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W. Leibniz + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Theodicy + Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the Origin of Evil + +Author: G. W. Leibniz + +Commentator: Austin Farrer + +Translator: E.M. Huggard + +Release Date: November 24, 2005 [EBook #17147] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THEODICY *** + + + + +Produced by John Hagerson, Juliet Sutherland, Keith Edkins +and the Online Distributed Proofreading Team at +https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + +</pre> + +<h2>Theodicy</h2> + + <p class="author">Essays on<br /> +the Goodness of God<br /> +the Freedom of Man and<br /> +the Origin of Evil</p> + + <p>G.W. LEIBNIZ</p> + + <p>Edited with an Introduction by Austin Farrer, Fellow of Trinity + College, Oxford</p> + + <p>Translated by E.M. Huggard from C.J. Gerhardt's Edition of the + Collected Philosophical Works, 1875-90</p> + + <p>Open <img src="images/opencourtlogo.png" alt="Open Court Logo"/> + Court</p> + + <p>La Salle, Illinois 61301</p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p><img src="images/opencourtlogo.png" alt="Open Court Logo"/></p> + + <p>OPEN COURT and the above logo are registered in the U.S. Patent & + Trademark Office.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Published 1985 by Open Court Publishing Company, Peru, Illinois 61354.</p> + <p>This edition first published 1951 by Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London.</p> + <p>Second printing 1988</p> + <p>Third printing 1990</p> + <p>Fourth printing 1993</p> + <p>Fifth printing 1996</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Printed and bound in the United States of America.</p> + + <p><b>Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data</b></p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716.</p> + <p class="i2">Theodicy: essays on the goodness of God, the</p> + <p>freedom of man, and the origin of evil.</p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i2">Translation of: Essais de Théodicée.</p> + <p class="i2">Includes index.</p> + <p class="i2">1. Theodicy—Early works to 1800. I. Title.</p> + <p>B2590.E5 1985 231'.8 85-8833</p> + <p>ISBN O-87548-437-9</p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 5 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page5"></a>[5]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>CONTENTS</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + +<table width="100%" class="single" summary="Table of Contents" title="Table of Contents"> + <tr> + <td align="left" colspan="2"> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left" width="79%"> + EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION + </td> + <td align="right" width="20%"> + page <a href="#page7">7</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + PREFACE + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page49">49</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON THE CONFORMITY OF FAITH WITH REASON + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page73">73</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + ESSAYS ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN THE ORIGIN OF + EVIL, IN THREE PARTS + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page123">123</a>, <a href="#page182">182</a>, <a + href="#page276">276</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="center" colspan="2"> + APPENDICES + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY, REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page377">377</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + EXCURSUS ON THEODICY, § 392 + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page389">389</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED IN ENGLISH ON + 'FREEDOM, NECESSITY AND CHANCE' + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page393">393</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL', PUBLISHED + RECENTLY IN LONDON + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page405">405</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + CAUSA DEI ASSERTA + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page443">443</a> + </td> + </tr> + + <tr> + <td align="left"> + INDEX + </td> + <td align="right"> + <a href="#page445">445</a> + </td> + </tr> +</table> + +<p><!-- Page 7 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page7"></a>[7]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>EDITOR'S +INTRODUCTION</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>I</h3> + + <p>Leibniz was above all things a metaphysician. That does not mean that + his head was in the clouds, or that the particular sciences lacked + interest for him. Not at all—he felt a lively concern for + theological debate, he was a mathematician of the first rank, he made + original contributions to physics, he gave a realistic attention to moral + psychology. But he was incapable of looking at the objects of any special + enquiry without seeing them as aspects or parts of one intelligible + universe. He strove constantly after system, and the instrument on which + his effort relied was the speculative reason. He embodied in an extreme + form the spirit of his age. Nothing could be less like the spirit of + ours. To many people now alive metaphysics means a body of wild and + meaningless assertions resting on spurious argument. A professor of + metaphysics may nowadays be held to deal handsomely with the duties of + his chair if he is prepared to handle metaphysical statements at all, + though it be only for the purpose of getting rid of them, by showing them + up as confused forms of something else. A chair in metaphysical + philosophy becomes analogous to a chair in tropical diseases: what is + taught from it is not the propagation but the cure.</p> + + <p>Confidence in metaphysical construction has ebbed and flowed through + philosophical history; periods of speculation have been followed by + periods of criticism. The tide will flow again, but it has <!-- Page 8 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page8"></a>[8]</span> not turned yet, + and such metaphysicians as survive scarcely venture further than to argue + a case for the possibility of their art. It would be an embarrassing task + to open an approach to Leibnitian metaphysics from the present + metaphysical position, if there is a present position. If we want an + agreed starting-point, it will have to be historical.</p> + + <p>The historical importance of Leibniz's ideas is anyhow unmistakable. + If metaphysical thinking is nonsensical, its empire over the human + imagination must still be confessed; if it is as chimerical a science as + alchemy, it is no less fertile in by-products of importance. And if we + are to consider Leibniz historically, we cannot do better than take up + his <i>Theodicy</i>, for two reasons. It was the only one of his main + philosophical works to be published in his lifetime, so that it was a + principal means of his direct influence; the Leibniz his own age knew was + the Leibniz of the <i>Theodicy</i>. Then in the second place, the + <i>Theodicy</i> itself is peculiarly rich in historical material. It + reflects the world of men and books which Leibniz knew; it expresses the + theological setting of metaphysical speculation which still predominated + in the first years of the eighteenth century.</p> + + <p>Leibniz is remembered for his philosophy; he was not a professional + philosopher. He was offered academic chairs, but he declined them. He was + a gentleman, a person of means, librarian to a reigning prince, and + frequently employed in state affairs of trust and importance. The + librarian might at any moment become the political secretary, and offer + his own contributions to policy. Leibniz was for the greater part of his + active life the learned and confidential servant of the House of + Brunswick; when the Duke had nothing better to do with him, he set him to + research into ducal history. If Leibniz had a profession in literature, + it was history rather than philosophy. He was even more closely bound to + the interests of his prince than John Locke was to those of the Prince of + Orange. The Houses of Orange and of Brunswick were on the same side in + the principal contest which divided Europe, the battle between Louis XIV + and his enemies. It was a turning-point of the struggle when the Prince + of Orange supplanted Louis's Stuart friends on the English throne. It was + a continuation of the same movement, when Leibniz's master, George I, + succeeded to the same throne, and frustrated the restoration of the + Stuart heir. Locke returned to England in the wake of the Prince <!-- + Page 9 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page9"></a>[9]</span> of Orange, + and became the representative thinker of the régime. Leibniz wished to + come to the English court of George I, but was unkindly ordered to attend + to the duties of his librarianship. So he remained in Hanover. He was + then an old man, and before the tide of favour had turned, he died.</p> + + <p>Posterity has reckoned Locke and Leibniz the heads of rival sects, but + politically they were on the same side. As against Louis's political + absolutism and enforced religious uniformity, both championed religious + toleration and the freedom of the mind. Their theological liberalism was + political prudence; it was not necessarily for that reason the less + personally sincere. They had too much wisdom to meet bigotry with + bigotry, or set Protestant intolerance against Catholic absolutism. But + they had too much sympathy with the spirit of Europe to react into free + thinking or to make a frontal attack on revealed truth. They took their + stand on a fundamental Christian theism, the common religion of all good + men; they repudiated the negative enormities of Hobbes and Spinoza.</p> + + <p>The Christian was to hold a position covered by three lines of + defences. The base line was to be the substance of Christian theism and + of Christian morals, and it was to be held by the forces of sheer reason, + without aid from scriptural revelation. The middle line was laid down by + the general sense of Scripture, and the defence of it was this. + 'Scriptural doctrine is reconcilable with the findings of sheer reason, + but it goes beyond them. We believe the Scriptures, because they are + authenticated by marks of supernatural intervention in the circumstances + of their origin. We believe them, but reason controls our interpretation + of them.' There remained the most forward and the most hazardous line: + the special positions which a Church, a sect, or an individual might + found upon the scriptural revelation. A prudent man would not hold his + advance positions in the same force or defend them with the same + obstinacy as either of the lines behind them. He could argue for them, + but he could not require assent to them.</p> + + <p>One cannot help feeling, indeed, the readiness of these writers to + fall back, not only from the front line to the middle line, but from the + middle line itself to the base line. Leibniz, for example, writes with + perfect seriousness and decency about the Christian scheme of redemption, + but it hardly looks like being for him a crucial deliverance from + perdition. It is not the intervention of Mercy, <!-- Page 10 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page10"></a>[10]</span> by which alone He + possesses himself of us: it is one of the ways in which supreme + Benevolence carries out a cosmic policy; and God's benevolence is known + by pure reason, and apart from Christian revelation.</p> + + <p>In one politically important particular the theological attitude of + Leibniz differed from that of Locke. Both stood for toleration and for + the minimizing of the differences between the sects. This was a serious + enough matter in England, but it was an even more serious matter in + Germany. For Germany was divided between Catholics and Protestants; + effective toleration must embrace them both. English toleration might + indulge a harmless Catholic minority, while rejecting the Catholic régime + as the embodiment of intolerance. But this was not practical politics on + the Continent; you must tolerate Catholicism on an equal footing, and + come to terms with Catholic régimes. Leibniz was not going to damn the + Pope with true Protestant fervour. It was his consistent aim to show that + his theological principles were as serviceable to Catholic thinkers as to + the doctors of his own church. On some points, indeed, he found his most + solid support from Catholics; in other places there are hints of a joint + Catholic-Lutheran front against Calvinism. But on the whole Leibniz's + writings suggest that the important decisions cut across all the + Churches, and not between them.</p> + + <p>Leibniz was impelled to a compromise with 'popery', not only by the + religious divisions of Germany, but (at one stage) by the political + weakness of the German Protestant States. At the point of Louis XIV's + highest success, the Protestant princes had no hope but in Catholic + Austria, and Austria was distracted by Turkish pressure in the rear. + Leibniz hoped to relieve the situation by preaching a crusade. Could not + the Christian princes sink their differences and unite against the + infidel? And could not the Christian alliance be cemented by theological + agreement? Hence Leibniz's famous negotiation with Bossuet for a basis of + Catholic-Lutheran concord. It was plainly destined to fail; and it was + bound to recoil upon its author. How could he be a true Protestant who + treated the differences with the Catholics as non-essentials? How could + he have touched pitch and taken no defilement? Leibniz was generally + admired, but he was not widely trusted. As a mere politician, he may be + judged to have over-reached himself.</p> + + <p>It has been the object of the preceding paragraphs to show that <!-- + Page 11 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page11"></a>[11]</span> Leibniz + the politician and Leibniz the theologian were one and the same person; + not at all to suggest that his rational theology was just political + expediency. We may apply to him a parody of his own doctrine, the + pre-established harmony between nature and grace. Everything happens as + though Leibniz were a liberal politician, and his theology expressed his + politics. Yes, but equally, everything happens as though Leibniz were a + philosophical theologian, and his politics expressed his theology. His + appreciation of Catholic speculation was natural and sincere; his + dogmatic ancestry is to be looked for in Thomism and Catholic humanism as + much as anywhere. Above all, he had himself a liberal and generous mind. + It gave him pleasure to appreciate good wherever he could see it, and to + discover a soul of truth in every opinion.</p> + + <p>From the moment when Leibniz became aware of himself as an independent + thinker, he was the man of a doctrine. Sometimes he called it 'my + principles', sometimes 'the new system', sometimes 'pre-established + harmony'. It could be quite briefly expressed; he was always ready to + oblige his friends with a summary statement, either in a letter or an + enclosed memorandum, and several such have come down to us. The doctrine + may have been in Leibniz's view simple, but it was applicable to every + department of human speculation or enquiry. It provided a new alphabet of + philosophical ideas, and everything in heaven and earth could be + expressed in it; not only could be, but ought to be, and Leibniz showed + tireless energy in working out restatements of standing problems.</p> + + <p>As a man with an idea, with a philosophical nostrum, Leibniz may be + compared to Bishop Berkeley. There was never any more doubt that Leibniz + was a Leibnitian than that Berkeley was a Berkeleian. But there is no + comparison between the two men in the width of their range. About many + things Berkeley never took the trouble to Berkeleianize. To take the most + surprising instance of his neglect—he assured the world that his + whole doctrine pointed to, and hung upon, theology. But what sort of a + theology? He scarcely took the first steps in the formulation of it. He + preferred to keep on defending and explaining his <i>esse est + percipi</i>. With Leibniz it is wholly different; he carries his new + torch into every corner, to illuminate the dark questions.</p> + + <p>The wide applicability of pre-established harmony might come home to + its inventor as a rich surprise. The reflective historian will <!-- Page + 12 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page12"></a>[12]</span> find it less + surprising, for he will suspect that the applications were in view from + the start. What was Leibniz thinking of when the new principle flashed + upon him? What was he <i>not</i> thinking of? He had a many-sided mind. + If the origins of the principle were complex, little wonder that its + applications were manifold. Every expositor of Leibniz who does not wish + to be endlessly tedious must concentrate attention on one aspect of + Leibniz's principle, and one source of its origin. We will here give an + account of the matter which, we trust, will go most directly to the heart + of it, but we will make no claims to sufficient interpretation of + Leibniz's thought-processes.</p> + + <p>Leibniz, then, like all the philosophers of the seventeenth century, + was reforming scholasticism in the light of a new physical science. The + science was mathematical in its form, mechanistical in its doctrine, and + unanswerable in its evidence—it got results. But it was + metaphysically intractable, and the doctrines of infinite and finite + substance which it generated furnish a gallery of metaphysical + grotesques; unless we are to except Leibniz; his system is, if nothing + else, a miracle of ingenuity, and there are moments when we are in danger + of believing it.</p> + + <p>It is a natural mistake for the student of seventeenth-century thought + to underestimate the tenacity of scholastic Aristotelianism. Descartes, + we all know, was reared in it, but then Descartes overthrew it; and he + had done his work and died by the time that Leibniz was of an age to + philosophize at all. We expect to see Leibniz starting on his shoulders + and climbing on from there. We are disappointed. Leibniz himself tells us + that he was raised in the scholastic teaching. His acquaintance with + Descartes's opinions was second-hand, and they were retailed to him only + that they might be derided. He agreed, like an amiable youth, with his + preceptors.</p> + + <p>The next phase of his development gave him a direct knowledge of + Cartesian writings, and of other modern books beside, such as those of + the atomist Gassendi. He was delighted with what he read, because of its + fertility in the field of physics and mathematics; and for a short time + he was an enthusiastic modern. But presently he became dissatisfied. The + new systems did not go far enough, they were still scientifically + inadequate. At the same time they went too far, and carried metaphysical + paradox beyond the limits of human credulity.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 13 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page13"></a>[13]</span></p> + + <p>There is no mystery about Leibniz's scientific objections to the new + philosophers. If he condemned them here, it was on the basis of + scientific thought and observation. Descartes's formulation of the laws + of motion could, for example, be refuted by physical experiment; and if + his general view of physical nature was bound up with it, then so much + the worse for the Cartesian philosophy. But whence came Leibniz's more + strictly metaphysical objections? Where had he learned that standard of + metaphysical adequacy which showed up the inadequacy of the new + metaphysicians? His own disciples might be satisfied to reply, that he + learnt it from Reason herself; but the answer will not pass with us. + Leibniz reasoned, indeed, but he did not reason from nowhere, nor would + he have got anywhere if he had. His conception of metaphysical reason was + what his early scholastic training had made it.</p> + + <p>There are certain absurd opinions which we are sure we have been + taught, although, when put to it, we find it hard to name the teacher. + Among them is something of this sort. 'Leibniz was a scholarly and + sympathetic thinker. He had more sense of history than his + contemporaries, and he was instinctively eclectic. He believed he could + learn something from each of his great predecessors. We see him reaching + back to cull a notion from Plato or from Aristotle; he even found + something of use in the scholastics. In particular, he picked out the + Aristotelian "entelechy" to stop a gap in the philosophy of his own age.' + What this form of statement ignores is that Leibniz <i>was</i> a + scholastic: a scholastic endeavouring, like Descartes before him, to + revolutionize scholasticism. The word 'entelechy' was, indeed, a piece of + antiquity which Leibniz revived, but the thing for which it stood was the + most familiar of current scholastic conceptions. 'Entelechy' means active + principle of wholeness or completion in an individual thing. + Scholasticism was content to talk about it under the name of 'substantial + form' or 'formal cause'. But the scholastic interpretation of the idea + was hopelessly discredited by the new science, and the scholastic terms + shared the discredit of scholastic doctrine. Leibniz wanted a term with a + more general sound. 'There is an <i>X</i>', he wanted to say, 'which + scholasticism has defined as substantial form, but I am going to give a + new definition of it.' Entelechy was a useful name for <i>X</i>, the more + so as it had the authority of Aristotle, the master of scholasticism.</p> + + <p>Under the name of entelechy Leibniz was upholding the soul of <!-- + Page 14 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page14"></a>[14]</span> + scholastic doctrine, while retrenching the limbs and outward flourishes. + The doctrine of substantial form which he learnt in his youth had had + <i>something</i> in it; he could not settle down in the principles of + Descartes or of Gassendi, because both ignored this vital + <i>something</i>. Since the requirements of a new science would not allow + a return to sheer scholasticism, it was necessary to find a fresh + philosophy, in which entelechy and mechanism might be accommodated side + by side.</p> + + <p>If one had asked any 'modern' of the seventeenth century to name the + 'ancient' doctrine he most abominated, he would most likely have replied, + 'Substantial form'. Let us recall what was rejected under this name, and + why.</p> + + <p>The medieval account of physical nature had been dominated by what we + may call common-sense biology. Biology, indeed, is the science of the + living, and the medievals were no more inclined than we are to endow all + physical bodies with life. What they did do was to take living bodies as + typical, and to treat other bodies as imperfectly analogous to them. Such + an approach was <i>a priori</i> reasonable enough. For we may be expected + to know best the physical being closest to our own; and we, at any rate, + are alive. Why not argue from the better known to the less known, from + the nearer to the more remote, interpreting other things by the formula + of our own being, and allowing whatever discount is necessary for their + degree of unlikeness to us?</p> + + <p>Common-sense biology reasons as follows. In a living body there is a + certain pattern of organized parts, a certain rhythm of successive + motions, and a certain range of characteristic activities. The pattern, + the sheer anatomy, is basic; but it cannot long continue to exist + (outside a refrigerator) without accompanying vital rhythms in heart, + respiration and digestion. Nor do these perform their parts without the + intermittent support of variable but still characteristic activities: + dogs not only breathe and digest, they run about, hunt their food, look + for mates, bark at cats, and so on. The anatomical pattern, the vital + rhythm, and the characteristic acts together express dogginess; they + reveal the specific form of the dog. They <i>reveal</i> it; exactly what + the specific form <i>consisted in</i> was the subject of much medieval + speculation. It need not concern us here.</p> + + <p>Taking the form of the species for granted, common-sense biology + proceeds to ask how it comes to be in a given instance, say <!-- Page 15 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page15"></a>[15]</span> in the dog + Toby. Before this dog was born or thought of, his form or species was + displayed in each of his parents. And now it looks as though the form of + dog had detached itself from them through the generative act, and set up + anew on its own account. How does it do that? By getting hold of some + materials in which to express itself. At first it takes them from the + body of the mother, afterwards it collects them from a wider environment, + and what the dog eats becomes the dog.</p> + + <p>What, then, is the relation of the assimilated materials to the + dog-form which assimilates them? Before assimilation, they have their own + form. Before the dog eats the leg of mutton, it has the form given to it + by its place in the body of a sheep. What happens to the mutton? Is it + without remainder transubstantiated from sheep into dog? It loses all its + distinctively sheep-like characteristicsm but there may be some more + basically material characteristics which it preserves. They underlay the + structure of the mutton, and they continue to underlie the structure of + the dog's flesh which supplants it. Whatever these characteristics may + be, let us call them common material characteristics, and let us say that + they belong to or compose a common material nature.</p> + + <p>The common material nature has its own way of existing, and perhaps + its own principles of physical action. We may suppose that we know much + or that we know little about it. This one thing at least we know, that it + is capable of becoming alternatively either mutton or dog's flesh. It is + not essential to it to be mutton, or mutton it would always be; nor dog's + flesh, or it would always be dog's flesh. It is capable of becoming + either, according as it is captured by one or other system of formal + organization. So the voters who are to go to the polls are, by their + common nature, Englishmen; they are essentially neither Socialist curs + nor Conservative sheep, but intrinsically capable of becoming either, if + they become captured by either system of party organization.</p> + + <p>According to this way of thinking, there is a certain <i>looseness</i> + about the relation of the common material nature to the higher forms of + organization capable of capturing it. Considered in itself alone, it is + perhaps to be seen as governed by absolutely determined laws of its own. + It is heavy, then it will fall unless obstructed; it is solid, then it + will resist intrusions. But considered as material for organization by + higher forms, it is indeterminate. It acts in one sort of way under the + persuasion of the sheep-form, and <!-- Page 16 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page16"></a>[16]</span> in another sort of way + under the persuasion of the dog-form, and we cannot tell how it will act + until we know which form is going to capture it. No amount of study + bestowed on the common material nature will enable us to judge how it + will behave under the persuasion of the higher organizing form. The only + way to discover that is to examine the higher form itself.</p> + + <p>Every form, then, will really be the object of a distinct science. The + form of the sheep and the form of the dog have much in common, but that + merely happens to be so; we cannot depend upon it, or risk inferences + from sheep to dog: we must examine each in itself; we shall really need a + science of probatology about sheep, and cynology about dogs. Again, the + common material nature has its own principles of being and action, so it + will need a science of itself, which we may call hylology. Each of these + sciences is mistress in her own province; but how many there are, and how + puzzlingly they overlap! So long as we remain within the province of a + single science, we may be able to think rigorously, everything will be + 'tight'. But as soon as we consider border-issues between one province + and another, farewell to exactitude: everything will be 'loose'. We can + think out hylology till we are blue in the face, but we shall never + discover anything about the entry of material elements into higher + organizations, or how they behave when they get there. We may form + perfect definitions and descriptions of the form of the dog as such, and + still derive no rules for telling what elements of matter will enter into + the body of a given dog or how they will be placed when they do. All we + can be sure of is, that the dog-form will keep itself going in, and by + means of, the material it embodies—unless the dog dies. But what + happens to the matter in the body of the dog is 'accidental' to the + nature of the matter; and the use of this matter, rather than of some + other equally suitable, is accidental to the nature of the dog.</p> + + <p>No account of material events can dispense with accidental relations + altogether. We must at least recognize that there are accidental + relations between particular things. Accident in the sense of brute fact + had to be acknowledged even by the tidiest and most dogmatic atomism of + the last century. That atomism must allow it to be accidental, in this + sense, that the space surrounding any given atom was occupied by other + atoms in a given manner. It belonged neither to the nature of space to be + occupied by just those atoms in just those places, nor to the nature of + the atoms to <!-- Page 17 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page17"></a>[17]</span> be distributed just like that over space; + and so in a certain sense the environment of any atom was an accidental + environment. That is, the particular arrangement of the environment was + accidental. The nature of the environment was not accidental at all. It + was proper to the nature of the atom to be in interaction with other + atoms over a spatial field, and it never encountered in the + fellow-denizens of space any other nature but its own. It was not subject + to the accident of meeting strange natures, nor of becoming suddenly + subject to strange or unequal laws of interaction. All interactions, + being with its own kind, were reciprocal and obedient to a single set of + calculable laws.</p> + + <p>But the medieval philosophy had asserted accidental relations between + distinct sorts of <i>natures</i>, the form of living dog and the form of + dead matter, for example. No one could know <i>a priori</i> what effect + an accidental relation would produce, and all accidental relations + between different pairs of natures were different: at the most there was + analogy between them. Every different nature had to be separately + observed, and when you had observed them all, you could still simply + write an inventory of them, you could not hope to rationalize your body + of knowledge. Let us narrow the field and consider what this doctrine + allows us to know about the wood of a certain kind of tree. We shall + begin by observing the impressions it makes on our several senses, and we + shall attribute to it a substantial form such as naturally to give rise + to these impressions, without, perhaps, being so rash as to claim a + knowledge of what this substantial form is. Still we do not know what its + capacities of physical action and passion may be. We shall find them out + by observing it in relation to different 'natures'. It turns out to be + combustible by fire, resistant to water, tractable to the carpenter's + tools, intractable to his digestive organs, harmless to ostriches, + nourishing to wood-beetles. Each of these capacities of the wood is + distinct; we cannot relate them intelligibly to one another, nor deduce + them from the assumed fundamental 'woodiness'.</p> + + <p>We can now see why 'substantial forms' were the <i>bêtes noires</i> of + the seventeenth-century philosophers. It was because they turned nature + into an unmanageable jungle, in which trees, bushes, and parasites of a + thousand kinds wildly interlaced. There was nothing for it, if science + was to proceed, but to clear the ground and replant with spruce in rows: + to postulate a single uniform nature, of which there should be a single + science. Now neither probatology <!-- Page 18 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page18"></a>[18]</span> nor cynology could hope to be + universal—the world is not all sheep nor all dog: it would have to + be hylology; for the world is, in its spatial aspect, all material. Let + us say, then, that there is one uniform material nature of things, and + that everything else consists in the arrangements of the basic material + nature; as the show of towers and mountains in the sunset results simply + from an arrangement of vapours. And let us suppose that the interactions + of the parts of matter are all like those which we can observe in dead + manipulable bodies—in mechanism, in fact. Such was the postulate of + the new philosophers, and it yielded them results.</p> + + <p>It yielded them results, and that was highly gratifying. But what, + meanwhile, had happened to those palpable facts of common experience from + which the whole philosophy of substantial forms had taken its rise? Is + the wholeness of a living thing the mere resultant of the orderly + operations of its parts? Is a bee no more essentially one than a swarm + is? Is the life of a living animal indistinguishable from the rhythm of a + going watch, except in degree of complication and subtlety of + contrivance? And if an animal's body, say my own, is simply an + agglomerate of minute interacting material units, and its wholeness is + merely accidental and apparent, how is my conscious mind to be adjusted + to it? For my consciousness appears to identify itself with that whole + vital pattern which used to be called the substantial form. We are now + told that the pattern is nothing real or active, but the mere accidental + resultant of distinct interacting forces: it does no work, it exercises + no influence or control, it <i>is</i> nothing. How then can it be the + vehicle and instrument of my conscious soul? It cannot. Then is my soul + homeless? Or is it to be identified with the activity and fortunes of a + single atomic constituent of my body, a single cog in the animal + clockwork? If so, how irrational! For the soul does not experience itself + as the soul of one minute part, but as the soul of the body.</p> + + <p>Such questions rose thick and fast in the minds of the + seventeenth-century philosophers. It will cause us no great surprise that + Leibniz should have quickly felt that the Formal Principle of Aristotle + and of the Scholastic philosophy must be by hook or by crook + reintroduced—not as the detested <i>substantial form</i>, but under + a name by which it might hope to smell more sweet, <i>entelechy</i>.</p> + + <p>Nothing so tellingly revealed the difficulties of the new philosophy + <!-- Page 19 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page19"></a>[19]</span> in + dealing with living bodies as the insufficiency of the solutions + Descartes had proposed. He had boldly declared the unity of animal life + to be purely mechanical, and denied that brutes had souls at all, or any + sensation. He had to admit soul in man, but he still denied the + substantial unity of the human body. It was put together like a watch, it + was many things, not one: if Descartes had lived in our time, he would + have been delighted to compare it with a telephone system, the nerves + taking the place of the wires, and being so arranged that all currents of + 'animal spirit' flowing in them converged upon a single unit, a gland at + the base of the brain. In this unit, or in the convergence of all the + motions upon it, the 'unity' of the body virtually consisted; and the + soul was incarnate, not in the plurality of members (for how could it, + being one, indwell many things?), but in the single gland.</p> + + <p>Even so, the relation between the soul and the gland was absolutely + unintelligible, as Descartes disarmingly confessed. Incarnation was all + very well in the old philosophy: those who had allowed the interaction of + disparate natures throughout the physical world need find no particular + difficulty about the special case of it provided by incarnation. Why + should not a form of conscious life so interact with what would otherwise + be dead matter as to 'indwell' it? But the very principle of the new + philosophy disallowed the interaction of disparate natures, because such + an interaction did not allow of exact formulation, it was a 'loose' and + not a 'tight' relation.</p> + + <p>From a purely practical point of view the much derided pineal gland + theory would serve. If we could be content to view Descartes as a man who + wanted to make the world safe for physical science, then there would be a + good deal to be said for his doctrine. In the old philosophy exact + science had been frustrated by the hypothesis of loose relations all over + the field of nature. Descartes had cleared them from as much of the field + as science was then in a position to investigate; he allowed only one + such relation to subsist, the one which experience appeared unmistakably + to force upon us—that between our own mind and its bodily vehicle. + He had exorcized the spirits from the rest of nature; and though there + was a spirit here which could not be exorcized, the philosophic conjurer + had nevertheless confined it and its unaccountable pranks within a + minutely narrow magic circle: all mind could do <!-- Page 20 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page20"></a>[20]</span> was to turn the one tiny + switch at the centre of its animal telephone system. It could create no + energy—it could merely redirect the currents actually flowing.</p> + + <p>Practically this might do, but speculatively it was most disturbing. + For if the 'loose relation' had to be admitted in one instance, it was + admitted in principle; and one could not get rid of the suspicion that it + would turn up elsewhere, and that the banishment of it from every other + field represented a convenient pragmatic postulate rather than a solid + metaphysical truth. Moreover, the correlation of the unitary soul with + the unitary gland might do justice to a mechanistical philosophy, but it + did not do justice to the soul's own consciousness of itself. The soul's + consciousness is the 'idea' or 'representation' of the life of the whole + body, certainly not of the life of the pineal gland nor, as the + unreflective nowadays would say, of the brain. I am not conscious in, or + of, my brain except when I have a headache; consciousness is in my eyes + and finger-tips and so on. It is physically true, no doubt, that + consciousness in and of my finger-tips is not possible without the + functioning of my brain; but that is a poor reason for locating the + consciousness in the brain. The filament of the electric bulb will not be + incandescent apart from the functioning of the dynamo; but that is a poor + reason for saying that the incandescence is in the dynamo.</p> + + <p>Certainly the area of representation in our mind is not simply + equivalent to the area of our body. But in so far as the confines of + mental representation part company with the confines of the body, it is + not that they may contract and fall back upon the pineal gland, but that + they may expand and advance over the surrounding world. The mind does not + represent its own body merely, it represents the world in so far as the + world affects that body or is physically reproduced in it. The mind has + no observable natural relation to the pineal gland. It has only two + natural relations: to its body as a whole and to its effective + environment. What Descartes had really done was to pretend that the soul + was related to the pineal gland as it is in fact related to its whole + body; and then that it was related to the bodily members as in fact it is + related to outer environment. The members became an inner environment, + known only in so far as they affected the pineal gland; just as the outer + environment in its turn was to be known only in so far as it affected the + members.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 21 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page21"></a>[21]</span></p> + + <p>This doctrine of a double environment was wholly artificial. It was + forced on Descartes by the requirements of mechanistical science: if the + members were simply a plurality of things, they must really be parts of + environment; the body which the soul indwelt must be <i>a</i> body; + presumably, then, the pineal gland. An untenable compromise, surely, + between admitting and denying the reality of the soul's incarnation.</p> + + <p>What, then, was to be done? Descartes's rivals and successors + attempted several solutions, which it would be too long to examine here. + They dissatisfied Leibniz and they have certainly no less dissatisfied + posterity. It will be enough for us here to consider what Leibniz did. He + admitted, to begin with, the psychological fact. The unity of + consciousness is the representation of a plurality—the plurality of + the members, and through them the plurality of the world. Here, surely, + was the very principle the new philosophy needed for the reconciliation + of substantial unity with mechanical plurality of parts. For it is + directly evident to us that consciousness focuses the plurality of + environing things in a unity of representation. This is no philosophical + theory, it is a simple fact. Our body, then, as a physical system is a + mechanical plurality; as focused in consciousness it is a unity of + 'idea'.</p> + + <p>Very well: but we have not got far yet. For the old difficulty still + remains—it is purely arbitrary, after all, that a unitary + consciousness should be attached to, and represent, a mechanical + collection of things which happen to interact in a sort of pattern. If + there is a consciousness attached to human bodies, then why not to + systems of clockwork? If the body is <i>represented</i> as unity, it must + surely be because it <i>is</i> unity, as the old philosophy had held. But + how can we reintroduce unity into the body without reintroducing + substantial form, and destroying the mechanistical plurality which the + new science demanded?</p> + + <p>It is at this point that Leibniz produces the speculative postulate of + his system. Why not reverse the relation, and make the members represent + the mind as the mind represents the members? For then the unity of person + represented in the mind will become something actual in the members + also.</p> + + <p>Representation appears to common sense to be a one-way sort of + traffic. If my mind represents my bodily members, something happens to my + mind, for it becomes a representation of such members in such a state; + but nothing happens to the members by <!-- Page 22 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page22"></a>[22]</span> their being so + represented in the mind. The mental representation obeys the bodily + facts; the bodily facts do not obey the mental representation. It seems + nonsense to say that my members obey my mind <i>because</i> they are + mirrored in it. And yet my members do obey my mind, or at least common + sense supposes so. Sometimes my mind, instead of representing the state + my members are in, represents a state which it intends that they shall be + in, for example, that my hand should go through the motion of writing + these words. And my hand obeys; its action becomes the moving diagram of + my thought, my thought is represented or expressed in the manual act. + Here the relation of mind and members appears to be reversed: instead of + its representing them, they represent it. With this representation it is + the opposite of what it was with the other. By the members' being + represented in the mind, something happened to the mind, and nothing to + the members; by the mind's being represented in the members something + happens to the members and nothing to the mind.</p> + + <p>Why should not we take this seriously? Why not allow that there is + two-way traffic—by one relation the mind represents the members, by + another the members represent the mind? But then again, how can we take + it seriously? For representation, in the required sense, is a mental act; + brute matter can represent nothing, only mind can represent. And the + members are brute matter. But are they? How do we know that? By brute + matter we understand extended lumps of stuff, interacting with one + another mechanically, as do, for example, two cogs in a piece of + clockwork. But this is a large-scale view. The cogs are themselves + composed of interrelated parts and those parts of others, and so on <i>ad + infinitum</i>. Who knows what the ultimate constituents really are? The + 'modern' philosophers, certainly, have proposed no hypothesis about them + which even looks like making sense. They have supposed that the + apparently inert lumps, the cogs, are composed of parts themselves + equally inert, and that by subdivision we shall still reach nothing but + the inert. But this supposition is in flat contradiction with what + physical theory demands. We have to allow the reality of <i>force</i> in + physics. Now the force which large-scale bodies display may easily be the + block-effect of activity in their minute real constituents. If not, where + does it come from? Let it be supposed, then, that these minute real + constituents are active because they are alive, because they are minds; + for indeed we have <!-- Page 23 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page23"></a>[23]</span> no notion of activity other than the + perception we have of our own. We have no notion of it except as + something mental. On the hypothesis that the constituents of active body + are also mental, this limitation in our conception of activity need cause + us neither sorrow nor surprise.</p> + + <p>The mind-units which make up body will not of course be developed and + fully conscious minds like yours or mine, and it is only for want of a + better word that we call them minds at all. They will be mere + unselfconscious representations of their physical environment, as it + might be seen from the physical point to which they belong by a human + mind paying no attention at all to its own seeing. How many of these + rudimentary 'minds' will there be in my body? As many as you + like—as many as it is possible there should be—say an + infinite number and have done with it.</p> + + <p>We may now observe how this hypothesis introduces real formal unity + without prejudicing mechanical plurality. Each of the mind-units in my + body is itself and substantially distinct. But since each, in its own way + and according to its own position, represents the superior and more + developed mind which I call 'me', they will order themselves according to + a common form. The order is real, not accidental: it is like the order of + troops on a parade-ground. Each man is a distinct active unit, but each + is really expressing by his action the mind of the officer in command. He + is expressing no less his relation to the other men in the ranks—to + obey the officer is to keep in step with them. So the metaphysical units + of the body, being all minds, represent one another as well as the + dominant mind: one another co-ordinately, the dominant mind + subordinately.</p> + + <p>But if the metaphysically real units of the body are of the nature of + mind, then <i>the</i> mind is a mind among minds, a spirit-atom among + spirit-atoms. What then constitutes its superiority or dominance, and + makes it a mind <i>par excellence</i>? Well, what constitutes the officer + an officer? Two things: a more developed mentality and the fact of being + obeyed. In military life these two factors are not always perfectly + proportioned to one another, but in the order of Leibniz's universe they + are. A fuller power to represent the universe is necessarily combined + with dominance over an organized troop of members; for the mind knows the + universe only in so far as the universe is expressed in its body. <!-- + Page 24 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page24"></a>[24]</span> That is + what the <i>finitude</i> of the mind means. Only an infinite mind + appreciates the whole plurality of things in themselves; a finite mind + perceives them in so far as mirrored in the physical being of an + organized body of members. The more adequate the mirror, the more + adequate the representation: the more highly organized the body, the more + developed the mind.</p> + + <p>The developed mind has an elaborate body; but the least developed mind + has still some body, or it would lack any mirror whatever through which + to represent the world. This means, in effect, that Leibniz's system is + not an unmitigated spiritual atomism. For though the spiritual atoms, or + monads, are the ultimate constituents out of which nature is composed, + they stand composed together from the beginning in a minimal order which + cannot be broken up. Each monad, if it is to be anything at all, must be + a continuing finite representation of the universe, and to be that it + must have a body, that is to say, it must have other monads in a + permanent relation of mutual correspondence with it. And if you said to + Leibniz, 'But surely any physical body can be broken up, and this must + mean the dissolution of the organic relation between its monadical + constituents,' he would take refuge in the infinitesimal. The wonders + revealed by that new miracle, the microscope, suggested what the + intrinsic divisibility of space itself suggests—whatever + organization is broken up, there will still be a minute organization + within each of the fragments which remains unbroken—and so <i>ad + infinitum</i>. You will never come down to loose monads, monads out of + all organization. You will never disembody the monads, and so remove + their representative power; you will only reduce their bodies and so + impoverish their representative power. In this sense no animal dies and + no animal is generated. Death is the reduction and generation the + enrichment of some existing monad's body; and, by being that, is the + enrichment or the reduction of the monad's mental life.</p> + + <p>'But,' our common sense protests, 'it is too great a strain on our + credulity to make the real nature of things so utterly different from + what sense and science make of them. If the real universe is what you say + it is, why do our minds represent it to us as they do?' The philosopher's + answer is, 'Because they <i>represent</i> it. According to the truth of + things, each monad is simply its own mental life, its own world-view, its + own thoughts and desires. To know things as they are would be + simultaneously to live over, as though from <!-- Page 25 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page25"></a>[25]</span> within and by a miracle + of sympathy, the biographies of an infinite number of distinct monads. + This is absolutely impossible. Our senses represent the coexistent + families of monads <i>in the gross</i>, and therefore conventionally; + what is in fact the mutual representation of monads in ordered systems, + is represented as the mechanical interaction of spatially extended and + material parts.' This does not mean that science is overthrown. The + physical world-view is in terms of the convention of representation, but + it is not, for all that, illusory. It can, ideally, be made as true as it + is capable of being. There is no reason whatever for confusing the + 'well-grounded seemings' of the apparent physical world with the + fantastic seemings of dream and hallucination.</p> + + <p>So far the argument seems to draw whatever cogency it has from the + simplicity and naturalness of the notion of representation. The nature of + idea, it is assumed, is to represent plurality in a unified view. If idea + did not represent, it would not be idea. And since there <i>is</i> idea + (for our minds at least exist and are made up of idea) there is + representation. It belongs to idea to represent, and since the whole + world has now been interpreted as a system of mutually representing + ideations, or ideators, it might seem that all their mutual relations are + perfectly natural, a harmony of agreement which could not be other than + it is. But if so, why does Leibniz keep saying that the harmony is + <i>pre-established</i>, by special and infinitely elaborate divine + decrees?</p> + + <p>Leibniz himself says that the very nature of representation excludes + interaction. By representing environment a mind does not do anything to + environment, that is plain. But it is no less plain that environment does + nothing to it, either. The act of representing is simply the act of the + mind; it represents <i>in view of</i> environment, of course, but not + under the causal influence of environment. Representation is a business + carried on by the mind on its own account, and in virtue of its innate + power to represent.</p> + + <p>Very well; but does this consideration really drive us into theology? + Is not Leibniz the victim of a familiar fallacy, that of incompletely + stated alternatives? '<i>Either</i> finite beings interact <i>or else</i> + they do not directly condition one another. Monads do not interact, + therefore they do not directly condition one another. How then explain + the actual conformity of their mutual representation, without recourse to + divine fore-ordaining?' It seems sufficient to introduce a further + alternative in the first line of the argument, <!-- Page 26 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page26"></a>[26]</span> and we are rid of the + theology. Things may condition the action of a further thing, without + acting upon it. It acts of itself, but it acts in view of what they are. + We are tempted to conclude that Leibniz has introduced the <i>Deus ex + machina</i> with the fatal facility of his age. 'Where a little further + meditation on the characters in the play would furnish a natural + <i>dénouement</i>, he swings divine intervention on to the scene by wires + from the ceiling. It is easy for us to reconstruct for him the end of the + piece without recourse to stage-machines.'</p> + + <p>Is it? No, I fear it is not. There is really no avoiding the + pre-established harmony. And so we shall discover, if we pursue our train + of reflexion a little further. It is natural, we were saying, than an + idea should represent an environment; indeed, it <i>is</i> the + representation of one. Given no environment to represent, it would be + empty, a mere capacity for representation. Then every idea or ideator, + taken merely in itself, <i>is</i> an empty capacity. But of what is the + environment of each made up? According to the Leibnitian theory, of + further ideas or ideators: of empty capacities, therefore. Then no idea + will either be anything in itself, or find anything in its neighbours to + represent. An unhappy predicament, like that of a literary clique in + which all the members are adepts at discussing one another's + ideas—only that unfortunately none of them are provided with any; + or like the shaky economics of the fabled Irish village where they all + lived by taking in one another's washing.</p> + + <p>It is useless, then, to conceive representations as simply coming into + existence in response to environment, and modelling themselves on + environment. They must all mutually reflect environment or they would not + be representations; but they must also exist as themselves and in their + own right or there would be no environment for them mutually to + represent. Since the world is infinitely various, each representor must + have its own distinct character or nature, as our minds have: that is to + say, it must represent in its own individual way; and all these endlessly + various representations must be so constituted as to form a mutually + reflecting harmony. Considered as a representation, each monadical + existence simply reflects the universe after its own manner. But + considered as something to be represented by the others, it is a + self-existent mental life, or world of ideas. Now when we are considering + the fact of representation, that which is to be represented comes first + and the representation follows upon it. <!-- Page 27 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page27"></a>[27]</span> Thus in considering the + Leibnitian universe, we must begin with the monads as self-existent + mental lives, or worlds of ideas; their representation of one another + comes second. Nothing surely, then, but omnipotent creative wisdom could + have pre-established between so many distinct given mental worlds that + harmony which constitutes their mutual representation.</p> + + <p>Our common-sense pluralistic thinking escapes from the need of the + pre-established harmony by distinguishing what we are from what we do. + Let the world be made up of a plurality of agents in a 'loose' order, + with room to manoeuvre and to adjust themselves to one another. Then, by + good luck or good management, through friction and disaster, by trial and + error, by accident or invention, they may work out for themselves a + harmony of <i>action</i>. There is no need for divine preordaining here. + But on Leibniz's view what the monads do is to represent, and what they + are is representation; there is no ultimate distinction between what they + are and what they do: all that they do belongs to what they are. The + whole system of action in each monad, which fits with such infinite + complexity the system of action in each other monad, is precisely the + existence of that monad, and apart from it the monad is not. The monads + do not <i>achieve</i> a harmony, they <i>are</i> a harmony, and therefore + they are pre-established in harmony.</p> + + <p>Leibniz denied that he invoked God to intervene in nature, or that + there was anything arbitrary or artificial about his physical theology. + He was simply analysing nature and finding it to be a system of mutual + representation; he was analysing mutual representation and finding it to + be of its nature intrinsically pre-established, and therefore + God-dependent. He was not adding anything to mutual representation, he + was just showing what it necessarily contained or implied. At least he + was doing nothing worse than recognized scholastic practice. Scholastic + Aristotelianism explained all natural causality as response to stimulus, + and then had to postulate a stimulus which stimulated without being + stimulated, and this was God. Apart from this supreme and first stimulus + nothing would in fact be moving. The Aristotelians claimed simply to be + analysing the nature of physical motion as they perceived it, and to find + the necessity of perpetually applied divine stimulation implicit in it. + No violence was thereby done to the system of physical motion nor was + anything brought in from <!-- Page 28 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page28"></a>[28]</span> without to patch it up; it was simply found + to be of its own nature God-dependent.</p> + + <p>It seems as though the reproachful description <i>'Deus ex + machina'</i> should be reserved for more arbitrary expedients than + Aristotle's or Leibniz's, say for the occasionalist theory. Occasionalism + appeared to introduce God that he might make physical matter do what it + had no natural tendency to do, viz. to obey the volitions of finite mind. + Ideas, on the other hand, have a natural tendency to represent one + another, for to be an idea is to be a representation; God is not + introduced by Leibniz to make them correspond, he is introduced to work a + system in which they shall correspond. This may not be <i>Deus-ex-machina + philosophy</i>, but it is <i>physical theology</i>; that is to say, it + treats divine action as one factor among the factors which together + constitute the working of the natural system. And this appears to be + perhaps unscientific, certainly blasphemous: God's action cannot be a + factor among factors; the Creator works through and in all creaturely + action equally; we can never say 'This is the creature, and that is God' + of distinguishable causalities in the natural world. The creature is, in + its creaturely action, self-sufficient: but because a creature, + insufficient to itself throughout, and sustained by its Creator both in + existence and in action.</p> + + <p>The only acceptable argument for theism is that which corresponds to + the religious consciousness, and builds upon the insufficiency of finite + existence throughout, because it is finite. All arguments to God's + existence from a particular gap in our account of the world of finites + are to be rejected. They do not indicate God, they indicate the failure + of our power to analyse the world-order. When Leibniz discovered that his + system of mutual representations needed to be pre-established, he ought + to have seen that he had come up a cul-de-sac and backed out; he ought + not to have said, 'With the help of God I will leap over the wall.'</p> + + <p>If we condemn Leibniz for writing physical theology, we condemn not + him but his age. No contemporary practice was any better, and much of it + a good deal worse, as Leibniz liked somewhat complacently to point out. + And because he comes to theology through physical theology, that does not + mean that all his theology was physical theology and as such to be + written off. On the contrary, Leibniz is led to wrestle with many + problems which beset any philosophical theism of the Christian type. This + is particularly <!-- Page 29 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page29"></a>[29]</span> so in the <i>Theodicy</i>, as its many + citations of theologians suggest. His discussions never lack ingenuity, + and the system of creation and providence in which they result has much + of that luminous serenity which colours the best works of the Age of + Reason.</p> + + <p>Every theistic philosopher is bound, with whatever cautions, to + conceive God by the analogy of the human mind. When Leibniz declares the + harmony of monads to be pre-established by God, he is invoking the image + of intelligent human pre-arrangement. Nor is he content simply to leave + it at that: he endeavours as well as he may to conceive the sort of act + by which God pre-arranges; and this involves the detailed adaptation for + theological purposes of Leibnitian doctrine about the human mind.</p> + + <p>The human mind, as we have seen, is the mind predominant in a certain + system of 'minds', viz. in those which constitute the members of the + human body. If we call it predominant, we mean that its system of ideas + is more developed than theirs, so that there are more points in which + each of them conforms to it than in which it conforms to any one of them. + The conception of a divine pre-establishing mind will be analogous. It + will be the conception of a mind <i>absolutely</i> dominant, to whose + ideas, that is to say, the whole system simply corresponds, without any + reciprocating correspondence on his side. In a certain sense this is to + make God the 'Mind of the World'; and yet the associations of the phrase + are misleading. It suggests that the world is an organism or body in + which the divine mind is incarnate, and on which he relies for his + representations. But that is nonsense; the world is not <i>a</i> body, + nor is it organic to God. Absolute dominance involves absolute + transcendence: if everything in the world without remainder simply obeys + the divine thoughts, that is only another way of saying that the world is + the creature of God; the whole system is pre-established by him who is + absolute Being and perfectly independent of the world.</p> + + <p>Of createdness, or pre-establishedness, there is no more to be said: + we can think of it as nothing but the pure or absolute case of subjection + to dominant mind. It is no use asking further <i>how</i> God's thoughts + are obeyed in the existence and action of things. What we can and must + enquire into further, is the nature of the divine thoughts which are thus + obeyed. They must be understood to be volitions or decrees. There are + indeed two ways in which things obey the divine thought, and + correspondingly two sorts of divine <!-- Page 30 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page30"></a>[30]</span> thoughts that they obey. + In so far as created things conform to the mere universal principles of + reason, they obey a reasonableness which is an inherent characteristic of + the divine mind itself. If God wills the existence of any creature, that + creature's existence must observe the limits prescribed by eternal + reason: it cannot, for example, both have and lack a certain + characteristic in the same sense and at the same time; nor can it contain + two parts and two parts which are not also countable as one part and + three parts. Finite things, if they exist at all, must thus conform to + the reasonableness of the divine nature, but what the divine + reasonableness thus prescribes is highly general: we can deduce from it + only certain laws which any finite things must obey, we can never deduce + from it which finite things there are to be, nor indeed that there are to + be any. Finite things are particular and individual: each of them might + have been other than it is or, to speak more properly, instead of any one + of them there might have existed something else; it was, according to the + mere principles of eternal reason, equally possible. But if so, the whole + universe, being made up of things each of which might be otherwise, might + as a whole be otherwise. Therefore the divine thoughts which it obeys by + existing have the nature of <i>choices</i> or <i>decrees</i>.</p> + + <p>What material does the finite mind supply for an analogical picture of + the infinite mind making choices or decrees? If we use such language of + God, we are using language which has its first and natural application to + ourselves. We all of us choose, and those of us who are in authority make + decrees. What is to choose? It involves a real freedom in the mind. A + finite mind, let us remember, is nothing but a self-operating succession + of perceptions, ideas, or representations. With regard to some of our + ideas we have no freedom, those, for example, which represent to us our + body. We think of them as constituting our given substance. They are + sheer datum for us, and so are those reflexions of our environment which + they mediate to us. They make up a closely packed and confused mass; they + persevere in their being with an obstinate innate force, the spiritual + counterpart of the force which we have to recognize in things as + physically interpreted. Being real spiritual force, it is + quasi-voluntary, and indeed do we not love our own existence and, in a + sense, will it in all its necessary circumstances? But if we can be said + to will to be ourselves and to enact with native force what our body and + its environment makes <!-- Page 31 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page31"></a>[31]</span> us, we are merely willing to conform to the + conditions of our existence; we are making no choice. When, however, we + think freely or perform deliberate acts, there is not only force but + choice in our activity. Choice between what? Between alternative + possibilities arising out of our situation. And choice in virtue of what? + In virtue of the appeal exercised by one alternative as seemingly + better.</p> + + <p>Can we adapt our scheme of choice to the description of God's creative + decrees? We will take the second point in it first: our choice is in + virtue of the appeal of the seeming best. Surely the only corrective + necessary in applying this to God is the omission of the word 'seeming'. + His choice is in virtue of the appeal of the simply best. The other point + causes more trouble. We choose between possibilities which arise for us + out of our situation in the system of the existing world. But as the + world does not exist before God's creative choices, he is in no + world-situation, and no alternative possibilities can arise out of it, + between which he should have to choose. But if God does not choose + between intrinsic possibilities of some kind, his choice becomes + something absolutely meaningless to us—it is not a choice at all, + it is an arbitrary and unintelligible <i>fiat</i>.</p> + + <p>Leibniz's solution is this: what are mere possibilities of thought for + us are possibilities of action for God. For a human subject, + possibilities of action are limited to what arises out of his actual + situation, but possibilities for thought are not so limited. I can + conceive a world different in many respects from this world, in which, + for example, vegetables should be gifted with thought and speech; but I + can do nothing towards bringing it about. My imaginary world is + practically impossible but speculatively possible, in the sense that it + contradicts no single principle of necessary and immutable reason. I, + indeed, can explore only a very little way into the region of sheer + speculative possibility; God does not explore it, he simply possesses it + all: the whole region of the possible is but a part of the content of his + infinite mind. So among all possible creatures he chooses the best and + creates it.</p> + + <p>But the whole realm of the possible is an actual infinity of ideas. + Out of the consideration of an infinity of ideas, how can God arrive at a + choice? Why not? His mind is not, of course, discursive; he does not + successively turn over the leaves of an infinite book of sample worlds, + for then he would never come to the end <!-- Page 32 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page32"></a>[32]</span> of it. Embracing + infinite possibility in the single act of his mind, he settles his will + with intuitive immediacy upon the best. The inferior, the monstrous, the + absurd is not a wilderness through which he painfully threads his way, it + is that from which he immediately turns; his wisdom is his elimination of + it.</p> + + <p>But in so applying the scheme of choice to God's act, have we not + invalidated its application to our own? For if God has chosen the whole + form and fabric of the world, he has chosen everything in it, including + the choices we shall make. And if our choices have already been chosen + for us by God, it would seem to follow that they are not real open + choices on our part at all, but are pre-determined. And if they are + pre-determined, it would seem that they are not really even choices, for + a determined choice is not a choice. But if we do not ourselves exercise + real choice in any degree, then we have no clue to what any choice would + be: and if so, we have no power of conceiving divine choice, either; and + so the whole argument cuts its own throat.</p> + + <p>There are two possible lines of escape from this predicament. One is + to define human choice in such a sense that it allows of + pre-determination without ceasing to be choice; and this is Leibniz's + method, and it can be studied at length in the <i>Theodicy</i>. He + certainly makes the very best he can of it, and it hardly seems that any + of those contemporaries whose views he criticizes was in a position to + answer him. The alternative method is to make the most of the negative + element involved in all theology. After all, we do not positively or + adequately understand the nature of infinite creative will. Perhaps it is + precisely the transcendent glory of divine freedom to be able to work + infallibly through free instruments. But so mystical a paradox is not the + sort of thing we can expect to appeal to a late-seventeenth-century + philosopher.</p> + + <p>One criticism of Leibniz's argument we cannot refrain from making. He + allows himself too easy a triumph when he says that the only alternative + to a choice determined by a prevailing inclination towards one proposal + is a choice of mere caprice. There is a sort of choice Leibniz never so + much as considers and which appears at least to fall quite outside his + categories, and that is the sort of choice exercised in artistic + creativity. In such choice we freely feel after the shaping of a scheme, + we do not arbitrate simply between shaped and given possible schemes. And + perhaps some such element enters into all our choices, since our life is + to <!-- Page 33 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page33"></a>[33]</span> + some extent freely designed by ourselves. If so, our minds are even more + akin to the divine mind than Leibniz realized. For the sort of choice we + are now referring to seems to be an intuitive turning away from an + infinite, or at least indefinite, range of less attractive possibility. + And such is the nature of the divine creative choice. The consequence of + such a line of speculation would be, that the divine mind designs more + through us, and less simply for us, than Leibniz allowed: the 'harmony' + into which we enter would be no longer simply 'pre-established'. Leibniz, + in fact, could have nothing to do with such a suggestion, and he would + have found it easy to be ironical about it if his contemporaries had + proposed it.</p> + +<h3>II</h3> + + <p>Leibniz wrote two books; a considerable number of articles in learned + periodicals; and an enormous number of unpublished notes, papers and + letters, preserved in the archives of the Electors of Hanover not because + of the philosophical significance of some of them, but because of the + political importance of most of them. From among this great mass various + excerpts of philosophical interest have been made by successive editors + of Leibniz's works. It may be that the most profound understanding of his + mind is to be derived from some of these pieces, but if we wish to + consider the public history of Leibniz, we may set them aside.</p> + + <p>Of the two books, one was published, and the other never was. The + <i>New Essays</i> remained in Leibniz's desk, the <i>Theodicy</i> saw the + light. And so, to his own and the succeeding generation, Leibniz was + known as the author of the <i>Theodicy</i>.</p> + + <p>The articles in journals form the immediate background to the two + books. In 1696 Leibniz heard that a French translation of Locke's + <i>Essay concerning Human Understanding</i> was being prepared at + Amsterdam. He wrote some polite comments on Locke's great work, and + published them. He also sent them to Locke, hoping that Locke would write + a reply, and that Leibniz's reflexions and Locke's reply might be + appended to the projected French translation. But Locke set Leibniz's + comments aside. Leibniz, not to be defeated, set to work upon the <i>New + Essays</i>, in which the whole substance of Locke's book is + systematically discussed in dialogue. The <i>New Essays</i> were written + in 1703. But meanwhile a painful <!-- Page 34 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page34"></a>[34]</span> dispute had broken out between Leibniz and + the disciples of Locke and Newton, in which the English, and perhaps + Newton himself, were much to blame, and Leibniz thought it impolitic to + publish his book. It was not issued until long after his death, in the + middle of the century.</p> + + <p>The discussion with Locke was a failure: Locke would not play, and the + book in which the whole controversy was to be systematized never + appeared. The discussion with Bayle, on the other hand, was a model of + what a discussion should be. Bayle played up tirelessly, and was never + embarrassingly profound; he provided just the sort of objections most + useful for drawing forth illuminating expositions; he was as good as a + fictitious character in a philosophical dialogue. And the book in which + the controversy was systematized duly appeared with great éclat.</p> + + <p>Here is the history of the controversy. In 1695 Leibniz was forty-nine + years old. He had just emerged from a period of close employment under + his prince's commands, and he thought fit to try his metaphysical + principles upon the polite world and see what would come of it. He + therefore published an article in the <i>Journal des Savants</i> under + the title: 'New System of Nature and of the Communication of Substances, + as well as of the Union between Soul and Body'. In the same year Foucher + published an article in the <i>Journal</i> controverting Leibniz; and in + the next year Leibniz replied with an 'Explanation'. A second explanation + in the same year appeared in Basnage's <i>Histoire des Ouvrages des + Savants</i>, in answer to reflexions by the editor. M. Pierre Bayle had + all these articles before him when he inserted a note on Leibniz's + doctrine in his article on 'Rorarius', in the first edition of his + <i>Historical and Critical Dictionary</i>. The point of connexion between + Rorarius and Leibniz was no more than this, that both held views about + the souls of beasts.</p> + + <p>Pierre Bayle was the son of a Calvinist pastor, early converted to + Catholicism, but recovered to his old faith after a short time. He held + academic employments in Switzerland and Holland; he promoted and edited + the <i>Nouvelles de la République des Lettres</i>, and he produced that + extraordinary work the <i>Historical and Critical Dictionary.</i> The + notices it contains of authors and thinkers are little more than pegs + upon which Bayle could hang his philosophical reflexions. He could write + an intelligent discussion on any opinion; what he could not do was to + reconcile the points of <!-- Page 35 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page35"></a>[35]</span> view from which he felt impelled to write + upon this author and that. His was not a systematic mind. So far as he + had a philosophical opinion, he was a Cartesian; in theology he was an + orthodox Calvinist. He could not reconcile his theology with his + Cartesianism and he did not try to. He made a merit of the oppositions of + faith to reason and reason to itself, so that he could throw himself upon + a meritorious and voluntary faith.</p> + + <p>There is nothing original in this position. It was characteristic of + decadent scholasticism, it squared with Luther's exaggerations about the + impotence of reason in fallen man, and Pascal had given his own highly + personal twist to it. Bayle has been hailed as a forerunner of Voltairean + scepticism. It would be truer to say that a Voltairean sceptic could read + Bayle's discussions in his own sense and for his own purposes if he + wished. But Bayle was not a sceptic. It is hard to say what he was; his + whole position as between faith and reason is hopelessly confused. He was + a scholar, a wit, and a philosophical sparring-partner of so perfectly + convenient a kind that if we had not evidence of his historical reality, + we might have suspected Leibniz of inventing him.</p> + + <p>In the first edition of his <i>Dictionary</i>, under the article + 'Rorarius', Bayle gave a very fair account of Leibniz's doctrine + concerning the souls of animals, as it could be collected from his + article in the <i>Journal des Savants</i>, 27 June 1695. He then + proceeded to comment upon it in the following terms:</p> + + <p>'There are some things in Mr. Leibniz's hypothesis that are liable to + some difficulties, though they show the great extent of his genius. He + will have it, for example, that the soul of a dog acts independently of + outward bodies; that <i>it stands upon its own bottom, by a perfect + </i>spontaneity<i> with respect to itself, and yet with a perfect + </i>conformity<i> to outward things</i>.... That <i>its internal + perceptions arise from its original constitution, that is to say, the + representative constitution (capable of expressing beings outside itself + in relation to its organs) which was bestowed upon it from the time of + its creation, and makes its individual character</i> (<i>Journal des + Savants</i>, 4 July 1695). From whence it results that it would feel + hunger and thirst at such and such an hour, though there were not any one + body in the universe, and <i>though nothing should exist but God and that + soul</i>. He has explained (<i>Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants</i>, + Feb. 1696) his thought by the example of two pendulums that should + perfectly agree: that is, he supposes that according to the particular + laws which put the soul upon <!-- Page 36 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page36"></a>[36]</span> action, it must feel hunger at such an + hour; and that according to the particular laws which direct the motion + of matter, the body which is united to that soul must be modified at that + same hour as it is modified when the soul is hungry. I will forbear + preferring this system to that of occasional causes till the learned + author has perfected it. I cannot apprehend the connexion of internal and + spontaneous actions which would have this effect, that the soul of a dog + would feel pain immediately after having felt joy, though it were alone + in the universe. I understand why a dog passes immediately from pleasure + to pain when, being very hungry and eating a piece of bread, he is + suddenly struck with a cudgel. But I cannot apprehend that his soul + should be so framed that at the very moment of his being beaten he should + feel pain though he were not beaten, and though he should continue to eat + bread without any trouble or hindrance. Nor do I see how the spontaneity + of that soul should be consistent with the sense of pain, and in general + with any unpleasing perceptions.</p> + + <p>'Besides, the reason why this learned man does not like the Cartesian + system seems to me to be a false supposition; for it cannot be said that + the system of occasional causes brings in God acting by a miracle + (ibid.), <i>Deum ex machina</i>, in the mutual dependency of the body and + soul: for since God does only intervene according to general laws, he + cannot be said to act in an extraordinary manner. Does the internal and + active virtue communicated to the forms of bodies according to M. Leibniz + know the train of actions which it is to produce? By no means; for we + know by experience that we are ignorant whether we shall have such and + such perceptions in an hour's time. It were therefore necessary that the + forms should be directed by some internal principle in the production of + their acts. But this would be <i>Deus ex machina,</i> as much as in the + system of occasional causes. In fine, as he supposes with great reason + that all souls are simple and indivisible, it cannot be apprehended how + they can be compared with a pendulum, that is, how by their original + constitution they can diversify their operations by using the spontaneous + activity bestowed upon them by their Creator. It may clearly be conceived + that a simple being will always act in a uniform manner, if no external + cause hinders it. If it were composed of several pieces, as a machine, it + would act different ways, because the peculiar activity of each piece + might change every moment the progress of <!-- Page 37 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page37"></a>[37]</span> others; but how will you + find in a simple substance the cause of a change of operation?'</p> + + <p>Leibniz published a reply to Bayle in the <i>Histoire des Ouvrages des + Savants</i> for July 1698. As in all his references to Bayle, he is + studiously polite and repays compliment for compliment. The following are + perhaps the principal points of his answer.</p> + + <p>1. On the example of the dog:</p> + + <p>(<i>a</i>) How should it of itself change its sentiment, since + everything left to itself continues in the state in which it is? Because + the state may be a state of <i>change</i>, as in a moving body which, + unless hindered, continues to move. And such is the nature of simple + substances—they continue to evolve steadily.</p> + + <p>(<i>b</i>) Would it really feel as though beaten if it were not + beaten, since Leibniz says that the action of every substance takes place + as though nothing existed but God and itself? Leibniz replies that his + remark refers to the causality behind an action, not to the reasons for + it. The spontaneous action of the dog, which leads to the feeling of + pain, is only decreed to be what it is, for the reason that the dog is + part of a world of mutually reflecting substances, a world which also + includes the cudgel.</p> + + <p>(<i>c</i>) Why should the dog ever be displeased <i>spontaneously</i>? + Leibniz distinguishes the spontaneous from the voluntary: many things + occur in the mind, of itself, but not chosen by it.</p> + + <p>2. On Cartesianism and miracle:</p> + + <p>Cartesianism in the form of occasionalism <i>does</i> involve miracle, + for though God is said by it to act according to laws in conforming body + and mind to one another, he thereby causes them to act beyond their + natural capacities.</p> + + <p>3. On the problem, how can the simple act otherwise than + uniformly?</p> + + <p>Leibniz distinguishes: some uniform action is monotonous, but some is + not. A point moves uniformly in describing a parabola, for it constantly + fulfils the formula of the curve. But it does not move monotonously, for + the curve constantly varies. Such is the uniformity of the action of + simple substances.</p> + + <p>Bayle read this reply, and was pleased but not satisfied with it. In + the second edition of the dictionary, under the same article 'Rorarius', + he added the following note:</p> + + <p>'I declare first of all that I am very glad I have proposed some small + difficulties against the system of that great philosopher, <!-- Page 38 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page38"></a>[38]</span> since they have + occasioned some answers whereby that subject has been made clearer to me, + and which have given me a more distinct notion of what is most to be + admired in it. I look now upon that new system as an important conquest, + which enlarges the bounds of philosophy. We had only two hypotheses, that + of the Schools and that of the Cartesians: the one was a <i>way of + influence</i> of the body upon the soul and of the soul upon the body; + the other was a <i>way of assistance</i> or occasional causality. But + here is a new acquisition, a new hypothesis, which may be called, as Fr. + Lami styles it, a <i>way of pre-established harmony</i>. We are beholden + for it to M. Leibniz, and it is impossible to conceive anything that + gives us a nobler idea of the power and wisdom of the Author of all + things. This, together with the advantage of setting aside all notions of + a miraculous conduct, would engage me to prefer this new system to that + of the Cartesians, if I could conceive any possibility in the <i>way of + pre-established harmony</i>.</p> + + <p>'I desire the reader to take notice that though I confess that this + way removes all notions of a miraculous conduct, yet I do not retract + what I have said formerly, that the system of occasional causes does not + bring in God acting miraculously. (See M. Leibniz's article in + <i>Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants</i>, July 1698.) I am as much + persuaded as ever I was that an action cannot be said to be miraculous, + unless God produces it as an exception to the general laws; and that + everything of which he is immediately the author according to those laws + is distinct from a miracle properly so called. But being willing to cut + off from this dispute as many things as I possibly can, I consent it + should be said that the surest way of removing all notions that include a + miracle is to suppose that all created substances are actively the + immediate causes of the effects of nature. I will therefore lay aside + what I might reply to that part of M. Leibniz's answer.</p> + + <p>'I will also omit all objections which are not more contrary to his + opinion than to that of some other philosophers. I will not therefore + propose the difficulties that may be raised against the supposition that + a creature can receive from God the power of moving itself. They are + strong and almost unanswerable, but M. Leibniz's system does not lie more + open to them than that of the Aristotelians; nay, I do not know whether + the Cartesians would presume to say that God cannot communicate to our + souls a power of acting. If they say so, how can they own that Adam + sinned? <!-- Page 39 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page39"></a>[39]</span> And if they dare not say so they weaken the + arguments whereby they endeavour to prove that matter is not capable of + any activity. Nor do I believe that it is more difficult for M. Leibniz + than for the Cartesians or other philosophers, to free himself from the + objection of a fatal mechanism which destroys human liberty. Wherefore, + waiving this, I shall only speak of what is peculiar to the system of the + <i>pre-established harmony</i>.</p> + + <p>'I. My first observation shall be, that it raises the power and wisdom + of the divine art above everything that can be conceived. Fancy to + yourself a ship which, without having any sense or knowledge, and without + being directed by any created or uncreated being, has the power of moving + itself so seasonably as to have always the wind favourable, to avoid + currents and rocks, to cast anchor where it ought to be done, and to + retire into a harbour precisely when it is necessary. Suppose such a ship + sails in that manner for several years successively, being always turned + and situated as it ought to be, according to the several changes of the + air and the different situations of seas and lands; you will acknowledge + that God, notwithstanding his infinite power, cannot communicate such a + faculty to a ship; or rather you will say that the nature of a ship is + not capable of receiving it from God. And yet what M. Leibniz supposes + about the machine of a human body is more admirable and more surprising + than all this. Let us apply his system concerning the union of the soul + with the body to the person of Julius Caesar.</p> + + <p>'II. We must say according to this system that the body of Julius + Caesar did so exercise its moving faculty that from its birth to its + death it went through continual changes which did most exactly answer the + perpetual changes of a certain soul which it did not know and which made + no impression on it. We must say that the rule according to which that + faculty of Caesar's body performed such actions was such, that he would + have gone to the Senate upon such a day and at such an hour, that he + would have spoken there such and such words, etc., though God had willed + to annihilate his soul the next day after it was created. We must say + that this moving power did change and modify itself exactly according to + the volubility of the thoughts of that ambitious man, and that it was + affected precisely in a certain manner rather than in another, because + the soul of Caesar passed from a certain thought to another. Can a blind + power modify itself so exactly <!-- Page 40 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page40"></a>[40]</span> by virtue of an impression communicated + thirty or forty years before and never renewed since, but left to itself, + without ever knowing what it is to do? Is not this much more + incomprehensible than the navigation I spoke of in the foregoing + paragraph?</p> + + <p>'III. The difficulty will be greater still, if it be considered that + the human machine contains an almost infinite number of organs, and that + it is continually exposed to the shock of the bodies that surround it,<a + name="NtA_1" href="#Nt_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> and which by an innumerable + variety of shakings produce in it a thousand sorts of modifications. How + is it possible to conceive that this <i>pre-established harmony</i> + should never be disordered, but go on still during the longest life of a + man, notwithstanding the infinite varieties of the reciprocal action of + so many organs upon one another, which are surrounded on all sides with + infinite corpuscles, sometimes hot and sometimes cold, sometimes dry and + sometimes moist, and always acting, and pricking the nerves a thousand + different ways? Suppose that the multiplicity of organs and of external + agents be a necessary instrument of the almost infinite variety of + changes in a human body: will that variety have the exactness here + required? Will it never disturb the correspondence of those changes with + the changes of the soul? This seems to be altogether impossible.</p> + +<div class="note"> + <p><a name="Nt_1" href="#NtA_1">[1]</a> 'According to M. Leibniz what is + active in every substance ought to be reduced to a true unity. Since + therefore the body of every man is composed of several substances, each + of them ought to have a principle of action really distinct from the + principle of each of the others. He will have the action of every + principle to be spontaneous. Now this must vary the effects <i>ad + infinitum</i>, and confound them. For the impression of the neighbouring + bodies must needs put some constraint upon the natural spontaneity of + every one of them.'</p> + +</div> + <p>'IV. It is in vain to have recourse to the power of God, in order to + maintain that brutes are mere machines; it is in vain to say that God was + able to make machines so artfully contrived that the voice of a man, the + reflected light of an object, etc., will strike them exactly where it is + necessary, that they may move in a given manner. This supposition is + rejected by everybody except some Cartesians; and no Cartesian would + admit it if it were to be extended to man; that is, if anyone were to + assert that God was able to form such bodies as would mechanically do + whatever we see other men do. By denying this we do not pretend to limit + the power and knowledge of God: we only mean that the nature of things + does not permit that the faculties imparted to a creature should not be + necessarily confined within certain bounds. The <!-- Page 41 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page41"></a>[41]</span> actions of creatures + must be necessarily proportioned to their essential state, and performed + according to the character belonging to each machine; for according to + the maxim of the philosophers, whatever is received is proportionate to + the capacity of the subject that receives it. We may therefore reject M. + Leibniz's hypothesis as being impossible, since it is liable to greater + difficulties than that of the Cartesians, which makes beasts to be mere + machines. It puts a perpetual harmony between two beings, which do not + act one upon another; whereas if servants were mere machines, and should + punctually obey their masters' command, it could not be said that they do + it without a real action of their masters upon them; for their masters + would speak words and make signs which would really shake and move the + organs of the servants.</p> + + <p>'V. Now let us consider the soul of Julius Caesar, and we shall find + the thing more impossible still. That soul was in the world without being + exposed to the influence of any spirit. The power it received from God + was the only principle of the actions it produced at every moment: and if + those actions were different one from another, it was not because some of + them were produced by the united influence of some springs which did not + contribute to the production of others, for the soul of man is simple, + indivisible and immaterial. M. Leibniz owns it; and if he did not + acknowledge it, but if, on the contrary, he should suppose with most + philosophers and some of the most excellent metaphysicians of our age + (Mr. Locke, for instance) that a compound of several material parts + placed and disposed in a certain manner, is capable of thinking, his + hypothesis would appear to be on that very ground absolutely impossible, + and I could refute it several other ways; which I need not mention since + he acknowledges the immateriality of our soul and builds upon it.</p> + + <p>'Let us return to the soul of Julius Caesar, and call it an immaterial + automaton (M. Leibniz's own phrase), and compare it with an atom of + Epicurus; I mean an atom surrounded with a vacuum on all sides, and which + will never meet any other atom. This is a very just comparison: for this + atom, on the one hand, has a natural power of moving itself and exerts it + without any assistance, and without being retarded or hindered by + anything: and, on the other hand, the soul of Caesar is a spirit which + has received the faculty of producing thoughts, and exerts it without + <!-- Page 42 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page42"></a>[42]</span> + the influence of any other spirit or of any body. It is neither assisted + nor thwarted by anything whatsoever. If you consult the common notions + and the ideas of order, you will find that this atom can never stop, and + that having been in motion in the foregoing moment, it will continue in + it at the present moment and in all the moments that shall follow, and + that it will always move in the same manner. This is the consequence of + an axiom approved by M. Leibniz: <i>since a thing does always remain in + the same state wherein it happens to be, unless it receives some + alteration from some other thing ... we conclude</i>, says he, <i>not + only that a body which is at rest will always be at rest, but that a body + in motion will always keep that motion or change, that is, the same + swiftness and the same direction, unless something happens to hinder + it</i>. (M. Leibniz, ibid.)</p> + + <p>'Everyone clearly sees that this atom, whether it moves by an innate + power, as Democritus and Epicurus would have it, or by a power received + from the Creator, will always move in the same line equally and after a + uniform manner, without ever turning or going back. Epicurus was laughed + at, when he invented the motion of declination; it was a needless + supposition, which he wanted in order to get out of the labyrinth of a + fatal necessity; and he could give no reason for this new part of his + system. It was inconsistent with the clearest notions of our minds: for + it is evident that an atom which describes a straight line for the space + of two days cannot turn away at the beginning of a third, unless it meets + with some obstacle, or has a mind all of a sudden to go out of its road, + or contains some spring which begins to play at that very moment. The + first of these reasons cannot be admitted in a vacuum. The second is + impossible, since an atom has not the faculty of thinking. And the third + is likewise impossible in a corpuscle that is a perfect unity. I must + make some use of all this.</p> + + <p>'VI. Caesar's soul is a being to which unity belongs in a strict + sense. The faculty of producing thoughts is a property of its nature (so + M. Leibniz), which it has received from God, both as to possession and + exercise. If the first thought it produces is a sense of pleasure, there + is no reason why the second should not likewise be a sense of pleasure; + for when the total cause of an effect remains the same, the effect cannot + be altered. Now this soul, at the second moment of its existence, does + not receive a new faculty of thinking; it only preserves the faculty it + had at the first moment, and it is as independent of the concourse of any + other cause at the second <!-- Page 43 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page43"></a>[43]</span> moment as it was at the first. It must + therefore produce again at the second moment the same thought it had + produced just before. If it be objected that it ought to be in a state of + change, and that it would not be in such a state, in the case that I have + supposed; I answer that its change will be like the change of the atom; + for an atom which continually moves in the same line acquires a new + situation at every moment, but it is like the preceding situation. A soul + may therefore continue in its state of change, if it does but produce a + new thought like the preceding.</p> + + <p>'But suppose it to be not confined within such narrow bounds; it must + be granted at least that its going from one thought to another implies + some reason of affinity. If I suppose that in a certain moment the soul + of Caesar sees a tree with leaves and blossoms, I can conceive that it + does immediately desire to see one that has only leaves, and then one + that has only blossoms, and that it will thus successively produce + several images arising from one another; but one cannot conceive the odd + change of thoughts, which have no affinity with, but are even contrary + to, one another, and which are so common in men's souls. One cannot + apprehend how God could place in the soul of Julius Caesar the principle + of what I am going to say. He was without doubt pricked with a pin more + than once, when he was sucking; and therefore according to M. Leibniz's + hypothesis which I am here considering, his soul must have produced in + itself a sense of pain immediately after the pleasant sensations of the + sweetness of the milk, which it had enjoyed for the space of two or three + minutes. By what springs was it determined to interrupt its pleasures and + to give itself all of a sudden a sense of pain, without receiving any + intimation of preparing itself to change, and without any new alteration + in its substance? If you run over the life of that Roman emperor, every + page will afford you matter for a stronger objection than this is.</p> + + <p>'VII. The thing would be less incomprehensible if it were supposed + that the soul of man is not one spirit but rather a multitude of spirits, + each of which has its functions, that begin and end precisely as the + changes made in a human body require. By virtue of this supposition it + should be said that something analogous to a great number of wheels and + springs, or of matters that ferment, disposed according to the changes of + our machine, awakens or lulls asleep for a certain time the action of + each of those spirits. But then the soul of man would be no longer a + single substance <!-- Page 44 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page44"></a>[44]</span> but an <i>ens per aggregationem</i>, a + collection and heap of substances just like all material beings. We are + here in quest of a single being, which produces in itself sometimes joy, + sometimes pain, etc., and not of many beings, one of which produces hope, + another despair, etc.</p> + + <p>'In these observations I have merely cleared and unfolded those which + M. Leibniz has done me the honour to examine: and now I shall make some + reflexions upon his answers.</p> + + <p>'VIII. He says (ibid., p. 332) that <i>the law of the change which + happens in the substance of the animal transports him from pleasure to + pain at the very moment that a solution of continuity is made in his + body; because the law of the indivisible substance of that animal is to + represent what is done in his body as we experience it, and even to + represent in some manner, and with respect to that body, whatever is done + in the world</i>. These words are a very good explication of the grounds + of this system; they are, as it were, the unfolding and key of it; but at + the same time they are the very things at which the objections of those + who take this system to be impossible are levelled. The law M. Leibniz + speaks of supposes a decree of God, and shows wherein this system agrees + with that of occasional causes. Those two systems agree in this point, + that there are laws according to which the soul of man is <i>to represent + what is done in the body of man, as we experience it</i>. But they + disagree as to the manner of executing those laws. The Cartesians say + that God executes them; M. Leibniz will have it, that the soul itself + does it; which appears to me impossible, because the soul has not the + necessary instruments for such an execution. Now however infinite the + power and knowledge of God be, he cannot perform with a machine deprived + of a certain piece, what requires the concourse of such a piece. He must + supply that defect; but then the effect would be produced by him and not + by the machine. I shall show that the soul has not the instruments + requisite for the divine law we speak of, and in order to do it I shall + make use of a comparison.</p> + + <p>'Fancy to yourself an animal created by God and designed to sing + continually. It will always sing, that is most certain; but if God + designs him a certain tablature, he must necessarily either put it before + his eyes or imprint it upon his memory or dispose his muscles in such a + manner that according to the laws of mechanism one certain note will + always come after another, agreeably to the order of the tablature. + Without this one cannot apprehend <!-- Page 45 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page45"></a>[45]</span> that the animal can + always follow the whole set of the notes appointed him by God. Let us + apply this to man's soul. M. Leibniz will have it that it has received + not only the power of producing thoughts continually, but also the + faculty of following always a certain set of thoughts, which answers the + continual changes that happen in the machine of the body. This set of + thoughts is like the tablature prescribed to the singing animal above + mentioned. Can the soul change its perceptions or modifications at every + moment according to such a set of thoughts, without knowing the series of + the notes, and actually thinking upon them? But experience teaches us + that it knows nothing of it. Were it not at least necessary that in + default of such a knowledge, there should be in the soul a set of + particular instruments, each of which would be a necessary cause of such + and such a thought? Must they not be so placed and disposed as to operate + precisely one after another, according to the correspondence + <i>pre-established</i> between the changes of the body and the thoughts + of the soul? but it is most certain that an immaterial simple and + indivisible substance cannot be made up of such an innumerable multitude + of particular instruments placed one before another, according to the + order of the tablature in question. It is not therefore possible that a + human soul should execute that law.</p> + + <p>'M. Leibniz supposes that the soul does not distinctly know its future + perceptions, <i>but that it perceives them confusedly</i>, and that + <i>there are in each substance traces of whatever hath happened, or shall + happen to it: but that an infinite multitude of perceptions hinders us + from distinguishing them. The present state of each substance is a + natural consequence of its preceding state. The soul, though never so + simple, has always a sentiment composed of several perceptions at one + time: which answers our end as well as though it were composed of pieces, + like a machine. For each foregoing perception has an influence on those + that follow agreeably to a law of order, which is in perceptions as well + as in motions...The perceptions that are together in one and the same + soul at the same time, including an infinite multitude of little and + indistinguishable sentiments that are to be unfolded, we need not wonder + at the infinite variety of what is to result from it in time. This is + only a consequence of the representative nature of the soul, which is, to + express what happens and what will happen in its body, by the connexion + and correspondence of all the parts of the world</i>. I have but little + to say in answer to this: I shall only observe that this supposition when + sufficiently cleared is the right way of solving all <!-- Page 46 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page46"></a>[46]</span> the + difficulties. M. Leibniz, through the penetration of his great genius, + has very well conceived the extent and strength of this objection, and + what remedy ought to be applied to the main inconveniency. I do not doubt + but that he will smooth the rough parts of his system, and teach us some + excellent things about the nature of spirits. Nobody can travel more + usefully or more safely than he in the intellectual world. I hope that + his curious explanations will remove all the impossibilities which I have + hitherto found in his system, and that he will solidly remove my + difficulties, as well as those of Father Lami. And these hopes made me + say before, without designing to pass a compliment upon that learned man, + that his system ought to be looked upon as an important conquest.</p> + + <p>'He will not be much embarrassed by this, viz. that whereas according + to the supposition of the Cartesians there is but one general law for the + union of spirits and bodies, he will have it that God gives a particular + law to each spirit; from whence it seems to result that the primitive + constitution of each spirit is specifically different from all others. Do + not the Thomists say, that there are as many species as individuals in + angelic nature?'</p> + + <p>Leibniz acknowledged Bayle's note in a further reply, which is written + as though for publication. It was communicated to Bayle, but it was not + in fact published. It is dated 1702. It may be found in the standard + collections of Leibniz's philosophical works. It reads almost like a + sketch for the <i>Theodicy</i>.</p> + + <p>The principal point developed by Leibniz is the richness of content + which, according to him, is to be found in each 'simple substance'. Its + simplicity is more like the infinitely rich simplicity of the divine + Being, than like the simplicity of the atom of Epicurus, with which Bayle + had chosen to compare it. It contains a condensation in confused idea of + the whole universe: and its essence is from the first defined by the part + it is to play in the total harmony.</p> + + <p>As to the musical score ('tablature of notes') which the individual + soul plays from, in order to perform its ordained part in the universal + harmony, this 'score' is to be found in the confused or implicit ideas at + any moment present, from which an omniscient observer could always deduce + what is to happen next. To the objection 'But the created soul is not an + omniscient observer, <!-- Page 47 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page47"></a>[47]</span> and if it cannot read the score, the score + is useless to it', Leibniz replies by affirming that much spontaneous + action arises from subjective and yet unperceived reasons, as we are all + perfectly aware, once we attend to the relevant facts. All he claims to + be doing is to generalize this observation. All events whatsoever arise + from the 'interpretation of the score' by monads, but very little of this + 'interpretation' is in the least conscious.</p> + + <p>Leibniz passes from the remarks about his own doctrine under the + article 'Rorarius' to other articles of Bayle's dictionary, and touches + the question of the origin of evil, and other matters which receive their + fuller treatment in the <i>Theodicy</i>.</p> + + <p>In the same year Leibniz wrote a very friendly letter to Bayle + himself, offering further explanations of disputed points. He concluded + it with a paragraph of some personal interest, comparing himself the + historian-philosopher with Bayle the philosophic lexicographer, and + revealing by the way his attitude to philosophy, science and history:</p> + + <p>'We have good reason to admire, Sir, the way in which your striking + reflexions on the deepest questions of philosophy remain unhindered by + your boundless researches into matters of fact. I too am not always able + to excuse myself from discussions of the sort, and have even been obliged + to descend to questions of genealogy, which would be still more trifling, + were it not that the interests of States frequently depend upon them. I + have worked much on the history of Germany in so far as it bears upon + these countries, a study which has furnished me with some observations + belonging to general history. So I have learnt not to neglect the + knowledge of sheer facts. But if the choice were open to me, I should + prefer natural history to political, and the customs and laws God has + established in nature, to what is observed among mankind.'</p> + + <p>Leibniz now conceived the idea of putting together all the passages in + Bayle's works which interested him, and writing a systematic answer to + them. Before he had leisure to finish the task, Bayle died. The work + nevertheless appeared in 1710 as the Essays in <i>Theodicy</i>.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 49 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page49"></a>[49]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>PREFACE</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p>It has ever been seen that men in general have resorted to outward + forms for the expression of their religion: sound piety, that is to say, + light and virtue, has never been the portion of the many. One should not + wonder at this, nothing is so much in accord with human weakness. We are + impressed by what is outward, while the inner essence of things requires + consideration of such a kind as few persons are fitted to give. As true + piety consists in principles and practice, the outward forms of religion + imitate these, and are of two kinds: the one kind consists in ceremonial + practices, and the other in the formularies of belief. Ceremonies + resemble virtuous actions, and formularies are like shadows of the truth + and approach, more or less, the true light. All these outward forms would + be commendable if those who invented them had rendered them appropriate + to maintain and to express that which they imitate—if religious + ceremonies, ecclesiastical discipline, the rules of communities, human + laws were always like a hedge round the divine law, to withdraw us from + any approach to vice, to inure us to the good and to make us familiar + with virtue. That was the aim of Moses and of other good lawgivers, of + the wise men who founded religious orders, and above all of Jesus Christ, + divine founder of the purest and most enlightened religion. It is just + the same with the formularies of <!-- Page 50 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page50"></a>[50]</span> belief: they would be valid provided there + were nothing in them inconsistent with truth unto salvation, even though + the full truth concerned were not there. But it happens only too often + that religion is choked in ceremonial, and that the divine light is + obscured by the opinions of men.</p> + + <p>The pagans, who inhabited the earth before Christianity was founded, + had only one kind of outward form: they had ceremonies in their worship, + but they had no articles of faith and had never dreamed of drawing up + formularies for their dogmatic theology. They knew not whether their gods + were real persons or symbols of the forces of Nature, as the sun, the + planets, the elements. Their mysteries consisted not in difficult dogmas + but in certain secret observances, whence the profane, namely those who + were not initiated, were excluded. These observances were very often + ridiculous and absurd, and it was necessary to conceal them in order to + guard them against contempt. The pagans had their superstitions: they + boasted of miracles, everything with them was full of oracles, auguries, + portents, divinations; the priests invented signs of the anger or of the + goodness of the gods, whose interpreters they claimed to be. This tended + to sway minds through fear and hope concerning human events; but the + great future of another life was scarce envisaged; one did not trouble to + impart to men true notions of God and of the soul.</p> + + <p>Of all ancient peoples, it appears that the Hebrews alone had public + dogmas for their religion. Abraham and Moses established the belief in + one God, source of all good, author of all things. The Hebrews speak of + him in a manner worthy of the Supreme Substance; and one wonders at + seeing the inhabitants of one small region of the earth more enlightened + than the rest of the human race. Peradventure the wise men of other + nations have sometimes said the same, but they have not had the good + fortune to find a sufficient following and to convert the dogma into law. + Nevertheless Moses had not inserted in his laws the doctrine of the + immortality of souls: it was consistent with his ideas, it was taught by + oral tradition; but it was not proclaimed for popular acceptance until + Jesus Christ lifted the veil, and, without having force in his hand, + taught with all the force of a lawgiver that immortal souls pass into + another life, wherein they shall receive the wages of their deeds. Moses + had already expressed the beautiful conceptions of the greatness and the + goodness of God, whereto many civilized <!-- Page 51 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page51"></a>[51]</span> peoples to-day assent; + but Jesus Christ demonstrated fully the results of these ideas, + proclaiming that divine goodness and justice are shown forth to + perfection in God's designs for the souls of men.</p> + + <p>I refrain from considering here the other points of the Christian + doctrine, and I will show only how Jesus Christ brought about the + conversion of natural religion into law, and gained for it the authority + of a public dogma. He alone did that which so many philosophers had + endeavoured in vain to do; and Christians having at last gained the upper + hand in the Roman Empire, the master of the greater part of the known + earth, the religion of the wise men became that of the nations. Later + also Mahomet showed no divergence from the great dogmas of natural + theology: his followers spread them abroad even among the most remote + races of Asia and of Africa, whither Christianity had not been carried; + and they abolished in many countries heathen superstitions which were + contrary to the true doctrine of the unity of God and the immortality of + souls.</p> + + <p>It is clear that Jesus Christ, completing what Moses had begun, wished + that the Divinity should be the object not only of our fear and + veneration but also of our love and devotion. Thus he made men happy by + anticipation, and gave them here on earth a foretaste of future felicity. + For there is nothing so agreeable as loving that which is worthy of love. + Love is that mental state which makes us take pleasure in the perfections + of the object of our love, and there is nothing more perfect than God, + nor any greater delight than in him. To love him it suffices to + contemplate his perfections, a thing easy indeed, because we find the + ideas of these within ourselves. The perfections of God are those of our + souls, but he possesses them in boundless measure; he is an Ocean, + whereof to us only drops have been granted; there is in us some power, + some knowledge, some goodness, but in God they are all in their entirety. + Order, proportions, harmony delight us; painting and music are samples of + these: God is all order; he always keeps truth of proportions, he makes + universal harmony; all beauty is an effusion of his rays.</p> + + <p>It follows manifestly that true piety and even true felicity consist + in the love of God, but a love so enlightened that its fervour is + attended by insight. This kind of love begets that pleasure in good + actions which gives relief to virtue, and, relating all to God as to the + centre, transports the human to the divine. For in doing <!-- Page 52 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page52"></a>[52]</span> one's duty, in + obeying reason, one carries out the orders of Supreme Reason. One directs + all one's intentions to the common good, which is no other than the glory + of God. Thus one finds that there is no greater individual interest than + to espouse that of the community, and one gains satisfaction for oneself + by taking pleasure in the acquisition of true benefits for men. Whether + one succeeds therein or not, one is content with what comes to pass, + being once resigned to the will of God and knowing that what he wills is + best. But before he declares his will by the event one endeavours to find + it out by doing that which appears most in accord with his commands. When + we are in this state of mind, we are not disheartened by ill success, we + regret only our faults; and the ungrateful ways of men cause no + relaxation in the exercise of our kindly disposition. Our charity is + humble and full of moderation, it presumes not to domineer; attentive + alike to our own faults and to the talents of others, we are inclined to + criticize our own actions and to excuse and vindicate those of others. We + must work out our own perfection and do wrong to no man. There is no + piety where there is not charity; and without being kindly and beneficent + one cannot show sincere religion.</p> + + <p>Good disposition, favourable upbringing, association with pious and + virtuous persons may contribute much towards such a propitious condition + for our souls; but most securely are they grounded therein by good + principles. I have already said that insight must be joined to fervour, + that the perfecting of our understanding must accomplish the perfecting + of our will. The practices of virtue, as well as those of vice, may be + the effect of a mere habit, one may acquire a taste for them; but when + virtue is reasonable, when it is related to God, who is the supreme + reason of things, it is founded on knowledge. One cannot love God without + knowing his perfections, and this knowledge contains the principles of + true piety. The purpose of religion should be to imprint these principles + upon our souls: but in some strange way it has happened all too often + that men, that teachers of religion have strayed far from this purpose. + Contrary to the intention of our divine Master, devotion has been reduced + to ceremonies and doctrine has been cumbered with formulae. All too often + these ceremonies have not been well fitted to maintain the exercise of + virtue, and the formulae sometimes have not been lucid. Can one believe + it? Some Christians have imagined that they could be <!-- Page 53 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page53"></a>[53]</span> devout without + loving their neighbour, and pious without loving God; or else people have + thought that they could love their neighbour without serving him and + could love God without knowing him. Many centuries have passed without + recognition of this defect by the people at large; and there are still + great traces of the reign of darkness. There are divers persons who speak + much of piety, of devotion, of religion, who are even busied with the + teaching of such things, and who yet prove to be by no means versed in + the divine perfections. They ill understand the goodness and the justice + of the Sovereign of the universe; they imagine a God who deserves neither + to be imitated nor to be loved. This indeed seemed to me dangerous in its + effect, since it is of serious moment that the very source of piety + should be preserved from infection. The old errors of those who arraigned + the Divinity or who made thereof an evil principle have been renewed + sometimes in our own days: people have pleaded the irresistible power of + God when it was a question rather of presenting his supreme goodness; and + they have assumed a despotic power when they should rather have conceived + of a power ordered by the most perfect wisdom. I have observed that these + opinions, apt to do harm, rested especially on confused notions which had + been formed concerning freedom, necessity and destiny; and I have taken + up my pen more than once on such an occasion to give explanations on + these important matters. But finally I have been compelled to gather up + my thoughts on all these connected questions, and to impart them to the + public. It is this that I have undertaken in the Essays which I offer + here, on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of + Evil.</p> + + <p>There are two famous labyrinths where our reason very often goes + astray: one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, + above all in the production and the origin of Evil; the other consists in + the discussion of continuity and of the indivisibles which appear to be + the elements thereof, and where the consideration of the infinite must + enter in. The first perplexes almost all the human race, the other + exercises philosophers only. I shall have perchance at another time an + opportunity to declare myself on the second, and to point out that, for + lack of a true conception of the nature of substance and matter, people + have taken up false positions leading to insurmountable difficulties, + difficulties which should properly be applied to the overthrow of these + very <!-- Page 54 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page54"></a>[54]</span> positions. But if the knowledge of + continuity is important for speculative enquiry, that of necessity is + none the less so for practical application; and it, together with the + questions therewith connected, to wit, the freedom of man and the justice + of God, forms the object of this treatise.</p> + + <p>Men have been perplexed in well-nigh every age by a sophism which the + ancients called the 'Lazy Reason', because it tended towards doing + nothing, or at least towards being careful for nothing and only following + inclination for the pleasure of the moment. For, they said, if the future + is necessary, that which must happen will happen, whatever I may do. Now + the future (so they said) is necessary, whether because the Divinity + foresees everything, and even pre-establishes it by the control of all + things in the universe; or because everything happens of necessity, + through the concatenation of causes; or finally, through the very nature + of truth, which is determinate in the assertions that can be made on + future events, as it is in all assertions, since the assertion must + always be true or false in itself, even though we know not always which + it is. And all these reasons for determination which appear different + converge finally like lines upon one and the same centre; for there is a + truth in the future event which is predetermined by the causes, and God + pre-establishes it in establishing the causes.</p> + + <p>The false conception of necessity, being applied in practice, has + given rise to what I call <i>Fatum Mahometanum</i>, fate after the + Turkish fashion, because it is said of the Turks that they do not shun + danger or even abandon places infected with plague, owing to their use of + such reasoning as that just recorded. For what is called <i>Fatum + Stoicum</i> was not so black as it is painted: it did not divert men from + the care of their affairs, but it tended to give them tranquillity in + regard to events, through the consideration of necessity, which renders + our anxieties and our vexations needless. In which respect these + philosophers were not far removed from the teaching of our Lord, who + deprecates these anxieties in regard to the morrow, comparing them with + the needless trouble a man would give himself in labouring to increase + his stature.</p> + + <p>It is true that the teachings of the Stoics (and perhaps also of some + famous philosophers of our time), confining themselves to this alleged + necessity, can only impart a forced patience; whereas our Lord inspires + thoughts more sublime, and even instructs us in the means of gaining + contentment by assuring us that since God, <!-- Page 55 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page55"></a>[55]</span> being altogether good + and wise, has care for everything, even so far as not to neglect one hair + of our head, our confidence in him ought to be entire. And thus we should + see, if we were capable of understanding him, that it is not even + possible to wish for anything better (as much in general as for + ourselves) than what he does. It is as if one said to men: Do your duty + and be content with that which shall come of it, not only because you + cannot resist divine providence, or the nature of things (which may + suffice for tranquillity, but not for contentment), but also because you + have to do with a good master. And that is what may be called <i>Fatum + Christianum</i>.</p> + + <p>Nevertheless it happens that most men, and even Christians, introduce + into their dealings some mixture of fate after the Turkish fashion, + although they do not sufficiently acknowledge it. It is true that they + are not inactive or negligent when obvious perils or great and manifest + hopes present themselves; for they will not fail to abandon a house that + is about to fall and to turn aside from a precipice they see in their + path; and they will burrow in the earth to dig up a treasure half + uncovered, without waiting for fate to finish dislodging it. But when the + good or the evil is remote and uncertain and the remedy painful or little + to our taste, the lazy reason seems to us to be valid. For example, when + it is a question of preserving one's health and even one's life by good + diet, people to whom one gives advice thereupon very often answer that + our days are numbered and that it avails nothing to try to struggle + against that which God destines for us. But these same persons run to + even the most absurd remedies when the evil they had neglected draws + near. One reasons in somewhat the same way when the question for + consideration is somewhat thorny, as for instance when one asks oneself, + <i>quod vitae sectabor iter</i>? what profession one must choose; when it + is a question of a marriage being arranged, of a war being undertaken, of + a battle being fought; for in these cases many will be inclined to evade + the difficulty of consideration and abandon themselves to fate or to + inclination, as if reason should not be employed except in easy cases. + One will then all too often reason in the Turkish fashion (although this + way is wrongly termed trusting in providence, a thing that in reality + occurs only when one has done one's duty) and one will employ the lazy + reason, derived from the idea of inevitable fate, to relieve oneself of + the need to reason properly. <!-- Page 56 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page56"></a>[56]</span> One will thus overlook the fact that if + this argument contrary to the practice of reason were valid, it would + always hold good, whether the consideration were easy or not. This + laziness is to some extent the source of the superstitious practices of + fortune-tellers, which meet with just such credulity as men show towards + the philosopher's stone, because they would fain have short cuts to the + attainment of happiness without trouble.</p> + + <p>I do not speak here of those who throw themselves upon fortune because + they have been happy before, as if there were something permanent + therein. Their argument from the past to the future has just as slight a + foundation as the principles of astrology and of other kinds of + divination. They overlook the fact that there is usually an ebb and flow + in fortune, <i>una marea</i>, as Italians playing basset are wont to call + it. With regard to this they make their own particular observations, + which I would, nevertheless, counsel none to trust too much. Yet this + confidence that people have in their fortune serves often to give courage + to men, and above all to soldiers, and causes them to have indeed that + good fortune they ascribe to themselves. Even so do predictions often + cause that to happen which has been foretold, as it is supposed that the + opinion the Mahometans hold on fate makes them resolute. Thus even errors + have their use at times, but generally as providing a remedy for other + errors: and truth is unquestionably better.</p> + + <p>But it is taking an unfair advantage of this alleged necessity of fate + to employ it in excuse for our vices and our libertinism. I have often + heard it said by smart young persons, who wished to play the freethinker, + that it is useless to preach virtue, to censure vice, to create hopes of + reward and fears of punishment, since it may be said of the book of + destiny, that what is written is written, and that our behaviour can + change nothing therein. Thus, they would say, it were best to follow + one's inclination, dwelling only upon such things as may content us in + the present. They did not reflect upon the strange consequences of this + argument, which would prove too much, since it would prove (for instance) + that one should take a pleasant beverage even though one knows it is + poisoned. For the same reason (if it were valid) I could say: if it is + written in the records of the Parcae that poison will kill me now or will + do me harm, this will happen even though I were not to take this + beverage; and if this is not written, it will not happen even though I + should take this same beverage; consequently I shall be <!-- Page 57 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page57"></a>[57]</span> able to follow + with impunity my inclination to take what is pleasing, however injurious + it may be; the result of which reasoning is an obvious absurdity. This + objection disconcerted them a little, but they always reverted to their + argument, phrased in different ways, until they were brought to + understand where the fault of the sophism lies. It is untrue that the + event happens whatever one may do: it will happen because one does what + leads thereto; and if the event is written beforehand, the cause that + will make it happen is written also. Thus the connexion of effects and + causes, so far from establishing the doctrine of a necessity detrimental + to conduct, serves to overthrow it.</p> + + <p>Yet, without having evil intentions inclined towards libertinism, one + may envisage differently the strange consequences of an inevitable + necessity, considering that it would destroy the freedom of the will, so + essential to the morality of action: for justice and injustice, praise + and blame, punishment and reward cannot attach to necessary actions, and + nobody will be under obligation to do the impossible or to abstain from + doing what is absolutely necessary. Without any intention of abusing this + consideration in order to favour irregularity, one will nevertheless not + escape embarrassment sometimes, when it comes to a question of judging + the actions of others, or rather of answering objections, amongst which + there are some even concerned with the actions of God, whereof I will + speak presently. And as an insuperable necessity would open the door to + impiety, whether through the impunity one could thence infer or the + hopelessness of any attempt to resist a torrent that sweeps everything + along with it, it is important to note the different degrees of + necessity, and to show that there are some which cannot do harm, as there + are others which cannot be admitted without giving rise to evil + consequences.</p> + + <p>Some go even further: not content with using the pretext of necessity + to prove that virtue and vice do neither good nor ill, they have the + hardihood to make the Divinity accessary to their licentious way of life, + and they imitate the pagans of old, who ascribed to the gods the cause of + their crimes, as if a divinity drove them to do evil. The philosophy of + Christians, which recognizes better than that of the ancients the + dependence of things upon the first Author and his co-operation with all + the actions of creatures, appears to have increased this difficulty. Some + able men in our own time have gone so far as to deny all <!-- Page 58 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page58"></a>[58]</span> action to + creatures, and M. Bayle, who tended a little towards this extraordinary + opinion, made use of it to restore the lapsed dogma of the two + principles, or two gods, the one good, the other evil, as if this dogma + were a better solution to the difficulties over the origin of evil. Yet + again he acknowledges that it is an indefensible opinion and that the + oneness of the Principle is incontestably founded on <i>a priori</i> + reasons; but he wishes to infer that our Reason is confounded and cannot + meet her own objections, and that one should disregard them and hold fast + the revealed dogmas, which teach us the existence of one God altogether + good, altogether powerful and altogether wise. But many readers, + convinced of the irrefutable nature of his objections and believing them + to be at least as strong as the proofs for the truth of religion, would + draw dangerous conclusions.</p> + + <p>Even though there were no co-operation by God in evil actions, one + could not help finding difficulty in the fact that he foresees them and + that, being able to prevent them through his omnipotence, he yet permits + them. This is why some philosophers and even some theologians have rather + chosen to deny to God any knowledge of the detail of things and, above + all, of future events, than to admit what they believed repellent to his + goodness. The Socinians and Conrad Vorstius lean towards that side; and + Thomas Bonartes, an English Jesuit disguised under a pseudonym but + exceedingly learned, who wrote a book <i>De Concordia Scientiae cum + Fide</i>, of which I will speak later, appears to hint at this also.</p> + + <p>They are doubtless much mistaken; but others are not less so who, + convinced that nothing comes to pass save by the will and the power of + God, ascribe to him intentions and actions so unworthy of the greatest + and the best of all beings that one would say these authors have indeed + renounced the dogma which recognizes God's justice and goodness. They + thought that, being supreme Master of the universe, he could without any + detriment to his holiness cause sins to be committed, simply at his will + and pleasure, or in order that he might have the pleasure of punishing; + and even that he could take pleasure in eternally afflicting innocent + people without doing any injustice, because no one has the right or the + power to control his actions. Some even have gone so far as to say that + God acts thus indeed; and on the plea that we are as nothing in + comparison with him, they liken us to earthworms which men crush without + heeding as they walk, or in general to <!-- Page 59 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page59"></a>[59]</span> animals that are not of + our species and which we do not scruple to ill-treat.</p> + + <p>I believe that many persons otherwise of good intentions are misled by + these ideas, because they have not sufficient knowledge of their + consequences. They do not see that, properly speaking, God's justice is + thus overthrown. For what idea shall we form of such a justice as has + only will for its rule, that is to say, where the will is not guided by + the rules of good and even tends directly towards evil? Unless it be the + idea contained in that tyrannical definition by Thrasymachus in Plato, + which designated as <i>just</i> that which pleases the stronger. Such + indeed is the position taken up, albeit unwittingly, by those who rest + all obligation upon constraint, and in consequence take power as the + gauge of right. But one will soon abandon maxims so strange and so unfit + to make men good and charitable through the imitation of God. For one + will reflect that a God who would take pleasure in the misfortune of + others cannot be distinguished from the evil principle of the + Manichaeans, assuming that this principle had become sole master of the + universe; and that in consequence one must attribute to the true God + sentiments that render him worthy to be called the good Principle.</p> + + <p>Happily these extravagant dogmas scarce obtain any longer among + theologians. Nevertheless some astute persons, who are pleased to make + difficulties, revive them: they seek to increase our perplexity by + uniting the controversies aroused by Christian theology to the disputes + of philosophy. Philosophers have considered the questions of necessity, + of freedom and of the origin of evil; theologians have added thereto + those of original sin, of grace and of predestination. The original + corruption of the human race, coming from the first sin, appears to us to + have imposed a natural necessity to sin without the succour of divine + grace: but necessity being incompatible with punishment, it will be + inferred that a sufficient grace ought to have been given to all men; + which does not seem to be in conformity with experience.</p> + + <p>But the difficulty is great, above all, in relation to God's + dispositions for the salvation of men. There are few saved or chosen; + therefore the choice of many is not God's decreed will. And since it is + admitted that those whom he has chosen deserve it no more than the rest, + and are not even fundamentally less evil, the goodness which they have + coming only from the gift of God, the difficulty <!-- Page 60 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page60"></a>[60]</span> is increased. Where is, + then, his justice (people will say), or at the least, where is his + goodness? Partiality, or respect of persons, goes against justice, and he + who without cause sets bounds to his goodness cannot have it in + sufficient measure. It is true that those who are not chosen are lost by + their own fault: they lack good will or living faith; but it rested with + God alone to grant it them. We know that besides inward grace there are + usually outward circumstances which distinguish men, and that training, + conversation, example often correct or corrupt natural disposition. Now + that God should call forth circumstances favourable to some and abandon + others to experiences which contribute to their misfortune, will not that + give us cause for astonishment? And it is not enough (so it seems) to say + with some that inward grace is universal and equal for all. For these + same authors are obliged to resort to the exclamations of St. Paul, and + to say: 'O the depth!' when they consider how men are distinguished by + what we may call outward graces, that is, by graces appearing in the + diversity of circumstances which God calls forth, whereof men are not the + masters, and which have nevertheless so great an influence upon all that + concerns their salvation.</p> + + <p>Nor will it help us to say with St. Augustine that, all men being + involved in the damnation caused by the sin of Adam, God might have left + them all in their misery; and that thus his goodness alone induces him to + deliver some of them. For not only is it strange that the sin of another + should condemn anyone, but there still remains the question why God does + not deliver all—why he delivers the lesser number and why some in + preference to others. He is in truth their master, but he is a good and + just master; his power is absolute, but his wisdom permits not that he + exercise that power in an arbitrary and despotic way, which would be + tyrannous indeed.</p> + + <p>Moreover, the fall of the first man having happened only with God's + permission, and God having resolved to permit it only when once he had + considered its consequences, which are the corruption of the mass of the + human race and the choice of a small number of elect, with the + abandonment of all the rest, it is useless to conceal the difficulty by + limiting one's view to the mass already corrupt. One must, in spite of + oneself, go back to the knowledge of the consequences of the first sin, + preceding the decree whereby God permitted it, and whereby he permitted + simultaneously that <!-- Page 61 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page61"></a>[61]</span> the damned should be involved in the mass + of perdition and should not be delivered: for God and the sage make no + resolve without considering its consequences.</p> + + <p>I hope to remove all these difficulties. I will point out that + absolute necessity, which is called also logical and metaphysical and + sometimes geometrical, and which would alone be formidable in this + connexion, does not exist in free actions, and that thus freedom is + exempt not only from constraint but also from real necessity. I will show + that God himself, although he always chooses the best, does not act by an + absolute necessity, and that the laws of nature laid down by God, founded + upon the fitness of things, keep the mean between geometrical truths, + absolutely necessary, and arbitrary decrees; which M. Bayle and other + modern philosophers have not sufficiently understood. Further I will show + that there is an indifference in freedom, because there is no absolute + necessity for one course or the other; but yet that there is never an + indifference of perfect equipoise. And I will demonstrate that there is + in free actions a perfect spontaneity beyond all that has been conceived + hitherto. Finally I will make it plain that the hypothetical and the + moral necessity which subsist in free actions are open to no objection, + and that the 'Lazy Reason' is a pure sophism.</p> + + <p>Likewise concerning the origin of evil in its relation to God, I offer + a vindication of his perfections that shall extol not less his holiness, + his justice and his goodness than his greatness, his power and his + independence. I show how it is possible for everything to depend upon + God, for him to co-operate in all the actions of creatures, even, if you + will, to create these creatures continually, and nevertheless not to be + the author of sin. Here also it is demonstrated how the privative nature + of evil should be understood. Much more than that, I explain how evil has + a source other than the will of God, and that one is right therefore to + say of moral evil that God wills it not, but simply permits it. Most + important of all, however, I show that it has been possible for God to + permit sin and misery, and even to co-operate therein and promote it, + without detriment to his holiness and his supreme goodness: although, + generally speaking, he could have avoided all these evils.</p> + + <p>Concerning grace and predestination, I justify the most debatable + assertions, as for instance: that we are converted only <!-- Page 62 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page62"></a>[62]</span> through the + prevenient grace of God and that we cannot do good except with his aid; + that God wills the salvation of all men and that he condemns only those + whose will is evil; that he gives to all a sufficient grace provided they + wish to use it; that, Jesus Christ being the source and the centre of + election, God destined the elect for salvation, because he foresaw that + they would cling with a lively faith to the doctrine of Jesus Christ. Yet + it is true that this reason for election is not the final reason, and + that this very pre-vision is still a consequence of God's anterior + decree. Faith likewise is a gift of God, who has predestinated the faith + of the elect, for reasons lying in a superior decree which dispenses + grace and circumstance in accordance with God's supreme wisdom.