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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/16833-8.txt b/16833-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4d8d18e --- /dev/null +++ b/16833-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,5213 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Auguste Comte and Positivism, by John-Stuart Mill + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Auguste Comte and Positivism + +Author: John-Stuart Mill + +Release Date: October 9, 2005 [EBook #16833] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe + + + + +AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM + +BY + +JOHN STUART MILL + + +1865. + + + + * * * * * + + + +PART I. + +THE COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE. + + +For some time much has been said, in England and on the Continent, +concerning "Positivism" and "the Positive Philosophy." Those phrases, +which during the life of the eminent thinker who introduced them had +made their way into no writings or discussions but those of his very few +direct disciples, have emerged from the depths and manifested themselves +on the surface of the philosophy of the age. It is not very widely known +what they represent, but it is understood that they represent something. +They are symbols of a recognised mode of thought, and one of sufficient +importance to induce almost all who now discuss the great problems of +philosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of +the age, to take what is termed the Positivist view of things into +serious consideration, and define their own position, more or less +friendly or hostile, in regard to it. Indeed, though the mode of thought +expressed by the terms Positive and Positivism is widely spread, the +words themselves are, as usual, better known through the enemies of that +mode of thinking than through its friends; and more than one thinker who +never called himself or his opinions by those appellations, and +carefully guarded himself against being confounded with those who did, +finds himself, sometimes to his displeasure, though generally by a +tolerably correct instinct, classed with Positivists, and assailed as a +Positivist. This change in the bearings of philosophic opinion commenced +in England earlier than in France, where a philosophy of a contrary kind +had been more widely cultivated, and had taken a firmer hold on the +speculative minds of a generation formed by Royer-Collard, Cousin, +Jouffroy, and their compeers. The great treatise of M. Comte was +scarcely mentioned in French literature or criticism, when it was +already working powerfully on the minds of many British students and +thinkers. But, agreeably to the usual course of things in France, the +new tendency, when it set in, set in more strongly. Those who call +themselves Positivists are indeed not numerous; but all French writers +who adhere to the common philosophy, now feel it necessary to begin by +fortifying their position against "the Positivist school." And the mode +of thinking thus designated is already manifesting its importance by one +of the most unequivocal signs, the appearance of thinkers who attempt a +compromise or _juste milieu_ between it and its opposite. The acute +critic and metaphysician M. Taine, and the distinguished chemist M. +Berthelot, are the authors of the two most conspicuous of these +attempts. + +The time, therefore, seems to have come, when every philosophic thinker +not only ought to form, but may usefully express, a judgment respecting +this intellectual movement; endeavouring to understand what it is, +whether it is essentially a wholesome movement, and if so, what is to be +accepted and what rejected of the direction given to it by its most +important movers. There cannot be a more appropriate mode of discussing +these points than in the form of a critical examination of the +philosophy of Auguste Comte; for which the appearance of a new edition +of his fundamental treatise, with a preface by the most eminent, in +every point of view, of his professed disciples, M. Littré, affords a +good opportunity. The name of M. Comte is more identified than any other +with this mode of thought. He is the first who has attempted its +complete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all +objects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a +quantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success, +which have not only won but retained the high admiration of thinkers as +radically and strenuously opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the +whole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions. It +would have been a mistake had such thinkers busied themselves in the +first instance with drawing attention to what they regarded as errors in +his great work. Until it had taken the place in the world of thought +which belonged to it, the important matter was not to criticise it, but +to help in making it known. To have put those who neither knew nor were +capable of appreciating the greatness of the book, in possession of its +vulnerable points, would have indefinitely retarded its progress to a +just estimation, and was not needful for guarding against any serious +inconvenience. While a writer has few readers, and no influence except +on independent thinkers, the only thing worth considering in him is what +he can teach us: if there be anything in which he is less wise than we +are already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes when his +errors can do harm. But the high place which M. Comte has now assumed +among European thinkers, and the increasing influence of his principal +work, while they make it a more hopeful task than before to impress and +enforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, for the +first time, not inopportune to discuss his mistakes. Whatever errors he +may have fallen into are now in a position to be injurious, while the +free exposure of them can no longer be so. + +We propose, then, to pass in review the main principles of M. Comte's +philosophy; commencing with the great treatise by which, in this +country, he is chiefly known, and postponing consideration of the +writings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional +illustration of detached points. + +When we extend our examination to these later productions, we shall +have, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognizing, as +in the Cours de Philosophic Positive, an essentially sound view of +philosophy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character +that we deem the subsequent speculations false and misleading, while in +the midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable +thoughts, and suggestions of thought, in detail. For the present we put +out of the question this signal anomaly in M. Comte's intellectual +career. We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to +the world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposition, and in part +creation, of what he terms the Positive Philosophy: endeavouring to +sever what in our estimation is true, from the much less which is +erroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as +we proceed, the part which is specially his, from that which belongs to +the philosophy of the age, and is the common inheritance of thinkers. +This last discrimination has been partially made in a late pamphlet, by +Mr Herbert Spencer, in vindication of his own independence of thought: +but this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with a less limited +purpose, here; especially as Mr Spencer rejects nearly all which +properly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged mode of statement does +scanty justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even +on the direct evidence given by M. Comte himself, who, far from claiming +any originality not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his +own most original thoughts with every germ of anything similar which he +observed in previous thinkers. + +The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, +and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the +following:--We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our +knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the +essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its +relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. +These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same +circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, +and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and +consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we +know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, +either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us. + +M. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. +He avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by +all who have made any real contribution to science, and became +distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of +Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the +founders of the Positive Philosophy. As he says, the knowledge which +mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which +they most needed, was _fore_knowledge: "savoir, pour prevoir." When they +sought for the cause, it was mainly in order to control the effect or if +it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it. Now, +all foresight of phaenomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of +their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting +their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of +facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its +antecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular +contractions, by means of some fact which experience has shown to be +followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action, +have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted +to ascertain the successions of phaenomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor +the knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other +means. + +The conviction, however, that knowledge of the successions and +co-existences of phaenomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us, +could not be arrived at in a very early stage of the progress of +thought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor +believing that they have attained it; and that, when attained, it is, in +some undefinable manner, greatly more precious than mere knowledge of +sequences and co-existences. The true doctrine was not seen in its full +clearness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his +speculations tend: still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly +apprehended by Newton.[1] + +But it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume, +who carries it a step further than Comte, maintaining not merely that +the only causes of phaenomena which can be known to us are other +phaenomena, their invariable antecedents, but that there is no other +kind of causes: cause, as he interprets it, _means_ the invariable +antecedent. This is the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested +by his great adversary, Kant; who, maintaining as strenuously as Comte +that we know nothing of Things in themselves, of Noumena, of real +Substances and real Causes, yet peremptorily asserted their existence. +But neither does Comte question this: on the contrary, all his language +implies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer who has best +stated and defended Comte's fundamental doctrine is Dr Thomas Brown. The +doctrine and spirit of Brown's philosophy are entirely Positivist, and +no better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his Lectures +has yet been produced. Of living thinkers we do not speak; but the same +great truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of +Bentham, and pre-eminently of James Mill: and Sir William Hamilton's +famous doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge has guided many to +it, though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having +understood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had. + +The foundation of M. Comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to +him, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from being +universally accepted even by thoughtful minds. + +The philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, +but a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific +minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte +has never presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine +his own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is, +we require to know, with equal distinctness, what it is not. To enter +into the real character of any mode of thought, we must understand what +other modes of thought compete with it. M. Comte has taken care that we +should do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him, +dispute ascendancy with the Positive, are two in number, both of them +anterior to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical. + +We use the words Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive, because they +are chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte's ideas. Any +philosopher whose thoughts another person undertakes to set forth, +has a right to require that it should be done by means of his own +nomenclature. They are not, however, the terms we should ourselves +choose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas +other than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the +meaning assigned to them, are ill fitted to take, root in English soil; +while Metaphysical suggests, and suggested even to M. Comte, much that +in no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term +Theological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of +condemnation implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of negation than +need be included in the Positive creed. Instead of the Theological we +should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of +nature; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological: and +the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the +objective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential. But +M. Comte's opinions are best stated in his own phraseology; several of +them, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bearings +without it. + +The Theological, which is the original and spontaneous form of thought, +regards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of +sequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or +imaginary, possessed of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of +reason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated. +The next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom +superintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last +merges this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made the whole +universe in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phaenomena by +his continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time +to time by special interferences. + +The mode of thought which M. Comte terms Metaphysical, accounts for +phaenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or +celestial, but to realized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer +a god that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature: +it is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real +existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which +they reside, and which they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads +presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phaenomena, every +plant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the [Greek: Threptikè phygè] +of Aristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic +Force, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they +do because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent +Virtue. Phaenomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and +propensities of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as +impersonal, is figured as acting on a sort of motives, and in a manner +more or less analogous to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a +tendency of nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many +natural phaenomena. The rise of water in a pump is attributed to +Nature's horror of a vacuum. The fall of heavy bodies, and the ascent of +flame and smoke, are construed as attempts of each to get to its +_natural_ place. Many important consequences are deduced from the +doctrine that Nature has no breaks (non habet saltum). In medicine the +curative force (vis medicatrix) of Nature furnishes the explanation of +the reparative processes which modern physiologists refer each to its +own particular agencies and laws. + +Examples are not necessary to prove to those who are acquainted with the +past phases of human thought, how great a place both the theological and +the metaphysical interpretations of phaenomena have historically +occupied, as well in the speculations of thinkers as in the familiar +conceptions of the multitude. Many had perceived before M. Comte that +neither of these modes of explanation was final: the warfare against +both of them could scarcely be carried on more vigorously than it +already was, early in the seventeenth century, by Hobbes. Nor is it +unknown to any one who has followed the history of the various physical +sciences, that the positive explanation of facts has substituted itself, +step by step, for the theological and metaphysical, as the progress of +inquiry brought to light an increasing number of the invariable laws of +phaenomena. In these respects M. Comte has not originated anything, but +has taken his place in a fight long since engaged, and on the side +already in the main victorious. The generalization which belongs to +himself, and in which he had not, to the best of our knowledge, been at +all anticipated, is, that every distinct class of human conceptions +passes through all these stages, beginning with the theological, and +proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive: the metaphysical +being a mere state of transition, but an indispensable one, from the +theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally +to prevail, by the universal recognition that all phaemomena without +exception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, +either natural or supernatural, interfere. This general theorem is +completed by the addition, that the theological mode of thought has +three stages, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism: the successive +transitions being prepared, and indeed caused, by the gradual uprising +of the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive, +and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first +and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive. + +This generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines which +originated with M. Comte; and the survey of history, which occupies the +two largest volumes of the six composing his work, is a continuous +exemplification and verification of the law. How well it accords with +the facts, and how vast a number of the greater historical phaenomena it +explains, is known only to those who have studied its exposition, where +alone it can be found--in these most striking and instructive volumes. +As this theory is the key to M. Comte's other generalizations, all of +which arc more or less dependent on it; as it forms the backbone, if we +may so speak, of his philosophy, and, unless it be true, he has +accomplished little; we cannot better employ part of our space than in +clearing it from misconception, and giving the explanations necessary to +remove the obstacles which prevent many competent persons from assenting +to it. + +It is proper to begin by relieving the doctrine from a religious +prejudice. The doctrine condemns all theological explanations, and +replaces them, or thinks them destined to be replaced, by theories which +take no account of anything but an ascertained order of phaenomena. It +is inferred that if this change were completely accomplished, mankind +would cease to refer the constitution of Nature to an intelligent will +or to believe at all in a Creator and supreme Governor of the world. +This supposition is the more natural, as M. Comte was avowedly of that +opinion. He indeed disclaimed, with some acrimony, dogmatic atheism, and +even says (in a later work, but the earliest contains nothing at +variance with it) that the hypothesis of design has much greater +verisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism. But conjecture, founded +on analogy, did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory on, in a mature +state of human intelligence. He deemed all real knowledge of a +commencement inaccessible to us, and the inquiry into it an overpassing +of the essential limits of our mental faculties. To this point, however, +those who accept his theory of the progressive stages of opinion are not +obliged to follow him. The Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a +denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the +origin of all things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by +the very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature +cannot account for their own origin. The Positive philosopher is free to +form his opinion on the subject, according to the weight he attaches to +the analogies which are called marks of design, and to the general +traditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a +question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one upon which Positive +philosophers must necessarily be agreed. It is one of M. Comte's +mistakes that he never allows of open questions. Positive Philosophy +maintains that within the existing order of the universe, or rather of +the part of it known to us, the direct determining cause of every +phaenomenon is not supernatural but natural. It is compatible with this +to believe, that the universe was created, and even that it is +continuously governed, by an Intelligence, provided we admit that the +intelligent Governor adheres to fixed laws, which are only modified or +counteracted by other laws of the same dispensation, and are never +either capriciously or providentially departed from. Whoever regards +all events as parts of a constant order, each one being the invariable +consequent of some antecedent condition, or combination of conditions, +accepts fully the Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or +not an universal antecedent on which the whole system of nature was +originally consequent, and whether that universal antecedent is +conceived as an Intelligence or not. + +There is a corresponding misconception to be corrected respecting the +Metaphysical mode of thought. In repudiating metaphysics, M. Comte did +not interdict himself from analysing or criticising any of the abstract +conceptions of the mind. He was not ignorant (though he sometimes seemed +to forget) that such analysis and criticism are a necessary part of the +scientific process, and accompany the scientific mind in all its +operations. What he condemned was the habit of conceiving these mental +abstractions as real entities, which could exert power, produce +phaenomena, and the enunciation of which could be regarded as a theory +or explanation of facts. Men of the present day with difficulty believe +that so absurd a notion was ever really entertained, so repugnant is it +to the mental habits formed by long and assiduous cultivation of the +positive sciences. But those sciences, however widely cultivated, have +never formed the basis of intellectual education in any society. It is +with philosophy as with religion: men marvel at the absurdity of other +people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities remain in their own, +and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken +for things, who is treating other words as if they were things every +time he opens his mouth to discuss. No one, unless entirely ignorant of +the history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for +realities pervaded speculation all through antiquity and the middle +ages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas +of Plato. The Aristotelians carried it on. Essences, quiddities, virtues +residing in things, were accepted as a _bonâ fide_ explanation of +phaenomena. Not only abstract qualities, but the concrete names of +genera and species, were mistaken for objective existences. It was +believed that there were General Substances corresponding to all the +familiar classes of concrete things: a substance Man, a substance Tree, +a substance Animal, which, and not the individual objects so called, +were directly denoted by those names. The real existence of Universal +Substances was the question at issue in the famous controversy of the +later middle ages between Nominalism and Realism, which is one of the +turning points in the history of thought, being its first struggle to +emancipate itself from the dominion of verbal abstractions. The Realists +were the stronger party, but though the Nominalists for a time +succumbed, the doctrine they rebelled against fell, after a short +interval, with the rest of the scholastic philosophy. But while +universal substances and substantial forms, being the grossest kind of +realized abstractions, were the soonest discarded, Essences, Virtues, +and Occult Qualities long survived them, and were first completely +extruded from real existence by the Cartesians. In Descartes' conception +of science, all physical phaenomena were to be explained by matter and +motion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws: +though his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned +out to be erroneous. Long after him, however, fictitious entities (as +they are happily termed by Bentham) continued to be imagined as means of +accounting for the more mysterious phaenomena; above all in physiology, +where, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious _forces_ and +_principles_ were the explanation, or substitute for explanation, of the +phaenomena of organized beings. To modern philosophers these fictions +are merely the abstract names of the classes of phaenomena which +correspond to them; and it is one of the puzzles of philosophy, how +mankind, after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain +combinations of ideas or images, could have so far forgotten their own +act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality, +and mistake the name of a phaenomenon for its efficient cause. What was +a mystery from the purely dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the +historical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of +phaenomena, but were not so in their origin. To us they denote only the +phaenomena, because we have ceased to believe in what else they once +designated; and the employment of them in explanation is to us +evidently, as M. Comte says, the naïf reproduction of the phaenomenon +as the reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning. The +metaphysical point of view was not a perversion of the positive, but a +transformation of the theological. The human mind, in framing a class of +objects, did not set out from the notion of a name, but from that of a +divinity. The realization of abstractions was not the embodiment of a +word, but the gradual disembodiment of a Fetish. + +The primitive tendency or instinct of mankind is to assimilate all the +agencies which they perceive in Nature, to the only one of which they +are directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object which +seems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visibly +acted upon, to communicate motion without having first received it, they +suppose to possess life, consciousness, will. This first rude conception +of nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all +phaenomena. The simplest observation, without which the preservation of +life would have been impossible, must have pointed out many uniformities +in nature, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly +like one another: and whenever this was observed, men's natural and +untutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class, +and to think of them together: of which it was a natural consequence to +refer effects, which were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than +to a number of wills precisely accordant. But this single will could not +be the will of the objects themselves, since they were many: it must be +the will of an invisible being, apart from the objects, and ruling them +from an unknown distance. This is Polytheism. We are not aware that in +any tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetichism has +been found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the +two coexisted from the earliest period at which the human mind was +capable of forming objects into classes. Fetichism proper gradually +becomes limited to objects possessing a marked individuality. A +particular mountain or river is worshipped bodily (as it is even now by +the Hindoos and the South Sea Islanders) as a divinity in itself, not +the mere residence of one, long after invisible gods have been imagined +as rulers of all the great classes of phaenomena, even intellectual and +moral, as war, love, wisdom, beauty, &c. The worship of the earth +(Tellus or Pales) and of the various heavenly bodies, was prolonged into +the heart of Polytheism. Every scholar knows, though _littérateurs_ and +men of the world do not, that in the full vigour of the Greek religion, +the Sun and Moon, not a god and goddess thereof, were sacrificed to as +deities--older deities than Zeus and his descendants, belonging to the +earlier dynasty of the Titans (which was the mythical version of the +fact that their worship was older), and these deities had a distinct set +of fables or legends connected with them. The father of Phaëthon and the +lover of Endymion were not Apollo and Diana, whose identification with +the Sungod and the Moongoddess was a late invention. Astrolatry, which, +as M. Comte observes, is the last form of Fetichism, survived the other +forms, partly because its objects, being inaccessible, were not so soon +discovered to be in themselves inanimate, and partly because of the +persistent spontaneousness of their apparent motions. + +As far as Fetichism reached, and as long as it lasted, there was no +abstraction, or classification of objects, and no room consequently for +the metaphysical mode of thought. But as soon as the voluntary agent, +whose will governed the phaenomenon, ceased to be the physical object +itself, and was removed to an invisible position, from which he or she +superintended an entire class of natural agencies, it began to seem +impossible that this being should exert his powerful activity from a +distance, unless through the medium of something present on the spot. +Through the same Natural Prejudice which made Newton unable to conceive +the possibility of his own law of gravitation without a subtle ether +filling up the intervening space, and through which the attraction could +be communicated--from this same natural infirmity of the human mind, it +seemed indispensable that the god, at a distance from the object, must +act through something residing in it, which was the immediate agent, the +god having imparted to the intermediate something the power whereby it +influenced and directed the object. When mankind felt a need for naming +these imaginary entities, they called them the _nature_ of the object, +or its _essence_, or _virtues_ residing in it, or by many other +different names. These metaphysical conceptions were regarded as +intensely real, and at first as mere instruments in the hands of the +appropriate deities. But the habit being acquired of ascribing not only +substantive existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract +entities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined +and faded away, the entities were left standing, and a semblance of +explanation of phaenomena, equal to what existed before, was furnished +by the entities alone, without referring them to any volitions. When +things had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought, had +completely substituted itself for the theological. + +Thus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at +an early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetichistic, +the Polytheistic, and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even +in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which +constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way +beneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one class +of phaenomena after another the laws to which they are really subject. +It was this growth of positive knowledge which principally determined +the next transition in the theological conception of the universe, from +Polytheism to Monotheism. + +It cannot be doubted that this transition took place very tardily. The +conception of a unity in Nature, which would admit of attributing it to +a single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds +admittance after a long period of discipline and preparation, the +obvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many +conflicting principles. We know how high a degree both of material +civilization and of moral and intellectual development preceded the +conversion of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one +God. The superficial observations by which Christian travellers have +persuaded themselves that they found their own Monotheistic belief in +some tribes of savages, have always been contradicted by more accurate +knowledge: those who have read, for instance, Mr Kohl's Kitchigami, know +what to think of the Great Spirit of the American Indians, who belongs +to a well-defined system of Polytheism, interspersed with large remains +of an original Fetichism. We have no wish to dispute the matter with +those who believe that Monotheism was the primitive religion, +transmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted +tradition. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all +the nations of the world except a small and peculiar people, in whom it +was miraculously kept alive, but who were themselves continually lapsing +from it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it +at all in its full meaning, but admitted the real existence of other +gods, though believing their own to be the most powerful, and to be the +Creator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturalness of Monotheism +to the human mind before a certain period in its development, could not +well be required. The highest form of Monotheism, Christianity, has +persisted to the present time in giving partial satisfaction to the +mental dispositions that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its +theology the thoroughly polytheistic conception of a devil. When +Monotheism, after many centuries, made its way to the Greeks and Romans +from the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the +notion of daemons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary +for Christians to deny the existence of the gods previously believed in, +it being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new +God, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the +local deities of all the subjugated nations had been subordinated by +conquest to the divine patrons of the Roman State. + +In whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the +early Monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its +reception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow +preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers. +In the age of the Caesars nearly the whole educated and cultivated class +had outgrown the polytheistic creed, and though individually liable to +returns of the superstition of their childhood, were predisposed (such +of them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the acknowledgment +of one Supreme Providence. It is vain to object that Christianity did +not find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class: +since, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of +that class--many of them, like St Paul, well versed in the mental +culture of their time; and they had evidently found no intellectual +obstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. We must not be deceived +by the recrudescence, at a much later date, of a metaphysical Paganism +in the Alexandrian and other philosophical schools, provoked not by +attachment to Polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social +ascendancy of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had +become congenial to the cultivated mind: and a belief which has gained +the cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is +certain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the multitude +itself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more +complete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy of Zeus; +from which the step to a single Deity, surrounded by a host of angels, +and keeping in recalcitrant subjection an army of devils, was by no +means difficult. + +By what means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been +educated for Monotheism? By the growth of a practical feeling of the +invariability of natural laws. Monotheism had a natural adaptation to +this belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conflicted with +it. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suppose that beings +so powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special +department, the will of any divinity might always be frustrated by +another: and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which +would itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of +invariability, and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy +of a Supreme Deity) it was impossible that the course of any of the +phaenomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the +contrary, all the phaenomena of the universe were under the exclusive +and uncontrollable influence of a single will, it was an admissible +supposition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and +might choose to conduct each class of its operations in an invariable +manner. In proportion, therefore, as the invariable laws of phaenomena +revealed themselves to observers, the theory which ascribed them all to +one will began to grow plausible; but must still have appeared +improbable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the +common rule of all nature. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era +had reached a point of advancement at which this supposition had become +probable. The admirable height to which geometry had already been +carried, had familiarized the educated mind with the conception of laws +absolutely invariable. The logical analysis of the intellectual +processes by Aristotle had shown a similar uniformity of law in the +realm of mind. In the concrete external world, the most imposing +phaenomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the +imagination had done most to keep up the whole system of ideas connected +with supernatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so +regular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which +to the notions of those days must have appeared perfect. And though an +equal degree of regularity had not been discerned in natural phaenomena +generally, even the most empirical observation had ascertained so many +cases of an uniformity _almost_ complete, that inquiring minds were +eagerly on the look-out for further indications pointing in the same +direction; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which, +though hypothetical and essentially premature, it was hoped would turn +out to be correct representations of invariable laws governing large +classes of phaenomena. When this hope and expectation became general, +they were already a great encroachment on the original domain of the +theological principle. Instead of the old conception, of events +regulated from day to day by the unforeseen and changeable volitions of +a legion of deities, it seemed more and more probable that all the +phaenomena of the universe took place according to rules which must have +been planned from the beginning; by which conception the function of the +gods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the +machinery in motion: their subsequent office appeared to be reduced to +a sinecure, or if they continued to reign, it was in the manner of +constitutional kings, bound by the laws to which they had previously +given their assent. Accordingly, the pretension of philosophers to +explain physical phaenomena by physical causes, or to predict their +occurrence, was, up to a very late period of Polytheism, regarded as +a sacrilegious insult to the gods. Anaxagoras was banished for it, +Aristotle had to fly for his life, and the mere unfounded suspicion of +it contributed greatly to the condemnation of Socrates. We are too well +acquainted with this form of the religious sentiment even now, to have +any difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then. +It was inevitable that philosophers should be anxious to get rid of at +least _these_ gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood +immediately in their way; accepting a notion of divine government which +harmonized better with the lessons they learnt from the study of nature, +and a God concerning whom no mythos, as far as they knew, had yet been +invented. + +Again, when the idea became prevalent that the constitution of every +part of Nature had been planned from the beginning, and continued to +take place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of +resemblance extending through all Nature, and affording a presumption +that the whole was the work, not of many, but of the same hand. It must +have appeared vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely +foreseeing Intelligence and immovable Will, than hundreds and thousands +of such. The philosophers had not at that time the arguments which might +have been grounded on universal laws not yet suspected, such as the law +of gravitation and the laws of heat; but there was a multitude, obvious +even to them, of analogies and homologies in natural phaenomena, which +suggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raised up by +their active fancy, aided by their premature scientific theories, all of +which aimed at interpreting some phaenomenon by the analogy of others +supposed to be better known; assuming, indeed, a much greater similarity +among the various processes of Nature, than ampler experience has since +shown to exist. The theological mode of thought thus advanced from +Polytheism to Monotheism through the direct influence of the Positive +mode of thought, not yet aspiring to complete speculative ascendancy. +But, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was +still imperfect even in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest +infancy in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but +not in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was +flexible by entreaty, was incessantly ordering the affairs of mankind by +direct volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by +miraculous interpositions; and this is believed still, wherever the +invariability of law has established itself in men's convictions as a +general, but not as an universal truth. + +In the change from Polytheism to Monotheism, the Metaphysical mode of +thought contributed its part, affording great aid to the up-hill +struggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the +prevailing form, of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has considerably +exaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spirit in this mental +revolution, since by a lax use of terms he credits the Metaphysical mode +of thought with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism--to +the exposure of inconsistencies and absurdities in the received +religions. But this operation is quite independent of the Metaphysical +mode of thought, and was no otherwise connected with it than in being +very generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant +example), since the most eminent efficiency in it does not necessarily +depend on the possession of positive scientific knowledge. But the +Metaphysical spirit, strictly so called, did contribute largely to the +advent of Monotheism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed +between the governing deity and the phaenomena, and forming the +machinery through which these are immediately produced, is not +repugnant, as the theory of direct supernatural volitions is, to the +belief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed +after the exemplar of men--being neither, like them, invested with human +passions, nor supposed, like them, to have power beyond the phaenomena +which are the special department of each, there was no fear of offending +them by the attempt to foresee and define their action, or by the +supposition that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular +tribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the +metaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a +select and instructed class, could say with impunity, speaking of what +were called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were +neither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of +abstract entities was a kind of instinctive conciliation between the +observed uniformity of the facts of nature, and their dependence on +arbitrary volition; since it was easier to conceive a single volition as +setting a machinery to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to +suppose an inflexible constancy in so capricious and changeable a thing +as volition must then have appeared. But though the régime of +abstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded +Monotheism as the condition of its free development. The received +Polytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too +closely mixed up in the daily details of phaenomena, and the habit of +propitiating them and ascertaining their will before any important +action of life was too inveterate, to admit, without the strongest shock +to the received system, the notion that they did not habitually rule by +special interpositions, but left phaenomena in all ordinary cases to the +operation of the essences or peculiar natures which they had first +implanted in them. Any modification of Polytheism which would have made +it fully compatible with the Metaphysical conception of the world, would +have been more difficult to effect than the transition to Monotheism, as +Monotheism was at first conceived. + +We have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important +portion of M. Comte's view of the evolution of human thought, as a +sample of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and interprets +historical facts, and also to obviate some objections to it, grounded on +an imperfect comprehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for +example, think the doctrine of the three successive stages of +speculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three +existed contemporaneously; much as if the natural succession of the +hunting, the nomad, and the agricultural state could be refuted by the +fact that there are still hunters and nomads. That the three states were +contemporaneous, that they all began before authentic history, and still +coexist, is M. Comte's express statement: as well as that the advent of +the two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorganized and +is gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of +explaining phaenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, +of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by +human will, belonged already to the positive mode of thought. The first +and easiest generalizations of common observation, anterior to the first +traces of the scientific spirit, determined the birth of the +Metaphysical mode of thought; and every further advance in the +observation of nature, gradually bringing to light its invariable laws, +determined a further development of the Metaphysical spirit at the +expense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the +conclusions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises of the +Theological could be temporarily made compatible. At a later period, +when the real character of the positive laws of nature had come to be in +a certain degree understood, and the theological idea had assumed, in +scientific minds, its final character, that of a God governing by +general laws, the positive spirit, having now no longer need of the +fictitious medium of imaginary entities, set itself to the easy task of +demolishing the instrument by which it had risen. But though it +destroyed the actual belief in the objective reality of these +abstractions, that belief has left behind it vicious tendencies of the +human mind, which are still far enough from being extinguished, and +which we shall presently have occasion to characterize. + +The next point on which we have to touch is one of greater importance +than it seems. If all human speculation had to pass through the three +stages, we may presume that its different branches, having always been +very unequally advanced, could not pass from one stage to another at the +same time. There must have been a certain order of succession in which +the different sciences would enter, first into the metaphysical, and +afterwards into the purely positive stage; and this order M. Comte +proceeds to investigate. The result is his remarkable conception of a +scale of subordination of the sciences, being the order of the logical +dependence of those which follow on those which precede. It is not at +first obvious how a mere classification of the sciences can be not +merely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of +doctrine; the classification, however, is a very important part of M. +Comte's philosophy. + +He first distinguishes between the abstract and the concrete sciences. +The abstract sciences have to do with the laws which govern the +elementary facts of Nature; laws on which all phaenomena actually +realized must of course depend, but which would have been equally +compatible with many other combinations than those which actually come +to pass. The concrete sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only +with the particular combinations of phaenomena which are found in +existence. For example; the minerals which compose our planet, or are +found in it, have been produced and are held together by the laws of +mechanical aggregation and by those of chemical union. It is the +business of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistry, to ascertain +these laws: to discover how and under what conditions bodies may become +aggregated, and what are the possible modes and results of chemical +combination. The great majority of these aggregations and combinations +take place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories; with these +the concrete science, Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is +with those aggregates, and those chemical compounds, which form +themselves, or have at some period been formed, in the natural world. +Again, Physiology, the abstract science, investigates, by such means as +are available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those +laws determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the +existence and determine the phaenomena of those which actually exist: +but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and +animals very different from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology and +Botany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be +shown to have really existed: and do not concern themselves with the +mode in which even these would comport themselves under all +circumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set +forth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phaenomena +which they in fact present: but they set forth all of these, and take +into simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each +species, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to +whatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong. +The existence of a date tree, or of a lion, is a joint result of many +natural laws, physical, chemical, biological, and even astronomical. +Abstract science deals with these laws separately, but considers each of +them in all its aspects, all its possibilities of operation: concrete +science considers them only in combination, and so far as they exist and +manifest themselves in the animals or plants of which we have +experience. The distinctive attributes of the two are summed up by M. +Comte in the expression, that concrete science relates to Beings, or +Objects, abstract science to Events.