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Courtney, M.A., LL.D. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> + /*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ + <!-- + p { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + h1,h2,h3,h4,h5,h6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + clear: both; + } + hr { width: 33%; + margin-top: 2em; + margin-bottom: 2em; + margin-left: auto; + margin-right: auto; + clear: both; + } + + table {margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;} + + body {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; + text-align: right;} /* page numbers */ + + .bbox {border: solid 2px; padding: 3px;} + + .center {text-align: center;} + .smcap {font-variant: small-caps;} + .lower {text-transform: lowercase;} + + .footnote {margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-size: 0.9em;} + .footnote .label {position: absolute; right: 84%; text-align: right;} + .fnanchor {vertical-align: super; font-size: .8em; + text-decoration: none;} + --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Armageddon--And After, by W. L. Courtney + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Armageddon--And After + +Author: W. L. Courtney + +Release Date: November 26, 2005 [EBook #17158] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ARMAGEDDON--AND AFTER *** + + + + +Produced by Irma Spehar, Christine D and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net (This +file was produced from images generously made available +by The Internet Archive/Canadian Libraries) + + + + + + +</pre> + + +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_i" id="Page_i"></a></small></p> +<h1>ARMAGEDDON—AND AFTER</h1> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_ii" id="Page_ii"></a></small></p> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_iii" id="Page_iii"></a></small></p> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>W.L. COURTNEY, M.A., LL.D.</h2> + +<p class="center">LONDON</p> +<p class="center">CHAPMAN & HALL, <span class="smcap">Ltd.</span></p> +<p class="center">1914</p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<!-- Autogenerated TOC. Modify or delete as required. --> + +<h3>Contents</h3> + +<div class='center'> +<table border="1" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td colspan='3'><a href="#PREFACE">Preface</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='center'><a href="#CHAPTER_I">Chapter I</a></td><td align='center'><a href="#CHAPTER_II">Chapter II</a></td><td align='center'><a href="#CHAPTER_III">Chapter III</a></td></tr> +<tr><th>Problems Of The Future</th><th>Lessons Of The Past</th><th>Some Suggested Reforms</th></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#A_Colossal_Upheaval">A Colossal Upheaval</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Naked_Strength">Naked Strength</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#An_Ignoble_Pacification">An Ignoble Pacification</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Never_Again">Never Again!</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Public_Right">Public Right</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#A_New_Europe">A New Europe</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Unexpected_War">Unexpected War</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#A_Common_Will">A Common Will</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Evil_of_Armaments">Evil Of Armaments</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Proximate_and_Ultimate_Causes">Proximate And Ultimate Causes</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#A_Hundred_Years_Ago">A Hundred Years Ago</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Absence_of_Provocation">Absence Of Provocation</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#European_Dictators">European Dictators</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Equilibrium">Equilibrium</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Fear_of_Russia">Fear Of Russia</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#The_Personal_Factor">The Personal Factor</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#The_Holy_Alliance">The Holy Alliance</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Military_Autocracy">Military Autocracy</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Kaiser_Wilhelm">Kaiser Wilhelm</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Diplomatic_Criticism">Diplomatic Criticism</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Limitation_of_Armaments">Limitation Of Armaments</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#An_Aggressive_Policy">An Aggressive Policy</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Failure">Failure</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Protection_of_Commerce">Protection Of Commerce</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Militarism">Militarism</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#A_Deceptive_Parallel">A Deceptive Parallel</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Trade_in_Armaments">Trade In Armaments</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#The_Evils_of_Autocracy">The Evils Of Autocracy</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Metternich">Metternich</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Financial_Interests">Financial Interests</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#The_Military_Caste">The Military Caste</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Castlereagh_and_Canning">Castlereagh And Canning</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Protection_of_Financiers">Protection Of Financiers</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Diplomacy">Diplomacy</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Earthen_Vessels">Earthen Vessels</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Investing_Money_Abroad">Investing Money Abroad</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Balance_of_Power">Balance Of Power</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Small_Nationalities">Small Nationalities</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Ideal_Aims">Ideal Aims</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Change_of_Policy">Change Of Policy</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Some_Plain_Issues">Some Plain Issues</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Greatness_of_States">Greatness Of States</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Balance_or_Concert">Balance Or Concert?</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#European_Partnership">European Partnership</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#Apostles_of_the_New_Era">Apostles Of The New Era</a></td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'><a href="#Control_of_Foreign_Policy">Control Of Foreign Policy</a></td><td align='left'><a href="#A_Moral_for_Pacifists">A Moral For Pacifists</a></td><td align='left'> </td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'> </td><td align='left'><a href="#Compulsory_Arbitration">Compulsory Arbitration</a></td><td align='left'> </td></tr> +<tr><td align='left'> </td><td align='left'><a href="#Democratic_Unanimity">Democratic Unanimity</a></td><td align='left'> </td></tr> +</table></div> +<!-- End Autogenerated TOC. --> +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + + + +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_iv" id="Page_iv"></a></small></p> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_v" id="Page_v"></a></small></p> +<p class="center">DEDICATED</p> +<p class="center">WITH ALL HUMILITY AND ADMIRATION</p> +<p class="center">TO</p> +<p class="center">THE YOUNG IDEALISTS OF ALL COUNTRIES</p> +<p class="center">WHO WILL NOT ALLOW THE DREAMS OF THEIR</p> +<p class="center">YOUTH TO BE TARNISHED BY THE</p> +<p class="center">EXPERIENCES OF AN</p> +<p class="center">OUTWORN AGE</p> + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_vi" id="Page_vi"></a></small></p> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_vii" id="Page_vii">vii</a></small></p> +<h2><a name="PREFACE" id="PREFACE"></a>PREFACE</h2> + + +<p>I dedicate this little book to the young +idealists of this and other countries, for +several reasons. They must, obviously, be +young, because their older contemporaries, +with a large amount of experience of earlier +conditions, will hardly have the courage to +deal with the novel data. I take it that, +after the conclusion of the present war, there +will come an uneasy period of exhaustion and +anxiety when we shall be told that those who +hold military power in their hands are alone +qualified to act as saviours of society. That +conclusion, as I understand the matter, young +idealists will strenuously oppose. They will +be quite aware that all the conservative +elements will be against them; they will +appreciate also the eagerness with which a +large number of people will point out that the +safest way is to leave matters more or less +alone, and to allow the situation to be controlled +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_viii" id="Page_viii">viii</a></small> +by soldiers and diplomatists. Of course +there is obvious truth in the assertion that the +immediate settlement of peace conditions must, +to a large extent, be left in the hands of those +who brought the war to a successful conclusion. +But the relief from pressing anxiety +when this horrible strife is over, and the feeling +of gratitude to those who have delivered us +must not be allowed to gild and consecrate, +as it were, systems proved effete and policies +which intelligent men recognise as bankrupt. +The moment of deliverance will be too unique +and too splendid to be left in the hands of +men who have grown, if not cynical, at all +events a little weary of the notorious defects +of humanity, and who are, perhaps naturally, +tempted to allow European progress to fall +back into the old well-worn ruts. It is the +young men who must take the matter in hand, +with their ardent hopes and their keen imagination, +and only so far as they believe in the +possibility of a great amelioration will they +have any chance of doing yeoman service for +humanity.</p> + +<p>The dawn of a new era must be plenarily +accepted as a wonderful opportunity for reform. +If viewed in any other spirit, the +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_ix" id="Page_ix">ix</a></small> +splendours of the morning will soon give way +before the obstinate clouds hanging on the +horizon. In some fashion or other it must be +acknowledged that older methods of dealing +with international affairs have been tried and +found wanting. It must be admitted that the +ancient principles helped to bring about the +tremendous catastrophe in which we are at +present involved, and that a thorough re-organisation +is required if the new Europe is +to start under better auspices. That is why +I appeal to the younger idealists, because they +are not likely to be deterred by inveterate +prejudices; they will be only too eager to +examine things with a fresh intelligence of +their own. Somehow or other we must get +rid of the absurd idea that the nations of +Europe are always on the look out to do each +other an injury. We have to establish the +doctrines of Right on a proper basis, and +dethrone that ugly phantom of Might, which +is the object of Potsdam worship. International +law must be built up with its proper +sanctions; and virtues, which are Christian +and humane, must find their proper place in +the ordinary dealings of states with one +another. Much clever dialectics will probably +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_x" id="Page_x">x</a></small> +be employed in order to prove that idealistic +dreams are vain. Young men will not be +afraid of such arguments; they will not be +deterred by purely logical difficulties. Let +us remember that this war has been waged in +order to make war for the future impossible. +If that be the presiding idea of men's minds, +they will keep their reforming course steadily +directed towards ideal ends, patiently working +for the reconstruction of Europe and a better +lot for humanity at large.</p> + +<p>Once more let me repeat that it is only young +idealists who are sufficient for these things. +They may call themselves democrats, or socialists, +or futurists, or merely reformers. The +name is unimportant: the main point is that +they must thoroughly examine their creed in +the light of their finest hopes and aspirations. +They will not be the slaves of any formulæ, and +they will hold out their right hands to every +man—whatever may be the label he puts on +his theories—who is striving in single-minded +devotion for a millennial peace. The new era +will have to be of a spiritual, ethical type. +Coarser forms of materialism, whether in +thought or life, will have to be banished, because +the scales have at last dropped from our +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_xi" id="Page_xi">xi</a></small> +eyes, and we intend to regard a human being +no longer as a thing of luxury, or wealth, or +greedy passions, but as the possessor of a +living soul.</p> + +<p>W.L.C.</p> + +<p><i>November 10, 1914.</i></p> + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + + +<p>I wish to acknowledge my obligation to Mr. H.N. +Brailsford's <i>The War of Steel and Gold</i> (Bell). I do not +pretend to agree with all that Mr. Brailsford says: but +I have found his book always interesting, and sometimes +inspiring.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_xii" id="Page_xii">xii</a></small></p> +<h2><a name="CONTENTS" id="CONTENTS"></a>CONTENTS</h2> + + +<div class='center'> +<table border="0" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" summary=""> +<tr><td></td><td align='right' style="padding-left: 3em;">PAGE</td></tr> +<tr><th align='center' colspan='2'>CHAPTER I</th></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE</td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_1">1</a></td></tr> +<tr><th align='center' colspan='2'>CHAPTER II</th></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>LESSONS OF THE PAST</td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_32">32</a></td></tr> +<tr><th align='center' colspan='2'>CHAPTER III</th></tr> +<tr><td align='left'>SOME SUGGESTED REFORMS</td><td align='right'><a href="#Page_63">63</a></td></tr> +</table></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_1" id="Page_1">1</a></small></p> +<h2><a name="ARMAGEDDON_AND_AFTER" id="ARMAGEDDON_AND_AFTER"></a>ARMAGEDDON—AND AFTER</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_I" id="CHAPTER_I"></a>CHAPTER I</h2> + +<h3>PROBLEMS OF THE FUTURE</h3> + + +<p>The newspapers have lately been making +large quotations from the poems of Mr. Rudyard +Kipling. They might, if they had been +so minded, have laid under similar contribution +the Revelation of St. John the Divine. There, +too, with all the imagery usual in Apocalyptic +literature, is to be found a description of vague +and confused fighting, when most of the Kings +of the earth come together to fight a last and +desperate battle. The Seven Angels go forth, +each armed with a vial, the first poisoning the +earth, the second the sea, the third the rivers +and fountains of waters, the fourth the sun. +Then out of the mouth of the dragon, of the +beast, and of the Antichrist come the lying +spirits which persuade the Kings of the earth +to gather all the people for that great day of +God Almighty "into a place called in the +Hebrew tongue Armageddon." Translated +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_2" id="Page_2">2</a></small> +into our language the account might very well +serve for the modern assemblage of troops in +which nearly all the kingdoms of the earth have +to play their part, with few, and not very +important, exceptions. It is almost absurd to +speak of the events of the past three months +as though they were merely incidents in a great +and important campaign. There is nothing in +history like them so far as we are aware. In +the clash of the two great European organisations—the +Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente—we +have all those wild features of +universal chaos which the writer of the Apocalypse +saw with prophetic eye as ushering in the +great day of the Lord, and paving the way for +a New Heaven and a New Earth.</p> + +<p><a name="A_Colossal_Upheaval" id="A_Colossal_Upheaval"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">A Colossal Upheaval</span></h4> + +<p>It is a colossal upheaval. But what sort of +New Heaven and New Earth is it likely to +usher in? This is a question which it is hardly +too early to discuss, for it makes a vast difference, +to us English in especial, if, fighting for +what we deem to be a just cause, we can look +forward to an issue in the long run beneficial +to ourselves and the world. We know the +character of the desperate conflict which has +yet to be accomplished before our eyes. Everything +points to a long stern war, which cannot +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_3" id="Page_3">3</a></small> +be completed in a single campaign. Every one +knows that Lord Kitchener is supposed to have +prophesied a war of three years, and we can +hardly ignore the opinion of so good a judge. +If we ask why, the obvious answer is that every +nation engaged is not fighting for mere victory +in battle, nor yet for extension of territory; but +for something more important than these. +They fight for the triumph of their respective +ideas, and it will make the greatest difference +to Europe and the world which of the ideas +is eventually conqueror. Supposing the German +invasion of France ends in failure; that, +clearly, will not finish the war. Supposing +even that Berlin is taken by the Russians, +we cannot affirm that so great an event will +necessarily complete the campaign. The whole +of Germany will have to be invaded and subdued, +and that is a process which will take a +very long time even under the most favourable +auspices. Or take the opposite hypothesis. +Let us suppose that the Germans capture Paris, +and manage by forced marches to defend their +country against the Muscovite incursion. Even +so, nothing is accomplished of a lasting character. +France will go on fighting as she did +after 1870, and we shall be found at her side. +Or, assuming the worst hypothesis of all, that +France lies prostrate under the heel of her +German conqueror, does any one suppose that +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_4" id="Page_4">4</a></small> +Great Britain will desist from fighting? We +know perfectly well that, with the aid of our +Fleet, we shall still be in a position to defy the +German invader and make use of our enormous +reserves to wear out even Teutonic obstinacy. +The great sign and seal of this battle to the +death is the recent covenant entered into by +the three members of the Triple Entente.