</p> + + <p>Now, as one of the most gifted men of our time, whose eloquence was as + great as his acumen and who gave great proofs of his vast erudition, had + applied himself with a strange predilection to call attention to all the + difficulties on this subject which I have just touched in general, I + found a fine field for exercise in considering the question with him in + detail. I acknowledge that M. Bayle (for it is easy to see that I speak + of him) has on his side all the advantages except that of the root of the + matter, but I hope that truth (which he acknowledges himself to be on our + side) by its very plainness, and provided it be fittingly set forth, will + prevail over all the ornaments of eloquence and erudition. My hope for + success therein is all the greater because it is the cause of God I + plead, and because one of the maxims here upheld states that God's help + is never lacking for those that lack not good will. The author of this + discourse believes that he has given proof of this good will in the + attention he has brought to bear upon this subject. He has meditated upon + it since his youth; he has conferred with some of the foremost men of the + time; and he has schooled himself by the reading of good authors. And the + success which God has given him (according to the opinion of sundry + competent judges) in certain other profound meditations, of which some + have much influence on this subject, gives him peradventure some right to + claim the attention of readers who love truth and are fitted to search + after it.</p> + + <p>The author had, moreover, particular and weighty reasons inducing him + to take pen in hand for discussion of this subject. Conversations which + he had concerning the same with literary and court personages, in Germany + and in France, and especially <!-- Page 63 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page63"></a>[63]</span> with one of the greatest and most + accomplished of princesses, have repeatedly prompted him to this course. + He had had the honour of expressing his opinions to this Princess upon + divers passages of the admirable <i>Dictionary</i> of M. Bayle, wherein + religion and reason appear as adversaries, and where M. Bayle wishes to + silence reason after having made it speak too loud: which he calls the + triumph of faith. The present author declared there and then that he was + of a different opinion, but that he was nevertheless well pleased that a + man of such great genius had brought about an occasion for going deeply + into these subjects, subjects as important as they are difficult. He + admitted having examined them also for some long time already, and having + sometimes been minded to publish upon this matter some reflexions whose + chief aim should be such knowledge of God as is needed to awaken piety + and to foster virtue. This Princess exhorted and urged him to carry out + his long-cherished intention, and some friends added their persuasions. + He was all the more tempted to accede to their requests since he had + reason to hope that in the sequel to his investigation M. Bayle's genius + would greatly aid him to give the subject such illumination as it might + receive with his support. But divers obstacles intervened, and the death + of the incomparable Queen was not the least. It happened, however, that + M. Bayle was attacked by excellent men who set themselves to examine the + same subject; he answered them fully and always ingeniously. I followed + their dispute, and was even on the point of being involved therein. This + is how it came about.</p> + + <p>I had published a new system, which seemed well adapted to explain the + union of the soul and the body: it met with considerable applause even + from those who were not in agreement with it, and certain competent + persons testified that they had already been of my opinion, without + having reached so distinct an explanation, before they saw what I had + written on the matter. M. Bayle examined it in his <i>Historical and + Critical Dictionary</i>, article 'Rorarius'. He thought that my + expositions were worthy of further development; he drew attention to + their usefulness in various connexions, and he laid stress upon what + might still cause difficulty. I could not but reply in a suitable way to + expressions so civil and to reflexions so instructive as his. In order to + turn them to greater account, I published some elucidations in the + <i>Histoire des Ouvrages des Savants</i>, July 1698. M. Bayle replied to + them in the <!-- Page 64 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page64"></a>[64]</span> second edition of his <i>Dictionary</i>. I + sent him a rejoinder which has not yet been published; I know not whether + he ever made a further reply.</p> + + <p>Meanwhile it happened that M. le Clerc had inserted in his <i>Select + Library</i> an extract from the <i>Intellectual System</i> of the late + Mr. Cudworth, and had explained therein certain 'plastic natures' which + this admirable author applied to the formation of animals. M. Bayle + believed (see the continuation of <i>Divers Thoughts on the Comet</i>, + ch. 21, art. 11) that, these natures being without cognition, in + establishing them one weakened the argument which proves, through the + marvellous formation of things, that the universe must have an + intelligent Cause. M. le Clerc replied (4th art. of the 5th vol. of his + <i>Select Library</i>) that these natures required to be directed by + divine wisdom. M. Bayle insisted (7th article of the <i>Histoire des + Ouvrages des Savants</i>, August 1704) that direction alone was not + sufficient for a cause devoid of cognition, unless one took the cause to + be a mere instrument of God, in which case direction would be needless. + My system was touched upon in passing; and that gave me an opportunity to + send a short essay to the illustrious author of the <i>Histoire des + Ouvrages des Savants</i>, which he inserted in the month of May 1705, + art. 9. In this I endeavoured to make clear that in reality mechanism is + sufficient to produce the organic bodies of animals, without any need of + other plastic natures, provided there be added thereto the + <i>preformation</i> already completely organic in the seeds of the bodies + that come into existence, contained in those of the bodies whence they + spring, right back to the primary seeds. This could only proceed from the + Author of things, infinitely powerful and infinitely wise, who, creating + all in the beginning in due order, had <i>pre-established</i> there all + order and artifice that was to be. There is no chaos in the inward nature + of things, and there is organism everywhere in a matter whose disposition + proceeds from God. More and more of it would come to light if we pressed + closer our examination of the anatomy of bodies; and we should continue + to observe it even if we could go on to infinity, like Nature, and make + subdivision as continuous in our knowledge as Nature has made it in + fact.</p> + + <p>In order to explain this marvel of the formation of animals, I made + use of a Pre-established Harmony, that is to say, of the same means I had + used to explain another marvel, namely the <!-- Page 65 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page65"></a>[65]</span> correspondence of soul + with body, wherein I proved the uniformity and the fecundity of the + principles I had employed. It seems that this reminded M. Bayle of my + system of accounting for this correspondence, which he had examined + formerly. He declared (in chapter 180 of his <i>Reply to the Questions of + a Provincial</i>, vol. III, p. 1253) that he did not believe God could + give to matter or to any other cause the faculty of becoming organic + without communicating to it the idea and the knowledge of organic nature. + Also he was not yet disposed to believe that God, with all his power over + Nature and with all the foreknowledge which he has of the contingencies + that may arrive, could have so disposed things that by the laws of + mechanics alone a vessel (for instance) should go to its port of + destination without being steered during its passage by some intelligent + guide. I was surprised to see that limits were placed on the power of + God, without the adduction of any proof and without indication that there + was any contradiction to be feared on the side of the object or any + imperfection on God's side. Whereas I had shown before in my Rejoinder + that even men often produce through automata something like the movements + that come from reason, and that even a finite mind (but one far above + ours) could accomplish what M. Bayle thinks impossible to the Divinity. + Moreover, as God orders all things at once beforehand, the accuracy of + the path of this vessel would be no more strange than that of a fuse + passing along a cord in fireworks, since the whole disposition of things + preserves a perfect harmony between them by means of their influence one + upon the other.</p> + + <p>This declaration of M. Bayle pledged me to an answer. I therefore + purposed to point out to him, that unless it be said that God forms + organic bodies himself by a perpetual miracle, or that he has entrusted + this care to intelligences whose power and knowledge are almost divine, + we must hold the opinion that God <i>preformed</i> things in such sort + that new organisms are only a mechanical consequence of a preceding + organic constitution. Even so do butterflies come out of silkworms, an + instance where M. Swammerdam has shown that there is nothing but + development. And I would have added that nothing is better qualified than + the preformation of plants and of animals to confirm my System of + Pre-established Harmony between the soul and the body. For in this the + body is prompted by its original constitution to carry out with the help + of external things all that it does in accordance with the <!-- Page 66 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page66"></a>[66]</span> will of the + soul. So the seeds by their original constitution carry out naturally the + intentions of God, by an artifice greater still than that which causes + our body to perform everything in conformity with our will. And since M. + Bayle himself deems with reason that there is more artifice in the + organism of animals than in the most beautiful poem in the world or in + the most admirable invention whereof the human mind is capable, it + follows that my system of the connexion between the body and the soul is + as intelligible as the general opinion on the formation of animals. For + this opinion (which appears to me true) states in effect that the wisdom + of God has so made Nature that it is competent in virtue of its laws to + form animals; I explain this opinion and throw more light upon the + possibility of it through the system of preformation. Whereafter there + will be no cause for surprise that God has so made the body that by + virtue of its own laws it can carry out the intentions of the reasoning + soul: for all that the reasoning soul can demand of the body is less + difficult than the organization which God has demanded of the seeds. M. + Bayle says (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, ch. 182, p. + 1294) that it is only very recently there have been people who have + understood that the formation of living bodies cannot be a natural + process. This he could say also (in accordance with his principles) of + the communication between the soul and the body, since God effects this + whole communication in the system of occasional causes to which this + author subscribes. But I admit the supernatural here only in the + beginning of things, in respect of the first formation of animals or in + respect of the original constitution of pre-established harmony between + the soul and the body. Once that has come to pass, I hold that the + formation of animals and the relation between the soul and the body are + something as natural now as the other most ordinary operations of Nature. + A close parallel is afforded by people's ordinary thinking about the + instinct and the marvellous behaviour of brutes. One recognizes reason + there not in the brutes but in him who created them. I am, then, of the + general opinion in this respect; but I hope that my explanation will have + added clearness and lucidity, and even a more ample range, to that + opinion.</p> + + <p>Now when preparing to justify my system in face of the new + difficulties of M. Bayle, I purposed at the same time to communicate to + him the ideas which I had had for some time already, on <!-- Page 67 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page67"></a>[67]</span> the + difficulties put forward by him in opposition to those who endeavour to + reconcile reason with faith in regard to the existence of evil. Indeed, + there are perhaps few persons who have toiled more than I in this matter. + Hardly had I gained some tolerable understanding of Latin writings when I + had an opportunity of turning over books in a library. I flitted from + book to book, and since subjects for meditation pleased me as much as + histories and fables, I was charmed by the work of Laurentius Valla + against Boethius and by that of Luther against Erasmus, although I was + well aware that they had need of some mitigation. I did not omit books of + controversy, and amongst other writings of this nature the records of the + Montbéliard Conversation, which had revived the dispute, appeared to me + instructive. Nor did I neglect the teachings of our theologians: and the + study of their opponents, far from disturbing me, served to strengthen me + in the moderate opinions of the Churches of the Augsburg Confession. I + had opportunity on my journeys to confer with some excellent men of + different parties, for instance with Bishop Peter von Wallenburg, + Suffragan of Mainz, with Herr Johann Ludwig Fabricius, premier theologian + of Heidelberg, and finally with the celebrated M. Arnauld. To him I even + tendered a Latin Dialogue of my own composition upon this subject, about + the year 1673, wherein already I laid it down that God, having chosen the + most perfect of all possible worlds, had been prompted by his wisdom to + permit the evil which was bound up with it, but which still did not + prevent this world from being, all things considered, the best that could + be chosen. I have also since read many and various good authors on these + subjects, and I have endeavoured to make progress in the knowledge that + seems to me proper for banishing all that could have obscured the idea of + supreme perfection which must be acknowledged in God. I have not + neglected to examine the most rigorous authors, who have extended + furthest the doctrine of the necessity of things, as for instance Hobbes + and Spinoza, of whom the former advocated this absolute necessity not + only in his <i>Physical Elements</i> and elsewhere, but also in a special + book against Bishop Bramhall. And Spinoza insists more or less (like an + ancient Peripatetic philosopher named Strato) that all has come from the + first cause or from primitive Nature by a blind and geometrical + necessity, with complete absence of capacity for choice, for goodness and + for understanding in this first source of things.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 68 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page68"></a>[68]</span></p> + + <p>I have found the means, so it seems to me, of demonstrating the + contrary in a way that gives one a clear insight into the inward essence + of the matter. For having made new discoveries on the nature of active + force and the laws of motion, I have shown that they have no geometrical + necessity, as Spinoza appears to have believed they had. Neither, as I + have made plain, are they purely arbitrary, even though this be the + opinion of M. Bayle and of some modern philosophers: but they are + dependent upon the fitness of things as I have already pointed out above, + or upon that which I call the 'principle of the best'. Moreover one + recognizes therein, as in every other thing, the marks of the first + substance, whose productions bear the stamp of a supreme wisdom and make + the most perfect of harmonies. I have shown also that this harmony + connects both the future with the past and the present with the absent. + The first kind of connexion unites times, and the other places. This + second connexion is displayed in the union of the soul with the body, and + in general in the communication of true substances with one another and + with material phenomena. But the first takes place in the preformation of + organic bodies, or rather of all bodies, since there is organism + everywhere, although all masses do not compose organic bodies. So a pond + may very well be full of fish or of other organic bodies, although it is + not itself an animal or organic body, but only a mass that contains them. + Thus I had endeavoured to build upon such foundations, established in a + conclusive manner, a complete body of the main articles of knowledge that + reason pure and simple can impart to us, a body whereof all the parts + were properly connected and capable of meeting the most important + difficulties of the ancients and the moderns. I had also in consequence + formed for myself a certain system concerning the freedom of man and the + cooperation of God. This system appeared to me to be such as would in no + wise offend reason and faith; and I desired to submit it to the scrutiny + of M. Bayle, as well as of those who are in controversy with him. Now he + has departed from us, and such a loss is no small one, a writer whose + learning and acumen few have equalled. But since the subject is under + consideration and men of talent are still occupied with it, while the + public also follows it attentively, I take this to be a fitting moment + for the publication of certain of my ideas.</p> + + <p>It will perhaps be well to add the observation, before finishing this + preface, that in denying the physical influence of the soul upon <!-- + Page 69 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page69"></a>[69]</span> the + body or of the body upon the soul, that is, an influence causing the one + to disturb the laws of the other, I by no means deny the union of the one + with the other which forms of them a suppositum; but this union is + something metaphysical, which changes nothing in the phenomena. This is + what I have already said in reply to the objection raised against me, in + the <i>Mémoires de Trévoux</i>, by the Reverend Father de Tournemine, + whose wit and learning are of no ordinary mould. And for this reason one + may say also in a metaphysical sense that the soul acts upon the body and + the body upon the soul. Moreover, it is true that the soul is the + Entelechy or the active principle, whereas the corporeal alone or the + mere material contains only the passive. Consequently the principle of + action is in the soul, as I have explained more than once in the + <i>Leipzig Journal</i>. More especially does this appear in my answer to + the late Herr Sturm, philosopher and mathematician of Altorf, where I + have even demonstrated that, if bodies contained only the passive, their + different conditions would be indistinguishable. Also I take this + opportunity to say that, having heard of some objections made by the + gifted author of the book on <i>Self-knowledge</i>, in that same book, to + my System of Pre-established Harmony, I sent a reply to Paris, showing + that he has attributed to me opinions I am far from holding. On another + matter recently I met with like treatment at the hands of an anonymous + Doctor of the Sorbonne. And these misconceptions would have become plain + to the reader at the outset if my own words, which were being taken in + evidence, had been quoted.</p> + + <p>This tendency of men to make mistakes in presenting the opinions of + others leads me to observe also, that when I said somewhere that man + helps himself in conversion through the succour of grace, I mean only + that he derives advantage from it through the cessation of the resistance + overcome, but without any cooperation on his part: just as there is no + co-operation in ice when it is broken. For conversion is purely the work + of God's grace, wherein man co-operates only by resisting it; but human + resistance is more or less great according to the persons and the + occasions. Circumstances also contribute more or less to our attention + and to the motions that arise in the soul; and the co-operation of all + these things, together with the strength of the impression and the + condition of the will, determines the operation of grace, although not + rendering it necessary. I have expounded sufficiently elsewhere <!-- Page + 70 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page70"></a>[70]</span> that in + relation to matters of salvation unregenerate man is to be considered as + dead; and I greatly approve the manner wherein the theologians of the + Augsburg Confession declare themselves on this subject. Yet this + corruption of unregenerate man is, it must be added, no hindrance to his + possession of true moral virtues and his performance of good actions in + his civic life, actions which spring from a good principle, without any + evil intention and without mixture of actual sin. Wherein I hope I shall + be forgiven, if I have dared to diverge from the opinion of St. + Augustine: he was doubtless a great man, of admirable intelligence, but + inclined sometimes, as it seems, to exaggerate things, above all in the + heat of his controversies. I greatly esteem some persons who profess to + be disciples of St. Augustine, amongst others the Reverend Father Quênel, + a worthy successor of the great Arnauld in the pursuit of controversies + that have embroiled them with the most famous of Societies. But I have + found that usually in disputes between people of conspicuous merit (of + whom there are doubtless some here in both parties) there is right on + both sides, although in different points, and it is rather in the matter + of defence than attack, although the natural malevolence of the human + heart generally renders attack more agreeable to the reader than defence. + I hope that the Reverend Father Ptolemei, who does his Society credit and + is occupied in filling the gaps left by the famous Bellarmine, will give + us, concerning all of that, some explanations worthy of his acumen and + his knowledge, and I even dare to add, his moderation. And one must + believe that among the theologians of the Augsburg Confession there will + arise some new Chemnitz or some new Callixtus; even as one is justified + in thinking that men like Usserius or Daillé will again appear among the + Reformed, and that all will work more and more to remove the + misconceptions wherewith this matter is charged. For the rest I shall be + well pleased that those who shall wish to examine it closely read the + objections with the answers I have given thereto, formulated in the small + treatise I have placed at the end of the work by way of summary. I have + endeavoured to forestall some new objections. I have explained, for + instance, why I have taken the antecedent and consequent will as + preliminary and final, after the example of Thomas, of Scotus and others; + how it is possible that there be incomparably more good in the glory of + all the saved than there is evil in the misery of all the damned, <!-- + Page 71 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page71"></a>[71]</span> despite + that there are more of the latter; how, in saying that evil has been + permitted as a <i>conditio sine qua non</i> of good, I mean not according + to the principle of necessity, but according to the principle of the + fitness of things. Furthermore I show that the predetermination I admit + is such as always to predispose, but never to necessitate, and that God + will not refuse the requisite new light to those who have made a good use + of that which they had. Other elucidations besides I have endeavoured to + give on some difficulties which have been put before me of late. I have, + moreover, followed the advice of some friends who thought it fitting that + I should add two appendices: the one treats of the controversy carried on + between Mr. Hobbes and Bishop Bramhall touching Freedom and Necessity, + the other of the learned work on <i>The Origin of Evil</i>, published a + short time ago in England.</p> + + <p>Finally I have endeavoured in all things to consider edification: and + if I have conceded something to curiosity, it is because I thought it + necessary to relieve a subject whose seriousness may cause + discouragement. It is with that in view that I have introduced into this + dissertation the pleasing chimera of a certain astronomical theology, + having no ground for apprehension that it will ensnare anyone and deeming + that to tell it and refute it is the same thing. Fiction for fiction, + instead of imagining that the planets were suns, one might conceive that + they were masses melted in the sun and thrown out, and that would destroy + the foundation of this hypothetical theology. The ancient error of the + two principles, which the Orientals distinguished by the names Oromasdes + and Arimanius, caused me to explain a conjecture on the primitive history + of peoples. It appears indeed probable that these were the names of two + great contemporary princes, the one monarch of a part of upper Asia, + where there have since been others of this name, the other king of the + Scythian Celts who made incursions into the states of the former, and who + was also named amongst the divinities of Germania. It seems, indeed, that + Zoroaster used the names of these princes as symbols of the invisible + powers which their exploits made them resemble in the ideas of Asiatics. + Yet elsewhere, according to the accounts of Arab authors, who in this + might well be better informed than the Greeks, it appears from detailed + records of ancient oriental history, that this Zerdust or Zoroaster, whom + they make contemporary with the great Darius, did not look upon these two + <!-- Page 72 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page72"></a>[72]</span> + principles as completely primitive and independent, but as dependent upon + one supreme and single principle. They relate that he believed, in + conformity with the cosmogony of Moses, that God, who is without an + equal, created all and separated the light from the darkness; that the + light conformed with his original design, but that the darkness came as a + consequence, even as the shadow follows the body, and that this is + nothing but privation. Such a thesis would clear this ancient author of + the errors the Greeks imputed to him. His great learning caused the + Orientals to compare him with the Mercury or Hermes of the Egyptians and + Greeks; just as the northern peoples compared their Wodan or Odin to this + same Mercury. That is why Mercredi (Wednesday), or the day of Mercury, + was called Wodansdag by the northern peoples, but day of Zerdust by the + Asiatics, since it is named Zarschamba or Dsearschambe by the Turks and + the Persians, Zerda by the Hungarians from the north-east, and Sreda by + the Slavs from the heart of Great Russia, as far as the Wends of the + Luneburg region, the Slavs having learnt the name also from the + Orientals. These observations will perhaps not be displeasing to the + curious. And I flatter myself that the small dialogue ending the Essays + written to oppose M. Bayle will give some satisfaction to those who are + well pleased to see difficult but important truths set forth in an easy + and familiar way. I have written in a foreign language at the risk of + making many errors in it, because that language has been recently used by + others in treating of my subject, and because it is more generally read + by those whom one would wish to benefit by this small work. It is to be + hoped that the language errors will be pardoned: they are to be + attributed not only to the printer and the copyist, but also to the haste + of the author, who has been much distracted from his task. If, moreover, + any error has crept into the ideas expressed, the author will be the + first to correct it, once he has been better informed: he has given + elsewhere such indications of his love of truth that he hopes this + declaration will not be regarded as merely an empty phrase.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 73 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page73"></a>[73]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION +ON THE CONFORMITY OF +FAITH WITH REASON</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p>1. I begin with the preliminary question of the <i>conformity of faith + with reason</i>, and the use of philosophy in theology, because it has + much influence on the main subject of my treatise, and because M. Bayle + introduces it everywhere. I assume that two truths cannot contradict each + other; that the object of faith is the truth God has revealed in an + extraordinary way; and that reason is the linking together of truths, but + especially (when it is compared with faith) of those whereto the human + mind can attain naturally without being aided by the light of faith. This + definition of reason (that is to say of strict and true reason) has + surprised some persons accustomed to inveigh against reason taken in a + vague sense. They gave me the answer that they had never heard of any + such explanation of it: the truth is that they have never conferred with + people who expressed themselves clearly on these subjects. They have + confessed to me, nevertheless, that one could not find fault with reason, + understood in the sense which I gave to it. It is in the same sense that + sometimes reason is contrasted with experience. Reason, since it consists + in the linking together of truths, is entitled to connect also those + wherewith experience has furnished it, in order thence to draw mixed + conclusions; but reason pure and simple, as distinct from experience, + only has to do with truths independent of the senses. And one may compare + faith with experience, since faith (in <!-- Page 74 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page74"></a>[74]</span> respect of the motives + that give it justification) depends upon the experience of those who have + seen the miracles whereon revelation is founded, and upon the trustworthy + tradition which has handed them down to us, whether through the + Scriptures or by the account of those who have preserved them. It is + rather as we rely upon the experience of those who have seen China and on + the credibility of their account when we give credence to the wonders + that are told us of that distant country. Yet I would also take into + account the inward motion of the Holy Spirit, who takes possession of + souls and persuades them and prompts them to good, that is, to faith and + to charity, without always having need of motives.</p> + + <p>2. Now the truths of reason are of two kinds: the one kind is of those + called the 'Eternal Verities', which are altogether necessary, so that + the opposite implies contradiction. Such are the truths whose necessity + is logical, metaphysical or geometrical, which one cannot deny without + being led into absurdities. There are others which may be called + <i>positive</i>, because they are the laws which it has pleased God to + give to Nature, or because they depend upon those. We learn them either + by experience, that is, <i>a posteriori</i>, or by reason and <i>a + priori</i>, that is, by considerations of the fitness of things which + have caused their choice. This fitness of things has also its rules and + reasons, but it is the free choice of God, and not a geometrical + necessity, which causes preference for what is fitting and brings it into + existence. Thus one may say that physical necessity is founded on moral + necessity, that is, on the wise one's choice which is worthy of his + wisdom; and that both of these ought to be distinguished from geometrical + necessity. It is this physical necessity that makes order in Nature and + lies in the rules of motion and in some other general laws which it + pleased God to lay down for things when he gave them being. It is + therefore true that God gave such laws not without reason, for he chooses + nothing from caprice and as though by chance or in pure indifference; but + the general reasons of good and of order, which have prompted him to the + choice, may be overcome in some cases by stronger reasons of a superior + order.</p> + + <p>3. Thus it is made clear that God can exempt creatures from the laws + he has prescribed for them, and produce in them that which their nature + does not bear by performing a miracle. When they have risen to + perfections and faculties nobler than those whereto they can by their + nature attain, the Schoolmen call this <!-- Page 75 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page75"></a>[75]</span> faculty an 'Obediential + Power', that is to say, a power which the thing acquires by obeying the + command of him who can give that which the thing has not. The Schoolmen, + however, usually give instances of this power which to me appear + impossible: they maintain, for example, that God can give the creature + the faculty to create. It may be that there are miracles which God + performs through the ministry of angels, where the laws of Nature are not + violated, any more than when men assist Nature by art, the skill of + angels differing from ours only by degree of perfection. Nevertheless it + still remains true that the laws of Nature are subject to be dispensed + from by the Law-giver; whereas the eternal verities, as for instance + those of geometry, admit no dispensation, and faith cannot contradict + them. Thus it is that there cannot be any invincible objection to truth. + For if it is a question of proof which is founded upon principles or + incontestable facts and formed by a linking together of eternal verities, + the conclusion is certain and essential, and that which is contrary to it + must be false; otherwise two contradictories might be true at the same + time. If the objection is not conclusive, it can only form a probable + argument, which has no force against faith, since it is agreed that the + Mysteries of religion are contrary to appearances. Now M. Bayle declares, + in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc, that he does not claim that there + are demonstrations contrary to the truths of faith: and as a result all + these insuperable difficulties, these so-called wars between reason and + faith, vanish away.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Hi motus animorum atque haec discrimina tanta,</i></p> + <p><i>Pulveris exigui jactu compressa quiescunt.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>4. Protestant theologians as well as those of the Roman confession + admit the maxims which I have just laid down, when they handle the matter + with attention; and all that is said against reason has no force save + against a kind of counterfeit reason, corrupted and deluded by false + appearances. It is the same with our notions of the justice and the + goodness of God, which are spoken of sometimes as if we had neither any + idea nor any definition of their nature. But in that case we should have + no ground for ascribing these attributes to him, or lauding him for them. + His goodness and his justice as well as his wisdom differ from ours only + because they are infinitely more perfect. Thus the simple notions, the + necessary truths and the conclusive results of philosophy <!-- Page 76 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page76"></a>[76]</span> cannot be + contrary to revelation. And when some philosophical maxims are rejected + in theology, the reason is that they are considered to have only a + physical or moral necessity, which speaks only of that which takes place + usually, and is consequently founded on appearances, but which may be + withheld if God so pleases.</p> + + <p>5. It seems, according to what I have just said, that there is often + some confusion in the expressions of those who set at variance philosophy + and theology, or faith and reason: they confuse the terms 'explain', + 'comprehend', 'prove', 'uphold'. And I find that M. Bayle, shrewd as he + is, is not always free from this confusion. Mysteries may be + <i>explained</i> sufficiently to justify belief in them; but one cannot + <i>comprehend</i> them, nor give understanding of how they come to pass. + Thus even in natural philosophy we explain up to a certain point sundry + perceptible qualities, but in an imperfect manner, for we do not + comprehend them. Nor is it possible for us, either, to prove Mysteries by + reason; for all that which can be proved <i>a priori</i>, or by pure + reason, can be comprehended. All that remains for us then, after having + believed in the Mysteries by reason of the proofs of the truth of + religion (which are called 'motives of credibility') is to be able to + <i>uphold</i> them against objections. Without that our belief in them + would have no firm foundation; for all that which can be refuted in a + sound and conclusive manner cannot but be false. And such proofs of the + truth of religion as can give only a <i>moral certainty</i> would be + balanced and even outweighed by such objections as would give an + <i>absolute certainty</i>, provided they were convincing and altogether + conclusive. This little might suffice me to remove the difficulties + concerning the use of reason and philosophy in relation to religion if + one had not to deal all too often with prejudiced persons. But as the + subject is important and it has fallen into a state of confusion, it will + be well to take it in greater detail.</p> + + <p>6. The question of the <i>conformity of faith with reason</i> has + always been a great problem. In the primitive Church the ablest Christian + authors adapted themselves to the ideas of the Platonists, which were the + most acceptable to them, and were at that time most generally in favour. + Little by little Aristotle took the place of Plato, when the taste for + systems began to prevail, and when theology itself became more + systematic, owing to the decisions of the General Councils, which + provided precise and positive formularies. St. Augustine, Boethius and + Cassiodorus in the West, and <!-- Page 77 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page77"></a>[77]</span> St. John of Damascus in the East + contributed most towards reducing theology to scientific form, not to + mention Bede, Alcuin, St. Anselm and some other theologians versed in + philosophy. Finally came the Schoolmen. The leisure of the cloisters + giving full scope for speculation, which was assisted by Aristotle's + philosophy translated from the Arabic, there was formed at last a + compound of theology and philosophy wherein most of the questions arose + from the trouble that was taken to reconcile faith with reason. But this + had not met with the full success hoped for, because theology had been + much corrupted by the unhappiness of the times, by ignorance and + obstinacy. Moreover, philosophy, in addition to its own faults, which + were very great, found itself burdened with those of theology, which in + its turn was suffering from association with a philosophy that was very + obscure and very imperfect. One must confess, notwithstanding, with the + incomparable Grotius, that there is sometimes gold hidden under the + rubbish of the monks' barbarous Latin. I have therefore oft-times wished + that a man of talent, whose office had necessitated his learning the + language of the Schoolmen, had chosen to extract thence whatever is of + worth, and that another Petau or Thomasius had done in respect of the + Schoolmen what these two learned men have done in respect of the Fathers. + It would be a very curious work, and very important for ecclesiastical + history, and it would continue the History of Dogmas up to the time of + the Revival of Letters (owing to which the aspect of things has changed) + and even beyond that point. For sundry dogmas, such as those of physical + predetermination, of mediate knowledge, philosophical sin, objective + precisions, and many other dogmas in speculative theology and even in the + practical theology of cases of conscience, came into currency even after + the Council of Trent.</p> + + <p>7. A little before these changes, and before the great schism in the + West that still endures, there was in Italy a sect of philosophers which + disputed this conformity of faith with reason which I maintain. They were + dubbed 'Averroists' because they were adherents of a famous Arab author, + who was called the Commentator by pre-eminence, and who appeared to be + the one of all his race that penetrated furthest into Aristotle's + meaning. This Commentator, extending what Greek expositors had already + taught, maintained that according to Aristotle, and even according to + reason (and at that time the two were considered almost identical) <!-- + Page 78 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page78"></a>[78]</span> there + was no case for the immortality of the soul. Here is his reasoning. The + human kind is eternal, according to Aristotle, therefore if individual + souls die not, one must resort to the metempsychosis rejected by that + philosopher. Or, if there are always new souls, one must admit the + infinity of these souls existing from all eternity; but actual infinity + is impossible, according to the doctrine of the same Aristotle. Therefore + it is a necessary conclusion that the souls, that is, the forms of + organic bodies, must perish with the bodies, or at least this must happen + to the passive understanding that belongs to each one individually. Thus + there will only remain the active understanding common to all men, which + according to Aristotle comes from outside, and which must work + wheresoever the organs are suitably disposed; even as the wind produces a + kind of music when it is blown into properly adjusted organ pipes.</p> + + <p>8. Nothing could have been weaker than this would-be proof. It is not + true that Aristotle refuted metempsychosis, or that he proved the + eternity of the human kind; and after all, it is quite untrue that an + actual infinity is impossible. Yet this proof passed as irresistible + amongst Aristotelians, and induced in them the belief that there was a + certain sublunary intelligence and that our active intellect was produced + by participation in it. But others who adhered less to Aristotle went so + far as to advocate a universal soul forming the ocean of all individual + souls, and believed this universal soul alone capable of subsisting, + whilst individual souls are born and die. According to this opinion the + souls of animals are born by being separated like drops from their ocean, + when they find a body which they can animate; and they die by being + reunited to the ocean of souls when the body is destroyed, as streams are + lost in the sea. Many even went so far as to believe that God is that + universal soul, although others thought that this soul was subordinate + and created. This bad doctrine is very ancient and apt to dazzle the + common herd. It is expressed in these beautiful lines of Vergil + (<i>Aen.</i>, VI, v. 724):</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Principio coelum ac terram camposque liquentes,</i></p> + <p><i>Lucentemque globum Lunae Titaniaque astra,</i></p> + <p><i>Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus</i></p> + <p><i>Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.</i></p> + <p><i>Inde hominum pecudumque genus vitaeque volantum.</i></p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 79 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page79"></a>[79]</span></p> + + <p>And again elsewhere (<i>Georg.</i>, IV, v. 221):</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i4"><i>Deum namque ire per omnes</i></p> + <p><i>Terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum:</i></p> + <p><i>Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,</i></p> + <p><i>Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.</i></p> + <p><i>Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>9. Plato's Soul of the World has been taken in this sense by some, but + there is more indication that the Stoics succumbed to that universal soul + which swallows all the rest. Those who are of this opinion might be + called 'Monopsychites', since according to them there is in reality only + one soul that subsists. M. Bernier observes that this is an opinion + almost universally accepted amongst scholars in Persia and in the States + of the Grand Mogul; it appears even that it has gained a footing with the + Cabalists and with the mystics. A certain German of Swabian birth, + converted to Judaism some years ago, who taught under the name Moses + Germanus, having adopted the dogmas of Spinoza, believed that Spinoza + revived the ancient Cabala of the Hebrews. And a learned man who confuted + this proselyte Jew appears to be of the same opinion. It is known that + Spinoza recognizes only substance in the world, whereof individual souls + are but transient modifications. Valentin Weigel, Pastor of Zschopau in + Saxony, a man of wit, even of excessive wit, although people would have + it that he was a visionary, was perhaps to some extent of that opinion; + as was also a man known as Johann Angelus Silesius, author of certain + quite pleasing little devotional verses in German, in the form of + epigrams, which have just been reprinted. In general, the mystics' + doctrine of deification was liable to such a sinister interpretation. + Gerson already has written opposing Ruysbroek, a mystical writer, whose + intention was evidently good and whose expressions are excusable. But it + would be better to write in a manner that has no need of excuses: + although I confess that oft-times expressions which are extravagant, and + as it were poetical, have greater force to move and to persuade than + correct forms of statement.</p> + + <p>10. The annihilation of all that belongs to us in our own right, + carried to great lengths by the Quietists, might equally well be veiled + irreligion in certain minds, as is related, for example, concerning the + Quietism of Foë, originator of a great Chinese sect. <!-- Page 80 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page80"></a>[80]</span> After having + preached his religion for forty years, when he felt death was + approaching, he declared to his disciples that he had hidden the truth + from them under the veil of metaphors, and that all reduced itself to + Nothingness, which he said was the first source of all things. That was + still worse, so it would seem, than the opinion of the Averroists. Both + of these doctrines are indefensible and even extravagant; nevertheless + some moderns have made no difficulty about adopting this one and + universal Soul that engulfs the rest. It has met with only too much + applause amongst the so-called freethinkers, and M. de Preissac, a + soldier and man of wit, who dabbled in philosophy, at one time aired it + publicly in his discourses. The System of Pre-established Harmony is the + one best qualified to cure this evil. For it shows that there are of + necessity substances which are simple and without extension, scattered + throughout all Nature; that these substances must subsist independently + of every other except God; and that they are never wholly separated from + organic body. Those who believe that souls capable of feeling but + incapable of reason are mortal, or who maintain that none but reasoning + souls can have feeling, offer a handle to the Monopsychites. For it will + ever be difficult to persuade men that beasts feel nothing; and once the + admission has been made that that which is capable of feeling can die, it + is difficult to found upon reason a proof of the immortality of our + souls.</p> + + <p>11. I have made this short digression because it appeared to me + seasonable at a time when there is only too much tendency to overthrow + natural religion to its very foundations. I return then to the + Averroists, who were persuaded that their dogma was proved conclusively + in accordance with reason. As a result they declared that man's soul is, + according to philosophy, mortal, while they protested their acquiescence + in Christian theology, which declares the soul's immortality. But this + distinction was held suspect, and this divorce between faith and reason + was vehemently rejected by the prelates and the doctors of that time, and + condemned in the last Lateran Council under Leo X. On that occasion also, + scholars were urged to work for the removal of the difficulties that + appeared to set theology and philosophy at variance. The doctrine of + their incompatibility continued to hold its ground <i>incognito</i>. + Pomponazzi was suspected of it, although he declared himself otherwise; + and that very sect of the Averroists survived as a school. It is thought + <!-- Page 81 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page81"></a>[81]</span> + that Caesar Cremoninus, a philosopher famous in his time, was one of its + mainstays. Andreas Cisalpinus, a physician (and an author of merit who + came nearest after Michael Servetus to the discovery of the circulation + of the blood), was accused by Nicolas Taurel (in a book entitled <i>Alpes + Caesae</i>) of belonging to these anti-religious Peripatetics. Traces of + this doctrine are found also in the <i>Circulus Pisanus Claudii + Berigardi</i>, an author of French nationality who migrated to Italy and + taught philosophy at Pisa: but especially the writings and the letters of + Gabriel Naudé, as well as the <i>Naudaeana</i>, show that Averroism still + lived on when this learned physician was in Italy. Corpuscular + philosophy, introduced shortly after, appears to have extinguished this + excessively Peripatetic sect, or perhaps to have been intermixed with its + teaching. It may be indeed that there have been Atomists who would be + inclined to teach dogmas like those of the Averroists, if circumstances + so permitted: but this abuse cannot harm such good as there is in + Corpuscular philosophy, which can very well be combined with all that is + sound in Plato and in Aristotle, and bring them both into harmony with + true theology.</p> + + <p><a name="sect12">12</a>. The Reformers, and especially Luther, as I + have already observed, spoke sometimes as if they rejected philosophy, + and deemed it inimical to faith. But, properly speaking, Luther + understood by philosophy only that which is in conformity with the + ordinary course of Nature, or perhaps even philosophy as it was taught in + the schools. Thus for example he says that it is impossible in + philosophy, that is, in the order of Nature, that the word be made flesh; + and he goes so far as to maintain that what is true in natural philosophy + might be false in ethics. Aristotle was the object of his anger; and so + far back as the year 1516 he contemplated the purging of philosophy, when + he perhaps had as yet no thoughts of reforming the Church. But at last he + curbed his vehemence and in the <i>Apology for the Augsburg + Confession</i> allowed a favourable mention of Aristotle and his + <i>Ethics</i>. Melanchthon, a man of sound and moderate ideas, made + little systems from the several parts of philosophy, adapted to the + truths of revelation and useful in civic life, which deserve to be read + even now. After him, Pierre de la Ramée entered the lists. His philosophy + was much in favour: the sect of the Ramists was powerful in Germany, + gaining many adherents among the Protestants, and even concerning itself + with theology, until the revival of Corpuscular philosophy, which <!-- + Page 82 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page82"></a>[82]</span> caused + that of Ramée to fall into oblivion and weakened the authority of the + Peripatetics.</p> + + <p>13. Meanwhile sundry Protestant theologians, deviating as far as they + could from Scholastic philosophy, which prevailed in the opposite party, + went so far as to despise philosophy itself, which to them was suspect. + The controversy blazed up finally owing to the rancour of Daniel + Hoffmann. He was an able theologian, who had previously gained a + reputation at the Conference of Quedlinburg, when Tilemann Heshusius and + he had supported Duke Julius of Brunswick in his refusal to accept the + Formula of Concord. For some reason or other Dr. Hoffmann flew into a + passion with philosophy, instead of being content to find fault with the + wrong uses made thereof by philosophers. He was, however, aiming at the + famous Caselius, a man esteemed by the princes and scholars of his time; + and Henry Julius, Duke of Brunswick (son of Julius, founder of the + University), having taken the trouble himself to investigate the matter, + condemned the theologian. There have been some small disputes of the kind + since, but it has always been found that they were misunderstandings. + Paul Slevogt, a famous Professor at Jena in Thuringia, whose still extant + treatises prove how well versed he was in Scholastic philosophy, as also + in Hebrew literature, had published in his youth under the title of + <i>Pervigilium</i> a little book 'de dissidio Theologi et Philosophi in + utriusque principiis fundato', bearing on the question whether God is + accidentally the cause of sin. But it was easy to see that his aim was to + demonstrate that theologians sometimes misuse philosophical terms.</p> + + <p>14. To come now to the events of my own time, I remember that when in + 1666 Louis Meyer, a physician of Amsterdam, published anonymously the + book entitled <i>Philosophia Scripturae Interpres</i> (by many persons + wrongly attributed to Spinoza, his friend) the theologians of Holland + bestirred themselves, and their written attacks upon this book gave rise + to great disputes among them. Divers of them held the opinion that the + Cartesians, in confuting the anonymous philosopher, had conceded too much + to philosophy. Jean de Labadie (before he had seceded from the Reformed + Church, his pretext being some abuses which he said had crept into public + observance and which he considered intolerable) attacked the book by Herr + von Wollzogen, and called it pernicious. On the other hand Herr + Vogelsang, Herr van der Weye and some <!-- Page 83 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page83"></a>[83]</span> other anti-Cocceïans + also assailed the same book with much acrimony. But the accused won his + case in a Synod. Afterwards in Holland people spoke of 'rational' and + 'non-rational' theologians, a party distinction often mentioned by M. + Bayle, who finally declared himself against the former. But there is no + indication that any precise rules have yet been defined which the rival + parties accept or reject with regard to the use of reason in the + interpretation of Holy Scripture.</p> + + <p>15. A like dispute has threatened of late to disturb the peace in the + Churches of the Augsburg Confession. Some Masters of Arts in the + University of Leipzig gave private lessons at their homes, to students + who sought them out in order to learn what is called 'Sacra Philologia', + according to the practice of this university and of some others where + this kind of study is not restricted to the Faculty of Theology. These + masters pressed the study of the Holy Scriptures and the practice of + piety further than their fellows had been wont to do. It is alleged that + they had carried certain things to excess, and aroused suspicions of + certain doctrinal innovations. This caused them to be dubbed 'Pietists', + as though they were a new sect; and this name is one which has since + caused a great stir in Germany. It has been applied somehow or other to + those whom one suspected, or pretended to suspect, of fanaticism, or even + of hypocrisy, concealed under some semblance of reform. Now some of the + students attending these masters had become conspicuous for behaviour + which gave general offence, and amongst other things for their scorn of + philosophy, even, so it was said, burning their notebooks. In consequence + the belief arose that their masters rejected philosophy: but they + justified themselves very well; nor could they be convicted either of + this error or of the heresies that were being imputed to them.</p> + + <p>16. The question of the use of philosophy in theology was debated much + amongst Christians, and difficulty was experienced over settling the + limits of its use when it came to detailed consideration. The Mysteries + of the Trinity, of the Incarnation and of the Holy Communion gave most + occasion for dispute. The new Photinians, disputing the first two + Mysteries, made use of certain philosophic maxims which Andreas Kessler, + a theologian of the Augsburg Confession, summarized in the various + treatises that he published on the parts of the Socinian philosophy. But + as to their metaphysics, one might instruct oneself better therein by + reading <!-- Page 84 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page84"></a>[84]</span> the work of Christopher Stegmann the + Socinian. It is not yet in print; but I saw it in my youth and it has + been recently again in my hands.</p> + + <p>17. Calovius and Scherzer, authors well versed in Scholastic + philosophy, and sundry other able theologians answered the Socinians at + great length, and often with success: for they would not content + themselves with the general and somewhat cavalier answers that were + commonly used against that sect. The drift of such answers was: that + their maxims were good in philosophy and not in theology; that it was the + fault of heterogeneousness called <span lang="el" title="metabasis eis allo genos" + >μεταβασις + εις αλλο + γενος</span> to apply those maxims to a + matter transcending reason; and that philosophy should be treated as a + servant and not a mistress in relation to theology, according to the + title of the book by a Scot named Robert Baronius, <i>Philosophia + Theologiae ancillans</i>. In fine, philosophy was a Hagar beside Sara and + must be driven from the house with her Ishmael when she was refractory. + There is something good in these answers: but one might abuse them, and + set natural truths and truths of revelation at variance. Scholars + therefore applied themselves to distinguishing between what is necessary + and indispensable in natural or philosophic truths and that which is not + so.</p> + + <p>18. The two Protestant parties are tolerably in agreement when it is a + question of making war on the Socinians; and as the philosophy of these + sectaries is not of the most exact, in most cases the attack succeeded in + reducing it. But the Protestants themselves had dissensions on the matter + of the Eucharistic Sacrament. A section of those who are called Reformed + (namely those who on that point follow rather Zwingli than Calvin) seemed + to reduce the participation in the body of Jesus Christ in the Holy + Communion to a mere figurative representation, employing the maxim of the + philosophers which states that a body can only be in one place at a time. + Contrariwise the Evangelicals (who name themselves thus in a particular + sense to distinguish themselves from the Reformed), being more attached + to the literal sense of Scripture, opined with Luther that this + participation was real, and that here there lay a supernatural Mystery. + They reject, in truth, the dogma of Transubstantiation, which they + believe to be without foundation in the Text; neither do they approve + that of Consubstantiation or of Impanation, which one could only impute + to them if one were ill-informed on their opinion. For they admit no + inclusion of the body <!-- Page 85 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page85"></a>[85]</span> of Jesus Christ in the bread, nor do they + even require any union of the one with the other: but they demand at + least a concomitance, so that these two substances be received both at + the same time. They believe that the ordinary sense of the words of Jesus + Christ on an occasion so important as that which concerned the expression + of his last wishes ought to be preserved. Thus in order to show that this + sense is free from all absurdity which could make it repugnant to us, + they maintain that the philosophic maxim restricting the existence of, + and partaking in, bodies to one place alone is simply a consequence of + the ordinary course of Nature. They make that no obstacle to the + presence, in the ordinary sense of the word, of the body of our Saviour + in such form as may be in keeping with the most glorified body. They do + not resort to a vague diffusion of ubiquity, which would disperse the + body and leave it nowhere in particular; nor do they admit the + multiple-reduplication theory of some Schoolmen, as if to say one and the + same body could be at the same time seated here and standing elsewhere. + In fine, they so express themselves that many consider the opinion of + Calvin, authorized by sundry confessions of faith from the Churches that + have accepted his teaching, to be not so far removed from the Augsburg + Confession as one might think: for he affirmed a partaking in the + substance. The divergence rests perhaps only upon the fact that Calvin + demands true faith in addition to the oral reception of the symbols, and + consequently excludes the unworthy.</p> + + <p>19. Thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation + can be supported (without resorting to the strange opinions of some + Schoolmen) by a properly understood analogy between <i>immediate + operation</i> and <i>presence</i>. Many philosophers have deemed that, + even in the order of Nature, a body may operate from a distance + immediately on many remote bodies at the same time. So do they believe, + all the more, that nothing can prevent divine Omnipotence from causing + one body to be present in many bodies together, since the transition from + immediate operation to presence is but slight, the one perhaps depending + upon the other. It is true that modern philosophers for some time now + have denied the immediate natural operation of one body upon another + remote from it, and I confess that I am of their opinion. Meanwhile + remote operation has just been revived in England by the admirable Mr. + Newton, who maintains that it is the nature of <!-- Page 86 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page86"></a>[86]</span> bodies to be attracted + and gravitate one towards another, in proportion to the mass of each one, + and the rays of attraction it receives. Accordingly the famous Mr. Locke, + in his answer to Bishop Stillingfleet, declares that having seen Mr. + Newton's book he retracts what he himself said, following the opinion of + the moderns, in his <i>Essay concerning Human Understanding</i>, to wit, + that a body cannot operate immediately upon another except by touching it + upon its surface and driving it by its motion. He acknowledges that God + can put properties into matter which cause it to operate from a distance. + Thus the theologians of the Augsburg Confession claim that God may ordain + not only that a body operate immediately on divers bodies remote from one + another, but that it even exist in their neighbourhood and be received by + them in a way with which distances of place and dimensions of space have + nothing to do. Although this effect transcends the forces of Nature, they + do not think it possible to show that it surpasses the power of the + Author of Nature. For him it is easy to annul the laws that he has given + or to dispense with them as seems good to him, in the same way as he was + able to make iron float upon water and to stay the operation of fire upon + the human body.</p> + + <p>20. I found in comparing the <i>Rationale Theologicum</i> of Nicolaus + Vedelius with the refutation by Johann Musaeus that these two authors, of + whom one died while a Professor at Franecker after having taught at + Geneva and the other finally became the foremost theologian at Jena, are + more or less in agreement on the principal rules for the use of reason, + but that it is in the application of these rules they disagree. For they + both agree that revelation cannot be contrary to the truths whose + necessity is called by philosophers 'logical' or 'metaphysical', that is + to say, whose opposite implies contradiction. They both admit also that + revelation will be able to combat maxims whose necessity is called + 'physical' and is founded only upon the laws that the will of God has + prescribed for Nature. Thus the question whether the presence of one and + the same body in divers places is possible in the supernatural order only + touches the application of the rule; and in order to decide this question + conclusively by reason, one must needs explain exactly wherein the + essence of body consists. Even the Reformed disagree thereon amongst + themselves; the Cartesians confine it to extension, but their adversaries + oppose that; and I think I have even observed that Gisbertus Voëtius, a + famous <!-- Page 87 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page87"></a>[87]</span> theologian of Utrecht, doubted the alleged + impossibility of plurality of locations.</p> + + <p>21. Furthermore, although the two Protestant parties agree that one + must distinguish these two necessities which I have just indicated, + namely metaphysical necessity and physical necessity, and that the first + excludes exceptions even in the case of Mysteries, they are not yet + sufficiently agreed upon the rules of interpretation, which serve to + determine in what cases it is permitted to desert the letter of Scripture + when one is not certain that it is contrary to strictly universal truths. + It is agreed that there are cases where one must reject a literal + interpretation that is not absolutely impossible, when it is otherwise + unsuitable. For instance, all commentators agree that when our Lord said + that Herod was a fox he meant it metaphorically; and one must accept + that, unless one imagine with some fanatics that for the time the words + of our Lord lasted Herod was actually changed into a fox. But it is not + the same with the texts on which Mysteries are founded, where the + theologians of the Augsburg Confession deem that one must keep to the + literal sense. Since, moreover, this discussion belongs to the art of + interpretation and not to that which is the proper sphere of logic, we + will not here enter thereon, especially as it has nothing in common with + the disputes that have arisen recently upon the conformity of faith with + reason.</p> + + <p>22. Theologians of all parties, I believe (fanatics alone excepted), + agree at least that no article of faith must imply contradiction or + contravene proofs as exact as those of mathematics, where the opposite of + the conclusion can be reduced <i>ad absurdum</i>, that is, to + contradiction. St. Athanasius with good reason made sport of the + preposterous ideas of some writers of his time, who maintained that God + had suffered without any suffering. <i>'Passus est impassibiliter. O + ludicram doctrinam aedificantem simul et demolientem!'</i> It follows + thence that certain writers have been too ready to grant that the Holy + Trinity is contrary to that great principle which states that two things + which are the same as a third are also the same as each other: that is to + say, if A is the same as B, and if C is the same as B, then A and C must + also be the same as each other. For this principle is a direct + consequence of that of contradiction, and forms the basis of all logic; + and if it ceases, we can no longer reason with certainty. Thus when one + says that the Father is God, that the Son is God and that the Holy Spirit + is God, and that <!-- Page 88 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page88"></a>[88]</span> nevertheless there is only one God, + although these three Persons differ from one another, one must consider + that this word <i>God</i> has not the same sense at the beginning as at + the end of this statement. Indeed it signifies now the Divine Substance + and now a Person of the Godhead. In general, one must take care never to + abandon the necessary and eternal truths for the sake of upholding + Mysteries, lest the enemies of religion seize upon such an occasion for + decrying both religion and Mysteries.</p> + + <p>23. The distinction which is generally drawn between that which is + <i>above</i> reason and that which is <i>against</i> reason is tolerably + in accord with the distinction which has just been made between the two + kinds of necessity. For what is contrary to reason is contrary to the + absolutely certain and inevitable truths; and what is above reason is in + opposition only to what one is wont to experience or to understand. That + is why I am surprised that there are people of intelligence who dispute + this distinction, and that M. Bayle should be of this number. The + distinction is assuredly very well founded. A truth is above reason when + our mind (or even every created mind) cannot comprehend it. Such is, as + it seems to me, the Holy Trinity; such are the miracles reserved for God + alone, as for instance Creation; such is the choice of the order of the + universe, which depends upon universal harmony, and upon the clear + knowledge of an infinity of things at once. But a truth can never be + contrary to reason, and once a dogma has been disputed and refuted by + reason, instead of its being incomprehensible, one may say that nothing + is easier to understand, nor more obvious, than its absurdity. For I + observed at the beginning that by <font class="sc">reason</font> here I + do not mean the opinions and discourses of men, nor even the habit they + have formed of judging things according to the usual course of Nature, + but rather the inviolable linking together of truths.</p> + + <p>24. I must come now to the great question which M. Bayle brought up + recently, to wit, whether a truth, and especially a truth of faith, can + prove to be subject to irrefutable objections. This excellent author + appears to answer with a bold affirmative: he quotes theologians of + repute in his party, and even in the Church of Rome, who appear to say + the same as he affirms; and he cites philosophers who have believed that + there are even philosophical truths whose champions cannot answer the + objections that are brought up against them. He believes that the + theological <!-- Page 89 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page89"></a>[89]</span> doctrine of predestination is of this + nature, and in philosophy that of the composition of the + <i>Continuum</i>. These are, indeed, the two labyrinths which have ever + exercised theologians and philosophers. Libertus Fromondus, a theologian + of Louvain (a great friend of Jansenius, whose posthumous book entitled + <i>Augustinus</i> he in fact published), who also wrote a book entitled + explicitly <i>Labyrinthus de Compositione Continui</i>, experienced in + full measure the difficulties inherent in both doctrines; and the + renowned Ochino admirably presented what he calls 'the labyrinths of + predestination'.</p> + + <p>25. But these writers have not denied the possibility of finding + thread in the labyrinth; they have recognized the difficulty, but they + have surely not turned difficulty into sheer impossibility. As for me, I + confess that I cannot agree with those who maintain that a truth can + admit of irrefutable objections: for is an <i>objection</i> anything but + an argument whose conclusion contradicts our thesis? And is not an + irrefutable argument a <i>demonstration</i>? And how can one know the + certainty of demonstrations except by examining the argument in detail, + the form and the matter, in order to see if the form is good, and then if + each premiss is either admitted or proved by another argument of like + force, until one is able to make do with admitted premisses alone? Now if + there is such an objection against our thesis we must say that the + falsity of this thesis is demonstrated, and that it is impossible for us + to have reasons sufficient to prove it; otherwise two contradictories + would be true at once. One must always yield to proofs, whether they be + proposed in positive form or advanced in the shape of objections. And it + is wrong and fruitless to try to weaken opponents' proofs, under the + pretext that they are only objections, since the opponent can play the + same game and can reverse the denominations, exalting his arguments by + naming them 'proofs' and sinking ours under the blighting title of + 'objections'.</p> + + <p>26. It is another question whether we are always obliged to examine + the objections we may have to face, and to retain some doubt in respect + of our own opinion, or what is called <i>formido oppositi</i>, until this + examination has been made. I would venture to say no, for otherwise one + would never attain to certainty and our conclusion would be always + provisional. I believe that able geometricians will scarce be troubled by + the objections of Joseph Scaliger against Archimedes, or by those of Mr. + Hobbes against <!-- Page 90 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page90"></a>[90]</span> Euclid; but that is because they have fully + understood and are sure of the proofs. Nevertheless it is sometimes well + to show oneself ready to examine certain objections. On the one hand it + may serve to rescue people from their error, while on the other we + ourselves may profit by it; for specious fallacies often contain some + useful solution and bring about the removal of considerable difficulties. + That is why I have always liked ingenious objections made against my own + opinions, and I have never examined them without profit: witness those + which M. Bayle formerly made against my System of Pre-established + Harmony, not to mention those which M. Arnauld, M. l'Abbé Foucher and + Father Lami, O.S.B., made to me on the same subject. But to return to the + principal question, I conclude from reasons I have just set forth that + when an objection is put forward against some truth, it is always + possible to answer it satisfactorily.</p> + + <p>27. It may be also that M. Bayle does not mean 'insoluble objections' + in the sense that I have just explained. I observe that he varies, at + least in his expressions: for in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc he + does not admit that one can bring demonstrations against the truths of + faith. It appears therefore that he takes the objections to be insoluble + only in respect of our present degree of enlightenment; and in this + Reply, p. 35, he even does not despair of the possibility that one day a + solution hitherto unknown may be found by someone. Concerning that more + will be said later. I hold an opinion, however, that will perchance cause + surprise, namely that this solution has been discovered entire, and is + not even particularly difficult. Indeed a mediocre intelligence capable + of sufficient care, and using correctly the rules of common logic, is in + a position to answer the most embarrassing objection made against truth, + when the objection is only taken from reason, and when it is claimed to + be a 'demonstration'. Whatever scorn the generality of moderns have + to-day for the logic of Aristotle, one must acknowledge that it teaches + infallible ways of resisting error in these conjunctures. For one has + only to examine the argument according to the rules and it will always be + possible to see whether it is lacking in form or whether there are + premisses such as are not yet proved by a good argument.</p> + + <p>28. It is quite another matter when there is only a question of + <i>probabilities</i>, for the art of judging from probable reasons is not + yet well established; so that our logic in this connexion is still very + <!-- Page 91 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page91"></a>[91]</span> + imperfect, and to this very day we have little beyond the art of judging + from demonstrations. But this art is sufficient here: for when it is a + question of opposing reason to an article of our faith, one is not + disturbed by objections that only attain probability. Everyone agrees + that appearances are against Mysteries, and that they are by no means + probable when regarded only from the standpoint of reason; but it + suffices that they have in them nothing of absurdity. Thus demonstrations + are required if they are to be refuted.</p> + + <p>29. And doubtless we are so to understand it when Holy Scripture warns + us that the wisdom of God is foolishness before men, and when St. Paul + observed that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is foolishness unto the Greeks, + as well as unto the Jews a stumbling-block. For, after all, one truth + cannot contradict another, and the light of reason is no less a gift of + God than that of revelation. Also it is a matter of no difficulty among + theologians who are expert in their profession, that the motives of + credibility justify, once for all, the authority of Holy Scripture before + the tribunal of reason, so that reason in consequence gives way before + it, as before a new light, and sacrifices thereto all its probabilities. + It is more or less as if a new president sent by the prince must show his + letters patent in the assembly where he is afterwards to preside. That is + the tendency of sundry good books that we have on the truth of religion, + such as those of Augustinus Steuchus, of Du Plessis-Mornay or of Grotius: + for the true religion must needs have marks that the false religions have + not, else would Zoroaster, Brahma, Somonacodom and Mahomet be as worthy + of belief as Moses and Jesus Christ. Nevertheless divine faith itself, + when it is kindled in the soul, is something more than an opinion, and + depends not upon the occasions or the motives that have given it birth; + it advances beyond the intellect, and takes possession of the will and of + the heart, to make us act with zeal and joyfully as the law of God + commands. Then we have no further need to think of reasons or to pause + over the difficulties of argument which the mind may anticipate.</p> + + <p>30. Thus what we have just said of human reason, which is extolled and + decried by turns, and often without rule or measure, may show our lack of + exactitude and how much we are accessary to our own errors. Nothing would + be so easy to terminate as these disputes on the rights of faith and of + reason if men would make use <!-- Page 92 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page92"></a>[92]</span> of the commonest rules of logic and reason + with even a modicum of attention. Instead of that, they become involved + in oblique and ambiguous phrases, which give them a fine field for + declamation, to make the most of their wit and their learning. It would + seem, indeed, that they have no wish to see the naked truth, peradventure + because they fear that it may be more disagreeable than error: for they + know not the beauty of the Author of all things, who is the source of + truth.</p> + + <p>31. This negligence is a general defect of humanity, and one not to be + laid to the charge of any particular person. <i>Abundamus dulcibus + vitiis</i>, as Quintilian said of the style of Seneca, and we take + pleasure in going astray. Exactitude incommodes us and rules we regard as + puerilities. Thus it is that common logic (although it is more or less + sufficient for the examination of arguments that tend towards certainty) + is relegated to schoolboys; and there is not even a thought for a kind of + logic which should determine the balance between probabilities, and would + be so necessary in deliberations of importance. So true is it that our + mistakes for the most part come from scorn or lack of the art of + thinking: for nothing is more imperfect than our logic when we pass + beyond necessary arguments. The most excellent philosophers of our time, + such as the authors of <i>The Art of Thinking</i>, of <i>The Search for + Truth</i> and of the <i>Essay concerning Human Understanding</i>, have + been very far from indicating to us the true means fitted to assist the + faculty whose business it is to make us weigh the probabilities of the + true and the false: not to mention the art of discovery, in which success + is still more difficult of attainment, and whereof we have nothing beyond + very imperfect samples in mathematics.</p> + + <p>32. One thing which might have contributed most towards M. Bayle's + belief that the difficulties of reason in opposition to faith cannot be + obviated is that he seems to demand that God be justified in some such + manner as that commonly used for pleading the cause of a man accused + before his judge. But he has not remembered that in the tribunals of men, + which cannot always penetrate to the truth, one is often compelled to be + guided by signs and probabilities, and above all by presumptions or + prejudices; whereas it is agreed, as we have already observed, that + Mysteries are not probable. For instance, M. Bayle will not have it that + one can justify the goodness of God in the permission of sin, because + probability would be against a man that should happen to be in <!-- Page + 93 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page93"></a>[93]</span> + circumstances comparable in our eyes to this permission. God foresees + that Eve will be deceived by the serpent if he places her in the + circumstances wherein she later found herself; and nevertheless he placed + her there. Now if a father or a guardian did the same in regard to his + child or his ward, if a friend did so in regard to a young person whose + behaviour was his concern, the judge would not be satisfied by the + excuses of an advocate who said that the man only permitted the evil, + without doing it or willing it: he would rather take this permission as a + sign of ill intention, and would regard it as a sin of omission, which + would render the one convicted thereof accessary in another's sin of + commission.</p> + + <p>33. But it must be borne in mind that when one has foreseen the evil + and has not prevented it although it seems as if one could have done so + with ease, and one has even done things that have facilitated it, it does + not follow on that account <i>necessarily</i> that one is accessary + thereto. It is only a very strong presumption, such as commonly replaces + truth in human affairs, but which would be destroyed by an exact + consideration of the facts, supposing we were capable of that in relation + to God. For amongst lawyers that is called 'presumption' which must + provisionally pass for truth in case the contrary is not proved; and it + says more than 'conjecture', although the <i>Dictionary</i> of the + Academy has not sifted the difference. Now there is every reason to + conclude unquestionably that one would find through this consideration, + if only it were attainable, that reasons most just, and stronger than + those which appear contrary to them, have compelled the All-Wise to + permit the evil, and even to do things which have facilitated it. Of this + some instances will be given later.</p> + + <p>34. It is none too easy, I confess, for a father, a guardian, a friend + to have such reasons in the case under consideration. Yet the thing is + not absolutely impossible, and a skilled writer of fiction might + perchance find an extraordinary case that would even justify a man in the + circumstances I have just indicated. But in reference to God there is no + need to suppose or to establish particular reasons such as may have + induced him to permit the evil; general reasons suffice. One knows that + he takes care of the whole universe, whereof all the parts are connected; + and one must thence infer that he has had innumerable considerations + whose result made him deem it inadvisable to prevent certain evils.</p> + + <p>35. It should even be concluded that there must have been <!-- Page 94 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page94"></a>[94]</span> great or rather + invincible reasons which prompted the divine Wisdom to the permission of + the evil that surprises us, from the mere fact that this permission has + occurred: for nothing can come from God that is not altogether consistent + with goodness, justice and holiness. Thus we can judge by the event (or + <i>a posteriori</i>) that the permission was indispensable, although it + be not possible for us to show this (<i>a priori</i>) by the detailed + reasons that God can have had therefor; as it is not necessary either + that we show this to justify him. M. Bayle himself aptly says concerning + that (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 165, + p. 1067): Sin made its way into the world; God therefore was able to + permit it without detriment to his perfections; <i>ab actu ad potentiam + valet consequentia.</i> In God this conclusion holds good: he did this, + therefore he did it well. It is not, then, that we have no notion of + justice in general fit to be applied also to God's justice; nor is it + that God's justice has other rules than the justice known of men, but + that the case in question is quite different from those which are common + among men. Universal right is the same for God and for men; but the + question of fact is quite different in their case and his.</p> + + <p>36. We may even assume or pretend (as I have already observed) that + there is something similar among men to this circumstance in God's + actions. A man might give such great and strong proofs of his virtue and + his holiness that all the most apparent reasons one could put forward + against him to charge him with an alleged crime, for instance a larceny + or murder, would deserve to be rejected as the calumnies of false + witnesses or as an extraordinary play of chance which sometimes throws + suspicion on the most innocent. Thus in a case where every other would + run the risk of being condemned or put to the torture (according to the + laws of the country), this man would be absolved by his judges + unanimously. Now in this case, which indeed is rare, but which is not + impossible, one might say in a sense (<i>sano sensu</i>) that there is a + conflict between reason and faith, and that the rules of law are other in + respect of this person than they are in respect of the remainder of + mankind. But that, when explained, will signify only that appearances of + reason here give way before the faith that is due to the word and the + integrity of this great and holy man, and that he is privileged above + other men; not indeed as if there were one law for others and another for + him, nor as if one had no understanding of what justice is in relation to + him. It is rather <!-- Page 95 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page95"></a>[95]</span> because the rules of universal justice do + not find here the application that they receive elsewhere, or because + they favour him instead of accusing him, since there are in this + personage qualities so admirable, that by virtue of a good logic of + probabilities one should place more faith in his word than in that of + many others.</p> + + <p>37. Since it is permitted here to imagine possible cases, may one not + suppose this incomparable man to be the Adept or the Possessor of</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i16"><i>'that blessed Stone</i></p> + <p><i>Able to enrich all earthly Kings alone'</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>and that he spends every day prodigious sums in order to feed and to + rescue from distress countless numbers of poor men? Be there never so + many witnesses or appearances of every kind tending to prove that this + great benefactor of the human race has just committed some larceny, is it + not true that the whole earth would make mock of the accusation, however + specious it might be? Now God is infinitely above the goodness and the + power of this man, and consequently there are no reasons at all, however + apparent they be, that can hold good against faith, that is, against the + assurance or the confidence in God wherewith we can and ought to say that + God has done all things well. The objections are therefore not insoluble. + They only involve prejudices and probabilities, which are, however, + overthrown by reasons incomparably stronger. One must not say either that + what we call <i>justice</i> is nothing in relation to God, that he is the + absolute Master of all things even to the point of being able to condemn + the innocent without violating his justice, or finally that justice is + something arbitrary where he is concerned. Those are rash and dangerous + expressions, whereunto some have been led astray to the discredit of the + attributes of God. For if such were the case there would be no reason for + praising his goodness and his justice: rather would it be as if the most + wicked spirit, the Prince of evil genii, the evil principle of the + Manichaeans, were the sole master of the universe, just as I observed + before. What means would there be of distinguishing the true God from the + false God of Zoroaster if all things depended upon the caprice of an + arbitrary power and there were neither rule nor consideration for + anything whatever?</p> + + <p>38. It is therefore more than evident that nothing compels us to + commit ourselves to a doctrine so strange, since it suffices to say <!-- + Page 96 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page96"></a>[96]</span> that we + have not enough knowledge of the facts when there is a question of + answering probabilities which appear to throw doubt upon the justice and + the goodness of God, and which would vanish away if the facts were well + known to us. We need neither renounce reason in order to listen to faith + nor blind ourselves in order to see clearly, as Queen Christine used to + say: it is enough to reject ordinary appearances when they are contrary + to Mysteries; and this is not contrary to reason, since even in natural + things we are very often undeceived about appearances either by + experience or by superior reasons. All that has been set down here in + advance, only with the object of showing more plainly wherein the fault + of the objections and the abuse of reason consists in the present case, + where the claim is made that reason has greatest force against faith: we + shall come afterwards to a more exact discussion of that which concerns + the origin of evil and the permission of sin with its consequences.</p> + + <p>39. For now, it will be well to continue our examination of the + important question of the use of reason in theology, and to make + reflexions upon what M. Bayle has said thereon in divers passages of his + works. As he paid particular attention in his <i>Historical and Critical + Dictionary</i> to expounding the objections of the Manichaeans and those + of the Pyrrhonians, and as this procedure had been criticized by some + persons zealous for religion, he placed a dissertation at the end of the + second edition of this <i>Dictionary</i>, which aimed at showing, by + examples, by authorities and by reasons, the innocence and usefulness of + his course of action. I am persuaded (as I have said above) that the + specious objections one can urge against truth are very useful, and that + they serve to confirm and to illumine it, giving opportunity to + intelligent persons to find new openings or to turn the old to better + account. But M. Bayle seeks therein a usefulness quite the reverse of + this: it would be that of displaying the power of faith by showing that + the truths it teaches cannot sustain the attacks of reason and that it + nevertheless holds its own in the heart of the faithful. M. Nicole seems + to call that 'the triumph of God's authority over human reason', in the + words of his quoted by M. Bayle in the third volume of his <i>Reply to + the Questions of a Provincial</i> (ch. 177, p. 120). But since reason is + a gift of God, even as faith is, contention between them would cause God + to contend against God; and if the objections of reason against any + article of faith are insoluble, then it must be said that <!-- Page 97 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page97"></a>[97]</span> this alleged + article will be false and not revealed: this will be a chimera of the + human mind, and the triumph of this faith will be capable of comparison + with bonfires lighted after a defeat. Such is the doctrine of the + damnation of unbaptized children, which M. Nicole would have us assume to + be a consequence of original sin; such would be the eternal damnation of + adults lacking the light that is necessary for the attainment of + salvation.</p> + + <p>40. Yet everyone need not enter into theological discussions; and + persons whose condition allows not of exact researches should be content + with instruction on faith, without being disturbed by the objections; and + if some exceeding great difficulty should happen to strike them, it is + permitted to them to avert the mind from it, offering to God a sacrifice + of their curiosity: for when one is assured of a truth one has no need to + listen to the objections. As there are many people whose faith is rather + small and shallow to withstand such dangerous tests, I think one must not + present them with that which might be poisonous for them; or, if one + cannot hide from them what is only too public, the antidote must be added + to it; that is to say, one must try to add the answer to the objection, + certainly not withhold it as unobtainable.</p> + + <p>41. The passages from the excellent theologians who speak of this + triumph of faith can and should receive a meaning appropriate to the + principles I have just affirmed. There appear in some objects of faith + two great qualities capable of making it triumph over reason, the one is + <i>incomprehensibility</i>, the other is <i>the lack of probability</i>. + But one must beware of adding thereto the third quality whereof M. Bayle + speaks, and of saying that what one believes is <i>indefensible</i>: for + that would be to cause reason in its turn to triumph in a manner that + would destroy faith. Incomprehensibility does not prevent us from + believing even natural truths. For instance (as I have already pointed + out) we do not comprehend the nature of odours and savours, and yet we + are persuaded, by a kind of faith which we owe to the evidence of the + senses, that these perceptible qualities are founded upon the nature of + things and that they are not illusions.</p> + + <p>42. There are also things contrary to appearances, which we admit when + they are sufficiently verified. There is a little romance of Spanish + origin, whose title states that one must not always believe what one + sees. What was there more specious than the lie of the false Martin + Guerre, who was acknowledged as the true <!-- Page 98 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page98"></a>[98]</span> Martin by the true + Martin's wife and relatives, and caused the judges and the relatives to + waver for a long time even after the arrival of the other? Nevertheless + the truth was known in the end. It is the same with faith. I have already + observed that all one can oppose to the goodness and the justice of God + is nothing but appearances, which would be strong against a man, but + which are nullified when they are applied to God and when they are + weighed against the proofs that assure us of the infinite perfection of + his attributes. Thus faith triumphs over false reasons by means of sound + and superior reasons that have made us embrace it; but it would not + triumph if the contrary opinion had for it reasons as strong as or even + stronger than those which form the foundation of faith, that is, if there + were invincible and conclusive objections against faith.</p> + + <p><a name="sect43">43</a>. It is well also to observe here that what M. + Bayle calls a 'triumph of faith' is in part a triumph of demonstrative + reason against apparent and deceptive reasons which are improperly set + against the demonstrations. For it must be taken into consideration that + the objections of the Manichaeans are hardly less contrary to natural + theology than to revealed theology. And supposing one surrendered to them + Holy Scripture, original sin, the grace of God in Jesus Christ, the pains + of hell and the other articles of our religion, one would not even so be + delivered from their objections: for one cannot deny that there is in the + world physical evil (that is, suffering) and moral evil (that is, crime) + and even that physical evil is not always distributed here on earth + according to the proportion of moral evil, as it seems that justice + demands. There remains, then, this question of natural theology, how a + sole Principle, all-good, all-wise and all-powerful, has been able to + admit evil, and especially to permit sin, and how it could resolve to + make the wicked often happy and the good unhappy?</p> + + <p>44. Now we have no need of revealed faith to know that there is such a + sole Principle of all things, entirely good and wise. Reason teaches us + this by infallible proofs; and in consequence all the objections taken + from the course of things, in which we observe imperfections, are only + based on false appearances. For, if we were capable of understanding the + universal harmony, we should see that what we are tempted to find fault + with is connected with the plan most worthy of being chosen; in a word, + we <i>should see</i>, and should not <i>believe</i> only, that what God + has done is the best. I call <!-- Page 99 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page99"></a>[99]</span> 'seeing' here what one knows <i>a + priori</i> by the causes; and 'believing' what one only judges by the + effects, even though the one be as certainly known as the other. And one + can apply here too the saying of St. Paul (2 Cor. v. 7), that we walk by + <i>faith</i> and not by <i>sight</i>. For the infinite wisdom of God + being known to us, we conclude that the evils we experience had to be + permitted, and this we conclude from the effect or <i>a posteriori</i>, + that is to say, because they exist. It is what M. Bayle acknowledges; and + he ought to content himself with that, and not claim that one must put an + end to the false appearances which are contrary thereto. It is as if one + asked that there should be no more dreams or optical illusions.</p> + + <p>45. And it is not to be doubted that this faith and this confidence in + God, who gives us insight into his infinite goodness and prepares us for + his love, in spite of the appearances of harshness that may repel us, are + an admirable exercise for the virtues of Christian theology, when the + divine grace in Jesus Christ arouses these motions within us. That is + what Luther aptly observed in opposition to Erasmus, saying that it is + love in the highest degree to love him who to flesh and blood appears so + unlovable, so harsh toward the unfortunate and so ready to condemn, and + to condemn for evils in which he appears to be the cause or accessary, at + least in the eyes of those who allow themselves to be dazzled by false + reasons. One may therefore say that the triumph of true reason illumined + by divine grace is at the same time the triumph of faith and love.</p> + + <p>46. M. Bayle appears to have taken the matter quite otherwise: he + declares himself against reason, when he might have been content to + censure its abuse. He quotes the words of Cotta in Cicero, where he goes + so far as to say that if reason were a gift of the gods providence would + be to blame for having given it, since it tends to our harm. M. Bayle + also thinks that human reason is a source of destruction and not of + edification (<i>Historical and Critical Dictionary</i>, p. 2026, col. 2), + that it is a runner who knows not where to stop, and who, like another + Penelope, herself destroys her own work.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Destruit, aedificat, mutat quadrata rotundis.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>(<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, p. 725). But + he takes pains especially to pile up many authorities one upon the other, + in order to show that theologians of all parties reject the use of reason + just as he does, and that they call attention to such gleams of reason as + oppose religion only that they may sacrifice them to <!-- Page 100 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page100"></a>[100]</span> faith by a + mere repudiation, answering nothing but the conclusion of the argument + that is brought against them. He begins with the New Testament. Jesus + Christ was content to say: 'Follow Me' (Luke v. 27; ix. 59). The Apostles + said: 'Believe, and thou shalt be saved' (Acts xvi. 3). St. Paul + acknowledges that his 'doctrine is obscure' (1 Cor. xiii. 12), that 'one + can comprehend nothing therein' unless God impart a spiritual + discernment, and without that it only passes for foolishness (1 Cor. ii. + 14). He exhorts the faithful 'to beware of philosophy' (Col. ii. 8) and + to avoid disputations in that science, which had caused many persons to + lose faith.</p> + + <p>47. As for the Fathers of the Church, M. Bayle refers us to the + collection of passages from them against the use of philosophy and of + reason which M. de Launoy made (<i>De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna,</i> cap. + 2) and especially to the passages from St. Augustine collected by M. + Arnauld (against Mallet), which state: that the judgements of God are + inscrutable; that they are not any the less just for that they are + unknown to us; that it is a deep abyss, which one cannot fathom without + running the risk of falling down the precipice; that one cannot without + temerity try to elucidate that which God willed to keep hidden; that his + will cannot but be just; that many men, having tried to explain this + incomprehensible depth, have fallen into vain imaginations and opinions + full of error and bewilderment.</p> + + <p>48. The Schoolmen have spoken in like manner. M. Bayle quotes a + beautiful passage from Cardinal Cajetan (Part I, <i>Summ.</i>, qu. 22, + art. 4) to this effect: 'Our mind', he says, 'rests not upon the evidence + of known truth but upon the impenetrable depth of hidden truth. And as + St. Gregory says: He who believes touching the Divinity only that which + he can gauge with his mind belittles the idea of God. Yet I do not + surmise that it is necessary to deny any of the things which we know, or + which we see as appertaining to the immutability, the actuality, the + certainty, the universality, etc., of God: but I think that there is here + some secret, either in regard to the relation which exists between God + and the event, or in respect of what connects the event itself with his + prevision. Thus, reflecting that the understanding of our soul is the eye + of the owl, I find the soul's repose only in ignorance. For it is better + both for the Catholic Faith and for Philosophic Faith to confess our + blindness, than to affirm as evident what does not afford our mind the + contentment which self-evidence gives. I do not accuse of <!-- Page 101 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page101"></a>[101]</span> presumption, + on that account, all the learned men who stammeringly have endeavoured to + suggest, as far as in them lay, the immobility and the sovereign and + eternal efficacy of the understanding, of the will and of the power of + God, through the infallibility of divine election and divine relation to + all events. Nothing of all that interferes with my surmise that there is + some depth which is hidden from us.' This passage of Cajetan is all the + more notable since he was an author competent to reach the heart of the + matter.</p> + + <p>49. Luther's book against Erasmus is full of vigorous comments hostile + to those who desire to submit revealed truths to the tribunal of our + reason. Calvin often speaks in the same tone, against the inquisitive + daring of those who seek to penetrate into the counsels of God. He + declares in his treatise on predestination that God had just causes for + damning some men, but causes unknown to us. Finally M. Bayle quotes + sundry modern writers who have spoken to the same effect (<i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, ch. 161 et seq.).</p> + + <p>50. But all these expressions and innumerable others like them do not + prove that the objections opposed to faith are so insoluble as M. Bayle + supposes. It is true that the counsels of God are inscrutable, but there + is no invincible objection which tends to the conclusion that they are + unjust. What appears injustice on the part of God, and foolishness in our + faith, only appears so. The famous passage of Tertullian (<i>De Carne + Christi</i>), 'mortuus est Dei filius, credibile est, quia ineptum est; + et sepultus revixit, certum est, quia impossibile', is a sally that can + only be meant to concern appearances of absurdity. There are others like + them in Luther's book on <i>Freewill in Bondage</i>, as when he says (ch. + 174): 'Si placet tibi Deus indignos coronans, non debet displicere + immeritos damnans.' Which being reduced to more temperate phrasing, + means: If you approve that God give eternal glory to those who are not + better than the rest, you should not disapprove that he abandon those who + are not worse than the rest. And to judge that he speaks only of + appearances of injustice, one only has to weigh these words of the same + author taken from the same book: 'In all the rest', he says, 'we + recognize in God a supreme majesty; there is only justice that we dare to + question: and we will not believe provisionally [tantisper] that he is + just, albeit he has promised us that the time shall come when his glory + being revealed all men shall see clearly that he has been and that he is + just.'</p> + +<p><!-- Page 102 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page102"></a>[102]</span></p> + + <p>51. It will be found also that when the Fathers entered into a + discussion they did not simply reject reason. And, in disputations with + the pagans, they endeavour usually to show how paganism is contrary to + reason, and how the Christian religion has the better of it on that side + also. Origen showed Celsus how reasonable Christianity is and why, + notwithstanding, the majority of Christians should believe without + examination. Celsus had jeered at the behaviour of Christians, 'who, + willing', he said, 'neither to listen to your reasons nor to give you any + for what they believe, are content to say to you: Examine not, only + believe, or: Your faith will save you; and they hold this as a maxim, + that the wisdom of the world is an evil.'</p> + + <p>52. Origen gives the answer of a wise man, and in conformity with the + principles we have established in the matter. For reason, far from being + contrary to Christianity, serves as a foundation for this religion, and + will bring about its acceptance by those who can achieve the examination + of it. But, as few people are capable of this, the heavenly gift of plain + faith tending towards good suffices for men in general. 'If it were + possible', he says, 'for all men, neglecting the affairs of life, to + apply themselves to study and meditation, one need seek no other way to + make them accept the Christian religion. For, to say nothing likely to + offend anyone' (he insinuates that the pagan religion is absurd, but he + will not say so explicitly), 'there will be found therein no less + exactitude than elsewhere, whether in the discussion of its dogmas, or in + the elucidation of the enigmatical expressions of its prophets, or in the + interpretation of the parables of its gospels and of countless other + things happening or ordained symbolically. But since neither the + necessities of life nor the infirmities of men permit of this application + to study, save for a very small number of persons, what means could one + find more qualified to benefit everyone else in the world than those + Jesus Christ wished to be used for the conversion of the nations? And I + would fain ask with regard to the great number of those who believe, and + who thereby have withdrawn themselves from the quagmire of vices wherein + before they were plunged, which would be the better: to have thus changed + one's morals and reformed one's life, believing without examination that + there are punishments for sin and rewards for good actions; or to have + waited for one's conversion until one not only believed but had examined + with care the foundations of these dogmas? It is certain <!-- Page 103 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page103"></a>[103]</span> that, were + this method to be followed, few indeed would reach that point whither + they are led by their plain and simple faith, but the majority would + remain in their corruption.'</p> + + <p>53. M. Bayle (in his explanation concerning the objections of the + Manichaeans, placed at the end of the second edition of the + <i>Dictionary</i>) takes those words where Origen points out that + religion can stand the test of having her dogmas discussed, as if it were + not meant in relation to philosophy, but only in relation to the accuracy + wherewith the authority and the true meaning of Holy Scripture is + established. But there is nothing to indicate this restriction. Origen + wrote against a philosopher whom such a restriction would not have + suited. And it appears that this Father wished to point out that among + Christians there was no less exactitude than among the Stoics and some + other philosophers, who established their doctrine as much by reason as + by authorities, as, for example, Chrysippus did, who found his philosophy + even in the symbols of pagan antiquity.</p> + + <p>54. Celsus brings up still another objection to the Christians, in the + same place. 'If they withdraw', he says, 'regularly into their "Examine + not, only believe", they must tell me at least what are the things they + wish me to believe.' Therein he is doubtless right, and that tells + against those who would say that God is good and just, and who yet would + maintain that we have no notion of goodness and of justice when we + attribute these perfections to him. But one must not always demand what I + call 'adequate notions', involving nothing that is not explained, since + even perceptible qualities, like heat, light, sweetness, cannot give us + such notions. Thus we agreed that Mysteries should receive an + explanation, but this explanation is imperfect. It suffices for us to + have some analogical understanding of a Mystery such as the Trinity and + the Incarnation, to the end that in accepting them we pronounce not words + altogether devoid of meaning: but it is not necessary that the + explanation go as far as we would wish, that is, to the extent of + comprehension and to the <i>how</i>.</p> + + <p>55. It appears strange therefore that M. Bayle rejects the tribunal of + <i>common notions</i> (in the third volume of his <i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, pp. 1062 and 1140) as if one should not + consult the idea of goodness in answering the Manichaeans; whereas he had + declared himself quite differently in his <i>Dictionary</i>. Of necessity + there must be agreement upon the meaning of <i>good</i> <!-- Page 104 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page104"></a>[104]</span> and + <i>bad</i>, amongst those who are in dispute over the question whether + there is only one principle, altogether good, or whether there are two, + the one good and the other bad. We understand something by union when we + are told of the union of one body with another or of a substance with its + accident, of a subject with its adjunct, of the place with the moving + body, of the act with the potency; we also mean something when we speak + of the union of the soul with the body to make thereof one single person. + For albeit I do not hold that the soul changes the laws of the body, or + that the body changes the laws of the soul, and I have introduced the + Pre-established Harmony to avoid this derangement, I nevertheless admit a + true union between the soul and the body, which makes thereof a + suppositum. This union belongs to the metaphysical, whereas a union of + influence would belong to the physical. But when we speak of the union of + the Word of God with human nature we should be content with an analogical + knowledge, such as the comparison of the union of the soul with the body + is capable of giving us. We should, moreover, be content to say that the + Incarnation is the closest union that can exist between the Creator and + the creature; and further we should not want to go.</p> + + <p>56. It is the same with the other Mysteries, where moderate minds will + ever find an explanation sufficient for belief, but never such as would + be necessary for understanding. A certain <i>what it is</i> (<span + lang="el" title="ti esti" >τι + εστι</span>) is enough for us, but the <i>how</i> + (<span lang="el" title="pôs" >πως</span>) is beyond us, + and is not necessary for us. One may say concerning the explanations of + Mysteries which are given out here and there, what the Queen of Sweden + inscribed upon a medal concerning the crown she had abandoned, 'Non mi + bisogna, e non mi basta.' Nor have we any need either (as I have already + observed) to prove the Mysteries <i>a priori</i>, or to give a reason for + them; it suffices us <i>that the thing is thus</i> (<span lang="el" + title="to hoti" >το ‛οτι</span>) + even though we know not the <i>why</i> (<span lang="el" title="to dioti" + >το διοτι</span>), which God + has reserved for himself. These lines, written on that theme by Joseph + Scaliger, are beautiful and renowned:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Ne curiosus quaere causas omnium,</i></p> + <p><i>Quaecumque libris vis Prophetarum indidit</i></p> + <p><i>Afflata caelo, plena veraci Deo:</i></p> + <p><i>Nec operta sacri supparo silentii</i></p> + <p><i>Irrumpere aude, sed pudenter praeteri.</i></p> +<!-- Page 105 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page105"></a>[105]</span> + <p><i>Nescire velle, quae Magister optimus</i></p> + <p><i>Docere non vult, erudita inscitia est.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>M. Bayle, who quotes them (<i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, vol. III, p. 1055), holds the likely opinion that + Scaliger made them upon the disputes between Arminius and Gomarus. I + think M. Bayle repeated them from memory, for he put <i>sacrata</i> + instead of <i>afflata</i>. But it is apparently the printer's fault that + <i>prudenter</i> stands in place of <i>pudenter</i> (that is, modestly) + which the metre requires.</p> + + <p>57. Nothing can be more judicious than the warning these lines + contain; and M. Bayle is right in saying (p. 729) that those who claim + that the behaviour of God with respect to sin and the consequences of sin + contains nothing but what they can account for, deliver themselves up to + the mercy of their adversary. But he is not right in combining here two + very different things, 'to account for a thing', and 'to uphold it + against objections'; as he does when he presently adds: 'They are obliged + to follow him [their adversary] everywhere whither he shall wish to lead + them, and it would be to retire ignominiously and ask for quarter, if + they were to admit that our intelligence is too weak to remove completely + all the objections advanced by a philosopher.'</p> + + <p>58. It seems here that, according to M. Bayle, 'accounting for' comes + short of 'answering objections', since he threatens one who should + undertake the first with the resulting obligation to pass on to the + second. But it is quite the opposite: he who maintains a thesis (the + <i>respondens</i>) is not bound to account for it, but he is bound to + meet the objections of an opponent. A defendant in law is not bound (as a + general rule) to prove his right or to produce his title to possession; + but he is obliged to reply to the arguments of the plaintiff. I have + marvelled many times that a writer so precise and so shrewd as M. Bayle + so often here confuses things where so much difference exists as between + these three acts of reason: to comprehend, to prove, and to answer + objections; as if when it is a question of the use of reason in theology + one term were as good as another. Thus he says in his posthumous + Conversations, p. 73: 'There is no principle which M. Bayle has more + often inculcated than this, that the incomprehensibility of a dogma and + the insolubility of the objections that oppose it provide no legitimate + reason for rejecting it.' This is true as regards the + incomprehensibility, but it is not the same with the insolubility. And it + is indeed <!-- Page 106 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page106"></a>[106]</span> just as if one said that an invincible + reason against a thesis was not a legitimate reason for rejecting it. For + what other legitimate reason for rejecting an opinion can one find, if an + invincible opposing argument is not such an one? And what means shall one + have thereafter of demonstrating the falsity, and even the absurdity, of + any opinion?</p> + + <p>59. It is well to observe also that he who proves a thing <i>a + priori</i> accounts for it through the efficient cause; and whosoever can + thus account for it in a precise and adequate manner is also in a + position to comprehend the thing. Therefore it was that the Scholastic + theologians had already censured Raymond Lully for having undertaken to + demonstrate the Trinity by philosophy. This so-called demonstration is to + be found in his <i>Works</i>; and Bartholomaeus Keckermann, a writer + renowned in the Reformed party, having made an attempt of just the same + kind upon the same Mystery, has been no less censured for it by some + modern theologians. Therefore censure will fall upon those who shall wish + to account for this Mystery and make it comprehensible, but praise will + be given to those who shall toil to uphold it against the objections of + adversaries.</p> + + <p>60. I have said already that theologians usually distinguish between + what is above reason and what is against reason. They place <i>above</i> + reason that which one cannot comprehend and which one cannot account for. + But <i>against</i> reason will be all opinion that is opposed by + invincible reasons, or the contrary of which can be proved in a precise + and sound manner. They avow, therefore, that the Mysteries are above + reason, but they do not admit that they are contrary to it. The English + author of a book which is ingenious, but has met with disapproval, + entitled <i>Christianity not Mysterious</i>, wished to combat this + distinction; but it does not seem to me that he has at all weakened it. + M. Bayle also is not quite satisfied with this accepted distinction. This + is what he says on the matter (vol. III of the <i>Reply to the Questions + of a Provincial</i>, ch. 158). Firstly (p. 998) he distinguishes, + together with M. Saurin, between these two theses: the one, <i>all the + dogmas of Christianity are in conformity with reason</i>; the other, + <i>human reason knows that they are in conformity with reason</i>. He + affirms the first and denies the second. I am of the same opinion, if in + saying 'that a dogma conforms to reason' one means that it is possible to + account for it or to explain its <i>how</i> by reason; for God could + doubtless do so, and we cannot. But I think that one <!-- Page 107 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page107"></a>[107]</span> must affirm + both theses if by 'knowing that a dogma conforms to reason' one means + that we can demonstrate, if need be, that there is no contradiction + between this dogma and reason, repudiating the objections of those who + maintain that this dogma is an absurdity.</p> + + <p>61. M. Bayle explains himself here in a manner not at all convincing. + He acknowledges fully that our Mysteries are in accordance with the + supreme and universal reason that is in the divine understanding, or with + reason in general; yet he denies that they are in accordance with that + part of reason which man employs to judge things. But this portion of + reason which we possess is a gift of God, and consists in the natural + light that has remained with us in the midst of corruption; thus it is in + accordance with the whole, and it differs from that which is in God only + as a drop of water differs from the ocean or rather as the finite from + the infinite. Therefore Mysteries may transcend it, but they cannot be + contrary to it. One cannot be contrary to one part without being contrary + to the whole. That which contradicts a proposition of Euclid is contrary + to the <i>Elements</i> of Euclid. That which in us is contrary to the + Mysteries is not reason nor is it the natural light or the linking + together of truths; it is corruption, or error, or prejudice, or + darkness.</p> + + <p>62. M. Bayle (p. 1002) is not satisfied with the opinion of Josua + Stegman and of M. Turretin, Protestant theologians who teach that the + Mysteries are contrary only to corrupt reason. He asks, mockingly, + whether by right reason is meant perchance that of an orthodox theologian + and by corrupt reason that of an heretic; and he urges the objection that + the evidence of the Mystery of the Trinity was no greater in the soul of + Luther than in the soul of Socinius. But as M. Descartes has well + observed, good sense is distributed to all: thus one must believe that + both the orthodox and heretics are endowed therewith. Right reason is a + linking together of truths, corrupt reason is mixed with prejudices and + passions. And in order to discriminate between the two, one need but + proceed in good order, admit no thesis without proof, and admit no proof + unless it be in proper form, according to the commonest rules of logic. + One needs neither any other criterion nor other arbitrator in questions + of reason. It is only through lack of this consideration that a handle + has been given to the sceptics, and that even in theology François Véron + and some others, who <!-- Page 108 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page108"></a>[108]</span> exacerbated the dispute with the + Protestants, even to the point of dishonesty, plunged headlong into + scepticism in order to prove the necessity of accepting an infallible + external judge. Their course meets with no approval from the most expert, + even in their own party: Calixtus and Daillé derided it as it deserved, + and Bellarmine argued quite otherwise.</p> + + <p>63. Now let us come to what M. Bayle says (p. 999) on the distinction + we are concerned with. 'It seems to me', he says, 'that an ambiguity has + crept into the celebrated distinction drawn between things that are above + reason and things that are against reason. The Mysteries of the Gospel + are above reason, so it is usually said, but they are not contrary to + reason. I think that the same sense is not given to the word reason in + the first part of this axiom as in the second: by the first is understood + rather the reason of man, or reason <i>in concreto</i> and by the second + reason in general, or reason <i>in abstracto</i>. For supposing that it + is understood always as reason in general or the supreme reason, the + universal reason that is in God, it is equally true that the Mysteries of + the Gospels are not above reason and that they are not against reason. + But if in both parts of the axiom human reason is meant, I do not clearly + see the soundness of the distinction: for the most orthodox confess that + we know not how our Mysteries can conform to the maxims of philosophy. It + seems to us, therefore, that they are not in conformity with our reason. + Now that which appears to us not to be in conformity with our reason + appears contrary to our reason, just as that which appears to us not in + conformity with truth appears contrary to truth. Thus why should not one + say, equally, that the Mysteries are against our feeble reason, and that + they are above our feeble reason?' I answer, as I have done already, that + 'reason' here is the linking together of the truths that we know by the + light of nature, and in this sense the axiom is true and without any + ambiguity. The Mysteries transcend our reason, since they contain truths + that are not comprised in this sequence; but they are not contrary to our + reason, and they do not contradict any of the truths whereto this + sequence can lead us. Accordingly there is no question here of the + universal reason that is in God, but of our reason. As for the question + whether we know the Mysteries to conform with our reason, I answer that + at least we never know of any non-conformity or any opposition between + the Mysteries and reason. Moreover, we can always abolish such alleged + <!-- Page 109 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page109"></a>[109]</span> + opposition, and so, if this can be called reconciling or harmonizing + faith with reason, or recognizing the conformity between them, it must be + said that we can recognize this conformity and this harmony. But if the + conformity consists in a reasonable explanation of the <i>how</i>, we + cannot recognize it.</p> + + <p>64. M. Bayle makes one more ingenious objection, which he draws from + the example of the sense of sight. 'When a square tower', he says, 'from + a distance appears to us round, our eyes testify very clearly not only + that they perceive nothing square in this tower, but also that they + discover there a round shape, incompatible with the square shape. One may + therefore say that the truth which is the square shape is not only above, + but even against, the witness of our feeble sight.' It must be admitted + that this observation is correct, and although it be true that the + appearance of roundness comes simply from the effacement of the angles, + which distance causes to disappear, it is true, notwithstanding, that the + round and the square are opposites. Therefore my answer to this objection + is that the representation of the senses, even when they do all that in + them lies, is often contrary to the truth; but it is not the same with + the faculty of reasoning, when it does its duty, since a strictly + reasoned argument is nothing but a linking together of truths. And as for + the sense of sight in particular, it is well to consider that there are + yet other false appearances which come not from the 'feebleness of our + eyes' nor from the loss of visibility brought about by distance, but from + the very <i>nature of vision</i>, however perfect it be. It is thus, for + instance, that the circle seen sideways is changed into that kind of oval + which among geometricians is known as an ellipse, and sometimes even into + a parabola or a hyperbola, or actually into a straight line, witness the + ring of Saturn.</p> + + <p>65. The <i>external</i> senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. + It is our inner sense which often makes us go too fast. That occurs also + in brute beasts, as when a dog barks at his reflexion in the mirror: for + beasts have <i>consecutions</i> of perception which resemble reasoning, + and which occur also in the inner sense of men, when their actions have + only an empirical quality. But beasts do nothing which compels us to + believe that they have what deserves to be properly called a + <i>reasoning</i> sense, as I have shown elsewhere. Now when the + understanding uses and follows the false decision of the inner sense (as + when the famous Galileo thought that Saturn had <!-- Page 110 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page110"></a>[110]</span> two handles) it is + deceived by the judgement it makes upon the effect of appearances, and it + infers from them more than they imply. For the appearances of the senses + do not promise us absolutely the truth of things, any more than dreams + do. It is we who deceive ourselves by the use we make of them, that is, + by our consecutions. Indeed we allow ourselves to be deluded by probable + arguments, and we are inclined to think that phenomena such as we have + found linked together often are so always. Thus, as it happens usually + that that which appears without angles has none, we readily believe it to + be always thus. Such an error is pardonable, and sometimes inevitable, + when it is necessary to act promptly and choose that which appearances + recommend; but when we have the leisure and the time to collect our + thoughts, we are in fault if we take for certain that which is not so. It + is therefore true that appearances are often contrary to truth, but our + reasoning never is when it proceeds strictly in accordance with the rules + of the art of reasoning. If by <i>reason</i> one meant generally the + faculty of reasoning whether well or ill, I confess that it might deceive + us, and does indeed deceive us, and the appearances of our understanding + are often as deceptive as those of the senses: but here it is a question + of the linking together of truths and of objections in due form, and in + this sense it is impossible for reason to deceive us.</p> + + <p>66. Thus it may be seen from all I have just said that M. Bayle + carries too far <i>the being above reason</i>, as if it included the + insoluble nature of objections: for according to him (<i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 130, p. 651) 'once a dogma + is above reason, philosophy can neither explain it nor comprehend it, nor + meet the difficulties that are urged against it'. I agree with regard to + comprehension, but I have already shown that the Mysteries receive a + necessary verbal explanation, to the end that the terms employed be not + <i>sine mente soni</i>, words signifying nothing. I have shown also that + it is necessary for one to be capable of answering the objections, and + that otherwise one must needs reject the thesis.</p> + + <p>67. He adduces the authority of theologians, who appear to recognize + the insoluble nature of the objections against the Mysteries. Luther is + one of the chief of these; but I have already replied, in <a + href="#sect12">§ 12</a>, to the passage where he seems to say that + philosophy contradicts theology. There is another passage (<i>De Servo + Arbitrio</i>, ch. 246) where he says that the apparent injustice of <!-- + Page 111 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page111"></a>[111]</span> God + is proved by arguments taken from the adversity of good people and the + prosperity of the wicked, an argument irresistible both for all reason + and for natural intelligence ('Argumentis talibus traducta, quibus nulla + ratio aut lumen naturae potest resistere'). But soon afterwards he shows + that he means it only of those who know nothing of the life to come, + since he adds that an expression in the Gospel dissipates this + difficulty, teaching us that there is another life, where that which has + not been punished and rewarded in this life shall receive its due. The + objection is then far from being insuperable, and even without the aid of + the Gospel one could bethink oneself of this answer. There is also quoted + (<i>Reply</i>, vol. III, p. 652) a passage from Martin Chemnitz, + criticized by Vedelius and defended by Johann Musaeus, where this famous + theologian seems to say clearly that there are truths in the word of God + which are not only above reason but also against reason. But this passage + must be taken as referring only to the principles of reason that are in + accordance with the order of Nature, as Musaeus also interprets it.</p> + + <p>68. It is true nevertheless that M. Bayle finds some authorities who + are more favourable to him, M. Descartes being one of the chief. This + great man says positively (Part I of his <i>Principles</i>, art. 41) + 'that we shall have not the slightest trouble in ridding ourselves of the + difficulty' (which one may have in harmonizing the freedom of our will + with the order of the eternal providence of God) 'if we observe that our + thought is finite, and that the Knowledge and the Omnipotence of God, + whereby he has not only known from all eternity all that which is or + which can be, but also has willed it, is infinite. We have therefore + quite enough intelligence to recognize clearly and distinctly that this + knowledge and this power are in God; but we have not enough so to + comprehend their scope that we can know how they leave the actions of men + entirely free and undetermined. Yet the Power and the Knowledge of God + must not prevent us from believing that we have a free will; for we + should be wrong to doubt of that whereof we are inwardly conscious, and + which we know by experience to be within us, simply because we do not + comprehend some other thing which we know to be incomprehensible in its + nature.'</p> + + <p>69. This passage from M. Descartes, followed by his adherents (who + rarely think of doubting what he asserts), has always appeared strange to + me. Not content with saying that, as for him, <!-- Page 112 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page112"></a>[112]</span> he sees no way of + reconciling the two dogmas, he puts the whole human race, and even all + rational creatures, in the same case. Yet could he have been unaware that + there is no possibility of an insuperable objection against truth? For + such an objection could only be a necessary linking together of other + truths whose result would be contrary to the truth that one maintains; + and consequently there would be contradiction between the truths, which + would be an utter absurdity. Moreover, albeit our mind is finite and + cannot comprehend the infinite, of the infinite nevertheless it has + proofs whose strength or weakness it comprehends; why then should it not + have the same comprehension in regard to the objections? And since the + power and the wisdom of God are infinite and comprehend everything, there + is no pretext for doubting their scope. Further, M. Descartes demands a + freedom which is not needed, by his insistence that the actions of the + will of man are altogether undetermined, a thing which never happens. + Finally, M. Bayle himself maintains that this experience or this inward + sense of our independence, upon which M. Descartes founds the proof of + our freedom, does not prove it: for from the fact that we are not + conscious of the causes whereon we depend, it does not follow, according + to M. Bayle, that we are independent. But that is something we will speak + of in its proper place.</p> + + <p>70. It seems that M. Descartes confesses also, in a passage of his + <i>Principles</i>, that it is impossible to find an answer to the + difficulties on the division of matter to infinity, which he nevertheless + recognizes as actual. Arriaga and other Schoolmen make well-nigh the same + confession: but if they took the trouble to give to the objections the + form these ought to have, they would see that there are faults in the + reasoning, and sometimes false assumptions which cause confusion. Here is + an example. A man of parts one day brought up to me an objection in the + following form: Let the straight line BA be cut in two equal parts at the + point C, and the part CA at the point D, and the part DA at the point E, + and so on to infinity; all the halves, BC, CD, DE, etc., together make + the whole BA; therefore there must be a last half, since the straight + line BA finishes at A. But this last half is absurd: for since it is a + line, it will be possible again to cut it in two. Therefore division to + infinity cannot be admitted. But I pointed out to him that one is not + justified in the inference that there must be a last half, although there + be a last point A, for this last point belongs to all <!-- Page 113 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page113"></a>[113]</span> the halves of + its side. And my friend acknowledged it himself when he endeavoured to + prove this deduction by a formal argument; on the contrary, just because + the division goes on to infinity, there is no last half. And although the + straight line AB be finite, it does not follow that the process of + dividing it has any final end. The same confusion arises with the series + of numbers going on to infinity. One imagines a final end, a number that + is infinite, or infinitely small; but that is all simple fiction. Every + number is finite and specific; every line is so likewise, and the + infinite or infinitely small signify only magnitudes that one may take as + great or as small as one wishes, to show that an error is smaller than + that which has been specified, that is to say, that there is no error; or + else by the infinitely small is meant the state of a magnitude at its + vanishing point or its beginning, conceived after the pattern of + magnitudes already actualized.</p> + + <p>71. It will, however, be well to consider the argument that M. Bayle + puts forward to show that one cannot refute the objections which reason + opposes to the Mysteries. It is in his comment on the Manichaeans (p. + 3140 of the second edition of his <i>Dictionary</i>). 'It is enough for + me', he says, 'that it be unanimously acknowledged that the Mysteries of + the Gospel are above reason. For thence comes the necessary conclusion + that it is impossible to settle the difficulties raised by the + philosophers, and in consequence that a dispute where only the light of + Nature is followed will always end unfavourably for the theologians, and + that they will see themselves forced to give way and to take refuge in + the canon of the supernatural light.' I am surprised that M. Bayle speaks + in such general terms, since he has acknowledged himself that the light + of Nature is against the Manichaeans, and for the oneness of the + Principle, and that the goodness of God is proved incontrovertibly by + reason. Yet this is how he continues:</p> + + <p>72. 'It is evident that reason can never attain to that which is above + it. Now if it could supply answers to the objections which are opposed to + the dogma of the Trinity and that of hypostatic union, it would attain to + those two Mysteries, it would have them in subjection and submit them to + the strictest examination by comparison with its first principles, or + with the aphorisms that spring from common notions, and proceed until + finally it had drawn the conclusion that they are in accordance with + natural light. It would therefore do what exceeds its powers, it would + soar <!-- Page 114 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page114"></a>[114]</span> above its confines, and that is a formal + contradiction. One must therefore say that it cannot provide answers to + its own objections, and that thus they remain victorious, so long as one + does not have recourse to the authority of God and to the necessity of + subjugating one's understanding to the obedience of faith.' I do not find + that there is any force in this reasoning. We can attain to that which is + above us not by penetrating it but by maintaining it; as we can attain to + the sky by sight, and not by touch. Nor is it necessary that, in order to + answer the objections which are made against the Mysteries, one should + have them in subjection to oneself, and submit them to examination by + comparison with the first principles that spring from common notions. For + if he who answers the objections had to go so far, he who proposes the + objections needs must do it first. It is the part of the objection to + open up the subject, and it is enough for him who answers to say Yes or + No. He is not obliged to counter with a distinction: it will do, in case + of need, if he denies the universality of some proposition in the + objection or criticizes its form, and one may do both these things + without penetrating beyond the objection. When someone offers me a proof + which he maintains is invincible, I can keep silence while I compel him + merely to prove in due form all the enunciations that he brings forward, + and such as appear to me in the slightest degree doubtful. For the + purpose of doubting only, I need not at all probe to the heart of the + matter; on the contrary, the more ignorant I am the more shall I be + justified in doubting. M. Bayle continues thus:</p> + + <p>73. 'Let us endeavour to clarify that. If some doctrines are above + reason they are beyond its reach, it cannot attain to them; if it cannot + attain to them, it cannot comprehend them.' (He could have begun here + with the 'comprehend', saying that reason cannot comprehend that which is + above it.) 'If it cannot comprehend them, it can find in them no idea' + (<i>Non valet consequentia</i>: for, to 'comprehend' something, it is not + enough that one have some ideas thereof; one must have all the ideas of + everything that goes to make it up, and all these ideas must be clear, + distinct, <i>adequate</i>. There are a thousand objects in Nature in + which we understand something, but which we do not therefore necessarily + comprehend. We have some ideas on the rays of light, we demonstrate upon + them up to a certain point; but there ever remains something which makes + us confess that we do not yet comprehend the whole <!-- Page 115 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page115"></a>[115]</span> nature of light.) 'nor + any principle such as may give rise to a solution;' (Why should not + evident principles be found mingled with obscure and confused knowledge?) + 'and consequently the objections that reason has made will remain + unanswered;' (By no means; the difficulty is rather on the side of the + opposer. It is for him to seek an evident principle such as may give rise + to some objection; and the more obscure the subject, the more trouble he + will have in finding such a principle. Moreover, when he has found it he + will have still more trouble in demonstrating an opposition between the + principle and the Mystery: for, if it happened that the Mystery was + evidently contrary to an evident principle, it would not be an obscure + Mystery, it would be a manifest absurdity.) 'or what is the same thing, + answer will be made with some distinction as obscure as the very thesis + that will have been attacked.' (One can do without distinctions, if need + be, by denying either some premiss or some conclusion; and when one is + doubtful of the meaning of some term used by the opposer one may demand + of him its definition. Thus the defender has no need to incommode himself + when it is a question of answering an adversary who claims that he is + offering us an invincible proof. But even supposing that the defender, + perchance being kindly disposed, or for the sake of brevity, or because + he feels himself strong enough, should himself vouchsafe to show the + ambiguity concealed in the objection, and to remove it by making some + distinction, this distinction need not of necessity lead to anything + clearer than the first thesis, since the defender is not obliged to + elucidate the Mystery itself.)</p> + + <p>74. 'Now it is certain', so M. Bayle continues, 'that an objection + which is founded on distinct notions remains equally victorious, whether + you give to it no answer, or you make an answer where none can comprehend + anything. Can the contest be equal between a man who alleges in objection + to you that which you and he very clearly conceive, and you, who can only + defend yourself by answers wherein neither of you understands anything?' + (It is not enough that the objection be founded on quite distinct + notions, it is necessary also that one apply it in contradiction of the + thesis. And when I answer someone by denying some premiss, in order to + compel him to prove it, or some conclusion, to compel him to put it in + good form, it cannot be said that I answer nothing or that I answer + nothing intelligible. For as it is the doubtful <!-- Page 116 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page116"></a>[116]</span> premiss of the + adversary that I deny, my denial will be as intelligible as his + affirmation. Finally, when I am so obliging as to explain myself by means + of some distinction, it suffices that the terms I employ have some + meaning, as in the Mystery itself. Thus something in my answer will be + comprehended: but one need not of necessity comprehend all that it + involves; otherwise one would comprehend the Mystery also.)</p> + + <p>75. M. Bayle continues thus: 'Every philosophical dispute assumes that + the disputant parties agree on certain definitions' (This would be + desirable, but usually it is only in the dispute itself that one reaches + such a point, if the necessity arises.) 'and that they admit the rules of + Syllogisms, and the signs for the recognition of bad arguments. After + that everything lies in the investigation as to whether a thesis conforms + mediately or immediately to the principles one is agreed upon' (which is + done by means of the syllogisms of him who makes objections); 'whether + the premisses of a proof (advanced by the opposer) 'are true; whether the + conclusion is properly drawn; whether a four-term Syllogism has been + employed; whether some aphorism of the chapter <i>de oppositis</i> or + <i>de sophisticis elenchis</i>, etc., has not been violated.' (It is + enough, putting it briefly, to deny some premiss or some conclusion, or + finally to explain or get explained some ambiguous term.) 'One comes off + victorious either by showing that the subject of dispute has no connexion + with the principles which had been agreed upon' (that is to say, by + showing that the objection proves nothing, and then the defender wins the + case), 'or by reducing the defender to absurdity' (when all the premisses + and all the conclusions are well proved). 'Now one can reduce him to that + point either by showing him that the conclusions of his thesis are "yes" + and "no" at once, or by constraining him to say only intelligible things + in answer.' (This last embarrassment he can always avoid, because he has + no need to advance new theses.) 'The aim in disputes of this kind is to + throw light upon obscurities and to arrive at self-evidence.' (It is the + aim of the opposer, for he wishes to demonstrate that the Mystery is + false; but this cannot here be the aim of the defender, for in admitting + Mystery he agrees that one cannot demonstrate it.) 'This leads to the + opinion that during the course of the proceedings victory sides more or + less with the defender or with the opposer, according to whether there is + more or less clarity in the propositions of the one than in the <!-- Page + 117 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page117"></a>[117]</span> + propositions of the other.' (That is speaking as if the defender and the + opposer were equally unprotected; but the defender is like a besieged + commander, covered by his defence works, and it is for the attacker to + destroy them. The defender has no need here of self-evidence, and he + seeks it not: but it is for the opposer to find it against him, and to + break through with his batteries in order that the defender may be no + longer protected.)</p> + + <p>76. 'Finally, it is judged that victory goes against him whose answers + are such that one comprehends nothing in them,' (It is a very equivocal + sign of victory: for then one must needs ask the audience if they + comprehend anything in what has been said, and often their opinions would + be divided. The order of formal disputes is to proceed by arguments in + due form and to answer them by denying or making a distinction.) 'and who + confesses that they are incomprehensible.' (It is permitted to him who + maintains the truth of a Mystery to confess that this mystery is + incomprehensible; and if this confession were sufficient for declaring + him vanquished there would be no need of objection. It will be possible + for a truth to be incomprehensible, but never so far as to justify the + statement that one comprehends nothing at all therein. It would be in + that case what the ancient Schools called <i>Scindapsus</i> or + <i>Blityri</i> (Clem. Alex., <i>Stromateis</i>, 8), that is, words devoid + of meaning.) 