[2] + +The concrete sciences are inevitably later in their development than the +abstract sciences on which they depend. Not that they begin later to be +studied; on the contrary, they are the earliest cultivated, since in our +abstract investigations we necessarily set out from spontaneous facts. +But though we may make empirical generalizations, we can form no +scientific theory of concrete phaenomena until the laws which govern and +explain them are first known; and those laws are the subject of the +abstract sciences. In consequence, there is not one of the concrete +studies (unless we count astronomy among them) which has received, up to +the present time, its final scientific constitution, or can be accounted +a science, except in a very loose sense, but only materials for science: +partly from insufficiency of facts, but more, because the abstract +sciences, except those at the very beginning of the scale, have not +attained the degree of perfection necessary to render real concrete +sciences possible. + +Postponing, therefore, the concrete sciences, as not yet formed, but +only tending towards formation, the abstract sciences remain to be +classed. These, as marked out by M. Comte, are six in number; and the +principle which he proposes for their classification is admirably in +accordance with the conditions of our study of Nature. It might have +happened that the different classes of phaenomena had depended on laws +altogether distinct; that in changing from one to another subject of +scientific study, the student left behind all the laws he previously +knew, and passed under the dominion of a totally new set of +uniformities. The sciences would then have been wholly independent of +one another; each would have rested entirely on its own inductions, and +if deductive at all, would have drawn its deductions from premises +exclusively furnished by itself. The fact, however, is otherwise. The +relation which really subsists between different kinds of phaenomena, +enables the sciences to be arranged in such an order, that in travelling +through them we do not pass out of the sphere of any laws, but merely +take up additional ones at each step. In this order M. Comte proposes to +arrange them. He classes the sciences in an ascending series, according +to the degree of complexity of their phaenomena; so that each science +depends on the truths of all those which precede it, with the addition +of peculiar truths of its own. + +Thus, the truths of number are true of all things, and depend only on +their own laws; the science, therefore, of Number, consisting of +Arithmetic and Algebra, may be studied without reference to any other +science. The truths of Geometry presuppose the laws of Number, and a +more special class of laws peculiar to extended bodies, but require no +others: Geometry, therefore, can be studied independently of all +sciences except that of Number. + +Rational Mechanics presupposes, and depends on, the laws of number and +those of extension, and along with them another set of laws, those of +Equilibrium and Motion. The truths of Algebra and Geometry nowise depend +on these last, and would have been true if these had happened to be the +reverse of what we find them: but the phaenomena of equilibrium and +motion cannot be understood, nor even stated, without assuming the laws +of number and extension, such as they actually are. The phaenomena of +Astronomy depend on these three classes of laws, and on the law of +gravitation besides; which last has no influence on the truths of +number, geometry, or mechanics. Physics (badly named in common English +parlance Natural Philosophy) presupposes the three mathematical +sciences, and also astronomy; since all terrestrial phaenomena are +affected by influences derived from the motions of the earth and of the +heavenly bodies. Chemical phaenomena depend (besides their own laws) on +all the preceding, those of physics among the rest, especially on the +laws of heat and electricity; physiological phaenomena, on the laws of +physics and chemistry, and their own laws in addition. The phaenomena of +human society obey laws of their own, but do not depend solely upon +these: they depend upon all the laws of organic and animal life, +together with those of inorganic nature, these last influencing society +not only through their influence on life, but by determining the +physical conditions under which society has to be carried on. "Chacun de +ces degré's successifs exige des inductions qui lui sont propres; mais +elles ne peuvent jamais devenir systématiques que sous l'impulsion +déductive resultée de tous les ordres moins compliqués."[3] + +Thus arranged by M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an +advance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what +necessarily accompanies increased speciality) an increase of +complexity--a set of phaenomena determined by a more numerous +combination of laws; the sciences stand in the following order: 1st, +Mathematics; its three branches following one another on the same +principle, Number, Geometry, Mechanics. 2nd, Astronomy. 3rd, Physics. +4th, Chemistry. 5th, Biology. 6th, Sociology, or the Social Science, the +phaemomena, of which depend on, and cannot be understood without, the +principal truths of all the other sciences. The subject matter and +contents of these various sciences are obvious of themselves, with the +exception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single +science, and is again divided by M. Comte into five departments: +Barology, or the science of weight; Thermology, or that of heat; +Acoustics, Optics, and Electrology. These he attempts to arrange on the +same principle of increasing speciality and complexity, but they hardly +admit of such a scale, and M. Comte's mode of placing them varied at +different periods. All the five being essentially independent of one +another, he attached little importance to their order, except that +barology ought to come first, as the connecting link with astronomy, and +electrology last, as the transition to chemistry. + +If the best classification is that which is grounded on the properties +most important for our purposes, this classification will stand the +test. By placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their +subject matter, it presents them in the order of their difficulty. Each +science proposes to itself a more arduous inquiry than those which +precede it in the series; it is therefore likely to be susceptible, even +finally, of a less degree of perfection, and will certainly arrive later +at the degree attainable by it. In addition to this, each science, to +establish its own truths, needs those of all the sciences anterior to +it. The only means, for example, by which the physiological laws of life +could have been ascertained, was by distinguishing, among the +multifarious and complicated facts of life, the portion which physical +and chemical laws cannot account for. Only by thus isolating the effects +of the peculiar organic laws, did it become possible to discover what +these are. It follows that the order in which the sciences succeed one +another in the series, cannot but be, in the main, the historical order +of their development; and is the only order in which they can rationally +be studied. For this last there is an additional reason: since the more +special and complete sciences require not only the truths of the simpler +and more general ones, but still more their methods. The scientific +intellect, both in the individual and in the race, must learn in the +move elementary studies that art of investigation and those canons of +proof which are to be put in practice in the more elevated. No intellect +is properly qualified for the higher part of the scale, without due +practice in the lower. + +Mr Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled "The Genesis of Science," and +more recently in a pamphlet on "the Classification of the Sciences," has +criticised and condemned M. Comte's classification, and proposed a more +elaborate one of his own: and M. Littré, in his valuable biographical +and philosophical work on M. Comte ("Auguste Comte et la Philosophie +Positive"), has at some length criticised the criticism. Mr Spencer is +one of the small number of persons who by the solidity and +encyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of +co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, +and entitled to a vote in the estimation of him. But after giving to his +animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr +Spencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy +to find fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways +of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said +against the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of +a classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We +have shown the purposes for which M. Comte's classification is intended. +Mr Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purposes: and +we cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His +chief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of +the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, +and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state +of sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's scale; so that, +the dependence being mutual, there is a _consensus_, but not an +ascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That the earlier sciences +derive help from the later is undoubtedly true; it is part of M. Comte's +theory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work. When he +affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean +that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of +those which follow. Mr Spencer does not distinguish between the +empirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the +scientific stage. The commencement of every study consists in gathering +together unanalyzed facts, and treasuring up such spontaneous +generalizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage +any branch of inquiry can be carried on independently of every other; +and it is one of M. Comte's own remarks that the most complex, in a +scientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his series, the +study of man as a moral and social being, since from its absorbing +interest it is cultivated more or less by every one, and pre-eminently +by the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater +stock of just though unscientific observations than the more elementary +sciences. It is these empirical truths that the later and more special +sciences lend to the earlier; or, at most, some extremely elementary +scientific truth, which happening to be easily ascertainable by direct +experiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science +already founded, to a higher stage of development; a re-action of the +later sciences on the earlier which M. Comte not only fully recognized, +but attached great importance to systematizing.[4] + +But though detached truths relating to the more complex order of +phaenomena may be empirically observed, and a few of them even +scientifically established, contemporaneously with an early stage of +some of the sciences anterior in the scale, such detached truths, as M. +Littré justly remarks, do not constitute a science. What is known of a +subject, only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of +truth; in which the relation between the general principles and the +details is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be +recognized as a case of the operation of wider laws. This point of +progress, at which the study passes from the preliminary state of mere +preparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex +studies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain +regularity of recurrence in the celestial appearances was ascertained +empirically before much progress had been made in geometry; but +astronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly +advanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before +addition and subtraction. The truths of the simpler sciences are a part +of the laws to which the phaenomena of the more complex sciences +conform: and are not only a necessary element in their explanation, but +must be so well understood as to be traceable through complex +combinations, before the special laws which co-exist and co-operate with +them can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte affirms, and +enough for his purpose.[5] He no doubt occasionally indulges in more +unqualified expressions than can be completely justified, regarding the +logical perfection of the construction of his series, and its exact +correspondence with the historical evolution of the sciences; +exaggerations confined to language, and which the details of his +exposition often correct. But he is sufficiently near the truth, in both +respects, for every practical purpose.[6] Minor inaccuracies must often +be forgiven even to great thinkers. Mr Spencer, in the very-writings in +which he criticises M. Comte, affords signal instances of them.[7] + +Combining the doctrines, that every science is in a less advanced state +as it occupies a higher place in the ascending scale, and that all the +sciences pass through the three stages, theological, metaphysical, and +positive, it follows that the more special a science is, the tardier is +it in effecting each transition, so that a completely positive state of +an earlier science has often coincided with the metaphysical state of +the one next to it, and a purely theological state of those further on. +This statement correctly represents the general course of the facts, +though requiring allowances in the detail. Mathematics, for example, +from the very beginning of its cultivation, can hardly at any time have +been in the theological state, though exhibiting many traces of the +metaphysical. No one, probably, ever believed that the will of a god +kept parallel lines from meeting, or made two and two equal to four; or +ever prayed to the gods to make the square of the hypothenuse equal to +more or less than the sum of the squares of the sides. The most devout +believers have recognized in propositions of this description a class of +truths independent of the devine omnipotence. Even among the truths +which popular philosophy calls by the misleading name of Contingent the +few which are at once exact and obvious were probably, from the very +first, excepted from the theological explanation. M. Comte observes, +after Adam Smith, that we are not told in any age or country of a god of +Weight. It was otherwise with Astronomy: the heavenly bodies were +believed not merely to be moved by gods, but to be gods themselves: and +when this theory was exploded, there movements were explained by +metaphysical conceptions; such as a tendency of Nature to perfection, in +virtue of which these sublime bodies, being left to themselves, move in +the most perfect orbit, the circle. Even Kepler was full of fancies of +this description, which only terminated when Newton, by unveiling the +real physical laws of the celestial motions, closed the metaphysical +period of astronomical science. As M. Comte remarks, our power of +foreseeing phaenomena, and our power of controlling them, are the two +things which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable +wills. In the case of phaenomena which science has not yet taught us +either to foresee or to control, the theological mode of thought has not +ceased to operate: men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to +avert a shipwreck or a pestilence, but not to put back the stars in +their courses, to abridge the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest +the tides. Such vestiges of the primitive mode of thought linger in the +more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high degree +of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation, being +less antagonistic than the theological to the idea of invariable laws, +is still slower in being entirely discarded. M. Comte finds remains of +it in the sciences which are the most completely positive, with the +single exception of astronomy, mathematics itself not being, he thinks, +altogether free from them: which is not wonderful, when we see at how +very recent a date mathematicians have been able to give the really +positive interpretation of their own symbols.[8] We have already however +had occasion to notice M. Comte's propensity to use the term +metaphysical in cases containing nothing that truly answers to his +definition of the word. For instance, he considers chemistry as tainted +with the metaphysical mode of thought by the notion of chemical +affinity. He thinks that the chemists who said that bodies combine +because they have an affinity for each other, believed in a mysterious +entity residing in bodies and inducing them to combine. On any other +supposition, he thinks the statement could only mean that bodies combine +because they combine. But it really meant more. It was the abstract +expression of the doctrine, that bodies have an invariable tendency to +combine with one thing in preference to another: that the tendencies of +different substances to combine are fixed quantities, of which the +greater always prevails over the less, so that if A detaches B from C in +one case it will do so in every other; which was called having a greater +attraction, or, more technically, a greater affinity for it. This was +not a metaphysical theory, but a positive generalization, which +accounted for a great number of facts, and would have kept its place as +a law of nature, had it not been disproved by the discovery of cases in +which though A detached B from C in some circumstances, C detached it +from A in others, showing the law of elective chemical combination to be +a less simple one than had at first been supposed. In this case, +therefore, M. Comte made a mistake: and he will be found to have made +many similar ones. But in the science next after chemistry, biology, the +empty mode of explanation by scholastic entities, such as a plastic +force, a vital principle, and the like, has been kept up even to the +present day. The German physiology of the school of Oken, +notwithstanding his acknowledged genius, is almost as metaphysical as +Hegel, and there is in France a quite recent revival of the Animism of +Stahl. These metaphysical explanations, besides their inanity, did +serious harm, by directing the course of positive scientific inquiry +into wrong channels. There was indeed nothing to prevent investigating +the mode of action of the supposed plastic or vital force by observation +and experiment; but the phrases gave currency and coherence to a false +abstraction and generalization, setting inquirers to look out for one +cause of complex phaenomena which undoubtedly depended on many. + +According to M. Comte, chemistry entered into the positive stage with +Lavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent +treatise he places the date a generation earlier); and biology at the +beginning of the present, when Bichat drew the fundamental distinction +between nutritive or vegetative and properly animal life, and referred +the properties of organs to the general laws of the component tissues. +The most complex of all sciences, the Social, had not, he maintained, +become positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and +barren contest between the theological and the metaphysical modes of +thought. To make this highest of the sciences positive, and thereby +complete the positive character of all human speculations, was the +principal aim of his labours, and he believed himself to have +accomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term +Positive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by M. Comte in +the same meaning. There never can have been a period in any science when +it was not in some degree positive, since it always professed to draw +conclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been +the last to deny that previous to his own speculations, the world +possessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social +subjects, the evidence of which was obtained by inductive or deductive +processes from observed sequences of phaenomena. Nor could it be denied +that the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the highest +mental capacity had employed their powers, had accepted as thoroughly +the positive point of view, and rejected the theological and +metaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. Montesquieu; even +Macchiavelli; Adam Smith and the political economists universally, both +in France and in England; Bentham, and all thinkers initiated by +him,--had a full conviction that social phaenomena conform to invariable +laws, the discovery and illustration of which was their great object as +speculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that those philosophers +did not get so far as M. Comte in discovering the methods best adapted +to bring these laws to light. It was not, therefore, reserved for M. +Comte to make sociological inquiries positive. But what he really meant +by making a science positive, is what we will call, with M. Littré, +giving it its final scientific constitution; in other words, discovering +or proving, and pursuing to their consequences, those of its truths +which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which +are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the +elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add +(though M. Comte did not) what the laws of association are to +psychology. This is an operation which, when accomplished, puts an end +to the empirical period, and enables the science to be conceived as a +co-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine. This is what had not yet +been done for sociology; and the hope of effecting it was, from his +early years, the prompter and incentive of all M. Comte's philosophic +labours. + +It was with a view to this that he undertook that wonderful +systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences, from +mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would +have stamped him, in all minds competent to appreciate it, as one of the +principal thinkers of the age. To make its nature intelligible to those +who are not acquainted with it, we must explain what we mean by the +philosophy of a science, as distinguished from the science itself. The +proper meaning of philosophy we take to be, what the ancients understood +by it--the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and +social being. Since his intellectual faculties include his knowing +faculty, the science of Man includes everything that man can know, so +far as regards his mode of knowing it: in other words, the whole +doctrine of the conditions of human knowledge. The philosophy of a +Science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its +results, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by +which the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognises them, and +the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest +clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availibility for +use: in one word, the logic of the science. M. Comte has accomplished +this for the first five of the fundamental sciences, with a success +which can hardly be too much admired. We never reopen even the least +admirable part of this survey, the volume on chemistry and biology +(which was behind the actual state of those sciences when first written, +and is far in the rear of them now), without a renewed sense of the +great reach of its speculations, and a conviction that the way to a +complete rationalizing of those sciences, still very imperfectly +conceived by most who cultivate them, has been shown nowhere so +successfully as there. + +Yet, for a correct appreciation of this great philosophical achievement, +we ought to take account of what has not been accomplished, as well as +of what has. Some of the chief deficiencies and infirmities of M. +Comte's system of thought will be found, as is usually the case, in +close connexion with its greatest successes. + +The philosophy of Science consists of two principal parts; the methods +of investigation, and the requisites of proof. The one points out the +roads by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions, the other the +mode of testing their evidence. The former if complete would be an +Organon of Discovery, the latter of Proof. It is to the first of these +that M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a +degree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything +comparable, in its kind, to his survey of the resources which the mind +has at its disposal for investigating the laws of phaenomena; the +circumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration +suitable or unsuitable to each class of phaenomena; the extensions and +transformations which the process of investigation has to undergo in +adapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the +especial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches +the method of positive inquiry, each science in its turn being the best +fitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These, and many +cognate subjects, such as the theory of Classification, and the proper +use of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness +of insight which leaves little to be desired. Not less admirable is his +survey of the most comprehensive truths that had been arrived at by each +science, considered as to their relation to the general sum of human +knowledge, and their logical value as aids to its further progress. But +after all this, there remains a further and distinct question. We are +taught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has +been reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves +that the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises, +whether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove +the conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte +throws no light. He supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he +neither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his +successors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is +real) nor proposes any other in lieu of it: and of induction he has no +canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any +general criterion by which to decide whether a given inductive inference +is correct or not. Yet he does not, with Dr Whewell, regard an inductive +theory as proved if it accounts for the facts: on the contrary, he sets +himself in the strongest opposition to those scientific hypotheses +which, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof, +and are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude for explaining +phenomena. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is +susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true +unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that +its falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He therefore needs a test +of inductive proof; and in assigning none, he seems to give up as +impracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the +beginning of his treatise he speaks of a doctrine of Method, apart from +particular applications, as conceivable, but not needful: method, +according to him, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the +logic of a science can only usefully be taught through the science +itself. Towards the end of the work, he assumes a more decidedly +negative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic +otherwise than in its applications as chimerical. He got on, in his +subsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part +of Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but +did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it. + +This hiatus in M. Comte's system is not unconnected with a defect in his +original conception of the subject matter of scientific investigation, +which has been generally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is +more apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that +he rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation, +true, for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as +distinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The +causes that he regards as inaccessible are causes which are not +themselves phaenomena. Like other people he admits the study of causes, +in every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another. +But he has an objection to the _word_ cause; he will only consent to +speak of Laws of Succession: and depriving himself of the use of a word +which has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses. He +sees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler's laws, and +such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real +distinction between the laws of succession and coexistence which +thinkers of a different school call Laws of Phaenomena, and those of +what they call the action of Causes: the former exemplified by the +succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation which +causes it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable +sequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to +the sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another; why? +Because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not +unconditionally so: those facts only succeed each other, provided that +the presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this +alternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfollowed +by one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, +the one unconditional, the other conditional on the first: laws of +causation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate +laws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale +of mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely, that every +phaenomenon has a phaenomenal cause; has some phaenomenon other than +itself, or some combination of phaenomena, on which it is invariably and +unconditionally consequent. It is on the universality of this law that +the possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general +proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when +the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been +correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be +inconsistent with the constancy of causation; with the universality of +the fact that the phaenomena of nature take place according to +invariable laws of succession.[9] It is probable, therefore, that M. +Comte's determined abstinence from the word and the idea of Cause, had +much to do with his inability to conceive an Inductive Logic, by +diverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be +founded. + +We are afraid it must also be said, though shown only by slight +indications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence +only in his later writings--that M. Comte, at bottom, was not so +solicitous about completeness of proof as becomes a positive +philosopher, and that the unimpeachable objectivity, as he would have +called it, of a conception--its exact correspondence to the realities of +outward fact--was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting +it, if it was subjectively useful, by affording facilities to the mind +for grouping phaenomena. This appears very curiously in his chapters on +the philosophy of Chemistry. He recommends, as a judicious use of "the +degree of liberty left to our intelligence by the end and purpose of +positive science," that we should accept as a convenient generalization +the doctrine that all chemical composition is between two elements only; +that every substance which our analysis decomposes, let us say into four +elements, has for its immediate constituents two hypothetical +substances, each compounded of two simpler ones. There would have been +nothing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed +tentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth may +be tested. With this for its destination, the conception, would have +been legitimate and philosophical; the more so, as, if confirmed, it +would have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances +which analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances +in the same proportions, differ in their general properties, as for +instance, sugar and gum.[10] And if, besides affording a reason for +difference between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a +reason for agreement between things which agree; if the intermediate +link by which the quaternary compound was resolved into two binary ones, +could have been so chosen as to bring each of them within the analogies +of some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose +possible, and which in some particular instances actually happens);[11] +the universality of binary composition would have been a successful +example of an hypothesis in anticipation of a positive theory, to give +a direction to inquiry which might end in its being either proved or +abandoned. But M. Comte evidently thought that even though it should +never be proved--however many cases of chemical composition might always +remain in which the theory was still as hypothetical as at first--so +long as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the +nature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be +retained, for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of +phaenomena under a general conception. In a _résumé_ of the general +principles of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, +in express terms, an unlimited license of adopting "without any vain +scruple" hypothetical conceptions of this sort; "in order to satisfy, +within proper limits, our just mental inclinations, which always turn, +with an instinctive predilection, towards simplicity, continuity, and +generality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of +external laws in so far as accessible to us" (vi. 639). "The most +philosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws +as destined to represent the external world so as to give as much +satisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is +consistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate of +our practical wants" (vi. 642). Among these "essential inclinations" he +includes not only our "instinctive predilection for order and harmony," +which makes us relish any conception, even fictitious, that helps to +reduce phaenomena to system; but even our feelings of taste, "les +convenances purement esthétiques," which, he says, have a legitimate +part in the employment of the "genre de liberté" resté facultatif pour +notre intelligence." After the due satisfaction of our "most eminent +mental inclinations," there will still remain "a considerable margin of +indeterminateness, which should be made use of to give a direct +gratification to our _besoin_ of ideality, by embellishing our +scientific thoughts, without injury to their essential reality" (vi. +647). In consistency with all this, M. Comte warns thinkers against too +severe a scrutiny of the exact truth of scientific laws, and stamps with +"severe reprobation" those who break down "by too minute an +investigation" generalizations already made, without being able to +substitute others (vi. 639): as in the case of Lavoisier's general +theory of chemistry, which would have made that science more +satisfactory than at present to "the instinctive inclinations of our +intelligence" if it had turned out true, but unhappily it did not. These +mental dispositions in M. Comte account for his not having found or +sought a logical criterion of proof; but they are scarcely consistent +with his inveterate hostility to the hypothesis of the luminiferous +ether, which certainly gratifies our "predilection for order and +harmony," not to say our "besoin d'idéalite", in no ordinary degree. +This notion of the "destination" of the study of natural laws is to our +minds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the +Positive conception of science; and contained the germ of the perversion +of his own philosophy which marked his later years. It might be +interesting, but scarcely worth while, to attempt to penetrate to the +just thought which misled M. Comte, for there is almost always a grain +of truth in the errors of an original and powerful mind. There is +another grave aberration in M. Comte's view of the method of positive +science, which though not more unphilosophical than the last mentioned, +is of greater practical importance. He rejects totally, as an invalid +process, psychological observation properly so called, or in other +words, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual +operations. He gives no place in his series of the science of +Psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental +phaenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions, +has a place in his scheme, under the head of Biology, but only as a +branch of physiology. Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks, +be acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other +people's mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without +having learnt what the signs mean by knowledge of ourselves, he does not +state. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the +feelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation. +Our intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot +observe ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning: and if we +could, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate its object, +by stopping the process observed. + +There is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting +which the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Two answers +may be given to it. In the first place, M. Comte might be referred to +experience, and to the writings of his countryman M. Cardaillac and our +own Sir William Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be +conscious of, but attend to, more than one, and even a considerable +number, of impressions at once.[12] It is true that attention is +weakened by being divided; and this forms a special difficulty in +psychological observation, as psychologists (Sir William Hamilton in +particular) have fully recognised; but a difficulty is not an +impossibility. Secondly, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact +may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of +our perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in +which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. +We reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when +its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these +ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies us +to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have +affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We +know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or +by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not +(like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their +results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. +Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe. + +And what Organon for the study of "the moral and intellectual functions" +does M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation which he +repudiates? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is Phrenology! Not, +indeed, he says, as a science formed, but as one still to be created; +for he rejects almost all the special organs imagined by phrenologists, +and accepts only their general division of the brain into the three +regions of the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect,[13] and +the subdivision of the latter region between the organs of meditation +and those of observation. Yet this mere first outline of an +apportionment of the mental functions among different organs, he regards +as extricating the mental study of man from the metaphysical stage, and +elevating it to the positive. The condition of mental science would be +sad indeed if this were its best chance of being positive; for the later +course of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to +confirm, but to discredit, the phrenological hypothesis. And even if +that hypothesis were true, psychological observation would still be +necessary; for how is it possible to ascertain the correspondence +between two things, by observation of only one of them? To establish a +relation between mental functions and cerebral conformations, requires +not only a parallel system of observations applied to each, but (as M. +Comte himself, with some inconsistency, acknowledges) an analysis of the +mental faculties, "des diverses facultés élémentaires," (iii. 573), +conducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the +proof of the theory would lie in the correspondence between the division +of the brain into organs and that of the mind into faculties, each shown +by separate evidence. To accomplish this analysis requires direct +psychological study carried to a high pitch of perfection; it being +necessary, among other things, to investigate the degree in which mental +character is created by circumstances, since no one supposes that +cerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing. The +phrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its necessary preparation +the whole of the Association psychology. Without, then, rejecting any +aid which study of the brain and nerves can afford to psychology (and it +has afforded, and will yet afford, much), we may affirm that M. Comte +has done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental +science. He refused to profit by the very valuable commencements made by +his predecessors, especially by Hartley, Brown, and James Mill (if +indeed any of those philosophers were known to him), and left the +psychological branch of the positive method, as well as psychology +itself, to be put in their true position as a part of Positive +Philosophy by successors who duly placed themselves at the twofold point +of view of physiology and psychology, Mr Bain and Mr Herbert Spencer. +This great mistake is not a mere hiatus in M. Comte's system, but the +parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science. He +is indeed very skilful in estimating the effect of circumstances in +moulding the general character of the human race; were he not, his +historical theory could be of little worth: but in appreciating the +influence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in +producing diversities of character, collective or individual, he is +sadly at fault. + +After this summary view of M. Comte's conception of Positive Philosophy, +it remains to give some account of his more special and equally +ambitious attempt to create the Science of Sociology, or, as he +expresses it, to elevate the study of social phaenomena to the positive +state. + +He regarded all who profess any political opinions as hitherto divided +between the adherents of the theological and those of the metaphysical +mode of thought: the former deducing all their doctrines from divine +ordinances, the latter from abstractions. This assertion, however, +cannot be intended in the same sense as when the terms are applied to +the sciences of inorganic nature; for it is impossible that acts +evidently proceeding from the human will could be ascribed to the agency +(at least immediate) of either divinities or abstractions. No one ever +regarded himself or his fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked +by a god, or as the abode of an entity which was the true author of what +the man himself appeared to do. True, it was believed that the gods, or +God, could move or change human wills, as well as control their +consequences, and prayers were offered to them accordingly, rather as +able to overrule the spontaneous course of things, than as at each +instant carrying it on. On the whole, however, the theological and +metaphysical conceptions, in their application to sociology, had +reference not to the production of phaenomena, but to the rule of duty, +and conduct in life. It is this which was based, either on a divine +will, or on abstract mental conceptions, which, by an illusion of the +rational faculty, were invested with objective validity. On the one +hand, the established rules of morality were everywhere referred to a +divine origin. In the majority of countries the entire civil and +criminal law was looked upon as revealed from above; and it is to the +petty military communities which escaped this delusion, that man is +indebted for being now a progressive being. The fundamental institutions +of the state were almost everywhere believed to have been divinely +established, and to be still, in a greater or less degree, of divine +authority. The divine right of certain lines of kings to rule, and even +to rule absolutely, was but lately the creed of the dominant party in +most countries of Europe; while the divine right of popes and bishops to +dictate men's beliefs (and not respecting the invisible world alone) is +still striving, though under considerable difficulties, to rule mankind. +When these opinions began to be out of date, a rival theory presented +itself to take their place. There were, in truth, many such theories, +and to some of them the term metaphysical, in M. Comte's sense, cannot +justly be applied. All theories in which the ultimate standard of +institutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and +observation and experience the guides (and some such there have been in +all periods of free speculation), are entitled to the name Positive, +whatever, in other respects, their imperfections may be. But these were +a small minority. M. Comte was right in affirming that the prevailing +schools of moral and political speculation, when not theological, have +been metaphysical. They affirmed that moral rules, and even political +institutions, were not means to an end, the general good, but +corollaries evolved from the conception of Natural Rights. This was +especially the case in all the countries in which the ideas of +publicists were the offspring of the Roman Law. The legislators of +opinion on these subjects, when not theologians, were lawyers: and the +Continental lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who followed the Greek +metaphysicians, in acknowledging as the ultimate source of right and +wrong in morals, and consequently in institutions, the imaginary law of +the imaginary being Nature. The first systematizers of morals in +Christian Europe, on any other than a purely theological basis, the +writers on International Law, reasoned wholly from these premises, and +transmitted them to a long line of successors. This mode of thought +reached its culmination in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as +powerful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for +directing the future. The complete victory which this philosophy gained, +in speculation, over the old doctrines, was temporarily followed by an +equally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, having +had, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its +tendencies, and showing what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously +as to determine a partial reaction to the doctrines of feudalism and +Catholicism. Between these and the political metaphysics (meta-politics +as Coleridge called it) of the Revolution, society has since oscillated; +raising up in the process a hybrid intermediate party, termed +Conservative, or the party of Order, which has no doctrines of its own, +but attempts to hold the scales even between the two others, borrowing +alternately the arguments of each, to use as weapons against whichever +of the two seems at the moment most likely to prevail. + +Such, reduced to a very condensed form, is M. Comte's version of the +state of European opinion on politics and society. An Englishman's +criticism would be, that it describes well enough the general division +of political opinion in France and the countries which follow her lead, +but not in England, or the communities of English origin: in all of +which, divine right died out with the Jacobites, and the law of nature +and natural rights have never been favourites even with the extreme +popular party, who preferred to rest their claims on the historical +traditions of their own country, and on maxims drawn from its law books, +and since they outgrew this standard, almost always base them on general +expediency. In England, the preference of one form of government to +another seldom turns on anything but the practical consequences which it +produces, or which are expected from it. M. Comte can point to little of +the nature of metaphysics in English politics, except "la métaphysique +constitutionnelle," a name he chooses to give to the conventional +fiction by which the occupant of the throne is supposed to be the source +from whence all power emanates, while nothing can be further from the +belief or intention of anybody than that such should really be the case. +Apart from this, which is a matter of forms and words, and has no +connexion with any belief except belief in the proprieties, the severest +criticism can find nothing either worse or better, in the modes of +thinking either of our conservative or of our liberal party, than a +particularly shallow and flimsy kind of positivism. The working classes +indeed, or some portion of them, perhaps still rest their claim to +universal suffrage on abstract right, in addition to more substantial +reasons, and thus far and no farther does metaphysics prevail in the +region of English politics. But politics is not the entire art of social +existence: ethics is a still deeper and more vital part of it: and in +that, as much in England as elsewhere, the current opinions are still +divided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical. +What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns supreme +wherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of +Bentham's philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of +ethical science? What else, indeed, is the whole _a priori_ philosophy, +in morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for +it does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of +observation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the +metaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of +erecting a mere creation of the mind into a test or _norma_ of external +truth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already +entertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies them. Of those +who still adhere to the old opinions we need not speak; but when one of +the most vigorous as well as boldest thinkers that English speculation +has yet produced, full of the true scientific spirit, Mr Herbert +Spencer, places in the front of his philosophy the doctrine that the +ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of +its negative; when, following in the steps of Mr Spencer, an able +expounder of positive philosophy like Mr Lewes, in his meritorious and +by no means superficial work on Aristotle, after laying, very justly, +the blame of almost every error of the ancient thinkers on their +neglecting to _verify_ their opinions, announces that there are two +kinds of verification, the Real and the Ideal, the ideal test of truth +being that its negative is unthinkable, and by the application of that +test judges that gravitation must be universal even in the stellar +regions, because in the absence of proof to the contrary, "the idea of +matter without gravity is unthinkable;"--when those from whom it was +least to be expected thus set up acquired necessities of thought in the +minds of one or two generations as evidence of real necessities in the +universe, we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still +rules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature, +and far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and +social being. + +But, while M. Comte is so far in the right, we often, as already +intimated, find him using the name metaphysical to denote certain +practical conclusions, instead of a particular kind of theoretical +premises. Whatever goes by the different names of the revolutionary, the +radical, the democratic, the liberal, the free-thinking, the sceptical, +or the negative and critical school or party in religion, politics, or +philosophy, all passes with him under the designation of metaphysical, +and whatever he has to say about it forms part of his description of the +metaphysical school of social science. He passes in review, one after +another, what he deems the leading doctrines of the revolutionary school +of politics, and dismisses them all as mere instruments of attack upon +the old social system, with no permanent validity as social truth. + +He assigns only this humble rank to the first of all the articles of the +liberal creed, "the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of +unlimited liberty of conscience." As far as this doctrine only means +that opinions, and their expression, should be exempt from _legal_ +restraint, either in the form of prevention or of penalty, M. Comte is a +firm adherent of it: but the _moral_ right of every human being, however +ill-prepared by the necessary instruction and discipline, to erect +himself into a judge of the most intricate as well as the most important +questions that can occupy the human intellect, he resolutely denies. +"There is no liberty of conscience," he said in an early work, "in +astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense +that every one would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the +principles established in those sciences by the competent persons. If it +is otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old +doctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there +are not properly, during the interval, any established opinions." When +first mankind outgrew the old doctrines, an appeal from doctors and +teachers to the outside public was inevitable and indispensable, since +without the toleration and encouragement of discussion and criticism +from all quarters, it would have been impossible for any new doctrines +to grow up. But in itself, the practice of carrying the questions which +more than all others require special knowledge and preparation, before +the incompetent tribunal of common opinion, is, he contends, radically +irrational, and will and ought to cease when once mankind have again +made up their minds to a system of doctrine. The prolongation of this +provisional state, producing an ever-increasing divergence of opinions, +is already, according to him, extremely dangerous, since it is only when +there is a tolerable unanimity respecting the rule of life, that a real +moral control can be established over the self-interest and passions of +individuals. Besides which, when every man is encouraged to believe +himself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he +cannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most +important public duties, and the baneful competition for power and +official functions spreads constantly downwards to a lower and lower +grade of intelligence. In M. Comte's opinion, the peculiarly complicated +nature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous +knowledge and intellectual discipline requisite for them, together with +the serious consequences that may be produced by even, temporary errors +on such subjects, render it necessary in the case of ethics and +politics, still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever +legal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of +mankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number +of minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough +and laborious mental preparation: and that the questioning of their +conclusions by any one, not of an equivalent grade of intellect and +instruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous, and more +blamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sciolists to refute the +Newtonian astronomy. All this is, in a sense, true: but we confess our +sympathy with those who feel towards it like the man in the story, who +being asked whether he admitted that six and five make eleven, refused +to give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it. The +doctrine is one of a class of truths which, unless completed by other +truths, are so liable to perversion, that we may fairly decline to take +notice of them except in connexion with some definite application. In +justice to M. Comte it should be said that he does not wish this +intellectual dominion to be exercised over an ignorant people. Par from +him is the thought of promoting the allegiance of the mass to scientific +authority by withholding from them scientific knowledge. He holds it the +duty of society to bestow on every one who grows up to manhood or +womanhood as complete a course of instruction in every department of +science, from mathematics to sociology, as can possibly be made general: +and his ideas of what is possible in that respect are carried to a +length to which few are prepared to follow him. There is something +startling, though, when closely looked into, not Utopian or chimerical, +in the amount of positive knowledge of the most varied kind which he +believes may, by good methods of teaching, be made the common +inheritance of all persons with ordinary faculties who are born into the +world: not the mere knowledge of results, to which, except for the +practical arts, he attaches only secondary value, but knowledge also of +the mode in which those results were attained, and the evidence on which +they rest, so far as it can be known and understood by those who do not +devote their lives to its study. + +We have stated thus fully M. Comte's opinion on the most fundamental +doctrine of liberalism, because it is the clue to much of his general +conception of politics. If his object had only been to exemplify by that +doctrine the purely negative character of the principal liberal and +revolutionary schools of thought, he need not have gone so far: it would +have been enough to say, that the mere liberty to hold and express any +creed, cannot itself _be_ that creed. Every one is free to believe and +publish that two and two make ten, but the important thing is to know +that they make four. M. Comte has no difficulty in making out an equally +strong case against the other principal tenets of what he calls the +revolutionary school; since all that they generally amount to is, that +something ought not to be: which cannot possibly be the whole truth, and +which M. Comte, in general, will not admit to be even part of it. Take +for instance the doctrine which denies to governments any initiative in +social progress, restricting them to the function of preserving order, +or in other words keeping the peace: an opinion which, so far as +grounded on so-called rights of the individual, he justly regards as +purely metaphysical; but does not recognise that it is also widely held +as an inference from the laws of human nature and human affairs, and +therefore, whether true or false, as a Positive doctrine. Believing with +M. Comte that there are no absolute truths in the political art, nor +indeed in any art whatever, we agree with him that the _laisser faire_ +doctrine, stated without large qualifications, is both unpractical and +unscientific; but it does not follow that those who assert it are not, +nineteen times out of twenty, practically nearer the truth than those +who deny it. The doctrine of Equality meets no better fate at M. Comte's +hands. He regards it as the erection into an absolute dogma of a mere +protest against the inequalities which came down from the middle ages, +and answer no legitimate end in modern society. He observes, that +mankind in a normal state, having to act together, are necessarily, in +practice, organized and classed with some reference to their unequal +aptitudes, natural or acquired, which demand that some should be under +the direction of others: scrupulous regard being at the same time had to +the fulfilment towards all, of "the claims rightfully inherent in the +dignity of a human being; the aggregate of which, still very +insufficiently appreciated, will constitute more and more the principle +of universal morality as applied to daily use... a grand moral +obligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition of +slavery" (iv. 51). There is not a word to be said against these +doctrines: but the practical question is one which M. Comte never even +entertains--viz., when, after being properly educated, people are left +to find their places for themselves, do they not spontaneously class +themselves in a manner much more conformable to their unequal or +dissimilar aptitudes, than governments or social institutions are likely +to do it for them? The Sovereignty of the People, again,--that +metaphysical axiom which in France and the rest of the Continent has so +long been the theoretic basis of radical and democratic politics,--he +regards as of a purely negative character, signifying the right of the +people to rid themselves by insurrection of a social order that has +become oppressive; but, when erected into a positive principle of +government, which condemns indefinitely all superiors to "an arbitrary +dependence upon the multitude of their inferiors," he considers it as a +sort of "transportation to peoples of the divine right so much +reproached to kings" (iv. 55, 56). On the doctrine as a metaphysical +dogma or an absolute principle, this criticism is just; but there is +also a Positive doctrine, without any pretension to being absolute, +which claims the direct participation of the governed in their own +government, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends, +under the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose. +The general result of M. Comte's criticism on the revolutionary +philosophy, is that he deems it not only incapable of aiding the +necessary reorganization of society, but a serious impediment thereto, +by setting up, on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation +of authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and +the solution of all problems: the extreme point of this aberration being +reached by Rousseau and his followers, when they extolled the savage +state, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more +or less marked and complete. + +The state of sociological speculation being such as has been +described--divided between a feudal and theological school, now effete, +and a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the +destruction of the former; the problem, how to render the social science +positive, must naturally have presented itself, more or less distinctly, +to superior minds. M. Comte examines and criticises, for the most part +justly, some of the principal efforts which have been made by individual +thinkers for this purpose. But the weak side of his philosophy comes out +prominently in his strictures on the only systematic attempt yet made by +any body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social +phenomena generally, but of one great class or division of them. We +mean, of course, political economy, which (with a reservation in favour +of the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for +science) he deems unscientific, unpositive, and a mere branch of +metaphysics, that comprehensive category of condemnation in which he +places all attempts at positive science which are not in his opinion +directed by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with the +writings of political economists need only read his few pages of +animadversions on them (iv. 193 to 205), to learn how extremely +superficial M. Comte can sometimes be. He affirms that they have added +nothing really new to the original _aperçus_ of Adam Smith; when every +one who has read them knows that they have added so much as to have +changed the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying and clearing +up in the most essential points the _aperçus_ themselves. He lays an +almost puerile stress, for the purpose of disparagement, on the +discussions about the meaning of words which are found in the best books +on political economy, as if such discussions were not an indispensable +accompaniment of the progress of thought, and abundant in the history of +every physical science. On the whole question he has but one remark of +any value, and that he misapplies; namely, that the study of the +conditions of national wealth as a detached subject is unphilosophical, +because, all the different aspects of social phaenomena acting and +reacting on one another, they cannot be rightly understood apart: which +by no means proves that the material and industrial phaenomena of +society are not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful +generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be +relative to a given form of civilization and a given stage of social +advancement. This, we apprehend, is what no political economist would +deny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values, +prices, and the like, set down in their treatises, would be strictly +true, or many of them true at all, in the savage state (for example), or +in a community composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with +good reason, that whoever understands the political economy of a country +with the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe, +can deduce without difficulty the political economy of any other state +of society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally +well acquainted.[14] We do not pretend that political economy has never +been prosecuted or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is +cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it narrow conclusions. +If a political economist is deficient in general knowledge, he will +exaggerate the importance and universality of the limited class of +truths which he knows. All kinds of scientific men are liable to this +imputation, and M. Comte is never weary of urging it against them; +reproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their +thoughts, their incapacity for large views, and the stupidity of those +they occasionally attempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects. +Political economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other +classes of positive inquirers, but less than most. The principal error +of narrowness with which they are frequently chargeable, is that of +regarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of +mankind, as of universal validity; mistaking temporary or local phases +of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the +wonderful pliability of the human mind; deeming it impossible, in spite +of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a +different type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or +even, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this +narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that +a person is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing +else. + +Thus far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist, only in his +critical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor--the +author of a sociological system. The first question is that of the +Method proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive. + +The Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the +same as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of +experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its +mode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity. In +general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary +facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are +thought out deductively: specific observation of complex phaenomena +yields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function +is to verify the laws obtained by deduction. This mode of philosophizing +is not adequate to the exigencies of sociological investigation. In +social phaemomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the +laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the +results of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phaenomena of man +in society result from his nature as an individual being, it might be +thought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science +must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the +facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been +the conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured +to render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte +considers this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal +laws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think, +rather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human +progress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical +records. But as society proceeds in its development, its phaenomena are +determined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal +human nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over +the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature +the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but +historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by +human society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable +any one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a +world such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human +agency, to predict and calculate the phaenomena of his development such +as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically +considered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study +of history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible +conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been +otherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive +whole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of +development: though history alone cannot prove this to be a necessary +law, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins +the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the +social science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data +of sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the +deductive physical sciences: for while, in these, specific experience +commonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it +is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which +verifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical +evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if +(to use M. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any +very decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it +supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the +desires, or the disinterested desires over the personal; we may know +that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On +the other hand, if laws of social phaenomena, empirically generalized +from history, can when once suggested be affiliated to the known laws of +human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and +changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of +man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical +generalizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a +science. + +Much has been said and written for centuries past, by the practical or +empirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on +principles of human nature, without an historical basis; and the +theorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated on the +practicalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had +penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of +historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the +true footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself +able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as +a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of +the age; while the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for +parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single +instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal +a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited. + +The inversion of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction +is not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper +to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The +common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The +method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There +is no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding +from the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever +point is most open to our observation. In the phaenomena of the social +state, the collective phaenomenon is more accessible to us than the +parts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true +of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and +it is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The +state of every part of the social whole at any time, is intimately +connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious +belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, +commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on +one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in +one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded +or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to +another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a +single impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can +therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even +be detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood +except by examining them in the _ensemble_. In constructing, therefore, +a theory of society, all the different aspects of the social +organization must be taken into consideration at once. + +Our space is not consistent with inquiring into all the limitations of +this doctrine. It requires many of which M. Comte's theory takes no +account. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice +familiar to students of science, especially of the applications of +mathematics to the study of nature. When an effect depends on several +variable conditions, some of which change less, or more slowly, than +others, we are often able to determine, either by reasoning or by +experiment, what would be the law of variation of the effect if its +changes depended only on some of the conditions, the remainder being +supposed constant. The law so found will be sufficiently near the truth +for all times and places in which the latter set of conditions do not +vary greatly, and will be a basis to set out from when it becomes +necessary to allow for the variations of those conditions also. Most of +the conclusions of social science applicable to practical use are of +this description. M. Comte's system makes no room for them. We have seen +how he deals with the part of them which are the most scientific in +character, the generalizations of political economy. + +There is one more point in the general philosophy of sociology requiring +notice. Social phaenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the +statical, and the dynamical; the phaenomena of equilibrium, and those of +motion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, +considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to +the progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that +of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the +conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics +studies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the +_consensus,_ or interdependence of social phaenomena. The second is the +theory of their filiation. + +The first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more +summary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the +weakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself +to have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,[15] unless +his revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so +considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in +which even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite, while in +our judgment far from being always true. + +He begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which +make social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the +society of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively, for its own +sake, and not out of regard to the advantages it procures for him, +which, in many conditions of humanity, must appear to him very +problematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of +natural benevolence. On the other hand, these social propensities are by +nature weaker than his selfish ones; and the social state, being mainly +kept in existence through the former, involves an habitual antagonism +between the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely +organic upwards, can only be satisfied by means of labour, nor does +bodily labour suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labour, +especially when prolonged and monotonous, is naturally hateful, and +mental labour the most irksome of all; and hence a second antagonism, +which must exist in all societies whatever. The character of the society +is principally determined by the degree in which the better incentive, +in each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In both the +points, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social +instincts may approximate much nearer to the strength of the personal +ones, though never entirely coming up to it; the aversion to labour in +general, and to intellectual labour in particular, may be much weakened, +and the predominance of the inclinations over the reason greatly +diminished, though never completely destroyed. The spirit of improvement +results from the increasing strength of the social instincts, combined +with the growth of an intellectual activity, which guiding the personal +propensities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to +improve his condition. The personal instincts left to their own +guidance, and the indolence and apathy natural to mankind, are the +sources which mainly feed the spirit of Conservation. The struggle +between the two spirits is an universal incident of the social state. + +The next of the universal elements in human society is family life; +which M. Comte regards as originally the sole, and always the principal, +source of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in +general, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and +conduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. M. Comte takes +this opportunity of declaring his opinions on the proper constitution of +the family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of +the most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to +the popular Christian, but to the Catholic view of marriage in its +utmost strictness, and rebukes Protestant nations for having tampered +with the indissolubility of the engagement, by permitting divorce. He +admits that the marriage institution has been, in various respects, +beneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not +yet have reached the last of these modifications; but strenuously +maintains that such changes cannot possibly affect what he regards as +the essential principles of the institution--the irrevocability of the +engagement, and the complete subordination of the wife to the husband, +and of women generally to men; which are precisely the great vulnerable +points of the existing constitution of society on this important +subject. It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but the +incidents of his life which have been made public by his biographers +afford an explanation of one of these two opinions: he had quarrelled +with his wife.[16] At a later period, under the influence of +circumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting +women were very much modified, without becoming more rational: in his +final scheme of society, instead of being treated as grown children, +they were exalted into goddesses: honours, privileges, and immunities, +were lavished on them, only not simple justice. On the other question, +the irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for +impartiality, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his +personal convenience: but we can give him no other credit, for his +argument is not only futile but refutes itself. He says that with +liberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of +experiments and failures; and in the same breath congratulates himself +on the fact, that modern manners and sentiments have in the main +prevented the baneful effects which the toleration of divorce in +Protestant countries might have been expected to produce. He did not +perceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted +what he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage law, it must be +because modern habits and feelings are inconsistent with the perpetual +series of new trials which he dreaded. If there are tendencies in human +nature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand +fixity, in matters which touch the daily sources of happiness; and one +who had studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that +ever since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural, +the latter tendencies have been always gaining ground on the former. All +experience testifies that regularity in domestic relations is almost in +direct proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military +life with its long intervals of idleness, are the conditions to which, +either sexual profligacy, or prolonged vagaries of imagination on that +subject, are congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too +much other occupation for their thoughts: they require that home should +be a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and +disturbance. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has +passed, there is no probability that marriages would often be contracted +without a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent. +That this has been the case hitherto in countries where divorce was +permitted, we have on M. Comte's own showing: and everything leads us to +believe that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in general be used +only for its legitimate purpose--for enabling those who, by a blameless +or excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic +happiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests +concerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favourable +auspices, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social +questions would evidently be incompatible with the nature and limits of +the present paper. + +Lastly, a phaenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly +assuming a wider extension as they advance in their progress, is the +co-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments +and interchange of commodities and services; a communion which extends +to nations as well as individuals. The economic importance of this +spontaneous organization of mankind as joint workers with and for one +another, has often been illustrated. Its moral effects, in connecting +them by their interests, and as a more remote consequence, by their +sympathies, are equally salutary. But there are some things to be said +on the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments; the +division of mankind into innumerable small fractions, each engrossed by +an extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without +inconveniences, as well moral as intellectual, which, if they could not +be remedied, would be a serious abatement from the benefits of advanced +civilization. The interests of the whole--the bearings of things on the +ends of the social union--are less and less present to the minds of men +who have so contracted a sphere of activity. The insignificant detail +which forms their whole occupation--the infinitely minute wheel they +help to turn in the machinery of society--does not arouse or gratify any +feeling of public spirit, or unity with their fellow-men. Their work is +a mere tribute to physical necessity, not the glad performance of a +social office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labour +tells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of +the rest. A man's mind is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards +the great ends of humanity as miserably stunted, by giving all his +thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a +few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of +pins. The "dispersive speciality" of the present race of scientific men, +who, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged +views, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of +mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit, is dwelt on by M. +Comte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one +which most retards moral and intellectual regeneration. To contend +against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the +forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and +liberal general education, preparatory to all special pursuits: and this +is M. Comte's opinion: but the education of youth is not in his +estimation enough: he requires an agency set apart for obtruding upon +all classes of persons through the whole of life, the paramount claims +of the general interest, and the comprehensive ideas that demonstrate +the mode in which human actions promote or impair it. In other words, +he demands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of +guiding men's opinions and enlightening and warning their consciences; +a Spiritual Power, whose judgments on all matters of high moment should +deserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is +paid to the united judgment of astronomers in matters astronomical. The +very idea of such an authority implies that an unanimity has been +attained, at least in essentials, among moral and political thinkers, +corresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other +sciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of +positive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as +they have been applied to the study of physical science: to this, +however, there is no real obstacle; and when once it is accomplished, +the same degree of accordance will naturally follow. The undisputed +authority which astronomers possess in astronomy, will be possessed on +the great social questions by Positive Philosophers; to whom will belong +the spiritual government of society, subject to two conditions: that +they be entirely independent, within their own sphere, of the temporal +government, and that they be peremptorily excluded from all share in it, +receiving instead the entire conduct of education. + +This is the leading feature in M. Comte's conception of a regenerated +society; and however much this ideal differs from that which is implied +more or less confusedly in the negative philosophy of the last three +centuries, we hold the amount of truth in the two to be about the same. +M. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or +revolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other +does not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it +which to the other appear mischievously absurd. It is, without doubt, +the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on +the authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which +they relate. The wisest can act on no other rule, on subjects with which +they are not themselves thoroughly conversant; and the mass of mankind +have always done the like on all the great subjects of thought and +conduct, acting with implicit confidence on opinions of which they did +not know, and were often incapable of understanding, the grounds, but on +which as long as their natural guides were unanimous they fully relied, +growing uncertain and sceptical only when these became divided, and +teachers who as far as they could judge were equally competent, +professed contradictory opinions. Any doctrines which come recommended +by the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt +continue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving +by the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion of +scientific education among the whole people, demanded by M. Comte, their +faith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be +the blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent +deference of those who know much, to those who know still more. It is +those who have some knowledge of astronomy, not those who have none at +all, who best appreciate how prodigiously more Lagrange or Laplace knew +than themselves. This is what can be said in favour of M. Comte. On the +contrary side it is to be said, that in order that this salutary +ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent +thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and +organized. The ascendancy will come of itself when the unanimity is +attained, without which it is neither desirable nor possible. It is +because astronomers agree in their teaching that astronomy is trusted, +and not because there is an Academy of Sciences or a Royal Society +issuing decrees or passing resolutions. A constituted moral authority +can only be required when the object is not merely to promulgate and +diffuse principles of conduct, but to direct the detail of their +application; to declare and inculcate, not duties, but each person's +duty, as was attempted by the spiritual authority of the middle ages. +From this extreme application of his principle M. Comte does not shrink. +A function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged +by individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted to any +organized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism. +This however is what M. Comte really contemplated, though it would +practically nullify that peremptory separation of the spiritual from the +temporal power, which he justly deemed essential to a wholesome state of +society. Those whom an irresistible public opinion invested with the +right to dictate or control the acts of rulers, though without the means +of backing their advice by force, would have all the real power of the +temporal authorities, without their labours or their responsibilities. +M. Comte would probably have answered that the temporal rulers, having +the whole legal power in their hands, would certainly not pay to the +spiritual authority more than a very limited obedience: which amounts to +saying that the ideal form of society which he sets up, is only fit to +be an ideal because it cannot possibly be realized. + +That education should be practically directed by the philosophic class, +when there is a philosophic class who have made good their claim to the +place in opinion hitherto filled by the clergy, would be natural and +indispensable. But that all education should be in the hands of a +centralized authority, whether composed of clergy or of philosophers, +and be consequently all framed on the same model, and directed to the +perpetuation of the same type, is a state of things which instead of +becoming more acceptable, will assuredly be more repugnant to mankind, +with every step of their progress in the unfettered exercise of their +highest faculties. We shall see, in the Second Part, the evils with +which the conception of the new Spiritual Power is pregnant, coming out +into full bloom in the more complete development which M. Comte gave to +the idea in his later years. + +After this unsatisfactory attempt to trace the outline of Social +Statics, M. Comte passes to a topic on which he is much more at +home--the subject of his most eminent speculations; Social Dynamics, or +the laws of the evolution of human society. + +Two questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in +human affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves +them both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of +society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to +our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity +towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached +though incapable of being completely realized. This is the character and +tendency of human development, or of what is called civilization; and +the obligation of seconding this movement--of working in the direction +of it--is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to +a general principle or standard of morality. + +But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various +orders, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic, the question presents +itself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant +agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main +agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development. + +Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, +for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but +because it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength +alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can +draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot +act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the +speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, +in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual +conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it +is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, +and become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing one +another. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our +animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for +a long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our +intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more +and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are +the prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead, not by its own +strength, but because in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it +points out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least +resistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can +only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and +the necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human +society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, +which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which when provided, +directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. +And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has +always been the leading element in the history of mankind. + +This doctrine has been combated by Mr Herbert Spencer, in the pamphlet +already referred to; and we will quote, in his own words, the theory he +propounds in opposition to it:-- + +/# + "Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world; the world is governed + or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The + social mechanism does not rest finally upon opinions, but almost + wholly upon character. Not intellectual anarchy, but moral + antagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phaenomena + are produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs, of + which the emotions are mainly predetermined, while the beliefs are + mainly post-determined. Men's desires are chiefly inherited; but + their beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding + conditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on + the social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The + social state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the + ambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences, indignations, + sympathies, &c., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The + ideas current in this social state must, on the average, lie + congruous with the feelings of citizens, and therefore, on the + average, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas + wholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, and if + introduced from without, cannot get accepted--or, if accepted, die + out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their + acceptance ends. Hence, though advanced ideas, when once + established, act upon society and aid its further advance, yet the + establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society for + receiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social + state determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current + ideas determining the social state and the character. The + modification of men's moral natures, caused by the continuous + discipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to + social relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social + progress."[17] +#/ + +A great part of these statements would have been acknowledged as true by +M. Comte, and belong as much to his theory as to Mr Spencer's. The +re-action of all other mental and social elements upon the intellectual +not only is fully recognized by him, but his philosophy of history makes +great use of it, pointing out that the principal intellectual changes +could not have taken place unless changes in other elements of society +had preceded; but also showing that these were themselves consequences +of prior intellectual changes. It will not be found, on a fair +examination of what M. Comte has written, that he has overlooked any of +the truth that there is in Mr Spencer's theory. He would not indeed have +said (what Mr Spencer apparently wishes us to say) that the effects +which can be historically traced, for example to religion, were not +produced by the belief in God, but by reverence and fear of him. He +would have said that the reverence and fear presuppose the belief: that +a God must be believed in before he can be feared or reverenced. The +whole influence of the belief in a God upon society and civilization, +depends on the powerful human sentiments which are ready to attach +themselves to the belief; and yet the sentiments are only a social force +at all, through the definite direction given to them by that or some +other intellectual conviction; nor did the sentiments spontaneously +throw up the belief in a God, since in themselves they were equally +capable of gathering round some other object. Though it is true that +men's passions and interests often dictate their opinions, or rather +decide their choice among the two or three forms of opinion, which the +existing condition of human intelligence renders possible, this +disturbing cause is confined to morals, politics, and religion; and it +is the intellectual movement in other regions than these, which is at +the root of all the great changes in human affairs. It was not human +emotions and passions which discovered the motion of the earth, or +detected the evidence of its antiquity; which exploded Scholasticism, +and inaugurated the exploration of nature; which invented printing, +paper, and the mariner's compass. Yet the Reformation, the English and +French revolutions, and still greater moral and social changes yet to +come, are direct consequences of these and similar discoveries. Even +alchemy and astrology were not believed because people thirsted for gold +and were anxious to pry into the future, for these desires are as strong +now as they were then: but because alchemy and astrology were +conceptions natural to a particular stage in the growth of human +knowledge, and consequently determined during that stage the particular +means whereby the passions which always exist, sought their +gratification. To say that men's intellectual beliefs do not determine +their conduct, is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and +not by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the +steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch; +yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which +decide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go. + +Examining next what is the natural order of intellectual progress among +mankind, M. Comte observes, that as their general mode of conceiving the +universe must give its character to all their conceptions of detail, the +determining fact in their intellectual history must be the natural +succession of theories of the universe; which, it has been seen, +consists of three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the +positive. The passage of mankind through these stages, including the +successive modifications of the theological conception by the rising +influence of the other two, is, to M. Comte's mind, the most decisive +fact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously, however, there has +been going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely +temporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the +military mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen) +and its replacement by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there +is a necessary connexion and interdependence between this historical +sequence and the other: and he easily shows that the progress of +industry and that of positive science are correlative; man's power to +modify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has +acquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in +showing a natural connexion between the theological mode of thought and +the military system of society: but since they both belong to the same +age of the world--since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and +they are together modified and together undermined by the same cause, +the progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in +considering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind +emerge from them as a single evolution. + +These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of +social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a +connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large +volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a +sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest +achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects +more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass +of an essay like the present, to give even a faint conception of the +extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be +appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be +made a science, should suspend his judgment until he has read these +volumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change +his opinion; but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance. + +We shall not attempt the vain task of abridgment, a few words are all we +can give to the subject. M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of +human progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van, +and regarding as the successors of a people not their actual +descendants, but those who took up the thread of progress after them. +His object is to characterize truly, though generally, the successive +states of society through which the advanced guard of our species has +passed, and the filiation of these states on one another--how each grew +out of the preceding and was the parent of the following state. A more +detailed explanation, taking into account minute differences and more +special and local phaenomena, M. Comte does not aim at, though he does +not avoid it when it falls in his path. Here, as in all his other +speculations, we meet occasional misjudgments, and his historical +correctness in minor matters is now and then at fault; but we may well +wonder that it is not oftener so, considering the vastness of the field, +and a passage in one of his prefaces in which he says of himself that he +_rapidly_ amassed the materials for his great enterprise (vi. 34). This +expression in his mouth does not imply what it would in that of the +majority of men, regard being had to his rare capacity of prolonged and +concentrated mental labour: and it is wonderful that he so seldom gives +cause to wish that his collection of materials had been less "rapid." +But (as he himself remarks) in an inquiry of this sort the vulgarest +facts are the most important. A movement common to all mankind--to all +of them at least who do move--must depend on causes affecting them all; +and these, from the scale on which they operate, cannot require abstruse +research to bring them to light: they are not only seen, but best seen, +in the most obvious, most universal, and most undisputed phaenomena. +Accordingly M. Comte lays no claim to new views respecting the mere +facts of history; he takes them as he finds them, builds almost +exclusively on those concerning which there is no dispute, and only +tries what positive results can be obtained by combining them. Among +the vast mass of historical observations which he has grouped and +co-ordinated, if we have found any errors they are in things which do +not affect his main conclusions. The chain of causation by which he +connects the spiritual and temporal life of each era with one another +and with the entire series, will be found, we think, in all essentials, +irrefragable. When local or temporary disturbing causes have to be taken +into the account as modifying the general movement, criticism has more +to say. But this will only become important when the attempt is made to +write the history or delineate the character of some given society on M. +Comte's principles. + +Such doubtful statements, or misappreciations of states of society, as +we have remarked, are confined to cases which stand more or less apart +from the principal line of development of the progressive societies. For +instance, he makes greatly too much of what, with many other Continental +thinkers, he calls the Theocratic state. He regards this as a natural, +and at one time almost an universal, stage of social progress, though +admitting that it either never existed or speedily ceased in the two +ancient nations to which mankind are chiefly indebted for being +permanently progressive. We hold it doubtful if there ever existed what +M. Comte means by a theocracy. There was indeed no lack of societies in +which, the civil and penal law being supposed to have been divinely +revealed, the priests were its authorized interpreters. But this is the +case even in Mussulman countries, the extreme opposite of theocracy. By +a theocracy we understand to be meant, and we understand M. Comte to +mean, a society founded on caste, and in which the speculative, +necessarily identical with the priestly caste, has the temporal +government in its hands or under its control. We believe that no such +state of things ever existed in the societies commonly cited as +theocratic. There is no reason to think that in any of them, the king, +or chief of the government, was ever, unless by occasional usurpation, +a member of the priestly caste.[18] It was not so in Israel, even in the +time of the Judges; Jephtha, for example, was a Gileadite, of the tribe +of Manasseh, and a military captain, as all governors in such an age and +country needed to be. Priestly rulers only present themselves in two +anomalous cases, of which next to nothing is known: the Mikados of Japan +and the Grand Lamas of Thibet: in neither of which instances was the +general constitution of society one of caste, and in the latter of them +the priestly sovereignty is as nominal as it has become in the former. +India is the typical specimen of the institution of caste--the only case +in which we are certain that it ever really existed, for its existence +anywhere else is a matter of more or less probable inference in the +remote past. But in India, where the importance of the sacerdotal order +was greater than in any other recorded state of society, the king not +only was not a priest, but, consistently with the religious law, could +not be one: he belonged to a different caste. The Brahmins were invested +with an exalted character of sanctity, and an enormous amount of civil +privileges; the king was enjoined to have a council of Brahmin advisers; +but practically he took their advice or disregarded it exactly as he +pleased. As is observed by the historian who first threw the light of +reason on Hindoo society,[19] the king, though in dignity, to judge by +the written code, he seemed vastly inferior to the Brahmins, had always +the full power of a despotic monarch: the reason being that he had the +command of the army, and the control of the public revenue. There is no +case known to authentic history in which either of these belonged to the +sacerdotal caste. Even in the cases most favourable to them, the +priesthood had no voice in temporal affairs, except the "consultative" +voice which M. Comte's theory allows to every spiritual power. His +collection of materials must have been unusually "rapid" in this +instance, for he regards almost all the societies of antiquity, except +the Greek and Roman, as theocratic, even Gaul under the Druids, and +Persia under Darius; admitting, however, that in these two countries, +when they emerge into the light of history, the theocracy had already +been much broken down by military usurpation. By what evidence he could +have proved that it ever existed, we confess ourselves unable to divine. + +The only other imperfection worth noticing here, which we find in M. +Comte's view of history, is that he has a very insufficient +understanding of the peculiar phaenomena of English development; though +he recognizes, and on the whole correctly estimates, its exceptional +character in relation to the general European movement. His failure +consists chiefly in want of appreciation of Protestantism; which, like +almost all thinkers, even unbelievers, who have lived and thought +exclusively in a Catholic atmosphere, he sees and knows only on its +negative side, regarding the Reformation as a mere destructive movement, +stopped short in too early a stage. He does not seem to be aware that +Protestantism has any positive influences, other than the general ones +of Christianity; and misses one of the most important facts connected +with it, its remarkable efficacy, as contrasted with Catholicism, in +cultivating the intelligence and conscience of the individual believer. +Protestantism, when not merely professed but actually taken into the +mind, makes a demand on the intelligence; the mind is expected to be +active, not passive, in the reception of it. The feeling of a direct +responsibility of the individual immediately to God, is almost wholly +a creation of Protestantism. Even when Protestants were nearly as +persecuting as Catholics (quite as much so they never were); even when +they held as firmly as Catholics that salvation depended on having the +true belief, they still maintained that the belief was not to be +accepted from a priest, but to be sought and found by the believer, at +his eternal peril if he failed; and that no one could answer to God for +him, but that he had to answer for himself. The avoidance of fatal error +thus became in a great measure a question of culture; and there was the +strongest inducement to every believer, however humble, to seek culture +and to profit by it. In those Protestant countries, accordingly, whose +Churches were not, as the Church of England always was, principally +political institutions--in Scotland, for instance, and the New England +States--an amount of education was carried down to the poorest of the +people, of which there is no other example; every peasant expounded the +Bible to his family (many to their neighbours), and had a mind practised +in meditation and discussion on all the points of his religious creed. +The food may not have been the most nourishing, but we cannot be blind +to the sharpening and strengthening exercise which such great topics +gave to the understanding--the discipline in abstraction and reasoning +which such mental occupation brought down to the humblest layman, and +one of the consequences of which was the privilege long enjoyed by +Scotland of supplying the greater part of Europe with professors for its +universities, and educated and skilled workmen for its practical arts. + +This, however, notwithstanding its importance, is, in a comprehensive +view of universal history, only a matter of detail. We find no +fundamental errors in M. Comte's general conception of history. He is +singularly exempt from most of the twists and exaggerations which we are +used to find in almost all thinkers who meddle with speculations of this +character. Scarcely any of them is so free (for example) from the +opposite errors of ascribing too much or too little influence to +accident, and to the qualities of individuals. The vulgar mistake of +supposing that the course of history has no tendencies of its own, and +that great events usually proceed from small causes, or that kings, or +conquerors, or the founders of philosophies and religions, can do with +society what they please, no one has more completely avoided or more +tellingly exposed. But he is equally free from the error of those who +ascribe all to general causes, and imagine that neither casual +circumstances, nor governments by their acts, nor individuals of genius +by their thoughts, materially accelerate or retard human progress. This +is the mistake which pervades the instructive writings of the thinker +who in England and in our own times bore the nearest, though a very +remote, resemblance to M. Comte--the lamented Mr Buckle; who, had he not +been unhappily cut off in an early stage of his labours, and before the +complete maturity of his powers, would probably have thrown off an +error, the more to be regretted as it gives a colour to the prejudice +which regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as +identical with fatalism. Mr Buckle also fell into another mistake which +M. Comte avoided, that of regarding the intellectual as the only +progressive element in man, and the moral as too much the same at all +times to affect even the annual average of crime. M. Comte shows, on the +contrary, a most acute sense of the causes which elevate or lower the +general level of moral excellence; and deems intellectual progress in no +other way so beneficial as by creating a standard to guide the moral +sentiments of mankind, and a mode of bringing those sentiments +effectively to bear on conduct. + +M. Comte is equally free from the error of considering any practical +rule or doctrine that can be laid down in politics as universal and +absolute. All political truth he deems strictly relative, implying as +its correlative a given state or situation of society. This conviction +is now common to him with all thinkers who are on a level with the age, +and comes so naturally to any intelligent reader of history, that the +only wonder is how men could have been prevented from reaching it +sooner. It marks one of the principal differences between the political +philosophy of the present time and that of the past; but M. Comte +adopted it when the opposite mode of thinking was still general, and +there are few thinkers to whom the principle owes more in the way of +comment and illustration. + +Again, while he sets forth the historical succession of systems of +belief and forms of political society, and places in the strongest light +those imperfections in each which make it impossible that any of them +should be final, this does not make him for a moment unjust to the men +or the opinions of the past. He accords with generous recognition the +gratitude due to all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or +even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human +improvement. In all past modes of thought and forms of society he +acknowledged a useful, in many a necessary, office, in carrying mankind +through one stage of improvement into a higher. The theological spirit +in its successive forms, the metaphysical in its principal varieties, +are honoured by him for the services they rendered in bringing mankind +out of pristine savagery into a state in which more advanced modes of +belief became possible. His list of heroes and benefactors of mankind +includes, not only every important name in the scientific movement, from +Thales of Miletus to Fourier the mathematician and Blainville the +biologist, and in the aesthetic from Homer to Manzoni, but the most +illustrious names in the annals of the various religions and +philosophies, and the really great politicians in all states of +society.[20] Above all, he has the most profound admiration for the +services rendered by Christianity, and by the Church of the middle ages. +His estimate of the Catholic period is such as the majority of +Englishmen (from whom we take the liberty to differ) would deem +exaggerated, if not absurd. The great men of Christianity, from St Paul +to St Francis of Assisi, receive his warmest homage: nor does he forget +the greatness even of those who lived and thought in the centuries in +which the Catholic Church, having stopt short while the world had gone +on, had become a hindrance to progress instead of a promoter of it; such +men as Fénélon and St Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Joseph de Maistre. +A more comprehensive, and, in the primitive sense of the term, more +catholic, sympathy and reverence towards real worth, and every kind of +service to humanity, we have not met with in any thinker. Men who would +have torn each other in pieces, who even tried to do so, if each +usefully served in his own way the interests of mankind, are all +hallowed to him. + +Neither is his a cramped and contracted notion of human excellence, +which cares only for certain forms of development. He not only +personally appreciates, but rates high in moral value, the creations of +poets and artists in all departments, deeming them, by their mixed +appeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to +educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual +horizon of people of the world.[21] He regards the law of progress as +applicable, in spite of appearances, to poetry and art as much as to +science and politics. The common impression to the contrary he ascribes +solely to the fact, that the perfection of aesthetic creation requires +as its condition a consentaneousness in the feelings of mankind, which +depends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions: +while the last five centuries have been a period not of settling, but of +unsettling and decomposing, the most general beliefs and sentiments of +mankind. The numerous monuments of poetic and artistic genius which the +modern mind has produced even under this great disadvantage, are (he +maintains) sufficient proof what great productions it will be capable +of, when one harmonious vein of sentiment shall once more thrill through +the whole of society, as in the days of Homer, of Aeschylus, of Phidias, +and even of Dante. + +After so profound and comprehensive a view of the progress of human +society in the past, of which the future can only be a prolongation, it +is natural to ask, to what use does he put this survey as a basis of +practical recommendations? Such recommendations he certainly makes, +though, in the present Treatise, they are of a much less definite +character than in his later writings. But we miss a necessary link; +there is a break in the otherwise close concatenation of his +speculations. We fail to see any scientific connexion between his +theoretical explanation of the past progress of society, and his +proposals for future improvement. The proposals are not, as we might +expect, recommended as that towards which human society has been tending +and working through the whole of history. It is thus that thinkers have +usually proceeded, who formed theories for the future, grounded on +historical analysis of the past. Tocqueville, for example, and others, +finding, as they thought, through all history, a steady progress in the +direction of social and political equality, argued that to smooth this +transition, and make the best of what is certainly coming, is the proper +employment of political foresight. We do not find M. Comte supporting +his recommendations by a similar line of argument. They rest as +completely, each on its separate reasons of supposed utility, as with +philosophers who, like Bentham, theorize on politics without any +historical basis at all. The only bridge of connexion which leads from +his historical speculations to his practical conclusions, is the +inference, that since the old powers of society, both in the region of +thought and of action, are declining and destined to disappear, leaving +only the two rising powers, positive thinkers on the one hand, leaders +of industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these: +spiritual power to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of +historical forecast this is very deficient; for are there not the masses +as well as the leaders of industry? and is not theirs also a growing +power? Be this as it may, M. Comte's conceptions of the mode in which +these growing powers should be organized and used, are grounded on +anything rather than on history. And we cannot but remark a singular +anomaly in a thinker of M. Comte's calibre. After the ample evidence he +has brought forward of the slow growth of the sciences, all of which +except the mathematico-astronomical couple are still, as he justly +thinks, in a very early stage, it yet appears as if, to his mind, the +mere institution of a positive science of sociology were tantamount to +its completion; as if all the diversities of opinion on the subject, +which set mankind at variance, were solely owing to its having been +studied in the theological or the metaphysical manner, and as if when +the positive method which has raised up real sciences on other subjects +of knowledge, is similarly employed on this, divergence would at once +cease, and the entire body of positive social inquirers would exhibit +as much agreement in their doctrines as those who cultivate any of the +sciences of inorganic life. Happy would be the prospects of mankind if +this were so. A time such as M. Comte reckoned upon may come; unless +something stops the progress of human improvement, it is sure to come: +but after an unknown duration of hard thought and violent controversy. +The period of decomposition, which has lasted, on his own computation, +from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the present, is not yet +terminated: the shell of the old edifice will remain standing until +there is another ready to replace it; and the new synthesis is barely +begun, nor is even the preparatory analysis completely finished. On +other occasions M. Comte is very well aware that the Method of a science +is not the science itself, and that when the difficulty of discovering +the right processes has been overcome, there remains a still greater +difficulty, that of applying them. This, which is true of all sciences, +is truest of all in Sociology. The facts being more complicated, and +depending on a greater concurrence of forces, than in any other science, +the difficulty of treating them deductively is proportionally increased, +while the wide difference between any one case and every other in some +of the circumstances which affect the result, makes the pretence of +direct induction usually no better than empiricism. It is therefore, out +of all proportion, more uncertain than in any other science, whether two +inquirers equally competent and equally disinterested will take the same +view of the evidence, or arrive at the same conclusion. When to this +intrinsic difficulty is added the infinitely greater extent to which +personal or class interests and predilections interfere with impartial +judgment, the hope of such accordance of opinion among sociological +inquirers as would obtain, in mere deference to their authority, the +universal assent which M. Comte's scheme of society requires, must be +adjourned to an indefinite distance. + +M. Comte's own theory is an apt illustration of these difficulties, +since, though prepared for these speculations as no one had ever been +prepared before, his views of social regeneration even in the +rudimentary form in which they appear above-ground in this treatise (not +to speak of the singular system into which he afterwards enlarged them) +are such as perhaps no other person of equal knowledge and capacity +would agree in. Were those views as true as they are questionable, they +could not take effect until the unanimity among positive thinkers, to +which he looked forward, shall have been attained; since the mainspring +of his system is a Spiritual Power composed of positive philosophers, +which only the previous attainment of the unanimity in question could +call into existence. A few words will sufficiently express the outline +of his scheme. A corporation of philosophers, receiving a modest support +from the state, surrounded by reverence, but peremptorily excluded not +only from all political power or employment, but from all riches, and +all occupations except their own, are to have the entire direction of +education: together with, not only the right and duty of advising and +reproving all persons respecting both their public and their private +life, but also a control (whether authoritative or only moral is not +defined) over the speculative class itself, to prevent them from wasting +time and ingenuity on inquiries and speculations of no value to mankind +(among which he includes many now in high estimation), and compel them +to employ all their powers on the investigations which may be judged, at +the time, to be the most urgently important to the general welfare. The +temporal government which is to coexist with this spiritual authority, +consists of an aristocracy of capitalists, whose dignity and authority +are to be in the ratio of the degree of generality of their conceptions +and operations--bankers at the summit, merchants next, then +manufacturers, and agriculturists at the bottom of the scale. No +representative system, or other popular organization, by way of +counterpoise to this governing power, is ever contemplated. The checks +relied upon for preventing its abuse, are the counsels and remonstrances +of the Spiritual Power, and unlimited liberty of discussion and comment +by all classes of inferiors. Of the mode in which either set of +authorities should fulfil the office assigned to it, little is said in +this treatise: but the general idea is, while regulating as little as +possible by law, to make the pressure of opinion, directed by the +Spiritual Power, so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the +most powerful, as to render legal obligation, in as many cases as +possible, needless. Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals +form no part of the scheme. M. Comte looks on them with as great +jealousy as any scholastic pedagogue, or ecclesiastical director of +consciences. Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be +open to the public eye, and to be kept, by the power of opinion, in the +course which the Spiritual corporation shall judge to be the most right. + +This is not a sufficiently tempting picture to have much chance of +making converts rapidly, and the objections to the scheme are too +obvious to need stating. Indeed, it is only thoughtful persons to whom +it will be credible, that speculations leading to this result can +deserve the attention necessary for understanding them. We propose in +the next Essay to examine them as part of the elaborate and coherent +system of doctrine, which M. Comte afterwards put together for the +reconstruction of society. Meanwhile the reader will gather, from what +has been said, that M. Comte has not, in our opinion, created Sociology. +Except his analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but +which we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features, +superseded, he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to +be done over again, and better. Nevertheless, he has greatly advanced +the study. Besides the great stores of thought, of various and often of +eminent merit, with which he has enriched the subject, his conception of +its method is so much truer and more profound than that of any one who +preceded him, as to constitute an era in its cultivation. If it cannot +be said of him that he has created a science, it may be said truly that +he has, for the first time, made the creation possible. This is a great +achievement, and, with the extraordinary merit of his historical +analysis, and of his philosophy of the physical sciences, is enough to +immortalize his name. But his renown with posterity would probably have +been greater than it is now likely to be, if after showing the way in +which the social science should be formed, he had not flattered himself +that he had formed it, and that it was already sufficiently solid for +attempting to build upon its foundation the entire fabric of the +Political Art. + + + + * * * * * + + + +PART II. + +THE LATER SPECULATIONS OF M. COMTE.[22] + + +The appended list of publications contain the materials for knowing and +estimating what M. Comte termed his second career, in which the +_savant_, historian, and philosopher of his fundamental treatise, came +forth transfigured as the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity. They +include all his writings except the Cours de Philosophic Positive: for +his early productions, and the occasional publications of his later life, +are reprinted as Preludes or Appendices to the treatises here enumerated, +or in Dr Robinet's volume, which, as well as that of M. Littré, also +contains copious extracts from his correspondence. + +In the concluding pages of his great systematic work, M. Comte had +announced four other treatises as in contemplation: on Politics; on the +Philosophy of Mathematics; on Education, a project subsequently enlarged +to include the systematization of Morals; and on Industry, or the action +of man upon external nature. Our list comprises the only two of these +which he lived to execute. It further contains a brief exposition of his +final doctrines, in the form of a Dialogue, or, as he terms it, a +Catechism, of which a translation has been published by his principal +English adherent, Mr Congreve. There has also appeared very recently, +under the title of "A General View of Positivism," a translation by Dr +Bridges, of the Preliminary Discourse in six chapters, prefixed to the +Système de Politique Positive. The remaining three books on our list are +the productions of disciples in different degrees. M. Littré, the only +thinker of established reputation who accepts that character, is a +disciple only of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, and can see the weak +points even in that. Some of them he has discriminated and discussed +with great judgment: and the merits of his volume, both as a sketch of +M. Comte's life and an appreciation of his doctrines, would well deserve +a fuller notice than we are able to give it here. M. de Blignières is +a far more thorough adherent; so much so, that the reader of his +singularly well and attractively written condensation and popularization +of his master's doctrines, does not easily discover in what it falls +short of that unqualified acceptance which alone, it would seem, could +find favour with M. Comte. For he ended by casting off M. de Blignières, +as he had previously cast off M. Littré, and every other person who, +having gone with him a certain length, refused to follow him to the end. +The author of the last work in our enumeration, Dr Robinet, is a +disciple after M. Comte's own heart; one whom no difficulty stops, and +no absurdity startles. But it is far from our disposition to speak +otherwise than respectfully of Dr Robinet and the other earnest men, who +maintain round the tomb of their master an organized co-operation for +the diffusion of doctrines which they believe destined to regenerate the +human race. Their enthusiastic veneration for him, and devotion to the +ends he pursued, do honour alike to them and to their teacher, and are +an evidence of the personal ascendancy he exercised over those who +approached him; an ascendancy which for a time carried away even M. +Littré, as he confesses, to a length which his calmer judgment does not +now approve. + +These various writings raise many points of interest regarding M. +Comte's personal history, and some, not without philosophic bearings, +respecting his mental habits: from all which matters we shall abstain, +with the exception of two, which he himself proclaimed with great +emphasis, and a knowledge of which is almost indispensable to an +apprehension of the characteristic difference between his second career +and his first. It should be known that during his later life, and even +before completing his first great treatise, M. Comte adopted a rule, to +which he very rarely made any exception: to abstain systematically, not +only from newspapers or periodical publications, even scientific, but +from all reading whatever, except a few favourite poets in the ancient +and modern European languages. This abstinence he practised for the sake +of mental health; by way, as he said, of "_hygiène cérébrale_." We are +far from thinking that the practice has nothing whatever to recommend +it. For most thinkers, doubtless, it would be a very unwise one; but we +will not affirm that it may not sometimes be advantageous to a mind of +the peculiar quality of M. Comte's--one that can usefully devote itself +to following out to the remotest developments a particular line of +meditations, of so arduous a kind that the complete concentration of the +intellect upon its own thoughts is almost a necessary condition of +success. When a mind of this character has laboriously and +conscientiously laid in beforehand, as M. Comte had done, an ample stock +of materials, he may be justified in thinking that he will contribute +most to the mental wealth of mankind by occupying himself solely in +working upon these, without distracting his attention by continually +taking in more matter, or keeping a communication open with other +independent intellects. The practice, therefore, may be legitimate; but +no one should adopt it without being aware of what he loses by it. He +must resign the pretension of arriving at the whole truth on the +subject, whatever it be, of his meditations. That he should effect this, +even on a narrow subject, by the mere force of his own mind, building on +the foundations of his predecessors, without aid or correction from his +contemporaries, is simply impossible. He may do eminent service by +elaborating certain sides of the truth, but he must expect to find that +there are other sides which have wholly escaped his attention. However +great his powers, everything that he can do without the aid of incessant +remindings from other thinkers, is merely provisional, and will require +a thorough revision. He ought to be aware of this, and accept it with +his eyes open, regarding himself as a pioneer, not a constructor. If he +thinks that he can contribute most towards the elements of the final +synthesis by following out his own original thoughts as far as they will +go, leaving to other thinkers, or to himself at a subsequent time, the +business of adjusting them to the thoughts by which they ought to be +accompanied, he is right in doing so. But he deludes himself if he +imagines that any conclusions he can arrive at, while he practises M. +Comte's rule of _hygiène cérébrale_, can possibly be definitive. + +Neither is such a practice, in a hygienic point of view, free from the +gravest dangers to the philosopher's own mind. When once he has +persuaded himself that he can work out the final truth on any subject, +exclusively from his own sources, he is apt to lose all measure or +standard by which to be apprized when he is departing from common sense. +Living only with his own thoughts, he gradually forgets the aspect they +present to minds of a different mould from his own; he looks at his +conclusions only from the point of view which suggested them, and from +which they naturally appear perfect; and every consideration which from +other points of view might present itself, either as an objection or as +a necessary modification, is to him as if it did not exist. When his +merits come to be recognised and appreciated, and especially if he +obtains disciples, the intellectual infirmity soon becomes complicated +with a moral one. The natural result of the position is a gigantic +self-confidence, not to say self-conceit. That of M. Comte is colossal. +Except here and there in an entirely self-taught thinker, who has no +high standard with which to compare himself, we have met with nothing +approaching to it. As his thoughts grew more extravagant, his +self-confidence grew more outrageous. The height it ultimately attained +must be seen, in his writings, to be believed. + +The other circumstance of a personal nature which it is impossible not +to notice, because M. Comte is perpetually referring to it as the origin +of the great superiority which he ascribes to his later as compared with +his earlier speculations, is the "moral regeneration" which he underwent +from "une angélique influence" and "une incomparable passion privée." He +formed a passionate attachment to a lady whom he describes as uniting +everything which is morally with much that is intellectually admirable, +and his relation to whom, besides the direct influence of her character +upon his own, gave him an insight into the true sources of human +happiness, which changed his whole conception of life. This attachment, +which always remained pure, gave him but one year of passionate +enjoyment, the lady having been cut off by death at the end of that +short period; but the adoration of her memory survived, and became, as +we shall see, the type of his conception of the sympathetic culture +proper for all human beings. The change thus effected in his personal +character and sentiments, manifested itself at once in his speculations; +which, from having been only a philosophy, now aspired to become a +religion; and from having been as purely, and almost rudely, scientific +and intellectual, as was compatible with a character always enthusiastic +in its admirations and in its ardour for improvement, became from this +time what, for want of a better name, may be called sentimental; but +sentimental in a way of its own, very curious to contemplate. In +considering the system of religion, politics, and morals, which in his +later writings M. Comte constructed, it is not unimportant to bear in +mind the nature of the personal experience and inspiration to which he +himself constantly attributed this phasis of his philosophy. But as we +shall have much more to say against, than in favour of, the conclusions +to which he was in this manner conducted, it is right to declare that, +from the evidence of his writings, we really believe the moral influence +of Madame Clotilde de Vaux upon his character to have been of the +ennobling as well as softening character which he ascribes to it. Making +allowance for the effects of his exuberant growth in self-conceit, we +perceive almost as much improvement in his feelings, as deterioration in +his speculations, compared with those of the Philosophie Positive. Even +the speculations are, in some secondary aspects, improved through the +beneficial effect of the improved feelings; and might have been more so, +if, by a rare good fortune, the object of his attachment had been +qualified to exercise as improving an influence over him intellectually +as morally, and if he could have been contented with something less +ambitious than being the supreme moral legislator and religious pontiff +of the human race. + +When we say that M. Comte has erected his philosophy into a religion, +the word religion must not be understood in its ordinary sense. He made +no change in the purely negative attitude which he maintained towards +theology: his religion is without a God. In saying this, we have done +enough to induce nine-tenths of all readers, at least in our own +country, to avert their faces and close their ears. To have no religion, +though scandalous enough, is an idea they are partly used to: but to +have no God, and to talk of religion, is to their feelings at once an +absurdity and an impiety. Of the remaining tenth, a great proportion, +perhaps, will turn away from anything which calls itself by the name of +religion at all. Between the two, it is difficult to find an audience +who can be induced to listen to M. Comte without an insurmountable +prejudice. But, to be just to any opinion, it ought to be considered, +not exclusively from an opponent's point of view, but from that of the +mind which propounds it. Though conscious of being in an extremely small +minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief +in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, +an instructive and profitable object of contemplation. + +What, in truth, are the conditions necessary to constitute a religion? +There must be a creed, or conviction, claiming authority over the whole +of human life; a belief, or set of beliefs, deliberately adopted, +respecting human destiny and duty, to which the believer inwardly +acknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate. Moreover, +there must be a sentiment connected with this creed, or capable of being +invoked by it, sufficiently powerful to give it in fact, the authority +over human conduct to which it lays claim in theory. It is a great +advantage (though not absolutely indispensable) that this sentiment +should crystallize, as it were, round a concrete object; if possible a +really existing one, though, in all the more important cases, only +ideally present. Such an object Theism and Christianity offer to the +believer: but the condition may be fulfilled, if not in a manner +strictly equivalent, by another object. It has been said that whoever +believes in "the Infinite nature of Duty," even if he believe in nothing +else, is religious. M. Comte believes in what is meant by the infinite +nature of duty, but ho refers the obligations of duty, as well as all +sentiments of devotion, to a concrete object, at once ideal and real; +the Human Race, conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the +present, and the future. This great collective existence, this "Grand +Etre," as he terms it, though the feelings it can excite are necessarily +very different from those which direct themselves towards an ideally +perfect Being, has, as he forcibly urges, this advantage in respect to +us, that it really needs our services, which Omnipotence cannot, in any +genuine sense of the term, be supposed to do: and M. Comte says, that +assuming the existence of a Supreme Providence (which he is as far from +denying as from affirming), the best, and even the only, way in which we +can rightly worship or serve Him, is by doing our utmost to love and +serve that other Great Being, whose inferior Providence has bestowed on +us all the benefits that we owe to the labours and virtues of former +generations. It may not be consonant to usage to call this a religion; +but the term so applied has a meaning, and one which is not adequately +expressed by any other word. Candid persons of all creeds may be willing +to admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense +of duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other +sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that +person has a religion: and though everyone naturally prefers his own +religion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this +attachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our +fellow-creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and +conscience, be called an intrinsically bad one. Many, indeed, may be +unable to believe that this object is capable of gathering round it +feelings sufficiently strong: but this is exactly the point on which a +doubt can hardly remain in an intelligent reader of M. Comte: and we +join with him in contemning, as equally irrational and mean, the +conception of human nature as incapable of giving its love and devoting +its existence to any object which cannot afford in exchange an eternity +of personal enjoyment. + +The power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general +interest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as a motive +to conduct, many have perceived; but we know not if any one, before M. +Comte, realized so fully as he has done, all the majesty of which that +idea is susceptible. It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, +embraces the manifold present, and descends into the indefinite and +unforeseeable future, forming a collective Existence without assignable +beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is +deeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the +imposingness of all our highest conceptions. Of the vast unrolling web +of human life, the part best known to us is irrevocably past; this we +can no longer serve, but can still love: it comprises for most of us the +far greater number of those who have loved us, or from whom we have +received benefits, as well as the long series of those who, by their +labours and sacrifices for mankind, have deserved to be held in +everlasting and grateful remembrance. As M. Comte truly says, the +highest minds, even now, live in thought with the great dead, far more +than with the living; and, next to the dead, with those ideal human +beings yet to come, whom they are never destined to see. If we honour as +we ought those who have served mankind in the past, we shall feel that +we are also working for those benefactors by serving that to which their +lives were devoted. And when reflection, guided by history, has taught +us the intimacy of the connexion of every age of humanity with every +other, making us see in the earthly destiny of mankind the playing out +of a great drama, or the action of a prolonged epic, all the generations +of mankind become indissolubly united into a single image, combining all +the power over the mind of the idea of Posterity, with our best feelings +towards the living world which surrounds us, and towards the +predecessors who have made us what we are. That the ennobling power of +this grand conception may have its full efficacy, we should, with M. +Comte, regard the Grand Etre, Humanity, or Mankind, as composed, in the +past, solely of those who, in every age and variety of position, have +played their part worthily in life. It is only as thus restricted that +the aggregate of our species becomes an object deserving our veneration. +The unworthy members of it are best dismissed from our habitual +thoughts; and the imperfections which adhered through life, even to +those of the dead who deserve honourable remembrance, should be no +further borne in mind than is necessary not to falsify our conception of +facts. On the other hand, the Grand Etre in its completeness ought to +include not only all whom we venerate, but all sentient beings to which +we owe duties, and which have a claim on our attachment. M. Comte, +therefore, incorporates into the ideal object whose service is to be the +law of our life, not our own species exclusively, but, in a subordinate +degree, our humble auxiliaries, those animal races which enter into real +society with man, which attach themselves to him, and voluntarily +co-operate with him, like the noble dog who gives his life for his human +friend and benefactor. For this M. Comte has been subjected to unworthy +ridicule, but there is nothing truer or more honourable to him in the +whole body of his doctrines. The strong sense he always shows of the +worth of the inferior animals, and of the duties of mankind towards +them, is one of the very finest traits of his character. + +We, therefore, not only hold that M. Comte was justified in the attempt +to develope his philosophy into a religion, and had realized the +essential conditions of one, but that all other religions are made +better in proportion as, in their practical result, they are brought to +coincide with that which he aimed at constructing. But, unhappily, the +next thing we are obliged to do, is to charge him with making a complete +mistake at the very outset of his operations--with fundamentally +misconceiving the proper office of a rule of life. He committed the +error which is often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of +utilitarian moralists; he required that the test of conduct should also +be the exclusive motive to it. Because the good of the human race is the +ultimate standard of right and wrong, and because moral discipline +consists in cultivating the utmost possible repugnance to all conduct +injurious to the general good, M. Comte infers that the good of others +is the only inducement on which we should allow ourselves to act; and +that we should endeavour to starve the whole of the desires which point +to our personal satisfaction, by denying them all gratification not +strictly required by physical necessities. The golden rule of morality, +in M. Comte's religion, is to live for others, "vivre pour autrui." To +do as we would be done by, and to love our neighbour as ourself, are not +sufficient for him: they partake, he thinks, of the nature of personal +calculations. We should endeavour not to love ourselves at all. We shall +not succeed in it, but we should make the nearest approach to it +possible. Nothing less will satisfy him, as towards humanity, than the +sentiment which one of his favourite writers, Thomas à Kempis, addresses +to God: Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te. All education and +all moral discipline should have but one object, to make altruism (a +word of his own coming) predominate over egoism. If by this were only +meant that egoism is bound, and should be taught, always to give way to +the well-understood interests of enlarged altruism, no one who +acknowledges any morality at all would object to the proposition. +But M. Comte, taking his stand on the biological fact that organs are +strengthened by exercise and atrophied by disuse, and firmly convinced +that each of our elementary inclinations has its distinct cerebral +organ, thinks it the grand duty of life not only to strengthen the +social affections by constant habit and by referring all our actions to +them, but, as far as possible, to deaden the personal passions and +propensities by desuetude. Even the exercise of the intellect is +required to obey as an authoritative rule the dominion of the social +feelings over the intelligence (du coeur sur l'esprit). The physical and +other personal instincts are to be mortified far beyond the demands of +bodily health, which indeed the morality of the future is not to insist +much upon, for fear of encouraging "les calculs personnels." M. Comte +condemns only such austerities as, by diminishing the vigour of the +constitution, make us less capable of being useful to others. Any +indulgence, even in food, not necessary to health and strength, he +condemns as immoral. All gratifications except those of the affections, +are to be tolerated only as "inevitable infirmities." Novalis said of +Spinoza that he was a God-intoxicated man: M. Comte is a +morality-intoxicated man. Every question with him is one of morality, +and no motive but that of morality is permitted. + +The explanation of this we find in an original mental twist, very common +in French thinkers, and by which M. Comte was distinguished beyond them +all. He could not dispense with what he called "unity." It was for the +sake of Unity that a religion was, in his eyes, desirable. Not in the +mere sense of Unanimity, but in a far wider one. A religion must be +something by which to "systematize" human life. His definition of it, in +the "Catéchisme," is "the state of complete unity which distinguishes +our existence, at once personal and social, when all its parts, both +moral and physical, converge habitually to a common destination.... +Such a harmony, individual and collective, being incapable of complete +realization in an existence so complicated as ours, this definition of +religion characterizes the immovable type towards which tends more and +more the aggregate of human efforts. Our happiness and our merit consist +especially in approaching as near as possible to this unity, of which +the gradual increase constitutes the best measure of real improvement, +personal or social." To this theme he continually returns, and argues +that this unity or harmony among all the elements of our life is not +consistent with the predominance of the personal propensities, since +these drag us in different directions; it can only result from the +subordination of them all to the social icelings, which may be made to +act in a uniform direction by a common system of convictions, and which +differ from the personal inclinations in this, that we all naturally +encourage them in one another, while, on the contrary, social life is a +perpetual restraint upon the selfish propensities. + +The _fons errorum_ in M. Comte's later speculations is this inordinate +demand for "unity" and "systematization." This is the reason why it does +not suffice to him that all should be ready, in case of need, to +postpone their personal interests and inclinations to the requirements +of the general good: he demands that each should regard as vicious any +care at all for his personal interests, except as a means to the good of +others--should be ashamed of it, should strive to cure himself of it, +because his existence is not "systematized," is not in "complete unity," +as long as he cares for more than one thing. The strangest part of the +matter is, that this doctrine seems to M. Comte to be axiomatic. That +all perfection consists in unity, he apparently considers to be a maxim +which no sane man thinks of questioning. It never seems to enter into +his conceptions that any one could object _ab initio_, and ask, why this +universal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing? Why is it +necessary that all human life should point but to one object, and be +cultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the +fact that mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings, +obtain a greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the +rules and conditions required by the good of the rest, than when each +makes the good of the rest his only subject, and allows himself no +personal pleasures not indispensable to the preservation of his +faculties? The regimen of a blockaded town should be cheerfully +submitted to when high purposes require it, but is it the ideal +perfection of human existence? M. Comte sees none of these difficulties. +The only true happiness, he affirms, is in the exercise of the +affections. He had found it so for a whole year, which was enough to +enable him to get to the bottom of the question, and to judge whether he +could do without everything else. Of course the supposition was not to +be heard of that any other person could require, or be the better for, +what M. Comte did not value. "Unity" and "systematization" absolutely +demanded that all other people should model themselves after M. Comte. +It would never do to suppose that there could be more than one road to +human happiness, or more than one ingredient in it. + +The most prejudiced must admit that this religion without theology is +not chargeable with relaxation of moral restraints. On the contrary, it +prodigiously exaggerates them. It makes the same ethical mistake as the +theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the glory +of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive +that between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate +space, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons +should be bound, by other people's opinion, to do everything that they +would deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which +all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not +obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain +the pursuit of his personal objects within the limits consistent with +the essential interests of others. What those limits are, it is the +province of ethical science to determine; and to keep all individuals +and aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of +punishment and of moral blame. If in addition to fulfilling this +obligation, persons make the good of others a direct object of +disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent +personal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit +objects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this +conduct by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a +necessary condition is its spontaneity; since the notion of a happiness +for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is +really felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spontaneity by +no means excludes sympathetic encouragement; but the encouragement +should take the form of making self-devotion pleasant, not that of +making everything else painful. The object should be to stimulate +services to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the pursuit +of our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the +reproaches of other and of our own conscience. The proper office of +those sanctions is to enforce upon every one, the conduct necessary to +give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists +in not doing them harm, and not impeding them in anything which without +harming others does good to themselves. To this must of course be added, +that when we either expressly or tacitly undertake to do more, we are +bound to keep our promise. And inasmuch as every one, who avails himself +of the advantages of society, leads others to expect from him all such +positive good offices and disinterested services as the moral +improvement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he deserves +moral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that expectation. +Through this principle the domain of moral duty is always widening. +When what once was uncommon virtue becomes common virtue, it comes to be +numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding what has grown +common, remains simply meritorious. + +M. Comte is accustomed to draw most of his ideas of moral cultivation +from the discipline of the Catholic Church. Had he followed that +guidance in the present case, he would have been less wide of the mark. +For the distinction which we have drawn was fully recognized by the +sagacious and far-sighted men who created the Catholic ethics. It is +even one of the stock reproaches against Catholicism, that it has two +standards of morality, and does not make obligatory on all Christians +the highest rule of Christian perfection. It has one standard which, +faithfully acted up to, suffices for salvation, another and a higher +which when realized constitutes a saint. M. Comte, perhaps +unconsciously, for there is nothing that he would have been more +unlikely to do if he had been aware of it, has taken a leaf out of the +book of the despised Protestantism. Like the extreme Calvinists, he +requires that all believers shall be saints, and damns then (after his +own fashion) if they are not. + +Our conception of human life is different. We do not conceive life to be +so rich in enjoyments, that it can afford to forego the cultivation of +all those which address themselves to what M. Comte terms the egoistic +propensities. On the contrary, we believe that a sufficient +gratification of these, short of excess, but up to the measure which +renders the enjoyment greatest, is almost always favourable to the +benevolent affections. The moralization of the personal enjoyments we +deem to consist, not in reducing them to the smallest possible amount, +but in cultivating the habitual wish to share them with others, and with +all others, and scorning to desire anything for oneself which is +incapable of being so shared. There is only one passion or inclination +which is permanently incompatible with this condition--the love of +domination, or superiority, for its own sake; which implies, and is +grounded on, the equivalent depression of other people. As a rule of +conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be +attempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting +to do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this, +society, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more; for the +natural activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions, +will expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception of the moral +rule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard +there is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted +heroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement, +though not converted into an obligation. It is as much a part of our +scheme as of M. Comte's, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and +the subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute +moral duty, should be one of the chief aims of education, both +individual and collective. We even recognize the value, for this end, of +ascetic discipline, in the original Greek sense of the word. We think +with Dr Johnson, that he who has never denied himself anything which is +not wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself everything which +is so. We do not doubt that children and young persons will one day be +again systematically disciplined in self-mortification; that they will +be taught, as in antiquity, to control their appetites, to brave +dangers, and submit voluntarily to pain, as simple exercises in +education. Something has been lost as well as gained by no longer giving +to every citizen the training necessary for a soldier. Nor can any pains +taken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being +useful to others and to the world, by the practice, independently of +reward and of every personal consideration, of positive virtue beyond +the bounds of prescribed duty. No efforts should be spared to associate +the pupil's self-respect, and his desire of the respect of others, with +service rendered to Humanity; when possible, collectively, but at all +events, what is always possible, in the persons of its individual +members. There are many remarks and precepts in M. Comte's volumes, +which, as no less pertinent to our conception of morality than to his, +we fully accept. For example; without admitting that to make "calculs +personnels" is contrary to morality, we agree with him in the opinion, +that the principal hygienic precepts should be inculcated, not solely or +principally as maxims of prudence, but as a matter of duty to others, +since by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering to +our fellow-creatures the services to which they are entitled. As M. +Comte truly says, the prudential motive is by no means fully sufficient +for the purpose, even physicians often disregarding their own precepts. +The personal penalties of neglect of health are commonly distant, as +well as more or less uncertain, and require the additional and more +immediate sanction of moral responsibility. M. Comte, therefore, in this +instance, is, we conceive, right in principle; though we have not the +smallest doubt that he would have gone into extreme exaggeration in +practice, and would have wholly ignored the legitimate liberty of the +individual to judge for himself respecting his own bodily conditions, +with due relation to the sufficiency of his means of knowledge, and +taking the responsibility of the result. + +Connected with the same considerations is another idea of M. Comte, +which has great beauty and grandeur in it, and the realization of which, +within the bounds of possibility, would be a cultivation of the social +feelings on a most essential point. It is, that every person who lives +by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an +individual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary; +and his wages, of whatever sort, as not the remuneration or +purchase-money of his labour, which should be given freely, but as the +provision made by society to enable him to carry it on, and to replace +the materials and products which have been consumed in the process. M. +Comte observes, that in modern industry every one in fact works much +more for others than for himself, since his productions are to be +consumed by others, and it is only necessary that his thoughts and +imagination should adapt themselves to the real state of the fact. The +practical problem, however, is not quite so simple, for a strong sense +that he is working for others may lead to nothing better than feeling +himself necessary to them, and instead of freely giving his commodity, +may only encourage him to put a high price upon it. What M. Comte really +means is that we should regard working for the benefit of others as a +good in itself; that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for +the sake of remuneration, which cannot justly be claimed for doing what +we like: that the proper return for a service to society is the +gratitude of society: and that the moral claim of any one in regard to +the provision for his personal wants, is not a question of _quid pro +quo_ in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the circumstances +of society permit to be assigned to him, consistently with the just +claims of others. To this opinion we entirely subscribe. The rough +method of settling the labourer's share of the produce, the competition +of the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a +moral ideal. Its defence is, that civilization has not hitherto been +equal to organizing anything better than this first rude approach to an +equitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the present go less wrong +by leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it artificially +in any mode which has yet been tried. But in whatever manner that +question may ultimately be decided, the true moral and social idea of +Labour is in no way affected by it. Until labourers and employers +perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform +that of an army, industry will never be moralized, and military life +will remain, what, in spite of the anti-social character of its direct +object, it has hitherto been--the chief school of moral co-operation. + +Thus far of the general idea of M. Comte's ethics and religion. We must +now say something of the details. Here we approach the ludicrous side of +the subject: but we shall unfortunately have to relate other things far +more really ridiculous. + +There cannot be a religion without a _cultus._ We use this term for want +of any other, for its nearest equivalent, worship, suggests a different +order of ideas. We mean by it, a set of systematic observances, intended +to cultivate and maintain the religious sentiment. Though M. Comte +justly appreciates the superior efficacy of acts, in keeping up and +strengthening the feeling which prompts them, over any mode whatever of +mere expression, he takes pains to organize the latter also with great +minuteness. He provides an equivalent both for the private devotions, +and for the public ceremonies, of other faiths. The reader will be +surprised to learn, that the former consists of prayer. But prayer, as +understood by M. Comte, does not mean asking; it is a mere outpouring of +feeling; and for this view of it he claims the authority of the +Christian mystics. It is not to be addressed to the Grand Etre, to +collective Humanity; though he occasionally carries metaphor so far as +to style this a goddess. The honours to collective Humanity are reserved +for the public celebrations. Private adoration is to be addressed to it +in the persons of worthy individual representatives, who may be either +living or dead, but must in all cases be women; for women, being the +_sexe aimant_, represent the best attribute of humanity, that which +ought to regulate all human life, nor can Humanity possibly be +symbolized in any form but that of a woman. The objects of private +adoration are the mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing +severally the past, the present, and the future, and calling into active +exercise the three social sentiments, veneration, attachment, and +kindness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian +angels, "les vrais anges gardiens." If the last two have never existed, +or if, in the particular case, any of the three types is too faulty for +the office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by some other +type of womanly excellence, even by one merely historical. Be the object +living or dead, the adoration (as we understand it) is to be addressed +only to the idea. The prayer consists of two parts; a commemoration, +followed by an effusion. By a commemoration M. Comte means an effort of +memory and imagination, summoning up with the utmost possible vividness +the image of the object: and every artifice is exhausted to render the +image as life-like, as close to the reality, as near an approach to +actual hallucination, as is consistent with sanity. This degree of +intensity having been, as far as practicable, attained, the effusion +follows. Every person should compose his own form of prayer, which +should be repeated not mentally only, but orally, and may be added +to or varied for sufficient cause, but never arbitrarily. It may be +interspersed with passages from the best poets, when they present +themselves spontaneously, as giving a felicitous expression to the +adorer's own feeling. These observances M. Comte practised to the memory +of his Clotilde, and he enjoins them on all true believers. They are to +occupy two hours of every day, divided into three parts; at rising, in +the middle of the working hours, and in bed at night. The first, which +should be in a kneeling attitude, will commonly be the longest, and the +second the shortest. The third is to be extended as nearly as possible +to the moment of falling asleep, that its effect may be felt in +disciplining even the dreams. + +The public _cultus_ consists of a series of celebrations or festivals, +eighty-four in the year, so arranged that at least one occurs in every +week. They are devoted to the successive glorification of Humanity +itself; of the various ties, political and domestic, among mankind; of +the successive stages in the past evolution of our species; and of the +several classes into which M. Comte's polity divides mankind. M. Comte's +religion has, moreover, nine Sacraments; consisting in the solemn +consecration, by the priests of Humanity, with appropriate exhortations, +of all the great transitions in life; the entry into life itself, and +into each of its successive stages: education, marriage, the choice of a +profession, and so forth. Among these is death, which receives the name +of transformation, and is considered as a passage from objective +existence to subjective--to living in the memory of our +fellow-creatures. Having no eternity of objective existence to offer, +M. Comte's religion gives it all he can, by holding out the hope of +subjective immortality--of existing in the remembrance and in the +posthumous adoration of mankind at large, if we have done anything to +deserve remembrance from them; at all events, of those whom we loved +during life; and when they too are gone, of being included in the +collective adoration paid to the Grand Etre. People are to be taught to +look forward to this as a sufficient recompense for the devotion of a +whole life to the service of Humanity. Seven years after death, comes +the last Sacrament: a public judgment, by the priesthood, on the memory +of the defunct. This is not designed for purposes of reprobation, but of +honour, and any one may, by declaration during life, exempt himself from +it. If judged, and found worthy, he is solemnly incorporated with the +Grand Etre, and his remains are transferred from the civil to the +religious place of sepulture: "le bois sacré" qui doit entourer chaque +temple de l'Humanité." + +This brief abstract gives no idea of the minuteness of M. Comte's +prescriptions, and the extraordinary height to which he carries the +mania for regulation by which Frenchmen are distinguished among +Europeans, and M. Comte among Frenchmen. It is this which throws an +irresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject. There is nothing +really ridiculous in the devotional practices which M. Comte recommends +towards a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come +unprompted from the depths of the individual feeling; but there is +something ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practise +them three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his +feelings require them, but for the premeditated, purpose of getting his +feelings up. The ludicrous, however, in any of its shapes, is a +phaenomenon with which M. Comte seems to have been totally unacquainted. +There is nothing in his writings from which it could be inferred that he +knew of the existence of such things as wit and humour. The only writer +distinguished for either, of whom he shows any admiration, is Molière, +and him he admires not for his wit but for his wisdom. We notice this +without intending any reflection on M. Comte; for a profound conviction +raises a person above the feeling of ridicule. But there are passages in +his writings which, it really seems to us, could have been written by no +man who had ever laughed. We will give one of these instances. Besides +the regular prayers, M. Comte's religion, like the Catholic, has need of +forms which can be applied to casual and unforeseen occasions. These, he +says, must in general be left to the believer's own choice; but he +suggests as a very suitable one the repetition of "the fundamental +formula of Positivism," viz., "l'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base, +et le progrès pour but." Not content, however, with an equivalent for +the Paters and Aves of Catholicism, he must have one for the sign of the +cross also; and he thus delivers himself:[23] "Cette expansion peut être +perfectionnée par des signes universels.... Afin de mieux développer +l'aptitude nécessaire de la formule positiviste à représenter toujours +la condition humaine, il convient ordinairement de l'énoncer en touchant +successivement les principaux organes que la théorie cérébrale assigne à +ses trois éléments." This _may_ be a very appropriate mode of expressing +one's devotion to the Grand Etre: but any one who had appreciated its +effect on the profane reader, would have thought it judicious to keep it +back till a considerably more advanced stage in the propagation of the +Positive Religion. + +As M. Comte's religion has a _cultus_, so also it has a clergy, who are +the pivot of his entire social and political system. Their nature and +office will be best shown by describing his ideal of political society +in its normal state, with the various classes of which it is composed. + +The necessity of a Spiritual Power, distinct and separate from the +temporal government, is the essential principle of M. Comte's political +scheme; as it may well be, since the Spiritual Power is the only +counterpoise he provides or tolerates, to the absolute dominion of the +civil rulers. Nothing can exceed his combined detestation and contempt +for government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative +institutions in any form. They are an expedient, in his opinion, only +suited to a state of transition, and even that nowhere but in England. +The attempt to naturalize them in France, or any Continental nation, he +regards as mischievous quackery. Louis Napoleon's usurpation is +absolved, is made laudable to him, because it overthrew a representative +government. Election of superiors by inferiors, except as a +revolutionary expedient, is an abomination in his sight. Public +functionaries of all kinds should name their successors, subject to the +approbation of their own superiors, and giving public notice of the +nomination so long beforehand as to admit of discussion, and the timely +revocation of a wrong choice. But, by the side of the temporal rulers, +he places another authority, with no power to command, but only to +advise and remonstrate. The family being, in his mind as in that of +Frenchmen generally, the foundation and essential type of all society, +the separation of the two powers commences there. The spiritual, or +moral and religious power, in a family, is the women of it. The +positivist family is composed of the "fundamental couple," their +children, and the parents of the man, if alive. The whole government of +the household, except as regards the education of the children, resides +in the man; and even over that he has complete power, but should forbear +to exert it. The part assigned to the women is to improve the man +through his affections, and to bring up the children, who, until the age +of fourteen, at which scientific instruction begins, are to be educated +wholly by their mother. That women may be better fitted for these +functions, they are peremptorily excluded from all others. No woman is +to work for her living. Every woman is to be supported by her husband or +her male relations, and if she has none of these, by the State. She is +to have no powers of government, even domestic, and no property. Her +legal rights of inheritance are preserved to her, that her feelings of +duty may make her voluntarily forego them. There are to be no marriage +portions, that women may no longer be sought in marriage from interested +motives. Marriages are to be rigidly indissoluble, except for a single +cause. It is remarkable that the bitterest enemy of divorce among all +philosophers, nevertheless allows it, in a case which the laws of +England, and of other countries reproached by him with tolerating +divorce, do not admit: namely, when one of the parties has been +sentenced to an infamizing punishment, involving loss of civil rights. +It is monstrous that condemnation, even for life, to a felon's +punishment, should leave an unhappy victim bound to, and in the wife's +case under the legal authority of, the culprit. M. Comte could feel for +the injustice in this special case, because it chanced to be the +unfortunate situation of his Clotilde. Minor degrees of unworthiness may +entitle the innocent party to a legal separation, but without the power +of re-marriage. Second marriages, indeed, are not permitted by the +Positive Religion. There is to be no impediment to them by law, but +morality is to condemn them, and every couple who are married +religiously as well as civilly are to make a vow of eternal widowhood, +"le veuvage éternel." This absolute monogamy is, in M. Comte's opinion, +essential to the complete fusion between two beings, which is the +essence of marriage; and moreover, eternal constancy is required by the +posthumous adoration, which is to be continuously paid by the survivor +to one who, though objectively dead, still lives "subjectively." The +domestic spiritual power, which resides in the women of the family, is +chiefly concentrated in the most venerable of them, the husband's +mother, while alive. It has an auxiliary in the influence of age, +represented by the husband's father, who is supposed to have passed the +period of retirement from active life, fixed by M. Comte (for he fixes +everything) at sixty-three; at which age the head of the family gives up +the reins of authority to his son, retaining only a consultative voice. + +This domestic Spiritual Power, being principally moral, and confined to +a private life, requires the support and guidance of an intellectual +power exterior to it, the sphere of which will naturally be wider, +extending also to public life. This consists of the clergy, or +priesthood, for M. Comte is fond of borrowing the consecrated +expressions of Catholicism to denote the nearest equivalents which his +own system affords. The clergy are the theoretic or philosophical class, +and are supported by an endowment from the State, voted periodically, +but administered by themselves. Like women, they are to be excluded from +all riches, and from all participation in power (except the absolute +power of each over his own household). They are neither to inherit, nor +to receive emolument from any of their functions, or from their writings +or teachings of any description, but are to live solely on their small +salaries. This M. Comte deems necessary to the complete +disinterestedness of their counsel. To have the confidence of the +masses, they must, like the masses, be poor. Their exclusion from +political and from all other practical occupations is indispensable for +the same reason, and for others equally peremptory. Those occupations +are, he contends, incompatible with the habits of mind necessary to +philosophers. A practical position, either private or public, chains the +mind to specialities and details, while a philosopher's business is with +general truths and connected views (vues d'ensemble). These, again, +require an habitual abstraction from details, which unfits the mind for +judging well and rapidly of individual cases. The same person cannot be +both a good theorist and a good practitioner or ruler, though +practitioners and rulers ought to have a solid theoretic education. The +two kinds of function must be absolutely exclusive of one another: to +attempt them both, is inconsistent with fitness for either. But as men +may mistake their vocation, up to the age of thirty-five they are +allowed to change their career. + +To the clergy is entrusted the theoretic or scientific instruction of +youth. The medical art also is to be in their hands, since no one is fit +to be a physician who does not study and understand the whole man, moral +as well as physical. M. Comte has a contemptuous opinion of the existing +race of physicians, who, he says, deserve no higher name than that of +veterinaires, since they concern themselves with man only in his animal, +and not in his human character. In his last years, M. Comte (as we learn +from Dr Robinet's volume) indulged in the wildest speculations on +medical science, declaring all maladies to be one and the same disease, +the disturbance or destruction of "l'unité cérébrale." The other +functions of the clergy are moral, much more than intellectual. They are +the spiritual directors, and venerated advisers, of the active or +practical classes, including the political. They are the mediators in +all social differences; between the labourers, for instance, and their +employers. They are to advise and admonish on all important violations +of the moral law. Especially, it devolves on them to keep the rich and +powerful to the performance of their moral duties towards their +inferiors. If private remonstrance fails, public denunciation is to +follow: in extreme cases they may proceed to the length of +excommunication, which, though it only operates through opinion, yet if +it carries opinion with it, may, as M. Comte complacently observes, be +of such powerful efficacy, that the richest man may be driven to produce +his subsistence by his own manual labour, through the impossibility of +inducing any other person to work for him. In this as in all other +cases, the priesthood depends for its authority on carrying with it the +mass of the people--those who, possessing no accumulations, live on the +wages of daily labour; popularly but incorrectly termed the working +classes, and by French writers, in their Roman law phraseology, +proletaires. These, therefore, who are not allowed the smallest +political rights, are incorporated into the Spiritual Power, of which +they form, after women and the clergy, the third element. + +It remains to give an account of the Temporal Power, composed of the +rich and the employers of labour, two classes who in M. Comte's system +are reduced to one, for he allows of no idle rich. A life made up of +mere amusement and self-indulgence, though not interdicted by law, is to +be deemed so disgraceful, that nobody with the smallest sense of shame +would choose to be guilty of it. Here, we think, M. Comte has lighted on +a true principle, towards which the tone of opinion in modern Europe is +more and more tending, and which is destined to be one of the +constitutive principles of regenerated society. We believe, for example, +with him, that in the future there will be no class of landlords living +at ease on their rents, but every landlord will be a capitalist trained +to agriculture, himself superintending and directing the cultivation of +his estate. No one but he who guides the work, should have the control +of the tools. In M. Comte's system, the rich, as a rule, consist of the +"captains of industry:" but the rule is not entirely without exception, +for M. Comte recognizes other useful modes of employing riches. In +particular, one of his favourite ideas is that of an order of Chivalry, +composed of the most generous and self-devoted of the rich, voluntarily +dedicating themselves, like knights-errant of old, to the redressing of +wrongs, and the protection of the weak and oppressed. He remarks, that +oppression, in modern life, can seldom reach, or even venture to attack, +the life or liberty of its victims (he forgets the case of domestic +tyranny), but only their pecuniary means, and it is therefore by the +purse chiefly that individuals can usefully interpose, as they formerly +did by the sword. The occupation, however, of nearly all the rich, will +be the direction of labour, and for this work they will be educated. +Reciprocally, it is in M. Comte's opinion essential, that all directors +of labour should be rich. Capital (in which he includes land) should be +concentrated in a few holders, so that every capitalist may conduct the +most extensive operations which one mind is capable of superintending. +This is not only demanded by good economy, in order to take the utmost +advantage of a rare kind of practical ability, but it necessarily +follows from the principle of M. Comte's scheme, which regards a +capitalist as a public functionary. M. Comte's conception of the +relation of capital to society is essentially that of Socialists, but he +would bring about by education and opinion, what they aim at effecting +by positive institution. The owner of capital is by no means to consider +himself its absolute proprietor. Legally he is not to be controlled in +his dealings with it, for power should be in proportion to +responsibility: but it does not belong to him for his own use; he is +merely entrusted by society with a portion of the accumulations made by +the past providence of mankind, to be administered for the benefit of +the present generation and of posterity, under the obligation of +preserving them unimpaired, and handing them down, more or less +augmented, to our successors. He is not entitled to dissipate them, or +divert them from the service of Humanity to his own pleasures. Nor has +he a moral right to consume on himself the whole even of his profits. He +is bound in conscience, if they exceed his reasonable wants, to employ +the surplus in improving either the efficiency of his operations, or the +physical and mental condition of his labourers. The portion of his gains +which he may appropriate to his own use, must be decided by himself, +under accountability to opinion; and opinion ought not to look very +narrowly into the matter, nor hold him to a rigid reckoning for any +moderate indulgence of luxury or ostentation; since under the great +responsibilities that will be imposed on him, the position of an +employer of labour will be so much less desirable, to any one in whom +the instincts of pride and vanity are not strong, than the "heureuse +insouciance" of a labourer, that those instincts must be to a certain +degree indulged, or no one would undertake the office. With this +limitation, every employer is a mere administrator of his possessions, +for his work-people and for society at large. If he indulges himself +lavishly, without reserving an ample remuneration for all who are +employed under him, he is morally culpable, and will incur sacerdotal +admonition. This state of things necessarily implies that capital should +be in few hands, because, as M. Comte observes, without great riches, +the obligations which society ought to impose, could not be fulfilled +without an amount of personal abnegation that it would be hopeless to +expect. If a person is conspicuously qualified for the conduct of an +industrial enterprise, but destitute of the fortune necessary for +undertaking it, M. Comte recommends that he should be enriched by +subscription, or, in cases of sufficient importance, by the State. Small +landed proprietors and capitalists, and the middle classes altogether, +he regards as a parasitic growth, destined to disappear, the best of the +body becoming large capitalists, and the remainder proletaires. Society +will consist only of rich and poor, and it will be the business of the +rich to make the best possible lot for the poor. The remuneration of the +labourers will continue, as at present, to be a matter of voluntary +arrangement between them and their employers, the last resort on either +side being refusal of co-operation, "refus de concours," in other words, +a strike or a lock-out; with the sacerdotal order for mediators in case +of need. But though wages are to be an affair of free contract, their +standard is not to be the competition of the market, but the application +of the products in equitable proportion between the wants of the +labourers and the wants and dignity of the employer. As it is one of M. +Comte's principles that a question cannot be usefully proposed without +an attempt at a solution, he gives his ideas from the beginning as to +what the normal income of a labouring family should be. They are on such +a scale, that until some great extension shall have taken place in the +scientific resources of mankind, it is no wonder he thinks it necessary +to limit as much as possible the number of those who are to be supported +by what is left of the produce. In the first place the labourer's +dwelling, which is to consist of seven rooms, is, with all that it +contains, to be his own property: it is the only landed property he is +allowed to possess, but every family should be the absolute owner of all +things which are destined for its exclusive use. Lodging being thus +independently provided for, and education and medical attendance being +secured gratuitously by the general arrangements of society, the pay of +the labourer is to consist of two portions, the one monthly, and of +fixed amount, the other weekly, and proportioned to the produce of his +labour. The former M. Comte fixes at 100 francs (£4) for a month of 28 +days; being £52 a year: and the rate of piece-work should be such as to +make the other part amount to an average of seven francs (5_s_. _6d_.) +per working day. + +Agreeably to M. Comte's rule, that every public functionary should +appoint his successor, the capitalist has unlimited power of +transmitting his capital by gift or bequest, after his own death or +retirement. In general it will be best bestowed entire upon one person, +unless the business will advantageously admit of subdivision. He will +naturally leave it to one or more of his sons, if sufficiently +qualified; and rightly so, hereditary being, in M. Comte's opinion, +preferable to acquired wealth, as being usually more generously +administered. But, merely as his sons, they have no moral right to it. +M. Comte here recognizes another of the principles, on which we believe +that the constitution of regenerated society will rest. He maintains (as +others in the present generation have done) that the father owes nothing +to his son, except a good education, and pecuniary aid sufficient for an +advantageous start in life: that he is entitled, and may be morally +bound, to leave the bulk of his fortune to some other properly selected +person or persons, whom he judges likely to make a more beneficial use +of it. This is the first of three important points, in which M. Comte's +theory of the family, wrong as we deem it in its foundations, is in +advance of prevailing theories and existing institutions. The second is +the re-introduction of adoption, not only in default of children, but to +fulfil the purposes, and satisfy the sympathetic wants, to which such +children as there are may happen to be inadequate. The third is a most +important point--the incorporation of domestics as substantive members +of the family. There is hardly any part of the present constitution of +society more essentially vicious, and morally injurious to both parties, +than the relation between masters and servants. To make this a really +human and a moral relation, is one of the principal desiderata in social +improvement. The feeling of the vulgar of all classes, that domestic +service has anything in it peculiarly mean, is a feeling than which +there is none meaner. In the feudal ages, youthful nobles of the highest +rank thought themselves honoured by officiating in what is now called a +menial capacity, about the persons of superiors of both sexes, for whom +they felt respect: and, as M. Comte observes, there are many families +who can in no other way so usefully serve Humanity, as by ministering to +the bodily wants of other families, called to functions which require +the devotion of all their thoughts. "We will add, by way of supplement +to M. Comte's doctrine, that much of the daily physical work of a +household, even in opulent families, if silly notions of degradation, +common to all ranks, did not interfere, might very advantageously be +performed by the family itself, at least by its younger members; to whom +it would give healthful exercise of the bodily powers, which has now to +be sought in modes far less useful, and also a familiar acquaintance +with the real work of the world, and a moral willingness to take their +share of its burthens, which, in the great majority of the better-off +classes, do not now get cultivated at all. + +We have still to speak of the directly political functions of the rich, +or, as M. Comte terms them, the patriciate. The entire political +government is to be in their hands. First, however, the existing nations +are to be broken up into small republics, the largest not exceeding the +size of Belgium, Portugal, or