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a> +They have declared in the most formal fashion, +over the signatures of their three representatives, +Sir Edward Grey, M. Paul Cambon, and +Count Benckendorff, that they will not make a +separate peace, that they will continue to act +in unison, and fight, not as three nations, but +as one. Perhaps one of the least expected +results of the present conjuncture is that the +Triple Entente, which was supposed to possess +less cohesive efficiency than the rival organisation, +has proved, on the contrary, the stronger +of the two. The Triple Alliance is not true +to its name. Italy, the third and unwilling +member, still preserves her neutrality, and declares +that her interests are not immediately +involved.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> Subsequently joined by Japan.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Never_Again" id="Never_Again"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Never Again!</span></h4> + +<p>In order to attempt to discover the vast +changes that are likely to come as a direct +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_5" id="Page_5">5</a></small> +consequence of the present Armageddon, it is +necessary to refer in brief retrospect to some +of the main causes and features of the great +European war. Meanwhile, I think the general +feeling amongst all thoughtful men is best +expressed in the phrase, "Never again." +Never again must we have to face the possibility +of such a world-wide catastrophe. Never +again must it be possible for the pursuit of +merely selfish interests to work such colossal +havoc. Never again must we have war as the +only solution of national differences. Never +again must all the arts of peace be suspended +while Europe rings to the tramp of armed +millions. Never again must spiritual, moral, +artistic culture be submerged under a wave of +barbarism. Never again must the Ruler of +this Universe be addressed as the "God of +battles." Never again shall a new Wordsworth +hail "carnage" as "God's daughter." +The illogicality of it all is too patent. That +everything which we respect and revere in the +way of science or thought, or culture, or music, +or poetry, or drama, should be cast into the +melting-pot to satisfy dynastic ambition is a +thing too puerile as well as too appalling to be +even considered. And the horror of it all +is something more than our nerves will stand. +The best brains and intellects of Europe, the +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_6" id="Page_6">6</a></small> +brightest and most promising youths, all the +manhood everywhere in Europe to be shrivelled +and consumed in a holocaust like this—it is +such a reign of the Devil and Antichrist on +earth that it must be banished in perpetuity if +civilisation and progress are to endure. Never +again!</p> + +<p><a name="Unexpected_War" id="Unexpected_War"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Unexpected War</span></h4> + +<p>How did we get into such a stupid and appalling +calamity? Let us think for a moment. +I do not suppose it would be wrong to say that +no one ever expected war in our days. Take +up any of the recent books. With the exception +of the fiery martial pamphlets of Germany, +the work of a von der Goltz or a Treitschke, or a +Bernhardi, we shall find a general consensus of +opinion that war on a large scale was impossible +because too ruinous, that the very size of the +European armaments made war impracticable. +Or else, to take the extreme case of Mr. Norman +Angell, the entanglements of modern finance +were said to have put war out of count as an +absurdity. We were a little too hasty in our +judgments. It is clear that a single determined +man, if he is powerful enough, may embroil +Europe. However destructive modern +armaments may be, and however costly a +campaign may prove, yet there are men who +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_7" id="Page_7">7</a></small> +will face the cost and confront the wholesale +destruction of life that modern warfare entails. +How pitiful it is, how strange also, to look back +upon the solemn asseveration of the Kaiser +and the Tsar, not so many months ago (Port +Baltic, July 1912), that the division of Europe +into the two great confederations known as the +Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente provided +a safeguard against hostilities! We were constantly +assured that diplomats were working +for a Balance of Power, such an equilibrium +of rival forces that the total result would +be stability and peace. Arbitration, too, was +considered by many as the panacea, to say +nothing of the Hague Palace of Peace. And +now we discover that nations may possibly +refer to arbitration points of small importance +in their quarrels, but that the greater things +which are supposed to touch national honour +and the preservation of national life are tacitly, +if not formally, exempted from the category +of arbitrable disputes. Diplomacy, Arbitration, +Palaces of Peace seem equally useless.</p> + +<p><a name="Proximate_and_Ultimate_Causes" id="Proximate_and_Ultimate_Causes"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Proximate and Ultimate Causes</span></h4> + +<p>In attempting to understand how Europe +has (to use Lord Rosebery's phrase) "rattled +into barbarism" in the uncompromising fashion +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_8" id="Page_8">8</a></small> +which we see before our eyes, we must distinguish +between recent operative causes and +those more slowly evolving antecedent conditions +which play a considerable, though not +necessarily an obvious part in the result. +Recent operative causes are such things as the +murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at +Serajevo, the consequent Austrian ultimatum +to Servia, the hasty and intemperate action +of the Kaiser in forcing war, and—from a more +general point of view—the particular form of +militarism prevalent in Germany. Ulterior +antecedent conditions are to be found in the +changing history of European States and their +mutual relations in the last quarter of a century; +the ambition of Germany to create an Imperial +fleet; the ambition of Germany to have "a +place in the sun" and become a large colonial +power; the formation of a Triple Entente +following on the formation of a Triple Alliance; +the rivalry between Teuton and Slav; and the +mutations of diplomacy and <i>Real-politik</i>. It +is not always possible to keep the two sets of +causes, the recent and the ulterior, separate, +for they naturally tend either to overlap or +to interpenetrate one another. German Militarism, +for instance, is only a specific form of +the general ambition of Germany, and the +Austrian desire to avenge herself on Servia is +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_9" id="Page_9">9</a></small> +a part of her secular animosity towards Slavdom +and its protector, Russia. Nor yet, when +we are considering the present <i>débâcle</i> of civilisation, +need we interest ourselves overmuch in +the immediate occasions and circumstances of +the huge quarrel. We want to know not how +Europe flared into war, but why. Our object +is so to understand the present imbroglio as to +prevent, if we can, the possibility for the future +of any similar world-wide catastrophe.</p> + +<p><a name="European_Dictators" id="European_Dictators"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">European Dictators</span></h4> + +<p>Let us fix our attention on one or two salient +points. Europe has often been accustomed to +watch with anxiety the rise of some potent +arbiter of her destinies who seems to arrogate +to himself a large personal dominion. There +was Philip II. There was Louis XIV. There +was Napoleon a hundred years ago. Then, +a mere shadow of his great ancestor, there was +Napoleon III. Then, after the Franco-German +war, there was Bismarck. Now it is Kaiser +Wilhelm II. The emergence of some ambitious +personality naturally makes Europe suspicious +and watchful, and leads to the formation of +leagues and confederations against him. The +only thing, however, which seems to have any +power of real resistance to the potential tyrant +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_10" id="Page_10">10</a></small> +is not the manœuvring of diplomats, but the +steady growth of democracy in Europe, which, +in virtue of its character and principles, steadily +objects to the despotism of any given individual, +and the arbitrary designs of a personal +will. We had hoped that the spread of +democracies in all European nations would +progressively render dynastic wars an impossibility. +The peoples would cry out, we +hoped, against being butchered to make a +holiday for any latter-day Cæsar. But democracy +is a slow growth, and exists in very +varying degrees of strength in different parts +of our continent. Evidently it has not yet +discovered its own power. We have sadly to +recognise that its range of influence and the +new spirit which it seeks to introduce into the +world are as yet impotent against the personal +ascendancy of a monarch and the old conceptions +of high politics. European democracy is +still too vague, too dispersed, too unorganised, +to prevent the breaking out of a bloody international +conflict.</p> + +<p><a name="The_Personal_Factor" id="The_Personal_Factor"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">The Personal Factor</span></h4> + +<p>Europe then has still to reckon with the +personal factor—with all its vagaries and its +desolating ambitions. Let us see how this has +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_11" id="Page_11">11</a></small> +worked in the case before us. In 1888 the +present German Emperor ascended the throne. +Two years afterwards, in March 1890, the +Pilot was dropped—Bismarck resigned. The +change was something more than a mere substitution +of men like Caprivi and Hohenlohe +for the Iron Chancellor. There was involved +a radical alteration in policy. The Germany +which was the ideal of Bismarck's dreams +was an exceedingly prosperous self-contained +country, which should flourish mainly because +it developed its internal industries as well as +paid attention to its agriculture, and secured +its somewhat perilous position in the centre of +Europe by skilful diplomatic means of sowing +dissension amongst its neighbours. Thus Bismarck +discouraged colonial extensions. He +thought they might weaken Germany. On the +other hand, he encouraged French colonial +policy, because he thought it would divert the +French from their preoccupation with the idea +of <i>revanche</i>. He played, more or less successfully, +with England, sometimes tempting her +with plausible suggestions that she should join +the Teutonic Empires on the Continent, sometimes +thwarting her aims by sowing dissensions +between her and her nearest neighbour, France. +But there was one empire which, certainly, +Bismarck dreaded not so much because she +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_12" id="Page_12">12</a></small> +was actually of much importance, but because +she might be. That empire was Russia. The +last thing in the world Bismarck desired was +precisely that approximation between France +and Russia which ended in the strange phenomenon +of an offensive and defensive alliance +between a western republic and a semi-eastern +despotic empire.</p> + +<p><a name="Kaiser_Wilhelm" id="Kaiser_Wilhelm"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Kaiser Wilhelm</span></h4> + +<p>Kaiser Wilhelm II had very different ideals +for Germany, and in many points he simply +reversed the policy of Bismarck. He began to +develop the German colonial empire, and in +order that it might be protected he did all in +his power to encourage the formation of a large +German navy. He even allowed himself to +say that "the future of Germany was on the +sea." It was part of that peculiar form of +personal autocracy which the Kaiser introduced +that he should from time to time invent phrases +suggestive of different principles of his policy. +Side by side with the assertion that Germany's +future was on the sea, we have the phrases +"Germany wants her place in the sun" and +that the "drag" of Teutonic development is +"towards the East." The reality and imminence +of "a yellow peril" was another of his +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_13" id="Page_13">13</a></small> +devices for stimulating the efforts of his countrymen. +Thus the new policy was expansion, +evolution as a world-power, colonisation; and +each in turn brought him up against the older +arrangement of European Powers. His colonial +policy, especially in Africa, led to collisions +with both France and Great Britain. The +building of the fleet, the Kiel Canal, and other +details of maritime policy naturally made +England very suspicious, while the steady drag +towards the East rendered wholly unavoidable +the conflict between Teutonism and the Slav +races. Germany looked, undoubtedly, towards +Asia Minor, and for this reason made great +advances to and many professions of friendship +for the Ottoman Empire. Turkey, indeed, in +several phrases was declared to be "the natural +ally" of Germany in the Near East. And if +we ask why, the answer nowadays is obvious. +Not only was Turkey to lend herself to the +encouragement of German commercial enterprise +in Asia Minor, but she was, in the judgment +of the Emperor, the one power which +could in time of trouble make herself especially +obnoxious to Great Britain. She could encourage +revolt in Egypt, and still more, through +the influence of Mahommedanism, stir up +disaffection in India.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Turkey has now joined Germany.</p></div><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_14" id="Page_14">14</a></small></p> + +<p><a name="An_Aggressive_Policy" id="An_Aggressive_Policy"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">An Aggressive Policy</span></h4> + +<p>And now let us watch this policy in action in +recent events. In 1897 Germany demanded +reparation from China for the recent murder of +two German missionaries. Troops were landed +at Kiao-chau Bay, a large pecuniary indemnity +of about £35,000 was refused, and Kiao-chau +itself with the adjacent territory was ceded to +Germany. That was a significant demonstration +of the Emperor's determination to make +his country a world-power, so that, as was +stated afterwards, nothing should occur in +the whole world in which Germany would +not have her say. Meanwhile, in Europe itself +event after event occurred to prove the persistent +character of German aggressiveness. On +March 31, 1905, the German Emperor landed +at Tangier, in order to aid the Sultan of Morocco +in his demand for a Conference of the Powers +to check the military dispositions of France. +M. Delcassé, France's Foreign Minister, demurred +to this proposal, asserting that a Conference +was wholly unnecessary. Thereupon +Prince Bülow used menacing language, and +Delcassé resigned in June 1905. The Conference +of Algeçiras was held in January 1906, +in which Austria proved herself "a brilliant +second" to Germany. Two years afterwards, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_15" id="Page_15">15</a></small> +in 1908, came still further proofs of Germany's +ambition. Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. +Russia immediately protested; so +did most of the other Great Powers. But +Germany at once took up the Austrian cause, +and stood "in shining armour" side by side +with her ally. Inasmuch as Russia was, in +1908, only just recovering from the effects of +her disastrous war with Japan, and was therefore +in no condition to take the offensive, +the Triple Alliance gained a distinct victory. +Three years later occurred another striking +event. In July 1911 the world was startled +by the news that the German gunboat <i>Panther</i>, +joined shortly afterwards by the cruiser <i>Berlin</i>, +had been sent to Agadir. Clearly Berlin intended +to reopen the whole Moroccan question, +and the tension between the Powers was for +some time acute. Nor did Mr. Lloyd George +make it much better by a fiery speech at the +Mansion House on July 21, which considerably +fluttered the Continental dovecots. The +immediate problem, however, was solved by +the cession of about one hundred thousand +square miles of territory in the Congo basin by +France to Germany in compensation for German +acquiescence in the French protectorate +over Morocco. I need not, perhaps, refer to +other more recent events. One point, however, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_16" id="Page_16">16</a></small> +must not be omitted. The issue of the Balkan +wars in 1912 caused a distinct disappointment +to both Germany and Austria. Turkey's +defeat lessened the importance of the Ottoman +Empire as an ally. Austria had to curb her +desires in the direction of Salonica. And the +enemies who had prevented the realisation of +wide Teutonic schemes were Servia and her +protector, Russia. From this time onwards +Austria waited for an opportunity to avenge +herself on Servia, while Germany, in close union +with her ally, began to study the situation in +relation to the Great Northern Empire in an +eminently bellicose spirit.