'He is condemned thenceforth by the rules for awarding + victory; and even when he cannot be pursued in the mist wherewith he has + covered himself, and which forms a kind of abyss between him and his + antagonists, he is believed to be utterly defeated, and is compared to an + army which, having lost the battle, steals away from the pursuit of the + victor only under cover of night.' (Matching allegory with allegory, I + will say that the defender is not vanquished so long as he remains + protected by his entrenchments; and if he risks some sortie beyond his + need, it is permitted to him to withdraw within his fort, without being + open to blame for that.)</p> + + <p>77. I was especially at pains to analyse this long passage where M. + Bayle has put down his strongest and most skilfully reasoned statements + in support of his opinion: and I hope that I have shown clearly how this + excellent man has been misled. That happens all too easily to the ablest + and shrewdest persons when they give free rein to their wit without + exercising the patience necessary for delving down to the very + foundations of their systems. The details <!-- Page 118 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page118"></a>[118]</span> we have entered into + here will serve as answer to some other arguments upon the subject which + are dispersed through the works of M. Bayle, as for instance when he says + in his <i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i> (vol. III, ch. 133, + p. 685): 'To prove that one has brought reason and religion into harmony + one must show not only that one has philosophic maxims favourable to our + faith, but also that the particular maxims cast up against us as not + being consistent with our Catechism are in reality consistent with it in + a clearly conceived way.' I do not see that one has need of all that, + unless one aspire to press reasoning as far as the <i>how</i> of the + Mystery. When one is content to uphold its truth, without attempting to + render it comprehensible, one has no need to resort to philosophic + maxims, general or particular, for the proof; and when another brings up + some philosophic maxims against us, it is not for us to prove clearly and + distinctly that these maxims are consistent with our dogma, but it is for + our opponent to prove that they are contrary thereto.</p> + + <p>78. M. Bayle continues thus in the same passage: 'For this result we + need an answer as clearly evident as the objection.' I have already shown + that it is obtained when one denies the premisses, but that for the rest + it is not necessary for him who maintains the truth of the Mystery always + to advance evident propositions, since the principal thesis concerning + the Mystery itself is not evident. He adds further: 'If we must make + reply and rejoinder, we must never rest in our positions, nor claim that + we have accomplished our design, so long as our opponent shall make + answer with things as evident as our reasons can be.' But it is not for + the defender to adduce reasons; it is enough for him to answer those of + his opponent.</p> + + <p>79. Finally the author draws the conclusion: 'If it were claimed that, + on making an evident objection, a man has to be satisfied with an answer + which we can only state as a thing possible though incomprehensible to + us, that would be unfair.' He repeats this in the posthumous Dialogues, + against M. Jacquelot, p. 69. I am not of this opinion. If the objection + were completely evident, it would triumph, and the thesis would be + overthrown. But when the objection is only founded on appearances or on + instances of the most frequent occurrence, and when he who makes it + desires to draw from it a universal and certain conclusion, he who + upholds the Mystery may answer with the instance of a bare possibility. + <!-- Page 119 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page119"></a>[119]</span> + For such an instance suffices to show that what one wished to infer from + the premisses, is neither certain nor general; and it suffices for him + who upholds the Mystery to maintain that it is possible, without having + to maintain that it is probable. For, as I have often said, it is agreed + that the Mysteries are against appearances. He who upholds the Mystery + need not even adduce such an instance; and should he adduce it, it were + indeed a work of supererogation, or else an instrument of greater + confusion to the adversary.</p> + + <p>80. There are passages of M. Bayle in the posthumous reply that he + made to M. Jacquelot which seem to me still worthy of scrutiny. 'M. + Bayle' (according to pp. 36, 37) 'constantly asserts in his + <i>Dictionary</i>, whenever the subject allows, that our reason is more + capable of refuting and destroying than of proving and building; that + there is scarcely any philosophical or theological matter in respect of + which it does not create great difficulties. Thus', he says, 'if one + desired to follow it in a disputatious spirit, as far as it can go, one + would often be reduced to a state of troublesome perplexity; and in fine, + there are doctrines certainly true, which it disputes with insoluble + objections.' I think that what is said here in reproach of reason is to + its advantage. When it overthrows some thesis, it builds up the opposing + thesis. And when it seems to be overthrowing the two opposing theses at + the same time, it is then that it promises us something profound, + provided that we follow it <i>as far as it can go</i>, not in a + disputatious spirit but with an ardent desire to search out and discover + the truth, which will always be recompensed with a great measure of + success.</p> + + <p>81. M. Bayle continues: 'that one must then ridicule these objections, + recognizing the narrow bounds of the human mind.' And I think, on the + other hand, that one must recognize the signs of the force of the human + mind, which causes it to penetrate into the heart of things. These are + new openings and, as it were, rays of the dawn which promises us a + greater light: I mean in philosophical subjects or those of natural + theology. But when these objections are made against revealed faith it is + enough that one be able to repel them, provided that one do so in a + submissive and zealous spirit, with intent to sustain and exalt the glory + of God. And when we succeed in respect of his justice, we shall likewise + be impressed by his greatness and charmed by his goodness, which will + show themselves through the clouds of a seeming reason that is <!-- Page + 120 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page120"></a>[120]</span> deceived + by outward appearances, in proportion as the mind is elevated by true + reason to that which to us is invisible, but none the less sure.</p> + + <p>82. 'Thus' (to continue with M. Bayle) 'reason will be compelled to + lay down its arms, and to subjugate itself to the obedience of the faith, + which it can and ought to do, in virtue of some of its most incontestable + maxims. Thus also in renouncing some of its other maxims it acts + nevertheless in accordance with that which it is, that is to say, in + reason.' But one must know 'that such maxims of reason as must be + renounced in this case are only those which make us judge by appearances + or according to the ordinary course of things.' This reason enjoins upon + us even in philosophical subjects, when there are invincible proofs to + the contrary. It is thus that, being made confident by demonstrations of + the goodness and the justice of God, we disregard the appearances of + harshness and injustice which we see in this small portion of his Kingdom + that is exposed to our gaze. Hitherto we have been illumined by the + <i>light of Nature</i> and by that of <i>grace</i>, but not yet by that + of <i>glory</i>. Here on earth we see apparent injustice, and we believe + and even know the truth of the hidden justice of God; but we shall see + that justice when at last the Sun of Justice shall show himself as he + is.</p> + + <p>83. It is certain that M. Bayle can only be understood as meaning + those ostensible maxims which must give way before the eternal verities; + for he acknowledges that reason is not in reality contrary to faith. In + these posthumous Dialogues he complains (p. 73, against M. Jacquelot) of + being accused of the belief that our Mysteries are in reality against + reason, and (p. 9, against M. le Clerc) of the assertion made that he who + acknowledges that a doctrine is exposed to irrefutable objections + acknowledges also by a necessary consequence the falsity of this + doctrine. Nevertheless one would be justified in the assertion if the + irrefutability were more than an outward appearance.</p> + + <p>84. It may be, therefore, that having long contended thus against M. + Bayle on the matter of the use of reason I shall find after all that his + opinions were not fundamentally so remote from mine as his expressions, + which have provided matter for our considerations, have led one to + believe. It is true that frequently he appears to deny absolutely that + one can ever answer the objections of reason against faith, and that he + asserts the necessity of comprehending, in order to achieve such an end, + how the Mystery comes <!-- Page 121 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page121"></a>[121]</span> to be or exists. Yet there are passages + where he becomes milder, and contents himself with saying that the + answers to these objections are unknown to him. Here is a very precise + passage, taken from the excursus on the Manichaeans, which is found at + the end of the second edition of his <i>Dictionary</i>: 'For the greater + satisfaction of the most punctilious readers, I desire to declare here' + (he says, p. 3148) 'that wherever the statement is to be met with in my + <i>Dictionary</i> that such and such arguments are irrefutable I do not + wish it to be taken that they are so in actuality. I mean naught else + than that they appear to me irrefutable. That is of no consequence: each + one will be able to imagine, if he pleases, that if I deem thus of a + matter it is owing to my lack of acumen.' I do not imagine such a thing; + his great acumen is too well known to me: but I think that, after having + applied his whole mind to magnifying the objections, he had not enough + attention left over for the purpose of answering them.</p> + + <p>85. M. Bayle confesses, moreover, in his posthumous work against M. le + Clerc, that the objections against faith have not the force of proofs. It + is therefore <i>ad hominem</i> only, or rather <i>ad homines</i>, that + is, in relation to the existing state of the human race, that he deems + these objections irrefutable and the subject unexplainable. There is even + a passage where he implies that he despairs not of the possibility that + the answer or the explanation may be found, and even in our time. For + here is what he says in his posthumous Reply to M. le Clerc (p. 35): 'M. + Bayle dared to hope that his toil would put on their mettle some of those + great men of genius who create new systems, and that they could discover + a solution hitherto unknown.' It seems that by this 'solution' he means + such an explanation of Mystery as would penetrate to the <i>how</i>: but + that is not necessary for replying to the objections.</p> + + <p>86. Many have undertaken to render this <i>how</i> comprehensible, and + to prove the possibility of Mysteries. A certain writer named Thomas + Bonartes Nordtanus Anglus, in his <i>Concordia Scientiae cum Fide,</i> + claimed to do so. This work seemed to me ingenious and learned, but + crabbed and involved, and it even contains indefensible opinions. I + learned from the <i>Apologia Cyriacorum</i> of the Dominican Father + Vincent Baron that that book was censured in Rome, that the author was a + Jesuit, and that he suffered for having published it. The Reverend Father + des Bosses, who now teaches Theology in the Jesuit College of Hildesheim, + and who has <!-- Page 122 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page122"></a>[122]</span> combined rare erudition with great + acumen, which he displays in philosophy and theology, has informed me + that the real name of Bonartes was Thomas Barton, and that after leaving + the Society he retired to Ireland, where the manner of his death brought + about a favourable verdict on his last opinions. I pity the men of talent + who bring trouble upon themselves by their toil and their zeal. Something + of like nature happened in time past to Pierre Abelard, to Gilbert de la + Porree, to John Wyclif, and in our day to the Englishman Thomas Albius, + as well as to some others who plunged too far into the explanation of the + Mysteries.</p> + + <p>87. St. Augustine, however (as well as M. Bayle), does not despair of + the possibility that the desired solution may be found upon earth; but + this Father believes it to be reserved for some holy man illumined by a + peculiar grace: 'Est aliqua causa fortassis occultior, quae melioribus + sanctioribusque reservatur, illius gratia potius quam meritis illorum' + (in <i>De Genesi ad Literam</i>, lib. 11, c. 4). Luther reserves the + knowledge of the Mystery of Election for the academy of heaven (lib. + <i>De Servo Arbitrio</i>, c. 174): 'Illic [Deus] gratiam et misericordiam + spargit in indignos, his iram et severitatem spargit in immeritos; + utrobique nimius et iniquus apud homines, sed justus et verax apud se + ipsum. Nam quomodo hoc justum sit ut indignos coronet, incomprehensibile + est modo, videbimus autem, cum illuc venerimus, ubi jam non credetur, sed + revelata facie videbitur. Ita quomodo hoc justum sit, ut immeritos + damnet, incomprehensibile est modo, creditur tamen, donec revelabitur + filius hominis.' It is to be hoped that M. Bayle now finds himself + surrounded by that light which is lacking to us here below, since there + is reason to suppose that he was not lacking in good will.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>VIRGIL</p> + <p class="i2"><i>Candidus insueti miratur limen Olympi,</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Sub pedibusque videt nubes et sidera Daphnis.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>LUCAN</p> + <p class="i2"><i>...Illic postquam se lumine vero</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Implevit, stellasque vagas miratur et astra</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Fixa polis, vidit quanta sub nocte jaceret</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Nostra dies.</i></p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 123 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page123"></a>[123]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>ESSAYS +ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD +AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN +IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>PART ONE</h3> + + <p>1. Having so settled the rights of faith and of reason as rather to + place reason at the service of faith than in opposition to it, we shall + see how they exercise these rights to support and harmonize what the + light of nature and the light of revelation teach us of God and of man in + relation to evil. The <i>difficulties</i> are distinguishable into two + classes. The one kind springs from man's freedom, which appears + incompatible with the divine nature; and nevertheless freedom is deemed + necessary, in order that man may be deemed guilty and open to punishment. + The other kind concerns the conduct of God, and seems to make him + participate too much in the existence of evil, even though man be free + and participate also therein. And this conduct appears contrary to the + goodness, the holiness and the justice of God, since God co-operates in + evil as well physical as moral, and co-operates in each of them both + morally and physically; and since it seems that these evils are + manifested in the order of nature as well as in that of grace, and in the + future and eternal life as well as, nay, more than, in this transitory + life.</p> + + <p>2. To present these difficulties in brief, it must be observed that + freedom is opposed, to all appearance, by determination or certainty of + any kind whatever; and nevertheless the common dogma of our philosophers + states that the truth of contingent futurities is <!-- Page 124 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page124"></a>[124]</span> determined. The + foreknowledge of God renders all the future certain and determined, but + his providence and his foreordinance, whereon foreknowledge itself + appears founded, do much more: for God is not as a man, able to look upon + events with unconcern and to suspend his judgement, since nothing exists + save as a result of the decrees of his will and through the action of his + power. And even though one leave out of account the co-operation of God, + all is perfectly connected in the order of things, since nothing can come + to pass unless there be a cause so disposed as to produce the effect, + this taking place no less in voluntary than in all other actions. + According to which it appears that man is compelled to do the good and + evil that he does, and in consequence that he deserves therefor neither + recompense nor chastisement: thus is the morality of actions destroyed + and all justice, divine and human, shaken.</p> + + <p>3. But even though one should grant to man this freedom wherewith he + arrays himself to his own hurt, the conduct of God could not but provide + matter for a criticism supported by the presumptuous ignorance of men, + who would wish to exculpate themselves wholly or in part at the expense + of God. It is objected that all the reality and what is termed the + substance of the act in sin itself is a production of God, since all + creatures and all their actions derive from him that reality they have. + Whence one could infer not only that he is the physical cause of sin, but + also that he is its moral cause, since he acts with perfect freedom and + does nothing without a complete knowledge of the thing and the + consequences that it may have. Nor is it enough to say that God has made + for himself a law to co-operate with the wills or resolutions of man, + whether we express ourselves in terms of the common opinion or in terms + of the system of occasional causes. Not only will it be found strange + that he should have made such a law for himself, of whose results he was + not ignorant, but the principal difficulty is that it seems the evil will + itself cannot exist without co-operation, and even without some + predetermination, on his part, which contributes towards begetting this + will in man or in some other rational creature. For an action is not, for + being evil, the less dependent on God. Whence one will come at last to + the conclusion that God does all, the good and the evil, indifferently; + unless one pretend with the Manichaeans that there are two principles, + the one good and the other evil. Moreover, according to the general <!-- + Page 125 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page125"></a>[125]</span> + opinion of theologians and philosophers, conservation being a perpetual + creation, it will be said that man is perpetually created corrupt and + erring. There are, furthermore, modern Cartesians who claim that God is + the sole agent, of whom created beings are only the purely passive + organs; and M. Bayle builds not a little upon that idea.</p> + + <p>4. But even granting that God should co-operate in actions only with a + general co-operation, or even not at all, at least in those that are bad, + it suffices, so it is said, to inculpate him and to render him the moral + cause that nothing comes to pass without his permission. To say nothing + of the fall of the angels, he knows all that which will come to pass, if, + having created man, he places him in such and such circumstances; and he + places him there notwithstanding. Man is exposed to a temptation to which + it is known that he will succumb, thereby causing an infinitude of + frightful evils, by which the whole human race will be infected and + brought as it were into a necessity of sinning, a state which is named + 'original sin'. Thus the world will be brought into a strange confusion, + by this means death and diseases being introduced, with a thousand other + misfortunes and miseries that in general afflict the good and the bad; + wickedness will even hold sway and virtue will be oppressed on earth, so + that it will scarce appear that a providence governs affairs. But it is + much worse when one considers the life to come, since but a small number + of men will be saved and since all the rest will perish eternally. + Furthermore these men destined for salvation will have been withdrawn + from the corrupt mass through an unreasoning election, whether it be said + that God in choosing them has had regard to their future actions, to + their faith or to their works, or one claim that he has been pleased to + give them these good qualities and these actions because he has + predestined them to salvation. For though it be said in the most lenient + system that God wished to save all men, and though in the other systems + commonly accepted it be granted, that he has made his Son take human + nature upon him to expiate their sins, so that all they who shall believe + in him with a lively and final faith shall be saved, it still remains + true that this lively faith is a gift of God; that we are dead to all + good works; that even our will itself must be aroused by a prevenient + grace, and that God gives us the power to will and to do. And whether + that be done through a grace efficacious of itself, that is to say, + through a divine inward motion <!-- Page 126 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page126"></a>[126]</span> which wholly determines our will to the + good that it does; or whether there be only a sufficient grace, but such + as does not fail to attain its end, and to become efficacious in the + inward and outward circumstances wherein the man is and has been placed + by God: one must return to the same conclusion that God is the final + reason of salvation, of grace, of faith and of election in Jesus Christ. + And be the election the cause or the result of God's design to give + faith, it still remains true that he gives faith or salvation to whom he + pleases, without any discernible reason for his choice, which falls upon + but few men.</p> + + <p>5. So it is a terrible judgement that God, giving his only Son for the + whole human race and being the sole author and master of the salvation of + men, yet saves so few of them and abandons all others to the devil his + enemy, who torments them eternally and makes them curse their Creator, + though they have all been created to diffuse and show forth his goodness, + his justice and his other perfections. And this outcome inspires all the + more horror, as the sole cause why all these men are wretched to all + eternity is God's having exposed their parents to a temptation that he + knew they would not resist; as this sin is inherent and imputed to men + before their will has participated in it; as this hereditary vice impels + their will to commit actual sins; and as countless men, in childhood or + maturity, that have never heard or have not heard enough of Jesus Christ, + Saviour of the human race, die before receiving the necessary succour for + their withdrawal from this abyss of sin. These men too are condemned to + be for ever rebellious against God and plunged in the most horrible + miseries, with the wickedest of all creatures, though in essence they + have not been more wicked than others, and several among them have + perchance been less guilty than some of that little number of elect, who + were saved by a grace without reason, and who thereby enjoy an eternal + felicity which they had not deserved. Such in brief are the difficulties + touched upon by sundry persons; but M. Bayle was one who insisted on them + the most, as will appear subsequently when we examine his passages. I + think that now I have recorded the main essence of these difficulties: + but I have deemed it fitting to refrain from some expressions and + exaggerations which might have caused offence, while not rendering the + objections any stronger.</p> + + <p>6. Let us now turn the medal and let us also point out what can be + said in answer to those objections; and here a course of <!-- Page 127 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page127"></a>[127]</span> explanation + through fuller dissertation will be necessary: for many difficulties can + be opened up in few words, but for their discussion one must dilate upon + them. Our end is to banish from men the false ideas that represent God to + them as an absolute prince employing a despotic power, unfitted to be + loved and unworthy of being loved. These notions are the more evil in + relation to God inasmuch as the essence of piety is not only to fear him + but also to love him above all things: and that cannot come about unless + there be knowledge of his perfections capable of arousing the love which + he deserves, and which makes the felicity of those that love him. Feeling + ourselves animated by a zeal such as cannot fail to please him, we have + cause to hope that he will enlighten us, and that he will himself aid us + in the execution of a project undertaken for his glory and for the good + of men. A cause so good gives confidence: if there are plausible + appearances against us there are proofs on our side, and I would dare to + say to an adversary:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Aspice, quam mage sit nostrum penetrabile telum.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>7. <i>God is the first reason of things</i>: for such things as are + bounded, as all that which we see and experience, are contingent and have + nothing in them to render their existence necessary, it being plain that + time, space and matter, united and uniform in themselves and indifferent + to everything, might have received entirely other motions and shapes, and + in another order. Therefore one must seek the reason for the existence of + the world, which is the whole assemblage of <i>contingent</i> things, and + seek it in the substance which carries with it the reason for its + existence, and which in consequence is <i>necessary</i> and eternal. + Moreover, this cause must be intelligent: for this existing world being + contingent and an infinity of other worlds being equally possible, and + holding, so to say, equal claim to existence with it, the cause of the + world must needs have had regard or reference to all these possible + worlds in order to fix upon one of them. This regard or relation of an + existent substance to simple possibilities can be nothing other than the + <i>understanding</i> which has the ideas of them, while to fix upon one + of them can be nothing other than the act of the <i>will</i> which + chooses. It is the <i>power</i> of this substance that renders its will + efficacious. Power relates to <i>being</i>, wisdom or understanding to + <i>truth</i>, and will to <i>good</i>. And this intelligent cause ought + to be infinite in all ways, and absolutely perfect in <i>power</i>, in + <i>wisdom</i> and in <i>goodness</i>, since it <!-- Page 128 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page128"></a>[128]</span> relates to all that + which is possible. Furthermore, since all is connected together, there is + no ground for admitting more than <i>one</i>. Its understanding is the + source of <i>essences</i>, and its will is the origin of + <i>existences</i>. There in few words is the proof of one only God with + his perfections, and through him of the origin of things.</p> + + <p>8. Now this supreme wisdom, united to a goodness that is no less + infinite, cannot but have chosen the best. For as a lesser evil is a kind + of good, even so a lesser good is a kind of evil if it stands in the way + of a greater good; and there would be something to correct in the actions + of God if it were possible to do better. As in mathematics, when there is + no maximum nor minimum, in short nothing distinguished, everything is + done equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it + may be said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less + orderly than mathematics, that if there were not the best + (<i>optimum</i>) among all possible worlds, God would not have produced + any. I call 'World' the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of + all existent things, lest it be said that several worlds could have + existed in different times and different places. For they must needs be + reckoned all together as one world or, if you will, as one Universe. And + even though one should fill all times and all places, it still remains + true that one might have filled them in innumerable ways, and that there + is an infinitude of possible worlds among which God must needs have + chosen the best, since he does nothing without acting in accordance with + supreme reason.</p> + + <p>9. Some adversary not being able to answer this argument will + perchance answer the conclusion by a counter-argument, saying that the + world could have been without sin and without sufferings; but I deny that + then it would have been <i>better</i>. For it must be known that all + things are <i>connected</i> in each one of the possible worlds: the + universe, whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean: the + least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever, even + though this effect become less perceptible in proportion to the distance. + Therein God has ordered all things beforehand once for all, having + foreseen prayers, good and bad actions, and all the rest; and each thing + <i>as an idea</i> has contributed, before its existence, to the + resolution that has been made upon the existence of all things; so that + nothing can be changed in the universe (any more than in a number) save + its essence or, if you will, save its <i>numerical individuality</i>. + Thus, if the smallest evil <!-- Page 129 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page129"></a>[129]</span> that comes to pass in the world were + missing in it, it would no longer be this world; which, with nothing + omitted and all allowance made, was found the best by the Creator who + chose it.</p> + + <p>10. It is true that one may imagine possible worlds without sin and + without unhappiness, and one could make some like Utopian or Sevarambian + romances: but these same worlds again would be very inferior to ours in + goodness. I cannot show you this in detail. For can I know and can I + present infinities to you and compare them together? But you must judge + with me <i>ab effectu</i>, since God has chosen this world as it is. We + know, moreover, that often an evil brings forth a good whereto one would + not have attained without that evil. Often indeed two evils have made one + great good:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Et si fata volunt, bina venena juvant</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Even so two liquids sometimes produce a solid, witness the spirit of + wine and spirit of urine mixed by Van Helmont; or so do two cold and dark + bodies produce a great fire, witness an acid solution and an aromatic oil + combined by Herr Hoffmann. A general makes sometimes a fortunate mistake + which brings about the winning of a great battle; and do they not sing on + the eve of Easter, in the churches of the Roman rite:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>O certe necessarium Adae peccatum, quod Christi morte deletum est!</i></p> + <p><i>O felix culpa, quae talem ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem!</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>11. The illustrious prelates of the Gallican church who wrote to Pope + Innocent XII against Cardinal Sfondrati's book on predestination, being + of the principles of St. Augustine, have said things well fitted to + elucidate this great point. The cardinal appears to prefer even to the + Kingdom of Heaven the state of children dying without baptism, because + sin is the greatest of evils, and they have died innocent of all actual + sin. More will be said of that below. The prelates have observed that + this opinion is ill founded. The apostle, they say (Rom. iii. 8), is + right to disapprove of the doing of evil that good may come, but one + cannot disapprove that God, through his exceeding power, derive from the + permitting of sins greater goods than such as occurred before the sins. + It is not that we ought to take pleasure in sin, God forbid! but that we + believe the same apostle when he says (Rom. v. 20) <!-- Page 130 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page130"></a>[130]</span> that where sin + abounded, grace did much more abound; and we remember that we have gained + Jesus Christ himself by reason of sin. Thus we see that the opinion of + these prelates tends to maintain that a sequence of things where sin + enters in may have been and has been, in effect, better than another + sequence without sin.</p> + + <p>12. Use has ever been made of comparisons taken from the pleasures of + the senses when these are mingled with that which borders on pain, to + prove that there is something of like nature in intellectual pleasures. A + little acid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing than sugar; + shadows enhance colours; and even a dissonance in the right place gives + relief to harmony. We wish to be terrified by rope-dancers on the point + of falling and we wish that tragedies shall well-nigh cause us to weep. + Do men relish health enough, or thank God enough for it, without having + ever been sick? And is it not most often necessary that a little evil + render the good more discernible, that is to say, greater?</p> + + <p>13. But it will be said that evils are great and many in number in + comparison with the good: that is erroneous. It is only want of attention + that diminishes our good, and this attention must be given to us through + some admixture of evils. If we were usually sick and seldom in good + health, we should be wonderfully sensible of that great good and we + should be less sensible of our evils. But is it not better, + notwithstanding, that health should be usual and sickness the exception? + Let us then by our reflexion supply what is lacking in our perception, in + order to make the good of health more discernible. Had we not the + knowledge of the life to come, I believe there would be few persons who, + being at the point of death, were not content to take up life again, on + condition of passing through the same amount of good and evil, provided + always that it were not the same kind: one would be content with variety, + without requiring a better condition than that wherein one had been.</p> + + <p>14. When one considers also the fragility of the human body, one looks + in wonder at the wisdom and the goodness of the Author of Nature, who has + made the body so enduring and its condition so tolerable. That has often + made me say that I am not astonished men are sometimes sick, but that I + am astonished they are sick so little and not always. This also ought to + make us the more esteem the divine contrivance of the mechanism of + animals, whose Author <!-- Page 131 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page131"></a>[131]</span> has made machines so fragile and so + subject to corruption and yet so capable of maintaining themselves: for + it is Nature which cures us rather than medicine. Now this very fragility + is a consequence of the nature of things, unless we are to will that this + kind of creature, reasoning and clothed in flesh and bones, be not in the + world. But that, to all appearance, would be a defect which some + philosophers of old would have called <i>vacuum formarum</i>, a gap in + the order of species.</p> + + <p>15. Those whose humour it is to be well satisfied with Nature and with + fortune and not to complain about them, even though they should not be + the best endowed, appear to me preferable to the other sort; for besides + that these complaints are ill founded, it is in effect murmuring against + the orders of providence. One must not readily be among the malcontents + in the State where one is, and one must not be so at all in the city of + God, wherein one can only wrongfully be of their number. The books of + human misery, such as that of Pope Innocent III, to me seem not of the + most serviceable: evils are doubled by being given an attention that + ought to be averted from them, to be turned towards the good which by far + preponderates. Even less do I approve books such as that of Abbé Esprit, + <i>On the Falsity of Human Virtues</i>, of which we have lately been + given a summary: for such a book serves to turn everything wrong side + out, and cause men to be such as it represents them.</p> + + <p>16. It must be confessed, however, that there are disorders in this + life, which appear especially in the prosperity of sundry evil men and in + the misfortune of many good people. There is a German proverb which even + grants the advantage to the evil ones, as if they were commonly the most + fortunate:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Je krümmer Holz, je bessre Krücke:</i></p> + <p><i>Je ärger Schalck, je grösser Glücke.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>And it were to be desired that this saying of Horace should be true in + our eyes:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Raro antecedentem scelestum</i></p> + <p><i>Deseruit pede poena claudo.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Yet it often comes to pass also, though this perchance not the most + often,</p> + +<p><!-- Page 132 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page132"></a>[132]</span></p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>That in the world's eyes Heaven is justified,</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>and that one may say with Claudian:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Abstulit hunc tandem Rufini poena tumultum,</i></p> + <p><i>Absolvitque deos...</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>17. But even though that should not happen here, the remedy is all + prepared in the other life: religion and reason itself teach us that, and + we must not murmur against a respite which the supreme wisdom has thought + fit to grant to men for repentance. Yet there objections multiply on + another side, when one considers salvation and damnation: for it appears + strange that, even in the great future of eternity, evil should have the + advantage over good, under the supreme authority of him who is the + sovereign good, since there will be many that are called and few that are + chosen or are saved. It is true that one sees from some lines of + Prudentius (Hymn. ante Somnum),</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Idem tamen benignus</i></p> + <p><i>Ultor retundit iram,</i></p> + <p><i>Paucosque non piorum</i></p> + <p><i>Patitur perire in aevum,</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>that divers men believed in his time that the number of those wicked + enough to be damned would be very small. To some indeed it seems that men + believed at that time in a sphere between Hell and Paradise; that this + same Prudentius speaks as if he were satisfied with this sphere; that St. + Gregory of Nyssa also inclines in that direction, and that St. Jerome + leans towards the opinion according whereunto all Christians would + finally be taken into grace. A saying of St. Paul which he himself gives + out as mysterious, stating that all Israel will be saved, has provided + much food for reflexion. Sundry pious persons, learned also, but daring, + have revived the opinion of Origen, who maintains that good will + predominate in due time, in all and everywhere, and that all rational + creatures, even the bad angels, will become at last holy and blessed. The + book of the eternal Gospel, published lately in German and supported by a + great and learned work entitled <span lang="el" title="'Apokatastasis pantôn" + >'Αποκαταστασις + παντων</span>, has caused much stir + over this great paradox. M. le Clerc also has ingeniously pleaded the + cause of the Origenists, but without declaring himself for them.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 133 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page133"></a>[133]</span></p> + + <p>18. There is a man of wit who, pushing my principle of harmony even to + arbitrary suppositions that I in no wise approve, has created for himself + a theology well-nigh astronomical. He believes that the present confusion + in this world below began when the Presiding Angel of the globe of the + earth, which was still a sun (that is, a star that was fixed and luminous + of itself) committed a sin with some lesser angels of his department, + perhaps rising inopportunely against an angel of a greater sun; that + simultaneously, by the Pre-established Harmony of the Realms of Nature + and of Grace, and consequently by natural causes occurring at the + appointed time, our globe was covered with stains, rendered opaque and + driven from its place; which has made it become a wandering star or + planet, that is, a Satellite of another sun, and even perhaps of that one + whose superiority its angel refused to recognize; and that therein + consists the fall of Lucifer. Now the chief of the bad angels, who in + Holy Scripture is named the prince, and even the god of this world, + being, with the angels of his train, envious of that rational animal + which walks on the surface of this globe, and which God has set up there + perhaps to compensate himself for their fall, strives to render it + accessary in their crimes and a participator in their misfortunes. + Whereupon Jesus Christ came to save men. He is the eternal Son of God, + even as he is his only Son; but (according to some ancient Christians, + and according to the author of this hypothesis) having taken upon him at + first, from the beginning of things, the most excellent nature among + created beings, to bring them all to perfection, he set himself amongst + them: and this is the second filiation, whereby he is the first-born of + all creatures. This is he whom the Cabalists called Adam Kadmon. Haply he + had planted his tabernacle in that great sun which illumines us; but he + came at last into this globe where we are, he was born of the Virgin, and + took human nature upon him to save mankind from the hands of their enemy + and his. And when the time of judgement shall draw near, when the present + face of our globe shall be about to perish, he will return to it in + visible form, thence to withdraw the good, transplanting them, it may be, + into the sun, and to punish here the wicked with the demons that have + allured them; then the globe of the earth will begin to burn and will be + perhaps a comet. This fire will last for aeons upon aeons. The tail of + the comet is intended by the smoke which will rise incessantly, according + to the Apocalypse, and this fire will be <!-- Page 134 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page134"></a>[134]</span> hell, or the second + death whereof Holy Scripture speaks. But at last hell will render up its + dead, death itself will be destroyed; reason and peace will begin to hold + sway again in the spirits that had been perverted; they will be sensible + of their error, they will adore their Creator, and will even begin to + love him all the more for seeing the greatness of the abyss whence they + emerge. Simultaneously (by virtue of the <i>harmonic parallelism</i> of + the Realms of Nature and of Grace) this long and great conflagration will + have purged the earth's globe of its stains. It will become again a sun; + its Presiding Angel will resume his place with the angels of his train; + humans that were damned shall be with them numbered amongst the good + angels; this chief of our globe shall render homage to the Messiah, chief + of created beings. The glory of this angel reconciled shall be greater + than it was before his fall.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Inque Deos iterum factorum lege receptus</i></p> + <p><i>Aureus aeternum noster regnabit Apollo.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>The vision seemed to me pleasing, and worthy of a follower of Origen: + but we have no need of such hypothesis or fictions, where Wit plays a + greater part than Revelation, and which even Reason cannot turn to + account. For it does not appear that there is one principal place in the + known universe deserving in preference to the rest to be the seat of the + eldest of created beings; and the sun of our system at least is not + it.</p> + + <p>19. Holding then to the established doctrine that the number of men + damned eternally will be incomparably greater than that of the saved, we + must say that the evil could not but seem to be almost as nothing in + comparison with the good, when one contemplates the true vastness of the + city of God. Coelius Secundus Curio wrote a little book, <i>De + Amplitudine Regni Coelestis</i>, which was reprinted not long since; but + he is indeed far from having apprehended the compass of the kingdom of + heaven. The ancients had puny ideas on the works of God, and St. + Augustine, for want of knowing modern discoveries, was at a loss when + there was question of explaining the prevalence of evil. It seemed to the + ancients that there was only one earth inhabited, and even of that men + held the antipodes in dread: the remainder of the world was, according to + them, a few shining globes and a few crystalline spheres. To-day, + whatever bounds are given or not given to the universe, it must be + acknowledged that there is an infinite number of globes, as great <!-- + Page 135 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page135"></a>[135]</span> as + and greater than ours, which have as much right as it to hold rational + inhabitants, though it follows not at all that they are human. It is only + one planet, that is to say one of the six principal satellites of our + sun; and as all fixed stars are suns also, we see how small a thing our + earth is in relation to visible things, since it is only an appendix of + one amongst them. It may be that all suns are peopled only by blessed + creatures, and nothing constrains us to think that many are damned, for + few instances or few samples suffice to show the advantage which good + extracts from evil. Moreover, since there is no reason for the belief + that there are stars everywhere, is it not possible that there may be a + great space beyond the region of the stars? Whether it be the Empyrean + Heaven, or not, this immense space encircling all this region may in any + case be filled with happiness and glory. It can be imagined as like the + Ocean, whither flow the rivers of all blessed creatures, when they shall + have reached their perfection in the system of the stars. What will + become of the consideration of our globe and its inhabitants? Will it not + be something incomparably less than a physical point, since our earth is + as a point in comparison with the distance of some fixed stars? Thus + since the proportion of that part of the universe which we know is almost + lost in nothingness compared with that which is unknown, and which we yet + have cause to assume, and since all the evils that may be raised in + objection before us are in this near nothingness, haply it may be that + all evils are almost nothingness in comparison with the good things which + are in the universe.</p> + + <p>20. But it is necessary also to meet the more speculative and + metaphysical difficulties which have been mentioned, and which concern + the cause of evil. The question is asked first of all, whence does evil + come? <i>Si Deus est, unde malum? Si non est, unde bonum?</i> The + ancients attributed the cause of evil to <i>matter</i>, which they + believed uncreate and independent of God: but we, who derive all being + from God, where shall we find the source of evil? The answer is, that it + must be sought in the ideal nature of the creature, in so far as this + nature is contained in the eternal verities which are in the + understanding of God, independently of his will. For we must consider + that there is an <i>original imperfection in the creature</i> before sin, + because the creature is limited in its essence; whence ensues that it + cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other errors. + Plato said in <i>Timaeus</i> that the world originated in Understanding + <!-- Page 136 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page136"></a>[136]</span> + united to Necessity. Others have united God and Nature. This can be given + a reasonable meaning. God will be the Understanding; and the Necessity, + that is, the essential nature of things, will be the object of the + understanding, in so far as this object consists in the eternal verities. + But this object is inward and abides in the divine understanding. And + therein is found not only the primitive form of good, but also the origin + of evil: the Region of the Eternal Verities must be substituted for + matter when we are concerned with seeking out the source of things.</p> + + <p>This region is the ideal cause of evil (as it were) as well as of + good: but, properly speaking, the formal character of evil has no + <i>efficient</i> cause, for it consists in privation, as we shall see, + namely, in that which the efficient cause does not bring about. That is + why the Schoolmen are wont to call the cause of evil + <i>deficient</i>.</p> + + <p>21. Evil may be taken metaphysically, physically and morally. + <i>Metaphysical evil</i> consists in mere imperfection, <i>physical + evil</i> in suffering, and <i>moral evil</i> in sin. Now although + physical evil and moral evil be not necessary, it is enough that by + virtue of the eternal verities they be possible. And as this vast Region + of Verities contains all possibilities it is necessary that there be an + infinitude of possible worlds, that evil enter into divers of them, and + that even the best of all contain a measure thereof. Thus has God been + induced to permit evil.</p> + + <p>22. But someone will say to me: why speak you to us of 'permitting'? + Is it not God that doeth the evil and that willeth it? Here it will be + necessary to explain what 'permission' is, so that it may be seen how + this term is not employed without reason. But before that one must + explain the nature of will, which has its own degrees. Taking it in the + general sense, one may say that <i>will</i> consists in the inclination + to do something in proportion to the good it contains. This will is + called <i>antecedent</i> when it is detached, and considers each good + separately in the capacity of a good. In this sense it may be said that + God tends to all good, as good, <i>ad perfectionem simpliciter + simplicem</i>, to speak like the Schoolmen, and that by an antecedent + will. He is earnestly disposed to sanctify and to save all men, to + exclude sin, and to prevent damnation. It may even be said that this will + is efficacious <i>of itself (per se)</i>, that is, in such sort that the + effect would ensue if there were not some stronger reason to prevent it: + for this will does not pass into final exercise (<i>ad summum + conatum</i>), else it would never fail to produce its <!-- Page 137 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page137"></a>[137]</span> full effect, + God being the master of all things. Success entire and infallible belongs + only to the <i>consequent will</i>, as it is called. This it is which is + complete; and in regard to it this rule obtains, that one never fails to + do what one wills, when one has the power. Now this consequent will, + final and decisive, results from the conflict of all the antecedent + wills, of those which tend towards good, even as of those which repel + evil; and from the concurrence of all these particular wills comes the + total will. So in mechanics compound movement results from all the + tendencies that concur in one and the same moving body, and satisfies + each one equally, in so far as it is possible to do all at one time. It + is as if the moving body took equal account of these tendencies, as I + once showed in one of the Paris Journals (7 Sept. 1693), when giving the + general law of the compositions of movement. In this sense also it may be + said that the antecedent will is efficacious in a sense and even + effective with success.</p> + + <p>23. Thence it follows that God wills <i>antecedently</i> the good and + <i>consequently</i> the best. And as for evil, God wills moral evil not + at all, and physical evil or suffering he does not will absolutely. Thus + it is that there is no absolute predestination to damnation; and one may + say of physical evil, that God wills it often as a penalty owing to + guilt, and often also as a means to an end, that is, to prevent greater + evils or to obtain greater good. The penalty serves also for amendment + and example. Evil often serves to make us savour good the more; sometimes + too it contributes to a greater perfection in him who suffers it, as the + seed that one sows is subject to a kind of corruption before it can + germinate: this is a beautiful similitude, which Jesus Christ himself + used.</p> + + <p>24. Concerning sin or moral evil, although it happens very often that + it may serve as a means of obtaining good or of preventing another evil, + it is not this that renders it a sufficient object of the divine will or + a legitimate object of a created will. It must only be admitted or + <i>permitted</i> in so far as it is considered to be a certain + consequence of an indispensable duty: as for instance if a man who was + determined not to permit another's sin were to fail of his own duty, or + as if an officer on guard at an important post were to leave it, + especially in time of danger, in order to prevent a quarrel in the town + between two soldiers of the garrison who wanted to kill each other.</p> + + <p>25. The rule which states, <i>non esse facienda mala, ut eveniant + bona</i>, and which even forbids the permission of a moral evil with the + end <!-- Page 138 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page138"></a>[138]</span> of obtaining a physical good, far from + being violated, is here proved, and its source and its reason are + demonstrated. One will not approve the action of a queen who, under the + pretext of saving the State, commits or even permits a crime. The crime + is certain and the evil for the State is open to question. Moreover, this + manner of giving sanction to crimes, if it were accepted, would be worse + than a disruption of some one country, which is liable enough to happen + in any case, and would perchance happen all the more by reason of such + means chosen to prevent it. But in relation to God nothing is open to + question, nothing can be opposed to <i>the rule of the best</i>, which + suffers neither exception nor dispensation. It is in this sense that God + permits sin: for he would fail in what he owes to himself, in what he + owes to his wisdom, his goodness, his perfection, if he followed not the + grand result of all his tendencies to good, and if he chose not that + which is absolutely the best, notwithstanding the evil of guilt, which is + involved therein by the supreme necessity of the eternal verities. Hence + the conclusion that God wills all good <i>in himself antecedently</i>, + that he wills the best <i>consequently</i> as an <i>end</i>, that he + wills what is indifferent, and physical evil, sometimes as a + <i>means</i>, but that he will only permit moral evil as the <i>sine quo + non</i> or as a hypothetical necessity which connects it with the best. + Therefore the <i>consequent will</i> of God, which has sin for its + object, is only <i>permissive</i>.</p> + + <p>26. It is again well to consider that moral evil is an evil so great + only because it is a source of physical evils, a source existing in one + of the most powerful of creatures, who is also most capable of causing + those evils. For an evil will is in its department what the evil + principle of the Manichaeans would be in the universe; and reason, which + is an image of the Divinity, provides for evil souls great means of + causing much evil. One single Caligula, one Nero, has caused more evil + than an earthquake. An evil man takes pleasure in causing suffering and + destruction, and for that there are only too many opportunities. But God + being inclined to produce as much good as possible, and having all the + knowledge and all the power necessary for that, it is impossible that in + him there be fault, or guilt, or sin; and when he permits sin, it is + wisdom, it is virtue.</p> + + <p>27. It is indeed beyond question that we must refrain from preventing + the sin of others when we cannot prevent their sin without sinning + ourselves. But someone will perhaps bring up the <!-- Page 139 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page139"></a>[139]</span> objection that it is + God himself who acts and who effects all that is real in the sin of the + creature. This objection leads us to consider the <i>physical + co-operation</i> of God with the creature, after we have examined the + <i>moral co-operation</i>, which was the more perplexing. Some have + believed, with the celebrated Durand de Saint-Pourçain and Cardinal + Aureolus, the famous Schoolman, that the co-operation of God with the + creature (I mean the physical cooperation) is only general and mediate, + and that God creates substances and gives them the force they need; and + that thereafter he leaves them to themselves, and does naught but + conserve them, without aiding them in their actions. This opinion has + been refuted by the greater number of Scholastic theologians, and it + appears that in the past it met with disapproval in the writings of + Pelagius. Nevertheless a Capuchin named Louis Pereir of Dole, about the + year 1630, wrote a book expressly to revive it, at least in relation to + free actions. Some moderns incline thereto, and M. Bernier supports it in + a little book on freedom and freewill. But one cannot say in relation to + God what 'to conserve' is, without reverting to the general opinion. Also + it must be taken into account that the action of God in conserving should + have some reference to that which is conserved, according to what it is + and to the state wherein it is; thus his action cannot be general or + indeterminate. These generalities are abstractions not to be found in the + truth of individual things, and the conservation of a man standing is + different from the conservation of a man seated. This would not be so if + conservation consisted only in the act of preventing and warding off some + foreign cause which could destroy that which one wishes to conserve; as + often happens when men conserve something. But apart from the fact that + we are obliged ourselves sometimes to maintain that which we conserve, we + must bear in mind that conservation by God consists in the perpetual + immediate influence which the dependence of creatures demands. This + dependence attaches not only to the substance but also to the action, and + one can perhaps not explain it better than by saying, with theologians + and philosophers in general, that it is a continued creation.</p> + + <p>28. The objection will be made that God therefore now creates man a + sinner, he that in the beginning created him innocent. But here it must + be said, with regard to the moral aspect, that God being supremely wise + cannot fail to observe certain laws, and to <!-- Page 140 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page140"></a>[140]</span> act according to the + rules, as well physical as moral, that wisdom has made him choose. And + the same reason that has made him create man innocent, but liable to + fall, makes him re-create man when he falls; for God's knowledge causes + the future to be for him as the present, and prevents him from rescinding + the resolutions made.</p> + + <p>29. As for physical co-operation, here one must consider the truth + which has made already so much stir in the Schools since St. Augustine + declared it, that evil is a privation of being, whereas the action of God + tends to the positive. This answer is accounted a quibble, and even + something chimerical in the minds of many people. But here is an instance + somewhat similar, which will serve to disabuse them.</p> + + <p>30. The celebrated Kepler and M. Descartes (in his letters) after him + have spoken of the 'natural inertia of bodies'; and it is something which + may be regarded as a perfect image and even as a sample of the original + limitation of creatures, to show that privation constitutes the formal + character of the imperfections and disadvantages that are in substance as + well as in its actions. Let us suppose that the current of one and the + same river carried along with it various boats, which differ among + themselves only in the cargo, some being laden with wood, others with + stone, and some more, the others less. That being so, it will come about + that the boats most heavily laden will go more slowly than the others, + provided it be assumed that the wind or the oar, or some other similar + means, assist them not at all. It is not, properly speaking, weight which + is the cause of this retardation, since the boats are going down and not + upwards; but it is the same cause which also increases the weight in + bodies that have greater density, which are, that is to say, less porous + and more charged with matter that is proper to them: for the matter which + passes through the pores, not receiving the same movement, must not be + taken into account. It is therefore matter itself which originally is + inclined to slowness or privation of speed; not indeed of itself to + lessen this speed, having once received it, since that would be action, + but to moderate by its receptivity the effect of the impression when it + is to receive it. Consequently, since more matter is moved by the same + force of the current when the boat is more laden, it is necessary that it + go more slowly; and experiments on the impact of bodies, as well as + reason, show that twice as much force must be <!-- Page 141 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page141"></a>[141]</span> employed to give equal + speed to a body of the same matter but of twice the size. But that indeed + would not be necessary if the matter were absolutely indifferent to + repose and to movement, and if it had not this natural inertia whereof we + have just spoken to give it a kind of repugnance to being moved. Let us + now compare the force which the current exercises on boats, and + communicates to them, with the action of God, who produces and conserves + whatever is positive in creatures, and gives them perfection, being and + force: let us compare, I say, the inertia of matter with the natural + imperfection of creatures, and the slowness of the laden boat with the + defects to be found in the qualities and the action of the creature; and + we shall find that there is nothing so just as this comparison. The + current is the cause of the boat's movement, but not of its retardation; + God is the cause of perfection in the nature and the actions of the + creature, but the limitation of the receptivity of the creature is the + cause of the defects there are in its action. Thus the Platonists, St. + Augustine and the Schoolmen were right to say that God is the cause of + the material element of evil which lies in the positive, and not of the + formal element, which lies in privation. Even so one may say that the + current is the cause of the material element of the retardation, but not + of the formal: that is, it is the cause of the boat's speed without being + the cause of the limits to this speed. And God is no more the cause of + sin than the river's current is the cause of the retardation of the boat. + Force also in relation to matter is as the spirit in relation to the + flesh; the spirit is willing and the flesh is weak, and spirits + act...</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>quantum non noxia corpora tardant.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>31. There is, then, a wholly similar relation between such and such an + action of God, and such and such a passion or reception of the creature, + which in the ordinary course of things is perfected only in proportion to + its 'receptivity', such is the term used. And when it is said that the + creature depends upon God in so far as it exists and in so far as it + acts, and even that conservation is a continual creation, this is true in + that God gives ever to the creature and produces continually all that in + it is positive, good and perfect, every perfect gift coming from the + Father of lights. The imperfections, on the other hand, and the defects + in operations spring from the original limitation that the creature could + not but <!-- Page 142 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page142"></a>[142]</span> receive with the first beginning of its + being, through the ideal reasons which restrict it. For God could not + give the creature all without making of it a God; therefore there must + needs be different degrees in the perfection of things, and limitations + also of every kind.</p> + + <p>32. This consideration will serve also to satisfy some modern + philosophers who go so far as to say that God is the only agent. It is + true that God is the only one whose action is pure and without admixture + of what is termed 'to suffer': but that does not preclude the creature's + participation in actions, since <i>the action of the creature</i> is a + modification of the substance, flowing naturally from it and containing a + variation not only in the perfections that God has communicated to the + creature, but also in the limitations that the creature, being what it + is, brings with it. Thus we see that there is an actual distinction + between the substance and its modification or accidents, contrary to the + opinion of some moderns and in particular of the late Duke of Buckingham, + who spoke of that in a little <i>Discourse on Religion</i> recently + reprinted. Evil is therefore like darkness, and not only ignorance but + also error and malice consist formally in a certain kind of privation. + Here is an example of error which we have already employed. I see a tower + which from a distance appears round although it is square. The thought + that the tower is what it appears to be flows naturally from that which I + see; and when I dwell on this thought it is an affirmation, it is a false + judgement; but if I pursue the examination, if some reflexion causes me + to perceive that appearances deceive me, lo and behold, I abandon my + error. To abide in a certain place, or not to go further, not to espy + some landmark, these are privations.</p> + + <p>33. It is the same in respect of malice or ill will. The will tends + towards good in general, it must strive after the perfection that befits + us, and the supreme perfection is in God. All pleasures have within + themselves some feeling of perfection. But when one is limited to the + pleasures of the senses, or to other pleasures to the detriment of + greater good, as of health, of virtue, of union with God, of felicity, it + is in this privation of a further aspiration that the defect consists. In + general perfection is positive, it is an absolute reality; defect is + privative, it comes from limitation and tends towards new privations. + This saying is therefore as true as it is ancient: <i>bonum ex causa + integra, malum ex quolibet defectu</i>; as also that <!-- Page 143 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page143"></a>[143]</span> which states: + <i>malum causam habet non efficientem, sed deficientem</i>. And I hope + that the meaning of these axioms will be better apprehended after what I + have just said.</p> + + <p>34. The physical co-operation of God and of creatures with the will + contributes also to the difficulties existing in regard to freedom. I am + of opinion that our will is exempt not only from constraint but also from + necessity. Aristotle has already observed that there are two things in + freedom, to wit, spontaneity and choice, and therein lies our mastery + over our actions. When we act freely we are not being forced, as would + happen if we were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; + and we are not prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as + would happen if we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment. + There is <i>contingency</i> in a thousand actions of Nature; but when + there is no judgement in him who acts there is no <i>freedom</i>. And if + we had judgement not accompanied by any inclination to act, our soul + would be an understanding without will.</p> + + <p>35. It is not to be imagined, however, that our freedom consists in an + indetermination or an indifference of equipoise, as if one must needs be + inclined equally to the side of yes and of no and in the direction of + different courses, when there are several of them to take. This equipoise + in all directions is impossible: for if we were equally inclined towards + the courses A, B and C, we could not be equally inclined towards A and + towards not A. This equipoise is also absolutely contrary to experience, + and in scrutinizing oneself one will find that there has always been some + cause or reason inclining us towards the course taken, although very + often we be not aware of that which prompts us: just in the same way one + is hardly aware why, on issuing from a door, one has placed the right + foot before the left or the left before the right.</p> + + <p>36. But let us pass to the difficulties. Philosophers agree to-day + that the truth of contingent futurities is determinate, that is to say + that contingent futurities are future, or that they will be, that they + will happen: for it is as sure that the future will be, as it is sure + that the past has been. It was true already a hundred years ago that I + should write to-day, as it will be true after a hundred years that I have + written. Thus the contingent is not, because it is future, any the less + contingent; and <i>determination</i>, which would be called certainty if + it were known, is not incompatible with contingency. Often the certain + and the determinate are taken as one thing, <!-- Page 144 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page144"></a>[144]</span> because a determinate + truth is capable of being known: thus it may be said that determination + is an objective certainty.</p> + + <p>37. This determination comes from the very nature of truth, and cannot + injure freedom: but there are other determinations taken from elsewhere, + and in the first place from the foreknowledge of God, which many have + held to be contrary to freedom. They say that what is foreseen cannot + fail to exist, and they say so truly; but it follows not that what is + foreseen is necessary, for <i>necessary truth</i> is that whereof the + contrary is impossible or implies contradiction. Now this truth which + states that I shall write tomorrow is not of that nature, it is not + necessary. Yet supposing that God foresees it, it is necessary that it + come to pass; that is, the consequence is necessary, namely, that it + exist, since it has been foreseen; for God is infallible. This is what is + termed a <i>hypothetical necessity</i>. But our concern is not this + necessity: it is an <i>absolute necessity</i> that is required, to be + able to say that an action is necessary, that it is not contingent, that + it is not the effect of a free choice. Besides it is very easily seen + that foreknowledge in itself adds nothing to the determination of the + truth of contingent futurities, save that this determination is known: + and this does not augment the determination or the 'futurition' (as it is + termed) of these events, that whereon we agreed at the outset.</p> + + <p>38. This answer is doubtless very correct. It is agreed that + foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate; truth is + foreseen because it is determinate, because it is true; but it is not + true because it is foreseen: and therein the knowledge of the future has + nothing that is not also in the knowledge of the past or of the present. + But here is what an opponent will be able to say: I grant you that + foreknowledge in itself does not make truth more determinate, but it is + the cause of the foreknowledge that makes it so. For it needs must be + that the foreknowledge of God have its foundation in the nature of + things, and this foundation, making the truth <i>predeterminate</i>, will + prevent it from being contingent and free.</p> + + <p>39. It is this difficulty that has caused two parties to spring up, + one of the <i>predeterminators</i>, the other of the supporters of + <i>mediate knowledge</i>. The Dominicans and the Augustinians are for + predetermination, the Franciscans and the modern Jesuits on the other + hand are for mediate knowledge. These two parties appeared towards the + middle of the sixteenth century and a little later. <!-- Page 145 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page145"></a>[145]</span> Molina + himself, who is perhaps one of the first, with Fonseca, to have + systematized this point, and from whom the others derived their name of + Molinists, says in the book that he wrote on the reconciliation of + freewill with grace, about the year 1570, that the Spanish doctors (he + means principally the Thomists), who had been writing then for twenty + years, finding no other way to explain how God could have a certain + knowledge of contingent futurities, had introduced predetermination as + being necessary to free actions.</p> + + <p>40. As for himself, he thought to have found another way. He considers + that there are three objects of divine knowledge, the possibles, the + actual events and the conditional events that would happen in consequence + of a certain condition if it were translated into action. The knowledge + of possibilities is what is called the 'knowledge of mere intelligence'; + that of events occurring actually in the progress of the universe is + called the 'knowledge of intuition'. And as there is a kind of mean + between the merely possible and the pure and absolute event, to wit, the + conditional event, it can be said also, according to Molina, that there + is a mediate knowledge between that of intuition and that of + intelligence. Instance is given of the famous example of David asking the + divine oracle whether the inhabitants of the town of Keilah, where he + designed to shut himself in, would deliver him to Saul, supposing that + Saul should besiege the town. God answered yes; whereupon David took a + different course. Now some advocates of this mediate knowledge are of + opinion that God, foreseeing what men would do of their own accord, + supposing they were placed in such and such circumstances, and knowing + that they would make ill use of their free will, decrees to refuse them + grace and favourable circumstances. And he may justly so decree, since in + any case these circumstances and these aids would not have served them + aught. But Molina contents himself with finding therein generally a + reason for the decrees of God, founded on what the free creature would do + in such and such circumstances.</p> + + <p>41. I will not enter into all the detail of this controversy; it will + suffice for me to give one instance. Certain older writers, not + acceptable to St. Augustine and his first disciples, appear to have had + ideas somewhat approaching those of Molina. The Thomists and those who + call themselves disciples of St. Augustine (but whom their opponents call + Jansenists) combat this doctrine on <!-- Page 146 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page146"></a>[146]</span> philosophical and + theological grounds. Some maintain that mediate knowledge must be + included in the knowledge of mere intelligence. But the principal + objection is aimed at the foundation of this knowledge. For what + foundation can God have for seeing what the people of Keilah would do? A + simple contingent and free act has nothing in itself to yield a principle + of certainty, unless one look upon it as predetermined by the decrees of + God, and by the causes that are dependent upon them. Consequently the + difficulty existing in actual free actions will exist also in conditional + free actions, that is to say, God will know them only under the condition + of their causes and of his decrees, which are the first causes of things: + and it will not be possible to separate such actions from those causes so + as to know a contingent event in a way that is independent of the + knowledge of its causes. Therefore all must of necessity be traced back + to the predetermination of God's decrees, and this mediate knowledge (so + it will be said) will offer no remedy. The theologians who profess to be + adherents of St. Augustine claim also that the system of the Molinists + would discover the source of God's grace in the good qualities of man, + and this they deem an infringement of God's honour and contrary to St. + Paul's teaching.</p> + + <p>42. It would be long and wearisome to enter here into the replies and + rejoinders coming from one side and the other, and it will suffice for me + to explain how I conceive that there is truth on both sides. For this + result I resort to my principle of an infinitude of possible worlds, + represented in the region of eternal verities, that is, in the object of + the divine intelligence, where all conditional futurities must be + comprised. For the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possible + world, <i>which differs from ours only in all that is connected with this + hypothesis</i>, and the idea of this possible world represents that which + would happen in this case. Thus we have a principle for the certain + knowledge of contingent futurities, whether they happen actually or must + happen in a certain case. For in the region of the possibles they are + represented as they are, namely, as free contingencies. Therefore neither + the foreknowledge of contingent futurities nor the foundation for the + certainty of this foreknowledge should cause us perplexity or seem to + prejudice freedom. And though it were true and possible that contingent + futurities consisting in free actions of reasonable creatures were + entirely independent of the decrees of God and of external causes, <!-- + Page 147 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page147"></a>[147]</span> + there would still be means of foreseeing them; for God would see them as + they are in the region of the possibles, before he decrees to admit them + into existence.</p> + + <p>43. But if the foreknowledge of God has nothing to do with the + dependence or independence of our free actions, it is not so with the + foreordinance of God, his decrees, and the sequence of causes which, as I + believe, always contribute to the determination of the will. And if I am + for the Molinists in the first point, I am for the predeterminators in + the second, provided always that predetermination be taken as not + necessitating. In a word, I am of opinion that the will is always more + inclined towards the course it adopts, but that it is never bound by the + necessity to adopt it. That it will adopt this course is certain, but it + is not necessary. The case corresponds to that of the famous saying, + <i>Astra inclinant, non necessitant</i>, although here the similarity is + not complete. For the event towards which the stars tend (to speak with + the common herd, as if there were some foundation for astrology) does not + always come to pass, whereas the course towards which the will is more + inclined never fails to be adopted. Moreover the stars would form only a + part of the inclinations that co-operate in the event, but when one + speaks of the greater inclination of the will, one speaks of the result + of all the inclinations. It is almost as we have spoken above of the + consequent will in God, which results from all the antecedent wills.</p> + + <p>44. Nevertheless, objective certainty or determination does not bring + about the necessity of the determinate truth. All philosophers + acknowledge this, asserting that the truth of contingent futurities is + determinate, and that nevertheless they remain contingent. The thing + indeed would imply no contradiction in itself if the effect did not + follow; and therein lies contingency. The better to understand this + point, we must take into account that there are two great principles of + our arguments. The one is the principle of <i>contradiction</i>, stating + that of two contradictory propositions the one is true, the other false; + the other principle is that of the <i>determinant reason</i>: it states + that nothing ever comes to pass without there being a cause or at least a + reason determining it, that is, something to give an <i>a priori</i> + reason why it is existent rather than non-existent, and in this wise + rather than in any other. This great principle holds for all events, and + a contrary instance will never be supplied: and although more often than + not we are <!-- Page 148 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page148"></a>[148]</span> insufficiently acquainted with these + determinant reasons, we perceive nevertheless that there are such. Were + it not for this great principle we could never prove the existence of + God, and we should lose an infinitude of very just and very profitable + arguments whereof it is the foundation; moreover, it suffers no + exception, for otherwise its force would be weakened. Besides, nothing is + so weak as those systems where all is unsteady and full of exceptions. + That fault cannot be laid to the charge of the system I approve, where + everything happens in accordance with general rules that at most are + mutually restrictive.</p> + + <p>45. We must therefore not imagine with some Schoolmen, whose ideas + tend towards the chimerical, that free contingent futurities have the + privilege of exemption from this general rule of the nature of things. + There is always a prevailing reason which prompts the will to its choice, + and for the maintenance of freedom for the will it suffices that this + reason should incline without necessitating. That is also the opinion of + all the ancients, of Plato, of Aristotle, of St. Augustine. The will is + never prompted to action save by the representation of the good, which + prevails over the opposite representations. This is admitted even in + relation to God, the good angels and the souls in bliss: and it is + acknowledged that they are none the less free in consequence of that. God + fails not to choose the best, but he is not constrained so to do: nay, + more, there is no necessity in the object of God's choice, for another + sequence of things is equally possible. For that very reason the choice + is free and independent of necessity, because it is made between several + possibles, and the will is determined only by the preponderating goodness + of the object. This is therefore not a defect where God and the saints + are concerned: on the contrary, it would be a great defect, or rather a + manifest absurdity, were it otherwise, even in men here on earth, and if + they were capable of acting without any inclining reason. Of such + absurdity no example will ever be found; and even supposing one takes a + certain course out of caprice, to demonstrate one's freedom, the pleasure + or advantage one thinks to find in this conceit is one of the reasons + tending towards it.</p> + + <p>46. There is therefore a freedom of contingency or, in a way, of + indifference, provided that by 'indifference' is understood that nothing + necessitates us to one course or the other; but there is never any + <i>indifference of equipoise</i>, that is, where all is completely <!-- + Page 149 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page149"></a>[149]</span> even + on both sides, without any inclination towards either. Innumerable great + and small movements, internal and external, co-operate with us, for the + most part unperceived by us. And I have already said that when one leaves + a room there are such and such reasons determining us to put the one foot + first, without pausing to reflect. For there is not everywhere a slave, + as in Trimalchio's house in Petronius, to cry to us: the right foot + first. All that we have just said agrees entirely also with the maxims of + the philosophers, who teach that a cause cannot act without having a + disposition towards action. It is this disposition which contains a + predetermination, whether the doer have received it from without, or have + had it in consequence of his own antecedent character.</p> + + <p>47. Thus we have no need to resort, in company with some new Thomists, + to a new immediate predetermination by God, such as may cause the free + creature to abandon his indifference, and to a decree of God for + predetermining the creature, making it possible for God to know what the + creature will do: for it suffices that the creature be predetermined by + its preceding state, which inclines it to one course more than to the + other. Moreover, all these connexions of the actions of the creature and + of all creatures were represented in the divine understanding, and known + to God through the knowledge of mere intelligence, before he had decreed + to give them existence. Thus we see that, in order to account for the + foreknowledge of God, one may dispense with both the mediate knowledge of + the Molinists and the predetermination which a Bañez or an Alvarez + (writers otherwise of great profundity) have taught.</p> + + <p>48. By this false idea of an indifference of equipoise the Molinists + were much embarrassed. They were asked not only how it was possible to + know in what direction a cause absolutely indeterminate would be + determined, but also how it was possible that there should finally result + therefrom a determination for which there is no source: to say with + Molina that it is the privilege of the free cause is to say nothing, but + simply to grant that cause the privilege of being chimerical. It is + pleasing to see their harassed efforts to emerge from a labyrinth whence + there is absolutely no means of egress. Some teach that the will, before + it is determined formally, must be determined virtually, in order to + emerge from its state of equipoise; and Father Louis of Dole, in his book + on the <i>Co-operation of God</i>, quotes Molinists who attempt to take + refuge <!-- Page 150 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page150"></a>[150]</span> in this expedient: for they are compelled + to acknowledge that the cause must needs be disposed to act. But they + gain nothing, they only defer the difficulty: for they will still be + asked how the free cause comes to be determined virtually. They will + therefore never extricate themselves without acknowledging that there is + a predetermination in the preceding state of the free creature, which + inclines it to be determined.</p> + + <p>49. In consequence of this, the case also of Buridan's ass between two + meadows, impelled equally towards both of them, is a fiction that cannot + occur in the universe, in the order of Nature, although M. Bayle be of + another opinion. It is true that, if the case were possible, one must say + that the ass would starve himself to death: but fundamentally the + question deals in the impossible, unless it be that God bring the thing + about expressly. For the universe cannot be halved by a plane drawn + through the middle of the ass, which is cut vertically through its + length, so that all is equal and alike on both sides, in the manner + wherein an ellipse, and every plane figure of the number of those I term + 'ambidexter', can be thus halved, by any straight line passing through + its centre. Neither the parts of the universe nor the viscera of the + animal are alike nor are they evenly placed on both sides of this + vertical plane. There will therefore always be many things in the ass and + outside the ass, although they be not apparent to us, which will + determine him to go on one side rather than the other. And although man + is free, and the ass is not, nevertheless for the same reason it must be + true that in man likewise the case of a perfect equipoise between two + courses is impossible. Furthermore it is true that an angel, or God + certainly, could always account for the course man has adopted, by + assigning a cause or a predisposing reason which has actually induced him + to adopt it: yet this reason would often be complex and incomprehensible + to ourselves, because the concatenation of causes linked together is very + long.</p> + + <p>50. Hence it is that the reason M. Descartes has advanced to prove the + independence of our free actions, by what he terms an intense inward + sensation, has no force. We cannot properly speaking be sensible of our + independence, and we are not aware always of the causes, often + imperceptible, whereon our resolution depends. It is as though the + magnetic needle took pleasure in turning towards the north: for it would + think that it was turning independently of any other cause, not being + aware of the imperceptible <!-- Page 151 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page151"></a>[151]</span> movements of the magnetic matter. + Nevertheless we shall see later in what sense it is quite true that the + human soul is altogether its own natural principle in relation to its + actions, dependent upon itself and independent of all other + creatures.</p> + + <p>51. As for <i>volition</i> itself, to say that it is an object of free + will is incorrect. We will to act, strictly speaking, and we do not will + to will; else we could still say that we will to have the will to will, + and that would go on to infinity. Besides, we do not always follow the + latest judgement of practical understanding when we resolve to will; but + we always follow, in our willing, the result of all the inclinations that + come from the direction both of reasons and passions, and this often + happens without an express judgement of the understanding.</p> + + <p>52. All is therefore certain and determined beforehand in man, as + everywhere else, and the human soul is a kind of <i>spiritual + automaton</i>, although contingent actions in general and free action in + particular are not on that account necessary with an absolute necessity, + which would be truly incompatible with contingency. Thus neither + futurition in itself, certain as it is, nor the infallible prevision of + God, nor the predetermination either of causes or of God's decrees + destroys this contingency and this freedom. That is acknowledged in + respect of futurition and prevision, as has already been set forth. + Since, moreover, God's decree consists solely in the resolution he forms, + after having compared all possible worlds, to choose that one which is + the best, and bring it into existence together with all that this world + contains, by means of the all-powerful word <i>Fiat</i>, it is plain to + see that this decree changes nothing in the constitution of things: God + leaves them just as they were in the state of mere possibility, that is, + changing nothing either in their essence or nature, or even in their + accidents, which are represented perfectly already in the idea of this + possible world. Thus that which is contingent and free remains no less so + under the decrees of God than under his prevision.</p> + + <p>53. But could God himself (it will be said) then change nothing in the + world? Assuredly he could not now change it, without derogation to his + wisdom, since he has foreseen the existence of this world and of what it + contains, and since, likewise, he has formed this resolution to bring it + into existence: for he cannot be mistaken nor repent, and it did not + behove him to from an imperfect resolution applying to one part and not + the <!-- Page 152 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page152"></a>[152]</span> whole. Thus, all being ordered from the + beginning, it is only because of this hypothetical necessity, recognized + by everyone, that after God's prevision or after his resolution nothing + can be changed: and yet the events in themselves remain contingent. For + (setting aside this supposition of the futurition of the thing and of the + prevision or of the resolution of God, a supposition which already lays + it down as a fact that the thing will happen, and in accordance with + which one must say, 'Unumquodque, quando est, oportet esse, aut + unumquodque, siquidem erit, oportet futurum esse'), the event has nothing + in it to render it necessary and to suggest that no other thing might + have happened in its stead. And as for the connexion between causes and + effects, it only inclined, without necessitating, the free agency, as I + have just explained; thus it does not produce even a hypothetical + necessity, save in conjunction with something from outside, to wit, this + very maxim, that the prevailing inclination always triumphs.</p> + + <p>54. It will be said also that, if all is ordered, God cannot then + perform miracles. But one must bear in mind that the miracles which + happen in the world were also enfolded and represented as possible in + this same world considered in the state of mere possibility; and God, who + has since performed them, when he chose this world had even then decreed + to perform them. Again the objection will be made that vows and prayers, + merits and demerits, good and bad actions avail nothing, since nothing + can be changed. This objection causes most perplexity to people in + general, and yet it is purely a sophism. These prayers, these vows, these + good or bad actions that occur to-day were already before God when he + formed the resolution to order things. Those things which happen in this + existing world were represented, with their effects and their + consequences, in the idea of this same world, while it was still possible + only; they were represented therein, attracting God's grace whether + natural or supernatural, requiring punishments or rewards, just as it has + happened actually in this world since God chose it. The prayer or the + good action were even then an <i>ideal cause</i> or <i>condition</i>, + that is, an inclining reason able to contribute to the grace of God, or + to the reward, as it now does in reality. Since, moreover, all is wisely + connected together in the world, it is clear that God, foreseeing that + which would happen freely, ordered all other things on that basis + beforehand, or (what is <!-- Page 153 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page153"></a>[153]</span> the same) he chose that possible world in + which everything was ordered in this fashion.</p> + + <p>55. This consideration demolishes at the same time what the ancients + called the 'Lazy Sophism' (<span lang="el" title="logos argos" + >λογος + αργος</span>) which ended in a decision to + do nothing: for (people would say) if what I ask is to happen it will + happen even though I should do nothing; and if it is not to happen it + will never happen, no matter what trouble I take to achieve it. This + necessity, supposedly existent in events, and detached from their causes, + might be termed <i>Fatum Mahometanum</i>, as I have already observed + above, because a similar line of reasoning, so it is said, causes the + Turks not to shun places ravaged by plague. But the answer is quite + ready: the effect being certain, the cause that shall produce it is + certain also; and if the effect comes about it will be by virtue of a + proportionate cause. Thus your laziness perchance will bring it about + that you will obtain naught of what you desire, and that you will fall + into those misfortunes which you would by acting with care have avoided. + We see, therefore, that the <i>connexion of causes with effects</i>, far + from causing an unendurable fatality, provides rather a means of + obviating it. There is a German proverb which says that death will ever + have a cause; and nothing is so true. You will die on that day (let us + presume it is so, and that God foresees it): yes, without doubt; but it + will be because you will do what shall lead you thither. It is likewise + with the chastisements of God, which also depend upon their causes. And + it will be apposite in this connexion to quote this famous passage from + St. Ambrose (in cap. I <i>Lucae</i>), 'Novit Dominus mutare sententiam, + si tu noveris mutare delictum', which is not to be understood as of + reprobation, but of denunciation, such as that which Jonah dealt out for + God to the Ninevites. This common saying: 'Si non es praedestinatus, fac + ut praedestineris', must not be taken literally, its true sense being + that he who has doubts of his predestination need only do what is + required for him to obtain it by the grace of God. The sophism which ends + in a decision to trouble oneself over nothing will haply be useful + sometimes to induce certain people to face danger fearlessly. It has been + applied in particular to Turkish soldiers: but it seems that hashish is a + more important factor than this sophism, not to mention the fact that + this resolute spirit in the Turks has greatly belied itself in our + days.</p> + + <p>56. A learned physician of Holland named Johan van Beverwyck took the + trouble to write <i>De Termino Vitae</i> and to collect <!-- Page 154 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page154"></a>[154]</span> sundry + answers, letters and discourses of some learned men of his time on this + subject. This collection has been printed, and it is astonishing to see + there how often people are misled, and how they have confused a problem + which, properly speaking, is the easiest in the world. After that it is + no wonder that there are very many doubts which the human race cannot + abandon. The truth is that people love to lose themselves, and this is a + kind of ramble of the mind, which is unwilling to subject itself to + attention, to order, to rules. It seems as though we are so accustomed to + games and jesting that we play the fool even in the most serious + occupations, and when we least think to do so.</p> + + <p>57. I fear that in the recent dispute between the theologians of the + Augsburg Confession, <i>De Termino Paenitentiae Peremptorio</i>, which + has called forth so many treatises in Germany, some misunderstanding, + though of a different nature, has slipped in. The terms prescribed by the + laws are amongst lawyers known as <i>fatalia</i>. It may be said, in a + sense, that the <i>peremptory term</i>, prescribed to man for his + repentance and amendment, is certain in the sight of God, with whom all + is certain. God knows when a sinner will be so hardened that thereafter + nothing can be done for him: not indeed that it would be impossible for + him to do penance or that sufficient grace needs must be refused to him + after a certain term, a grace that never fails; but because there will be + a time whereafter he will no more approach the ways of salvation. But we + never have certain marks for recognizing this term, and we are never + justified in considering a man utterly abandoned: that would be to pass a + rash judgement. It were better always to have room for hope; and this is + an occasion, with a thousand others, where our ignorance is + beneficial.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Prudens futuri temporis exitum</i></p> + <p><i>Caliginosa nocte premit Deus</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>58. The whole future is doubtless determined: but since we know not + what it is, nor what is foreseen or resolved, we must do our duty, + according to the reason that God has given us and according to the rules + that he has prescribed for us; and thereafter we must have a quiet mind, + and leave to God himself the care for the outcome. For he will never fail + to do that which shall be the best, not only in general but also in + particular, for those who have true confidence in him, that is, a + confidence composed of <!-- Page 155 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page155"></a>[155]</span> true piety, a lively faith and fervent + charity, by virtue of which we will, as far as in us lies, neglect + nothing appertaining to our duty and his service. It is true that we + cannot 'render service' to him, for he has need of nothing: but it is + 'serving him', in our parlance, when we strive to carry out his + presumptive will, co-operating in the good as it is known to us, wherever + we can contribute thereto. For we must always presume that God is + prompted towards the good we know, until the event shows us that he had + stronger reasons, although perhaps unknown to us, which have made him + subordinate this good that we sought to some other greater good of his + own designing, which he has not failed or will not fail to effect.</p> + + <p>59. I have just shown how the action of the will depends upon its + causes; that there is nothing so appropriate to human nature as this + dependence of our actions; and that otherwise one would slip into a + preposterous and unendurable fatality, namely into the <i>Fatum + Mahometanum</i>, which is the worst of all because it overthrows + foresight and good counsel. It is well to show, notwithstanding, how this + dependence of voluntary actions does not fundamentally preclude the + existence within us of a wonderful <i>spontaneity</i>, which in a certain + sense makes the soul in its resolves independent of the physical + influence of all other creatures. This spontaneity, hitherto little + recognized, which exalts our command over our actions to the highest + pitch, is a consequence of the System of Pre-established Harmony, of + which I must give some explanation here. The Scholastic philosophers + believed that there was a reciprocal physical influence between body and + soul: but since it has been recognized that thought and dimensional mass + have no mutual connexion, and that they are creatures differing <i>toto + genere</i>, many moderns have acknowledged that there is no <i>physical + communication</i> between soul and body, despite the <i>metaphysical + communication</i> always subsisting, which causes soul and body to + compose one and the same <i>suppositum</i>, or what is called a person. + This physical communication, if there were such, would cause the soul to + change the degree of speed and the directional line of some motions that + are in the body, and <i>vice versa</i> the body to change the sequence of + the thoughts that are in the soul. But this effect cannot be inferred + from any notion conceived in the body and in the soul; though nothing be + better known to us than the soul, since it is inmost to us, that is to + say inmost to itself.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 156 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page156"></a>[156]</span></p> + + <p>60. M. Descartes wished to compromise and to make a part of the body's + action dependent upon the soul. He believed in the existence of a rule of + Nature to the effect, according to him, that the same quantity of + movement is conserved in bodies. He deemed it not possible that the + influence of the soul should violate this law of bodies, but he believed + that the soul notwithstanding might have power to change the direction of + the movements that are made in the body; much as a rider, though giving + no force to the horse he mounts, nevertheless controls it by guiding that + force in any direction he pleases. But as that is done by means of the + bridle, the bit, the spurs and other material aids, it is conceivable how + that can be; there are, however, no instruments such as the soul may + employ for this result, nothing indeed either in the soul or in the body, + that is, either in thought or in the mass, which may serve to explain + this change of the one by the other. In a word, that the soul should + change the quantity of force and that it should change the line of + direction, both these things are equally inexplicable.</p> + + <p>61. Moreover, two important truths on this subject have been + discovered since M. Descartes' day. The first is that the quantity of + absolute force which is in fact conserved is different from the quantity + of movement, as I have demonstrated elsewhere. The second discovery is + that the same direction is still conserved in all bodies together that + are assumed as interacting, in whatever way they come into collision. If + this rule had been known to M. Descartes, he would have taken the + direction of bodies to be as independent of the soul as their force; and + I believe that that would have led direct to the Hypothesis of + Pre-established Harmony, whither these same rules have led me. For apart + from the fact that the physical influence of one of these substances on + the other is inexplicable, I recognized that without a complete + derangement of the laws of Nature the soul could not act physically upon + the body. And I did not believe that one could here listen to + philosophers, competent in other respects, who produce a God, as it were, + <i>ex machina</i>, to bring about the final solution of the piece, + maintaining that God exerts himself deliberately to move bodies as the + soul pleases, and to give perceptions to the soul as the body requires. + For this system, which is called that of <i>occasional causes</i> + (because it teaches that God acts on the body at the instance of the + soul, and <i>vice versa</i>), besides introducing perpetual miracles to + <!-- Page 157 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page157"></a>[157]</span> + establish communication between these two substances, does not obviate + the derangement of the natural laws obtaining in each of these same + substances, which, in the general opinion, their mutual influence would + cause.</p> + + <p>62. Being on other considerations already convinced of the principle + of Harmony in general, I was in consequence convinced likewise of the + <i>preformation</i> and the Pre-established Harmony of all things amongst + themselves, of that between nature and grace, between the decrees of God + and our actions foreseen, between all parts of matter, and even between + the future and the past, the whole in conformity with the sovereign + wisdom of God, whose works are the most harmonious it is possible to + conceive. Thus I could not fail to arrive at the system which declares + that God created the soul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must + produce and represent to itself successively that which takes place + within the body, and the body also in such a fashion that it must do of + itself that which the soul ordains. Consequently the laws that connect + the thoughts of the soul in the order of final causes and in accordance + with the evolution of perceptions must produce pictures that meet and + harmonize with the impressions of bodies on our organs; and likewise the + laws of movements in the body, which follow one another in the order of + efficient causes, meet and so harmonize with the thoughts of the soul + that the body is induced to act at the time when the soul wills it.</p> + + <p>63. Far from its being prejudicial, nothing can be more favourable to + freedom than that system. And M. Jacquelot has demonstrated well in his + book on the <i>Conformity of Faith with Reason</i>, that it is just as if + he who knows all that I shall order a servant to do the whole day long on + the morrow made an automaton entirely resembling this servant, to carry + out to-morrow at the right moment all that I should order; and yet that + would not prevent me from ordering freely all that I should please, + although the action of the automaton that would serve me would not be in + the least free.</p> + + <p>64. Moreover, since all that passes in the soul depends, according to + this system, only upon the soul, and its subsequent state is derived only + from it and from its present state, how can one give it a greater + <i>independence</i>? It is true that there still remains some + imperfection in the constitution of the soul. All that happens to the + soul depends upon it, but depends not always upon its will; that <!-- + Page 158 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page158"></a>[158]</span> were + too much. Nor are such happenings even recognized always by its + understanding or perceived with distinctness. For there is in the soul + not only an order of distinct perceptions, forming its dominion, but also + a series of confused perceptions or passions, forming its bondage: and + there is no need for astonishment at that; the soul would be a Divinity + if it had none but distinct perceptions. It has nevertheless some power + over these confused perceptions also, even if in an indirect manner. For + although it cannot change its passions forthwith, it can work from afar + towards that end with enough success, and endue itself with new passions + and even habits. It even has a like power over the more distinct + perceptions, being able to endue itself indirectly with opinions and + intentions, and to hinder itself from having this one or that, and stay + or hasten its judgement. For we can seek means beforehand to arrest + ourselves, when occasion arises, on the sliding step of a rash judgement; + we can find some incident to justify postponement of our resolution even + at the moment when the matter appears ready to be judged. Although our + opinion and our act of willing be not directly objects of our will (as I + have already observed), one sometimes, takes measures nevertheless, to + will and even to believe in due time, that which one does not will, or + believe, now. So great is the profundity of the spirit of man.</p> + + <p>65. And now, to bring to a conclusion this question of + <i>spontaneity</i>, it must be said that, on a rigorous definition, the + soul has within it the principle of all its actions, and even of all its + passions, and that the same is true in all the simple substances + scattered throughout Nature, although there be freedom only in those that + are intelligent. In the popular sense notwithstanding, speaking in + accordance with appearances, we must say that the soul depends in some + way upon the body and upon the impressions of the senses: much as we + speak with Ptolemy and Tycho in everyday converse, and think with + Copernicus, when it is a question of the rising and the setting of the + sun.</p> + + <p>66. One may however give a true and philosophic sense to this + <i>mutual dependence</i> which we suppose between the soul and the body. + It is that the one of these two substances depends upon the other + ideally, in so far as the reason of that which is done in the one can be + furnished by that which is in the other. This had already happened when + God ordered beforehand the harmony that there <!-- Page 159 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page159"></a>[159]</span> would be between them. + Even so would that automaton, that should fulfil the servant's function, + depend upon me <i>ideally</i>, in virtue of the knowledge of him who, + foreseeing my future orders, would have rendered it capable of serving me + at the right moment all through the morrow. The knowledge of my future + intentions would have actuated this great craftsman, who would + accordingly have fashioned the automaton: my influence would be + objective, and his physical. For in so far as the soul has perfection and + distinct thoughts, God has accommodated the body to the soul, and has + arranged beforehand that the body is impelled to execute its orders. And + in so far as the soul is imperfect and as its perceptions are confused, + God has accommodated the soul to the body, in such sort that the soul is + swayed by the passions arising out of corporeal representations. This + produces the same effect and the same appearance as if the one depended + immediately upon the other, and by the agency of a physical influence. + Properly speaking, it is by its confused thoughts that the soul + represents the bodies which encompass it. The same thing must apply to + all that we understand by the actions of simple substances one upon + another. For each one is assumed to act upon the other in proportion to + its perfection, although this be only ideally, and in the reasons of + things, as God in the beginning ordered one substance to accord with + another in proportion to the perfection or imperfection that there is in + each. (Withal action and passion are always reciprocal in creatures, + because one part of the reasons which serve to explain clearly what is + done, and which have served to bring it into existence, is in the one of + these substances, and another part of these reasons is in the other, + perfections and imperfections being always mingled and shared.) Thus it + is we attribute <i>action</i> to the one, and <i>passion</i> to the + other.</p> + + <p>67. But after all, whatsoever dependence be conceived in voluntary + actions, and even though there were an absolute and mathematical + necessity (which there is not) it would not follow that there would not + be a sufficient degree of freedom to render rewards and punishments just + and reasonable. It is true that generally we speak as though the + necessity of the action put an end to all merit and all demerit, all + justification for praise and blame, for reward and punishment: but it + must be admitted that this conclusion is not entirely correct. I am very + far from sharing the opinions of Bradwardine, Wyclif, Hobbes and Spinoza, + who <!-- Page 160 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page160"></a>[160]</span> advocate, so it seems, this entirely + mathematical necessity, which I think I have adequately refuted, and + perhaps more clearly than is customary. Yet one must always bear + testimony to the truth and not impute to a dogma anything that does not + result from it. Moreover, these arguments prove too much, since they + would prove just as much against hypothetical necessity, and would + justify the lazy sophism. For the absolute necessity of the sequence of + causes would in this matter add nothing to the infallible certainty of a + hypothetical necessity.</p> + + <p>68. In the first place, therefore, it must be agreed that it is + permitted to kill a madman when one cannot by other means defend oneself. + It will be granted also that it is permitted, and often even necessary, + to destroy venomous or very noxious animals, although they be not so by + their own fault.</p> + + <p>69. Secondly, one inflicts punishments upon a beast, despite its lack + of reason and freedom, when one deems that this may serve to correct it: + thus one punishes dogs and horses, and indeed with much success. Rewards + serve us no less in the managing of animals: when an animal is hungry, + the food that is given to him causes him to do what otherwise would never + be obtained from him.</p> + + <p>70. Thirdly, one would inflict even on beasts capital punishments + (where it is no longer a question of correcting the beast that is + punished) if this punishment could serve as an example, or inspire terror + in others, to make them cease from evil doing. Rorarius, in his book on + reason in beasts, says that in Africa they crucified lions, in order to + drive away other lions from the towns and frequented places, and that he + had observed in passing through the province of Jülich that they hanged + wolves there in order to ensure greater safety for the sheepfolds. There + are people in the villages also who nail birds of prey to the doors of + houses, with the idea that other birds of the same kind will then not so + readily appear. These measures would always be justified if they were of + any avail.</p> + + <p>71. Then, in the fourth place, since experience proves that the fear + of chastisements and the hope of rewards serves to make men abstain from + evil and strive to do good, one would have good reason to avail oneself + of such, even though men were acting under necessity, whatever the + necessity might be. The objection will be raised that if good or evil is + necessary it is useless to avail oneself of means to obtain it or to + hinder it: but the answer has already been <!-- Page 161 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page161"></a>[161]</span> given above in the + passage combating the lazy sophism. If good or evil were a necessity + without these means, then such means would be unavailing; but it is not + so. These goods and evils come only with the aid of these means, and if + these results were necessary the means would be a part of the causes + rendering them necessary, since experience teaches us that often fear or + hope hinders evil or advances good. This objection, then, differs hardly + at all from the lazy sophism, which we raise against the certainty as + well as the necessity of future events. Thus one may say that these + objections are directed equally against hypothetical necessity and + absolute necessity, and that they prove as much against the one as + against the other, that is to say, nothing at all.</p> + + <p>72. There was a great dispute between Bishop Bramhall and Mr. Hobbes, + which began when they were both in Paris, and which was continued after + their return to England; all the parts of it are to be found collected in + a quarto volume published in London in the year 1656. They are all in + English, and have not been translated as far as I know, nor inserted in + the Collection of Works in Latin by Mr. Hobbes. I had already read these + writings, and have obtained them again since. And I had observed at the + outset that he had not at all proved the absolute necessity of all + things, but had shown sufficiently that necessity would not overthrow all + the rules of divine or human justice, and would not prevent altogether + the exercise of this virtue.</p> + + <p>73. There is, however, a kind of justice and a certain sort of rewards + and of punishments which appear not so applicable to those who should act + by an absolute necessity, supposing such necessity existed. It is that + kind of justice which has for its goal neither improvement nor example, + nor even redress of the evil. This justice has its foundation only in the + fitness of things, which demands a certain satisfaction for the expiation + of an evil action. The Socinians, Hobbes and some others do not admit + this punitive justice, which properly speaking is avenging justice. God + reserves it for himself in many cases; but he does not fail to grant it + to those who are entitled to govern others, and he exercises it through + their agency, provided that they act under the influence of reason and + not of passion. The Socinians believe it to be without foundation, but it + always has some foundation in that fitness of things which gives + satisfaction not only to the injured but also to the wise who see it; + even as a beautiful piece of music, or again a good <!-- Page 162 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page162"></a>[162]</span> piece of + architecture, satisfies cultivated minds. And the wise lawgiver having + threatened, and having, so to speak, promised a chastisement, it befits + his consistency not to leave the action completely unpunished, even + though the punishment would no longer avail to correct anyone. But even + though he should have promised nothing, it is enough that there is a + fitness of things which could have prompted him to make this promise, + since the wise man likewise promises only that which is fitting. And one + may even say that there is here a certain compensation of the mind, which + would be scandalized by disorder if the chastisement did not contribute + towards restoring order. One can also consult what Grotius wrote against + the Socinians, of the satisfaction of Jesus Christ, and the answer of + Crellius thereto.</p> + + <p>74. Thus it is that the pains of the damned continue, even when they + no longer serve to turn them away from evil, and that likewise the + rewards of the blessed continue, even when they no longer serve for + strengthening them in good. One may say nevertheless that the damned ever + bring upon themselves new pains through new sins, and that the blessed + ever bring upon themselves new joys by new progress in goodness: for both + are founded on the <i>principle of the fitness of things</i>, which has + seen to it that affairs were so ordered that the evil action must bring + upon itself a chastisement. There is good reason to believe, following + the parallelism of the two realms, that of final causes and that of + efficient causes, that God has established in the universe a connexion + between punishment or reward and bad or good action, in accordance + wherewith the first should always be attracted by the second, and virtue + and vice obtain their reward and their punishment in consequence of the + natural sequence of things, which contains still another kind of + pre-established harmony than that which appears in the communication + between the soul and the body. For, in a word, all that God does, as I + have said already, is harmonious to perfection. Perhaps then this + principle of the fitness of things would no longer apply to beings acting + without true freedom or exemption from absolute necessity; and in that + case corrective justice alone would be administered, and not punitive + justice. That is the opinion of the famous Conringius, in a dissertation + he published on what is just. And indeed, the reasons Pomponazzi employed + in his book on fate, to prove the usefulness of chastisements and + rewards, even though all should come about in our <!-- Page 163 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page163"></a>[163]</span> actions by a fatal + necessity, concern only amendment and not satisfaction, <span lang="el" + title="kolasin ou timôrian" + >κολασιν ου + τιμωριαν</span>. + Moreover, it is only for the sake of outward appearances that one + destroys animals accessary to certain crimes, as one razes the houses of + rebels, that is, to inspire terror. Thus it is an act of corrective + justice, wherein punitive justice has no part at all.</p> + + <p>75. But we will not amuse ourselves now by discussing a question more + curious than necessary, since we have shown sufficiently that there is no + such necessity in voluntary actions. Nevertheless it was well to show + that <i>imperfect freedom</i> alone, that is, freedom which is exempt + only from constraint, would suffice as foundation for chastisements and + rewards of the kind conducive to the avoidance of evil, and to amendment. + One sees also from this that some persons of intelligence, who persuade + themselves that everything is necessary, are wrong in saying that none + must be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished. Apparently they say so + only to exercise their wit: the pretext is that all being necessary + nothing would be in our power. But this pretext is ill founded: necessary + actions would be still in our power, at least in so far as we could + perform them or omit them, when the hope or the fear of praise or blame, + of pleasure or pain prompted our will thereto, whether they prompted it + of necessity, or in prompting it they left spontaneity, contingency and + freedom all alike unimpaired. Thus praise and blame, rewards and + punishments would preserve always a large part of their use, even though + there were a true necessity in our actions. We can praise and blame also + natural good and bad qualities, where the will has no part—in a + horse, in a diamond, in a man; and he who said of Cato of Utica that he + acted virtuously through the goodness of his nature, and that it was + impossible for him to behave otherwise, thought to praise him the + more.</p> + + <p>76. The difficulties which I have endeavoured up to now to remove have + been almost all common to natural and revealed theology. Now it will be + necessary to come to a question of revealed theology, concerning the + election or the reprobation of men, with the dispensation or use of + divine grace in connexion with these acts of the mercy or the justice of + God. But when I answered the preceding objections, I opened up a way to + meet those that remain. This confirms the observation I made thereon + (<i>Preliminary Dissertation,</i> <a href="#sect43">43</a>) that there is + rather a conflict between the <!-- Page 164 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page164"></a>[164]</span> true reasons of natural theology and the + false reasons of human appearances, than between revealed faith and + reason. For on this subject scarcely any difficulty arises that is new, + and not deriving its origin from those which can be placed in the way of + the truths discerned by reason.</p> + + <p>77. Now as theologians of all parties are divided among themselves on + this subject of predestination and grace, and often give different + answers to the same objections, according to their various principles, + one cannot avoid touching on the differences which prevail among them. + One may say in general that some look upon God more metaphysically and + others more morally: and it has already been stated on other occasions + that the Counter-Remonstrants took the first course and the Remonstrants + the second. But to act rightly we must affirm alike on one side the + independence of God and the dependence of creatures, and on the other + side the justice and goodness of God, which makes him dependent upon + himself, his will upon his understanding or his wisdom.</p> + + <p>78. Some gifted and well-intentioned authors, desiring to show the + force of the reasons advocated by the two principal parties, in order to + persuade them to a mutual tolerance, deem that the whole controversy is + reduced to this essential point, namely: What was God's principal aim in + making his decrees with regard to man? Did he make them solely in order + to show forth his glory by manifesting his attributes, and forming, to + that end, the great plan of creation and providence? Or has he had regard + rather to the voluntary movements of intelligent substances which he + designed to create, considering what they would will and do in the + different circumstances and situations wherein he might place them, so as + to form a fitting resolve thereupon? It appears to me that the two + answers to this great question thus given as opposites to one another are + easy to reconcile, and that in consequence the two parties would be + agreed in principle, without any need of tolerance, if all were reduced + to this point. In truth God, in designing to create the world, purposed + solely to manifest and communicate his perfections in the way that was + most efficacious, and most worthy of his greatness, his wisdom and his + goodness. But that very purpose pledged him to consider all the actions + of creatures while still in the state of pure possibility, that he might + form the most fitting plan. He is like a great architect whose aim <!-- + Page 165 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page165"></a>[165]</span> in + view is the satisfaction or the glory of having built a beautiful palace, + and who considers all that is to enter into this construction: the form + and the materials, the place, the situation, the means, the workmen, the + expense, before he forms a complete resolve. For a wise person in laying + his plans cannot separate the end from the means; he does not contemplate + any end without knowing if there are means of attaining thereto.</p> + + <p>79. I know not whether there are also perchance persons who imagine + that, God being the absolute master of all things, one can thence infer + that everything outside him is indifferent to him, that he considers + himself alone, without concern for others, and that thus he has made some + happy and others unhappy without any cause, without choice, without + reason. But to teach so about God were to deprive him of wisdom and of + goodness. We need only observe that he considers himself and neglects + nothing of what he owes to himself, to conclude that he considers his + creatures also, and that he uses them in the manner most consistent with + order. For the more a great and good prince is mindful of his glory, the + more he will think of making his subjects happy, even though he were the + most absolute of all monarchs, and though his subjects were slaves from + birth, bondsmen (in lawyers' parlance), people entirely in subjection to + arbitrary power. Calvin himself and some others of the greatest defenders + of the absolute decree rightly maintained that God had <i>great and just + reasons</i> for his election and the dispensation of his grace, although + these reasons be unknown to us in detail: and we must judge charitably + that the most rigid predestinators have too much reason and too much + piety to depart from this opinion.</p> + + <p>80. There will therefore be no argument for debate on that point (as I + hope) with people who are at all reasonable. But there will always be + argument among those who are called Universalists and Particularists, + according to what they teach of the grace and the will of God. Yet I am + somewhat inclined to believe that the heated dispute between them on the + will of God to save all men, and on that which depends upon it (when one + keeps separate the doctrine <i>de Auxiliis</i>, or of the assistance of + grace), rests rather in expressions than in things. For it is sufficient + to consider that God, as well as every wise and beneficent mind, is + inclined towards all possible good, and that this inclination is + proportionate to the excellence of the good. Moreover, this results (if + we take the matter <!-- Page 166 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page166"></a>[166]</span> precisely and in itself) from an + 'antecedent will', as it is termed, which, however, is not always + followed by its complete effect, because this wise mind must have many + other inclinations besides. Thus it is the result of all the inclinations + together that makes his will complete and decretory, as I have already + explained. One may therefore very well say with ancient writers that God + wills to save all men according to his antecedent will, but not according + to his consequent will, which never fails to be followed by its effect. + And if those who deny this universal will do not allow that the + antecedent inclination be called a will, they are only troubling + themselves about a question of name.</p> + + <p>81. But there is a question more serious in regard to predestination + to eternal life and to all other destination by God, to wit, whether this + destination is absolute or respective. There is destination to good and + destination to evil; and as evil is moral or physical, theologians of all + parties agree that there is no destination to moral evil, that is to say, + that none is destined to sin. As for the greatest physical evil, which is + damnation, one can distinguish between destination and predestination: + for predestination appears to contain within itself an absolute + destination, which is anterior to the consideration of the good or evil + actions of those whom it concerns. Thus one may say that the reprobate + are <i>destined</i> to be condemned, because they are known to be + impenitent. But it cannot so well be said that the reprobate are + <i>predestined</i> to damnation: for there is no <i>absolute</i> + reprobation, its foundation being final foreseen impenitence.</p> + + <p>82. It is true that there are writers who maintain that God, wishing + to manifest his mercy and his justice in accordance with reasons worthy + of him, but unknown to us, chose the elect, and in consequence rejected + the damned, prior to all thought of sin, even of Adam, that after this + resolve he thought fit to permit sin in order to be able to exercise + these two virtues, and that he has bestowed grace in Jesus Christ to some + in order to save them, while he has refused it to others in order to be + able to punish them. Hence these writers are named 'Supralapsarians', + because the decree to punish precedes, according to them, the knowledge + of the future existence of sin. But the opinion most common to-day + amongst those who are called Reformed, and one that is favoured by the + Synod of Dordrecht, is that of the 'Infralapsarians', corresponding + somewhat to the conception of St. Augustine. For <!-- Page 167 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page167"></a>[167]</span> he asserts that God + having resolved to permit the sin of Adam and the corruption of the human + race, for reasons just but hidden, his mercy made him choose some of the + corrupt mass to be freely saved by the merit of Jesus Christ, and his + justice made him resolve to punish the others by the damnation that they + deserved. That is why, with the Schoolmen, only the saved were called + <i>Praedestinati</i> and the damned were called <i>Praesciti</i>. It must + be admitted that some Infralapsarians and others speak sometimes of + predestination to damnation, following the example of Fulgentius and of + St. Augustine himself: but that signifies the same as destination to + them, and it avails nothing to wrangle about words. That pretext, + notwithstanding, was in time past used for maltreating that Godescalc who + caused a stir about the middle of the ninth century, and who took the + name of Fulgentius to indicate that he followed that author.</p> + + <p>83. As for the destination of the elect to eternal life, the + Protestants, as well as those of the Roman Church, dispute much among + themselves as to whether election is absolute or is founded on the + prevision of final living faith. Those who are called Evangelicals, that + is, those of the Augsburg Confession, hold the latter opinion: they + believe that one need not go into the hidden causes of election while one + may find a manifest cause of it shown in Holy Scripture, which is faith + in Jesus Christ; and it appears to them that the prevision of the cause + is also the cause of the prevision of the effect. Those who are called + Reformed are of a different opinion: they admit that salvation comes from + faith in Jesus Christ, but they observe that often the cause anterior to + the effect in execution is posterior in intention, as when the cause is + the means and the effect is the end. Thus the question is, whether faith + or salvation is anterior in the intention of God, that is, whether God's + design is rather to save man than to make him a believer.</p> + + <p>84. Hence we see that the question between the Supralapsarians and the + Infralapsarians in part, and again between them and the Evangelicals, + comes back to a right conception of the order that is in God's decrees. + Perhaps one might put an end to this dispute at once by saying that, + properly speaking, all the decrees of God that are here concerned are + simultaneous, not only in respect of time, as everyone agrees, but also + <i>in signo rationis</i>, or in the order of nature. And indeed, the + Formula of Concord, building upon some passages <!-- Page 168 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page168"></a>[168]</span> of St. Augustine, + comprised in the same Decree of Election salvation and the means that + conduce to it. To demonstrate this synchronism of destinations or of + decrees with which we are concerned, we must revert to the expedient that + I have employed more than once, which states that God, before decreeing + anything, considered among other possible sequences of things that one + which he afterwards approved. In the idea of this is represented how the + first parents sin and corrupt their posterity; how Jesus Christ redeems + the human race; how some, aided by such and such graces, attain to final + faith and to salvation; and how others, with or without such or other + graces, do not attain thereto, continue in sin, and are damned. God + grants his sanction to this sequence only after having entered into all + its detail, and thus pronounces nothing final as to those who shall be + saved or damned without having pondered upon everything and compared it + with other possible sequences. Thus God's pronouncement concerns the + whole sequence at the same time; he simply decrees its existence. In + order to save other men, or in a different way, he must needs choose an + altogether different sequence, seeing that all is connected in each + sequence. In this conception of the matter, which is that most worthy of + the All-wise, all whose actions are connected together to the highest + possible degree, there would be only one total decree, which is to create + such a world. This total decree comprises equally all the particular + decrees, without setting one of them before or after another. Yet one may + say also that each particular act of antecedent will entering into the + total result has its value and order, in proportion to the good whereto + this act inclines. But these acts of antecedent will are not called + decrees, since they are not yet inevitable, the outcome depending upon + the total result. According to this conception of things, all the + difficulties that can here be made amount to the same as those I have + already stated and removed in my inquiry concerning the origin of + evil.</p> + + <p>85. There remains only one important matter of discussion, which has + its peculiar difficulties. It is that of the dispensation of the means + and circumstances contributing to salvation and to damnation. This + comprises amongst others the subject of the Aids of Grace (<i>de auxiliis + gratiae</i>), on which Rome (since the Congregation <i>de Auxiliis</i> + under Clement VIII, when a debate took place between the Dominicans and + the Jesuits) does not readily permit <!-- Page 169 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page169"></a>[169]</span> books to be published. + Everyone must agree that God is altogether good and just, that his + goodness makes him contribute the least possible to that which can render + men guilty, and the most possible to that which serves to save them + (possible, I say, subject to the general order of things); that his + justice prevents him from condemning innocent men, and from leaving good + actions without reward; and that he even keeps an exact proportion in + punishments and rewards. Nevertheless, this idea that one should have of + the goodness and the justice of God does not appear enough in what we + know of his actions with regard to the salvation and the damnation of + men: and it is that which makes difficulties concerning sin and its + remedies.</p> + + <p><a name="sect86">86</a>. The first difficulty is how the soul could be + infected with original sin, which is the root of actual sins, without + injustice on God's part in exposing the soul thereto. This difficulty has + given rise to three opinions on the origin of the soul itself. The first + is that of the <i>pre-existence of human souls</i> in another world or in + another life, where they had sinned and on that account had been + condemned to this prison of the human body, an opinion of the Platonists + which is attributed to Origen and which even to-day finds adherents. + Henry More, an English scholar, advocated something like this dogma in a + book written with that express purpose. Some of those who affirm this + pre-existence have gone as far as metempsychosis. The younger van Helmont + held this opinion, and the ingenious author of some metaphysical + <i>Meditations</i>, published in 1678 under the name of William Wander, + appears to have some leaning towards it. The second opinion is that of + <i>Traduction</i>, as if the soul of children were engendered (<i>per + traducem</i>) from the soul or souls of those from whom the body is + engendered. St. Augustine inclined to this judgement the better to + explain original sin. This doctrine is taught also by most of the + theologians of the Augsburg Confession. Nevertheless it is not completely + established among them, since the Universities of Jena and Helmstedt, and + others besides, have long been opposed to it. The third opinion, and that + most widely accepted to-day, is that of <i>Creation</i>: it is taught in + the majority of the Christian Schools, but it is fraught with the + greatest difficulty in respect of original sin.</p> + + <p>87. Into this controversy of theologians on the origin of the human + soul has entered the philosophic dispute on <i>the origin of forms.</i> + Aristotle and scholastic philosophy after him called <i>Form</i> <!-- + Page 170 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page170"></a>[170]</span> that + which is a principle of action and is found in that which acts. This + inward principle is either substantial, being then termed 'Soul', when it + is in an organic body, or accidental, and customarily termed 'Quality'. + The same philosopher gave to the soul the generic name of 'Entelechy' or + <i>Act</i>. This word 'Entelechy' apparently takes its origin from the + Greek word signifying 'perfect', and hence the celebrated Ermolao Barbaro + expressed it literally in Latin by <i>perfectihabia</i>: for Act is a + realization of potency. And he had no need to consult the Devil, as men + say he did, in order to learn that. Now the Philosopher of Stagira + supposes that there are two kinds of Act, the permanent act and the + successive act. The permanent or lasting act is nothing but the + Substantial or Accidental Form: the substantial form (as for example the + soul) is altogether permanent, at least according to my judgement, and + the accidental is only so for a time. But the altogether momentary act, + whose nature is transitory, consists in action itself. I have shown + elsewhere that the notion of Entelechy is not altogether to be scorned, + and that, being permanent, it carries with it not only a mere faculty for + action, but also that which is called 'force', 'effort', 'conatus', from + which action itself must follow if nothing prevents it. Faculty is only + an <i>attribute</i>, or rather sometimes a mode; but force, when it is + not an ingredient of substance itself (that is, force which is not + primitive but derivative), is a <i>quality</i>, which is distinct and + separable from substance. I have shown also how one may suppose that the + soul is a primitive force which is modified and varied by derivative + forces or qualities, and exercised in actions.</p> + + <p>88. Now philosophers have troubled themselves exceedingly on the + question of the origin of substantial forms. For to say that the compound + of form and matter is produced and that the form is only + <i>comproduced</i> means nothing. The common opinion was that forms were + derived from the potency of matter, this being called <i>Eduction</i>. + That also meant in fact nothing, but it was explained in a sense by a + comparison with shapes: for that of a statue is produced only by removal + of the superfluous marble. This comparison might be valid if form + consisted in a mere limitation, as in the case of shape. Some have + thought that forms were sent from heaven, and even created expressly, + when bodies were produced. Julius Scaliger hinted that it was possible + that forms were rather derived from the active potency of the efficient + cause (that is to <!-- Page 171 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page171"></a>[171]</span> say, either from that of God in the case + of Creation or from that of other forms in the case of generation), than + from the passive potency of matter. And that, in the case of generation, + meant a return to traduction. Daniel Sennert, a famous doctor and + physicist at Wittenberg, cherished this opinion, particularly in relation + to animate bodies which are multiplied through seed. A certain Julius + Caesar della Galla, an Italian living in the Low Countries, and a doctor + of Groningen named Johan Freitag wrote with much vehemence in opposition + to Sennert. Johann Sperling, a professor at Wittenberg, made a defence of + his master, and finally came into conflict with Johann Zeisold, a + professor at Jena, who upheld the belief that the human soul is + created.</p> + + <p>89. But traduction and eduction are equally inexplicable when it is a + question of finding the origin of the soul. It is not the same with + accidental forms, since they are only modifications of the substance, and + their origin may be explained by eduction, that is, by variation of + limitations, in the same way as the origin of shapes. But it is quite + another matter when we are concerned with the origin of a substance, + whose beginning and destruction are equally difficult to explain. Sennert + and Sperling did not venture to admit the subsistence and the + indestructibility of the souls of beasts or of other primitive forms, + although they allowed that they were indivisible and immaterial. But the + fact is that they confused indestructibility with immortality, whereby is + understood in the case of man that not only the soul but also the + personality subsists. In saying that the soul of man is immortal one + implies the subsistence of what makes the identity of the person, + something which retains its moral qualities, conserving the + <i>consciousness</i>, or the reflective inward feeling, of what it is: + thus it is rendered susceptible to chastisement or reward. But this + conservation of personality does not occur in the souls of beasts: that + is why I prefer to say that they are imperishable rather than to call + them immortal. Yet this misapprehension appears to have been the cause of + a great inconsistency in the doctrine of the Thomists and of other good + philosophers: they recognized the immateriality or indivisibility of all + souls, without being willing to admit their indestructibility, greatly to + the prejudice of the immortality of the human soul. John Scot, that is, + the Scotsman (which formerly signified Hibernian or Erigena), a famous + writer of the time of Louis the Debonair and of his sons, was for the + conservation of all <!-- Page 172 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page172"></a>[172]</span> souls: and I see not why there should be + less objection to making the atoms of Epicurus or of Gassendi endure, + than to affirming the subsistence of all truly simple and indivisible + substances, which are the sole and true atoms of Nature. And Pythagoras + was right in saying generally, as Ovid makes him say:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Morte carent animae</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>90. Now as I like maxims which hold good and admit of the fewest + exceptions possible, here is what has appeared to me most reasonable in + every sense on this important question. I consider that souls and simple + substances altogether cannot begin except by creation, or end except by + annihilation. Moreover, as the formation of organic animate bodies + appears explicable in the order of nature only when one assumes a + <i>preformation</i> already organic, I have thence inferred that what we + call generation of an animal is only a transformation and augmentation. + Thus, since the same body was already furnished with organs, it is to be + supposed that it was already animate, and that it had the same soul: so I + assume <i>vice versa</i>, from the conservation of the soul when once it + is created, that the animal is also conserved, and that apparent death is + only an envelopment, there being no likelihood that in the order of + nature souls exist entirely separated from all body, or that what does + not begin naturally can cease through natural forces.