. + +SOCRATES: Which is probably correct--for how can there be knowledge apart +from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has +been said which does not quite satisfy me. + +THEAETETUS: What was it? + +SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:--That +the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables +known. + +THEAETETUS: And was that wrong? + +SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which +the author of the argument himself used. + +THEAETETUS: What hostages? + +SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which +are the combinations;--he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the +alphabet? + +THEAETETUS: Yes; he did. + +SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test +ourselves:--What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of +all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that +letters have no definition? + +THEAETETUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the +first syllable of my name:--Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? + +THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. + +SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? + +THEAETETUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. + +THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an +element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the +tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds +nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even +the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, +but no definition at all. + +SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in +our idea about knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: Yes; I think that we have. + +SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables +can be known, but not the letters? + +THEAETETUS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, +all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? + +THEAETETUS: I should say that we mean all the letters. + +SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first +syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of +them? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both +together? + +THEAETETUS: Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning. + +SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is +ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the +fine theory has again taken wings and departed. + +THEAETETUS: Yes, with wonderful celerity. + +SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have +maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea +framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. + +THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion than the other. + +SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing +theory. + +THEAETETUS: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple +form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements--of +letters or of any other elements. + +THEAETETUS: Very good. + +SOCRATES: And it must have no parts. + +THEAETETUS: Why? + +SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. +Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a +single notion different from all the parts? + +THEAETETUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or +different? + +THEAETETUS: I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I +shall hazard the reply, that they are different. + +SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to +think whether I equally approve of your answer. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; the answer is the point. + +SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from +all? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) +and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:--When we say one, +two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times +two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same +or of different numbers? + +THEAETETUS: Of the same. + +SOCRATES: That is of six? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing +which we express? + +THEAETETUS: Of course there is. + +SOCRATES: And that is six? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, +we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly we do. + +SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are +they not? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar +cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire +number is the all? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, +if consisting of all the parts? + +THEAETETUS: That is the inference. + +SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? + +THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all. + +SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all +that of which nothing is wanting? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? +but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;--if +wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. + +THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and +all. + +SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the +parts will be a whole and all? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that +either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts +of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, +and will therefore be equally known with them? + +THEAETETUS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from +them? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of +any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? + +THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in +a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for +other parts. + +SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present +view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we +admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of +which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because +each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly +attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are alien and +inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were +indefinable and unknown? + +THEAETETUS: I remember. + +SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and +indivisible? I can see no other. + +THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given. + +SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or +letters, if it has no parts and is one form? + +THEAETETUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, +the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, +since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the +letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? + +THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that. + +SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that +the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument. + +SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, +when you remember your own experience in learning to read? + +THEAETETUS: What experience? + +SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the +separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you +heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their +position. + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can +tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one +would allow, are the elements or letters of music? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know +to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple +elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and +much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some +one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall +consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking +nonsense? + +THEAETETUS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am +not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the +question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right +opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form of +knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: We must not. + +SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I +think that we have a choice of three meanings. + +THEAETETUS: What are they? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's +thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the stream +which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not explanation +appear to be of this nature? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain +himself. + +SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or +later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who have +a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor will +right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account +of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended +to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he +should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the +thing. + +THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...? + +SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a +hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them +individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content +to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if +we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the +name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the +letters of your name--that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; for +knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, combined +with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of which +anything is composed. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a +waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the +hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of +opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he attains +to the whole through the elements. + +THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you +admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational +explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger +combinations of them to be irrational--is this your view? + +THEAETETUS: Precisely. + +SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any +element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of +something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements +at different times? + +THEAETETUS: Assuredly not. + +SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others +this often occurred in the process of learning to read? + +THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the +syllables? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +THEAETETUS: To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from +supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge. + +SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of +Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e; but, +again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought to +write and does write T and e--can we suppose that he knows the first +syllables of your two names? + +THEAETETUS: We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained +knowledge. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the +second and third and fourth syllables of your name? + +THEAETETUS: He may. + +SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can +write them out correctly, he has right opinion? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still +be without knowledge? + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for +he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be +explanation. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united +with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the +exactness of knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: It would seem so. + +SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a +dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there +not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be +adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with +rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will +not prefer this but the third. + +THEAETETUS: You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first +was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has +just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of +the elements. But what is the third definition? + +SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or +sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all +others. + +THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition? + +SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would +be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the +heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth. + +THEAETETUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Understand why:--the reason is, as I was just now saying, that +if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of each +thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition or +explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of the +characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those things to +which this common quality belongs. + +THEAETETUS: I understand you, and your account of definition is in my +judgment correct. + +SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out +the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of +which before he had only an opinion. + +THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we are maintaining. + +SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite +disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now +become altogether unintelligible. + +THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have true +opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have +knowledge, but if not, opinion only. + +THEAETETUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your +difference. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your +distinguishing characteristics. + +THEAETETUS: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature +which no more belonged to you than to another. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, now--How in that case could I have formed a judgment of +you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I imagine Theaetetus to be +a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other member complete; how +would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from Theodorus, or from some +outer barbarian? + +THEAETETUS: How could it? + +SOCRATES: Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose +and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any +more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me? + +THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your snub- +nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the snub- +nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other +peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow +the right opinion will be re-called? + +THEAETETUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences? + +THEAETETUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to +right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the +way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is +ridiculous. + +THEAETETUS: How so? + +SOCRATES: We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences +which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right +opinion of them, and so we go round and round:--the revolution of the +scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is +as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly described +as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already +have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul +utterly benighted. + +THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked +the question? + +SOCRATES: If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, +had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the +difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of +knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to acquire +knowledge. + +THEAETETUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair +argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'--knowledge, that is, +of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the +definition. + +THEAETETUS: That seems to be true. + +SOCRATES: But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, +that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference +or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor +true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to +true opinion? + +THEAETETUS: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have +you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth? + +THEAETETUS: I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good +deal more than ever was in me. + +SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and +that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up? + +THEAETETUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be +all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be +soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to +fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; +I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and +famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a +midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, I +deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair. + +And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet +Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to +see you again at this place. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Theaetetus, by Plato + |