</p> + + +<p><a name="Militarism" id="Militarism"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Militarism</span></h4> + +<p>Now that we have the proper standpoint +from which to watch the general tendency of +events like these, we can form some estimate +of the nature of German ambition and the +results of the personal ascendancy of the +Kaiser. We speak vaguely of militarism. +Fortunately, we have a very valuable document +to enable us to understand what precisely +German militarism signifies. General von +Bernhardi's <i>Germany and the Next War</i> is one +of the most interesting, as well as most suggestive, +of books, intended to illustrate the +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_17" id="Page_17">17</a></small> +spirit of German ambition. Bernhardi writes +like a soldier. Such philosophy as he possesses +he has taken from Nietzsche. His applications +of history come from Treitschke. He has +persuaded himself that the main object of +human life is war, and the higher the nation +the more persistently must it pursue preparations +for war. Hence the best men in the State +are the fighting men. Ethics and religion, so +far as they deprecate fighting and plead for +peace, are absolutely pernicious. Culture does +not mean, as we hoped and thought, the best +development of scientific and artistic enlightenment, +but merely an all-absorbing will-power, +an all-devouring ambition to be on the top +and to crush every one else. The assumption +throughout is that the German is the highest +specimen of humanity. Germany is especially +qualified to be the leader, and the only way +in which it can become the leader is to have such +overwhelming military power that no one has +any chance of resisting. Moreover, all methods +are justified in the sacred cause of German +culture—duplicity, violence, the deliberate sowing +of dissensions between possible rivals, +incitements of Asiatics to rise against Europeans. +All means are to be adopted to win +the ultimate great victory, and, of course, +when the struggle comes there must be no +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_18" id="Page_18">18</a></small> +misplaced leniency to any of the inferior races +who interpose between Germany and her legitimate +place in the sun.<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a> The ideal is almost +too naïve and too ferocious to be conceived +by ordinary minds. Yet here it all stands in +black and white. According to Bernhardi's +volume German militarism means at least two +things. First the suppression of every other +nationality except the German; second the +suppression of the whole civilian element in the +population under the heel of the German drill-sergeant. +Is it any wonder that the recent +war has been conducted by Berlin with such +appalling barbarism and ferocity?</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> <i>Germany and the Next War</i>, by F. von Bernhardi. +See especially Chap. V, "World-Power or Downfall." +Other works which may be consulted are Professor J.A. +Cramb's <i>Germany and England</i> (esp. pp. 111-112) and +Professor Usher's <i>Pan-Germanism</i>.</p></div> + + +<p><a name="The_Evils_of_Autocracy" id="The_Evils_of_Autocracy"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">The Evils of Autocracy</span></h4> + +<p>Our inquiry so far has led to two conclusions. +We have discovered by bitter experience that +a personal ascendancy, such as the German +Emperor wields, is in the highest degree perilous +to the interests of peace: and that a militarism +such as that which holds in its thrall the +German Empire is an open menace to intellectual +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_19" id="Page_19">19</a></small> +culture and to Christian ethics. But +we must not suppose that these conclusions +are only true so far as they apply to the +Teutonic race, and that the same phenomena +observed elsewhere are comparatively innocuous. +Alas! autocracy in any and every +country seems to be inimical to the best and +highest of social needs, and militarism, wherever +found, is the enemy of pacific social development. +Let us take a few instances at haphazard +of the danger of the personal factor in +European politics. There is hardly a person +to be found nowadays who defends the Crimean +war, or indeed thinks that it was in any sense +inevitable. Yet if there was one man more +than another whose personal will brought it +about, it was—not Lord Aberdeen who ought +to have been responsible—but Lord Stratford +de Redcliffe. "The great Eltchi," as he was +called, was our Ambassador at Constantinople, +a man of uncommon strength of will, which, as +is often the case with these powerful natures, +not infrequently degenerated into sheer obstinacy. +He had made up his mind that England +was to support Turkey and fight with Russia, +and inasmuch as Louis Napoleon, for the sake +of personal glory, had similar opinions, France +as well as England was dragged into a costly +and quite useless war. Napoleon III has +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_20" id="Page_20">20</a></small> +already figured among those aspiring monarchs +who wish "to sit in the chair of Europe." It +was his personal will once more which sent the +unhappy Maximilian to his death in Mexico, +and his personal jealousy of Prussia which +launched him in the fatal enterprise "à Berlin" +in 1870. In the latter case we find another +personal influence, still more sinister—that of +the Empress Eugénie, whose capricious ambition +and interference in military matters +directly led to the ruinous disaster of Sedan. +The French people, who had to suffer, discovered +it too late. "Quicquid delirant reges +plectuntur Achivi." Or take another more +recent instance. Who was responsible for the +Russo-Japanese war? Not Kuropatkin, assuredly, +nor yet the Russian Prime Minister, +but certain of the Grand Dukes and probably +the Tsar himself, who were interested in the +forests of the Yalu district and had no mind +to lose the money they had invested in a purely +financial operation. The truth is that modern +Europe has no room for "prancing Pro-consuls," +and no longer takes stock in autocrats. +They are, or ought to be, superannuated, out +of date. To use an expressive colloquialism +they are "a back number." The progress of +the world demands the development of peoples; +it has no use for mediæval monarchies like +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_21" id="Page_21">21</a></small> +that of Potsdam. One of the things we ought +to banish for ever is the horrible idea that whole +nations can be massacred and civilisation indefinitely +postponed to suit the individual +caprice of a bragging and self-opinionated +despot who calls himself God's elect. Now +that we know the ruin he can cause, let us +fight shy of the Superman, and the whole range +of ideas which he connotes.</p> + + +<p><a name="The_Military_Caste" id="The_Military_Caste"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">The Military Caste</span></h4> + +<p>Militarism is another of our maladies. Here +we must distinguish with some care. A military +spirit is one thing: militarism is another. +It is probable that no nation is worthy to +survive which does not possess a military spirit, +or, in other words, the instinct to defend itself +and its liberties against an aggressor. It is a +virtue which is closely interfused with high +moral qualities—self-respect, a proper pride, +self-reliance—and is compatible with real +modesty and sobriety of mind. But militarism +has nothing ethical about it. It is not courage, +but sheer pugnacity and quarrelsomeness, +and as exemplified in our modern history it +means the dominion of a clique, the reign of +a few self-opinionated officials. That these +individuals should possess only a limited +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_22" id="Page_22">22</a></small> +intelligence is almost inevitable. Existing for +the purposes of war, they naturally look at +everything from an oblique and perverted point +of view. They regard nations, not as peaceful +communities of citizens, but as material to be +worked up into armies. Their assumption is +that war, being an indelible feature in the +history of our common humanity, must be +ceaselessly prepared for by the piling up of +huge armaments and weapons of destruction. +Their invariable motto is that if you wish for +peace you must prepare for war—"si vis pacem, +para bellum"—a notoriously false apophthegm, +because armaments are provocative, not soothing, +and the man who is a swash-buckler +invites attack. It is needless to say that +thousands of military men do not belong to +this category: no one dreads war so much as +the man who knows what it means. I am not +speaking of individuals, I am speaking of a +particular caste, military officials in the abstract, +if you like to put it so, who, because +their business is war, have not the slightest idea +what the pacific social development of a people +really means. Militarism is simply a one-sided, +partial point of view, and to enforce that +upon a nation is as though a man with a +pronounced squint were to be accepted as a +man of normal vision. We have seen what it +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_23" id="Page_23">23</a></small> +involves in Germany. In a less offensive form, +however, it exists in most states, and its root +idea is usually that the civilian as such belongs +to a lower order of humanity, and is not so +important to the State as the officer who discharges +vague and for the most part useless +functions in the War Office.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a> It is a swollen, +over-developed militarism that has got us into +the present mess, and one of our earliest concerns, +when the storm is over, must be to put +it into its proper place. Let him who uses the +sword perish by the sword.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> Thus it was the Military party in Bulgaria which drove +her to the disastrous second Balkan war, and the Military +party in Austria which insisted on the ultimatum to +Servia.</p></div> + + +<p><a name="Diplomacy" id="Diplomacy"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Diplomacy</span></h4> + +<p>And I fear that there is another ancient +piece of our international strategy which has +been found wanting. I approach with some +hesitation the subject of diplomacy, because it +contains so many elements of value to a state, +and has given so many opportunities for active +and original minds. Its worst feature is that +its operations have to be conducted in secret: +its best is that it affords a fine exemplification +of the way in which the history and fortunes +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_24" id="Page_24">24</a></small> +of states are—to their advantage—dependent +upon the initiative of gifted and patriotic individuals. +But if we look back over the history +of recent years, we shall discover that diplomacy +has not fulfilled its especial mission. +According to a well-known cynical dictum a +diplomatist is a man who is paid to lie for his +country. And, indeed, it is one of the least +gracious aspects of the diplomatic career that it +seems necessarily to involve the use of a certain +amount of chicanery and falsehood, the object +being to jockey opponents by means of skilful +ruses into a position in which they find themselves +at a disadvantage. Clearly, however, +there are better aims than these for diplomacy—one +aim in particular, which is the preservation +of peace. A diplomat is supposed to have failed +if the result of his work leads to war. It is +not his business to bring about war. Any +king or prime minister or general can do that, +very often with conspicuous ease. A diplomat +is a skilful statesman versed in international +politics, who makes the best provision he can +for the interests of his country, carefully steering +it away from those rocks of angry hostility +on which possibly his good ship may founder.</p> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_25" id="Page_25">25</a></small></p> + + +<p><a name="Balance_of_Power" id="Balance_of_Power"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Balance of Power</span></h4> + +<p>Now what has diplomacy done for us during +the last few years? It has formed certain +understandings and alliances between different +states; it has tried to safeguard our position +by creating sympathetic bonds with those +nations who are allied to us in policy. It has +also attempted to produce that kind of "Balance +of Power" in Europe which on its own +showing makes for peace. This Balance of +Power, so often and so mysteriously alluded +to by the diplomatic world, has become a +veritable fetish. Perhaps its supreme achievement +was reached when two autocratic monarchs—the +Tsar of Russia and the German +Emperor—solemnly propounded a statement, +as we have seen, at Port Baltic that the Balance +of Power, as distributed between the Triple +Alliance and the Triple Entente, had proved +itself valuable in the interests of European +peace. That was only two years ago, and the +thing seems a mockery now. If we examine +precisely what is meant by a Balance of Power, +we shall see that it presupposes certain conditions +of animosity and attempts to neutralise +them by the exhibition of superior or, at all +events, equivalent forces. A Balance of Power +in the continental system assumes, for all +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_26" id="Page_26">26</a></small> +practical purposes, that the nations of Europe +are ready to fly at each other's throats, and +that the only way to deter them is to make +them realise how extremely perilous to themselves +would be any such military enterprise. +Can any one doubt that this is the real meaning +of the phrase? If we listen to the Delphic +oracles of diplomacy on this subject of the +Balance of Power, we shall understand that in +nine cases out of ten a man invoking this +phrase means that he wants the Balance of +Power to be favourable to himself. It is not +so much an exact equipoise that he desires, +as a certain tendency of the scales to dip in +his direction. If Germany feels herself weak +she not only associates Austria and Italy with +herself, but looks eastward to get the assistance +of Turkey, or, perhaps, attempts—as it so +happens without any success—to create sympathy +for herself in the United States of +America. If, on the other hand, France feels +herself in danger, she not only forms an alliance +with Russia, but also an entente with England +and, on the principle that the friends of one's +friends ought to be accepted, produces a further +entente between England and Russia. England, +on her part, if for whatever reason she +feels that she is liable to attack, goes even so +far as to make an alliance with an Asiatic +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_27" id="Page_27">27</a></small> +nation—Japan—in order to safeguard her +Asiatic interests in India. Thus, when diplomatists +invoke the necessity of a Balance of +Power, they are really trying to work for a +preponderance of power on their side. It is +inevitable that this should be so. An exact +Balance of Power must result in a stalemate.</p> + +<p><a name="Change_of_Policy" id="Change_of_Policy"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Change of Policy</span></h4> + +<p>Observe what has happened to Great Britain +during recent years. When she was ruled by +that extremely clear-headed though obstinate +statesman, Lord Salisbury, she remained, at +his advice, outside the circle of continental +entanglements and rejoiced in what was known +as a policy of "Splendid Isolation." It was, +of course, a selfish policy. It rested on sound +geographical grounds, because, making use of +the fortunate accident that Great Britain is an +island, it suggested that she could pursue her +own commercial career and, thanks to the +English Channel, let the whole of the rest of +the world go hang. Such a position could not +possibly last, partly because Great Britain is +not only an island, but also an empire scattered +over the seven seas; partly because we could +not remain alien from those social and economic +interests which necessarily link our career with +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_28" id="Page_28">28</a></small> +continental nations. So we became part of +the continental system, and it became necessary +for us to choose friends and partners and +mark off other peoples as our enemies. It +might have been possible a certain number of +years ago for us to join the Triple Alliance. +At one time Prince Bülow seemed anxious that +we should do so, and Mr. Chamberlain on our +side was by no means unwilling. But gradually +we discovered that Germany was intensely +jealous of us as a colonial power and as a great +sea-power, and for this reason, as well as for +others, we preferred to compose our ancient +differences with France and promote an understanding +between English and French as the +nearest of neighbours and the most convenient +of allies. Observe, however, that every step +in the process was a challenge, and a challenge +which the rival aimed at could not possibly +ignore. The conclusion of the French Entente +Cordiale in 1904, the launching of the <i>Dreadnought</i> +in 1906, the formation of the Russian +agreement in 1907, and certain changes which +we made in our own army were obviously +intended as warnings to Germany that we +were dangerous people to attack.