Tuscany; any larger nationalities being +incompatible with the unity of wants and feelings, which is required, +not only to give due strength to the sentiment of patriotism (always +strongest in small states), but to prevent undue compression; for no +territory, M. Comte thinks, can without oppression be governed from a +distant centre. Algeria, therefore, is to be given up to the Arabs, +Corsica to its inhabitants, and France proper is to be, before the end +of the century, divided into seventeen republics, corresponding to the +number of considerable towns: Paris, however, (need it be said?) +succeeding to Rome as the religious metropolis of the world. Ireland, +Scotland, and Wales, are to be separated from England, which is of +course to detach itself from all its transmarine dependencies. In each +state thus constituted, the powers of government are to be vested in a +triumvirate of the three principal bankers, who are to take the foreign, +home, and financial departments respectively. How they are to conduct +the government and remain bankers, does not clearly appear; but it must +be intended that they should combine both offices, for they are to +receive no pecuniary remuneration for the political one. Their power is +to amount to a dictatorship (M. Comte's own word): and he is hardly +justified in saying that he gives political power to the rich, since he +gives it over the rich and every one else, to three individuals of the +number, not even chosen by the rest, but named by their predecessors. As +a check on the dictators, there is to be complete freedom of speech, +writing, printing, and voluntary association; and all important acts of +the government, except in cases of emergency, are to be announced +sufficiently long beforehand to ensure ample discussion. This, and the +influences of the Spiritual Power, are the only guarantees provided +against misgovernment. When we consider that the complete dominion of +every nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men--for the +Spiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a +single Pontiff for the whole human race--one is appalled at the picture +of entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the +last and highest result of the evolution of Humanity. But the conception +rises to the terrific, when we are told the mode in which the single +High Priest of Humanity is intended to use his authority. It is the most +warning example we know, into what frightful aberrations a powerful and +comprehensive mind may be led by the exclusive following out of a single +idea. + +The single idea of M. Comte, on this subject, is that the intellect +should be wholly subordinated to the feelings; or, to translate the +meaning out of sentimental into logical language, that the exercise of +the intellect, as of all our other faculties, should have for its sole +object the general good. Every other employment of it should be +accounted not only idle and frivolous, but morally culpable. Being +indebted wholly to Humanity for the cultivation to which we owe our +mental powers, we are bound in return to consecrate them wholly to her +service. Having made up his mind that this ought to be, there is with M. +Comte but one step to concluding that the Grand Pontiff of Humanity must +take care that it shall be; and on this foundation he organizes an +elaborate system for the total suppression of all independent thought. +He does not, indeed, invoke the arm of the law, or call for any +prohibitions. The clergy are to have no monopoly. Any one else may +cultivate science if he can, may write and publish if he can find +readers, may give private instruction if anybody consents to receive it. +But since the sacerdotal body will absorb into itself all but those whom +it deems either intellectually or morally unequal to the vocation, all +rival teachers will, as he calculates, be so discredited beforehand, +that their competition will not be formidable. Within the body itself, +the High Priest has it in his power to make sure that there shall be no +opinions, and no exercise of mind, but such as he approves; for he alone +decides the duties and local residence of all its members, and can even +eject them from the body. Before electing to be under this rule, we feel +a natural curiosity to know in what manner it is to be exercised. +Humanity has only yet had one Pontiff, whose mental qualifications for +the post are not likely to be often surpassed, M. Comte himself. It is +of some importance to know what are the ideas of this High Priest, +concerning the moral and religious government of the human intellect. + +One of the doctrines which M. Comte most strenuously enforces in his +later writings is, that during the preliminary evolution of humanity, +terminated by the foundation of Positivism, the free development of our +forces of all kinds was the important matter, but that from this time +forward the principal need is to regulate them. Formerly the danger was +of their being insufficient, but henceforth, of their being abused. Let +us express, in passing, our entire dissent from this doctrine. Whoever +thinks that the wretched education which mankind as yet receive, calls +forth their mental powers (except those of a select few) in a sufficient +or even tolerable degree, must be very easily satisfied: and the abuse +of them, far from becoming proportionally greater as knowledge and +mental capacity increase, becomes rapidly less, provided always that the +diffusion of those qualities keeps pace with their growth. The abuse of +intellectual power is only to be dreaded, when society is divided +between a few highly cultivated intellects and an ignorant and stupid +multitude. But mental power is a thing which M. Comte does not want--or +wants infinitely less than he wants submission and obedience. Of all the +ingredients of human nature, he continually says, the intellect most +needs to be disciplined and reined-in. It is the most turbulent "le plus +perturbateur," of all the mental elements; more so than even the selfish +instincts. Throughout the whole modern transition, beginning with +ancient Greece (for M. Comte tells us that we have always been in a +state of revolutionary transition since then), the intellect has been in +a state of systematic insurrection against "le coeur." The +metaphysicians and literati (lettrés), after helping to pull down the +old religion and social order, are rootedly hostile to the construction +of the new, and desiring only to prolong the existing scepticism and +intellectual anarchy, which secure to them a cheap social ascendancy, +without the labour of earning it by solid scientific preparation. The +scientific class, from whom better might have been expected, are, if +possible, worse. Void of enlarged views, despising all that is too large +for their comprehension, devoted exclusively each to his special +science, contemptuously indifferent to moral and political interests, +their sole aim is to acquire an easy reputation, and in France (through +paid Academies and professorships) personal lucre, by pushing their +sciences into idle and useless inquiries (speculations oiseuses), of no +value to the real interests of mankind, and tending to divert the +thoughts from them. One of the duties most incumbent on opinion and on +the Spiritual Power, is to stigmatize as immoral, and effectually +suppress, these useless employments of the speculative faculties. All +exercise of thought should be abstained from, which has not some +beneficial tendency, some actual utility to mankind. M. Comte, of +course, is not the man to say that it must be a merely material utility. +If a speculation, though it has no doctrinal, has a logical value--if it +throws any light on universal Method--it is still more deserving of +cultivation than if its usefulness was merely practical: but, either as +method or as doctrine, it must bring forth fruits to Humanity, otherwise +it is not only contemptible, but criminal. + +That there is a portion of truth at the bottom of all this, we should be +the last to deny. No respect is due to any employment of the intellect +which does not tend to the good of mankind. It is precisely on a level +with any idle amusement, and should be condemned as waste of time, if +carried beyond the limit within which amusement is permissible. And +whoever devotes powers of thought which could render to Humanity +services it urgently needs, to speculations and studies which it could +dispense with, is liable to the discredit attaching to a well-grounded +suspicion of caring little for Humanity. But who can affirm positively +of any speculations, guided by right scientific methods, on subjects +really accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of +being of any use? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use, +and what is destined to be useless. The most that can be said is that +some kinds are of more certain, and above all, of more present utility +than others. How often the most important practical results have been +the remote consequence of studies which no one would have expected to +lead to them! Could the mathematicians, who, in the schools of +Alexandria, investigated the properties of the ellipse, have foreseen +that nearly two thousand years afterwards their speculations would +explain the solar system, and a little later would enable ships safely +to circumnavigate the earth? Even in M. Comte's opinion, it is well for +mankind that, in those early days, knowledge was thought worth pursuing +for its own sake. Nor has the "foundation of Positivism," we imagine, so +far changed the conditions of human existence, that it should now be +criminal to acquire, by observation and reasoning, a knowledge of the +facts of the universe, leaving to posterity to find a use for it. Even +in the last two or three years, has not the discovery of new metals, +which may prove important even in the practical arts, arisen from one of +the investigations which M. Comte most unequivocally condemns as idle, +the research into the internal constitution of the sun? How few, +moreover, of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world, +either were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming +directly at the object! Would the mariner's compass ever have been found +by direct efforts for the improvement of navigation? Should we have +reached the electric telegraph by any amount of striving for a means of +instantaneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity +with lightning, and Ampère with magnetism? The most apparently +insignificant archaeological or geological fact, is often found to throw +a light on human history, which M. Comte, the basis of whose social +philosophy is history, should be the last person to disparage. The +direction of the entrance to the three great Pyramids of Ghizeh, by +showing the position of the circumpolar stars at the time when they were +built, is the best evidence we even now have of the immense antiquity of +Egyptian civilization.[24] The one point on which M. Comte's doctrine +has some colour of reason, is the case of sidereal astronomy: so little +knowledge of it being really accessible to us, and the connexion of that +little with any terrestrial interests being, according to all our means +of judgment, infinitesimal. It is certainly difficult to imagine how any +considerable benefit to humanity can be derived from a knowledge of the +motions of the double stars: should these ever become important to us it +will be in so prodigiously remote an age, that we can afford to remain +ignorant of them until, at least, all our moral, political, and social +difficulties have been settled. Yet the discovery that gravitation +extends even to those remote regions, gives some additional strength to +the conviction of the universality of natural laws; and the habitual +meditation on such vast objects and distances is not without an +aesthetic usefulness, by kindling and exalting the imagination, the +worth of which in itself, and even its re-action on the intellect, M. +Comte is quite capable of appreciating. He would reply, however, that +there are better means of accomplishing these purposes. In the same +spirit he condemns the study even of the solar system, when extended to +any planets but those which are visible to the naked eye, and which +alone exert an appreciable gravitative influence on the earth. Even the +perturbations he thinks it idle to study, beyond a mere general +conception of them, and thinks that astronomy may well limit its domain +to the motions and mutual action of the earth, sun, and moon. He looks +for a similar expurgation of all the other sciences. In one passage he +expressly says that the greater part of the researches which are really +accessible to us are idle and useless. He would pare down the dimensions +of all the sciences as narrowly as possible. He is continually repeating +that no science, as an abstract study, should be carried further than is +necessary to lay the foundation for the science next above it, and so +ultimately for moral science, the principal purpose of them all. Any +further extension of the mathematical and physical sciences should be +merely "episodic;" limited to what may from time to time be demanded by +the requirements of industry and the arts; and should be left to the +industrial classes, except when they find it necessary to apply to the +sacerdotal order for some additional development of scientific theory. +This, he evidently thinks, would be a rare contingency, most physical +truths sufficiently concrete and real for practice being empirical. +Accordingly in estimating the number of clergy necessary for France, +Europe, and our entire planet (for his forethought extends thus far), +he proportions it solely to their moral and religious attributions +(overlooking, by the way, even their medical); and leaves nobody with +any time to cultivate the sciences, except abortive candidates for the +priestly office, who having been refused admittance into it for +insufficiency in moral excellence or in strength of character, may be +thought worth retaining as "pensioners" of the sacerdotal order, on +account of their theoretic abilities. + +It is no exaggeration to say, that M. Comte gradually acquired a real +hatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits, and was bent +on retaining no more of them than was strictly indispensable. The +greatest of his anxieties is lest people should reason, and seek to +know, more than enough. He regards all abstraction and all reasoning as +morally dangerous, by developing an inordinate pride (orgueil), and +still more, by producing dryness (scheresse). Abstract thought, he says, +is not a wholesome occupation for more than a small number of human +beings, nor of them for more than a small part of their time. Art, which +calls the emotions into play along with and more than the reason, is the +only intellectual exercise really adapted to human nature. It is +nevertheless indispensable that the chief theories of the various +abstract sciences, together with the modes in which those theories were +historically and logically arrived at, should form a part of universal +education: for, first, it is only thus that the methods can be learnt, +by which to attain the results sought by the moral and social sciences: +though we cannot perceive that M. Comte got at his own moral and social +results by those processes. Secondly, the principal truths of the +subordinate sciences are necessary to the systematization (still +systematization!) of our conceptions, by binding together our notions of +the world in a set of propositions, which are coherent, and are a +sufficiently correct representation of fact for our practical wants. +Thirdly, a familiar knowledge of the invariable laws of natural +phaenomena is a great elementary lesson of submission, which, he is +never weary of saying, is the first condition both of morality and of +happiness. For these reasons, he would cause to be taught, from the age +of fourteen to that of twenty-one, to all persons, rich and poor, girls +or youths, a knowledge of the whole series of abstract sciences, such as +none but the most highly instructed persons now possess, and of a far +more systematic and philosophical character than is usually possessed +even by them. (N.B.--They are to learn, during the same years, Greek and +Latin, having previously, between the ages of seven and fourteen, learnt +the five principal modern languages, to the degree necessary for +reading, with due appreciation, the chief poetical compositions in +each.) But they are to be taught all this, not only without encouraging, +but stifling as much as possible, the examining and questioning spirit. +The disposition which should be encouraged is that of receiving all on +the authority of the teacher. The Positivist faith, even in its +scientific part, is _la foi démontrable_, but ought by no means to be +_la foi toujours démontrée_. The pupils have no business to be +over-solicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the +proofs to them in a complete form, or as proofs. The object of +instruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves, +perceive their mutual connexion, and form by means of them a consistent +and _systematized_ conception of nature. As for the demonstrations, it +is rather desirable than otherwise that even theorists should forget +them, retaining only the results. Among all the aberrations of +scientific men, M. Comte thinks none greater than the pedantic anxiety +they show for complete proof, and perfect rationalization of scientific +processes. It ought to be enough that the doctrines afford an +explanation of phaenomena, consistent with itself and with known facts, +and that the processes are justified by their fruits. This over-anxiety +for proof, he complains, is breaking down, by vain scruples, the +knowledge which seemed to have been attained; witness the present state +of chemistry. The demand of proof for what has been accepted by +Humanity, is itself a mark of "distrust, if not hostility, to the +sacerdotal order" (the naïveté of this would be charming, if it were not +deplorable), and is a revolt against the traditions of the human race. +So early had the new High Priest adopted the feelings and taken up the +inheritance of the old. One of his favourite aphorisms is the strange +one, that the living are more and more governed by the dead. As is not +uncommon with him, he introduces the dictum in one sense, and uses it in +another. What he at first means by it, is that as civilization advances, +the sum of our possessions, physical and intellectual, is due in a +decreasing proportion to ourselves, and in an increasing one to our +progenitors. The use he makes of it is, that we should submit ourselves +more and more implicitly to the authority of previous generations, and +suffer ourselves less and less to doubt their judgment, or test by our +own reason the grounds of their opinions. The unwillingness of the human +intellect and conscience, in their present state of "anarchy," to sign +their own abdication, lie calls "the insurrection of the living against +the dead." To this complexion has Positive Philosophy come at last! + +Worse, however, remains to be told. M. Comte selects a hundred volumes +of science, philosophy, poetry, history, and general knowledge, which he +deems a sufficient library for every positivist, even of the theoretic +order, and actually proposes a systematic holocaust of books in +general--it would almost seem of all books except these. Even that to +which he shows most indulgence, poetry, except the very best, is to +undergo a similar fate, with the reservation of select passages, on the +ground that, poetry being intended to cultivate our instinct of ideal +perfection, any kind of it that is less than the best is worse than +none. This imitation of the error, we will call it the crime, of the +early Christians--and in an exaggerated form, for even they destroyed +only those writings of pagans or heretics which were directed against +themselves--is the one thing in M. Comte's projects which merits real +indignation. When once M. Comte has decided, all evidence on the other +side, nay, the very historical evidence on which he grounded his +decision, had better perish. When mankind have enlisted under his +banner, they must burn their ships. There is, though in a less offensive +form, the same overweening presumption in a suggestion he makes, that +all species of animals and plants which are useless to man should be +systematically rooted out. As if any one could presume to assert that +the smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some +property serviceable to man. When we consider that the united power of +the whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated--that +what is once done, in the extirpation of races, can never be repaired; +one can only be thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of +mankind have to answer for, they have never come up to the measure of +the great regenerator of Humanity; mankind have not yet been under the +rule of one who assumes that he knows all there is to be known, and that +when he has put himself at the head of humanity, the book of human +knowledge may be closed. + +Of course M. Comte does not make this assumption consistently. He does +not imagine that he actually possesses all knowledge, but only that he +is an infallible judge what knowledge is worth possessing. He does not +believe that mankind have reached in all directions the extreme limits +of useful and laudable scientific inquiry. He thinks there is a large +scope for it still, in adding to our power over the external world, but +chiefly in perfecting our own physical, intellectual, and moral nature. +He holds that all our mental strength should be economized, for the +pursuit of this object in the mode leading most directly to the end. +With this view, some one problem should always be selected, the solution +of which would be more important than any other to the interests of +humanity, and upon this the entire intellectual resources of the +theoretic mind should be concentrated, until it is either resolved, or +has to be given up as insoluble: after which mankind should go on to +another, to be pursued with similar exclusiveness. The selection of this +problem of course rests with the sacerdotal order, or in other words, +with the High Priest. We should then see the whole speculative intellect +of the human race simultaneously at work on one question, by orders from +above, as a French minister of public instruction once boasted that a +million of boys were saying the same lesson during the same half-hour in +every town and village of France. The reader will be anxious to know, +how much better and more wisely the human intellect will be applied +under this absolute monarchy, and to what degree this system of +government will be preferable to the present anarchy, in which every +theorist does what is intellectually right in his own eyes. M. Comte has +not left us in ignorance on this point. He gives us ample means of +judging. The Pontiff of Positivism informs us what problem, in his +opinion, should be selected before all others for this united pursuit. + +What this problem is, we must leave those who are curious on the subject +to learn from the treatise itself. When they have done so, they will be +qualified to form their own opinion of the amount of advantage which the +general good of mankind would be likely to derive, from exchanging the +present "dispersive speciality" and "intellectual anarchy" for the +subordination of the intellect to the _coeur_, personified in a High +Priest, prescribing a single problem for the undivided study of the +theoretic mind. + +We have given a sufficient general idea of M. Comte's plan for the +regeneration of human society, by putting an end to anarchy, and +"systematizing" human thought and conduct under the direction of +feeling. But an adequate conception will not have been formed of the +height of his self-confidence, until something more has been told. Be it +known, then, that M. Comte by no means proposes this new constitution of +society for realization in the remote future. A complete plan of +measures of transition is ready prepared, and he determines the year, +before the end of the present century, in which the new spiritual and +temporal powers will be installed, and the regime of our maturity will +begin. He did not indeed calculate on converting to Positivism, within +that time, more than a thousandth part of all the heads of families in +Western Europe and its offshoots beyond the Atlantic. But he fixes the +time necessary for the complete political establishment of Positivism at +thirty-three years, divided into three periods, of seven, five, and +twenty-one years respectively. At the expiration of seven, the direction +of public education in France would be placed in M. Comte's hands. In +five years more, the Emperor Napoleon, or his successor, will resign his +power to a provisional triumvirate, composed of three eminent +proletaires of the positivist faith; for proletaires, though not fit for +permanent rule, are the best agents of the transition, being the most +free from the prejudices which are the chief obstacle to it. These +rulers will employ the remaining twenty-one years in preparing society +for its final constitution; and after duly installing the Spiritual +Power, and effecting the decomposition of France into the seventeen +republics before mentioned, will give over the temporal government of +each to the normal dictatorship of the three bankers. A man may be +deemed happy, but scarcely modest, who had such boundless confidence in +his own powers of foresight, and expected so complete a triumph of his +own ideas on the reconstitution of society within the possible limits of +his lifetime. If he could live (he said) to the age of Pontenelle, or of +Hobbes, or even of Voltaire, he should see all this realized, or as good +as realized. He died, however, at sixty, without leaving any disciple +sufficiently advanced to be appointed his successor. There is now a +College, and a Director, of Positivism; but Humanity no longer possesses +a High Priest. + +What more remains to be said may be despatched more summarily. Its +interest is philosophic rather than practical. In his four volumes of +"Politique Positive," M. Comte revises and reelaborates the scientific +and historical expositions of his first treatise. His object is to +systematize (again to systematize) knowledge from the human or +subjective point of view, the only one, he contends, from which a real +synthesis is possible. For (he says) the knowledge attainable by us of +the laws of the universe is at best fragmentary, and incapable of +reduction to a real unity. An objective synthesis, the dream of +Descartes and the best thinkers of old, is impossible. The laws of the +real world are too numerous, and the manner of their working into one +another too intricate, to be, as a general rule, correctly traced and +represented by our reason. The only connecting principle in our +knowledge is its relation to our wants, and it is upon that we must +found our systematization. The answer to this is, first, that there is +no necessity for an universal synthesis; and secondly, that the same +arguments may be used against the possibility of a complete subjective, +as of a complete objective systematization. A subjective synthesis must +consist in the arrangement and co-ordination of all useful knowledge, on +the basis of its relation to human wants and interests. But those wants +and interests are, like the laws of the universe, extremely +multifarious, and the order of preference among them in all their +different gradations (for it varies according to the degree of each) +cannot be cast into precise general propositions. M. Comte's subjective +synthesis consists only in eliminating from the sciences everything that +he deems useless, and presenting as far as possible every theoretical +investigation as the solution of a practical problem. To this, however, +he cannot consistently adhere; for, in every science, the theoretic +truths are much more closely connected with one another than with the +human purposes which they eventually serve, and can only be made to +cohere in the intellect by being, to a great degree, presented as if +they were truths of pure reason, irrespective of any practical +application. + +There are many things eminently characteristic of M. Comte's second +career, in this revision of the results of his first. Under the head of +Biology, and for the better combination of that science with Sociology +and Ethics, he found that he required a new system of Phrenology, being +justly dissatisfied with that of Gall and his successors. Accordingly he +set about constructing one _è priori_, grounded on the best enumeration +and classification he could make of the elementary faculties of our +intellectual, moral, and animal nature; to each of which he assigned an +hypothetical place in the skull, the most conformable that he could to +the few positive facts on the subject which he considered as +established, and to the general presumption that functions which react +strongly on one another must have their organs adjacent: leaving the +localities avowedly to be hereafter verified, by anatomical and +inductive investigation. There is considerable merit in this attempt, +though it is liable to obvious criticisms, of the same nature as his own +upon Gall. But the characteristic thing is, that while presenting all +this as hypothesis waiting for verification, he could not have taken its +truth more completely for granted if the verification had been made. In +all that he afterwards wrote, every detail of his theory of the brain is +as unhesitatingly asserted, and as confidently built upon, as any other +doctrine of science. This is his first great attempt in the "Subjective +Method," which, originally meaning only the subordination of the pursuit +of truth to human uses, had already come to mean drawing truth itself +from the fountain of his own mind. He had become, on the one hand, +almost indifferent to proof, provided he attained theoretic coherency, +and on the other, serenely confident that even the guesses which +originated with himself could not but come out true. + +There is one point in his later view of the sciences, which appears to +us a decided improvement on his earlier. He adds to the six fundamental +sciences of his original scale, a seventh under the name of Morals, +forming the highest step of the ladder, immediately after Sociology: +remarking that it might, with still greater propriety, be termed +Anthropology, being the science of individual human nature, a study, +when rightly understood, more special and complicated than even that of +Society. For it is obliged to take into consideration the diversities of +constitution and temperament (la réaction cérébrale des viscères +végétatifs) the effects of which, still very imperfectly understood, are +highly important in the individual, but in the theory of society may be +neglected, because, differing in different persons, they neutralize one +another on the large scale. This is a remark worthy of M. Comte in his +best days; and the science thus conceived is, as he says, the true +scientific foundation of the art of Morals (and indeed of the art of +human life), which, therefore, may, both philosophically and +didactically, be properly combined with it. + +His philosophy of general history is recast, and in many respects +changed; we cannot but say, greatly for the worse. He gives much greater +development than before to the Fetishistic, and to what he terms the +Theocratic, periods. To the Fetishistic view of nature he evinces a +partiality, which appears strange in a Positive philosopher. But the +reason is that Fetish-worship is a religion of the feelings, and not at +all of the intelligence. He regards it as cultivating universal love: as +a practical fact it cultivates much rather universal fear. He looks upon +Fetishism as much more akin to Positivism than any of the forms of +Theology, inasmuch as these consider matter as inert, and moved only by +forces, natural and supernatural, exterior to itself: while Fetishism +resembles Positivism in conceiving matter as spontaneously active, and +errs only by not distinguishing activity from life. As if the +superstition of the Fetishist consisted only in believing that the +objects which produce the phaenomena of nature involuntarily, produce +them voluntarily. The Fetishist thinks not merely that his Fetish is +alive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can +grant him prosperity, or afflict him with all the contrary evils. +Therein consists the lamentable effect of Fetishism--its degrading and +prostrating influence on the feelings and conduct, its conflict with all +genuine experience, and antagonism to all real knowledge of nature. + +M. Comte had also no small sympathy with the Oriental theocracies, as he +calls the sacerdotal castes, who indeed often deserved it by their early +services to intellect and civilization; by the aid they gave to the +establishment of regular government, the valuable though empirical +knowledge they accumulated, and the height to which they helped to carry +some of the useful arts. M. Comte admits that they became oppressive, +and that the prolongation of their ascendancy came to be incompatible +with further improvement. But he ascribes this to their having arrogated +to themselves the temporal government, which, so far as we have any +authentic information, they never did. The reason why the sacerdotal +corporations became oppressive, was because they were organized: because +they attempted the "unity" and "systematization" so dear to M. Comte, +and allowed no science and no speculation, except with their leave and +under their direction. M. Comte's sacerdotal order, which, in his +system, has all the power that ever they had, would be oppressive in the +same manner; with no variation but that which arises from the altered +state of society and of the human mind. + +M. Comte's partiality to the theocracies is strikingly contrasted with +his dislike of the Greeks, whom as a people he thoroughly detests, for +their undue addiction to intellectual speculation, and considers to have +been, by an inevitable fatality, morally sacrificed to the formation of +a few great scientific intellects,--principally Aristotle, Archimedes, +Apollonius, and Hipparchus. Any one who knows Grecian history as it can +now be known, will be amazed at M. Comte's travestie of it, in which the +vulgarest historical prejudices are accepted and exaggerated, to +illustrate the mischiefs of intellectual culture left to its own +guidance. + +There is no need to analyze further M. Comte's second view of universal +history. The best chapter is that on the Romans, to whom, because they +were greater in practice than in theory, and for centuries worked +together in obedience to a social sentiment (though only that of their +country's aggrandizement), M. Comte is as favourably affected, as he is +inimical to all but a small selection of eminent thinkers among the +Greeks. The greatest blemish in this chapter is the idolatry of Julius +Caesar, whom M. Comte regards as one of the most illustrious characters +in history, and of the greatest practical benefactors of mankind. Caesar +had many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we +are at a loss to discover, except subverting a free government: that +merit, however, with M. Comte, goes a great way. It did not, in his +former days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he +regarded with a bitterness highly honourable to himself, and whose +career he deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But +in his later writings these sentiments are considerably mitigated: he +regards Napoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe, and +thinks that his greatest error was re-establishing the Academy of +Sciences! That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon, +measures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen. + +The last volume which he published, that on the Philosophy of +Mathematics, is in some respects a still sadder picture of intellectual +degeneracy than those which preceded it. After the admirable résumé of +the subject in the first volume of his first great work, we expected +something of the very highest order when he returned to the subject for +a more thorough treatment of it. But, being the commencement of a +Synthèse Subjective, it contains, as might be expected, a great deal +that is much more subjective than mathematical. Nor of this do we +complain: but we little imagined of what nature this subjective matter +was to be. M. Comte here joins together the two ideas, which, of all +that he has put forth, are the most repugnant to the fundamental +principles of Positive Philosophy. One of them is that on which we have +just commented, the assimilation between Positivism and Fetishism. The +other, of which we took notice in a former article, was the "liberté +facultative" of shaping our scientific conceptions to gratify the +demands not solely of objective truth, but of intellectual and aesthetic +suitability. It would be an excellent thing, M. Comte thinks, if science +could be deprived of its _sécheresse_, and directly associated with +sentiment. Now it is impossible to prove that the external world, and +the bodies composing it, are not endowed with feeling, and voluntary +agency. It is therefore highly desirable that we should educate +ourselves into imagining that they are. Intelligence it will not do to +invest them with, for some distinction must be maintained between simple +activity and life. But we may suppose that they feel what is done to +them, and desire and will what they themselves do. Even intelligence, +which we must deny to them in the present, may be attributed to them in +the past. Before man existed, the earth, at that time an intelligent +being, may have exerted "its physico-chemical activity so as to improve +the astronomical order by changing its principal coefficients. Our +planet may be supposed to have rendered its orbit less excentric, and +thereby more habitable, by planning a long series of explosions, +analogous to those from which, according to the best hypotheses, comets +proceed. Judiciously reproduced, similar shocks may have rendered the +inclination of the earth's axis better adapted to the future wants of +the Grand Etre. _A fortiori_ the Earth may have modified its own figure, +which is only beyond our intervention because our spiritual ascendancy +has not at its disposal a sufficient material force." The like may be +conceived as having been done by each of the other planets, in concert, +possibly, with the Earth and with one another. "In proportion as each +planet improved its own condition, its life exhausted itself by excess +of innervation; but with the consolation of rendering its self-devotion +more efficacious, when the extinction of its special functions, first +animal, and finally vegetative, reduced it to the universal attributes +of feeling and activity."[25] This stuff, though he calls it fiction, he +soon after speaks of as belief (croyance), to be greatly recommended, as +at once satisfying our natural curiosity, and "perfecting our unity" +(again unity!) "by supplying the gaps in our scientific notions with +poetic fictions, and developing sympathetic emotions and aesthetic +inspirations: the world being conceived as aspiring to second mankind in +ameliorating the universal order under the impulse of the Grand Etre." +And he obviously intends that we should be trained to make these +fantastical inventions permeate all our associations, until we are +incapable of conceiving the world and Nature apart from them, and they +become equivalent to, and are in fact transformed into, real beliefs. + +Wretched as this is, it is singularly characteristic of M. Comte's later +mode of thought. A writer might be excused for introducing into an +avowed work of fancy this dance of the planets, and conception of an +animated Earth. If finely executed, he might even be admired for it. No +one blames a poet for ascribing feelings, purposes, and human +propensities to flowers. Because a conception might be interesting, and +perhaps edifying, in a poem, M. Comte would have it imprinted on the +inmost texture of every human mind in ordinary prose. If the imagination +were not taught its prescribed lesson equally with the reason, where +would be Unity? "It is important that the domain of fiction should +become as _systematic_ as that of demonstration, in order that their +mutual harmony may be conformable to their respective destinations, both +equally directed towards the continual increase of _unity_, personal and +social."[26] + +Nor is it enough to have created the Grand Fétiche (so he actually +proposes to call the Earth), and to be able to include it and all +concrete existence in our adoration along with the Grand Etre. It is +necessary also to extend Positivist Fetishism to purely abstract +existence; to "animate" the laws as well as the facts of nature. It is +not sufficient to have made physics sentimental, mathematics must be +made so too. This does not at first seem easy; but M. Comte finds the +means of accomplishing it. His plan is, to make Space also an object of +adoration, under the name of the Grand Milieu, and consider it as the +representative of Fatality in general. "The final _unity_ disposes us to +cultivate sympathy by developing our gratitude to whatever serves the +Grand Etre. It must dispose us to venerate the Fatality on which reposes +the whole aggregate of our existence." We should conceive this Fatality +as having a fixed seat, and that seat must be considered to be Space, +which should be conceived as possessing feeling, but not activity or +intelligence. And in our abstract speculations we should imagine all our +conceptions as located in free Space. Our images of all sorts, down to +our geometrical diagrams, and even our ciphers and algebraic symbols, +should always be figured to ourselves as written in space, and not on +paper or any other material substance. M. Comte adds that they should be +conceived as green on a white ground. + +We cannot go on any longer with this. In spite of it all, the volume on +mathematics is full of profound thoughts, and will be very suggestive to +those who take up the subject after M. Comte. What deep meaning there +is, for example, in the idea that the infinitesimal calculus is a +conception analogous to the corpuscular hypothesis in physics; which +last M. Comte has always considered as a logical artifice; not an +opinion respecting matters of fact. The assimilation, as it seems to us, +throws a flood of light on both conceptions; on the physical one still +more than the mathematical. We might extract many ideas of similar, +though none perhaps of equal, suggestiveness. But mixed with these, what +pitiable _niaiseries_! One of his great points is the importance of the +"moral and intellectual properties of numbers." He cultivates a +superstitious reverence for some of them. The first three are sacred, +_les nombres sacrés_: One being the type of all Synthesis, Two of all +Combination, which he now says _is_ always binary (in his first treatise +he only said that we may usefully represent it to ourselves as being +so), and Three of all Progression, which not only requires three terms, +but as he now maintains, never ought to have any more. To these sacred +numbers all our mental operations must be made, as far as possible, to +adjust themselves. Next to them, he has a great partiality for the +number seven; for these whimsical reasons: "Composed of two progressions +followed by a synthesis, or of one progression between two couples, the +number seven, coming next after the sum of the three sacred numbers, +determines the largest group which we can distinctly imagine. +Reciprocally, it marks the limit of the divisions which we can directly +conceive in a magnitude of any kind." The number seven, therefore, must +be foisted in wherever possible, and among other things, is to be made +the basis of numeration, which is hereafter to be septimal instead of +decimal: producing all the inconvenience of a change of system, not only +without getting rid of, but greatly aggravating, the disadvantages of +the existing one. But then, he says, it is absolutely necessary that the +basis of numeration should be a prime number. All other people think it +absolutely necessary that it should not, and regard the present basis as +only objectionable in not being divisible enough. But M. Comte's puerile +predilection for prime numbers almost passes belief. His reason is that +they are the type of irreductibility: each of them is a kind of ultimate +arithmetical fact. This, to any one who knows M. Comte in his later +aspects, is amply sufficient. Nothing can exceed his delight in anything +which says to the human mind, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. If +prime numbers are precious, doubly prime numbers are doubly so; meaning +those which are not only themselves prime numbers, but the number which +marks their place in the series of prime numbers is a prime number. +Still greater is the dignity of trebly prime numbers; when the number +marking the place of this second number is also prime. The number +thirteen fulfils these conditions: it is a prime number, it is the +seventh prime number, and seven is the fifth prime number. Accordingly +he has an outrageous partiality to the number thirteen. Though one of +the most inconvenient of all small numbers, he insists on introducing it +everywhere. + +These strange conceits are connected with a highly characteristic +example of M. Comte's frenzy for regulation. He cannot bear that +anything should be left unregulated: there ought to be no such thing as +hesitation; nothing should remain arbitrary, for _l'arbitraire_ is +always favourable to egoism. Submission to artificial prescriptions is +as indispensable as to natural laws, and he boasts that under the reign +of sentiment, human life may be made equally, and even more, regular +than the courses of the stars. But the great instrument of exact +regulation for the details of life is numbers: fixed numbers, therefore, +should be introduced into all our conduct. M. Comte's first application +of this system was to the correction of his own literary style. +Complaint had been made, not undeservedly, that in his first great work, +especially in the latter part of it, the sentences and paragraphs were +long, clumsy, and involved. To correct this fault, of which he was +aware, he imposed on himself the following rules. No sentence was to +exceed two lines of his manuscript, equivalent to five of print. No +paragraph was to consist of more than seven sentences. He further +applied to his prose writing the rule of French versification which +forbids a _hiatus_(the concourse of two vowels), not allowing it to +himself even at the break between two sentences or two paragraphs; nor +did he permit himself ever to use the same word twice, either in the +same sentence or in two consecutive sentences, though belonging to +different paragraphs: with the exception of the monosyllabic +auxiliaries.