</p> + + <p>91. Considering that so admirable an order and rules so general are + established in regard to animals, it does not appear reasonable that man + should be completely excluded from that order, and that everything in + relation to his soul should come about in him by miracle. Besides I have + pointed out repeatedly that it is of the essence of God's wisdom that all + should be harmonious in his works, and that nature should be parallel + with grace. It is thus my belief that those souls which one day shall be + human souls, like those of other species, have been in the seed, and in + the progenitors as far back as Adam, and have consequently existed since + the beginning of things, always in a kind of organic body. On this point + it seems that M. Swammerdam, Father Malebranche, M. Bayle, Mr. Pitcairne, + M. Hartsoeker and numerous other very able persons share my opinion. This + doctrine is also sufficiently confirmed by the microscope observations of + M. Leeuwenhoek and other good observers. But it also for divers reasons + appears likely <!-- Page 173 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page173"></a>[173]</span> to me that they existed then as sentient + or animal souls only, endowed with perception and feeling, and devoid of + reason. Further I believe that they remained in this state up to the time + of the generation of the man to whom they were to belong, but that then + they received reason, whether there be a natural means of raising a + sentient soul to the degree of a reasoning soul (a thing I find it + difficult to imagine) or whether God may have given reason to this soul + through some special operation, or (if you will) by a kind of + <i>transcreation</i>. This latter is easier to admit, inasmuch as + revelation teaches much about other forms of immediate operation by God + upon our souls. This explanation appears to remove the obstacles that + beset this matter in philosophy or theology. For the difficulty of the + origin of forms thus disappears completely; and besides it is much more + appropriate to divine justice to give the soul, already corrupted + <i>physically</i> or on the animal side by the sin of Adam, a new + perfection which is reason, than to put a reasoning soul, by creation or + otherwise, in a body wherein it is to be corrupted <i>morally</i>.</p> + + <p>92. Now the soul being once under the domination of sin, and ready to + commit sin in actual fact as soon as the man is fit to exercise reason, a + new question arises, to wit: whether this tendency in a man who has not + been regenerated by baptism suffices to damn him, even though he should + never come to commit sin, as may happen, and happens often, whether he + die before reaching years of discretion or he become dull of sense before + he has made use of his reason. St. Gregory of Nazianzos is supposed to + have denied this (<i>Orat. de Baptismo</i>); but St. Augustine is for the + affirmative, and maintains that original sin of itself is sufficient to + earn the flames of hell, although this opinion is, to say the least, very + harsh. When I speak here of damnation or of hell, I mean pains, and not + mere deprivation of supreme felicity; I mean <i>poenam sensus, non + damni</i>. Gregory of Rimini, General of the Augustinians, with a few + others followed St. Augustine in opposition to the accepted opinion of + the Schools of his time, and for that reason he was called the torturer + of children, <i>tortor infantum</i>. The Schoolmen, instead of sending + them into the flames of hell, have assigned to them a special Limbo, + where they do not suffer, and are only punished by privation of the + beatific vision. The Revelations of St. Birgitta (as they are called), + much esteemed in Rome, also uphold this dogma. Salmeron and Molina, and + before them <!-- Page 174 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page174"></a>[174]</span> Ambrose Catharin and others, grant them a + certain natural bliss; and Cardinal Sfondrati, a man of learning and + piety, who approves this, latterly went so far as to prefer in a sense + their state, which is the state of happy innocence, to that of a sinner + saved, as we may see in his <i>Nodus Praedestinationis Solutus</i>. That, + however, seems to go too far. Certainly a soul truly enlightened would + not wish to sin, even though it could by this means obtain all imaginable + pleasures. But the case of choosing between sin and true bliss is simply + chimerical, and it is better to obtain bliss (even after repentance) than + to be deprived of it for ever.</p> + + <p>93. Many prelates and theologians of France who are well pleased to + differ from Molina, and to join with St. Augustine, seem to incline + towards the opinion of this great doctor, who condemns to eternal flames + children that die in the age of innocence before having received baptism. + This is what appears from the letter mentioned above, written by five + distinguished prelates of France to Pope Innocent XII, against that + posthumous book by Cardinal Sfondrati. But therein they did not venture + to condemn the doctrine of the purely privative punishment of children + dying without baptism, seeing it approved by the venerable Thomas + Aquinas, and by other great men. I do not speak of those who are called + on one side Jansenists and on the other disciples of St. Augustine, for + they declare themselves entirely and firmly for the opinion of this + Father. But it must be confessed that this opinion has not sufficient + foundation either in reason or in Scripture, and that it is outrageously + harsh. M. Nicole makes rather a poor apology for it in his book on the + <i>Unity of the Church</i>, written to oppose M. Jurieu, although M. + Bayle takes his side in chapter 178 of the <i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, vol. III. M. Nicole makes use of this pretext, that there + are also other dogmas in the Christian religion which appear harsh. On + the one hand, however, that does not lead to the conclusion that these + instances of harshness may be multiplied without proof; and on the other + we must take into account that the other dogmas mentioned by M. Nicole, + namely original sin and eternity of punishment, are only harsh and unjust + to outward appearance, while the damnation of children dying without + actual sin and without regeneration would in truth be harsh, since it + would be in effect the damning of innocents. For that reason I believe + that the party which advocates this opinion will never altogether have + the upper hand in the <!-- Page 175 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page175"></a>[175]</span> Roman Church itself. Evangelical + theologians are accustomed to speak with fair moderation on this + question, and to surrender these souls to the judgement and the clemency + of their Creator. Nor do we know all the wonderful ways that God may + choose to employ for the illumination of souls.</p> + + <p>94. One may say that those who condemn for original sin alone, and who + consequently condemn children dying unbaptized or outside the Covenant, + fall, in a sense, without being aware of it, into a certain attitude to + man's inclination and God's foreknowledge which they disapprove in + others. They will not have it that God should refuse his grace to those + whose resistance to it he foresees, nor that this expectation and this + tendency should cause the damnation of these persons: and yet they claim + that the tendency which constitutes original sin, and in which God + foresees that the child will sin as soon as he shall reach years of + discretion, suffices to damn this child beforehand. Those who maintain + the one and reject the other do not preserve enough uniformity and + connexion in their dogmas.</p> + + <p>95. There is scarcely less difficulty in the matter of those who reach + years of discretion and plunge into sin, following the inclination of + corrupt nature, if they receive not the succour of the grace necessary + for them to stop on the edge of the precipice, or to drag themselves from + the abyss wherein they have fallen. For it seems hard to damn them + eternally for having done that which they had no power to prevent + themselves from doing. Those that damn even children, who are without + discretion, trouble themselves even less about adults, and one would say + that they have become callous through the very expectation of seeing + people suffer. But it is not the same with other theologians, and I would + be rather on the side of those who grant to all men a grace sufficient to + draw them away from evil, provided they have a sufficient tendency to + profit by this succour, and not to reject it voluntarily. The objection + is made that there has been and still is a countless multitude of men, + among civilized peoples and among barbarians, who have never had this + knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ which is necessary for those who + would tread the wonted paths to salvation. But without excusing them on + the plea of a sin purely philosophical, and without stopping at a mere + penalty of privation, things for which there is no opportunity of + discussion here, one may doubt the fact: for how do we know whether they + <!-- Page 176 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page176"></a>[176]</span> + do not receive ordinary or extraordinary succour of kinds unknown to us? + This maxim, <i>Quod facienti, quod in se est, non denegatur gratia + necessaria</i>, appears to me to have eternal truth. Thomas Aquinas, + Archbishop Bradwardine and others have hinted that, in regard to this, + something comes to pass of which we are not aware. (Thom. quest. XIV, + <i>De Veritate</i>, artic. XI, ad I et alibi. Bradwardine, <i>De Causa + Dei</i>, non procul ab initio.) And sundry theologians of great authority + in the Roman Church itself have taught that a sincere act of the love of + God above all things, when the grace of Jesus Christ arouses it, suffices + for salvation. Father Francis Xavier answered the Japanese that if their + ancestors had used well their natural light God would have given them the + grace necessary for salvation; and the Bishop of Geneva, Francis of + Sales, gives full approval to this answer (Book 4, <i>On the Love of + God,</i> ch. 5).</p> + + <p>96. This I pointed out some time ago to the excellent M Pélisson, to + show him that the Roman Church, going further than the Protestants, does + not damn utterly those who are outside its communion, and even outside + Christianity, by using as its only criterion explicit faith. Nor did he + refute it, properly speaking, in the very kind answer he gave me, and + which he published in the fourth part of his <i>Reflexions</i>, also + doing me the honour of adding to it my letter. I offered him then for + consideration what a famous Portuguese theologian, by name Jacques Payva + Andradius, envoy to the Council of Trent, wrote concerning this, in + opposition to Chemnitz, during this same Council. And now, without citing + many other authors of eminence, I will content myself with naming Father + Friedrich Spee, the Jesuit, one of the most excellent in his Society, who + also held this common opinion upon the efficacy of the love of God, as is + apparent in the preface to the admirable book which he wrote in Germany + on the Christian virtues. He speaks of this observation as of a highly + important secret of piety, and expatiates with great clearness upon the + power of divine love to blot out sin, even without the intervention of + the Sacraments of the Catholic Church, provided one scorn them not, for + that would not at all be compatible with this love. And a very great + personage, whose character was one of the most lofty to be found in the + Roman Church, was the first to make me acquainted with it. Father Spee + was of a noble family of Westphalia (it may be said in passing) and he + died in the odour of sanctity, according <!-- Page 177 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page177"></a>[177]</span> to the testimony of + him who published this book in Cologne with the approval of the + Superiors.</p> + + <p>97. The memory of this excellent man ought to be still precious to + persons of knowledge and good sense, because he is the author of the book + entitled: <i>Cautio Criminalis circa Processus contra Sagas</i>, which + has caused much stir, and has been translated into several languages. I + learnt from the Grand Elector of Mainz, Johann Philipp von Schonborn, + uncle of His Highness the present Elector, who walks gloriously in the + footsteps of that worthy predecessor, the story that follows. That Father + was in Franconia when there was a frenzy there for burning alleged + sorcerers. He accompanied even to the pyre many of them, all of whom he + recognized as being innocent, from their confessions and the researches + that he had made thereon. Therefore in spite of the danger incurred at + that time by one telling the truth in this matter, he resolved to compile + this work, without however naming himself. It bore great fruit and on + this matter converted that Elector, at that time still a simple canon and + afterwards Bishop of Würzburg, finally also Archbishop of Mainz, who, as + soon as he came to power, put an end to these burnings. Therein he was + followed by the Dukes of Brunswick, and finally by the majority of the + other princes and states of Germany.</p> + + <p>98. This digression appeared to me to be seasonable, because that + writer deserves to be more widely known. Returning now to the subject I + make a further observation. Supposing that to-day a knowledge of Jesus + Christ according to the flesh is absolutely necessary to salvation, as + indeed it is safest to teach, it will be possible to say that God will + give that knowledge to all those who do, humanly speaking, that which in + them lies, even though God must needs give it by a miracle. Moreover, we + cannot know what passes in souls at the point of death; and if sundry + learned and serious theologians claim that children receive in baptism a + kind of faith, although they do not remember it afterwards when they are + questioned about it, why should one maintain that nothing of a like + nature, or even more definite, could come about in the dying, whom we + cannot interrogate after their death? Thus there are countless paths open + to God, giving him means of satisfying his justice and his goodness: and + the only thing one may allege against this is that we know not what way + he employs; which is far from being a valid objection.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 178 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page178"></a>[178]</span></p> + + <p>99. Let us pass on to those who lack not power to amend, but good + will. They are doubtless not to be excused; but there always remains a + great difficulty concerning God, since it rested with him to give them + this same good will. He is the master of wills, the hearts of kings and + those of all other men are in his hand. Holy Scripture goes so far as to + say that God at times hardened the wicked in order to display his power + by punishing them. This hardening is not to be taken as meaning that God + inspires men with a kind of anti-grace, that is, a kind of repugnance to + good, or even an inclination towards evil, just as the grace that he + gives is an inclination towards good. It is rather that God, having + considered the sequence of things that he established, found it fitting, + for superior reasons, to permit that Pharaoh, for example, should be in + such <i>circumstances</i> as should increase his wickedness, and divine + wisdom willed to derive a good from this evil.</p> + + <p>100. Thus it all often comes down to <i>circumstances</i>, which form + a part of the combination of things. There are countless examples of + small circumstances serving to convert or to pervert. Nothing is more + widely known than the <i>Tolle, lege</i> (Take and read) cry which St. + Augustine heard in a neighbouring house, when he was pondering on what + side he should take among the Christians divided into sects, and saying + to himself,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Quod vitae sectabor iter?</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>This brought him to open at random the book of the Holy Scriptures + which he had before him, and to read what came before his eyes: and these + were words which finally induced him to give up Manichaeism. The good + Steno, a Dane, who was titular Bishop of Titianopolis, Vicar Apostolic + (as they say) of Hanover and the region around, when there was a Duke + Regent of his religion, told us that something of that kind had happened + to him. He was a great anatomist and deeply versed in natural science; + but he unfortunately gave up research therein, and from being a great + physicist he became a mediocre theologian. He would almost listen to + nothing more about the marvels of Nature, and an express order from the + Pope <i>in virtute sanctae obedientiae</i> was needed to extract from him + the observations M. Thévenot asked of him. He told us then that what had + greatly helped towards inducing him to place himself on the side of the + Roman Church had been the voice of a lady in Florence, who had cried out + to him from a window: <!-- Page 179 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page179"></a>[179]</span> 'Go not on the side where you are about + to go, sir, go on the other side.' 'That voice struck me,' he told us, + 'because I was just meditating upon religion.' This lady knew that he was + seeking a man in the house where she was, and, when she saw him making + his way to the other house, wished to point out where his friend's room + was.</p> + + <p>101. Father John Davidius, the Jesuit, wrote a book entitled + <i>Veridicus Christianus</i>, which is like a kind of <i>Bibliomancy</i>, + where one takes passages at random, after the pattern of the <i>Tolle, + lege</i> of St. Augustine, and it is like a devotional game. But the + chances to which, in spite of ourselves, we are subject, play only too + large a part in what brings salvation to men, or removes it from them. + Let us imagine twin Polish children, the one taken by the Tartars, sold + to the Turks, brought to apostasy, plunged in impiety, dying in despair; + the other saved by some chance, falling then into good hands to be + educated properly, permeated by the soundest truths of religion, + exercised in the virtues that it commends to us, dying with all the + feelings of a good Christian. One will lament the misfortune of the + former, prevented perhaps by a slight circumstance from being saved like + his brother, and one will marvel that this slight chance should have + decided his fate for eternity.</p> + + <p>102. Someone will perchance say that God foresaw by mediate knowledge + that the former would have been wicked and damned even if he had remained + in Poland. There are perhaps conjunctures wherein something of the kind + takes place. But will it therefore be said that this is a general rule, + and that not one of those who were damned amongst the pagans would have + been saved if he had been amongst Christians? Would that not be to + contradict our Lord, who said that Tyre and Sidon would have profited + better by his preaching, if they had had the good fortune to hear it, + than Capernaum?</p> + + <p>103. But were one to admit even here this use of mediate knowledge + against all appearances, this knowledge still implies that God considers + what a man would do in such and such circumstances; and it always remains + true that God could have placed him in other circumstances more + favourable, and given him inward or outward succour capable of + vanquishing the most abysmal wickedness existing in any soul. I shall be + told that God is not bound to do so, but that is not enough; it must be + added that greater reasons prevent him from making all his goodness felt + by <!-- Page 180 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page180"></a>[180]</span> all. Thus there must needs be choice; but + I do not think one must seek the reason altogether in the good or bad + nature of men. For if with some people one assume that God, choosing the + plan which produces the most good, but which involves sin and damnation, + has been prompted by his wisdom to choose the best natures in order to + make them objects of his grace, this grace would not sufficiently appear + to be a free gift. Accordingly man will be distinguishable by a kind of + inborn merit, and this assumption seems remote from the principles of St. + Paul, and even from those of Supreme Reason.</p> + + <p>104. It is true that there are reasons for God's choice, and the + consideration of the object, that is, the nature of man, must needs enter + therein; but it does not seem that this choice can be subjected to a rule + such as we are capable of conceiving, and such as may flatter the pride + of men. Some famous theologians believe that God offers more grace, and + in a more favourable way, to those whose resistance he foresees will be + less, and that he abandons the rest to their self-will. We may readily + suppose that this is often the case, and this expedient, among those + which make man distinguishable by anything favourable in his nature, is + the farthest removed from Pelagianism. But I would not venture, + notwithstanding, to make of it a universal rule. Moreover, that we may + not have cause to vaunt ourselves, it is necessary that we be ignorant of + the reasons for God's choice. Those reasons are too diverse to become + known to us; and it may be that God at times shows the power of his grace + by overcoming the most obstinate resistance, to the end that none may + have cause either to despair or to be puffed up. St. Paul, as it would + seem, had this in mind when he offered himself as an example. God, he + said, has had mercy upon me, to give a great example of his patience.</p> + + <p>105. It may be that fundamentally all men are equally bad, and + consequently incapable of being distinguished the one from the other + through their good or less bad natural qualities; but they are not bad + all in the same way: for there is an inherent individual difference + between souls, as the Pre-established Harmony proves. Some are more or + less inclined towards a particular good or a particular evil, or towards + their opposites, all in accordance with their natural dispositions. But + since the general plan of the universe, chosen by God for superior + reasons, causes men to be in different circumstances, those who meet with + such as are more <!-- Page 181 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page181"></a>[181]</span> favourable to their nature will become + more readily the least wicked, the most virtuous, the most happy; yet it + will be always by aid of the influence of that inward grace which God + unites with the circumstances. Sometimes it even comes to pass, in the + progress of human life, that a more excellent nature succeeds less, for + lack of cultivation or opportunities. One may say that men are chosen and + ranged not so much according to their excellence as according to their + conformity with God's plan. Even so it may occur that a stone of lesser + quality is made use of in a building or in a group because it proves to + be the particular one for filling a certain gap.</p> + + <p>106. But, in fine, all these attempts to find reasons, where there is + no need to adhere altogether to certain hypotheses, serve only to make + clear to us that there are a thousand ways of justifying the conduct of + God. All the disadvantages we see, all the obstacles we meet with, all + the difficulties one may raise for oneself, are no hindrance to a belief + founded on reason, even when it cannot stand on conclusive proof, as has + been shown and will later become more apparent, that there is nothing so + exalted as the wisdom of God, nothing so just as his judgements, nothing + so pure as his holiness, and nothing more vast than his goodness.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 182 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page182"></a>[182]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>ESSAYS +ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD +AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN +IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>PART TWO</h3> + + <p>107. Hitherto I have devoted myself to giving a full and clear + exposition of this whole subject: and although I have not yet spoken of + M. Bayle's objections in particular, I have endeavoured to anticipate + them, and to suggest ways of answering them. But as I have taken upon + myself the task of meeting them in detail, not only because there will + perhaps still be passages calling for elucidation, but also because his + arguments are usually full of wit and erudition, and serve to throw + greater light on this controversy, it will be well to give an account of + the chief objections that are dispersed through his works, and to add my + answers. At the beginning I observed 'that God co-operates in moral evil, + and in physical evil, and in each of them both morally and physically; + and that man co-operates therein also morally and physically in a free + and active way, becoming in consequence subject to blame and punishment'. + I have shown also that each point has its own difficulty; but the + greatest of these lies in maintaining that God co-operates morally in + moral evil, that is, in sin, without being the originator of the sin, and + even without being accessary thereto.</p> + + <p>108. He does this by <i>permitting</i> it justly, and by + <i>directing</i> it wisely towards the good, as I have shown in a manner + that appears tolerably intelligible. But as it is here principally that + M. Bayle <!-- Page 183 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page183"></a>[183]</span> undertakes to discomfit those who + maintain that there is nothing in faith which cannot be harmonized with + reason, it is also here especially I must show that my dogmas are + fortified (to make use of his own allegory) with a rampart, even of + reasons, which is able to resist the fire of his strongest batteries. He + has ranged them against me in chapter 144 of his <i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i> (vol. III, p. 812), where he includes the + theological doctrine in seven propositions and opposes thereto nineteen + philosophic maxims, like so many large cannon capable of breaching my + rampart. Let us begin with the theological propositions.</p> + + <p>109. I. 'God,' he says, 'the Being eternal and necessary, infinitely + good, holy, wise and powerful, possesses from all eternity a glory and a + bliss that can never either increase or diminish.' This proposition of M. + Bayle's is no less philosophical than theological. To say that God + possesses a 'glory' when he is alone, that depends upon the meaning of + the term. One may say, with some, that glory is the satisfaction one + finds in being aware of one's own perfections; and in this sense God + possesses it always. But when glory signifies that others become aware of + these perfections, one may say that God acquires it only when he reveals + himself to intelligent creatures; even though it be true that God thereby + gains no new good, and it is rather the rational creatures who thence + derive advantage, when they apprehend aright the glory of God.</p> + + <p>110. II. 'He resolved freely upon the production of creatures, and he + chose from among an infinite number of possible beings those whom it + pleased him to choose, to give them existence, and to compose the + universe of them, while he left all the rest in nothingness.' This + proposition is also, just like the preceding one, in close conformity + with that part of philosophy which is called natural theology. One must + dwell a little on what is said here, that he chose the possible beings + 'whom it pleased him to choose'. For it must be borne in mind that when I + say, 'that pleases me', it is as though I were saying, 'I find it good'. + Thus it is the ideal goodness of the object which pleases, and which + makes me choose it among many others which do not please or which please + less, that is to say, which contain less of that goodness which moves me. + Now it is only the genuinely good that is capable of pleasing God: and + consequently that which pleases God most, and which meets his choice, is + the best.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 184 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page184"></a>[184]</span></p> + + <p>111. III. 'Human nature having been among the Beings that he willed to + produce, he created a man and a woman, and granted them amongst other + favours free will, so that they had the power to obey him; but he + threatened them with death if they should disobey the order that he gave + them to abstain from a certain fruit.' This proposition is in part + revealed, and should be admitted without difficulty, provided that + <i>free will</i> be understood properly, according to the explanation I + have given.</p> + + <p>112. IV. 'They ate thereof nevertheless, and thenceforth they were + condemned, they and all their posterity, to the miseries of this life, to + temporal death and eternal damnation, and made subject to such a tendency + to sin that they abandoned themselves thereto endlessly and without + ceasing.' There is reason to suppose that the forbidden action by itself + entailed these evil results in accordance with a natural effect, and that + it was for that very reason, and not by a purely arbitrary decree, that + God had forbidden it: much as one forbids knives to children. The famous + Fludde or de Fluctibus, an Englishman, once wrote a book <i>De Vita, + Morte et Resurrectione</i> under the name of R. Otreb, wherein he + maintained that the fruit of the forbidden tree was a poison: but we + cannot enter into this detail. It suffices that God forbade a harmful + thing; one must not therefore suppose that God acted here simply in the + character of a legislator who enacts a purely positive law, or of a judge + who imposes and inflicts a punishment by an order of his will, without + any connexion between the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment. And + it is not necessary to suppose that God in justifiable annoyance + deliberately put a corruption in the soul and the body of man, by an + extraordinary action, in order to punish him: much as the Athenians gave + hemlock-juice to their criminals. M. Bayle takes the matter thus: he + speaks as if the original corruption had been put in the soul of the + first man by an order and operation of God. It is that which calls forth + his objection (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, + ch. 178, p. 1218) 'that reason would not commend the monarch who, in + order to chastise a rebel, condemned him and his descendants to have a + tendency towards rebellion'. But this chastisement happens naturally to + the wicked, without any ordinance of a legislator, and they become + addicted to evil. If drunkards begot children inclined to the same vice, + by a natural consequence of what takes place in bodies, that would be a + punishment of their progenitors, <!-- Page 185 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page185"></a>[185]</span> but it would not be a + penalty of law. There is something comparable to this in the consequences + of the first man's sin. For the contemplation of divine wisdom leads us + to believe that the realm of nature serves that of grace; and that God as + an Architect has done all in a manner befitting God considered as a + Monarch. We do not sufficiently know the nature of the forbidden fruit, + or that of the action, or its effects, to judge of the details of this + matter: nevertheless we must do God justice so far as to believe that it + comprised something other than what painters depict for us.</p> + + <p>113. V. 'It has pleased him by his infinite mercy to deliver a very + few men from this condemnation; and, leaving them exposed during this + life to the corruption of sin and misery, he has given them aids which + enable them to obtain the never-ending bliss of paradise.' Many in the + past have doubted, as I have already observed, whether the number of the + damned is so great as is generally supposed; and it appears that they + believed in the existence of some intermediate state between eternal + damnation and perfect bliss. But we have no need of these opinions, and + it is enough to keep to the ideas accepted in the Church. In this + connexion it is well to observe that this proposition of M. Bayle's is + conceived in accordance with the principles of sufficient grace, given to + all men, and sufficing them provided that they have good will. Although + M. Bayle holds the opposite opinion, he wished (as he states in the + margin) to avoid the terms that would not agree with a system of decrees + subsequent to the prevision of contingent events.</p> + + <p>114. VI. 'He foresaw from eternity all that which should happen, he + ordered all things and placed them each one in its own place, and he + guides and controls them continually, according to his pleasure. Thus + nothing is done without his permission or against his will, and he can + prevent, as seems good to him, as much and as often as seems good to him, + all that does not please him, and in consequence sin, which is the thing + in the world that most offends him and that he most detests; and he can + produce in each human soul all the thoughts that he approves.' This + thesis is also purely philosophic, that is, recognizable by the light of + natural reason. It is opportune also, as one has dwelt in thesis II on + <i>that which pleases</i>, to dwell here upon <i>that which seems + good</i>, that is, upon that which God finds good to do. He can avoid or + put away as 'seems good to him' all 'that does not please him'. + Nevertheless it must be borne in mind that some objects of his aversion, + such as <!-- Page 186 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page186"></a>[186]</span> certain evils, and especially sin, which + his antecedent will repelled, could only have been rejected by his + consequent or decretory will, in so far as it was prompted by the rule of + the best, which the All-wise must choose after having taken all into + account. When one says 'that sin offends God most, and that he detests it + most', these are human ways of speaking. God cannot, properly speaking, + be <i>offended</i>, that is, injured, disturbed, disquieted or angered; + and he <i>detests</i> nothing of that which exists, in the sense that to + detest something is to look upon it with abomination and in a way that + causes us disgust, that greatly pains and distresses us; for God cannot + suffer either vexation, or grief or discomfort; he is always altogether + content and at ease. Yet these expressions in their true sense are + justified. The supreme goodness of God causes his antecedent will to + repel all evil, but moral evil more than any other: it only admits evil + at all for irresistible superior reasons, and with great correctives + which repair its ill effects to good advantage. It is true also that God + could produce in each human soul all the thoughts that he approves: but + this would be to act by miracles, more than his most perfectly conceived + plan admits.</p> + + <p>115. VII. 'He offers grace to people that he knows are destined not to + accept it, and so destined by this refusal to make themselves more + criminal than they would be if he had not offered them that grace; he + assures them that it is his ardent wish that they accept it, and he does + not give them the grace which he knows they would accept.' It is true + that these people become more criminal through their refusal than if one + had offered them nothing, and that God knows this. Yet it is better to + permit their crime than to act in a way which would render God himself + blameworthy, and provide the criminals with some justification for the + complaint that it was not possible for them to do better, even though + they had or might have wished it. God desires that they receive such + grace from him as they are fit to receive, and that they accept it; and + he desires to give them in particular that grace whose acceptance by them + he foresees: but it is always by a will antecedent, detached or + particular, which cannot always be carried out in the general plan of + things. This thesis also is among the number of those which philosophy + establishes no less than revelation, like three others of the seven that + we have just stated here, the third, fourth and fifth being the only ones + where revelation is necessary.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 187 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page187"></a>[187]</span></p> + + <p>116. Here now are the nineteen philosophic maxims which M. Bayle + opposes to the seven theological propositions.</p> + + <p>I. 'As the infinitely perfect Being finds in himself a glory and a + bliss that can never either diminish or increase, his goodness alone has + determined him to create this universe: neither the ambition to be + praised, nor any interested motive of preserving or augmenting his bliss + and his glory, has had any part therein.' This maxim is very good: + praises of God do him no service, but they are of service to the men who + praise him, and he desired their good. Nevertheless, when one says that + <i>goodness</i> alone determined God to create this universe, it is well + to add that his <font class="sc">goodness</font> prompted him + <i>antecedently</i> to create and to produce all possible good; but that + his <font class="sc">wisdom</font> made the choice and caused him to + select the best <i>consequently</i>; and finally that his <font + class="sc">power</font> gave him the means to carry out <i>actually</i> + the great design which he had formed.</p> + + <p>117. II. 'The goodness of the infinitely perfect Being is infinite, + and would not be infinite if one could conceive of a goodness greater + than this. This characteristic of infinity is proper also to all his + other perfections, to love of virtue, hatred of vice, etc., they must be + the greatest one can imagine. (See M. Jurieu in the first three sections + of the <i>Judgement on Methods</i>, where he argues constantly upon this + principle, as upon a primary notion. See also in Wittich, <i>De + Providentia Dei</i>, n. 12, these words of St. Augustine, lib. I, <i>De + Doctrina Christiana</i>, c. 7: "Cum cogitatur Deus, ita cogitatur, ut + aliquid, quo nihil melius sit atque sublimius. Et paulo post: Nec + quisquam inveniri potest, qui hoc Deum credat esse, quo melius aliquid + est.")'</p> + + <p>This maxim is altogether to my liking, and I draw from it this + conclusion, that God does the very best possible: otherwise the exercise + of his goodness would be restricted, and that would be restricting his + <i>goodness</i> itself, if it did not prompt him to the best, if he were + lacking in good will. Or again it would be restricting his <i>wisdom</i> + and his <i>power</i>, if he lacked the knowledge necessary for discerning + the best and for finding the means to obtain it, or if he lacked the + strength necessary for employing these means. There is, however, + ambiguity in the assertion that love of virtue and hatred of vice are + infinite in God: if that were absolutely and unreservedly true, in + practice there would be no vice in the world. But although each one of + God's perfections is infinite in itself, it is exercised only in + proportion to the object and as the nature of things prompts it. <!-- + Page 188 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page188"></a>[188]</span> Thus + love of the best in the whole carries the day over all other individual + inclinations or hatreds; it is the only impulse whose very exercise is + absolutely infinite, nothing having power to prevent God from declaring + himself for the best; and some vice being combined with the best possible + plan, God permits it.</p> + + <p>118. III. 'An infinite goodness having guided the Creator in the + production of the world, all the characteristics of knowledge, skill, + power and greatness that are displayed in his work are destined for the + happiness of intelligent creatures. He wished to show forth his + perfections only to the end that creatures of this kind should find their + felicity in the knowledge, the admiration and the love of the Supreme + Being.'</p> + + <p>This maxim appears to me not sufficiently exact. I grant that the + happiness of intelligent creatures is the principal part of God's design, + for they are most like him; but nevertheless I do not see how one can + prove that to be his sole aim. It is true that the realm of nature must + serve the realm of grace: but, since all is connected in God's great + design, we must believe that the realm of grace is also in some way + adapted to that of nature, so that nature preserves the utmost order and + beauty, to render the combination of the two the most perfect that can + be. And there is no reason to suppose that God, for the sake of some + lessening of moral evil, would reverse the whole order of nature. Each + perfection or imperfection in the creature has its value, but there is + none that has an infinite value. Thus the moral or physical good and evil + of rational creatures does not infinitely exceed the good and evil which + is simply metaphysical, namely that which lies in the perfection of the + other creatures; and yet one would be bound to say this if the present + maxim were strictly true. When God justified to the Prophet Jonah the + pardon that he had granted to the inhabitants of Nineveh, he even touched + upon the interest of the beasts who would have been involved in the ruin + of this great city. No substance is absolutely contemptible or absolutely + precious before God. And the abuse or the exaggerated extension of the + present maxim appears to be in part the source of the difficulties that + M. Bayle puts forward. It is certain that God sets greater store by a man + than a lion; nevertheless it can hardly be said with certainty that God + prefers a single man in all respects to the whole of lion-kind. Even + should that be so, it would by no means follow that the interest of a + certain number of men would prevail over the <!-- Page 189 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page189"></a>[189]</span> consideration of a + general disorder diffused through an infinite number of creatures. This + opinion would be a remnant of the old and somewhat discredited maxim, + that all is made solely for man.</p> + + <p>119. IV. 'The benefits he imparts to the creatures that are capable of + felicity tend only to their happiness. He therefore does not permit that + these should serve to make them unhappy, and, if the wrong use that they + made of them were capable of destroying them, he would give them sure + means of always using them well. Otherwise they would not be true + benefits, and his goodness would be smaller than that we can conceive of + in another benefactor. (I mean, in a Cause that united with its gifts the + sure skill to make good use of them.)'</p> + + <p>There already is the abuse or the ill effect of the preceding maxim. + It is not strictly true (though it appear plausible) that the benefits + God imparts to the creatures who are capable of felicity tend solely to + their happiness. All is connected in Nature; and if a skilled artisan, an + engineer, an architect, a wise politician often makes one and the same + thing serve several ends, if he makes a double hit with a single throw, + when that can be done conveniently, one may say that God, whose wisdom + and power are perfect, does so always. That is husbanding the ground, the + time, the place, the material, which make up as it were his outlay. Thus + God has more than one purpose in his projects. The felicity of all + rational creatures is one of the aims he has in view; but it is not his + whole aim, nor even his final aim. Therefore it happens that the + unhappiness of some of these creatures may come about <i>by + concomitance</i>, and as a result of other greater goods: this I have + already explained, and M. Bayle has to some extent acknowledged it. The + goods as such, considered in themselves, are the object of the antecedent + will of God. God will produce as much reason and knowledge in the + universe as his plan can admit. One can conceive of a mean between an + antecedent will altogether pure and primitive, and a consequent and final + will. The <i>primitive antecedent will</i> has as its object each good + and each evil in itself, detached from all combination, and tends to + advance the good and prevent the evil. The <i>mediate will</i> relates to + combinations, as when one attaches a good to an evil: then the will will + have some tendency towards this combination when the good exceeds the + evil therein. But the <i>final and decisive will</i> results from + consideration of all the goods and all the evils that enter into our + deliberation, it results <!-- Page 190 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page190"></a>[190]</span> from a total combination. This shows that + a mediate will, although it may in a sense pass as consequent in relation + to a pure and primitive antecedent will, must be considered antecedent in + relation to the final and decretory will. God gives reason to the human + race; misfortunes arise thence by concomitance. His pure antecedent will + tends towards giving reason, as a great good, and preventing the evils in + question. But when it is a question of the evils that accompany this gift + which God has made to us of reason, the compound, made up of the + combination of reason and of these evils, will be the object of a mediate + will of God, which will tend towards producing or preventing this + compound, according as the good or the evil prevails therein. But even + though it should prove that reason did more harm than good to men (which, + however, I do not admit), whereupon the mediate will of God would discard + it with all its concomitants, it might still be the case that it was more + in accordance with the perfection of the universe to give reason to men, + notwithstanding all the evil consequences which it might have with + reference to them. Consequently, the final will or the decree of God, + resulting from all the considerations he can have, would be to give it to + them. And, far from being subject to blame for this, he would be + blameworthy if he did not so. Thus the evil, or the mixture of goods and + evils wherein the evil prevails, happens only <i>by concomitance</i>, + because it is connected with greater goods that are outside this mixture. + This mixture, therefore, or this compound, is not to be conceived as a + grace or as a gift from God to us; but the good that is found mingled + therein will nevertheless be good. Such is God's gift of reason to those + who make ill use thereof. It is always a good in itself; but the + combination of this good with the evils that proceed from its abuse is + not a good with regard to those who in consequence thereof become + unhappy. Yet it comes to be by concomitance, because it serves a greater + good in relation to the universe. And it is doubtless that which prompted + God to give reason to those who have made it an instrument of their + unhappiness. Or, to put it more precisely, in accordance with my system + God, having found among the possible beings some rational creatures who + misuse their reason, gave existence to those who are included in the best + possible plan of the universe. Thus nothing prevents us from admitting + that God grants goods which turn into evil by the fault of men, this + often happening to men in just punishment of the misuse they had made of + God's <!-- Page 191 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page191"></a>[191]</span> grace. Aloysius Novarinus wrote a book + <i>De Occultis Dei Beneficiis</i>: one could write one <i>De Occultis Dei + Poenis</i>. This saying of Claudian would be in place here with regard to + some persons:</p> + +<blockquote class="b1"> + + <p> <i>Tolluntur in altum,</i> <i>Ut lapsu graviore ruant</i>.</p> + +</blockquote> + + <p>But to say that God should not give a good which he knows an evil will + will abuse, when the general plan of things demands that he give it; or + again to say that he should give certain means for preventing it, + contrary to this same general order: that is to wish (as I have observed + already) that God himself become blameworthy in order to prevent man from + being so. To object, as people do here, that the goodness of God would be + smaller than that of another benefactor who would give a more useful + gift, is to overlook the fact that the goodness of a benefactor is not + measured by a single benefit. It may well be that a gift from a private + person is greater than one from a prince, but the gifts of this private + person all taken together will be much inferior to the prince's gifts all + together. Thus one can esteem fittingly the good things done by God only + when one considers their whole extent by relating them to the entire + universe. Moreover, one may say that the gifts given in the expectation + that they will harm are the gifts of an enemy, <span lang="el" + title="hechthrôn dôra adôra" + >‛εχθρων + δωρα + αδωρα</span>,</p> + +<blockquote class="b1"> + + <p><i>Hostibus eveniant talia dona meis.</i></p> + +</blockquote> + + <p>But that applies to when there is malice or guilt in him who gives + them, as there was in that Eutrapelus of whom Horace speaks, who did good + to people in order to give them the means of destroying themselves. His + design was evil, but God's design cannot be better than it is. Must God + spoil his system, must there be less beauty, perfection and reason in the + universe, because there are people who misuse reason? The common sayings + are in place here: <i>Abusus non tollit usum</i>; there is <i>scandalum + datum et scandalum acceptum</i>.</p> + + <p>120. V. 'A maleficent being is very capable of heaping magnificent + gifts upon his enemies, when he knows that they will make thereof a use + that will destroy them. It therefore does not beseem the infinitely good + Being to give to creatures a free will, whereof, as he knows for certain, + they would make a use that would render them unhappy. Therefore if he + gives them free will he combines with it the art of using it always + opportunely, and permits not that <!-- Page 192 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page192"></a>[192]</span> they neglect the + practice of this art in any conjuncture; and if there were no sure means + of determining the good use of this free will, he would rather take from + them this faculty, than allow it to be the cause of their unhappiness. + That is the more manifest, as free will is a grace which he has given + them of his own choice and without their asking for it; so that he would + be more answerable for the unhappiness it would bring upon them than if + he had only granted it in response to their importunate prayers.'</p> + + <p>What was said at the end of the remark on the preceding maxim ought to + be repeated here, and is sufficient to counter the present maxim. + Moreover, the author is still presupposing that false maxim advanced as + the third, stating that the happiness of rational creatures is the sole + aim of God. If that were so, perhaps neither sin nor unhappiness would + ever occur, even by concomitance. God would have chosen a sequence of + possibles where all these evils would be excluded. But God would fail in + what is due to the universe, that is, in what he owes to himself. If + there were only spirits they would be without the required connexion, + without the order of time and place. This order demands matter, movement + and its laws; to adjust these to spirits in the best possible way means + to return to our world. When one looks at things only in the mass, one + imagines to be practicable a thousand things that cannot properly take + place. To wish that God should not give free will to rational creatures + is to wish that there be none of these creatures; and to wish that God + should prevent them from misusing it is to wish that there be none but + these creatures alone, together with what was made for them only. If God + had none but these creatures in view, he would doubtless prevent them + from destroying themselves. One may say in a sense, however, that God has + given to these creatures the art of always making good use of their free + will, for the natural light of reason is this art. But it would be + necessary always to have the will to do good, and often creatures lack + the means of giving themselves the will they ought to have; often they + even lack the will to use those means which indirectly give a good will. + Of this I have already spoken more than once. This fault must be + admitted, and one must even acknowledge that God would perhaps have been + able to exempt creatures from that fault, since there is nothing to + prevent, so it seems, the existence of some whose nature it would be + always to have good will. But I reply that it is not necessary, and that + it was not feasible <!-- Page 193 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page193"></a>[193]</span> for all rational creatures to have so + great a perfection, and such as would bring them so close to the + Divinity. It may even be that that can only be made possible by a special + divine grace. But in this case, would it be proper for God to grant it to + all, that is, always to act miraculously in respect of all rational + creatures? Nothing would be less rational than these perpetual miracles. + There are degrees among creatures: the general order requires it. And it + appears quite consistent with the order of divine government that the + great privilege of strengthening in the good should be granted more + easily to those who had a good will when they were in a more imperfect + state, in the state of struggle and of pilgrimage, <i>in Ecclesia + militante, in statu viatorum</i>. The good angels themselves were not + created incapable of sin. Nevertheless I would not dare to assert that + there are no blessed creatures born, or such as are sinless and holy by + their nature. There are perhaps people who give this privilege to the + Blessed Virgin, since, moreover, the Roman Church to-day places her above + the angels. But it suffices us that the universe is very great and very + varied: to wish to limit it is to have little knowledge thereof. 'But', + M. Bayle goes on, 'God has given free will to creatures capable of + sinning, without their having asked him for this grace. And he who gave + such a gift would be more answerable for the unhappiness that it brought + upon those who made use of it, than if he had granted it only in response + to their importunate prayers.' But importunity in prayers makes no + difference to God; he knows better than we what we need, and he only + grants what serves the interest of the whole. It seems that M. Bayle here + makes free will consist in the faculty for sinning; yet he acknowledges + elsewhere that God and the Saints are free, without having this faculty. + However that may be, I have already shown fully that God, doing what his + wisdom and his goodness combined ordain, is not answerable for the evil + that he permits. Even men, when they do their duty, are not answerable + for consequences, whether they foresee them or not.</p> + + <p>121. VI. 'It is as sure a means of taking a man's life to give him a + silk cord that one knows certainly he will make use of freely to strangle + himself, as to plant a few dagger thrusts in his body. One desires his + death not less when one makes use of the first way, than when one employs + the second: it even seems as though one desires it with a more malicious + intention, since one tends to leave to him the whole trouble and the + whole blame of his destruction.'</p> + +<p><!-- Page 194 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page194"></a>[194]</span></p> + + <p>Those who write treatises on Duties (De Officiis) as, for instance, + Cicero, St. Ambrose, Grotius, Opalenius, Sharrok, Rachelius, Pufendorf, + as well as the Casuists, teach that there are cases where one is not + obliged to return to its owner a thing deposited: for example, one will + not give back a dagger when one knows that he who has deposited it is + about to stab someone. Let us pretend that I have in my hands the fatal + draught that Meleager's mother will make use of to kill him; the magic + javelin that Cephalus will unwittingly employ to kill his Procris; the + horses of Theseus that will tear to pieces Hippolytus, his son: these + things are demanded back from me, and I am right in refusing them, + knowing the use that will be made of them. But how will it be if a + competent judge orders me to restore them, when I cannot prove to him + what I know of the evil consequences that restitution will have, Apollo + perchance having given to me, as to Cassandra, the gift of prophecy under + the condition that I shall not be believed? I should then be compelled to + make restitution, having no alternative other than my own destruction: + thus I cannot escape from contributing towards the evil. Another + comparison: Jupiter promises Semele, the Sun Phaeton, Cupid Psyche to + grant whatever favour the other shall ask. They swear by the Styx,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Di cujus jurare timent et fallere Numen</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>One would gladly stop, but too late, the request half heard,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i12"><i>Voluit Deus ora loquentis</i></p> + <p><i>Opprimere; exierat jam vox properata sub auras</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>One would gladly draw back after the request was made, making vain + remonstrances; but they press you, they say to you: 'Do you make oaths + that you will not keep?' The law of the Styx is inviolable, one must + needs submit to it; if one has erred in making the oath, one would err + more in not keeping it; the promise must be fulfilled, however harmful it + may be to him who exacts it. It would be ruinous to you if you did not + fulfil it. It seems as though the moral of these fables implies that a + supreme necessity may constrain one to comply with evil. God, in truth, + knows no other judge that can compel him to give what may turn to evil, + he is not like Jupiter who fears the Styx. But his own wisdom is the + greatest judge that he can find, there is no appeal from its judgements: + they are the decrees of destiny. The eternal verities, objects of <!-- + Page 195 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page195"></a>[195]</span> his + wisdom, are more inviolable than the Styx. These laws and this judge do + not constrain: they are stronger, for they persuade. Wisdom only shows + God the best possible exercise of his goodness: after that, the evil that + occurs is an inevitable result of the best. I will add something + stronger: To permit the evil, as God permits it, is the greatest + goodness.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Si mala sustulerat, non erat ille bonus.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>One would need to have a bent towards perversity to say after this + that it is more malicious to leave to someone the whole trouble and the + whole blame of his destruction. When God does leave it to a man, it has + belonged to him since before his existence; it was already in the idea of + him as still merely possible, before the decree of God which makes him to + exist. Can one, then, leave it or give it to another? There is the whole + matter.</p> + + <p>122. VII. 'A true benefactor gives promptly, and does not wait to give + until those he loves have suffered long miseries from the privation of + what he could have imparted to them at first very easily, and without + causing any inconvenience to himself. If the limitation of his forces + does not permit him to do good without inflicting pain or some other + inconvenience, he acquiesces in this, but only regretfully, and he never + employs this way of rendering service when he can render it without + mingling any kind of evil in his favours. If the profit one could derive + from the evils he inflicted could spring as easily from an unalloyed good + as from those evils, he would take the straight road of unalloyed good, + and not the indirect road that would lead from the evil to the good. If + he showers riches and honours, it is not to the end that those who have + enjoyed them, when they come to lose them, should be all the more deeply + afflicted in proportion to their previous experience of pleasure, and + that thus they should become more unhappy than the persons who have + always been deprived of these advantages. A malicious being would shower + good things at such a price upon the people for whom he had the most + hatred.'</p> + + <p>(Compare this passage of Aristotle, <i>Rhetor.</i>, 1. 2, c. 23, p. m. + 446: <span lang="el" title="hoion ei doiê an tis tini hina aphelomenos leipêsêi; hothen kai tout' eirêtai," + >‛οιον ει + δοιη αν τις + τινι ‛ινα + αφελομενος + λειπησηι· + ‛οθεν και + τουτ' + ειρηται,</span></p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><span lang="el" title="pollois ho daimôn ou kat' eunoian pherôn" >πολλοις ‛ο δαιμων ου κατ' ευνοιαν φερων</span></p> + <p><span lang="el" title="Megala didôsin eutychêmat', all' hina" >Μεγαλα διδωσιν ευτυχηματ', αλλ' ‛ινα</span></p> + <p><span lang="el" title="tas symphoras labôsin epiphanesteras." >τας συμφορας λαβωσιν επιφανεστερας.</span></p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 196 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page196"></a>[196]</span></p> + + <p>Id est: Veluti si quis alicui aliquid det, ut (postea) hoc (ipsi) + erepto (ipsum) afficiat dolore. Unde etiam illud est dictum:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Bona magna multis non amicus dat Deus,</i></p> + <p><i>Insigniore ut rursus his privet malo.</i>)</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>All these objections depend almost on the same sophism; they change + and mutilate the fact, they only half record things: God has care for + men, he loves the human race, he wishes it well, nothing so true. Yet he + allows men to fall, he often allows them to perish, he gives them goods + that tend towards their destruction; and when he makes someone happy, it + is after many sufferings: where is his affection, where is his goodness + or again where is his power? Vain objections, which suppress the main + point, which ignore the fact that it is of God one speaks. It is as + though one were speaking of a mother, a guardian, a tutor, whose + well-nigh only care is concerned with the upbringing, the preservation, + the happiness of the person in question, and who neglect their duty. God + takes care of the universe, he neglects nothing, he chooses what is best + on the whole. If in spite of all that someone is wicked and unhappy, it + behoved him to be so. God (so they say) could have given happiness to + all, he could have given it promptly and easily, and without causing + himself any inconvenience, for he can do all. But should he? Since he + does not so, it is a sign that he had to act altogether differently. If + we infer from this either that God only regretfully, and owing to lack of + power, fails to make men happy and to give the good first of all and + without admixture of evil, or else that he lacks the good will to give it + unreservedly and for good and all, then we are comparing our true God + with the God of Herodotus, full of envy, or with the demon of the poet + whose iambics Aristotle quotes, and I have just translated into Latin, + who gives good things in order that he may cause more affliction by + taking them away. That would be trifling with God in perpetual + anthropomorphisms, representing him as a man who must give himself up + completely to one particular business, whose goodness must be chiefly + exercised upon those objects alone which are known to us, and who lacks + either aptitude or good will. God is not lacking therein, he could do the + good that we would desire; he even wishes it, taking it separately, but + he must not do it in preference to other greater goods which are opposed + to it. Moreover, one has no cause to complain of the fact that usually + one <!-- Page 197 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page197"></a>[197]</span> attains salvation only through many + sufferings, and by bearing the cross of Jesus Christ. These evils serve + to make the elect imitators of their master, and to increase their + happiness.</p> + + <p>123. VIII. 'The greatest and the most substantial glory that he who is + the master of others can gain is to maintain amongst them virtue, order, + peace, contentment of mind. The glory that he would derive from their + unhappiness can be nothing but a false glory.'</p> + + <p>If we knew the city of God just as it is, we should see that it is the + most perfect state which can be devised; that virtue and happiness reign + there, as far as is possible, in accordance with the laws of the best; + that sin and unhappiness (whose entire exclusion from the nature of + things reasons of the supreme order did not permit), are well-nigh + nothing there in comparison with the good, and even are of service for + greater good. Now since these evils were to exist, there must needs be + some appointed to be subject to them, and we are those people. If it were + others, would there not be the same appearance of evil? Or rather, would + not these others be those known as We? When God derives some glory from + the evil through having made it serve a greater good, it was proper that + he should derive that glory. It is not therefore a false glory, as would + be that of a prince who overthrew his state in order to have the honour + of setting it up again.</p> + + <p>124. IX. 'The way whereby that master can give proof of greatest love + for virtue is to cause it, if he can, to be always practised without any + mixture of vice. If it is easy for him to procure for his subjects this + advantage, and nevertheless he permits vice to raise its head, save that + he punishes it finally after having long tolerated it, his affection for + virtue is not the greatest one can conceive; it is therefore not + infinite.'</p> + + <p>I am not yet half way through the nineteen maxims, and already I am + weary of refuting, and making the same answer always. M. Bayle multiplies + unnecessarily his so-called maxims in opposition to my dogmas. If things + connected together may be separated, the parts from their whole, the + human kind from the universe, God's attributes the one from the other, + power from wisdom, it may be said that God <i>can cause</i> virtue to be + in the world without any mixture of vice, and even that he can do so + <i>easily</i>. But, since he has permitted vice, it must be that that + order of the universe which was found preferable to every other plan + required it. One must believe that it is not permitted to do otherwise, + since <!-- Page 198 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page198"></a>[198]</span> it is not possible to do better. It is a + hypothetical necessity, a moral necessity, which, far from being contrary + to freedom, is the effect of its choice. <i>Quae rationi contraria sunt, + ea nec fieri a Sapiente posse credendum est</i>. The objection is made + here, that God's affection for virtue is therefore not the greatest which + can be conceived, that it is not <i>infinite</i>. To that an answer has + already been given on the second maxim, in the assertion that God's + affection for any created thing whatsoever is proportionate to the value + of the thing. Virtue is the noblest quality of created things, but it is + not the only good quality of creatures. There are innumerable others + which attract the inclination of God: from all these inclinations there + results the most possible good, and it turns out that if there were only + virtue, if there were only rational creatures, there would be less good. + Midas proved to be less rich when he had only gold. And besides, wisdom + must vary. To multiply one and the same thing only would be superfluity, + and poverty too. To have a thousand well-bound Vergils in one's library, + always to sing the airs from the opera of Cadmus and Hermione, to break + all the china in order only to have cups of gold, to have only diamond + buttons, to eat nothing but partridges, to drink only Hungarian or Shiraz + wine—would one call that reason? Nature had need of animals, + plants, inanimate bodies; there are in these creatures, devoid of reason, + marvels which serve for exercise of the reason. What would an intelligent + creature do if there were no unintelligent things? What would it think + of, if there were neither movement, nor matter, nor sense? If it had only + distinct thoughts it would be a God, its wisdom would be without bounds: + that is one of the results of my meditations. As soon as there is a + mixture of confused thoughts, there is sense, there is matter. For these + confused thoughts come from the relation of all things one to the other + by way of duration and extent. Thus it is that in my philosophy there is + no rational creature without some organic body, and there is no created + spirit entirely detached from matter. But these organic bodies vary no + less in perfection than the spirits to which they belong. Therefore, + since God's wisdom must have a world of bodies, a world of substances + capable of perception and incapable of reason; since, in short, it was + necessary to choose from all the things possible what produced the best + effect together, and since vice entered in by this door, God would not + have been altogether good, altogether wise if he had excluded it.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 199 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page199"></a>[199]</span></p> + + <p>125. X. 'The way to evince the greatest hatred for vice is not indeed + to allow it to prevail for a long time and then chastise it, but to crush + it before its birth, that is, prevent it from showing itself anywhere. A + king, for example, who put his finances in such good order that no + malversation was ever committed, would thus display more hatred for the + wrong done by factionaries than if, after having suffered them to batten + on the blood of the people, he had them hanged.'</p> + + <p>It is always the same song, it is anthropomorphism pure and simple. A + king should generally have nothing so much at heart as to keep his + subjects free from oppression. One of his greatest interests is to bring + good order into his finances. Nevertheless there are times when he is + obliged to tolerate vice and disorders. He has a great war on his hands, + he is in a state of exhaustion, he has no choice of generals, it is + necessary to humour those he has, those possessed of great authority with + the soldiers: a Braccio, a Sforza, a Wallenstein. He lacks money for the + most pressing needs, it is necessary to turn to great financiers, who + have an established credit, and he must at the same time connive at their + malversations. It is true that this unfortunate necessity arises most + often from previous errors. It is not the same with God: he has need of + no man, he commits no error, he always does the best. One cannot even + wish that things may go better, when one understands them: and it would + be a vice in the Author of things if he wished to change anything + whatsoever in them, if he wished to exclude the vice that was found + there. Is this State with perfect government, where good is willed and + performed as far as it is possible, where evil even serves the greatest + good, comparable with the State of a prince whose affairs are in ruin and + who escapes as best he can? Or with that of a prince who encourages + oppression in order to punish it, and who delights to see the little men + with begging bowls and the great on scaffolds?</p> + + <p>126. XI. 'A ruler devoted to the interests of virtue, and to the good + of his subjects, takes the utmost care to ensure that they never disobey + his laws; and if he must needs chastise them for their disobedience, he + sees to it that the penalty cures them of the inclination to evil, and + restores in their soul a strong and constant tendency towards good: so + far is he from any desire that the penalty for the error should incline + them more and more towards evil.'</p> + +<p><!-- Page 200 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page200"></a>[200]</span></p> + + <p>To make men better, God does all that is due, and even all that can be + done on his side without detriment to what is due. The most usual aim of + punishment is amendment; but it is not the sole aim, nor that which God + always intends. I have said a word on that above. Original sin, which + disposes men towards evil, is not merely a penalty for the first sin; it + is a natural consequence thereof. On that too a word has been said, in + the course of an observation on the fourth theological proposition. It is + like drunkenness, which is a penalty for excess in drinking and is at the + same time a natural consequence that easily leads to new sins.</p> + + <p>127. XII. 'To permit the evil that one could prevent is not to care + whether it be committed or not, or is even to wish that it be + committed.'</p> + + <p>By no means. How many times do men permit evils which they could + prevent if they turned all their efforts in that direction? But other + more important cares prevent them from doing so. One will rarely resolve + upon adjusting irregularities in the coinage while one is involved in a + great war. And the action of an English Parliament in this direction a + little before the Peace of Ryswyck will be rather praised than imitated. + Can one conclude from this that the State has no anxiety about this + irregularity, or even that it desires it? God has a far stronger reason, + and one far more worthy of him, for tolerating evils. Not only does he + derive from them greater goods, but he finds them connected with the + greatest goods of all those that are possible: so that it would be a + fault not to permit them.</p> + + <p>128. XIII. 'It is a very great fault in those who govern, if they do + not care whether there be disorder in their States or not. The fault is + still greater if they wish and even desire disorder there. If by hidden + and indirect, but infallible, ways they stirred up a sedition in their + States to bring them to the brink of ruin, in order to gain for + themselves the glory of showing that they have the courage and the + prudence necessary for saving a great kingdom on the point of perishing, + they would be most deserving of condemnation. But if they stirred up this + sedition because there were no other means than that, of averting the + total ruin of their subjects and of strengthening on new foundations, and + for several centuries, the happiness of nations, one must needs lament + the unfortunate necessity (see above, pp. <a href="#page146">146</a>, <a + href="#page147">147</a>, what has been said of the <!-- Page 201 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page201"></a>[201]</span> force of necessity) to + which they were reduced, and praise them for the use that they made + thereof.'</p> + + <p>This maxim, with divers others set forth here, is not applicable to + the government of God. Not to mention the fact that it is only the + disorders of a very small part of his kingdom which are brought up in + objection, it is untrue that he has no anxiety about evils, that he + desires them, that he brings them into being, to have the glory of + allaying them. God wills order and good; but it happens sometimes that + what is disorder in the part is order in the whole. I have already stated + this legal axiom: <i>Incivile est nisi tota lege inspecta judicare</i>. + The permission of evils comes from a kind of moral necessity: God is + constrained to this by his wisdom and by his goodness; <i>this necessity + is happy</i>, whereas that of the prince spoken of in the maxim is + <i>unhappy</i>. His State is one of the most corrupt; and the government + of God is the best State possible.</p> + + <p>129. XIV. 'The permission of a certain evil is only excusable when one + cannot remedy it without introducing a greater evil; but it cannot be + excusable in those who have in hand a remedy more efficacious against + this evil, and against all the other evils that could spring from the + suppression of this one.'</p> + + <p>The maxim is true, but it cannot be brought forward against the + government of God. Supreme reason constrains him to permit the evil. If + God chose what would not be the best absolutely and in all, that would be + a greater evil than all the individual evils which he could prevent by + this means. This wrong choice would destroy his wisdom and his + goodness.</p> + + <p>130. XV. 'The Being infinitely powerful, Creator of matter and of + spirits, makes whatever he wills of this matter and these spirits. There + is no situation or shape that he cannot communicate to spirits. If he + then permitted a physical or a moral evil, this would not be for the + reason that otherwise some other still greater physical or moral evil + would be altogether inevitable. None of those reasons for the mixture of + good and evil which are founded on the limitation of the forces of + benefactors can apply to him.'</p> + + <p>It is true that God makes of matter and of spirits whatever he wills; + but he is like a good sculptor, who will make from his block of marble + only that which he judges to be the best, and who judges well. God makes + of matter the most excellent of all possible machines; he makes of + spirits the most excellent of all governments conceivable; and over and + above all that, he establishes for <!-- Page 202 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page202"></a>[202]</span> their union the most + perfect of all harmonies, according to the system I have proposed. Now + since physical evil and moral evil occur in this perfect work, one must + conclude (contrary to M. Bayle's assurance here) that <i>otherwise a + still greater evil would have been altogether inevitable</i>. This great + evil would be that God would have chosen ill if he had chosen otherwise + than he has chosen. It is true that God is infinitely powerful; but his + power is indeterminate, goodness and wisdom combined determine him to + produce the best. M. Bayle makes elsewhere an objection which is peculiar + to him, which he derives from the opinions of the modern Cartesians. They + say that God could have given to souls what thoughts he would, without + making them depend upon any relation to the body: by this means souls + would be spared a great number of evils which only spring from + derangement of the body. More will be said of this later; now it is + sufficient to bear in mind that God cannot establish a system + ill-connected and full of dissonances. It is to some extent the nature of + souls to represent bodies.</p> + + <p>131. XVI. 'One is just as much the cause of an event when one brings + it about in moral ways, as when one brings it about in physical ways. A + Minister of State, who, without going out of his study, and simply by + utilizing the passions of the leaders of a faction, overthrew all their + plots, would thus be bringing about the ruin of this faction, no less + than if he destroyed it by a surprise attack.'</p> + + <p>I have nothing to say against this maxim. Evil is always attributed to + moral causes, and not always to physical causes. Here I observe simply + that if I could not prevent the sin of others except by committing a sin + myself, I should be justified in permitting it, and I should not be + accessary thereto, or its moral cause. In God, every fault would + represent a sin; it would be even more than sin, for it would destroy + Divinity. And it would be a great fault in him not to choose the best. I + have said so many times. He would then prevent sin by something worse + than all sins.</p> + + <p>132. XVII. 'It is all the same whether one employ a necessary cause, + or employ a free cause while choosing the moments when one knows it to be + determined. If I imagine that gunpowder has the power to ignite or not to + ignite when fire touches it, and if I know for certain that it will be + disposed to ignite at eight o'clock in the morning, I shall be just as + much the cause of its effects if I apply the fire to it at that hour, as + I should be in assuming, as is <!-- Page 203 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page203"></a>[203]</span> the case, that it is a necessary cause. + For where I am concerned it would no longer be a free cause. I should be + catching it at the moment when I knew it to be necessitated by its own + choice. It is impossible for a being to be free or indifferent with + regard to that to which it is already determined, and at the time when it + is determined thereto. All that which exists exists of necessity while it + exists. <span lang="el" title="To einai to on hotan êi, kai to mê einai hotan mê êi, anankê." + >Το ειναι το + ον ‛οταν ηι, + και το μη + ειναι ‛οταν + μη ηι, + αναγκη.</span> "Necesse est id quod + est, quando est, esse; et id quod non est, quando non est, non esse": + Arist., <i>De Interpret.</i>, cap. 9. The Nominalists have adopted this + maxim of Aristotle. Scotus and sundry other Schoolmen appear to reject + it, but fundamentally their distinctions come to the same thing. See the + Jesuits of Coimbra on this passage from Aristotle, p. 380 <i>et + seq.</i>)'</p> + + <p>This maxim may pass also; I would wish only to change something in the + phraseology. I would not take 'free' and 'indifferent' for one and the + same thing, and would not place 'free' and 'determined' in antithesis. + One is never altogether indifferent with an indifference of equipoise; + one is always more inclined and consequently more determined on one side + than on another: but one is never necessitated to the choice that one + makes. I mean here a <i>necessity</i> absolute and metaphysical; for it + must be admitted that God, that wisdom, is prompted to the best by a + <i>moral</i> necessity. It must be admitted also that one is necessitated + to the choice by a hypothetical necessity, when one actually makes the + choice; and even before one is necessitated thereto by the very truth of + the futurition, since one will do it. These hypothetical necessities do + no harm. I have spoken sufficiently on this point already.</p> + + <p>133. XVIII. 'When a whole great people has become guilty of rebellion, + it is not showing clemency to pardon the hundred thousandth part, and to + kill all the rest, not excepting even babes and sucklings.'</p> + + <p>It seems to be assumed here that there are a hundred thousand times + more damned than saved, and that children dying unbaptized are included + among the former. Both these points are disputed, and especially the + damnation of these children. I have spoken of this above. M. Bayle urges + the same objection elsewhere (<i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 178, p. 1223): 'We see clearly', he says, + 'that the Sovereign who wishes to exercise both justice and clemency when + a city has revolted must be content with the punishment of a small number + of <!-- Page 204 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page204"></a>[204]</span> mutineers, and pardon all the rest. For + if the number of those who are chastised is as a thousand to one, in + comparison with those whom he freely pardons, he cannot be accounted + mild, but, on the contrary, cruel. He would assuredly be accounted an + abominable tyrant if he chose punishments of long duration, and if he + eschewed bloodshed only because he was convinced that men would prefer + death to a miserable life; and if, finally, the desire to take revenge + were more responsible for his severities than the desire to turn to the + service of the common weal the penalty that he would inflict on almost + all the rebels. Criminals who are executed are considered to expiate + their crimes so completely by the loss of their life, that the public + requires nothing more, and is indignant when executioners are clumsy. + These would be stoned if they were known deliberately to give repeated + strokes of the axe; and the judges who are present at the execution would + not be immune from danger if they were thought to take pleasure in this + evil sport of the executioners, and to have surreptitiously urged them to + practise it.' (Note that this is not to be understood as strictly + universal. There are cases where the people approve of the slow killing + of certain criminals, as when Francis I thus put to death some persons + accused of heresy after the notorious Placards of 1534. No pity was shown + to Ravaillac, who was tortured in divers horrible ways. See the <i>French + Mercury</i>, vol. I, fol. m., 455 <i>et seq.</i> See also Pierre Matthieu + in his <i>History of the Death of Henry IV</i>; and do not forget what he + says on page m. 99 concerning the discussion by the judges with regard to + the torture of this parricide.) 'Finally it is an exceptionally notorious + fact that Rulers who should be guided by St. Paul, I mean who should + condemn to the extreme penalty all those whom he condemns to eternal + death, would be accounted enemies of the human kind and destroyers of + their communities. It is incontestable that their laws, far from being + fitted, in accordance with the aim of legislators, to uphold society, + would be its complete ruin. (Apply here these words of Pliny the Younger, + <i>Epist.</i>, 22, lib. 8: Mandemus memoriae quod vir mitissimus, et ob + hoc quoque maximus, Thrasea crebro dicere solebat, Qui vitia odit, + homines odit.)' He adds that it was said of the laws of Draco, an + Athenian lawgiver, that they had not been written with ink, but with + blood, because they punished all sins with the extreme penalty, and + because damnation is a penalty even worse than death. But it must be + borne in mind that <!-- Page 205 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page205"></a>[205]</span> damnation is a consequence of sin. Thus I + once answered a friend, who raised as an objection the disproportion + existing between an eternal punishment and a limited crime, that there is + no injustice when the continuation of the punishment is only a result of + the continuation of the sin. I will speak further on this point later. As + for the number of the damned, even though it should be incomparably + greater among men than the number of the saved, that would not preclude + the possibility that in the universe the happy creatures infinitely + outnumber those who are unhappy. Such examples as that of a prince who + punishes only the leaders of rebels or of a general who has a regiment + decimated, are of no importance here. Self-interest compels the prince + and the general to pardon the guilty, even though they should remain + wicked. God only pardons those who become better: he can distinguish + them; and this severity is more consistent with perfect justice. But if + anyone asks why God gives not to all the grace of conversion, the + question is of a different nature, having no relation to the present + maxim. I have already answered it in a sense, not in order to find God's + reasons, but to show that he cannot lack such, and that there are no + opposing reasons of any validity. Moreover, we know that sometimes whole + cities are destroyed and the inhabitants put to the sword, to inspire + terror in the rest. That may serve to shorten a great war or a rebellion, + and would mean a saving of blood through the shedding of it: there is no + decimation there. We cannot assert, indeed, that the wicked of our globe + are punished so severely in order to intimidate the inhabitants of the + other globes and to make them better. Yet an abundance of reasons in the + universal harmony which are unknown to us, because we know not + sufficiently the extent of the city of God, nor the form of the general + republic of spirits, nor even the whole architecture of bodies, may + produce the same effect.</p> + + <p>134. XIX. 'Those physicians who chose, among many remedies capable of + curing a sick man, whereof divers were such as they well knew he would + take with enjoyment, precisely that one which they knew he would refuse + to take, would vainly urge and pray him not to refuse it; we should still + have just cause for thinking that they had no desire to cure him: for if + they wished to do so, they would choose for him among those good + medicines one which they knew he would willingly swallow. If, moreover, + they knew that rejection of the remedy they offered him would augment his + <!-- Page 206 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page206"></a>[206]</span> + sickness to the point of making it fatal, one could not help saying that, + despite all their exhortations, they must certainly be desirous of the + sick man's death.'</p> + + <p>God wishes to save all men: that means that he would save them if men + themselves did not prevent it, and did not refuse to receive his grace; + and he is not bound or prompted by reason always to overcome their evil + will. He does so sometimes nevertheless, when superior reasons allow of + it, and when his consequent and decretory will, which results from all + his reasons, makes him resolve upon the election of a certain number of + men. He gives aids to all for their conversion and for perseverance, and + these aids suffice in those who have good will, but they do not always + suffice to give good will. Men obtain this good will either through + particular aids or through circumstances which cause the success of the + general aids. God cannot refrain from offering other remedies which he + knows men will reject, bringing upon themselves all the greater guilt: + but shall one wish that God be unjust in order that man may be less + criminal? Moreover, the grace that does not serve the one may serve the + other, and indeed always serves the totality of God's plan, which is the + best possible in conception. Shall God not give the rain, because there + are low-lying places which will be thereby incommoded? Shall the sun not + shine as much as it should for the world in general, because there are + places which will be too much dried up in consequence? In short, all + these comparisons, spoken of in these maxims that M. Bayle has just + given, of a physician, a benefactor, a minister of State, a prince, are + exceedingly lame, because it is well known what their duties are and what + can and ought to be the object of their cares: they have scarce more than + the one affair, and they often fail therein through negligence or malice. + God's object has in it something infinite, his cares embrace the + universe: what we know thereof is almost nothing, and we desire to gauge + his wisdom and his goodness by our knowledge. What temerity, or rather + what absurdity! The objections are on false assumptions; it is senseless + to pass judgement on the point of law when one does not know the matter + of fact. To say with St. Paul, <i>O altitudo divitiarum et + sapientiae,</i> is not renouncing reason, it is rather employing the + reasons that we know, for they teach us that immensity of God whereof the + Apostle speaks. But therein we confess our ignorance of the facts, and we + acknowledge, moreover, before we see it, that <!-- Page 207 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page207"></a>[207]</span> God does all the best + possible, in accordance with the infinite wisdom which guides his + actions. It is true that we have already before our eyes proofs and tests + of this, when we see something entire, some whole complete in itself, and + isolated, so to speak, among the works of God. Such a whole, shaped as it + were by the hand of God, is a plant, an animal, a man. We cannot wonder + enough at the beauty and the contrivance of its structure. But when we + see some broken bone, some piece of animal's flesh, some sprig of a + plant, there appears to be nothing but confusion, unless an excellent + anatomist observe it: and even he would recognize nothing therein if he + had not before seen like pieces attached to their whole. It is the same + with the government of God: that which we have been able to see hitherto + is not a large enough piece for recognition of the beauty and the order + of the whole. Thus the very nature of things implies that this order in + the Divine City, which we see not yet here on earth, should be an object + of our faith, of our hope, of our confidence in God. If there are any who + think otherwise, so much the worse for them, they are malcontents in the + State of the greatest and the best of all monarchs; and they are wrong + not to take advantage of the examples he has given them of his wisdom and + his infinite goodness, whereby he reveals himself as being not only + wonderful, but also worthy of love beyond all things.</p> + + <p>135. I hope it will be found that nothing of what is comprised in the + nineteen maxims of M. Bayle, which we have just considered, has been left + without a necessary answer. It is likely that, having often before + meditated on this subject, he will have put there all his strongest + convictions touching the moral cause of moral evil. There are, however, + still sundry passages here and there in his works which it will be well + not to pass over in silence. Very often he exaggerates the difficulty + which he assumes with regard to freeing God from the imputation of sin. + He observes <i>(Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, ch. 161, p. + 1024) that Molina, if he reconciled free will with foreknowledge, did not + reconcile the goodness and the holiness of God with sin. He praises the + sincerity of those who bluntly declare (as he claims Piscator did) that + everything is to be traced back to the will of God, and who maintain that + God could not but be just, even though he were the author of sin, even + though he condemned innocence. And on the other side, or in other + passages, he seems to show more approval <!-- Page 208 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page208"></a>[208]</span> of the opinions of + those who preserve God's goodness at the expense of his greatness, as + Plutarch does in his book against the Stoics. 'It was more reasonable', + he says, 'to say' (with the Epicureans) 'that innumerable parts' (or + atoms flying about at haphazard through an infinite space) 'by their + force prevailed over the weakness of Jupiter and, in spite of him and + against his nature and will, did many bad and irrational things, than to + agree that there is neither confusion nor wickedness but he is the author + thereof.' What may be said for both these parties, Stoics and Epicureans, + appears to have led M. Bayle to the <span lang="el" title="epechein" + >επεχειν</span> of the + Pyrrhonians, the suspension of his judgement in respect of reason, so + long as faith is set apart; and to that he professes sincere + submission.</p> + + <p>136. Pursuing his arguments, however, he has gone as far as attempting + almost to revive and reinforce those of the disciples of Manes, a Persian + heretic of the third century after Christ, or of a certain Paul, chief of + the Manichaeans in Armenia in the seventh century, from whom they were + named Paulicians. All these heretics renewed what an ancient philosopher + of Upper Asia, known under the name of Zoroaster, had taught, so it is + said, of two intelligent principles of all things, the one good, the + other bad, a dogma that had perhaps come from the Indians. Among them + numbers of people still cling to their error, one that is exceedingly + prone to overtake human ignorance and superstition, since very many + barbarous peoples, even in America, have been deluded by it, without + having had need of philosophy. The Slavs (according to Helmold) had their + Zernebog or black God. The Greeks and Romans, wise as they seem to be, + had a Vejovis or Anti-Jupiter, otherwise called Pluto, and numerous other + maleficent divinities. The Goddess Nemesis took pleasure in abasing those + who were too fortunate; and Herodotus in some passages hints at his + belief that all Divinity is envious; which, however, is not in harmony + with the doctrine of the two principles.</p> + + <p>137. Plutarch, in his treatise <i>On Isis and Osiris</i>, knows of no + writer more ancient than Zoroaster the magician, as he calls him, that is + likely to have taught the two principles. Trogus or Justin makes him a + King of the Bactrians, who was conquered by Ninus or Semiramis; he + attributes to him the knowledge of astronomy and the invention of magic. + But this magic was apparently the religion of the fire-worshippers: and + it appears that he looked upon <!-- Page 209 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page209"></a>[209]</span> light and heat as the good principle, + while he added the evil, that is to say, opacity, darkness, cold. Pliny + cites the testimony of a certain Hermippus, an interpreter of Zoroaster's + books, according to whom Zoroaster was a disciple in the art of magic to + one named Azonacus; unless indeed this be a corruption of Oromases, of + whom I shall speak presently, and whom Plato in the <i>Alcibiades</i> + names as the father of Zoroaster. Modern Orientals give the name Zerdust + to him whom the Greeks named Zoroaster; he is regarded as corresponding + to Mercury, because with some nations Wednesday <i>(mercredi)</i> takes + its name from him. It is difficult to disentangle the story of Zoroaster + and know exactly when he lived. Suidas puts him five hundred years before + the taking of Troy. Some Ancients cited by Pliny and Plutarch took it to + be ten times as far back. But Xanthus the Lydian (in the preface to + Diogenes Laertius) put him only six hundred years before the expedition + of Xerxes. Plato declares in the same passage, as M. Bayle observes, that + the magic of Zoroaster was nothing but the study of religion. Mr. Hyde in + his book on the religion of the ancient Persians tries to justify this + magic, and to clear it not only of the crime of impiety but also of + idolatry. Fire-worship prevailed among the Persians and the Chaldaeans + also; it is thought that Abraham left it when he departed from Ur of the + Chaldees. Mithras was the sun and he was also the God of the Persians; + and according to Ovid's account horses were offered in sacrifice to + him,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Placat equo Persis radiis Hyperiona cinctum,</i></p> + <p><i>Ne detur celeri victima tarda Deo.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But Mr. Hyde believes that they only made use of the sun and fire in + their worship as symbols of the Divinity. It may be necessary to + distinguish, as elsewhere, between the Wise and the Multitude. There are + in the splendid ruins of Persepolis or of Tschelminaar (which means forty + columns) sculptured representations of their ceremonies. An ambassador of + Holland had had them sketched at very great cost by a painter, who had + devoted a considerable time to the task: but by some chance or other + these sketches fell into the hands of a well-known traveller, M. Chardin, + according to what he tells us himself. It would be a pity if they were + lost. These ruins are one of the most ancient and most beautiful + monuments of the earth; and in this respect I wonder at such lack of + curiosity in a century so curious as ours.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 210 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page210"></a>[210]</span></p> + + <p>138. The ancient Greeks and the modern Orientals agree in saying that + Zoroaster called the good God Oromazes, or rather Oromasdes, and the evil + God Arimanius. When I pondered on the fact that great princes of Upper + Asia had the name of Hormisdas and that Irminius or Herminius was the + name of a god or ancient hero of the Scythian Celts, that is, of the + Germani, it occurred to me that this Arimanius or Irminius might have + been a great conqueror of very ancient time coming from the west, just as + Genghis Khan and Tamburlaine were later, coming from the east. Arimanius + would therefore have come from the north-west, that is, from Germania and + Sarmatia, through the territory of the Alani and Massagetae, to raid the + dominions of one Ormisdas, a great king in Upper Asia, just as other + Scythians did in the days of Cyaxares, King of the Medes, according to + the account given by Herodotus. The monarch governing civilized peoples, + and working to defend them against the barbarians, would have gone down + to posterity, amongst the same peoples, as the good god; but the chief of + these devastators will have become the symbol of the evil principle: that + is altogether reasonable. It appears from this same mythology that these + two princes contended for long, but that neither of them was victorious. + Thus they both held their own, just as the two principles shared the + empire of the world according to the hypothesis attributed to + Zoroaster.</p> + + <p>139. It remains to be proved that an ancient god or hero of the + Germani was called Herman, Arimanius or Irminius. Tacitus relates that + the three tribes which composed Germania, the Ingaevones, the Istaevones + and the Herminones or Hermiones, were thus named from the three sons of + Mannus. Whether that be true or not, he wished in any case to indicate + that there was a hero named Herminius, from whom he was told the + Herminones were named. Herminones, Hermenner, Hermunduri all mean the + same, that is, Soldiers. Even in the Dark Ages Arimanni were <i>viri + militares,</i> and there is <i>feudum Arimandiae</i> in Lombard law.</p> + + <p>140. I have shown elsewhere that apparently the name of one part of + Germania was given to the whole, and that from these Herminones or + Hermunduri all the Teutonic peoples were named <i>Hermanni</i> or + <i>Germani</i>. The difference between these two words is only in the + force of the aspiration: there is the same difference of initial letter + between the <i>Germani</i> of the Latins and <i>Hermanos</i> of the + Spaniards, or in the <i>Gammarus</i> of the Latins and the <i>Hummer</i> + (that is, <!-- Page 211 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page211"></a>[211]</span> marine crayfish) of the Low Germans. + Besides it is very usual for one part of a nation to give the name to the + whole: so all the Germani were called Alemanni by the French, and yet + this, according to the old nomenclature, only applied to the Suabians and + the Swiss. Although Tacitus did not actually know the origin of the name + of the Germani, he said something which supports my opinion, when he + observed that it was a name which inspired terror, taken or given <i>ob + metum</i>. In fact it signifies a warrior: <i>Heer</i>, <i>Hari</i> is + army, whence comes <i>Hariban</i>, or 'call to Haro', that is, a general + order to be with the army, since corrupted into <i>Arrièreban</i>. Thus + Hariman or Ariman, German <i>Guerre-man</i>, is a soldier. For as + <i>Hari</i>, <i>Heer</i> means army, so <i>Wehr</i> signifies arms, + <i>Wehren</i> to fight, to make war, the word <i>Guerre</i>, + <i>Guerra</i> coming doubtless from the same source. I have already + spoken of the <i>feudum Arimandiae</i>: not only did Herminones or + Germani signify the same, but also that ancient Herman, so-called son of + Mannus, appears to have been given this name as being pre-eminently a + warrior.</p> + + <p>141. Now it is not the passage in Tacitus only which indicates for us + this god or hero: we cannot doubt the existence of one of this name among + these peoples, since Charlemagne found and destroyed near the Weser the + column called <i>Irminsäule</i>, erected in honour of this god. And that + combined with the passage in Tacitus leaves us with the conclusion that + it was not that famous Arminius who was an enemy of the Romans, but a + much greater and more ancient hero, that this cult concerned. Arminius + bore the same name as those who are called Hermann to-day. Arminius was + not great enough, nor fortunate enough, nor well enough known throughout + Germania to attain to the honour of a public cult, even at the hands of + remote tribes, like the Saxons, who came long after him into the country + of the Cherusci. And our Arminius, taken by the Asiatics for the evil + God, provides ample confirmation of my opinion. For in these matters + conjectures confirm one another without any logical circle, when their + foundations tend towards one and the same end.</p> + + <p>142. It is not beyond belief that the Hermes (that is, Mercury) of the + Greeks is the same Herminius or Arimanius. He may have been an inventor + or promoter of the arts and of a slightly more civilized life among his + own people and in the countries where he held supremacy, while amongst + his enemies he was looked upon as the author of confusion. Who knows but + that he may have <!-- Page 212 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page212"></a>[212]</span> penetrated even into Egypt, like the + Scythians who in pursuit of Sesostris came nearly so far. Theut, Menes + and Hermes were known and revered in Egypt. They might have been Tuiscon, + his son Mannus and Herman, son of Mannus, according to the genealogy of + Tacitus. Menes is held to be the most ancient king of the Egyptians; + 'Theut' was with them a name for Mercury. At least Theut or Tuiscon, from + whom Tacitus derives the descent of the Germani, and from whom the + Teutons, <i>Tuitsche</i> (that is, Germani) even to-day have their name, + is the same as that <i>Teutates</i> who according to Lucan was worshipped + by the Gauls, and whom Caesar took <i>pro Dite Patre</i>, for Pluto, + because of the resemblance between his Latin name and that of <i>Teut</i> + or <i>Thiet</i>, <i>Titan</i>, <i>Theodon</i>; this in ancient times + signified men, people, and also an excellent man (like the word 'baron'), + in short, a prince. There are authorities for all these significations: + but one must not delay over this point. Herr Otto Sperling, who is well + known for various learned writings, but has many more in readiness to + appear, in a special dissertation has treated the question of this + Teutates, God of the Celts. Some observations which I imparted to him on + that subject have been published, with his reply, in the <i>Literary News + of the Baltic Sea</i>. He interprets this passage from Lucan somewhat + otherwise than I do:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Teutates, pollensque feris altaribus Hesus,</i></p> + <p><i>Et Tamaris Scythicae non mitior ara Dianae.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Hesus was, it appears, the God of War, who was called Ares by the + Greeks and Erich by the ancient Germani, whence still remains + <i>Erichtag</i>, Tuesday. The letters R and S, which are produced by the + same organ, are easily interchanged, for instance: <i>Moor</i> and + <i>Moos</i>, <i>Geren</i> and <i>Gesen</i>, <i>Er war</i> and <i>Er + was</i>, <i>Fer</i>, <i>Hierro</i>, <i>Eiron</i>, <i>Eisen</i>. Likewise + <i>Papisius</i>, <i>Valesius</i>, <i>Fusius</i>, instead of + <i>Papirius</i>, <i>Valerius</i>, <i>Furius</i>, with the ancient Romans. + As for Taramis or perhaps Taranis, one knows that <i>Taran</i> was the + thunder, or the God of Thunder, with the ancient Celts, called + <i>Thor</i> by the Germani of the north; whence the English have + preserved the name 'Thursday', <i>jeudi</i>, <i>diem Jovis</i>. And the + passage from Lucan means that the altar of Taran, God of the Celts, was + not less cruel than that of Diana in Tauris: <i>Taranis aram non mitiorem + ara Dianae Scythicae fuisse</i>.</p> + + <p>143. It is also not impossible that there was a time when the <!-- + Page 213 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page213"></a>[213]</span> + western or Celtic princes made themselves masters of Greece, of Egypt and + a good part of Asia, and that their cult remained in those countries. + When one considers with what rapidity the Huns, the Saracens and the + Tartars gained possession of a great part of our continent one will be + the less surprised at this; and it is confirmed by the great number of + words in the Greek and German tongues which correspond so closely. + Callimachus, in a hymn in honour of Apollo, seems to imply that the Celts + who attacked the Temple at Delphi, under their Brennus, or chief, were + descendants of the ancient Titans and Giants who made war on Jupiter and + the other gods, that is to say, on the Princes of Asia and of Greece. It + may be that Jupiter is himself descended from the Titans or Theodons, + that is, from the earlier Celto-Scythian princes; and the material + collected by the late Abbé de la Charmoye in his <i>Celtic Origins</i> + conforms to that possibility. Yet there are opinions on other matters in + this work by this learned writer which to me do not appear probable, + especially when he excludes the Germani from the number of the Celts, not + having recalled sufficiently the facts given by ancient writers and not + being sufficiently aware of the relation between the ancient Gallic and + Germanic tongues. Now the so-called Giants, who wished to scale the + heavens, were new Celts who followed the path of their ancestors; and + Jupiter, although of their kindred, as it were, was constrained to resist + them. Just so did the Visigoths established in Gallic territory resist, + together with the Romans, other peoples of Germania and Scythia, who + succeeded them under Attila their leader, he being at that time in + control of the Scythian, Sarmatic and Germanic tribes from the frontiers + of Persia up to the Rhine. But the pleasure one feels when one thinks to + find in the mythologies of the gods some trace of the old history of + fabulous times has perhaps carried me too far, and I know not whether I + shall have been any more successful than Goropius Becanus, Schrieckius, + Herr Rudbeck and the Abbe de la Charmoye.</p> + + <p>144. Let us return to Zoroaster, who led us to Oromasdes and + Arimanius, the sources of good and evil, and let us assume that he looked + upon them as two eternal principles opposed to each other, although there + is reason to doubt this assumption. It is thought that Marcion, disciple + of Cerdon, was of this opinion before Manes. M. Bayle acknowledges that + these men used lamentable arguments; but he thinks that they did not + sufficiently <!-- Page 214 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page214"></a>[214]</span> recognize their advantages or know how to + apply their principal instrument, which was the difficulty over the + origin of evil. He believes that an able man on their side would have + thoroughly embarrassed the orthodox, and it seems as though he himself, + failing any other, wished to undertake a task so unnecessary in the + opinion of many people. 'All the hypotheses' (he says, <i>Dictionary</i>, + v., 'Marcion', p. 2039) 'that Christians have established parry but + poorly the blows aimed at them: they all triumph when they act on the + offensive; but they lose their whole advantage when they have to sustain + the attack.' He confesses that the 'Dualists' (as with Mr. Hyde he calls + them), that is, the champions of two principles, would soon have been + routed by <i>a priori</i> reasons, taken from the nature of God; but he + thinks that they triumph in their turn when one comes to the <i>a + posteriori</i> reasons, which are taken from the existence of evil.</p> + + <p>145. He treats of the matter with abundant detail in his + <i>Dictionary</i>, article 'Manichaeans', p. 2025, which we must examine + a little, in order to throw greater light upon this subject: 'The surest + and clearest ideas of order teach us', he says, 'that a Being who exists + through himself, who is necessary, who is eternal, must be single, + infinite, all powerful, and endowed with all kinds of perfections.' This + argument deserves to have been developed more completely. 'Now it is + necessary to see', he goes on, 'if the phenomena of nature can be + conveniently explained by the hypothesis of one single principle.' I have + explained it sufficiently by showing that there are cases where some + disorder in the part is necessary for producing the greatest order in the + whole. But it appears that M. Bayle asks a little too much: he wishes for + a detailed exposition of how evil is connected with the best possible + scheme for the universe. That would be a complete explanation of the + phenomena: but I do not undertake to give it; nor am I bound to do so, + for there is no obligation to do that which is impossible for us in our + existing state. It is sufficient for me to point out that there is + nothing to prevent the connexion of a certain individual evil with what + is the best on the whole. This incomplete explanation, leaving something + to be discovered in the life to come, is sufficient for answering the + objections, though not for a comprehension of the matter.</p> + + <p>146. 'The heavens and all the rest of the universe', adds M. Bayle, + 'preach the glory, the power, the oneness of God.' Thence <!-- Page 215 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page215"></a>[215]</span> the + conclusion should have been drawn that this is the case (as I have + already observed above) because there is seen in these objects something + entire and isolated, so to speak. Every time we see such a work of God, + we find it so perfect that we must wonder at the contrivance and the + beauty thereof: but when we do not see an entire work, when we only look + upon scraps and fragments, it is no wonder if the good order is not + evident there. Our planetary system composes such an isolated work, which + is complete also when it is taken by itself; each plant, each animal, + each man furnishes one such work, to a certain point of perfection: one + recognizes therein the wonderful contrivance of the author. But the human + kind, so far as it is known to us, is only a fragment, only a small + portion of the City of God or of the republic of Spirits, which has an + extent too great for us, and whereof we know too little, to be able to + observe the wonderful order therein. 'Man alone,' says M. Bayle, 'that + masterpiece of his Creator among things visible, man alone, I say, gives + rise to great objections with regard to the oneness of God.' Claudian + made the same observation, unburdening his heart in these well-known + lines:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Saepe mihi dubiam traxit sententia mentem</i>, etc.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But the harmony existing in all the rest allows of a strong + presumption that it would exist also in the government of men, and + generally in that of Spirits, if the whole were known to us. One must + judge the works of God as wisely as Socrates judged those of Heraclitus + in these words: What I have understood thereof pleases me; I think that + the rest would please me no less if I understood it.</p> + + <p>147. Here is another particular reason for the disorder apparent in + that which concerns man. It is that God, in giving him intelligence, has + presented him with an image of the Divinity. He leaves him to himself, in + a sense, in his small department, <i>ut Spartam quam nactus est + ornet</i>. He enters there only in a secret way, for he supplies being, + force, life, reason, without showing himself. It is there that free will + plays its game: and God makes game (so to speak) of these little Gods + that he has thought good to produce, as we make game of children who + follow pursuits which we secretly encourage or hinder according as it + pleases us. Thus man is there like a little god in his own world or + <i>Microcosm</i>, which he governs <!-- Page 216 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page216"></a>[216]</span> after his own fashion: + he sometimes performs wonders therein, and his art often imitates + nature.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Jupiter in parvo cum cerneret aethera vitro,</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Risit et ad Superos talia dicta dedit:</i></p> + <p><i>Huccine mortalis progressa potentia, Divi?</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Jam meus in fragili luditur orbe labor.</i></p> + <p><i>Jura poli rerumque fidem legesque Deorum</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Cuncta Syracusius transtulit arte Senex.</i></p> + <p><i>Quid falso insontem tonitru Salmonea miror?</i></p> + <p class="i2"><i>Aemula Naturae est parva reperta manus.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But he also commits great errors, because he abandons himself to the + passions, and because God abandons him to his own way. God punishes him + also for such errors, now like a father or tutor, training or chastising + children, now like a just judge, punishing those who forsake him: and + evil comes to pass most frequently when these intelligences or their + small worlds come into collision. Man finds himself the worse for this, + in proportion to his fault; but God, by a wonderful art, turns all the + errors of these little worlds to the greater adornment of his great + world. It is as in those devices of perspective, where certain beautiful + designs look like mere confusion until one restores them to the right + angle of vision or one views them by means of a certain glass or mirror. + It is by placing and using them properly that one makes them serve as + adornment for a room. Thus the apparent deformities of our little worlds + combine to become beauties in the great world, and have nothing in them + which is opposed to the oneness of an infinitely perfect universal + principle: on the contrary, they increase our wonder at the wisdom of him + who makes evil serve the greater good.</p> + + <p>148. M. Bayle continues: 'that man is wicked and miserable; that there + are everywhere prisons and hospitals; that history is simply a collection + of the crimes and calamities of the human race.' I think that there is + exaggeration in that: there is incomparably more good than evil in the + life of men, as there are incomparably more houses than prisons. With + regard to virtue and vice, a certain mediocrity prevails. Machiavelli has + already observed that there are few very wicked and very good men, and + that this causes the failure of many great enterprises. I find it a great + fault in historians that they keep their mind on the evil more <!-- Page + 217 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page217"></a>[217]</span> than on + the good. The chief end of history, as also of poetry, should be to teach + prudence and virtue by examples, and then to display vice in such a way + as to create aversion to it and to prompt men to avoid it, or serve + towards that end.</p> + + <p>149. M. Bayle avows: 'that one finds everywhere both moral good and + physical good, some examples of virtue, some examples of happiness, and + that this is what makes the difficulty. For if there were only wicked and + unhappy people', he says, 'there would be no need to resort to the + hypothesis of the two principles.' I wonder that this admirable man could + have evinced so great an inclination towards this opinion of the two + principles; and I am surprised at his not having taken into account that + this romance of human life, which makes the universal history of the + human race, lay fully devised in the divine understanding, with + innumerable others, and that the will of God only decreed its existence + because this sequence of events was to be most in keeping with the rest + of things, to bring forth the best result. And these apparent faults in + the whole world, these spots on a Sun whereof ours is but a ray, rather + enhance its beauty than diminish it, contributing towards that end by + obtaining a greater good. There are in truth two principles, but they are + both in God, to wit, his understanding and his will. The understanding + furnishes the principle of evil, without being sullied by it, without + being evil; it represents natures as they exist in the eternal verities; + it contains within it the reason wherefore evil is permitted: but the + will tends only towards good. Let us add a third principle, namely power; + it precedes even understanding and will, but it operates as the one + displays it and as the other requires it.</p> + + <p>150. Some (like Campanella) have called these three perfections of God + the three primordialities. Many have even believed that there was therein + a secret connexion with the Holy Trinity: that power relates to the + Father, that is, to the source of Divinity, wisdom to the Eternal Word, + which is called <i>logos</i> by the most sublime of the Evangelists, and + will or Love to the Holy Spirit. Well-nigh all the expressions or + comparisons derived from the nature of the intelligent substance tend + that way.</p> + + <p>151. It seems to me that if M. Bayle had taken into account what I + have just said of the principles of things, he would have answered his + own questions, or at the least he would not have continued to ask, as he + does in these which follow: 'If man is the work <!-- Page 218 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page218"></a>[218]</span> of a single principle + supremely good, supremely holy, supremely powerful, can he be subject to + diseases, to cold, heat, hunger, thirst, pain, grief? Can he have so many + evil tendencies? Can he commit so many crimes? Can supreme goodness + produce an unhappy creature? Shall not supreme power, united to an + infinite goodness, shower blessings upon its work, and shall it not + banish all that might offend or grieve?' Prudentius in his + <i>Hamartigenia</i> presented the same difficulty:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Si non vult Deus esse malum, cur non vetat? inquit.</i></p> + <p><i>Non refert auctor fuerit, factorve malorum.</i></p> + <p><i>Anne opera in vitium sceleris pulcherrima verti,</i></p> + <p><i>Cum possit prohibere, sinat; quod si velit omnes</i></p> + <p><i>Innocuos agere Omnipotens, ne sancta voluntas</i></p> + <p><i>Degeneret, facto nec se manus inquinet ullo?</i></p> + <p><i>Condidit ergo malum Dominus, quod spectat ab alto,</i></p> + <p><i>Et patitur fierique probat, tanquam ipse crearit.</i></p> + <p><i>Ipse creavit enim, quod si discludere possit,</i></p> + <p><i>Non abolet, longoque sinit grassarier usu.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But I have already answered that sufficiently. Man is himself the + source of his evils: just as he is, he was in the divine idea. God, + prompted by essential reasons of wisdom, decreed that he should pass into + existence just as he is. M. Bayle would perchance have perceived this + origin of evil in the form in which I demonstrate it here, if he had + herein combined the wisdom of God with his power, his goodness and his + holiness. I will add, in passing, that his <i>holiness</i> is nothing + other than the highest degree of goodness, just as the crime which is its + opposite is the worst of all evil.</p> + + <p>152. M. Bayle places the Greek philosopher Melissus, champion of the + oneness of the first principle (and perhaps even of the oneness of + substance) in conflict with Zoroaster, as with the first originator of + duality. Zoroaster admits that the hypothesis of Melissus is more + consistent with order and <i>a priori</i> reasons, but he denies its + conformity with experience and <i>a posteriori</i> reasons. 'I surpass + you', he said, 'in the explanation of phenomena, which is the principal + mark of a good system.' But, in my opinion, it is not a very good + explanation of a phenomenon to assign to it an <i>ad hoc</i> principle: + to evil, a <i>principium maleficum</i>, to cold, a <i>primum + frigidum</i>; there is nothing so easy and nothing so dull. It is + well-nigh as if someone were to say that the <!-- Page 219 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page219"></a>[219]</span> Peripatetics surpass + the new mathematicians in the explanation of the phenomena of the stars, + by giving them <i>ad hoc</i> intelligences to guide them. According to + that, it is quite easy to conceive why the planets make their way with + such precision; whereas there is need of much geometry and reflexion to + understand how from the gravity of the planets, which bears them towards + the sun, combined with some whirlwind which carries them along, or with + their own motive force, can spring the elliptic movement of Kepler, which + satisfies appearances so well. A man incapable of relishing deep + speculations will at first applaud the Peripatetics and will treat our + mathematicians as dreamers. Some old Galenist will do the same with + regard to the faculties of the Schoolmen: he will admit a chylific, a + chymific and a sanguific, and he will assign one of these <i>ad hoc</i> + to each operation; he will think he has worked wonders, and will laugh at + what he will call the chimeras of the moderns, who claim to explain + through mechanical structure what passes in the body of an animal.</p> + + <p>153. The explanation of the cause of evil by a particular principle, + <i>per principium maleficum</i>, is of the same nature. Evil needs no + such explanation, any more than do cold and darkness: there is neither + <i>primum frigidum</i> nor principle of darkness. Evil itself comes only + from privation; the positive enters therein only by concomitance, as the + active enters by concomitance into cold. We see that water in freezing is + capable of breaking a gun-barrel wherein it is confined; and yet cold is + a certain privation of force, it only comes from the diminution of a + movement which separates the particles of fluids. When this separating + motion becomes weakened in the water by the cold, the particles of + compressed air concealed in the water collect; and, becoming larger, they + become more capable of acting outwards through their buoyancy. The + resistance which the surfaces of the proportions of air meet in the + water, and which opposes the force exerted by these portions towards + dilation, is far less, and consequently the effect of the air greater, in + large air-bubbles than in small, even though these small bubbles combined + should form as great a mass as the large. For the resistances, that is, + the surfaces, increase by the <i>square</i>, and the forces, that is, the + contents or the volumes of the spheres of compressed air, increase by the + <i>cube</i>, of their diameters. Thus it is <i>by accident</i> that + privation involves action and force. I have already shown how privation + is enough to cause error and malice, and <!-- Page 220 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page220"></a>[220]</span> how God is prompted to + permit them, despite that there be no malignity in him. Evil comes from + privation; the positive and action spring from it by accident, as force + springs from cold.</p> + + <p>154. The statement that M. Bayle attributes to the Paulicians, p. + 2323, is not conclusive, to wit, that free will must come from two + principles, to the end that it may have power to turn towards good and + towards evil: for, being simple in itself, it should rather have come + from a neutral principle if this argument held good. But free will tends + towards good, and if it meets with evil it is by accident, for the reason + that this evil is concealed beneath the good, and masked, as it were. + These words which Ovid ascribes to Medea,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i4"><i>Video meliora proboque,</i></p> + <p><i>Deteriora sequor</i>,</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>imply that the morally good is mastered by the agreeably good, which + makes more impression on souls when they are disturbed by the + passions.</p> + + <p>155. Furthermore, M. Bayle himself supplies Melissus with a good + answer; but a little later he disputes it. Here are his words, p. 2025: + 'If Melissus consults the notions of order, he will answer that man was + not wicked when God made him; he will say that man received from God a + happy state, but that not having followed the light of conscience, which + in accordance with the intention of its author should have guided him + along the path of virtue, he has become wicked, and has deserved that God + the supremely good should make him feel the effects of his anger. It is + therefore not God who is the cause of moral evil: but he is the cause of + physical evil, that is, of the punishment of moral evil. And this + punishment, far from being incompatible with the supremely good + principle, of necessity emanates from that one of its attributes, I mean + its justice, which is not less essential to it than its goodness. This + answer, the most reasonable that Melissus can give, is fundamentally good + and sound, but it may be disputed by something more specious and more + dazzling. For indeed Zoroaster objects that the infinitely good principle + ought to have created man not only without actual evil, but also without + the inclination towards evil; that God, having foreseen sin with all its + consequences, ought to have prevented it; that he ought to have impelled + man to moral good, and not to have allowed him any force for tending + towards crime.' That is quite easy to say, but it is not <!-- Page 221 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page221"></a>[221]</span> practicable + if one follows the principles of order: it could not have been + accomplished without perpetual miracles. Ignorance, error and malice + follow one another naturally in animals made as we are: should this + species, then, have been missing in the universe? I have no doubt but + that it is too important there, despite all its weaknesses, for God to + have consented to its abolition.</p> + + <p>156. M. Bayle, in the article entitled 'Paulicians' inserted by him in + his <i>Dictionary</i>, follows up the pronouncements he made in the + article on the Manichaeans. According to him (p. 2330, lit. H) the + orthodox seem to admit two first principles, in making the devil the + originator of sin. M. Becker, a former minister of Amsterdam, author of + the book entitled <i>The World Bewitched</i>, has made use of this idea + in order to demonstrate that one should not assign such power and + authority to the Devil as would allow of his comparison with God. Therein + he is right: but he pushes the conclusions too far. And the author of the + book entitled <span lang="el" title="Apokatastasis Pantôn" + >Αποκαταστασις + Παντων</span> believes that if the + Devil had never been vanquished and despoiled, if he had always kept his + prey, if the title of invincible had belonged to him, that would have + done injury to the glory of God. But it is a poor advantage to keep those + whom one has led astray in order to share their punishment for ever. And + as for the cause of evil, it is true that the Devil is the author of sin. + But the origin of sin comes from farther away, its source is in the + original imperfection of creatures: that renders them capable of sinning, + and there are circumstances in the sequence of things which cause this + power to evince itself in action.</p> + + <p>157. The devils were angels like the rest before their fall, and it is + thought that their leader was one of the chief among angels; but + Scripture is not explicit enough on that point. The passage of the + Apocalypse that speaks of the struggle with the Dragon, as of a vision, + leaves much in doubt, and does not sufficiently develop a subject which + by the other sacred writers is hardly mentioned. It is not in place here + to enter into this discussion, and one must still admit that the common + opinion agrees best with the sacred text. M. Bayle examines some replies + of St. Basil, of Lactantius and others on the origin of evil. As, + however, they are concerned with physical evil, I postpone discussion + thereof, and I will proceed with the examination of the difficulties over + the moral cause of moral evil, which arise in several passages of the + works of our gifted author.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 222 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page222"></a>[222]</span></p> + + <p>158. He disputes the <i>permission</i> of this evil, he would wish one + to admit that God <i>wills</i> it. He quotes these words of Calvin (on + Genesis, ch. 3): 'The ears of some are offended when one says that God + willed it. But I ask you, what else is the permission of him who is + entitled to forbid, or rather who has the thing in his own hands, but an + act of will?' M. Bayle explains these words of Calvin, and those which + precede them, as if he admitted that God willed the fall of Adam, not in + so far as it was a crime, but under some other conception that is unknown + to us. He quotes casuists who are somewhat lax, who say that a son can + desire the death of his father, not in so far as it is an evil for + himself but in so far as it is a good for his heirs <i>(Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, ch. 147, p. 850). It seems to me that + Calvin only says that God willed man's fall for some reason unknown to + us. In the main, when it is a question of a decisive will, that is, of a + decree, these distinctions are useless: one wills the action with all its + qualities, if it is true that one wills it. But when it is a crime, God + can only will the permission of it: the crime is neither an end nor a + means, it is only a <i>conditio sine qua non</i>; thus it is not the + object of a direct will, as I have already demonstrated above. God cannot + prevent it without acting against what he owes to himself, without doing + something that would be worse than the crime of man, without violating + the rule of the best; and that would be to destroy divinity, as I have + already observed. God is therefore bound by a moral necessity, which is + in himself, to permit moral evil in creatures. There is precisely the + case wherein the will of a wise mind is only permissive. I have already + said this: he is bound to permit the crime of others when he cannot + prevent it without himself failing in that which he owes to himself.</p> + + <p>159. 'But among all these infinite combinations', says M. Bayle (p. + 853), 'it pleased God to choose one wherein Adam was to sin, and by his + decree he made it, in preference to all the others, the plan that should + come to pass.' Very good; that is speaking my language; so long as one + applies it to the combinations which compose the whole universe. 'You + will therefore never make us understand', he adds, 'how God did not will + that Eve and Adam should sin, since he rejected all the combinations + wherein they would not have sinned.' But the thing is in general very + easy to understand, from all that I have just said. This combination that + makes the whole universe is the best; God therefore could not <!-- Page + 223 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page223"></a>[223]</span> refrain + from choosing it without incurring a lapse, and rather than incur such, a + thing altogether inappropriate to him, he permits the lapse or the sin of + man which is involved in this combination.</p> + + <p>160. M. Jacquelot, with other able men, does not differ in opinion + from me, when for example he says, p. 186 of his treatise on the + <i>Conformity of Faith with Reason</i>: 'Those who are puzzled by these + difficulties seem to be too limited in their outlook, and to wish to + reduce all God's designs to their own interests. When God formed the + universe, his whole prospect was himself and his own glory, so that if we + had knowledge of all creatures, of their diverse combinations and of + their different relations, we should understand without difficulty that + the universe corresponds perfectly to the infinite wisdom of the + Almighty.' He says elsewhere (p. 232): 'Supposing the impossible, that + God could not prevent the wrong use of free will without destroying it, + it will be agreed that since his wisdom and his glory determined him to + form free creatures this powerful reason must have prevailed over the + grievous consequences which their freedom might have.' I have endeavoured + to develop this still further through <i>the reason of the best and the + moral necessity</i> which led God to make this choice, despite the sin of + some creatures which is involved therein. I think that I have cut down to + the root of the difficulty; nevertheless I am well pleased, for the sake + of throwing more light on the matter, to apply my principle of solution + to the peculiar difficulties of M. Bayle.</p> + + <p>161. Here is one, set forth in these terms (ch. 148, p. 856): 'Would + it in a prince be a mark of his kindness: 1. To give to a hundred + messengers as much money as is needed for a journey of two hundred + leagues? 2. To promise a recompense to all those who should finish the + journey without having borrowed anything, and to threaten with + imprisonment all those whom their money should not have sufficed? 3. To + make choice of a hundred persons, of whom he would know for certain that + there were but two who should earn the recompense, the ninety-eight + others being destined to find on the way either a mistress or a gamester + or some other thing which would make them incur expenses, and which he + would himself have been at pains to dispose in certain places along their + path? 4. To imprison actually ninety-eight of these messengers on the + moment of their return? Is it not abundantly evident that he would have + no kindness for them, and that on the contrary he would intend for them, + not the proposed recompense, <!-- Page 224 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page224"></a>[224]</span> but prison? They would deserve it, + certainly; but he who had wished them to deserve it and placed them in + the sure way towards deserving it, should he be worthy of being called + kind, on the pretext that he had recompensed the two others?' It would + doubtless not be on that account that he earned the title of 'kind'. Yet + other circumstances may contribute, which would avail to render him + worthy of praise for having employed this artifice in order to know those + people, and to make trial of them; just as Gideon made use of some + extraordinary means of choosing the most valiant and the least squeamish + among his soldiers. And even if the prince were to know already the + disposition of all these messengers, may he not put them to this test in + order to make them known also to the others? Even though these reasons be + not applicable to God, they make it clear, nevertheless, that an action + like that of this prince may appear preposterous when it is detached from + the circumstances indicating its cause. All the more must one deem that + God has acted well, and that we should see this if we fully knew of all + that he has done.</p> + + <p>162. M. Descartes, in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth (vol. 1, + letter 10) has made use of another comparison to reconcile human freedom + with the omnipotence of God. 'He imagines a monarch who has forbidden + duels, and who, knowing for certain that two noblemen, if they meet, will + fight, takes sure steps to bring about their meeting. They meet indeed, + they fight: their disobedience of the law is an effect of their free + will, they are punishable. What a king can do in such a case (he adds) + concerning some free actions of his subjects, God, who has infinite + foreknowledge and power, certainly does concerning all those of men. + Before he sent us into this world he knew exactly what all the tendencies + of our will would be: he has endued us therewith, he also has disposed + all other things that are outside us, to cause such and such objects to + present themselves to our senses at such and such a time. He knew that as + a result of this our free will would determine us toward some particular + thing, and he has willed it thus; but he has not for that willed to + constrain our free will thereto. In this king one may distinguish two + different degrees of will, the one whereby he willed that these noblemen + should fight, since he brought about their meeting, and the other whereby + he did not will it, since he forbade duels. Even so theologians + distinguish in God an absolute and independent will, whereby he wills + that all things be done <!-- Page 225 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page225"></a>[225]</span> just as they are done, and another which + is relative, and which concerns the merit or demerit of men, whereby he + wills that his Laws be obeyed' (Descartes, letter 10 of vol. 1, pp. 51, + 52. Compare with that the quotation made by M. Arnauld, vol. 2, p. 288 + <i>et seqq</i>. of his <i>Reflexions on the System of Malebranche</i>, + from Thomas Aquinas, on the antecedent and consequent will of God).</p> + + <p>163. Here is M. Bayle's reply to that (<i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, ch. 154, p. 943): 'This great philosopher is much + mistaken, it seems to me. There would not be in this monarch any degree + of will, either small or great, that these two noblemen should obey the + law, and not fight. He would will entirely and solely that they should + fight. That would not exculpate them, they would only follow their + passion, they would be unaware that they conformed to the will of their + sovereign: but he would be in truth the moral cause of their encounter, + and he would not more entirely wish it supposing he were to inspire them + with the desire or to give them the order for it. Imagine to yourself two + princes each of whom wishes his eldest son to poison himself. One employs + constraint, the other contents himself with secretly causing a grief that + he knows will be sufficient to induce his son to poison himself. Will you + be doubtful whether the will of the latter is less complete than the will + of the former? M. Descartes is therefore assuming an unreal fact and does + not at all solve the difficulty.'</p> + + <p>164. One must confess that M. Descartes speaks somewhat crudely of the + will of God in regard to evil in saying not only that God knew that our + free will would determine us toward some particular thing, but also + <i>that he also wished it</i>, albeit he did not will to constrain the + will thereto. He speaks no less harshly in the eighth letter of the same + volume, saying that not the slightest thought enters into the mind of a + man which God does not <i>will</i>, and has not willed from all eternity, + to enter there. Calvin never said anything harsher; and all that can only + be excused if it is to be understood of a permissive will. M. Descartes' + solution amounts to the distinction between the will expressed in the + sign and the will expressive of the good pleasure (<i>inter voluntatem + signi et beneplaciti</i>) which the moderns have taken from the Schoolmen + as regards the terms, but to which they have given a meaning not usual + among the ancients. It is true that God may command something and yet not + will that it be done, as when he commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son: + he willed the obedience, and he did not <!-- Page 226 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page226"></a>[226]</span> will the action. But + when God commands the virtuous action and forbids the sin, he wills + indeed that which he ordains, but it is only by an antecedent will, as I + have explained more than once.</p> + + <p>165. M. Descartes' comparison is therefore not satisfactory; but it + may be made so. One must make some change in the facts, inventing some + reason to oblige the prince to cause or permit the two enemies to meet. + They must, for instance, be together in the army or in other obligatory + functions, a circumstance the prince himself cannot hinder without + endangering his State. For example, the absence of either of them might + be responsible for the disappearance of innumerable persons of his party + from the army or cause grumbling among the soldiers and give rise to some + great disturbance. In this case, therefore, one may say that the prince + does not will the duel: he knows of it, but he permits it + notwithstanding, for he prefers permitting the sin of others to + committing one himself. Thus this corrected comparison may serve, + provided that one observe the difference between God and the prince. The + prince is forced into this permission by his powerlessness; a more + powerful monarch would have no need of all these considerations; but God, + who has power to do all that is possible, only permits sin because it is + absolutely impossible to anyone at all to do better. The prince's action + is peradventure not free from sorrow and regret. This regret is due to + his imperfection, of which he is sensible; therein lies displeasure. God + is incapable of such a feeling and finds, moreover, no cause therefor; he + is infinitely conscious of his own perfection, and it may even be said + that the imperfection in creatures taken individually changes for him + into perfection in relation to the whole, and that it is an added glory + for the Creator. What more can one wish, when one possesses a boundless + wisdom and when one is as powerful as one is wise; when one can do all + and when one has the best?</p> + + <p>166. Having once understood these things, we are hardened + sufficiently, so it seems to me, against the strongest and most spirited + objections. I have not concealed them: but there are some we shall merely + touch upon, because they are too odious. The Remonstrants and M. Bayle + (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 152, end + page 919) quote St. Augustine, saying, '<i>crudelem esse misericordiam + velle aliquem miserum esse ut eius miserearis</i>': in the same sense is + cited Seneca <i>De Benef.</i>, L. 6, c. 36, 37. I confess that one would + have some reason to urge that against those who <!-- Page 227 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page227"></a>[227]</span> believed that God has + no other cause for permitting sin than the design to have something + wherewith to exercise punitive justice against the majority of men, and + his mercy towards a small number of elect. But it must be considered that + God had reasons for his permission of sin, more worthy of him and more + profound in relation to us. Someone has dared to compare God's course of + action with that of a Caligula, who has his edicts written in so small a + hand and has them placarded in so high a place that it is not possible to + read them; with that of a mother who neglects her daughter's honour in + order to attain her own selfish ends; with that of Queen Catherine de + Medicis, who is said to have abetted the love-affairs of her ladies in + order to learn of the intrigues of the great; and even with that of + Tiberius, who arranged, through the extraordinary services of the + executioner, that the law forbidding the subjection of a virgin to + capital punishment should no longer apply to the case of Sejanus's + daughter. This last comparison was proposed by Peter Bertius, then an + Armenian, but finally a member of the Roman communion. And a scandalous + comparison has been made between God and Tiberius, which is related at + length by Andreas Caroli in his <i>Memorabilia Ecclesiastica</i> of the + last century, as M. Bayle observes. Bertius used it against the + Gomarists. I think that arguments of this kind are only valid against + those who maintain that justice is an arbitrary thing in relation to God; + or that he has a despotic power which can go so far as being able to + condemn innocents; or, in short, that good is not the motive of his + actions.