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> Germany +naturally sought reprisals in her fashion, and +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_29" id="Page_29">29</a></small> +gradually Europe was transformed into a huge +armed camp, divided into two powerful organisations +which necessarily watched each other with +no friendly gaze.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> See <i>The War of Steel and Gold</i>, by H.N. Brailsford +(Bell)—opening chapter on "The Balance of Power."</p></div> + +<p><a name="Balance_or_Concert" id="Balance_or_Concert"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Balance or Concert</span>?</h4> + +<p>I do not say that the course of events could +possibly have been altered. When once we +became part of the continental system, it was +necessary for us to choose between friends +and enemies. I only say that if diplomacy calls +itself an agency for preventing war, it cannot be +said to be altogether successful. Its famous +doctrine of a Balance of Power is in reality a +mere phrase. If one combination be represented +as X and the other as Y, and X increases +itself up to X<sup>2</sup>, it becomes necessary +that Y should similarly increase itself to Y<sup>2</sup>, a +process which, clearly, does not make for +peace. I should imagine that the best of +diplomatists are quite aware of this. Indeed, +there seems reason to suppose that Sir Edward +Grey, owing to definite experience in the last +two years, not only discovered the uselessness +of the principle of a Balance of Power, but did +his best to substitute something entirely different—the +Concert of Europe. All the negotiations +he conducted during and after the two +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_30" id="Page_30">30</a></small> +Balkan wars, his constant effort to summon +London Conferences and other things, were +intended to create a Concert of European +Powers, discussing amongst themselves the +best measures to secure the peace of the world. +Alas! the whole of the fabric was destroyed, +the fair prospects hopelessly clouded over, by +the intemperate ambition of the Kaiser, who, +just because he believed that the Balance of +Power was favourable to himself, that Russia +was unready, that France was involved in +serious domestic trouble, that England was on +the brink of civil war, set fire to the magazine +and engineered the present colossal explosion.</p> + +<p><a name="Control_of_Foreign_Policy" id="Control_of_Foreign_Policy"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Control of Foreign Policy</span></h4> + +<p>One cannot feel sure that diplomacy as +hitherto recognised will be able, or, indeed, +ought to be able, to survive the shock. In this +country, as in others, diplomacy has been considered +a highly specialised science, which can +only be conducted by trained men and by +methods of entire secrecy. As a mere matter +of fact, England has far less control over her +foreign policy than any of the continental +Powers. In Germany foreign affairs come +before the Reichstag, in France they are surveyed +by the Senate, in America there is a +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_31" id="Page_31">31</a></small> +special department of the Senate empowered +to deal with foreign concerns. In Great Britain +there is nothing of the kind. Parliament has +practically no control whatsoever over foreign +affairs, it is not even consulted in the formation +of treaties and arrangements with other nations. +Nor yet has the Cabinet any real control, +because it must act together as a whole, and a +determined criticism of a foreign secretary +means the resignation of the Government. +Fortunately, our diplomacy has been left for +the most part in very able hands. Nevertheless, +it is surely a paradox that the English +people should know so little about foreign +affairs as to be absolutely incapable of any +control in questions that affect their life or +death. Democracy, though it is supposed to +be incompetent to manage foreign relations, +could hardly have made a worse mess of it +than the highly-trained Chancelleries. When +the new Europe arises out of the ashes of the +old, it is not very hazardous to prophesy that +diplomacy, with its secret methods, its belief +in phrases and abstract principles, and its +assumption of a special professional knowledge, +will find the range of its powers and the +sphere of its authority sensibly curtailed.</p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_32" id="Page_32">32</a></small></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_II" id="CHAPTER_II"></a>CHAPTER II</h2> + +<h3>LESSONS OF THE PAST</h3> + +<p>The problems that lie before us in the +reconstitution of Europe are so many and so +various that we can only hope to take a few +separately, especially those which seem to +throw most light on a possible future. I have +used the phrase "reconstitution of Europe," +because I do not know how otherwise to +characterise the general trend of the ideas +germinating in many men's minds as they +survey the present crisis and its probable +outcome. Europe will have to be reconstituted +in more respects than one. At the present +moment, or rather before the present war +broke out, it was governed by phrases and +conceptions which had become superannuated. +An uneasy equipoise between the Great Powers +represented the highest culmination of our +diplomatic efforts. Something must clearly be +substituted for this uneasy equipoise. It is +not enough that after tremendous efforts the +relative balance of forces between great states +should, on the whole, dissuade them from war. +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_33" id="Page_33">33</a></small> +As a matter of fact, it has not done so. The +underlying conception has been that nations +are so ardently bellicose that they require to +be restrained from headlong conflicts by the +doubtful and dangerous character of such +military efforts as might be practicable. Hence +Europe, as divided into armed camps, represents +one of the old-fashioned ideas that we +want to abolish. We wish to put in its stead +something like a Concert of Europe. We have +before our eyes a vague, but inspiring vision +not of tremendous and rival armaments, but +of a United States of Europe, each component +element striving for the public weal, and for +further advances in general cultivation and +welfare rather than commercial prosperity. +The last is a vital point, for it does not require +much knowledge of modern history to discover +that the race for commercial advantage is +exactly one of the reasons why Europe is at +war at the present moment. A vast increase +in the commercial prosperity of any one state +means a frantic effort on the part of its rivals +to pull down this advantage. In some fashion, +therefore, we have to substitute for endless competition +the principle of co-operation, national +welfare being construed at the same time not in +terms of overwhelming wealth, but of thorough +sanity and health in the body corporate.</p><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_34" id="Page_34">34</a></small></p> + +<p><a name="Naked_Strength" id="Naked_Strength"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Naked Strength</span></h4> + +<p>All this sounds shadowy and abstruse until +it is translated into something concrete and +definite. What is it we want to dispossess +and banish from the Europe of to-day? We +have to find something to take the place of +what is called militarism. I dealt with the +general features of militarism in my last +essay; I will therefore content myself with +saying that militarism in Europe has meant +two things above all. First, the worship of +might, as expressed in formidable armaments; +next, the corresponding worship of wealth to +enable the burden of armaments to be borne +with comparative ease. The worship of naked +strength involves several deductions. Right +disappears, or rather is translated in terms of +might. International morality equally disappears. +Individuals, it is true, seek to be +governed by the consciousness of universal +moral laws. But a nation, as such, has no +conscience, and is not bound to recognise the +supremacy of anything higher than itself. +Morality, though it may bind the individual, +does not bind the State, or, as General von +Bernhardi has expressed it, "political morality +differs from individual morality because there +is no power above the State." In similar +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_35" id="Page_35">35</a></small> +fashion the worship of wealth carries numerous +consequences with it, which are well worthy +of consideration. But the main point, so far +as it affects my present argument, is that it +substitutes materialistic objects of endeavour +for ethical and spiritual aims. Once more +morality is defeated. The ideal is not the +supremacy of good, but the supremacy of that +range and sphere of material efficiency that is +procurable by wealth.</p> + +<p><a name="Public_Right" id="Public_Right"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Public Right</span></h4> + +<p>Let us try to be more concrete still, and in +this context let us turn to such definite statements +as are available of the views entertained +by our chief statesmen, politicians, and leaders +of public opinion. I turn to the speech which +Mr. Asquith delivered on Friday evening, +September 25, in Dublin, as part of the crusade +which he and others are undertaking for the +general enlightenment of the country. "I +should like," said Mr. Asquith, "to ask your +attention and that of my fellow-countrymen +to the end which, in this war, we ought to +keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the +time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used +these words. He said: 'The greatest triumph +of our time will be the enthronement of the +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_36" id="Page_36">36</a></small> +idea of public right as the governing idea of +European politics.' Nearly fifty years have +passed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet +been made towards that good and beneficent +change, but it seems to me to be now at this +moment as good a definition as we can have of +our European policy—the idea of public right. +What does it mean when translated into +concrete terms? It means, first and foremost, +the clearing of the ground by the definite +repudiation of militarism as the governing +factor in the relation of states and of the future +moulding of the European world. It means +next that room must be found and kept for +the independent existence and the free development +of the smaller nationalities, each with a +corporate consciousness of its own.... And +it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps, +by a slow and gradual process, the substitution +for force, for the clash of competing ambition, +for groupings and alliances, of a real European +partnership based on the recognition of equal +right and established and enforced by a +common will."<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a></p> + +<p>Much the same language has been used by +Sir Edward Grey and by Mr. Winston +Churchill.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a> +<a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> <i>The Times</i>, September 26.</p></div> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_37" id="Page_37">37</a></small></p> + + +<p><a name="A_Common_Will" id="A_Common_Will"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">A Common Will</span></h4> + +<p>Observe that there are three points here. +In the first place—if I do not misapprehend +Mr. Asquith's drift—in working for the abolition +of militarism, we are working for a great +diminution in those armaments which have +become a nightmare to the modern world. +The second point is that we have to help in +every fashion small nationalities, or, in other +words, that we have to see that countries like +Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian +countries, Greece and the Balkan States, +and, perhaps, more specially, the Slav nationalities +shall have a free chance in Europe, +shall "have their place in the sun," and not +be browbeaten and raided and overwhelmed +by their powerful neighbours. And the third +point, perhaps more important than all, is +the creation of what Mr. Asquith calls a +"European partnership based on the recognition +of equal right and established and enforced +by a common will." We have to recognise +that there is such a thing as public right; that +there is such a thing as international morality, +and that the United States of Europe have to +keep as their ideal the affirmation of this +public right, and to enforce it by a common +will. That creation of a common will is at once +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_38" id="Page_38">38</a></small> +the most difficult and the most imperative +thing of all. Every one must be aware how +difficult it is. We know, for instance, how the +common law is enforced in any specified state, +because it has a "sanction," or, in other words, +because those who break it can be punished. +But the weakness for a long time past of international +law, from the time of Grotius onwards, +is that it apparently has no real sanction. +How are we to punish an offending state? +It can only be done by the gradual development +of a public conscience in Europe, and by +means of definite agreements so that the rest +of the civilised world shall compel a recalcitrant +member to abide by the common decrees. +If only this common will of Europe ever came +into existence, we should have solved most, if +not all, our troubles. But the question is: +How?</p> + +<p><a name="A_Hundred_Years_Ago" id="A_Hundred_Years_Ago"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">A Hundred Years Ago</span></h4> + +<p>It may be depressing, but it certainly is an +instructive lesson to go back just a hundred +years ago, when the condition of Europe +was in many respects similar to that which +prevails now. The problems that unrolled +themselves before the nations afford useful +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_39" id="Page_39">39</a></small> +points of comparison. The great enemy was +then Napoleon and France. Napoleon's views +of empire were precisely of that universal +predatory type which we have learnt to +associate with the Kaiser and the German +Empire. The autocratic rule of the single +personal will was weighing heavily on nearly +every quarter of the globe. Then came a +time when the principle of nationality, which +Napoleon had everywhere defied, gradually +grew in strength until it was able to shake off +the yoke of the conqueror. In Germany, and +Spain, and Italy the principle of nationality +steadily grew, while in England there had +always been a steady opposition to the tyranny +of Napoleon on the precise ground that it +interfered with the independent existence of +nations. The defeat of Napoleon, therefore, +was hailed by our forefathers a hundred years +ago as the dawn of a new era. Four great +Powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and +Prussia—had before them as their task the +settlement of Europe, one of the noblest tasks +that could possibly be assigned to those who, +having suffered under the old regime, were +desirous to secure peace and base it on just +and equitable foundations. There is thus an +obvious parallelism between the conditions of +affairs in 1815 and those which will, as we hope, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_40" id="Page_40">40</a></small> +obtain if and when the German tyrant is defeated +and the nations of Europe commence their +solemn task of reconstituting Europe. Of course, +we must not press the analogy too far. The +dawn of a new era might have been welcomed +in 1815, but the proviso was always kept in the +background that most of the older traditions +should be preserved. Diplomacy was still +inspired by its traditional watchwords. Above +all, the transformation so keenly and so vaguely +desired was in the hands of sovereigns who +were more anxious about their own interests +than perhaps was consistent with the common +weal.</p> + +<p><a name="Equilibrium" id="Equilibrium"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Equilibrium</span></h4> + +<p>At first the four Great Powers proceeded +very tentatively. They wished to confine +France—the dangerous element in Europe—within +her legitimate boundaries. Next, they +desired to arrange an equilibrium of Powers +(observe, in passing, the old doctrine of +the Balance of Power) so that no individual +state should for the future be in a position to +upset the general tranquillity. Revolutionary +France was to be held under by the re-establishment +of its ancient dynasty. Hence +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_41" id="Page_41">41</a></small> +Louis XVIII was to be restored. The other +object was to be obtained by a careful parcelling +out of the various territories of Europe, on the +basis, so far as possible, of old rights consecrated +by treaties. It is unnecessary to go +into detail in this matter. We may say summarily +that Germany was reconstituted as a +Confederation of Sovereign States; Austria +received the Presidency of the Federal Diet; +in Italy Lombardo-Venetia was erected into a +kingdom under Austrian hegemony, while the +Low Countries were annexed to the crown of +Holland so as to form, under the title of the +United Netherlands, an efficient barrier against +French aggression northwards. It was troublesome +to satisfy Alexander I of Russia because +of his ambition to secure for himself the +kingdom of Poland. Indeed, as we shall see +presently, the personality of Alexander was a +permanent stumbling-block to most of the +projects of European statesmen. As a whole, +it cannot be denied that this particular period +of history, between Napoleon's abdication in +1814 and the meeting of the European Congress +at Verona in 1882, presented a profoundly +distressing picture of international egotism. +The ruin of their common enemy, relieving +the members of the European family from the +necessity of maintaining concord, also released +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_42" id="Page_42">42</a></small> +their individual selfishnesses and their long-suppressed +mutual jealousies.