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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Theaetetus + +Author: Plato + +Release Date: November 17, 2008 [EBook #1726] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEAETETUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + THEAETETUS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> THEAETETUS </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS. + </h2> + <p> + Some dialogues of Plato are of so various a character that their relation + to the other dialogues cannot be determined with any degree of certainty. + The Theaetetus, like the Parmenides, has points of similarity both with + his earlier and his later writings. The perfection of style, the humour, + the dramatic interest, the complexity of structure, the fertility of + illustration, the shifting of the points of view, are characteristic of + his best period of authorship. The vain search, the negative conclusion, + the figure of the midwives, the constant profession of ignorance on the + part of Socrates, also bear the stamp of the early dialogues, in which the + original Socrates is not yet Platonized. Had we no other indications, we + should be disposed to range the Theaetetus with the Apology and the + Phaedrus, and perhaps even with the Protagoras and the Laches. + </p> + <p> + But when we pass from the style to an examination of the subject, we trace + a connection with the later rather than with the earlier dialogues. In the + first place there is the connexion, indicated by Plato himself at the end + of the dialogue, with the Sophist, to which in many respects the + Theaetetus is so little akin. (1) The same persons reappear, including the + younger Socrates, whose name is just mentioned in the Theaetetus; (2) the + theory of rest, which Socrates has declined to consider, is resumed by the + Eleatic Stranger; (3) there is a similar allusion in both dialogues to the + meeting of Parmenides and Socrates (Theaet., Soph.); and (4) the inquiry + into not-being in the Sophist supplements the question of false opinion + which is raised in the Theaetetus. (Compare also Theaet. and Soph. for + parallel turns of thought.) Secondly, the later date of the dialogue is + confirmed by the absence of the doctrine of recollection and of any + doctrine of ideas except that which derives them from generalization and + from reflection of the mind upon itself. The general character of the + Theaetetus is dialectical, and there are traces of the same Megarian + influences which appear in the Parmenides, and which later writers, in + their matter of fact way, have explained by the residence of Plato at + Megara. Socrates disclaims the character of a professional eristic, and + also, with a sort of ironical admiration, expresses his inability to + attain the Megarian precision in the use of terms. Yet he too employs a + similar sophistical skill in overturning every conceivable theory of + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + The direct indications of a date amount to no more than this: the + conversation is said to have taken place when Theaetetus was a youth, and + shortly before the death of Socrates. At the time of his own death he is + supposed to be a full-grown man. Allowing nine or ten years for the + interval between youth and manhood, the dialogue could not have been + written earlier than 390, when Plato was about thirty-nine years of age. + No more definite date is indicated by the engagement in which Theaetetus + is said to have fallen or to have been wounded, and which may have taken + place any time during the Corinthian war, between the years 390-387. The + later date which has been suggested, 369, when the Athenians and + Lacedaemonians disputed the Isthmus with Epaminondas, would make the age + of Theaetetus at his death forty-five or forty-six. This a little impairs + the beauty of Socrates' remark, that 'he would be a great man if he + lived.' + </p> + <p> + In this uncertainty about the place of the Theaetetus, it seemed better, + as in the case of the Republic, Timaeus, Critias, to retain the order in + which Plato himself has arranged this and the two companion dialogues. We + cannot exclude the possibility which has been already noticed in reference + to other works of Plato, that the Theaetetus may not have been all written + continuously; or the probability that the Sophist and Politicus, which + differ greatly in style, were only appended after a long interval of time. + The allusion to Parmenides compared with the Sophist, would probably imply + that the dialogue which is called by his name was already in existence; + unless, indeed, we suppose the passage in which the allusion occurs to + have been inserted afterwards. Again, the Theaetetus may be connected with + the Gorgias, either dialogue from different points of view containing an + analysis of the real and apparent (Schleiermacher); and both may be + brought into relation with the Apology as illustrating the personal life + of Socrates. The Philebus, too, may with equal reason be placed either + after or before what, in the language of Thrasyllus, may be called the + Second Platonic Trilogy. Both the Parmenides and the Sophist, and still + more the Theaetetus, have points of affinity with the Cratylus, in which + the principles of rest and motion are again contrasted, and the + Sophistical or Protagorean theory of language is opposed to that which is + attributed to the disciple of Heracleitus, not to speak of lesser + resemblances in thought and language. The Parmenides, again, has been + thought by some to hold an intermediate position between the Theaetetus + and the Sophist; upon this view, the Sophist may be regarded as the answer + to the problems about One and Being which have been raised in the + Parmenides. Any of these arrangements may suggest new views to the student + of Plato; none of them can lay claim to an exclusive probability in its + favour. + </p> + <p> + The Theaetetus is one of the narrated dialogues of Plato, and is the only + one which is supposed to have been written down. In a short introductory + scene, Euclides and Terpsion are described as meeting before the door of + Euclides' house in Megara. This may have been a spot familiar to Plato + (for Megara was within a walk of Athens), but no importance can be + attached to the accidental introduction of the founder of the Megarian + philosophy. The real intention of the preface is to create an interest + about the person of Theaetetus, who has just been carried up from the army + at Corinth in a dying state. The expectation of his death recalls the + promise of his youth, and especially the famous conversation which + Socrates had with him when he was quite young, a few days before his own + trial and death, as we are once more reminded at the end of the dialogue. + Yet we may observe that Plato has himself forgotten this, when he + represents Euclides as from time to time coming to Athens and correcting + the copy from Socrates' own mouth. The narrative, having introduced + Theaetetus, and having guaranteed the authenticity of the dialogue + (compare Symposium, Phaedo, Parmenides), is then dropped. No further use + is made of the device. As Plato himself remarks, who in this as in some + other minute points is imitated by Cicero (De Amicitia), the interlocutory + words are omitted. + </p> + <p> + Theaetetus, the hero of the battle of Corinth and of the dialogue, is a + disciple of Theodorus, the great geometrician, whose science is thus + indicated to be the propaedeutic to philosophy. An interest has been + already excited about him by his approaching death, and now he is + introduced to us anew by the praises of his master Theodorus. He is a + youthful Socrates, and exhibits the same contrast of the fair soul and the + ungainly face and frame, the Silenus mask and the god within, which are + described in the Symposium. The picture which Theodorus gives of his + courage and patience and intelligence and modesty is verified in the + course of the dialogue. His courage is shown by his behaviour in the + battle, and his other qualities shine forth as the argument proceeds. + Socrates takes an evident delight in 'the wise Theaetetus,' who has more + in him than 'many bearded men'; he is quite inspired by his answers. At + first the youth is lost in wonder, and is almost too modest to speak, but, + encouraged by Socrates, he rises to the occasion, and grows full of + interest and enthusiasm about the great question. Like a youth, he has not + finally made up his mind, and is very ready to follow the lead of + Socrates, and to enter into each successive phase of the discussion which + turns up. His great dialectical talent is shown in his power of drawing + distinctions, and of foreseeing the consequences of his own answers. The + enquiry about the nature of knowledge is not new to him; long ago he has + felt the 'pang of philosophy,' and has experienced the youthful + intoxication which is depicted in the Philebus. But he has hitherto been + unable to make the transition from mathematics to metaphysics. He can form + a general conception of square and oblong numbers, but he is unable to + attain a similar expression of knowledge in the abstract. Yet at length he + begins to recognize that there are universal conceptions of being, + likeness, sameness, number, which the mind contemplates in herself, and + with the help of Socrates is conducted from a theory of sense to a theory + of ideas. + </p> + <p> + There is no reason to doubt that Theaetetus was a real person, whose name + survived in the next generation. But neither can any importance be + attached to the notices of him in Suidas and Proclus, which are probably + based on the mention of him in Plato. According to a confused statement in + Suidas, who mentions him twice over, first, as a pupil of Socrates, and + then of Plato, he is said to have written the first work on the Five + Solids. But no early authority cites the work, the invention of which may + have been easily suggested by the division of roots, which Plato + attributes to him, and the allusion to the backward state of solid + geometry in the Republic. At any rate, there is no occasion to recall him + to life again after the battle of Corinth, in order that we may allow time + for the completion of such a work (Muller). We may also remark that such a + supposition entirely destroys the pathetic interest of the introduction. + </p> + <p> + Theodorus, the geometrician, had once been the friend and disciple of + Protagoras, but he is very reluctant to leave his retirement and defend + his old master. He is too old to learn Socrates' game of question and + answer, and prefers the digressions to the main argument, because he finds + them easier to follow. The mathematician, as Socrates says in the + Republic, is not capable of giving a reason in the same manner as the + dialectician, and Theodorus could not therefore have been appropriately + introduced as the chief respondent. But he may be fairly appealed to, when + the honour of his master is at stake. He is the 'guardian of his orphans,' + although this is a responsibility which he wishes to throw upon Callias, + the friend and patron of all Sophists, declaring that he himself had early + 'run away' from philosophy, and was absorbed in mathematics. His extreme + dislike to the Heraclitean fanatics, which may be compared with the + dislike of Theaetetus to the materialists, and his ready acceptance of the + noble words of Socrates, are noticeable traits of character. + </p> + <p> + The Socrates of the Theaetetus is the same as the Socrates of the earlier + dialogues. He is the invincible disputant, now advanced in years, of the + Protagoras and Symposium; he is still pursuing his divine mission, his + 'Herculean labours,' of which he has described the origin in the Apology; + and he still hears the voice of his oracle, bidding him receive or not + receive the truant souls. There he is supposed to have a mission to + convict men of self-conceit; in the Theaetetus he has assigned to him by + God the functions of a man-midwife, who delivers men of their thoughts, + and under this character he is present throughout the dialogue. He is the + true prophet who has an insight into the natures of men, and can divine + their future; and he knows that sympathy is the secret power which unlocks + their thoughts. The hit at Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who was + specially committed to his charge in the Laches, may be remarked by the + way. The attempt to discover the definition of knowledge is in accordance + with the character of Socrates as he is described in the Memorabilia, + asking What is justice? what is temperance? and the like. But there is no + reason to suppose that he would have analyzed the nature of perception, or + traced the connexion of Protagoras and Heracleitus, or have raised the + difficulty respecting false opinion. The humorous illustrations, as well + as the serious thoughts, run through the dialogue. The snubnosedness of + Theaetetus, a characteristic which he shares with Socrates, and the + man-midwifery of Socrates, are not forgotten in the closing words. At the + end of the dialogue, as in the Euthyphro, he is expecting to meet Meletus + at the porch of the king Archon; but with the same indifference to the + result which is everywhere displayed by him, he proposes that they shall + reassemble on the following day at the same spot. The day comes, and in + the Sophist the three friends again meet, but no further allusion is made + to the trial, and the principal share in the argument is assigned, not to + Socrates, but to an Eleatic stranger; the youthful Theaetetus also plays a + different and less independent part. And there is no allusion in the + Introduction to the second and third dialogues, which are afterwards + appended. There seems, therefore, reason to think that there is a real + change, both in the characters and in the design. + </p> + <p> + The dialogue is an enquiry into the nature of knowledge, which is + interrupted by two digressions. The first is the digression about the + midwives, which is also a leading thought or continuous image, like the + wave in the Republic, appearing and reappearing at intervals. Again and + again we are reminded that the successive conceptions of knowledge are + extracted from Theaetetus, who in his turn truly declares that Socrates + has got a great deal more out of him than ever was in him. Socrates is + never weary of working out the image in humorous details,—discerning + the symptoms of labour, carrying the child round the hearth, fearing that + Theaetetus will bite him, comparing his conceptions to wind-eggs, + asserting an hereditary right to the occupation. There is also a serious + side to the image, which is an apt similitude of the Socratic theory of + education (compare Republic, Sophist), and accords with the ironical + spirit in which the wisest of men delights to speak of himself. + </p> + <p> + The other digression is the famous contrast of the lawyer and philosopher. + This is a sort of landing-place or break in the middle of the dialogue. At + the commencement of a great discussion, the reflection naturally arises, + How happy are they who, like the philosopher, have time for such + discussions (compare Republic)! There is no reason for the introduction of + such a digression; nor is a reason always needed, any more than for the + introduction of an episode in a poem, or of a topic in conversation. That + which is given by Socrates is quite sufficient, viz. that the philosopher + may talk and write as he pleases. But though not very closely connected, + neither is the digression out of keeping with the rest of the dialogue. + The philosopher naturally desires to pour forth the thoughts which are + always present to him, and to discourse of the higher life. The idea of + knowledge, although hard to be defined, is realised in the life of + philosophy. And the contrast is the favourite antithesis between the + world, in the various characters of sophist, lawyer, statesman, speaker, + and the philosopher,—between opinion and knowledge,—between + the conventional and the true. + </p> + <p> + The greater part of the dialogue is devoted to setting up and throwing + down definitions of science and knowledge. Proceeding from the lower to + the higher by three stages, in which perception, opinion, reasoning are + successively examined, we first get rid of the confusion of the idea of + knowledge and specific kinds of knowledge,—a confusion which has + been already noticed in the Lysis, Laches, Meno, and other dialogues. In + the infancy of logic, a form of thought has to be invented before the + content can be filled up. We cannot define knowledge until the nature of + definition has been ascertained. Having succeeded in making his meaning + plain, Socrates proceeds to analyze (1) the first definition which + Theaetetus proposes: 'Knowledge is sensible perception.' This is speedily + identified with the Protagorean saying, 'Man is the measure of all + things;' and of this again the foundation is discovered in the perpetual + flux of Heracleitus. The relativeness of sensation is then developed at + length, and for a moment the definition appears to be accepted. But soon + the Protagorean thesis is pronounced to be suicidal; for the adversaries + of Protagoras are as good a measure as he is, and they deny his doctrine. + He is then supposed to reply that the perception may be true at any given + instant. But the reply is in the end shown to be inconsistent with the + Heraclitean foundation, on which the doctrine has been affirmed to rest. + For if the Heraclitean flux is extended to every sort of change in every + instant of time, how can any thought or word be detained even for an + instant? Sensible perception, like everything else, is tumbling to pieces. + Nor can Protagoras himself maintain that one man is as good as another in + his knowledge of the future; and 'the expedient,' if not 'the just and + true,' belongs to the sphere of the future. + </p> + <p> + And so we must ask again, What is knowledge? The comparison of sensations + with one another implies a principle which is above sensation, and which + resides in the mind itself. We are thus led to look for knowledge in a + higher sphere, and accordingly Theaetetus, when again interrogated, + replies (2) that 'knowledge is true opinion.' But how is false opinion + possible? The Megarian or Eristic spirit within us revives the question, + which has been already asked and indirectly answered in the Meno: 'How can + a man be ignorant of that which he knows?' No answer is given to this not + unanswerable question. The comparison of the mind to a block of wax, or to + a decoy of birds, is found wanting. + </p> + <p> + But are we not inverting the natural order in looking for opinion before + we have found knowledge? And knowledge is not true opinion; for the + Athenian dicasts have true opinion but not knowledge. What then is + knowledge? We answer (3), 'True opinion, with definition or explanation.' + But all the different ways in which this statement may be understood are + set aside, like the definitions of courage in the Laches, or of friendship + in the Lysis, or of temperance in the Charmides. At length we arrive at + the conclusion, in which nothing is concluded. + </p> + <p> + There are two special difficulties which beset the student of the + Theaetetus: (1) he is uncertain how far he can trust Plato's account of + the theory of Protagoras; and he is also uncertain (2) how far, and in + what parts of the dialogue, Plato is expressing his own opinion. The + dramatic character of the work renders the answer to both these questions + difficult. + </p> + <p> + 1. In reply to the first, we have only probabilities to offer. Three main + points have to be decided: (a) Would Protagoras have identified his own + thesis, 'Man is the measure of all things,' with the other, 'All knowledge + is sensible perception'? (b) Would he have based the relativity of + knowledge on the Heraclitean flux? (c) Would he have asserted the + absoluteness of sensation at each instant? Of the work of Protagoras on + 'Truth' we know nothing, with the exception of the two famous fragments, + which are cited in this dialogue, 'Man is the measure of all things,' and, + 'Whether there are gods or not, I cannot tell.' Nor have we any other + trustworthy evidence of the tenets of Protagoras, or of the sense in which + his words are used. For later writers, including Aristotle in his + Metaphysics, have mixed up the Protagoras of Plato, as they have the + Socrates of Plato, with the real person. + </p> + <p> + Returning then to the Theaetetus, as the only possible source from which + an answer to these questions can be obtained, we may remark, that Plato + had 'The Truth' of Protagoras before him, and frequently refers to the + book. He seems to say expressly, that in this work the doctrine of the + Heraclitean flux was not to be found; 'he told the real truth' (not in the + book, which is so entitled, but) 'privately to his disciples,'—words + which imply that the connexion between the doctrines of Protagoras and + Heracleitus was not generally recognized in Greece, but was really + discovered or invented by Plato. On the other hand, the doctrine that 'Man + is the measure of all things,' is expressly identified by Socrates with + the other statement, that 'What appears to each man is to him;' and a + reference is made to the books in which the statement occurs;—this + Theaetetus, who has 'often read the books,' is supposed to acknowledge (so + Cratylus). And Protagoras, in the speech attributed to him, never says + that he has been misunderstood: he rather seems to imply that the + absoluteness of sensation at each instant was to be found in his words. He + is only indignant at the 'reductio ad absurdum' devised by Socrates for + his 'homo mensura,' which Theodorus also considers to be 'really too bad.' + </p> + <p> + The question may be raised, how far Plato in the Theaetetus could have + misrepresented Protagoras without violating the laws of dramatic + probability. Could he have pretended to cite from a well-known writing + what was not to be found there? But such a shadowy enquiry is not worth + pursuing further. We need only remember that in the criticism which + follows of the thesis of Protagoras, we are criticizing the Protagoras of + Plato, and not attempting to draw a precise line between his real + sentiments and those which Plato has attributed to him. + </p> + <p> + 2. The other difficulty is a more subtle, and also a more important one, + because bearing on the general character of the Platonic dialogues. On a + first reading of them, we are apt to imagine that the truth is only spoken + by Socrates, who is never guilty of a fallacy himself, and is the great + detector of the errors and fallacies of others. But this natural + presumption is disturbed by the discovery that the Sophists are sometimes + in the right and Socrates in the wrong. Like the hero of a novel, he is + not to be supposed always to represent the sentiments of the author. There + are few modern readers who do not side with Protagoras, rather than with + Socrates, in the dialogue which is called by his name. The Cratylus + presents a similar difficulty: in his etymologies, as in the number of the + State, we cannot tell how far Socrates is serious; for the Socratic irony + will not allow him to distinguish between his real and his assumed wisdom. + No one is the superior of the invincible Socrates in argument (except in + the first part of the Parmenides, where he is introduced as a youth); but + he is by no means supposed to be in possession of the whole truth. + Arguments are often put into his mouth (compare Introduction to the + Gorgias) which must have seemed quite as untenable to Plato as to a modern + writer. In this dialogue a great part of the answer of Protagoras is just + and sound; remarks are made by him on verbal criticism, and on the + importance of understanding an opponent's meaning, which are conceived in + the true spirit of philosophy. And the distinction which he is supposed to + draw between Eristic and Dialectic, is really a criticism of Plato on + himself and his own criticism of Protagoras. + </p> + <p> + The difficulty seems to arise from not attending to the dramatic character + of the writings of Plato. There are two, or more, sides to questions; and + these are parted among the different speakers. Sometimes one view or + aspect of a question is made to predominate over the rest, as in the + Gorgias or Sophist; but in other dialogues truth is divided, as in the + Laches and Protagoras, and the interest of the piece consists in the + contrast of opinions. The confusion caused by the irony of Socrates, who, + if he is true to his character, cannot say anything of his own knowledge, + is increased by the circumstance that in the Theaetetus and some other + dialogues he is occasionally playing both parts himself, and even charging + his own arguments with unfairness. In the Theaetetus he is designedly held + back from arriving at a conclusion. For we cannot suppose that Plato + conceived a definition of knowledge to be impossible. But this is his + manner of approaching and surrounding a question. The lights which he + throws on his subject are indirect, but they are not the less real for + that. He has no intention of proving a thesis by a cut-and-dried argument; + nor does he imagine that a great philosophical problem can be tied up + within the limits of a definition. If he has analyzed a proposition or + notion, even with the severity of an impossible logic, if half-truths have + been compared by him with other half-truths, if he has cleared up or + advanced popular ideas, or illustrated a new method, his aim has been + sufficiently accomplished. + </p> + <p> + The writings of Plato belong to an age in which the power of analysis had + outrun the means of knowledge; and through a spurious use of dialectic, + the distinctions which had been already 'won from the void and formless + infinite,' seemed to be rapidly returning to their original chaos. The two + great speculative philosophies, which a century earlier had so deeply + impressed the mind of Hellas, were now degenerating into Eristic. The + contemporaries of Plato and Socrates were vainly trying to find new + combinations of them, or to transfer them from the object to the subject. + The Megarians, in their first attempts to attain a severer logic, were + making knowledge impossible (compare Theaet.). They were asserting 'the + one good under many names,' and, like the Cynics, seem to have denied + predication, while the Cynics themselves were depriving virtue of all + which made virtue desirable in the eyes of Socrates and Plato. And besides + these, we find mention in the later writings of Plato, especially in the + Theaetetus, Sophist, and Laws, of certain impenetrable godless persons, + who will not believe what they 'cannot hold in their hands'; and cannot be + approached in argument, because they cannot argue (Theat; Soph.). No + school of Greek philosophers exactly answers to these persons, in whom + Plato may perhaps have blended some features of the Atomists with the + vulgar materialistic tendencies of mankind in general (compare + Introduction to the Sophist). + </p> + <p> + And not only was there a conflict of opinions, but the stage which the + mind had reached presented other difficulties hardly intelligible to us, + who live in a different cycle of human thought. All times of mental + progress are times of confusion; we only see, or rather seem to see things + clearly, when they have been long fixed and defined. In the age of Plato, + the limits of the world of imagination and of pure abstraction, of the old + world and the new, were not yet fixed. The Greeks, in the fourth century + before Christ, had no words for 'subject' and 'object,' and no distinct + conception of them; yet they were always hovering about the question + involved in them. The analysis of sense, and the analysis of thought, were + equally difficult to them; and hopelessly confused by the attempt to solve + them, not through an appeal to facts, but by the help of general theories + respecting the nature of the universe. + </p> + <p> + Plato, in his Theaetetus, gathers up the sceptical tendencies of his age, + and compares them. But he does not seek to reconstruct out of them a + theory of knowledge. The time at which such a theory could be framed had + not yet arrived. For there was no measure of experience with which the + ideas swarming in men's minds could be compared; the meaning of the word + 'science' could scarcely be explained to them, except from the + mathematical sciences, which alone offered the type of universality and + certainty. Philosophy was becoming more and more vacant and abstract, and + not only the Platonic Ideas and the Eleatic Being, but all abstractions + seemed to be at variance with sense and at war with one another. + </p> + <p> + The want of the Greek mind in the fourth century before Christ was not + another theory of rest or motion, or Being or atoms, but rather a + philosophy which could free the mind from the power of abstractions and + alternatives, and show how far rest and how far motion, how far the + universal principle of Being and the multitudinous principle of atoms, + entered into the composition of the world; which could distinguish between + the true and false analogy, and allow the negative as well as the positive + a place in human thought. To such a philosophy Plato, in the Theaetetus, + offers many contributions. He has followed philosophy into the region of + mythology, and pointed out the similarities of opposing phases of thought. + He has also shown that extreme abstractions are self-destructive, and, + indeed, hardly distinguishable from one another. But his intention is not + to unravel the whole subject of knowledge, if this had been possible; and + several times in the course of the dialogue he rejects explanations of + knowledge which have germs of truth in them; as, for example, 'the + resolution of the compound into the simple;' or 'right opinion with a mark + of difference.' + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + Terpsion, who has come to Megara from the country, is described as having + looked in vain for Euclides in the Agora; the latter explains that he has + been down to the harbour, and on his way thither had met Theaetetus, who + was being carried up from the army to Athens. He was scarcely alive, for + he had been badly wounded at the battle of Corinth, and had taken the + dysentery which prevailed in the camp. The mention of his condition + suggests the reflection, 'What a loss he will be!' 'Yes, indeed,' replies + Euclid; 'only just now I was hearing of his noble conduct in the battle.' + 'That I should expect; but why did he not remain at Megara?' 'I wanted him + to remain, but he would not; so I went with him as far as Erineum; and as + I parted from him, I remembered that Socrates had seen him when he was a + youth, and had a remarkable conversation with him, not long before his own + death; and he then prophesied of him that he would be a great man if he + lived.' 'How true that has been; how like all that Socrates said! And + could you repeat the conversation?' 'Not from memory; but I took notes + when I returned home, which I afterwards filled up at leisure, and got + Socrates to correct them from time to time, when I came to + Athens'...Terpsion had long intended to ask for a sight of this writing, + of which he had already heard. They are both tired, and agree to rest and + have the conversation read to them by a servant...'Here is the roll, + Terpsion; I need only observe that I have omitted, for the sake of + convenience, the interlocutory words, "said I," "said he"; and that + Theaetetus, and Theodorus, the geometrician of Cyrene, are the persons + with whom Socrates is conversing.' + </p> + <p> + Socrates begins by asking Theodorus whether, in his visit to Athens, he + has found any Athenian youth likely to attain distinction in science. + 'Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable youth, with whom I have + become acquainted. He is no beauty, and therefore you need not imagine + that I am in love with him; and, to say the truth, he is very like you, + for he has a snub nose, and projecting eyes, although these features are + not so marked in him as in you. He combines the most various qualities, + quickness, patience, courage; and he is gentle as well as wise, always + silently flowing on, like a river of oil. Look! he is the middle one of + those who are entering the palaestra.' + </p> + <p> + Socrates, who does not know his name, recognizes him as the son of + Euphronius, who was himself a good man and a rich. He is informed by + Theodorus that the youth is named Theaetetus, but the property of his + father has disappeared in the hands of trustees; this does not, however, + prevent him from adding liberality to his other virtues. At the desire of + Socrates he invites Theaetetus to sit by them. + </p> + <p> + 'Yes,' says Socrates, 'that I may see in you, Theaetetus, the image of my + ugly self, as Theodorus declares. Not that his remark is of any + importance; for though he is a philosopher, he is not a painter, and + therefore he is no judge of our faces; but, as he is a man of science, he + may be a judge of our intellects. And if he were to praise the mental + endowments of either of us, in that case the hearer of the eulogy ought to + examine into what he says, and the subject should not refuse to be + examined.' Theaetetus consents, and is caught in a trap (compare the + similar trap which is laid for Theodorus). 'Then, Theaetetus, you will + have to be examined, for Theodorus has been praising you in a style of + which I never heard the like.' 'He was only jesting.' 'Nay, that is not + his way; and I cannot allow you, on that pretence, to retract the assent + which you have already given, or I shall make Theodorus repeat your + praises, and swear to them.' Theaetetus, in reply, professes that he is + willing to be examined, and Socrates begins by asking him what he learns + of Theodorus. He is himself anxious to learn anything of anybody; and now + he has a little question to which he wants Theaetetus or Theodorus (or + whichever of the company would not be 'donkey' to the rest) to find an + answer. Without further preface, but at the same time apologizing for his + eagerness, he asks, 'What is knowledge?' Theodorus is too old to answer + questions, and begs him to interrogate Theaetetus, who has the advantage + of youth. + </p> + <p> + Theaetetus replies, that knowledge is what he learns of Theodorus, i.e. + geometry and arithmetic; and that there are other kinds of knowledge—shoemaking, + carpentering, and the like. But Socrates rejoins, that this answer + contains too much and also too little. For although Theaetetus has + enumerated several kinds of knowledge, he has not explained the common + nature of them; as if he had been asked, 'What is clay?' and instead of + saying 'Clay is moistened earth,' he had answered, 'There is one clay of + image-makers, another of potters, another of oven-makers.' Theaetetus at + once divines that Socrates means him to extend to all kinds of knowledge + the same process of generalization which he has already learned to apply + to arithmetic. For he has discovered a division of numbers into square + numbers, 4, 9, 16, etc., which are composed of equal factors, and + represent figures which have equal sides, and oblong numbers, 3, 5, 6, 7, + etc., which are composed of unequal factors, and represent figures which + have unequal sides. But he has never succeeded in attaining a similar + conception of knowledge, though he has often tried; and, when this and + similar questions were brought to him from Socrates, has been sorely + distressed by them. Socrates explains to him that he is in labour. For men + as well as women have pangs of labour; and both at times require the + assistance of midwives. And he, Socrates, is a midwife, although this is a + secret; he has inherited the art from his mother bold and bluff, and he + ushers into light, not children, but the thoughts of men. Like the + midwives, who are 'past bearing children,' he too can have no offspring—the + God will not allow him to bring anything into the world of his own. He + also reminds Theaetetus that the midwives are or ought to be the only + matchmakers (this is the preparation for a biting jest); for those who + reap the fruit are most likely to know on what soil the plants will grow. + But respectable midwives avoid this department of practice—they do + not want to be called procuresses. There are some other differences + between the two sorts of pregnancy. For women do not bring into the world + at one time real children and at another time idols which are with + difficulty distinguished from them. 'At first,' says Socrates in his + character of the man-midwife, 'my patients are barren and stolid, but + after a while they "round apace," if the gods are propitious to them; and + this is due not to me but to themselves; I and the god only assist in + bringing their ideas to the birth. Many of them have left me too soon, and + the result has been that they have produced abortions; or when I have + delivered them of children they have lost them by an ill bringing up, and + have ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. + Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of these, and there have been + others. The truants often return to me and beg to be taken back; and then, + if my familiar allows me, which is not always the case, I receive them, + and they begin to grow again. There come to me also those who have nothing + in them, and have no need of my art; and I am their matchmaker (see + above), and marry them to Prodicus or some other inspired sage who is + likely to suit them. I tell you this long story because I suspect that you + are in labour. Come then to me, who am a midwife, and the son of a + midwife, and I will deliver you. And do not bite me, as the women do, if I + abstract your first-born; for I am acting out of good-will towards you; + the God who is within me is the friend of man, though he will not allow me + to dissemble the truth. Once more then, Theaetetus, I repeat my old + question—"What is knowledge?" Take courage, and by the help of God + you will discover an answer.' 'My answer is, that knowledge is + perception.' 'That is the theory of Protagoras, who has another way of + expressing the same thing when he says, "Man is the measure of all + things." He was a very wise man, and we should try to understand him. In + order to illustrate his meaning let me suppose that there is the same wind + blowing in our faces, and one of us may be hot and the other cold. How is + this? Protagoras will reply that the wind is hot to him who is cold, cold + to him who is hot. And "is" means "appears," and when you say "appears to + him," that means "he feels." Thus feeling, appearance, perception, + coincide with being. I suspect, however, that this was only a "facon de + parler," by which he imposed on the common herd like you and me; he told + "the truth" (in allusion to the title of his book, which was called "The + Truth") in secret to his disciples. For he was really a votary of that + famous philosophy in which all things are said to be relative; nothing is + great or small, or heavy or light, or one, but all is in motion and + mixture and transition and flux and generation, not "being," as we + ignorantly affirm, but "becoming." This has been the doctrine, not of + Protagoras only, but of all philosophers, with the single exception of + Parmenides; Empedocles, Heracleitus, and others, and all the poets, with + Epicharmus, the king of Comedy, and Homer, the king of Tragedy, at their + head, have said the same; the latter has these words— + </p> + <p> + "Ocean, whence the gods sprang, and mother Tethys." + </p> + <p> + And many arguments are used to show, that motion is the source of life, + and rest of death: fire and warmth are produced by friction, and living + creatures owe their origin to a similar cause; the bodily frame is + preserved by exercise and destroyed by indolence; and if the sun ceased to + move, "chaos would come again." Now apply this doctrine of "All is motion" + to the senses, and first of all to the sense of sight. The colour of + white, or any other colour, is neither in the eyes nor out of them, but + ever in motion between the object and the eye, and varying in the case of + every percipient. All is relative, and, as the followers of Protagoras + remark, endless contradictions arise when we deny this; e.g. here are six + dice; they are more than four and less than twelve; "more and also less," + would you not say?' 'Yes.' 'But Protagoras will retort: "Can anything be + more or less without addition or subtraction?"' + </p> + <p> + 'I should say "No" if I were not afraid of contradicting my former + answer.' + </p> + <p> + 'And if you say "Yes," the tongue will escape conviction but not the mind, + as Euripides would say?' 'True.' 'The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all + that can be known, would have a sparring match over this, but you and I, + who have no professional pride, want only to discover whether our ideas + are clear and consistent. And we cannot be wrong in saying, first, that + nothing can be greater or less while remaining equal; secondly, that there + can be no becoming greater or less without addition or subtraction; + thirdly, that what is and was not, cannot be without having become. But + then how is this reconcilable with the case of the dice, and with similar + examples?—that is the question.' 'I am often perplexed and amazed, + Socrates, by these difficulties.' 'That is because you are a philosopher, + for philosophy begins in wonder, and Iris is the child of Thaumas. Do you + know the original principle on which the doctrine of Protagoras is based?' + 'No.' 'Then I will tell you; but we must not let the uninitiated hear, and + by the uninitiated I mean the obstinate people who believe in nothing + which they cannot hold in their hands. The brethren whose mysteries I am + about to unfold to you are far more ingenious. They maintain that all is + motion; and that motion has two forms, action and passion, out of which + endless phenomena are created, also in two forms—sense and the + object of sense—which come to the birth together. There are two + kinds of motions, a slow and a fast; the motions of the agent and the + patient are slower, because they move and create in and about themselves, + but the things which are born of them have a swifter motion, and pass + rapidly from place to place. The eye and the appropriate object come + together, and give birth to whiteness and the sensation of whiteness; the + eye is filled with seeing, and becomes not sight but a seeing eye, and the + object is filled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white; and + no other compound of either with another would have produced the same + effect. All sensation is to be resolved into a similar combination of an + agent and patient. Of either, taken separately, no idea can be formed; and + the agent may become a patient, and the patient an agent. Hence there + arises a general reflection that nothing is, but all things become; no + name can detain or fix them. Are not these speculations charming, + Theaetetus, and very good for a person in your interesting situation? I am + offering you specimens of other men's wisdom, because I have no wisdom of + my own, and I want to deliver you of something; and presently we will see + whether you have brought forth wind or not. Tell me, then, what do you + think of the notion that "All things are becoming"?' + </p> + <p> + 'When I hear your arguments, I am marvellously ready to assent.' + </p> + <p> + 'But I ought not to conceal from you that there is a serious objection + which may be urged against this doctrine of Protagoras. For there are + states, such as madness and dreaming, in which perception is false; and + half our life is spent in dreaming; and who can say that at this instant + we are not dreaming? Even the fancies of madmen are real at the time. But + if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between the true and + the false in such cases? Having stated the objection, I will now state the + answer. Protagoras would deny the continuity of phenomena; he would say + that what is different is entirely different, and whether active or + passive has a different power. There are infinite agents and patients in + the world, and these produce in every combination of them a different + perception. Take myself as an instance:—Socrates may be ill or he + may be well,—and remember that Socrates, with all his accidents, is + spoken of. The wine which I drink when I am well is pleasant to me, but + the same wine is unpleasant to me when I am ill. And there is nothing else + from which I can receive the same impression, nor can another receive the + same impression from the wine. Neither can I and the object of sense + become separately what we become together. For the one in becoming is + relative to the other, but they have no other relation; and the + combination of them is absolute at each moment. (In modern language, the + act of sensation is really indivisible, though capable of a mental + analysis into subject and object.) My sensation alone is true, and true to + me only. And therefore, as Protagoras says, "To myself I am the judge of + what is and what is not." Thus the flux of Homer and Heracleitus, the + great Protagorean saying that "Man is the measure of all things," the + doctrine of Theaetetus that "Knowledge is perception," have all the same + meaning. And this is thy new-born child, which by my art I have brought to + light; and you must not be angry if instead of rearing your infant we + expose him.' + </p> + <p> + 'Theaetetus will not be angry,' says Theodorus; 'he is very good-natured. + But I should like to know, Socrates, whether you mean to say that all this + is untrue?' + </p> + <p> + 'First reminding you that I am not the bag which contains the arguments, + but that I extract them from Theaetetus, shall I tell you what amazes me + in your friend Protagoras?' + </p> + <p> + 'What may that be?' + </p> + <p> + 'I like his doctrine that what appears is; but I wonder that he did not + begin his great work on Truth with a declaration that a pig, or a + dog-faced baboon, or any other monster which has sensation, is a measure + of all things; then, while we were reverencing him as a god, he might have + produced a magnificent effect by expounding to us that he was no wiser + than a tadpole. For if sensations are always true, and one man's + discernment is as good as another's, and every man is his own judge, and + everything that he judges is right and true, then what need of Protagoras + to be our instructor at a high figure; and why should we be less knowing + than he is, or have to go to him, if every man is the measure of all + things? My own art of midwifery, and all dialectic, is an enormous folly, + if Protagoras' "Truth" be indeed truth, and the philosopher is not merely + amusing himself by giving oracles out of his book.' + </p> + <p> + Theodorus thinks that Socrates is unjust to his master, Protagoras; but he + is too old and stiff to try a fall with him, and therefore refers him to + Theaetetus, who is already driven out of his former opinion by the + arguments of Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Socrates then takes up the defence of Protagoras, who is supposed to reply + in his own person—'Good people, you sit and declaim about the gods, + of whose existence or non-existence I have nothing to say, or you + discourse about man being reduced to the level of the brutes; but what + proof have you of your statements? And yet surely you and Theodorus had + better reflect whether probability is a safe guide. Theodorus would be a + bad geometrician if he had nothing better to offer.'