</p> + + <p>167. At that same time an ingenious satire was composed against the + Gomarists, entitled <i>Fur praedestinatus, de gepredestineerdedief</i>, + wherein there is introduced a thief condemned to be hanged, who + attributes to God all the evil he has done; who believes himself + predestined to salvation notwithstanding his wicked actions; who imagines + that this belief is sufficient for him, and who defeats by arguments + <i>ad hominem</i> a Counter-remonstrant minister called to prepare him + for death: but this thief is finally converted by an old pastor who had + been dismissed for his Arminianism, whom the gaoler, in pity for the + criminal and for the weakness of the minister, had brought to him + secretly. Replies were made to this lampoon, but replies to satires never + please as much as the satires themselves. M. Bayle (<i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 154, p. 938) says that this + book was printed in England in the <!-- Page 228 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page228"></a>[228]</span> time of Cromwell, and + he appears not to have been informed that it was only a translation of + the much older original Flemish. He adds that Dr. George Kendal wrote a + confutation of it at Oxford in the year 1657, under the title of <i>Fur + pro Tribunali</i>, and that the dialogue is there inserted. This dialogue + presupposes, contrary to the truth, that the Counter-remonstrants make + God the cause of evil, and teach a kind of predestination in the + Mahometan manner according to which it does not matter whether one does + good or evil, and the assumption that one is predestined assures the + fact. They by no means go so far. Nevertheless it is true that there are + among them some Supralapsarians and others who find it hard to declare + themselves in clear terms upon the justice of God and the principles of + piety and morals in man. For they imagine despotism in God, and demand + that man be convinced, without reason, of the absolute certainty of his + election, a course that is liable to have dangerous consequences. But all + those who acknowledge that God produces the best plan, having chosen it + from among all possible ideas of the universe; that he there finds man + inclined by the original imperfection of creatures to misuse his free + will and to plunge into misery; that God prevents the sin and the misery + in so far as the perfection of the universe, which is an emanation from + his, may permit it: those, I say, show forth more clearly that God's + intention is the one most right and holy in the world; that the creature + alone is guilty, that his original limitation or imperfection is the + source of his wickedness, that his evil will is the sole cause of his + misery; that one cannot be destined to salvation without also being + destined to the holiness of the children of God, and that all hope of + election one can have can only be founded upon the good will infused into + one's heart by the grace of God.</p> + + <p>168. <i>Metaphysical considerations</i> also are brought up against my + explanation of the moral cause of moral evil; but they will trouble me + less since I have dismissed the objections derived from moral reasons, + which were more impressive. These metaphysical considerations concern the + nature of the <i>possible</i> and of the <i>necessary</i>; they go + against my fundamental assumption that God has chosen the best of all + possible worlds. There are philosophers who have maintained that there is + nothing possible except that which actually happens. These are those same + people who thought or could have thought that all is necessary + unconditionally. Some <!-- Page 229 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page229"></a>[229]</span> were of this opinion because they + admitted a brute and blind necessity in the cause of the existence of + things: and it is these I have most reason for opposing. But there are + others who are mistaken only because they misuse terms. They confuse + moral necessity with metaphysical necessity: they imagine that since God + cannot help acting for the best he is thus deprived of freedom, and + things are endued with that necessity which philosophers and theologians + endeavour to avoid. With these writers my dispute is only one of words, + provided they admit in very deed that God chooses and does the best. But + there are others who go further, they think that God could have done + better. This is an opinion which must be rejected: for although it does + not altogether deprive God of wisdom and goodness, as do the advocates of + blind necessity, it sets bounds thereto, thus derogating from God's + supreme perfection.</p> + + <p>169. The question of the <i>possibility of things that do not + happen</i> has already been examined by the ancients. It appears that + Epicurus, to preserve freedom and to avoid an absolute necessity, + maintained, after Aristotle, that contingent futurities were not + susceptible of determinate truth. For if it was true yesterday that I + should write to-day, it could therefore not fail to happen, it was + already necessary; and, for the same reason, it was from all eternity. + Thus all that which happens is necessary, and it is impossible for + anything different to come to pass. But since that is not so it would + follow, according to him, that contingent futurities have no determinate + truth. To uphold this opinion, Epicurus went so far as to deny the first + and the greatest principle of the truths of reason, he denied that every + assertion was either true or false. Here is the way they confounded him: + 'You deny that it was true yesterday that I should write to-day; it was + therefore false.' The good man, not being able to admit this conclusion, + was obliged to say that it was neither true nor false. After that, he + needs no refutation, and Chrysippus might have spared himself the trouble + he took to prove the great principle of contradictories, following the + account by Cicero in his book <i>De Fato</i>: 'Contendit omnes nervos + Chrysippus ut persuadeat omne <span lang="el" title="Axiôma" + >Αξιωμα</span> aut verum esse aut + falsum. Ut enim Epicurus veretur ne si hoc concesserit, concedendum sit, + fato fieri quaecunque fiant; si enim alterum ex aeternitate verum sit, + esse id etiam certum; si certum, etiam necessarium; ita et necessitatem + et fatum confirmari putat; sic Chrysippus metuit ne non, si non <!-- Page + 230 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page230"></a>[230]</span> + obtinuerit omne quod enuncietur aut verum esse aut falsum, omnia fato + fieri possint ex causis aeternis rerum futurarum.' M. Bayle observes + (<i>Dictionary</i>, article 'Epicurus', let. T, p. 1141) 'that neither of + these two great philosophers [Epicurus and Chrysippus] understood that + the truth of this maxim, every proposition is true or false, is + independent of what is called <i>fatum</i>: it could not therefore serve + as proof of the existence of the <i>fatum</i>, as Chrysippus maintained + and as Epicurus feared. Chrysippus could not have conceded, without + damaging his own position, that there are propositions which are neither + true nor false. But he gained nothing by asserting the contrary: for, + whether there be free causes or not, it is equally true that this + proposition, The Grand Mogul will go hunting to-morrow, is true or false. + Men rightly regarded as ridiculous this speech of Tiresias: All that I + shall say will happen or not, for great Apollo confers on me the faculty + of prophesying. If, assuming the impossible, there were no God, it would + yet be certain that everything the greatest fool in the world should + predict would happen or would not happen. That is what neither Chrysippus + nor Epicurus has taken into consideration.' Cicero, lib. I, <i>De Nat. + Deorum</i>, with regard to the evasions of the Epicureans expressed the + sound opinion (as M. Bayle observes towards the end of the same page) + that it would be much less shameful to admit that one cannot answer one's + opponent, than to have recourse to such answers. Yet we shall see that M. + Bayle himself confused the certain with the necessary, when he maintained + that the choice of the best rendered things necessary.</p> + + <p>170. Let us come now to the possibility of things that do not happen, + and I will give the very words of M. Bayle, albeit they are somewhat + discursive. This is what he says on the matter in his <i>Dictionary</i> + (article 'Chrysippus', let. S, p. 929): 'The celebrated dispute on things + possible and things impossible owed its origin to the doctrine of the + Stoics concerning fate. The question was to know whether, among the + things which have never been and never will be, there are some possible; + or whether all that is not, all that has never been, all that will never + be, was impossible. A famous dialectician of the Megaric Sect, named + Diodorus, gave a negative answer to the first of these two questions and + an affirmative to the second; but Chrysippus vehemently opposed him. Here + are two passages of Cicero (epist. 4, lib. 9, <i>Ad Familiar.</i>): + "<span lang="el" title="peri dynatôn" >περι + δυνατων</span> me scito <span + lang="el" title="kata Diodôron krinein" >κατα + Διοδωρον + κρινειν</span>. Quapropter si + <!-- Page 231 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page231"></a>[231]</span> + venturus es, scito necesse esse te venire. Sin autem non es, <span + lang="el" title="tôn adynatôn" >των + αδυνατων</span> est te + venire. Nunc vide utra te <span lang="el" title="krisis" + >κρισις</span> magis delectet, <span + lang="el" title="Chrysippeia" + >Χρυσιππεια</span> + ne, an haec; quam noster Diodorus [a Stoic who for a long time had lived + in Cicero's house] non concoquebat." This is quoted from a letter that + Cicero wrote to Varro. He sets forth more comprehensively the whole state + of the question, in the little book <i>De Fato</i>. I am going to quote a + few pieces (Cic., <i>De Fato</i>, p. m. 65): "Vigila, Chrysippe, ne tuam + causam, in qua tibi cum Diodoro valente Dialectico magna luctatio est, + deseras ... omne ergo quod falsum dicitur in futuro, id fieri non potest. + At hoc, Chrysippe, minime vis, maximeque tibi de hoc ipso cum Diodoro + certamen est. Ille enim id solum fieri posse dicit, quod aut sit verum, + aut futurum sit verum; et quicquid futurum sit, id dicit fieri necesse + esse; et quicquid non sit futurum, id negat fieri posse. Tu etiam quae + non sint futura, posse fieri dicis, ut frangi hanc gemmam, etiamsi id + nunquam futurum sit: neque necesse fuisse Cypselum regnare Corinthi, + quamquam id millesimo ante anno Apollinis Oraculo editum esset.... Placet + Diodoro, id solum fieri posse, quod aut verum sit, aut verum futurum sit: + qui locus attingit hanc quaestionem, nihil fieri, quod non necesse + fuerit; et quicquid fieri possit, id aut esse jam, aut futurum esse: nec + magis commutari ex veris in falsa ea posse quae futura sunt, quam ea quae + facta sunt: sed in factis immutabilitatem apparere; in futuris quibusdam, + quia non apparent, ne inesse quidem videri: ut in eo qui mortifero morbo + urgeatur, verum sit, hic morietur hoc morbo: at hoc idem si vere dicatur + in eo, in quo tanta vis morbi non appareat, nihilominus futurum sit. Ita + fit ut commutatio ex vero in falsum, ne in futuro quidem ulla fieri + possit." Cicero makes it clear enough that Chrysippus often found himself + in difficulties in this dispute, and that is no matter for astonishment: + for the course he had chosen was not bound up with his dogma of fate, + and, if he had known how, or had dared, to reason consistently, he would + readily have adopted the whole hypothesis of Diodorus. We have seen + already that the freedom he assigned to the soul, and his comparison of + the cylinder, did not preclude the possibility that in reality all the + acts of the human will were unavoidable consequences of fate. Hence it + follows that everything which does not happen is impossible, and that + there is nothing possible but that which actually comes to pass. Plutarch + (<i>De Stoicor. Repugn.</i>, pp. 1053, 1054) discomfits him completely, + on that point as well <!-- Page 232 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page232"></a>[232]</span> as on the dispute with Diodorus, and + maintains that his opinion on possibility is altogether contrary to the + doctrine of <i>fatum</i>. Observe that the most eminent Stoics had + written on this matter without following the same path. Arrian (in + <i>Epict.</i>, lib. 2, c. 29, p. m. 166) named four of them, who are + Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Archidemus and Antipater. He evinces great scorn + for this dispute; and M. Menage need not have cited him as a writer who + had spoken in commendation of the work of Chrysippus <span lang="el" + title="peri dynatôn" >περι + δυνατων</span> ("citatur + honorifice apud Arrianum", Menag. in <i>Laert.</i>, I, 7, 341) for + assuredly these words, "<span lang="el" title="gegraphe de kai Chrysippos thaumastôs" + >γεγραφε δε + και + Χρυσιππος + θαυμαστως</span>, + etc., de his rebus mira scripsit Chrysippus", etc., are not in that + connexion a eulogy. That is shown by the passages immediately before and + after it. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (<i>De Collocat. Verbor.</i>, c. 17, + p. m. 11) mentions two treatises by Chrysippus, wherein, under a title + that promised something different, much of the logicians' territory had + been explored. The work was entitled "<span lang="el" title="peri tês syntaxeôs tôn tou logou merôn" + >περι της + συνταξεως + των του + λογου + μερων</span>, de partium orationis + collocatione", and treated only of propositions true and false, possible + and impossible, contingent and equivocal, etc., matter that our Schoolmen + have pounded down and reduced to its essence. Take note that Chrysippus + recognized that past things were necessarily true, which Cleanthes had + not been willing to admit. (Arrian, <i>ubi supra</i>, p. m. 165.) "<span + lang="el" title="Ou pan de parelêlythos alêthes anankaion esti, kathaper hoi peri Kleanthên pheresthai dokousi" + >Ου παν δε + παρεληλυθος + αληθες + αναγκαιον + εστι, + καθαπερ ‛οι + περι + Κλεανθην + φερεσθαι + δοκουσι</span>. Non omne + praeteritum ex necessitate verum est, ut illi qui Cleanthem sequuntur + sentiunt." We have already seen (p. 562, col. 2) that Abélard is alleged + to have taught a doctrine which resembles that of Diodorus. I think that + the Stoics pledged themselves to give a wider range to possible things + than to future things, for the purpose of mitigating the odious and + frightful conclusions which were drawn from their dogma of fatality.'</p> + + <p>It is sufficiently evident that Cicero when writing to Varro the words + that have just been quoted (lib. 9, Ep. 4, <i>Ad Familiar.</i>) had not + enough comprehension of the effect of Diodorus's opinion, since he found + it preferable. He presents tolerably well in his book <i>De Fato</i> the + opinions of those writers, but it is a pity that he has not always added + the reasons which they employed. Plutarch in his treatise on the + contradictions of the Stoics and M. Bayle are both surprised that + Chrysippus was not of the same opinion as Diodorus, since he favours + fatality. But Chrysippus and even his master <!-- Page 233 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page233"></a>[233]</span> Cleanthes were on that + point more reasonable than is supposed. That will be seen as we proceed. + It is open to question whether the past is more necessary than the + future. Cleanthes held the opinion that it is. The objection is raised + that it is necessary <i>ex hypothesi</i> for the future to happen, as it + is necessary <i>ex hypothesi</i> for the past to have happened. But there + is this difference, that it is not possible to act on the past state, + that would be a contradiction; but it is possible to produce some effect + on the future. Yet the hypothetical necessity of both is the same: the + one cannot be changed, the other will not be; and once that is past, it + will not be possible for it to be changed either.</p> + + <p>171. The famous Pierre Abélard expressed an opinion resembling that of + Diodorus in the statement that God can do only that which he does. It was + the third of the fourteen propositions taken from his works which were + censured at the Council of Sens. It had been taken from the third book of + his <i>Introduction to Theology</i>, where he treats especially of the + power of God. The reason he gave for his statement was that God can do + only that which he wills. Now God cannot will to do anything other than + that which he does, because, of necessity, he must will whatever is + fitting. Hence it follows that all that which he does not, is not + fitting, that he cannot will to do it, and consequently that he cannot do + it. Abélard admits himself that this opinion is peculiar to him, that + hardly anyone shares in it, that it seems contrary to the doctrine of the + saints and to reason and derogatory to the greatness of God. It appears + that this author was a little too much inclined to speak and to think + differently from others: for in reality this was only a dispute about + words: he was changing the use of terms. Power and will are different + faculties, whose objects also are different; it is confusing them to say + that God can do only that which he wills. On the contrary, among various + possibles, he wills only that which he finds the best. For all possibles + are regarded as objects of power, but actual and existing things are + regarded as the objects of his decretory will. Abélard himself + acknowledged it. He raises this objection for himself: a reprobate can be + saved; but he can only be saved if God saves him. God can therefore save + him, and consequently do something that he does not. Abélard answers that + it may indeed be said that this man can be saved in respect of the + possibility of human nature, which is capable of salvation: but that it + may not be said that God can save him in respect of God <!-- Page 234 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page234"></a>[234]</span> himself, + because it is impossible that God should do that which he must not do. + But Abélard admits that it may very well be said in a sense, speaking + absolutely and setting aside the assumption of reprobation, that such an + one who is reprobate can be saved, and that thus often that which God + does not can be done. He could therefore have spoken like the rest, who + mean nothing different when they say that God can save this man, and that + he can do that which he does not.</p> + + <p>172. The so-called necessity of Wyclif, which was condemned by the + Council of Constance, seems to arise simply from this same + misunderstanding. I think that men of talent do wrong to truth and to + themselves when, without reason, they bring into use new and displeasing + expressions. In our own time the celebrated Mr. Hobbes supported this + same opinion, that what does not happen is impossible. He proves it by + the statement that all the conditions requisite for a thing that shall + not exist (<i>omnia rei non futurae requisita</i>) are never found + together, and that the thing cannot exist otherwise. But who does not see + that that only proves a hypothetical impossibility? It is true that a + thing cannot exist when a requisite condition for it is lacking. But as + we claim to be able to say that the thing can exist although it does not + exist, we claim in the same way to be able to say that the requisite + conditions can exist although they do not exist. Thus Mr. Hobbes's + argument leaves the matter where it is. The opinion which was held + concerning Mr. Hobbes, that he taught an absolute necessity of all + things, brought upon him much discredit, and would have done him harm + even had it been his only error.</p> + + <p>173. Spinoza went further: he appears to have explicitly taught a + blind necessity, having denied to the Author of Things understanding and + will, and assuming that good and perfection relate to us only, and not to + him. It is true that Spinoza's opinion on this subject is somewhat + obscure: for he grants God thought, after having divested him of + understanding, <i>cogitationem, non intellectum concedit Deo</i>. There + are even passages where he relents on the question of necessity. + Nevertheless, as far as one can understand him, he acknowledges no + goodness in God, properly speaking, and he teaches that all things exist + through the necessity of the divine nature, without any act of choice by + God. We will not waste time here in refuting an opinion so bad, and + indeed so inexplicable. My own opinion is founded on the nature of the + possibles, that is, <!-- Page 235 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page235"></a>[235]</span> of things that imply no contradiction. I + do not think that a Spinozist will say that all the romances one can + imagine exist actually now, or have existed, or will still exist in some + place in the universe. Yet one cannot deny that romances such as those of + Mademoiselle de Scudéry, or as <i>Octavia</i>, are possible. Let us + therefore bring up against him these words of M. Bayle, which please me + well, on page 390, 'It is to-day', he says, 'a great embarrassment for + the Spinozists to see that, according to their hypothesis, it was as + impossible from all eternity that Spinoza, for instance, should not die + at The Hague, as it is impossible for two and two to make six. They are + well aware that it is a necessary conclusion from their doctrine, and a + conclusion which disheartens, affrights, and stirs the mind to revolt, + because of the absurdity it involves, diametrically opposed to common + sense. They are not well pleased that one should know they are subverting + a maxim so universal and so evident as this one: All that which implies + contradiction is impossible, and all that which implies no contradiction + is possible.'</p> + + <p>174. One may say of M. Bayle, 'ubi bene, nemo melius', although one + cannot say of him what was said of Origen, 'ubi male, nemo pejus'. I will + only add that what has just been indicated as a maxim is in fact the + definition of the <i>possible</i> and the <i>impossible</i>. M. Bayle, + however, adds here towards the end a remark which somewhat spoils his + eminently reasonable statement. 'Now what contradiction would there be if + Spinoza had died in Leyden? Would Nature then have been less perfect, + less wise, less powerful?' He confuses here what is impossible because it + implies contradiction with what cannot happen because it is not meet to + be chosen. It is true that there would have been no contradiction in the + supposition that Spinoza died in Leyden and not at The Hague; there would + have been nothing so possible: the matter was therefore indifferent in + respect of the power of God. But one must not suppose that any event, + however small it be, can be regarded as indifferent in respect of his + wisdom and his goodness. Jesus Christ has said divinely well that + everything is numbered, even to the hairs of our head. Thus the wisdom of + God did not permit that this event whereof M. Bayle speaks should happen + otherwise than it happened, not as if by itself it would have been more + deserving of choice, but on account of its connexion with that entire + sequence of the universe which deserved to be given preference. To say + that what has already happened was of no interest to the wisdom of <!-- + Page 236 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page236"></a>[236]</span> God, + and thence to infer that it is therefore not necessary, is to make a + false assumption and argue incorrectly to a true conclusion. It is + confusing what is necessary by moral necessity, that is, according to the + principle of Wisdom and Goodness, with what is so by metaphysical and + brute necessity, which occurs when the contrary implies contradiction. + Spinoza, moreover, sought a metaphysical necessity in events. He did not + think that God was determined by his goodness and by his perfection + (which this author treated as chimeras in relation to the universe), but + by the necessity of his nature; just as the semicircle is bound to + enclose only right angles, without either knowing or willing this. For + Euclid demonstrated that all angles enclosed between two straight lines + drawn from the extremities of the diameter towards a point on the + circumference of the circle are of necessity right angles, and that the + contrary implies contradiction.</p> + + <p>175. There are people who have gone to the other extreme: under the + pretext of freeing the divine nature from the yoke of necessity they + wished to regard it as altogether indifferent, with an indifference of + equipoise. They did not take into account that just as metaphysical + necessity is preposterous in relation to God's actions <i>ad extra</i>, + so moral necessity is worthy of him. It is a happy necessity which + obliges wisdom to do good, whereas indifference with regard to good and + evil would indicate a lack of goodness or of wisdom. And besides, the + indifference which would keep the will in a perfect equipoise would + itself be a chimera, as has been already shown: it would offend against + the great principle of the determinant reason.</p> + + <p>176. Those who believe that God established good and evil by an + arbitrary decree are adopting that strange idea of mere indifference, and + other absurdities still stranger. They deprive God of the designation + <i>good</i>: for what cause could one have to praise him for what he + does, if in doing something quite different he would have done equally + well? And I have very often been surprised that divers Supralapsarian + theologians, as for instance Samuel Rutherford, a Professor of Theology + in Scotland, who wrote when the controversies with the Remonstrants were + at their height, could have been deluded by so strange an idea. + Rutherford (in his <i>Exercitationes Apologeticae pro Gratia</i>) says + positively that nothing is unjust or morally bad in God's eyes before he + has forbidden it: thus without this prohibition it would be a matter of + <!-- Page 237 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page237"></a>[237]</span> + indifference whether one murdered or saved a man, loved God or hated him, + praised or blasphemed him. Nothing is so unreasonable as that. One may + teach that God established good and evil by a positive law, or one may + assert that there was something good and just before his decree, but that + he is not required to conform to it, and that nothing prevents him from + acting unjustly and from perhaps condemning innocence: but it all comes + to the same thing, offering almost equal dishonour to God. For if justice + was established arbitrarily and without any cause, if God came upon it by + a kind of hazard, as when one draws lots, his goodness and his wisdom are + not manifested in it, and there is nothing at all to attach him to it. If + it is by a purely arbitrary decree, without any reason, that he has + established or created what we call justice and goodness, then he can + annul them or change their nature. Thus one would have no reason to + assume that he will observe them always, as it would be possible to say + he will observe them on the assumption that they are founded on reasons. + The same would hold good more or less if his justice were different from + ours, if (for example) it were written in his code that it is just to + make the innocent eternally unhappy. According to these principles also, + nothing would compel God to keep his word or would assure us of its + fulfilment. For why should the law of justice, which states that + reasonable promises must be kept, be more inviolable for him than any + other laws?</p> + + <p>177. All these three dogmas, albeit a little different from one + another, namely, (1) that the nature of justice is arbitrary, (2) that it + is fixed, but it is not certain that God will observe it, and finally (3) + that the justice we know is not that which he observes, destroy the + confidence in God that gives us tranquillity, and the love of God that + makes our happiness. There is nothing to prevent such a God from behaving + as a tyrant and an enemy of honest folk, and from taking pleasure in that + which we call evil. Why should he not, then, just as well be the evil + principle of the Manichaeans as the single good principle of the + orthodox? At least he would be neutral and, as it were, suspended between + the two, or even sometimes the one and sometimes the other. That would be + as if someone were to say that Oromasdes and Arimanius reign in turns, + according to which of the two is the stronger or the more adroit. It is + like the saying of a certain Moghul woman. She, so it seems, having heard + it said that formerly under Genghis Khan and his <!-- Page 238 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page238"></a>[238]</span> successors her nation + had had dominion over most of the North and East, told the Muscovites + recently, when M. Isbrand went to China on behalf of the Czar, through + the country of those Tartars, that the god of the Moghuls had been driven + from Heaven, but that one day he would take his own place again. The true + God is always the same: natural religion itself demands that he be + essentially as good and wise as he is powerful. It is scarcely more + contrary to reason and piety to say that God acts without cognition, than + to maintain that he has cognition which does not find the eternal rules + of goodness and of justice among its objects, or again to say that he has + a will such as heeds not these rules.</p> + + <p>178. Some theologians who have written of God's right over creatures + appear to have conceded to him an unrestricted right, an arbitrary and + despotic power. They thought that would be placing divinity on the most + exalted level that may be imagined for it, and that it would abase the + creature before the Creator to such an extent that the Creator is bound + by no laws of any kind with respect to the creature. There are passages + from Twiss, Rutherford and some other Supralapsarians which imply that + God cannot sin whatever he may do, because he is subject to no law. M. + Bayle himself considers that this doctrine is monstrous and contrary to + the holiness of God (<i>Dictionary</i>, v. 'Paulicians', p. 2332 <i>in + initio</i>); but I suppose that the intention of some of these writers + was less bad than it seems to be. Apparently they meant by the term + right, <span lang="el" title="anypeuthynian" + >ανυπευθυνιαν</span>, + a state wherein one is responsible to none for one's actions. But they + will not have denied that God owes to himself what goodness and justice + demand of him. On that matter one may see M. Amyraut's <i>Apology for + Calvin</i>: it is true that Calvin appears orthodox on this subject, and + that he is by no means one of the extreme Supralapsarians.</p> + + <p>179. Thus, when M. Bayle says somewhere that St. Paul extricates + himself from predestination only through the consideration of God's + absolute right, and the incomprehensibility of his ways, it is implied + that, if one understood them, one would find them consistent with + justice, God not being able to use his power otherwise. St. Paul himself + says that it is a <i>depth</i>, but a depth of wisdom (<i>altitudo + sapientiae</i>), and <i>justice</i> is included in <i>the goodness of the + All-wise</i>. I find that M. Bayle speaks very well elsewhere on the + application of our notions of goodness to the actions of God (<i>Reply to + the Questions of a Provincial</i>, ch. 81, p. 139): 'One must not assert + <!-- Page 239 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page239"></a>[239]</span> + here', he says, 'that the goodness of the infinite Being is not subject + to the same rules as the goodness of the creature. For if there is in God + an attribute that can be called goodness, the marks of goodness in + general must apply to him. Now when we reduce goodness to the most + general abstraction, we find therein the will to do good. Divide and + subdivide into as many kinds as you shall please this general goodness, + into infinite goodness, finite goodness, kingly goodness, goodness of a + father, goodness of a husband, goodness of a master, you will find in + each, as an inseparable attribute, the will to do good.'</p> + + <p>180. I find also that M. Bayle combats admirably the opinion of those + who assert that goodness and justice depend solely upon the arbitrary + choice of God; who suppose, moreover, that if God had been determined by + the goodness of things themselves to act, he would be entirely subjected + to necessity in his actions, a state incompatible with freedom. That is + confusing metaphysical necessity with moral necessity. Here is what M. + Bayle says in objection to this error (<i>Reply</i>, ch. 89, p. 203): + 'The consequence of this doctrine will be, that before God resolved upon + creating the world he saw nothing better in virtue than in vice, and that + his ideas did not show him that virtue was more worthy of his love than + vice. That leaves no distinction between natural right and positive + right; there will no longer be anything unalterable or inevitable in + morals; it will have been just as possible for God to command people to + be vicious as to command them to be virtuous; and one will have no + certainty that the moral laws will not one day be abrogated, as the + ceremonial laws of the Jews were. This, in a word, leads us straight to + the belief that God was the free author, not only of goodness and of + virtue, but also of truth and of the essence of things. That is what + certain of the Cartesians assert, and I confess that their opinion (see + the Continuation of <i>Divers Thoughts on the Comet</i>, p. 554) might be + of some avail in certain circumstances. Yet it is open to dispute for so + many reasons, and subject to consequences so troublesome (see chapter 152 + of the same Continuation) that there are scarcely any extremes it were + not better to suffer rather than plunge into that one. It opens the door + to the most exaggerated Pyrrhonism: for it leads to the assertion that + this proposition, three and three make six, is only true where and during + the time when it pleases God; that it is perhaps false in some parts of + the universe; and that perhaps it will be so among <!-- Page 240 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page240"></a>[240]</span> men in the coming + year. All that depends on the free will of God could have been limited to + certain places and certain times, like the Judaic ceremonies. This + conclusion will be extended to all the laws of the Decalogue, if the + actions they command are in their nature divested of all goodness to the + same degree as the actions they forbid.'</p> + + <p>181. To say that God, having resolved to create man just as he is, + could not but have required of him piety, sobriety, justice and chastity, + because it is impossible that the disorders capable of overthrowing or + disturbing his work can please him, that is to revert in effect to the + common opinion. Virtues are virtues only because they serve perfection or + prevent the imperfection of those who are virtuous, or even of those who + have to do with them. And they have that power by their nature and by the + nature of rational creatures, before God decrees to create them. To hold + a different opinion would be as if someone were to say that the rules of + proportion and harmony are arbitrary with regard to musicians because + they occur in music only when one has resolved to sing or to play some + instrument. But that is exactly what is meant by being essential to good + music: for those rules belong to it already in the ideal state, even when + none yet thinks of singing, since it is known that they must of necessity + belong to it as soon as one shall sing. In the same way virtues belong to + the ideal state of the rational creature before God decrees to create it; + and it is for that very reason we maintain that virtues are good by their + nature.</p> + + <p>182. M. Bayle has inserted a special chapter in his Continuation of + <i>Divers Thoughts on the Comet</i> (it is chapter 152) where he shows + 'that the Christian Doctors teach that there are things which are just + antecedently to God's decrees'. Some theologians of the Augsburg + Confession censured some of the Reformed who appeared to be of a + different opinion; and this error was regarded as if it were a + consequence of the absolute decree, which doctrine seems to exempt the + will of God from any kind of reason, <i>ubi stat pro ratione + voluntas</i>. But, as I have observed already on various occasions, + Calvin himself acknowledged that the decrees of God are in conformity + with justice and wisdom, although the reasons that might prove this + conformity in detail are unknown to us. Thus, according to him, the rules + of goodness and of justice are anterior to the decrees of God. M. Bayle, + in the same place, quotes a passage from the celebrated M. Turretin which + draws a <!-- Page 241 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page241"></a>[241]</span> distinction between natural divine laws + and positive divine laws. Moral laws are of the first kind and ceremonial + of the second. Samuel Desmarests, a celebrated theologian formerly at + Groningen, and Herr Strinesius, who is still at Frankfort on the Oder, + advocated this same distinction; and I think that it is the opinion most + widely accepted even among the Reformed. Thomas Aquinas and all the + Thomists were of the same opinion, with the bulk of the Schoolmen and the + theologians of the Roman Church. The Casuists also held to that idea: I + count Grotius among the most eminent of them, and he was followed in this + point by his commentators. Herr Pufendorf appeared to be of a different + opinion, which he insisted on maintaining in the face of censure from + some theologians; but he need not be taken into account, not having + advanced far enough in subjects of this kind. He makes a vigorous protest + against the absolute decree, in his <i>Fecialis divinus</i>, and yet he + approves what is worst in the opinions of the champions of this decree, + and without which this decree (as others of the Reformed explain) becomes + endurable. Aristotle was very orthodox on this matter of justice, and the + Schoolmen followed him: they distinguish, just as Cicero and the Jurists + do, between perpetual right, which is binding on all and everywhere, and + positive right, which is only for certain times and certain peoples. I + once read with enjoyment the <i>Euthyphro</i> of Plato, who makes + Socrates uphold the truth on that point, and M. Bayle has called + attention to the same passage.</p> + + <p>183. M. Bayle himself upholds this truth with considerable force in a + certain passage, which it will be well to quote here in its entirety, + long as it is (vol. II of the Continuation of <i>Divers Thoughts on the + Comet</i>, ch. 152, p. 771 <i>seqq.</i>): 'According to the teaching of + countless writers of importance', he says, 'there is in nature and in the + essence of certain things a moral good or evil that precedes the divine + decree. They prove this doctrine principally through the frightful + consequences that attend the opposite dogma. Thus from the proposition + that to do wrong to no man would be a good action, not in itself but by + an arbitrary dispensation of God's will, it would follow that God could + have given to man a law directly opposed at all points to the + commandments of the Decalogue. That is horrifying. But here is a more + direct proof, one derived from metaphysics. One thing is certain, that + the existence of God is not an effect of his will. He exists not because + he wills his <!-- Page 242 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page242"></a>[242]</span> existence, but through the necessity of + his infinite nature. His power and his knowledge exist through the same + necessity. He is all-powerful, he knows all things, not because he wills + it thus, but because these are attributes necessarily identified with + him. The dominion of his will relates only to the exercise of his power, + he gives effect outside himself only to that which he wills, and he + leaves all the rest in the state of mere possibility. Thence it comes + that this dominion extends only over the existence of creatures, and not + over their essential being. God was able to create matter, a man, a + circle, or leave them in nothingness, but he was not able to produce them + without giving them their essential properties. He had of necessity to + make man a rational animal and to give the round shape to a circle, + since, according to his eternal ideas, independent of the free decrees of + his will, the essence of man lay in the properties of being animal and + rational, and since the essence of the circle lay in having a + circumference equally distant from the centre as to all its parts. This + is what has caused the Christian philosophers to acknowledge that the + essences of things are eternal, and that there are propositions of + eternal truth; consequently that the essences of things and the truth of + the first principles are immutable. That is to be understood not only of + theoretical but also of practical first principles, and of all the + propositions that contain the true definition of creatures. These + essences and these truths emanate from the same necessity of nature as + the knowledge of God. Since therefore it is by the nature of things that + God exists, that he is all-powerful, and that he has perfect knowledge of + all things, it is also by the nature of things that matter, the triangle, + man and certain actions of man, etc., have such and such properties + essentially. God saw from all eternity and in all necessity the essential + relations of numbers, and the identity of the subject and predicate in + the propositions that contain the essence of each thing. He saw likewise + that the term just is included in these propositions: to esteem what is + estimable, be grateful to one's benefactor, fulfil the conditions of a + contract, and so on, with many others relating to morals. One is + therefore justified in saying that the precepts of natural law assume the + reasonableness and justice of that which is enjoined, and that it would + be man's duty to practise what they contain even though God should have + been so indulgent as to ordain nothing in that respect. Pray observe that + in going back with our visionary thoughts to that ideal moment <!-- Page + 243 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page243"></a>[243]</span> when God + has yet decreed nothing, we find in the ideas of God the principles of + morals under terms that imply an obligation. We understand these maxims + as certain, and derived from the eternal and immutable order: it beseems + the rational creature to conform to reason; a rational creature + conforming to reason is to be commended, but not conforming thereto is + blameworthy. You would not dare to deny that these truths impose upon man + a duty in relation to all acts which are in conformity with strict + reason, such as these: one must esteem all that is estimable; render good + for good; do wrong to no man; honour one's father; render to every man + that which is his due, etc. Now since by the very nature of things, and + before the divine laws, the truths of morality impose upon man certain + duties, Thomas Aquinas and Grotius were justified in saying that if there + were no God we should nevertheless be obliged to conform to natural law. + Others have said that even supposing all rational beings in existence + were to perish, true propositions would remain true. Cajetan maintained + that if he remained alone in the universe, all other things without any + exception having been destroyed, the knowledge that he had of the nature + of a rose would nevertheless subsist.'</p> + + <p>184. The late Jacob Thomasius, a celebrated Professor at Leipzig, made + the apt observation in his elucidations of the philosophic rules of + Daniel Stahl, a Jena professor, that it is not advisable to go altogether + beyond God, and that one must not say, with some Scotists, that the + eternal verities would exist even though there were no understanding, not + even that of God. For it is, in my judgement, the divine understanding + which gives reality to the eternal verities, albeit God's will have no + part therein. All reality must be founded on something existent. It is + true that an atheist may be a geometrician: but if there were no God, + geometry would have no object. And without God, not only would there be + nothing existent, but there would be nothing possible. That, however, + does not hinder those who do not see the connexion of all things one with + another and with God from being able to understand certain sciences, + without knowing their first source, which is in God. Aristotle, although + he also scarcely knew that source, nevertheless said something of the + same kind which was very apposite. He acknowledged that the principles of + individual forms of knowledge depend on a superior knowledge which gives + the reason for them; and this superior knowledge must <!-- Page 244 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page244"></a>[244]</span> have being, + and consequently God, the source of being, for its object. Herr Dreier of + Königsberg has aptly observed that the true metaphysics which Aristotle + sought, and which he called <span lang="el" title="tên zêtoumenên" + >την + ζητουμενην</span>, + his <i>desideratum</i>, was theology.</p> + + <p>185. Yet the same M. Bayle, who says so much that is admirable in + order to prove that the rules of goodness and justice, and the eternal + verities in general, exist by their nature, and not by an arbitrary + choice of God, has spoken very hesitatingly about them in another passage + (Continuation of <i>Divers Thoughts on the Comet</i>, vol. II, ch. 114, + towards the end). After having given an account of the opinion of M. + Descartes and a section of his followers, who maintain that God is the + free cause of truths and of essences, he adds (p. 554): 'I have done all + that I could to gain true understanding of this dogma and to find the + solution of the difficulties surrounding it. I confess to you quite + simply that I still cannot properly fathom it. That does not discourage + me; I suppose, as other philosophers in other cases have supposed, that + time will unfold the meaning of this noble paradox. I wish that Father + Malebranche had thought fit to defend it, but he took other measures.' Is + it possible that the enjoyment of doubt can have such influence upon a + gifted man as to make him wish and hope for the power to believe that two + contradictories never exist together for the sole reason that God forbade + them to, and, moreover, that God could have issued them an order to + ensure that they always walked together? There is indeed a noble paradox! + Father Malebranche showed great wisdom in taking other measures.</p> + + <p>186. I cannot even imagine that M. Descartes can have been quite + seriously of this opinion, although he had adherents who found this easy + to believe, and would in all simplicity follow him where he only made + pretence to go. It was apparently one of his tricks, one of his + philosophic feints: he prepared for himself some loophole, as when for + instance he discovered a trick for denying the movement of the earth, + while he was a Copernican in the strictest sense. I suspect that he had + in mind here another extraordinary manner of speaking, of his own + invention, which was to say that affirmations and negations, and acts of + inner judgement in general, are operations of the will. Through this + artifice the eternal verities, which until the time of Descartes had been + named an object of the divine understanding, suddenly became an object of + God's will. Now the acts of his will are free, therefore God is the <!-- + Page 245 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page245"></a>[245]</span> free + cause of the verities. That is the outcome of the matter. <i>Spectatum + admissi.</i> A slight change in the meaning of terms has caused all this + commotion. But if the affirmations of necessary truths were actions of + the will of the most perfect mind, these actions would be anything but + free, for there is nothing to choose. It seems that M. Descartes did not + declare himself sufficiently on the nature of freedom, and that his + conception of it was somewhat unusual: for he extended it so far that he + even held the affirmations of necessary truths to be free in God. That + was preserving only the name of freedom.</p> + + <p>187. M. Bayle, who with others conceives this to be a freedom of + indifference, that God had had to establish (for instance) the truths of + numbers, and to ordain that three times three made nine, whereas he could + have commanded them to make ten, imagines in this strange opinion, + supposing it were possible to defend it, some kind of advantage gained + against the Stratonists. Strato was one of the leaders of the School of + Aristotle, and the successor of Theophrastus; he maintained (according to + Cicero's account) that this world had been formed such as it is by Nature + or by a necessary cause devoid of cognition. I admit that that might be + so, if God had so preformed matter as to cause such an effect by the laws + of motion alone. But without God there would not even have been any + reason for existence, and still less for any particular existence of + things: thus Strato's system is not to be feared.</p> + + <p>188. Nevertheless M. Bayle is in difficulties over this: he will not + admit plastic natures devoid of cognition, which Mr. Cudworth and others + had introduced, for fear that the modern Stratonists, that is, the + Spinozists, take advantage of it. This has involved him in disputes with + M. le Clerc. Under the influence of this error, that a non-intelligent + cause can produce nothing where contrivance appears, he is far from + conceding to me that <i>preformation</i> which produces naturally the + organs of animals, and <i>the system of a harmony pre-established by + God</i> in bodies, to make them respond in accordance with their own laws + to the thoughts and the wills of souls. But it ought to have been taken + into account that this non-intelligent cause, which produces such + beautiful things in the grains and seeds of plants and animals, and + effects the actions of bodies as the will ordains them, was formed by the + hand of God: and God is infinitely more skilful than a watchmaker, who + himself <!-- Page 246 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page246"></a>[246]</span> makes machines and automata that are + capable of producing as wonderful effects as if they possessed + intelligence.</p> + + <p>189. Now to come to M. Bayle's apprehensions concerning the + Stratonists, in case one should admit truths that are not dependent upon + the will of God: he seems to fear lest they may take advantage against us + of the perfect regularity of the eternal verities. Since this regularity + springs only from the nature and necessity of things, without being + directed by any cognition, M. Bayle fears that one might with Strato + thence infer that the world also could have become regular through a + blind necessity. But it is easy to answer that. In the region of the + eternal verities are found all the possibles, and consequently the + regular as well as the irregular: there must be a reason accounting for + the preference for order and regularity, and this reason can only be + found in understanding. Moreover these very truths can have no existence + without an understanding to take cognizance of them; for they would not + exist if there were no divine understanding wherein they are realized, so + to speak. Hence Strato does not attain his end, which is to exclude + cognition from that which enters into the origin of things.</p> + + <p>190. The difficulty that M. Bayle has imagined in connexion with + Strato seems a little too subtle and far-fetched. That is termed: + <i>timere, ubi non est timor</i>. He makes another difficulty, which has + just as slight a foundation, namely, that God would be subjected to a + kind of <i>fatum</i>. Here are his words (p. 555): 'If they are + propositions of eternal truth, which are such by their nature and not by + God's institution, if they are not true by a free decree of his will, but + if on the contrary he has recognized them as true of necessity, because + such was their nature, there is a kind of <i>fatum</i> to which he is + subjected; there is an absolutely insurmountable natural necessity. + Thence comes also the result that the divine understanding in the + infinity of its ideas has always and at the outset hit upon their perfect + conformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition; for + it would be a contradiction to say that any exemplary cause had served as + a plan for the acts of God's understanding. One would never that way find + eternal ideas or any first intelligence. One must say, then, that a + nature which exists of necessity always finds its way, without any need + for it to be shown. How then shall we overcome the obstinacy of a + Stratonist?'</p> + + <p>191. But again it is easy to answer. This so-called <i>fatum</i>, + which <!-- Page 247 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page247"></a>[247]</span> binds even the Divinity, is nothing but + God's own nature, his own understanding, which furnishes the rules for + his wisdom and his goodness; it is a happy necessity, without which he + would be neither good nor wise. Is it to be desired that God should not + be bound to be perfect and happy? Is our condition, which renders us + liable to fail, worth envying? And should we not be well pleased to + exchange it for sinlessness, if that depended upon us? One must be indeed + weary of life to desire the freedom to destroy oneself and to pity the + Divinity for not having that freedom. M. Bayle himself reasons thus + elsewhere against those who laud to the skies an extravagant freedom + which they assume in the will, when they would make the will independent + of reason.</p> + + <p>192. Moreover, M. Bayle wonders 'that the divine understanding in the + infinity of its ideas always and at the outset hits upon their perfect + conformity with their objects, without the guidance of any cognition'. + This objection is null and void. Every distinct idea is, through its + distinctness, in conformity with its object, and in God there are + distinct ideas only. At first, moreover, the object exists nowhere; but + when it comes into existence, it will be formed according to this idea. + Besides, M. Bayle knows very well that the divine understanding has no + need of time for seeing the connexion of things. All trains of reasoning + are in God in a transcendent form, and they preserve an order amongst + them in his understanding, as well as in ours: but with him it is only an + order and a <i>priority of nature</i>, whereas with us there is a + <i>priority of time</i>. It is therefore not to be wondered at that he + who penetrates all things at one stroke should always strike true at the + outset; and it must not be said that he succeeds without the guidance of + any cognition. On the contrary, it is because his knowledge is perfect + that his voluntary actions are also perfect.</p> + + <p>193. Up to now I have shown that the Will of God is not independent of + the rules of Wisdom, although indeed it is a matter for surprise that one + should have been constrained to argue about it, and to do battle for a + truth so great and so well established. But it is hardly less surprising + that there should be people who believe that God only half observes these + rules, and does not choose the best, although his wisdom causes him to + recognize it; and, in a word, that there should be writers who hold that + God could have done better. That is more or less the error of the famous + Alfonso, King of Castile, who was elected King of the Romans by certain + <!-- Page 248 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page248"></a>[248]</span> + Electors, and originated the astronomical tables that bear his name. This + prince is reported to have said that if God in making the world had + consulted him he would have given God good advice. Apparently the + Ptolemaic system, which prevailed at that time, was displeasing to him. + He believed therefore that something better planned could have been made, + and he was right. But if he had known the system of Copernicus, with the + discoveries of Kepler, now extended by knowledge of the gravity of the + planets, he would indeed have confessed that the contrivance of the true + system is marvellous. We see, therefore, that here the question concerned + the more or less only; Alfonso maintained that better could have been + done, and his opinion was censured by everyone.</p> + + <p>194. Yet philosophers and theologians dare to support dogmatically + such a belief; and I have many times wondered that gifted and pious + persons should have been capable of setting bounds to the goodness and + the perfection of God. For to assert that he knows what is best, that he + can do it and that he does it not, is to avow that it rested with his + will only to make the world better than it is; but that is what one calls + lacking goodness. It is acting against that axiom already quoted: + <i>Minus bonum habet rationem mali</i>. If some adduce experience to + prove that God could have done better, they set themselves up as + ridiculous critics of his works. To such will be given the answer given + to all those who criticize God's course of action, and who from this same + assumption, that is, the alleged defects of the world, would infer that + there is an evil God, or at least a God neutral between good and evil. + And if we hold the same opinion as King Alfonso, we shall, I say, receive + this answer: You have known the world only since the day before + yesterday, you see scarce farther than your nose, and you carp at the + world. Wait until you know more of the world and consider therein + especially the parts which present a complete whole (as do organic + bodies); and you will find there a contrivance and a beauty transcending + all imagination. Let us thence draw conclusions as to the wisdom and the + goodness of the author of things, even in things that we know not. We + find in the universe some things which are not pleasing to us; but let us + be aware that it is not made for us alone. It is nevertheless made for us + if we are wise: it will serve us if we use it for our service; we shall + be happy in it if we wish to be.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 249 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page249"></a>[249]</span></p> + + <p>195. Someone will say that it is impossible to produce the best, + because there is no perfect creature, and that it is always possible to + produce one which would be more perfect. I answer that what can be said + of a creature or of a particular substance, which can always be surpassed + by another, is not to be applied to the universe, which, since it must + extend through all future eternity, is an infinity. Moreover, there is an + infinite number of creatures in the smallest particle of matter, because + of the actual division of the <i>continuum</i> to infinity. And infinity, + that is to say, the accumulation of an infinite number of substances, is, + properly speaking, not a whole any more than the infinite number itself, + whereof one cannot say whether it is even or uneven. That is just what + serves to confute those who make of the world a God, or who think of God + as the Soul of the world; for the world or the universe cannot be + regarded as an animal or as a substance.</p> + + <p>196. It is therefore not a question of a creature, but of the + universe; and the adversary will be obliged to maintain that one possible + universe may be better than the other, to infinity; but there he would be + mistaken, and it is that which he cannot prove. If this opinion were + true, it would follow that God had not produced any universe at all: for + he is incapable of acting without reason, and that would be even acting + against reason. It is as if one were to suppose that God had decreed to + make a material sphere, with no reason for making it of any particular + size. This decree would be useless, it would carry with it that which + would prevent its effect. It would be quite another matter if God decreed + to draw from a given point one straight line to another given straight + line, without any determination of the angle, either in the decree or in + its circumstances. For in this case the determination would spring from + the nature of the thing, the line would be perpendicular, and the angle + would be right, since that is all that is determined and distinguishable. + It is thus one must think of the creation of the best of all possible + universes, all the more since God not only decrees to create a universe, + but decrees also to create the best of all. For God decrees nothing + without knowledge, and he makes no separate decrees, which would be + nothing but antecedent acts of will: and these we have sufficiently + explained, distinguishing them from genuine decrees.</p> + + <p>197. M. Diroys, whom I knew in Rome, theologian to Cardinal d'Estrées, + wrote a book entitled <i>Proofs and Assumptions in Favour of</i> <!-- + Page 250 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page250"></a>[250]</span> + <i>the Christian Religion</i>, published in Paris in the year 1683. M. + Bayle (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 165, + p. 1058) recounts this objection brought up by M. Diroys: 'There is one + more difficulty', he says, 'which it is no less important to meet than + those given earlier, since it causes more trouble to those who judge + goods and evils by considerations founded on the purest and most lofty + maxims. This is that God being the supreme wisdom and goodness, it seems + to them that he ought to do all things as wise and virtuous persons would + wish them to be done, following the rules of wisdom and of goodness which + God has imprinted in them, and as they would be obliged themselves to do + these things if they depended upon them. Thus, seeing that the affairs of + the world do not go so well as, in their opinion, they might go, and as + they would go if they interfered themselves, they conclude that God, who + is infinitely better and wiser than they, or rather wisdom and goodness + itself, does not concern himself with these affairs.'</p> + + <p>198. M. Diroys makes some apt remarks concerning this, which I will + not repeat, since I have sufficiently answered the objection in more than + one passage, and that has been the chief end of all my discourse. But he + makes one assertion with which I cannot agree. He claims that the + objection proves too much. One must again quote his own words with M. + Bayle, p. 1059: 'If it does not behove the supreme Wisdom and Goodness to + fail to do what is best and most perfect, it follows that all Beings are + eternally, immutably and essentially as perfect and as good as they can + be, since nothing can change except by passing either from a state less + good to a better, or from a better to a less good. Now that cannot happen + if it does not behove God to fail to do that which is best and most + perfect, when he can do it. It will therefore be necessary that all + beings be eternally and essentially filled with a knowledge and a virtue + as perfect as God can give them. Now all that which is eternally and + essentially as perfect as God can make it proceeds essentially from him; + in a word, is eternally and essentially good as he is, and consequently + it is God, as he is. That is the bearing of this maxim, that it is + repugnant to supreme justice and goodness not to make things as good and + perfect as they can be. For it is essential to essential wisdom and + goodness to banish all that is repugnant to it altogether. One must + therefore assert as a primary truth concerning the conduct of God in + relation to creatures that there is nothing repugnant to this goodness + and this wisdom in <!-- Page 251 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page251"></a>[251]</span> making things less perfect than they + could be, or in permitting the goods that it has produced either + completely to cease to be or to change and deteriorate. For it causes no + offence to God that there should be other Beings than he, that is beings + who can be not what they are, and do not what they do or do what they do + not.'</p> + + <p>199. M. Bayle calls this answer paltry, but I find his + counter-objection involved. M. Bayle will have those who are for the two + principles to take their stand chiefly on the assumption of the supreme + freedom of God: for if he were compelled to produce all that which he + can, he would produce also sins and sorrows. Thus the Dualists could from + the existence of evil conclude nothing contrary to the oneness of the + principle, if this principle were as much inclined to evil as to good. + There M. Bayle carries the notion of freedom too far: for even though God + be supremely free, it does not follow that he maintains an indifference + of equipoise: and even though he be inclined to act, it does not follow + that he is compelled by this inclination to produce all that which he + can. He will produce only that which he wills, for his inclination + prompts him to good. I admit the supreme freedom of God, but I do not + confuse it with indifference of equipoise, as if he could act without + reason. M. Diroys therefore imagines that the Dualists, in their + insistence that the single good principle produce no evil, ask too much; + for by the same reason, according to M. Diroys, they ought also to ask + that he should produce the greatest good, the less good being a kind of + evil. I hold that the Dualists are wrong in respect of the first point, + and that they would be right in respect of the second, where M. Diroys + blames them without cause; or rather that one can reconcile the evil, or + the less good, in some parts with the best in the whole. If the Dualists + demanded that God should do the best, they would not be demanding too + much. They are mistaken rather in claiming that the best in the whole + should be free from evil in the parts, and that therefore what God has + made is not the best.</p> + + <p>200. But M. Diroys maintains that if God always produces the best he + will produce other Gods; otherwise each substance that he produced would + not be the best nor the most perfect. But he is mistaken, through not + taking into account the order and connexion of things. If each substance + taken separately were perfect, all would be alike; which is neither + fitting nor possible. If they <!-- Page 252 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page252"></a>[252]</span> were Gods, it would not have been + possible to produce them. The best system of things will therefore not + contain Gods; it will always be a system of bodies (that is, things + arranged according to time and place) and of souls which represent and + are aware of bodies, and in accordance with which bodies are in great + measure directed. So, as the design of a building may be the best of all + in respect of its purpose, of expense and of circumstances; and as an + arrangement of some figured representations of bodies which is given to + you may be the best that one can find, it is easy to imagine likewise + that a structure of the universe may be the best of all, without becoming + a god. The connexion and order of things brings it about that the body of + every animal and of every plant is composed of other animals and of other + plants, or of other living and organic beings; consequently there is + subordination, and one body, one substance serves the other: thus their + perfection cannot be equal.</p> + + <p>201. M. Bayle thinks (p. 1063) that M. Diroys has confused two + different propositions. According to the one, God must do all things as + wise and virtuous persons would wish that they should be done, by the + rules of wisdom and of goodness that God has imprinted in them, and as + they would be obliged themselves to do them if those things depended upon + them. The other is that it is not consistent with supreme wisdom and + goodness to fail to do what is best and most perfect. M. Diroys (in M. + Bayle's opinion) sets up the first proposition as an objection for + himself, and replies to the second. But therein he is justified, as it + seems to me. For these two propositions are connected, the second is a + result of the first: to do less good than one could is to be lacking in + wisdom or in goodness. To be the best, and to be desired by those who are + most virtuous and wise, comes to the same thing. And it may be said that, + if we could understand the structure and the economy of the universe, we + should find that it is made and directed as the wisest and most virtuous + could wish it, since God cannot fail to do thus. This necessity + nevertheless is only of a moral nature: and I admit that if God were + forced by a metaphysical necessity to produce that which he makes, he + would produce all the possibles, or nothing; and in this sense M. Bayle's + conclusion would be fully correct. But as all the possibles are not + compatible together in one and the same world-sequence, for that very + reason all the possibles cannot be produced, and it must be said that God + is not <!-- Page 253 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page253"></a>[253]</span> forced, metaphysically speaking, into the + creation of this world. One may say that as soon as God has decreed to + create something there is a struggle between all the possibles, all of + them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united, + produce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day. + It is true that all this struggle can only be ideal, that is to say, it + can only be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding, + which cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to + choose the best. Yet God is bound by a moral necessity, to make things in + such a manner that there can be nothing better: otherwise not only would + others have cause to criticize what he makes, but, more than that, he + would not himself be satisfied with his work, he would blame himself for + its imperfection; and that conflicts with the supreme felicity of the + divine nature. This perpetual sense of his own fault or imperfection + would be to him an inevitable source of grief, as M. Bayle says on + another occasion (p.953).</p> + + <p>202. M. Diroys' argument contains a false assumption, in his statement + that nothing can change except by passing from a state less good to a + better or from a better to a less good; and that thus, if God makes the + best, what he has produced cannot be changed: it would be an eternal + substance, a god. But I do not see why a thing cannot change its kind in + relation to good or evil, without changing its degree. In the transition + from enjoyment of music to enjoyment of painting, or <i>vice versa</i> + from the pleasure of the eyes to that of the ears, the degree of + enjoyment may remain the same, the latter gaining no advantage over the + former save that of novelty. If the quadrature of the circle should come + to pass or (what is the same thing) the circulature of the square, that + is, if the circle were changed into a square of the same size, or the + square into a circle, it would be difficult to say, on the whole, without + having regard to some special use, whether one would have gained or lost. + Thus the best may be changed into another which neither yields to it nor + surpasses it: but there will always be an order among them, and that the + best order possible. Taking the whole sequence of things, the best has no + equal; but one part of the sequence may be equalled by another part of + the same sequence. Besides it might be said that the whole sequence of + things to infinity may be the best possible, although what exists all + through the universe in each portion of time be not the best. It <!-- + Page 254 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page254"></a>[254]</span> + might be therefore that the universe became even better and better, if + the nature of things were such that it was not permitted to attain to the + best all at once. But these are problems of which it is hard for us to + judge.</p> + + <p>203. M. Bayle says (p. 1064) that the question whether God could have + made things more perfect than he made them is also very difficult, and + that the reasons for and against are very strong. But it is, so it seems + to me, as if one were to question whether God's actions are consistent + with the most perfect wisdom and the greatest goodness. It is a very + strange thing, that by changing the terms a little one throws doubt upon + what is, if properly understood, as clear as anything can be. The reasons + to the contrary have no force, being founded only on the semblance of + defects; and M. Bayle's objection, which tends to prove that the law of + the best would impose upon God a true metaphysical necessity, is only an + illusion that springs from the misuse of terms. M. Bayle formerly held a + different opinion, when he commended that of Father Malebranche, which + was akin to mine on this subject. But M. Arnauld having written in + opposition to Father Malebranche, M. Bayle altered his opinion; and I + suppose that his tendency towards doubt, which increased in him with the + years, was conducive to that result. M. Arnauld was doubtless a great + man, and his authority has great weight: he made sundry good observations + in his writings against Father Malebranche, but he was not justified in + contesting those of his statements that were akin to mine on the rule of + the best.</p> + + <p>204. The excellent author of <i>The Search for Truth</i>, having + passed from philosophy to theology, published finally an admirable + treatise on Nature and Grace. Here he showed in his way (as M. Bayle + explained in his <i>Divers Thoughts on the Comet</i>, ch. 234) that the + events which spring from the enforcement of general laws are not the + object of a particular will of God. It is true that when one wills a + thing one wills also in a sense everything that is necessarily attached + to it, and in consequence God cannot will general laws without also + willing in a sense all the particular effects that must of necessity be + derived from them. But it is always true that these particular events are + not willed for their own sake, and that is what is meant by the + expression that they are not willed by a <i>particular</i> and direct + <i>will</i>. There is no doubt that when God resolved to act outside + himself, he made choice of a manner of action which <!-- Page 255 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page255"></a>[255]</span> should be + worthy of the supremely perfect Being, that is, which should be + infinitely simple and uniform, but yet of an infinite productivity. One + may even suppose that this manner of action by <i>general acts of + will</i> appeared to him preferable—although there must thence + result some superfluous events (and even bad if they are taken + separately, that is my own addition)—to another manner more + composed and more regular; such is Father Malebranche's opinion. Nothing + is more appropriate than this assumption (according to the opinion of M. + Bayle, when he wrote his <i>Divers Thoughts on the Comet</i>) to solve a + thousand difficulties which are brought up against divine providence: 'To + ask God', he says, 'why he has made things which serve to render men more + wicked, that would be to ask why God has carried out his plan (which can + only be of infinite beauty) by the simplest and most uniform methods, and + why, by a complexity of decrees that would unceasingly cut across one + another, he has not prevented the wrong use of man's free will.' He adds + 'that miracles being particular acts of will must have an end worthy of + God'.</p> + + <p>205. On these foundations he makes some good reflexions (ch. 231) + concerning the injustice of those who complain of the prosperity of the + wicked. 'I shall have no scruples', he says, 'about saying that all those + who are surprised at the prosperity of the wicked have pondered very + little upon the nature of God, and that they have reduced the obligations + of a cause which directs all things, to the scope of a providence + altogether subordinate; and that is small-minded. What then! Should God, + after having made free causes and necessary causes, in a mixture + infinitely well fitted to show forth the wonders of his infinite wisdom, + have established laws consistent with the nature of free causes, but so + lacking in firmness that the slightest trouble that came upon a man would + overthrow them entirely, to the ruin of human freedom? A mere city + governor will become an object of ridicule if he changes his regulations + and orders as often as someone is pleased to murmur against him. And + shall God, whose laws concern a good so universal that all of the world + that is visible to us perchance enters into it as no more than a trifling + accessary, be bound to depart from his laws, because they to-day + displease the one and to-morrow the other? Or again because a + superstitious person, deeming wrongly that a monstrosity presages + something deadly, proceeds from his error to a criminal sacrifice? Or + because a good <!-- Page 256 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page256"></a>[256]</span> soul, who yet does not value virtue + highly enough to believe that to have none is punishment enough in + itself, is shocked that a wicked man should become rich and enjoy + vigorous health? Can one form any falser notions of a universal + providence? Everyone agrees that this law of nature, the strong prevails + over the weak, has been very wisely laid down, and that it would be + absurd to maintain that when a stone falls on a fragile vase which is the + delight of its owner, God should depart from this law in order to spare + that owner vexation. Should one then not confess that it is just as + absurd to maintain that God must depart from the same law to prevent a + wicked man from growing rich at the expense of a good man? The more the + wicked man sets himself above the promptings of conscience and of honour, + the more does he exceed the good man in strength, so that if he comes to + grips with the good man he must, according to the course of nature, ruin + him. If, moreover, they are both engaged in the business of finance, the + wicked man must, according to the same course of nature, grow richer than + the good man, just as a fierce fire consumes more wood than a fire of + straw. Those who would wish sickness for a wicked man are sometimes as + unfair as those who would wish that a stone falling on a glass should not + break it: for his organs being arranged as they are, neither the food + that he takes nor the air that he breathes can, according to natural + laws, be detrimental to his health. Therefore those who complain about + his health complain of God's failure to violate the laws which he has + established. And in this they are all the more unfair because, through + combinations and concatenations which were in the power of God alone, it + happens often enough that the course of nature brings about the + punishment of sin.'</p> + + <p>206. It is a thousand pities that M. Bayle so soon quitted the way he + had so auspiciously begun, of reasoning on behalf of providence: for his + work would have been fruitful, and in saying fine things he would have + said good things as well. I agree with Father Malebranche that God does + things in the way most worthy of him. But I go a little further than he, + with regard to 'general and particular acts of will'. As God can do + nothing without reasons, even when he acts miraculously, it follows that + he has no will about individual events but what results from some general + truth or will. Thus I would say that God never has a <i>particular + will</i> such as this Father implies, that is to say, <i>a particular + primitive will</i>.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 257 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page257"></a>[257]</span></p> + + <p>207. I think even that miracles have nothing to distinguish them from + other events in this regard: for reasons of an order superior to that of + Nature prompt God to perform them. Thus I would not say, with this + Father, that God departs from general laws whenever order requires it: he + departs from one law only for another law more applicable, and what order + requires cannot fail to be in conformity with the rule of order, which is + one of the general laws. The distinguishing mark of miracles (taken in + the strictest sense) is that they cannot be accounted for by the natures + of created things. That is why, should God make a general law causing + bodies to be attracted the one to the other, he could only achieve its + operation by perpetual miracles. And likewise, if God willed that the + organs of human bodies should conform to the will of the soul, according + to the <i>system of occasional causes</i>, this law also would come into + operation only through perpetual miracles.</p> + + <p>208. Thus one must suppose that, among the general rules which are not + absolutely necessary, God chooses those which are the most natural, which + it is easiest to explain, and which also are of greatest service for the + explanation of other things. That is doubtless the conclusion most + excellent and most pleasing; and even though the System of + Pre-established Harmony were not necessary otherwise, because it banishes + superfluous miracles, God would have chosen it as being the most + harmonious. The ways of God are those most simple and uniform: for he + chooses rules that least restrict one another. They are also the most + <i>productive</i> in proportion to the <i>simplicity of ways and + means</i>. It is as if one said that a certain house was the best that + could have been constructed at a certain cost. One may, indeed, reduce + these two conditions, simplicity and productivity, to a single advantage, + which is to produce as much perfection as is possible: thus Father + Malebranche's system in this point amounts to the same as mine. Even if + the effect were assumed to be greater, but the process less simple, I + think one might say that, when all is said and done, the effect itself + would be less great, taking into account not only the final effect but + also the mediate effect. For the wisest mind so acts, as far as it is + possible, that the <i>means</i> are also in a sense <i>ends</i>, that is, + they are desirable not only on account of what they do, but on account of + what they are. The more intricate processes take up too much ground, too + much space, too much place, too much time that might have been better + employed.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 258 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page258"></a>[258]</span></p> + + <p>209. Now since everything resolves itself into this greatest + perfection, we return to my law of the best. For perfection includes not + only the <i>moral good</i> and the <i>physical good</i> of intelligent + creatures, but also the good which is purely <i>metaphysical</i>, and + concerns also creatures devoid of reason. It follows that the evil that + is in rational creatures happens only by concomitance, not by antecedent + will but by a consequent will, as being involved in the best possible + plan; and the metaphysical good which includes everything makes it + necessary sometimes to admit physical evil and moral evil, as I have + already explained more than once. It so happens that the ancient Stoics + were not far removed from this system. M. Bayle remarked upon this + himself in his <i>Dictionary</i> in the article on 'Chrysippus', rem. T. + It is of importance to give his own words, in order sometimes to face him + with his own objections and to bring him back to the fine sentiments that + he had formerly pronounced: 'Chrysippus', he says (p. 930), 'in his work + on Providence examined amongst other questions this one: Did the nature + of things, or the providence that made the world and the human kind, make + also the diseases to which men are subject? He answers that the chief + design of Nature was not to make them sickly, that would not be in + keeping with the cause of all good; but Nature, in preparing and + producing many great things excellently ordered and of great usefulness, + found that some drawbacks came as a result, and thus these were not in + conformity with the original design and purpose; they came about as a + sequel to the work, they existed only as consequences. For the formation + of the human body, Chrysippus said, the finest idea as well as the very + utility of the work demanded that the head should be composed of a tissue + of thin, fine bones; but because of that it was bound to have the + disadvantage of not being able to resist blows. Nature made health, and + at the same time it was necessary by a kind of concomitance that the + source of diseases should be opened up. The same thing applies with + regard to virtue; the direct action of Nature, which brought it forth, + produced by a counter stroke the brood of vices. I have not translated + literally, for which reason I give here the actual Latin of Aulus + Gellius, for the benefit of those who understand that language (Aul. + Gellius, lib. 6, cap. 1): "Idem Chrysippus in eod. lib. (quarto, <span + lang="el" title="peri pronoias" >περι + προνοιας</span>) tractat + consideratque, dignumque esse id quaeri putat, <span lang="el" title="ei hai tôn anthrôpôn nosoi kata physin gignontai" + >ει ‛αι των + ανθρωπων + νοσοι κατα + φυσιν + γιγνονται</span>. + Id est, naturane ipsa rerum, vel <!-- Page 259 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page259"></a>[259]</span> providentia quae + compagem hanc mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates + et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat + autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines + morbis obnoxios. Nunquam enim hoc convenisse naturae auctori parentique + rerum omnium bonarum. Sed quum multa, inquit, atque magna gigneret, + pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul agnata sunt + incommoda iis ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia: eaque non per naturam, + sed per sequelas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat + <span lang="el" title="kata parakolouthêsin" + >κατα + παρακολουθησιν</span>. + Sicut, inquit, quum corpora hominum natura fingeret, ratio subtilior et + utilitas ipsa operis postulavit ut tenuissimis minutisque ossiculis caput + compingeret. Sed hanc utilitatem rei majoris alia quaedam incommoditas + extrinsecus consecuta est, ut fieret caput tenuiter munitum et ictibus + offensionibusque parvis fragile. Proinde morbi quoque et aegritudines + partae sunt, dum salus paritur. Sic Hercle, inquit, dum virtus hominibus + per consilium naturae gignitur, vitia ibidem per affinitatem contrariam + nata sunt." I do not think that a pagan could have said anything more + reasonable, considering his ignorance of the first man's fall, the + knowledge of which has only reached us through revelation, and which + indeed is the true cause of our miseries. If we had sundry like extracts + from the works of Chrysippus, or rather if we had his works, we should + have a more favourable idea than we have of the beauty of his + genius.'</p> + + <p>210. Let us now see the reverse of the medal in the altered M. Bayle. + After having quoted in his <i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i> + (vol. III, ch. 155, p. 962) these words of M. Jacquelot, which are much + to my liking: 'To change the order of the universe is something of + infinitely greater consequence than the prosperity of a good man,' he + adds: 'This thought has something dazzling about it: Father Malebranche + has placed it in the best possible light; and he has persuaded some of + his readers that a system which is simple and very productive is more + consistent with God's wisdom than a system more composite and less + productive in proportion, but more capable of averting irregularities. M. + Bayle was one of those who believed that Father Malebranche in that way + gave a wonderful solution.' (It is M. Bayle himself speaking.) 'But it is + almost impossible to be satisfied with it after having read M. Arnauld's + books against this system, and after having contemplated the vast and + boundless idea of the supremely <!-- Page 260 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page260"></a>[260]</span> perfect Being. This idea shows us that + nothing is easier for God than to follow a plan which is simple, + productive, regular and opportune for all creatures simultaneously.'</p> + + <p>211. While I was in France I showed to M. Arnauld a dialogue I had + composed in Latin on the cause of evil and the justice of God; it was not + only before his disputes with Father Malebranche, but even before the + book on <i>The Search for Truth</i> appeared. That principle which I + uphold here, namely that sin had been permitted because it had been + involved in the best plan for the universe, was already applied there; + and M. Arnauld did not seem to be startled by it. But the slight + contentions which he has since had with Father Malebranche have given him + cause to examine this subject with closer attention, and to be more + severe in his judgement thereof. Yet I am not altogether pleased with M. + Bayle's manner of expression here on this subject, and I am not of the + opinion 'that a more composite and less productive plan might be more + capable of averting irregularities'. Rules are the expression of general + will: the more one observes rules, the more regularity there is; + simplicity and productivity are the aim of rules. I shall be met with the + objection that a uniform system will be free from irregularities. I + answer that it would be an irregularity to be too uniform, that would + offend against the rules of harmony. <i>Et citharoedus Ridetur chorda qui + semper oberrat eadem</i>. I believe therefore that God can follow a + simple, productive, regular plan; but I do not believe that the best and + the most regular is always opportune for all creatures simultaneously; + and I judge <i>a posteriori</i>, for the plan chosen by God is not so. I + have, however, also shown this <i>a priori</i> in examples taken from + mathematics, and I will presently give another here. An Origenist who + maintains that all rational creatures become happy in the end will be + still easier to satisfy. He will say, in imitation of St. Paul's saying + about the sufferings of this life, that those which are finite are not + worthy to be compared with eternal bliss.</p> + + <p>212. What is deceptive in this subject, as I have already observed, is + that one feels an inclination to believe that what is the best in the + whole is also the best possible in each part. One reasons thus in + geometry, when it is a question <i>de maximis et minimis</i>. If the road + from A to B that one proposes to take is the shortest possible, and if + this road passes by C, then the road from A to C, part of the first, must + also be the shortest possible. But the inference from <!-- Page 261 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page261"></a>[261]</span> + <i>quantity</i> to <i>quality</i> is not always right, any more than that + which is drawn from equals to similars. For <i>equals</i> are those whose + quantity is the same, and <i>similars</i> are those not differing + according to qualities. The late Herr Sturm, a famous mathematician in + Altorf, while in Holland in his youth published there a small book under + the title of <i>Euclides Catholicus</i>. Here he endeavoured to give + exact and general rules in subjects not mathematical, being encouraged in + the task by the late Herr Erhard Weigel, who had been his tutor. In this + book he transfers to similars what Euclid had said of equals, and he + formulates this axiom: <i>Si similibus addas similia, tota sunt + similia</i>. But so many limitations were necessary to justify this new + rule, that it would have been better, in my opinion, to enounce it at the + outset with a reservation, by saying, <i>Si similibus similia addas + similiter, tota sunt similia</i>. Moreover, geometricians often require + <i>non tantum similia, sed et similiter posita</i>.</p> + + <p>213. This difference between quantity and quality appears also in our + case. The part of the shortest way between two extreme points is also the + shortest way between the extreme points of this part; but the part of the + best Whole is not of necessity the best that one could have made of this + part. For the part of a beautiful thing is not always beautiful, since it + can be extracted from the whole, or marked out within the whole, in an + irregular manner. If goodness and beauty always lay in something absolute + and uniform, such as extension, matter, gold, water, and other bodies + assumed to be homogeneous or similar, one must say that the part of the + good and the beautiful would be beautiful and good like the whole, since + it would always have resemblance to the whole: but this is not the case + in things that have mutual relations. An example taken from geometry will + be appropriate to explain my idea.</p> + + <p>214. There is a kind of geometry which Herr Jung of Hamburg, one of + the most admirable men of his time, called 'empiric'. It makes use of + conclusive experiments and proves various propositions of Euclid, but + especially those which concern the equality of two figures, by cutting + the one in pieces, and putting the pieces together again to make the + other. In this manner, by cutting carefully in parts the squares on the + two sides of the right-angled triangle, and arranging these parts + carefully, one makes from them the square on the hypotenuse; that is + demonstrating empirically the 47th proposition of the first book of + Euclid. Now supposing that some of these pieces taken from the two + smaller <!-- Page 262 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page262"></a>[262]</span> squares are lost, something will be + lacking in the large square that is to be formed from them; and this + defective combination, far from pleasing, will be disagreeably ugly. If + then the pieces that remained, composing the faulty combination, were + taken separately without any regard to the large square to whose + formation they ought to contribute, one would group them together quite + differently to make a tolerably good combination. But as soon as the lost + pieces are retrieved and the gap in the faulty combination is filled, + there will ensue a beautiful and regular thing, the complete large + square: this perfect combination will be far more beautiful than the + tolerably good combination which had been made from the pieces one had + not mislaid alone. The perfect combination corresponds to the universe in + its entirety, and the faulty combination that is a part of the perfect + one corresponds to some part of the universe, where we find defects which + the Author of things has allowed, because otherwise, if he had wished to + re-shape this faulty part and make thereof a tolerably good combination, + the whole would not then have been so beautiful. For the parts of the + faulty combination, grouped better to make a tolerably good combination, + could not have been used properly to form the whole and perfect + combination. Thomas Aquinas had an inkling of these things when he said: + <i>ad prudentem gubernatorem pertinet, negligere aliquem defectum + bonitatis in parte, ut faciat augmentum bonitatis in toto</i> (Thom., + <i>Contra Gentiles</i>, lib. 2, c. 71). Thomas Gatacre, in his Notes on + the book of Marcus Aurelius (lib. 5, cap. 8, with M. Bayle), cites also + passages from authors who say that the evil of the parts is often the + good of the whole.</p> + + <p>215. Let us return to M. Bayle's illustrations. He imagines a prince + (p. 963) who is having a city built, and who, in bad taste, aims rather + at airs of magnificence therein, and a bold and unusual style of + architecture, than at the provision of conveniences of all kinds for the + inhabitants. But if this prince has true magnanimity he will prefer the + convenient to the magnificent architecture. That is M. Bayle's judgement. + I consider, however, that there are cases where one will justifiably + prefer beauty of construction in a palace to the convenience of a few + domestics. But I admit that the construction would be bad, however + beautiful it might be, if it were a cause of diseases to the inhabitants; + provided it was possible to make one that would be better, taking into + account beauty, convenience and health all together. It may be, indeed, + that one cannot <!-- Page 263 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page263"></a>[263]</span> have all these advantages at once. Thus, + supposing one wished to build on the northern and more bracing side of + the mountain, if the castle were then bound to be of an unendurable + construction, one would prefer to make it face southward.</p> + + <p>216. M. Bayle raises the further objection, that it is true that our + legislators can never invent regulations such as are convenient for all + individuals, 'Nulla lex satis commoda omnibus est; id modo quaeritur, si + majori parti et in summam prodest. (Cato apud Livium, L. 34, circa + init.)' But the reason is that the limited condition of their knowledge + compels them to cling to laws which, when all is taken into account, are + more advantageous than harmful. Nothing of all that can apply to God, who + is as infinite in power and understanding as in goodness and true + greatness. I answer that since God chooses the best possible, one cannot + tax him with any limitation of his perfections; and in the universe not + only does the good exceed the evil, but also the evil serves to augment + the good.</p> + + <p>217. He observes also that the Stoics derived a blasphemy from this + principle, saying that evils must be endured with patience, or that they + were necessary, not only to the well-being and completeness of the + universe, but also to the felicity, perfection and conservation of God, + who directs it. The Emperor Marcus Aurelius gave expression to that in + the eighth chapter of the fifth book of his <i>Meditations</i>. 'Duplici + ratione', he says, 'diligas oportet, quidquid evenerit tibi; altera quod + tibi natum et tibi coordinatum et ad te quodammodo affectum est; altera + quod universi gubernatori prosperitatis et consummationis atque adeo + permansionis ipsius procurandae (<span lang="el" title="tês euodias kai tês synteleias kai tês symmonês autês" + >της ευοδιας + και της + συντελειας + και της + συμμονης + αυτης</span>) ex parte causa est.' This + precept is not the most reasonable of those stated by that great emperor. + A <i>diligas oportet</i> (<span lang="el" title="stergein chrê" + >στεργειν + χρη</span>) is of no avail; a thing does not become + pleasing just because it is necessary, and because it is destined for or + attached to someone: and what for me would be an evil would not cease to + be such because it would be my master's good, unless this good reflected + back on me. One good thing among others in the universe is that the + general good becomes in reality the individual good of those who love the + Author of all good. But the principal error of this emperor and of the + Stoics was their assumption that the good of the universe must please God + himself, because they imagined God as the soul of the world. This error + has nothing in <!-- Page 264 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page264"></a>[264]</span> common with my dogma, according to which + God is <i>Intelligentia extramundana</i>, as Martianus Capella calls him, + or rather <i>supramundana</i>. Further, he acts to do good, and not to + receive it. <i>Melius est dare quam accipere</i>; his bliss is ever + perfect and can receive no increase, either from within or from + without.</p> + + <p>218. I come now to the principal objection M. Bayle, after M. Arnauld, + brings up against me. It is complicated: they maintain that God would be + under compulsion, that he would act of necessity, if he were bound to + create the best; or at least that he would have been lacking in power if + he could not have found a better expedient for excluding sins and other + evils. That is in effect denying that this universe is the best, and that + God is bound to insist upon the best. I have met this objection + adequately in more than one passage: I have proved that God cannot fail + to produce the best; and from that assumption it follows that the evils + we experience could not have been reasonably excluded from the universe, + since they are there. Let us see, however, what these two excellent men + bring up, or rather let us see what M. Bayle's objection is, for he + professes to have profited by the arguments of M. Arnauld.</p> + + <p>219. 'Would it be possible', he says, <i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 158, p. 890, 'that a nature whose goodness, + holiness, wisdom, knowledge and power are infinite, who loves virtue + supremely, and hates vice supremely, as our clear and distinct idea of + him shows us, and as well-nigh every page of Scripture assures us, could + have found in virtue no means fitting and suited for his ends? Would it + be possible that vice alone had offered him this means? One would have + thought on the contrary that nothing beseemed this nature more than to + establish virtue in his work to the exclusion of all vice.' M. Bayle here + exaggerates things. I agree that some vice was connected with the best + plan of the universe, but I do not agree with him that God could not find + in virtue any means suited for his ends. This objection would have been + valid if there were no virtue, if vice took its place everywhere. He will + say it suffices that vice prevails and that virtue is trifling in + comparison. But I am far from agreeing with him there, and I think that + in reality, properly speaking, there is incomparably more moral good than + moral evil in rational creatures; and of these we have knowledge of but + few.</p> + + <p>220. This evil is not even so great in men as it is declared to be. + <!-- Page 265 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page265"></a>[265]</span> + It is only people of a malicious disposition or those who have become + somewhat misanthropic through misfortunes, like Lucian's Timon, who find + wickedness everywhere, and who poison the best actions by the + interpretations they give to them. I speak of those who do it in all + seriousness, to draw thence evil conclusions, by which their conduct is + tainted; for there are some who only do it to show off their own acumen. + People have found that fault in Tacitus, and that again is the criticism + M. Descartes (in one of his letters) makes of Mr. Hobbes's book <i>De + Cive</i>, of which only a few copies had at that time been printed for + distribution among friends, but to which some notes by the author were + added in the second edition which we have. For although M. Descartes + acknowledges that this book is by a man of talent, he observes therein + some very dangerous principles and maxims, in the assumption there made + that all men are wicked, or the provision of them with motives for being + so. The late Herr Jacob Thomasius said in his admirable <i>Tables of + Practical Philosophy</i> that the <span lang="el" title="prôton pseudos" + >πρωτον + ψευδος</span>, the primary cause of + errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was that he took <i>statum legalem pro + naturali</i>, that is to say that the corrupt state served him as a gauge + and rule, whereas it is the state most befitting human nature which + Aristotle had had in view. For according to Aristotle, that is termed + <i>natural</i> which conforms most closely to the perfection of the + nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term <i>natural state</i> + to that which has least art, perhaps not taking into account that human + nature in its perfection carries art with it. But the question of name, + that is to say, of what may be called natural, would not be of great + importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened upon it the + notion of natural right, each one following his own signification. I have + said here already that I found in the book on the Falsity of human + Virtues the same defect as M. Descartes found in Mr. Hobbes's <i>De + Cive</i>.</p> + + <p>221. But even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind, + as it is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect, it + by no means follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in + the universe: one should rather believe the opposite, because the City of + God must be the most perfect of all possible states, since it was formed + and is perpetually governed by the greatest and best of all Monarchs. + This answer confirms the observation I made earlier, when speaking of the + conformity of faith with reason, namely, that one of the greatest <!-- + Page 266 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page266"></a>[266]</span> + sources of fallacy in the objections is the confusion of the apparent + with the real. And here by the apparent I mean not simply such as would + result from an exact discussion of facts, but that which has been derived + from the small extent of our experiences. It would be senseless to try to + bring up appearances so imperfect, and having such slight foundation, in + opposition to the proofs of reason and the revelations of faith.</p> + + <p>222. Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred + of vice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence + and to prevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, + such as is the will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save + them from misery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of + all the antecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the + consequent will, or the decree to create the best. Through this decree it + is that love for virtue and for the happiness of rational creatures, + which is undefined in itself and goes as far as is possible, receives + some slight limitations, on account of the heed that must be paid to good + in general. Thus one must understand that God loves virtue supremely and + hates vice supremely, and that nevertheless some vice is to be + permitted.</p> + + <p>223. M. Arnauld and M. Bayle appear to maintain that this method of + explaining things and of establishing a best among all the plans for the + universe, one such as may not be surpassed by any other, sets a limit to + God's power. 'Have you considered', says M. Arnauld to Father Malebranche + (in his <i>Reflexions on the New System of Nature and Grace</i>, vol. II, + p. 385), 'that in making such assumptions you take it upon yourself to + subvert the first article of the creed, whereby we make profession of + believing in God the Father Almighty?' He had said already (p. 362): 'Can + one maintain, without trying to blind oneself, that a course of action + which could not fail to have this grievous result, namely, that the + majority of men perish, bears the stamp of God's goodness more than a + different course of action, which would have caused, if God had followed + it, the salvation of all men?' And, as M. Jacquelot does not differ from + the principles I have just laid down, M. Bayle raises like objections in + his case (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. + 151, p. 900): 'If one adopts such explanations', he says, 'one sees + oneself constrained to renounce the most obvious notions on the nature of + the supremely perfect Being. These teach us that all things not implying + contradiction <!-- Page 267 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page267"></a>[267]</span> are possible for him, that consequently + it is possible for him to save people whom he does not save: for what + contradiction would result supposing the number of the elect were greater + than it is? They teach us besides that, since he is supremely happy, he + has no will which he cannot carry out. How, then, shall we understand + that he wills to save all men and that he cannot do so? We sought some + light to help us out of the perplexities we feel in comparing the idea of + God with the state of the human kind, and lo! we are given elucidations + that cast us into darkness more dense.'</p> + + <p>224. All these obstacles vanish before the exposition I have just + given. I agree with M. Bayle's principle, and it is also mine, that + everything implying no contradiction is possible. But as for me, holding + as I do that God did the best that was possible, or that he could not + have done better than he has done, deeming also that to pass any other + judgement upon his work in its entirety would be to wrong his goodness or + his wisdom, I must say that to make something which surpasses in goodness + the best itself, that indeed would imply contradiction. That would be as + if someone maintained that God could draw from one point to another a + line shorter than the straight line, and accused those who deny this of + subverting the article of faith whereby we believe in God the Father + Almighty.</p> + + <p>225. The infinity of possibles, however great it may be, is no greater + than that of the wisdom of God, who knows all possibles. One may even say + that if this wisdom does not exceed the possibles extensively, since the + objects of the understanding cannot go beyond the possible, which in a + sense is alone intelligible, it exceeds them intensively, by reason of + the infinitely infinite combinations it makes thereof, and its many + deliberations concerning them. The wisdom of God, not content with + embracing all the possibles, penetrates them, compares them, weighs them + one against the other, to estimate their degrees of perfection or + imperfection, the strong and the weak, the good and the evil. It goes + even beyond the finite combinations, it makes of them an infinity of + infinites, that is to say, an infinity of possible sequences of the + universe, each of which contains an infinity of creatures. By this means + the divine Wisdom distributes all the possibles it had already + contemplated separately, into so many universal systems which it further + compares the one with the other. The result of all these comparisons and + deliberations is the choice of the best from <!-- Page 268 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page268"></a>[268]</span> among all these + possible systems, which wisdom makes in order to satisfy goodness + completely; and such is precisely the plan of the universe as it is. + Moreover, all these operations of the divine understanding, although they + have among them an order and a priority of nature, always take place + together, no priority of time existing among them.</p> + + <p>226. The careful consideration of these things will, I hope, induce a + different idea of the greatness of the divine perfections, and especially + of the wisdom and goodness of God, from any that can exist in the minds + of those who make God act at random, without cause or reason. And I do + not see how they could avoid falling into an opinion so strange, unless + they acknowledged that there are reasons for God's choice, and that these + reasons are derived from his goodness: whence it follows of necessity + that what was chosen had the advantage of goodness over what was not + chosen, and consequently that it is the best of all the possibles. The + best cannot be surpassed in goodness, and it is no restriction of the + power of God to say that he cannot do the impossible. Is it possible, + said M. Bayle, that there is no better plan than that one which God + carried out? One answers that it is very possible and indeed necessary, + namely that there is none: otherwise God would have preferred it.</p> + + <p>227. It seems to me that I have proved sufficiently that among all the + possible plans of the universe there is one better than all the rest, and + that God has not failed to choose it. But M. Bayle claims to infer thence + that God is therefore not free. This is how he speaks on that question + (<i>ubi supra</i>, ch. 151, p. 899): 'I thought to argue with a man who + assumed as I do that the goodness and the power of God are infinite, as + well as his wisdom; and now I see that in reality this man assumes that + God's goodness and power are enclosed within rather narrow bounds.' As to + that, the objection has already been met: I set no bounds to God's power, + since I recognize that it extends <i>ad maximum, ad omnia</i>, to all + that implies no contradiction; and I set none to his goodness, since it + attains to the best, <i>ad optimum</i>. But M. Bayle goes on: 'There is + therefore no freedom in God; he is compelled by his wisdom to create, and + then to create precisely such a work, and finally to create it precisely + in such ways. These are three servitudes which form a more than Stoic + <i>fatum</i>, and which render impossible all that is not within their + sphere. It seems that, according to this system, God could <!-- Page 269 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page269"></a>[269]</span> have said, + even before shaping his decrees: I cannot save such and such a man, nor + condemn such and such another, <i>quippe vetor fatis</i>, my wisdom + permits it not.'</p> + + <p>228. I answer that it is goodness which prompts God to create with the + purpose of communicating himself; and this same goodness combined with + wisdom prompts him to create the best: a best that includes the whole + sequence, the effect and the process. It prompts him thereto without + compelling him, for it does not render impossible that which it does not + cause him to choose. To call that <i>fatum</i> is taking it in a good + sense, which is not contrary to freedom: <i>fatum</i> comes from + <i>fari</i>, to speak, to pronounce; it signifies a judgement, a decree + of God, the award of his wisdom. To say that one cannot do a thing, + simply because one does not will it, is to misuse terms. The wise mind + wills only the good: is it then a servitude when the will acts in + accordance with wisdom? And can one be less a slave than to act by one's + own choice in accordance with the most perfect reason? Aristotle used to + say that that man is in a natural servitude (<i>natura servus</i>) who + lacks guidance, who has need of being directed. Slavery comes from + without, it leads to that which offends, and especially to that which + offends with reason: the force of others and our own passions enslave us. + God is never moved by anything outside himself, nor is he subject to + inward passions, and he is never led to that which can cause him offence. + It appears, therefore, that M. Bayle gives odious names to the best + things in the world, and turns our ideas upside-down, applying the term + slavery to the state of the greatest and most perfect freedom.</p> + + <p>229. He had also said not long before (ch. 151, p. 891): 'If virtue, + or any other good at all, had been as appropriate as vice for the + Creator's ends, vice would not have been given preference; it must + therefore have been the only means that the Creator could have used; it + was therefore employed purely of necessity. As therefore he loves his + glory, not with a freedom of indifference, but by necessity, he must by + necessity love all the means without which he could not manifest his + glory. Now if vice, as vice, was the only means of attaining to this end, + it will follow that God of necessity loves vice as vice, a thought which + can only inspire us with horror; and he has revealed quite the contrary + to us.' He observes at the same time that certain doctors among the + Supralapsarians (like Rutherford, for example) denied that God wills sin + as sin, whilst <!-- Page 270 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page270"></a>[270]</span> they admitted that he wills sin + permissively in so far as it is punishable and pardonable. But he urges + in objection, that an action is only punishable and pardonable in so far + as it is vicious.</p> + + <p>230. M. Bayle makes a false assumption in these words that we have + just read, and draws from them false conclusions. It is not true that God + loves his glory by necessity, if thereby it is understood that he is led + by necessity to acquire his glory through his creatures. For if that were + so, he would acquire his glory always and everywhere. The decree to + create is free: God is prompted to all good; the good, and even the best, + inclines him to act; but it does not compel him, for his choice creates + no impossibility in that which is distinct from the best; it causes no + implication of contradiction in that which God refrains from doing. There + is therefore in God a freedom that is exempt not only from constraint but + also from necessity. I mean this in respect of metaphysical necessity; + for it is a moral necessity that the wisest should be bound to choose the + best. It is the same with the means which God chooses to attain his + glory. And as for vice, it has been shown in preceding pages that it is + not an object of God's decree as <i>means</i>, but as <i>conditio sine + qua non</i>, and that for that reason alone it is permitted. One is even + less justified in saying that vice is <i>the only means</i>; it would be + at most one of the means, but one of the least among innumerable + others.</p> + + <p>231. 'Another frightful consequence,' M. Bayle goes on, 'the fatality + of all things, ensues: God will not have been free to arrange events in a + different way, since the means he chose to show forth his glory was the + only means befitting his wisdom.' This so-called fatality or necessity is + only moral, as I have just shown: it does not affect freedom; on the + contrary, it assumes the best use thereof; it does not render impossible + the objects set aside by God's choice. 'What, then, will become', he + adds, 'of man's free will? Will there not have been necessity and + fatality for Adam to sin? For if he had not sinned, he would have + overthrown the sole plan that God had of necessity created.' That is + again a misuse of terms. Adam sinning freely was seen of God among the + ideas of the possibles, and God decreed to admit him into existence as he + saw him. This decree does not change the nature of the objects: it does + not render necessary that which was contingent in itself, or impossible + that which was possible.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 271 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page271"></a>[271]</span></p> + + <p>232. M. Bayle goes on (p. 892): 'The subtle Scotus asserts with much + discernment that if God had no freedom of indifference no creature could + have this kind of freedom.' I agree provided it is not meant as an + indifference of equipoise, where there is no reason inclining more to one + side than the other. M. Bayle acknowledges (farther on in chapter 168, p. + 1111) that what is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient + inclinations and pleasures. It suffices therefore that there be no + metaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to + say, it suffices that a choice be made between several courses + possible.</p> + + <p>233. He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893: 'If God is not + determined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by + the interests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the + only thing he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if + the love that he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his + glory through the most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this + same means, it is evident that this fall happened entirely by necessity + and that the obedience of Eve and Adam to God's commands was impossible.' + Still the same error. The love that God bears to himself is essential to + him, but the love for his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not + so by any means: the love he has for himself did not impel him by + necessity to actions without; they were free; and since there were + possible plans whereby the first parents should not sin, their sin was + therefore not necessary. Finally, I say in effect what M. Bayle + acknowledges here, 'that God resolved to create the world by a free + motion of his goodness'; and I add that this same motion prompted him to + the best.</p> + + <p>234. The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle's + (ch. 165, p. 1071): 'The means most appropriate for attaining an end is + of necessity one alone' (that is very well said, at least for the cases + where God has chosen). 'Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to + employ this means, he employed it by necessity.' (He was certainly + prompted thereto, he was determined, or rather he determined himself + thereto: but that which is certain is not always necessary, or altogether + irresistible; the thing might have gone otherwise, but that did not + happen, and with good reason. God chose between different courses all + possible: thus, metaphysically speaking, he could have chosen or done + what was not the best; but he could not morally speaking have done so. + <!-- Page 272 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page272"></a>[272]</span> + Let us make use of a comparison from geometry. The best way from one + point to another (leaving out of account obstacles and other + considerations accidental to the medium) is one alone: it is that one + which passes by the shortest line, which is the straight line. Yet there + are innumerable ways from one point to another. There is therefore no + necessity which binds me to go by the straight line; but as soon as I + choose the best, I am determined to go that way, although this is only a + moral necessity in the wise. That is why the following conclusions fail.) + 'Therefore he could only do that which he did. Therefore that which has + not happened or will never happen is absolutely impossible.' (These + conclusions fail, I say: for since there are many things which have never + happened and never will happen, and which nevertheless are clearly + conceivable, and imply no contradiction, how can one say they are + altogether impossible? M. Bayle has refuted that himself in a passage + opposing the Spinozists, which I have already quoted here, and he has + frequently acknowledged that there is nothing impossible except that + which implies contradiction: now he changes style and terminology.) + 'Therefore Adam's perseverance in innocence was always impossible; + therefore his fall was altogether inevitable, and even antecedently to + God's decree, for it implied contradiction that God should be able to + will a thing opposed to his wisdom: it is, after all, the same thing to + say, that it is impossible for God, as to say, God could do it, if he so + willed, but he cannot will it.' (It is misusing terms in a sense to say + here: one can will, one will will; 'can' here concerns the actions that + one does will. Nevertheless it implies no contradiction that God should + will—directly or permissively—a thing not implying + contradiction, and in this sense it is permitted to say that God can will + it.)</p> + + <p>235. In a word, when one speaks of the <i>possibility</i> of a thing + it is not a question of the causes that can bring about or prevent its + actual existence: otherwise one would change the nature of the terms, and + render useless the distinction between the possible and the actual. This + Abelard did, and Wyclif appears to have done after him, in consequence of + which they fell needlessly into unsuitable and disagreeable expressions. + That is why, when one asks if a thing is possible or necessary, and + brings in the consideration of what God wills or chooses, one alters the + issue. For God chooses among the possibles, and for that very reason he + chooses freely, <!-- Page 273 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page273"></a>[273]</span> and is not compelled; there would be + neither choice nor freedom if there were but one course possible.</p> + + <p>236. One must also answer M. Bayle's syllogisms, so as to neglect none + of the objections of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his + <i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i> (vol. III, pp. 900, + 901).</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;">FIRST SYLLOGISM</p> + + <p>'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he + has for his wisdom.</p> + + <p>'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which + God has for his wisdom.</p> + + <p>'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men.'</p> + + <p>The major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite + is necessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves his + wisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot + but be free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do + not cease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will + the salvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet + this consequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of + will, cannot fail to be free also.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;">SECOND SYLLOGISM</p> + + <p>'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things + the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men.</p> + + <p>'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom.</p> + + <p>'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other + things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of + men.'</p> + + <p>The major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are + always free, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which + lie in the intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, + to be bound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not + compulsion in the metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, + as I have observed so many times, is opposed to freedom.</p> + + <p>238. I shall not examine the syllogisms that M. Bayle urges in + objection in the following chapter (Ch. 152), against the system of the + Supralapsarians, and particularly against the oration made by <!-- Page + 274 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page274"></a>[274]</span> Theodore + de Bèze at the Conference of Montbéliard in the year 1586. This + conference also only served to increase the acrimony of the parties. 'God + created the World to his glory: his glory is not known (according to + Bèze), if his mercy and his justice are not declared; for this cause + simply by his grace he decreed for some men life eternal, and for others + by a just judgement eternal damnation. Mercy presupposes misery, justice + presupposes guilt.' (He might have added that misery also supposes + guilt.) 'Nevertheless God being good, indeed goodness itself, he created + man good and righteous, but unstable, and capable of sinning of his own + free will. Man did not fall at random or rashly, or through causes + ordained by some other God, as the Manichaeans hold, but by the + providence of God; in such a way notwithstanding, that God was not + involved in the fault, inasmuch as man was not constrained to sin.'</p> + + <p>239. This system is not of the best conceived: it is not well fitted + to show forth the wisdom, the goodness and the justice of God; and + happily it is almost abandoned to-day. If there were not other more + profound reasons capable of inducing God to permit guilt, the source of + misery, there would be neither guilt nor misery in the world, for the + reasons alleged here do not suffice. He would declare his mercy better in + preventing misery, and he would declare his justice better in preventing + guilt, in advancing virtue, in recompensing it. Besides, one does not see + how he who not only causes a man to be capable of falling, but who so + disposes circumstances that they contribute towards causing his fall, is + not culpable, if there are no other reasons compelling him thereto. But + when one considers that God, altogether good and wise, must have produced + all the virtue, goodness, happiness whereof the best plan of the universe + is capable, and that often an evil in some parts may serve the greater + good of the whole, one readily concludes that God may have given room for + unhappiness, and even permitted guilt, as he has done, without deserving + to be blamed. It is the only remedy that supplies what all systems lack, + however they arrange the decrees. These thoughts have already been + favoured by St. Augustine, and one may say of Eve what the poet said of + the hand of Mucius Scaevola:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Si non errasset, fecerat illa minus</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>240. I find that the famous English prelate who wrote an ingenious + book on the origin of evil, some passages of which were <!-- Page 275 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page275"></a>[275]</span> disputed by + M. Bayle in the second volume of his <i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, while disagreeing with some of the opinions that I have + upheld here and appearing to resort sometimes to a despotic power, as if + the will of God did not follow the rules of wisdom in relation to good or + evil, but decreed arbitrarily that such and such a thing must be + considered good or evil; and as if even the will of the creature, in so + far as it is free, did not choose because the object appears good to him, + but by a purely arbitrary determination, independent of the + representation of the object; this bishop, I say, in other passages + nevertheless says things which seem more in favour of my doctrine than of + what appears contrary thereto in his own. He says that what an infinitely + wise and free cause has chosen is better than what it has not chosen. Is + not that recognizing that goodness is the object and the reason of his + choice? In this sense one will here aptly say:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Sic placuit superis; quaerere plura, nefas</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 276 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page276"></a>[276]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>ESSAYS +ON THE JUSTICE OF GOD +AND THE FREEDOM OF MAN +IN THE ORIGIN OF EVIL</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>PART THREE</h3> + + <p>241. Now at last I have disposed of the cause of moral evil; + <i>physical evil</i>, that is, sorrows, sufferings, miseries, will be + less troublesome to explain, since these are results of moral evil. + <i>Poena est malum passionis, quod infligitur ob malum actionis</i>, + according to Grotius. One suffers because one has acted; one suffers evil + because one does evil.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i2"><i>Nostrorum causa malorum</i></p> + <p><i>Nos sumus</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>It is true that one often suffers through the evil actions of others; + but when one has no part in the offence one must look upon it as a + certainty that these sufferings prepare for us a greater happiness. The + question of <i>physical evil</i>, that is, of the origin of sufferings, + has difficulties in common with that of the origin of <i>metaphysical + evil</i>, examples whereof are furnished by the monstrosities and other + apparent irregularities of the universe. But one must believe that even + sufferings and monstrosities are part of order; and it is well to bear in + mind not only that it was better to admit these defects and these + monstrosities than to violate general laws, as Father Malebranche + sometimes argues, but also that these very monstrosities are in the + rules, and are in conformity with general acts of will, though we be not + capable of discerning this conformity. <!-- Page 277 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page277"></a>[277]</span> It is just as + sometimes there are appearances of irregularity in mathematics which + issue finally in a great order when one has finally got to the bottom of + them: that is why I have already in this work observed that according to + my principles all individual events, without exception, are consequences + of general acts of will.</p> + + <p>242. It should be no cause for astonishment that I endeavour to + elucidate these things by comparisons taken from pure mathematics, where + everything proceeds in order, and where it is possible to fathom them by + a close contemplation which grants us an enjoyment, so to speak, of the + vision of the ideas of God. One may propose a succession or series of + numbers perfectly irregular to all appearance, where the numbers increase + and diminish variably without the emergence of any order; and yet he who + knows the key to the formula, and who understands the origin and the + structure of this succession of numbers, will be able to give a rule + which, being properly understood, will show that the series is perfectly + regular, and that it even has excellent properties. One may make this + still more evident in lines. A line may have twists and turns, ups and + downs, points of reflexion and points of inflexion, interruptions and + other variations, so that one sees neither rhyme nor reason therein, + especially when taking into account only a portion of the line; and yet + it may be that one can give its equation and construction, wherein a + geometrician would find the reason and the fittingness of all these + so-called irregularities. That is how we must look upon the + irregularities constituted by monstrosities and other so-called defects + in the universe.</p> + + <p>243. In this sense one may apply that fine adage of St. Bernard (Ep. + 276, Ad Eugen., III): 'Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinate fieri + aliquid.' It belongs to the great order that there should be some small + disorder. One may even say that this small disorder is apparent only in + the whole, and it is not even apparent when one considers the happiness + of those who walk in the ways of order.</p> + + <p>244. When I mention monstrosities I include numerous other apparent + defects besides. We are acquainted with hardly anything but the surface + of our globe; we scarce penetrate into its interior beyond a few hundred + fathoms. That which we find in this crust of the globe appears to be the + effect of some great upheavals. It seems that this globe was once on + fire, and that the rocks forming the base of this crust of the earth are + scoria remaining from a great <!-- Page 278 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page278"></a>[278]</span> fusion. In their entrails are found metal + and mineral products, which closely resemble those emanating from our + furnaces: and the entire sea may be a kind of <i>oleum per deliquium</i>, + just as tartaric oil forms in a damp place. For when the earth's surface + cooled after the great conflagration the moisture that the fire had + driven into the air fell back upon the earth, washed its surface and + dissolved and absorbed the solid salt that was left in the cinders, + finally filling up this great cavity in the surface of our globe, to form + the ocean filled with salt water.</p> + + <p>245. But, after the fire, one must conclude that earth and water made + ravages no less. It may be that the crust formed by the cooling, having + below it great cavities, fell in, so that we live only on ruins, as among + others Thomas Burnet, Chaplain to the late King of Great Britain, aptly + observed. Sundry deluges and inundations have left deposits, whereof + traces and remains are found which show that the sea was in places that + to-day are most remote from it. But these upheavals ceased at last, and + the globe assumed the shape that we see. Moses hints at these changes in + few words: the separation of light from darkness indicates the melting + caused by the fire; and the separation of the moist from the dry marks + the effects of inundations. But who does not see that these disorders + have served to bring things to the point where they now are, that we owe + to them our riches and our comforts, and that through their agency this + globe became fit for cultivation by us. These disorders passed into + order. The disorders, real or apparent, that we see from afar are + sunspots and comets; but we do not know what uses they supply, nor the + rules prevailing therein. Time was when the planets were held to be + wandering stars: now their motion is found to be regular. Peradventure it + is the same with the comets: posterity will know.</p> + + <p>246. One does not include among the disorders inequality of + conditions, and M. Jacquelot is justified in asking those who would have + everything equally perfect, why rocks are not crowned with leaves and + flowers? why ants are not peacocks? And if there must needs be equality + everywhere, the poor man would serve notice of appeal against the rich, + the servant against the master. The pipes of an organ must not be of + equal size. M. Bayle will say that there is a difference between a + privation of good and a disorder; between a disorder in inanimate things, + which is purely metaphysical, and a disorder in rational creatures, which + is composed of crime and <!-- Page 279 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page279"></a>[279]</span> sufferings. He is right in making a + distinction between them, and I am right in combining them. God does not + neglect inanimate things: they do not feel, but God feels for them. He + does not neglect animals: they have not intelligence, but God has it for + them. He would reproach himself for the slightest actual defect there + were in the universe, even though it were perceived of none.</p> + + <p>247. It seems M. Bayle does not approve any comparison between the + disorders which may exist in inanimate things and those which trouble the + peace and happiness of rational creatures; nor would he agree to our + justifying the permission of vice on the pretext of the care that must be + taken to avoid disturbing the laws of motion. One might thence conclude, + according to him (posthumous Reply to M. Jacquelot, p. 183), 'that God + created the world only to display his infinite skill in architecture and + mechanics, whilst his property of goodness and love of virtue took no + part in the construction of this great work. This God would pride himself + only on skill; he would prefer to let the whole human kind perish rather + than suffer some atoms to go faster or more slowly than general laws + require.' M. Bayle would not have made this antithesis if he had been + informed on the system of general harmony which I assume, which states + that the realm of efficient causes and that of final causes are parallel + to each other; that God has no less the quality of the best monarch than + that of the greatest architect; that matter is so disposed that the laws + of motion serve as the best guidance for spirits; and that consequently + it will prove that he has attained the utmost good possible, provided one + reckon the metaphysical, physical and moral goods together.</p> + + <p>248. But (M. Bayle will say) God having power to avert innumerable + evils by one small miracle, why did he not employ it? He gives so much + extraordinary help to fallen men; but slight help of such a kind given to + Eve would have prevented her fall and rendered the temptation of the + serpent ineffective. I have sufficiently met objections of this sort with + this general answer, that God ought not to make choice of another + universe since he has chosen the best, and has only made use of the + miracles necessary thereto. I had answered M. Bayle that miracles change + the natural order of the universe. He replies, that that is an illusion, + and that the miracle of the wedding at Cana (for instance) made no change + in the air of the room, except that instead of receiving <!-- Page 280 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page280"></a>[280]</span> into its + pores some corpuscles of water, it received corpuscles of wine. But one + must bear in mind that once the best plan of things has been chosen + nothing can be changed therein.</p> + + <p>249. As for miracles (concerning which I have already said something + in this work), they are perhaps not all of one and the same kind: there + are many, to all appearances, which God brings about through the ministry + of invisible substances, such as the angels, as Father Malebranche also + believes. These angels or these substances act according to the ordinary + laws of their nature, being combined with bodies more rarefied and more + vigorous than those we have at our command. And such miracles are only so + by comparison, and in relation to us; just as our works would be + considered miraculous amongst animals if they were capable of remarking + upon them. The changing of water into wine might be a miracle of this + kind. But the Creation, the Incarnation and some other actions of God + exceed all the power of creatures and are truly miracles, or indeed + Mysteries. If, nevertheless, the changing of water into wine at Cana was + a miracle of the highest kind, God would have thereby changed the whole + course of the universe, because of the connexion of bodies; or else he + would have been bound to prevent this connexion miraculously also, and + cause the bodies not concerned in the miracle to act as if no miracle had + happened. After the miracle was over, it would have been necessary to + restore all things in those very bodies concerned to the state they would + have reached without the miracle: whereafter all would have returned to + its original course. Thus this miracle demanded more than at first + appears.</p> + + <p>250. As for physical evil in creatures, to wit their sufferings, M. + Bayle contends vigorously against those who endeavour to justify by means + of particular reasons the course of action pursued by God in regard to + this. Here I set aside the sufferings of animals, and I see that M. Bayle + insists chiefly on those of men, perhaps because he thinks that brute + beasts have no feeling. It is on account of the injustice there would be + in the sufferings of beasts that divers Cartesians wished to prove that + they are only machines, <i>quoniam sub Deo justo nemo innocens miser + est</i>: it is impossible that an innocent creature should be unhappy + under such a master as God. The principle is good, but I do not think it + warrants the inference that beasts have no feeling, because I think that, + properly speaking, perception is not sufficient to cause misery if it is + not accompanied <!-- Page 281 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page281"></a>[281]</span> by reflexion. It is the same with + happiness: without reflexion there is none.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>O fortunatos nimium, sua qui bona norint!</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>One cannot reasonably doubt the existence of pain among animals; but + it seems as if their pleasures and their pains are not so keen as they + are in man: for animals, since they do not reflect, are susceptible + neither to the grief that accompanies pain, nor to the joy that + accompanies pleasure. Men are sometimes in a state approaching that of + the beasts, when they act almost on instinct alone and simply on the + impressions made by the experience of the senses: and, in this state, + their pleasures and their pains are very slight.</p> + + <p>251. But let us pass from the beasts and return to rational creatures. + It is with regard to them that M. Bayle discusses this question: whether + there is more physical evil than physical good in the world? (<i>Reply to + the Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. II, ch. 75.) To settle it aright, + one must explain wherein these goods and evils lie. We are agreed that + physical evil is simply displeasure and under that heading I include + pain, grief, and every other kind of discomfort. But does physical good + lie solely in pleasure? M. Bayle appears to be of this opinion; but I + consider that it lies also in a middle state, such as that of health. One + is well enough when one has no ill; it is a degree of wisdom to have no + folly:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i4"><i>Sapientia prima est,</i></p> + <p><i>Stultitia caruisse</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>In the same way one is worthy of praise when one cannot with justice + be blamed:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Si non culpabor, sat mihi laudis erit</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>That being the case, all the sensations not unpleasing to us, all the + exercises of our powers that do not incommode us, and whose prevention + would incommode us, are physical goods, even when they cause us no + pleasure; for privation of them is a physical evil. Besides we only + perceive the good of health, and other like goods, when we are deprived + of them. On those terms I would dare to maintain that even in this life + goods exceed evils, that our comforts exceed our discomforts, and that M. + Descartes was justified in writing (vol. I, Letter 9) 'that natural + reason teaches us that we have more goods than evils in this life'.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 282 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page282"></a>[282]</span></p> + + <p>252. It must be added that pleasures enjoyed too often and to excess + would be a very great evil. There are some which Hippocrates compared to + the falling sickness, and Scioppius doubtless only made pretence of + envying the sparrows in order to be agreeably playful in a learned and + far from playful work. Highly seasoned foods are injurious to health and + impair the niceness of a delicate sense; and in general bodily pleasures + are a kind of expenditure of the spirit, though they be made good in some + better than in others.</p> + + <p>253. As proof, however, that the evil exceeds the good is quoted the + instance of M. de la Motte le Vayer (Letter 134), who would not have been + willing to return to the world, supposing he had had to play the same + part as providence had already assigned to him. But I have already said + that I think one would accept the proposal of him who could re-knot the + thread of Fate if a new part were promised to us, even though it should + not be better than the first. Thus from M. de la Motte le Vayer's saying + it does not follow that he would not have wished for the part he had + already played, provided it had been new, as M. Bayle seems to take + it.</p> + + <p>254. The pleasures of the mind are the purest, and of greatest service + in making joy endure. Cardan, when already an old man, was so content + with his state that he protested solemnly that he would not exchange it + for the state of the richest of young men who at the same time was + ignorant. M. de la Motte le Vayer quotes the saying himself without + criticizing it. Knowledge has doubtless charms which cannot be conceived + by those who have not tasted them. I do not mean a mere knowledge of + facts without that of reasons, but knowledge like that of Cardan, who + with all his faults was a great man, and would have been incomparable + without those faults.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas!</i></p> + <p><i>Ille metus omnes et inexorabile fatum</i></p> + <p><i>Subjecit pedibus.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>It is no small thing to be content with God and with the universe, not + to fear what destiny has in store for us, nor to complain of what befalls + us. Acquaintance with true principles gives us this advantage, quite + other than that the Stoics and the Epicureans derived from their + philosophy. There is as much difference <!-- Page 283 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page283"></a>[283]</span> between true morality + and theirs as there is between joy and patience: for their tranquillity + was founded only on necessity, while ours must rest upon the perfection + and beauty of things, upon our own happiness.</p> + + <p>255. What, then, shall we say of bodily sufferings? May they not be + sufficiently acute to disturb the sage's tranquillity? Aristotle assents; + the Stoics were of a different opinion, and even the Epicureans likewise. + M. Descartes revived the doctrine of these philosophers; he says in the + letter just quoted: 'that even amid the worst misfortunes and the most + overwhelming sufferings one may always be content, if only one knows how + to exercise reason'. M. Bayle says concerning this (<i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 157, p. 991) 'that it is + saying nothing, that it is prescribing for us a remedy whose preparation + hardly anyone understands'. I hold that the thing is not impossible, and + that men could attain it by dint of meditation and practice. For apart + from the true martyrs and those who have been aided in wonderful wise + from on high, there have been counterfeits who imitated them. That + Spanish slave who killed the Carthaginian governor in order to avenge his + master and who evinced great joy in his deed, even in the greatest + tortures, may shame the philosophers. Why should not one go as far as he? + One may say of an advantage, as of a disadvantage:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Cuivis potest accidere, quod cuiquam potest</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>256. But even to-day entire tribes, such as the Hurons, the Iroquois, + the Galibis and other peoples of America teach us a great lesson on this + matter: one cannot read without astonishment of the intrepidity and + well-nigh insensibility wherewith they brave their enemies, who roast + them over a slow fire and eat them by slices. If such people could retain + their physical superiority and their courage, and combine them with our + acquirements, they would surpass us in every way,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Extat ut in mediis turris aprica casis</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>They would be, in comparison with us, as a giant to a dwarf, a + mountain to a hill:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Quantus Eryx, et quantus Athos, gaudetque nivali</i></p> + <p><i>Vertice se attollens pater Apenninus ad auras.</i></p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 284 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page284"></a>[284]</span></p> + + <p>257. All that which is effected by a wonderful vigour of body and mind + in these savages, who persist obstinately in the strangest point of + honour, might be acquired in our case by training, by well-seasoned + mortifications, by an overmastering joy founded on reason, by great + practice in preserving a certain presence of mind in the midst of the + distractions and impressions most liable to disturb it. Something of this + kind is related of the ancient Assassins, subjects and pupils of the Old + Man or rather the Seigneur (<i>Senior</i>) of the Mountain. Such a school + (for a better purpose) would be good for missionaries who would wish to + return to Japan. The Gymnosophists of the ancient Indians had perhaps + something resembling this, and that Calanus, who provided for Alexander + the Great the spectacle of his burning alive, had doubtless been + encouraged by the great examples of his masters and trained by great + sufferings not to fear pain. The wives of these same Indians, who even + to-day ask to be burned with the bodies of their husbands, seem still to + keep something of the courage of those ancient philosophers of their + country. I do not expect that there should straightway be founded a + religious order whose purpose would be to exalt man to that high pitch of + perfection: such people would be too much above the rest, and too + formidable for the authorities. As it rarely happens that people are + exposed to extremes where such great strength of mind would be needed, + one will scarce think of providing for it at the expense of our usual + comforts, albeit incomparably more would be gained than lost thereby.</p> + + <p>258. Nevertheless the very fact that one has no need of that great + remedy is a proof that the good already exceeds the evil. Euripides also + said:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><span lang="el" title="pleiô ta chrêsta tôn kakôn einai brotois" >πλειω τα χρηστα των κακων ειναι βροτοις</span>.</p> + <p><i>Mala nostra longe judico vinci a bonis.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Homer and divers other poets were of another mind, and men in general + agree with them. The reason for this is that the evil arouses our + attention rather than the good: but this same reason proves that the evil + is more rare. One must therefore not credit the petulant expressions of + Pliny, who would have it that Nature is a stepmother, and who maintains + that man is the most unhappy and most vain of all creatures. These two + epithets do not agree: one is not so very unhappy, when one is full of + oneself. It is true <!-- Page 285 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page285"></a>[285]</span> that men hold human nature only too much + in contempt, apparently because they see no other creatures capable of + arousing their emulation; but they have all too much self-esteem, and + individually are but too easily satisfied. I therefore agree with Meric + Casaubon, who in his notes on the Xenophanes of Diogenes Laertius praises + exceedingly the admirable sentiments of Euripides, going so far as to + credit him with having said things <i>quae spirant</i> <span lang="el" + title="theopneuston" + >θεοπνευστον</span> + <i>pectus</i>. Seneca (Lib. 4, c. 5, <i>De Benefic.</i>) speaks + eloquently of the blessings Nature has heaped upon us. M. Bayle in his + <i>Dictionary</i>, article 'Xenophanes', brings up sundry authorities + against this, and among others that of the poet Diphilus in the + Collections of Stobaeus, whose Greek might be thus expressed in + Latin:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Fortuna cyathis bibere nos datis jubens,</i></p> + <p><i>Infundit uno terna pro bono mala.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>259. M. Bayle believes that if it were a question only of the evil of + guilt, or of moral evil among men, the case would soon be terminated to + the advantage of Pliny, and Euripides would lose his action. To that I am + not opposed; our vices doubtless exceed our virtues, and this is the + effect of original sin. It is nevertheless true that also on that point + men in general exaggerate things, and that even some theologians + disparage man so much that they wrong the providence of the Author of + mankind. That is why I am not in favour of those who thought to do great + honour to our religion by saying that the virtues of the pagans were only + <i>splendida peccata</i>, splendid vices. It is a sally of St. + Augustine's which has no foundation in holy Scripture, and which offends + reason. But here we are only discussing a physical good and evil, and one + must compare in detail the prosperities and the adversities of this life. + M. Bayle would wish almost to set aside the consideration of health; he + likens it to the rarefied bodies, which are scarcely felt, like air, for + example; but he likens pain to the bodies that have much density and much + weight in slight volume. But pain itself makes us aware of the importance + of health when we are bereft of it. I have already observed that excess + of physical pleasures would be a real evil, and the matter ought not to + be otherwise; it is too important for the spirit to be free. Lactantius + (<i>Divin. Instit.</i>, lib. 3, cap. 18) had said that men are so + squeamish that they complain of the slightest ill, as if it swallowed up + all the goods they have enjoyed. M. Bayle says, concerning this, that the + very fact that <!-- Page 286 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page286"></a>[286]</span> men have this feeling warrants the + judgement that they are in evil case, since it is feeling which measures + the extent of good or evil. But I answer that present feeling is anything + rather than the true measure of good and evil past and future. I grant + that one is in evil case while one makes these peevish reflexions; but + that does not exclude a previous state of well-being, nor imply that, + everything reckoned in and all allowance made, the good does not exceed + the evil.</p> + + <p>260. I do not wonder that the pagans, dissatisfied with their gods, + made complaints against Prometheus and Epimetheus for having forged so + weak an animal as man. Nor do I wonder that they acclaimed the fable of + old Silenus, foster-father of Bacchus, who was seized by King Midas, and + as the price of his deliverance taught him that ostensibly fine maxim + that the first and the greatest of goods was not to be born, and the + second, to depart from this life with dispatch (Cic., <i>Tuscul.</i>, + lib. 1). Plato believed that souls had been in a happier state, and many + of the ancients, amongst others Cicero in his Consolation (according to + the account of Lactantius), believed that for their sins they were + confined in bodies as in a prison. They rendered thus a reason for our + ills, and asserted their prejudices against human life: for there is no + such thing as a beautiful prison. But quite apart from the consideration + that, even according to these same pagans, the evils of this life would + be counterbalanced and exceeded by the goods of past and future lives, I + make bold to say that we shall find, upon unbiassed scrutiny of the + facts, that taking all in all human life is in general tolerable. And + adding thereto the motives of religion, we shall be content with the + order God has set therein. Moreover, for a better judgement of our goods + and our evils, it will be well to read Cardan, <i>De Utilitate ex + Adversis Capienda</i>, and Novarini, <i>De Occultis Dei + Beneficiis</i>.</p> + + <p>261. M. Bayle dilates upon the misfortunes of the great, who are + thought to be the most fortunate: the constant experience of the fair + aspect of their condition renders them unaware of good, but greatly aware + of evil. Someone will say: so much the worse for them; if they know not + how to enjoy the advantages of nature and fortune, is that the fault of + either? There are nevertheless great men possessed of more wisdom, who + know how to profit by the favours God has shown them, who are easily + consoled for their misfortunes, and who even turn their own faults to + account. M. <!-- Page 287 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page287"></a>[287]</span> Bayle pays no heed to that: he prefers to + listen to Pliny, who thinks that Augustus, one of the princes most + favoured by fortune, experienced at least as much evil as good. I admit + that he found great causes of trouble in his family and that remorse for + having crushed the Republic may have tormented him; but I think that he + was too wise to grieve over the former, and that Maecenas apparently made + him understand that Rome had need of a master. Had not Augustus been + converted on this point, Vergil would never have said of a lost soul:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Vendidit hic auro patriam Dominumque potentem</i></p> + <p><i>Imposuit, fixit leges pretio atque refixit.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Augustus would have thought that he and Caesar were alluded to in + these lines, which speak of a master given to a free state. But there is + every indication that he applied it just as little to his dominion, which + he regarded as compatible with liberty and as a necessary remedy for + public evils, as the princes of to-day apply to themselves the words used + of the kings censured in M. de Cambray's <i>Telemachus</i>. Each one + considers himself within his rights. Tacitus, an unbiassed writer, + justifies Augustus in two words, at the beginning of his <i>Annals</i>. + But Augustus was better able than anyone to judge of his good fortune. He + appears to have died content, as may be inferred from a proof he gave of + contentedness with his life: for in dying he repeated to his friends a + line in Greek, which has the signification of that <i>Plaudite</i> that + was wont to be spoken at the conclusion of a well-acted play. Suetonius + quotes it:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><span lang="el" title="Dote kroton kai pantes hymeis meta charas ktypêsate." >Δοτε κροτον και παντες ‛υμεις μετα χαρας κτυπησατε.</span></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>262. But even though there should have fallen to the lot of the human + kind more evil than good, it is enough where God is concerned that there + is incomparably more good than evil in the universe. Rabbi Maimonides + (whose merit is not sufficiently recognized in the statement that he is + the first of the Rabbis to have ceased talking nonsense) also gave wise + judgement on this question of the predominance of good over evil in the + world. Here is what he says in his <i>Doctor Perplexorum</i> (cap. 12, p. + 3): 'There arise often in the hearts of ill-instructed persons thoughts + which persuade them there is more evil than good in the world: and one + often finds in the poems and songs of the pagans that it is as it were a + miracle when something good comes to pass, whereas <!-- Page 288 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page288"></a>[288]</span> evils are usual and + constant. This error has taken hold not of the common herd only, those + very persons who wish to be considered wise have been beguiled thereby. A + celebrated writer named Alrasi, in his <i>Sepher Elohuth</i>, or + Theosophy, amongst other absurdities has stated that there are more evils + than goods, and that upon comparison of the recreations and the pleasures + man enjoys in times of tranquillity with the pains, the torments, the + troubles, faults, cares, griefs and afflictions whereby he is overwhelmed + our life would prove to be a great evil, and an actual penalty inflicted + upon us to punish us.' Maimonides adds that the cause of their + extravagant error is their supposition that Nature was made for them + only, and that they hold of no account what is separate from their + person; whence they infer that when something unpleasing to them occurs + all goes ill in the universe.</p> + + <p>263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the + point, because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, + upon consideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he + formulates is general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it + on one particular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if + all had been made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he + refutes spoke also of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in + saying that if one took into account the littleness of man in relation to + the universe one would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, + even though it prevailed among men, need not on that account occur among + the angels, nor among the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and + inanimate compounds, nor among many kinds of animals. I have shown + elsewhere that in supposing that the number of the damned exceeds that of + the saved (a supposition which is nevertheless not altogether certain) + one might admit that there is more evil than good in respect of the human + kind known to us. But I pointed out that that neither precludes the + existence of incomparably more good than evil, both moral and physical, + in rational creatures in general, nor prevents the city of God, which + contains all creatures, from being the most perfect state. So also on + consideration of the metaphysical good and evil which is in all + substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence, and which + taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good, one must + say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of all + systems.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 289 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page289"></a>[289]</span></p> + + <p>264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should + have anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right + when it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case + is not the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, + this indeed being the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he + places reason or experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is + wont to say that it is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his + objections tend also to prove that the misuse of free will must no less + be laid to the account of God, who has permitted it and who has + co-operated therein. He states it as a maxim that for one difficulty more + or less one must not abandon a system. This he advances especially in + favour of the methods of the strict and the dogma of the Supralapsarians. + For he supposes that one can subscribe to their opinion, although he + leaves all the difficulties in their entirety, because the other systems, + albeit they put an end to some of the difficulties, cannot meet them all. + I hold that the true system I have expounded satisfies all. Nevertheless, + even were that not so, I confess that I cannot relish this maxim of M. + Bayle's, and I should prefer a system which would remove a great portion + of the difficulties, to one which would meet none of them. And the + consideration of the wickedness of men, which brings upon them well-nigh + all their misfortunes, shows at least that they have no right to + complain. No justice need trouble itself over the origin of a scoundrel's + wickedness when it is only a question of punishing him: it is quite + another matter when it is a question of prevention. One knows well that + disposition, upbringing, conversation, and often chance itself, have much + share in that origin: is the man any the less deserving of + punishment?</p> + + <p>265. I confess that there still remains another difficulty. If God is + not bound to account to the wicked for their wickedness, it seems as if + he owes to himself, and to those who honour him and love him, + justification for his course of action with regard to the permission of + vice and crime. But God has already given that satisfaction, as far as it + is needed here on earth: by granting us the light of reason he has + bestowed upon us the means whereby we may meet all difficulties. I hope + that I have made it plain in this discourse, and have elucidated the + matter in the preceding portion of these Essays, almost as far as it can + be done through general arguments. Thereafter, the permission of sin + being justified, the <!-- Page 290 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page290"></a>[290]</span> other evils that are a consequence + thereof present no further difficulty. Thus also I am justified in + restricting myself here to the evil of guilt to account for the evil of + punishment, as Holy Scripture does, and likewise well-nigh all the + Fathers of the Church and the Preachers. And, to the end that none may + say that is only good <i>per la predica</i>, it is enough to consider + that, after the solutions I have given, nothing must seem more right or + more exact than this method. For God, having found already among things + possible, before his actual decrees, man misusing his freedom and + bringing upon himself his misfortune, yet could not avoid admitting him + into existence, because the general plan required this. Wherefore it will + no longer be necessary to say with M. Jurieu that one must dogmatize like + St. Augustine and preach like Pelagius.</p> + + <p>266. This method, deriving the evil of punishment from the evil of + guilt, cannot be open to censure, and serves especially to account for + the greatest physical evil, which is damnation. Ernst Sonner, sometime + Professor of Philosophy at Altorf (a university established in the + territory of the free city of Nuremberg), who was considered an excellent + Aristotelian, but was finally recognized as being secretly a Socinian, + had composed a little discourse entitled: <i>Demonstration against the + Eternity of Punishment</i>. It was founded on this somewhat trite + principle, that there is no proportion between an infinite punishment and + a finite guilt. It was conveyed to me, printed (so it seemed) in Holland; + and I replied that there was one thing to be considered which had escaped + the late Herr Sonner: namely that it was enough to say that the duration + of the guilt caused the duration of the penalty. Since the damned + remained wicked they could not be withdrawn from their misery; and thus + one need not, in order to justify the continuation of their sufferings, + assume that sin has become of infinite weight through the infinite nature + of the object offended, who is God. This thesis I had not explored enough + to pass judgement thereon. I know that the general opinion of the + Schoolmen, according to the Master of the Sentences, is that in the other + life there is neither merit nor demerit; but I do not think that, taken + literally, it can pass for an article of faith. Herr Fecht, a famous + theologian at Rostock, well refuted that in his book on <i>The State of + the Damned</i>. It is quite wrong, he says (§ 59); God cannot change his + nature; justice is essential to him; death has closed the door of grace, + but not that of justice.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 291 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page291"></a>[291]</span></p> + + <p>267. I have observed that sundry able theologians have accounted for + the duration of the pains of the damned as I have just done. Johann + Gerhard, a famous theologian of the Augsburg Confession (in <i>Locis + Theol.</i>, loco de Inferno, § 60), brings forward amongst other + arguments that the damned have still an evil will and lack the grace that + could render it good. Zacharias Ursinus, a theologian of Heidelberg, who + follows Calvin, having formulated this question (in his treatise <i>De + Fide</i>) why sin merits an eternal punishment, advances first the common + reason, that the person offended is infinite, and then also this second + reason, <i>quod non cessante peccato non potest cessare poena</i>. And + the Jesuit Father Drexler says in his book entitled <i>Nicetas, or + Incontinence Overcome</i> (book 2, ch. 11, § 9): 'Nec mirum damnatos + semper torqueri, continue blasphemant, et sic quasi semper peccant, + semper ergo plectuntur.' He declares and approves the same reason in his + work on <i>Eternity</i> (book 2, ch. 15) saying: 'Sunt qui dicant, nec + displicet responsum: scelerati in locis infernis semper peccant, ideo + semper puniuntur.' And he indicates thereby that this opinion is very + common among learned men in the Roman Church. He alleges, it is true, + another more subtle reason, derived from Pope Gregory the Great (lib. 4, + Dial. c. 44), that the damned are punished eternally because God foresaw + by a kind of <i>mediate knowledge</i> that they would always have sinned + if they had always lived upon earth. But it is a hypothesis very much + open to question. Herr Fecht quotes also various eminent Protestant + theologians for Herr Gerhard's opinion, although he mentions also some + who think differently.</p> + + <p>268. M. Bayle himself in various places has supplied me with passages + from two able theologians of his party, which have some reference to + these statements of mine. M. Jurieu in his book on the <i>Unity of the + Church</i>, in opposition to that written by M. Nicole on the same + subject, gives the opinion (p. 379) 'that reason tells us that a creature + which cannot cease to be criminal can also not cease to be miserable'. M. + Jacquelot in his book on <i>The Conformity of Faith with Reason</i> (p. + 220) is of opinion 'that the damned must remain eternally deprived of the + glory of the blessed, and that this deprivation might well be the origin + and the cause of all their pains, through the reflexions these unhappy + creatures make upon their crimes which have deprived them of an eternal + bliss. One knows what burning regrets, what pain envy causes to those who + see themselves deprived of a good, of a notable honour which had <!-- + Page 292 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page292"></a>[292]</span> been + offered to them, and which they rejected, especially when they see others + invested with it.' This position is a little different from that of M. + Jurieu, but both agree in this sentiment, that the damned are themselves + the cause of the continuation of their torments. M. le Clerc's Origenist + does not entirely differ from this opinion when he says in the <i>Select + Library</i> (vol. 7, p. 341): 'God, who foresaw that man would fall, does + not condemn him on that account, but only because, although he has the + power to recover himself, he yet does not do so, that is, he freely + retains his evil ways to the end of his life.' If he carries this + reasoning on beyond this life, he will ascribe the continuation of the + pains of the wicked to the continuation of their guilt.</p> + + <p>269. M. Bayle says (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, ch. + 175, p. 1188) 'that this dogma of the Origenist is heretical, in that it + teaches that damnation is not founded simply on sin, but on voluntary + impenitence': but is not this voluntary impenitence a continuation of + sin? I would not simply say, however, that it is because man, having the + power to recover himself, does not; and would wish to add that it is + because man does not take advantage of the succour of grace to aid him to + recover himself. But after this life, though one assume that the succour + ceases, there is always in the man who sins, even when he is damned, a + freedom which renders him culpable, and a power, albeit remote, of + recovering himself, even though it should never pass into action. And + there is no reason why one may not say that this degree of freedom, + exempt from necessity, but not exempt from certainty, remains in the + damned as well as in the blessed. Moreover, the damned have no need of a + succour that is needed in this life, for they know only too well what one + must believe here.</p> + + <p>270. The illustrious prelate of the Anglican Church who published + recently a book on the origin of evil, concerning which M. Bayle made + some observations in the second volume of his <i>Reply</i>, speaks with + much subtlety about the pains of the damned. This prelate's opinion is + presented (according to the author of the <i>Nouvelles de la République + des Lettres</i>, June 1703) as if he made 'of the damned just so many + madmen who will feel their miseries acutely, but who will nevertheless + congratulate themselves on their own behaviour, and who will rather + choose to be, and to be that which they are, than not to be at all. They + will love their state, unhappy as it will be, even as angry people, + lovers, the ambitious, <!-- Page 293 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page293"></a>[293]</span> the envious take pleasure in the very + things that only augment their misery. Furthermore the ungodly will have + so accustomed their mind to wrong judgements that they will henceforth + never make any other kind, and will perpetually pass from one error into + another. They will not be able to refrain from desiring perpetually + things whose enjoyment will be denied them, and, being deprived of which, + they will fall into inconceivable despair, while experience can never + make them wiser for the future. For by their own fault they will have + altogether corrupted their understanding, and will have rendered it + incapable of passing a sound judgement on any matter.'</p> + + <p><a name="sect271">271</a>. The ancients already imagined that the + Devil dwells remote from God voluntarily, in the midst of his torments, + and that he is unwilling to redeem himself by an act of submission. They + invented a tale that an anchorite in a vision received a promise from God + that he would receive into grace the Prince of the bad angels if he would + acknowledge his fault; but that the devil rebuffed this mediator in a + strange manner. At the least, the theologians usually agree that the + devils and the damned hate God and blaspheme him; and such a state cannot + but be followed by continuation of misery. Concerning that, one may read + the learned treatise of Herr Fecht on the <i>State of the Damned</i>.</p> + + <p>272. There were times when the belief was held that it was not + impossible for a lost soul to be delivered. The story told of Pope + Gregory the Great is well known, how by his prayers he had withdrawn from + hell the soul of the Emperor Trajan, whose goodness was so renowned that + to new emperors the wish was offered that they should surpass Augustus in + good fortune and Trajan in goodness. It was this that won for the latter + the pity of the Holy Father. God acceded to his prayers (it is said), but + he forbade him to make the like prayers in future. According to this + fable, the prayers of St. Gregory had the force of the remedies of + Aesculapius, who recalled Hippolytus from Hades; and, if he had continued + to make such prayers, God would have waxed wroth, like Jupiter in + Vergil:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>At pater omnipotens aliquem indignatus ab umbris</i></p> + <p><i>Mortalem infernis ad lumina surgere vitae,</i></p> + <p><i>Ipse repertorem medicinae talis et artis</i></p> + <p><i>Fulmine Phoebigenam Stygias detrusit ad undas.</i></p> + </div> + </div> +<p><!-- Page 294 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page294"></a>[294]</span></p> + + <p>Godescalc, a monk of the ninth century, who set at variance the + theologians of his day, and even those of our day, maintained that the + reprobate should pray God to render their pains more bearable; but one is + never justified in believing oneself reprobate so long as one is alive. + The passage in the Mass for the dead is more reasonable: it asks for the + abatement of the torments of the damned, and, according to the hypothesis + that I have just stated, one must wish for them <i>meliorem mentem</i>. + Origen having applied the passage from Psalm lxxvii, verse 10: God will + not forget to be gracious, neither will he shut up his loving-kindness in + displeasure, St. Augustine replies <i>(Enchirid.</i>, c. 112) that it is + possible that the pains of the damned last eternally, and that they may + nevertheless be mitigated. If the text implied that, the abatement would, + as regards its duration, go on to infinity; and yet that abatement would, + as regards its extent, have a <i>non plus ultra</i>. Even so there are + asymptote figures in geometry where an infinite length makes only a + finite progress in breadth. If the parable of the wicked rich man + represented the state of a definitely lost soul, the hypothesis which + makes these souls so mad and so wicked would be groundless. But the + charity towards his brothers attributed to him in the parable does not + seem to be consistent with that degree of wickedness which is ascribed to + the damned. St. Gregory the Great (IX <i>Mor.</i>, 39) thinks that the + rich man was afraid lest their damnation should increase his: but it + seems as though this fear is not sufficiently consistent with the + disposition of a perfectly wicked will. Bonaventura, on the Master of the + Sentences, says that the wicked rich man would have desired to see + everyone damned; but since that was not to be, he desired the salvation + of his brothers rather than that of the rest. This reply is by no means + sound. On the contrary, the mission of Lazarus that he desired would have + served to save many people; and he who takes so much pleasure in the + damnation of others that he desires it for everyone will perhaps desire + that damnation for some more than others; but, generally speaking, he + will have no inclination to gain salvation for anyone. However that may + be, one must admit that all this detail is problematical, God having + revealed to us all that is needed to put us in fear of the greatest of + misfortunes, and not what is needed for our understanding thereof.</p> + + <p>273. Now since it is henceforth permitted to have recourse to the + misuse of free will, and to evil will, in order to account for other <!-- + Page 295 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page295"></a>[295]</span> + evils, since the divine permission of this misuse is plainly enough + justified, the ordinary system of the theologians meets with + justification at the same time. Now we can seek with confidence <i>the + origin of evil in the freedom of creatures</i>. The first wickedness is + well known to us, it is that of the Devil and his angels: the Devil + sinneth from the beginning, and for this purpose the Son of God was + manifested, that he might destroy the works of the Devil (1 John iii. 8). + The Devil is the father of wickedness, he was a murderer from the + beginning, and abode not in the truth (John viii. 44). And therefore God + spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to Hell, and + delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgement (2 + Pet. ii. 4). And the angels which kept not their own habitation, he hath + reserved in <i>eternal</i> (that is to say everlasting) chains under + darkness unto the judgement of the great day (Jude i. 6). Whence it is + easy to observe that one of these two letters must have been seen by the + author of the other.</p> + + <p>274. It seems as if the author of the Apocalypse wished to throw light + upon what the other canonical writers had left obscure: he gives us an + account of a battle that took place in Heaven. Michael and his angels + fought against the Dragon, and the Dragon fought and his angels. 'But + they prevailed not, neither was their place found any more in heaven. And + the great Dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and + Satan, which deceiveth the whole world: and he was cast out into the + earth, and his angels were cast out with him' (Rev. xii. 7, 8, 9). For + although this account is placed after the flight of the woman into the + wilderness, and it may have been intended to indicate thereby some + revulsion favourable to the Church, it appears as though the author's + design was to show simultaneously the old fall of the first enemy and a + new fall of a new enemy.</p> + + <p>275. Lying or wickedness springs from the Devil's own nature, <span + lang="el" title="ek tôn idiôn" >εκ των + ιδιων</span> from his will, because it was + written in the book of the eternal verities, which contains the things + possible before any decree of God, that this creature would freely turn + toward evil if it were created. It is the same with Eve and Adam; they + sinned freely, albeit the Devil tempted them. God gives the wicked over + to a reprobate mind (Rom. i. 28), abandoning them to themselves and + denying them a grace which he owes them not, and indeed ought to deny to + them.</p> + + <p>276. It is said in the Scriptures that God hardeneth (Exod. iv. <!-- + Page 296 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page296"></a>[296]</span> 21 + and vii. 3; Isa. lxiii. 17); that God sendeth a lying spirit (1 Kings + xxii. 23); strong delusion that they should believe a lie (2 Thess. ii. + 11); that he deceived the prophet (Ezek. xiv. 9); that he commanded + Shimei to curse (2 Sam xvi. 10); that the children of Eli hearkened not + unto the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. + ii. 25); that the Lord took away Job's substance, even although that was + done through the malice of brigands (Job i. 21); that he raised up + Pharaoh, to show his power in him (Exod. ix. 19; Rom. ix. 17) that he is + like a potter who maketh a vessel unto dishonour (Rom. ix. 21); that he + hideth the truth from the wise and prudent (Matt. xi. 25); that he + speaketh in parables unto them that are without, that seeing they may see + and not perceive, and hearing they may hear and not understand, lest at + any time they might be converted, and their sins might be forgiven them + (Mark iv. 12; Luke viii. 10); that Jesus was delivered by the determinate + counsel and foreknowledge of God (Acts ii. 23); that Pontius Pilate and + Herod with the Gentiles and the people of Israel did that which the hand + and the counsel of God had determined before to be done (Acts iv. 27, + 28); that it was of the Lord to harden the hearts of the enemy, that they + should come against Israel in battle, that he might destroy them utterly, + and that they might have no favour (Joshua xi. 20); that the Lord mingled + a perverse spirit in the midst of Egypt, and caused it to err in all its + works, like a drunken man (Isa. xix. 14); that Rehoboam hearkened not + unto the word of the people, for the cause was from the Lord (1 Kings + xii. 15); that he turned the hearts of the Egyptians to hate his people + (Ps. cv. 25). But all these and other like expressions suggest only that + the things God has done are used as occasion for ignorance, error, malice + and evil deeds, and contribute thereto, God indeed foreseeing this, and + intending to use it for his ends, since superior reasons of perfect + wisdom have determined him to permit these evils, and even to co-operate + therein. 'Sed non sineret bonus fieri male, nisi omnipotens etiam de malo + posset facere bene', in St. Augustine's words. But this has been + expounded more fully in the preceding part.</p> + + <p>277. God made man in his image (Gen. i. 26); he made him upright + (Eccles. vii. 29). But also he made him free. Man has behaved badly, he + has fallen; but there remains still a certain freedom after the fall. + Moses said as from God: 'I call heaven and earth to record this day + against you, that I have set before you life <!-- Page 297 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page297"></a>[297]</span> and death, blessing + and cursing; therefore choose life' (Deut. xxx. 19). 'Thus saith the + Lord: Behold, I set before you the way of life, and the way of death' + (Jer. xxi. 8). He has left man in the power of his counsel, giving him + his ordinances and his commandments. 'If thou wilt, thou shalt keep the + commandments' (or they shall keep thee). 'He hath set before thee fire + and water, to stretch forth thine hand to whichever thou wilt' (Sirach + xv. 14, 15, 16). Fallen and unregenerate man is under the domination of + sin and of Satan, because it pleases him so to be; he is a voluntary + slave through his evil lust. Thus it is that free will and will in + bondage are one and the same thing.</p> + + <p>278. 'Let no man say, I am tempted of God'; 'but every man is tempted, + when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed' (Jas. i. 13, 14). And + Satan contributes thereto. He 'blindeth the minds of them which believe + not' (2 Cor. iv. 4). But man is delivered up to the Devil by his covetous + desire: the pleasure he finds in evil is the bait that hooks him. Plato + has said so already, and Cicero repeats it: 'Plato voluptatem dicebat + escam malorum.' Grace sets over against it a greater pleasure, as St. + Augustine observed. All <i>pleasure</i> is a feeling of some perfection; + one <i>loves</i> an object in proportion as one feels its perfections; + nothing surpasses the divine perfections. Whence it follows that charity + and love of God give the greatest pleasure that can be conceived, in that + proportion in which one is penetrated by these feelings, which are not + common among men, busied and taken up as men are with the objects that + are concerned with their passions.</p> + + <p>279. Now as our corruption is not altogether invincible and as we do + not necessarily sin even when we are under the bondage of sin, it must + likewise be said that we are not aided invincibly; and, however + efficacious divine grace may be, there is justification for saying that + one can resist it. But when it indeed proves victorious, it is certain + and infallible beforehand that one will yield to its allurements, whether + it have its strength of itself or whether it find a way to triumph + through the congruity of circumstances. Thus one must always distinguish + between the infallible and the necessary.</p> + + <p>280. The system of those who call themselves Disciples of St. + Augustine is not far removed from this, provided one exclude certain + obnoxious things, whether in the expressions or in the dogmas themselves. + In the <i>expressions</i> I find that it is principally the <!-- Page 298 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page298"></a>[298]</span> use of terms + like 'necessary' or 'contingent', 'possible' or 'impossible', which + sometimes gives a handle and causes much ado. That is why, as Herr + Löscher the younger aptly observed in a learned dissertation on the + <i>Paroxysms of the Absolute Decree</i>, Luther desired, in his book + <i>On the Will in Bondage</i>, to find a word more fitting for that which + he wished to express than the word necessity. Speaking generally, it + appears more reasonable and more fitting to say that obedience to God's + precepts is always <i>possible</i>, even for the unregenerate; that the + grace of God is always <i>resistible</i>, even in those most holy, and + that <i>freedom</i> is exempt not only from <i>constraint</i> but also + from <i>necessity</i>, although it be never without infallible + <i>certainty</i> or without inclining <i>determination</i>.</p> + + <p>281. Nevertheless there is on the other hand a sense wherein it would + be permitted to say, in certain conjunctures, that the <i>power</i> to do + good is often lacking, even in the just; that sins are often + <i>necessary</i>, even in the regenerate; that it is <i>impossible</i> + sometimes for one not to sin; that grace is <i>irresistible</i>; that + freedom is not exempt from <i>necessity</i>. But these expressions are + less exact and less pleasing in the circumstances that prevail about us + to-day. They are also in general more open to misuse; and moreover they + savour somewhat of the speech of the people, where terms are employed + with great latitude. There are, however, circumstances which render them + acceptable and even serviceable. It is the case that sacred and orthodox + writers, and even the holy Scriptures, have made use of expressions on + both sides, and no real contradiction has arisen, any more than between + St. Paul and St. James, or any error on either side that might be + attributable to the ambiguity of the terms. One is so well accustomed to + these various ways of speaking that often one is put to it to say + precisely which sense is the more ordinary and the more natural, and even + that more intended by the author (<i>quis sensus magis naturalis, obvius, + intentus</i>). For the same writer has different aims in different + passages, and the same ways of speaking are more or less accepted or + acceptable before or after the decision of some great man or of some + authority that one respects and follows. As a result of this one may well + authorize or ban, as opportunity arises and at certain times, certain + expressions; but it makes no difference to the sense, or to the content + of faith, if sufficient explanations of the terms are not added.</p> + + <p>282. It is therefore only necessary to understand fully some + distinctions, such as that I have very often urged between the <!-- Page + 299 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page299"></a>[299]</span> necessary + and the certain, and between metaphysical necessity and moral necessity. + It is the same with possibility and impossibility, since the event whose + opposite is possible is contingent, even as that whose opposite is + impossible is necessary. A distinction is rightly drawn also between a + proximate potency and a remote potency; and, according to these different + senses, one says now that a thing may be and now that it may not be. It + may be said in a certain sense that it is necessary that the blessed + should not sin; that the devils and the damned should sin; that God + himself should choose the best; that man should follow the course which + after all attracts him most. But this necessity is not opposed to + contingency; it is not of the kind called logical, geometrical or + metaphysical, whose opposite implies contradiction. M. Nicole has made + use somewhere of a comparison which is not amiss. It is considered + impossible that a wise and serious magistrate, who has not taken leave of + his senses, should publicly commit some outrageous action, as it would + be, for instance, to run about the streets naked in order to make people + laugh. It is the same, in a sense, with the blessed; they are still less + capable of sinning, and the necessity that forbids them to sin is of the + same kind. Finally I also hold that 'will' is a term as equivocal as + potency and necessity. For I have already observed that those who employ + this axiom, that one does not fail to do what one wills when one can, and + who thence infer that God therefore does not will the salvation of all, + imply a <i>decretory will</i>. Only in that sense can one support this + proposition, that wisdom never wills what it knows to be among the things + that shall not happen. On the other hand, one may say, taking will in a + sense more general and more in conformity with customary use, that the + wise will is <i>inclined</i> antecedently to all good, although it + <i>decrees</i> finally to do that which is most fitting. Thus one would + be very wrong to deny to God the serious and strong inclination to save + all men, which Holy Scripture attributes to him; or even to attribute to + him an original distaste which diverts him from the salvation of a number + of persons, <i>odium antecedaneum</i>. One should rather maintain that + the wise mind tends towards all good, as good, in proportion to his + knowledge and his power, but that he only produces the best that can be + achieved. Those who admit that, and yet deny to God the antecedent will + to save all men, are wrong only in their misuse of the term, provided + that they acknowledge, besides, that God gives <!-- Page 300 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page300"></a>[300]</span> to all help sufficient + to enable them to win salvation if only they have the will to avail + themselves thereof.</p> + + <p>283. In the <i>dogmas</i> themselves held by the Disciples of St. + Augustine I cannot approve the damnation of unregenerate children, nor in + general damnation resulting from original sin alone. Nor can I believe + that God condemns those who are without the necessary light. One may + believe, with many theologians, that men receive more aid than we are + aware of, were it only when they are at the point of death. It does not + appear necessary either that all those who are saved should always be + saved through a grace efficacious of itself, independently of + circumstances. Also I consider it unnecessary to say that all the virtues + of the pagans were false or that all their actions were sins; though it + be true that what does not spring from faith, or from the uprightness of + the soul before God, is infected with sin, at least virtually. Finally I + hold that God cannot act as if at random by an absolutely absolute + decree, or by a will independent of reasonable motives. And I am + persuaded that he is always actuated, in the dispensation of his grace, + by reasons wherein the nature of the objects participates. Otherwise he + would not act in accordance with wisdom. I grant nevertheless that these + reasons are not of necessity bound up with the good or the less evil + natural qualities of men, as if God gave his grace only according to + these good qualities. Yet I hold, as I have explained already here, that + these qualities are taken into consideration like all the other + circumstances, since nothing can be neglected in the designs of supreme + wisdom.</p> + + <p>284. Save for these points, and some few others, where St. Augustine + appears obscure or even repellent, it seems as though one can conform to + his system. He states that from the substance of God only a God can + proceed, and that thus the creature is derived from nothingness + (Augustine <i>De Lib. Arb.</i>, lib. 1, c. 2). That is what makes the + creature imperfect, faulty and corruptible (<i>De Genesi ad Lit.</i>, c. + 15, <i>Contra Epistolam Manichaei</i>, c. 36). Evil comes not from + nature, but from evil will (Augustine, in the whole book <i>On the Nature + of Good</i>). God can command nothing that would be impossible. + 'Firmissime creditur Deum justum et bonum impossibilia non potuisse + praecipere' (<i>Lib. de Nat. et Grat.</i>, c. 43, p. 69). Nemo peccat in + eo, quod caveri non potest (lib. 3, <i>De Lib. Arb.</i>, c. 16, 17, + <i>lib.</i> 1 <i>Retract.</i> c. 11, 13, 15). Under a just God, none can + be unhappy who deserves not so to be, 'neque sub Deo justo <!-- Page 301 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page301"></a>[301]</span> miser esse + quisquam, nisi mereatur, potest' (lib. 1, c. 39). Free will cannot carry + out God's commands without the aid of grace (<i>Ep. ad Hilar. + Caesaraugustan.</i>). We know that grace is not given according to + deserts (Ep. 106, 107, 120). Man in the state of innocence had the aid + necessary to enable him to do good if he wished; but the wish depended on + free will, 'habebat adjutorium, per quod posset, et sine quo non vellet, + sed non adjutorium quo vellet' (<i>Lib. de Corrept.</i>, c. 11 et c. 10, + 12). God let angels and men try what they could do by their free will, + and after that what his grace and his justice could achieve (ibid., c. + 10, 11, 12). Sin turned man away from God, to turn him towards creatures + (lib. 1, qu. 2, <i>Ad Simplicium</i>). To take pleasure in sinning is the + freedom of a slave (<i>Enchirid.</i>, c. 103). 'Liberum arbitrium usque + adeo in peccatore non periit, ut per illud peccent maxime omnes, qui cum + delectatione peccant' (lib. 1, <i>Ad Bonifac.</i>, c. 2, 3).</p> + + <p>285. God said to Moses: 'I will be gracious to whom I will be + gracious, and will shew mercy on whom I will shew mercy' (Exod. xxxiii. + 19). 'So then it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but + of God that sheweth mercy' (Rom. ix. 15, 16). That does not prevent all + those who have good will, and who persevere therein, from being saved. + But God gives them the willing and the doing. 'Therefore hath he mercy on + whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth' (Rom. ix. 18). + And yet the same Apostle says that God willeth that all men should be + saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth; which I would not + interpret in accordance with some passages of St. Augustine, as if it + signified that no men are saved except those whose salvation he wills, or + as if he would save <i>non singulos generum, sed genera singulorum</i>. + But I would rather say that there is none whose salvation he willeth not, + in so far as this is permitted by greater reasons. For these bring it + about that God only saves those who accept the faith he has offered to + them and who surrender themselves thereto by the grace he has given them, + in accordance with what was consistent with the plan of his works in its + entirety, than which none can be better conceived.</p> + + <p>286. As for predestination to salvation, it includes also, according + to St. Augustine, the ordinance of the means that shall lead to + salvation. 'Praedestinatio sanctorum nihil aliud est, quam praescientia + et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque + liberantur' (<i>Lib. de Persev.</i>, c. 14). He does <!-- Page 302 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page302"></a>[302]</span> not then + understand it there as an absolute decree; he maintains that there is a + grace which is not rejected by any hardened heart, because it is given in + order to remove especially the hardness of hearts (<i>Lib. de + Praedest.</i>, c. 8; <i>Lib. de Grat.</i>, c. 13, 14). I do not find, + however, that St. Augustine conveys sufficiently that this grace, which + subdues the heart, is always efficacious of itself. And one might perhaps + have asserted without offence to him that the same degree of inward grace + is victorious in the one, where it is aided by outward circumstances, but + not in the other.</p> + + <p>287. Will is proportionate to the sense we have of the good, and + follows the sense which prevails. 'Si utrumque tantundem diligimus, nihil + horum dabimus. Item: Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur + necesse est' (in c. 5, <i>Ad Gal.</i>). I have explained already how, + despite all that, we have indeed a great power over our will. St. + Augustine takes it somewhat differently, and in a way that does not go + far, when he says that nothing is so much within our power as the action + of our will. And he gives a reason which is almost tautological: for (he + says) this action is ready at the moment when we will. 'Nihil tam in + nostra potestate est, quam ipsa voluntas, ea enim mox ut volumus praesto + est' (lib. 3, <i>De Lib. Arb.</i>, c. 3; lib. 5, <i>De Civ. Dei</i>, c. + 10). But that only means that we will when we will, and not that we will + that which we wish to will. There is more reason for saying with him: + '<i>aut voluntas non est, aut libera dicenda est</i>' (d. 1, 3, c. 3); + and that what inclines the will towards good infallibly, or certainly, + does not prevent it from being free. 'Perquam absurdum est, ut ideo + dicamus non pertinere ad voluntatem [libertatem] nostram, quod beati esse + volumus, quia id omnino nolle non possumus, nescio qua bona constrictione + naturae. Nec dicere audemus ideo Deum non voluntatem [libertatem], sed + necessitatem habere justitiae, quia non potest velle peccare. Certe Deus + ipse numquid quia peccare non potest, ideo liberum arbitrium habere + negandus est?' (<i>De Nat. et Grat.</i>, c. 46, 47, 48, 49). He also says + aptly, that God gives the first good impulse, but that afterwards man + acts also. 'Aguntur ut agant, non ut ipsi nihil agant' (<i>De + Corrept.</i>, c. 2).</p> + + <p>288. I have proved that free will is the proximate cause of the evil + of guilt, and consequently of the evil of punishment; although it is true + that the original imperfection of creatures, which is already presented + in the eternal ideas, is the first and most remote <!-- Page 303 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page303"></a>[303]</span> cause. M. Bayle + nevertheless always disputes this use of the notion of free will; he will + not have the cause of evil ascribed to it. One must listen to his + objections, but first it will be well to throw further light on the + nature of freedom. I have shown that freedom, according to the definition + required in the schools of theology, consists in intelligence, which + involves a clear knowledge of the object of deliberation, in spontaneity, + whereby we determine, and in contingency, that is, in the exclusion of + logical or metaphysical necessity. Intelligence is, as it were, the soul + of freedom, and the rest is as its body and foundation. The free + substance is self-determining and that according to the motive of good + perceived by the understanding, which inclines it without compelling it: + and all the conditions of freedom are comprised in these few words. It is + nevertheless well to point out that the imperfection present in our + knowledge and our spontaneity, and the infallible determination that is + involved in our contingency, destroy neither freedom nor contingency.</p> + + <p>289. Our knowledge is of two kinds, distinct or confused. Distinct + knowledge, or <i>intelligence</i>, occurs in the actual use of reason; + but the senses supply us with confused thoughts. And we may say that we + are immune from bondage in so far as we act with a distinct knowledge, + but that we are the slaves of passion in so far as our perceptions are + confused. In this sense we have not all the freedom of spirit that were + to be desired, and we may say with St. Augustine that being subject to + sin we have the freedom of a slave. Yet a slave, slave as he is, + nevertheless has freedom to choose according to the state wherein he is, + although more often than not he is under the stern necessity of choosing + between two evils, because a superior force prevents him from attaining + the goods whereto he aspires. That which in a slave is effected by bonds + and constraint in us is effected by passions, whose violence is sweet, + but none the less pernicious. In truth we will only that which pleases + us: but unhappily what pleases us now is often a real evil, which would + displease us if we had the eyes of the understanding open. Nevertheless + that evil state of the slave, which is also our own, does not prevent us, + any more than him, from making a free choice of that which pleases us + most, in the state to which we are reduced, in proportion to our present + strength and knowledge.</p> + + <p>290. As for spontaneity, it belongs to us in so far as we have within + us the source of our actions, as Aristotle rightly conceived. <!-- Page + 304 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page304"></a>[304]</span> The + impressions of external things often, indeed, divert us from our path, + and it was commonly believed that, at least in this respect, some of the + sources of our actions were outside ourselves. I admit that one is bound + to speak thus, adapting oneself to the popular mode of expression, as one + may, in a certain sense, without doing violence to truth. But when it is + a question of expressing oneself accurately I maintain that our + spontaneity suffers no exception and that external things have no + physical influence upon us, I mean in the strictly philosophical + sense.</p> + + <p>291. For better understanding of this point, one must know that true + spontaneity is common to us and all simple substances, and that in the + intelligent or free substance this becomes a mastery over its actions. + That cannot be better explained than by the System of Pre-established + Harmony, which I indeed propounded some years ago. There I pointed out + that by nature every simple substance has perception, and that its + individuality consists in the perpetual law which brings about the + sequence of perceptions that are assigned to it, springing naturally from + one another, to represent the body that is allotted to it, and through + its instrumentality the entire universe, in accordance with the point of + view proper to this simple substance and without its needing to receive + any physical influence from the body. Even so the body also for its part + adapts itself to the wishes of the soul by its own laws, and consequently + only obeys it according to the promptings of these laws. Whence it + follows that the soul has in itself a perfect spontaneity, so that it + depends only upon God and upon itself in its actions.</p> + + <p>292. As this system was not known formerly, other ways were sought for + emerging from this labyrinth, and the Cartesians themselves were in + difficulties over the subject of free will. They were no longer satisfied + by the 'faculties' of the Schoolmen, and they considered that all the + actions of the soul appear to be determined by what comes from without, + according to the impressions of the senses, and that, ultimately, all is + controlled in the universe by the providence of God. Thence arose + naturally the objection that there is therefore no freedom. To that M. + Descartes replied that we are assured of God's providence by reason; but + that we are likewise assured of our freedom by experience thereof within + ourselves; and that we must believe in both, even though we see not how + it is possible to reconcile them.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 305 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page305"></a>[305]</span></p> + + <p>293. That was cutting the Gordian knot, and answering the conclusion + of an argument not by refuting it but by opposing thereto a contrary + argument. Which procedure does not conform to the laws for philosophical + disputes. Notwithstanding, most of the Cartesians contented themselves + with this, albeit the inward experience they adduce does not prove their + assertion, as M. Bayle has clearly shown. M. Regis (<i>Philos.</i>, vol. + 1, Metaph., book 2, part 2, c. 22) thus paraphrases M. Descartes' + doctrine: 'Most philosophers', he says, 'have fallen into error. Some, + not being able to understand the relation existing between free actions + and the providence of God, have denied that God was the first efficient + cause of free will: but that is sacrilegious. The others, not being able + to apprehend the relation between God's efficacy and free actions, have + denied that man was endowed with freedom: and that is a blasphemy. The + mean to be found between these two extremes is to say' (id. ibid., p. + 485) 'that, even though we were not able to understand all the relations + existing between freedom and God's providence, we should nevertheless be + bound to acknowledge that we are free and dependent upon God. For both + these truths are equally known, the one through experience, and the other + through reason; and prudence forbids one to abandon truths whereof one is + assured, under the pretext that one cannot apprehend all the relations + existing between them and other truths well known.'</p> + + <p>294. M. Bayle here remarks pertinently in the margin, 'that these + expressions of M. Regis fail to point out that we are aware of relations + between man's actions and God's providence, such as appear to us to be + incompatible with our freedom.' He adds that these expressions are + over-circumspect, weakening the statement of the problem. 'Authors + assume', he says, 'that the difficulty arises solely from our lack of + enlightenment; whereas they ought to say that it arises in the main from + the enlightenment which we have, and cannot reconcile' (in M. Bayle's + opinion) 'with our Mysteries.' That is exactly what I said at the + beginning of this work, that if the Mysteries were irreconcilable with + reason, and if there were unanswerable objections, far from finding the + mystery incomprehensible, we should comprehend that it was false. It is + true that here there is no question of a mystery, but only of natural + religion.</p> + + <p>295. This is how M. Bayle combats those inward experiences, <!-- Page + 306 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page306"></a>[306]</span> whereon + the Cartesians make freedom rest: but he begins by reflexions with which + I cannot agree. 'Those who do not make profound examination', he says + (<i>Dictionary</i>, art. 'Helen.', lit. <span lang="el" title="TD" + >ΤΔ</span>), 'of that which passes within them easily + persuade themselves that they are free, and that, if their will prompts + them to evil, it is their fault, it is through a choice whereof they are + the masters. Those who judge otherwise are persons who have studied with + care the springs and the circumstances of their actions, and who have + thought over the progress of their soul's impulses. Those persons usually + have doubts about their free will, and even come to persuade themselves + that their reason and mind are slaves, without power to resist the force + that carries them along where they would not go. It was principally + persons of this kind who ascribed to the gods the cause of their evil + deeds.'</p> + + <p>296. These words remind me of those of Chancellor Bacon, who says that + a little philosophy inclineth us away from God, but that depth in + philosophy bringeth men's minds about to him. It is the same with those + who reflect upon their actions: it appears to them at first that all we + do is only impulsion from others, and that all we apprehend comes from + without through the senses, and is traced upon the void of our mind + <i>tanquam in tabula rasa</i>. But more profound meditation shows us that + all (even perceptions and passions) comes to us from our own inner being, + with complete spontaneity.</p> + + <p>297. Yet M. Bayle cites poets who pretend to exonerate men by laying + the blame upon the gods. Medea in Ovid speaks thus:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i4"><i>Frustra, Medea, repugnas,</i></p> + <p><i>Nescio quid Deus obstat, ait.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>And a little later Ovid makes her add:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Sed trahit invitam nova vis, aliudque Cupido,</i></p> + <p><i>Mens aliud suadet; video meliora proboque,</i></p> + <p><i>Deteriora sequor</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But one could set against that a passage from Vergil, who makes Nisus + say with far more reason:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Di ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,</i></p> + <p><i>Euryale, an sua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>298. Herr Wittich seems to have thought that in reality our + independence is only apparent. For in his <i>Diss. de providentia Dei + <!-- Page 307 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page307"></a>[307]</span> + actuali</i> (n. 61) he makes free will consist in our being inclined + towards the objects that present themselves to our soul for affirmation + or denial, love or hate, in such a way that we <i>do not feel</i> we are + being determined by any outward force. He adds that it is when God + himself causes our volitions that we act with most freedom; and that the + more efficacious and powerful God's action is upon us, the more we are + masters of our actions. 'Quia enim Deus operatur ipsum velle, quo + efficacius operatur, eo magis volumus; quod autem, cum volumus, facimus, + id maxime habemus in nostra potestate.' It is true that when God causes a + volition in us he causes a free action. But it seems to me that the + question here is not of the universal cause or of that production of our + will which is proper to it in so far as it is a created effect, whose + positive elements are actually created continually through God's + co-operation, like all other absolute reality of things. We are concerned + here with the reasons for willing, and the means God uses when he gives + us a good will or permits us to have an evil will. It is always we who + produce it, good or evil, for it is our action: but there are always + reasons that make us act, without impairing either our spontaneity or our + freedom. Grace does no more than give impressions which are conducive to + making will operate through fitting motives, such as would be an + attention, <i>a dic cur hic</i>, a prevenient pleasure. And it is quite + evident that that does not interfere with freedom, any more than could a + friend who gives counsel and furnishes motives. Thus Herr Wittich has not + supplied an answer to the question, any more than M. Bayle, and recourse + to God is of no avail here.</p> + + <p>299. But let me give another much more reasonable passage from the + same M. Bayle, where he disputes with greater force the so-called lively + sense of freedom, which according to the Cartesians is a proof of + freedom. His words are indeed full of wit, and worthy of consideration, + and occur in the <i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i> (vol. III, + ch. 140, p. 761 <i>seqq.</i>). Here they are: 'By the clear and distinct + sense we have of our existence we do not discern whether we exist through + ourselves or derive our being from another. We discern that only by + reflexion, that is, through meditation upon our powerlessness in the + matter of conserving ourselves as much as we would, and of freeing + ourselves from dependence upon the beings that surround us, etc. It is + indeed certain that the pagans (the same must be said of the Socinians, + since they deny <!-- Page 308 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page308"></a>[308]</span> the creation) never attained to the + knowledge of that true dogma that we were created from nothing, and that + we are derived from nothingness at every moment of our continuance. They + therefore thought erroneously that all substances in the universe exist + of themselves and can never be reduced to nothing, and that thus they + depend upon no other thing save in respect of their modifications, which + are liable to be destroyed by the action of an external cause. Does not + this error spring from the fact that we are unconscious of the creative + action which conserves us, and that we are only conscious of our + existence? That we are conscious of it, I say, in such a way that we + should for ever remain ignorant of the cause of our being if other + knowledge did not aid us? Let us say also, that the clear and distinct + sense we have of the acts of our will cannot make us discern whether we + give them ourselves to ourselves or receive them from that same cause + which gives us existence. We must have recourse to reflexion or to + meditation in order to effect this discrimination. Now I assert that one + can never by purely philosophical meditations arrive at an established + certainty that we are the efficient cause of our volitions: for every + person who makes due investigation will recognize clearly, that if we + were only passive subjects with regard to will we should have the same + sensations of experience as we have when we think that we are free. + Assume, for the sake of argument, that God so ordered the laws of the + union between soul and body that all the modalities of the soul, without + a single exception, are of necessity linked together with the + interposition of the modalities of the brain. You will then understand + that nothing will happen to us except that of which we are conscious: + there will be in our soul the same sequence of thoughts from the + perception of objects of the senses, which is its first step, up to the + most definite volitions, which are its final step. There will be in this + sequence the consciousness of ideas, that of affirmations, that of + irresolutions, that of velleities and that of volitions. For whether the + act of willing be impressed upon us by an external cause or we bring it + about ourselves, it will be equally true that we will, and that we feel + that we will. Moreover, as this external cause can blend as much pleasure + as it will with the volition which it impresses upon us, we shall be able + to feel at times that the acts of our will please us infinitely, and that + they lead us according to the bent of our strongest inclinations. We + shall feel no constraint; you know the maxim: <i>voluntas non <!-- Page + 309 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page309"></a>[309]</span> potest + cogi</i>. Do you not clearly understand that a weather-vane, always + having communicated to it simultaneously (in such a way, however, that + priority of nature or, if one will, a real momentary priority, should + attach to the desire for motion) movement towards a certain point on the + horizon, and the wish to turn in that direction, would be persuaded that + it moved of itself to fulfil the desires which it conceived? I assume + that it would not know that there were winds, or that an external cause + changed everything simultaneously, both its situation and its desires. + That is the state we are in by our nature: we know not whether an + invisible cause makes us pass sufficiently from one thought to another. + It is therefore natural that men are persuaded that they determine their + own acts. But it remains to be discovered whether they are mistaken in + that, as in countless other things they affirm by a kind of instinct and + without having made use of philosophic meditation. Since therefore there + are two hypotheses as to what takes place in man: the one that he is only + a passive subject, the other that he has active virtues, one cannot in + reason prefer the second to the first, so long as one can only adduce + proofs of feeling. For we should feel with an equal force that we wish + this or that, whether all our volitions were imprinted upon our soul by + an exterior and invisible cause, or we formed them ourselves.'</p> + + <p>300. There are here excellent arguments, which are valid against the + usual systems; but they fail in respect of the System of Pre-established + Harmony, which takes us further than we were able to go formerly. M. + Bayle asserts, for instance, 'that by purely philosophical meditations + one can never attain to an established certainty that we are the + efficient cause of our volitions'. But this is a point which I do not + concede to him: for the establishment of this system demonstrates beyond + a doubt that in the course of nature each substance is the sole cause of + all its actions, and that it is free of all physical influence from every + other substance, save the customary co-operation of God. And this system + shows that our spontaneity is real, and not only apparent, as Herr + Wittich believed it to be. M. Bayle asserts also on the same reasons (ch. + 170, p. 1132) that if there were a <i>fatum Astrologicum</i> this would + not destroy freedom; and I would concede that to him, if freedom + consisted only in an apparent spontaneity.</p> + + <p>301. The spontaneity of our actions can therefore no longer be + questioned; and Aristotle has defined it well, saying that an <!-- Page + 310 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page310"></a>[310]</span> action is + <i>spontaneous</i> when its source is in him who acts. 'Spontaneum est, + cujus principium est in agente.' Thus it is that our actions and our + wills depend entirely upon us. It is true that we are not directly the + masters of our will, although we be its cause; for we do not choose + volitions, as we choose our actions by our volitions. Yet we have a + certain power also over our will, because we can contribute indirectly + towards willing another time that which we would fain will now, as I have + here already shown: that, however, is no <i>velleity</i>, properly + speaking. There also we have a mastery, individual and even perceptible, + over our actions and our wills, resulting from a combination of + spontaneity with intelligence.</p> + + <p>302. Up to this point I have expounded the two conditions of freedom + mentioned by Aristotle, that is, <i>spontaneity</i> and + <i>intelligence</i>, which are found united in us in deliberation, + whereas beasts lack the second condition. But the Schoolmen demand yet a + third, which they call <i>indifference</i>. And indeed one must admit it, + if indifference signifies as much as 'contingency'; for I have already + said here that freedom must exclude an absolute and metaphysical or + logical necessity. But, as I have declared more than once, this + indifference, this contingency, this non-necessity, if I may venture so + to speak, which is a characteristic attribute of freedom, does not + prevent one from having stronger inclinations towards the course one + chooses; nor does it by any means require that one be absolutely and + equally indifferent towards the two opposing courses.</p> + + <p>303. I therefore admit indifference only in the one sense, implying + the same as contingency, or non-necessity. But, as I have declared more + than once, I do not admit an indifference of equipoise, and I do not + think that one ever chooses when one is absolutely indifferent. Such a + choice would be, as it were, mere chance, without determining reason, + whether apparent or hidden. But such a chance, such an absolute and + actual fortuity, is a chimera which never occurs in nature. All wise men + are agreed that chance is only an apparent thing, like fortune: only + ignorance of causes gives rise to it. But if there were such a vague + indifference, or rather if we were to choose without having anything to + prompt us to the choice, chance would then be something actual, + resembling what, according to Epicurus, took place in that little + deviation of the atoms, occurring without cause or reason. Epicurus had + <!-- Page 311 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page311"></a>[311]</span> + introduced it in order to evade necessity, and Cicero with good reason + ridiculed it.</p> + + <p>304. This deviation had a final cause in the mind of Epicurus, his aim + being to free us from fate; but it can have no efficient cause in the + nature of things, it is one of the most impossible of chimeras. M. Bayle + himself refutes it admirably, as we shall see presently. And yet it is + surprising that he appears to admit elsewhere himself something of like + nature with this supposed deviation: here is what he says, when speaking + of Buridan's ass (<i>Dictionary</i>, art. 'Buridan', lit. 13): 'Those who + advocate free will properly so called admit in man a power of + determining, either to the right hand or the left, even when the motives + are perfectly uniform on the side of each of the two opposing objects. + For they maintain that our soul can say, without having any reason other + than that of using its freedom: "I prefer this to that, although I see + nothing more worthy of my choice in the one than the other".'</p> + + <p>305. All those who admit a free will properly so called will not for + that reason concede to M. Bayle this determination springing from an + indeterminate cause. St. Augustine and the Thomists believe that all is + determined. And one sees that their opponents resort also to the + circumstances which contribute to our choice. Experience by no means + approves the chimera of an indifference of equipoise; and one can employ + here the argument that M. Bayle himself employed against the Cartesians' + manner of proving freedom by the lively sense of our independence. For + although I do not always see the reason for an inclination which makes me + choose between two apparently uniform courses, there will always be some + impression, however imperceptible, that determines us. The mere desire to + make use of one's freedom has no effect of specifying, or determining us + to the choice of one course or the other.</p> + + <p>306. M. Bayle goes on: 'There are at the very least two ways whereby + man can extricate himself from the snares of equipoise. One, which I have + already mentioned, is for a man to flatter himself with the pleasing + fancy that he is master in his own house, and that he does not depend + upon objects.' This way is blocked: for all that one might wish to play + master in one's own house, that has no determining effect, nor does it + favour one course more than the other. M. Bayle goes on: 'He would make + this Act: I will prefer <!-- Page 312 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page312"></a>[312]</span> this to that, because it pleases me to + behave thus.' But these words, 'because it pleases me', 'because such is + my pleasure', imply already a leaning towards 'the object that + pleases'.</p> + + <p>307. There is therefore no justification for continuing thus: 'And so + that which determined him would not be taken from the object; the motive + would be derived only from the ideas men have of their own perfections, + or of their natural faculties. The other way is that of the lot or + chance: the short straw would decide.' This way has an outlet, but it + does not reach the goal: it would alter the issue, for in such a case it + is not man who decides. Or again if one maintains that it is still the + man who decides by lot, man himself is no longer in equipoise, because + the lot is not, and the man has attached himself to it. There are always + reasons in Nature which cause that which happens by chance or through the + lot. I am somewhat surprised that a mind so shrewd as M. Bayle's could + have allowed itself to be so misled on this point. I have set out + elsewhere the true rejoinder to the Buridan sophism: it is that the case + of perfect equipoise is impossible, since the universe can never be + halved, so as to make all impressions equivalent on both sides.</p> + + <p>308. Let us see what M. Bayle himself says elsewhere against the + chimerical or absolutely undefined indifference. Cicero had said (in his + book <i>De Fato</i>) that Carneades had found something more subtle than + the deviation of atoms, attributing the cause of a so-called absolutely + undefined indifference to the voluntary motions of souls, because these + motions have no need of an external cause, coming as they do from our + nature. But M. Bayle (<i>Dictionary</i>, art. 'Epicurus', p. 1143) aptly + replies that all that which springs from the nature of a thing is + determined: thus determination always remains, and Carneades' evasion is + of no avail.</p> + + <p>309. He shows elsewhere (<i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, ch. 90, l. 2, p. 229) 'that a freedom far removed from + this so-called equipoise is incomparably more beneficial. I mean', he + says, 'a freedom such as may always follow the judgements of the mind, + and such as cannot resist objects clearly recognized as good. I know of + no people who do not agree that truth clearly recognized necessitates' + (determines rather, unless one speak of a moral necessity) 'the assent of + the soul; experience teaches us that. In the schools they teach + constantly that as the true is the object of <!-- Page 313 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page313"></a>[313]</span> the understanding, so + the good is the object of the will. So likewise they teach that as the + understanding can never affirm anything save that which is shown to it + under the semblance of truth, the will can never love anything which to + it does not appear to be good. One never believes the false as such, and + one never loves evil as evil. There is in the understanding a natural + determination towards the true in general, and towards each individual + truth clearly recognized. There is in the will a natural determination + towards good in general; whence many philosophers conclude that from the + moment when individual goods are clearly recognized by us we are of + necessity compelled to love them. The understanding suspends its actions + only when its objects show themselves obscurely, so that there is cause + for doubt as to whether they are false or true. That leads many persons + to the conclusion that the will remains in equipoise only when the soul + is uncertain whether the object presented to it is a good with regard to + it; but that also, the moment the soul decides in the affirmative, it of + necessity clings to that object until other judgements of the mind + determine it otherwise. Those who expound freedom in this fashion think + to find therein plentiful enough material for merit or demerit. For they + assume that these judgements of the mind proceed from a free attention of + the soul in examining the objects, comparing them together, and + discriminating between them. I must not forget that there are very + learned men' (such as Bellarmine, lib. 3, <i>De Gratia et Libero + Arbitrio</i>, c. 8, et 9, and Cameron, in <i>Responsione ad Epistolam + Viri Docti, id est Episcopii</i>) 'who maintain with very cogent reasons + that the will always of necessity follows the last practical act of the + understanding.'</p> + + <p>310. One must make some observations on this discourse. A very clear + recognition of the best <i>determines</i> the will; but it does not + necessitate it, properly speaking. One must always distinguish between + the necessary and the certain or infallible, as I have already observed + more than once, and distinguish metaphysical necessity from moral + necessity. I think also that it is only God's will which always follows + the judgements of the understanding: all intelligent creatures are + subject to some passions, or to perceptions at least, that are not + composed entirely of what I call <i>adequate ideas</i>. And although in + the blessed these passions always tend towards the true good, by virtue + of the laws of Nature and the system of things pre-established in + relation to them, yet this <!-- Page 314 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page314"></a>[314]</span> does not always happen in such a way that + they have a perfect knowledge of that good. It is the same with them as + with us, who do not always understand the reason for our instincts. The + angels and the blessed are created beings, even as we are, in whom there + is always some confused perception mingled with distinct knowledge. + Suarez said something similar concerning them. He thinks (<i>Treatise on + Prayer</i>, book I, ch. 11) that God has so ordered things beforehand + that their prayers, when they are made with a full will, always succeed: + that is an example of a pre-established harmony. As for us, in addition + to the judgement of the understanding, of which we have an express + knowledge, there are mingled therewith confused perceptions of the + senses, and these beget passions and even imperceptible inclinations, of + which we are not always aware. These movements often thwart the judgement + of the practical understanding.</p> + + <p>311. As for the parallel between the relation of the understanding to + the true and that of the will to the good, one must know that a clear and + distinct perception of a truth contains within it actually the + affirmation of this truth: thus the understanding is necessitated in that + direction. But whatever perception one may have of the good, the effort + to act in accordance with the judgement, which in my opinion forms the + essence of the will, is distinct from it. Thus, since there is need of + time to raise this effort to its climax, it may be suspended, and even + changed, by a new perception or inclination which passes athwart it, + which diverts the mind from it, and which even causes it sometimes to + make a contrary judgement. Hence it comes that our soul has so many means + of resisting the truth which it knows, and that the passage from mind to + heart is so long. Especially is this so when the understanding to a great + extent proceeds only by faint <i>thoughts</i>, which have only slight + power to affect, as I have explained elsewhere. Thus the connexion + between judgement and will is not so necessary as one might think.</p> + + <p>312. M. Bayle goes on to say, with truth (p. 221): 'Indeed, it cannot + be a fault in man's soul that it has no freedom of indifference as + regards good in general. It would be rather a disorder, an inordinate + imperfection, if one could say truthfully: It is all one to me whether I + am happy or unhappy; I have no more determination to love the good than + to hate it; I can do both equally. Now if it is a praiseworthy and + advantageous quality to be determinate <!-- Page 315 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page315"></a>[315]</span> as regards good in + general, it cannot be a fault if one is necessitated as regards each + individual good recognized plainly as for our good. It seems even as + though it were a necessary conclusion, that if the soul has no freedom of + indifference as regards good in general, it also has none in respect of + particular goods which after due examination it judges to be goods in + relation to it. What should we think of a soul which, having formed that + judgement, had, and prided itself on having, the power not to love these + goods, and even to hate them, and which said: I recognize clearly that + these are goods for me, I have all the enlightenment necessary on that + point; nevertheless I will not love them, I will hate them; my decision + is made, I act upon it; it is not that any reason' (that is, any other + reason than that which is founded upon 'Such is my good pleasure') 'urges + me thereto, but it pleases me so to behave: what should we think, I say, + of such a soul? Should we not find it more imperfect and more unhappy + than if it had not this freedom of indifference?</p> + + <p>313. 'Not only does the doctrine that subjects the will to the final + acts of the understanding give a more favourable idea of the state of the + soul, but it shows also that it is easier to lead man to happiness along + that road than along the road of indifference. It will suffice to + enlighten his mind upon his true interests, and straightway his will will + comply with the judgements that reason shall have pronounced. But if he + has a freedom independent of reason and of the quality of objects clearly + recognized, he will be the most intractable of all animals, and it will + never be possible to rely upon making him choose the right course. All + the counsels, all the arguments in the world may prove unavailing; you + will give him explanations, you will convince his mind, and yet his will + will play the haughty madam and remain motionless as a rock. Vergil, + <i>Aen</i>., lib. 6, v. 470:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Non magis incepto vultum sermone movetur,</i></p> + <p><i>Quam si dura silex, aut stet Marpesia cautes</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>A caprice, an empty whim will make her stiffen against reasons of all + kinds; it will not please her to love her clearly recognized good, it + will please her to hate it. Do you consider such a faculty, sir, to be + the richest present God can have made to man, and the sole instrument of + our happiness? Is it not rather an obstacle to our felicity? Is there + cause for boasting in being able to say: "I have <!-- Page 316 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page316"></a>[316]</span> scorned all the + judgements of my reason, and I have followed an altogether different + path, simply from considerations of my own good pleasure?" With what + regrets would one not be torn, in that case, if the determination made + had an ill result? Such a freedom would therefore be more harmful than + profitable to men, because the understanding would not present all the + goodness of the objects clearly enough to deprive the will of the power + of rejection. It would be therefore infinitely better for man to be + always of necessity determined by the judgement of the understanding, + than to permit the will to suspend its action. For by this means it would + achieve its aim with greater ease and certainty.'</p> + + <p>314. Upon this discourse I make the further observation, that it is + very true that a freedom of indifference, undefined and without any + determining reason, would be as harmful, and even objectionable, as it is + impracticable and chimerical. The man who wished to behave thus, or at + the least appear to be acting without due cause, would most certainly be + looked upon as irrational. But it is very true also that the thing is + impossible, when it is taken strictly in accordance with the assumption. + As soon as one tries to give an example of it one misses one's aim and + stumbles upon the case of a man who, while he does not come to a decision + without cause, does so rather under the influence of inclination or + passion than of judgement. As soon as one says: 'I scorn the judgements + of my reason simply from considerations of my own good pleasure, it + pleases me to behave thus', it is as if one were to say: I prefer my + inclination to my interest, my pleasure to my profit.</p> + + <p>315. Even so some capricious man, fancying that it is ignominious for + him to follow the advice of his friends or his servants, might prefer the + satisfaction of contradicting them to the profit he could derive from + their counsel. It may happen, however, that in a matter of small moment a + wise man acts irregularly and against his own interest in order to thwart + another who tries to restrain him or direct him, or that he may + disconcert those who watch his steps. It is even well at times to imitate + Brutus by concealing one's wit, and even to feign madness, as David did + before the King of the Philistines.</p> + + <p>316. M. Bayle admirably supplements his remarks with the object of + showing that to act against the judgement of the understanding would be a + great imperfection. He observes (p. 225) that, <!-- Page 317 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page317"></a>[317]</span> even according to the + Molinists, 'the understanding which does its <font class="sc">duty</font> + well indicates that which is <font class="sc">the best</font>'. He + introduces God (ch. 91, p. 227) saying to our first parents in the Garden + of Eden: 'I have given you my knowledge, the faculty of judging things, + and full power to dispose your wills. I shall give you instructions and + orders; but the free will that I have bestowed upon you is of such a + nature that you have equal power (according to circumstances) to obey me + and to disobey me. You will be tempted: if you make a good use of your + freedom you will be happy; and if you use it ill you will be unhappy. It + is for you to see if you wish to ask of me, as a new grace, either that I + permit you to abuse your freedom when you shall make resolve to do so, or + that I prevent you from doing so. Consider carefully, I give you four and + twenty hours. Do you not clearly understand' (adds M. Bayle) 'that their + reason, which had not yet been obscured by sin, would have made them + conclude that they must ask God, as the crowning point of the favours + wherewith he had honoured them, not to permit them to destroy themselves + by an ill use of their powers? And must one not admit that if Adam, + through wrongly making it a point of honour to order his own goings, had + refused a divine direction that would have safeguarded his happiness, he + would have been the prototype of all such as Phaeton and Icarus? He would + have been well-nigh as ungodly as the Ajax of Sophocles, who wished to + conquer without the aid of the gods, and who said that the most craven + would put their enemies to flight with such aid.'</p> + + <p>317. M. Bayle also shows (ch. 80) that one congratulates oneself no + less, or even takes more credit to oneself, for having been aided from + above, than for owing one's happiness to one's own choice. And if one + does well through having preferred a tumultuous instinct, which arose + suddenly, to reasons maturely considered, one feels an extraordinary joy + in this; for one assumes that either God, or our Guardian Angel, or + something or other which one pictures to oneself under the vague name of + <i>good luck</i> has impelled us thereto. Indeed, Sulla and Caesar + boasted more of their good luck than of their prudence. The pagans, and + particularly the poets (Homer especially), determined their heroes' acts + by divine promptings. The hero of the <i>Aeneid</i> proceeds only under + the direction of a God. It was very great praise offered to the Emperors + if one said that they were victorious both through their <!-- Page 318 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page318"></a>[318]</span> troops and + through their gods whom they lent to their generals: 'Te copias, te + consilium et tuos praebente Divos,' said Horace. The generals fought + under the auspices of the Emperors, as if trusting to the Emperor's good + luck, for subordinate officers had no rights regarding the auspices. One + takes credit to oneself for being a favourite of heaven, one rates + oneself more highly for the possession of good fortune than of talent. + There are no people that think themselves more fortunate than the + mystics, who imagine that they keep still while God acts within them.</p> + + <p>318. 'On the other hand', M. Bayle adds (ch. 83), 'a Stoic + philosopher, who attaches to everything an inevitable necessity, is as + susceptible as another man to the pleasure of having chosen well. And + every man of sense will find that, far from taking pleasure in the + thought of having deliberated long and finally chosen the most honourable + course, one feels incredible satisfaction in persuading oneself that one + is so firmly rooted in the love of virtue that without the slightest + resistance one would repel a temptation. A man to whom is suggested the + doing of a deed contrary to his duty, his honour and his conscience, who + answers forthwith that he is incapable of such a crime, and who is + certainly not capable of it, is far more contented with himself than if + he asked for time to consider it, and were for some hours in a state of + indecision as to which course to take. One is on many occasions regretful + over not being able to make up one's mind between two courses, and one + would be well pleased that the counsel of a good friend, or some succour + from above, should impel us to make a good choice.' All that demonstrates + for us the advantage a determinate judgement has over that vague + indifference which leaves us in uncertainty. But indeed I have proved + sufficiently that only ignorance or passion has power to keep us in + doubt, and have thus given the reason why God is never in doubt. The + nearer one comes to him, the more perfect is freedom, and the more it is + determined by the good and by reason. The character of Cato, of whom + Velleius said that it was impossible for him to perform a dishonourable + action, will always be preferred to that of a man who is capable of + wavering.</p> + + <p>319. I have been well pleased to present and to support these + arguments of M. Bayle against vague indifference, as much for the + elucidation of the subject as to confront him with himself, and to + demonstrate that he ought therefore not to complain of the <!-- Page 319 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page319"></a>[319]</span> alleged + necessity imposed upon God, of choosing the best way that is possible. + For either God will act through a vague indifference and at random, or + again he will act on caprice or through some other passion, or finally he + must act through a prevailing inclination of reason which prompts him to + the best. But passions, which come from the confused perception of an + apparent good, cannot occur in God; and vague indifference is something + chimerical. It is therefore only the strongest reason that can regulate + God's choice. It is an imperfection in our freedom that makes us capable + of choosing evil instead of good, a greater evil instead of the lesser + evil, the lesser good instead of the greater good. That arises from the + appearances of good and evil, which deceive us; whereas God is always + prompted to the true and the greatest good, that is, to the absolutely + true good, which he cannot fail to know.</p> + + <p>320. This false idea of freedom, conceived by those who, not content + with exempting it, I do not say from constraint, but from necessity + itself, would also exempt it from certainty and determination, that is, + from reason and perfection, nevertheless pleased some Schoolmen, people + who often become entangled in their own subtleties, and take the straw of + terms for the grain of things. They assume some chimerical notion, whence + they think to derive some use, and which they endeavour to maintain by + quibblings. Complete indifference is of this nature: to concede it to the + will is to grant it a privilege of the kind that some Cartesians and some + mystics find in the divine nature, of being able to do the impossible, to + produce absurdities, to cause two contradictory propositions to be true + simultaneously. To claim that a determination comes from a complete + indifference absolutely indeterminate is to claim that it comes naturally + from nothing. Let it be assumed that God does not give this + determination: it has accordingly no fountainhead in the soul, nor in the + body, nor in circumstances, since all is assumed to be indeterminate; and + yet there it is, appearing and existing without preparation, nothing + making ready for it, no angel, not even God himself, being able to see or + to show how it exists. That would be not only the emergence of something + from nothing, but its emergence thence <i>of itself</i>. This doctrine + introduces something as preposterous as the theory already mentioned, of + the deviation of atoms, whereby Epicurus asserted that one of these small + bodies, going in a straight line, would turn aside all at <!-- Page 320 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page320"></a>[320]</span> once from its + path, without any reason, simply because the will so commands. Take note + moreover that he resorted to that only to justify this alleged freedom of + complete indifference, a chimerical notion which appears to be of very + ancient origin; and one may with good reason say: <i>Chimaera Chimaeram + parit</i>.</p> + + <p>321. This is the way Signor Marchetti has expressed it in his + admirable translation of Lucretius into Italian verse, which has not yet + been published (Book 2):</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Mà ch'i principii poi non corran punto</i></p> + <p><i>Della lor dritta via, chi veder puote?</i></p> + <p><i>Sì finalmente ogni lor moto sempre</i></p> + <p><i>Insieme s'aggruppa, e dall' antico</i></p> + <p><i>Sempre con ordin certo il nuovo nasce;</i></p> + <p><i>Ne tracciando i primi semi, fanno</i></p> + <p><i>Di moto un tal principio, il qual poi rompa</i></p> + <p><i>I decreti del fato, acciò non segua</i></p> + <p><i>L'una causa dell' altra in infinito;</i></p> + <p><i>Onde han questa, dich' io</i>, del fato sciolta</p> + <p>Libera voluntà, <i>per cui ciascuno</i></p> + <p><i>Va dove più l'agrada? I moti ancora</i></p> + <p><i>Si declinan sovente, e non in tempo</i></p> + <p><i>Certo, ne certa region, mà solo</i></p> + <p><i>Quando e dove commanda il nostro arbitrio;</i></p> + <p><i>Poiche senz' alcun dubbio à queste cose</i></p> + <p><i>Dà sol principio il voler proprio, e quindi</i></p> + <p><i>Van poi scorrendo per le membra i moti.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>It is comical that a man like Epicurus, after having discarded the + gods and all incorporeal substances, could have supposed that the will, + which he himself takes as composed of atoms, could have had control over + the atoms, and diverted them from their path, without its being possible + for one to say how.</p> + + <p>322. Carneades, not going so far back as to the atoms, claimed to find + at once in the soul of man the reason for the so-called vague + indifference, assuming as reason for the thing just that for which + Epicurus sought a reason. Carneades gained nothing thereby, except that + he more easily deceived careless people, in transferring the absurdity + from one subject, where it is somewhat too evident, to another subject + where it is easier to confuse matters, that is to say, from the body to + the soul. For most philosophers <!-- Page 321 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page321"></a>[321]</span> had not very distinct notions of the + nature of the soul. Epicurus, who composed it of atoms, was at least + right in seeking the origin of its determination in that which he + believed to be the origin of the soul itself. That is why Cicero and M. + Bayle were wrong to find so much fault with him, and to be indulgent + towards, and even praise, Carneades, who is no less irrational. I do not + understand how M. Bayle, who was so clear-sighted, was thus satisfied by + a disguised absurdity, even to the extent of calling it the greatest + effort the human mind can make on this matter. It is as if the soul, + which is the seat of reason, were more capable than the body of acting + without being determined by some reason or cause, internal or external; + or as if the great principle which states that nothing comes to pass + without cause only related to the body.</p> + + <p>323. It is true that the Form or the Soul has this advantage over + matter, that it is the source of action, having within itself the + principle of motion or of change, in a word, <span lang="el" title="to autokinêton" + >το + αυτοκινητον</span>, + as Plato calls it; whereas matter is simply passive, and has need of + being impelled to act, <i>agitur, ut agat</i>. But if the soul is active + of itself (as it indeed is), for that very reason it is not of itself + absolutely indifferent to the action, like matter, and it must find in + itself a ground of determination. According to the System of + Pre-established Harmony the soul finds in itself, and in its ideal nature + anterior to existence, the reasons for its determinations, adjusted to + all that shall surround it. That way it was determined from all eternity + in its state of mere possibility to act freely, as it does, when it + attains to existence.</p> + + <p>324. M. Bayle himself remarks aptly that freedom of indifference (such + as must be admitted) does not exclude inclinations and does not demand + equipoise. He demonstrates amply enough (<i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, ch. 139, p. 748 <i>seqq</i>.) that the soul may be + compared to a balance, where reasons and inclinations take the place of + weights. According to him, one can explain what passes in our resolutions + by the hypothesis that the will of man is like a balance which is at rest + when the weights of its two pans are equal, and which always inclines + either to one side or the other according to which of the pans is the + more heavily laden. A new reason makes a heavier weight, a new idea + shines more brightly than the old; the fear of a heavy penalty prevails + over some pleasure; when two passions dispute the ground, it is always + the stronger which gains the mastery, unless the other be <!-- Page 322 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page322"></a>[322]</span> assisted by + reason or by some other contributing passion. When one flings away + merchandise in order to save oneself, the action, which the Schoolmen + call mixed, is voluntary and free; and yet love of life indubitably + prevails over love of possessions. Grief arises from remembrance of lost + possessions, and one has all the greater difficulty in making one's + resolve, the nearer the approach to even weight in the opposing reasons, + as also we see that the balance is determined more promptly when there is + a great difference between the weights.</p> + + <p>325. Nevertheless, as very often there are divers courses to choose + from, one might, instead of the balance, compare the soul with a force + which puts forth effort on various sides simultaneously, but which acts + only at the spot where action is easiest or there is least resistance. + For instance, air if it is compressed too firmly in a glass vessel will + break it in order to escape. It puts forth effort at every part, but + finally flings itself upon the weakest. Thus do the inclinations of the + soul extend over all the goods that present themselves: they are + antecedent acts of will; but the consequent will, which is their result, + is determined in the direction of that which touches most closely.</p> + + <p>326. This ascendancy of inclinations, however, does not prevent man + from being master in his own domain, provided that he knows how to make + use of his power. His dominion is that of reason: he has only to prepare + himself in good time to resist the passions, and he will be capable of + checking the vehemence of the most furious. Let us assume that Augustus, + about to give orders for putting to death Fabius Maximus, acts, as is his + wont, upon the advice a philosopher had given him, to recite the Greek + alphabet before doing anything in the first heat of his anger: this + reflexion will be capable of saving the life of Fabius and the glory of + Augustus. But without some fortunate reflexion, which one owes sometimes + to a special divine mercy, or without some skill acquired beforehand, + like that of Augustus, calculated to make us reflect fittingly as to time + and place, passion will prevail over reason. The driver is master over + the horses if he controls them as he should, and as he can; but there are + occasions when he becomes negligent, and then for a time he will have to + let go the reins:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Fertur equis auriga, nec audit currus habenas</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>327. One must admit that there is always within us enough <!-- Page + 323 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page323"></a>[323]</span> power + over our will, but we do not always bethink ourselves of employing it. + That shows, as I have observed more than once, that the power of the soul + over its inclinations is a control which can only be exercised in an + <i>indirect</i> manner, almost as Bellarmine would have had the Popes + exercise rights over the temporal power of kings. In truth, the external + actions that do not exceed our powers depend absolutely upon our will; + but our volitions depend upon our will only through certain artful twists + which give us means of suspending our resolutions, or of changing them. + We are masters in our own house, not as God is in the world, he having + but to speak, but as a wise prince is in his dominions or as a good + father of a family is in his home. M. Bayle sometimes takes the matter + differently, as though we must have, in order to boast of a free will, an + absolute power over ourselves, independent of reasons and of means. But + even God has not such a power, and must not have in this sense, in + relation to his will: he cannot change his nature, nor act otherwise than + according to method; and how could man transform himself all of a sudden? + I have already said God's dominion, the dominion of wisdom, is that of + reason. It is only God, however, who always wills what is most to be + desired, and consequently he has no need of the power to change his will. + 328. If the soul is mistress in its own house (says M. Bayle, p. 753) it + has only to will, and straightway that vexation and pain which is + attendant upon victory over the passions will vanish away. For this + effect it would suffice, in his opinion, to give oneself indifference to + the objects of the passions (p. 758). Why, then, do men not give + themselves this indifference (he says), if they are masters in their own + house? But this objection is exactly as if I were to ask why a father of + a family does not give himself gold when he has need thereof? He can + acquire some, but through skill, and not, as in the age of the fairies, + or of King Midas, through a mere command of the will or by his touch. It + would not suffice to be master in one's own house; one must be master of + all things in order to give oneself all that one wishes; for one does not + find everything in one's own house. Working thus upon oneself, one must + do as in working upon something else; one must have knowledge of the + constitution and the qualities of one's object, and adapt one's + operations thereto. It is therefore not in a moment and by a mere act of + the will that one corrects oneself, and that one acquires a better + will.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 324 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page324"></a>[324]</span></p> + + <p>329. Nevertheless it is well to observe that the vexations and pains + attendant upon victory over the passions in some people turn into + pleasure, through the great satisfaction they find in the lively sense of + the force of their mind, and of the divine grace. Ascetics and true + mystics can speak of this from experience; and even a true philosopher + can say something thereof. One can attain to that happy state, and it is + one of the principal means the soul can use to strengthen its + dominion.</p> + + <p>330. If the Scotists and the Molinists appear to favour vague + indifference (appear, I say, for I doubt whether they do so in reality, + once they have learnt to know it), the Thomists and the disciples of + Augustine are for predetermination. For one must have either the one or + the other. Thomas Aquinas is a writer who is accustomed to reason on + sound principles, and the subtle Scotus, seeking to contradict him, often + obscures matters instead of throwing light upon them. The Thomists as a + general rule follow their master, and do not admit that the soul makes + its resolve without the existence of some predetermination which + contributes thereto. But the predetermination of the new Thomists is not + perhaps exactly that which one needs. Durand de Saint-Pourçain, who often + enough formed a party of his own, and who opposed the idea of the special + co-operation of God, was nevertheless in favour of a certain + predetermination. He believed that God saw in the state of the soul, and + of its surroundings, the reason for his determinations.</p> + + <p>331. The ancient Stoics were in that almost of the same opinion as the + Thomists. They were at the same time in favour of determination and + against necessity, although they have been accused of attaching necessity + to everything. Cicero says in his book <i>De Fato</i> that Democritus, + Heraclitus, Empedocles and Aristotle believed that fate implied + necessity; that others were opposed to that (he means perhaps Epicurus + and the Academicians); and that Chrysippus sought a middle course. I + think that Cicero is mistaken as regards Aristotle, who fully recognized + contingency and freedom, and went even too far, saying (inadvertently, as + I think) that propositions on contingent futurities had no determinate + truth; on which point he was justifiably abandoned by most of the + Schoolmen. Even Cleanthes, the teacher of Chrysippus, although he upheld + the determinate truth of future events, denied their necessity. Had the + Schoolmen, so fully convinced of this <!-- Page 325 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page325"></a>[325]</span> determination of + contingent futurities (as were for instance the Fathers of Coimbra, + authors of a famous Course of Philosophy), seen the connexion between + things in the form wherein the System of General Harmony proclaims it, + they would have judged that one cannot admit preliminary certainty, or + determination of futurition, without admitting a predetermination of the + thing in its causes and in its reasons.</p> + + <p>332. Cicero has endeavoured to expound for us the middle course taken + by Chrysippus; but Justus Lipsius observed, in his <i>Stoic + Philosophy</i>, that the passage from Cicero was mutilated, and that + Aulus Gellius has preserved for us the whole argument of the Stoic + philosopher (<i>Noct. Att.</i>, lib. 6, c. 2). Here it is in epitome. + Fate is the inevitable and eternal connexion of all events. Against this + is urged in objection, that it follows that the acts of the will would be + necessary, and that criminals, being coerced into evil, should not be + punished. Chrysippus answers that evil springs from the original + constitution of souls, which forms part of the destined sequence; that + souls which are of a good natural disposition offer stronger resistance + to the impressions of external causes; but that those whose natural + defects had not been corrected by discipline allowed themselves to be + perverted. Next he distinguishes (according to Cicero) between principal + causes and accessary causes, and uses the comparison of a cylinder, whose + rotatory force and speed or ease in motion comes chiefly from its shape, + whereas it would be retarded by any roughness in formation. Nevertheless + it has need of impulsion, even as the soul needs to be acted upon by the + objects of the senses, and receives this impression according to its own + constitution.</p> + + <p>333. Cicero considers that Chrysippus becomes so confused that, + whether he will or no, he confirms the necessity of fate. M. Bayle is + almost of the same opinion (<i>Dictionary</i>, art. 'Chrysippus', lit. + H). He says that this philosopher does not get out of the bog, since the + cylinder is regular or uneven according to what the craftsman has made + it; and thus God, providence, fate will be the causes of evil in such a + way as to render it necessary. Justus Lipsius answers that, according to + the Stoics, evil came from matter. That is (to my mind) as if he had said + that the stone on which the craftsman worked was sometimes too rough and + too irregular to produce a good cylinder. M. Bayle cites against + Chrysippus the fragments of Onomaus and Diogenianus that <!-- Page 326 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page326"></a>[326]</span> Eusebius has + preserved for us in the <i>Praeparatio Evangelica</i> (lib. 6, c. 7, 8); + and above all he relies upon Plutarch's refutation in his book against + the Stoics, quoted art. 'Paulicians', lit. G. But this refutation does + not amount to very much. Plutarch maintains that it would be better to + deny power to God than to impute to him the permission of evils; and he + will not admit that evil may serve a greater good. I have already shown, + on the contrary, that God cannot but be all-powerful, even though he can + do no better than produce the best, which includes the permission of + evil. Moreover, I have pointed out repeatedly that what is to the + disadvantage of a part taken separately may serve the perfection of the + whole.</p> + + <p>334. Chrysippus had already made an observation to this effect, not + only in his fourth book on Providence, as given by Aulus Gellius (lib. 6, + c. 1) where he asserts that evil serves to bring the good to notice (a + reason which is not sufficient here), but still better when he applies + the comparison of a stage play, in his second book on Nature (as Plutarch + quotes it himself). There he says that there are sometimes portions in a + comedy which are of no worth in themselves and which nevertheless lend + grace to the whole poem. He calls these portions epigrams or + inscriptions. We have not enough acquaintance with the nature of the + ancient comedy for full understanding of this passage from Chrysippus; + but since Plutarch assents to the fact, there is reason to believe that + this comparison was not a poor one. Plutarch replies in the first place + that the world is not like a play to provide entertainment. But that is a + poor answer: the comparison lies in this point alone, that one bad part + may make the whole better. He replies secondly that this bad passage is + only a small part of the comedy, whereas human life swarms with evils. + This reply is of no value either: for he ought to have taken into account + that what we know is also a very small part of the universe.</p> + + <p>335. But let us return to the cylinder of Chrysippus. He is right in + saying that vice springs from the original constitution of some minds. He + was met with the objection that God formed them, and he could only reply + by pointing to the imperfection of matter, which did not permit God to do + better. This reply is of no value, for matter in itself is indifferent to + all forms, and God made it. Evil springs rather from the <i>Forms</i> + themselves in their detached state, that is, from the ideas that God has + not produced by an act <!-- Page 327 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page327"></a>[327]</span> of his will, any more than he thus + produced numbers and figures, and all possible essences which one must + regard as eternal and necessary; for they are in the ideal region of the + possibles, that is, in the divine understanding. God is therefore not the + author of essences in so far as they are only possibilities. But there is + nothing actual to which he has not decreed and given existence; and he + has permitted evil because it is involved in the best plan existing in + the region of possibles, a plan which supreme wisdom could not fail to + choose. This notion satisfies at once the wisdom, the power and the + goodness of God, and yet leaves a way open for the entrance of evil. God + gives perfection to creatures in so far as it is possible in the + universe. One gives a turn to the cylinder, but any roughness in its + shape restricts the swiftness of its motion. This comparison made by + Chrysippus does not greatly differ from mine, which was taken from a + laden boat that is carried along by the river current, its pace becoming + slower as the load grows heavier. These comparisons tend towards the same + end; and that shows that if we were sufficiently informed concerning the + opinions of ancient philosophers, we should find therein more reason than + is supposed.</p> + + <p>336. M. Bayle himself commends the passage from Chrysippus (art. + 'Chrysippus', lit. T) that Aulus Gellius quotes in the same place, where + this philosopher maintains that evil has come <i>by concomitance.</i> + That also is made clear by my system. For I have demonstrated that the + evil which God permitted was not an object of his will, as an end or a + means, but simply as a condition, since it had to be involved in the + best. Yet one must confess that the cylinder of Chrysippus does not + answer the objection of necessity. He ought to have added, in the first + place, that it is by the free choice of God that some of the possibles + exist; secondly, that rational creatures act freely also, in accordance + with their original nature, which existed already in the eternal ideas; + and lastly, that the motive power of good inclines the will without + compelling it.</p> + + <p>337. The advantage of freedom which is in the creature without doubt + exists to an eminent degree in God. That must be understood in so far as + it is genuinely an advantage and in so far as it presupposes no + imperfection. For to be able to make a mistake and go astray is a + disadvantage, and to have control over the passions is in truth an + advantage, but one that presupposes an imperfection, <!-- Page 328 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page328"></a>[328]</span> namely + passion itself, of which God is incapable. Scotus was justified in saying + that if God were not free and exempt from necessity, no creature would be + so. But God is incapable of being indeterminate in anything whatsoever: + he cannot be ignorant, he cannot doubt, he cannot suspend his judgement; + his will is always decided, and it can only be decided by the best. God + can never have a primitive particular will, that is, independent of laws + or general acts of will; such a thing would be unreasonable. He cannot + determine upon Adam, Peter, Judas or any individual without the existence + of a reason for this determination; and this reason leads of necessity to + some general enunciation. The wise mind always acts <i>according to + principles</i>; always <i>according to rules</i>, and never <i>according + to exceptions</i>, save when the rules come into collision through + opposing tendencies, where the strongest carries the day: or else, either + they will stop one another or some third course will emerge as a result. + In all these cases one rule serves as an exception to the other, and + there are never any <i>original exceptions</i> with one who always acts + in a regular way.</p> + + <p>338. If there are people who believe that election and reprobation are + accomplished on God's part by a despotic absolute power, not only without + any apparent reason but actually without any reason, even a concealed + one, they maintain an opinion that destroys alike the nature of things + and the divine perfections. Such an <i>absolutely absolute decree</i> (so + to speak) would be without doubt insupportable. But Luther and Calvin + were far from such a belief: the former hopes that the life to come will + make us comprehend the just reasons of God's choice; and the latter + protests explicitly that these reasons are just and holy, although they + be unknown to us. I have already in that connexion quoted Calvin's + treatise on predestination, and here are the actual words: 'God before + the fall of Adam had reflected upon what he had to do, and that for + causes concealed from us.... It is evident therefore that he had just + causes for the reprobation of some of mankind, but causes to us <font + class="sc">unknown</font>.'</p> + + <p>339. This truth, that all God does is reasonable and cannot be better + done, strikes at the outset every man of good sense, and extorts, so to + speak, his approbation. And yet the most subtle of philosophers have a + fatal propensity for offending sometimes without observing it, during the + course and in the heat of disputes, against the first principles of good + sense, when these are shrouded <!-- Page 329 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page329"></a>[329]</span> in terms that disguise them. We have here + already seen how the excellent M. Bayle, with all his shrewdness, has + nevertheless combated this principle which I have just indicated, and + which is a sure consequence of the supreme perfection of God. He thought + to defend in that way the cause of God and to exempt him from an + imaginary necessity, by leaving him the freedom to choose from among + various goods the least. I have already spoken of M. Diroys and others + who have also been deluded by this strange opinion, one that is far too + commonly accepted. Those who uphold it do not observe that it implies a + wish to preserve for, or rather bestow upon, God a false freedom, which + is the freedom to act unreasonably. That is rendering his works subject + to correction, and making it impossible for us to say or even to hope + that anything reasonable can be said upon the permission of evil.</p> + + <p>340. This error has much impaired M. Bayle's arguments, and has barred + his way of escape from many perplexities. That appears again in relation + to the laws of the realm of Nature: he believes them to be arbitrary and + indifferent, and he objects that God could better have attained his end + in the realm of grace if he had not clung to these laws, if he had more + often dispensed with their observance, or even if he had made others. He + believed this especially with regard to the law of the union between the + soul and the body. For he is persuaded, with the modern Cartesians, that + the ideas of the perceptible qualities that God gives (according to them) + to the soul, occasioned by movements of the body, have nothing + representing these movements or resembling them. Accordingly it was a + purely arbitrary act on God's part to give us the ideas of heat, cold, + light and other qualities which we experience, rather than to give us + quite different ideas occasioned in the same way. I have often wondered + that people so talented should have been capable of relishing notions so + unphilosophic and so contrary to the fundamental maxims of reason. For + nothing gives clearer indication of the imperfection of a philosophy than + the necessity experienced by the philosopher to confess that something + comes to pass, in accordance with his system, for which there is no + reason. That applies to the idea of Epicurus on the deviation of atoms. + Whether it be God or Nature that operates, the operation will always have + its reasons. In the operations of Nature, these reasons will depend + either upon necessary truths or upon the laws that God has found the most + reasonable; and in the operations of <!-- Page 330 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page330"></a>[330]</span> God, they will depend + upon the choice of the supreme reason which causes them to act.</p> + + <p>341. M. Regis, a famous Cartesian, had asserted in his 'Metaphysics' + (part 2, book 2, c. 29) that the faculties God has given to men are the + most excellent that they were capable of in conformity with the general + order of nature. 'Considering only', he says, 'the power of God and the + nature of man by themselves, it is very easy to conceive that God could + have made man more perfect: but if one will consider man, not in himself + and separately from all other creatures, but as a member of the universe + and a portion which is subject to the general laws of motions, one will + be bound to acknowledge that man is as perfect as he could have been.' He + adds 'that we cannot conceive that God could have employed any other + means more appropriate than pain for the conservation of our bodies'. M. + Regis is right in a general way in saying that God cannot do better than + he has done in relation to all. And although there be apparently in some + places in the universe rational animals more perfect than man, one may + say that God was right to create every kind of species, some more perfect + than others. It is perhaps not impossible that there be somewhere a + species of animals much resembling man and more perfect than we are. It + may be even that the human race will attain in time to a greater + perfection than that which we can now envisage. Thus the laws of motions + do not prevent man from being more perfect: but the place God has + assigned to man in space and in time limits the perfections he was able + to receive.</p> + + <p>342. I also doubt, with M. Bayle, whether pain be necessary in order + to warn men of peril. But this writer goes too far (<i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. II, ch. 77, p. 104): he seems to + think that a feeling of pleasure could have the same effect, and that, in + order to prevent a child from going too near the fire, God could give him + ideas of pleasure in proportion to the distance he kept from it. This + expedient does not appear very practicable with regard to all evils, + unless a miracle were involved. It is more natural that what if it were + too near would cause an evil should cause some foreboding of evil when it + is a little less near. Yet I admit that it is possible such a foreboding + will be something less than pain, and usually this is the case. Thus it + indeed appears that pain is not necessary for causing one to shun present + peril; it is wont rather to serve as a penalty for having actually + plunged into <!-- Page 331 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page331"></a>[331]</span> evil, and a warning against further + lapse. There are also many painful evils the avoidance whereof rests not + with us. As a dissolution of the continuity of our body is a consequence + of many accidents that may happen to us, it was natural that this + imperfection of the body should be represented by some sense of + imperfection in the soul. Nevertheless I would not guarantee that there + were no animals in the universe whose structure was cunning enough to + cause a sense of indifference as accompaniment to this dissolution of + continuity, as for instance when a gangrenous limb is cut off; or even a + sense of pleasure, as if one were only scratching oneself. For the + imperfection that attends the dissolution of the body might lead to the + sense of a greater perfection, which was suspended or checked by the + continuity which is now broken: and in this respect the body would be as + it were a prison.</p> + + <p>343. There is also nothing to preclude the existence in the universe + of animals resembling that one which Cyrano de Bergerac encountered in + the sun. The body of this animal being a sort of fluid composed of + innumerable small animals, that were capable of ranging themselves in + accordance with the desires of the great animal, by this means it + transformed itself in a moment, just as it pleased; and the dissolution + of continuity caused it no more hurt than the stroke of an oar can cause + to the sea. But, after all, these animals are not men, they are not in + our globe or in our present century; and God's plan ensured that there + should not be lacking here on earth a rational animal clothed in flesh + and bones, whose structure involves susceptibility to pain.</p> + + <p>344. But M. Bayle further opposes this on another principle, one which + I have already mentioned. It seems that he thinks the ideas which the + soul conceives in relation to the feelings of the body are arbitrary. + Thus God might have caused the dissolution of continuity to give us + pleasure. He even maintains that the laws of motion are entirely + arbitrary. 'I would wish to know', he says (vol. III, ch. 166, p. 1080), + 'whether God established by an act of his freedom of indifference general + laws on the communication of movements, and the particular laws on the + union of the human soul with an organic body? In this case, he could have + established quite different laws, and adopted a system whose results + involved neither moral evil nor physical evil. But if the answer is given + that God was constrained by supreme wisdom to establish the laws that he + has established, there we have neither more nor <!-- Page 332 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page332"></a>[332]</span> less than the + <i>Fatum</i> of the Stoics. Wisdom will have marked out a way for God, + the abandonment whereof will have been as impossible to him as his own + self-destruction.' This objection has been sufficiently overthrown: it is + only a moral necessity; and it is always a happy necessity to be bound to + act in accordance with the rules of perfect wisdom.</p> + + <p>345. Moreover, it appears to me that the reason for the belief held by + many that the laws of motion are arbitrary comes from the fact that few + people have properly examined them. It is known now that M. Descartes was + much mistaken in his statement of them. I have proved conclusively that + conservation of the same quantity of motion cannot occur, but I consider + that the same quantity of force is conserved, whether absolute or + directive and respective, whether total or partial. My principles, which + carry this subject as far as it can go, have not yet been published in + full; but I have communicated them to friends competent to judge of them, + who have approved them, and have converted some other persons of + acknowledged erudition and ability. I discovered at the same time that + the laws of motion actually existing in Nature, and confirmed by + experiments, are not in reality absolutely demonstrable, as a geometrical + proposition would be; but neither is it necessary that they be so. They + do not spring entirely from the principle of necessity, but rather from + the principle of perfection and order; they are an effect of the choice + and the wisdom of God. I can demonstrate these laws in divers ways, but + must always assume something that is not of an absolutely geometrical + necessity. Thus these admirable laws are wonderful evidence of an + intelligent and free being, as opposed to the system of absolute and + brute necessity, advocated by Strato or Spinoza.</p> + + <p>346. I have found that one may account for these laws by assuming that + the effect is always equal in force to its cause, or, which amounts to + the same thing, that the same force is conserved always: but this axiom + of higher philosophy cannot be demonstrated geometrically. One may again + apply other principles of like nature, for instance the principle that + action is always equal to reaction, one which assumes in things a + distaste for external change, and cannot be derived either from extension + or impenetrability; and that other principle, that a simple movement has + the same properties as those which might belong to a compound <!-- Page + 333 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page333"></a>[333]</span> movement + such as would produce the same phenomena of locomotion. These assumptions + are very plausible, and are successful as an explanation of the laws of + motion: nothing is so appropriate, all the more since they are in accord + with each other. But there is to be found in them no absolute necessity, + such as may compel us to admit them, in the way one is compelled to admit + the rules of logic, of arithmetic and geometry.</p> + + <p>347. It seems, when one considers the indifference of matter to motion + and to rest, that the largest body at rest could be carried along without + any resistance by the smallest body in motion, in which case there would + be action without reaction and an effect greater than its cause. There is + also no necessity to say of the motion of a ball which runs freely on an + even, horizontal plane, with a certain degree of speed, termed A, that + this motion must have the properties of that motion which it would have + if it were going with lesser speed in a boat, itself moving in the same + direction with the residue of the speed, to ensure that the ball, seen + from the bank, advance with the same degree A. For, although the same + appearance of speed and of direction results through this medium of the + boat, it is not because it is the same thing. Nevertheless it happens + that the effects of the collision of the balls in the boat, the motion in + each one separately combined with that of the boat giving the appearance + of that which goes on outside the boat, also give the appearance of the + effects that these same balls colliding would have outside the boat. All + that is admirable, but one does not see its absolute necessity. A + movement on the two sides of the right-angled triangle composes a + movement on the hypotenuse; but it does not follow that a ball moving on + the hypotenuse must produce the effect of two balls of its own size + moving on the two sides: yet that is true. Nothing is so appropriate as + this result, and God has chosen the laws that produce it: but one sees no + geometrical necessity therein. Yet it is this very lack of necessity + which enhances the beauty of the laws that God has chosen, wherein divers + admirable axioms exist in conjunction, and it is impossible for one to + say which of them is the primary.</p> + + <p>348. I have also shown that therein is observed that excellent law of + continuity, which I have perhaps been the first to state, and which is a + kind of touchstone whose test the rules of M. Descartes, of Father Fabry, + Father Pardies, Father de Malebranche and others cannot pass. In virtue + of this law, one must be able to <!-- Page 334 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page334"></a>[334]</span> regard rest as a + movement vanishing after having continually diminished, and likewise + equality as an inequality that vanishes also, as would happen through the + continual diminution of the greater of two unequal bodies, while the + smaller retains its size. As a consequence of this consideration, the + general rule for unequal bodies, or bodies in motion, must apply also to + equal bodies or to bodies one of which is at rest, as to a particular + case of the rule. This does result in the true laws of motion, and does + not result in certain laws invented by M. Descartes and by some other men + of talent, which already on that score alone prove to be ill-concerted, + so that one may predict that experiment will not favour them.</p> + + <p>349. These considerations make it plain that the laws of Nature + regulating movements are neither entirely necessary nor entirely + arbitrary. The middle course to be taken is that they are a choice of the + most perfect wisdom. And this great example of the laws of motion shows + with the utmost clarity how much difference there is between these three + cases, to wit, firstly <i>an absolute necessity</i>, metaphysical or + geometrical, which may be called blind, and which does not depend upon + any but efficient causes; in the second place, <i>a moral necessity</i>, + which comes from the free choice of wisdom in relation to final causes; + and finally in the third place, <i>something absolutely arbitrary</i>, + depending upon an indifference of equipoise, which is imagined, but which + cannot exist, where there is no sufficient reason either in the efficient + or in the final cause. Consequently one must conclude how mistaken it is + to confuse either that which is absolutely necessary with that which is + determined by the reason of the best, or the freedom that is determined + by reason with a vague indifference.</p> + + <p>350. This also settles M. Bayle's difficulty, for he fears that, if + God is always determinate, Nature could dispense with him and bring about + that same effect which is attributed to him, through the necessity of the + order of things. That would be true if the laws of motion for instance, + and all the rest, had their source in a geometrical necessity of + efficient causes; but in the last analysis one is obliged to resort to + something depending upon final causes and upon what is fitting. This also + utterly destroys the most plausible reasoning of the Naturalists. Dr. + Johann Joachim Becher, a German physician, well known for his books on + chemistry, had composed a prayer which looked like getting him into + trouble. It <!-- Page 335 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page335"></a>[335]</span> began: 'O sancta mater natura, aeterne + rerum ordo'. And it ended by saying that this Nature must forgive him his + errors, since she herself was their cause. But the nature of things, if + taken as without intelligence and without choice, has in it nothing + sufficiently determinant. Herr Becher did not sufficiently take into + account that the Author of things (<i>natura naturans</i>) must be good + and wise, and that we can be evil without complicity on his part in our + acts of wickedness. When a wicked man exists, God must have found in the + region of possibles the idea of such a man forming part of that sequence + of things, the choice of which was demanded by the greatest perfection of + the universe, and in which errors and sins are not only punished but even + repaired to greater advantage, so that they contribute to the greatest + good.</p> + + <p>351. M. Bayle, however, has extended the free choice of God a little + too far. Speaking of the Peripatetic Strato (<i>Reply to the Questions of + a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 180, p. 1239), who asserted that + everything had been brought forth by the necessity of a nature devoid of + intelligence, he maintains that this philosopher, on being asked why a + tree has not the power to form bones and veins, might have asked in his + turn: Why has matter precisely three dimensions? why should not two have + sufficed for it? why has it not four? 'If one had answered that there can + be neither more nor less than three dimensions he would have demanded the + cause of this impossibility.' These words lead one to believe that M. + Bayle suspected that the number of the dimensions of matter depended upon + God's choice, even as it depended upon him to cause or not to cause trees + to produce animals. Indeed, how do we know whether there are not + planetary globes or earths situated in some more remote place in the + universe where the fable of the Barnacle-geese of Scotland (birds that + were said to be born of trees) proves true, and even whether there are + not countries where one could say:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>... populos umbrosa creavit</i></p> + <p><i>Fraxinus, et foeta viridis puer excidit alno?</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But with the dimensions of matter it is not thus: the ternary number + is determined for it not by the reason of the best, but by a geometrical + necessity, because the geometricians have been able to prove that there + are only three straight lines perpendicular to one another which can + intersect at one and the same point. <!-- Page 336 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page336"></a>[336]</span> Nothing more + appropriate could have been chosen to show the difference there is + between the moral necessity that accounts for the choice of wisdom and + the brute necessity of Strato and the adherents of Spinoza, who deny to + God understanding and will, than a consideration of the difference + existing between the reason for the laws of motion and the reason for the + ternary number of the dimensions: for the first lies in the choice of the + best and the second in a geometrical and blind necessity.</p> + + <p>352. Having spoken of the laws of bodies, that is, of the rules of + motion, let us come to the laws of the union between body and soul, where + M. Bayle believes that he finds again some vague indifference, something + absolutely arbitrary. Here is the way he speaks of it in his <i>Reply</i> + (vol. II, ch. 84, p. 163): 'It is a puzzling question whether bodies have + some natural property of doing harm or good to man's soul. If one answers + yes, one plunges into an insane labyrinth: for, as man's soul is an + immaterial substance, one will be bound to say that the local movement of + certain bodies is an efficient cause of the thoughts in a mind, a + statement contrary to the most obvious notions that philosophy imparts to + us. If one answers no, one will be constrained to admit that the + influence of our organs upon our thoughts depends neither upon the + internal qualities of matter, nor upon the laws of motion, but upon an + <i>arbitrary institution</i> of the creator. One must then admit that it + depended altogether upon God's freedom to combine particular thoughts of + our soul with particular modifications of our body, even when he had once + established all the laws for the action of bodies one upon another. + Whence it results that there is in the universe no portion of matter + which by its proximity can harm us, save when God wills it; and + consequently, that the earth is as capable as any other place of being + the abode of the happy man.... In short it is evident that there is no + need, in order to prevent the wrong choices of freedom, to transport man + outside the earth. God could do on earth with regard to all the acts of + the will what he does in respect of the good works of the predestined + when he settles their outcome, whether by efficacious or by sufficient + grace: and that grace, without in any way impairing freedom, is always + followed by the assent of the soul. It would be as easy for him on earth + as in heaven to bring about the determination of our souls to a good + choice.'</p> + + <p>353. I agree with M. Bayle that God could have so ordered <!-- Page + 337 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page337"></a>[337]</span> bodies + and souls on this globe of earth, whether by ways of nature or by + extraordinary graces, that it would have been a perpetual paradise and a + foretaste of the celestial state of the blessed. There is no reason why + there should not be worlds happier than ours; but God had good reasons + for willing that ours should be such as it is. Nevertheless, in order to + prove that a better state would have been possible here, M. Bayle had no + need to resort to the system of occasional causes: it abounds in miracles + and in hypotheses for which their very originators confess there is no + justification; and these are two defects such as will most of all + estrange a system from true philosophy. It is a cause for surprise, in + the first place, that M. Bayle did not bethink himself of the System of + Pre-established Harmony which he had examined before, and which for this + matter was so opportune. But as in this system all is connected and + harmonious, all following from reasons and nothing being left incomplete + or exposed to the rash discretion of perfect indifference, it seems that + it was not pleasing to M. Bayle: for he was here somewhat biassed in + favour of such indifference, which, notwithstanding, he contested so + strongly on other occasions. He was much given to passing from one + extreme to the other, not with an ill intention or against his own + conviction, but because there was as yet nothing settled in his mind on + the question concerned. He contented himself with whatever suited him for + frustrating the opponent he had in mind, his aim being only to perplex + philosophers, and show the weakness of our reason; and never, in my + opinion, did either Arcesilaus or Carneades argue for and against with + more eloquence and more wit. But, after all, one must not doubt for the + sake of doubting: doubts must serve us as a gangway to the truth. That is + what I often said to the late Abbé Foucher, a few specimens of whose work + prove that he designed to do with regard to the Academicians what Lipsius + and Scioppius had done for the Stoics, and M. Gassendi for Epicurus, and + what M. Dacier has so well begun for Plato. It must not be possible for + us to offer true philosophers such a reproach as that implied in the + celebrated Casaubon's answer to those who, in showing him the hall of the + Sorbonne, told him that debate had been carried on there for some + centuries. What conclusions have been reached? he said to them.