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> See <i>The Confederation of Europe</i>, by Walter Alison +Phillips (Longmans), esp. Chapters V and VI. Cf. also +<i>Political and Literary Essays</i>, by the Earl of Cromer, 2nd +series (Macmillan), on <i>The Confederation of Europe</i>.</p></div> + +<p><a name="The_Holy_Alliance" id="The_Holy_Alliance"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">The Holy Alliance</span></h4> + +<p>The figure of Alexander I dominates this +epoch. His character exhibits a very curious +mixture of autocratic ambition and a mystical +vein of sheer undiluted idealism. Probably it +would be true to say that he began by being +an idealist, and was forced by the pressure of +events to adopt reactionary tactics. Perhaps +also, deeply embedded in the Russian nature +we generally find a certain unpracticalness and +a tendency to mystical dreams, far remote +from the ordinary necessities of every day. +It was Alexander's dream to found a Union +of Europe, and to consecrate its political by +its spiritual aims. He retained various nebulous +thinkers around his throne; he also +derived much of his crusade from the inspiration +of a woman—Baroness von Krüdener, +who is supposed to have owed her own conversion +to the teaching of a pious cobbler. +Even if we have to describe Alexander's dream +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_43" id="Page_43">43</a></small> +as futile, we cannot afford to dismiss it as +wholly inoperative. For it had as its fruit the +so-called Holy Alliance, which was in a sense +the direct ancestor of the peace programmes +of the Hague, and, through a different chain of +ideas, the Monroe Doctrine of the United +States. We are apt sometimes to confuse the +Holy Alliance with the Grand Alliance. The +second, however, was a union of the four +Great Powers, to which France was ultimately +admitted. The first was not an alliance at all, +hardly, perhaps, even a treaty. It was in its +original conception a single-hearted attempt to +arrange Europe on the principles of the Christian +religion, the various nations being regarded as +brothers who ought to have proper brotherly +affection for one another. We know that, +eventually, the Holy Alliance became an instrument +of something like autocratic despotism, +but in its essence it was so far from being +reactionary that, according to the Emperor +Alexander, it involved the grant of liberal +constitutions by princes to their subjects.</p> + +<p><a name="Diplomatic_Criticism" id="Diplomatic_Criticism"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Diplomatic Criticism</span></h4> + +<p>But just because it bound its signatories to +act on certain vague principles for no well-defined +ends, it was bound to become the +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_44" id="Page_44">44</a></small> +mockery of diplomatists trained in an older +school. Metternich, for instance, called it a +"loud sounding nothing"; Castlereagh "a +piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," +while Canning declared that for his part he +wanted no more of "Areopagus and the like +of that." What happened on this occasion +is what ordinarily happens with well-intentioned +idealists who happen also to be amateur +statesmen. Trying to regulate practical politics, +the Holy Alliance was deflected from its original +purpose because its chief author, Alexander I, +came under the influence of Metternich and was +frightened by revolutionary movements in Italy +and within his own dominions. Thus the +instrument originally intended to preserve +nationalities and secure the constitutional +rights of people was converted into a weapon +for the use of autocrats only anxious to preserve +their own thrones. Nevertheless, though +it may have been a failure, the Holy Alliance +did not leave itself without witness in the +modern world. It tried to regulate ordinary +diplomacy in accordance with ethical and +spiritual principles; and the dreaming mind +of its first founder was reproduced in that +later descendant of his who initiated the +Hague propaganda of peace.</p><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_45" id="Page_45">45</a></small></p> + +<p><a name="Failure" id="Failure"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Failure</span></h4> + +<p>"These things were written for our ensamples," +and we should be foolish indeed if +we did not take stock of them with an anxious +eye to the future. The main and startling +fact is that with every apparent desire for +the re-establishment of Europe on better +lines, Europe, as a matter of fact, drifted back +into the old welter of conflicting nationalities, +while the very instrument of peace—the Holy +Alliance—was used by autocratic governments +for the subjection of smaller nationalities and +the destruction of popular freedom. It is +accordingly very necessary that we should +study the conditions under which so startling +a transformation took place. Even in England +herself it cannot be said that the people were in +any sense benefited by the conclusions of the +war. They had borne its burdens, but at its +end found themselves hampered as before in +the free development of a democracy. Meanwhile, +Europe at large presented a spectacle of +despotism tempered by occasional popular outbreaks, +while in the majority of cases the old +fetters were riveted anew by cunning and by +no means disinterested hands.</p><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_46" id="Page_46">46</a></small></p> + +<p><a name="A_Deceptive_Parallel" id="A_Deceptive_Parallel"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">A Deceptive Parallel</span></h4> + +<p>What we have to ask ourselves is whether +the conditions a hundred years ago have any +real similarity with those likely to obtain when +Europe begins anew to set its house in order. +To this, fortunately, we can return a decided +negative. We have already shown that the +general outlines present a certain similarity, +but the parallelism is at most superficial, and +in many respects deceptive. A despot has to +be overthrown, an end has to be put to a +particular form of autocratic regime, and +smaller states have to be protected against +the exactions of their stronger neighbours—that +is the extent of the analogy. But it is +to be hoped that we shall commence our +labours under much better auspices. The +personal forces involved, for instance, are +wholly different. Amongst those who took +upon themselves to solve the problems of the +time is to be found the widest possible divergence +in character and aims. On the one side +we have a sheer mystic and idealist in the +person of Alexander I, with all kinds of +visionary characters at his side—La Harpe, +who was his tutor, a Jacobin pure and simple, +and a fervent apostle of the teachings of +Jean Jacques Rousseau; Czartoryski, a Pole, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_47" id="Page_47">47</a></small> +sincerely anxious for the regeneration of his +kingdom; and Capo d'Istria, a champion of +Greek nationality. To these we have to add +the curious figure of the Baroness von Krüdener, +an admirable representative of the religious +sickliness of the age. "I have immense things +to say to him," she said, referring to the +Emperor, "the Lord alone can prepare his +heart to receive them." She had, indeed, +many things to say to him, but her influence +was evanescent and his Imperial heart was +hardened eventually to quite different issues.</p> + +<p><a name="Metternich" id="Metternich"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Metternich</span></h4> + +<p>Absolutely at the other extreme was a man +like Metternich, trained in the old school of +politics, wily with the wiliness of a practised +diplomatic training, naturally impatient of +speculative dreamers, thoroughly practical in +the only sense in which he understood the term, +that is to say, determined to preserve Austrian +supremacy. To a reactionary of this kind the +Holy Alliance represented nothing but words. +He knew, with the cynicism bred of long +experience of mankind, that the rivalries and +jealousies between different states would prevent +their union in any common purpose, and +in the long run the intensity with which he +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_48" id="Page_48">48</a></small> +pursued his objects, narrow and limited as it +was, prevailed over the large and vague +generosity of Alexander's nature. To the same +type belonged both Talleyrand and Richelieu, +who concentrated themselves on the single task +of winning back for France her older position +in the European commonwealth—a laudable +aim for patriots to espouse, but one which +was not likely to help the cause of the Holy +Alliance.</p> + +<p><a name="Castlereagh_and_Canning" id="Castlereagh_and_Canning"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Castlereagh and Canning</span></h4> + +<p>Half-way between these two extremes of +unpractical idealists and extremely practical +but narrow-minded reactionaries come the +English statesmen, Castlereagh, Wellington, +and Canning. Much injustice has been done +to the first of these. For many critics have +been misled by Byron's denunciation of Castlereagh, +just as others have spoken lightly of the +stubborn conservatism of Wellington, or the +easy and half-cynical insouciance of the author +of the <i>Anti-Jacobin</i>. As a matter of fact, +Castlereagh was by no means an opponent of +the principles of the Holy Alliance. He joined +with Russia, Austria, and Prussia as a not +unwilling member of the successive Congresses, +but both he and Wellington, true to their +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_49" id="Page_49">49</a></small> +national instincts, sought to subordinate all +proposals to the interests of Great Britain, and +to confine discussions to immediate objects, +such as the limitation of French power and +the suppression of dangerous revolutionary +ideas. They were not, it is true, idealists in +the sense in which Alexander I understood the +term. And yet, on the whole, both Castlereagh +and Canning did more for the principle of +nationality than any of the other diplomatists +of the time. The reason why Canning broke +with the Holy Alliance, after Troppau, Laibach, +and Verona, was because he discerned something +more than a tendency on the part of +Continental States to crush the free development +of peoples, especially in reference to the +Latin-American States of South America. It +is true that in these matters he and his successor +were guided by a shrewd notion of British +interest, but it would be hardly just to blame +them on this account. "You know my politics +well enough," wrote Canning in 1822 to the +British Ambassador in St. Petersburg, "to +know what I mean when I say that for Europe +I should be desirous now and then to read +England." Castlereagh was, no doubt, more +conciliatory than Canning, but he saw the +fundamental difficulty of organising an international +system and yet holding the balance +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_50" id="Page_50">50</a></small> +between conflicting nations. And thus we get +to a result such as seems to have rejoiced the +heart of Canning, when he said in 1823 that +"the issue of Verona has split the one and +indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct +as the constitutions of England, France, and +Muscovy." "Things are getting back," he +added, "to a wholesome state again. Every +nation for itself and God for us all. Only bid +your Emperor (Alexander I) be quiet, for the +time for Areopagus and the like of that is +gone by."<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> <i>The Confederation of Europe</i>, by W.A. Phillips, p. 280.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Earthen_Vessels" id="Earthen_Vessels"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Earthen Vessels</span></h4> + +<p>If, then, the ardent hopes of a regenerated +Europe in the early years of the nineteenth +century failed, the result was due in large +measure to the fact that the business was +committed to wrong hands. The organs for +working the change were for the most part +autocratic monarchs and old-world diplomatists—the +last people in the world likely to bring +about a workable millennium. A great crisis +demands very careful manipulation. Cynicism +must not be allowed to play any part in it. +Traditional watchwords are not of much use. +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_51" id="Page_51">51</a></small> +Theoretical idealism itself may turn out to be +a most formidable stumbling-block. Yet no +one can doubt that a solution of the problem, +whenever it is arrived at, must come along the +path of idealism. Long ago a man of the +world was defined as a man who in every +serious crisis is invariably wrong. He is wrong +because he applies old-fashioned experience +to a novel situation—old wine in new bottles—and +because he has no faith in generous aspirations, +having noted their continuous failure in +the past. Yet, after all, it is only faith which +can move mountains, and the Holy Alliance +itself was not so much wrong in the principles +to which it appealed as it was in the personages +who signed it. We have noticed already that, +like all other great ideas, it did not wholly +die. The propaganda of peace, however futile +may be some of the discussions of pacifists, +is the heritage which even so wrong-headed a +man as Alexander I has left to the world. +The idea of arbitration between nations, the +solution of difficulties by arguments rather +than by swords, the power which democracies +hold in their hands for guiding the future +destinies of the world—all these in their various +forms remain with us as legacies of that +splendid, though ineffective, idealism which +lay at the root of the Holy Alliance.</p><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_52" id="Page_52">52</a></small></p> + +<p><a name="Small_Nationalities" id="Small_Nationalities"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Small Nationalities</span></h4> + +<p>And now after this digression, which has +been necessary to clear the ground, and also +to suggest apt parallels, let us return to what +Mr. Asquith said in Dublin on the ultimate +objects of the present war. He borrowed from +Mr. Gladstone the phrase "the enthronement +of the idea of public right as the governing +idea of European politics," and in developing +it as applicable to the present situation he +pointed out that for us three definite objects +are involved. The first, assented to by every +publicist of the day, apart from those educated +in Germany, is the wholesale obliteration of +the notion that states exist simply for the +sake of going to war. This kind of militarism, +in all its different aspects, will have to be +abolished. The next point brings us at once +to the heart of some of the controversies raised +in 1815 and onwards. "Room," said Mr. +Asquith—agreeing in this matter with Mr. +Winston Churchill—"room must be found, +and kept, for the independent existence and +the free development of the smaller nationalities, +each with a corporate consciousness of +its own." Now this is a plain issue which +every one can understand. Not only did we +go to war in order to help a small +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_53" id="Page_53">53</a></small> +nationality—Belgium—but +the very principle of nationality +is one of the familiar phrases which have +characterised British policy through the greater +part of the nineteenth century. Our principle +is to live and let live, to allow smaller states +to exist and thrive by the side of their large +neighbours without undue interference on the +part of the latter. Each distinct nationality +is to have its voice, at all events, in the free +direction of its own future. And, above all, +its present and future position must be determined +not by the interests of the big Powers, +but by a sort of plebiscite of the whole nationality.</p> + +<p><a name="Some_Plain_Issues" id="Some_Plain_Issues"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Some Plain Issues</span></h4> + +<p>Applying such principles to Europe as it +exists to-day, and as it is likely to exist to-morrow, +we arrive at certain very definite +conclusions. The independence of Belgium +must be secured, so also must the independence +of Holland and Denmark. Alsace and Lorraine +must, if the inhabitants so wish, be +restored to France, and there can be little +doubt that Alsace at all events will be only +too glad to resume her old allegiance to the +French nation. The Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein +must also decide whether they would +like to be reunited to Denmark. And we are +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_54" id="Page_54">54</a></small> +already aware that the Tsar has promised to +give independence to the country of Poland—a +point which forms a curious analogy with the +same offer originally proposed by the Tsar's +ancestor, Alexander I. Of course, these do +not exhaust by any means the changes that +must be forthcoming. Finland will have to +be liberated; those portions of Transylvania +which are akin to Roumania must be allowed +to gravitate towards their own stock. Italy +must arrogate to herself—if she is wise enough +to join her forces with those of the Triple +Entente—those territories which come under +the general title of "unredeemed Italy"—the +Trentino and Trieste, to say nothing of what +Italy claims on the Adriatic littoral. Possibly +the greatest changes of all will take place in +reference to the Slavs. Servia and Montenegro +will clearly wish to incorporate in a great Slav +kingdom a great many of their kinsmen who +at present are held in uneasy subjection by +Austria.