...Theaetetus is + affected by the appeal to geometry, and Socrates is induced by him to put + the question in a new form. He proceeds as follows:—'Should we say + that we know what we see and hear,—e.g. the sound of words or the + sight of letters in a foreign tongue?' + </p> + <p> + 'We should say that the figures of the letters, and the pitch of the voice + in uttering them, were known to us, but not the meaning of them.' + </p> + <p> + 'Excellent; I want you to grow, and therefore I will leave that answer and + ask another question: Is not seeing perceiving?' 'Very true.' 'And he who + sees knows?' 'Yes.' 'And he who remembers, remembers that which he sees + and knows?' 'Very true.' 'But if he closes his eyes, does he not + remember?' 'He does.' 'Then he may remember and not see; and if seeing is + knowing, he may remember and not know. Is not this a "reductio ad + absurdum" of the hypothesis that knowledge is sensible perception? Yet + perhaps we are crowing too soon; and if Protagoras, "the father of the + myth," had been alive, the result might have been very different. But he + is dead, and Theodorus, whom he left guardian of his "orphan," has not + been very zealous in defending him.' + </p> + <p> + Theodorus objects that Callias is the true guardian, but he hopes that + Socrates will come to the rescue. Socrates prefaces his defence by + resuming the attack. He asks whether a man can know and not know at the + same time? 'Impossible.' Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is + knowing. The confident adversary, suiting the action to the word, shuts + one of your eyes; and now, says he, you see and do not see, but do you + know and not know? And a fresh opponent darts from his ambush, and + transfers to knowledge the terms which are commonly applied to sight. He + asks whether you can know near and not at a distance; whether you can have + a sharp and also a dull knowledge. While you are wondering at his + incomparable wisdom, he gets you into his power, and you will not escape + until you have come to an understanding with him about the money which is + to be paid for your release. + </p> + <p> + But Protagoras has not yet made his defence; and already he may be heard + contemptuously replying that he is not responsible for the admissions + which were made by a boy, who could not foresee the coming move, and + therefore had answered in a manner which enabled Socrates to raise a laugh + against himself. 'But I cannot be fairly charged,' he will say, 'with an + answer which I should not have given; for I never maintained that the + memory of a feeling is the same as a feeling, or denied that a man might + know and not know the same thing at the same time. Or, if you will have + extreme precision, I say that man in different relations is many or rather + infinite in number. And I challenge you, either to show that his + perceptions are not individual, or that if they are, what appears to him + is not what is. As to your pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and + you make my writings a sport of other swine. But I still affirm that man + is the measure of all things, although I admit that one man may be a + thousand times better than another, in proportion as he has better + impressions. Neither do I deny the existence of wisdom or of the wise man. + But I maintain that wisdom is a practical remedial power of turning evil + into good, the bitterness of disease into the sweetness of health, and + does not consist in any greater truth or superior knowledge. For the + impressions of the sick are as true as the impressions of the healthy; and + the sick are as wise as the healthy. Nor can any man be cured of a false + opinion, for there is no such thing; but he may be cured of the evil habit + which generates in him an evil opinion. This is effected in the body by + the drugs of the physician, and in the soul by the words of the Sophist; + and the new state or opinion is not truer, but only better than the old. + And philosophers are not tadpoles, but physicians and husbandmen, who till + the soil and infuse health into animals and plants, and make the good take + the place of the evil, both in individuals and states. Wise and good + rhetoricians make the good to appear just in states (for that is just + which appears just to a state), and in return, they deserve to be well + paid. And you, Socrates, whether you please or not, must continue to be a + measure. This is my defence, and I must request you to meet me fairly. We + are professing to reason, and not merely to dispute; and there is a great + difference between reasoning and disputation. For the disputer is always + seeking to trip up his opponent; and this is a mode of argument which + disgusts men with philosophy as they grow older. But the reasoner is + trying to understand him and to point out his errors to him, whether + arising from his own or from his companion's fault; he does not argue from + the customary use of names, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of + ways. If you are gentle to an adversary he will follow and love you; and + if defeated he will lay the blame on himself, and seek to escape from his + own prejudices into philosophy. I would recommend you, Socrates, to adopt + this humaner method, and to avoid captious and verbal criticisms.' + </p> + <p> + Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to afford to your + friend; had he been alive, he would have helped himself in far better + style. + </p> + <p> + 'You have made a most valorous defence.' + </p> + <p> + Yes; but did you observe that Protagoras bade me be serious, and + complained of our getting up a laugh against him with the aid of a boy? He + meant to intimate that you must take the place of Theaetetus, who may be + wiser than many bearded men, but not wiser than you, Theodorus. + </p> + <p> + 'The rule of the Spartan Palaestra is, Strip or depart; but you are like + the giant Antaeus, and will not let me depart unless I try a fall with + you.' + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is the nature of my complaint. And many a Hercules, many a + Theseus mighty in deeds and words has broken my head; but I am always at + this rough game. Please, then, to favour me. + </p> + <p> + 'On the condition of not exceeding a single fall, I consent.' + </p> + <p> + Socrates now resumes the argument. As he is very desirous of doing justice + to Protagoras, he insists on citing his own words,—'What appears to + each man is to him.' And how, asks Socrates, are these words reconcileable + with the fact that all mankind are agreed in thinking themselves wiser + than others in some respects, and inferior to them in others? In the hour + of danger they are ready to fall down and worship any one who is their + superior in wisdom as if he were a god. And the world is full of men who + are asking to be taught and willing to be ruled, and of other men who are + willing to rule and teach them. All which implies that men do judge of one + another's impressions, and think some wise and others foolish. How will + Protagoras answer this argument? For he cannot say that no one deems + another ignorant or mistaken. If you form a judgment, thousands and tens + of thousands are ready to maintain the opposite. The multitude may not and + do not agree in Protagoras' own thesis that 'Man is the measure of all + things;' and then who is to decide? Upon his own showing must not his + 'truth' depend on the number of suffrages, and be more or less true in + proportion as he has more or fewer of them? And he must acknowledge + further, that they speak truly who deny him to speak truly, which is a + famous jest. And if he admits that they speak truly who deny him to speak + truly, he must admit that he himself does not speak truly. But his + opponents will refuse to admit this of themselves, and he must allow that + they are right in their refusal. The conclusion is, that all mankind, + including Protagoras himself, will deny that he speaks truly; and his + truth will be true neither to himself nor to anybody else. + </p> + <p> + Theodorus is inclined to think that this is going too far. Socrates + ironically replies, that he is not going beyond the truth. But if the old + Protagoras could only pop his head out of the world below, he would + doubtless give them both a sound castigation and be off to the shades in + an instant. Seeing that he is not within call, we must examine the + question for ourselves. It is clear that there are great differences in + the understandings of men. Admitting, with Protagoras, that immediate + sensations of hot, cold, and the like, are to each one such as they + appear, yet this hypothesis cannot be extended to judgments or opinions. + And even if we were to admit further,—and this is the view of some + who are not thorough-going followers of Protagoras,—that right and + wrong, holy and unholy, are to each state or individual such as they + appear, still Protagoras will not venture to maintain that every man is + equally the measure of expediency, or that the thing which seems is + expedient to every one. But this begins a new question. 'Well, Socrates, + we have plenty of leisure. Yes, we have, and, after the manner of + philosophers, we are digressing; I have often observed how ridiculous this + habit of theirs makes them when they appear in court. 'What do you mean?' + I mean to say that a philosopher is a gentleman, but a lawyer is a + servant. The one can have his talk out, and wander at will from one + subject to another, as the fancy takes him; like ourselves, he may be long + or short, as he pleases. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the + clepsydra limiting his time, and the brief limiting his topics, and his + adversary is standing over him and exacting his rights. He is a servant + disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who holds the cause in + his hands; the path never diverges, and often the race is for his life. + Such experiences render him keen and shrewd; he learns the arts of + flattery, and is perfect in the practice of crooked ways; dangers have + come upon him too soon, when the tenderness of youth was unable to meet + them with truth and honesty, and he has resorted to counter-acts of + dishonesty and falsehood, and become warped and distorted; without any + health or freedom or sincerity in him he has grown up to manhood, and is + or esteems himself to be a master of cunning. Such are the lawyers; will + you have the companion picture of philosophers? or will this be too much + of a digression? + </p> + <p> + 'Nay, Socrates, the argument is our servant, and not our master. Who is + the judge or where is the spectator, having a right to control us?' + </p> + <p> + I will describe the leaders, then: for the inferior sort are not worth the + trouble. The lords of philosophy have not learned the way to the dicastery + or ecclesia; they neither see nor hear the laws and votes of the state, + written or recited; societies, whether political or festive, clubs, and + singing maidens do not enter even into their dreams. And the scandals of + persons or their ancestors, male and female, they know no more than they + can tell the number of pints in the ocean. Neither are they conscious of + their own ignorance; for they do not practise singularity in order to gain + reputation, but the truth is, that the outer form of them only is residing + in the city; the inner man, as Pindar says, is going on a voyage of + discovery, measuring as with line and rule the things which are under and + in the earth, interrogating the whole of nature, only not condescending to + notice what is near them. + </p> + <p> + 'What do you mean, Socrates?' + </p> + <p> + I will illustrate my meaning by the jest of the witty maid-servant, who + saw Thales tumbling into a well, and said of him, that he was so eager to + know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before + his feet. This is applicable to all philosophers. The philosopher is + unacquainted with the world; he hardly knows whether his neighbour is a + man or an animal. For he is always searching into the essence of man, and + enquiring what such a nature ought to do or suffer different from any + other. Hence, on every occasion in private life and public, as I was + saying, when he appears in a law-court or anywhere, he is the joke, not + only of maid-servants, but of the general herd, falling into wells and + every sort of disaster; he looks such an awkward, inexperienced creature, + unable to say anything personal, when he is abused, in answer to his + adversaries (for he knows no evil of any one); and when he hears the + praises of others, he cannot help laughing from the bottom of his soul at + their pretensions; and this also gives him a ridiculous appearance. A king + or tyrant appears to him to be a kind of swine-herd or cow-herd, milking + away at an animal who is much more troublesome and dangerous than cows or + sheep; like the cow-herd, he has no time to be educated, and the pen in + which he keeps his flock in the mountains is surrounded by a wall. When he + hears of large landed properties of ten thousand acres or more, he thinks + of the whole earth; or if he is told of the antiquity of a family, he + remembers that every one has had myriads of progenitors, rich and poor, + Greeks and barbarians, kings and slaves. And he who boasts of his descent + from Amphitryon in the twenty-fifth generation, may, if he pleases, add as + many more, and double that again, and our philosopher only laughs at his + inability to do a larger sum. Such is the man at whom the vulgar scoff; he + seems to them as if he could not mind his feet. 'That is very true, + Socrates.' But when he tries to draw the quick-witted lawyer out of his + pleas and rejoinders to the contemplation of absolute justice or injustice + in their own nature, or from the popular praises of wealthy kings to the + view of happiness and misery in themselves, or to the reasons why a man + should seek after the one and avoid the other, then the situation is + reversed; the little wretch turns giddy, and is ready to fall over the + precipice; his utterance becomes thick, and he makes himself ridiculous, + not to servant-maids, but to every man of liberal education. Such are the + two pictures: the one of the philosopher and gentleman, who may be excused + for not having learned how to make a bed, or cook up flatteries; the + other, a serviceable knave, who hardly knows how to wear his cloak,—still + less can he awaken harmonious thoughts or hymn virtue's praises. + </p> + <p> + 'If the world, Socrates, were as ready to receive your words as I am, + there would be greater peace and less evil among mankind.' + </p> + <p> + Evil, Theodorus, must ever remain in this world to be the antagonist of + good, out of the way of the gods in heaven. Wherefore also we should fly + away from ourselves to them; and to fly to them is to become like them; + and to become like them is to become holy, just and true. But many live in + the old wives' fable of appearances; they think that you should follow + virtue in order that you may seem to be good. And yet the truth is, that + God is righteous; and of men, he is most like him who is most righteous. + To know this is wisdom; and in comparison of this the wisdom of the arts + or the seeming wisdom of politicians is mean and common. The unrighteous + man is apt to pride himself on his cunning; when others call him rogue, he + says to himself: 'They only mean that I am one who deserves to live, and + not a mere burden of the earth.' But he should reflect that his ignorance + makes his condition worse than if he knew. For the penalty of injustice is + not death or stripes, but the fatal necessity of becoming more and more + unjust. Two patterns of life are set before him; the one blessed and + divine, the other godless and wretched; and he is growing more and more + like the one and unlike the other. He does not see that if he continues in + his cunning, the place of innocence will not receive him after death. And + yet if such a man has the courage to hear the argument out, he often + becomes dissatisfied with himself, and has no more strength in him than a + child.—But we have digressed enough. + </p> + <p> + 'For my part, Socrates, I like the digressions better than the argument, + because I understand them better.' + </p> + <p> + To return. When we left off, the Protagoreans and Heracliteans were + maintaining that the ordinances of the State were just, while they lasted. + But no one would maintain that the laws of the State were always good or + expedient, although this may be the intention of them. For the expedient + has to do with the future, about which we are liable to mistake. Now, + would Protagoras maintain that man is the measure not only of the present + and past, but of the future; and that there is no difference in the + judgments of men about the future? Would an untrained man, for example, be + as likely to know when he is going to have a fever, as the physician who + attended him? And if they differ in opinion, which of them is likely to be + right; or are they both right? Is not a vine-grower a better judge of a + vintage which is not yet gathered, or a cook of a dinner which is in + preparation, or Protagoras of the probable effect of a speech than an + ordinary person? The last example speaks 'ad hominen.' For Protagoras + would never have amassed a fortune if every man could judge of the future + for himself. He is, therefore, compelled to admit that he is a measure; + but I, who know nothing, am not equally convinced that I am. This is one + way of refuting him; and he is refuted also by the authority which he + attributes to the opinions of others, who deny his opinions. I am not + equally sure that we can disprove the truth of immediate states of + feeling. But this leads us to the doctrine of the universal flux, about + which a battle-royal is always going on in the cities of Ionia. 'Yes; the + Ephesians are downright mad about the flux; they cannot stop to argue with + you, but are in perpetual motion, obedient to their text-books. Their + restlessness is beyond expression, and if you ask any of them a question, + they will not answer, but dart at you some unintelligible saying, and + another and another, making no way either with themselves or with others; + for nothing is fixed in them or their ideas,—they are at war with + fixed principles.' I suppose, Theodorus, that you have never seen them in + time of peace, when they discourse at leisure to their disciples? + 'Disciples! they have none; they are a set of uneducated fanatics, and + each of them says of the other that they have no knowledge. We must trust + to ourselves, and not to them for the solution of the problem.' Well, the + doctrine is old, being derived from the poets, who speak in a figure of + Oceanus and Tethys; the truth was once concealed, but is now revealed by + the superior wisdom of a later generation, and made intelligible to the + cobbler, who, on hearing that all is in motion, and not some things only, + as he ignorantly fancied, may be expected to fall down and worship his + teachers. And the opposite doctrine must not be forgotten:— + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Alone being remains unmoved which is the name for all,' +</pre> + <p> + as Parmenides affirms. Thus we are in the midst of the fray; both parties + are dragging us to their side; and we are not certain which of them are in + the right; and if neither, then we shall be in a ridiculous position, + having to set up our own opinion against ancient and famous men. + </p> + <p> + Let us first approach the river-gods, or patrons of the flux. + </p> + <p> + When they speak of motion, must they not include two kinds of motion, + change of place and change of nature?—And all things must be + supposed to have both kinds of motion; for if not, the same things would + be at rest and in motion, which is contrary to their theory. And did we + not say, that all sensations arise thus: they move about between the agent + and patient together with a perception, and the patient ceases to be a + perceiving power and becomes a percipient, and the agent a quale instead + of a quality; but neither has any absolute existence? But now we make the + further discovery, that neither white or whiteness, nor any sense or + sensation, can be predicated of anything, for they are in a perpetual + flux. And therefore we must modify the doctrine of Theaetetus and + Protagoras, by asserting further that knowledge is and is not sensation; + and of everything we must say equally, that this is and is not, or becomes + or becomes not. And still the word 'this' is not quite correct, for + language fails in the attempt to express their meaning. + </p> + <p> + At the close of the discussion, Theodorus claims to be released from the + argument, according to his agreement. But Theaetetus insists that they + shall proceed to consider the doctrine of rest. This is declined by + Socrates, who has too much reverence for the great Parmenides lightly to + attack him. (We shall find that he returns to the doctrine of rest in the + Sophist; but at present he does not wish to be diverted from his main + purpose, which is, to deliver Theaetetus of his conception of knowledge.) + He proceeds to interrogate him further. When he says that 'knowledge is in + perception,' with what does he perceive? The first answer is, that he + perceives sights with the eye, and sounds with the ear. This leads + Socrates to make the reflection that nice distinctions of words are + sometimes pedantic, but sometimes necessary; and he proposes in this case + to substitute the word 'through' for 'with.' For the senses are not like + the Trojan warriors in the horse, but have a common centre of perception, + in which they all meet. This common principle is able to compare them with + one another, and must therefore be distinct from them (compare Republic). + And as there are facts of sense which are perceived through the organs of + the body, there are also mathematical and other abstractions, such as + sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, which the soul perceives + by herself. Being is the most universal of these abstractions. The good + and the beautiful are abstractions of another kind, which exist in + relation and which above all others the mind perceives in herself, + comparing within her past, present, and future. For example; we know a + thing to be hard or soft by the touch, of which the perception is given at + birth to men and animals. But the essence of hardness or softness, or the + fact that this hardness is, and is the opposite of softness, is slowly + learned by reflection and experience. Mere perception does not reach + being, and therefore fails of truth; and therefore has no share in + knowledge. But if so, knowledge is not perception. What then is knowledge? + The mind, when occupied by herself with being, is said to have opinion—shall + we say that 'Knowledge is true opinion'? But still an old difficulty + recurs; we ask ourselves, 'How is false opinion possible?' This difficulty + may be stated as follows:— + </p> + <p> + Either we know or do not know a thing (for the intermediate processes of + learning and forgetting need not at present be considered); and in + thinking or having an opinion, we must either know or not know that which + we think, and we cannot know and be ignorant at the same time; we cannot + confuse one thing which we do not know, with another thing which we do not + know; nor can we think that which we do not know to be that which we know, + or that which we know to be that which we do not know. And what other case + is conceivable, upon the supposition that we either know or do not know + all things? Let us try another answer in the sphere of being: 'When a man + thinks, and thinks that which is not.' But would this hold in any parallel + case? Can a man see and see nothing? or hear and hear nothing? or touch + and touch nothing? Must he not see, hear, or touch some one existing + thing? For if he thinks about nothing he does not think, and not thinking + he cannot think falsely. And so the path of being is closed against us, as + well as the path of knowledge. But may there not be 'heterodoxy,' or + transference of opinion;—I mean, may not one thing be supposed to be + another? Theaetetus is confident that this must be 'the true falsehood,' + when a man puts good for evil or evil for good. Socrates will not + discourage him by attacking the paradoxical expression 'true falsehood,' + but passes on. The new notion involves a process of thinking about two + things, either together or alternately. And thinking is the conversing of + the mind with herself, which is carried on in question and answer, until + she no longer doubts, but determines and forms an opinion. And false + opinion consists in saying to yourself, that one thing is another. But did + you ever say to yourself, that good is evil, or evil good? Even in sleep, + did you ever imagine that odd was even? Or did any man in his senses ever + fancy that an ox was a horse, or that two are one? So that we can never + think one thing to be another; for you must not meet me with the verbal + quibble that one—eteron—is other—eteron (both 'one' and + 'other' in Greek are called 'other'—eteron). He who has both the two + things in his mind, cannot misplace them; and he who has only one of them + in his mind, cannot misplace them—on either supposition + transplacement is inconceivable. + </p> + <p> + But perhaps there may still be a sense in which we can think that which we + do not know to be that which we know: e.g. Theaetetus may know Socrates, + but at a distance he may mistake another person for him. This process may + be conceived by the help of an image. Let us suppose that every man has in + his mind a block of wax of various qualities, the gift of Memory, the + mother of the Muses; and on this he receives the seal or stamp of those + sensations and perceptions which he wishes to remember. That which he + succeeds in stamping is remembered and known by him as long as the + impression lasts; but that, of which the impression is rubbed out or + imperfectly made, is forgotten, and not known. No one can think one thing + to be another, when he has the memorial or seal of both of these in his + soul, and a sensible impression of neither; or when he knows one and does + not know the other, and has no memorial or seal of the other; or when he + knows neither; or when he perceives both, or one and not the other, or + neither; or when he perceives and knows both, and identifies what he + perceives with what he knows (this is still more impossible); or when he + does not know one, and does not know and does not perceive the other; or + does not perceive one, and does not know and does not perceive the other; + or has no perception or knowledge of either—all these cases must be + excluded. But he may err when he confuses what he knows or perceives, or + what he perceives and does not know, with what he knows, or what he knows + and perceives with what he knows and perceives. + </p> + <p> + Theaetetus is unable to follow these distinctions; which Socrates proceeds + to illustrate by examples, first of all remarking, that knowledge may + exist without perception, and perception without knowledge. I may know + Theodorus and Theaetetus and not see them; I may see them, and not know + them. 'That I understand.' But I could not mistake one for the other if I + knew you both, and had no perception of either; or if I knew one only, and + perceived neither; or if I knew and perceived neither, or in any other of + the excluded cases. The only possibility of error is: 1st, when knowing + you and Theodorus, and having the impression of both of you on the waxen + block, I, seeing you both imperfectly and at a distance, put the foot in + the wrong shoe—that is to say, put the seal or stamp on the wrong + object: or 2ndly, when knowing both of you I only see one; or when, seeing + and knowing you both, I fail to identify the impression and the object. + But there could be no error when perception and knowledge correspond. + </p> + <p> + The waxen block in the heart of a man's soul, as I may say in the words of + Homer, who played upon the words ker and keros, may be smooth and deep, + and large enough, and then the signs are clearly marked and lasting, and + do not get confused. But in the 'hairy heart,' as the all-wise poet sings, + when the wax is muddy or hard or moist, there is a corresponding confusion + and want of retentiveness; in the muddy and impure there is + indistinctness, and still more in the hard, for there the impressions have + no depth of wax, and in the moist they are too soon effaced. Yet greater + is the indistinctness when they are all jolted together in a little soul, + which is narrow and has no room. These are the sort of natures which have + false opinion; from stupidity they see and hear and think amiss; and this + is falsehood and ignorance. Error, then, is a confusion of thought and + sense. + </p> + <p> + Theaetetus is delighted with this explanation. But Socrates has no sooner + found the new solution than he sinks into a fit of despondency. For an + objection occurs to him:—May there not be errors where there is no + confusion of mind and sense? e.g. in numbers. No one can confuse the man + whom he has in his thoughts with the horse which he has in his thoughts, + but he may err in the addition of five and seven. And observe that these + are purely mental conceptions. Thus we are involved once more in the + dilemma of saying, either that there is no such thing as false opinion, or + that a man knows what he does not know. + </p> + <p> + We are at our wit's end, and may therefore be excused for making a bold + diversion. All this time we have been repeating the words 'know,' + 'understand,' yet we do not know what knowledge is. 'Why, Socrates, how + can you argue at all without using them?' Nay, but the true hero of + dialectic would have forbidden me to use them until I had explained them. + And I must explain them now. The verb 'to know' has two senses, to have + and to possess knowledge, and I distinguish 'having' from 'possessing.' A + man may possess a garment which he does not wear; or he may have wild + birds in an aviary; these in one sense he possesses, and in another he has + none of them. Let this aviary be an image of the mind, as the waxen block + was; when we are young, the aviary is empty; after a time the birds are + put in; for under this figure we may describe different forms of + knowledge;—there are some of them in groups, and some single, which + are flying about everywhere; and let us suppose a hunt after the science + of odd and even, or some other science. The possession of the birds is + clearly not the same as the having them in the hand. And the original + chase of them is not the same as taking them in the hand when they are + already caged. + </p> + <p> + This distinction between use and possession saves us from the absurdity of + supposing that we do not know what we know, because we may know in one + sense, i.e. possess, what we do not know in another, i.e. use. But have we + not escaped one difficulty only to encounter a greater? For how can the + exchange of two kinds of knowledge ever become false opinion? As well + might we suppose that ignorance could make a man know, or that blindness + could make him see. Theaetetus suggests that in the aviary there may be + flying about mock birds, or forms of ignorance, and we put forth our hands + and grasp ignorance, when we are intending to grasp knowledge. But how can + he who knows the forms of knowledge and the forms of ignorance imagine one + to be the other? Is there some other form of knowledge which distinguishes + them? and another, and another? Thus we go round and round in a circle and + make no progress. + </p> + <p> + All this confusion arises out of our attempt to explain false opinion + without having explained knowledge. What then is knowledge? Theaetetus + repeats that knowledge is true opinion. But this seems to be refuted by + the instance of orators and judges. For surely the orator cannot convey a + true knowledge of crimes at which the judges were not present; he can only + persuade them, and the judge may form a true opinion and truly judge. But + if true opinion were knowledge they could not have judged without + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + Once more. Theaetetus offers a definition which he has heard: Knowledge is + true opinion accompanied by definition or explanation. Socrates has had a + similar dream, and has further heard that the first elements are names + only, and that definition or explanation begins when they are combined; + the letters are unknown, the syllables or combinations are known. But this + new hypothesis when tested by the letters of the alphabet is found to + break down. The first syllable of Socrates' name is SO. But what is SO? + Two letters, S and O, a sibilant and a vowel, of which no further + explanation can be given. And how can any one be ignorant of either of + them, and yet know both of them? There is, however, another alternative:—We + may suppose that the syllable has a separate form or idea distinct from + the letters or parts. The all of the parts may not be the whole. + Theaetetus is very much inclined to adopt this suggestion, but when + interrogated by Socrates he is unable to draw any distinction between the + whole and all the parts. And if the syllables have no parts, then they are + those original elements of which there is no explanation. But how can the + syllable be known if the letter remains unknown? In learning to read as + children, we are first taught the letters and then the syllables. And in + music, the notes, which are the letters, have a much more distinct meaning + to us than the combination of them. + </p> + <p> + Once more, then, we must ask the meaning of the statement, that 'Knowledge + is right opinion, accompanied by explanation or definition.' Explanation + may mean, (1) the reflection or expression of a man's thoughts—but + every man who is not deaf and dumb is able to express his thoughts—or + (2) the enumeration of the elements of which anything is composed. A man + may have a true opinion about a waggon, but then, and then only, has he + knowledge of a waggon when he is able to enumerate the hundred planks of + Hesiod. Or he may know the syllables of the name Theaetetus, but not the + letters; yet not until he knows both can he be said to have knowledge as + well as opinion. But on the other hand he may know the syllable 'The' in + the name Theaetetus, yet he may be mistaken about the same syllable in the + name Theodorus, and in learning to read we often make such mistakes. And + even if he could write out all the letters and syllables of your name in + order, still he would only have right opinion. Yet there may be a third + meaning of the definition, besides the image or expression of the mind, + and the enumeration of the elements, viz. (3) perception of difference. + </p> + <p> + For example, I may see a man who has eyes, nose, and mouth;—that + will not distinguish him from any other man. Or he may have a snub-nose + and prominent eyes;—that will not distinguish him from myself and + you and others who are like me. But when I see a certain kind of + snub-nosedness, then I recognize Theaetetus. And having this sign of + difference, I have knowledge. But have I knowledge or opinion of this + difference; if I have only opinion I have not knowledge; if I have + knowledge we assume a disputed term; for knowledge will have to be defined + as right opinion with knowledge of difference. + </p> + <p> + And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither perception nor true opinion, nor + yet definition accompanying true opinion. And I have shown that the + children of your brain are not worth rearing. Are you still in labour, or + have you brought all you have to say about knowledge to the birth? If you + have any more thoughts, you will be the better for having got rid of + these; or if you have none, you will be the better for not fancying that + you know what you do not know. Observe the limits of my art, which, like + my mother's, is an art of midwifery; I do not pretend to compare with the + good and wise of this and other ages. + </p> + <p> + And now I go to meet Meletus at the porch of the King Archon; but + to-morrow I shall hope to see you again, Theodorus, at this place. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + I. The saying of Theaetetus, that 'Knowledge is sensible perception,' may + be assumed to be a current philosophical opinion of the age. 'The + ancients,' as Aristotle (De Anim.) says, citing a verse of Empedocles, + 'affirmed knowledge to be the same as perception.' We may now examine + these words, first, with reference to their place in the history of + philosophy, and secondly, in relation to modern speculations. + </p> + <p> + (a) In the age of Socrates the mind was passing from the object to the + subject. The same impulse which a century before had led men to form + conceptions of the world, now led them to frame general notions of the + human faculties and feelings, such as memory, opinion, and the like. The + simplest of these is sensation, or sensible perception, by which Plato + seems to mean the generalized notion of feelings and impressions of sense, + without determining whether they are conscious or not. + </p> + <p> + The theory that 'Knowledge is sensible perception' is the antithesis of + that which derives knowledge from the mind (Theaet.), or which assumes the + existence of ideas independent of the mind (Parm.). Yet from their extreme + abstraction these theories do not represent the opposite poles of thought + in the same way that the corresponding differences would in modern + philosophy. The most ideal and the most sensational have a tendency to + pass into one another; Heracleitus, like his great successor Hegel, has + both aspects. The Eleatic isolation of Being and the Megarian or Cynic + isolation of individuals are placed in the same class by Plato (Soph.); + and the same principle which is the symbol of motion to one mind is the + symbol of rest to another. The Atomists, who are sometimes regarded as the + Materialists of Plato, denied the reality of sensation. And in the ancient + as well as the modern world there were reactions from theory to + experience, from ideas to sense. This is a point of view from which the + philosophy of sensation presented great attraction to the ancient thinker. + Amid the conflict of ideas and the variety of opinions, the impression of + sense remained certain and uniform. Hardness, softness, cold, heat, etc. + are not absolutely the same to different persons, but the art of measuring + could at any rate reduce them all to definite natures (Republic). Thus the + doctrine that knowledge is perception supplies or seems to supply a firm + standing ground. Like the other notions of the earlier Greek philosophy, + it was held in a very simple way, without much basis of reasoning, and + without suggesting the questions which naturally arise in our own minds on + the same subject. + </p> + <p> + (b) The fixedness of impressions of sense furnishes a link of connexion + between ancient and modern philosophy. The modern thinker often repeats + the parallel axiom, 'All knowledge is experience.' He means to say that + the outward and not the inward is both the original source and the final + criterion of truth, because the outward can be observed and analyzed; the + inward is only known by external results, and is dimly perceived by each + man for himself. In what does this differ from the saying of Theaetetus? + Chiefly in this—that the modern term 'experience,' while implying a + point of departure in sense and a return to sense, also includes all the + processes of reasoning and imagination which have intervened. The + necessary connexion between them by no means affords a measure of the + relative degree of importance which is to be ascribed to either element. + For the inductive portion of any science may be small, as in mathematics + or ethics, compared with that which the mind has attained by reasoning and + reflection on a very few facts. + </p> + <p> + II. The saying that 'All knowledge is sensation' is identified by Plato + with the Protagorean thesis that 'Man is the measure of all things.' The + interpretation which Protagoras himself is supposed to give of these + latter words is: 'Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as + they appear to you.' But there remains still an ambiguity both in the text + and in the explanation, which has to be cleared up. Did Protagoras merely + mean to assert the relativity of knowledge to the human mind? Or did he + mean to deny that there is an objective standard of truth? + </p> + <p> + These two questions have not been always clearly distinguished; the + relativity of knowledge has been sometimes confounded with uncertainty. + The untutored mind is apt to suppose that objects exist independently of + the human faculties, because they really exist independently of the + faculties of any individual. In the same way, knowledge appears to be a + body of truths stored up in books, which when once ascertained are + independent of the discoverer. Further consideration shows us that these + truths are not really independent of the mind; there is an adaptation of + one to the other, of the eye to the object of sense, of the mind to the + conception. There would be no world, if there neither were nor ever had + been any one to perceive the world. A slight effort of reflection enables + us to understand this; but no effort of reflection will enable us to pass + beyond the limits of our own faculties, or to imagine the relation or + adaptation of objects to the mind to be different from that of which we + have experience. There are certain laws of language and logic to which we + are compelled to conform, and to which our ideas naturally adapt + themselves; and we can no more get rid of them than we can cease to be + ourselves. The absolute and infinite, whether explained as self-existence, + or as the totality of human thought, or as the Divine nature, if known to + us at all, cannot escape from the category of relation. + </p> + <p> + But because knowledge is subjective or relative to the mind, we are not to + suppose that we are therefore deprived of any of the tests or criteria of + truth. One man still remains wiser than another, a more accurate observer + and relater of facts, a truer measure of the proportions of knowledge. The + nature of testimony is not altered, nor the verification of causes by + prescribed methods less certain. Again, the truth must often come to a man + through others, according to the measure of his capacity and education. + But neither does this affect the testimony, whether written or oral, which + he knows by experience to be trustworthy. He cannot escape from the laws + of his own mind; and he cannot escape from the further accident of being + dependent for his knowledge on others. But still this is no reason why he + should always be in doubt; of many personal, of many historical and + scientific facts he may be absolutely assured. And having such a mass of + acknowledged truth in the mathematical and physical, not to speak of the + moral sciences, the moderns have certainly no reason to acquiesce in the + statement that truth is appearance only, or that there is no difference + between appearance and truth. + </p> + <p> + The relativity of knowledge is a truism to us, but was a great + psychological discovery in the fifth century before Christ. Of this + discovery, the first distinct assertion is contained in the thesis of + Protagoras. Probably he had no intention either of denying or affirming an + objective standard of truth. He did not consider whether man in the higher + or man in the lower sense was a 'measure of all things.' Like other great + thinkers, he was absorbed with one idea, and that idea was the + absoluteness of perception. Like Socrates, he seemed to see that + philosophy must be brought back from 'nature' to 'truth,' from the world + to man. But he did not stop to analyze whether he meant 'man' in the + concrete or man in the abstract, any man or some men, 'quod semper quod + ubique' or individual private judgment. Such an analysis lay beyond his + sphere of thought; the age before Socrates had not arrived at these + distinctions. Like the Cynics, again, he discarded knowledge in any higher + sense than perception. For 'truer' or 'wiser' he substituted the word + 'better,' and is not unwilling to admit that both states and individuals + are capable of practical improvement. But this improvement does not arise + from intellectual enlightenment, nor yet from the exertion of the will, + but from a change of circumstances and impressions; and he who can effect + this change in himself or others may be deemed a philosopher. In the mode + of effecting it, while agreeing with Socrates and the Cynics in the + importance which he attaches to practical life, he is at variance with + both of them. To suppose that practice can be divorced from speculation, + or that we may do good without caring about truth, is by no means + singular, either in philosophy or life. The singularity of this, as of + some other (so-called) sophistical doctrines, is the frankness with which + they are avowed, instead of being veiled, as in modern times, under + ambiguous and convenient phrases. + </p> + <p> + Plato appears to treat Protagoras much as he himself is treated by + Aristotle; that is to say, he does not attempt to understand him from his + own point of view. But he entangles him in the meshes of a more advanced + logic. To which Protagoras is supposed to reply by Megarian quibbles, + which destroy logic, 'Not only man, but each man, and each man at each + moment.' In the arguments about sight and memory there is a palpable + unfairness which is worthy of the great 'brainless brothers,' Euthydemus + and Dionysodorus, and may be compared with the egkekalummenos + ('obvelatus') of Eubulides. For he who sees with one eye only cannot be + truly said both to see and not to see; nor is memory, which is liable to + forget, the immediate knowledge to which Protagoras applies the term. + Theodorus justly charges Socrates with going beyond the truth; and + Protagoras has equally right on his side when he protests against Socrates + arguing from the common use of words, which 'the vulgar pervert in all + manner of ways.' + </p> + <p> + III. The theory of Protagoras is connected by Aristotle as well as Plato + with the flux of Heracleitus. But Aristotle is only following Plato, and + Plato, as we have already seen, did not mean to imply that such a + connexion was admitted by Protagoras himself. His metaphysical genius saw + or seemed to see a common tendency in them, just as the modern historian + of ancient philosophy might perceive a parallelism between two thinkers of + which