[27] All this is well enough, especially the first two +precepts, and a good way of breaking through a bad habit. But M. Comte +persuaded himself that any arbitrary restriction, though in no way +emanating from, and therefore necessarily disturbing, the natural order +and proportion of the thoughts, is a benefit in itself, and tends to +improve style. If it renders composition vastly more difficult, he +rejoices at it, as tending to confine writing to superior minds. +Accordingly, in the Synthèse Subjective, he institutes the following +"plan for all compositions of importance." "Every volume really capable +of forming a distinct treatise" should consist of "seven chapters, +besides the introduction and the conclusion; and each of these should be +composed of three parts." Each third part of a chapter should be divided +into "seven sections, each composed of seven groups of sentences, +separated by the usual break of line. Normally formed, the section +offers a central group of seven sentences, preceded and followed by +three groups of five: the first section of each part reduces to three +sentences three of its groups, symmetrically placed; the last section +gives seven sentences to each of its extreme groups. These rules of +composition make prose approach to the regularity of poetry, when +combined with my previous reduction of the maximum length of a sentence +to two manuscript or five printed lines, that is, 250 letters." +"Normally constructed, great poems consist of thirteen cantos, +decomposed into parts, sections, and groups like my chapters, saving the +complete equality of the groups and of the sections." "This difference +of structure between volumes of poetry and of philosophy is more +apparent than real, for the introduction and the conclusion of a poem +should comprehend six of its thirteen cantos," leaving, therefore, the +cabalistic numeber seven for the body of the poem. And all this +regulation not being sufficiently meaningless, fantastic, and +oppressive, he invents an elaborate system for compelling each of his +sections and groups to begin with a letter of the alphabet, determined +beforehand, the letters being selected so as to compose words having +"a synthetic or sympathetic signification," and as close a relation as +possible to the section or part to which they are appropriated. + +Others may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this melancholy +decadence of a great intellect. M. Comte used to reproach his early +English admirers with maintaining the "conspiracy of silence" concerning +his later performances. The reader can now judge whether such reticence +is not more than sufficiently explained by tenderness for his fame, and +a conscientious fear of bringing undeserved discredit on the noble +speculations of his early career. + +M. Comte was accustomed to consider Descartes and Leibnitz as his +principal precursors, and the only great philosophers (among many +thinkers of high philosophic capacity) in modern times. It was to their +minds that he considered his own to bear the nearest resemblance. Though +we have not so lofty an opinion of any of the three as M. Comte had, we +think the assimilation just: thes were, of all recorded thinkers, the +two who bore most resemblance to M. Comte. They were like him in +earnestness, like him, though scarcely equal to him, in confidence in +themselves; they had the same extraordinary power of concatenation and +co-ordination; they enriched human knowledge with great truths and great +conceptions of method; they were, of all great scientific thinkers, the +most consistent, and for that reason often the most absurd, because they +shrank from no consequences, however contrary to common sense, to which +their premises appeared to lead. Accordingly their names have come down +to us associated with grand thoughts, with most important discoveries, +and also with some of the most extravagantly wild and ludicrously absurd +conceptions and theories which ever were solemnly propounded by +thoughtful men. "We think M. Comte as great as either of these +philosophers, and hardly more extravagant. Were we to speak our whole +mind, we should call him superior to them: though not intrinsically, yet +by the exertion of equal intellectual power in a more advanced state of +human preparation; but also in an age less tolerant of palpable +absurdities, and to which those he has committed, if not in themselves +greater, at least appear more ridiculous. + + +THE END. + + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] See the Chapter on Efficient Causes in Reid's "Essays on the Active +Powers," which is avowedly grounded on Newton's ideas. + +[2] Mr Herbert Spencer, who also distinguishes between abstract and +concrete sciences, employs the terms in a different sense from that +explained above. He calls a science abstract when its truths are merely +ideal; when, like the truths of geometry, they are not exactly true of +real things--or, like the so-called law of inertia (the persistence in +direction and velocity of a motion once impressed) are "involved" in +experience but never actually seen in it, being always more or less +completely frustrated. Chemistry and biology he includes, on the +contrary, among concrete sciences, because chemical combinations and +decompositions, and the physiological action of tissues, do actually +take place (as our senses testify) in the manner in which the scientific +propositions state them to take place. We will not discuss the logical +or philological propriety of either use of the terms abstract and +concrete, in which twofold point of view very few of the numerous +acceptations of these words are entirely defensible: but of the two +distinctions M. Comte's answers to by far the deepest and most vital +difference. Mr Spencer's is open to the radical objection, that it +classifies truths not according to their subject-matter or their mutual +relations, but according to an unimportant difference in the manner in +which we come to know them. Of what consequence is it that the law of +inertia (considered as an exact truth) is not generalized from our +direct perceptions, but inferred by combining with the movements which +we see, those which we should see if it were not for the disturbing +causes? In either case we are equally certain that it _is_ an exact +truth: for every dynamical law is perfectly fulfilled even when it seems +to be counteracted. There must, we should think, be many truths in +physiology (for example) which are only known by a similar indirect +process; and Mr Spencer would hardly detach these from the body of the +science, and call them abstract and the remainder concrete. + +[3] Système de Politique Positive, ii. 36. + +[4] The strongest case which Mr Spencer produces of a scientifically +ascertained law, which, though belonging to a later science, was +necessary to the scientific formation of one occupying an earlier place +in M. Comte's series, is the law of the accelerating force of gravity; +which M. Comte places in Physics, but without which the Newtonian theory +of the celestial motions could not have been discovered, nor could even +now be proved. This fact, as is judiciously remarked by M. Littré, is +not valid against the plan of M. Comte's classification, but discloses a +slight error in the detail. M. Comte should not have placed the laws of +terrestrial gravity under Physics. They are part of the general theory +of gravitation, and belong to astronomy. Mr Spencer has hit one of the +weak points in M. Comte's scientific scale; weak however only because +left unguarded. Astronomy, the second of M. Comte's abstract sciences, +answers to his own definition of a concrete science. M. Comte however +was only wrong in overlooking a distinction. There _is_ an abstract +science of astronomy, namely, the theory of gravitation, which would +equally agree with and explain the facts of a totally different solar +system from the one of which our earth forms a part. The actual facts of +our own system, the dimensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, +physical constitution, &c., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly +the subject of a concrete science, similar to natural history; but the +concrete is more inseparably united to the abstract science than in any +other case, since the few celestial facts really accessible to us are +nearly all required for discovering and proving the law of gravitation +as an universal property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable +place in the abstract science as its fundamental data. + +[5] The only point at which the general principle of the series fails in +its application, is the subdivision of Physics; and there, as the +subordination of the different branches scarcely exists, their order is +of little consequence. Thermology, indeed, is altogether an exception to +the principle of decreasing generality, heat, as Mr Spencer truly says +being as universal as gravitation. But the place of Thermology is marked +out, within certain narrow limits, by the ends of the classification, +though not by its principle. The desideratum is, that every science +should precede those which cannot be scientifically constitute or +rationally studied until it is known. It is as a means to this end, that +the arrangement of the phaenomena in the order of their dependence on +one another is important. Now, though heat is as universal a phaenomenon +as any which external nature presents, its laws do not affect, in any +manner important to us, the phaenomena of Astronomy, and operate in the +other branches of Physics only as slight modifying agencies, the +consideration of which may be postponed to a rather advanced stage. But +the phaenomena of Chemistry and Biology depend on them often for their +very existence. The ends of the classification require therefore that +Thermology should precede Chemistry and Biology, but do not demand that +it should be thrown farther back. On the other hand, those same ends, in +another point of view, require that it should be subsequent to +Astronomy, for reasons not of doctrine but of method: Astronomy being +the best school of the true art of interpreting Nature, by which +Thermology profits like other sciences, but which it was ill adapted to +originate. + +[6] The philosophy of the subject is perhaps nowhere so well expressed +as in the "Système de Politique Positive" (iii. 41). "Conçu logiquement, +l'ordre suivant lequel nos principales théories accomplissent +l'évolution fondamentale résulte nécessairement de leur dépendence +mutuelle. Toutes les sciences peuvent, sans doute, être ébauchées à la +fois: leur usage pratique exige même cette culture simultanée. Mais +elle ne peut concerner que les inductions propres à chaque classe de +spéculations. Or cet essor inductif ne saurait fournir des principes +suffisants qu'envers les plus simples études. Partout ailleurs, ils ne +peuvent être établis qu'en subordonnant chaque genre d'inductions +scientifiques à l'ensemble des déductions emanées des domaines moins +compliqués, et dès-lors moins dépendants. Ainsi nos diverses théories +reposent dogmatiquement les unes sur les autres, suivant un ordre +invariable, qui doit régler historiquement leur avénement décisif, les +plus indépendantes ayant toujours dû se développer plus tôt." + +[7] "Science," says Mr Spencer in his "Genesis," "while purely inductive +is purely qualitative.... All quantitative prevision is reached +deductively; induction can achieve only qualitative prevision." Now, if +we remember that the very first accurate quantitative law of physical +phaenomena ever established, the law of the accelerating force of +gravity, was discovered and proved by Galileo partly at least by +experiment; that the quantitative laws on which the whole theory of the +celestial motions is grounded, were generalized by Kepler from direct +comparison of observations; that the quantitative law of the +condensation of gases by pressure, the law of Boyle and Mariotte, was +arrived at by direct experiment; that the proportional quantities in +which every known substance combines chemically with every other, were +ascertained by innumerable experiments, from which the general law of +chemical equivalents, now the ground of the most exact quantitative +previsions, was an inductive generalization; we must conclude that Mr +Spencer has committed himself to a general proposition, which a very +slight consideration of truths perfectly known to him would have shown +to be unsustainable. + +Again, in the very pamphlet in which Mr Spencer defends himself against +the supposition of being a disciple of M. Comte ("The Classification of +the Sciences," p. 37), he speaks of "M. Comte's adherent, Mr Buckle." +Now, except in the opinion common to both, that history may be made a +subject of science, the speculations of these two thinkers are not only +different, but run in different channels, M. Comte applying himself +principally to the laws of evolution common to all mankind, Mr Buckle +almost exclusively to the diversities: and it may be affirmed without +presumption, that they neither saw the same truths, nor fell into the +same errors, nor defended their opinions, either true or erroneous, by +the same arguments. Indeed, it is one of the surprising things in the +case of Mr Buckle as of Mr Spencer, that being a man of kindred genius, +of the same wide range of knowledge, and devoting himself to +speculations of the same kind, he profited so little by M. Comte. + +These oversights prove nothing against the general accuracy of Mr +Spencer's acquirements. They are mere lapses of inattention, such as +thinkers who attempt speculations requiring that vast multitudes of +facts should be kept in recollection at once, can scarcely hope always +to avoid. + +[8] We refer particularly to the mystical metaphysics connected with the +negative sign, imaginary quantities, infinity and infinitesimals, &c, +all cleared up and put on a rational footing in the highly philosophical +treatises of Professor De Morgan. + +[9] Those who wish to see this idea followed out, are referred to "A +System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive." It is not irrelevant to +state that M. Comte, soon after the publication of that work, expressed, +both in a letter (published in M. Littré's volume) and in print, his +high approval of it (especially of the Inductive part) as a real +contribution to the construction of the Positive Method. But we cannot +discover that he was indebted to it for a single idea, or that it +influenced, in the smallest particular, the course of his subsequent +speculations. + +[10] The force, however, of this last consideration has been much +weakened by the progress of discovery since M. Comte left off studying +chemistry; it being now probable that most if not all substances, even +elementary, are susceptible of _allotropic_ forms; as in the case of +oxygen and ozone, the two forms of phosphorus, &c. + +[11] Thus; by considering prussic acid as a compound of hydrogen and +cyanogen rather than of hydrogen and the elements of cyanogen (carbon +and nitrogen), it is assimilated to a whole class of acid compounds +between hydrogen and other substances, and a reason is thus found for +its agreeing in their acid properties. + +[12] According to Sir William Hamilton, as many as six; but numerical +precision in such matters is out of the question, and it is probable +that different minds have the power in different degrees. + +[13] Or, as afterwards corrected by him, the appetites and emotions, the +active capacities, and the intellectual faculties; "le coeur," "le +caractère," and "l'esprit." + +[14] M. Littré, who, though a warm admirer, and accepting the position +of a disciple of M. Comte, is singularly free from his errors, makes the +equally ingenious and just remark, that Political Economy corresponds in +social science to the theory of the nutritive functions in biology, +which M. Comte, with all good physiologists, thinks it not only +permissible but a great and fundamental improvement to treat, in the +first place, separately, as the necessary basis of the higher branches +of the science: although the nutritive functions can no more be +withdrawn _in fact_ from the influence of the animal and human +attributes, than the economical phaenomena of society from that of the +political and moral. + +[15] Indeed his claim to be the creator of Sociology does not extend to +this branch of the science; on the contrary, he, in a subsequent work, +expressly declares that the real founder of it was Aristotle, by whom +the theory of the conditions of social existence was carried as far +towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any theory of +Progress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly possible +to appreciate too highly the merit of those early efforts, beyond which +little progress had been made, until a very recent period, either in +ethical or in political science. + +[16] It is due to them both to say, that he continued to express, in +letters which have been published, a high opinion of her, both morally +and intellectually; and her persistent and strong concern for his +interests and his fame is attested both by M. Littré and by his own +correspondence. + +[17] "Of the Classification of the Sciences," pp. 37, 38. + +[18] In the case of Egypt we admit that there may be cited against us +the authority of Plato, in whose Politicus it is said that the king of +Egypt must be a member of the priestly caste, or if by usurpation a +member of any other caste acquired the sovereignty he must be initiated +with the sacerdotal order. But Plato was writing of a state of things +which already belonged to the past; nor have we any assurance that his +information on Egyptian institutions was authentic and accurate. Had the +king been necessarily or commonly a member of the priestly order, it is +most improbable that the careful Herodotus, of whose comprehensive work +an entire book was devoted to a minute account of Egypt and its +institutions, and who collected his information from Egyptian priests in +the country itself, would have been ignorant of a part so important, and +tending so much to exalt the dignity of the priesthood, who were much +more likely to affirm it falsely to Plato than to withhold the knowledge +of it if true from Heredotus. Not only is Herodotus silent respecting +any such law or custom, but he thinks it needful to mention that in one +particular instance the king (by name Sethôs) was a priest, which he +would scarcely have done if this had been other than an exceptional +case. It is likely enough that a king of Egypt would learn the hieratic +character, and would not suffer any of the mysteries of law or religion +which were in the keeping of the priests to be withheld from him; and +this was very probably all the foundation which existed for the +assertion of the Eleatic stranger in Plato's dialogue. + +[19] Mill, History of British India, book ii. chap. iii. + +[20] At a somewhat later period M. Comte drew up what he termed a +Positivist Calendar, in which every day was dedicated to some benefactor +of humanity (generally with the addition of a similar but minor +luminary, to be celebrated in the room of his principal each bissextile +year). In this no kind of human eminence, really useful, is omitted, +except that which is merely negative and destructive. On this principle +(which is avowed) the French _philosophes_ as such are excluded, those +only among them being admitted who, like Voltaire and Diderot, had +claims to admission on other grounds: and the Protestant religious +reformers are left out entirely, with the curious exception of George +Fox--who is included, we presume, in consideration of his Peace +principles. + +[21] He goes still further and deeper in a subsequent work. "L'art +ramène doucement à la réalite les contemplations trop abstraites du +théoricien, tandis qu'il pousse noblement le praticien aux speculations +désinteressées." Système de Politique Positive, i. 287. + +[22] 1. _Système de Politique Positive, ou Traité de Sociologie, +instituant la Religion de l'Humanité_. 4 vols. 8vo. Paris: 1851--1854. + +2. _Catéchisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion +Universelle, en onze Entretiens Systématiques entre une Femme et un +Prêtre de l'Humanité_. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1852. + +3. _Appel aux Conservateurs_. Paris: 1855 (brochure). + +4. _Synthèse Subjective, ou Système Universel des Conceptions propres +à l'Etat Normal de l'Humanité_. Tome Premier, contenant le Système de +Logique Positive, ou Traité de Philosophie Mathématique. 8vo. Paris: +1856. + +5. _Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive_. Par E. LITTRE. 1 vol. +8vo. Paris: 1863. + +6. _Exposition Abrégée et Populaire de la Philosophie et de la Religion +Positives_. PAR CÉLESTIN DE BLIGNIÈRES, ancien élève de l'Ecole +Polytechnique. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1857. + +7. _Notice sur l'Oeuvre et sur la Vie d'Auguste Comte_. Par le DOCTEUR +ROBINET, son Médecin, et l'un de ses treize Exécuteurs Testamentaires. 1 +vol. 8vo. Paris: 1860. + +[23] Système de Politique Positive, iv. 100. + +[24] See Sir John Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy, § 319. + +[25] Synthèse Subjective, pp. 10, 11. + +[26] Synthèse Subjective, pp. 11, 12. + + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Auguste Comte and Positivism, by John-Stuart Mill + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM *** + +***** This file should be named 16833-8.txt or 16833-8.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/8/3/16833/ + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: August Comte and Positivism + +Author: John-Stuart Mill + +Release Date: October 9, 2005 [EBook #16833] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AUGUST COMTE AND POSITIVISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe + + + + + +</pre> + + + +<h1>AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM</h1> + +<h3>BY</h3> + +<h2>JOHN STUART MILL</h2> + + +<h4>1865.</h4> + + + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + + + +<h3>PART I.</h3> + +<h2>THE COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE.</h2> + + +<p>For some time much has been said, in England and on the Continent, +concerning "Positivism" and "the Positive Philosophy." Those phrases, +which during the life of the eminent thinker who introduced them had +made their way into no writings or discussions but those of his very few +direct disciples, have emerged from the depths and manifested themselves +on the surface of the philosophy of the age. It is not very widely known +what they represent, but it is understood that they represent something. +They are symbols of a recognised mode of thought, and one of sufficient +importance to induce almost all who now discuss the great problems of +philosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of +the age, to take what is termed the Positivist view of things into +serious consideration, and define their own position, more or less +friendly or hostile, in regard to it. Indeed, though the mode of thought +expressed by the terms Positive and Positivism is widely spread, the +words themselves are, as usual, better known through the enemies of that +mode of thinking than through its friends; and more than one thinker who +never called himself or his opinions by those appellations, and +carefully guarded himself against being confounded with those who did, +finds himself, sometimes to his displeasure, though generally by a +tolerably correct instinct, classed with Positivists, and assailed as a +Positivist. This change in the bearings of philosophic opinion commenced +in England earlier than in France, where a philosophy of a contrary kind +had been more widely cultivated, and had taken a firmer hold on the +speculative minds of a generation formed by Royer-Collard, Cousin, +Jouffroy, and their compeers. The great treatise of M. Comte was +scarcely mentioned in French literature or criticism, when it was +already working powerfully on the minds of many British students and +thinkers. But, agreeably to the usual course of things in France, the +new tendency, when it set in, set in more strongly. Those who call +themselves Positivists are indeed not numerous; but all French writers +who adhere to the common philosophy, now feel it necessary to begin by +fortifying their position against "the Positivist school." And the mode +of thinking thus designated is already manifesting its importance by one +of the most unequivocal signs, the appearance of thinkers who attempt a +compromise or <i>juste milieu</i> between it and its opposite. The acute +critic and metaphysician M. Taine, and the distinguished chemist M. +Berthelot, are the authors of the two most conspicuous of these +attempts.</p> + +<p>The time, therefore, seems to have come, when every philosophic thinker +not only ought to form, but may usefully express, a judgment respecting +this intellectual movement; endeavouring to understand what it is, +whether it is essentially a wholesome movement, and if so, what is to be +accepted and what rejected of the direction given to it by its most +important movers. There cannot be a more appropriate mode of discussing +these points than in the form of a critical examination of the +philosophy of Auguste Comte; for which the appearance of a new edition +of his fundamental treatise, with a preface by the most eminent, in +every point of view, of his professed disciples, M. Littré, affords a +good opportunity. The name of M. Comte is more identified than any other +with this mode of thought. He is the first who has attempted its +complete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all +objects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a +quantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success, +which have not only won but retained the high admiration of thinkers as +radically and strenuously opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the +whole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions. It +would have been a mistake had such thinkers busied themselves in the +first instance with drawing attention to what they regarded as errors in +his great work. Until it had taken the place in the world of thought +which belonged to it, the important matter was not to criticise it, but +to help in making it known. To have put those who neither knew nor were +capable of appreciating the greatness of the book, in possession of its +vulnerable points, would have indefinitely retarded its progress to a +just estimation, and was not needful for guarding against any serious +inconvenience. While a writer has few readers, and no influence except +on independent thinkers, the only thing worth considering in him is what +he can teach us: if there be anything in which he is less wise than we +are already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes when his +errors can do harm. But the high place which M. Comte has now assumed +among European thinkers, and the increasing influence of his principal +work, while they make it a more hopeful task than before to impress and +enforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, for the +first time, not inopportune to discuss his mistakes. Whatever errors he +may have fallen into are now in a position to be injurious, while the +free exposure of them can no longer be so.</p> + +<p>We propose, then, to pass in review the main principles of M. Comte's +philosophy; commencing with the great treatise by which, in this +country, he is chiefly known, and postponing consideration of the +writings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional +illustration of detached points.</p> + +<p>When we extend our examination to these later productions, we shall +have, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognizing, as +in the Cours de Philosophic Positive, an essentially sound view of +philosophy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character +that we deem the subsequent speculations false and misleading, while in +the midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable +thoughts, and suggestions of thought, in detail. For the present we put +out of the question this signal anomaly in M. Comte's intellectual +career. We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to +the world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposition, and in part +creation, of what he terms the Positive Philosophy: endeavouring to +sever what in our estimation is true, from the much less which is +erroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as +we proceed, the part which is specially his, from that which belongs to +the philosophy of the age, and is the common inheritance of thinkers. +This last discrimination has been partially made in a late pamphlet, by +Mr Herbert Spencer, in vindication of his own independence of thought: +but this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with a less limited +purpose, here; especially as Mr Spencer rejects nearly all which +properly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged mode of statement does +scanty justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even +on the direct evidence given by M. Comte himself, who, far from claiming +any originality not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his +own most original thoughts with every germ of anything similar which he +observed in previous thinkers.</p> + +<p>The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, +and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the +following:—We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our +knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the +essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its +relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. +These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same +circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, +and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and +consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we +know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, +either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us.</p> + +<p>M. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. +He avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by +all who have made any real contribution to science, and became +distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of +Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the +founders of the Positive Philosophy. As he says, the knowledge which +mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which +they most needed, was <i>fore</i>knowledge: "savoir, pour prevoir." When they +sought for the cause, it was mainly in order to control the effect or if +it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it. Now, +all foresight of phaenomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of +their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting +their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of +facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its +antecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular +contractions, by means of some fact which experience has shown to be +followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action, +have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted +to ascertain the successions of phaenomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor +the knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other +means.</p> + +<p>The conviction, however, that knowledge of the successions and +co-existences of phaenomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us, +could not be arrived at in a very early stage of the progress of +thought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor +believing that they have attained it; and that, when attained, it is, in +some undefinable manner, greatly more precious than mere knowledge of +sequences and co-existences. The true doctrine was not seen in its full +clearness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his +speculations tend: still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly +apprehended by Newton.<a name="FNanchor_1_1" id="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1" class="fnanchor">[1]</a></p> + +<p>But it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume, +who carries it a step further than Comte, maintaining not merely that +the only causes of phaenomena which can be known to us are other +phaenomena, their invariable antecedents, but that there is no other +kind of causes: cause, as he interprets it, <i>means</i> the invariable +antecedent. This is the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested +by his great adversary, Kant; who, maintaining as strenuously as Comte +that we know nothing of Things in themselves, of Noumena, of real +Substances and real Causes, yet peremptorily asserted their existence. +But neither does Comte question this: on the contrary, all his language +implies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer who has best +stated and defended Comte's fundamental doctrine is Dr Thomas Brown. The +doctrine and spirit of Brown's philosophy are entirely Positivist, and +no better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his Lectures +has yet been produced. Of living thinkers we do not speak; but the same +great truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of +Bentham, and pre-eminently of James Mill: and Sir William Hamilton's +famous doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge has guided many to +it, though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having +understood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had.</p> + +<p>The foundation of M. Comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to +him, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from being +universally accepted even by thoughtful minds.</p> + +<p>The philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, +but a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific +minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte +has never presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine +his own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is, +we require to know, with equal distinctness, what it is not. To enter +into the real character of any mode of thought, we must understand what +other modes of thought compete with it. M. Comte has taken care that we +should do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him, +dispute ascendancy with the Positive, are two in number, both of them +anterior to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical.</p> + +<p>We use the words Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive, because they +are chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte's ideas. Any +philosopher whose thoughts another person undertakes to set forth, has a +right to require that it should be done by means of his own +nomenclature. They are not, however, the terms we should ourselves +choose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas +other than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the +meaning assigned to them, are ill fitted to take, root in English soil; +while Metaphysical suggests, and suggested even to M. Comte, much that +in no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term +Theological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of +condemnation implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of negation than +need be included in the Positive creed. Instead of the Theological we +should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of +nature; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological: and +the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the +objective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential. But +M. Comte's opinions are best stated in his own phraseology; several of +them, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bearings +without it.</p> + +<p>The Theological, which is the original and spontaneous form of thought, +regards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of +sequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or +imaginary, possessed of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of +reason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated. +The next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom +superintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last +merges this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made the whole +universe in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phaenomena by +his continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time +to time by special interferences.</p> + +<p>The mode of thought which M. Comte terms Metaphysical, accounts for +phaenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or +celestial, but to realized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer a +god that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature: it +is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real +existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which +they reside, and which they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads +presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phaenomena, every +plant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the θρεπτίκη ψυχή of +Aristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic +Force, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they +do because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent +Virtue. Phaenomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and +propensities of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as +impersonal, is figured as acting on a sort of motives, and in a manner +more or less analogous to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a +tendency of nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many +natural phaenomena. The rise of water in a pump is attributed to +Nature's horror of a vacuum. The fall of heavy bodies, and the ascent of +flame and smoke, are construed as attempts of each to get to its +<i>natural</i> place. Many important consequences are deduced from the +doctrine that Nature has no breaks (non habet saltum). In medicine the +curative force (vis medicatrix) of Nature furnishes the explanation of +the reparative processes which modern physiologists refer each to its +own particular agencies and laws.</p> + +<p>Examples are not necessary to prove to those who are acquainted with the +past phases of human thought, how great a place both the theological and +the metaphysical interpretations of phaenomena have historically +occupied, as well in the speculations of thinkers as in the familiar +conceptions of the multitude. Many had perceived before M. Comte that +neither of these modes of explanation was final: the warfare against +both of them could scarcely be carried on more vigorously than it +already was, early in the seventeenth century, by Hobbes. Nor is it +unknown to any one who has followed the history of the various physical +sciences, that the positive explanation of facts has substituted itself, +step by step, for the theological and metaphysical, as the progress of +inquiry brought to light an increasing number of the invariable laws of +phaenomena. In these respects M. Comte has not originated anything, but +has taken his place in a fight long since engaged, and on the side +already in the main victorious. The generalization which belongs to +himself, and in which he had not, to the best of our knowledge, been at +all anticipated, is, that every distinct class of human conceptions +passes through all these stages, beginning with the theological, and +proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive: the metaphysical +being a mere state of transition, but an indispensable one, from the +theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally +to prevail, by the universal recognition that all phaemomena without +exception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, +either natural or supernatural, interfere. This general theorem is +completed by the addition, that the theological mode of thought has +three stages, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism: the successive +transitions being prepared, and indeed caused, by the gradual uprising +of the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive, +and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first +and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive.</p> + +<p>This generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines which +originated with M. Comte; and the survey of history, which occupies the +two largest volumes of the six composing his work, is a continuous +exemplification and verification of the law. How well it accords with +the facts, and how vast a number of the greater historical phaenomena it +explains, is known only to those who have studied its exposition, where +alone it can be found—in these most striking and instructive volumes. +As this theory is the key to M. Comte's other generalizations, all of +which arc more or less dependent on it; as it forms the backbone, if we +may so speak, of his philosophy, and, unless it be true, he has +accomplished little; we cannot better employ part of our space than in +clearing it from misconception, and giving the explanations necessary to +remove the obstacles which prevent many competent persons from assenting +to it.</p> + +<p>It is proper to begin by relieving the doctrine from a religious +prejudice. The doctrine condemns all theological explanations, and +replaces them, or thinks them destined to be replaced, by theories which +take no account of anything but an ascertained order of phaenomena. It +is inferred that if this change were completely accomplished, mankind +would cease to refer the constitution of Nature to an intelligent will +or to believe at all in a Creator and supreme Governor of the world. +This supposition is the more natural, as M. Comte was avowedly of that +opinion. He indeed disclaimed, with some acrimony, dogmatic atheism, and +even says (in a later work, but the earliest contains nothing at +variance with it) that the hypothesis of design has much greater +verisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism. But conjecture, founded +on analogy, did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory on, in a mature +state of human intelligence. He deemed all real knowledge of a +commencement inaccessible to us, and the inquiry into it an overpassing +of the essential limits of our mental faculties. To this point, however, +those who accept his theory of the progressive stages of opinion are not +obliged to follow him. The Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a +denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the +origin of all things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by +the very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature +cannot account for their own origin. The Positive philosopher is free to +form his opinion on the subject, according to the weight he attaches to +the analogies which are called marks of design, and to the general +traditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a +question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one upon which Positive +philosophers must necessarily be agreed. It is one of M. Comte's +mistakes that he never allows of open questions. Positive Philosophy +maintains that within the existing order of the universe, or rather of +the part of it known to us, the direct determining cause of every +phaenomenon is not supernatural but natural. It is compatible with this +to believe, that the universe was created, and even that it is +continuously governed, by an Intelligence, provided we admit that the +intelligent Governor adheres to fixed laws, which are only modified or +counteracted by other laws of the same dispensation, and are never +either capriciously or providentially departed from. Whoever regards +all events as parts of a constant order, each one being the invariable +consequent of some antecedent condition, or combination of conditions, +accepts fully the Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or +not an universal antecedent on which the whole system of nature was +originally consequent, and whether that universal antecedent is +conceived as an Intelligence or not.</p> + +<p>There is a corresponding misconception to be corrected respecting the +Metaphysical mode of thought. In repudiating metaphysics, M. Comte did +not interdict himself from analysing or criticising any of the abstract +conceptions of the mind. He was not ignorant (though he sometimes seemed +to forget) that such analysis and criticism are a necessary part of the +scientific process, and accompany the scientific mind in all its +operations. What he condemned was the habit of conceiving these mental +abstractions as real entities, which could exert power, produce +phaenomena, and the enunciation of which could be regarded as a theory +or explanation of facts. Men of the present day with difficulty believe +that so absurd a notion was ever really entertained, so repugnant is it +to the mental habits formed by long and assiduous cultivation of the +positive sciences. But those sciences, however widely cultivated, have +never formed the basis of intellectual education in any society. It is +with philosophy as with religion: men marvel at the absurdity of other +people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities remain in their own, +and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken +for things, who is treating other words as if they were things every +time he opens his mouth to discuss. No one, unless entirely ignorant of +the history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for +realities pervaded speculation all through antiquity and the middle +ages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas +of Plato. The Aristotelians carried it on. Essences, quiddities, virtues +residing in things, were accepted as a <i>bonâ fide</i> explanation of +phaenomena. Not only abstract qualities, but the concrete names of +genera and species, were mistaken for objective existences. It was +believed that there were General Substances corresponding to all the +familiar classes of concrete things: a substance Man, a substance Tree, +a substance Animal, which, and not the individual objects so called, +were directly denoted by those names. The real existence of Universal +Substances was the question at issue in the famous controversy of the +later middle ages between Nominalism and Realism, which is one of the +turning points in the history of thought, being its first struggle to +emancipate itself from the dominion of verbal abstractions. The Realists +were the stronger party, but though the Nominalists for a time +succumbed, the doctrine they rebelled against fell, after a short +interval, with the rest of the scholastic philosophy. But while +universal substances and substantial forms, being the grossest kind of +realized abstractions, were the soonest discarded, Essences, Virtues, +and Occult Qualities long survived them, and were first completely +extruded from real existence by the Cartesians. In Descartes' conception +of science, all physical phaenomena were to be explained by matter and +motion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws: +though his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned +out to be erroneous. Long after him, however, fictitious entities (as +they are happily termed by Bentham) continued to be imagined as means of +accounting for the more mysterious phaenomena; above all in physiology, +where, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious <i>forces</i> and +<i>principles</i> were the explanation, or substitute for explanation, of the +phaenomena of organized beings. To modern philosophers these fictions +are merely the abstract names of the classes of phaenomena which +correspond to them; and it is one of the puzzles of philosophy, how +mankind, after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain +combinations of ideas or images, could have so far forgotten their own +act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality, +and mistake the name of a phaenomenon for its efficient cause. What was +a mystery from the purely dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the +historical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of +phaenomena, but were not so in their origin. To us they denote only the +phaenomena, because we have ceased to believe in what else they once +designated; and the employment of them in explanation is to us +evidently, as M. Comte says, the naïf reproduction of the phaenomenon as +the reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning. The +metaphysical point of view was not a perversion of the positive, but a +transformation of the theological. The human mind, in framing a class of +objects, did not set out from the notion of a name, but from that of a +divinity. The realization of abstractions was not the embodiment of a +word, but the gradual disembodiment of a Fetish.</p> + +<p>The primitive tendency or instinct of mankind is to assimilate all the +agencies which they perceive in Nature, to the only one of which they +are directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object which +seems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visibly +acted upon, to communicate motion without having first received it, they +suppose to possess life, consciousness, will. This first rude conception +of nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all +phaenomena. The simplest observation, without which the preservation of +life would have been impossible, must have pointed out many uniformities +in nature, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly +like one another: and whenever this was observed, men's natural and +untutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class, +and to think of them together: of which it was a natural consequence to +refer effects, which were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than +to a number of wills precisely accordant. But this single will could not +be the will of the objects themselves, since they were many: it must be +the will of an invisible being, apart from the objects, and ruling them +from an unknown distance. This is Polytheism. We are not aware that in +any tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetichism has +been found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the +two coexisted from the earliest period at which the human mind was +capable of forming objects into classes. Fetichism proper gradually +becomes limited to objects possessing a marked individuality. A +particular mountain or river is worshipped bodily (as it is even now by +the Hindoos and the South Sea Islanders) as a divinity in itself, not +the mere residence of one, long after invisible gods have been imagined +as rulers of all the great classes of phaenomena, even intellectual and +moral, as war, love, wisdom, beauty, &c. The worship of the earth +(Tellus or Pales) and of the various heavenly bodies, was prolonged into +the heart of Polytheism. Every scholar knows, though <i>littérateurs</i> and +men of the world do not, that in the full vigour of the Greek religion, +the Sun and Moon, not a god and goddess thereof, were sacrificed to as +deities—older deities than Zeus and his descendants, belonging to the +earlier dynasty of the Titans (which was the mythical version of the +fact that their worship was older), and these deities had a distinct set +of fables or legends connected with them. The father of Phaëthon and the +lover of Endymion were not Apollo and Diana, whose identification with +the Sungod and the Moongoddess was a late invention. Astrolatry, which, +as M. Comte observes, is the last form of Fetichism, survived the other +forms, partly because its objects, being inaccessible, were not so soon +discovered to be in themselves inanimate, and partly because of the +persistent spontaneousness of their apparent motions.