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> Nor must we forget how these same +principles apply to the Teutonic States. If the +principle of nationality is to guide us, we must +preserve the German nation, even though we +desire to reduce its dangerous elements to +impotence. Prussia must remain the home of +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_55" id="Page_55">55</a></small> +all those Germans who accept the hegemony of +Berlin, but it does not follow that the southern +states of the German Empire—who have not been +particularly fond of their northern neighbours—should +have to endure any longer the Prussian +yoke. Lastly, the German colonies can hardly +be permitted to remain under the dominion of +the Kaiser.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> Here are only a few of the +changes which may metamorphose the face of +Europe as a direct result of enforcing the +principle of nationalities.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> The entrance of Turkey into the quarrel of course +brings new factors into the ultimate settlement.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> Cf. <i>Who is Responsible?</i> by Cloudesley Brereton +(Harrap), Chapter IV, "The Settlement."</p></div> + +<p><a name="European_Partnership" id="European_Partnership"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">European Partnership</span></h4> + +<p>But there is a further point to which Mr. +Asquith referred, one which is more important +than anything else, because it represents the +far-off ideal of European peace and the peace +of the world. "We have got to substitute +by a slow and gradual process," said Mr. Asquith, +"instead of force, instead of the clash +of compelling ambition, instead of groupings +and alliances, a real European partnership, +based on the recognition of equal right and +established and enforced by a common will." +There we have the whole crux of the situation, +and, unfortunately, we are forced to add, its +main difficulty. For if we desire to summarise +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_56" id="Page_56">56</a></small> +in a single sentence the rock on which European +negotiations from 1815 to 1829 ultimately +split, it was the union of two such contradictory +things as independent nationalities and an +international committee or system of public +law. Intrinsically the two ideas are opposed, +for one suggests absolute freedom, and the +other suggests control, superintendence, interference. +If the one recognises the entire independence +of a nationality within its own +limits, the other seeks to enforce something +of the nature of a European police to see that +every nation does its duty. It is true, of +course, that this public will of Europe must +be incorporated in a kind of parliament, to +which the separate nations must send their +representatives, and that thus in a fashion +each nation will have its proper say in any +of the conclusions arrived at. But here the +difficulty starts anew owing to the relative +size, and therefore the relative importance +of the different states constituting the union. +If all alike are given an equivalent vote, it is +rather hard on the big states, which represent +larger numbers and therefore control larger +destinies. If, on the other hand, we adopt the +principle of proportional representation, we +may be pretty certain that the larger states +will press somewhat heavily on the smaller. +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_57" id="Page_57">57</a></small> +For instance, suppose that some state violates, +or threatens to violate, the public law of the +world. In that case the Universal Union +must, of course, try to bring it to reason by +peaceful means first, but if that should fail, +the only other alternative is by force of arms. +If once we admit the right of the world-organisation +to coerce its recalcitrant members, +what becomes of the sovereign independence +of nations? That, as we have said, was the +main difficulty confronting the European peace-maker +of a hundred years ago, and, however +we may choose to regard it, it remains a difficulty, +we will not say insuperable, but at all +events exceedingly formidable, for the European +peace-makers of the twentieth century. The +antithesis is the old antithesis between order +and progress; between coercion and independence; +between the public voice, or, if we like +to phrase it so, the public conscience, and the +arbitrariness and irresponsibility of individual +units. Or we might put the problem in a still +wider form. A patriot is a man who believes +intensely in the rights of his own nationality. +But if we have to form a United States of +Europe we shall have gradually to soften, +diminish, or perhaps even destroy the narrower +conceptions of patriotism. The ultimate evolution +of democracy in the various peoples means +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_58" id="Page_58">58</a></small> +the mutual recognition of their common interests, +as against despotism and autocracy. +It is clear that such a process must gradually +wipe out the distinction between the different +peoples, and substitute for particularism something +of universal import. In such a process +what, we ask once more, becomes of the principle +of nationality, which is one of our immediate +aims? In point of fact, it is obvious +that, from a strictly logical standpoint, the +will of Europe, or the public right of Europe, +and the free independence of nationalities are +antithetical terms, and will continue to remain +so, however cunningly, by a series of compromises, +we may conceal their essential divergence. +That is the real problem which confronts +us quite as obstinately as it did our forefathers +after the destruction of the Napoleonic power. +And it will have to be faced by all reformers, +whether they are pacifists or idealists, on ethical +or political grounds.</p> + +<p><a name="A_Moral_for_Pacifists" id="A_Moral_for_Pacifists"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">A Moral for Pacifists</span></h4> + +<p>What is the outcome of the foregoing considerations? +The only moral at present which +I am disposed to draw is one which may be +addressed to pacifists in general, and to all +those who avail themselves of large and +generous phrases, such as "the public will of +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_59" id="Page_59">59</a></small> +Europe," or "the common consciousness of +civilised states." The solution of the problem +before us is not to be gained by the use of +abstract terms, but by very definite and concrete +experience used in the most practical +way to secure immediate reforms. We demand, +for instance, the creation of what is to all +intents and purposes an international federal +system applied to Europe at large. Now it is +obvious that a federal system can be created +amongst nations more or less at the same level +of civilisation, inspired by much the same +ideals, acknowledging the same end of their +political and social activity. But in what +sense is this true of Europe as we know it? +There is every kind of diversity between the +constituent elements of the suggested federation. +There is no real uniformity of political +institutions and ideals. But in order that our +object may be realised it is precisely this +uniformity of political institutions and ideals +amongst the nations which we require. How +is a public opinion formed in any given state? +It comes into being owing to a certain community +of sentiments, opinions, and prejudices, +and without such community it cannot develop. +The same thing holds true of international +affairs. If we desiderate the public voice of +Europe, or the public conscience of Europe, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_60" id="Page_60">60</a></small> +Europe must grow to be far more concordant +than it is at present, both in actual political +institutions and in those inspiring ideals which +form the life-blood of institutions. How many +states, for instance, recognise or put into +practice a really representative system of +government?</p> + +<p><a name="Compulsory_Arbitration" id="Compulsory_Arbitration"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Compulsory Arbitration</span></h4> + +<p>If we turn to the programme of the pacifists, +we shall be confronted by similar difficulties. +Pacifism, as such, involves an appeal to all the +democracies, asking them to come into line, as +it were, for the execution of certain definite +projects intended to seek peace and ensure it. +The first stage of the peace movement is the +general recognition of the principle of arbitration +between states. That first period has, +we may take it, been already realised. The +second stage is the recognition of compulsory +arbitration. When, in 1907, the second Hague +Conference was held, this principle was supported +by thirty-two different states, representing +more than a thousand million human +beings. Something like three or four hundred +millions remained not yet prepared to admit +the principle in its entirety. I may remark in +passing that the verbal acceptance of a general +principle is one thing, the application, as we +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_61" id="Page_61">61</a></small> +have lately had much reason to discover, is +quite another. We may recognise, however, +that this second stage of the pacifist programme +has, undoubtedly, made large advances. But +of course it must necessarily be followed by +its consequence, a third stage which shall +ensure respect for, and obedience to arbitration +verdicts. Recalcitrant states will have +to be coerced, and the one thing that can coerce +them is an international police administered +by an international executive power. That is +to say, we must have a parliament of parliaments, +a universal parliament, the representatives +of which must be selected by the +different constituent members of the United +States of Europe. When this has been done, +and only when this has been done, can we +arrive at a fourth stage, that of a general disarmament. +In the millennium that is to be +it is only the international police which shall +be allowed to use weapons of war in order to +execute the decrees of the central parliament +representing the common European will.</p> + + +<p><a name="Democratic_Unanimity" id="Democratic_Unanimity"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Democratic Unanimity</span></h4> + +<p>Here we have all the old difficulties starting +anew, and especially the main one—democratic +unanimity. How far the democracies of the +European Commonwealth can work in unison is +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_62" id="Page_62">62</a></small> +one of the problems which the future will have +to solve. At present they, obviously, do not do +so. The Social Democrats of Germany agreed +to make war on the democrats of other countries. +Old instincts were too strong for them. For it +must always be remembered that only so far +as a cosmopolitan spirit takes the place of +narrow national prejudices can we hope to +reach the level of a common conscience, or a +common will of Europe. And are we prepared +to say that national prejudices <i>ought</i> to be +obliterated and ignored? The very principle +of nationality forbids it.</p> + +<p>I do not wish, however, to end on a note of +pessimism. The mistake of the pacifist has +all along been the assumption that bellicose +impulses have died away. They have done +nothing of the kind, and are not likely to do +so. But, happily, all past experience in the +world's history shows us that ideas in a real +sense govern the world, and that a logical +difficulty is not necessarily a practical impossibility. +In this case, as in others, a noble +and generous idea of European peace will +gradually work its own fulfilment, if we are +not in too much of a hurry to force the pace, +or imagine that the ideal has been reached +even before the preliminary foundations have +been laid.</p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_63" id="Page_63">63</a></small></p> +<h2><a name="CHAPTER_III" id="CHAPTER_III"></a>CHAPTER III</h2> + +<h3>SOME SUGGESTED REFORMS</h3> + +<p>It is an obvious criticism on the considerations +which have been occupying us in the +preceding chapters that they are too purely +theoretical to be of any value. They are indeed +speculative, and, perhaps, from one point of +view come under the edge of the usual condemnation +of prophecy. Prophecy is, of course, +if one of the most interesting, also one of the +most dangerous of human ingenuities, and the +usual fate of prophets is, in nine cases out of +ten, to be proved wrong. Moreover, it is +possible that there may come an issue to the +present war which would be by far the worst +which the human mind can conceive. It may +end in a deadlock, a stalemate, an impasse, +because the two opposing forces are so equal +that neither side can get the better of the other. +If peace has to be made because of such a +balance between the opposing forces as this, +it would be a calamity almost worse than the +original war. German militarism would still +be unsubdued, the Kaiser's pretensions to +universal sovereignty, although clipped, would +not be wiped out, and we should find remaining +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_64" id="Page_64">64</a></small> +in all the nations of the earth a sort of sullen +resentment which could not possibly lead to +anything else than a purely temporary truce. +The only logical object of war is to make war +impossible, and if merely an indecisive result +were achieved in the present war, it would be +as certain as anything human can be that a fresh +war would soon arise. At the present moment +we confess that there is an ugly possibility of +this kind, and that it is one of the most formidable +perils of future civilisation.</p> + +<p><a name="An_Ignoble_Pacification" id="An_Ignoble_Pacification"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">An Ignoble Pacification</span></h4> + +<p>It is so immensely important, however, that +the cause of the Allies should prevail not for +their own sakes alone, but for the sake of the +world, that it is difficult to imagine their consenting +to an ignoble pacification. The Allies +have signed an important document, in order +to prove their solidarity, that no one of them +will sign peace without the sanction of the +other partners. Let us suppose that the rival +armies have fought each other to a standstill; +let us suppose that France is exhausted; let +us further suppose that the German troops, +by their mobility and their tactical skill, are +able to hold the Russians in the eastern +sphere of war. We can suppose all these +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_65" id="Page_65">65</a></small> +things, but what we cannot imagine even for +a moment is that Great Britain—to confine +ourselves only to our own case—will ever consent +to stop until she has achieved her object. +America may strive to make the combatants +desist from hostilities, partly because she is a +great pacific power herself, and partly because +it is a practical object with her as a commercial +nation to secure tranquil conditions. Yet, +even so, there would be no answer to the question +which most thoughtful minds would propound: +Why did we go to war, and what have +we gained by the war? If we went to war for +large cosmic purposes, then we cannot consent +to a peace which leaves those ultimate purposes +unfulfilled. I think, therefore, we can put +aside this extremely uncomfortable suggestion +that the war may possibly end in a deadlock, +because, in the last resort, Great Britain, with +her fleet, her sister dominions over the seas, +her colonies, and her eastern ally Japan, will +always, to use the familiar phrase, have "something +up her sleeve," even though continental +nations should reach a pitch of absolute +exhaustion.</p> + +<p><a name="A_New_Europe" id="A_New_Europe"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">A New Europe</span></h4> + +<p>It follows then that, even if we admit the +purely speculative character of our argument, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_66" id="Page_66">66</a></small> +it is not only right and proper, but absolutely +necessary that we should prepare ourselves +for something which we can really describe +as a new Europe. Thoughtful minds ought +imaginatively to put themselves in the position +of a spectator of a reconstituted world, or +rather of a world that waits to be reconstituted. +It is necessary that this should be done, because +so many older prejudices have to be swept away, +so many novel conceptions have to be entertained. +Let us take only a single example. +If we look back over history, we shall see that +all the great nations have made themselves +great by war. There is a possible exception +in the case of Italy, whose present greatness +has flowed from loyal help rendered her by +other kindred nations, and by realising for +herself certain large patriotic ideals entertained +by great minds. But for the majority of +nations it is certainly true that they have fought +their way into the ranks of supreme powers. +From this the deduction is easy that greatness +depends on the possession of formidable military +power. Indeed, all the arguments of +those who are very anxious that we should not +reduce our armaments is entirely based on this +supposition. The strong man armed keepeth +his goods in peace; his only fear is that a +stronger man may come with better arms and +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_67" id="Page_67">67</a></small> +take away his possessions. Now if the new +Europe dawns not indeed for those who are +past middle age—for they will have died before +its realisation—but for the younger generation +for whose sake we are bearing the toil and +burden of the day, the one thing which is +absolutely necessary is that the index of greatness +must no longer be found in armies and +navies. Clearly it will take a long time for +men to get used to this novel conception. Inveterate +prejudices will stand in the way. We +shall be told over and over again that peace-lovers +are no patriots; that imperialism demands +the possible sacrifice of our manhood +to the exigencies of war; and that the only class +of men who are ever respected in this world +are those who can fight. And so, even though +we have had ocular demonstration of the +appalling ruin which militarism can produce, +we may yet, if we are not careful, forget all our +experience and drift back into notions which +are not really separable from precisely those +ideas which we are at present reprobating in +the German nation. The real test is this: Is, +or is not, war a supreme evil? It is no answer +to this question to suggest that war educes +many splendid qualities. Of course it does. +And so, too, does exploration of Polar solitudes, +or even climbing Alpine or Himalayan heights. +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_68" id="Page_68">68</a></small> +Either war is a detestable solution of our +difficulties, or it is not. If it is not, then we +have no right whatsoever to object to the +Prussian ideal. But if it is, let us call it by its +proper name. Let us say that it is devil's +work, and have done with it.