they were probably unconscious themselves. We must remember + throughout that Plato is not speaking of Heracleitus, but of the + Heracliteans, who succeeded him; nor of the great original ideas of the + master, but of the Eristic into which they had degenerated a hundred years + later. There is nothing in the fragments of Heracleitus which at all + justifies Plato's account of him. His philosophy may be resolved into two + elements—first, change, secondly, law or measure pervading the + change: these he saw everywhere, and often expressed in strange + mythological symbols. But he has no analysis of sensible perception such + as Plato attributes to him; nor is there any reason to suppose that he + pushed his philosophy into that absolute negation in which Heracliteanism + was sunk in the age of Plato. He never said that 'change means every sort + of change;' and he expressly distinguished between 'the general and + particular understanding.' Like a poet, he surveyed the elements of + mythology, nature, thought, which lay before him, and sometimes by the + light of genius he saw or seemed to see a mysterious principle working + behind them. But as has been the case with other great philosophers, and + with Plato and Aristotle themselves, what was really permanent and + original could not be understood by the next generation, while a perverted + logic carried out his chance expressions with an illogical consistency. + His simple and noble thoughts, like those of the great Eleatic, soon + degenerated into a mere strife of words. And when thus reduced to mere + words, they seem to have exercised a far wider influence in the cities of + Ionia (where the people 'were mad about them') than in the life-time of + Heracleitus—a phenomenon which, though at first sight singular, is + not without a parallel in the history of philosophy and theology. + </p> + <p> + It is this perverted form of the Heraclitean philosophy which is supposed + to effect the final overthrow of Protagorean sensationalism. For if all + things are changing at every moment, in all sorts of ways, then there is + nothing fixed or defined at all, and therefore no sensible perception, nor + any true word by which that or anything else can be described. Of course + Protagoras would not have admitted the justice of this argument any more + than Heracleitus would have acknowledged the 'uneducated fanatics' who + appealed to his writings. He might have said, 'The excellent Socrates has + first confused me with Heracleitus, and Heracleitus with his Ephesian + successors, and has then disproved the existence both of knowledge and + sensation. But I am not responsible for what I never said, nor will I + admit that my common-sense account of knowledge can be overthrown by + unintelligible Heraclitean paradoxes.' + </p> + <p> + IV. Still at the bottom of the arguments there remains a truth, that + knowledge is something more than sensible perception;—this alone + would not distinguish man from a tadpole. The absoluteness of sensations + at each moment destroys the very consciousness of sensations (compare + Phileb.), or the power of comparing them. The senses are not mere holes in + a 'Trojan horse,' but the organs of a presiding nature, in which they + meet. A great advance has been made in psychology when the senses are + recognized as organs of sense, and we are admitted to see or feel 'through + them' and not 'by them,' a distinction of words which, as Socrates + observes, is by no means pedantic. A still further step has been made when + the most abstract notions, such as Being and Not-being, sameness and + difference, unity and plurality, are acknowledged to be the creations of + the mind herself, working upon the feelings or impressions of sense. In + this manner Plato describes the process of acquiring them, in the words + 'Knowledge consists not in the feelings or affections (pathemasi), but in + the process of reasoning about them (sullogismo).' Here, is in the + Parmenides, he means something not really different from generalization. + As in the Sophist, he is laying the foundation of a rational psychology, + which is to supersede the Platonic reminiscence of Ideas as well as the + Eleatic Being and the individualism of Megarians and Cynics. + </p> + <p> + V. Having rejected the doctrine that 'Knowledge is perception,' we now + proceed to look for a definition of knowledge in the sphere of opinion. + But here we are met by a singular difficulty: How is false opinion + possible? For we must either know or not know that which is presented to + the mind or to sense. We of course should answer at once: 'No; the + alternative is not necessary, for there may be degrees of knowledge; and + we may know and have forgotten, or we may be learning, or we may have a + general but not a particular knowledge, or we may know but not be able to + explain;' and many other ways may be imagined in which we know and do not + know at the same time. But these answers belong to a later stage of + metaphysical discussion; whereas the difficulty in question naturally + arises owing to the childhood of the human mind, like the parallel + difficulty respecting Not-being. Men had only recently arrived at the + notion of opinion; they could not at once define the true and pass beyond + into the false. The very word doxa was full of ambiguity, being sometimes, + as in the Eleatic philosophy, applied to the sensible world, and again + used in the more ordinary sense of opinion. There is no connexion between + sensible appearance and probability, and yet both of them met in the word + doxa, and could hardly be disengaged from one another in the mind of the + Greek living in the fifth or fourth century B.C. To this was often added, + as at the end of the fifth book of the Republic, the idea of relation, + which is equally distinct from either of them; also a fourth notion, the + conclusion of the dialectical process, the making up of the mind after she + has been 'talking to herself' (Theat.). + </p> + <p> + We are not then surprised that the sphere of opinion and of Not-being + should be a dusky, half-lighted place (Republic), belonging neither to the + old world of sense and imagination, nor to the new world of reflection and + reason. Plato attempts to clear up this darkness. In his accustomed manner + he passes from the lower to the higher, without omitting the intermediate + stages. This appears to be the reason why he seeks for the definition of + knowledge first in the sphere of opinion. Hereafter we shall find that + something more than opinion is required. + </p> + <p> + False opinion is explained by Plato at first as a confusion of mind and + sense, which arises when the impression on the mind does not correspond to + the impression made on the senses. It is obvious that this explanation + (supposing the distinction between impressions on the mind and impressions + on the senses to be admitted) does not account for all forms of error; and + Plato has excluded himself from the consideration of the greater number, + by designedly omitting the intermediate processes of learning and + forgetting; nor does he include fallacies in the use of language or + erroneous inferences. But he is struck by one possibility of error, which + is not covered by his theory, viz. errors in arithmetic. For in numbers + and calculation there is no combination of thought and sense, and yet + errors may often happen. Hence he is led to discard the explanation which + might nevertheless have been supposed to hold good (for anything which he + says to the contrary) as a rationale of error, in the case of facts + derived from sense. + </p> + <p> + Another attempt is made to explain false opinion by assigning to error a + sort of positive existence. But error or ignorance is essentially negative—a + not-knowing; if we knew an error, we should be no longer in error. We may + veil our difficulty under figures of speech, but these, although telling + arguments with the multitude, can never be the real foundation of a system + of psychology. Only they lead us to dwell upon mental phenomena which if + expressed in an abstract form would not be realized by us at all. The + figure of the mind receiving impressions is one of those images which have + rooted themselves for ever in language. It may or may not be a 'gracious + aid' to thought; but it cannot be got rid of. The other figure of the + enclosure is also remarkable as affording the first hint of universal + all-pervading ideas,—a notion further carried out in the Sophist. + This is implied in the birds, some in flocks, some solitary, which fly + about anywhere and everywhere. Plato discards both figures, as not really + solving the question which to us appears so simple: 'How do we make + mistakes?' The failure of the enquiry seems to show that we should return + to knowledge, and begin with that; and we may afterwards proceed, with a + better hope of success, to the examination of opinion. + </p> + <p> + But is true opinion really distinct from knowledge? The difference between + these he seeks to establish by an argument, which to us appears singular + and unsatisfactory. The existence of true opinion is proved by the + rhetoric of the law courts, which cannot give knowledge, but may give true + opinion. The rhetorician cannot put the judge or juror in possession of + all the facts which prove an act of violence, but he may truly persuade + them of the commission of such an act. Here the idea of true opinion seems + to be a right conclusion from imperfect knowledge. But the correctness of + such an opinion will be purely accidental; and is really the effect of one + man, who has the means of knowing, persuading another who has not. Plato + would have done better if he had said that true opinion was a + contradiction in terms. + </p> + <p> + Assuming the distinction between knowledge and opinion, Theaetetus, in + answer to Socrates, proceeds to define knowledge as true opinion, with + definite or rational explanation. This Socrates identifies with another + and different theory, of those who assert that knowledge first begins with + a proposition. + </p> + <p> + The elements may be perceived by sense, but they are names, and cannot be + defined. When we assign to them some predicate, they first begin to have a + meaning (onomaton sumploke logou ousia). This seems equivalent to saying, + that the individuals of sense become the subject of knowledge when they + are regarded as they are in nature in relation to other individuals. + </p> + <p> + Yet we feel a difficulty in following this new hypothesis. For must not + opinion be equally expressed in a proposition? The difference between true + and false opinion is not the difference between the particular and the + universal, but between the true universal and the false. Thought may be as + much at fault as sight. When we place individuals under a class, or assign + to them attributes, this is not knowledge, but a very rudimentary process + of thought; the first generalization of all, without which language would + be impossible. And has Plato kept altogether clear of a confusion, which + the analogous word logos tends to create, of a proposition and a + definition? And is not the confusion increased by the use of the analogous + term 'elements,' or 'letters'? For there is no real resemblance between + the relation of letters to a syllable, and of the terms to a proposition. + </p> + <p> + Plato, in the spirit of the Megarian philosophy, soon discovers a flaw in + the explanation. For how can we know a compound of which the simple + elements are unknown to us? Can two unknowns make a known? Can a whole be + something different from the parts? The answer of experience is that they + can; for we may know a compound, which we are unable to analyze into its + elements; and all the parts, when united, may be more than all the parts + separated: e.g. the number four, or any other number, is more than the + units which are contained in it; any chemical compound is more than and + different from the simple elements. But ancient philosophy in this, as in + many other instances, proceeding by the path of mental analysis, was + perplexed by doubts which warred against the plainest facts. + </p> + <p> + Three attempts to explain the new definition of knowledge still remain to + be considered. They all of them turn on the explanation of logos. The + first account of the meaning of the word is the reflection of thought in + speech—a sort of nominalism 'La science est une langue bien faite.' + But anybody who is not dumb can say what he thinks; therefore mere speech + cannot be knowledge. And yet we may observe, that there is in this + explanation an element of truth which is not recognized by Plato; viz. + that truth and thought are inseparable from language, although mere + expression in words is not truth. The second explanation of logos is the + enumeration of the elementary parts of the complex whole. But this is only + definition accompanied with right opinion, and does not yet attain to the + certainty of knowledge. Plato does not mention the greater objection, + which is, that the enumeration of particulars is endless; such a + definition would be based on no principle, and would not help us at all in + gaining a common idea. The third is the best explanation,—the + possession of a characteristic mark, which seems to answer to the logical + definition by genus and difference. But this, again, is equally necessary + for right opinion; and we have already determined, although not on very + satisfactory grounds, that knowledge must be distinguished from opinion. A + better distinction is drawn between them in the Timaeus. They might be + opposed as philosophy and rhetoric, and as conversant respectively with + necessary and contingent matter. But no true idea of the nature of either + of them, or of their relation to one another, could be framed until + science obtained a content. The ancient philosophers in the age of Plato + thought of science only as pure abstraction, and to this opinion stood in + no relation. + </p> + <p> + Like Theaetetus, we have attained to no definite result. But an + interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passed before us. And the + negative result is not to be despised. For on certain subjects, and in + certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or clearing the ground + must go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin + to rise. Plato saw the necessity of combating the illogical logic of the + Megarians and Eristics. For the completion of the edifice, he makes + preparation in the Theaetetus, and crowns the work in the Sophist. + </p> + <p> + Many (1) fine expressions, and (2) remarks full of wisdom, (3) also germs + of a metaphysic of the future, are scattered up and down in the dialogue. + Such, for example, as (1) the comparison of Theaetetus' progress in + learning to the 'noiseless flow of a river of oil'; the satirical touch, + 'flavouring a sauce or fawning speech'; or the remarkable expression, + 'full of impure dialectic'; or the lively images under which the argument + is described,—'the flood of arguments pouring in,' the fresh + discussions 'bursting in like a band of revellers.' (2) As illustrations + of the second head, may be cited the remark of Socrates, that + 'distinctions of words, although sometimes pedantic, are also necessary'; + or the fine touch in the character of the lawyer, that 'dangers came upon + him when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them'; or the description + of the manner in which the spirit is broken in a wicked man who listens to + reproof until he becomes like a child; or the punishment of the wicked, + which is not physical suffering, but the perpetual companionship of evil + (compare Gorgias); or the saying, often repeated by Aristotle and others, + that 'philosophy begins in wonder, for Iris is the child of Thaumas'; or + the superb contempt with which the philosopher takes down the pride of + wealthy landed proprietors by comparison of the whole earth. (3) Important + metaphysical ideas are: a. the conception of thought, as the mind talking + to herself; b. the notion of a common sense, developed further by + Aristotle, and the explicit declaration, that the mind gains her + conceptions of Being, sameness, number, and the like, from reflection on + herself; c. the excellent distinction of Theaetetus (which Socrates, + speaking with emphasis, 'leaves to grow') between seeing the forms or + hearing the sounds of words in a foreign language, and understanding the + meaning of them; and d. the distinction of Socrates himself between + 'having' and 'possessing' knowledge, in which the answer to the whole + discussion appears to be contained. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + There is a difference between ancient and modern psychology, and we have a + difficulty in explaining one in the terms of the other. To us the inward + and outward sense and the inward and outward worlds of which they are the + organs are parted by a wall, and appear as if they could never be + confounded. The mind is endued with faculties, habits, instincts, and a + personality or consciousness in which they are bound together. Over + against these are placed forms, colours, external bodies coming into + contact with our own body. We speak of a subject which is ourselves, of an + object which is all the rest. These are separable in thought, but united + in any act of sensation, reflection, or volition. As there are various + degrees in which the mind may enter into or be abstracted from the + operations of sense, so there are various points at which this separation + or union may be supposed to occur. And within the sphere of mind the + analogy of sense reappears; and we distinguish not only external objects, + but objects of will and of knowledge which we contrast with them. These + again are comprehended in a higher object, which reunites with the + subject. A multitude of abstractions are created by the efforts of + successive thinkers which become logical determinations; and they have to + be arranged in order, before the scheme of thought is complete. The + framework of the human intellect is not the peculium of an individual, but + the joint work of many who are of all ages and countries. What we are in + mind is due, not merely to our physical, but to our mental antecedents + which we trace in history, and more especially in the history of + philosophy. Nor can mental phenomena be truly explained either by + physiology or by the observation of consciousness apart from their + history. They have a growth of their own, like the growth of a flower, a + tree, a human being. They may be conceived as of themselves constituting a + common mind, and having a sort of personal identity in which they coexist. + </p> + <p> + So comprehensive is modern psychology, seeming to aim at constructing anew + the entire world of thought. And prior to or simultaneously with this + construction a negative process has to be carried on, a clearing away of + useless abstractions which we have inherited from the past. Many erroneous + conceptions of the mind derived from former philosophies have found their + way into language, and we with difficulty disengage ourselves from them. + Mere figures of speech have unconsciously influenced the minds of great + thinkers. Also there are some distinctions, as, for example, that of the + will and of the reason, and of the moral and intellectual faculties, which + are carried further than is justified by experience. Any separation of + things which we cannot see or exactly define, though it may be necessary, + is a fertile source of error. The division of the mind into faculties or + powers or virtues is too deeply rooted in language to be got rid of, but + it gives a false impression. For if we reflect on ourselves we see that + all our faculties easily pass into one another, and are bound together in + a single mind or consciousness; but this mental unity is apt to be + concealed from us by the distinctions of language. + </p> + <p> + A profusion of words and ideas has obscured rather than enlightened mental + science. It is hard to say how many fallacies have arisen from the + representation of the mind as a box, as a 'tabula rasa,' a book, a mirror, + and the like. It is remarkable how Plato in the Theaetetus, after having + indulged in the figure of the waxen tablet and the decoy, afterwards + discards them. The mind is also represented by another class of images, as + the spring of a watch, a motive power, a breath, a stream, a succession of + points or moments. As Plato remarks in the Cratylus, words expressive of + motion as well as of rest are employed to describe the faculties and + operations of the mind; and in these there is contained another store of + fallacies. Some shadow or reflection of the body seems always to adhere to + our thoughts about ourselves, and mental processes are hardly + distinguished in language from bodily ones. To see or perceive are used + indifferently of both; the words intuition, moral sense, common sense, the + mind's eye, are figures of speech transferred from one to the other. And + many other words used in early poetry or in sacred writings to express the + works of mind have a materialistic sound; for old mythology was allied to + sense, and the distinction of matter and mind had not as yet arisen. Thus + materialism receives an illusive aid from language; and both in philosophy + and religion the imaginary figure or association easily takes the place of + real knowledge. + </p> + <p> + Again, there is the illusion of looking into our own minds as if our + thoughts or feelings were written down in a book. This is another figure + of speech, which might be appropriately termed 'the fallacy of the + looking-glass.' We cannot look at the mind unless we have the eye which + sees, and we can only look, not into, but out of the mind at the thoughts, + words, actions of ourselves and others. What we dimly recognize within us + is not experience, but rather the suggestion of an experience, which we + may gather, if we will, from the observation of the world. The memory has + but a feeble recollection of what we were saying or doing a few weeks or a + few months ago, and still less of what we were thinking or feeling. This + is one among many reasons why there is so little self-knowledge among + mankind; they do not carry with them the thought of what they are or have + been. The so-called 'facts of consciousness' are equally evanescent; they + are facts which nobody ever saw, and which can neither be defined nor + described. Of the three laws of thought the first (All A = A) is an + identical proposition—that is to say, a mere word or symbol claiming + to be a proposition: the two others (Nothing can be A and not A, and + Everything is either A or not A) are untrue, because they exclude degrees + and also the mixed modes and double aspects under which truth is so often + presented to us. To assert that man is man is unmeaning; to say that he is + free or necessary and cannot be both is a half truth only. These are a few + of the entanglements which impede the natural course of human thought. + Lastly, there is the fallacy which lies still deeper, of regarding the + individual mind apart from the universal, or either, as a self-existent + entity apart from the ideas which are contained in them. + </p> + <p> + In ancient philosophies the analysis of the mind is still rudimentary and + imperfect. It naturally began with an effort to disengage the universal + from sense—this was the first lifting up of the mist. It wavered + between object and subject, passing imperceptibly from one or Being to + mind and thought. Appearance in the outward object was for a time + indistinguishable from opinion in the subject. At length mankind spoke of + knowing as well as of opining or perceiving. But when the word 'knowledge' + was found how was it to be explained or defined? It was not an error, it + was a step in the right direction, when Protagoras said that 'Man is the + measure of all things,' and that 'All knowledge is perception.' This was + the subjective which corresponded to the objective 'All is flux.' But the + thoughts of men deepened, and soon they began to be aware that knowledge + was neither sense, nor yet opinion—with or without explanation; nor + the expression of thought, nor the enumeration of parts, nor the addition + of characteristic marks. Motion and rest were equally ill adapted to + express its nature, although both must in some sense be attributed to it; + it might be described more truly as the mind conversing with herself; the + discourse of reason; the hymn of dialectic, the science of relations, of + ideas, of the so-called arts and sciences, of the one, of the good, of the + all:—this is the way along which Plato is leading us in his later + dialogues. In its higher signification it was the knowledge, not of men, + but of gods, perfect and all sufficing:—like other ideals always + passing out of sight, and nevertheless present to the mind of Aristotle as + well as Plato, and the reality to which they were both tending. For + Aristotle as well as Plato would in modern phraseology have been termed a + mystic; and like him would have defined the higher philosophy to be + 'Knowledge of being or essence,'—words to which in our own day we + have a difficulty in attaching a meaning. + </p> + <p> + Yet, in spite of Plato and his followers, mankind have again and again + returned to a sensational philosophy. As to some of the early thinkers, + amid the fleetings of sensible objects, ideas alone seemed to be fixed, so + to a later generation amid the fluctuation of philosophical opinions the + only fixed points appeared to be outward objects. Any pretence of + knowledge which went beyond them implied logical processes, of the + correctness of which they had no assurance and which at best were only + probable. The mind, tired of wandering, sought to rest on firm ground; + when the idols of philosophy and language were stripped off, the + perception of outward objects alone remained. The ancient Epicureans never + asked whether the comparison of these with one another did not involve + principles of another kind which were above and beyond them. In like + manner the modern inductive philosophy forgot to enquire into the meaning + of experience, and did not attempt to form a conception of outward objects + apart from the mind, or of the mind apart from them. Soon objects of sense + were merged in sensations and feelings, but feelings and sensations were + still unanalyzed. At last we return to the doctrine attributed by Plato to + Protagoras, that the mind is only a succession of momentary perceptions. + At this point the modern philosophy of experience forms an alliance with + ancient scepticism. + </p> + <p> + The higher truths of philosophy and religion are very far removed from + sense. Admitting that, like all other knowledge, they are derived from + experience, and that experience is ultimately resolvable into facts which + come to us through the eye and ear, still their origin is a mere accident + which has nothing to do with their true nature. They are universal and + unseen; they belong to all times—past, present, and future. Any + worthy notion of mind or reason includes them. The proof of them is, 1st, + their comprehensiveness and consistency with one another; 2ndly, their + agreement with history and experience. But sensation is of the present + only, is isolated, is and is not in successive moments. It takes the + passing hour as it comes, following the lead of the eye or ear instead of + the command of reason. It is a faculty which man has in common with the + animals, and in which he is inferior to many of them. The importance of + the senses in us is that they are the apertures of the mind, doors and + windows through which we take in and make our own the materials of + knowledge. Regarded in any other point of view sensation is of all mental + acts the most trivial and superficial. Hence the term 'sensational' is + rightly used to express what is shallow in thought and feeling. + </p> + <p> + We propose in what follows, first of all, like Plato in the Theaetetus, to + analyse sensation, and secondly to trace the connexion between theories of + sensation and a sensational or Epicurean philosophy. + </p> + <p> + Paragraph I. We, as well as the ancients, speak of the five senses, and of + a sense, or common sense, which is the abstraction of them. The term + 'sense' is also used metaphorically, both in ancient and modern + philosophy, to express the operations of the mind which are immediate or + intuitive. Of the five senses, two—the sight and the hearing—are + of a more subtle and complex nature, while two others—the smell and + the taste—seem to be only more refined varieties of touch. All of + them are passive, and by this are distinguished from the active faculty of + speech: they receive impressions, but do not produce them, except in so + far as they are objects of sense themselves. + </p> + <p> + Physiology speaks to us of the wonderful apparatus of nerves, muscles, + tissues, by which the senses are enabled to fulfil their functions. It + traces the connexion, though imperfectly, of the bodily organs with the + operations of the mind. Of these latter, it seems rather to know the + conditions than the causes. It can prove to us that without the brain we + cannot think, and that without the eye we cannot see: and yet there is far + more in thinking and seeing than is given by the brain and the eye. It + observes the 'concomitant variations' of body and mind. Psychology, on the + other hand, treats of the same subject regarded from another point of + view. It speaks of the relation of the senses to one another; it shows how + they meet the mind; it analyzes the transition from sense to thought. The + one describes their nature as apparent to the outward eye; by the other + they are regarded only as the instruments of the mind. It is in this + latter point of view that we propose to consider them. + </p> + <p> + The simplest sensation involves an unconscious or nascent operation of the + mind; it implies objects of sense, and objects of sense have differences + of form, number, colour. But the conception of an object without us, or + the power of discriminating numbers, forms, colours, is not given by the + sense, but by the mind. A mere sensation does not attain to distinctness: + it is a confused impression, sugkechumenon ti, as Plato says (Republic), + until number introduces light and order into the confusion. At what point + confusion becomes distinctness is a question of degree which cannot be + precisely determined. The distant object, the undefined notion, come out + into relief as we approach them or attend to them. Or we may assist the + analysis by attempting to imagine the world first dawning upon the eye of + the infant or of a person newly restored to sight. Yet even with them the + mind as well as the eye opens or enlarges. For all three are inseparably + bound together—the object would be nowhere and nothing, if not + perceived by the sense, and the sense would have no power of + distinguishing without the mind. + </p> + <p> + But prior to objects of sense there is a third nature in which they are + contained—that is to say, space, which may be explained in various + ways. It is the element which surrounds them; it is the vacuum or void + which they leave or occupy when passing from one portion of space to + another. It might be described in the language of ancient philosophy, as + 'the Not-being' of objects. It is a negative idea which in the course of + ages has become positive. It is originally derived from the contemplation + of the world without us—the boundless earth or sea, the vacant + heaven, and is therefore acquired chiefly through the sense of sight: to + the blind the conception of space is feeble and inadequate, derived for + the most part from touch or from the descriptions of others. At first it + appears to be continuous; afterwards we perceive it to be capable of + division by lines or points, real or imaginary. By the help of mathematics + we form another idea of space, which is altogether independent of + experience. Geometry teaches us that the innumerable lines and figures by + which space is or may be intersected are absolutely true in all their + combinations and consequences. New and unchangeable properties of space + are thus developed, which are proved to us in a thousand ways by + mathematical reasoning as well as by common experience. Through quantity + and measure we are conducted to our simplest and purest notion of matter, + which is to the cube or solid what space is to the square or surface. And + all our applications of mathematics are applications of our ideas of space + to matter. No wonder then that they seem to have a necessary existence to + us. Being the simplest of our ideas, space is also the one of which we + have the most difficulty in ridding ourselves. Neither can we set a limit + to it, for wherever we fix a limit, space is springing up beyond. Neither + can we conceive a smallest or indivisible portion of it; for within the + smallest there is a smaller still; and even these inconceivable qualities + of space, whether the infinite or the infinitesimal, may be made the + subject of reasoning and have a certain truth to us. + </p> + <p> + Whether space exists in the mind or out of it, is a question which has no + meaning. We should rather say that without it the mind is incapable of + conceiving the body, and therefore of conceiving itself. The mind may be + indeed imagined to contain the body, in the same way that Aristotle + (partly following Plato) supposes God to be the outer heaven or circle of + the universe. But how can the individual mind carry about the universe of + space packed up within, or how can separate minds have either a universe + of their own or a common universe? In such conceptions there seems to be a + confusion of the individual and the universal. To say that we can only + have a true idea of ourselves when we deny the reality of that by which we + have any idea of ourselves is an absurdity. The earth which is our + habitation and 'the starry heaven above' and we ourselves are equally an + illusion, if space is only a quality or condition of our minds. + </p> + <p> + Again, we may compare the truths of space with other truths derived from + experience, which seem to have a necessity to us in proportion to the + frequency of their recurrence or the truth of the consequences which may + be inferred from them. We are thus led to remark that the necessity in our + ideas of space on which much stress has been laid, differs in a slight + degree only from the necessity which appears to belong to other of our + ideas, e.g. weight, motion, and the like. And there is another way in + which this necessity may be explained. We have been taught it, and the + truth which we were taught or which we inherited has never been + contradicted in all our experience and is therefore confirmed by it. Who + can resist an idea which is presented to him in a general form in every + moment of his life and of which he finds no instance to the contrary? The + greater part of what is sometimes regarded as the a priori intuition of + space is really the conception of the various geometrical figures of which + the properties have been revealed by mathematical analysis. And the + certainty of these properties is immeasurably increased to us by our + finding that they hold good not only in every instance, but in all the + consequences which are supposed to flow from them. + </p> + <p> + Neither must we forget that our idea of space, like our other ideas, has a + history. The Homeric poems contain no word for it; even the later Greek + philosophy has not the Kantian notion of space, but only the definite + 'place' or 'the infinite.' To Plato, in the Timaeus, it is known only as + the 'nurse of generation.' When therefore we speak of the necessity of our + ideas of space we must remember that this is a necessity which has grown + up with the growth of the human mind, and has been made by ourselves. We + can free ourselves from the perplexities which are involved in it by + ascending to a time in which they did not as yet exist. And when space or + time are described as 'a priori forms or intuitions added to the matter + given in sensation,' we should consider that such expressions belong + really to the 'pre-historic study' of philosophy, i.e. to the eighteenth + century, when men sought to explain the human mind without regard to + history or language or the social nature of man. + </p> + <p> + In every act of sense there is a latent perception of space, of which we + only become conscious when objects are withdrawn from it. There are + various ways in which we may trace the connexion between them. We may + think of space as unresisting matter, and of matter as divided into + objects; or of objects again as formed by abstraction into a collective + notion of matter, and of matter as rarefied into space. And motion may be + conceived as the union of there and not there in space, and force as the + materializing or solidification of motion. Space again is the individual + and universal in one; or, in other words, a perception and also a + conception. So easily do what are sometimes called our simple ideas pass + into one another, and differences of kind resolve themselves into + differences of degree. + </p> + <p> + Within or behind space there is another abstraction in many respects + similar to it—time, the form of the inward, as space is the form of + the outward. As we cannot think of outward objects of sense or of outward + sensations without space, so neither can we think of a succession of + sensations without time. It is the vacancy of thoughts or sensations, as + space is the void of outward objects, and we can no more imagine the mind + without the one than the world without the other. It is to arithmetic what + space is to geometry; or, more strictly, arithmetic may be said to be + equally applicable to both. It is defined in our minds, partly by the + analogy of space and partly by the recollection of events which have + happened to us, or the consciousness of feelings which we are + experiencing. Like space, it is without limit, for whatever beginning or + end of time we fix, there is a beginning and end before them, and so on + without end. We speak of a past, present, and future, and again the + analogy of space assists us in conceiving of them as coexistent. When the + limit of time is removed there arises in our minds the idea of eternity, + which at first, like time itself, is only negative, but gradually, when + connected with the world and the divine nature, like the other negative + infinity of space, becomes positive. Whether time is prior to the mind and + to experience, or coeval with them, is (like the parallel question about + space) unmeaning. Like space it has been realized gradually: in the + Homeric poems, or even in the Hesiodic cosmogony, there is no more notion + of time than of space. The conception of being is more general than + either, and might therefore with greater plausibility be affirmed to be a + condition or quality of the mind. The a priori intuitions of Kant would + have been as unintelligible to Plato as his a priori synthetical + propositions to Aristotle. The philosopher of Konigsberg supposed himself + to be analyzing a necessary mode of thought: he was not aware that he was + dealing with a mere abstraction. But now that we are able to trace the + gradual developement of ideas through religion, through language, through + abstractions, why should we interpose the fiction of time between + ourselves and realities? Why should we single out one of these + abstractions to be the a priori condition of all the others? It comes last + and not first in the order of our thoughts, and is not the condition + precedent of them, but the last generalization of them. Nor can any + principle be imagined more suicidal to philosophy than to assume that all + the truth which we are capable of attaining is seen only through an unreal + medium. If all that exists in time is illusion, we may well ask with + Plato, 'What becomes of the mind?' + </p> + <p> + Leaving the a priori conditions of sensation we may proceed to consider + acts of sense. These admit of various degrees of duration or intensity; + they admit also of a greater or less extension from one object, which is + perceived directly, to many which are perceived indirectly or in a less + degree, and to the various associations of the object which are latent in + the mind. In general the greater the intension the less the extension of + them. The simplest sensation implies some relation of objects to one + another, some position in space, some relation to a previous or subsequent + sensation. The acts of seeing and hearing may be almost unconscious and + may pass away unnoted; they may also leave an impression behind them or + power of recalling them. If, after seeing an object we shut our eyes, the + object remains dimly seen in the same or about the same place, but with + form and lineaments half filled up. This is the simplest act of memory. + And as we cannot see one thing without at the same time seeing another, + different objects hang together in recollection, and when we call for one + the other quickly follows. To think of the place in which we have last + seen a thing is often the best way of recalling it to the mind. Hence + memory is dependent on association. The act of recollection may be + compared to the sight of an object at a great distance which we have + previously seen near and seek to bring near to us in thought. Memory is to + sense as dreaming is to waking; and like dreaming has a wayward and + uncertain power of recalling impressions from the past. + </p> + <p> + Thus begins the passage from the outward to the inward sense. But as yet + there is no conception of a universal—the mind only remembers the + individual object or objects, and is always attaching to them some colour + or association of sense. The power of recollection seems to depend on the + intensity or largeness of the perception, or on the strength of some + emotion with which it is inseparably connected. This is the natural memory + which is allied to sense, such as children appear to have and barbarians + and animals. It is necessarily limited in range, and its limitation is its + strength. In later life, when the mind has become crowded with names, + acts, feelings, images innumerable, we acquire by education another memory + of system and arrangement which is both stronger and weaker than the first—weaker + in the recollection of sensible impressions as they are represented to us + by eye or ear—stronger by the natural connexion of ideas with + objects or with one another. And many of the notions which form a part of + the train of our thoughts are hardly realized by us at the time, but, like + numbers or algebraical symbols, are used as signs only, thus lightening + the labour of recollection. + </p> + <p> + And now we may suppose that numerous images present themselves to the + mind, which begins to act upon them and to arrange them in various ways. + Besides the impression of external objects present with us or just absent + from us, we have a dimmer conception of other objects which have + disappeared from our immediate recollection and yet continue to exist in + us. The mind is full of fancies which are passing to and fro before it. + Some feeling or association calls them up, and they are uttered by the + lips. This is the first rudimentary imagination, which may be truly + described in the language of Hobbes, as 'decaying sense,' an expression + which may be applied with equal truth to memory as well. For memory and + imagination, though we sometimes oppose them, are nearly allied; the + difference between them seems chiefly to lie in the activity of the one + compared with the passivity of the other. The sense decaying in memory + receives a flash of light or life from imagination. Dreaming is a link of + connexion between them; for in dreaming we feebly recollect and also + feebly imagine at one and the same time. When reason is asleep the lower + part of the mind wanders at will amid the images which have been received + from without, the intelligent element retires, and the sensual or sensuous + takes its place. And so in the first efforts of imagination reason is + latent or set aside; and images, in part disorderly, but also having a + unity (however imperfect) of their own, pour like a flood over the mind. + And if we could penetrate into the heads of animals we should probably + find that their intelligence, or the state of what in them is analogous to + our intelligence, is of this nature. + </p> + <p> + Thus far we have been speaking of men, rather in the points in which they + resemble animals than in the points in which they differ from them. The + animal too has memory in various degrees, and the elements of imagination, + if, as appears to be the case, he dreams. How far their powers or + instincts are educated by the circumstances of their lives or by + intercourse with one another or with mankind, we cannot precisely tell. + They, like ourselves, have the physical inheritance of form, scent, + hearing, sight, and other qualities or instincts. But they have not the + mental inheritance of thoughts and ideas handed down by tradition, 'the + slow additions that build up the mind' of the human race. And language, + which is the great educator of mankind, is wanting in them; whereas in us + language is ever present—even in the infant the latent power of + naming is almost immediately observable. And therefore the description + which has been already given of the nascent power of the faculties is in + reality an anticipation. For simultaneous with their growth in man a + growth of language must be supposed. The child of two years old sees the + fire once and again, and the feeble observation of the same recurring + object is associated with the feeble utterance of the name by which he is + taught to call it. Soon he learns to utter the name when the object is no + longer there, but the desire or imagination of it is present to him. At + first in every use of the word there is a colour of sense, an indistinct + picture of the object which accompanies it. But in later years he sees in + the name only the universal or class word, and the more abstract the + notion becomes, the more vacant is the image which is presented to him. + Henceforward all the operations of his mind, including the perceptions of + sense, are a synthesis of sensations, words, conceptions. In seeing or + hearing or looking or listening the sensible impression prevails over the + conception and the word. In reflection the process is reversed—the + outward object fades away into nothingness, the name or the conception or + both together are everything. Language, like number, is intermediate + between the two, partaking of the definiteness of the outer and of the + universality of the inner world. For logic teaches us that every word is + really a universal, and only condescends by the help of position or + circumlocution to become the expression of individuals or particulars. And + sometimes by using words as symbols we are able to give a 'local + habitation and a name' to the infinite and inconceivable. + </p> + <p> + Thus we see that no line can be drawn between the powers of sense and of + reflection—they pass imperceptibly into one another. We may indeed + distinguish