</p> + + <p>354. M. Bayle goes on (p. 166): 'It is true that since the laws of + motion were instituted in such forms as we see now in the world, it is an + inevitable necessity that a hammer striking a nut should <!-- Page 338 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page338"></a>[338]</span> break it, and + that a stone falling on a man's foot should cause some bruise or some + derangement of its parts. But that is all that can follow the action of + this stone upon the human body. If you want it in addition to cause a + feeling of pain, then one must assume the institution of a code other + than that one which regulates the action and reaction of bodies one upon + another; one must, I say, have recourse to the particular system of the + laws of union between the soul and certain bodies. Now as this system is + not of necessity connected with the other, the indifference of God does + not cease in relation to the one immediately upon his choice of the + other. He therefore combined these two systems with a complete freedom, + like two things which did not follow naturally the one from the other. + Thus it is by an arbitrary institution he has ordained that wounds in the + body should cause pain in the soul which is united to this body. It + therefore only rested with him to have chosen another system of union + between soul and body: he was therefore able to choose one in accordance + wherewith wounds only evoke the idea of the remedy and an intense but + agreeable desire to apply it. He was able to arrange that all bodies + which were on the point of breaking a man's head or piercing his heart + should evoke a lively sense of danger, and that this sense should cause + the body to remove itself promptly out of reach of the blow. All that + would have come to pass without miracles, since there would have been + general laws on this subject. The system which we know by experience + teaches us that the determination of the movement of certain bodies + changes in pursuance of our desires. It was therefore possible for a + combination to be effected between our desires and the movement of + certain bodies, whereby the nutritive juices were so modified that the + good arrangement of our organs was never affected.'</p> + + <p>355. It is evident that M. Bayle believes that everything accomplished + through general laws is accomplished without miracles. But I have shown + sufficiently that if the law is not founded on reasons and does not serve + to explain the event through the nature of things, it can only be put + into execution by a miracle. If, for example, God had ordained that + bodies must have a circular motion, he would have needed perpetual + miracles, or the ministry of angels, to put this order into execution: + for that is contrary to the nature of motion, whereby the body naturally + abandons the circular line to continue in the tangent straight line if + nothing <!-- Page 339 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page339"></a>[339]</span> holds it back. Therefore it is not enough + for God to ordain simply that a wound should excite an agreeable + sensation: natural means must be found for that purpose. The real means + whereby God causes the soul to be conscious of what happens in the body + have their origin in the nature of the soul, which represents the bodies, + and is so made beforehand that the representations which are to spring up + one from another within it, by a natural sequence of thoughts, correspond + to the changes in the body.</p> + + <p>356. The representation has a natural relation to that which is to be + represented. If God should have the round shape of a body represented by + the idea of a square, that would be an unsuitable representation: for + there would be angles or projections in the representation, while all + would be even and smooth in the original. The representation often + suppresses something in the objects when it is imperfect; but it can add + nothing: that would render it, not more than perfect, but false. + Moreover, the suppression is never complete in our perceptions, and there + is in the representation, confused as it is, more than we see there. Thus + there is reason for supposing that the ideas of heat, cold, colours, + etc., also only represent the small movements carried out in the organs, + when one is conscious of these qualities, although the multiplicity and + the diminutive character of these movements prevents their clear + representation. Almost in the same way it happens that we do not + distinguish the blue and the yellow which play their part in the + representation as well as in the composition of the green, when the + microscope shows that what appears to be green is composed of yellow and + blue parts.</p> + + <p>357. It is true that the same thing may be represented in different + ways; but there must always be an exact relation between the + representation and the thing, and consequently between the different + representations of one and the same thing. The projections in perspective + of the conic sections of the circle show that one and the same circle may + be represented by an ellipse, a parabola and a hyperbola, and even by + another circle, a straight line and a point. Nothing appears so different + nor so dissimilar as these figures; and yet there is an exact relation + between each point and every other point. Thus one must allow that each + soul represents the universe to itself according to its point of view, + and through a relation which is peculiar to it; but a perfect harmony + always subsists therein. God, if he wished to effect representation <!-- + Page 340 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page340"></a>[340]</span> of + the dissolution of continuity of the body by an agreeable sensation in + the soul, would not have neglected to ensure that this very dissolution + should serve some perfection in the body, by giving it some new relief, + as when one is freed of some burden or loosed from some bond. But organic + bodies of such kinds, although possible, do not exist upon our globe, + which doubtless lacks innumerable inventions that God may have put to use + elsewhere. Nevertheless it is enough that, due allowance being made for + the place our world holds in the universe, nothing can be done for it + better than what God does. He makes the best possible use of the laws of + nature which he has established and (as M. Regis also acknowledged in the + same passage) 'the laws that God has established in nature are the most + excellent it is possible to conceive'.</p> + + <p>358. I will add to that the remark from the <i>Journal des Savants</i> + of the 16th March 1705, which M. Bayle has inserted in chapter 162 of the + <i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i> (vol. III, p. 1030). The + matter in question is the extract from a very ingenious modern book on + the Origin of Evil, to which I have already referred here. It is stated: + 'that the general solution in respect of physical evil which this book + gives is that the universe must be regarded as a work composed of various + pieces which form a whole; that, according to the laws established in + nature, some parts cannot be better unless others become worse, whence + would result a system less perfect as a whole. This principle', the + writer goes on, 'is good; but if nothing is added to it, it does not + appear sufficient. Why has God established laws that give rise to so many + difficulties? philosophers who are somewhat precise will say. Could he + not have established others of a kind not subject to any defects? And to + cut the matter short, how comes it that he has prescribed laws for + himself? Why does he not act without general laws, in accordance with all + his power and all his goodness? The writer has not carried the difficulty + as far as that. By disentangling his ideas one might indeed possibly find + means of solving the difficulty, but there is no development of the + subject in his work.'</p> + + <p>359. I suppose that the gifted author of this extract, when he thought + the difficulty could be solved, had in mind something akin to my + principles on this matter. If he had vouchsafed to declare himself in + this passage, he would to all appearance have replied, like M. Regis, + that the laws God established were the most excellent that could be + established. He would have acknowledged, <!-- Page 341 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page341"></a>[341]</span> at the same time, that + God could not have refrained from establishing laws and following rules, + because laws and rules are what makes order and beauty; that to act + without rules would be to act without reason; and that because God + <i>called into action all his goodness</i> the exercise of his + omnipotence was consistent with the laws of wisdom, to secure as much + good as was possible of attainment. Finally, he would have said, the + existence of certain particular disadvantages which strike us is a sure + indication that the best plan did not permit of their avoidance, and that + they assist in the achievement of the total good, an argument wherewith + M. Bayle in more than one place expresses agreement.</p> + + <p>360. Now that I have proved sufficiently that everything comes to pass + according to determinate reasons, there cannot be any more difficulty + over these principles of God's foreknowledge. Although these + determinations do not compel, they cannot but be certain, and they + foreshadow what shall happen. It is true that God sees all at once the + whole sequence of this universe, when he chooses it, and that thus he has + no need of the connexion of effects and causes in order to foresee these + effects. But since his wisdom causes him to choose a sequence in perfect + connexion, he cannot but see one part of the sequence in the other. It is + one of the rules of my system of general harmony, <i>that the present is + big with the future</i>, and that he who sees all sees in that which is + that which shall be. What is more, I have proved conclusively that God + sees in each portion of the universe the whole universe, owing to the + perfect connexion of things. He is infinitely more discerning than + Pythagoras, who judged the height of Hercules by the size of his + footprint. There must therefore be no doubt that effects follow their + causes determinately, in spite of contingency and even of freedom, which + nevertheless exist together with certainty or determination.</p> + + <p>361. Durand de Saint-Pourçain, among others, has indicated this + clearly in saying that contingent futurities are seen determinately in + their causes, and that God, who knows all, seeing all that shall have + power to tempt or repel the will, will see therein the course it shall + take. I could cite many other authors who have said the same thing, and + reason does not allow the possibility of thinking otherwise. M. Jacquelot + implies also (<i>Conformity of Faith with Reason</i>, p. 318 <i>et + seqq.</i>), as M. Bayle observes (<i>Reply to the Questions of a + Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 142, p. 796), that the dispositions of the + human heart and those of circumstances acquaint God <!-- Page 342 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page342"></a>[342]</span> unerringly + with the choice that man shall make. M. Bayle adds that some Molinists + say the same, and refers us to those who are quoted in the <i>Suavis + Concordia</i> of Pierre de S. Joseph, the Feuillant (pp. 579, 580).</p> + + <p>362. Those who have confused this determination with necessity have + fabricated monsters in order to fight them. To avoid a reasonable thing + which they had disguised under a hideous shape, they have fallen into + great absurdities. For fear of being obliged to admit an imaginary + necessity, or at least one different from that in question, they have + admitted something which happens without the existence of any cause or + reason for it. This amounts to the same as the absurd deviation of atoms, + which according to Epicurus happened without any cause. Cicero, in his + book on Divination, saw clearly that if the cause could produce an effect + towards which it was entirely indifferent there would be a true chance, a + genuine luck, an actual fortuitous case, that is, one which would be so + not merely in relation to us and our ignorance, according to which one + may say:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i30"><i>Sed Te</i></p> + <p><i>Nos facimus, Fortuna, Deam, caeloque locamus,</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>but even in relation to God and to the nature of things. Consequently + it would be impossible to foresee events by judging of the future by the + past. He adds fittingly in the same passage: 'Qui potest provideri, + quicquam futurum esse, quod neque causam habet ullam, neque notam cur + futurum sit?' and soon after: 'Nihil est tam contrarium rationi et + constantiae, quam fortuna; ut mihi ne in Deum quidem cadere videatur, ut + sciat quid casu et fortuito futurum sit. Si enim scit, certe illud + eveniet: sin certe eveniet, nulla fortuna est.' If the future is certain, + there is no such thing as luck. But he wrongly adds: 'Est autum fortuna; + rerum igitur fortuitarum nulla praesensio est.' There is luck, therefore + future events cannot be foreseen. He ought rather to have concluded that, + events being predetermined and foreseen, there is no luck. But he was + then speaking against the Stoics, in the character of an Academician.</p> + + <p>363. The Stoics already derived from the decrees of God the prevision + of events. For, as Cicero says in the same book: 'Sequitur porro nihil + Deos ignorare, quod omnia ab iis sint constituta.' And, according to my + system, God, having seen the possible world that <!-- Page 343 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page343"></a>[343]</span> he desired to create, + foresaw everything therein. Thus one may say that the <i>divine knowledge + of vision differs from the knowledge of simple intelligence</i> only in + that it adds to the latter the acquaintance with the actual decree to + choose this sequence of things which simple intelligence had already + presented, but only as possible; and this decree now makes the present + universe.</p> + + <p>364. Thus the Socinians cannot be excused for denying to God the + certain knowledge of future events, and above all of the future resolves + of a free creature. For even though they had supposed that there is a + freedom of complete indifference, so that the will can choose without + cause, and that thus this effect could not be seen in its cause (which is + a great absurdity), they ought always to take into account that God was + able to foresee this event in the idea of the possible world that he + resolved to create. But the idea which they have of God is unworthy of + the Author of things, and is not commensurate with the skill and wit + which the writers of this party often display in certain particular + discussions. The author of the <i>Reflexion on the Picture of + Socinianism</i> was not altogether mistaken in saying that the God of the + Socinians would be ignorant and powerless, like the God of Epicurus, + every day confounded by events and living from one day to the next, if he + only knows by conjecture what the will of men is to be.</p> + + <p>365. The whole difficulty here has therefore only come from a wrong + idea of contingency and of freedom, which was thought to have need of a + complete indifference or equipoise, an imaginary thing, of which neither + a notion nor an example exists, nor ever can exist. Apparently M. + Descartes had been imbued with the idea in his youth, at the College of + la Flèche. That caused him to say (part I of his <i>Principles</i>, art. + 41): 'Our thought is finite, and the knowledge and omnipotence of God, + whereby he has not only known from all eternity everything that is, or + that can be, but also has willed it, is infinite. Thus we have enough + intelligence to recognize clearly and distinctly that this power and this + knowledge are in God; but we have not enough so to comprehend their + extent that we can know how they leave the actions of men entirely free + and indeterminate.' The continuation has already been quoted above. + 'Entirely free', that is right; but one spoils everything by adding + 'entirely indeterminate'. One has no need of infinite knowledge in order + to see that the foreknowledge and the providence of God allow freedom to + our actions, since God has foreseen those <!-- Page 344 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page344"></a>[344]</span> actions in his ideas, + just as they are, that is, free. Laurentius Valla indeed, in his + <i>Dialogue against Boethius</i> (which I will presently quote in + epitome) ably undertakes to reconcile freedom with foreknowledge, but + does not venture to hope that he can reconcile it with providence. Yet + there is no more difficulty in the one than the other, because the decree + to give existence to this action no more changes its nature than does + one's mere consciousness thereof. But there is no knowledge, however + infinite it be, which can reconcile the knowledge and providence of God + with actions of an indeterminate cause, that is to say, with a chimerical + and impossible being. The actions of the will are determined in two ways, + by the foreknowledge or providence of God, and also by the dispositions + of the particular immediate cause, which lie in the inclinations of the + soul. M. Descartes followed the Thomists on this point; but he wrote with + his usual circumspection, so as not to come into conflict with some other + theologians.</p> + + <p>366. M. Bayle relates (<i>Reply to the Questions of a Provincial</i>, + vol. III, ch. 142, p. 804) that Father Gibieuf of the Oratory published a + Latin treatise on the freedom of God and of the creature, in the year + 1639; that he was met with protests, and was shown a collection of + seventy contradictions taken from the first book of his work; and that, + twenty years after, Father Annat, Confessor to the King of France, + reproached him in his book <i>De Incoacta Libertate</i> (ed. Rome, 1654, + in 4to.), for the silence he still maintained. Who would not think (adds + M. Bayle), after the uproar of the <i>de Auxiliis</i> Congregations, that + the Thomists taught things touching the nature of free will which were + entirely opposed to the opinion of the Jesuits? When, however, one + considers the passages that Father Annat quoted from the works of the + Thomists (in a pamphlet entitled: <i>Jansenius a Thomistis, gratiae per + se ipsam efficacis defensoribus, condemnatus</i>, printed in Paris in the + year 1654 in 4to.) one can in reality only see verbal controversies + between the two sects. The grace efficacious of itself, according to the + one side, leaves to free will quite as much power of resistance as the + congruent grace of the others. M. Bayle thinks one can say almost as much + of Jansenius himself. He was (so he says) an able man, of a methodical + mind and of great assiduity. He worked for twenty-two years at his + <i>Augustinus</i>. One of his aims was to refute the Jesuits on the dogma + of free will; yet no decision has yet been reached as to whether he + rejects or adopts freedom of indifference. <!-- Page 345 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page345"></a>[345]</span> From his work + innumerable passages are quoted for and against this opinion, as Father + Annat has himself shown in the work that has just been mentioned, <i>De + Incoacta Libertate</i>. So easy is it to render this subject obscure, as + M. Bayle says at the conclusion of this discourse. As for Father Gibieuf, + it must be admitted that he often alters the meaning of his terms, and + that consequently he does not answer the question in the main, albeit he + often writes with good sense.</p> + + <p>367. Indeed, confusion springs, more often than not, from ambiguity in + terms, and from one's failure to take trouble over gaining clear ideas + about them. That gives rise to these eternal, and usually mistaken, + contentions on necessity and contingency, on the possible and the + impossible. But provided that it is understood that necessity and + possibility, taken metaphysically and strictly, depend solely upon this + question, whether the object in itself or that which is opposed to it + implies contradiction or not; and that one takes into account that + contingency is consistent with the inclinations, or reasons which + contribute towards causing determination by the will; provided also that + one knows how to distinguish clearly between necessity and determination + or certainty, between metaphysical necessity, which admits of no choice, + presenting only one single object as possible, and moral necessity, which + constrains the wisest to choose the best; finally, provided that one is + rid of the chimera of complete indifference, which can only be found in + the books of philosophers, and on paper (for they cannot even conceive + the notion in their heads, or prove its reality by an example in things) + one will easily escape from a labyrinth whose unhappy Daedalus was the + human mind. That labyrinth has caused infinite confusion, as much with + the ancients as with those of later times, even so far as to lead men + into the absurd error of the Lazy Sophism, which closely resembles fate + after the Turkish fashion. I do not wonder if in reality the Thomists and + the Jesuits, and even the Molinists and the Jansenists, agree together on + this matter more than is supposed. A Thomist and even a wise Jansenist + will content himself with certain determination, without going on to + necessity: and if someone goes so far, the error mayhap will lie only in + the word. A wise Molinist will be content with an indifference opposed to + necessity, but such as shall not exclude prevalent inclinations.</p> + + <p>368. These difficulties, however, have greatly impressed M. Bayle, + <!-- Page 346 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page346"></a>[346]</span> + who was more inclined to dwell on them than to solve them, although he + might perhaps have had better success than anyone if he had thought fit + to turn his mind in that direction. Here is what he says of them in his + <i>Dictionary</i>, art. 'Jansenius', lit. G, p. 1626: 'Someone has said + that the subject of Grace is an ocean which has neither shore nor bottom. + Perhaps he would have spoken more correctly if he had compared it to the + Strait of Messina, where one is always in danger of striking one reef + while endeavouring to avoid another.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Dextrum Scylla latus, laevum implacata Charybdis</i></p> + <p><i>Obsidet.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Everything comes back in the end to this: Did Adam sin freely? If you + answer yes, then you will be told, his fall was not foreseen. If you + answer no, then you will be told, he is not guilty. You may write a + hundred volumes against the one or the other of these conclusions, and + yet you will confess, either that the infallible prevision of a + contingent event is a mystery impossible to conceive, or that the way in + which a creature which acts without freedom sins nevertheless is + altogether incomprehensible.'</p> + + <p>369. Either I am greatly mistaken or these two alleged + incomprehensibilities are ended altogether by my solutions. Would to God + it were as easy to answer the question how to cure fevers, and how to + avoid the perils of two chronic sicknesses that may originate, the one + from not curing the fever, the other from curing it wrongly. When one + asserts that a free event cannot be foreseen, one is confusing freedom + with indetermination, or with indifference that is complete and in + equipoise; and when one maintains that the lack of freedom would prevent + man from being guilty, one means a freedom exempt, not from determination + or from certainty, but from necessity and from constraint. This shows + that the dilemma is not well expressed, and that there is a wide passage + between the two perilous reefs. One will reply, therefore, that Adam + sinned freely, and that God saw him sinning in the possible state of + Adam, which became actual in accordance with the decree of the divine + permission. It is true that Adam was determined to sin in consequence of + certain prevailing inclinations: but this determination destroys neither + contingency nor freedom. Moreover, the certain determination to sin which + exists in man does not deprive him of the power to avoid sinning + (speaking generally) or, <!-- Page 347 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page347"></a>[347]</span> since he does sin, prevent him from being + guilty and deserving punishment. This is more especially so since the + punishment may be of service to him or others, to contribute towards + determining them another time not to sin. There is besides punitive + justice, which goes beyond compensation and amendment, and wherein also + there is nothing liable to be shaken by the certain determination of the + contingent resolutions of the will. It may be said, on the contrary, that + the penalties and rewards would be to some extent unavailing, and would + fail in one of their aims, that of amendment, if they could not + contribute towards determining the will to do better another time.</p> + + <p>370. M. Bayle continues: 'Where freedom is concerned there are only + two courses to take: one is to say that all the causes distinct from the + soul, and co-operating with it, leave it the power to act or not to act; + the other is to say that they so determine it to act that it cannot + forbear to do so. The first course is that taken by the Molinists, the + other is that of the Thomists and Jansenists and the Protestants of the + Geneva Confession. Yet the Thomists have clamorously maintained that they + were not Jansenists; and the latter have maintained with equal warmth + that where freedom was concerned they were not Calvinists. On the other + hand, the Molinists have maintained that St. Augustine did not teach + Jansenism. Thus the one side not wishing to admit that they were in + conformity with people who were considered heretics, and the other side + not wishing to admit that they were in opposition to a learned saint + whose opinions were always considered orthodox, have both performed a + hundred feats of contortion, etc.'</p> + + <p>371. The two courses which M. Bayle distinguishes here do not exclude + a third course, according to which the determination of the soul does not + come solely from the co-operation of all the causes distinct from the + soul, but also from the state of the soul itself and its inclinations + which mingle with the impressions of the senses, strengthening or + weakening them. Now all the internal and external causes taken together + bring it about that the soul is determined certainly, but not of + necessity: for no contradiction would be implied if the soul were to be + determined differently, it being possible for the will to be inclined, + but not possible for it to be compelled by necessity. I will not venture + upon a discussion of the difference existing between the Jansenists and + the Reformed on this matter. They are not perhaps always fully in accord + with <!-- Page 348 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page348"></a>[348]</span> themselves as regards things, or as + regards expressions, on a matter where one often loses one's way in + bewildering subtleties. Father Theophile Raynaud, in his book entitled + <i>Calvinismus Religio Bestiarum</i>, wished to strike at the Dominicans, + without naming them. On the other hand, those who professed to be + followers of St. Augustine reproached the Molinists with Pelagianism or + at the least semi-Pelagianism. Things were carried to excess at times by + both sides, whether in their defence of a vague indifference and the + granting of too much to man, or in their teaching <i>determinationem ad + unum secundum qualitatem actus licet non quoad ejus substantiam</i>, that + is to say, a determination to evil in the non-regenerate, as if they did + nothing but sin. After all, I think one must not reproach any but the + adherents of Hobbes and Spinoza with destroying freedom and contingency; + for they think that that which happens is alone possible, and must happen + by a brute geometrical necessity. Hobbes made everything material and + subjected it to mathematical laws alone; Spinoza also divested God of + intelligence and choice, leaving him a blind power, whence all emanates + of necessity. The theologians of the two Protestant parties are equally + zealous in refuting an unendurable necessity. Although those who follow + the Synod of Dordrecht teach sometimes that it suffices for freedom to be + exempt from constraint, it seems that the necessity they leave in it is + only hypothetical, or rather that which is more appropriately termed + certainty and infallibility. Thus it results that very often the + difficulties only lie in the terms. I say as much with regard to the + Jansenists, although I do not wish to make excuse for those people in + everything.</p> + + <p>372. With the Hebrew Cabalists, <i>Malcuth</i> or the Kingdom, the + last of the Sephiroth, signified that God controls everything + irresistibly, but gently and without violence, so that man thinks he is + following his own will while he carries out God's. They said that Adam's + sin had been <i>truncatio Malcuth a caeteris plantis</i>, that is to say, + that Adam had cut back the last of the Sephiroth, by making a dominion + for himself within God's dominion, and by assuming for himself a freedom + independent of God, but that his fall had taught him that he could not + subsist of himself, and that men must needs be redeemed by the Messiah. + This doctrine may receive a good interpretation. But Spinoza, who was + versed in the Cabala of the writers of his race, and who says + (<i>Tractatus Politicus</i>, c. 2, n. 6) that men, conceiving of freedom + as they do, establish a <!-- Page 349 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page349"></a>[349]</span> dominion within God's dominion, has gone + too far. The dominion of God is with Spinoza nothing but the dominion of + necessity, and of a blind necessity (as with Strato), whereby everything + emanates from the divine nature, while no choice is left to God, and + man's choice does not exempt him from necessity. He adds that men, in + order to establish what is termed <i>Imperium in Imperio</i>, supposed + that their soul was a direct creation of God, something which could not + be produced by natural causes, furthermore that it had an absolute power + of determination, a state of things contrary to experience. Spinoza is + right in opposing an absolute power of determination, that is, one + without any grounds; it does not belong even to God. But he is wrong in + thinking that a soul, that a simple substance, can be produced naturally. + It seems, indeed, that the soul to him was only a transient modification; + and when he pretends to make it lasting, and even perpetual, he + substitutes for it the idea of the body, which is purely a notion and not + a real and actual thing.</p> + + <p>373. The story M. Bayle relates of Johan Bredenburg, a citizen of + Rotterdam (<i>Dictionary</i>, art. 'Spinoza', lit. H, p. 2774) is + curious. He published a book against Spinoza, entitled: <i>Enervatio + Tractatus Theologico-politici, una cum demonstratione geometrico ordine + disposita, Naturam non esse Deum, cujus effati contrario praedictus + Tractatus unice innititur</i>. One was surprised to see that a man who + did not follow the profession of letters, and who had but slight + education (having written his book in Flemish, and had it translated into + Latin), had been able to penetrate with such subtlety all the principles + of Spinoza, and succeed in overthrowing them, after having reduced them + by a candid analysis to a state wherein they could appear in their full + force. I have been told (adds M. Bayle) that this writer after copious + reflexion upon his answer, and upon the principle of his opponent, + finally found that this principle could be reduced to the form of a + demonstration. He undertook therefore to prove that there is no cause of + all things other than a nature which exists necessarily, and which acts + according to an immutable, inevitable and irrevocable necessity. He + examined the whole system of the geometricians, and after having + constructed his demonstration he scrutinized it from every imaginable + angle, he endeavoured to find its weak spot and was never able to + discover any means of destroying it, or even of weakening it. That caused + him real distress: he groaned over it and begged <!-- Page 350 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page350"></a>[350]</span> the most talented of + his friends to help him in searching out the defects of this + demonstration. For all that, he was not well pleased that copies of the + book were made. Franz Cuper, a Socinian (who had written <i>Arcana + Atheismi Revelata</i> against Spinoza, Rotterdam, 1676, in 4to.), having + obtained a copy, published it just as it was, that is, in Flemish, with + some reflexions, and accused the author of being an atheist. The accused + made his defence in the same tongue. Orobio, a very able Jewish physician + (that one who was refuted by M. Limbourg, and who replied, so I have + heard say, in a work posthumously circulated, but unpublished), brought + out a book opposing Bredenburg's demonstration, entitled: <i>Certamen + Philosophicum Propugnatae Veritatis Divinae ac Naturalis, adversus J.B. + principia, Amsterdam</i>, 1684. M. Aubert de Versé also wrote in + opposition to him the same year under the name of Latinus Serbattus + Sartensis. Bredenburg protested that he was convinced of free will and of + religion, and that he wished he might be shown a possibility of refuting + his own demonstration.</p> + + <p>374. I would desire to see this alleged demonstration, and to know + whether it tended to prove that primitive Nature, which produces all, + acts without choice and without knowledge. In this case, I admit that his + proof was Spinozistic and dangerous. But if he meant perhaps that the + divine nature is determined toward that which it produces, by its choice + and through the motive of the best, there was no need for him to grieve + about this so-called immutable, inevitable, irrevocable necessity. It is + only moral, it is a happy necessity; and instead of destroying religion + it shows divine perfection to the best advantage.</p> + + <p>375. I take this opportunity to add that M. Bayle quotes (p. 2773) the + opinion of those who believe that the book entitled <i>Lucii Antistii + Constantis de Jure Ecclesiasticorum Liber Singularis</i>, published in + 1665, is by Spinoza. But I have reason for doubting this, despite that M. + Colerus, who has passed on to me an account he wrote of the life of that + famous Jew, is also of that opinion. The initial letters L.A.C. lead me + to believe that the author of this book was M. de la Cour or Van den + Hoof, famous for works on the <i>Interest of Holland, Political + Equipoise</i>, and numerous other books that he published (some of them + under the signature V.D.H.) attacking the power of the Governor of + Holland, which was at that time considered a danger to the Republic; for + the memory of Prince William the Second's attempt upon the city of + Amsterdam <!-- Page 351 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page351"></a>[351]</span> was still quite fresh. Most of the + ecclesiastics of Holland were on the side of this prince's son, who was + then a minor, and they suspected M. de Witt and what was called the + Lowenstein faction of favouring the Arminians, the Cartesians, and other + sects that were feared still more, endeavouring to rouse the populace + against them, and not without success, as the event proved. It was thus + very natural that M. de la Cour should publish this book. It is true that + people seldom keep to the happy mean in works published to further party + interests. I will say in passing that a French version of the <i>Interest + of Holland</i> by M. de la Cour has just been published, under the + deceptive title of <i>Mémoires de M. le Grand-Pensionnaire de Witt</i>; + as if the thoughts of a private individual, who was, to be sure, of de + Witt's party, and a man of talent, but who had not enough acquaintance + with public affairs or enough ability to write as that great Minister of + State might have written, could pass for the production of one of the + first men of his time.</p> + + <p>376. I saw M. de la Cour as well as Spinoza on my return from France + by way of England and Holland, and I learnt from them a few good + anecdotes on the affairs of that time. M. Bayle says, p. 2770, that + Spinoza studied Latin under a physician named Franz van den Ende. He + tells at the same time, on the authority of Sebastian Kortholt (who + refers to it in the preface to the second edition of the book by his late + father, <i>De Tribus Impostoribus, Herberto L. B. de Cherbury, Hobbio et + Spinoza</i>) that a girl instructed Spinoza in Latin, and that she + afterwards married M. Kerkering, who was her pupil at the same time as + Spinoza. In connexion with that I note that this young lady was a + daughter of M. van den Ende, and that she assisted her father in the work + of teaching. Van den Ende, who was also called A. Finibus, later went to + Paris, and there kept a boarding-school in the Faubourg St. Antoine. He + was considered excellent as an instructor, and he told me, when I called + upon him there, that he would wager that his audiences would always pay + attention to his words. He had with him as well at that time a young girl + who also spoke Latin, and worked upon geometrical demonstrations. He had + insinuated himself into M. Arnauld's good graces, and the Jesuits began + to be jealous of his reputation. But he disappeared shortly afterwards, + having been mixed up in the Chevalier de Rohan's conspiracy.</p> + + <p>377. I think I have sufficiently proved that neither the foreknowledge + nor the providence of God can impair either his justice <!-- Page 352 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page352"></a>[352]</span> or his + goodness, or our freedom. There remains only the difficulty arising from + God's co-operation with the actions of the creature, which seems to + concern more closely both his goodness, in relation to our evil actions, + and our freedom, in relation to good actions as well as to others. M. + Bayle has brought out this also with his usual acuteness. I will + endeavour to throw light upon the difficulties he puts forward, and then + I shall be in a position to conclude this work. I have already proved + that the co-operation of God consists in giving us continually all that + is real in us and in our actions, in so far as it involves perfection; + but that all that is limited and imperfect therein is a consequence of + the previous limitations which are originally in the creature. Since, + moreover, every action of the creature is a change of its modifications, + it is obvious that action arises in the creature in relation to the + limitations or negations which it has within itself, and which are + diversified by this change.</p> + + <p>378. I have already pointed out more than once in this work that evil + is a consequence of privation, and I think that I have explained that + intelligibly enough. St. Augustine has already put forward this idea, and + St. Basil said something of the same kind in his <i>Hexaëmeron</i>, + Homil. 2, 'that vice is not a living and animate substance, but an + affection of the soul contrary to virtue, which arises from one's + abandoning the good; and there is therefore no need to look for an + original evil'. M. Bayle, quoting this passage in his <i>Dictionary</i> + (art. 'Paulicians', lit. D, p. 2325) commends a remark by Herr Pfanner + (whom he calls a German theologian, but he is a jurist by profession, + Counsellor to the Dukes of Saxony), who censures St. Basil for not being + willing to admit that God is the author of physical evil. Doubtless God + is its author, when the moral evil is assumed to be already in existence; + but speaking generally, one might assert that God permitted physical evil + by implication, in permitting moral evil which is its source. It appears + that the Stoics knew also how slender is the entity of evil. These words + of Epictetus are an indication: 'Sicut aberrandi causa meta non ponitur, + sic nec natura mali in mundo existit.'</p> + + <p>379. There was therefore no need to have recourse to a principle of + evil, as St. Basil aptly observes. Nor is it necessary either to seek the + origin of evil in matter. Those who believed that there was a chaos + before God laid his hand upon it sought therein the source of disorder. + It was an opinion which Plato introduced into his <i>Timaeus</i>. + Aristotle found fault with him for that (in his third book <!-- Page 353 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page353"></a>[353]</span> on Heaven, + ch. 2) because, according to this doctrine, disorder would be original + and natural, and order would have been introduced against nature. This + Anaxagoras avoided by making matter remain at rest until it was stirred + by God; and Aristotle in the same passage commends him for it. According + to Plutarch (<i>De Iside et Osiride</i>, and <i>Tr. de Animae + Procreatione ex Timaeo</i>) Plato recognized in matter a certain + maleficent soul or force, rebellious against God: it was an actual + blemish, an obstacle to God's plans. The Stoics also believed that matter + was the source of defects, as Justus Lipsius showed in the first book of + the Physiology of the Stoics.</p> + + <p>380. Aristotle was right in rejecting chaos: but it is not always easy + to disentangle the conceptions of Plato, and such a task would be still + less easy in respect of some ancient authors whose works are lost. + Kepler, one of the most excellent of modern mathematicians, recognized a + species of imperfection in matter, even when there is no irregular + motion: he calls it its 'natural inertia', which gives it a resistance to + motion, whereby a greater mass receives less speed from one and the same + force. There is soundness in this observation, and I have used it to + advantage in this work, in order to have a comparison such as should + illustrate how the original imperfection of the creatures sets bounds to + the action of the Creator, which tends towards good. But as matter is + itself of God's creation, it only furnishes a comparison and an example, + and cannot be the very source of evil and of imperfection. I have already + shown that this source lies in the forms or ideas of the possibles, for + it must be eternal, and matter is not so. Now since God made all positive + reality that is not eternal, he would have made the source of evil, if + that did not rather lie in the possibility of things or forms, that which + alone God did not make, since he is not the author of his own + understanding.</p> + + <p>381. Yet even though the source of evil lies in the possible forms, + anterior to the acts of God's will, it is nevertheless true that God + co-operates in evil in the actual performance of introducing these forms + into matter: and this is what causes the difficulty in question here. + Durand de Saint-Pourçain, Cardinal Aureolus, Nicolas Taurel, Father Louis + de Dole, M. Bernier and some others, speaking of this co-operation, would + have it only general, for fear of impairing the freedom of man and the + holiness of God. They seem to maintain that God, having given to + creatures the power <!-- Page 354 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page354"></a>[354]</span> to act, contents himself with conserving + this power. On the other hand, M. Bayle, according to some modern + writers, carries the cooperation of God too far: he seems to fear lest + the creature be not sufficiently dependent upon God. He goes so far as to + deny action to creatures; he does not even acknowledge any real + distinction between accident and substance.</p> + + <p>382. He places great reliance especially on that doctrine accepted of + the Schoolmen, that conservation is a continued creation. The conclusion + to be drawn from this doctrine would seem to be that the creature never + exists, that it is ever newborn and ever dying, like time, movement and + other transient beings. Plato believed this of material and tangible + things, saying that they are in a perpetual flux, <i>semper fluunt, + nunquam sunt</i>. But of immaterial substances he judged quite + differently, regarding them alone as real: nor was he in that altogether + mistaken. Yet continued creation applies to all creatures without + distinction. Sundry good philosophers have been opposed to this dogma, + and M. Bayle tells that David de Rodon, a philosopher renowned among + those of the French who have adhered to Geneva, deliberately refuted it. + The Arminians also do not approve of it; they are not much in favour of + these metaphysical subtleties. I will say nothing of the Socinians, who + relish them even less.</p> + + <p>383. For a proper enquiry as to <i>whether conservation is a continued + creation,</i> it would be necessary to consider the reasons whereon this + dogma is founded. The Cartesians, after the example of their master, + employ in order to prove it a principle which is not conclusive enough. + They say that 'the moments of time having no necessary connexion with one + another, it does not follow that because I am at this moment I shall + exist at the moment which shall follow, if the same cause which gives me + being for this moment does not also give it to me for the instant + following.' The author of the <i>Reflexion on the Picture of + Socinianism</i> has made use of this argument, and M. Bayle (perhaps the + author of this same <i>Reflexion</i>) quotes it (<i>Reply to the + Questions of a Provincial</i>, vol. III, ch. 141, p. 771). One may answer + that in fact it does not follow <i>of necessity</i> that, because I am, I + shall be; but this follows <i>naturally</i>, nevertheless, that is, of + itself, <i>per se</i>, if nothing prevents it. It is the distinction that + can be drawn between the essential and the natural. For the same movement + endures naturally unless some new cause prevents it or changes it, + because the reason which makes it cease <!-- Page 355 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page355"></a>[355]</span> at this instant, if it + is no new reason, would have already made it cease sooner.</p> + + <p>384. The late Herr Erhard Weigel, a celebrated mathematician and + philosopher at Jena, well known for his <i>Analysis Euclidea</i>, his + mathematical philosophy, some neat mechanical inventions, and finally the + trouble he took to induce the Protestant princes of the Empire to + undertake the last reform of the Almanac, whose success, notwithstanding, + he did not witness; Herr Weigel, I say, communicated to his friends a + certain demonstration of the existence of God, which indeed amounted to + this idea of continued creation. As he was wont to draw parallels between + reckoning and reasoning—witness his Arithmetical Ethics + (<i>rechenschaftliche Sittenlehre</i>)—he said that the foundation + of the demonstration was this beginning of the Pythagorean Table, <i>once + one is one</i>. These repeated unities were the moments of the existence + of things, each one of them depending upon God, who resuscitates, as it + were, all things outside himself at each moment: falling away as they do + at each moment, they must ever have one who shall resuscitate them, and + that cannot be any other than God. But there would be need of a more + exact proof if that is to be called a demonstration. It would be + necessary to prove that the creature always emerges from nothingness and + relapses thither forthwith. In particular it must be shown that the + privilege of enduring more than a moment by its nature belongs to the + necessary being alone. The difficulties on the composition of the + <i>continuum</i> enter also into this matter. This dogma appears to + resolve time into moments, whereas others regard moments and points as + mere modalities of the <i>continuum</i>, that is, as extremities of the + parts that can be assigned to it, and not as constituent parts. But this + is not the place for entering into that labyrinth.</p> + + <p>385. What can be said for certain on the present subject is that the + creature depends continually upon divine operation, and that it depends + upon that no less after the time of its beginning than when it first + begins. This dependence implies that it would not continue to exist if + God did not continue to act; in short, that this action of God is free. + For if it were a necessary emanation, like that of the properties of the + circle, which issue from its essence, it must then be said that God in + the beginning produced the creature by necessity; or else it must be + shown how, in creating it once, he imposed upon himself the necessity of + conserving it. Now there is <!-- Page 356 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page356"></a>[356]</span> no reason why this conserving action + should not be called production, and even creation, if one will: for the + dependence being as great afterwards as at the beginning, the extrinsic + designation of being new or not does not change the nature of that + action.</p> + + <p>386. Let us then admit in such a sense that conservation is a + continued creation, and let us see what M. Bayle seems to infer thence + (p. 771) after the author of the <i>Reflexion on the Picture of + Socinianism</i>, in opposition to M. Jurieu. 'It seems to me', this + writer says, 'that one must conclude that God does all, and that in all + creation there are no first or second or even occasional causes, as can + be easily proved. At this moment when I speak, I am such as I am, with + all my circumstances, with such thought, such action, whether I sit or + stand, that if God creates me in this moment such as I am, as one must of + necessity say in this system, he creates me with such thought, such + action, such movement and such determination. One cannot say that God + creates me in the first place, and that once I am created he produces + with me my movements and my determinations. That is indefensible for two + reasons. The first is, that when God creates me or conserves me at this + instant, he does not conserve me as a being without form, like a species, + or another of the Universals of Logic. I am an individual; he creates me + and conserves me as such, and as being all that I am in this instant, + with all my attendant circumstances. The second reason is that if God + creates me in this instant, and one says that afterwards he produces with + me my actions, it will be necessary to imagine another instant for + action: for before acting one must exist. Now that would be two instants + where we only assume one. It is therefore certain in this hypothesis that + creatures have neither more connexion nor more relation with their + actions than they had with their production at the first moment of the + first creation.' The author of this <i>Reflexion</i> draws thence very + harsh conclusions which one can picture to oneself; and he testifies at + the end that one would be deeply indebted to any man that should teach + those who approve this system how to extricate themselves from these + frightful absurdities.</p> + + <p>387. M. Bayle carries this still further. 'You know', he says (p. + 775), 'that it is demonstrated in the Scholastic writings' (he cites + Arriaga, <i>Disp</i>. 9, Phys., sect. 6 et praesertim, sub-sect. 3) 'that + the creature cannot be either the total cause or the partial cause of its + conservation: for if it were, it would exist before existing, <!-- Page + 357 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page357"></a>[357]</span> which is + contradictory. You know that the argument proceeds like this: that which + conserves itself acts; now that which acts exists, and nothing can act + before it has attained complete existence; therefore, if a creature + conserved itself, it would act before being. This argument is not founded + upon probabilities, but upon the first principles of Metaphysics, <i>non + entis nulla sunt accidentia, operari sequitur esse</i>, axioms as clear + as daylight. Let us go further. If creatures co-operated with God (here + is meant an active cooperation, and not co-operation by a passive + instrument) to conserve themselves they would act before being: that has + been demonstrated. Now if they co-operated with God for the production of + any other thing, they would also act before being; it is therefore as + impossible for them to co-operate with God for the production of any + other thing (such as local movement, an affirmation, volition, entities + actually distinct from their substance, so it is asserted) as for their + own conservation. Since their conservation is a continued creation, and + since all human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot + co-operate with God at the first moment of their existence, either to + produce themselves or to give themselves any modality, since that would + be to act before being (observe that Thomas Aquinas and sundry other + Schoolmen teach that if the angels had sinned at the first moment of + their creation God would be the author of the sin: see the Feuillant + Pierre de St. Joseph, p. 318, <i>et seqq</i>., of the <i>Suavis Concordia + Humanae Libertatis</i>; it is a sign that they acknowledge that at the + first instant the creature cannot act in anything whatsoever), it follows + manifestly that they cannot co-operate with God in any one of the + subsequent moments, either to produce themselves or to produce any other + thing. If they could co-operate therein at the second moment of their + existence, nothing would prevent their being able to cooperate at the + first moment.'</p> + + <p>388. This is the way it will be necessary to answer these arguments. + Let us assume that the creature is produced anew at each instant; let us + grant also that the instant excludes all priority of time, being + indivisible; but let us point out that it does not exclude priority of + nature, or what is called anteriority <i>in signo rationis,</i> and that + this is sufficient. The production, or action whereby God produces, is + anterior by nature to the existence of the creature that is produced; the + creature taken in itself, with its nature and its necessary properties, + is anterior to its accidental affections and <!-- Page 358 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page358"></a>[358]</span> to its actions; and + yet all these things are in being in the same moment. God produces the + creature in conformity with the exigency of the preceding instants, + according to the laws of his wisdom; and the creature operates in + conformity with that nature which God conveys to it in creating it + always. The limitations and imperfections arise therein through the + nature of the subject, which sets bounds to God's production; this is the + consequence of the original imperfection of creatures. Vice and crime, on + the other hand, arise there through the free inward operation of the + creature, in so far as this can occur within the instant, repetition + afterwards rendering it discernible.</p> + + <p>389. This anteriority of nature is a commonplace in philosophy: thus + one says that the decrees of God have an order among themselves. When one + ascribes to God (and rightly so) understanding of the arguments and + conclusions of creatures, in such sort that all their demonstrations and + syllogisms are known to him, and are found in him in a transcendent way, + one sees that there is in the propositions or truths a natural order; but + there is no order of time or interval, to cause him to advance in + knowledge and pass from the premisses to the conclusion.</p> + + <p>390. I find in the arguments that have just been quoted nothing which + these reflexions fail to satisfy. When God produces the thing he produces + it as an individual and not as a universal of logic (I admit); but he + produces its essence before its accidents, its nature before its + operations, following the priority of their nature, and <i>in signo + anteriore rationis</i>. Thus one sees how the creature can be the true + cause of the sin, while conservation by God does not prevent the sin; God + disposes in accordance with the preceding state of the same creature, in + order to follow the laws of his wisdom notwithstanding the sin, which in + the first place will be produced by the creature. But it is true that God + would not in the beginning have created the soul in a state wherein it + would have sinned from the first moment, as the Schoolmen have justly + observed: for there is nothing in the laws of his wisdom that could have + induced him so to do.</p> + + <p>391. This law of wisdom brings it about also that God reproduces the + same substance, the same soul. Such was the answer that could have been + given by the Abbé whom M. Bayle introduces in his <i>Dictionary</i> (art. + 'Pyrrhon.' lit. B, p. 2432). This wisdom effects the connexion of things. + I concede therefore that the creature <!-- Page 359 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page359"></a>[359]</span> does not co-operate + with God to conserve himself (in the sense in which I have just explained + conservation). But I see nothing to prevent the creature's co-operation + with God for the production of any other thing: and especially might this + concern its inward operation, as in the case of a thought or a volition, + things really distinct from the substance.</p> + + <p><a name="sect392">392</a>. But there I am once more at grips with M. + Bayle. He maintains that there are no such accidents distinct from the + substance. 'The reasons', he says, 'which our modern philosophers have + employed to demonstrate that the accidents are not beings in reality + distinct from the substance are not mere difficulties; they are arguments + which overwhelm one, and which cannot be refuted. Take the trouble', he + adds, 'to look for them in the writings of Father Maignan, or Father + Malebranche or M. Calli' (Professor of Philosophy at Caen) 'or in the + <i>Accidentia profligata</i> of Father Saguens, disciple of Father + Maignan, the extract from which is to be found in the <i>Nouvelles de la + République des Lettres</i>, June 1702. Or if you wish one author only to + suffice you, choose Dom François Lami, a Benedictine monk, and one of the + strongest Cartesians to be found in France. You will find among his + <i>Philosophical Letters</i>, printed at Trévoux in 1703, that one + wherein by the geometricians' method he demonstrates "that God is the + sole true cause of all that which is real." I would wish to see all these + books; and as for this last proposition, it may be true in a very good + sense: God is the one principal cause of pure and absolute realities, or + of perfections. <i>Causae secundae agunt in virtute primae.</i> But when + one comprises limitations and privations under the term realities one may + say that the second causes co-operate in the production of that which is + limited; otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even the sole + cause.</p> + + <p>393. It is well to beware, moreover, lest in confusing substances with + accidents, in depriving created substances of action, one fall into + Spinozism, which is an exaggerated Cartesianism. That which does not act + does not merit the name of substance. If the accidents are not distinct + from the substances; if the created substance is a successive being, like + movement; if it does not endure beyond a moment, and does not remain the + same (during some stated portion of time) any more than its accidents; if + it does not operate any more than a mathematical figure or a number: why + shall one not say, with Spinoza, that God is the <!-- Page 360 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page360"></a>[360]</span> only substance, and + that creatures are only accidents or modifications? Hitherto it has been + supposed that the substance remains, and that the accidents change; and I + think one ought still to abide by this ancient doctrine, for the + arguments I remember having read do not prove the contrary, and prove + more than is needed.</p> + + <p>394. 'One of the absurdities', says M. Bayle (p. 779), 'that arise + from the so-called distinction which is alleged to exist between + substances and their accidents is that creatures, if they produce the + accidents, would possess a power of creation and annihilation. + Accordingly one could not perform the slightest action without creating + an innumerable number of real beings, and without reducing to nothingness + an endless multitude of them. Merely by moving the tongue to cry out or + to eat, one creates as many accidents as there are movements of the parts + of the tongue, and one destroys as many accidents as there are parts of + that which one eats, which lose their form, which become chyle, blood, + etc.' This argument is only a kind of bugbear. What harm would be done, + supposing that an infinity of movements, an infinity of figures spring up + and disappear at every moment in the universe, and even in each part of + the universe? It can be demonstrated, moreover, that that must be so.</p> + + <p>395. As for the so-called creation of the accidents, who does not see + that one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to + form a square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the + movement of the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion a statue + by removing a few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure + in relief, by changing, decreasing or increasing a piece of wax? The + production of modifications has never been called <i>creation</i>, and it + is an abuse of terms to scare the world thus. God produces substances + from nothing, and the substances produce accidents by the changes of + their limits.</p> + + <p>396. As for the souls or substantial forms, M. Bayle is right in + adding: 'that there is nothing more inconvenient for those who admit + substantial forms than the objection which is made that they could not be + produced save by an actual creation, and that the Schoolmen are pitiable + in their endeavours to answer this.' But there is nothing more convenient + for me and for my system than this same objection. For I maintain that + all the Souls, Entelechies or primitive forces, substantial forms, simple + substances, or Monads, whatever name one may apply to them, can neither + <!-- Page 361 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page361"></a>[361]</span> + spring up naturally nor perish. And the qualities or derivative forces, + or what are called accidental forms, I take to be modifications of the + primitive Entelechy, even as shapes are modifications of matter. That is + why these modifications are perpetually changing, while the simple + substance remains.</p> + + <p>397. I have shown already (part I, <a href="#sect86">§ 86</a> + <i>seqq.</i>) that souls cannot spring up naturally, or be derived from + one another, and that it is necessary that ours either be created or be + pre-existent. I have even pointed out a certain middle way between a + creation and an entire pre-existence. I find it appropriate to say that + the soul preexisting in the seeds from the beginning of things was only + sentient, but that it was elevated to the superior degree, which is that + of reason, when the man to whom this soul should belong was conceived, + and when the organic body, always accompanying this soul from the + beginning, but under many changes, was determined for forming the human + body. I considered also that one might attribute this elevation of the + sentient soul (which makes it reach a more sublime degree of being, + namely reason) to the extraordinary operation of God. Nevertheless it + will be well to add that I would dispense with miracles in the generating + of man, as in that of the other animals. It will be possible to explain + that, if one imagines that in this great number of souls and of animals, + or at least of living organic bodies which are in the seeds, those souls + alone which are destined to attain one day to human nature contain the + reason that shall appear therein one day, and the organic bodies of these + souls alone are preformed and predisposed to assume one day the human + shape, while the other small animals or seminal living beings, in which + no such thing is pre-established, are essentially different from them and + possessed only of an inferior nature. This production is a kind of + <i>traduction</i>, but more manageable than that kind which is commonly + taught: it does not derive the soul from a soul, but only the animate + from an animate, and it avoids the repeated miracles of a new creation, + which would cause a new and pure soul to enter a body that must corrupt + it.</p> + + <p>398. I am, however, of the same opinion as Father Malebranche, that, + in general, creation properly understood is not so difficult to admit as + might be supposed, and that it is in a sense involved in the notion of + the dependence of creatures. 'How stupid and ridiculous are the + Philosophers!' (he exclaims, in his <i>Christian Meditations</i>, 9, No. + 3). 'They assume that Creation is <!-- Page 362 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page362"></a>[362]</span> impossible, because + they cannot conceive how God's power is great enough to make something + from nothing. But can they any better conceive how the power of God is + capable of stirring a straw?' He adds, again with great truth (No. 5), + 'If matter were uncreate, God could not move it or form anything from it. + For God cannot move matter, or arrange it wisely, if he does not know it. + Now God cannot know it, if he does not give it being: he can derive his + knowledge only from himself. Nothing can act on him or enlighten + him.'</p> + + <p>399. M. Bayle, not content with saying that we are created + continually, insists also on this other doctrine which he would fain + derive thence: that our soul cannot act. This is the way he speaks on + that matter (ch. 141, p. 765): 'He has too much acquaintance with + Cartesianism' (it is of an able opponent he is speaking) 'not to know + with what force it has been maintained in our day that there is no + creature capable of producing motion, and that our soul is a purely + passive subject in relation to sensations and ideas, and feelings of pain + and of pleasure, etc. If this has not been carried as far as the + volitions, that is on account of the existence of revealed truths; + otherwise the acts of the will would have been found as passive as those + of the understanding. The same reasons which prove that our soul does not + form our ideas, and does not stir our organs, would prove also that it + cannot form our acts of love and our volitions, etc' He might add: our + vicious actions, our crimes.</p> + + <p>400. The force of these proofs, which he praises, must not be so great + as he thinks, for if it were they would prove too much. They would make + God the author of sin. I admit that the soul cannot stir the organs by a + physical influence; for I think that the body must have been so formed + beforehand that it would do in time and place that which responds to the + volitions of the soul, although it be true nevertheless that the soul is + the principle of the operation. But if it be said that the soul does not + produce its thoughts, its sensations, its feelings of pain and of + pleasure, that is something for which I see no reason. In my system every + simple substance (that is, every true substance) must be the true + immediate cause of all its actions and inward passions; and, speaking + strictly in a metaphysical sense, it has none other than those which it + produces. Those who hold a different opinion, and who make God the sole + agent, are needlessly becoming involved in expressions whence they will + only with difficulty extricate themselves without offence <!-- Page 363 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page363"></a>[363]</span> against + religion; moreover, they unquestionably offend against reason.</p> + + <p>401. Here is, however, the foundation of M. Bayle's argument. He says + that we do not do that of which we know not the way it is done. But it is + a principle which I do not concede to him. Let us listen to his + dissertation (p. 767 seqq.): 'It is an astonishing thing that almost all + philosophers (with the exception of those who expounded Aristotle, and + who admitted a universal intelligence distinct from our soul, and cause + of our perceptions: see in the <i>Historical and Critical Dictionary</i>, + Note E of the article "Averroes") have shared the popular belief that we + form our ideas actively. Yet where is the man who knows not on the one + hand that he is in absolute ignorance as to how ideas are made, and on + the other hand, that he could not sew two stitches if he were ignorant of + how to sew? Is the sewing of two stitches in itself a work more difficult + than the painting in one's mind of a rose, the very first time one's eyes + rest upon it, and although one has never learnt this kind of painting? + Does it not appear on the contrary that this mental portrait is in itself + a work more difficult than tracing on canvas the shape of a flower, a + thing we cannot do without having learnt it? We are all convinced that a + key would be of no use to us for opening a chest if we were ignorant as + to how to use the key, and yet we imagine that our soul is the efficient + cause of the movement of our arms, despite that it knows neither where + the nerves are which must be used for this movement, nor whence to obtain + the animal spirits that are to flow into these nerves. We have the + experience every day that the ideas we would fain recall do not come, and + that they appear of themselves when we are no longer thinking of them. If + that does not prevent us from thinking that we are their efficient cause, + what reliance shall one place on the proof of feeling, which to M. + Jacquelot appears so conclusive? Does our authority over our ideas more + often fall short than our authority over our volitions? If we were to + count up carefully, we should find in the course of our life more + velleities than volitions, that is, more evidences of the servitude of + our will than of its dominion. How many times does one and the same man + not experience an inability to do a certain act of will (for example, an + act of love for a man who had just injured him; an act of scorn for a + fine sonnet that he had composed; an act of hatred for a mistress; an act + of approval of an absurd epigram. Take note that I speak <!-- Page 364 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page364"></a>[364]</span> only of + inward acts, expressed by an "I will", such as "I will scorn", "approve", + etc.) even if there were a hundred pistoles to be gained forthwith, and + he ardently desired to gain these hundred pistoles, and he were fired + with the ambition to convince himself by an experimental proof that he is + master in his own domain?</p> + + <p>402. 'To put together in few words the whole force of what I have just + said to you, I will observe that it is evident to all those who go deeply + into things, that the true efficient cause of an effect must know the + effect, and be aware also of the way in which it must be produced. That + is not necessary when one is only the instrument of the cause, or only + the passive subject of its action; but one cannot conceive of it as not + necessary to a true agent. Now if we examine ourselves well we shall be + strongly convinced, (1) that, independently of experience, our soul is + just as little aware of what a volition is as of what an idea is; (2) + that after a long experience it is no more fully aware of how volitions + are formed than it was before having willed anything. What is one to + conclude from that, save that the soul cannot be the efficient cause of + its volitions, any more than of its ideas, and of the motion of the + spirits which cause our arms to move? (Take note that no pretence is made + of deciding the point here absolutely, it is only being considered in + relation to the principles of the objection.)'</p> + + <p>403. That is indeed a strange way of reasoning! What necessity is + there for one always to be aware how that which is done is done? Are + salts, metals, plants, animals and a thousand other animate or inanimate + bodies aware how that which they do is done, and need they be aware? Must + a drop of oil or of fat understand geometry in order to become round on + the surface of water? Sewing stitches is another matter: one acts for an + end, one must be aware of the means. But we do not form our ideas because + we will to do so, they form themselves within us, they form themselves + through us, not in consequence of our will, but in accordance with our + nature and that of things. The foetus forms itself in the animal, and a + thousand other wonders of nature are produced by a certain + <i>instinct</i> that God has placed there, that is by virtue of <i>divine + preformation</i>, which has made these admirable automata, adapted to + produce mechanically such beautiful effects. Even so it is easy to + believe that the soul is a spiritual automaton still more admirable, and + that it is through divine preformation that it produces these <!-- Page + 365 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page365"></a>[365]</span> beautiful + ideas, wherein our will has no part and to which our art cannot attain. + The operation of spiritual automata, that is of souls, is not mechanical, + but it contains in the highest degree all that is beautiful in mechanism. + The movements which are developed in bodies are concentrated in the soul + by representation as in an ideal world, which expresses the laws of the + actual world and their consequences, but with this difference from the + perfect ideal world which is in God, that most of the perceptions in the + other substances are only confused. For it is plain that every simple + substance embraces the whole universe in its confused perceptions or + sensations, and that the succession of these perceptions is regulated by + the particular nature of this substance, but in a manner which always + expresses all the nature in the universe; and every present perception + leads to a new perception, just as every movement that it represents + leads to another movement. But it is impossible that the soul can know + clearly its whole nature, and perceive how this innumerable number of + small perceptions, piled up or rather concentrated together, shapes + itself there: to that end it must needs know completely the whole + universe which is embraced by them, that is, it must needs be a God.</p> + + <p>404. As regards <i>velleities</i>, they are only a very imperfect kind + of conditional will. I would, if I could: <i>liberet si liceret</i>; and + in the case of a velleity, we do not will, properly speaking, to will, + but to be able. That explains why there are none in God; and they must + not be confused with antecedent will. I have explained sufficiently + elsewhere that our control over volitions can be exercised only + indirectly, and that one would be unhappy if one were sufficiently master + in one's own domain to be able to will without cause, without rhyme or + reason. To complain of not having such a control would be to argue like + Pliny, who carps at the power of God because God cannot destroy + himself.</p> + + <p>405. I intended to finish here after having met (as it seems to me) + all the objections of M. Bayle on this matter that I could find in his + works. But remembering Laurentius Valla's <i>Dialogue on Free Will,</i> + in opposition to Boethius, which I have already mentioned, I thought it + would be opportune to quote it in abstract, retaining the dialogue form, + and then to continue from where it ends, keeping up the fiction it + initiated; and that less with the purpose of enlivening the subject, than + in order to explain myself towards the end of my dissertation as clearly + as I can, and in a way most <!-- Page 366 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page366"></a>[366]</span> likely to be generally understood. This + Dialogue of Valla and his books on Pleasure and the True Good make it + plain that he was no less a philosopher than a humanist. These four books + were opposed to the four books on the <i>Consolation of Philosophy</i> by + Boethius, and the Dialogue to the fifth book. A certain Spaniard named + Antonio Glarea requests of him elucidation on the difficulty of free + will, whereof little is known as it is worthy to be known, for upon it + depend justice and injustice, punishment and reward in this life and in + the life to come. Laurentius Valla answers him that we must console + ourselves for an ignorance which we share with the whole world, just as + one consoles oneself for not having the wings of birds.</p> + + <p>406. <font class="sc">antonio</font>—I know that you can give me + those wings, like another Daedalus, so that I may emerge from the prison + of ignorance, and rise to the very region of truth, which is the homeland + of souls. The books that I have seen have not satisfied me, not even the + famous Boethius, who meets with general approval. I know not whether he + fully understood himself what he says of God's understanding, and of + eternity superior to time; and I ask for your opinion on his way of + reconciling foreknowledge with freedom. <font + class="sc">laurent</font>—I am fearful of giving offence to many + people, if I confute this great man; yet I will give preference over this + fear to the consideration I have for the entreaties of a friend, provided + that you make me a promise. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—What? + <font class="sc">laur</font>.—It is, that when you have dined with + me you do not ask me to give you supper, that is to say, I desire that + you be content with the answer to the question you have put to me, and do + not put a further question.</p> + + <p>407. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—I promise you. Here is the + heart of the difficulty. If God foresaw the treason of Judas, it was + necessary that he should betray, it was impossible for him not to betray. + There is no obligation to do the impossible. He therefore did not sin, he + did not deserve to be punished. That destroys justice and religion, and + the fear of God. <font class="sc">laur</font>.—God foresaw sin; but + he did not compel man to commit it; sin is voluntary. <font + class="sc">ant</font>.—That will was necessary, since it was + foreseen. <font class="sc">laur</font>.—If my knowledge does not + cause things past or present to exist, neither will my foreknowledge + cause future things to exist.</p> + + <p>408. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—That comparison is deceptive: + neither the present nor the past can be changed, they are already + necessary; but the future, movable in itself, becomes fixed and necessary + through <!-- Page 367 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page367"></a>[367]</span> foreknowledge. Let us pretend that a god + of the heathen boasts of knowing the future: I will ask him if he knows + which foot I shall put foremost, then I will do the opposite of that + which he shall have foretold. <font class="sc">laur</font>.—This + God knows what you are about to do. <font + class="sc">ant</font>.—How does he know it, since I will do the + opposite of what he shall have said, and I suppose that he will say what + he thinks? <font class="sc">laur</font>.—Your supposition is false: + God will not answer you; or again, if he were to answer you, the + veneration you would have for him would make you hasten to do what he had + said; his prediction would be to you an order. But we have changed the + question. We are not concerned with what God will foretell but with what + he foresees. Let us therefore return to foreknowledge, and distinguish + between the necessary and the certain. It is not impossible for what is + foreseen not to happen; but it is infallibly sure that it will happen. I + can become a Soldier or Priest, but I shall not become one.</p> + + <p>409. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—Here I have you firmly held. + The philosophers' rule maintains that all that which is possible can be + considered as existing. But if that which you affirm to be possible, + namely an event different from what has been foreseen, actually happened, + God would have been mistaken. <font class="sc">laur</font>.—The + rules of the philosophers are not oracles for me. This one in particular + is not correct. Two contradictories are often both possible. Can they + also both exist? But, for your further enlightenment, let us pretend that + Sextus Tarquinius, coming to Delphi to consult the Oracle of Apollo, + receives the answer:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Exul inopsque cades irata pulsus ab urbe.</i></p> + <p>A beggared outcast of the city's rage,</p> + <p>Beside a foreign shore cut short thy age.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>The young man will complain: I have brought you a royal gift, O + Apollo, and you proclaim for me a lot so unhappy? Apollo will say to him: + Your gift is pleasing to me, and I will do that which you ask of me, I + will tell you what will happen. I know the future, but I do not bring it + about. Go make your complaint to Jupiter and the Parcae. Sextus would be + ridiculous if he continued thereafter to complain about Apollo. Is not + that true? <font class="sc">ant</font>.—He will say: I thank you, O + holy Apollo, for not having repaid me with silence, for having revealed + to me the Truth. But whence comes it that Jupiter is so cruel towards me, + that he prepares so hard a fate <!-- Page 368 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page368"></a>[368]</span> for an innocent man, for a devout + worshipper of the Gods? <font class="sc">laur</font>.—You innocent? + Apollo will say. Know that you will be proud, that you will commit + adulteries, that you will be a traitor to your country. Could Sextus + reply: It is you who are the cause, O Apollo; you compel me to do it, by + foreseeing it? <font class="sc">ant</font>.—I admit that he would + have taken leave of his senses if he were to make this reply. <font + class="sc">laur</font>.—Therefore neither can the traitor Judas + complain of God's foreknowledge. And there is the answer to your + question.</p> + + <p>410. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—You have satisfied me beyond + my hopes, you have done what Boethius was not able to do: I shall be + beholden to you all my life long. <font class="sc">laur</font>.—Yet + let us carry our tale a little further. Sextus will say: No, Apollo, I + will not do what you say. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—What! the + God will say, do you mean then that I am a liar? I repeat to you once + more, you will do all that I have just said. <font + class="sc">laur</font>.—Sextus, mayhap, would pray the Gods to + alter fate, to give him a better heart. <font + class="sc">ant</font>.—He would receive the answer:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Desine fata Deum flecti sperare precando</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>He cannot cause divine foreknowledge to lie. But what then will Sextus + say? Will he not break forth into complaints against the Gods? Will he + not say? What? I am then not free? It is not in my power to follow + virtue? <font class="sc">laur</font>.—Apollo will say to him + perhaps: Know, my poor Sextus, that the Gods make each one as he is. + Jupiter made the wolf ravening, the hare timid, the ass stupid, and the + lion courageous. He gave you a soul that is wicked and irreclaimable; you + will act in conformity with your natural disposition, and Jupiter will + treat you as your actions shall deserve; he has sworn it by the Styx.</p> + + <p>411. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—I confess to you, it seems to + me that Apollo in excusing himself accuses Jupiter more than he accuses + Sextus, and Sextus would answer him: Jupiter therefore condemns in me his + own crime; it is he who is the only guilty one. He could have made me + altogether different: but, made as I am, I must act as he has willed. Why + then does he punish me? Could I have resisted his will? <font + class="sc">laur</font>.—I confess that I am brought to a pause here + as you are. I have made the Gods appear on the scene, Apollo and Jupiter, + to make you distinguish between divine foreknowledge and providence. I + have shown that Apollo and foreknowledge do not impair freedom; but I + cannot satisfy you on the decrees of Jupiter's will, that is to say, on + the orders of providence. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—You have + <!-- Page 369 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page369"></a>[369]</span> + dragged me out of one abyss, and you plunge me back into another and + greater abyss. <font class="sc">laur</font>.—Remember our contract: + I have given you dinner, and you ask me to give you supper also.</p> + + <p>412. <font class="sc">ant</font>.—Now I discover your cunning: + You have caught me, this is not an honest contract. <font + class="sc">laur</font>.—What would you have me do? I have given you + wine and meats from my home produce, such as my small estate can provide; + as for nectar and ambrosia, you will ask the Gods for them: that divine + nurture is not found among men. Let us hearken to St. Paul, that chosen + vessel who was carried even to the third heaven, who heard there + unutterable words: he will answer you with the comparison of the potter, + with the incomprehensibility of the ways of God, and wonder at the depth + of his wisdom. Nevertheless it is well to observe that one does not ask + why God foresees the thing, for that is understood, it is because it will + be: but one asks why he ordains thus, why he hardens such an one, why he + has compassion on another. We do not know the reasons which he may have + for this; but <i>since he is very good and very wise that is enough to + make us deem that his reasons are good</i>. As he is just also, it + follows that his decrees and his operation do not destroy our freedom. + Some men have sought some reason therein. They have said that we are made + from a corrupt and impure mass, indeed of mud. But Adam and the Angels + were made of silver and gold, and they sinned notwithstanding. One + sometimes becomes hardened again after regeneration. We must therefore + seek another cause for evil, and I doubt whether even the Angels are + aware of it; yet they cease not to be happy and to praise God. Boethius + hearkened more to the answer of philosophy than to that of St. Paul; that + was the cause of his failure. Let us believe in Jesus Christ, he is the + virtue and the wisdom of God: he teaches us that God willeth the + salvation of all, that he willeth not the death of the sinner. Let us + therefore put our trust in the divine mercy, and let us not by our vanity + and our malice disqualify ourselves to receive it.</p> + + <p>413. This dialogue of Valla's is excellent, even though one must take + exception to some points in it: but its chief defect is that it cuts the + knot and that it seems to condemn providence under the name of Jupiter, + making him almost the author of sin. Let us therefore carry the little + fable still further. Sextus, quitting Apollo and Delphi, seeks out + Jupiter at Dodona. He makes sacrifices and then he exhibits his + complaints. Why have you condemned me, O <!-- Page 370 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page370"></a>[370]</span> great God, to be + wicked and unhappy? Change my lot and my heart, or acknowledge your + error. Jupiter answers him: If you will renounce Rome, the Parcae shall + spin for you different fates, you shall become wise, you shall be happy. + <font class="sc">sextus</font>—Why must I renounce the hope of a + crown? Can I not come to be a good king? <font + class="sc">jupiter</font>—No, Sextus; I know better what is needful + for you. If you go to Rome, you are lost. Sextus, not being able to + resolve upon so great a sacrifice, went forth from the temple, and + abandoned himself to his fate. Theodorus, the High Priest, who had been + present at the dialogue between God and Sextus, addressed these words to + Jupiter: Your wisdom is to be revered, O great Ruler of the Gods. You + have convinced this man of his error; he must henceforth impute his + unhappiness to his evil will; he has not a word to say. But your faithful + worshippers are astonished; they would fain wonder at your goodness as + well as at your greatness: it rested with you to give him a different + will. <font class="sc">jupiter</font>—Go to my daughter Pallas, she + will inform you what I was bound to do.</p> + + <p>414. Theodorus journeyed to Athens: he was bidden to lie down to sleep + in the temple of the Goddess. Dreaming, he found himself transported into + an unknown country. There stood a palace of unimaginable splendour and + prodigious size. The Goddess Pallas appeared at the gate, surrounded by + rays of dazzling majesty.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i8"><i>Qualisque videri</i></p> + <p><i>Coelicolis et quanta solet.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>She touched the face of Theodorus with an olive-branch, which she was + holding in her hand. And lo! he had become able to confront the divine + radiancy of the daughter of Jupiter, and of all that she should show him. + Jupiter who loves you (she said to him) has commended you to me to be + instructed. You see here the palace of the fates, where I keep watch and + ward. Here are representations not only of that which happens but also of + all that which is possible. Jupiter, having surveyed them before the + beginning of the existing world, classified the possibilities into + worlds, and chose the best of all. He comes sometimes to visit these + places, to enjoy the pleasure of recapitulating things and of renewing + his own choice, which cannot fail to please him. I have only to speak, + and we shall see a whole world that my father might have produced, + wherein will be represented anything that can be asked of him; and in + this way one may know also what would happen if any <!-- Page 371 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page371"></a>[371]</span> particular + possibility should attain unto existence. And whenever the conditions are + not determinate enough, there will be as many such worlds differing from + one another as one shall wish, which will answer differently the same + question, in as many ways as possible. You learnt geometry in your youth, + like all well-instructed Greeks. You know therefore that when the + conditions of a required point do not sufficiently determine it, and + there is an infinite number of them, they all fall into what the + geometricians call a locus, and this locus at least (which is often a + line) will be determinate. Thus you can picture to yourself an ordered + succession of worlds, which shall contain each and every one the case + that is in question, and shall vary its circumstances and its + consequences. But if you put a case that differs from the actual world + only in one single definite thing and in its results, a certain one of + those determinate worlds will answer you. These worlds are all here, that + is, in ideas. I will show you some, wherein shall be found, not + absolutely the same Sextus as you have seen (that is not possible, he + carries with him always that which he shall be) but several Sextuses + resembling him, possessing all that you know already of the true Sextus, + but not all that is already in him imperceptibly, nor in consequence all + that shall yet happen to him. You will find in one world a very happy and + noble Sextus, in another a Sextus content with a mediocre state, a + Sextus, indeed, of every kind and endless diversity of forms.</p> + + <p>415. Thereupon the Goddess led Theodorus into one of the halls of the + palace: when he was within, it was no longer a hall, it was a world,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Solemque suum, sua sidera norat</i>.</p> + </div> + </div> + <p>At the command of Pallas there came within view Dodona with the temple + of Jupiter, and Sextus issuing thence; he could be heard saying that he + would obey the God. And lo! he goes to a city lying between two seas, + resembling Corinth. He buys there a small garden; cultivating it, he + finds a treasure; he becomes a rich man, enjoying affection and esteem; + he dies at a great age, beloved of the whole city. Theodorus saw the + whole life of Sextus as at one glance, and as in a stage presentation. + There was a great volume of writings in this hall: Theodorus could not + refrain from asking what that meant. It is the history of this world + which we are now visiting, the Goddess told him; it is the book of its + fates. You have <!-- Page 372 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page372"></a>[372]</span> seen a number on the forehead of Sextus. + Look in this book for the place which it indicates. Theodorus looked for + it, and found there the history of Sextus in a form more ample than the + outline he had seen. Put your finger on any line you please, Pallas said + to him, and you will see represented actually in all its detail that + which the line broadly indicates. He obeyed, and he saw coming into view + all the characteristics of a portion of the life of that Sextus. They + passed into another hall, and lo! another world, another Sextus. who, + issuing from the temple, and having resolved to obey Jupiter, goes to + Thrace. There he marries the daughter of the king, who had no other + children; he succeeds him, and he is adored by his subjects. They went + into other rooms, and always they saw new scenes.</p> + + <p>416. The halls rose in a pyramid, becoming even more beautiful as one + mounted towards the apex, and representing more beautiful worlds. Finally + they reached the highest one which completed the pyramid, and which was + the most beautiful of all: for the pyramid had a beginning, but one could + not see its end; it had an apex, but no base; it went on increasing to + infinity. That is (as the Goddess explained) because amongst an endless + number of possible worlds there is the best of all, else would God not + have determined to create any; but there is not any one which has not + also less perfect worlds below it: that is why the pyramid goes on + descending to infinity. Theodorus, entering this highest hall, became + entranced in ecstasy; he had to receive succour from the Goddess, a drop + of a divine liquid placed on his tongue restored him; he was beside + himself for joy. We are in the real true world (said the Goddess) and you + are at the source of happiness. Behold what Jupiter makes ready for you, + if you continue to serve him faithfully. Here is Sextus as he is, and as + he will be in reality. He issues from the temple in a rage, he scorns the + counsel of the Gods. You see him going to Rome, bringing confusion + everywhere, violating the wife of his friend. There he is driven out with + his father, beaten, unhappy. If Jupiter had placed here a Sextus happy at + Corinth or King in Thrace, it would be no longer this world. And + nevertheless he could not have failed to choose this world, which + surpasses in perfection all the others, and which forms the apex of the + pyramid. Else would Jupiter have renounced his wisdom, he would have + banished me, me his daughter. You see that my father did not make Sextus + wicked; he was so from all <!-- Page 373 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page373"></a>[373]</span> eternity, he was so always and freely. My + father only granted him the existence which his wisdom could not refuse + to the world where he is included: he made him pass from the region of + the possible to that of the actual beings. The crime of Sextus serves for + great things: it renders Rome free; thence will arise a great empire, + which will show noble examples to mankind. But that is nothing in + comparison with the worth of this whole world, at whose beauty you will + marvel, when, after a happy passage from this mortal state to another and + better one, the Gods shall have fitted you to know it.</p> + + <p>417. At this moment Theodorus wakes up, he gives thanks to the + Goddess, he owns the justice of Jupiter. His spirit pervaded by what he + has seen and heard, he carries on the office of High Priest, with all the + zeal of a true servant of his God, and with all the joy whereof a mortal + is capable. It seems to me that this continuation of the tale may + elucidate the difficulty which Valla did not wish to treat. If Apollo has + represented aright God's knowledge of vision (that which concerns beings + in existence), I hope that Pallas will have not discreditably filled the + role of what is called knowledge of simple intelligence (that which + embraces all that is possible), wherein at last the source of things must + be sought.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 377 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page377"></a>[377]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>APPENDICES</h3> + +<h3>SUMMARY OF THE CONTROVERSY +REDUCED TO FORMAL ARGUMENTS</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p>Some persons of discernment have wished me to make this addition. I + have the more readily deferred to their opinion, because of the + opportunity thereby gained for meeting certain difficulties, and for + making observations on certain matters which were not treated in + sufficient detail in the work itself.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection i</font></p> + + <p>Whoever does not choose the best course is lacking either in power, or + knowledge, or goodness.</p> + + <p>God did not choose the best course in creating this world.</p> + + <p>Therefore God was lacking in power, or knowledge, or goodness.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I deny the minor, that is to say, the second premiss of this + syllogism, and the opponent proves it by this</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">prosyllogism</font></p> + + <p>Whoever makes things in which there is evil, and which could have been + made without any evil, or need not have been made at all, does not choose + the best course.</p> + + <p>God made a world wherein there is evil; a world, I say, which could + have been made without any evil or which need not have been made at + all.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 378 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page378"></a>[378]</span></p> + + <p>Therefore God did not choose the best course.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I admit the minor of this prosyllogism: for one must confess that + there is evil in this world which God has made, and that it would have + been possible to make a world without evil or even not to create any + world, since its creation depended upon the free will of God. But I deny + the major, that is, the first of the two premisses of the prosyllogism, + and I might content myself with asking for its proof. In order, however, + to give a clearer exposition of the matter, I would justify this denial + by pointing out that the best course is not always that one which tends + towards avoiding evil, since it is possible that the evil may be + accompanied by a greater good. For example, the general of an army will + prefer a great victory with a slight wound to a state of affairs without + wound and without victory. I have proved this in further detail in this + work by pointing out, through instances taken from mathematics and + elsewhere, that an imperfection in the part may be required for a greater + perfection in the whole. I have followed therein the opinion of St. + Augustine, who said a hundred times that God permitted evil in order to + derive from it a good, that is to say, a greater good; and Thomas Aquinas + says (in libr. 2, <i>Sent. Dist.</i> 32, qu. 1, art. 1) that the + permission of evil tends towards the good of the universe. I have shown + that among older writers the fall of Adam was termed <i>felix culpa</i>, + a fortunate sin, because it had been expiated with immense benefit by the + incarnation of the Son of God: for he gave to the universe something more + noble than anything there would otherwise have been amongst created + beings. For the better understanding of the matter I added, following the + example of many good authors, that it was consistent with order and the + general good for God to grant to certain of his creatures the opportunity + to exercise their freedom, even when he foresaw that they would turn to + evil: for God could easily correct the evil, and it was not fitting that + in order to prevent sin he should always act in an extraordinary way. It + will therefore sufficiently refute the objection to show that a world + with evil may be better than a world without evil. But I have gone still + further in the work, and have even shown that this universe must be + indeed better than every other possible universe.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 379 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page379"></a>[379]</span></p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection ii</font></p> + + <p>If there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures, there is + more evil than good in all God's work.</p> + + <p>Now there is more evil than good in intelligent creatures.</p> + + <p>Therefore there is more evil than good in all God's work.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I deny the major and the minor of this conditional syllogism. As for + the major, I do not admit it because this supposed inference from the + part to the whole, from intelligent creatures to all creatures, assumes + tacitly and without proof that creatures devoid of reason cannot be + compared or taken into account with those that have reason. But why might + not the surplus of good in the non-intelligent creatures that fill the + world compensate for and even exceed incomparably the surplus of evil in + rational creatures? It is true that the value of the latter is greater; + but by way of compensation the others are incomparably greater in number; + and it may be that the proportion of number and quantity surpasses that + of value and quality.</p> + + <p>The minor also I cannot admit, namely, that there is more evil than + good in intelligent creatures. One need not even agree that there is more + evil than good in the human kind. For it is possible, and even a very + reasonable thing, that the glory and the perfection of the blessed may be + incomparably greater than the misery and imperfection of the damned, and + that here the excellence of the total good in the smaller number may + exceed the total evil which is in the greater number. The blessed draw + near to divinity through a divine Mediator, so far as can belong to these + created beings, and make such progress in good as is impossible for the + damned to make in evil, even though they should approach as nearly as may + be the nature of demons. God is infinite, and the Devil is finite; good + can and does go on <i>ad infinitum</i>, whereas evil has its bounds. It + may be therefore, and it is probable, that there happens in the + comparison between the blessed and the damned the opposite of what I said + could happen in the comparison between the happy and the unhappy, namely + that in the latter the proportion of degrees surpasses that of numbers, + while in the comparison between intelligent and non-intelligent the + proportion of numbers is greater than that of values. One is justified in + assuming that a thing may be so as long as one does not prove that it is + <!-- Page 380 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page380"></a>[380]</span> + impossible, and indeed what is here put forward goes beyond + assumption.</p> + + <p>But secondly, even should one admit that there is more evil than good + in the human kind, one still has every reason for not admitting that + there is more evil than good in all intelligent creatures. For there is + an inconceivable number of Spirits, and perhaps of other rational + creatures besides: and an opponent cannot prove that in the whole City of + God, composed as much of Spirits as of rational animals without number + and of endless different kinds, the evil exceeds the good. Although one + need not, in order to answer an objection, prove that a thing is, when + its mere possibility suffices, I have nevertheless shown in this present + work that it is a result of the supreme perfection of the Sovereign of + the Universe that the kingdom of God should be the most perfect of all + states or governments possible, and that in consequence what little evil + there is should be required to provide the full measure of the vast good + existing there.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection iii</font></p> + + <p>If it is always impossible not to sin, it is always unjust to + punish.</p> + + <p>Now it is always impossible not to sin, or rather all sin is + necessary.</p> + + <p>Therefore it is always unjust to punish.</p> + + <p>The minor of this is proved as follows.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">first prosyllogism</font></p> + + <p>Everything predetermined is necessary.</p> + + <p>Every event is predetermined.</p> + + <p>Therefore every event (and consequently sin also) is necessary.</p> + + <p>Again this second minor is proved thus.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">second prosyllogism</font></p> + + <p>That which is future, that which is foreseen, that which is involved + in causes is predetermined.</p> + + <p>Every event is of this kind.</p> + + <p>Therefore every event is predetermined.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I admit in a certain sense the conclusion of the second prosyllogism, + which is the minor of the first; but I shall deny the <!-- Page 381 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page381"></a>[381]</span> major of the + first prosyllogism, namely that everything predetermined is necessary; + taking 'necessity', say the necessity to sin, or the impossibility of not + sinning, or of not doing some action, in the sense relevant to the + argument, that is, as a necessity essential and absolute, which destroys + the morality of action and the justice of punishment. If anyone meant a + different necessity or impossibility (that is, a necessity only moral or + hypothetical, which will be explained presently) it is plain that we + would deny him the major stated in the objection. We might content + ourselves with this answer, and demand the proof of the proposition + denied: but I am well pleased to justify my manner of procedure in the + present work, in order to make the matter clear and to throw more light + on this whole subject, by explaining the necessity that must be rejected + and the determination that must be allowed. The truth is that the + necessity contrary to morality, which must be avoided and which would + render punishment unjust, is an insuperable necessity, which would render + all opposition unavailing, even though one should wish with all one's + heart to avoid the necessary action, and though one should make all + possible efforts to that end. Now it is plain that this is not applicable + to voluntary actions, since one would not do them if one did not so + desire. Thus their prevision and predetermination is not absolute, but it + presupposes will: if it is certain that one will do them, it is no less + certain that one will will to do them. These voluntary actions and their + results will not happen whatever one may do and whether one will them or + not; but they will happen because one will do, and because one will will + to do, that which leads to them. That is involved in prevision and + predetermination, and forms the reason thereof. The necessity of such + events is called conditional or hypothetical, or again necessity of + consequence, because it presupposes the will and the other requisites. + But the necessity which destroys morality, and renders punishment unjust + and reward unavailing, is found in the things that will be whatever one + may do and whatever one may will to do: in a word, it exists in that + which is essential. This it is which is called an absolute necessity. + Thus it avails nothing with regard to what is necessary absolutely to + ordain interdicts or commandments, to propose penalties or prizes, to + blame or to praise; it will come to pass no more and no less. In + voluntary actions, on the contrary, and in what depends upon them, + precepts, armed with power to <!-- Page 382 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page382"></a>[382]</span> punish and to reward, very often serve, + and are included in the order of causes that make action exist. Thus it + comes about that not only pains and effort but also prayers are + effective, God having had even these prayers in mind before he ordered + things, and having made due allowance for them. That is why the precept + <i>Ora et labora</i> (Pray and work) remains intact. Thus not only those + who (under the empty pretext of the necessity of events) maintain that + one can spare oneself the pains demanded by affairs, but also those who + argue against prayers, fall into that which the ancients even in their + time called 'the Lazy Sophism'. So the predetermination of events by + their causes is precisely what contributes to morality instead of + destroying it, and the causes incline the will without necessitating it. + For this reason the determination we are concerned with is not a + necessitation. It is certain (to him who knows all) that the effect will + follow this inclination; but this effect does not follow thence by a + consequence which is necessary, that is, whose contrary implies + contradiction; and it is also by such an inward inclination that the will + is determined, without the presence of necessity. Suppose that one has + the greatest possible passion (for example, a great thirst), you will + admit that the soul can find some reason for resisting it, even if it + were only that of displaying its power. Thus though one may never have + complete indifference of equipoise, and there is always a predominance of + inclination for the course adopted, that predominance does not render + absolutely necessary the resolution taken.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection iv</font></p> + + <p>Whoever can prevent the sin of others and does not so, but rather + contributes to it, although he be fully apprised of it, is accessary + thereto.</p> + + <p>God can prevent the sin of intelligent creatures; but he does not so, + and he rather contributes to it by his co-operation and by the + opportunities he causes, although he is fully cognizant of it.</p> + + <p>Therefore, etc.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I deny the major of this syllogism. It may be that one can prevent the + sin, but that one ought not to do so, because one could not do so without + committing a sin oneself, or (when God is concerned) without acting + unreasonably. I have given instances of <!-- Page 383 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page383"></a>[383]</span> that, and have applied + them to God himself. It may be also that one contributes to the evil, and + that one even opens the way to it sometimes, in doing things one is bound + to do. And when one does one's duty, or (speaking of God) when, after + full consideration, one does that which reason demands, one is not + responsible for events, even when one foresees them. One does not will + these evils; but one is willing to permit them for a greater good, which + one cannot in reason help preferring to other considerations. This is a + <i>consequent</i> will, resulting from acts of <i>antecedent</i> will, in + which one wills the good. I know that some persons, in speaking of the + antecedent and consequent will of God, have meant by the antecedent that + which wills that all men be saved, and by the consequent that which + wills, in consequence of persistent sin, that there be some damned, + damnation being a result of sin. But these are only examples of a more + general notion, and one may say with the same reason, that God wills by + his antecedent will that men sin not, and that by his consequent or final + and decretory will (which is always followed by its effect) he wills to + permit that they sin, this permission being a result of superior reasons. + One has indeed justification for saying, in general, that the antecedent + will of God tends towards the production of good and the prevention of + evil, each taken in itself, and as it were detached (<i>particulariter et + secundum quid</i>: Thom., I, qu. 19, art. 6) according to the measure of + the degree of each good or of each evil. Likewise one may say that the + consequent, or final and total, divine will tends towards the production + of as many goods as can be put together, whose combination thereby + becomes determined, and involves also the permission of some evils and + the exclusion of some goods, as the best possible plan of the universe + demands. Arminius, in his <i>Antiperkinsus,</i> explained very well that + the will of God can be called consequent not only in relation to the + action of the creature considered beforehand in the divine understanding, + but also in relation to other anterior acts of divine will. But it is + enough to consider the passage cited from Thomas Aquinas, and that from + Scotus (I, dist. 46, qu. 11), to see that they make this distinction as I + have made it here. Nevertheless if anyone will not suffer this use of the + terms, let him put 'previous' in place of 'antecedent' will, and 'final' + or 'decretory' in place of 'consequent' will. For I do not wish to + wrangle about words.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 384 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page384"></a>[384]</span></p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection v</font></p> + + <p>Whoever produces all that is real in a thing is its cause.</p> + + <p>God produces all that is real in sin.</p> + + <p>Therefore God is the cause of sin.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I might content myself with denying the major or the minor, because + the term 'real' admits of interpretations capable of rendering these + propositions false. But in order to give a better explanation I will make + a distinction. 'Real' either signifies that which is positive only, or + else it includes also privative beings: in the first case, I deny the + major and I admit the minor; in the second case, I do the opposite. I + might have confined myself to that; but I was willing to go further, in + order to account for this distinction. I have therefore been well pleased + to point out that every purely positive or absolute reality is a + perfection, and that every imperfection comes from limitation, that is, + from the privative: for to limit is to withhold extension, or the more + beyond. Now God is the cause of all perfections, and consequently of all + realities, when they are regarded as purely positive. But limitations or + privations result from the original imperfection of creatures which + restricts their receptivity. It is as with a laden boat, which the river + carries along more slowly or less slowly in proportion to the weight that + it bears: thus the speed comes from the river, but the retardation which + restricts this speed comes from the load. Also I have shown in the + present work how the creature, in causing sin, is a deficient cause; how + errors and evil inclinations spring from privation; and how privation is + efficacious accidentally. And I have justified the opinion of St. + Augustine (lib. I, <i>Ad. Simpl.</i>, qu. 2) who explains (for example) + how God hardens the soul, not in giving it something evil, but because + the effect of the good he imprints is restricted by the resistance of the + soul, and by the circumstances contributing to this resistance, so that + he does not give it all the good that would overcome its evil. 'Nec + <i>(inquit)</i> ab illo erogatur aliquid quo homo fit deterior, sed + tantum quo fit melior non erogatur.' But if God had willed to do more + here he must needs have produced either fresh natures in his creatures or + fresh miracles to change their natures, and this the best plan did not + allow. It is just as if the current of the river must needs be more rapid + than its slope permits or the boats themselves <!-- Page 385 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page385"></a>[385]</span> be less laden, if they + had to be impelled at a greater speed. So the limitation or original + imperfection of creatures brings it about that even the best plan of the + universe cannot admit more good, and cannot be exempted from certain + evils, these, however, being only of such a kind as may tend towards a + greater good. There are some disorders in the parts which wonderfully + enhance the beauty of the whole, just as certain dissonances, + appropriately used, render harmony more beautiful. But that depends upon + the answer which I have already given to the first objection.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection vi</font></p> + + <p>Whoever punishes those who have done as well as it was in their power + to do is unjust.</p> + + <p>God does so.</p> + + <p>Therefore, etc.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I deny the minor of this argument. And I believe that God always gives + sufficient aid and grace to those who have good will, that is to say, who + do not reject this grace by a fresh sin. Thus I do not admit the + damnation of children dying unbaptized or outside the Church, or the + damnation of adult persons who have acted according to the light that God + has given them. And I believe that, <i>if anyone has followed the light + he had</i>, he will undoubtedly receive thereof in greater measure as he + has need, even as the late Herr Hulsemann, who was celebrated as a + profound theologian at Leipzig, has somewhere observed; and if such a man + had failed to receive light during his life, he would receive it at least + in the hour of death.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection vii</font></p> + + <p>Whoever gives only to some, and not to all, the means of producing + effectively in them good will and final saving faith has not enough + goodness.</p> + + <p>God does so.</p> + + <p>Therefore, etc.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I deny the major. It is true that God could overcome the greatest + resistance of the human heart, and indeed he sometimes <!-- Page 386 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page386"></a>[386]</span> does so, + whether by an inward grace or by the outward circumstances that can + greatly influence souls; but he does not always do so. Whence comes this + distinction, someone will say, and wherefore does his goodness appear to + be restricted? The truth is that it would not have been in order always + to act in an extraordinary way and to derange the connexion of things, as + I have observed already in answering the first objection. The reasons for + this connexion, whereby the one is placed in more favourable + circumstances than the other, are hidden in the depths of God's wisdom: + they depend upon the universal harmony. The best plan of the universe, + which God could not fail to choose, required this. One concludes thus + from the event itself; since God made the universe, it was not possible + to do better. Such management, far from being contrary to goodness, has + rather been prompted by supreme goodness itself. This objection with its + solution might have been inferred from what was said with regard to the + first objection; but it seemed advisable to touch upon it separately.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">objection viii</font></p> + + <p>Whoever cannot fail to choose the best is not free.</p> + + <p>God cannot fail to choose the best.</p> + + <p>Therefore God is not free.</p> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><font class="sc">answer</font></p> + + <p>I deny the major of this argument. Rather is it true freedom, and the + most perfect, to be able to make the best use of one's free will, and + always to exercise this power, without being turned aside either by + outward force or by inward passions, whereof the one enslaves our bodies + and the other our souls. There is nothing less servile and more befitting + the highest degree of freedom than to be always led towards the good, and + always by one's own inclination, without any constraint and without any + displeasure. And to object that God therefore had need of external things + is only a sophism. He creates them freely: but when he had set before him + an end, that of exercising his goodness, his wisdom determined him to + choose the means most appropriate for obtaining this end. To call that a + <i>need</i> is to take the term in a sense not usual, which clears it of + all imperfection, somewhat as one does when speaking of the wrath of + God.</p> + + <p>Seneca says somewhere, that God commanded only once, but <!-- Page 387 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page387"></a>[387]</span> that he obeys + always, because he obeys the laws that he willed to ordain for himself: + <i>semel jussit, semper paret</i>. But he had better have said, that God + always commands and that he is always obeyed: for in willing he always + follows the tendency of his own nature, and all other things always + follow his will. And as this will is always the same one cannot say that + he obeys that will only which he formerly had. Nevertheless, although his + will is always indefectible and always tends towards the best, the evil + or the lesser good which he rejects will still be possible in itself. + Otherwise the necessity of good would be geometrical (so to speak) or + metaphysical, and altogether absolute; the contingency of things would be + destroyed, and there would be no choice. But necessity of this kind, + which does not destroy the possibility of the contrary, has the name by + analogy only: it becomes effective not through the mere essence of + things, but through that which is outside them and above them, that is, + through the will of God. This necessity is called moral, because for the + wise what is necessary and what is owing are equivalent things; and when + it is always followed by its effect, as it indeed is in the perfectly + wise, that is, in God, one can say that it is a happy necessity. The more + nearly creatures approach this, the closer do they come to perfect + felicity. Moreover, necessity of this kind is not the necessity one + endeavours to avoid, and which destroys morality, reward and + commendation. For that which it brings to pass does not happen whatever + one may do and whatever one may will, but because one desires it. A will + to which it is natural to choose well deserves most to be commended; and + it carries with it its own reward, which is supreme happiness. And as + this constitution of the divine nature gives an entire satisfaction to + him who possesses it, it is also the best and the most desirable from the + point of view of the creatures who are all dependent upon God. If the + will of God had not as its rule the principle of the best, it would tend + towards evil, which would be worst of all; or else it would be + indifferent somehow to good and to evil, and guided by chance. But a will + that would always drift along at random would scarcely be any better for + the government of the universe than the fortuitous concourse of + corpuscles, without the existence of divinity. And even though God should + abandon himself to chance only in some cases, and in a certain way (as he + would if he did not always tend entirely towards the best, and if he were + capable of preferring a lesser good to a greater good, that <!-- Page 388 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page388"></a>[388]</span> is, an evil + to a good, since that which prevents a greater good is an evil) he would + be no less imperfect than the object of his choice. Then he would not + deserve absolute trust; he would act without reason in such a case, and + the government of the universe would be like certain games equally + divided between reason and luck. This all proves that this objection + which is made against the choice of the best perverts the notions of free + and necessary, and represents the best to us actually as evil: but that + is either malicious or absurd.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 389 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page389"></a>[389]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>EXCURSUS ON THEODICY</h3> + +<h3><a href="#sect392">§ 392</a></h3> + +<h3>published by the author in Mémoires de Trévoux</h3> + +<h3>July 1712</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p class="author"><i>February</i> 1712</p> + + <p>I said in my essays, <a href="#sect392">§ 392</a>, that I wished to + see the demonstrations mentioned by M. Bayle and contained in the sixth + letter printed at Trévoux in 1703. Father des Bosses has shown me this + letter, in which the writer essays to demonstrate by the geometrical + method that God is the sole true cause of all that is real. My perusal of + it has confirmed me in the opinion which I indicated in the same passage, + namely, that this proposition can be true in a very good sense, God being + the only cause of pure and absolute realities, or perfections; but when + one includes limitations or privations under the name of realities one + can say that second causes co-operate in the production of what is + limited, and that otherwise God would be the cause of sin, and even its + sole cause. And I am somewhat inclined to think that the gifted author of + the letter does not greatly differ in opinion from me, although he seems + to include all modalities among the realities of which he declares God to + be the sole cause. For in actual fact I think he will not admit that God + is the cause and the author of sin. Indeed, he explains himself in a + manner which seems to overthrow his thesis and to grant real action to + creatures. For in the proof of the eighth corollary of his second + proposition these words occur: 'The natural motion of the soul, although + determinate in itself, is indeterminate in respect of its objects. For it + is love of good in <!-- Page 390 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page390"></a>[390]</span> general. It is through the ideas of good + appearing in individual objects that this motion becomes individual and + determinate in relation to those objects. And thus as the mind has the + power of varying its own ideas it can also change the determinations of + its love. And for that purpose it is not necessary that it overcome the + power of God or oppose his action. These determinations of motion towards + individual objects are not invincible. It is this noninvincibility which + causes the mind to be free and capable of changing them; but after all + the mind makes these changes only through the motion which God gives to + it and conserves for it.' In my own style I would have said that the + perfection which is in the action of the creature comes from God, but + that the limitations to be found there are a consequence of the original + limitation and the preceding limitations that occurred in the creature. + Further, this is so not only in minds but also in all other substances, + which thereby are causes co-operating in the change which comes to pass + in themselves; for this determination of which the author speaks is + nothing but a limitation.</p> + + <p>Now if after that one reviews all the demonstrations or corollaries of + the letter, one will be able to admit or reject the majority of its + assertions, in accordance with the interpretation one may make of them. + If by 'reality' one means only perfections or positive realities, God is + the only true cause; but if that which involves limitations is included + under the realities, one will deny a considerable portion of the theses, + and the author himself will have shown us the example. It is in order to + render the matter more comprehensible that I used in the Essays the + example of a laden boat, which, the more laden it is, is the more slowly + carried along by the stream. There one sees clearly that the stream is + the cause of what is positive in this motion, of the perfection, the + force, the speed of the boat, but that the load is the cause of the + restriction of this force, and that it brings about the retardation.</p> + + <p>It is praiseworthy in anyone to attempt to apply the geometrical + method to metaphysical matters. But it must be admitted that hitherto + success has seldom been attained: and M. Descartes himself, with all that + very great skill which one cannot deny in him, never perhaps had less + success than when he essayed to do this in one of his answers to + objections. For in mathematics it is easier to succeed, because numbers, + figures and calculations make good the defects concealed in words; but in + metaphysics, where <!-- Page 391 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page391"></a>[391]</span> one is deprived of this aid (at least in + ordinary argumentation), the strictness employed in the form of the + argument and in the exact definitions of the terms must needs supply this + lack. But in neither argument nor definition is that strictness here to + be seen.</p> + + <p>The author of the letter, who undoubtedly displays much ardour and + penetration, sometimes goes a little too far, as when he claims to prove + that there is as much reality and force in rest as in motion, according + to the fifth corollary of the second proposition. He asserts that the + will of God is no less positive in rest than in motion, and that it is + not less invincible. Be it so, but does it follow that there is as much + reality and force in each of the two? I do not see this conclusion, and + with the same argument one would prove that there is as much force in a + strong motion as in a weak motion. God in willing rest wills that the + body be at the place A, where it was immediately before, and for that it + suffices that there be no reason to prompt God to the change. But when + God wills that afterwards the body be at the place B, there must needs be + a new reason, of such a kind as to determine God to will that it be in B + and not in C or in any other place, and that it be there more or less + promptly. It is upon these reasons, the volitions of God, that we must + assess the force and the reality existent in things. The author speaks + much of the will of God, but he does not speak much in this letter of the + reasons which prompt God to will, and upon which all depends. And these + reasons are taken from the objects.</p> + + <p>I observe first, indeed, with regard to the second corollary of the + first proposition, that it is very true, but that it is not very well + proven. The writer affirms that if God only ceased to will the existence + of a being, that being would no longer exist; and here is the proof given + word for word:</p> + + <p>'Demonstration. That which exists only by the will of God no longer + exists once that will has ceased.' (But that is what must be proved. The + writer endeavours to prove it by adding:) 'Remove the cause, you remove + the effect.' (This maxim ought to have been placed among the axioms which + are stated at the beginning. But unhappily this axiom may be reckoned + among those rules of philosophy which are subject to many exceptions.) + 'Now by the preceding proposition and by its first corollary no being + exists save by the will of God. Therefore, etc.' There is ambiguity in + this expression, that nothing exists save by the will of God. If one <!-- + Page 392 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page392"></a>[392]</span> + means that things begin to exist only through this will, one is justified + in referring to the preceding propositions; but if one means that the + existence of things is at all times a consequence of the will of God, one + assumes more or less what is in question. Therefore it was necessary to + prove first that the existence of things depends upon the will of God, + and that it is not only a mere effect of that will, but a dependence, in + proportion to the perfection which things contain; and once that is + assumed, they will depend upon God's will no less afterwards than at the + beginning. That is the way I have taken the matter in my Essays.</p> + + <p>Nevertheless I recognize that the letter upon which I have just made + observations is admirable and well deserving of perusal, and that it + contains noble and true sentiments, provided it be taken in the sense I + have just indicated. And arguments in this form may serve as an + introduction to meditations somewhat more advanced.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 393 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page393"></a>[393]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>REFLEXIONS ON THE WORK +THAT MR. HOBBES PUBLISHED +IN ENGLISH ON 'FREEDOM, +NECESSITY AND CHANCE'</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p>1. As the question of Necessity and Freedom, with other questions + depending thereon, was at one time debated between the famous Mr. Hobbes + and Dr. John Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, in books published by each of + them, I have deemed it appropriate to give a clear account of them + (although I have already mentioned them more than once); and this all the + more since these writings of Mr. Hobbes have hitherto only appeared in + English, and since the works of this author usually contain something + good and ingenious. The Bishop of Derry and Mr. Hobbes, having met in + Paris at the house of the Marquis, afterwards Duke, of Newcastle in the + year 1646, entered into a discussion on this subject. The dispute was + conducted with extreme restraint; but the bishop shortly afterwards sent + a note to My Lord Newcastle, desiring him to induce Mr. Hobbes to answer + it. He answered; but at the same time he expressed a wish that his answer + should not be published, because he believed it possible for + ill-instructed persons to abuse dogmas such as his, however true they + might be. It so happened, however, that Mr. Hobbes himself passed it to a + French friend, and allowed a young Englishman to translate it into French + for the benefit of this friend. This young man kept a copy of the English + original, and published it later in England without the author's + knowledge. Thus the bishop was obliged to reply to it, <!-- Page 394 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page394"></a>[394]</span> and Mr. + Hobbes to make a rejoinder, and to publish all the pieces together in a + book of 348 pages printed in London in the year 1656, in 4to., entitled, + <i>Questions concerning Freedom, Necessity and Chance, elucidated and + discussed between Doctor Bramhall, Bishop of Derry, and Thomas Hobbes of + Malmesbury</i>. There is a later edition, of the year 1684, in a work + entitled <i>Hobbes's Tripos</i>, where are to be found his book on human + nature, his treatise on the body politic and his treatise on freedom and + necessity; but the latter does not contain the bishop's reply, nor the + author's rejoinder. Mr. Hobbes argues on this subject with his usual wit + and subtlety; but it is a pity that in both the one and the other we + stumble upon petty tricks, such as arise in excitement over the game. The + bishop speaks with much vehemence and behaves somewhat arrogantly. Mr. + Hobbes for his part is not disposed to spare the other, and manifests + rather too much scorn for theology, and for the terminology of the + Schoolmen, which is apparently favoured by the bishop.</p> + + <p>2. One must confess that there is something strange and indefensible + in the opinions of Mr. Hobbes. He maintains that doctrines touching the + divinity depend entirely upon the determination of the sovereign, and + that God is no more the cause of the good than of the bad actions of + creatures. He maintains that all that which God does is just, because + there is none above him with power to punish and constrain him. Yet he + speaks sometimes as if what is said about God were only compliments, that + is to say expressions proper for paying him honour, but not for knowing + him. He testifies also that it seems to him that the pains of the wicked + must end in their destruction: this opinion closely approaches that of + the Socinians, but it seems that Mr. Hobbes goes much further. His + philosophy, which asserts that bodies alone are substances, hardly + appears favourable to the providence of God and the immortality of the + soul. On other subjects nevertheless he says very reasonable things. He + shows clearly that nothing comes about by chance, or rather that chance + only signifies the ignorance of causes that produce the effect, and that + for each effect there must be a concurrence of all the sufficient + conditions anterior to the event, not one of which, manifestly, can be + lacking when the event is to follow, because they are conditions: the + event, moreover, does not fail to follow when these conditions exist all + together, because they are sufficient conditions. All which amounts to + the same as I have said so many times, that everything comes to pass <!-- + Page 395 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page395"></a>[395]</span> as a + result of determining reasons, the knowledge whereof, if we had it, would + make us know at the same time why the thing has happened and why it did + not go otherwise.</p> + + <p>3. But this author's humour, which prompts him to paradoxes and makes + him seek to contradict others, has made him draw out exaggerated and + odious conclusions and expressions, as if everything happened through an + absolute necessity. The Bishop of Derry, on the other hand, has aptly + observed in the answer to article 35, page 327, that there results only a + hypothetical necessity, such as we all grant to events in relation to the + foreknowledge of God, while Mr. Hobbes maintains that even divine + foreknowledge alone would be sufficient to establish an absolute + necessity of events. This was also the opinion of Wyclif, and even of + Luther, when he wrote <i>De Servo Arbitrio</i>; or at least they spoke + so. But it is sufficiently acknowledged to-day that this kind of + necessity which is termed hypothetical, and springs from foreknowledge or + from other anterior reasons, has nothing in it to arouse one's alarm: + whereas it would be quite otherwise if the thing were necessary of + itself, in such a way that the contrary implied contradiction. Mr. Hobbes + refuses to listen to anything about a moral necessity either, on the + ground that everything really happens through physical causes. But one is + nevertheless justified in making a great difference between the necessity + which constrains the wise to do good, and which is termed moral, existing + even in relation to God, and that blind necessity whereby according to + Epicurus, Strato, Spinoza, and perhaps Mr. Hobbes, things exist without + intelligence and without choice, and consequently without God. Indeed, + there would according to them be no need of God, since in consequence of + this necessity all would have existence through its own essence, just as + necessarily as two and three make five. And this necessity is absolute, + because everything it carries with it must happen, whatever one may do; + whereas what happens by a hypothetical necessity happens as a result of + the supposition that this or that has been foreseen or resolved, or done + beforehand; and moral necessity contains an obligation imposed by reason, + which is always followed by its effect in the wise. This kind of + necessity is happy and desirable, when one is prompted by good reasons to + act as one does; but necessity blind and absolute would subvert piety and + morality.</p> + + <p>4. There is more reason in Mr. Hobbes's discourse when he <!-- Page + 396 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page396"></a>[396]</span> admits + that our actions are in our power, so that we do that which we will when + we have the power to do it, and when there is no hindrance. He asserts + notwithstanding that our volitions themselves are not so within our power + that we can give ourselves, without difficulty and according to our good + pleasure, inclinations and wills which we might desire. The bishop does + not appear to have taken notice of this reflexion, which Mr. Hobbes also + does not develop enough. The truth is that we have some power also over + our volitions, but obliquely, and not absolutely and indifferently. This + has been explained in some passages of this work. Finally Mr. Hobbes + shows, like others before him, that the certainty of events, and + necessity itself, if there were any in the way our actions depend upon + causes, would not prevent us from employing deliberations, exhortations, + blame and praise, punishments and rewards: for these are of service and + prompt men to produce actions or to refrain from them. Thus, if human + actions were necessary, they would be so through these means. But the + truth is, that since these actions are not necessary absolutely whatever + one may do, these means contribute only to render the actions determinate + and certain, as they are indeed; for their nature shows that they are not + subject to an absolute necessity. He gives also a good enough notion of + <i>freedom</i>, in so far as it is taken in a general sense, common to + intelligent and non-intelligent substances: he states that a thing is + deemed free when the power which it has is not impeded by an external + thing. Thus the water that is dammed by a dyke has the power to spread, + but not the freedom. On the other hand, it has not the power to rise + above the dyke, although nothing would prevent it then from spreading, + and although nothing from outside prevents it from rising so high. To + that end it would be necessary that the water itself should come from a + higher point or that the water-level should be raised by an increased + flow. Thus a prisoner lacks the freedom, while a sick man lacks the + power, to go his way.</p> + + <p>5. There is in Mr. Hobbes's preface an abstract of the disputed + points, which I will give here, adding some expression of opinion. <i>On + one side</i> (he says) the assertion is made, (1) 'that it is not in the + present power of man to choose for himself the will that he should have'. + That is <i>well</i> said, especially in relation to present will: men + choose the objects through will, but they do not choose their present + wills, which spring from reasons and dispositions. It is <!-- Page 397 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page397"></a>[397]</span> true, + however, that one can seek new reasons for oneself, and with time give + oneself new dispositions; and by this means one can also obtain for + oneself a will which one had not and could not have given oneself + forthwith. It is (to use the comparison Mr. Hobbes himself uses) as with + hunger or with thirst. At the present it does not rest with my will to be + hungry or not; but it rests with my will to eat or not to eat; yet, for + the time to come, it rests with me to be hungry, or to prevent myself + from being so at such and such an hour of day, by eating beforehand. In + this way it is possible often to avoid an evil will. Even though Mr. + Hobbes states in his reply (No. 14, p. 138) that it is the manner of laws + to say, you must do or you must not do this, but that there is no law + saying, you must will, or you must not will it, yet it is clear that he + is mistaken in regard to the Law of God, which says <i>non + concupisces</i>, thou shalt not covet; it is true that this prohibition + does not concern the first motions, which are involuntary. It is asserted + (2) 'That hazard' (<i>chance</i> in English, <i>casus</i> in Latin) + 'produces nothing', that is, that nothing is produced without cause or + reason. Very <i>right</i>, I admit it, if one thereby intends a real + hazard. For fortune and hazard are only appearances, which spring from + ignorance of causes or from disregard of them. (3) 'That all events have + their necessary causes.' <i>Wrong</i>: they have their determining + causes, whereby one can account for them; but these are not necessary + causes. The contrary might have happened, without implying contradiction. + (4) 'That the will of God makes the necessity of all things.' + <i>Wrong</i>: the will of God produces only contingent things, which + could have gone differently, since time, space and matter are indifferent + with regard to all kinds of shape and movement.</p> + + <p>6. <i>On the other side</i> (according to Mr. Hobbes) it is asserted, + (1) 'That man is free' (absolutely) not only 'to choose what he wills to + do, but also to choose what he wills to will.' That is <i>ill</i> said: + one is not absolute master of one's will, to change it forthwith, without + making use of some means or skill for that purpose. (2) 'When man wills a + good action, the will of God co-operates with his, otherwise not.' That + is <i>well</i> said, provided one means that God does not will evil + actions, although he wills to permit them, to prevent the occurrence of + something which would be worse than these sins. (3) 'That the will can + choose whether it wills to will or not.' <i>Wrong</i>, with regard to + present volition. (4) 'That things happen without necessity by chance.' + <i>Wrong</i>: what <!-- Page 398 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page398"></a>[398]</span> happens without necessity does not + because of that happen by chance, that is to say, without causes and + reasons. (5) 'Notwithstanding that God may foresee that an event will + happen, it is not necessary that it happen, since God foresees things, + not as futurities and as in their causes, but as present.' That begins + <i>well</i>, and finishes <i>ill</i>. One is justified in admitting the + necessity of the consequence, but one has no reason to resort to the + question how the future is present to God: for the necessity of the + consequence does not prevent the event or consequent from being + contingent in itself.