</p> + +<p><a name="Evil_of_Armaments" id="Evil_of_Armaments"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Evil of Armaments</span></h4> + +<p>We are trying not only to understand what +Europe will be like if, as we hope, this war +ends successfully for the Allies, but what sort +of new Europe it will be in the hands of the +conquerors to frame. Those who come after +us are to find in that new Europe real possibilities +of advance in all the higher kinds of +civilisation. Not only are the various states +to contain sane and healthy people who desire +to live in peace with their neighbours, but people +who will desire to realise themselves in science, +in philosophic thought, in art, in literature. +What is an indispensable condition for an +evolution of this sort? It must be the absence +of all uneasiness, the growth of a serene confidence +and trust, the obliteration of envy, +jealousy, and every kind of unreasonableness. +The cause, above all others, which has produced +an opposite condition of things, which has +created the unfortunate Europe in which we +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_69" id="Page_69">69</a></small> +have hitherto had to live, is the growth and +extension of armaments. The main factor, +then, in our problem is the existence of such +swollen armaments as have wasted the resources +of every nation and embittered the +minds of rival peoples. How are we to meet +this intolerable evil of armaments?</p> + +<p><a name="Absence_of_Provocation" id="Absence_of_Provocation"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Absence of Provocation</span></h4> + +<p>In the first place, let us remark that on our +supposition—the eventual victory of the Allies—one +of the great disturbing elements will +have been put out of the field. Europe has +hitherto been lulled into an uneasy and fractious +sleep by the balance of two great organisations. +Under the happiest hypothesis the Triple +Alliance and the Triple Entente will have disappeared +into the deep backward and abysm +of time. For all practical purposes there will +be no Triple Alliance, and therefore no Triple +Entente to confront it. With Austria wiped +out of the map for all purposes of offence, and +Germany restricted within modest dimensions, +the three powers of the Triple Entente—Great +Britain, France, and Russia—can do what they +like, and as they are sworn friends and allies +they can take their own steps undisturbed by +fears of hostile combinations. Why should +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_70" id="Page_70">70</a></small> +these three allies consent any further to keep +up bloated armaments? It is against their +own interests and against the interests of the +world. So long as Germany existed as a power +and developed her own ambitions, we were +always on the edge of a catastrophe. With +the conquest of Germany that nightmare will +have gone. And observe some of the consequences +which must inevitably follow. It was +against the menace of Germany that France +had to pass her three years' law of military +service: in the absence of the German army +France can reduce as she pleases her military +establishment. It was against the menace of a +German fleet that we had to incur an outlay of +millions of pounds: in the absence of the +German fleet we, too, can do what we please. +It is certain also that Russia, so long as the +deep-seated antagonism between Teuton and +Slav remained, was under strong compulsion +to reform and reinforce her army.</p> + +<p><a name="Fear_of_Russia" id="Fear_of_Russia"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Fear of Russia</span></h4> + +<p>There may, it is true, remain in some minds +a certain fear about Russia, because it is +difficult to dispel the old conception of a +great despotic Russian autocracy, or, if we +like to say so, a semi-eastern and half-barbarous +power biding her time to push +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_71" id="Page_71">71</a></small> +her conquests both towards the rising and the +setting sun. But many happy signs of quite +a new spirit in Russia have helped to allay our +fears. It looks as if a reformed Russia might +arise, with ideas of constitutionalism and +liberty and a much truer conception of what +the evolution of a state means. At the very +beginning of the war the Tsar issued a striking +proclamation to the Poles, promising them a +restoration of the national freedom which they +had lost a century and a half previously. This +doubtless was a good stroke of policy, but also +it seemed something more—a proof of that +benevolent idealism which belongs to the +Russian nature, and of which the Tsar himself +has given many signs. Of the three nations +who control the Poles, the Austrians have done +most for their subjects: at all events, the Poles +under Austrian control are supposed to be the +most happy and contented. Then come the +Russian Poles. But the Poles under German +government are the most miserable of all, +mainly because all German administration is +so mechanical, so hard, in a real sense so inhuman. +But this determination of the Tsar +to do some justice to the Polish subjects is not +the only sign of a newer spirit we have to deal +with. There was also a proclamation promising +liberty to the Jews—a very necessary piece +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_72" id="Page_72">72</a></small> +of reform—and giving, as an earnest of the good +intentions of the Government, commissions to +Jews in the army. Better than all other evidence +is the extraordinary outburst of patriotic +feeling in all sections of the Russian people. +It looks as if this war has really united Russia +in a sense in which it has never been united +before. When we see voluntary service offered +on the part of those who hitherto have felt +themselves the victims of Russian autocracy, +we may be pretty certain that even the reformers +in the great northern kingdom have +satisfied themselves that their long-deferred +hopes may at length gain fulfilment. Nor +ought we to forget that splendid act of reform +which has abolished the Imperial monopoly of +the sale of vodka. If by one stroke of the pen +the Tsar can sacrifice ninety-three millions of +revenue in order that Russia may be sober, it +is not very extravagant to hope that in virtue +of the same kind of benevolent despotism +Russia may secure a liberal constitution and +the Russian people be set free.<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a></p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> See <i>Our Russian Ally</i>, by Sir Donald Mackenzie +Wallace (Macmillan).</p></div> + +<p><a name="Military_Autocracy" id="Military_Autocracy"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Military Autocracy</span></h4> + +<p>The end of a great war, however, has one +inevitable result, that it leaves a military +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_73" id="Page_73">73</a></small> +autocracy in supreme control of affairs. The +armies which have won the various campaigns, +the generals who have led them, the Commanders-in-Chief +who have carried out the +successful strategy, these are naturally left +with almost complete authority in their hands. +Wellington, for instance, a hundred years ago, +held an extraordinarily strong position in +deciding the fate of Europe. And so, too, did +the Russian Tsar, whose armies had done so +much to destroy the legend of Napoleonic +invincibility. Similar conditions must be expected +on the present occasion. And, perhaps, +the real use of diplomats, if they are prudent +and level-headed men, is to control the ambitions +of the military element, to adopt a wider +outlook, to consider the ultimate consequences +rather than the immediate effects of things. +It would indeed be a lamentable result if a +war which was intended to destroy militarism +in Europe should end by setting up militarism +in high places.</p> + +<p><a name="Limitation_of_Armaments" id="Limitation_of_Armaments"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Limitation of Armaments</span></h4> + +<p>Thus we seem to see still more clearly than +before that the size of armaments in Europe +constitutes a fundamental problem with which +we have to grapple. Every soldier, as a matter +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_74" id="Page_74">74</a></small> +of course, believes in military armaments, and +is inclined to exaggerate their social and not +merely their offensive value. Those of us who +are not soldiers, but who are interested in the +social and economic development of the nation, +know, on the contrary, that the most destructive +and wasteful form of expenditure is that +which is occupied with armaments grown so +bloated that they go far to render the most +pressing domestic reforms absolutely impossible. +How, then, can we limit the size of +armaments? What provision can we make +to keep in check that desire to fortify itself, +to entrench itself in an absolutely commanding +position, which inherently belongs to the +military mind? In the case of both navies and +armies something depends on geographical +conditions, and something on financial possibilities. +The first represents, as it were, the +minimum required for safety; the second the +maximum burden which a state can endure +without going into bankruptcy.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> Our own +country, we should say, requires fleets, so far +as geographical conditions are concerned, for +the protection of her shores, and, inasmuch as +she is a scattered empire, we must have our +warships in all the Seven Seas. France, in +her turn, requires a navy which shall protect +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_75" id="Page_75">75</a></small> +her in the Mediterranean, and especially render +access easy to her North African possessions. +On the supposition that she is good friends with +England, she does not require ships in the North +Sea or in the English Channel, while, vice versa, +England, so long as France is strong in the +Mediterranean, need only keep quite small +detachments at Gibraltar, Malta, and elsewhere. +Russia must have a fleet for the Baltic, and also +a fleet in the Black Sea. Beyond that her +requirements assuredly do not go. Italy's +activities are mainly in the Mediterranean. +Under the supposition that she is conquered, +Germany stands in some danger of losing her +navy altogether.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> Brailsford's <i>War of Steel and Gold</i>: Chap. IX.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Protection_of_Commerce" id="Protection_of_Commerce"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Protection of Commerce</span></h4> + +<p>It is obvious, therefore, that if we confine +ourselves purely to geographical conditions, +and adhere to the principle that navies are +required for the protection of coasts, we can at +once reduce, within relatively small limits, the +building of armoured ships. The reason why +large navies have hitherto been necessary is +because it has been assumed that they do not +merely protect coasts, but protect lines of commerce. +We have been told, for instance, that +inasmuch as we cannot feed our own population, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_76" id="Page_76">76</a></small> +and our national food comes to us from +Canada, America, the Argentine, Russia, and +elsewhere, we must possess a very large amount +of cruisers to safeguard the ships that are conveying +to us our daily bread. If we ask why +our ships must not only protect our shores, but +our merchandise—the latter being for the most +part a commercial enterprise worked by individual +companies—the answer turns on that +much-discussed principle, the Right of Capture +at Sea, which was debated at the last Hague +Conference, and as a matter of fact stoutly +defended both by Germany and ourselves. If +we look at this doctrine—the supposed right that +a power possesses to capture the merchandise +of private individuals who belong to an enemy +country in times of war—we shall perhaps feel +some surprise that a principle which is not +admitted in land warfare should still prevail +at sea. According to the more benevolent +notions of conducting a campaign suggested, +and indeed enforced by Hague Conventions +and such like, an army has no right to steal the +food of a country which it has invaded. It +must pay for what it takes. Well-conducted +armies, as a matter of fact, behave in this +fashion: the necessity of paying for what they +take is very strictly enforced by responsible +officers. Why, therefore, at sea an opposite +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_77" id="Page_77">77</a></small> +state of affairs should prevail is really not easy +to understand. Most of the enemy's merchant +ships which have been captured in the recent war +belong to private individuals, or private companies. +But they are taken, subject to the +decision of Prize Courts, as part of the spoils of +a successful maritime power. I am aware that +the question is an exceedingly controversial +one, and that Great Britain has hitherto been +very firm, or, perhaps, I might be allowed to +say, obstinate in upholding the law of capture +at sea. But I also know that a great many +competent lawyers and politicians do not believe +in the validity of such a principle, and +would not be sorry to have it abolished.<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> At +all events, it is clear enough that if it were +abolished one of the main arguments for keeping +up a strong navy would fall to the ground. +We should then require no patrol of cruisers +in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, and in the +Mediterranean. One thing at least is certain, +that if we can ever arrive at a time when a real +Concert of Europe prevails, one of the first +things which it must take in hand is a thorough +examination of the extent of defensive force +which a nation requires as a minimum for the +preservation of its independence and liberty.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Notably Lord Loreburn, in his <i>Capture at Sea</i> +(Methuen).</p></div><p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_78" id="Page_78">78</a></small></p> + +<p><a name="Trade_in_Armaments" id="Trade_in_Armaments"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Trade in Armaments</span></h4> + +<p>Certainly one crying evil exists which ought +to be dealt with promptly and effectively in +accordance with the dictates of common sense +as well as common morality. I refer to the +trade in armaments carried on by private +companies, whose only interest it is to foment, +or perhaps actually to produce, war scares in +order that munitions of war may be greedily +purchased. A notorious example is furnished +by the great works at Essen owned by Krupp. +In the same position are the great French +works at Creusot, owned by Schneider, and +those of our own English firms, Armstrongs, +Vickers, John Brown, and Cammell Laird. These +are all successful concerns, and the shareholders +have reaped large profits. I believe that at +Creusot the dividends have reached twenty +per cent., and Armstrongs yield rarely less +than ten per cent. It is necessary to speak +very plainly about industries of this kind, because, +however we like to phrase it, they represent +the realisation of private profit through +the instruments of death and slaughter. It +would be bad enough if they remained purely +private companies, but they really represent +the most solid public organisations in the world. +We know the intimate relations between Krupp +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_79" id="Page_79">79</a></small> +and the German Government, and doubtless +also between Messrs. Schneider and the French +Government. This sordid manufacture of the +instruments of death constitutes a vast business, +with all kinds of ramifications, and the +main and deadly stigma on it is that it is bound +to encourage and promote war. Let me quote +some energetic sentences from Mr. H.G. Wells +on this point: "Kings and Kaisers must +cease to be commercial travellers of monstrous +armament concerns.... I do not need to +argue, what is manifest, what every German +knows, what every intelligent educated man +in the world knows. The Krupp concern and +the tawdry Imperialism of Berlin are linked +like thief and receiver; the hands of the German +princes are dirty with the trade. All over the +world statecraft and royalty have been approached +and touched and tainted by these +vast firms, but it is in Berlin that the corruption +is centred, it is from Berlin that the intolerable +pressure to arm and still to arm has come."