between the seeing and the closed eye—between the + sensation and the recollection of it. But this distinction carries us a + very little way, for recollection is present in sight as well as sight in + recollection. There is no impression of sense which does not + simultaneously recall differences of form, number, colour, and the like. + Neither is such a distinction applicable at all to our internal bodily + sensations, which give no sign of themselves when unaccompanied with pain, + and even when we are most conscious of them, have often no assignable + place in the human frame. Who can divide the nerves or great nervous + centres from the mind which uses them? Who can separate the pains and + pleasures of the mind from the pains and pleasures of the body? The words + 'inward and outward,' 'active and passive,' 'mind and body,' are best + conceived by us as differences of degree passing into differences of kind, + and at one time and under one aspect acting in harmony and then again + opposed. They introduce a system and order into the knowledge of our + being; and yet, like many other general terms, are often in advance of our + actual analysis or observation. + </p> + <p> + According to some writers the inward sense is only the fading away or + imperfect realization of the outward. But this leaves out of sight one + half of the phenomenon. For the mind is not only withdrawn from the world + of sense but introduced to a higher world of thought and reflection, in + which, like the outward sense, she is trained and educated. By use the + outward sense becomes keener and more intense, especially when confined + within narrow limits. The savage with little or no thought has a quicker + discernment of the track than the civilised man; in like manner the dog, + having the help of scent as well as of sight, is superior to the savage. + By use again the inward thought becomes more defined and distinct; what + was at first an effort is made easy by the natural instrumentality of + language, and the mind learns to grasp universals with no more exertion + than is required for the sight of an outward object. There is a natural + connexion and arrangement of them, like the association of objects in a + landscape. Just as a note or two of music suffices to recall a whole piece + to the musician's or composer's mind, so a great principle or leading + thought suggests and arranges a world of particulars. The power of + reflection is not feebler than the faculty of sense, but of a higher and + more comprehensive nature. It not only receives the universals of sense, + but gives them a new content by comparing and combining them with one + another. It withdraws from the seen that it may dwell in the unseen. The + sense only presents us with a flat and impenetrable surface: the mind + takes the world to pieces and puts it together on a new pattern. The + universals which are detached from sense are reconstructed in science. + They and not the mere impressions of sense are the truth of the world in + which we live; and (as an argument to those who will only believe 'what + they can hold in their hands') we may further observe that they are the + source of our power over it. To say that the outward sense is stronger + than the inward is like saying that the arm of the workman is stronger + than the constructing or directing mind. + </p> + <p> + Returning to the senses we may briefly consider two questions—first + their relation to the mind, secondly, their relation to outward objects:— + </p> + <p> + 1. The senses are not merely 'holes set in a wooden horse' (Theaet.), but + instruments of the mind with which they are organically connected. There + is no use of them without some use of words—some natural or latent + logic—some previous experience or observation. Sensation, like all + other mental processes, is complex and relative, though apparently simple. + The senses mutually confirm and support one another; it is hard to say how + much our impressions of hearing may be affected by those of sight, or how + far our impressions of sight may be corrected by the touch, especially in + infancy. The confirmation of them by one another cannot of course be given + by any one of them. Many intuitions which are inseparable from the act of + sense are really the result of complicated reasonings. The most cursory + glance at objects enables the experienced eye to judge approximately of + their relations and distance, although nothing is impressed upon the + retina except colour, including gradations of light and shade. From these + delicate and almost imperceptible differences we seem chiefly to derive + our ideas of distance and position. By comparison of what is near with + what is distant we learn that the tree, house, river, etc. which are a + long way off are objects of a like nature with those which are seen by us + in our immediate neighbourhood, although the actual impression made on the + eye is very different in one case and in the other. This is a language of + 'large and small letters' (Republic), slightly differing in form and + exquisitely graduated by distance, which we are learning all our life + long, and which we attain in various degrees according to our powers of + sight or observation. There is nor the consideration. The greater or less + strain upon the nerves of the eye or ear is communicated to the mind and + silently informs the judgment. We have also the use not of one eye only, + but of two, which give us a wider range, and help us to discern, by the + greater or less acuteness of the angle which the rays of sight form, the + distance of an object and its relation to other objects. But we are + already passing beyond the limits of our actual knowledge on a subject + which has given rise to many conjectures. More important than the addition + of another conjecture is the observation, whether in the case of sight or + of any other sense, of the great complexity of the causes and the great + simplicity of the effect. + </p> + <p> + The sympathy of the mind and the ear is no less striking than the sympathy + of the mind and the eye. Do we not seem to perceive instinctively and as + an act of sense the differences of articulate speech and of musical notes? + Yet how small a part of speech or of music is produced by the impression + of the ear compared with that which is furnished by the mind! + </p> + <p> + Again: the more refined faculty of sense, as in animals so also in man, + seems often to be transmitted by inheritance. Neither must we forget that + in the use of the senses, as in his whole nature, man is a social being, + who is always being educated by language, habit, and the teaching of other + men as well as by his own observation. He knows distance because he is + taught it by a more experienced judgment than his own; he distinguishes + sounds because he is told to remark them by a person of a more discerning + ear. And as we inherit from our parents or other ancestors peculiar powers + of sense or feeling, so we improve and strengthen them, not only by + regular teaching, but also by sympathy and communion with other persons. + </p> + <p> + 2. The second question, namely, that concerning the relation of the mind + to external objects, is really a trifling one, though it has been made the + subject of a famous philosophy. We may if we like, with Berkeley, resolve + objects of sense into sensations; but the change is one of name only, and + nothing is gained and something is lost by such a resolution or confusion + of them. For we have not really made a single step towards idealism, and + any arbitrary inversion of our ordinary modes of speech is disturbing to + the mind. The youthful metaphysician is delighted at his marvellous + discovery that nothing is, and that what we see or feel is our sensation + only: for a day or two the world has a new interest to him; he alone knows + the secret which has been communicated to him by the philosopher, that + mind is all—when in fact he is going out of his mind in the first + intoxication of a great thought. But he soon finds that all things remain + as they were—the laws of motion, the properties of matter, the + qualities of substances. After having inflicted his theories on any one + who is willing to receive them 'first on his father and mother, secondly + on some other patient listener, thirdly on his dog,' he finds that he only + differs from the rest of mankind in the use of a word. He had once hoped + that by getting rid of the solidity of matter he might open a passage to + worlds beyond. He liked to think of the world as the representation of the + divine nature, and delighted to imagine angels and spirits wandering + through space, present in the room in which he is sitting without coming + through the door, nowhere and everywhere at the same instant. At length he + finds that he has been the victim of his own fancies; he has neither more + nor less evidence of the supernatural than he had before. He himself has + become unsettled, but the laws of the world remain fixed as at the + beginning. He has discovered that his appeal to the fallibility of sense + was really an illusion. For whatever uncertainty there may be in the + appearances of nature, arises only out of the imperfection or variation of + the human senses, or possibly from the deficiency of certain branches of + knowledge; when science is able to apply her tests, the uncertainty is at + an end. We are apt sometimes to think that moral and metaphysical + philosophy are lowered by the influence which is exercised over them by + physical science. But any interpretation of nature by physical science is + far in advance of such idealism. The philosophy of Berkeley, while giving + unbounded license to the imagination, is still grovelling on the level of + sense. + </p> + <p> + We may, if we please, carry this scepticism a step further, and deny, not + only objects of sense, but the continuity of our sensations themselves. We + may say with Protagoras and Hume that what is appears, and that what + appears appears only to individuals, and to the same individual only at + one instant. But then, as Plato asks,—and we must repeat the + question,—What becomes of the mind? Experience tells us by a + thousand proofs that our sensations of colour, taste, and the like, are + the same as they were an instant ago—that the act which we are + performing one minute is continued by us in the next—and also + supplies abundant proof that the perceptions of other men are, speaking + generally, the same or nearly the same with our own. After having slowly + and laboriously in the course of ages gained a conception of a whole and + parts, of the constitution of the mind, of the relation of man to God and + nature, imperfect indeed, but the best we can, we are asked to return + again to the 'beggarly elements' of ancient scepticism, and acknowledge + only atoms and sensations devoid of life or unity. Why should we not go a + step further still and doubt the existence of the senses of all things? We + are but 'such stuff as dreams are made of;' for we have left ourselves no + instruments of thought by which we can distinguish man from the animals, + or conceive of the existence even of a mollusc. And observe, this extreme + scepticism has been allowed to spring up among us, not, like the ancient + scepticism, in an age when nature and language really seemed to be full of + illusions, but in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when men walk + in the daylight of inductive science. + </p> + <p> + The attractiveness of such speculations arises out of their true nature + not being perceived. They are veiled in graceful language; they are not + pushed to extremes; they stop where the human mind is disposed also to + stop—short of a manifest absurdity. Their inconsistency is not + observed by their authors or by mankind in general, who are equally + inconsistent themselves. They leave on the mind a pleasing sense of wonder + and novelty: in youth they seem to have a natural affinity to one class of + persons as poetry has to another; but in later life either we drift back + into common sense, or we make them the starting-points of a higher + philosophy. + </p> + <p> + We are often told that we should enquire into all things before we accept + them;—with what limitations is this true? For we cannot use our + senses without admitting that we have them, or think without presupposing + that there is in us a power of thought, or affirm that all knowledge is + derived from experience without implying that this first principle of + knowledge is prior to experience. The truth seems to be that we begin with + the natural use of the mind as of the body, and we seek to describe this + as well as we can. We eat before we know the nature of digestion; we think + before we know the nature of reflection. As our knowledge increases, our + perception of the mind enlarges also. We cannot indeed get beyond facts, + but neither can we draw any line which separates facts from ideas. And the + mind is not something separate from them but included in them, and they in + the mind, both having a distinctness and individuality of their own. To + reduce our conception of mind to a succession of feelings and sensations + is like the attempt to view a wide prospect by inches through a + microscope, or to calculate a period of chronology by minutes. The mind + ceases to exist when it loses its continuity, which though far from being + its highest determination, is yet necessary to any conception of it. Even + an inanimate nature cannot be adequately represented as an endless + succession of states or conditions. + </p> + <p> + Paragraph II. Another division of the subject has yet to be considered: + Why should the doctrine that knowledge is sensation, in ancient times, or + of sensationalism or materialism in modern times, be allied to the lower + rather than to the higher view of ethical philosophy? At first sight the + nature and origin of knowledge appear to be wholly disconnected from + ethics and religion, nor can we deny that the ancient Stoics were + materialists, or that the materialist doctrines prevalent in modern times + have been associated with great virtues, or that both religious and + philosophical idealism have not unfrequently parted company with practice. + Still upon the whole it must be admitted that the higher standard of duty + has gone hand in hand with the higher conception of knowledge. It is + Protagoras who is seeking to adapt himself to the opinions of the world; + it is Plato who rises above them: the one maintaining that all knowledge + is sensation; the other basing the virtues on the idea of good. The reason + of this phenomenon has now to be examined. + </p> + <p> + By those who rest knowledge immediately upon sense, that explanation of + human action is deemed to be the truest which is nearest to sense. As + knowledge is reduced to sensation, so virtue is reduced to feeling, + happiness or good to pleasure. The different virtues—the various + characters which exist in the world—are the disguises of + self-interest. Human nature is dried up; there is no place left for + imagination, or in any higher sense for religion. Ideals of a whole, or of + a state, or of a law of duty, or of a divine perfection, are out of place + in an Epicurean philosophy. The very terms in which they are expressed are + suspected of having no meaning. Man is to bring himself back as far as he + is able to the condition of a rational beast. He is to limit himself to + the pursuit of pleasure, but of this he is to make a far-sighted + calculation;—he is to be rationalized, secularized, animalized: or + he is to be an amiable sceptic, better than his own philosophy, and not + falling below the opinions of the world. + </p> + <p> + Imagination has been called that 'busy faculty' which is always intruding + upon us in the search after truth. But imagination is also that higher + power by which we rise above ourselves and the commonplaces of thought and + life. The philosophical imagination is another name for reason finding an + expression of herself in the outward world. To deprive life of ideals is + to deprive it of all higher and comprehensive aims and of the power of + imparting and communicating them to others. For men are taught, not by + those who are on a level with them, but by those who rise above them, who + see the distant hills, who soar into the empyrean. Like a bird in a cage, + the mind confined to sense is always being brought back from the higher to + the lower, from the wider to the narrower view of human knowledge. It + seeks to fly but cannot: instead of aspiring towards perfection, 'it + hovers about this lower world and the earthly nature.' It loses the + religious sense which more than any other seems to take a man out of + himself. Weary of asking 'What is truth?' it accepts the 'blind witness of + eyes and ears;' it draws around itself the curtain of the physical world + and is satisfied. The strength of a sensational philosophy lies in the + ready accommodation of it to the minds of men; many who have been + metaphysicians in their youth, as they advance in years are prone to + acquiesce in things as they are, or rather appear to be. They are + spectators, not thinkers, and the best philosophy is that which requires + of them the least amount of mental effort. + </p> + <p> + As a lower philosophy is easier to apprehend than a higher, so a lower way + of life is easier to follow; and therefore such a philosophy seems to + derive a support from the general practice of mankind. It appeals to + principles which they all know and recognize: it gives back to them in a + generalized form the results of their own experience. To the man of the + world they are the quintessence of his own reflections upon life. To + follow custom, to have no new ideas or opinions, not to be straining after + impossibilities, to enjoy to-day with just so much forethought as is + necessary to provide for the morrow, this is regarded by the greater part + of the world as the natural way of passing through existence. And many who + have lived thus have attained to a lower kind of happiness or equanimity. + They have possessed their souls in peace without ever allowing them to + wander into the region of religious or political controversy, and without + any care for the higher interests of man. But nearly all the good (as well + as some of the evil) which has ever been done in this world has been the + work of another spirit, the work of enthusiasts and idealists, of apostles + and martyrs. The leaders of mankind have not been of the gentle Epicurean + type; they have personified ideas; they have sometimes also been the + victims of them. But they have always been seeking after a truth or ideal + of which they fell short; and have died in a manner disappointed of their + hopes that they might lift the human race out of the slough in which they + found them. They have done little compared with their own visions and + aspirations; but they have done that little, only because they sought to + do, and once perhaps thought that they were doing, a great deal more. + </p> + <p> + The philosophies of Epicurus or Hume give no adequate or dignified + conception of the mind. There is no organic unity in a succession of + feeling or sensations; no comprehensiveness in an infinity of separate + actions. The individual never reflects upon himself as a whole; he can + hardly regard one act or part of his life as the cause or effect of any + other act or part. Whether in practice or speculation, he is to himself + only in successive instants. To such thinkers, whether in ancient or in + modern times, the mind is only the poor recipient of impressions—not + the heir of all the ages, or connected with all other minds. It begins + again with its own modicum of experience having only such vague + conceptions of the wisdom of the past as are inseparable from language and + popular opinion. It seeks to explain from the experience of the individual + what can only be learned from the history of the world. It has no + conception of obligation, duty, conscience—these are to the + Epicurean or Utilitarian philosopher only names which interfere with our + natural perceptions of pleasure and pain. + </p> + <p> + There seem then to be several answers to the question, Why the theory that + all knowledge is sensation is allied to the lower rather than to the + higher view of ethical philosophy:—1st, Because it is easier to + understand and practise; 2ndly, Because it is fatal to the pursuit of + ideals, moral, political, or religious; 3rdly, Because it deprives us of + the means and instruments of higher thought, of any adequate conception of + the mind, of knowledge, of conscience, of moral obligation. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + ON THE NATURE AND LIMITS Of PSYCHOLOGY. + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + O gar arche men o me oide, teleute de kai ta metaxu ex ou me + oide sumpeplektai, tis mechane ten toiauten omologian pote + epistemen genesthai; Plato Republic. + + Monon gar auto legeiv, osper gumnon kai aperemomenon apo ton + onton apanton, adunaton. Soph. +</pre> + <p> + Since the above essay first appeared, many books on Psychology have been + given to the world, partly based upon the views of Herbart and other + German philosophers, partly independent of them. The subject has gained in + bulk and extent; whether it has had any true growth is more doubtful. It + begins to assume the language and claim the authority of a science; but it + is only an hypothesis or outline, which may be filled up in many ways + according to the fancy of individual thinkers. The basis of it is a + precarious one,—consciousness of ourselves and a somewhat uncertain + observation of the rest of mankind. Its relations to other sciences are + not yet determined: they seem to be almost too complicated to be + ascertained. It may be compared to an irregular building, run up hastily + and not likely to last, because its foundations are weak, and in many + places rest only on the surface of the ground. It has sought rather to put + together scattered observations and to make them into a system than to + describe or prove them. It has never severely drawn the line between facts + and opinions. It has substituted a technical phraseology for the common + use of language, being neither able to win acceptance for the one nor to + get rid of the other. + </p> + <p> + The system which has thus arisen appears to be a kind of metaphysic + narrowed to the point of view of the individual mind, through which, as + through some new optical instrument limiting the sphere of vision, the + interior of thought and sensation is examined. But the individual mind in + the abstract, as distinct from the mind of a particular individual and + separated from the environment of circumstances, is a fiction only. Yet + facts which are partly true gather around this fiction and are naturally + described by the help of it. There is also a common type of the mind which + is derived from the comparison of many minds with one another and with our + own. The phenomena of which Psychology treats are familiar to us, but they + are for the most part indefinite; they relate to a something inside the + body, which seems also to overleap the limits of space. The operations of + this something, when isolated, cannot be analyzed by us or subjected to + observation and experiment. And there is another point to be considered. + The mind, when thinking, cannot survey that part of itself which is used + in thought. It can only be contemplated in the past, that is to say, in + the history of the individual or of the world. This is the scientific + method of studying the mind. But Psychology has also some other supports, + specious rather than real. It is partly sustained by the false analogy of + Physical Science and has great expectations from its near relationship to + Physiology. We truly remark that there is an infinite complexity of the + body corresponding to the infinite subtlety of the mind; we are conscious + that they are very nearly connected. But in endeavouring to trace the + nature of the connexion we are baffled and disappointed. In our knowledge + of them the gulf remains the same: no microscope has ever seen into + thought; no reflection on ourselves has supplied the missing link between + mind and matter...These are the conditions of this very inexact science, + and we shall only know less of it by pretending to know more, or by + assigning to it a form or style to which it has not yet attained and is + not really entitled. + </p> + <p> + Experience shows that any system, however baseless and ineffectual, in our + own or in any other age, may be accepted and continue to be studied, if it + seeks to satisfy some unanswered question or is based upon some ancient + tradition, especially if it takes the form and uses the language of + inductive philosophy. The fact therefore that such a science exists and is + popular, affords no evidence of its truth or value. Many who have pursued + it far into detail have never examined the foundations on which it rests. + The have been many imaginary subjects of knowledge of which enthusiastic + persons have made a lifelong study, without ever asking themselves what is + the evidence for them, what is the use of them, how long they will last? + They may pass away, like the authors of them, and 'leave not a wrack + behind;' or they may survive in fragments. Nor is it only in the Middle + Ages, or in the literary desert of China or of India, that such systems + have arisen; in our own enlightened age, growing up by the side of + Physics, Ethics, and other really progressive sciences, there is a weary + waste of knowledge, falsely so-called. There are sham sciences which no + logic has ever put to the test, in which the desire for knowledge invents + the materials of it. + </p> + <p> + And therefore it is expedient once more to review the bases of Psychology, + lest we should be imposed upon by its pretensions. The study of it may + have done good service by awakening us to the sense of inveterate errors + familiarized by language, yet it may have fallen into still greater ones; + under the pretence of new investigations it may be wasting the lives of + those who are engaged in it. It may also be found that the discussion of + it will throw light upon some points in the Theaetetus of Plato,—the + oldest work on Psychology which has come down to us. The imaginary science + may be called, in the language of ancient philosophy, 'a shadow of a part + of Dialectic or Metaphysic' (Gorg.). + </p> + <p> + In this postscript or appendix we propose to treat, first, of the true + bases of Psychology; secondly, of the errors into which the students of it + are most likely to fall; thirdly, of the principal subjects which are + usually comprehended under it; fourthly, of the form which facts relating + to the mind most naturally assume. + </p> + <p> + We may preface the enquiry by two or three remarks:— + </p> + <p> + (1) We do not claim for the popular Psychology the position of a science + at all; it cannot, like the Physical Sciences, proceed by the Inductive + Method: it has not the necessity of Mathematics: it does not, like + Metaphysic, argue from abstract notions or from internal coherence. It is + made up of scattered observations. A few of these, though they may + sometimes appear to be truisms, are of the greatest value, and free from + all doubt. We are conscious of them in ourselves; we observe them working + in others; we are assured of them at all times. For example, we are + absolutely certain, (a) of the influence exerted by the mind over the body + or by the body over the mind: (b) of the power of association, by which + the appearance of some person or the occurrence of some event recalls to + mind, not always but often, other persons and events: (c) of the effect of + habit, which is strongest when least disturbed by reflection, and is to + the mind what the bones are to the body: (d) of the real, though not + unlimited, freedom of the human will: (e) of the reference, more or less + distinct, of our sensations, feelings, thoughts, actions, to ourselves, + which is called consciousness, or, when in excess, self-consciousness: (f) + of the distinction of the 'I' and 'Not I,' of ourselves and outward + objects. But when we attempt to gather up these elements in a single + system, we discover that the links by which we combine them are apt to be + mere words. We are in a country which has never been cleared or surveyed; + here and there only does a gleam of light come through the darkness of the + forest. + </p> + <p> + (2) These fragments, although they can never become science in the + ordinary sense of the word, are a real part of knowledge and may be of + great value in education. We may be able to add a good deal to them from + our own experience, and we may verify them by it. Self-examination is one + of those studies which a man can pursue alone, by attention to himself and + the processes of his individual mind. He may learn much about his own + character and about the character of others, if he will 'make his mind sit + down' and look at itself in the glass. The great, if not the only use of + such a study is a practical one,—to know, first, human nature, and, + secondly, our own nature, as it truly is. + </p> + <p> + (3) Hence it is important that we should conceive of the mind in the + noblest and simplest manner. While acknowledging that language has been + the greatest factor in the formation of human thought, we must endeavour + to get rid of the disguises, oppositions, contradictions, which arise out + of it. We must disengage ourselves from the ideas which the customary use + of words has implanted in us. To avoid error as much as possible when we + are speaking of things unseen, the principal terms which we use should be + few, and we should not allow ourselves to be enslaved by them. Instead of + seeking to frame a technical language, we should vary our forms of speech, + lest they should degenerate into formulas. A difficult philosophical + problem is better understood when translated into the vernacular. + </p> + <p> + I.a. Psychology is inseparable from language, and early language contains + the first impressions or the oldest experience of man respecting himself. + These impressions are not accurate representations of the truth; they are + the reflections of a rudimentary age of philosophy. The first and simplest + forms of thought are rooted so deep in human nature that they can never be + got rid of; but they have been perpetually enlarged and elevated, and the + use of many words has been transferred from the body to the mind. The + spiritual and intellectual have thus become separated from the material—there + is a cleft between them; and the heart and the conscience of man rise + above the dominion of the appetites and create a new language in which + they too find expression. As the differences of actions begin to be + perceived, more and more names are needed. This is the first analysis of + the human mind; having a general foundation in popular experience, it is + moulded to a certain extent by hierophants and philosophers. (See Introd. + to Cratylus.) + </p> + <p> + b. This primitive psychology is continually receiving additions from the + first thinkers, who in return take a colour from the popular language of + the time. The mind is regarded from new points of view, and becomes + adapted to new conditions of knowledge. It seeks to isolate itself from + matter and sense, and to assert its independence in thought. It recognizes + that it is independent of the external world. It has five or six natural + states or stages:—(1) sensation, in which it is almost latent or + quiescent: (2) feeling, or inner sense, when the mind is just awakening: + (3) memory, which is decaying sense, and from time to time, as with a + spark or flash, has the power of recollecting or reanimating the buried + past: (4) thought, in which images pass into abstract notions or are + intermingled with them: (5) action, in which the mind moves forward, of + itself, or under the impulse of want or desire or pain, to attain or avoid + some end or consequence: and (6) there is the composition of these or the + admixture or assimilation of them in various degrees. We never see these + processes of the mind, nor can we tell the causes of them. But we know + them by their results, and learn from other men that so far as we can + describe to them or they to us the workings of the mind, their experience + is the same or nearly the same with our own. + </p> + <p> + c. But the knowledge of the mind is not to any great extent derived from + the observation of the individual by himself. It is the growing + consciousness of the human race, embodied in language, acknowledged by + experience, and corrected from time to time by the influence of literature + and philosophy. A great, perhaps the most important, part of it is to be + found in early Greek thought. In the Theaetetus of Plato it has not yet + become fixed: we are still stumbling on the threshold. In Aristotle the + process is more nearly completed, and has gained innumerable abstractions, + of which many have had to be thrown away because relative only to the + controversies of the time. In the interval between Thales and Aristotle + were realized the distinctions of mind and body, of universal and + particular, of infinite and infinitesimal, of idea and phenomenon; the + class conceptions of faculties and virtues, the antagonism of the + appetites and the reason; and connected with this, at a higher stage of + development, the opposition of moral and intellectual virtue; also the + primitive conceptions of unity, being, rest, motion, and the like. These + divisions were not really scientific, but rather based on popular + experience. They were not held with the precision of modern thinkers, but + taken all together they gave a new existence to the mind in thought, and + greatly enlarged and more accurately defined man's knowledge of himself + and of the world. The majority of them have been accepted by Christian and + Western nations. Yet in modern times we have also drifted so far away from + Aristotle, that if we were to frame a system on his lines we should be at + war with ordinary language and untrue to our own consciousness. And there + have been a few both in mediaeval times and since the Reformation who have + rebelled against the Aristotelian point of view. Of these eccentric + thinkers there have been various types, but they have all a family + likeness. According to them, there has been too much analysis and too + little synthesis, too much division of the mind into parts and too little + conception of it as a whole or in its relation to God and the laws of the + universe. They have thought that the elements of plurality and unity have + not been duly adjusted. The tendency of such writers has been to allow the + personality of man to be absorbed in the universal, or in the divine + nature, and to deny the distinction between matter and mind, or to + substitute one for the other. They have broken some of the idols of + Psychology: they have challenged the received meaning of words: they have + regarded the mind under many points of view. But though they may have + shaken the old, they have not established the new; their views of + philosophy, which seem like the echo of some voice from the East, have + been alien to the mind of Europe. + </p> + <p> + d. The Psychology which is found in common language is in some degree + verified by experience, but not in such a manner as to give it the + character of an exact science. We cannot say that words always correspond + to facts. Common language represents the mind from different and even + opposite points of view, which cannot be all of them equally true (compare + Cratylus). Yet from diversity of statements and opinions may be obtained a + nearer approach to the truth than is to be gained from any one of them. It + also tends to correct itself, because it is gradually brought nearer to + the common sense of mankind. There are some leading categories or + classifications of thought, which, though unverified, must always remain + the elements from which the science or study of the mind proceeds. For + example, we must assume ideas before we can analyze them, and also a + continuing mind to which they belong; the resolution of it into successive + moments, which would say, with Protagoras, that the man is not the same + person which he was a minute ago, is, as Plato implies in the Theaetetus, + an absurdity. + </p> + <p> + e. The growth of the mind, which may be traced in the histories of + religions and philosophies and in the thoughts of nations, is one of the + deepest and noblest modes of studying it. Here we are dealing with the + reality, with the greater and, as it may be termed, the most sacred part + of history. We study the mind of man as it begins to be inspired by a + human or divine reason, as it is modified by circumstances, as it is + distributed in nations, as it is renovated by great movements, which go + beyond the limits of nations and affect human society on a scale still + greater, as it is created or renewed by great minds, who, looking down + from above, have a wider and more comprehensive vision. This is an + ambitious study, of which most of us rather 'entertain conjecture' than + arrive at any detailed or accurate knowledge. Later arises the reflection + how these great ideas or movements of the world have been appropriated by + the multitude and found a way to the minds of individuals. The real + Psychology is that which shows how the increasing knowledge of nature and + the increasing experience of life have always been slowly transforming the + mind, how religions too have been modified in the course of ages 'that God + may be all and in all.' E pollaplasion, eoe, to ergon e os nun zeteitai + prostatteis. + </p> + <p> + f. Lastly, though we speak of the study of mind in a special sense, it may + also be said that there is no science which does not contribute to our + knowledge of it. The methods of science and their analogies are new + faculties, discovered by the few and imparted to the many. They are to the + mind, what the senses are to the body; or better, they may be compared to + instruments such as the telescope or microscope by which the + discriminating power of the senses, or to other mechanical inventions, by + which the strength and skill of the human body is so immeasurably + increased. + </p> + <p> + II. The new Psychology, whatever may be its claim to the authority of a + science, has called attention to many facts and corrected many errors, + which without it would have been unexamined. Yet it is also itself very + liable to illusion. The evidence on which it rests is vague and + indefinite. The field of consciousness is never seen by us as a whole, but + only at particular points, which are always changing. The veil of language + intercepts facts. Hence it is desirable that in making an approach to the + study we should consider at the outset what are the kinds of error which + most easily affect it, and note the differences which separate it from + other branches of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + a. First, we observe the mind by the mind. It would seem therefore that we + are always in danger of leaving out the half of that which is the subject + of our enquiry. We come at once upon the difficulty of what is the meaning + of the word. Does it differ as subject and object in the same manner? Can + we suppose one set of feelings or one part of the mind to interpret + another? Is the introspecting thought the same with the thought which is + introspected? Has the mind the power of surveying its whole domain at one + and the same time?—No more than the eye can take in the whole human + body at a glance. Yet there may be a glimpse round the corner, or a + thought transferred in a moment from one point of view to another, which + enables us to see nearly the whole, if not at once, at any rate in + succession. Such glimpses will hardly enable us to contemplate from within + the mind in its true proportions. Hence the firmer ground of Psychology is + not the consciousness of inward feelings but the observation of external + actions, being the actions not only of ourselves, but of the innumerable + persons whom we come across in life. + </p> + <p> + b. The error of supposing partial or occasional explanation of mental + phenomena to be the only or complete ones. For example, we are disinclined + to admit of the spontaneity or discontinuity of the mind—it seems to + us like an effect without a cause, and therefore we suppose the train of + our thoughts to be always called up by association. Yet it is probable, or + indeed certain, that of many mental phenomena there are no mental + antecedents, but only bodily ones. + </p> + <p> + c. The false influence of language. We are apt to suppose that when there + are two or more words describing faculties or processes of the mind, there + are real differences corresponding to them. But this is not the case. Nor + can we determine how far they do or do not exist, or by what degree or + kind of difference they are distinguished. The same remark may be made + about figures of speech. They fill up the vacancy of knowledge; they are + to the mind what too much colour is to the eye; but the truth is rather + concealed than revealed by them. + </p> + <p> + d. The uncertain meaning of terms, such as Consciousness, Conscience, + Will, Law, Knowledge, Internal and External Sense; these, in the language + of Plato, 'we shamelessly use, without ever having taken the pains to + analyze them.' + </p> + <p> + e. A science such as Psychology is not merely an hypothesis, but an + hypothesis which, unlike the hypotheses of Physics, can never be verified. + It rests only on the general impressions of mankind, and there is little + or no hope of adding in any considerable degree to our stock of mental + facts. + </p> + <p> + f. The parallelism of the Physical Sciences, which leads us to analyze the + mind on the analogy of the body, and so to reduce mental operations to the + level of bodily ones, or to confound one with the other. + </p> + <p> + g. That the progress of Physiology may throw a new light on Psychology is + a dream in which scientific men are always tempted to indulge. But however + certain we may be of the connexion between mind and body, the explanation + of the one by the other is a hidden place of nature which has hitherto + been investigated with little or no success. + </p> + <p> + h. The impossibility of distinguishing between mind and body. Neither in + thought nor in experience can we separate them. They seem to act together; + yet we feel that we are sometimes under the dominion of the one, sometimes + of the other, and sometimes, both in the common use of language and in + fact, they transform themselves, the one into the good principle, the + other into the evil principle; and then again the 'I' comes in and + mediates between them. It is also difficult to distinguish outward facts + from the ideas of them in the mind, or to separate the external stimulus + to a sensation from the activity of the organ, or this from the invisible + agencies by which it reaches the mind, or any process of sense from its + mental antecedent, or any mental energy from its nervous expression. + </p> + <p> + i. The fact that mental divisions tend to run into one another, and that + in speaking of the mind we cannot always distinguish differences of kind + from differences of degree; nor have we any measure of the strength and + intensity of our ideas or feelings. + </p> + <p> + j. Although heredity has been always known to the ancients as well as + ourselves to exercise a considerable influence on human character, yet we + are unable to calculate what proportion this birth-influence bears to + nurture and education. But this is the real question. We cannot pursue the + mind into embryology: we can only trace how, after birth, it begins to + grow. But how much is due to the soil, how much to the original latent + seed, it is impossible to distinguish. And because we are certain that + heredity exercises a considerable, but undefined influence, we must not + increase the wonder by exaggerating it. + </p> + <p> + k. The love of system is always tending to prevail over the historical + investigation of the mind, which is our chief means of knowing it. It + equally tends to hinder the other great source of our knowledge of the + mind, the observation of its workings and processes which we can make for + ourselves. + </p> + <p> + l. The mind, when studied through the individual, is apt to be isolated—this + is due to the very form of the enquiry; whereas, in truth, it is + indistinguishable from circumstances, the very language which it uses + being the result of the instincts of long-forgotten generations, and every + word which a man utters being the answer to some other word spoken or + suggested by somebody else. + </p> + <p> + III. The tendency of the preceding remarks has been to show that + Psychology is necessarily a fragment, and is not and cannot be a connected + system. We cannot define or limit the mind, but we can describe it. We can + collect information about it; we can enumerate the principal subjects + which are included in the study of it. Thus we are able to rehabilitate + Psychology to some extent, not as a branch of science, but as a collection + of facts bearing on human life, as a part of the history of philosophy, as + an aspect of Metaphysic. It is a fragment of a science only, which in all + probability can never make any great progress or attain to much clearness + or exactness. It is however a kind of knowledge which has a great interest + for us and is always present to us, and of which we carry about the + materials in our own bosoms. We can observe our minds and we can + experiment upon them, and the knowledge thus acquired is not easily + forgotten, and is a help to us in study as well as in conduct. + </p> + <p> + The principal subjects of Psychology may be summed up as follows:— + </p> + <p> + a. The relation of man to the world around him,—in what sense and + within what limits can he withdraw from its laws or assert himself against + them (Freedom and Necessity), and what is that which we suppose to be thus + independent and which we call ourselves? How does the inward differ from + the outward and what is the relation between them, and where do we draw + the line by which we separate mind from matter, the soul from the body? Is + the mind active or passive, or partly both? Are its movements identical + with those of the body, or only preconcerted and coincident with them, or + is one simply an aspect of the other? + </p> + <p> + b. What are we to think of time and space? Time seems to have a nearer + connexion with the mind, space with the body; yet time, as well as space, + is necessary to our idea of either. We see also that they have an analogy + with one another, and that in Mathematics they often interpenetrate. Space + or place has been said by Kant to be the form of the outward, time of the + inward sense. He regards them as parts or forms of the mind. But this is + an unfortunate and inexpressive way of describing their relation to us. + For of all the phenomena present to the human mind they seem to have most + the character of objective existence. There is no use in asking what is + beyond or behind them; we cannot get rid of them. And to throw the laws of + external nature which to us are the type of the immutable into the + subjective side of the antithesis seems to be equally inappropriate. + </p> + <p> + c. When in imagination we enter into the closet of the mind and withdraw + ourselves from the external world, we seem to find there more or less + distinct processes which may be described by the words, 'I perceive,' 'I + feel,' 'I think,' 'I want,' 'I wish,' 'I like,' 'I dislike,' 'I fear,' 'I + know,' 'I remember,' 'I imagine,' 'I dream,' 'I act,' 'I endeavour,' 'I + hope.' These processes would seem to have the same notions attached to + them in the minds of all educated persons. They are distinguished from one + another in thought, but they intermingle. It is possible to reflect upon + them or to become conscious of them in a greater or less degree, or with a + greater or less continuity or attention, and thus arise the intermittent + phenomena of consciousness or self-consciousness. The use of all of them + is possible to us at all times; and therefore in any operation of the mind + the whole are latent. But we are able to characterise them sufficiently by + that part of the complex action which is the most prominent. We have no + difficulty in distinguishing an act of sight or an act of will from an act + of thought, although thought is present in both of them. Hence the + conception of different faculties or different virtues is precarious, + because each of them is passing into the other, and they are all one in + the mind itself; they appear and reappear, and may all be regarded as the + ever-varying phases or aspects or differences of the same mind or person. + </p> + <p> + d. Nearest the sense in the scale of the intellectual faculties is memory, + which is a mode rather than a faculty of the mind, and accompanies all + mental operations. There are two principal kinds of it, recollection and + recognition,—recollection in which forgotten things are recalled or + return to the mind, recognition in which the mind finds itself again among + things once familiar. The simplest way in which we can represent the + former to ourselves is by shutting our eyes and trying to recall in what + we term the mind's eye the picture of the surrounding scene, or by laying + down the book which we are reading and recapitulating what we can remember + of it. But many times more powerful than recollection is recognition, + perhaps because it is more assisted by association. We have known and + forgotten, and after a long interval the thing which we have seen once is + seen again by us, but with a different feeling, and comes back to us, not + as new knowledge, but as a thing to which we ourselves impart a notion + already present to us; in Plato's words, we set the stamp upon the wax. + Every one is aware of the difference between the first and second sight of + a place, between a scene clothed with associations or bare and divested of + them. We say to ourselves on revisiting a spot after a long interval: How + many things have happened since I last saw this! There is probably no + impression ever received by us of which we can venture to say that the + vestiges are altogether lost, or that we might not, under some + circumstances, recover it. A long-forgotten knowledge may be easily + renewed and therefore is very different from ignorance. Of the language + learnt in childhood not a word may be remembered, and yet, when a new + beginning is made, the old habit soon returns, the neglected organs come + back into use, and the river of speech finds out the dried-up channel. + </p> + <p> + e. 