</p> + + <p>7. Our author thinks that since the doctrine revived by Arminius had + been favoured in England by Archbishop Laud and by the Court, and + important ecclesiastical promotions had been only for those of that + party, this contributed to the revolt which caused the bishop and him to + meet in their exile in Paris at the house of Lord Newcastle, and to enter + into a discussion. I would not approve all the measures of Archbishop + Laud, who had merit and perhaps also good will, but who appears to have + goaded the Presbyterians excessively. Nevertheless one may say that the + revolutions, as much in the Low Countries as in Great Britain, in part + arose from the extreme intolerance of the strict party. One may say also + that the defenders of the absolute decree were at least as strict as the + others, having oppressed their opponents in Holland with the authority of + Prince Maurice and having fomented the revolts in England against King + Charles I. But these are the faults of men, and not of dogmas. Their + opponents do not spare them either, witness the severity used in Saxony + against Nicolas Krell and the proceedings of the Jesuits against the + Bishop of Ypres's party.</p> + + <p>8. Mr. Hobbes observes, after Aristotle, that there are two sources + for proofs: reason and authority. As for reason, he says that he admits + the reasons derived from the attributes of God, which he calls + argumentative, and the notions whereof are conceivable; but he maintains + that there are others wherein one conceives nothing, and which are only + expressions by which we aspire to honour God. But I do not see how one + can honour God by expressions that have no meaning. It may be that with + Mr. Hobbes, as with Spinoza, wisdom, goodness, justice are only fictions + in relation to God and the universe, since the prime cause, according to + them, acts through the necessity of its power, and <!-- Page 399 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page399"></a>[399]</span> not by the choice of + its wisdom. That is an opinion whose falsity I have sufficiently proved. + It appears that Mr. Hobbes did not wish to declare himself enough, for + fear of causing offence to people; on which point he is to be commended. + It was also on that account, as he says himself, that he had desired that + what had passed between the bishop and him in Paris should not be + published. He adds that it is not good to say that an action which God + does not will happens, since that is to say in effect that God is lacking + in power. But he adds also at the same time that it is not good either to + say the opposite, and to attribute to God that he wills the evil; because + that is not seemly, and would appear to accuse God of lack of goodness. + He believes, therefore, that in these matters telling the truth is not + advisable. He would be right if the truth were in the paradoxical + opinions that he maintains. For indeed it appears that according to the + opinion of this writer God has no goodness, or rather that that which he + calls God is nothing but the blind nature of the mass of material things, + which acts according to mathematical laws, following an absolute + necessity, as the atoms do in the system of Epicurus. If God were as the + great are sometimes here on earth, it would not be fitting to utter all + the truths concerning him. But God is not as a man, whose designs and + actions often must be concealed; rather it is always permissible and + reasonable to publish the counsels and the actions of God, because they + are always glorious and worthy of praise. Thus it is always right to + utter truths concerning the divinity; one need not anyhow refrain from + fear of giving offence. And I have explained, so it seems to me, in a way + which satisfies reason, and does not wound piety, how it is to be + understood that God's will takes effect, and concurs with sin, without + compromising his wisdom and his goodness.</p> + + <p>9. As to the authorities derived from Holy Scripture, Mr. Hobbes + divides them into three kinds; some, he says, are for me, the second kind + are neutral, and the third seem to be for my opponent. The passages which + he thinks favourable to his opinion are those which ascribe to God the + cause of our will. Thus Gen. xlv. 5, where Joseph says to his brethren, + 'Be not grieved, nor angry with yourselves, that you sold me hither: for + God did send me before you to preserve life'; and verse 8, 'it was not + you that sent me hither, but God.' And God said (Exod. vii. 3), 'I will + harden Pharaoh's heart.' And Moses said (Deut. ii. 30), <!-- Page 400 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page400"></a>[400]</span> 'But Sihon + King of Heshbon would not let us pass by him: for the Lord thy God + hardened his spirit, and made his heart obstinate, that he might deliver + him into thy hand.' And David said of Shimei (2 Sam. xvi. 10), 'Let him + curse, because the Lord hath said unto him: Curse David. Who shall then + say, wherefore hast thou done so?' And (1 Kings xii. 15), 'The King + [Rehoboam] hearkened not unto the people; for the cause was from the + Lord.' Job xii. 16: 'The deceived and the deceiver are his.' v. 17: 'He + maketh the judges fools'; v. 24: 'He taketh away the heart of the chief + of the people of the earth, and causeth them to wander in a wilderness'; + v. 25: 'He maketh them to stagger like a drunken man.' God said of the + King of Assyria (Isa. x. 6), 'Against the people will I give him a + charge, to take the spoil, and to take the prey, and to tread them down + like the mire of the streets.' And Jeremiah said (Jer. x. 23), 'O Lord, I + know that the way of man is not in himself: it is not in man that walketh + to direct his steps.' And God said (Ezek. iii. 20), 'When a righteous man + doth turn from his righteousness, and commit iniquity, and I lay a + stumbling-block before him, he shall die.' And the Saviour said (John vi. + 44), 'No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw + him.' And St. Peter (Acts ii. 23), 'Jesus having been delivered by the + determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken.' And Acts + iv. 27, 28, 'Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the + people of Israel, were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand + and thy counsel determined before to be done.' And St. Paul (Rom. ix. + 16), 'It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God + that showeth mercy.' And v. 18: 'Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will + have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth'; v. 19: 'Thou wilt say then + unto me, why doth he yet find fault? For who hath resisted his will?'; v. + 20: 'Nay but, O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the + thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus?' And + 1 Cor. iv. 7: 'For who maketh thee to differ from another? and what hast + thou that thou didst not receive?' And 1 Cor. xii. 6: 'There are + diversities of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in + all.' And Eph. ii. 10: 'We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus + unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in + them.' And Phil. ii. 13: 'It is God which worketh in you both to will and + to do of his good pleasure.' One may add to these passages all those + which <!-- Page 401 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page401"></a>[401]</span> make God the author of all grace and of + all good inclinations, and all those which say that we are as dead in + sin.</p> + + <p>10. Here now are the neutral passages, according to Mr. Hobbes. These + are those where Holy Scripture says that man has the choice to act if he + wills, or not to act if he wills not. For example Deut. xxx. 19: 'I call + heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before + you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that + both thou and thy seed may live.' And Joshua xxiv. 15: 'Choose you this + day whom ye will serve.' And God said to Gad the prophet (2 Sam. xxiv. + 12), 'Go and say unto David: Thus saith the Lord, I offer thee three + things; choose thee one of them, that I may do it unto thee.' And Isa. + vii. 16: 'Until the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the + good.' Finally the passages which Mr. Hobbes acknowledges to be + apparently contrary to his opinion are all those where it is indicated + that the will of man is not in conformity with that of God. Thus Isa. v. + 4: 'What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done + in it? Wherefore, when I looked that it should bring forth grapes, + brought it forth wild grapes?' And Jer. xix. 5: 'They have built also the + high places of Baal, to burn their sons with fire for burnt offerings + unto Baal; which I commanded not, nor spake it, neither came it into my + mind.' And Hos. xiii. 9: 'O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in + me is thine help.' And I Tim. ii. 4: 'God will have all men to be saved, + and to come unto the knowledge of the truth.' He avows that he could + quote very many other passages, such as those which indicate that God + willeth not iniquity, that he willeth the salvation of the sinner, and + generally all those which declare that God commands good and forbids + evil.</p> + + <p>11. Mr. Hobbes makes answer to these passages that God does not always + will that which he commands, as for example when he commanded Abraham to + sacrifice his son, and that God's revealed will is not always his full + will or his decree, as when he revealed to Jonah that Nineveh would + perish in forty days. He adds also, that when it is said that God wills + the salvation of all, that means simply that God commands that all do + that which is necessary for salvation; when, moreover, the Scripture says + that God wills not sin, that means that he wills to punish it. And as for + the rest, Mr. Hobbes ascribes it to the forms of expression used among + men. But one will answer him that it would be to God's discredit that + <!-- Page 402 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page402"></a>[402]</span> + his revealed will should be opposed to his real will: that what he bade + Jonah say to the Ninevites was rather a threat than a prediction, and + that thus the condition of impenitence was implied therein; moreover the + Ninevites took it in this sense. One will say also, that it is quite true + that God in commanding Abraham to sacrifice his son willed obedience, but + did not will action, which he prevented after having obtained obedience; + for that was not an action deserving in itself to be willed. And it is + not the same in the case of actions where he exerts his will positively, + and which are in fact worthy to be the object of his will. Of such are + piety, charity and every virtuous action that God commands; of such is + omission of sin, a thing more alien to divine perfection than any other. + It is therefore incomparably better to explain the will of God as I have + explained it in this work. Thus I shall say that God, by virtue of his + supreme goodness, has in the beginning a serious inclination to produce, + or to see and cause to be produced, all good and every laudable action, + and to prevent, or to see and cause to fail, all evil and every bad + action. But he is determined by this same goodness, united to an infinite + wisdom, and by the very concourse of all the previous and particular + inclinations towards each good, and towards the preventing of each evil, + to produce the best possible design of things. This is his final and + decretory will. And this design of the best being of such a nature that + the good must be enhanced therein, as light is enhanced by shade, by some + evil which is incomparably less than this good, God could not have + excluded this evil, nor introduced certain goods that were excluded from + this plan, without wronging his supreme perfection. So for that reason + one must say that he permitted the sins of others, because otherwise he + would have himself performed an action worse than all the sin of + creatures.</p> + + <p>12. I find that the Bishop of Derry is at least justified in saying, + article XV, in his Reply, p. 153, that the opinion of his opponents is + contrary to piety, when they ascribe all to God's power only, and that + Mr. Hobbes ought not to have said that honour or worship is only a sign + of the power of him whom one honours: for one may also, and one must, + acknowledge and honour wisdom, goodness, justice and other perfections. + <i>Magnos facile laudamus, bonos libenter.</i> This opinion, which + despoils God of all goodness and of all true justice, which represents + him as a Tyrant, wielding an absolute power, independent of all right and + of all equity, and <!-- Page 403 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page403"></a>[403]</span> creating millions of creatures to be + eternally unhappy, and this without any other aim than that of displaying + his power, this opinion, I say, is capable of rendering men very evil; + and if it were accepted no other Devil would be needed in the world to + set men at variance among themselves and with God; as the Serpent did in + making Eve believe that God, when he forbade her the fruit of the tree, + did not will her good. Mr. Hobbes endeavours to parry this thrust in his + Rejoinder (p. 160) by saying that goodness is a part of the power of God, + that is to say, the power of making himself worthy of love. But that is + an abuse of terms by an evasion, and confounds things that must be kept + distinct. After all, if God does not intend the good of intelligent + creatures, if he has no other principles of justice than his power alone, + which makes him produce either arbitrarily that which chance presents to + him, or by necessity all that which is possible, without the intervention + of choice founded on good, how can he make himself worthy of love? It is + therefore the doctrine either of blind power or of arbitrary power, which + destroys piety: for the one destroys the intelligent principle or the + providence of God, the other attributes to him actions which are + appropriate to the evil principle. Justice in God, says Mr. Hobbes (p. + 161), is nothing but the power he has, which he exercises in distributing + blessings and afflictions. This definition surprises me: it is not the + power to distribute them, but the will to distribute them reasonably, + that is, goodness guided by wisdom, which makes the justice of God. But, + says he, justice is not in God as in a man, who is only just through the + observance of laws made by his superior. Mr. Hobbes is mistaken also in + that, as well as Herr Pufendorf, who followed him. Justice does not + depend upon arbitrary laws of superiors, but on the eternal rules of + wisdom and of goodness, in men as well as in God. Mr. Hobbes asserts in + the same passage that the wisdom which is attributed to God does not lie + in a logical consideration of the relation of means to ends, but in an + incomprehensible attribute, attributed to an incomprehensible nature to + honour it. It seems as if he means that it is an indescribable something + attributed to an indescribable something, and even a chimerical quality + given to a chimerical substance, to intimidate and to deceive the nations + through the worship which they render to it. After all, it is difficult + for Mr. Hobbes to have a different opinion of God and of wisdom, since he + admits only material substances. If Mr. Hobbes were still alive, I would + beware <!-- Page 404 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page404"></a>[404]</span> of ascribing to him opinions which might + do him injury; but it is difficult to exempt him from this. He may have + changed his mind subsequently, for he attained to a great age; thus I + hope that his errors may not have been deleterious to him. But as they + might be so to others, it is expedient to give warnings to those who + shall read the writings of one who otherwise is of great merit, and from + whom one may profit in many ways. It is true that God does not reason, + properly speaking, using time as we do, to pass from one truth to the + other: but as he understands at one and the same time all the truths and + all their connexions, he knows all the conclusions, and he contains in + the highest degree within himself all the reasonings that we can develop. + And just because of that his wisdom is perfect.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 405 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page405"></a>[405]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>OBSERVATIONS ON THE BOOK +CONCERNING 'THE ORIGIN OF EVIL' +PUBLISHED RECENTLY IN LONDON</h3> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + + <p>1. It is a pity that M. Bayle should have seen only the reviews of + this admirable work, which are to be found in the journals. If he had + read it himself and examined it properly, he would have provided us with + a good opportunity of throwing light on many difficulties, which spring + again and again like the head of the hydra, in a matter where it is easy + to become confused when one has not seen the whole system or does not + take the trouble to reason according to a strict plan. For strictness of + reasoning performs in subjects that transcend imagination the same + function as figures do in geometry: there must always be something + capable of fixing our attention and forming a connexion between our + thoughts. That is why when this Latin book, so learned and so elegant of + style, printed originally in London and then reprinted in Bremen, fell + into my hands, I judged that the seriousness of the matter and the + author's merit required an attention which readers might fairly expect of + me, since we are agreed only in regard to half of the subject. Indeed, as + the work contains five chapters, and the fifth with the appendix equals + the rest in size, I have observed that the first four, where it is a + question of evil in general and of physical evil in particular, are in + harmony with my principles (save for a few individual passages), and that + they sometimes even develop with force and eloquence some points I had + treated but <!-- Page 406 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page406"></a>[406]</span> slightly because M. Bayle had not placed + emphasis upon them. But the fifth chapter, with its sections (of which + some are equal to entire chapters) speaking of freedom and of the moral + evil dependent upon it, is constructed upon principles opposed to mine, + and often, indeed, to those of M. Bayle; that is, if it were possible to + credit him with any fixed principles. For this fifth chapter tends to + show (if that were possible) that true freedom depends upon an + indifference of equipoise, vague, complete and absolute; so that, until + the will has determined itself, there would be no reason for its + determination, either in him who chooses or in the object; and one would + not choose what pleases, but in choosing without reason one would cause + what one chooses to be pleasing.</p> + + <p>2. This principle of choice without cause or reason, of a choice, I + say, divested of the aim of wisdom and goodness, is regarded by many as + the great privilege of God and of intelligent substances, and as the + source of their freedom, their satisfaction, their morality and their + good or evil. The fantasy of a power to declare one's independence, not + only of inclination, but of reason itself within and of good and evil + without, is sometimes painted in such fine colours that one might take it + to be the most excellent thing in the world. Nevertheless it is only a + hollow fantasy, a suppression of the reasons for the caprice of which one + boasts. What is asserted is impossible, but if it came to pass it would + be harmful. This fantastic character might be attributed to some Don Juan + in a St. Peter's Feast, and a man of romantic disposition might even + affect the outward appearances of it and persuade himself that he has it + in reality. But in Nature there will never be any choice to which one is + not prompted by the previous representation of good or evil, by + inclinations or by reasons: and I have always challenged the supporters + of this absolute indifference to show an example thereof. Nevertheless if + I call fantastic this choice whereto one is determined by nothing, I am + far from calling visionaries the supporters of that hypothesis, + especially our gifted author. The Peripatetics teach some beliefs of this + nature; but it would be the greatest injustice in the world to be ready + to despise on that account an Occam, a Suisset, a Cesalpino, a + Conringius, men who still advocated certain scholastic opinions which + have been improved upon to-day.</p> + + <p>3. One of these opinions, revived, however, and introduced by <!-- + Page 407 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page407"></a>[407]</span> + degenerate scholasticism, and in the Age of Chimeras, is vague + indifference of choice, or real chance, assumed in our souls; as if + nothing gave us any inclination unless we perceived it distinctly, and as + if an effect could be without causes, when these causes are + imperceptible. It is much as some have denied the existence of insensible + corpuscles because they do not see them. Modern philosophers have + improved upon the opinions of the Schoolmen by showing that, according to + the laws of corporeal nature, a body can only be set in motion by the + movement of another body propelling it. Even so we must believe that our + souls (by virtue of the laws of spiritual nature) can only be moved by + some reason of good or evil: and this even when no distinct knowledge can + be extracted from our mental state, on account of a concourse of + innumerable little perceptions which make us now joyful and now sad, or + again of some other humour, and cause us to like one thing more than + another without its being possible to say why. Plato, Aristotle and even + Thomas Aquinas, Durand and other Schoolmen of the sounder sort reason on + that question like the generality of men, and as unprejudiced people + always have reasoned. They assume that freedom lies in the use of reason + and the inclinations, which cause the choice or rejection of objects. But + finally some rather too subtle philosophers have extracted from their + alembic an inexplicable notion of choice independent of anything + whatsoever, which is said to do wonders in solving all difficulties. But + the notion is caught up at the outset in one of the greatest + difficulties, by offending against the grand principle of reasoning which + makes us always assume that nothing is done without some sufficient cause + or reason. As the Schoolmen often forgot to apply this great principle, + admitting certain prime occult qualities, one need not wonder if this + fiction of vague indifference met with applause amongst them, and if even + most worthy men have been imbued therewith. Our author, who is otherwise + rid of many of the errors of the ordinary Schoolmen, is still deluded by + this fiction: but he is without doubt one of the most skilful of those + who have supported it.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p class="i12"><i>Si Pergama dextra</i></p> + <p><i>Defendi possent, etiam hac defensa fuissent.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>He gives it the best possible turn, and only shows it on its good + side. He knows how to strip spontaneity and reason of their <!-- Page 408 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page408"></a>[408]</span> advantages, + transferring all these to vague indifference: only through this + indifference is one active, resisting the passions, taking pleasure in + one's choice, or being happy; it appears indeed that one would be + miserable if some happy necessity should oblige us to choose aright. Our + author had said admirable things on the origin and reasons of natural + evils: he only had to apply the same principles to moral evil; indeed, he + believes himself that moral evil becomes an evil through the physical + evils that it causes or tends to cause. But somehow or other he thinks + that it would be a degradation of God and men if they were to be made + subject to reason; that thus they would all be rendered passive to it and + would no longer be satisfied with themselves; in short that men would + have nothing wherewith to oppose the misfortunes that come to them from + without, if they had not within them this admirable privilege of + rendering things good or tolerable by choosing them, and of changing all + into gold by the touch of this wondrous faculty.</p> + + <p>4. We will examine it in closer detail presently; but it will be well + to profit beforehand by the excellent ideas of our author on the nature + of things and on natural evils, particularly since there are some points + in which we shall be able to go a little further: by this means also we + shall gain a better understanding of the whole arrangement of his system. + The first chapter contains the principles. The writer calls substance a + being the idea of which does not involve the existence of another. I do + not know if there are any such among created beings, by reason of the + connexion existing between all things; and the example of a wax torch is + not the example of a substance, any more than that of a swarm of bees + would be. But one may take the terms in an extended sense. He observes + aptly that after all the changes of matter and after all the qualities of + which it may be divested, there remain extension, mobility, divisibility + and resistance. He explains also the nature of notions, and leaves it to + be understood that <i>universals</i> indicate only the resemblances which + exist between <i>individuals</i>; that we understand by <i>ideas</i> only + that which is known through an immediate sensation, and that the rest is + known to us only through relations with these ideas. But when he admits + that we have no idea of God, of spirit, of substance, he does not appear + to have observed sufficiently that we have immediate apperception of + substance and of spirit in our apperception of ourselves, and that <!-- + Page 409 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page409"></a>[409]</span> the + idea of God is found in the idea of ourselves through a suppression of + the limits of our perfections, as extension taken in an absolute sense is + comprised in the idea of a globe. He is right also in asserting that our + simple ideas at least are innate, and in rejecting the <i>Tabula rasa</i> + of Aristotle and of Mr. Locke. But I cannot agree with him that our ideas + have scarce any more relation to things than words uttered into the air + or writings traced upon paper have to our ideas, and that the bearing of + our sensations is arbitrary and <i>ex instituto</i>, like the + signification of words. I have already indicated elsewhere why I am not + in agreement with our Cartesians on that point.</p> + + <p>5. For the purpose of advancing to the first Cause, the author seeks a + criterion, a distinguishing mark of truth; and he finds it in the force + whereby our inward assertions, when they are evident, compel the + understanding to give them its consent. It is by such a process, he says, + that we credit the senses. He points out that the distinguishing mark in + the Cartesian scheme, to wit, a clear and distinct perception, has need + of a new mark to indicate what is clear and distinct, and that the + congruity or non-congruity of ideas (or rather of terms, as one spoke + formerly) may still be deceptive, because there are congruities real and + apparent. He appears to recognize even that the inward force which + constrains us to give our assent is still a matter for caution, and may + come from deep-rooted prejudices. That is why he confesses that he who + should furnish another criterion would have found something very + advantageous to the human race. I have endeavoured to explain this + criterion in a little <i>Discourse on Truth and Ideas</i>, published in + 1684; and although I do not boast of having given therein a new discovery + I hope that I have expounded things which were only confusedly + recognized. I distinguish between truths of fact and truths of reason. + Truths of fact can only be verified by confronting them with truths of + reason, and by tracing them back to immediate perceptions within us, such + as St. Augustine and M. Descartes very promptly acknowledged to be + indubitable; that is to say, we cannot doubt that we think, nor indeed + that we think this thing or that. But in order to judge whether our + inward notions have any reality in things, and to pass from thoughts to + objects, my opinion is that it is necessary to consider whether our + perceptions are firmly connected among themselves and with others that we + have had, in such fashion as to manifest the rules of mathematics and + <!-- Page 410 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page410"></a>[410]</span> + other truths of reason. In this case one must regard them as real; and I + think that it is the only means of distinguishing them from imaginations, + dreams and visions. Thus the truth of things outside us can be recognized + only through the connexion of phenomena. The criterion of the truths of + reason, or those which spring from conceptions, is found in an exact use + of the rules of logic. As for ideas or notions, I call <i>real</i> all + those the possibility of which is certain; and the <i>definitions</i> + which do not mark this possibility are only <i>nominal</i>. Geometricians + well versed in analysis are aware what difference there is in this + respect between several properties by which some line or figure might be + defined. Our gifted author has not gone so far, perhaps; one may see, + however, from the account I have given of him already, and from what + follows, that he is by no means lacking in profundity or reflexion.</p> + + <p>6. Thereafter he proceeds to examine whether motion, matter and space + spring from themselves; and to that end he considers whether it is + possible to conceive that they do not exist. He remarks upon this + privilege of God, that as soon as it is assumed that he exists it must be + admitted that he exists of necessity. This is a corollary to a remark + which I made in the little discourse mentioned above, namely that as soon + as one admits that God is possible, one must admit that he exists of + necessity. Now, as soon as one admits that God exists, one admits that he + is possible. Therefore as soon as one admits that God exists, one must + admit that he exists of necessity. Now this privilege does not belong to + the three things of which we have just spoken. The author believes also + especially concerning motion, that it is not sufficient to say, with Mr. + Hobbes, that the present movement comes from an anterior movement, and + this one again from another, and so on to infinity. For, however far back + you may go, you will not be one whit nearer to finding the reason which + causes the presence of motion in matter. Therefore this reason must be + outside the sequence; and even if there were an eternal motion, it would + require an eternal motive power. So the rays of the sun, even though they + were eternal with the sun, would nevertheless have their eternal cause in + the sun. I am well pleased to recount these arguments of our gifted + author, that it may be seen how important, according to him, is the + principle of sufficient reason. For, if it is permitted to admit + something for which it is acknowledged there is no reason, it will be + easy for an atheist to overthrow this argument, <!-- Page 411 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page411"></a>[411]</span> by saying that it is + not necessary that there be a sufficient reason for the existence of + motion. I will not enter into the discussion of the reality and the + eternity of space, for fear of straying too far from our subject. It is + enough to state that the author believes that space can be annihilated by + the divine power, but in entirety and not in portions, and that we could + exist alone with God even if there were neither space nor matter, since + we do not contain within ourselves the notion of the existence of + external things. He also puts forward the consideration that in the + sensations of sounds, of odours and of savours the idea of space is not + included. But whatever the opinion formed as to space, it suffices that + there is a God, the cause of matter and of motion, and in short of all + things. The author believes that we can reason about God, as one born + blind would reason about light. But I hold that there is something more + in us, for our light is a ray from God's light. After having spoken of + some attributes of God, the author acknowledges that God acts for an end, + which is the communication of his goodness, and that his works are + ordered aright. Finally he concludes this chapter very properly, by + saying that God in creating the world was at pains to give it the + greatest harmony amongst things, the greatest comfort of beings endowed + with reason, and the greatest compatibility in desires that an infinite + power, wisdom and goodness combined could produce. He adds that, if some + evil has remained notwithstanding, one must believe that these infinite + divine perfections could not have (I would rather say ought not to have) + taken it away.</p> + + <p>7. Chapter II anatomizes evil, dividing it as we do into metaphysical, + physical and moral. Metaphysical evil consists in imperfections, physical + evil in suffering and other like troubles, and moral evil in sin. All + these evils exist in God's work; Lucretius thence inferred that there is + no providence, and he denied that the world can be an effect of + divinity:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Naturam rerum divinitus esse creatam;</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>because there are so many faults in the nature of things,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>quoniam tanta stat praedita culpa.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Others have admitted two principles, the one good, the other evil. + There have also been people who thought the difficulty insurmountable, + and among these our author appears to have had <!-- Page 412 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page412"></a>[412]</span> M. Bayle in mind. He + hopes to show in his work that it is not a Gordian knot, which needs to + be cut; and he says rightly that the power, the wisdom and the goodness + of God would not be infinite and perfect in their exercise if these evils + had been banished. He begins with the evil of imperfection in Chapter III + and observes, as St. Augustine does, that creatures are imperfect, since + they are derived from nothingness, whereas God producing a perfect + substance from his own essence would have made thereof a God. This gives + him occasion for making a little digression against the Socinians. But + someone will say, why did not God refrain from producing things, rather + than make imperfect things? The author answers appositely that the + abundance of the goodness of God is the cause. He wished to communicate + himself at the expense of a certain fastidiousness which we assume in + God, imagining that imperfections offend him. Thus he preferred that + there should be the imperfect rather than nothing. But one might have + added that God has produced indeed the most perfect whole that was + possible, one wherewith he had full cause for satisfaction, the + imperfections of the parts serving a greater perfection in the whole. + Also the observation is made soon afterwards, that certain things might + have been made better, but not without other new and <i>perhaps</i> + greater disadvantages. This <i>perhaps</i> could have been omitted: for + the author also states as a certainty, and rightly so, at the end of the + chapter, <i>that it appertains to infinite goodness to choose the + best</i>; and thus he was able to draw this conclusion a little earlier, + that imperfect things will be added to those more perfect, so long as + they do not preclude the existence of the more perfect in as great a + number as possible. Thus bodies were created as well as spirits, since + the one does not offer any obstacle to the other; and the creation of + matter was not unworthy of the great God, as some heretics of old + believed, attributing this work to a certain Demogorgon.</p> + + <p>8. Let us now proceed to physical evil, which is treated of in Chapter + IV. Our famous author, having observed that metaphysical evil, or + imperfection, springs from nothingness, concludes that physical evil, or + discomfort, springs from matter, or rather from its movement; for without + movement matter would be useless. Moreover there must be contrariety in + these movements; otherwise, if all went together in the same direction, + there would be neither variety nor generation. But the movements that + cause <!-- Page 413 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page413"></a>[413]</span> generations cause also corruptions, since + from the variety of movements comes concussion between bodies, by which + they are often dissipated and destroyed. The Author of Nature however, in + order to render bodies more enduring, distributed them into + <i>systems</i>, those which we know being composed of luminous and opaque + balls, in a manner so excellent and so fitting for the display of that + which they contain, and for arousing wonder thereat, that we can conceive + of nothing more beautiful. But the crowning point of the work was the + construction of animals, to the end that everywhere there should be + creatures capable of cognition,</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Ne regio foret ulla suis animalibus orba.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>Our sagacious author believes that the air and even the purest aether + have their denizens as well as the water and the earth. But supposing + that there were places without animals, these places might have uses + necessary for other places which are inhabited. So for example the + mountains, which render the surface of our globe unequal and sometimes + desert and barren, are of use for the production of rivers and of winds; + and we have no cause to complain of sands and marshes, since there are so + many places still remaining to be cultivated. Moreover, it must not be + supposed that all is made for man alone: and the author is persuaded that + there are not only pure spirits but also immortal animals of a nature + akin to these spirits, that is, animals whose souls are united to an + ethereal and incorruptible matter. But it is not the same with animals + whose body is terrestrial, composed of tubes and fluids which circulate + therein, and whose motion is terminated by the breaking of the vessels. + Thence the author is led to believe that the immortality granted to Adam, + if he had been obedient, would not have been an effect of his nature, but + of the grace of God.</p> + + <p>9. Now it was necessary for the conservation of corruptible animals + that they should have indications causing them to recognize a present + danger, and giving them the inclination to avoid it. That is why what is + about to cause a great injury must beforehand cause pain such as may + force the animal to efforts capable of repulsing or shunning the cause of + this discomfort, and of forestalling a greater evil. The dread of death + helps also to cause its avoidance: for it if were not so ugly and if the + dissolution of continuity were not so painful, very often animals would + take no precautions against perishing, or allowing the parts of their + body <!-- Page 414 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page414"></a>[414]</span> to perish, and the strongest would have + difficulty in subsisting for a whole day.</p> + + <p>God has also given hunger and thirst to animals, to compel them to + feed and maintain themselves by replacing that which is used up and which + disappears imperceptibly. These appetites are of use also to prompt them + to work, in order to procure a nourishment meet for their constitution, + and which may avail to invigorate them. It was even found necessary by + the Author of things that one animal very often should serve as food for + another. This hardly renders the victim more unhappy, since death caused + by diseases is generally just as painful as a violent death, if not more + so; and animals subject to being preyed upon by others, having neither + foresight nor anxiety for the future, have a life no less tranquil when + they are not in danger. It is the same with inundations, earthquakes, + thunderbolts and other disorders, which brute beasts do not fear, and + which men have ordinarily no cause to fear, since there are few that + suffer thereby.</p> + + <p>10. The Author of Nature has compensated for these evils and others, + which happen only seldom, with a thousand advantages that are ordinary + and constant. Hunger and thirst augment the pleasure experienced in the + taking of nourishment. Moderate work is an agreeable exercise of the + animal's powers; and sleep is also agreeable in an altogether opposite + way, restoring the forces through repose. But one of the pleasures most + intense is that which prompts animals to propagation. God, having taken + care to ensure that the species should be immortal, since the individual + cannot be so here on earth, also willed that animals should have a great + tenderness for their little ones, even to the point of endangering + themselves for their preservation. From pain and from sensual pleasure + spring fear, cupidity and the other passions that are ordinarily + serviceable, although it may accidentally happen that they sometimes turn + towards ill: one must say as much of poisons, epidemic diseases and other + hurtful things, namely that these are indispensable consequences of a + well-conceived system. As for ignorance and errors, it must be taken into + account that the most perfect creatures are doubtless ignorant of much, + and that knowledge is wont to be proportionate to needs. Nevertheless it + is necessary that one be exposed to hazards which cannot be foreseen, and + accidents of such kinds are inevitable. One must often be mistaken in + one's judgement, because it is not always permitted <!-- Page 415 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page415"></a>[415]</span> to suspend it + long enough for exact consideration. These disadvantages are inseparable + from the system of things: for things must very often resemble one + another in a certain situation, the one being taken for the other. But + the inevitable errors are not the most usual, nor the most pernicious. + Those which cause us the most harm are wont to arise through our fault; + and consequently one would be wrong to make natural evils a pretext for + taking one's own life, since one finds that those who have done so have + generally been prompted to such action by voluntary evils.</p> + + <p>11. After all, one finds that all these evils of which we have spoken + come accidentally from good causes; and there is reason to infer + concerning all we do not know, from all we do know, that one could not + have done away with them without falling into greater troubles. For the + better understanding of this the author counsels us to picture the world + as a great building. There must be not only apartments, halls, galleries, + gardens, grottoes, but also the kitchen, the cellar, the poultry-yard, + stables, drainage. Thus it would not have been proper to make only suns + in the world, or to make an earth all of gold and of diamonds, but not + habitable. If man had been all eye or all ear, he would not have been + fitted for feeding himself. If God had made him without passions, he + would have made him stupid; and if he had wished to make man free from + error he would have had to deprive him of senses, or give him powers of + sensation through some other means than organs, that is to say, there + would not have been any man. Our learned author remarks here upon an idea + which histories both sacred and profane appear to inculcate, namely that + wild beasts, poisonous plants and other natures that are injurious to us + have been armed against us by sin. But as he argues here only in + accordance with the principles of reason he sets aside what Revelation + can teach. He believes, however, that Adam would have been exempted from + natural evils (if he had been obedient) only by virtue of divine grace + and of a covenant made with God, and that Moses expressly indicates only + about seven effects of the first sin. These effects are:</p> + + <p>1. The revocation of the gracious gift of immortality.</p> + + <p>2. The sterility of the earth, which was no longer to be fertile of + itself, save in evil or useless herbs.</p> + + <p>3. The rude toil one must exercise in order to gain sustenance.</p> + + <p>4. The subjection of the woman to the will of the husband.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 416 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page416"></a>[416]</span></p> + + <p>5. The pains of childbirth.</p> + + <p>6. The enmity between man and the serpent.</p> + + <p>7. The banishment of man from the place of delight wherein God had + placed him.</p> + + <p>But our author thinks that many of our evils spring from the necessity + of matter, especially since the withdrawal of grace. Moreover, it seems + to him that after our banishment immortality would be only a burden to + us, and that it is perhaps more for our good than to punish us that the + tree of life has become inaccessible to us. On one point or another one + might have something to say in objection, but the body of the discourse + by our author on the origin of evils is full of good and sound + reflexions, which I have judged it advisable to turn to advantage. Now I + must pass on to the subject of our controversy, that is, the explanation + of the nature of freedom.</p> + + <p>12. The learned author of this work on the origin of evil, proposing + to explain the origin of moral evil in the fifth chapter, which makes up + half of the whole book, considers that it is altogether different from + that of physical evil, which lies in the inevitable imperfection of + creatures. For, as we shall see presently, it appears to him that moral + evil comes rather from that which he calls a perfection, which the + creature has in common, according to him, with the Creator, that is to + say, in the power of choosing without any motive and without any final or + impelling cause. It is a very great paradox to assert that the greatest + imperfection, namely sin, springs from perfection itself. But it is no + less a paradox to present as a perfection the thing which is the least + reasonable in the world, the advantage whereof would consist in being + privileged against reason. And that, after all, rather than pointing out + the source of the evil, would be to contend that it has none. For if the + will makes its resolve without the existence of anything, either in the + person who chooses or in the object which is chosen, to prompt it to the + choice, there will be neither cause nor reason for this election; and as + moral evil consists in the wrong choice, that is admitting that moral + evil has no source at all. Thus in the rules of good metaphysics there + would have to be no moral evil in Nature; and also for the same reason + there would be no moral good either, and all morality would be destroyed. + But we must listen to our gifted author, from whom the subtlety of an + opinion maintained by famous philosophers among the Schoolmen, and <!-- + Page 417 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page417"></a>[417]</span> the + adornments that he has added thereto himself by his wit and his + eloquence, have hidden the great disadvantages contained therein. In + setting forth the position reached in the controversy, he divides the + writers into two parties. The one sort, he says, are content to say that + the freedom of the will is exempt from outward constraint; and the other + sort maintain that it is also exempt from inward necessity. But this + exposition does not suffice, unless one distinguish the necessity that is + absolute and contrary to morality from hypothetical necessity and moral + necessity, as I have already explained in many places.</p> + + <p>13. The first section of this chapter is to indicate the nature of + choice. The author sets forth in the first place the opinion of those who + believe that the will is prompted by the judgement of the understanding, + or by anterior inclinations of the desires, to resolve upon the course + that it adopts. But he confuses these authors with those who assert that + the will is prompted to its resolution by an absolute necessity, and who + maintain that the person who wills has no power over his volitions: that + is, he confuses a Thomist with a Spinozist. He makes use of the + admissions and the odious declarations of Mr. Hobbes and his like, to lay + them to the charge of those who are infinitely far removed from them, and + who take great care to refute them. He lays these things to their charge + because they believe, as Mr. Hobbes believes, like everyone else (save + for some doctors who are enveloped in their own subtleties), that the + will is moved by the representation of good and evil. Thence he imputes + to them the opinion that there is therefore no such thing as contingency, + and that all is connected by an absolute necessity. That is a very speedy + manner of reasoning; yet he adds also, that properly speaking there will + be no evil will, since if there were, all one could object to therein + would be the evil which it can cause. That, he says, is different from + the common notion, since the world censures the wicked not because they + do harm, but because they do harm without necessity. He holds also that + the wicked would be only unfortunate and by no means culpable; that there + would be no difference between physical evil and moral evil, since man + himself would not be the true cause of an action which he could not + avoid; that evil-doers would not be either blamed or maltreated because + they deserve it, but because that action may serve to turn people away + from evil; again, for this reason only one would find fault with a rogue, + but <!-- Page 418 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page418"></a>[418]</span> not with a sick man, that reproaches and + threats can correct the one, and cannot cure the other. And further, + according to this doctrine, chastisements would have no object save the + prevention of future evil, without which the mere consideration of the + evil already done would not be sufficient for punishment. Likewise + gratitude would have as its sole aim that of procuring a fresh benefit, + without which the mere consideration of the past benefit would not + furnish a sufficient reason. Finally the author thinks that if this + doctrine, which derives the resolution of the will from the + representation of good and evil, were true, one must despair of human + felicity, since it would not be in our power, and would depend upon + things which are outside us. Now as there is no ground for hoping that + things from outside will order themselves and agree together in + accordance with our wishes, there will always lack something to us, and + there will always be something too much. All these conclusions hold, + according to him, against those also who think that the will makes its + resolve in accordance with the final judgement of the understanding, an + opinion which, as he considers, strips the will of its right and renders + the soul quite passive. This accusation is also directed against + countless serious writers, of accepted authority, who are here placed in + the same class with Mr. Hobbes and Spinoza, and with some other + discredited authors, whose doctrine is considered odious and + insupportable. As for me, I do not require the will always to follow the + judgement of the understanding, because I distinguish this judgement from + the motives that spring from insensible perceptions and inclinations. But + I hold that the will always follows the most advantageous representation, + whether distinct or confused, of the good or the evil resulting from + reasons, passions and inclinations, although it may also find motives for + suspending its judgement. But it is always upon motives that it acts.</p> + + <p>14. It will be necessary to answer these objections to my opinion + before proceeding to establish that of our author. The misapprehension of + my opponents originates in their confusing a consequence which is + necessary absolutely, whose contrary implies contradiction, with a + consequence which is founded only upon truths of fitness, and + nevertheless has its effect. To put it otherwise, there is a confusion + between what depends upon the principle of contradiction, which makes + necessary and indispensable truths, and what depends upon the principle + of the sufficient <!-- Page 419 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page419"></a>[419]</span> reason, which applies also to contingent + truths. I have already elsewhere stated this proposition, which is one of + the most important in philosophy, pointing out that there are two great + principles, namely, <i>that of identicals or of contradiction</i>, which + states that of two contradictory enunciations the one is true and the + other false, and <i>that of the sufficient reason</i>, which states that + there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by one + possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding. + Both principles must hold not only in necessary but also in contingent + truths; and it is even necessary that that which has no sufficient reason + should not exist. For one may say in a sense that these two principles + are contained in the definition of the true and the false. Nevertheless, + when in making the analysis of the truth submitted one sees it depending + upon truths whose contrary implies contradiction, one may say that it is + absolutely necessary. But when, while pressing the analysis to the + furthest extent, one can never attain to such elements of the given + truth, one must say that it is contingent, and that it originates from a + prevailing reason which inclines without necessitating. Once that is + granted, it is seen how we can say with sundry famous philosophers and + theologians, that the thinking substance is prompted to its resolution by + the prevailing representation of good or of evil, and this certainly and + infallibly, but not necessarily, that is, by reasons which incline it + without necessitating it. That is why contingent futurities, foreseen + both in themselves and through their reasons, remain contingent. God was + led infallibly by his wisdom and by his goodness to create the world + through his power, and to give it the best possible form; but he was not + led thereto of necessity, and the whole took place without any diminution + of his perfect and supreme wisdom. And I do not know if it would be easy, + apart from the reflexions we have just entertained, to untie the Gordian + knot of contingency and freedom.</p> + + <p>15. This explanation dismisses all the objections of our gifted + opponent. In the first place, it is seen that contingency exists together + with freedom. Secondly, evil wills are evil not only because they do + harm, but also because they are a source of harmful things, or of + physical evils, a wicked spirit being, in the sphere of its activity, + what the evil principle of the Manichaeans would be in the universe. + Moreover, the author has observed (ch. 4, sect. 4, § 8) that divine + wisdom has usually forbidden actions <!-- Page 420 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page420"></a>[420]</span> which would cause + discomforts, that is to say, physical evils. It is agreed that he who + causes evil by necessity is not culpable. But there is neither legislator + nor lawyer who by this necessity means the force of the considerations of + good or evil, real or apparent, that have prompted man to do ill: else + anyone stealing a great sum of money or killing a powerful man in order + to attain to high office would be less deserving of punishment than one + who should steal a few halfpence for a mug of beer or wantonly kill his + neighbour's dog, since these latter were tempted less. But it is quite + the opposite in the administration of justice which is authorized in the + world: for the greater is the temptation to sin, the more does it need to + be repressed by the fear of a great chastisement. Besides, the greater + the calculation evident in the design of an evil-doer, the more will it + be found that the wickedness has been deliberate, and the more readily + will one decide that it is great and deserving of punishment. Thus a too + artful fraud causes the aggravating crime called <i>stellionate</i>, and + a cheat becomes a forger when he has the cunning to sap the very + foundations of our security in written documents. But one will have + greater indulgence for a great passion, because it is nearer to madness. + The Romans punished with the utmost severity the priests of the God Apis, + when these had prostituted the chastity of a noble lady to a knight who + loved her to distraction, making him pass as their god; while it was + found enough to send the lover into exile. But if someone had done evil + deeds without apparent reason and without appearance of passion the judge + would be tempted to take him for a madman, especially if it proved that + he was given to committing such extravagances often: this might tend + towards reduction of the penalty, rather than supplying the true grounds + of wickedness and punishment. So far removed are the principles of our + opponents from the practice of the tribunals and from the general opinion + of men.</p> + + <p>16. Thirdly, the distinction between physical evil and moral evil will + still remain, although there be this in common between them, that they + have their reasons and causes. And why manufacture new difficulties for + oneself concerning the origin of moral evil, since the principle followed + in the solution of those which natural evils have raised suffices also to + account for voluntary evils? That is to say, it suffices to show that one + could not have prevented men from being prone to errors, without changing + the <!-- Page 421 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page421"></a>[421]</span> constitution of the best of systems or + without employing miracles at every turn. It is true that sin makes up a + large portion of human wretchedness, and even the largest; but that does + not prevent one from being able to say that men are wicked and deserving + of punishment: else one must needs say that the actual sins of the + non-regenerate are excusable, because they spring from the first cause of + our wretchedness, which is original sin. Fourthly, to say that the soul + becomes passive and that man is not the true cause of sin, if he is + prompted to his voluntary actions by their objects, as our author asserts + in many passages, and particularly ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 3, § 18, is + to create for oneself new senses for terms. When the ancients spoke of + that which is <span lang="el" title="eph' hêmin" >εφ' + ‛ημιν</span>, or when we speak of that + which depends upon us, of spontaneity, of the inward principle of our + actions, we do not exclude the representation of external things; for + these representations are in our souls, they are a portion of the + modifications of this active principle which is within us. No agent is + capable of acting without being <i>predisposed</i> to what the action + demands; and the reasons or inclinations derived from good or evil are + the dispositions that enable the soul to decide between various courses. + One will have it that the will is alone active and supreme, and one is + wont to imagine it to be like a queen seated on her throne, whose + minister of state is the understanding, while the passions are her + courtiers or favourite ladies, who by their influence often prevail over + the counsel of her ministers. One will have it that the understanding + speaks only at this queen's order; that she can vacillate between the + arguments of the minister and the suggestions of the favourites, even + rejecting both, making them keep silence or speak, and giving them + audience or not as seems good to her. But it is a personification or + mythology somewhat ill-conceived. If the will is to judge, or take + cognizance of the reasons and inclinations which the understanding or the + senses offer it, it will need another understanding in itself, to + understand what it is offered. The truth is that the soul, or the + thinking substance, understands the reasons and feels the inclinations, + and decides according to the predominance of the representations + modifying its active force, in order to shape the action. I have no need + here to apply my system of Pre-established Harmony, which shows our + independence to the best advantage and frees us from the physical + influence of objects. For what I have just said is sufficient to answer + the <!-- Page 422 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page422"></a>[422]</span> objection. Our author, even though he + admits with people in general this physical influence of objects upon us, + observes nevertheless with much perspicacity that the body or the objects + of the senses do not even give us our ideas, much less the active force + of our soul, and that they serve only to draw out that which is within + us. This is much in the spirit of M. Descartes' belief that the soul, not + being able to give force to the body, gives it at least some direction. + It is a mean between one side and the other, between physical influence + and Pre-established Harmony.</p> + + <p>17. Fifthly, the objection is made that, according to my opinion, sin + would neither be censured nor punished because of its deserts, but + because the censure and the chastisement serve to prevent it another + time; whereas men demand something more, namely, satisfaction for the + crime, even though it should serve neither for amendment nor for example. + So do men with reason demand that true gratitude should come from a true + recognition of the past benefit, and not from the interested aim of + extorting a fresh benefit. This objection contains noble and sound + considerations, but it does not strike at me. I require a man to be + virtuous, grateful, just, not only from the motive of interest, of hope + or of fear, but also of the pleasure that he should find in good actions: + else one has not yet reached the degree of virtue that one must endeavour + to attain. That is what one means by saying that justice and virtue must + be loved for their own sake; and it is also what I explained in + justifying 'disinterested love', shortly before the opening of the + controversy which caused so much stir. Likewise I consider that + wickedness is all the greater when its practice becomes a pleasure, as + when a highwayman, after having killed men because they resist, or + because he fears their vengeance, finally grows cruel and takes pleasure + in killing them, and even in making them suffer beforehand. Such a degree + of wickedness is taken to be diabolical, even though the man affected + with it finds in this execrable indulgence a stronger reason for his + homicides than he had when he killed simply under the influence of hope + or of fear. I have also observed in answering the difficulties of M. + Bayle that, according to the celebrated Conringius, justice which + punishes by means of <i>medicinal</i> penalties, so to speak, that is, in + order to correct the criminal or at least to provide an example for + others, might exist in the opinion of those who do away with the freedom + that is exempt from necessity. <!-- Page 423 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page423"></a>[423]</span> True retributive justice, on the other + hand, going beyond the medicinal, assumes something more, namely, + intelligence and freedom in him who sins, because the harmony of things + demands a satisfaction, or evil in the form of suffering, to make the + mind feel its error after the voluntary active evil whereto it has + consented. Mr. Hobbes also, who does away with freedom, has rejected + retributive justice, as do the Socinians, drawing on themselves the + condemnation of our theologians; although the writers of the Socinian + party are wont to exaggerate the idea of freedom.</p> + + <p>18. Sixthly, the objection is finally made that men cannot hope for + felicity if the will can only be actuated by the representation of good + and evil. But this objection seems to me completely null and void, and I + think it would be hard to guess how any tolerable interpretation was ever + put upon it. Moreover, the line of reasoning adopted to prove it is of a + most astounding nature: it is that our felicity depends upon external + things, if it is true that it depends upon the representation of good or + evil. It is therefore not in our own power, so it is said, for we have no + ground for hoping that outward things will arrange themselves for our + pleasure. This argument is halting from every aspect. <i>There is no + force in the inference: one might grant the conclusion: the argument may + be retorted upon the author</i>. Let us begin with the retort, which is + easy. For are men any happier or more independent of the accidents of + fortune upon this argument, or because they are credited with the + advantage of choosing without reason? Have they less bodily suffering? + Have they less tendency toward true or apparent goods, less fear of true + or imaginary evils? Are they any less enslaved by sensual pleasure, by + ambition, by avarice? less apprehensive? less envious? Yes, our gifted + author will say; I will prove it by a method of counting or assessment. I + would rather he had proved it by experience; but let us see this proof by + counting. Suppose that by my choice, which enables me to give + goodness-for-me to that which I choose, I give to the object chosen six + degrees of goodness, when previously there were two degrees of evil in my + condition; I shall become happy all at once, and with perfect ease, for I + should have four degrees surplus, or net good. Doubtless that is all very + well; but unfortunately it is impossible. For what possibility is there + of giving these six degrees of goodness to the object? To that end we + must needs have the power to change our taste, or the things, as we + please. That <!-- Page 424 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page424"></a>[424]</span> would be almost as if I could say to + lead, Thou shalt be gold, and make it so; to the pebble, Thou shalt be + diamond; or at the least, Thou shalt look like it. Or it would be like + the common explanation of the Mosaical passage which seems to say that + the desert manna assumed any taste the Israelites desired to give to it. + They only had to say to their homerful, Thou shalt be a capon, thou shalt + be a partridge. But if I am free to give these six degrees of goodness to + the object, am I not permitted to give it more goodness? I think that I + am. But if that is so, why shall we not give to the object all the + goodness conceivable? Why shall we not even go as far as twenty-four + carats of goodness? By this means behold us completely happy, despite the + accidents of fortune; it may blow, hail or snow, and we shall not mind: + by means of this splendid secret we shall be always shielded against + fortuitous events. The author agrees (in this first section of the fifth + chapter, sub-sect. 3, § 12) that this power overcomes all the natural + appetites and cannot be overcome by any of them; and he regards it (§§ + 20, 21, 22) as the soundest foundation for happiness. Indeed, since there + is nothing capable of limiting a power so indeterminate as that of + choosing without any reason, and of giving goodness to the object through + the choice, either this goodness must exceed infinitely that which the + natural appetites seek in objects, these appetites and objects being + limited while this power is independent or at the least this goodness, + given by the will to the chosen object, must be arbitrary and of such a + kind as the will desires. For whence would one derive the reason for + limits if the object is possible, if it is within reach of him who wills, + and if the will can give it the goodness it desires to give, + independently of reality and of appearances? It seems to me that may + suffice to overthrow a hypothesis so precarious, which contains something + of a fairy-tale kind, <i>optantis ista sunt, non invenientis</i>. It + therefore remains only too true that this handsome fiction cannot render + us more immune from evils. And we shall see presently that when men place + themselves above certain desires or certain aversions they do so through + other desires, which always have their foundation in the representation + of good and evil. I said also 'that one might grant the conclusion of the + argument', which states that our happiness does not depend absolutely + upon ourselves, at least in the present state of human life: for who + would question the fact that we are liable to meet a thousand accidents + which human prudence cannot evade? How, <!-- Page 425 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page425"></a>[425]</span> for example, can I + avoid being swallowed up, together with a town where I take up my abode, + by an earthquake, if such is the order of things? But finally I can also + deny the inference in the argument, which states that if the will is only + actuated by the representation of good and evil our happiness does not + depend upon ourselves. The inference would be valid if there were no God, + if everything were ruled by brute causes; but God's ordinance is that for + the attainment of happiness it suffices that one be virtuous. Thus, if + the soul follows reason and the orders that God has given it, it is + assured of its happiness, even though one may not find a sufficiency + thereof in this life.</p> + + <p>19. Having thus endeavoured to point out the disadvantages of my + hypothesis, our gifted author sets forth the advantages of his own. He + believes that it alone is capable of saving our freedom, that all our + felicity rests therein, that it increases our goods and lessens our + evils, and that an agent possessing this power is so much the more + complete. These advantages have almost all been already disproved. We + have shown that for the securing of our freedom it is enough that the + representations of goods and of evils, and other inward or outward + dispositions, should incline us without constraining us. Moreover one + does not see how pure indifference can contribute to felicity; on the + contrary, the more indifferent one is, the more insensitive and the less + capable of enjoying what is good will one prove to be. Besides the + hypothesis proves too much. For if an indifferent power could give itself + the consciousness of good it could also give itself the most perfect + happiness, as has been already shown. And it is manifest that there is + nothing which would set limits to that power, since limits would withdraw + it from its pure indifference, whence, so our author alleges, it only + emerges of itself, or rather wherein it has never been. Finally one does + not see wherein the perfection of pure indifference lies: on the + contrary, there is nothing more imperfect; it would render knowledge and + goodness futile, and would reduce everything to chance, with no rules, + and no measures that could be taken. There are, however, still some + advantages adduced by our author which have not been discussed. He + considers then that by this power alone are we the true cause to which + our actions can be imputed, since otherwise we should be under the + compulsion of external objects; likewise that by this power alone can one + ascribe to oneself the merit of one's own felicity, and feel pleased with + oneself. <!-- Page 426 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page426"></a>[426]</span> But the exact opposite is the case: for + when one happens upon the action through an absolutely indifferent + movement, and not as a result of one's good or bad qualities, is it not + just as though one were to happen upon it blindly by chance or hazard? + Why then should one boast of a good action, or why should one be censured + for an evil one, if the thanks or blame redounds to fortune or hazard? I + think that one is more worthy of praise when one owes the action to one's + good qualities, and the more culpable in proportion as one has been + impelled to it by one's evil qualities. To attempt to assess actions + without weighing the qualities whence they spring is to talk at random + and to put an imaginary indefinable something in the place of causes. + Thus, if this chance or this indefinable something were the cause of our + actions, to the exclusion of our natural or acquired qualities, of our + inclinations, of our habits, it would not be possible to set one's hopes + upon anything depending upon the resolve of others, since it would not be + possible to fix something indefinite, or to conjecture into what + roadstead the uncertain weather of an extravagant indifference will drive + the vessel of the will.</p> + + <p>20. But setting aside advantages and disadvantages, let us see how our + learned author will justify the hypothesis from which he promises us so + much good. He imagines that it is only God and the free creatures who are + active in the true sense, and that in order to be active one must be + determined by oneself only. Now that which is determined by itself must + not be determined by objects, and consequently the free substance, in so + far as it is free, must be indifferent with regard to objects, and emerge + from this indifference only by its own choice, which shall render the + object pleasing to it. But almost all the stages of this argument have + their stumbling-blocks. Not only the free creatures, but also all the + other substances and natures composed of substances, are active. Beasts + are not free, and yet all the same they have active souls, unless one + assume, with the Cartesians, that they are mere machines. Moreover, it is + not necessary that in order to be active one should be determined only by + oneself, since a thing may receive direction without receiving force. So + it is that the horse is controlled by the rider and the vessel is steered + by the helm; and M. Descartes' belief was that our body, having force in + itself, receives only some direction from the soul. Thus an active thing + may receive from outside some determination or direction, capable of + changing <!-- Page 427 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page427"></a>[427]</span> that direction which it would take of + itself. Finally, even though an active substance is determined only by + itself, it does not follow that it is not moved by objects: for it is the + representation of the object within it which contributes towards the + determination. Now the representation does not come from without, and + consequently there is complete spontaneity. Objects do not act upon + intelligent substances as efficient and physical causes, but as final and + moral causes. When God acts in accordance with his wisdom, he is guided + by the ideas of the possibles which are his objects, but which have no + reality outside him before their actual creation. Thus this kind of + spiritual and moral motion is not contrary to the activity of the + substance, nor to the spontaneity of its action. Finally, even though + free power were not determined by the objects, it can never be + indifferent to the action when it is on the point of acting, since the + action must have its origin in a disposition to act: otherwise one will + do anything from anything, <i>quidvis ex quovis</i>, and there will be + nothing too absurd for us to imagine. But this disposition will have + already broken the charm of mere indifference, and if the soul gives + itself this disposition there must needs be another predisposition for + this act of giving it. Consequently, however far back one may go, one + will never meet with a mere indifference in the soul towards the actions + which it is to perform. It is true that these dispositions incline it + without constraining it. They relate usually to the objects; but there + are some, notwithstanding, which arise variously <i>a subjecto</i> or + from the soul itself, and which bring it about that one object is more + acceptable than the other, or that the same is more acceptable at one + time than at another.</p> + + <p>21. Our author continually assures us that his hypothesis is true, and + he undertakes to show that this indifferent power is indeed found in God, + and even that it must be attributed to him of necessity. For (he says) + nothing is to God either good or bad in creatures. He has no natural + appetite, to be satisfied by the enjoyment of anything outside him. He is + therefore absolutely indifferent to all external things, since by them he + can neither be helped nor hindered; and he must determine himself and + create as it were an appetite in making his choice. And having once + chosen, he will wish to abide by his choice, just as if he had been + prompted thereto by a natural inclination. Thus will the divine will be + the cause of goodness in beings. That is to say, there will <!-- Page 428 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page428"></a>[428]</span> be goodness + in the objects, not by their nature, but by the will of God: whereas if + that will be excluded neither good nor evil can exist in things. It is + difficult to imagine how writers of merit could have been misled by so + strange an opinion, for the reason which appears to be advanced here has + not the slightest force. It seems to me as though an attempt is being + made to justify this opinion by the consideration that all creatures have + their whole being from God, so that they cannot act upon him or determine + him. But this is clearly an instance of self-deception. When we say that + an intelligent substance is actuated by the goodness of its object, we do + not assert that this object is necessarily a being existing outside the + substance, and it is enough for us that it be conceivable: for its + representation acts in the substance, or rather the substance acts upon + itself, in so far as it is disposed and influenced by this + representation. With God, it is plain that his understanding contains the + ideas of all possible things, and that is how everything is in him in a + transcendent manner. These ideas represent to him the good and evil, the + perfection and imperfection, the order and disorder, the congruity and + incongruity of possibles; and his superabundant goodness makes him choose + the most advantageous. God therefore determines himself by himself; his + will acts by virtue of his goodness, but it is particularized and + directed in action by understanding filled with wisdom. And since his + understanding is perfect, since his thoughts are always clear, his + inclinations always good, he never fails to do the best; whereas we may + be deceived by the mere semblances of truth and goodness. But how is it + possible for it to be said that there is no good or evil in the ideas + before the operation of God's will? Does the will of God form the ideas + which are in his understanding? I dare not ascribe to our learned author + so strange a sentiment, which would confuse understanding and will, and + would subvert the current use of our notions. Now if ideas are + independent of will, the perfection or imperfection which is represented + in them will be independent also. Indeed, is it by the will of God, for + example, or is it not rather by the nature of numbers, that certain + numbers allow more than others of various exact divisions? that some are + more fitted than others for forming battalions, composing polygons and + other regular figures? that the number six has the advantage of being the + least of all the numbers that are called perfect? that in a plane six + equal circles may touch a seventh? that of all equal <!-- Page 429 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page429"></a>[429]</span> bodies, the + sphere has the least surface? that certain lines are incommensurable, and + consequently ill-adapted for harmony? Do we not see that all these + advantages or disadvantages spring from the idea of the thing, and that + the contrary would imply contradiction? Can it be thought that the pain + and discomfort of sentient creatures, and above all the happiness and + unhappiness of intelligent substances, are a matter of indifference to + God? And what shall be said of his justice? Is it also something + arbitrary, and would he have acted wisely and justly if he had resolved + to condemn the innocent? I know that there have been writers so + ill-advised as to maintain an opinion so dangerous and so liable to + overthrow religion. But I am assured that our illustrious author is far + from holding it. Nevertheless, it seems as though this hypothesis tends + in that direction, if there is nothing in objects save what is + indifferent to the divine will before its choice. It is true that God has + need of nothing; but the author has himself shown clearly that God's + goodness, and not his need, prompted him to produce creatures. There was + therefore in him a reason anterior to the resolution; and, as I have said + so many times, it was neither by chance nor without cause, nor even by + necessity, that God created this world, but rather as a result of his + inclination, which always prompts him to the best. Thus it is surprising + that our author should assert here (ch. 5, sect. 1, sub-sect. 4, § 5) + that there is no reason which could have induced God, absolutely perfect + and happy in himself, to create anything outside him, although, according + to the author's previous declarations (ch. 1, sect. 3, §§ 8, 9), God acts + for an end, and his aim is to communicate his goodness. It was therefore + not altogether a matter of indifference to him whether he should create + or not create, and creation is notwithstanding a free act. Nor was it a + matter of indifference to him either, whether he should create one world + rather than another; a perpetual chaos, or a completely ordered system. + Thus the qualities of objects, included in their ideas, formed the reason + for God's choice.</p> + + <p>22. Our author, having already spoken so admirably about the beauty + and fittingness of the works of God, has tried to search out phrases that + would reconcile them with his hypothesis, which appears to deprive God of + all consideration for the good or the advantage of creatures. The + indifference of God prevails (he says) only in his first elections, but + as soon as God has chosen something <!-- Page 430 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page430"></a>[430]</span> he has virtually + chosen, at the same time, all that which is of necessity connected + therewith. There were innumerable possible men equally perfect: the + election of some from among them is purely arbitrary (in the judgement of + our author). But God, once having chosen them, could not have willed in + them anything contrary to human nature. Up to this point the author's + words are consistent with his hypothesis; but those that follow go + further. He advances the proposition that when God resolved to produce + certain creatures he resolved at the same time, by virtue of his infinite + goodness, to give them every possible advantage. Nothing, indeed, could + be so reasonable, but also nothing could be so contrary to the hypothesis + he has put forward, and he does right to overthrow it, rather than + prolong the existence of anything so charged with incongruities + incompatible with the goodness and wisdom of God. Here is the way to see + plainly that this hypothesis cannot harmonize with what has just been + said. The first question will be: Will God create something or not, and + wherefore? The author has answered that he will create something in order + to communicate his goodness. It is therefore no matter of indifference to + him whether he shall create or not. Next the question is asked: Will God + create such and such a thing, and wherefore? One must needs answer (to + speak consistently) that the same goodness makes him choose the best, and + indeed the author falls back on that subsequently. But, following his own + hypothesis, he answers that God will create such a thing, but that there + is no <i>wherefore</i>, because God is absolutely indifferent towards + creatures, who have their goodness only from his choice. It is true that + our author varies somewhat on this point, for he says here (ch. 5, sect. + 5, sub-sect. 4, § 12) that God is indifferent to the choice between men + of equal perfection, or between equally perfect kinds of rational + creatures. Thus, according to this form of expression, he would choose + rather the more perfect kind: and as kinds that are of equal perfection + harmonize more or less with others, God will choose those that agree best + together; there will therefore be no pure and absolute indifference, and + the author thus comes back to my principles. But let us speak, as he + speaks, in accordance with his hypothesis, and let us assume with him + that God chooses certain creatures even though he be absolutely + indifferent towards them. He will then just as soon choose creatures that + are irregular, ill-shapen, mischievous, unhappy, chaos everlasting, <!-- + Page 431 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page431"></a>[431]</span> + monsters everywhere, scoundrels as sole inhabitants of the earth, devils + filling the whole universe, all this rather than excellent systems, + shapely forms, upright persons, good angels! No, the author will say, + God, when once he had resolved to create men, resolved at the same time + to give them all the advantages possible in the world, and it is the same + with regard to creatures of other kinds. I answer, that if this advantage + were connected of necessity with their nature, the author would be + speaking in accordance with his hypothesis. That not being so, however, + he must admit that God's resolve to give every possible advantage to men + arises from a new election independent of that one which prompted God to + make men. But whence comes this new election? Does it also come from mere + indifference? If such is the case, nothing prompts God to seek the good + of men, and if he sometimes comes to do it, it will be merely by + accident. But the author maintains that God was prompted to the choice by + his goodness; therefore the good and ill of creatures is no matter of + indifference to him, and there are in him primary choices to which the + goodness of the object prompts him. He chooses not only to create men, + but also to create men as happy as it is possible to be in this system. + After that not the least vestige of mere indifference will be left, for + we can reason concerning the entire world just as we have reasoned + concerning the human race. God resolved to create a world, but he was + bound by his goodness at the same time to make choice of such a world as + should contain the greatest possible amount of order, regularity, virtue, + happiness. For I can see no excuse for saying that whereas God was + prompted by his goodness to make the men he has resolved to create as + perfect as is possible within this system, he had not the same good + intention towards the whole universe. There we have come back again to + the goodness of the objects; and pure indifference, where God would act + without cause, is altogether destroyed by the very procedure of our + gifted author, with whom the force of truth, once the heart of the matter + was reached, prevailed over a speculative hypothesis, which cannot admit + of any application to the reality of things.</p> + + <p>23. Since, therefore, nothing is altogether indifferent to God, who + knows all degrees, all effects, all relations of things, and who + penetrates at one and the same time all their possible connexions, let us + see whether at least the ignorance and insensibility of man can make him + absolutely indifferent in his choice. The author <!-- Page 432 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page432"></a>[432]</span> regales us with this + pure indifference as with a handsome present. Here are the proofs of it + which he gives: (1) We feel it within us. (2) We have experience within + ourselves of its marks and its properties. (3) We can show that other + causes which might determine our will are insufficient. As for the first + point, he asserts that in feeling freedom within us we feel within us at + the same time pure indifference. But I do not agree that we feel such + indifference, or that this alleged feeling follows upon that of freedom. + We feel usually within us something which inclines us to our choice. At + times it happens, however, that we cannot account for all our + dispositions. If we give our mind to the question, we shall recognize + that the constitution of our body and of bodies in our environment, the + present or previous temper of our soul, together with countless small + things included under these comprehensive headings, may contribute + towards our greater or lesser predilection for certain objects, and the + variation of our opinions from one time to another. At the same time we + shall recognize that none would attribute this to mere indifference, or + to some indefinable force of the soul which has the same effect upon + objects as colours are said to have upon the chameleon. Thus the author + has no cause here to appeal to the judgement of the people: he does so, + saying that in many things the people reason better than the + philosophers. It is true that certain philosophers have been misled by + chimeras, and it would seem that mere indifference is numbered among + chimerical notions. But when someone maintains that a thing does not + exist because the common herd does not perceive it, here the populace + cannot be regarded as a good judge, being, as it is, only guided by the + senses. Many people think that air is nothing when it is not stirred by + the wind. The majority do not know of imperceptible bodies, the fluid + which causes weight or elasticity, magnetic matter, to say nothing of + atoms and other indivisible substances. Do we say then that these things + are not because the common herd does not know of them? If so, we shall be + able to say also that the soul acts sometimes without any disposition or + inclination contributing towards the production of its act, because there + are many dispositions and inclinations which are not sufficiently + perceived by the common herd, for lack of attention and thought. + Secondly, as to the marks of the power in question, I have already + refuted the claim advanced for it, that it possesses the advantage of + making one active, the real cause of <!-- Page 433 --><span + class="pagenum"><a name="page433"></a>[433]</span> one's action, and + subject to responsibility and morality: these are not genuine marks of + its existence. Here is one the author adduces, which is not genuine + either, namely, that we have within us a power of resisting natural + appetites, that is to say of resisting not only the senses, but also the + reason. But I have already stated this fact: one resists natural + appetites through other natural appetites. One sometimes endures + inconveniences, and is happy to do so; but that is on account of some + hope or of some satisfaction which is combined with the ill and exceeds + it: either one anticipates good from it, or one finds good in it. The + author asserts that it is through that power to transform appearances + which he has introduced on the scene, that we render agreeable what at + first displeased us. But who cannot see that the true reason is, that + application and attention to the object and custom change our disposition + and consequently our natural appetites? Once we become used to a rather + high degree of cold or heat, it no longer incommodes us as it formerly + did, and yet no one would ascribe this effect to our power of choice. + Time is needed, for instance, to bring about that hardening, or rather + that callosity, which enables the hands of certain workmen to resist a + degree of heat that would burn our hands. The populace, whom the author + invokes, guess correctly the cause of this effect, although they + sometimes apply it in a laughable manner. Two serving-maids being close + to the fire in the kitchen, one who has burnt herself says to the other: + Oh, my dear, who will be able to endure the fire of purgatory? The other + answers: Don't be absurd, my good woman, one grows used to + everything.</p> + + <p>24. But (the author will say) this wonderful power which causes us to + be indifferent to everything, or inclined towards everything, simply at + our own free will, prevails over reason itself. And this is his third + proof, namely, that one cannot sufficiently explain our actions without + having recourse to this power. One sees numbers of people despising the + entreaties of their friends, the counsels of their neighbours, the + reproaches of their conscience, discomforts, tortures, death, the wrath + of God, hell itself, for the sake of running after follies which have no + claim to be good or tolerable, save as being freely chosen by such + people. All is well in this argument, with the exception of the last + words only. For when one takes an actual instance one will find that + there were reasons or causes which led the man to his choice, and that + there are very <!-- Page 434 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page434"></a>[434]</span> strong bonds to fasten him thereto. A + love-affair, for example, will never have arisen from mere indifference: + inclination or passion will have played its part; but habit and + stubbornness will cause certain natures to face ruin rather than + separation from the beloved. Here is another example cited by the author: + an atheist, a man like Lucilio Vanini (that is what many people call him, + whereas he himself adopts the magnificent name of Giulio Cesare Vanini in + his works), will suffer a preposterous martyrdom for his chimera rather + than renounce his impiety. The author does not name Vanini; and the truth + is that this man repudiated his wrong opinions, until he was convicted of + having published atheistical dogmas and acted as an apostle of atheism. + When he was asked whether there was a God, he plucked some grass, + saying:</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Et levis est cespes qui probet esse Deum.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>But since the Attorney General to the Parliament of Toulouse desired + to cause annoyance to the First President (so it is said), to whom Vanini + was granted considerable access, teaching his children philosophy, if + indeed he was not altogether in the service of that magistrate, the + inquisition was carried through rigorously. Vanini, seeing that there was + no chance of pardon, declared himself, when at the point of death, for + what he was, an atheist; and there was nothing very extraordinary in + that. But supposing there were an atheist who gave himself up for + torture, vanity might be in his case a strong enough motive, as in that + of the Gymnosophist, Calanus, and of the Sophist who, according to + Lucian's account, was burnt to death of his own will. But the author + thinks that that very vanity, that stubbornness, those other wild + intentions of persons who otherwise seem to have quite good sense, cannot + be explained by the appetites that arise from the representation of good + and evil, and that they compel us to have recourse to that transcendent + power which transforms good into evil, and evil into good, and the + indifferent into good or into evil. But we do not need to go so far, and + the causes of our errors are only too visible. Indeed, we can make these + transformations, but it is not as with the Fairies, by a mere act of this + magic power, but by obscuring and suppressing in one's mind the + representations of good or bad qualities which are naturally attached to + certain objects, and by contemplating only such representations as + conform to our taste or <!-- Page 435 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page435"></a>[435]</span> our prejudices; or again, because one + attaches to the objects, by dint of thinking of them, certain qualities + which are connected with them only accidentally or through our habitual + contemplation of them. For example, all my life long I detest a certain + kind of good food, because in my childhood I found in it something + distasteful, which made a strong impression upon me. On the other hand, a + certain natural defect will be pleasing to me, because it will revive + within me to some extent the thought of a person I used to esteem or + love. A young man will have been delighted by the applause which has been + showered upon him after some successful public action; the impression of + this great pleasure will have made him remarkably sensitive to + reputation; he will think day and night of nothing save what nourishes + this passion, and that will cause him to scorn death itself in order to + attain his end. For although he may know very well that he will not feel + what is said of him after his death, the representation he makes of it + for himself beforehand creates a strong impression on his mind. And there + are always motives of the same kind in actions which appear most useless + and absurd to those who do not enter into these motives. In a word, a + strong or oft-repeated impression may alter considerably our organs, our + imagination, our memory, and even our reasoning. It happens that a man, + by dint of having often related something untrue, which he has perhaps + invented, finally comes to believe in it himself. And as one often + represents to oneself something pleasing, one makes it easy to imagine, + and one thinks it also easy to put into effect, whence it comes that one + persuades oneself easily of what one wishes.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Et qui amant ipsi sibi somnia fingunt.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>25. Errors are therefore, absolutely speaking, never voluntary, + although the will very often contributes towards them indirectly, owing + to the pleasure one takes in giving oneself up to certain thoughts, or + owing to the aversion one feels for others. Beautiful print in a book + will help towards making it persuasive to the reader. The air and manner + of a speaker will win the audience for him. One will be inclined to + despise doctrines coming from a man one despises or hates, or from + another who resembles him in some point that strikes us. I have already + said why one is readily disposed to believe what is advantageous or + agreeable, and I have known people who at first had changed their + religion for worldly <!-- Page 436 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page436"></a>[436]</span> considerations, but who have been + persuaded (and well persuaded) afterwards that they had taken the right + course. One sees also that stubbornness is not simply wrong choice + persevering, but also a disposition to persevere therein, which is due to + some good supposed to be inherent in the choice, or some evil imagined as + arising from a change. The first choice has perchance been made in mere + levity, but the intention to abide by it springs from certain stronger + reasons or impressions. There are even some writers on ethics who lay it + down that one ought to abide by one's choice so as not to be inconstant + or appear so. Yet perseverance is wrong when one despises the warnings of + reason, especially when the subject is important enough to be examined + carefully; but when the thought of change is unpleasant, one readily + averts one's attention from it, and that is the way which most frequently + leads one to stubbornness. The author wished to connect stubbornness with + his so-called pure indifference. He might then have taken into account + that to make us cling to a choice there would be need of more than the + mere choice itself or a pure indifference, especially if this choice has + been made lightly, and all the more lightly in proportion to the + indifference shown. In such a case we shall be readily inclined to + reverse the choice, unless vanity, habit, interest or some other motive + makes us persevere therein. It must not be supposed either that vengeance + pleases without cause. Persons of intense feeling ponder upon it day and + night, and it is hard for them to efface the impression of the wrong or + the affront they have sustained. They picture for themselves a very great + pleasure in being freed from the thought of scorn which comes upon them + every moment, and which causes some to find vengeance sweeter than life + itself.</p> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p><i>Quis vindicta bonum vita jucundius ipsa.</i></p> + </div> + </div> + <p>The author would wish to persuade us that usually, when our desire or + our aversion is for some object which does not sufficiently deserve it, + we have given to it the surplus of good or evil which has affected us, + through the alleged power of choice which makes things appear good or + evil as we wish. One has had two degrees of natural evil, one gives + oneself six degrees of artificial good through the power that can choose + without cause. Thus one will have four degrees of net good (ch. 5, sect. + 2, § 7). If that could be carried out it would take us far, as I have + already said here. The <!-- Page 437 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page437"></a>[437]</span> author even thinks that ambition, + avarice, the gambling mania and other frivolous passions derive all their + force from this power (ch. 5, sect. 5, sub-sect. 6). But there are + besides so many false appearances in things, so many imaginations capable + of enlarging or diminishing objects, so many unjustified connexions in + our arguments, that there is no need of this little Fairy, that is, of + this inward power operating as it were by enchantment, to whom the author + attributes all these disorders. Indeed, I have already said repeatedly + that when we resolve upon some course contrary to acknowledged reason, we + are prompted to it by another reason stronger to outward appearance, such + as, for instance, is the pleasure of appearing independent and of + performing an extraordinary action. There was in days past at the Court + of Osnabrück a tutor to the pages, who, like a second Mucius Scaevola, + held out his arm into the flame and looked like getting a gangrene, in + order to show that the strength of his mind was greater than a very acute + pain. Few people will follow his example; and I do not even know if a + writer could easily be found who, having once affirmed the existence of a + power capable of choosing without cause, or even contrary to reason, + would be willing to prove his case by his own example, in renouncing some + good benefice or some high office, simply in order to display this + superiority of will over reason. But I am sure at the least that an + intelligent man would not do so. He would be presently aware that someone + would nullify his sacrifice by pointing out to him that he had simply + imitated Heliodorus, Bishop of Larissa. That man (so it is said) held his + book on Theagenes and Chariclea dearer than his bishopric; and such a + thing may easily happen when a man has resources enabling him to dispense + with his office and when he is sensitive to reputation. Thus every day + people are found ready to sacrifice their advantages to their caprices, + that is to say, actual goods to the mere semblance of them.</p> + + <p>26. If I wished to follow step by step the arguments of our gifted + author, which often come back to matters previously considered in our + inquiry, usually however with some elegant and well-phrased addition, I + should be obliged to proceed too far; but I hope that I shall be able to + avoid doing so, having, as I think, sufficiently met all his reasons. The + best thing is that with him practice usually corrects and amends theory. + After having advanced the hypothesis, in the second section of this fifth + chapter, <!-- Page 438 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page438"></a>[438]</span> that we approach God through the capacity + to choose without reason, and that this power being of the noblest kind + its exercise is the most capable of making one happy, things in the + highest degree paradoxical, since it is reason which leads us to imitate + God and our happiness lies in following reason: after that, I say, the + author provides an excellent corrective, for he says rightly (§ 5) that + in order to be happy we must adapt our choice to things, since things are + scarcely prone to adapt themselves to us, and that this is in effect + adapting oneself to the divine will. Doubtless that is well said, but it + implies besides that our will must be guided as far as possible by the + reality of the objects, and by true representations of good and evil. + Consequently also the motives of good and evil are not opposed to + freedom, and the power of choosing without cause, far from ministering to + our happiness, will be useless and even highly prejudicial. Thus it is + happily the case that this power nowhere exists, and that it is 'a being + of reasoning reason', as some Schoolmen call the fictions that are not + even possible. As for me, I should have preferred to call them 'beings of + non-reasoning reason'. Also I think that the third section (on wrong + elections) may pass, since it says that one must not choose things that + are impossible, inconsistent, harmful, contrary to the divine will, or + already taken by others. Moreover, the author remarks appositely that by + prejudicing the happiness of others needlessly one offends the divine + will, which desires that all be happy as far as it is possible. I will + say as much of the fourth section, where there is mention of the source + of wrong elections, which are error or ignorance, negligence, fickleness + in changing too readily, stubbornness in not changing in time, and bad + habits; finally there is the importunity of the appetites, which often + drive us inopportunely towards external things. The fifth section is + designed to reconcile evil elections or sins with the power and goodness + of God; and this section, as it is diffuse, is divided into sub-sections. + The author has cumbered himself needlessly with a great objection: for he + asserts that without a power to choose that is altogether indifferent in + the choice there would be no sin. Now it was very easy for God to refuse + to creatures a power so irrational. It was sufficient for them to be + actuated by the representations of goods and evils; it was therefore + easy, according to the author's hypothesis, for God to prevent sin. To + extricate himself from this difficulty, he has no other resource than to + state that if this power <!-- Page 439 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page439"></a>[439]</span> were removed from things the world would + be nothing but a purely passive machine. But that is the very thing which + I have disproved. If this power were missing in the world (as in fact it + is), one would hardly complain of the fact. Souls will be well content + with the representations of goods and evils for the making of their + choice, and the world will remain as beautiful as it is. The author comes + back to what he had already put forward here, that without this power + there would be no happiness. But I have given a sufficient answer to + that, and there is not the slightest probability in this assertion and in + certain other paradoxes he puts forward here to support his principal + paradox.</p> + + <p>27. He makes a small digression on prayer (sub-sect. 4), saying that + those who pray to God hope for some change in the order of nature; but it + seems as though, according to his opinion, they are mistaken. In reality, + men will be content if their prayers are heard, without troubling + themselves as to whether the course of nature is changed in their favour, + or not. Indeed, if they receive succour from good angels there will be no + change in the general order of things. Also this opinion of our author is + a very reasonable one, that there is a system of spiritual substances, + just as there is of corporeal substances, and that the spiritual have + communication with one another, even as bodies do. God employs the + ministry of angels in his rule of mankind, without any detriment to the + order of nature. Nevertheless, it is easier to put forward theories on + these matters than to explain them, unless one have recourse to my system + of Harmony. But the author goes somewhat further. He believes that the + mission of the Holy Spirit was a great miracle in the beginning, but that + now his operations within us are natural. I leave it to him to explain + his opinion, and to settle the matter with other theologians. Yet I + observe that he finds the natural efficacy of prayer in the power it has + of making the soul better, of overcoming the passions, and of winning for + oneself a certain degree of new grace. I can say almost the same things + on my hypothesis, which represents the will as acting only in accordance + with motives; and I am immune from the difficulties in which the author + has become involved over his power of choosing without cause. He is in + great embarrassment also with regard to the foreknowledge of God. For if + the soul is perfectly indifferent in its choice how is it possible to + foresee this choice? and what sufficient reason will one be able to find + for the knowledge of a <!-- Page 440 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page440"></a>[440]</span> thing, if there is no reason for its + existence? The author puts off to some other occasion the solution of + this difficulty, which would require (according to him) an entire work. + For the rest, he sometimes speaks pertinently, and in conformity with my + principles, on the subject of moral evil. He says, for example (sub-sect. + 6), that vices and crimes do not detract from the beauty of the universe, + but rather add to it, just as certain dissonances would offend the ear by + their harshness if they were heard quite alone, and yet in combination + they render the harmony more pleasing. He also points out divers goods + involved in evils, for instance, the usefulness of prodigality in the + rich and avarice in the poor; indeed it serves to make the arts flourish. + We must also bear in mind that we are not to judge the universe by the + small size of our globe and of all that is known to us. For the stains + and defects in it may be found as useful for enhancing the beauty of the + rest as patches, which have nothing beautiful in themselves, are by the + fair sex found adapted to embellish the whole face, although they + disfigure the part they cover. Cotta, in Cicero's book, had compared + providence, in its granting of reason to men, to a physician who allows + wine to a patient, notwithstanding that he foresees the misuse which will + be made thereof by the patient, at the expense of his life. The author + replies that providence does what wisdom and goodness require, and that + the good which accrues is greater than the evil. If God had not given + reason to man there would have been no man at all, and God would be like + a physician who killed someone in order to prevent his falling ill. One + may add that it is not reason which is harmful in itself, but the absence + of reason; and when reason is ill employed we reason well about means, + but not adequately about an end, or about that bad end we have proposed + to ourselves. Thus it is always for lack of reason that one does an evil + deed. The author also puts forward the objection made by Epicurus in the + book by Lactantius on the wrath of God. The terms of the objection are + more or less as follows. Either God wishes to banish evils and cannot + contrive to do so, in which case he would be weak; or he can abolish + them, and will not, which would be a sign of malignity in him; or again + he lacks power and also will, which would make him appear both weak and + jealous; or finally he can and will, but in this case it will be asked + why he then does not banish evil, if he exists? The author replies that + God cannot banish evil, that he does not wish to either, <!-- Page 441 + --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page441"></a>[441]</span> and that + notwithstanding he is neither malicious nor weak. I should have preferred + to say that he can banish evil, but that he does not wish to do so + absolutely, and rightly so, because he would then banish good at the same + time, and he would banish more good than evil. Finally our author, having + finished his learned work, adds an Appendix, in which he speaks of the + Divine Laws. He fittingly divides these laws into natural and positive. + He observes that the particular laws of the nature of animals must give + way to the general laws of bodies, that God is not in reality angered + when his laws are violated, but that order demanded that he who sins + should bring an evil upon himself, and that he who does violence to + others should suffer violence in his turn. But he believes that the + positive laws of God rather indicate and forecast the evil than cause its + infliction. And that gives him occasion to speak of the eternal damnation + of the wicked, which no longer serves either for correction or example, + and which nevertheless satisfies the retributive justice of God, although + the wicked bring their unhappiness upon themselves. He suspects, however, + that these punishments of the wicked bring some advantage to virtuous + people. He is doubtful also whether it is not better to be damned than to + be nothing: for it might be that the damned are fools, capable of + clinging to their state of misery owing to a certain perversity of mind + which, he maintains, makes them congratulate themselves on their false + judgements in the midst of their misery, and take pleasure in finding + fault with the will of God. For every day one sees peevish, malicious, + envious people who enjoy the thought of their ills, and seek to bring + affliction upon themselves. These ideas are not worthy of contempt, and I + have sometimes had the like myself, but I am far from passing final + judgement on them. I related, in <a href="#sect271">§ 271</a> of the + essays written to oppose M. Bayle, the fable of the Devil's refusal of + the pardon a hermit offers him on God's behalf. Baron André Taifel, an + Austrian nobleman, Knight of the Court of Ferdinand Archduke of Austria + who became the second emperor of that name, alluding to his name (which + appears to mean Devil in German) assumed as his emblem a devil or satyr, + with this Spanish motto, <i>Mas perdido, y menos arrepentido</i>, the + more lost, the less repentant, which indicates a hopeless passion from + which one cannot free oneself. This motto was afterwards repeated by the + Spanish Count of Villamediana when he was said to be in love with the + Queen. Coming to the question <!-- Page 442 --><span class="pagenum"><a + name="page442"></a>[442]</span> why evil often happens to the good and + good to the wicked, our illustrious author thinks that it has been + sufficiently answered, and that hardly any doubt remains on that point. + He observes nevertheless that one may often doubt whether good people who + endure affliction have not been made good by their very misfortune, and + whether the fortunate wicked have not perhaps been spoilt by prosperity. + He adds that we are often bad judges, when it is a question of + recognizing not only a virtuous man, but also a happy man. One often + honours a hypocrite, and one despises another whose solid virtue is + without pretence. We are poor judges of happiness also, and often + felicity is hidden from sight under the rags of a contented poor man, + while it is sought in vain in the palaces of certain of the great. + Finally the author observes, that the greatest felicity here on earth + lies in the hope of future happiness, and thus it may be said that to the + wicked nothing happens save what is of service for correction or + chastisement, and to the good nothing save what ministers to their + greater good. These conclusions entirely correspond to my opinion, and + one can say nothing more appropriate for the conclusion of this work.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 443 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page443"></a>[443]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>CAUSA DEI ASSERTA +PER JUSTITIAM EJUS</h3> + +<p class="center" style="margin-top: 2em;"><i>cum caeteris ejus perfectionibus cunctisque +actionibus conciliatam.</i></p> + + <p>The original edition of the Theodicy contained a fourth appendix under + this title. It presented in scholastic Latin a formal summary of the + positive doctrine expressed by the French treatise. It satisfied the + academic requirements of its day, but would not, presumably, be of + interest to many modern readers, and is consequently omitted here.</p> + +<p><!-- Page 445 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page445"></a>[445]</span></p> + + <br clear="all" /> +<hr /> + +<h3>INDEX</h3> + + <div class="poem"> + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Abélard, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page232">232</a>-4, <a href="#page272">272</a></p> + <p>Abraham, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + <p>Adam, <a href="#page222">222</a>, <a href="#page270">270</a>-2, <a href="#page346">346</a>-7</p> + <p>Adam Kadmon, <a href="#page133">133</a></p> + <p>Albius, Thomas, <a href="#page122">122</a></p> + <p>Alcuin, <a href="#page77">77</a></p> + <p>Alfonso, King of Castile, <a href="#page247">247</a>-8</p> + <p>Aloysius Novarinus, <a href="#page191">191</a></p> + <p>Alrasi, <a href="#page288">288</a></p> + <p>Alvarez, <a href="#page149">149</a></p> + <p>Ambrose, St., <a href="#page153">153</a>, <a href="#page194">194</a></p> + <p>Amyraut, <a href="#page238">238</a></p> + <p>Anaxagoras, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Andradius, Jacques Payva, <a href="#page176">176</a></p> + <p>Andreas Cisalpinus, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Angelus Silesius, Johann, <a href="#page79">79</a></p> + <p>Annat, <a href="#page344">344</a>-5</p> + <p>Anselm, St., <a href="#page77">77</a></p> + <p>Antipater, <a href="#page232">232</a></p> + <p>Aquinas, Thomas, <i>see</i> Thomas</p> + <p>Arcesilaus, <a href="#page337">337</a></p> + <p>Archidemus, <a href="#page232">232</a></p> + <p>Aristotelians, <a href="#page27">27</a>-8</p> + <p>Aristotle, <a href="#page13">13</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>-8, <a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href="#page148">148</a>, <a href="#page170">170</a>, <a href="#page195">195</a>, <a href="#page203">203</a>, <a href="#page229">229</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page243">243</a>-4, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page269">269</a>, <a href="#page283">283</a>, <a href="#page304">304</a>, <a href="#page309">309</a>-10, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page352">352</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a>, <a href="#page409">409</a></p> + <p>Arminius, <i>see</i> Irminius</p> + <p>Arminius (Jacob Harmensen), <a href="#page383">383</a>, <a href="#page398">398</a></p> + <p>Arnauld, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a>, <a href="#page225">225</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a>, <a href="#page260">260</a>, <a href="#page264">264</a>-6, <a href="#page351">351</a></p> + <p>Arriaga, <a href="#page112">112</a>, <a href="#page356">356</a></p> + <p>Arrian, <a href="#page232">232</a></p> + <p>Assassins, <a href="#page284">284</a></p> + <p>Athanasius, St., <a href="#page87">87</a></p> + <p>Augustine (of Hippo), St., <a href="#page60">60</a>, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page134">134</a>, <a href="#page148">148</a>, <a href="#page166">166</a>, <a href="#page173">173</a>, <a href="#page187">187</a>, <a href="#page226">226</a>, <a href="#page274">274</a>, <a href="#page285">285</a>, <a href="#page294">294</a>, <a href="#page296">296</a>-7, <a href="#page300">300</a>-3, <a href="#page347">347</a>, <a href="#page352">352</a>-3, <a href="#page378">378</a>, <a href="#page384">384</a>, <a href="#page409">409</a>, <a href="#page412">412</a></p> + <p>——, his disciples, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href="#page297">297</a>, <a href="#page300">300</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page330">330</a>, <a href="#page348">348</a></p> + <p>Augustus (Emperor), <a href="#page287">287</a></p> + <p>Aulus Gellius, <a href="#page258">258</a>-9, <a href="#page325">325</a>, <a href="#page327">327</a></p> + <p>Aureolus, Cardinal, <a href="#page139">139</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Averroes, Averroists, <a href="#page77">77</a> ff.</p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Bacon, Francis, <a href="#page306">306</a></p> + <p>Bañez, <a href="#page149">149</a></p> + <p>Barbaro, Ermolao, <a href="#page170">170</a></p> + <p>Baron, Vincent, <a href="#page121">121</a></p> + <p>Baronius, Robert, <a href="#page84">84</a></p> + <p>Barton, Thomas, <a href="#page122">122</a></p> + <p>Basil, St., <a href="#page221">221</a>, <a href="#page352">352</a></p> + <p>Bayle, P., <a href="#page34">34</a> ff. <i>et passim</i></p> + <p>Becher, Johann Joachim, <a href="#page334">334</a>-5</p> + <p>Becker, <a href="#page221">221</a></p> + <p>Bede, <a href="#page77">77</a></p> + <p>Bellarmine, St. Robert, <a href="#page107">107</a>, <a href="#page313">313</a>, <a href="#page323">323</a></p> + <p>Berigardus, Claudius, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Berkeley, Bp., <a href="#page11">11</a></p> + <p>Bernard, St., <a href="#page277">277</a></p> + <p>Bernier, <a href="#page139">139</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Bertius, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + <p>de Bèze, Theodore, <a href="#page274">274</a></p> + <p><i>Birgitta, Revelations of St.</i>, <a href="#page173">173</a></p> + <p>Boethius, <a href="#page76">76</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a>-6</p> + <p>Bonartes, Thomas, <a href="#page58">58</a>, <a href="#page121">121</a>-2</p> + <p>Bonaventura, St., <a href="#page294">294</a></p> + <p>des Bosses, Fr., <a href="#page121">121</a>, <a href="#page389">389</a></p> + <p>Bossuet, <a href="#page10">10</a></p> + <p>Bradwardine, Abp., <a href="#page159">159</a>, <a href="#page176">176</a></p> + <p>Bramhall, Bp. John, <a href="#page161">161</a>, <a href="#page393">393</a></p> + <p>Bredenburg, Johan, <a href="#page349">349</a>-50</p> + <p>Brunswick, Duke of, <a href="#page8">8</a>, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Buckingham, Duke of, <a href="#page142">142</a></p> + <p>Buridan's ass, <a href="#page150">150</a>, <a href="#page311">311</a>, <a href="#page312">312</a></p> + <p>Burnet, Thomas, <a href="#page278">278</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Cabalists, <a href="#page79">79</a>, <a href="#page133">133</a>, <a href="#page347">347</a></p> + <p>Caesar Cremoninus, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Cajetan, Cardinal, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page243">243</a></p> + <p>Calanus, <a href="#page284">284</a>, <a href="#page434">434</a></p> + <p>Caligula, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + <p>Calixtus, <a href="#page108">108</a></p> + <p>Calli, <a href="#page359">359</a></p> + <p>Callimachus, <a href="#page213">213</a></p> + <p>Calovius, <a href="#page84">84</a></p> + <p>Calvin, <a href="#page84">84</a>-5, <a href="#page101">101</a>, <a href="#page165">165</a>, <a href="#page222">222</a>, <a href="#page238">238</a>, <a href="#page240">240</a>, <a href="#page328">328</a></p> + <p>Cameron, <a href="#page313">313</a></p> + <p>Campanella, <a href="#page217">217</a></p> + <p>Capella, Martianus, <a href="#page264">264</a></p> + <p>Cardan, Jerome, <a href="#page282">282</a>, <a href="#page286">286</a></p> + <p>Carneades, <a href="#page312">312</a>, <a href="#page320">320</a>-1, <a href="#page337">337</a></p> + <p>Caroli, Andreas, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + <p>Casaubon, Meric, <a href="#page285">285</a></p> + <p>Caselius, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Cassiodorus, <a href="#page76">76</a></p> +<!-- Page 446 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page446"></a>[446]</span> + <p>Casuists, <a href="#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page222">222</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a></p> + <p>Catharin, Ambrose, <a href="#page173">173</a></p> + <p>Catherine de Medicis, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + <p>Cato, <a href="#page263">263</a>, <a href="#page318">318</a></p> + <p>Celsus, <a href="#page102">102</a>-3</p> + <p>Chardin, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + <p>de la Charmoye, Abbé, <a href="#page213">213</a></p> + <p>Chemnitz, Martin, <a href="#page111">111</a>, <a href="#page176">176</a></p> + <p>Christine, Queen of Sweden, <a href="#page96">96</a>, <a href="#page104">104</a></p> + <p>Chrysippus, <a href="#page229">229</a>-32, <a href="#page258">258</a>-9, <a href="#page324">324</a>-7</p> + <p>Cicero, <a href="#page99">99</a>, <a href="#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page229">229</a>-32, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page286">286</a>, <a href="#page297">297</a>, <a href="#page312">312</a>, <a href="#page321">321</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>-5, <a href="#page342">342</a></p> + <p>Claudian, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page191">191</a>, <a href="#page215">215</a></p> + <p>Cleanthes, <a href="#page233">233</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a></p> + <p>Coelius Secundus Curio, <a href="#page134">134</a></p> + <p>Coimbra, Fathers of, <a href="#page325">325</a></p> + <p>Colerus, <a href="#page350">350</a></p> + <p>Conringius, <a href="#page161">161</a>, <a href="#page422">422</a></p> + <p>Constance, Council of, <a href="#page234">234</a></p> + <p>de la Cour, <a href="#page350">350</a>-1</p> + <p>Crellius, <a href="#page161">161</a></p> + <p>Cudworth, Ralph, <a href="#page64">64</a>, <a href="#page245">245</a></p> + <p>Cuper, Franz, <a href="#page350">350</a></p> + <p>Cyrano de Bergerac, <a href="#page331">331</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Dacier, <a href="#page337">337</a></p> + <p>Daillé, <a href="#page70">70</a>, <a href="#page107">107</a></p> + <p>Davidius, John, <a href="#page179">179</a></p> + <p><i>De Auxiliis</i>, <a href="#page168">168</a></p> + <p>Democritus, <a href="#page324">324</a></p> + <p>Descartes, <a href="#page12">12</a>-13, <a href="#page19">19</a>-21, <a href="#page107">107</a>, <a href="#page111">111</a>-12, <a href="#page140">140</a>, <a href="#page150">150</a>, <a href="#page156">156</a>, <a href="#page224">224</a> ff., <a href="#page239">239</a>, <a href="#page244">244</a>, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page281">281</a>, <a href="#page304">304</a>, <a href="#page331">331</a>, <a href="#page333">333</a>, <a href="#page334">334</a>, <a href="#page343">343</a>, <a href="#page390">390</a>, <a href="#page409">409</a>, <a href="#page426">426</a></p> + <p>Desmarests, Samuel, <a href="#page241">241</a></p> + <p>Diodorus, <a href="#page230">230</a>-2</p> + <p>Diogenianus, <a href="#page325">325</a></p> + <p>Dionysius of Halicarnassus, <a href="#page232">232</a></p> + <p>Diphilus, <a href="#page285">285</a></p> + <p>Diroys, <a href="#page249">249</a>-53, <a href="#page329">329</a></p> + <p>Dominicans, <a href="#page348">348</a></p> + <p>Dreier, <a href="#page244">244</a></p> + <p>Drexler, <a href="#page291">291</a></p> + <p>Dualists, <a href="#page251">251</a></p> + <p>du Plessis-Mornay, <a href="#page91">91</a></p> + <p>Durand de Saint-Pourçain, <a href="#page139">139</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page341">341</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Empedocles, <a href="#page324">324</a></p> + <p>Epictetus, <a href="#page352">352</a></p> + <p>Epicureans, <a href="#page282">282</a>-3</p> + <p>Epicurus, <a href="#page229">229</a>-30, <a href="#page310">310</a>-11, <a href="#page319">319</a>, <a href="#page320">320</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page395">395</a></p> + <p>Esprit, Abbé, <a href="#page131">131</a></p> + <p>Euclid, <a href="#page261">261</a></p> + <p>Euripides, <a href="#page284">284</a>, <a href="#page285">285</a></p> + <p>Eusebius, <a href="#page326">326</a></p> + <p>Eutrapelus, <a href="#page191">191</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Fabricius, Johann Ludwig, <a href="#page67">67</a></p> + <p>Fabry, <a href="#page333">333</a></p> + <p>Fecht, <a href="#page290">290</a>, <a href="#page291">291</a>, <a href="#page293">293</a></p> + <p>Fénelon, <a href="#page287">287</a></p> + <p>Fludde, <a href="#page184">184</a></p> + <p>Fonseca, <a href="#page145">145</a></p> + <p>Foucher, <a href="#page34">34</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a></p> + <p>Francis I of France, <a href="#page204">204</a></p> + <p>Francis of Sales, St., <a href="#page176">176</a></p> + <p>Francis Xavier, St., <a href="#page176">176</a></p> + <p>Freitag, Johann, <a href="#page171">171</a></p> + <p>Fromondus, Libertus, <a href="#page89">89</a></p> + <p>Fulgentius, <a href="#page167">167</a></p> + <p><i>Fur praedestinatus</i>, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>della Galla, Julius Caesar, <a href="#page171">171</a></p> + <p>Gassendi, <a href="#page12">12</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a></p> + <p>Gatacre, Thomas, <a href="#page262">262</a></p> + <p>Gerhard, Johann, <a href="#page291">291</a></p> + <p>Gerson, <a href="#page79">79</a></p> + <p>Gibieuf, <a href="#page344">344</a>-5</p> + <p>Glarea, Antonio, <a href="#page366">366</a></p> + <p>Godescalc, <a href="#page167">167</a>, <a href="#page294">294</a></p> + <p>Gomarists, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + <p>Gregory, St., the Great, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page291">291</a>, <a href="#page293">293</a>, <a href="#page294">294</a></p> + <p>Gregory, St., of Nazianzus, <a href="#page173">173</a></p> + <p>Gregory, St., of Nyssa, <a href="#page132">132</a></p> + <p>Gregory of Rimini, <a href="#page173">173</a></p> + <p>Grotius, <a href="#page77">77</a>, <a href="#page91">91</a>, <a href="#page161">161</a>, <a href="#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page243">243</a>, <a href="#page276">276</a></p> + <p>Guerre, Martin, <a href="#page97">97</a>-8</p> + <p>Gymnosophists, <a href="#page284">284</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Hartsoeker, <a href="#page172">172</a></p> + <p>Heliodorus of Larissa, <a href="#page437">437</a></p> + <p>Heraclitus, <a href="#page324">324</a></p> + <p>Herminius, <i>see</i> Irminius</p> + <p>Hermippus, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + <p>Herodotus, <a href="#page196">196</a>, <a href="#page208">208</a>, <a href="#page210">210</a></p> + <p>Heshusius, Tilemann, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Hobbes, Thomas, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page89">89</a>, <a href="#page159">159</a>, <a href="#page161">161</a>, <a href="#page234">234</a>, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page348">348</a>, <a href="#page393">393</a> ff., <a href="#page410">410</a></p> + <p>Hoffmann, Daniel, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Horace, <a href="#page131">131</a>, <a href="#page318">318</a></p> + <p>Homer, <a href="#page284">284</a></p> + <p>Hyde, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Innocent III, Pope, <a href="#page131">131</a></p> + <p>Irminius, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + <p>Isbrand, <a href="#page238">238</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Jansenists, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href="#page346">346</a>-7</p> + <p>Jansenius, <a href="#page344">344</a></p> + <p>Jacquelot, <a href="#page157">157</a>, <a href="#page223">223</a>, <a href="#page259">259</a>, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page278">278</a>, <a href="#page341">341</a></p> + <p>Jerome, St., <a href="#page132">132</a></p> + <p>John of Damascus, St., <a href="#page77">77</a></p> +<!-- Page 447 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page447"></a>[447]</span> + <p>John Scot, <a href="#page171">171</a></p> + <p>Jung, <a href="#page261">261</a></p> + <p>Jupiter, <a href="#page213">213</a></p> + <p>Jurieu, <a href="#page174">174</a>, <a href="#page187">187</a>, <a href="#page290">290</a>-2, <a href="#page356">356</a></p> + <p>Justin, <a href="#page208">208</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Keckermann, Bartholomaeus, <a href="#page106">106</a></p> + <p>Keilah, siege of, <a href="#page145">145</a>-6</p> + <p>Kendal, George, <a href="#page228">228</a></p> + <p>Kepler, <a href="#page140">140</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Kerkering, <a href="#page351">351</a></p> + <p>Kessler, Andreas, <a href="#page83">83</a></p> + <p>Kortholt, Sebastian, <a href="#page351">351</a></p> + <p>Krell, Nicolas, <a href="#page398">398</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>de Labadie, Jean, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Lactantius, <a href="#page221">221</a>, <a href="#page285">285</a>, <a href="#page286">286</a>, <a href="#page440">440</a></p> + <p>Lami, François, <a href="#page89">89</a>, <a href="#page359">359</a></p> + <p>Lateran Council, <a href="#page80">80</a></p> + <p>Laud, Abp., <a href="#page398">398</a></p> + <p>de Launoy, <a href="#page100">100</a></p> + <p>Lazarus, <a href="#page294">294</a></p> + <p>le Clerc, <a href="#page64">64</a>, <a href="#page121">121</a>, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page245">245</a>, <a href="#page292">292</a></p> + <p>Leeuwenhoek, <a href="#page172">172</a></p> + <p>Limbourg, <a href="#page350">350</a></p> + <p>Lipsius, Justus, <a href="#page325">325</a>, <a href="#page337">337</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Livy, <a href="#page263">263</a></p> + <p>Locke, John, <a href="#page8">8</a>, <a href="#page9">9</a>, <a href="#page33">33</a>-4, <a href="#page86">86</a>, <a href="#page409">409</a></p> + <p>Löscher, <a href="#page298">298</a></p> + <p>Louis of Dole, <a href="#page149">149</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Lucan, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page212">212</a></p> + <p>Lucian, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page434">434</a></p> + <p>Lucretius, <a href="#page320">320</a></p> + <p>Lully, Raymond, <a href="#page106">106</a></p> + <p>Luther, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href="#page99">99</a>, <a href="#page101">101</a>, <a href="#page110">110</a>-11, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page298">298</a>, <a href="#page328">328</a>, <a href="#page395">395</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Machiavelli, <a href="#page216">216</a></p> + <p>Maignan, <a href="#page359">359</a></p> + <p>Maimonides, <a href="#page287">287</a>-8</p> + <p>Malebranche, <a href="#page172">172</a>, <a href="#page244">244</a>, <a href="#page254">254</a> ff., <a href="#page276">276</a>, <a href="#page280">280</a>, <a href="#page333">333</a>, <a href="#page359">359</a>, <a href="#page361">361</a></p> + <p>Manichaeans, <a href="#page59">59</a>, <a href="#page98">98</a>, <a href="#page113">113</a>, <a href="#page124">124</a>, <a href="#page208">208</a>, <a href="#page274">274</a>, <a href="#page419">419</a></p> + <p>Marchetti, <a href="#page320">320</a></p> + <p>Marcion, <a href="#page213">213</a></p> + <p>Marcus Aurelius, <a href="#page263">263</a></p> + <p>Mary, Blessed Virgin, <a href="#page193">193</a></p> + <p>Matthieu, Pierre, <a href="#page204">204</a></p> + <p>Maurice, Prince, <a href="#page398">398</a></p> + <p>Melanchthon, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Melissus, <a href="#page218">218</a>, <a href="#page220">220</a></p> + <p>Ménage, <a href="#page232">232</a></p> + <p>Meyer, Louis, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Mithras, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + <p>Molina, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href="#page173">173</a>, <a href="#page207">207</a></p> + <p>Molinists, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href="#page317">317</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page342">342</a></p> + <p>More, Henry, <a href="#page169">169</a></p> + <p>Moses Germanus, <a href="#page79">79</a></p> + <p>de la Motte le Vayer, <a href="#page282">282</a></p> + <p>Musaeus, Johann, <a href="#page86">86</a>, <a href="#page111">111</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Naudé, Gabriel, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Newcastle, Duke of, <a href="#page393">393</a> ff.</p> + <p>Newton, Isaac, <a href="#page34">34</a>, <a href="#page85">85</a>-6</p> + <p>Nicole, <a href="#page96">96</a>-7, <a href="#page174">174</a>, <a href="#page291">291</a>, <a href="#page299">299</a></p> + <p>Nominalists, <a href="#page203">203</a></p> + <p>Novarini, <a href="#page286">286</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Ochino, Bernardino, <a href="#page89">89</a></p> + <p>Onomaus, <a href="#page325">325</a></p> + <p>Opalenius, <a href="#page194">194</a></p> + <p>Origen, <a href="#page102">102</a>-3, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page235">235</a>, <a href="#page294">294</a></p> + <p>Origenists, <a href="#page260">260</a>, <a href="#page292">292</a></p> + <p>Orobio, <a href="#page350">350</a></p> + <p>Ovid, <a href="#page209">209</a>, <a href="#page220">220</a>, <a href="#page306">306</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Pardies, <a href="#page333">333</a></p> + <p>Pascal, <a href="#page35">35</a></p> + <p>Paul, St., <a href="#page129">129</a>-30, <a href="#page238">238</a>, <a href="#page260">260</a></p> + <p>Paulicians, <i>see</i> Manichaeans</p> + <p>Pelagius, <a href="#page139">139</a></p> + <p>Pélisson, <a href="#page176">176</a></p> + <p>Pereir, Louis, <a href="#page139">139</a></p> + <p>Peter Lombard, <a href="#page290">290</a></p> + <p>Pfanner, <a href="#page352">352</a></p> + <p>Pierre de Saint-Joseph, <a href="#page342">342</a>, <a href="#page357">357</a></p> + <p>Pietists, Leipzig, <a href="#page83">83</a></p> + <p>Piscator, <a href="#page207">207</a></p> + <p>Pitcairne, <a href="#page172">172</a></p> + <p>Plato, <a href="#page59">59</a>, <a href="#page76">76</a>, <a href="#page135">135</a>, <a href="#page148">148</a>, <a href="#page209">209</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page286">286</a>, <a href="#page297">297</a>, <a href="#page321">321</a>, <a href="#page352">352</a>-4</p> + <p>Pliny the Younger, <a href="#page204">204</a>, <a href="#page209">209</a>, <a href="#page284">284</a>, <a href="#page287">287</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a></p> + <p>Plutarch, <a href="#page208">208</a>, <a href="#page231">231</a>, <a href="#page326">326</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Pomponazzi, <a href="#page80">80</a>, <a href="#page161">161</a></p> + <p>de la Porrée, Gilbert, <a href="#page122">122</a></p> + <p>de Preissac, <a href="#page80">80</a></p> + <p>Prudentius, <a href="#page132">132</a>, <a href="#page218">218</a></p> + <p>Ptolomei, Fr., <a href="#page70">70</a></p> + <p>Pufendorf, <a href="#page194">194</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page403">403</a></p> + <p>Pythagoras, <a href="#page172">172</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Quênel, Fr., <a href="#page70">70</a></p> + <p>Quietists, <a href="#page79">79</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Rachelius, <a href="#page194">194</a></p> + <p>de la Ramée, Pierre, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Ravaillac, <a href="#page204">204</a></p> + <p>Regis, <a href="#page305">305</a>, <a href="#page330">330</a>, <a href="#page340">340</a></p> + <p>Remonstrants, <a href="#page226">226</a></p> + <p>Reynaud, Theophile, <a href="#page348">348</a></p> +<!-- Page 448 --><span class="pagenum"><a name="page448"></a>[448]</span> + <p>Rodon, David de, <a href="#page354">354</a></p> + <p>Rorarius, <a href="#page160">160</a></p> + <p>Rutherford, Samuel, <a href="#page236">236</a>, <a href="#page238">238</a>, <a href="#page269">269</a></p> + <p>Ruysbroek, <a href="#page79">79</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Saguens, <a href="#page359">359</a></p> + <p>Salmeron, <a href="#page173">173</a></p> + <p>Saurin, <a href="#page106">106</a></p> + <p>Scaliger, Joseph, <a href="#page89">89</a>, <a href="#page104">104</a>-5</p> + <p>Scaliger, Julius, <a href="#page170">170</a></p> + <p>Scherzer, <a href="#page84">84</a></p> + <p>Schoolmen, <a href="#page75">75</a>, <a href="#page77">77</a>, <a href="#page100">100</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page290">290</a>, <a href="#page310">310</a>, <a href="#page354">354</a>, <a href="#page407">407</a></p> + <p>Scioppius, <a href="#page337">337</a></p> + <p>Scotists, <a href="#page243">243</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a></p> + <p>Scotus, Duns, <a href="#page203">203</a>, <a href="#page271">271</a>, <a href="#page328">328</a>, <a href="#page383">383</a></p> + <p>Seneca, <a href="#page226">226</a>, <a href="#page285">285</a></p> + <p>Sennert, Daniel, <a href="#page171">171</a></p> + <p>Sentences, Master of the, <i>see</i> Peter Lombard</p> + <p>Servetus, Michael, <a href="#page81">81</a></p> + <p>Sfondrati, Cardinal, <a href="#page129">129</a>, <a href="#page173">173</a></p> + <p>Sharrok, <a href="#page194">194</a></p> + <p>Silenus, <a href="#page286">286</a></p> + <p>Slevogt, Paul, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Socinians, <a href="#page58">58</a>, <a href="#page83">83</a>-4, <a href="#page161">161</a>-2, <a href="#page307">307</a>, <a href="#page343">343</a>, <a href="#page394">394</a>, <a href="#page412">412</a>, <a href="#page423">423</a></p> + <p>Sonner, Ernst, <a href="#page290">290</a></p> + <p>Spee, Friedrich, <a href="#page176">176</a>-7</p> + <p>Sperling, Johann, <a href="#page171">171</a></p> + <p>Sperling, Otto, <a href="#page212">212</a></p> + <p>Spinoza, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page68">68</a>, <a href="#page79">79</a>, <a href="#page82">82</a>, <a href="#page159">159</a>, <a href="#page234">234</a>-6, <a href="#page331">331</a>, <a href="#page348">348</a>-51, <a href="#page359">359</a>, <a href="#page418">418</a></p> + <p>Stahl, Daniel, <a href="#page243">243</a></p> + <p>Stegman, Josua, <a href="#page107">107</a></p> + <p>Stegmann, Christopher, <a href="#page84">84</a></p> + <p>Steno, <a href="#page178">178</a></p> + <p>Steuchus, Augustinus, <a href="#page91">91</a></p> + <p>Stoics, <a href="#page79">79</a>, <a href="#page232">232</a>, <a href="#page263">263</a>, <a href="#page282">282</a>-3, <a href="#page324">324</a> ff., <a href="#page342">342</a></p> + <p>Strato, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page245">245</a>-6, <a href="#page331">331</a>, <a href="#page335">335</a>, <a href="#page336">336</a>, <a href="#page349">349</a>, <a href="#page395">395</a></p> + <p>Strinesius, <a href="#page241">241</a></p> + <p>Sturm, <a href="#page69">69</a>, <a href="#page261">261</a></p> + <p>Suarez, <a href="#page314">314</a></p> + <p>Suetonius, <a href="#page287">287</a></p> + <p>Supralapsarians, <a href="#page166">166</a>, <a href="#page228">228</a>, <a href="#page236">236</a>, <a href="#page238">238</a>, <a href="#page269">269</a>, <a href="#page273">273</a>-4, <a href="#page289">289</a></p> + <p>Swammerdam, <a href="#page172">172</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Tacitus, <a href="#page210">210</a>, <a href="#page211">211</a>, <a href="#page265">265</a>, <a href="#page287">287</a></p> + <p>Taifel, Baron André, <a href="#page441">441</a></p> + <p>Taurel, Nicolas, <a href="#page81">81</a>, <a href="#page353">353</a></p> + <p>Tertullian, <a href="#page101">101</a></p> + <p>Thomas Aquinas, St., <a href="#page174">174</a>, <a href="#page176">176</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page243">243</a>, <a href="#page262">262</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page357">357</a>, <a href="#page378">378</a>, <a href="#page383">383</a></p> + <p>Thomasius, Jacob, <a href="#page243">243</a>, <a href="#page265">265</a></p> + <p>Thomists, <a href="#page145">145</a>, <a href="#page149">149</a>, <a href="#page241">241</a>, <a href="#page311">311</a>, <a href="#page324">324</a>, <a href="#page344">344</a>, <a href="#page347">347</a></p> + <p>Tiberius, <a href="#page227">227</a></p> + <p>Timon, <a href="#page265">265</a></p> + <p>Tiresias, <a href="#page230">230</a></p> + <p>Toland, John, <a href="#page106">106</a></p> + <p>de Tournemine, Fr., <a href="#page69">69</a></p> + <p>Trajan, <a href="#page293">293</a></p> + <p>Trogus, <a href="#page208">208</a></p> + <p>Turretin, <a href="#page240">240</a></p> + <p>Twiss, <a href="#page238">238</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Ursinus, Zacharias, <a href="#page291">291</a></p> + <p>Usserius, <a href="#page70">70</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Valla, Laurentius, <a href="#page67">67</a>, <a href="#page344">344</a>, <a href="#page365">365</a> ff.</p> + <p>van Beverwyck, Johan, <a href="#page153">153</a>-4</p> + <p>van den Ende, Franz, <a href="#page351">351</a></p> + <p>van den Hoof, <a href="#page350">350</a></p> + <p>van der Weye, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>van Helmont, <a href="#page169">169</a></p> + <p>Vanini, Lucilio, <a href="#page434">434</a></p> + <p>Vedelius, Nicolaus, <a href="#page86">86</a>, <a href="#page111">111</a></p> + <p>Velleius Paterculus, <a href="#page318">318</a></p> + <p>Vergil, <a href="#page78">78</a>-9, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page287">287</a>, <a href="#page293">293</a>, <a href="#page306">306</a>, <a href="#page315">315</a></p> + <p>Véron, François, <a href="#page107">107</a></p> + <p>Versé, Aubert de, <a href="#page350">350</a></p> + <p>Voëtius, Gisbertus, <a href="#page86">86</a></p> + <p>Vorstius, Conrad, <a href="#page58">58</a></p> + <p>Vogelsang, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>von Wallenberg, Bp. Peter, <a href="#page67">67</a></p> + <p>Wander, William, <a href="#page169">169</a></p> + <p>Weigel, Erhard, <a href="#page261">261</a>, <a href="#page355">355</a></p> + <p>Weigel, Valentine, <a href="#page79">79</a></p> + <p>de Witt, <a href="#page351">351</a></p> + <p>Wittich, <a href="#page187">187</a>, <a href="#page306">306</a>-7, <a href="#page309">309</a></p> + <p>von Wollzogen, <a href="#page82">82</a></p> + <p>Wyclif, John, <a href="#page122">122</a>, <a href="#page159">159</a>, <a href="#page234">234</a>, <a href="#page272">272</a>, <a href="#page395">395</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Xanthus, <a href="#page209">209</a></p> + </div> + + <div class="stanza"> + <p>Zeisold, Johann, <a href="#page171">171</a></p> + <p>Zoroaster, <a href="#page71">71</a>, <a href="#page208">208</a>-10, <a href="#page218">218</a></p> + </div> + </div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Theodicy, by G. W. 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