<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a></p> + +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_80" id="Page_80">80</a></small></p> +<p>What is the obvious cure for this state of +things? It stares us in the face. Governments +alone should be allowed to manufacture +weapons. This ought not to be an industry +left in private hands. If a nation, through its +accredited representatives, thinks it is necessary +to arm itself, it must keep in its own hands +this lethal industry. Beyond the Government +factories there clearly ought to be no making of +weapons all over Europe and the world.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> There are one or two pamphlets on this subject which +are worth consulting, especially <i>The War Traders</i>, by +G.H. Perris (National Peace Council, St. Stephen's House, +Westminster), and <i>The War Trust Exposed</i>, by J.F. +Walton Newbold (the National Leader Press, Manchester). +See also <i>The War of Steel and Gold</i>, by H.N. Brailsford, +Chapter II, "Real Politics," p. 89. The sentences quoted +from Mr. Wells come from <i>The War that will end War</i> +(F. and C. Palmer), p. 39.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Financial_Interests" id="Financial_Interests"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Financial Interests</span></h4> + +<p>It has already been remarked that the conditions +which limit and control the size of +armaments are partly geographical and partly +financial, and that while the former represent +the minimum, the latter stand for the maximum +of protective force. I need say nothing further +about the geographical conditions. Every one +who studies a map can see for himself what is +required by a country anxious to protect its +shores or its boundaries. If we suppose that +armaments are strictly limited to the needs of +self-defence, and if we further assume that in +the new Europe countries are not animated by +the strongest dislikes against one another, but +are prepared to live and let live (a tolerably +large assumption, I am aware), we can readily +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_81" id="Page_81">81</a></small> +imagine a steady process of curtailment in the +absolutely necessary armament. Further, if +Great Britain gave up its doctrine of the Right +of Capture at Sea (and if Great Britain surrendered +it, we may be pretty sure that, after +Germany has been made powerless, no other +country would wish to retain it), the supposed +necessity of protecting lines of commerce would +disappear and a further reduction in cruisers +would take place. I cannot imagine that either +America or Japan would wish to revive the +Right of Capture theory if we ourselves had +given it up. And they are the most important +maritime and commercial nations after ourselves.<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a></p> + +<p>The financial conditions, however, deserve +study because they lead straight to the very +heart of the modern bellicose tendencies. In +an obvious and superficial sense, financial conditions +represent the maximum in the provision +of armaments, because ultimately it +becomes a question of how much a nation can +afford to spend without going bankrupt or +being fatally hampered in its expenditure on +necessary social reforms. This, however, is +not perhaps the most significant point. Financial +conditions act much more subtly than this. +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_82" id="Page_82">82</a></small> +Why has it grown so imperative on states to +have large armies or large navies, or both? +Because—so we have been told over and over +again—diplomacy cannot speak with effect +unless it is backed by power. And what are +the main occasions on which diplomacy has to +speak effectively? We should be inclined to +answer off-hand that it must possess this +stentorian power when there is any question +about national honour—when the country for +whom it speaks is insulted or bullied, or defrauded +of its just rights; when treaties are +torn up and disregarded; when its plighted +word has been given and another nation acts +as though no such pledge had been made; when +its territory is menaced with invasion and so +forth.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> As a matter of fact, the United States are opposed to +the Capture at Sea principle.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Protection_of_Financiers" id="Protection_of_Financiers"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Protection of Financiers</span></h4> + +<p>But these justifiable occasions do not exhaust +the whole field. Sometimes diplomacy +is brought to bear on much more doubtful +issues. It is used to support the concession-hunter, +and to coerce a relatively powerless +nation to grant concessions. It backs up a +bank which has financed a company to build +railroads or develop the internal resources of +a country; or to exploit mines or oil-fields, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_83" id="Page_83">83</a></small> +or to do those thousand-and-one things which +constitute what is called "peaceful penetration." +Think of the recent dealings with +Turkey,<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> and the international rivalry, always +suspicious and inflammatory, which has practically +divided up her Asiatic dominions between +European States—so that Armenia is to belong +to Russia, Syria to France, Arabia to Great +Britain, and Anatolia and I know not what +besides to Germany! Think of the competition +for the carrying out of railways in Asia +Minor and the constant friction as to which +power has obtained, by fair means or foul, the +greatest influence! Or let us remember the +recent disputes as to the proper floating of a +loan to China and the bickering about the Five-Power +Group and the determination on the +part of the last named that no one else should +share the spoil! Or shall we transfer our +attention to Mexico, where the severe struggle +between the two rival Oil Companies—the +Cowdray group and the American group—threw +into the shade the quarrel between +Huerta and Carranza? These are only a few +instances taken at random to illustrate the +dealings of modern finance. Relatively small +harm would be done if financiers were allowed +to fight out their own quarrels. Unfortunately, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_84" id="Page_84">84</a></small> +however, diplomacy is brought in to support +this side or that: and ambassadors have to +speak in severe terms if a Chinese mandarin +does not favour our so-called "nationals," or +if corrupt Turkish officials are not sufficiently +squeezable to suit our "patriotic" purposes. +Our armaments are big not merely to protect +the nation's honour, but to provide large +dividends for speculative concerns held in +private hands.</p> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> Turkey has now thrown in her lot with Germany.</p></div> + +<p><a name="Investing_Money_Abroad" id="Investing_Money_Abroad"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Investing Money Abroad</span></h4> + +<p>The truth is, of course, that the honourable +name of commerce is now used to cover very +different kinds of enterprise. We used to +export goods; now we export cash. Wealthy +men, not being content with the sound, but +not magnificent interest on home securities, +take their money abroad and invest in extremely +remunerative—though of course speculative—businesses +in South Africa, or South +America, concerned with rubber, petroleum, or +whatnot. Often they subscribe to a foreign +loan—in itself a perfectly legitimate and harmless +operation, but not harmless or legitimate +if one of the conditions of the loan is that the +country to which it is lent should purchase its +artillery from Essen or Creusot, or its battleships +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_85" id="Page_85">85</a></small> +from our yards. For that is precisely +one of the ways in which the traffic in munitions +of war goes on increasing and itself helps to +bring about a conflagration. Financial enterprise +is, of course, the life-blood of modern +states. But why should our army and navy +be brought in to protect financiers? Let them +take their own risks, like every other man who +pursues a hazardous path for his own private +gain. Private investment in foreign securities +does not increase the volume of a nation's commerce. +The individual may make a colossal +fortune, but the nation pays much too dearly +for the enrichment of financiers if it allows +itself to be dragged into war on account of their +"<i>beaux yeux</i>."</p> + +<p><a name="Ideal_Aims" id="Ideal_Aims"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Ideal Aims</span></h4> + +<p>It is time to gather together in a summary +fashion some of the considerations which have +been presented to us in the course of our +inquiry. We have gone to war partly for +direct, partly for indirect objects. The direct +objects are the protection of small nationalities, +the destruction of a particularly offensive kind +of militarism in Germany, the securing of +respect for treaties, and the preservation of +our own and European liberty. But there are +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_86" id="Page_86">86</a></small> +also indirect objects at which we have to aim, +and it is here, of course, that the speculative +character of our inquiry is most clearly revealed. +Apart from the preservation of the +smaller nationalities, Mr. Asquith has himself +told us that we should aim at the organisation +of a Public Will of Europe, a sort of Collective +Conscience which should act as a corrective +of national defects and as a support of international +morality. Nothing could well be +more speculative or vague than this, and we +have already seen the kind of difficulties which +surround the conception, especially the conflict +between a collective European constraint and +an eager and energetic patriotism. We must +not, however, be deterred by the nebulous +character of some of the ideals which are +floating through our minds. Ideals are always +nebulous, and always resisted by the narrow +sort of practical men who suggest that we are +metaphysical dreamers unaware of the stern +facts of life. Nevertheless, the actual progress +of the world depends on the visions of idealists, +and when the time comes for the reconstitution +of Europe on a new basis we must already have +imaginatively thought out some of the ends +towards which we are striving. We must also +be careful not to narrow our conceptions to the +level of immediate needs—that is not the right +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_87" id="Page_87">87</a></small> +way of any reform. Our conceptions must be +as large and as wide and as philanthropical +as imagination can make them; otherwise +Europe will miss one of the greatest opportunities +that it has ever had to deal with, and +we shall incur the bitterest of all disappointments—not +to be awake when the dawn +appears.</p> + +<p><a name="Greatness_of_States" id="Greatness_of_States"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Greatness of States</span></h4> + +<p>What, then, are some of those nebulous +visions which come before the minds of eager +idealists? We have got to envisage for ourselves +a new idea of what constitutes greatness +in a state. Hitherto we have measured +national greatness by military strength, because +most of the European nations have +attained their present position through successful +war. So long as we cherish a notion like +this, so long shall we be under the heel of a +grinding militarism. We have set out as +crusaders to destroy Prussian militarism, and +in pursuit of this quest we have invoked, as a +matter of necessity, the aid of our militarists. +But when their work is done, all peoples who +value freedom and independence will refuse to +be under the heel of any military party. To be +great is not, necessarily, to be strong for war. +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_88" id="Page_88">88</a></small> +There are other qualities which ought to enter +into the definition, a high standard of civilisation +and culture—not culture in the Prussian sense, +but that which we understand by the term—the +great development and extension of knowledge, +room for the discoveries of science, quick +susceptibility in the domain of art, the organisation +of literature—all these things are part and +parcel of greatness, as we want to understand +it in the future. It is precisely these things +that militarism, as such, cares nothing for. +Therefore, if we are out for war against militarism, +the whole end and object of our endeavour +must be by means of war to make war +impossible. Hence it follows, as a matter of +course, that the new Europe must take very +serious and energetic steps to diminish military +establishments and to limit the size of armaments. +If once the new masters of Europe +understand the immense importance of reducing +their military equipment, they have it in +their power to relieve nations of one of the +greatest burdens which have ever checked the +social and economic development of the world. +Suggestions have already been made as to the +reduction of armaments, and, although such +schemes as have been set forward are, in the +truest sense, speculative, it does not follow +that they, or something like them, cannot +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_89" id="Page_89">89</a></small> +hereafter be realised. Nor yet in our conception +of greatness must we include another false +idea of the past. If a nation is not necessarily +great because it is strong for war, neither is it +necessarily great because it contains a number +of cosmopolitan financiers trying to exploit +for their own purposes various undeveloped +tracts of the world's surface. These financiers +are certainly not patriots because, amongst +other things, they take particular care to invest +in foreign securities, the interest of home +investments not being sufficient for their +financial greed. It will not be the least of the +many benefits which may accrue to us after +the end of this disastrous war if a vulgar +and crude materialism, based on the notion +of wealth, is dethroned from its present +sovereignty over men's minds. The more we +study the courses of this world's history, the +more certainly do we discover that a love of +money is the root of most of the evils which +beset humanity.</p> + +<p><a name="Apostles_of_the_New_Era" id="Apostles_of_the_New_Era"></a></p> +<h4><span class="smcap">Apostles of the New Era</span></h4> + +<p>As we survey the possible reforms which +are to set up a new and better Europe on the +ruin of the old, we naturally ask ourselves with +some disquietude: Who are the personalities, +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_90" id="Page_90">90</a></small> +and what are the forces required for so +tremendous a change? Who are sufficient for +these things? Are kings likely to be saviours +of society? Past experience hardly favours +this suggestion. Will soldiers and great +generals help us? Here, again, we may be +pardoned for a very natural suspicion. Every +one knows that a benevolent despotism has +much to recommend it. But, unfortunately, +the benevolent are not usually despotic, nor +are despots as a rule benevolent. Can diplomatists +help us? Not so far as they continue +to mumble the watchwords of their ancient +mystery: they will have to learn a new set of +formulæ, or more likely, perhaps, they will +find that ordinary people, who have seen to +what a pass diplomacy has brought us, may +work out for themselves some better system. +Clearly the tasks of the future will depend +on the co-operation of intelligent, far-sighted +philanthropic reformers in the various states +of the world, who will recognise that at critical +periods of the world's history they must set to +work with a new ardour to think out problems +from the very beginning. We want fresh and +intelligent minds, specially of the younger +idealists, keen, ardent, and energetic souls, +touched with the sacred fire, erecting the fabric +of humanity on a novel basis. Democracy +<small class="pagenum"><a name="Page_91" id="Page_91">91</a></small> +will have a great deal to do in the new Europe. +It, too, had better refurbish its old watchwords. +It has got to set itself patiently to the business +of preventing future wars by the extension of +its sympathies and its clear discernment of all +that imperils its future development and progress. +Above all, it has got to solve that most +difficult problem of creating a Public Will and +a Common Conscience in Europe, a conscience +sensitive to the demands of a higher ethics, +and a will to enforce its decrees against obstructives +and recalcitrants. We do not see our +way clear as yet, it is true. But we have a dim +idea of the far-seen peaks towards which we +must lift up our eyes. It is the greatest enterprise +which humanity has ever been called +upon to face, and, however difficult, it is also +the most splendid.</p> +<p class="pagenum"><small><a name="Page_92" id="Page_92">92</a></small></p> + +<hr style="width: 65%;" /> + +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Printed in Great Britain by</span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap">Richard Clay & Sons, Limited,</span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap lower">Brunswick St., Stamford St., S.E.,</span></p> +<p class="center"><span class="smcap lower">and Bungay, Suffolk.</span></p> + +<p class="bbox">Original Table of contents retained. Additional +table of contents with subsection hyperlinks added by transcriber.</p> + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Armageddon--And After, by W. L. 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