'Consciousness' is the most treacherous word which is employed in the + study of the mind, for it is used in many senses, and has rarely, if ever, + been minutely analyzed. Like memory, it accompanies all mental operations, + but not always continuously, and it exists in various degrees. It may be + imperceptible or hardly perceptible: it may be the living sense that our + thoughts, actions, sufferings, are our own. It is a kind of attention + which we pay to ourselves, and is intermittent rather than continuous. Its + sphere has been exaggerated. It is sometimes said to assure us of our + freedom; but this is an illusion: as there may be a real freedom without + consciousness of it, so there may be a consciousness of freedom without + the reality. It may be regarded as a higher degree of knowledge when we + not only know but know that we know. Consciousness is opposed to habit, + inattention, sleep, death. It may be illustrated by its derivative + conscience, which speaks to men, not only of right and wrong in the + abstract, but of right and wrong actions in reference to themselves and + their circumstances. + </p> + <p> + f. Association is another of the ever-present phenomena of the human mind. + We speak of the laws of association, but this is an expression which is + confusing, for the phenomenon itself is of the most capricious and + uncertain sort. It may be briefly described as follows. The simplest case + of association is that of sense. When we see or hear separately one of two + things, which we have previously seen or heard together, the occurrence of + the one has a tendency to suggest the other. So the sight or name of a + house may recall to our minds the memory of those who once lived there. + Like may recall like and everything its opposite. The parts of a whole, + the terms of a series, objects lying near, words having a customary order + stick together in the mind. A word may bring back a passage of poetry or a + whole system of philosophy; from one end of the world or from one pole of + knowledge we may travel to the other in an indivisible instant. The long + train of association by which we pass from one point to the other, + involving every sort of complex relation, so sudden, so accidental, is one + of the greatest wonders of mind...This process however is not always + continuous, but often intermittent: we can think of things in isolation as + well as in association; we do not mean that they must all hang from one + another. We can begin again after an interval of rest or vacancy, as a new + train of thought suddenly arises, as, for example, when we wake of a + morning or after violent exercise. Time, place, the same colour or sound + or smell or taste, will often call up some thought or recollection either + accidentally or naturally associated with them. But it is equally + noticeable that the new thought may occur to us, we cannot tell how or + why, by the spontaneous action of the mind itself or by the latent + influence of the body. Both science and poetry are made up of associations + or recollections, but we must observe also that the mind is not wholly + dependent on them, having also the power of origination. + </p> + <p> + There are other processes of the mind which it is good for us to study + when we are at home and by ourselves,—the manner in which thought + passes into act, the conflict of passion and reason in many stages, the + transition from sensuality to love or sentiment and from earthly love to + heavenly, the slow and silent influence of habit, which little by little + changes the nature of men, the sudden change of the old nature of man into + a new one, wrought by shame or by some other overwhelming impulse. These + are the greater phenomena of mind, and he who has thought of them for + himself will live and move in a better-ordered world, and will himself be + a better-ordered man. + </p> + <p> + At the other end of the 'globus intellectualis,' nearest, not to earth and + sense, but to heaven and God, is the personality of man, by which he holds + communion with the unseen world. Somehow, he knows not how, somewhere, he + knows not where, under this higher aspect of his being he grasps the ideas + of God, freedom and immortality; he sees the forms of truth, holiness and + love, and is satisfied with them. No account of the mind can be complete + which does not admit the reality or the possibility of another life. + Whether regarded as an ideal or as a fact, the highest part of man's + nature and that in which it seems most nearly to approach the divine, is a + phenomenon which exists, and must therefore be included within the domain + of Psychology. + </p> + <p> + IV. We admit that there is no perfect or ideal Psychology. It is not a + whole in the same sense in which Chemistry, Physiology, or Mathematics are + wholes: that is to say, it is not a connected unity of knowledge. Compared + with the wealth of other sciences, it rests upon a small number of facts; + and when we go beyond these, we fall into conjectures and verbal + discussions. The facts themselves are disjointed; the causes of them run + up into other sciences, and we have no means of tracing them from one to + the other. Yet it may be true of this, as of other beginnings of + knowledge, that the attempt to put them together has tested the truth of + them, and given a stimulus to the enquiry into them. + </p> + <p> + Psychology should be natural, not technical. It should take the form which + is the most intelligible to the common understanding, because it has to do + with common things, which are familiar to us all. It should aim at no more + than every reflecting man knows or can easily verify for himself. When + simple and unpretentious, it is least obscured by words, least liable to + fall under the influence of Physiology or Metaphysic. It should argue, not + from exceptional, but from ordinary phenomena. It should be careful to + distinguish the higher and the lower elements of human nature, and not + allow one to be veiled in the disguise of the other, lest through the + slippery nature of language we should pass imperceptibly from good to + evil, from nature in the higher to nature in the neutral or lower sense. + It should assert consistently the unity of the human faculties, the unity + of knowledge, the unity of God and law. The difference between the will + and the affections and between the reason and the passions should also be + recognized by it. + </p> + <p> + Its sphere is supposed to be narrowed to the individual soul; but it + cannot be thus separated in fact. It goes back to the beginnings of + things, to the first growth of language and philosophy, and to the whole + science of man. There can be no truth or completeness in any study of the + mind which is confined to the individual. The nature of language, though + not the whole, is perhaps at present the most important element in our + knowledge of it. It is not impossible that some numerical laws may be + found to have a place in the relations of mind and matter, as in the rest + of nature. The old Pythagorean fancy that the soul 'is or has in it + harmony' may in some degree be realized. But the indications of such + numerical harmonies are faint; either the secret of them lies deeper than + we can discover, or nature may have rebelled against the use of them in + the composition of men and animals. It is with qualitative rather than + with quantitative differences that we are concerned in Psychology. The + facts relating to the mind which we obtain from Physiology are negative + rather than positive. They show us, not the processes of mental action, + but the conditions of which when deprived the mind ceases to act. It would + seem as if the time had not yet arrived when we can hope to add anything + of much importance to our knowledge of the mind from the investigations of + the microscope. The elements of Psychology can still only be learnt from + reflections on ourselves, which interpret and are also interpreted by our + experience of others. The history of language, of philosophy, and + religion, the great thoughts or inventions or discoveries which move + mankind, furnish the larger moulds or outlines in which the human mind has + been cast. From these the individual derives so much as he is able to + comprehend or has the opportunity of learning. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + THEAETETUS + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Theodorus, Theaetetus. + </p> + <p> + Euclid and Terpsion meet in front of Euclid's house in Megara; they enter + the house, and the dialogue is read to them by a servant. + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: Have you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion? + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking + for you, and wondering that I could not find you. + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: But I was not in the city. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: Where then? + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus—he was + being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: Was he alive or dead? + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: He was scarcely alive, for he has been badly wounded; but he was + suffering even more from the sickness which has broken out in the army. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: The dysentery, you mean? + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: Yes. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: Alas! what a loss he will be! + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: Yes, Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; only to-day I heard some + people highly praising his behaviour in this very battle. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: No wonder; I should rather be surprised at hearing anything else + of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara? + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: He wanted to get home: although I entreated and advised him to + remain, he would not listen to me; so I set him on his way, and turned + back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how + remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe + that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a + youth, and he had a memorable conversation with him, which he repeated to + me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and + said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: The prophecy has certainly been fulfilled; but what was the + conversation? can you tell me? + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: No, indeed, not offhand; but I took notes of it as soon as I got + home; these I filled up from memory, writing them out at leisure; and + whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had + forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; thus I have nearly the + whole conversation written down. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: I remember—you told me; and I have always been intending + to ask you to show me the writing, but have put off doing so; and now, why + should we not read it through?—having just come from the country, I + should greatly like to rest. + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: I too shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as + far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the + servant shall read to us. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: Very good. + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: Here is the roll, Terpsion; I may observe that I have introduced + Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the + persons whom he mentioned—these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of + Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the + interlocutory words 'I said,' 'I remarked,' which he used when he spoke of + himself, and again, 'he agreed,' or 'disagreed,' in the answer, lest the + repetition of them should be troublesome. + </p> + <p> + TERPSION: Quite right, Euclid. + </p> + <p> + EUCLID: And now, boy, you may take the roll and read. + </p> + <p> + EUCLID'S SERVANT READS. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask + you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that + part of the world. But I am more interested in our own Athenian youth, and + I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them + as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I + see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, + considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. Tell me then, if + you have met with any one who is good for anything. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, Socrates, I have become acquainted with one very + remarkable Athenian youth, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your + attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise + him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no + beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; + for he has a snub nose and projecting eyes, although these features are + less marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal + attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very + large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts: for he has + a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is + exceedingly gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union + of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should + scarcely have thought possible; for those who, like him, have quick and + ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are + ships without ballast, and go darting about, and are mad rather than + courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, prove + stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and + successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of + gentleness, flowing on silently like a river of oil; at his age, it is + wonderful. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is good news; whose son is he? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself + is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions + have been anointing themselves in the outer court, and now they seem to + have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know + him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of + Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as + his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a + considerable fortune. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the + property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is + wonderfully liberal. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection + of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if + each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were tuned + alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who + said so was or was not a musician? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: We should ask. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we found that he was, we should take his word; and if + not, not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any + interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is + a painter or not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly we should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is Theodorus a painter? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I never heard that he was. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is he a geometrician? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course he is, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in + general an educated man? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If, then, he remarks on a similarity in our persons, either by + way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend + to him. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should say not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental + endowments of either of us, then he who hears the praises will naturally + desire to examine him who is praised: and he again should be willing to + exhibit himself. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for me to examine, and + for you to exhibit; since although Theodorus has praised many a citizen + and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has + been praising you. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am glad to hear it, Socrates; but what if he was only in + jest? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nay, Theodorus is not given to jesting; and I cannot allow you + to retract your consent on any such pretence as that. If you do, he will + have to swear to his words; and we are perfectly sure that no one will be + found to impugn him. Do not be shy then, but stand to your word. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I suppose I must, if you wish it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, I should like to ask what you learn of + Theodorus: something of geometry, perhaps? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And astronomy and harmony and calculation? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do my best. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, or + of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well + in general; but there is a little difficulty which I want you and the + company to aid me in investigating. Will you answer me a question: 'Is not + learning growing wiser about that which you learn?' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And by wisdom the wise are wise? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is that different in any way from knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly they are. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then wisdom and knowledge are the same? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Herein lies the difficulty which I can never solve to my + satisfaction—What is knowledge? Can we answer that question? What + say you? which of us will speak first? whoever misses shall sit down, as + at a game of ball, and shall be donkey, as the boys say; he who lasts out + his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall + have the right of putting to us any questions which he pleases...Why is + there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed into rudeness by + my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and + sociable. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: The reverse of rudeness, Socrates: but I would rather that you + would ask one of the young fellows; for the truth is, that I am unused to + your game of question and answer, and I am too old to learn; the young + will be more suitable, and they will improve more than I shall, for youth + is always able to improve. And so having made a beginning with Theaetetus, + I would advise you to go on with him and not let him off. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says? The philosopher, + whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command + to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say + what you think that knowledge is. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and if I + make a mistake, you will doubtless correct me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We will, if we can. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus—geometry, + and those which you just now mentioned—are knowledge; and I would + include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, each and all + of, them, are knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of + your nature make you give many and diverse things, when I am asking for + one simple thing. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I + believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art or + science of making shoes? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Just so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making + wooden implements? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In both cases you define the subject matter of each of the two + arts? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But that, Theaetetus, was not the point of my question: we + wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or + sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the + nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Perfectly right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me offer an illustration: Suppose that a person were to ask + about some very trivial and obvious thing—for example, What is clay? + and we were to reply, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of + oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not the answer be + ridiculous? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Truly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that + he who asked the question would understand from our answer the nature of + 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other + workers. How can a man understand the name of anything, when he does not + know the nature of it? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: He cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no + knowledge of the art or science of making shoes? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: None. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor of any other science? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when a man is asked what science or knowledge is, to give in + answer the name of some art or science is ridiculous; for the question is, + 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'A knowledge of this or that.' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an + enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay, he might have + said simply, that clay is moistened earth—what sort of clay is not + to the point. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, there is no difficulty as you put the question. + You mean, if I am not mistaken, something like what occurred to me and to + my friend here, your namesake Socrates, in a recent discussion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What was that, Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such + as the roots of three or five, showing that they are incommensurable by + the unit: he selected other examples up to seventeen—there he + stopped. Now as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of + attempting to include them all under one name or class. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did you find such a class? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: We divided all numbers into two classes: those which are made + up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we compared to + square figures and called square or equilateral numbers;—that was + one class. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every + other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater + multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when + regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;—all these we + compared to oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Capital; and what followed? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: The lines, or sides, which have for their squares the + equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and + the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the + oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter + name being, that they are commensurable with the former [i.e., with the + so-called lengths or magnitudes] not in linear measurement, but in the + value of the superficial content of their squares; and the same about + solids. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Excellent, my boys; I think that you fully justify the praises + of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about + knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore Theodorus is a + deceiver after all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but if some one were to praise you for running, and to say + that he never met your equal among boys, and afterwards you were beaten in + a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner—would the praise be + any the less true? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge so small a + matter, as just now said? Is it not one which would task the powers of men + perfect in every way? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: By heaven, they should be the top of all perfection! + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was + mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of + knowledge, as well as of other things. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the + truth. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer + about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, + try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one definition. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when + the report of questions asked by you was brought to me; but I can neither + persuade myself that I have a satisfactory answer to give, nor hear of any + one who answers as you would have him; and I cannot shake off a feeling of + anxiety. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have + something within you which you are bringing to the birth. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And have you never heard, simpleton, that I am the son of a + midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, I have. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that I myself practise midwifery? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No, never. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me tell you that I do though, my friend: but you must not + reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and + therefore they only say of me, that I am the strangest of mortals and + drive men to their wits' end. Did you ever hear that too? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall I tell you the reason? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Bear in mind the whole business of the midwives, and then you + will see my meaning better:—No woman, as you are probably aware, who + is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those + who are past bearing. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, I know. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess + of childbirth—is not a mother, and she honours those who are like + herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human + nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore + she assigned this office to those who are too old to bear. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I dare say too, or rather I am absolutely certain, that the + midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to + arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who + have a difficulty in bearing, and if they think fit they can smother the + embryo in the womb. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: They can. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did you ever remark that they are also most cunning matchmakers, + and have a thorough knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave + brood? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No, never. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more + than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the + same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be + most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be + deposited. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, the same art. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you suppose that with women the case is otherwise? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certainly not; but midwives are respectable women who have a + character to lose, and they avoid this department of their profession, + because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given + to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific + way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only matchmaker. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Such are the midwives, whose task is a very important one, but + not so important as mine; for women do not bring into the world at one + time real children, and at another time counterfeits which are with + difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of + the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of + midwifery—you would think so? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Indeed I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but + differs, in that I attend men and not women; and look after their souls + when they are in labour, and not after their bodies: and the triumph of my + art is in thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind of the + young man brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth. And like + the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against + me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them + myself, is very just—the reason is, that the god compels me to be a + midwife, but does not allow me to bring forth. And therefore I am not + myself at all wise, nor have I anything to show which is the invention or + birth of my own soul, but those who converse with me profit. Some of them + appear dull enough at first, but afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, + if the god is gracious to them, they all make astonishing progress; and + this in the opinion of others as well as in their own. It is quite clear + that they never learned anything from me; the many fine discoveries to + which they cling are of their own making. But to me and the god they owe + their delivery. And the proof of my words is, that many of them in their + ignorance, either in their self-conceit despising me, or falling under the + influence of others, have gone away too soon; and have not only lost the + children of whom I had previously delivered them by an ill bringing up, + but have stifled whatever else they had in them by evil communications, + being fonder of lies and shams than of the truth; and they have at last + ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. + Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of them, and there are many + others. The truants often return to me, and beg that I would consort with + them again—they are ready to go to me on their knees—and then, + if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and + they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to + arouse and to allay in those who consort with me, just like the pangs of + women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail + which is even worse than that of the women. So much for them. And there + are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; + and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into marrying + some one, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do + them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and many to other + inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I + suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour—great + with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife's son and myself a + midwife, and do your best to answer the questions which I will ask you. + And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon + inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do + not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their + first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who + were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did + not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the + enemy of man—that was not within the range of their ideas; neither + am I their enemy in all this, but it would be wrong for me to admit + falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then, Theaetetus, I repeat + my old question, 'What is knowledge?'—and do not say that you cannot + tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be + able to tell. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be + ashamed of not trying to do my best. Now he who knows perceives what he + knows, and, as far as I can see at present, knowledge is perception. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express + your opinion. And now, let us examine together this conception of yours, + and see whether it is a true birth or a mere wind-egg:—You say that + knowledge is perception? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine + about knowledge; it is indeed the opinion of Protagoras, who has another + way of expressing it. Man, he says, is the measure of all things, of the + existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are + not:—You have read him? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: O yes, again and again. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Does he not say that things are to you such as they appear to + you, and to me such as they appear to me, and that you and I are men? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, he says so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A wise man is not likely to talk nonsense. Let us try to + understand him: the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold + and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, + cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to + him who is cold, and not to him who is not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I suppose the last. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then it must appear so to each of them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives.' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the case of hot and + cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to + be, to each one such as he perceives them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as + knowledge is unerring? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the name of the Graces, what an almighty wise man Protagoras + must have been! He spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, + like you and me, but told the truth, 'his Truth,' (In allusion to a book + of Protagoras' which bore this title.) in secret to his own disciples. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am about to speak of a high argument, in which all things are + said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as + great or small, heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy + light—there is no single thing or quality, but out of motion and + change and admixture all things are becoming relatively to one another, + which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really + becoming, for nothing ever is, but all things are becoming. Summon all + philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of + them, one after another, and with the exception of Parmenides they will + agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, + the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of + </p> + <p> + 'Ocean whence sprang the gods, and mother Tethys,' + </p> + <p> + does he not mean that all things are the offspring, of flux and motion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And who could take up arms against such a great army having + Homer for its general, and not appear ridiculous? (Compare Cratylus.) + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Who indeed, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Theaetetus; and there are plenty of other proofs which will + show that motion is the source of what is called being and becoming, and + inactivity of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are + supposed to be the parent and guardian of all other things, are born of + movement and of friction, which is a kind of motion;—is not this the + origin of fire? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the race of animals is generated in the same way? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but + preserved for a long time by motion and exercise? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what of the mental habit? Is not the soul informed, and + improved, and preserved by study and attention, which are motions; but + when at rest, which in the soul only means want of attention and study, is + uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, to the soul as well as + to the body? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I may add, that breathless calm, stillness and the like waste + and impair, while wind and storm preserve; and the palmary argument of + all, which I strongly urge, is the golden chain in Homer, by which he + means the sun, thereby indicating that so long as the sun and the heavens + go round in their orbits, all things human and divine are and are + preserved, but if they were chained up and their motions ceased, then all + things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, turned upside down. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his + meaning. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now apply his doctrine to perception, my good friend, and + first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your + eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them. And you must + not assign any place to it: for if it had position it would be, and be at + rest, and there would be no process of becoming. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Then what is colour? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us carry the principle which has just been affirmed, that + nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that white, black, and + every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, + and that what we call a colour is in each case neither the active nor the + passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar + to each percipient; are you quite certain that the several colours appear + to a dog or to any animal whatever as they appear to you? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Far from it. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Are + you so profoundly convinced of this? Rather would it not be true that it + never appears exactly the same to you, because you are never exactly the + same? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: The latter. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I + apprehend by touch, were great or white or hot, it could not become + different by mere contact with another unless it actually changed; nor + again, if the comparing or apprehending subject were great or white or + hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any + approximation or affection of any other thing. The fact is that in our + ordinary way of speaking we allow ourselves to be driven into most + ridiculous and wonderful contradictions, as Protagoras and all who take + his line of argument would remark. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How? and of what sort do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are + six dice, which are more by a half when compared with four, and fewer by a + half than twelve—they are more and also fewer. How can you or any + one maintain the contrary? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether + anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you + answer him, Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should say 'No,' Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in + reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting + my former answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Capital! excellent! spoken like an oracle, my boy! And if you + reply 'Yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; for our tongue will be + unconvinced, but not our mind. (In allusion to the well-known line of + Euripides, Hippol.: e gloss omomoch e de thren anomotos.) + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about + the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their wits, would have + had a regular sparring-match over this, and would have knocked their + arguments together finely. But you and I, who have no professional aims, + only desire to see what is the mutual relation of these principles,—whether + they are consistent with each or not. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, that would be my desire. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And mine too. But since this is our feeling, and there is plenty + of time, why should we not calmly and patiently review our own thoughts, + and thoroughly examine and see what these appearances in us really are? If + I am not mistaken, they will be described by us as follows:—first, + that nothing can become greater or less, either in number or magnitude, + while remaining equal to itself—you would agree? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no + increase or diminution of anything, but only equality. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thirdly, that what was not before cannot be afterwards, without + becoming and having become. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, truly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, are fighting with one + another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as + this—if I were to say that I, who am of a certain height and taller + than you, may within a year, without gaining or losing in height, be not + so tall—not that I should have lost, but that you would have + increased. In such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not, and yet I + have not become; for I could not have become without becoming, neither + could I have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could + give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them + at all. I believe that you follow me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you + have thought of these questions before now. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the + Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times + when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight + into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is + the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder. He was not + a bad genealogist who said that Iris (the messenger of heaven) is the + child of Thaumas (wonder). But do you begin to see what is the explanation + of this perplexity on the hypothesis which we attribute to Protagoras? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Not as yet. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the + hidden 'truth' of a famous man or school. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: To be sure, I shall be very much obliged. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Take a look round, then, and see that none of the uninitiated + are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in + nothing but what they can grasp in their hands, and who will not allow + that action or generation or anything invisible can have real existence. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very hard and impenetrable + mortals. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the + brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their first + principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of + which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend: there is nothing + but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in + endless number; and out of the union and friction of them there is + generated a progeny endless in number, having two forms, sense and the + object of sense, which are ever breaking forth and coming to the birth at + the same moment. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; + there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many + more which have names, as well as innumerable others which are without + them; each has its kindred object,—each variety of colour has a + corresponding variety of sight, and so with sound and hearing, and with + the rest of the senses and the objects akin to them. Do you see, + Theaetetus, the bearings of this tale on the preceding argument? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Indeed I do not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then attend, and I will try to finish the story. The purport is + that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion + is of two kinds, a slower and a quicker; and the slower elements have + their motions in the same place and with reference to things near them, + and so they beget; but what is begotten is swifter, for it is carried to + fro, and moves from place to place. Apply this to sense:—When the + eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness + and the sensation connatural with it, which could not have been given by + either of them going elsewhere, then, while the sight is flowing from the + eye, whiteness proceeds from the object which combines in producing the + colour; and so the eye is fulfilled with sight, and really sees, and + becomes, not sight, but a seeing eye; and the object which combined to + form the colour is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but + a white thing, whether wood or stone or whatever the object may be which + happens to be coloured white. And this is true of all sensible objects, + hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was + saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of + them of whatever kind generated by motion in their intercourse with one + another; for of the agent and patient, as existing in separation, no + trustworthy conception, as they say, can be formed, for the agent has no + existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence + until united with the agent; and that which by uniting with something + becomes an agent, by meeting with some other thing is converted into a + patient. And from all these considerations, as I said at first, there + arises a general reflection, that there is no one self-existent thing, but + everything is becoming and in relation; and being must be altogether + abolished, although from habit and ignorance we are compelled even in this + discussion to retain the use of the term. But great philosophers tell us + that we are not to allow either the word 'something,' or 'belonging to + something,' or 'to me,' or 'this,' or 'that,' or any other detaining name + to be used, in the language of nature all things are being created and + destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name + fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And + this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of + aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or + 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not + these speculations sweet as honey? And do you not like the taste of them + in the mouth? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot + make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw + me out. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to know, + anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am the + barren midwife; and this is why I soothe you, and offer you one good thing + after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help + to bring your own opinion into the light of day: when this has been + accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth + is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine birth. Therefore, keep up your + spirits, and answer like a man what you think. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Ask me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then once more: Is it your opinion that nothing is but what + becomes?—the good and the noble, as well as all the other things + which we were just now mentioning? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there + is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; for there still + remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and + diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of + hearing and sight, or of other senses. For you know that in all these + cases the esse-percipi theory appears to be unmistakably refuted, since in + dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from + saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing + is which appears. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But then, my boy, how can any one contend that knowledge is + perception, or that to every man what appears is? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, + because you rebuked me just now for making this excuse; but I certainly + cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they + imagine, some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, + and are flying in their sleep. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you see another question which can be raised about these + phenomena, notably about dreaming and waking? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A question which I think that you must often have heard persons + ask:—How can you determine whether at this moment we are sleeping, + and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to + one another in the waking state? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how to prove the one any more + than the other, for in both cases the facts precisely correspond;—and + there is no difficulty in supposing that during all this discussion we + have been talking to one another in a dream; and when in a dream we seem + to be narrating dreams, the resemblance of the two states is quite + astonishing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You see, then, that a doubt about the reality of sense is easily + raised, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a + dream. And as our time is equally divided between sleeping and waking, in + either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are + present to our minds at the time are true; and during one half of our + lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the + other; and are equally confident of both. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the + difference is only that the times are not equal. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That would be in many ways ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But can you certainly determine by any other means which of + these opinions is true? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do not think that I can. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, + which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I imagine—Can + that which is wholly other than something, have the same quality as that + from which it differs? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word 'other' + means not 'partially,' but 'wholly other.' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly, putting the question as you do, that which is + wholly other cannot either potentially or in any other way be the same. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And must therefore be admitted to be unlike? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or + another, when it becomes like we call it the same—when unlike, + other? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and + patients many and infinite? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And also that different combinations will produce results which + are not the same, but different? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—There + is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and + Socrates in sickness as a whole? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Exactly; that is my meaning. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I answer, they are unlike. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if unlike, they are other? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and waking, + or in any of the states which we were mentioning? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All agents have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as + he is well or ill. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will + produce something different in each of the two cases? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and + pleasant to me? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent + meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which + are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the + patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which + arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and + to appear sweet to the healthy tongue. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly; that has been already acknowledged. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon another and a + different person? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is + sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness + in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in and about the + wine, which becomes not bitterness but something bitter; as I myself + become not perception but percipient? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same + perception, for another object would give another perception, and would + make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects + me, meeting another subject, produce the same, or become similar, for that + too would produce another result from another subject, and become + different. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Neither can I by myself, have this sensation, nor the object by + itself, this quality. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there + can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the object, + whether it become sweet, bitter, or of any other quality, must have + relation to a percipient; nothing can become sweet which is sweet to no + one. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the inference is, that we (the agent and patient) are or + become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to + the other, but not to any other existence, nor each of us to himself; and + therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person + says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or + of or in relation to something else; but he must not say or allow any one + else to say that anything is or becomes absolutely:—such is our + conclusion. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no + other, I and no other am the percipient of it? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then my perception is true to me, being inseparable from my own + being; and, as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what + is not to me. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the + conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I + perceive? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only + perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer + and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and + flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all + things; or with Theaetetus, that, given these premises, perception is + knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and is not this your new-born + child, of which I have delivered you? What say you? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I + have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we + must run round the hearth with him, and see whether he is worth rearing, + or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not + exposed? or will you bear to see him rejected, and not get into a passion + if I take away your first-born? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-natured. But + tell me, Socrates, in heaven's name, is this, after all, not the truth? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You, Theodorus, are a lover of theories, and now you innocently + fancy that I am a bag full of them, and can easily pull one out which will + overthrow its predecessor. But you do not see that in reality none of + these theories come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. I + only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to + receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing myself, + but shall endeavour to elicit something from our young friend. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Do as you say, Socrates; you are quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance + Protagoras? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am charmed with his doctrine, that what appears is to each + one, but I wonder that he did not begin his book on Truth with a + declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other yet stranger + monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then he might + have shown a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him by informing us + at the outset that while we were reverencing him like a God for his wisdom + he was no better than a tadpole, not to speak of his fellow-men—would + not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only + sensation, and no man can discern another's feelings better than he, or + has any superior right to determine whether his opinion is true or false, + but each, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, + and everything that he judges is true and right, why, my friend, should + Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and + deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if + each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad + captandum' in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in + which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the + attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be + a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man his own are right; + and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the + philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the + shrine of his book. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and + therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when + I agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to + answer very nicely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, + would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them + making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of + judging of your own person? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, + in consideration of my age and stiffness; let some more supple youth try a + fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers + say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus: Tell me, + Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not lost in wonder, + like myself, when you find that all of a sudden you are raised to the + level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?—for you would + assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly I should, and I confess to you that I am lost in + wonder. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that + whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, my dear boy, you are young, and therefore your ear is + quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, + or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,—Good + people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, whose + existence or non-existence I banish from writing and speech, or you talk + about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which + is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or + demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely + you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of + probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any + other mathematician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in + geometry, would not be worth an ace. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: But neither you nor we, Socrates, would be satisfied with such + arguments. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must look at the + matter in some other way? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, in quite another way. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the way will be to ask whether perception is or is not the + same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a + view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we say that we know every thing which we see and hear? for + example, shall we say that not having learned, we do not hear the language + of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that we not only + hear, but know what they are saying? Or again, if we see letters which we + do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we aver + that, seeing them, we must know them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: We shall say, Socrates, that we know what we actually see and + hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour + of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the + sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that + which grammarians and interpreters teach about them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Capital, Theaetetus; and about this there shall be no dispute, + because I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which + you will also have to repulse. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Some one will say, Can a man who has ever known anything, and + still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that + which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a + tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who + has learned, and remembers, can fail to know? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Impossible, Socrates; the supposition is monstrous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Am I talking nonsense, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, + and is not sight perception? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which + he has seen? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is memory of something or of nothing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of something, surely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of things learned and perceived, that is? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Often a man remembers that which he has seen? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he closed his eyes, would he forget? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Who, Socrates, would dare to say so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But we must say so, if the previous argument is to be + maintained. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean? I am not quite sure that I understand you, + though I have a strong suspicion that you are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for + perception and sight and knowledge are admitted to be the same. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, + remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And seeing is knowing, and therefore not-seeing is not-knowing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the + knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, because he + does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be a monstrous + supposition. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, + involves a manifest impossibility? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then they must be distinguished? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I suppose that they must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' + and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: About what? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Like a good-for-nothing cock, without having won the victory, we + walk away from the argument and crow. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: After the manner of disputers (Lys.; Phaedo; Republic), we were + satisfied with mere verbal consistency, and were well pleased if in this + way we could gain an advantage. Although professing not to be mere + Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen + into the error of that ingenious class of persons. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do not as yet understand you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the + question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, + and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his + eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember + and not know. But this was an impossibility. And so the Protagorean fable + came to nought, and yours also, who maintained that knowledge is the same + as perception. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, I rather suspect that the result would have + been different if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two + brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say on their + behalf. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the + guardians whom he left, and of whom our friend Theodorus is one, are + unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up + his cause myself, and see justice done? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is + guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of + dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless, I shall be grateful to you if you + assist him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the + rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of terms as they are + commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes + than these. Shall I explain this matter to you or to Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less + disgrace if he is discomfited. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:—Can + a man know and also not know that which he knows? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: How shall we answer, Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: He cannot, I should say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He can, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are + imprisoned in a well, as the saying is, and the self-assured adversary + closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his + cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable + man? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should answer, 'Not with that eye but with the other.' + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, in a certain sense. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: None of that, he will reply; I do not ask or bid you answer in + what sense you know, but only whether you know that which you do not know. + You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have + already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not-seeing is + not-knowing: I leave you to draw the inference. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my marvel, and there might have been yet worse things in + store for you, if an opponent had gone on to ask whether you can have a + sharp and also a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at + a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on + without end. Such questions might have been put to you by a light-armed + mercenary, who argued for pay. He would have lain in wait for you, and + when you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, he would have made + an assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;—he would + have shown you no mercy; and while you were lost in envy and admiration of + his wisdom, he would have got you into his net, out of which you would not + have escaped until you had come to an understanding about the sum to be + paid for your release. Well, you ask, and how will Protagoras reinforce + his position? Shall I answer for him? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will repeat all those things which we have been urging on his + behalf, and then he will close with us in disdain, and say:—The + worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember + and not know the same thing, and the boy said No, because he was + frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made fun + of poor me. The truth is, O slatternly Socrates, that when you ask + questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found + tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, + but if he answers something else, then he is refuted and not I. For do you + really suppose that any one would admit the memory which a man has of an + impression which has passed away to be the same with that which he + experienced at the time? Assuredly not. Or would he hesitate to + acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing? Or, if + he is afraid of making this admission, would he ever grant that one who + has become unlike is the same as before he became unlike? Or would he + admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite as the + changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid + entanglements of words. But, O my good sir, he will say, come to the + argument in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that our + sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit them to be + so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance + becomes, or, if you will have the word, is, to the individual only. As to + your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself behaving like a pig, + and you teach your hearers to make sport of my writings in the same + ignorant manner; but this is not to your credit. For I declare that the + truth is as I have written, and that each of us is a measure of existence + and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than + another in proportion as different things are and appear to him. And I am + far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say + that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, + into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press + my words in the letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain + them. Remember what has been already said,—that to the sick man his + food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of + bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be + made wiser than the other: nor can you assert that the sick man because he + has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another + is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the + worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be + effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the + physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another + think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is + not, or, think anything different from that which he feels; and this is + always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of kindred + nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; + and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, + and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men + tadpoles: far from it; I say that they are the physicians of the human + body, and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away + the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good + and healthy sensations—aye and true ones; and the wise and good + rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil to seem just to states; for + whatever appears to a state to be just and fair, so long as it is regarded + as such, is just and fair to it; but the teacher of wisdom causes the good + to take the place of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And in + like manner the Sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is + a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And so one man is wiser + than another; and no one thinks falsely, and you, whether you will or not, + must endure to be a measure. On these foundations the argument stands + firm, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an opposite + argument, or if you like you may put questions to me—a method to + which no intelligent person will object, quite the reverse. But I must beg + you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that + you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. + The unfairness of which I complain is that you do not distinguish between + mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as + often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, + and only correct his adversary when necessary, telling him the errors into + which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he + has previously kept. If you do so, your adversary will lay the blame of + his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will + follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into + philosophy, in order that he may become different from what he was. But + the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the many, will have just + the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning + philosopher, he will come to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, + therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical + and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial + spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and + that to every individual and state what appears, is. In this manner you + will consider whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different, + but you will not argue, as you were just now doing, from the customary use + of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all sorts of ways, causing + infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight + help which I am able to offer to your old friend; had he been living, he + would have helped himself in a far more gloriose style. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defence of him has been + most valorous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras + bidding us be serious, as the text, 'Man is the measure of all things,' + was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of + discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his + argument; he also declared that we made a joke of him. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: How could I fail to observe all that, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and shall we do as he says? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up the + argument, and in all seriousness, and ask and answer one another, for you + see that the rest of us are nothing but boys. In no other way can we + escape the imputation, that in our fresh analysis of his thesis we are + making fun with boys. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Well, but is not Theaetetus better able to follow a + philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please + not to imagine that I am to defend by every means in my power your + departed friend; and that you are to defend nothing and nobody. At any + rate, my good man, do not sheer off until we know whether you are a true + measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and + sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and the other + branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: He who is sitting by you, Socrates, will not easily avoid being + drawn into an argument; and when I said just now that you would excuse me, + and not, like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I was + talking nonsense—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw + travellers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is 'strip or + depart,' but you seem to go about your work more after the fashion of + Antaeus: you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you + have stripped him, and he has been compelled to try a fall with you in + argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There, Theodorus, you have hit off precisely the nature of my + complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I + have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in + words, has broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough + exercise, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to try a fall + with me, whereby you will do yourself good as well as me. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are + like destiny; no man can escape from any argument which you may weave for + him. But I am not disposed to go further than you suggest. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Once will be enough; and now take particular care that we do not + again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I will do my best to avoid that error. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see + whether we were right in blaming and taking offence at Protagoras on the + ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although + he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of + this, some who as he said were the wise excelled others. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Had Protagoras been living and answered for himself, instead of + our answering for him, there would have been no need of our reviewing or + reinforcing the argument. But as he is not here, and some one may accuse + us of speaking without authority on his behalf, had we not better come to + a clearer agreement about his meaning, for a great deal may be at stake? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us obtain, not through any third person, but from his + own statement and in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: In what way? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In this way:—His words are, 'What seems to a man, is to + him.' + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, so he says. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or + rather of all mankind, when we say that every one thinks himself wiser + than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? In the hour + of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, + do they not look up to their commanders as if they were gods, and expect + salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the + world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for + teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty + who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this + is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their + own opinion. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And wisdom is assumed by them to be true thought, and ignorance + to be false opinion. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? + Shall we say that the opinions of men are always true, or sometimes true + and sometimes false? In either case, the result is the same, and their + opinions are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For + tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that you yourself, or any other + follower of Protagoras, would contend that no one deems another ignorant + or mistaken in his opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: The thing is incredible, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis + which declares man to be the measure of all things. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be + true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he argues, that + this is true to you. Now, if so, you must either say that the rest of us + are not the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or that we judge + you always to have a true opinion? But are there not thousands upon + thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms against you and + are of an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as + Homer says, who give me a world of trouble. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but are we to assert that what you think is true to you + and false to the ten thousand others? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: No other inference seems to be possible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how about Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the + multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of + all things, must it not follow that the truth of which Protagoras wrote + would be true to no one? But if you suppose that he himself thought this, + and that the multitude does not agree with him, you must begin by allowing + that in whatever proportion the many are more than one, in that proportion + his truth is more untrue than true. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with + individual opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of + their opinion who believe his own opinion to be false; for he admits that + the opinions of all men are true. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he + admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whereas the other side do not admit that they speak falsely? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: They do not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this + opinion is also true. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then all mankind, beginning with Protagoras, will contend, or + rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his + adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow + that neither a dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which + he has not learned—am I not right? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true + neither to himself to any one else? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, + as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he + could only just get his head out of the world below, he would have + overthrown both of us again and again, me for talking nonsense and you for + assenting to me, and have been off and underground in a trice. But as he + is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such + as they are, and speak out what appears to us to be true. And one thing + which no one will deny is, that there are great differences in the + understandings of men. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: In that opinion I quite agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is there not most likely to be firm ground in the + distinction which we were indicating on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that + most things, and all immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are + only such as they appear; if however difference of opinion is to be + allowed at all, surely we must allow it in respect of health or disease? + for every woman, child, or living creature has not such a knowledge of + what conduces to health as to enable them to cure themselves. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I quite agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or again, in politics, while affirming that just and unjust, + honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state + such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these + matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers + of Protagoras will not deny that in determining what is or is not + expedient for the community one state is wiser and one counsellor better + than another—they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a + city enacts in the belief that it is expedient will always be really + expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and + injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that in nature these have + no existence or essence of their own—the truth is that which is + agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement + lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along + with Protagoras. Here arises a new question, Theodorus, which threatens to + be more serious than the last. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation + which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the + pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear + and speak in court. How natural is this! + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean to say, that those who have been trained in philosophy + and liberal pursuits are as unlike those who from their youth upwards have + been knocking about in the courts and such places, as a freeman is in + breeding unlike a slave. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: In what is the difference seen? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the leisure spoken of by you, which a freeman can always + command: he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, he wanders at + will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third,—if + the fancy takes him, he begins again, as we are doing now, caring not + whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. + But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra + driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will: and there is + his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the indictment, + which in their phraseology is termed the affidavit, is recited at the + time: and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is + continually disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is + seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some + indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often the race is for + his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he + has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but + his soul is small and unrighteous. His condition, which has been that of a + slave from his youth upwards, has deprived him of growth and uprightness + and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and + honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was + unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first + he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and + warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no + soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is + the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the + philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the + argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not until we have finished what we are about; + for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are + not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and + must wait our leisure. Who is our judge? Or where is the spectator having + any right to censure or control us, as he might the poets? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for + there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, + the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their + way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political + assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or decrees, as they are + called, of the state written or recited; the eagerness of political + societies in the attainment of offices—clubs, and banquets, and + revels, and singing-maidens,—do not enter even into their dreams. + Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace + may have descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are + matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they + say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of + his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a + reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the + city: his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human + things, is 'flying all abroad' as Pindar says, measuring earth and heaven + and the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, + interrogating the whole nature of each and all in their entirety, but not + condescending to anything which is within reach. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the + clever witty Thracian handmaid is said to have made about Thales, when he + fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was + so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what + was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all + philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his + next-door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but he + hardly knows whether he is a man or an animal; he is searching into the + essence of man, and busy in enquiring what belongs to such a nature to do + or suffer different from any other;—I think that you understand me, + Theodorus? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I do, and what you say is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as + public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any + place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before + his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the + general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his + inexperience. His awkwardness is fearful, and gives the impression of + imbecility. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer + to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, + and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his + sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, in the + simplicity of his heart he cannot help going into fits of laughter, so + that he seems to be a downright idiot. When he hears a tyrant or king + eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper + of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or perhaps a cowherd, who is + congratulated on the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he + remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the + wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he + observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated + as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a + wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of + ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, + because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they + sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because + he can show seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their + sentiments only betray a dull and narrow vision in those who utter them, + and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that + every man has had thousands and ten thousands of progenitors, and among + them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, + innumerable. And when people pride themselves on having a pedigree of + twenty-five ancestors, which goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, + he cannot understand their poverty of ideas. Why are they unable to + calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been + anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so + on? He amuses himself with the notion that they cannot count, and thinks + that a little arithmetic would have got rid of their senseless vanity. + Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly + because he is thought to despise them, and also because he is ignorant of + what is before him, and always at a loss. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: That is very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and + gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice + and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another + and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of + a king or of a rich man to the consideration of government, and of human + happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man is to + attain the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little + legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher + his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, whence he + looks down into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being + dismayed, and lost, and stammering broken words, is laughed at, not by + Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye + for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up a slave. + Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the freeman, who has + been trained in liberty and leisure, whom you call the philosopher,—him + we cannot blame because he appears simple and of no account when he has to + perform some menial task, such as packing up bed-clothes, or flavouring a + sauce or fawning speech; the other character is that of the man who is + able to do all this kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how + to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less with the music of discourse + can he hymn the true life aright which is lived by immortals or men + blessed of heaven. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, + of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils + among men. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Evils, Theodorus, can never pass away; for there must always + remain something which is antagonistic to good. Having no place among the + gods in heaven, of necessity they hover around the mortal nature, and this + earthly sphere. Wherefore we ought to fly away from earth to heaven as + quickly as we can; and to fly away is to become like God, as far as this + is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy, just, and wise. + But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should + pursue virtue or avoid vice, not merely in order that a man may seem to be + good, which is the reason given by the world, and in my judgment is only a + repetition of an old wives' fable. Whereas, the truth is that God is never + in any way unrighteous—he is perfect righteousness; and he of us who + is the most righteous is most like him. Herein is seen the true cleverness + of a man, and also his nothingness and want of manhood. For to know this + is true wisdom and virtue, and ignorance of this is manifest folly and + vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cleverness, which seem only, such as + the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and + vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had + far better not be encouraged in the illusion that his roguery is clever; + for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying + of them, 'These are not mere good-for-nothing persons, mere burdens of the + earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let + us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not think they + are because they do not know it; for they do not know the penalty of + injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and + death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which + cannot be escaped. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are two patterns eternally set before them; the one + blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched: but they do not see + them, or perceive that in their utter folly and infatuation they are + growing like the one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; + and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which + they are growing like. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from + their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; + and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own + evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their + superior cunning will seem to be listening to the talk of idiots. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Very true, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one + peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about + their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument + out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with + themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they become helpless as + children. These however are digressions from which we must now desist, or + they will overflow, and drown the original argument; to which, if you + please, we will now return. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for + at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to + the argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Had we not reached the point at which the partisans of the + perpetual flux, who say that things are as they seem to each one, were + confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and + thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were + in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no + one had any longer the hardihood to contend of any ordinances which the + state thought and enacted to be good that these, while they were in force, + were really good;—he who said so would be playing with the name + 'good,' and would not touch the real question—it would be a mockery, + would it not? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly it would. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He ought not to speak of the name, but of the thing which is + contemplated under the name. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whatever be the term used, the good or expedient is the aim of + legislation, and as far as she has an opinion, the state imposes all laws + with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other + aim? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is the aim attained always? do not mistakes often happen? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, I think that there are mistakes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognised, if + we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good + or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws + are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after-time; which, + in other words, is the future. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a + question:—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man is, as you declare, + the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: of all such things he + is the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he + thinks that things are such as he experiences them to be, he thinks what + is and is true to himself. Is it not so? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we shall further + say), to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion + not only of what in his opinion is but of what will be, and do things + always happen to him as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:—When + an ordinary man thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this + kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks + the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both + right?—he will have a heat and fever in his own judgment, and not + have a fever in the physician's judgment? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: How ludicrous! + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is a better judge of + the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the + harp-player? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in musical composition the musician will know better than + the training master what the training master himself will hereafter think + harmonious or the reverse? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a + cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in + preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not as yet arguing; + but can we say that every one will be to himself the best judge of the + pleasure which will seem to be and will be to him in the future?—nay, + would not you, Protagoras, better guess which arguments in a court would + convince any one of us than the ordinary man? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner + that he was the superior of all men in this respect. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To be sure, friend: who would have paid a large sum for the + privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that + neither a prophet nor any other man was better able to judge what will be + and seem to be in the future than every one could for himself? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Who indeed? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the + future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often + fail of their highest interests? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit + one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure: but I, + who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the + advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or + not, of being a measure of anything. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: That is the best refutation of him, Socrates; although he is + also caught when he ascribes truth to the opinions of others, who give the + lie direct to his own opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that every + opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty + in proving that states of feeling, which are present to a man, and out of + which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also + untrue. And very likely I have been talking nonsense about them; for they + may be unassailable, and those who say that there is clear evidence of + them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in + which case our friend Theaetetus was not so far from the mark when he + identified perception and knowledge. And therefore let us draw nearer, as + the advocate of Protagoras desires; and give the truth of the universal + flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is + raging about it, and there are combination not a few. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: No small, war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid + strides; the disciples of Heracleitus are most energetic upholders of the + doctrine. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the + question from the foundation as it is set forth by themselves. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heracleitus, + which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still, the Ephesians + themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot + talk with them on the subject. For, in accordance with their text-books, + they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a + question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they can no more do so + than they can fly; or rather, the determination of these fellows not to + have a particle of rest in them is more than the utmost powers of negation + can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a + quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire + the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled + word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; + their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their + arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such + principle would be stationary; for they are at war with the stationary, + and do what they can to drive it out everywhere. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they + were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they + are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated + by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they + want to make like themselves. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of their sort are + not one another's disciples, but they grow up at their own sweet will, and + get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that + he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will + never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must + take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as + if we were doing geometrical problem. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Quite right too; but as touching the aforesaid problem, have we + not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in + poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are + streams, and that nothing is at rest? And now the moderns, in their + superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may + hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things + are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion, + he will duly honour his teachers. I had almost forgotten the opposite + doctrine, Theodorus, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Alone Being remains unmoved, which is the name for the all.' +</pre> + <p> + This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who + stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained, and has no + place in which to move. What shall we do, friend, with all these people; + for, advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the + combatants, and, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the + penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are + caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties. + Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we + first accosted, 'the river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we + will help them to pull us over, and try to get away from the others. But + if the partisans of 'the whole' appear to speak more truly, we will fly + off from the party which would move the immovable, to them. And if I find + that neither of them have anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a + ridiculous position, having so great a conceit of our own poor opinion and + rejecting that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that + there is any use in proceeding when the danger is so great? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties + have to say would be quite intolerable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then examine we must, since you, who were so reluctant to begin, + are so eager to proceed. The nature of motion appears to be the question + with which we begin. What do they mean when they say that all things are + in motion? Is there only one kind of motion, or, as I rather incline to + think, two? I should like to have your opinion upon this point in addition + to my own, that I may err, if I must err, in your company; tell me, then, + when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same + place, is not that what is called motion? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here then we have one kind of motion. But when a thing, + remaining on the same spot, grows old, or becomes black from being white, + or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, may not this be + properly called motion of another kind? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Say rather that it must be so. Of motion then there are these + two kinds, 'change,' and 'motion in place.' + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: You are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves + to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things + according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as + move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another in one + only? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think they would + say that all things are moved in both ways. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, comrade; for, if not, they would have to say that the same + things are in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in + saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of + motion, all things must always have every sort of motion? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Consider a further point: did we not understand them to explain + the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner + as the following:—were they not saying that each of them is moving + between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and that + the patient ceases to be a perceiving power and becomes a percipient, and + the agent a quale instead of a quality? I suspect that quality may appear + a strange and uncouth term to you, and that you do not understand the + abstract expression. Then I will take concrete instances: I mean to say + that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness but + hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said + before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, + but when they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the + one becomes a thing of a certain quality, and the other a percipient. You + remember? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We may leave the details of their theory unexamined, but we must + not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are + all things in motion and flux? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, they will reply. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished, + that is to say, they move in place and are also changed? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Of course, if the motion is to be perfect. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If they only moved in place and were not changed, we should be + able to say what is the nature of the things which are in motion and flux? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and + whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, + and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any colour be + rightly used at all? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: How is that possible, Socrates, either in the case of this or + of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is + escaping in the flux? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and + hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act + of seeing and hearing? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly not, if all things are in motion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not-seeing, + nor of any other perception more than of any non-perception, if all things + partake of every kind of motion? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yet perception is knowledge: so at least Theaetetus and I were + saying. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered + what is knowledge than what is not knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in + our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, + every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a + thing is or is not thus; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' thus; and if we say + 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'thus' and 'not thus.' But you + ought not to use the word 'thus,' for there is no motion in 'thus' or in + 'not thus.' The maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words in which + to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that + will suit them, except perhaps 'no how,' which is perfectly indefinite. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Yes, that is a manner of speaking in which they will be quite + at home. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend without + assenting to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—a + wise man only is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is + perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless + perchance our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us that it is. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the + doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering; + for this was the agreement. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed the + doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were + proposing. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your + elders to a breach of faith, but should prepare to answer Socrates in the + remainder of the argument. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the + doctrine of rest. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Invite Socrates to an argument—invite horsemen to the + open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to + comply with the request of Theaetetus. + </p> + <p> + THEODORUS: Not comply! for what reason? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for + Melissus and the others, who say that 'All is one and at rest,' as for the + great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric + language he may be called;—him I should be ashamed to approach in a + spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere + youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am + afraid that we may not understand his words, and may be still further from + understanding his meaning; above all I fear that the nature of knowledge, + which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by + the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon our feast of discourse, + if we let them in—besides, the question which is now stirring is of + immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the + way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the + other question of knowledge. Neither the one nor the other can be allowed; + but I must try by my art of midwifery to deliver Theaetetus of his + conceptions about knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very well; do so if you will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now, Theaetetus, take another view of the subject: you + answered that knowledge is perception? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black + and white colours? and with what does he hear high and low sounds?—you + would say, if I am not mistaken, 'With the eyes and with the ears.' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute precision, + is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is + pedantic; but sometimes precision is necessary, and I believe that the + answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; + for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and + with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should say 'through,' Socrates, rather than 'with.' + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, my boy, for no one can suppose that in each of us, as in a + sort of Trojan horse, there are perched a number of unconnected senses, + which do not all meet in some one nature, the mind, or whatever we please + to call it, of which they are the instruments, and with which through them + we perceive objects of sense. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I agree with you in that opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know + whether, when we perceive black and white through the eyes, and again, + other qualities through other organs, we do not perceive them with one and + the same part of ourselves, and, if you were asked, you might refer all + such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to + answer for yourself and not interfere. Tell me, then, are not the organs + through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of + the body? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of the body, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty + you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, + cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through + hearing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If you have any thought about both of them, this common + perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How about sounds and colours: in the first place you would admit + that they both exist? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that either of them is different from the other, and the + same with itself? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that both are two and each of them one? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You can further observe whether they are like or unlike one + another? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I dare say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But through what do you perceive all this about them? for + neither through hearing nor yet through seeing can you apprehend that + which they have in common. Let me give you an illustration of the point at + issue:—If there were any meaning in asking whether sounds and + colours are saline or not, you would be able to tell me what faculty would + consider the question. It would not be sight or hearing, but some other. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly; the faculty of taste. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not + only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as + those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which + we were just asking—what organs will you assign for the perception + of these notions? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You are thinking of being and not being, likeness and + unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers + which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what + bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other + arithmetical conceptions. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I + am asking. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that + these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind, + by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was + saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And + besides being beautiful, you have done me a kindness in releasing me from + a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things + by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own + opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am quite clear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, + of all our notions, is the most universal? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should say, to that class which the soul aspires to know of + herself. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you say this also of like and unlike, same and other? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good + and evil? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: These I conceive to be notions which are essentially relative, + and which the soul also perceives by comparing in herself things past and + present with the future. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by + the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But their essence and what they are, and their opposition to one + another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself + endeavours to decide for us by the review and comparison of them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are + given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on the + being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever + gained, by education and long experience. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of + that thing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: He cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in + reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth + and being can be attained? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when + there is so great a difference between them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That would certainly not be right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being + cold and being hot? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving—what other name + could be given to them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any + more than of being? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge + or science? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most + distinctly proved to be different from perception. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather + what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some + progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in + that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged + with being. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You mean, Socrates, if I am not mistaken, what is called + thinking or opining. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You conceive truly. And now, my friend, please to begin again at + this point; and having wiped out of your memory all that has preceded, see + if you have arrived at any clearer view, and once more say what is + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I cannot say, Socrates, that all opinion is knowledge, because + there may be a false opinion; but I will venture to assert, that knowledge + is true opinion: let this then be my reply; and if this is hereafter + disproved, I must try to find another. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is the way in which you ought to answer, Theaetetus, and + not in your former hesitating strain, for if we are bold we shall gain one + of two advantages; either we shall find what we seek, or we shall be less + likely to think that we know what we do not know—in either case we + shall be richly rewarded. And now, what are you saying?—Are there + two sorts of opinion, one true and the other false; and do you define + knowledge to be the true? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, according to my present view. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is it still worth our while to resume the discussion touching + opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: To what are you alluding? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is a point which often troubles me, and is a great + perplexity to me, both in regard to myself and others. I cannot make out + the nature or origin of the mental experience to which I refer. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Pray what is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How there can be false opinion—that difficulty still + troubles the eye of my mind; and I am uncertain whether I shall leave the + question, or begin over again in a new way. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Begin again, Socrates,—at least if you think that there + is the slightest necessity for doing so. Were not you and Theodorus just + now remarking very truly, that in discussions of this kind we may take our + own time? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You are quite right, and perhaps there will be no harm in + retracing our steps and beginning again. Better a little which is well + done, than a great deal imperfectly. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and what is the difficulty? Do we not speak of false + opinion, and say that one man holds a false and another a true opinion, as + though there were some natural distinction between them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: We certainly say so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All things and everything are either known or not known. I leave + out of view the intermediate conceptions of learning and forgetting, + because they have nothing to do with our present question. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: There can be no doubt, Socrates, if you exclude these, that + there is no other alternative but knowing or not knowing a thing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That point being now determined, must we not say that he who has + an opinion, must have an opinion about something which he knows or does + not know? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: He must. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He who knows, cannot but know; and he who does not know, cannot + know? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What shall we say then? When a man has a false opinion does he + think that which he knows to be some other thing which he knows, and + knowing both, is he at the same time ignorant of both? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That, Socrates, is impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But perhaps he thinks of something which he does not know as + some other thing which he does not know; for example, he knows neither + Theaetetus nor Socrates, and yet he fancies that Theaetetus is Socrates, + or Socrates Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How can he? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But surely he cannot suppose what he knows to be what he does + not know, or what he does not know to be what he knows? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That would be monstrous. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Where, then, is false opinion? For if all things are either + known or unknown, there can be no opinion which is not comprehended under + this alternative, and so false opinion is excluded. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Suppose that we remove the question out of the sphere of knowing + or not knowing, into that of being and not-being. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May we not suspect the simple truth to be that he who thinks + about anything, that which is not, will necessarily think what is false, + whatever in other respects may be the state of his mind? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That, again, is not unlikely, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then suppose some one to say to us, Theaetetus:—Is it + possible for any man to think that which is not, either as a self-existent + substance or as a predicate of something else? And suppose that we answer, + 'Yes, he can, when he thinks what is not true.'—That will be our + answer? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is there any parallel to this? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Can a man see something and yet see nothing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do + you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing + things? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He then who sees some one thing, sees something which is? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who hears anything, hears some one thing, and hears that + which is? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and + therefore is? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That again is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks, think some one thing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not he who thinks some one thing, think something which + is? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who thinks of that which is not, thinks of nothing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who thinks of nothing, does not think at all? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Obviously. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then no one can think that which is not, either as a + self-existent substance or as a predicate of something else? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then to think falsely is different from thinking that which is + not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It would seem so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then false opinion has no existence in us, either in the sphere + of being or of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But may not the following be the description of what we express + by this name? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May we not suppose that false opinion or thought is a sort of + heterodoxy; a person may make an exchange in his mind, and say that one + real object is another real object. For thus he always thinks that which + is, but he puts one thing in place of another; and missing the aim of his + thoughts, he may be truly said to have false opinion. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Now you appear to me to have spoken the exact truth: when a + man puts the base in the place of the noble, or the noble in the place of + the base, then he has truly false opinion. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I see, Theaetetus, that your fear has disappeared, and that you + are beginning to despise me. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You think, if I am not mistaken, that your 'truly false' is safe + from censure, and that I shall never ask whether there can be a swift + which is slow, or a heavy which is light, or any other self-contradictory + thing, which works, not according to its own nature, but according to that + of its opposite. But I will not insist upon this, for I do not wish + needlessly to discourage you. And so you are satisfied that false opinion + is heterodoxy, or the thought of something else? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: It is possible then upon your view for the mind to conceive of + one thing as another? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But must not the mind, or thinking power, which misplaces them, + have a conception either of both objects or of one of them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Either together or in succession? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you mean by conceiving, the same which I mean? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I mean the conversation which the soul holds with herself in + considering of anything. I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the + soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions + of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has + arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at + last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, + that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I + mean, to oneself and in silence, not aloud or to another: What think you? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then when any one thinks of one thing as another, he is saying + to himself that one thing is another? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you ever remember saying to yourself that the noble is + certainly base, or the unjust just; or, best of all—have you ever + attempted to convince yourself that one thing is another? Nay, not even in + sleep, did you ever venture to say to yourself that odd is even, or + anything of the kind? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Never. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you suppose that any other man, either in his senses or + out of them, ever seriously tried to persuade himself that an ox is a + horse, or that two are one? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if thinking is talking to oneself, no one speaking and + thinking of two objects, and apprehending them both in his soul, will say + and think that the one is the other of them, and I must add, that even + you, lover of dispute as you are, had better let the word 'other' alone + (i.e. not insist that 'one' and 'other' are the same (Both words in Greek + are called eteron: compare Parmen.; Euthyd.)). I mean to say, that no one + thinks the noble to be base, or anything of the kind. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I will give up the word 'other,' Socrates; and I agree to what + you say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If a man has both of them in his thoughts, he cannot think that + the one of them is the other? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Neither, if he has one of them only in his mind and not the + other, can he think that one is the other? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True; for we should have to suppose that he apprehends that + which is not in his thoughts at all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then no one who has either both or only one of the two objects + in his mind can think that the one is the other. And therefore, he who + maintains that false opinion is heterodoxy is talking nonsense; for + neither in this, any more than in the previous way, can false opinion + exist in us. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, this is not admitted, we shall be driven + into many absurdities. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will not tell you until I have endeavoured to consider the + matter from every point of view. For I should be ashamed of us if we were + driven in our perplexity to admit the absurd consequences of which I + speak. But if we find the solution, and get away from them, we may regard + them only as the difficulties of others, and the ridicule will not attach + to us. On the other hand, if we utterly fail, I suppose that we must be + humble, and allow the argument to trample us under foot, as the sea-sick + passenger is trampled upon by the sailor, and to do anything to us. + Listen, then, while I tell you how I hope to find a way out of our + difficulty. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think that we were wrong in denying that a man could think + what he knew to be what he did not know; and that there is a way in which + such a deception is possible. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You mean to say, as I suspected at the time, that I may know + Socrates, and at a distance see some one who is unknown to me, and whom I + mistake for him—then the deception will occur? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But has not that position been relinquished by us, because + involving the absurdity that we should know and not know the things which + we know? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us make the assertion in another form, which may or may not + have a favourable issue; but as we are in a great strait, every argument + should be turned over and tested. Tell me, then, whether I am right in + saying that you may learn a thing which at one time you did not know? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly you may. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And another and another? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I would have you imagine, then, that there exists in the mind of + man a block of wax, which is of different sizes in different men; harder, + moister, and having more or less of purity in one than another, and in + some of an intermediate quality. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I see. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us say that this tablet is a gift of Memory, the mother of + the Muses; and that when we wish to remember anything which we have seen, + or heard, or thought in our own minds, we hold the wax to the perceptions + and thoughts, and in that material receive the impression of them as from + the seal of a ring; and that we remember and know what is imprinted as + long as the image lasts; but when the image is effaced, or cannot be + taken, then we forget and do not know. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now, when a person has this knowledge, and is considering + something which he sees or hears, may not false opinion arise in the + following manner? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: In what manner? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When he thinks what he knows, sometimes to be what he knows, and + sometimes to be what he does not know. We were wrong before in denying the + possibility of this. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: And how would you amend the former statement? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I should begin by making a list of the impossible cases which + must be excluded. (1) No one can think one thing to be another when he + does not perceive either of them, but has the memorial or seal of both of + them in his mind; nor can any mistaking of one thing for another occur, + when he only knows one, and does not know, and has no impression of the + other; nor can he think that one thing which he does not know is another + thing which he does not know, or that what he does not know is what he + knows; nor (2) that one thing which he perceives is another thing which he + perceives, or that something which he perceives is something which he does + not perceive; or that something which he does not perceive is something + else which he does not perceive; or that something which he does not + perceive is something which he perceives; nor again (3) can he think that + something which he knows and perceives, and of which he has the impression + coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows and perceives, and + of which he has the impression coinciding with sense;—this last + case, if possible, is still more inconceivable than the others; nor (4) + can he think that something which he knows and perceives, and of which he + has the memorial coinciding with sense, is something else which he knows; + nor so long as these agree, can he think that a thing which he knows and + perceives is another thing which he perceives; or that a thing which he + does not know and does not perceive, is the same as another thing which he + does not know and does not perceive;—nor again, can he suppose that + a thing which he does not know and does not perceive is the same as + another thing which he does not know; or that a thing which he does not + know and does not perceive is another thing which he does not perceive:—All + these utterly and absolutely exclude the possibility of false opinion. The + only cases, if any, which remain, are the following. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What are they? If you tell me, I may perhaps understand you + better; but at present I am unable to follow you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A person may think that some things which he knows, or which he + perceives and does not know, are some other things which he knows and + perceives; or that some things which he knows and perceives, are other + things which he knows and perceives. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I understand you less than ever now. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Hear me once more, then:—I, knowing Theodorus, and + remembering in my own mind what sort of person he is, and also what sort + of person Theaetetus is, at one time see them, and at another time do not + see them, and sometimes I touch them, and at another time not, or at one + time I may hear them or perceive them in some other way, and at another + time not perceive them, but still I remember them, and know them in my own + mind. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, first of all, I want you to understand that a man may or + may not perceive sensibly that which he knows. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that which he does not know will sometimes not be perceived + by him and sometimes will be perceived and only perceived? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That is also true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: See whether you can follow me better now: Socrates can recognize + Theodorus and Theaetetus, but he sees neither of them, nor does he + perceive them in any other way; he cannot then by any possibility imagine + in his own mind that Theaetetus is Theodorus. Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You are quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then that was the first case of which I spoke. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The second case was, that I, knowing one of you and not knowing + the other, and perceiving neither, can never think him whom I know to be + him whom I do not know. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the third case, not knowing and not perceiving either of you, + I cannot think that one of you whom I do not know is the other whom I do + not know. I need not again go over the catalogue of excluded cases, in + which I cannot form a false opinion about you and Theodorus, either when I + know both or when I am in ignorance of both, or when I know one and not + the other. And the same of perceiving: do you understand me? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The only possibility of erroneous opinion is, when knowing you + and Theodorus, and having on the waxen block the impression of both of you + given as by a seal, but seeing you imperfectly and at a distance, I try to + assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and + to fit this into its own print: if I succeed, recognition will take place; + but if I fail and transpose them, putting the foot into the wrong shoe—that + is to say, putting the vision of either of you on to the wrong impression, + or if my mind, like the sight in a mirror, which is transferred from right + to left, err by reason of some similar affection, then 'heterodoxy' and + false opinion ensues. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, Socrates, you have described the nature of opinion with + wonderful exactness. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or again, when I know both of you, and perceive as well as know + one of you, but not the other, and my knowledge of him does not accord + with perception—that was the case put by me just now which you did + not understand. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No, I did not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I meant to say, that when a person knows and perceives one of + you, his knowledge coincides with his perception, he will never think him + to be some other person, whom he knows and perceives, and the knowledge of + whom coincides with his perception—for that also was a case + supposed. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But there was an omission of the further case, in which, as we + now say, false opinion may arise, when knowing both, and seeing, or having + some other sensible perception of both, I fail in holding the seal over + against the corresponding sensation; like a bad archer, I miss and fall + wide of the mark—and this is called falsehood. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes; it is rightly so called. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When, therefore, perception is present to one of the seals or + impressions but not to the other, and the mind fits the seal of the absent + perception on the one which is present, in any case of this sort the mind + is deceived; in a word, if our view is sound, there can be no error or + deception about things which a man does not know and has never perceived, + but only in things which are known and perceived; in these alone opinion + turns and twists about, and becomes alternately true and false;—true + when the seals and impressions of sense meet straight and opposite—false + when they go awry and crooked. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: And is not that, Socrates, nobly said? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nobly! yes; but wait a little and hear the explanation, and then + you will say so with more reason; for to think truly is noble and to be + deceived is base. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the origin of truth and error is as follows:—When the + wax in the soul of any one is deep and abundant, and smooth and perfectly + tempered, then the impressions which pass through the senses and sink into + the heart of the soul, as Homer says in a parable, meaning to indicate the + likeness of the soul to wax (Kerh Kerhos); these, I say, being pure and + clear, and having a sufficient depth of wax, are also lasting, and minds, + such as these, easily learn and easily retain, and are not liable to + confusion, but have true thoughts, for they have plenty of room, and + having clear impressions of things, as we term them, quickly distribute + them into their proper places on the block. And such men are called wise. + Do you agree? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Entirely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when the heart of any one is shaggy—a quality which + the all-wise poet commends, or muddy and of impure wax, or very soft, or + very hard, then there is a corresponding defect in the mind—the soft + are good at learning, but apt to forget; and the hard are the reverse; the + shaggy and rugged and gritty, or those who have an admixture of earth or + dung in their composition, have the impressions indistinct, as also the + hard, for there is no depth in them; and the soft too are indistinct, for + their impressions are easily confused and effaced. Yet greater is the + indistinctness when they are all jostled together in a little soul, which + has no room. These are the natures which have false opinion; for when they + see or hear or think of anything, they are slow in assigning the right + objects to the right impressions—in their stupidity they confuse + them, and are apt to see and hear and think amiss—and such men are + said to be deceived in their knowledge of objects, and ignorant. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No man, Socrates, can say anything truer than that. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then now we may admit the existence of false opinion in us? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And of true opinion also? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We have at length satisfactorily proven beyond a doubt there are + these two sorts of opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Undoubtedly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Alas, Theaetetus, what a tiresome creature is a man who is fond + of talking! + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What makes you say so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because I am disheartened at my own stupidity and tiresome + garrulity; for what other term will describe the habit of a man who is + always arguing on all sides of a question; whose dulness cannot be + convinced, and who will never leave off? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: But what puts you out of heart? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am not only out of heart, but in positive despair; for I do + not know what to answer if any one were to ask me:—O Socrates, have + you indeed discovered that false opinion arises neither in the comparison + of perceptions with one another nor yet in thought, but in union of + thought and perception? Yes, I shall say, with the complacence of one who + thinks that he has made a noble discovery. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I see no reason why we should be ashamed of our demonstration, + Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will say: You mean to argue that the man whom we only think + of and do not see, cannot be confused with the horse which we do not see + or touch, but only think of and do not perceive? That I believe to be my + meaning, I shall reply. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Quite right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, he will say, according to that argument, the number + eleven, which is only thought, can never be mistaken for twelve, which is + only thought: How would you answer him? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should say that a mistake may very likely arise between the + eleven or twelve which are seen or handled, but that no similar mistake + can arise between the eleven and twelve which are in the mind. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but do you think that no one ever put before his own mind + five and seven,—I do not mean five or seven men or horses, but five + or seven in the abstract, which, as we say, are recorded on the waxen + block, and in which false opinion is held to be impossible; did no man + ever ask himself how many these numbers make when added together, and + answer that they are eleven, while another thinks that they are twelve, or + would all agree in thinking and saying that they are twelve? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not; many would think that they are eleven, and in + the higher numbers the chance of error is greater still; for I assume you + to be speaking of numbers in general. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Exactly; and I want you to consider whether this does not imply + that the twelve in the waxen block are supposed to be eleven? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, that seems to be the case. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then do we not come back to the old difficulty? For he who makes + such a mistake does think one thing which he knows to be another thing + which he knows; but this, as we said, was impossible, and afforded an + irresistible proof of the non-existence of false opinion, because + otherwise the same person would inevitably know and not know the same + thing at the same time. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then false opinion cannot be explained as a confusion of thought + and sense, for in that case we could not have been mistaken about pure + conceptions of thought; and thus we are obliged to say, either that false + opinion does not exist, or that a man may not know that which he knows;—which + alternative do you prefer? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It is hard to determine, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet the argument will scarcely admit of both. But, as we are + at our wits' end, suppose that we do a shameless thing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us attempt to explain the verb 'to know.' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: And why should that be shameless? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You seem not to be aware that the whole of our discussion from + the very beginning has been a search after knowledge, of which we are + assumed not to know the nature. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Nay, but I am well aware. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is it not shameless when we do not know what knowledge is, + to be explaining the verb 'to know'? The truth is, Theaetetus, that we + have long been infected with logical impurity. Thousands of times have we + repeated the words 'we know,' and 'do not know,' and 'we have or have not + science or knowledge,' as if we could understand what we are saying to one + another, so long as we remain ignorant about knowledge; and at this moment + we are using the words 'we understand,' 'we are ignorant,' as though we + could still employ them when deprived of knowledge or science. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: But if you avoid these expressions, Socrates, how will you + ever argue at all? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I could not, being the man I am. The case would be different if + I were a true hero of dialectic: and O that such an one were present! for + he would have told us to avoid the use of these terms; at the same time he + would not have spared in you and me the faults which I have noted. But, + seeing that we are no great wits, shall I venture to say what knowing is? + for I think that the attempt may be worth making. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Then by all means venture, and no one shall find fault with + you for using the forbidden terms. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You have heard the common explanation of the verb 'to know'? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I think so, but I do not remember it at the moment. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They explain the word 'to know' as meaning 'to have knowledge.' + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I should like to make a slight change, and say 'to possess' + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How do the two expressions differ? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perhaps there may be no difference; but still I should like you + to hear my view, that you may help me to test it. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I will, if I can. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I should distinguish 'having' from 'possessing': for example, a + man may buy and keep under his control a garment which he does not wear; + and then we should say, not that he has, but that he possesses the + garment. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It would be the correct expression. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, may not a man 'possess' and yet not 'have' knowledge in + the sense of which I am speaking? As you may suppose a man to have caught + wild birds—doves or any other birds—and to be keeping them in + an aviary which he has constructed at home; we might say of him in one + sense, that he always has them because he possesses them, might we not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, in another sense, he has none of them; but they are in + his power, and he has got them under his hand in an enclosure of his own, + and can take and have them whenever he likes;—he can catch any which + he likes, and let the bird go again, and he may do so as often as he + pleases. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Once more, then, as in what preceded we made a sort of waxen + figment in the mind, so let us now suppose that in the mind of each man + there is an aviary of all sorts of birds—some flocking together + apart from the rest, others in small groups, others solitary, flying + anywhere and everywhere. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Let us imagine such an aviary—and what is to follow? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We may suppose that the birds are kinds of knowledge, and that + when we were children, this receptacle was empty; whenever a man has + gotten and detained in the enclosure a kind of knowledge, he may be said + to have learned or discovered the thing which is the subject of the + knowledge: and this is to know. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Granted. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And further, when any one wishes to catch any of these + knowledges or sciences, and having taken, to hold it, and again to let + them go, how will he express himself?—will he describe the + 'catching' of them and the original 'possession' in the same words? I will + make my meaning clearer by an example:—You admit that there is an + art of arithmetic? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Conceive this under the form of a hunt after the science of odd + and even in general. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I follow. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Having the use of the art, the arithmetician, if I am not + mistaken, has the conceptions of number under his hand, and can transmit + them to another. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when transmitting them he may be said to teach them, and + when receiving to learn them, and when receiving to learn them, and when + having them in possession in the aforesaid aviary he may be said to know + them. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Attend to what follows: must not the perfect arithmetician know + all numbers, for he has the science of all numbers in his mind? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he can reckon abstract numbers in his head, or things about + him which are numerable? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course he can. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And to reckon is simply to consider how much such and such a + number amounts to? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so he appears to be searching into something which he knows, + as if he did not know it, for we have already admitted that he knows all + numbers;—you have heard these perplexing questions raised? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I have. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: May we not pursue the image of the doves, and say that the chase + after knowledge is of two kinds? one kind is prior to possession and for + the sake of possession, and the other for the sake of taking and holding + in the hands that which is possessed already. And thus, when a man has + learned and known something long ago, he may resume and get hold of the + knowledge which he has long possessed, but has not at hand in his mind. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That was my reason for asking how we ought to speak when an + arithmetician sets about numbering, or a grammarian about reading? Shall + we say, that although he knows, he comes back to himself to learn what he + already knows? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It would be too absurd, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he + does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all + numbers? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That, again, would be an absurdity. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?—any + one may twist and turn the words 'knowing' and 'learning' in any way which + he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is + not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess + that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know + that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may + have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;—when + the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, + and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general + store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought + eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ring-dove which he had in his + mind, when he wanted the pigeon. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: A very rational explanation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not + deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion + may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I + dare say that you agree with me, do you not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man's not knowing what + he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess + what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a + greater difficulty is looking in at the window. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become + false opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of + anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, + but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme + absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be + another thing;—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, + he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?—you + might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make + him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms + of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of + ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who + sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and + sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from + ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you + to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say—then, according + to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion—am I right? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that + he knows the things about which he has been deceived? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not + ignorance? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to + face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon + us:—'O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows + the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of + them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither + of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he + knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one + which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he + does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there + are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, + and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks + according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while + he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And + thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, + and you will make no progress.' What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly + show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what + knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false + opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet + gone. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?—for + we are not going to lose heart as yet. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What definition will be most consistent with our former views? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What was it? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion + is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and + good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said 'The + experiment will show;' and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may + stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we + are, nothing will come to light. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true; let us go forward and try. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is + against us. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How is that, and what profession do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and + lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever + they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any + teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the + truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not + eye-witnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not, they can only persuade them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you not say that persuading them is making them have + an opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which + you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus + judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they + judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have + judged well. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts and + knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly + without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by + some one else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined + with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was + out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no + rational account are not knowable—such was the singular expression + which he used—and that things which have a reason or explanation are + knowable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which + are and are not 'knowable'? I wish that you would repeat to me what he + said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person + would tell me, I think that I could follow him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:—Methought + that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters + or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, + have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate + can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, + in the other non-existence is already implied, neither of which must be + added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It + should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the + like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are + distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and + had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all + else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be + named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are + compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of + names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, + then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot + be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known + and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, any + one forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you + may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who + cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that + thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in + knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the + form in which the dream appeared to you? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Precisely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with + definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that to-day, and in this casual + manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have + grown old and have not found? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present + statement. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which is probably correct—for how can there be knowledge + apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what + has been said which does not quite satisfy me. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What was it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:—That + the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables + known. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: And was that wrong? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which + the author of the argument himself used. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What hostages? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which + are the combinations;—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of + the alphabet? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes; he did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test + ourselves:—What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first + of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that + letters have no definition? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think so too; for, suppose that some one asks you to spell the + first syllable of my name:—Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should reply S and O. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the S. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: But how can any one, Socrates, tell the elements of an + element? I can only reply, that S is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the + tongue hissing; B, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds + nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even + the most distinct of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, + but no definition at all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in + our idea about knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes; I think that we have. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables + can be known, but not the letters? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, + all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should say that we mean all the letters. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Take the case of the two letters S and O, which form the first + syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of + them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He knows, that is, the S and O? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both + together? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is + ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the + fine theory has again taken wings and departed. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, with wonderful celerity. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have + maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea + framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true; and a more likely notion than the other. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing + theory. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple + form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements—of + letters or of any other elements. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And it must have no parts. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Why? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. + Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a + single notion different from all the parts? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or + different? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I + shall hazard the reply, that they are different. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to + think whether I equally approve of your answer. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes; the answer is the point. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from + all? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) + and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:—When we say + one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three + times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of + the same or of different numbers? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of the same. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is of six? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing + which we express? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Of course there is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that is six? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in predicating the word 'all' of things measured by number, + we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly we do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are + they not? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar + cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the number of each is the parts of each? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire + number is the all? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, + if consisting of all the parts? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That is the inference. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is a part a part of anything but the whole? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes, of the all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all + that of which nothing is wanting? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? + but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;—if + wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I now think that there is no difference between a whole and + all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the + parts will be a whole and all? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that + either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts + of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, + and will therefore be equally known with them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from + them? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of + any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in + a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for + other parts. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present + view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we + admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of + which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, + because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one + rightly attribute to them the words 'being' or 'this,' because they are + alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements + were indefinable and unknown? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I remember. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not this also the reason why they are simple and + indivisible? I can see no other. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: No other reason can be given. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then is not the syllable in the same case as the elements or + letters, if it has no parts and is one form? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If, then, a syllable is a whole, and has many parts or letters, + the letters as well as the syllable must be intelligible and expressible, + since all the parts are acknowledged to be the same as the whole? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if it be one and indivisible, then the syllables and the + letters are alike undefined and unknown, and for the same reason? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I cannot deny that. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We cannot, therefore, agree in the opinion of him who says that + the syllable can be known and expressed, but not the letters. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not; if we may trust the argument. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but will you not be equally inclined to disagree with him, + when you remember your own experience in learning to read? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What experience? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, that in learning you were kept trying to distinguish the + separate letters both by the eye and by the ear, in order that, when you + heard them spoken or saw them written, you might not be confused by their + position. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the education of the harp-player complete unless he can + tell what string answers to a particular note; the notes, as every one + would allow, are the elements or letters of music? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, if we argue from the letters and syllables which we know + to other simples and compounds, we shall say that the letters or simple + elements as a class are much more certainly known than the syllables, and + much more indispensable to a perfect knowledge of any subject; and if some + one says that the syllable is known and the letter unknown, we shall + consider that either intentionally or unintentionally he is talking + nonsense? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And there might be given other proofs of this belief, if I am + not mistaken. But do not let us in looking for them lose sight of the + question before us, which is the meaning of the statement, that right + opinion with rational definition or explanation is the most perfect form + of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: We must not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and what is the meaning of the term 'explanation'? I think + that we have a choice of three meanings. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, the meaning may be, manifesting one's + thought by the voice with verbs and nouns, imaging an opinion in the + stream which flows from the lips, as in a mirror or water. Does not + explanation appear to be of this nature? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly; he who so manifests his thought, is said to explain + himself. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And every one who is not born deaf or dumb is able sooner or + later to manifest what he thinks of anything; and if so, all those who + have a right opinion about anything will also have right explanation; nor + will right opinion be anywhere found to exist apart from knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let us not, therefore, hastily charge him who gave this account + of knowledge with uttering an unmeaning word; for perhaps he only intended + to say, that when a person was asked what was the nature of anything, he + should be able to answer his questioner by giving the elements of the + thing. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: As for example, Socrates...? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As, for example, when Hesiod says that a waggon is made up of a + hundred planks. Now, neither you nor I could describe all of them + individually; but if any one asked what is a waggon, we should be content + to answer, that a waggon consists of wheels, axle, body, rims, yoke. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And our opponent will probably laugh at us, just as he would if + we professed to be grammarians and to give a grammatical account of the + name of Theaetetus, and yet could only tell the syllables and not the + letters of your name—that would be true opinion, and not knowledge; + for knowledge, as has been already remarked, is not attained until, + combined with true opinion, there is an enumeration of the elements out of + which anything is composed. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the same general way, we might also have true opinion about a + waggon; but he who can describe its essence by an enumeration of the + hundred planks, adds rational explanation to true opinion, and instead of + opinion has art and knowledge of the nature of a waggon, in that he + attains to the whole through the elements. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: And do you not agree in that view, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If you do, my friend; but I want to know first, whether you + admit the resolution of all things into their elements to be a rational + explanation of them, and the consideration of them in syllables or larger + combinations of them to be irrational—is this your view? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Precisely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and do you conceive that a man has knowledge of any + element who at one time affirms and at another time denies that element of + something, or thinks that the same thing is composed of different elements + at different times? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Assuredly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you not remember that in your case and in that of others + this often occurred in the process of learning to read? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You mean that I mistook the letters and misspelt the + syllables? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: To be sure; I perfectly remember, and I am very far from + supposing that they who are in this condition have knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When a person at the time of learning writes the name of + Theaetetus, and thinks that he ought to write and does write Th and e; + but, again, meaning to write the name of Theododorus, thinks that he ought + to write and does write T and e—can we suppose that he knows the + first syllables of your two names? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: We have already admitted that such a one has not yet attained + knowledge. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in like manner be may enumerate without knowing them the + second and third and fourth syllables of your name? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: He may. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in that case, when he knows the order of the letters and can + write them out correctly, he has right opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But although we admit that he has right opinion, he will still + be without knowledge? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet he will have explanation, as well as right opinion, for + he knew the order of the letters when he wrote; and this we admit to be + explanation. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, my friend, there is such a thing as right opinion united + with definition or explanation, which does not as yet attain to the + exactness of knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: It would seem so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what we fancied to be a perfect definition of knowledge is a + dream only. But perhaps we had better not say so as yet, for were there + not three explanations of knowledge, one of which must, as we said, be + adopted by him who maintains knowledge to be true opinion combined with + rational explanation? And very likely there may be found some one who will + not prefer this but the third. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: You are quite right; there is still one remaining. The first + was the image or expression of the mind in speech; the second, which has + just been mentioned, is a way of reaching the whole by an enumeration of + the elements. But what is the third definition? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is, further, the popular notion of telling the mark or + sign of difference which distinguishes the thing in question from all + others. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Can you give me any example of such a definition? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As, for example, in the case of the sun, I think that you would + be contented with the statement that the sun is the brightest of the + heavenly bodies which revolve about the earth. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Understand why:—the reason is, as I was just now saying, + that if you get at the difference and distinguishing characteristic of + each thing, then, as many persons affirm, you will get at the definition + or explanation of it; but while you lay hold only of the common and not of + the characteristic notion, you will only have the definition of those + things to which this common quality belongs. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I understand you, and your account of definition is in my + judgment correct. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But he, who having right opinion about anything, can find out + the difference which distinguishes it from other things will know that of + which before he had only an opinion. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes; that is what we are maintaining. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nevertheless, Theaetetus, on a nearer view, I find myself quite + disappointed; the picture, which at a distance was not so bad, has now + become altogether unintelligible. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: I will suppose myself to have true + opinion of you, and if to this I add your definition, then I have + knowledge, but if not, opinion only. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The definition was assumed to be the interpretation of your + difference. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when I had only opinion, I had no conception of your + distinguishing characteristics. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then I must have conceived of some general or common nature + which no more belonged to you than to another. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Tell me, now—How in that case could I have formed a + judgment of you any more than of any one else? Suppose that I imagine + Theaetetus to be a man who has nose, eyes, and mouth, and every other + member complete; how would that enable me to distinguish Theaetetus from + Theodorus, or from some outer barbarian? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How could it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or if I had further conceived of you, not only as having nose + and eyes, but as having a snub nose and prominent eyes, should I have any + more notion of you than of myself and others who resemble me? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Surely I can have no conception of Theaetetus until your + snub-nosedness has left an impression on my mind different from the + snub-nosedness of all others whom I have ever seen, and until your other + peculiarities have a like distinctness; and so when I meet you to-morrow + the right opinion will be re-called? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Most true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then right opinion implies the perception of differences? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, then, shall we say of adding reason or explanation to + right opinion? If the meaning is, that we should form an opinion of the + way in which something differs from another thing, the proposal is + ridiculous. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: We are supposed to acquire a right opinion of the differences + which distinguish one thing from another when we have already a right + opinion of them, and so we go round and round:—the revolution of the + scytal, or pestle, or any other rotatory machine, in the same circles, is + as nothing compared with such a requirement; and we may be truly described + as the blind directing the blind; for to add those things which we already + have, in order that we may learn what we already think, is like a soul + utterly benighted. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Tell me; what were you going to say just now, when you asked + the question? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: If, my boy, the argument, in speaking of adding the definition, + had used the word to 'know,' and not merely 'have an opinion' of the + difference, this which is the most promising of all the definitions of + knowledge would have come to a pretty end, for to know is surely to + acquire knowledge. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so, when the question is asked, What is knowledge? this fair + argument will answer 'Right opinion with knowledge,'—knowledge, that + is, of difference, for this, as the said argument maintains, is adding the + definition. + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: That seems to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how utterly foolish, when we are asking what is knowledge, + that the reply should only be, right opinion with knowledge of difference + or of anything! And so, Theaetetus, knowledge is neither sensation nor + true opinion, nor yet definition and explanation accompanying and added to + true opinion? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you still in labour and travail, my dear friend, or have + you brought all that you have to say about knowledge to the birth? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: I am sure, Socrates, that you have elicited from me a good + deal more than ever was in me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not my art show that you have brought forth wind, and + that the offspring of your brain are not worth bringing up? + </p> + <p> + THEAETETUS: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if, Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be + all the better for the present investigation, and if not, you will be + soberer and humbler and gentler to other men, and will be too modest to + fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art; + I can no further go, nor do I know aught of the things which great and + famous men know or have known in this or former ages. The office of a + midwife I, like my mother, have received from God; she delivered women, I + deliver men; but they must be young and noble and fair. + </p> + <p> + And now I have to go to the porch of the King Archon, where I am to meet + Meletus and his indictment. To-morrow morning, Theodorus, I shall hope to + see you again at this place. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theaetetus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEAETETUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1726-h.htm or 1726-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/7/2/1726/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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