</p> + +<p>As far as Fetichism reached, and as long as it lasted, there was no +abstraction, or classification of objects, and no room consequently for +the metaphysical mode of thought. But as soon as the voluntary agent, +whose will governed the phaenomenon, ceased to be the physical object +itself, and was removed to an invisible position, from which he or she +superintended an entire class of natural agencies, it began to seem +impossible that this being should exert his powerful activity from a +distance, unless through the medium of something present on the spot. +Through the same Natural Prejudice which made Newton unable to conceive +the possibility of his own law of gravitation without a subtle ether +filling up the intervening space, and through which the attraction could +be communicated—from this same natural infirmity of the human mind, it +seemed indispensable that the god, at a distance from the object, must +act through something residing in it, which was the immediate agent, the +god having imparted to the intermediate something the power whereby it +influenced and directed the object. When mankind felt a need for naming +these imaginary entities, they called them the <i>nature</i> of the object, +or its <i>essence</i>, or <i>virtues</i> residing in it, or by many other +different names. These metaphysical conceptions were regarded as +intensely real, and at first as mere instruments in the hands of the +appropriate deities. But the habit being acquired of ascribing not only +substantive existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract +entities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined +and faded away, the entities were left standing, and a semblance of +explanation of phaenomena, equal to what existed before, was furnished +by the entities alone, without referring them to any volitions. When +things had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought, had +completely substituted itself for the theological.</p> + +<p>Thus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at +an early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetichistic, +the Polytheistic, and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even +in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which +constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way +beneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one class +of phaenomena after another the laws to which they are really subject. +It was this growth of positive knowledge which principally determined +the next transition in the theological conception of the universe, from +Polytheism to Monotheism.</p> + +<p>It cannot be doubted that this transition took place very tardily. The +conception of a unity in Nature, which would admit of attributing it to +a single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds +admittance after a long period of discipline and preparation, the +obvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many +conflicting principles. We know how high a degree both of material +civilization and of moral and intellectual development preceded the +conversion of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one +God. The superficial observations by which Christian travellers have +persuaded themselves that they found their own Monotheistic belief in +some tribes of savages, have always been contradicted by more accurate +knowledge: those who have read, for instance, Mr Kohl's Kitchigami, know +what to think of the Great Spirit of the American Indians, who belongs +to a well-defined system of Polytheism, interspersed with large remains +of an original Fetichism. We have no wish to dispute the matter with +those who believe that Monotheism was the primitive religion, +transmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted +tradition. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all +the nations of the world except a small and peculiar people, in whom it +was miraculously kept alive, but who were themselves continually lapsing +from it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it +at all in its full meaning, but admitted the real existence of other +gods, though believing their own to be the most powerful, and to be the +Creator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturalness of Monotheism +to the human mind before a certain period in its development, could not +well be required. The highest form of Monotheism, Christianity, has +persisted to the present time in giving partial satisfaction to the +mental dispositions that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its +theology the thoroughly polytheistic conception of a devil. When +Monotheism, after many centuries, made its way to the Greeks and Romans +from the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the +notion of daemons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary +for Christians to deny the existence of the gods previously believed in, +it being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new +God, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the +local deities of all the subjugated nations had been subordinated by +conquest to the divine patrons of the Roman State.</p> + +<p>In whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the +early Monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its +reception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow +preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers. In +the age of the Caesars nearly the whole educated and cultivated class +had outgrown the polytheistic creed, and though individually liable to +returns of the superstition of their childhood, were predisposed (such +of them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the acknowledgment +of one Supreme Providence. It is vain to object that Christianity did +not find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class: +since, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of +that class—many of them, like St Paul, well versed in the mental +culture of their time; and they had evidently found no intellectual +obstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. We must not be deceived +by the recrudescence, at a much later date, of a metaphysical Paganism +in the Alexandrian and other philosophical schools, provoked not by +attachment to Polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social +ascendancy of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had +become congenial to the cultivated mind: and a belief which has gained +the cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is +certain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the multitude +itself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more +complete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy of Zeus; +from which the step to a single Deity, surrounded by a host of angels, +and keeping in recalcitrant subjection an army of devils, was by no +means difficult.</p> + +<p>By what means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been +educated for Monotheism? By the growth of a practical feeling of the +invariability of natural laws. Monotheism had a natural adaptation to +this belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conflicted with +it. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suppose that beings +so powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special +department, the will of any divinity might always be frustrated by +another: and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which +would itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of +invariability, and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy of +a Supreme Deity) it was impossible that the course of any of the +phaenomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the +contrary, all the phaenomena of the universe were under the exclusive +and uncontrollable influence of a single will, it was an admissible +supposition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and +might choose to conduct each class of its operations in an invariable +manner. In proportion, therefore, as the invariable laws of phaenomena +revealed themselves to observers, the theory which ascribed them all to +one will began to grow plausible; but must still have appeared +improbable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the +common rule of all nature. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era +had reached a point of advancement at which this supposition had become +probable. The admirable height to which geometry had already been +carried, had familiarized the educated mind with the conception of laws +absolutely invariable. The logical analysis of the intellectual +processes by Aristotle had shown a similar uniformity of law in the +realm of mind. In the concrete external world, the most imposing +phaenomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the +imagination had done most to keep up the whole system of ideas connected +with supernatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so +regular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which +to the notions of those days must have appeared perfect. And though an +equal degree of regularity had not been discerned in natural phaenomena +generally, even the most empirical observation had ascertained so many +cases of an uniformity <i>almost</i> complete, that inquiring minds were +eagerly on the look-out for further indications pointing in the same +direction; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which, +though hypothetical and essentially premature, it was hoped would turn +out to be correct representations of invariable laws governing large +classes of phaenomena. When this hope and expectation became general, +they were already a great encroachment on the original domain of the +theological principle. Instead of the old conception, of events +regulated from day to day by the unforeseen and changeable volitions of +a legion of deities, it seemed more and more probable that all the +phaenomena of the universe took place according to rules which must have +been planned from the beginning; by which conception the function of the +gods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the +machinery in motion: their subsequent office appeared to be reduced to a +sinecure, or if they continued to reign, it was in the manner of +constitutional kings, bound by the laws to which they had previously +given their assent. Accordingly, the pretension of philosophers to +explain physical phaenomena by physical causes, or to predict their +occurrence, was, up to a very late period of Polytheism, regarded as a +sacrilegious insult to the gods. Anaxagoras was banished for it, +Aristotle had to fly for his life, and the mere unfounded suspicion of +it contributed greatly to the condemnation of Socrates. We are too well +acquainted with this form of the religious sentiment even now, to have +any difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then. +It was inevitable that philosophers should be anxious to get rid of at +least <i>these</i> gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood +immediately in their way; accepting a notion of divine government which +harmonized better with the lessons they learnt from the study of nature, +and a God concerning whom no mythos, as far as they knew, had yet been +invented.</p> + +<p>Again, when the idea became prevalent that the constitution of every +part of Nature had been planned from the beginning, and continued to +take place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of +resemblance extending through all Nature, and affording a presumption +that the whole was the work, not of many, but of the same hand. It must +have appeared vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely +foreseeing Intelligence and immovable Will, than hundreds and thousands +of such. The philosophers had not at that time the arguments which might +have been grounded on universal laws not yet suspected, such as the law +of gravitation and the laws of heat; but there was a multitude, obvious +even to them, of analogies and homologies in natural phaenomena, which +suggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raised up by +their active fancy, aided by their premature scientific theories, all of +which aimed at interpreting some phaenomenon by the analogy of others +supposed to be better known; assuming, indeed, a much greater similarity +among the various processes of Nature, than ampler experience has since +shown to exist. The theological mode of thought thus advanced from +Polytheism to Monotheism through the direct influence of the Positive +mode of thought, not yet aspiring to complete speculative ascendancy. +But, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was +still imperfect even in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest +infancy in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but +not in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was +flexible by entreaty, was incessantly ordering the affairs of mankind by +direct volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by +miraculous interpositions; and this is believed still, wherever the +invariability of law has established itself in men's convictions as a +general, but not as an universal truth.</p> + +<p>In the change from Polytheism to Monotheism, the Metaphysical mode of +thought contributed its part, affording great aid to the up-hill +struggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the +prevailing form, of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has considerably +exaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spirit in this mental +revolution, since by a lax use of terms he credits the Metaphysical mode +of thought with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism—to +the exposure of inconsistencies and absurdities in the received +religions. But this operation is quite independent of the Metaphysical +mode of thought, and was no otherwise connected with it than in being +very generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant +example), since the most eminent efficiency in it does not necessarily +depend on the possession of positive scientific knowledge. But the +Metaphysical spirit, strictly so called, did contribute largely to the +advent of Monotheism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed +between the governing deity and the phaenomena, and forming the +machinery through which these are immediately produced, is not +repugnant, as the theory of direct supernatural volitions is, to the +belief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed +after the exemplar of men—being neither, like them, invested with human +passions, nor supposed, like them, to have power beyond the phaenomena +which are the special department of each, there was no fear of offending +them by the attempt to foresee and define their action, or by the +supposition that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular +tribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the +metaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a +select and instructed class, could say with impunity, speaking of what +were called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were +neither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of +abstract entities was a kind of instinctive conciliation between the +observed uniformity of the facts of nature, and their dependence on +arbitrary volition; since it was easier to conceive a single volition as +setting a machinery to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to +suppose an inflexible constancy in so capricious and changeable a thing +as volition must then have appeared. But though the régime of +abstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded +Monotheism as the condition of its free development. The received +Polytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too +closely mixed up in the daily details of phaenomena, and the habit of +propitiating them and ascertaining their will before any important +action of life was too inveterate, to admit, without the strongest shock +to the received system, the notion that they did not habitually rule by +special interpositions, but left phaenomena in all ordinary cases to the +operation of the essences or peculiar natures which they had first +implanted in them. Any modification of Polytheism which would have made +it fully compatible with the Metaphysical conception of the world, would +have been more difficult to effect than the transition to Monotheism, as +Monotheism was at first conceived.</p> + +<p>We have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important +portion of M. Comte's view of the evolution of human thought, as a +sample of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and interprets +historical facts, and also to obviate some objections to it, grounded on +an imperfect comprehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for +example, think the doctrine of the three successive stages of +speculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three +existed contemporaneously; much as if the natural succession of the +hunting, the nomad, and the agricultural state could be refuted by the +fact that there are still hunters and nomads. That the three states were +contemporaneous, that they all began before authentic history, and still +coexist, is M. Comte's express statement: as well as that the advent of +the two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorganized and +is gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of +explaining phaenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, +of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by +human will, belonged already to the positive mode of thought. The first +and easiest generalizations of common observation, anterior to the first +traces of the scientific spirit, determined the birth of the +Metaphysical mode of thought; and every further advance in the +observation of nature, gradually bringing to light its invariable laws, +determined a further development of the Metaphysical spirit at the +expense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the +conclusions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises of the +Theological could be temporarily made compatible. At a later period, +when the real character of the positive laws of nature had come to be in +a certain degree understood, and the theological idea had assumed, in +scientific minds, its final character, that of a God governing by +general laws, the positive spirit, having now no longer need of the +fictitious medium of imaginary entities, set itself to the easy task of +demolishing the instrument by which it had risen. But though it +destroyed the actual belief in the objective reality of these +abstractions, that belief has left behind it vicious tendencies of the +human mind, which are still far enough from being extinguished, and +which we shall presently have occasion to characterize.</p> + +<p>The next point on which we have to touch is one of greater importance +than it seems. If all human speculation had to pass through the three +stages, we may presume that its different branches, having always been +very unequally advanced, could not pass from one stage to another at the +same time. There must have been a certain order of succession in which +the different sciences would enter, first into the metaphysical, and +afterwards into the purely positive stage; and this order M. Comte +proceeds to investigate. The result is his remarkable conception of a +scale of subordination of the sciences, being the order of the logical +dependence of those which follow on those which precede. It is not at +first obvious how a mere classification of the sciences can be not +merely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of +doctrine; the classification, however, is a very important part of M. +Comte's philosophy.</p> + +<p>He first distinguishes between the abstract and the concrete sciences. +The abstract sciences have to do with the laws which govern the +elementary facts of Nature; laws on which all phaenomena actually +realized must of course depend, but which would have been equally +compatible with many other combinations than those which actually come +to pass. The concrete sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only +with the particular combinations of phaenomena which are found in +existence. For example; the minerals which compose our planet, or are +found in it, have been produced and are held together by the laws of +mechanical aggregation and by those of chemical union. It is the +business of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistry, to ascertain +these laws: to discover how and under what conditions bodies may become +aggregated, and what are the possible modes and results of chemical +combination. The great majority of these aggregations and combinations +take place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories; with these +the concrete science, Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is +with those aggregates, and those chemical compounds, which form +themselves, or have at some period been formed, in the natural world. +Again, Physiology, the abstract science, investigates, by such means as +are available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those +laws determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the +existence and determine the phaenomena of those which actually exist: +but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and +animals very different from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology and +Botany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be +shown to have really existed: and do not concern themselves with the +mode in which even these would comport themselves under all +circumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set +forth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phaenomena +which they in fact present: but they set forth all of these, and take +into simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each +species, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to +whatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong. +The existence of a date tree, or of a lion, is a joint result of many +natural laws, physical, chemical, biological, and even astronomical. +Abstract science deals with these laws separately, but considers each of +them in all its aspects, all its possibilities of operation: concrete +science considers them only in combination, and so far as they exist and +manifest themselves in the animals or plants of which we have +experience. The distinctive attributes of the two are summed up by M. +Comte in the expression, that concrete science relates to Beings, or +Objects, abstract science to Events.<a name="FNanchor_2_2" id="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2" class="fnanchor">[2]</a></p> + +<p>The concrete sciences are inevitably later in their development than the +abstract sciences on which they depend. Not that they begin later to be +studied; on the contrary, they are the earliest cultivated, since in our +abstract investigations we necessarily set out from spontaneous facts. +But though we may make empirical generalizations, we can form no +scientific theory of concrete phaenomena until the laws which govern and +explain them are first known; and those laws are the subject of the +abstract sciences. In consequence, there is not one of the concrete +studies (unless we count astronomy among them) which has received, up to +the present time, its final scientific constitution, or can be accounted +a science, except in a very loose sense, but only materials for science: +partly from insufficiency of facts, but more, because the abstract +sciences, except those at the very beginning of the scale, have not +attained the degree of perfection necessary to render real concrete +sciences possible.</p> + +<p>Postponing, therefore, the concrete sciences, as not yet formed, but +only tending towards formation, the abstract sciences remain to be +classed. These, as marked out by M. Comte, are six in number; and the +principle which he proposes for their classification is admirably in +accordance with the conditions of our study of Nature. It might have +happened that the different classes of phaenomena had depended on laws +altogether distinct; that in changing from one to another subject of +scientific study, the student left behind all the laws he previously +knew, and passed under the dominion of a totally new set of +uniformities. The sciences would then have been wholly independent of +one another; each would have rested entirely on its own inductions, and +if deductive at all, would have drawn its deductions from premises +exclusively furnished by itself. The fact, however, is otherwise. The +relation which really subsists between different kinds of phaenomena, +enables the sciences to be arranged in such an order, that in travelling +through them we do not pass out of the sphere of any laws, but merely +take up additional ones at each step. In this order M. Comte proposes to +arrange them. He classes the sciences in an ascending series, according +to the degree of complexity of their phaenomena; so that each science +depends on the truths of all those which precede it, with the addition +of peculiar truths of its own.</p> + +<p>Thus, the truths of number are true of all things, and depend only on +their own laws; the science, therefore, of Number, consisting of +Arithmetic and Algebra, may be studied without reference to any other +science. The truths of Geometry presuppose the laws of Number, and a +more special class of laws peculiar to extended bodies, but require no +others: Geometry, therefore, can be studied independently of all +sciences except that of Number.</p> + +<p>Rational Mechanics presupposes, and depends on, the laws of number and +those of extension, and along with them another set of laws, those of +Equilibrium and Motion. The truths of Algebra and Geometry nowise depend +on these last, and would have been true if these had happened to be the +reverse of what we find them: but the phaenomena of equilibrium and +motion cannot be understood, nor even stated, without assuming the laws +of number and extension, such as they actually are. The phaenomena of +Astronomy depend on these three classes of laws, and on the law of +gravitation besides; which last has no influence on the truths of +number, geometry, or mechanics. Physics (badly named in common English +parlance Natural Philosophy) presupposes the three mathematical +sciences, and also astronomy; since all terrestrial phaenomena are +affected by influences derived from the motions of the earth and of the +heavenly bodies. Chemical phaenomena depend (besides their own laws) on +all the preceding, those of physics among the rest, especially on the +laws of heat and electricity; physiological phaenomena, on the laws of +physics and chemistry, and their own laws in addition. The phaenomena of +human society obey laws of their own, but do not depend solely upon +these: they depend upon all the laws of organic and animal life, +together with those of inorganic nature, these last influencing society +not only through their influence on life, but by determining the +physical conditions under which society has to be carried on. "Chacun de +ces degré's successifs exige des inductions qui lui sont propres; mais +elles ne peuvent jamais devenir systématiques que sous l'impulsion +déductive resultée de tous les ordres moins compliqués."<a name="FNanchor_3_3" id="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3" class="fnanchor">[3]</a></p> + +<p>Thus arranged by M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an +advance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what +necessarily accompanies increased speciality) an increase of +complexity—a set of phaenomena determined by a more numerous +combination of laws; the sciences stand in the following order: 1st, +Mathematics; its three branches following one another on the same +principle, Number, Geometry, Mechanics. 2nd, Astronomy. 3rd, Physics. +4th, Chemistry. 5th, Biology. 6th, Sociology, or the Social Science, the +phaemomena, of which depend on, and cannot be understood without, the +principal truths of all the other sciences. The subject matter and +contents of these various sciences are obvious of themselves, with the +exception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single +science, and is again divided by M. Comte into five departments: +Barology, or the science of weight; Thermology, or that of heat; +Acoustics, Optics, and Electrology. These he attempts to arrange on the +same principle of increasing speciality and complexity, but they hardly +admit of such a scale, and M. Comte's mode of placing them varied at +different periods. All the five being essentially independent of one +another, he attached little importance to their order, except that +barology ought to come first, as the connecting link with astronomy, and +electrology last, as the transition to chemistry.</p> + +<p>If the best classification is that which is grounded on the properties +most important for our purposes, this classification will stand the +test. By placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their +subject matter, it presents them in the order of their difficulty. Each +science proposes to itself a more arduous inquiry than those which +precede it in the series; it is therefore likely to be susceptible, even +finally, of a less degree of perfection, and will certainly arrive later +at the degree attainable by it. In addition to this, each science, to +establish its own truths, needs those of all the sciences anterior to +it. The only means, for example, by which the physiological laws of life +could have been ascertained, was by distinguishing, among the +multifarious and complicated facts of life, the portion which physical +and chemical laws cannot account for. Only by thus isolating the effects +of the peculiar organic laws, did it become possible to discover what +these are. It follows that the order in which the sciences succeed one +another in the series, cannot but be, in the main, the historical order +of their development; and is the only order in which they can rationally +be studied. For this last there is an additional reason: since the more +special and complete sciences require not only the truths of the simpler +and more general ones, but still more their methods. The scientific +intellect, both in the individual and in the race, must learn in the +move elementary studies that art of investigation and those canons of +proof which are to be put in practice in the more elevated. No intellect +is properly qualified for the higher part of the scale, without due +practice in the lower.</p> + +<p>Mr Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled "The Genesis of Science," and +more recently in a pamphlet on "the Classification of the Sciences," has +criticised and condemned M. Comte's classification, and proposed a more +elaborate one of his own: and M. Littré, in his valuable biographical +and philosophical work on M. Comte ("Auguste Comte et la Philosophie +Positive"), has at some length criticised the criticism. Mr Spencer is +one of the small number of persons who by the solidity and +encyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of +co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, +and entitled to a vote in the estimation of him. But after giving to his +animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr +Spencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy +to find fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways +of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said +against the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of +a classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We +have shown the purposes for which M. Comte's classification is intended. +Mr Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purposes: and +we cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His +chief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of +the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, +and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state +of sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's scale; so that, +the dependence being mutual, there is a <i>consensus</i>, but not an +ascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That the earlier sciences +derive help from the later is undoubtedly true; it is part of M. Comte's +theory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work. When he +affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean +that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of +those which follow. Mr Spencer does not distinguish between the +empirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the +scientific stage. The commencement of every study consists in gathering +together unanalyzed facts, and treasuring up such spontaneous +generalizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage +any branch of inquiry can be carried on independently of every other; +and it is one of M. Comte's own remarks that the most complex, in a +scientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his series, the +study of man as a moral and social being, since from its absorbing +interest it is cultivated more or less by every one, and pre-eminently +by the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater +stock of just though unscientific observations than the more elementary +sciences. It is these empirical truths that the later and more special +sciences lend to the earlier; or, at most, some extremely elementary +scientific truth, which happening to be easily ascertainable by direct +experiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science +already founded, to a higher stage of development; a re-action of the +later sciences on the earlier which M. Comte not only fully recognized, +but attached great importance to systematizing.<a name="FNanchor_4_4" id="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4" class="fnanchor">[4]</a></p> + +<p>But though detached truths relating to the more complex order of +phaenomena may be empirically observed, and a few of them even +scientifically established, contemporaneously with an early stage of +some of the sciences anterior in the scale, such detached truths, as M. +Littré justly remarks, do not constitute a science. What is known of a +subject, only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of +truth; in which the relation between the general principles and the +details is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be +recognized as a case of the operation of wider laws. This point of +progress, at which the study passes from the preliminary state of mere +preparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex +studies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain +regularity of recurrence in the celestial appearances was ascertained +empirically before much progress had been made in geometry; but +astronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly +advanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before +addition and subtraction. The truths of the simpler sciences are a part +of the laws to which the phaenomena of the more complex sciences +conform: and are not only a necessary element in their explanation, but +must be so well understood as to be traceable through complex +combinations, before the special laws which co-exist and co-operate with +them can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte affirms, and +enough for his purpose.<a name="FNanchor_5_5" id="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5" class="fnanchor">[5]</a> He no doubt occasionally indulges in more +unqualified expressions than can be completely justified, regarding the +logical perfection of the construction of his series, and its exact +correspondence with the historical evolution of the sciences; +exaggerations confined to language, and which the details of his +exposition often correct. But he is sufficiently near the truth, in both +respects, for every practical purpose.<a name="FNanchor_6_6" id="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6" class="fnanchor">[6]</a> Minor inaccuracies must often +be forgiven even to great thinkers. Mr Spencer, in the very-writings in +which he criticises M. Comte, affords signal instances of them.<a name="FNanchor_7_7" id="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7" class="fnanchor">[7]</a></p> + +<p>Combining the doctrines, that every science is in a less advanced +state as it occupies a higher place in the ascending scale, and that all +the sciences pass through the three stages, theological, metaphysical, +and positive, it follows that the more special a science is, the tardier +is it in effecting each transition, so that a completely positive state +of an earlier science has often coincided with the metaphysical state of +the one next to it, and a purely theological state of those further on. +This statement correctly represents the general course of the facts, +though requiring allowances in the detail. Mathematics, for example, +from the very beginning of its cultivation, can hardly at any time have +been in the theological state, though exhibiting many traces of the +metaphysical. No one, probably, ever believed that the will of a god +kept parallel lines from meeting, or made two and two equal to four; or +ever prayed to the gods to make the square of the hypothenuse equal to +more or less than the sum of the squares of the sides. The most devout +believers have recognized in propositions of this description a class of +truths independent of the devine omnipotence. Even among the truths +which popular philosophy calls by the misleading name of Contingent the +few which are at once exact and obvious were probably, from the very +first, excepted from the theological explanation. M. Comte observes, +after Adam Smith, that we are not told in any age or country of a god of +Weight. It was otherwise with Astronomy: the heavenly bodies were +believed not merely to be moved by gods, but to be gods themselves: and +when this theory was exploded, there movements were explained by +metaphysical conceptions; such as a tendency of Nature to perfection, in +virtue of which these sublime bodies, being left to themselves, move in +the most perfect orbit, the circle. Even Kepler was full of fancies of +this description, which only terminated when Newton, by unveiling the +real physical laws of the celestial motions, closed the metaphysical +period of astronomical science. As M. Comte remarks, our power of +foreseeing phaenomena, and our power of controlling them, are the two +things which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable +wills. In the case of phaenomena which science has not yet taught us +either to foresee or to control, the theological mode of thought has not +ceased to operate: men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to +avert a shipwreck or a pestilence, but not to put back the stars in +their courses, to abridge the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest +the tides. Such vestiges of the primitive mode of thought linger in +the more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high +degree of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation, +being less antagonistic than the theological to the idea of invariable +laws, is still slower in being entirely discarded. M. Comte finds +remains of it in the sciences which are the most completely positive, +with the single exception of astronomy, mathematics itself not being, he +thinks, altogether free from them: which is not wonderful, when we see +at how very recent a date mathematicians have been able to give the +really positive interpretation of their own symbols.<a name="FNanchor_8_8" id="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8" class="fnanchor">[8]</a> We have already +however had occasion to notice M. Comte's propensity to use the term +metaphysical in cases containing nothing that truly answers to his +definition of the word. For instance, he considers chemistry as tainted +with the metaphysical mode of thought by the notion of chemical +affinity. He thinks that the chemists who said that bodies combine +because they have an affinity for each other, believed in a mysterious +entity residing in bodies and inducing them to combine. On any other +supposition, he thinks the statement could only mean that bodies combine +because they combine. But it really meant more. It was the abstract +expression of the doctrine, that bodies have an invariable tendency to +combine with one thing in preference to another: that the tendencies of +different substances to combine are fixed quantities, of which the +greater always prevails over the less, so that if A detaches B from C in +one case it will do so in every other; which was called having a greater +attraction, or, more technically, a greater affinity for it. This was +not a metaphysical theory, but a positive generalization, which +accounted for a great number of facts, and would have kept its place as +a law of nature, had it not been disproved by the discovery of cases in +which though A detached B from C in some circumstances, C detached it +from A in others, showing the law of elective chemical combination to be +a less simple one than had at first been supposed. In this case, +therefore, M. Comte made a mistake: and he will be found to have made +many similar ones. But in the science next after chemistry, biology, the +empty mode of explanation by scholastic entities, such as a plastic +force, a vital principle, and the like, has been kept up even to the +present day. The German physiology of the school of Oken, +notwithstanding his acknowledged genius, is almost as metaphysical as +Hegel, and there is in France a quite recent revival of the Animism of +Stahl. These metaphysical explanations, besides their inanity, did +serious harm, by directing the course of positive scientific inquiry +into wrong channels. There was indeed nothing to prevent investigating +the mode of action of the supposed plastic or vital force by observation +and experiment; but the phrases gave currency and coherence to a false +abstraction and generalization, setting inquirers to look out for one +cause of complex phaenomena which undoubtedly depended on many.</p> + +<p>According to M. Comte, chemistry entered into the positive stage with +Lavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent +treatise he places the date a generation earlier); and biology at the +beginning of the present, when Bichat drew the fundamental distinction +between nutritive or vegetative and properly animal life, and referred +the properties of organs to the general laws of the component tissues. +The most complex of all sciences, the Social, had not, he maintained, +become positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and +barren contest between the theological and the metaphysical modes of +thought. To make this highest of the sciences positive, and thereby +complete the positive character of all human speculations, was the +principal aim of his labours, and he believed himself to have +accomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term +Positive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by M. Comte in +the same meaning. There never can have been a period in any science when +it was not in some degree positive, since it always professed to draw +conclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been +the last to deny that previous to his own speculations, the world +possessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social +subjects, the evidence of which was obtained by inductive or deductive +processes from observed sequences of phaenomena. Nor could it be denied +that the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the highest +mental capacity had employed their powers, had accepted as thoroughly +the positive point of view, and rejected the theological and +metaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. Montesquieu; even +Macchiavelli; Adam Smith and the political economists universally, both +in France and in England; Bentham, and all thinkers initiated by +him,—had a full conviction that social phaenomena conform to invariable +laws, the discovery and illustration of which was their great object as +speculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that those philosophers +did not get so far as M. Comte in discovering the methods best adapted +to bring these laws to light. It was not, therefore, reserved for M. +Comte to make sociological inquiries positive. But what he really meant +by making a science positive, is what we will call, with M. Littré, +giving it its final scientific constitution; in other words, discovering +or proving, and pursuing to their consequences, those of its truths +which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which +are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the +elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add +(though M. Comte did not) what the laws of association are to +psychology. This is an operation which, when accomplished, puts an end +to the empirical period, and enables the science to be conceived as a +co-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine. This is what had not yet +been done for sociology; and the hope of effecting it was, from his +early years, the prompter and incentive of all M. Comte's philosophic +labours.</p> + +<p>It was with a view to this that he undertook that wonderful +systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences, from +mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would +have stamped him, in all minds competent to appreciate it, as one of the +principal thinkers of the age. To make its nature intelligible to those +who are not acquainted with it, we must explain what we mean by the +philosophy of a science, as distinguished from the science itself. The +proper meaning of philosophy we take to be, what the ancients understood +by it—the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and +social being. Since his intellectual faculties include his knowing +faculty, the science of Man includes everything that man can know, so +far as regards his mode of knowing it: in other words, the whole +doctrine of the conditions of human knowledge. The philosophy of a +Science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its +results, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by +which the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognises them, and +the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest +clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availibility for +use: in one word, the logic of the science. M. Comte has accomplished +this for the first five of the fundamental sciences, with a success +which can hardly be too much admired. We never reopen even the least +admirable part of this survey, the volume on chemistry and biology +(which was behind the actual state of those sciences when first written, +and is far in the rear of them now), without a renewed sense of the +great reach of its speculations, and a conviction that the way to a +complete rationalizing of those sciences, still very imperfectly +conceived by most who cultivate them, has been shown nowhere so +successfully as there.</p> + +<p>Yet, for a correct appreciation of this great philosophical achievement, +we ought to take account of what has not been accomplished, as well as +of what has. Some of the chief deficiencies and infirmities of M. +Comte's system of thought will be found, as is usually the case, in +close connexion with its greatest successes.</p> + +<p>The philosophy of Science consists of two principal parts; the methods +of investigation, and the requisites of proof. The one points out the +roads by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions, the other the +mode of testing their evidence. The former if complete would be an +Organon of Discovery, the latter of Proof. It is to the first of these +that M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a +degree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything +comparable, in its kind, to his survey of the resources which the mind +has at its disposal for investigating the laws of phaenomena; the +circumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration +suitable or unsuitable to each class of phaenomena; the extensions and +transformations which the process of investigation has to undergo in +adapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the +especial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches +the method of positive inquiry, each science in its turn being the best +fitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These, and many +cognate subjects, such as the theory of Classification, and the proper +use of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness +of insight which leaves little to be desired. Not less admirable is his +survey of the most comprehensive truths that had been arrived at by each +science, considered as to their relation to the general sum of human +knowledge, and their logical value as aids to its further progress. But +after all this, there remains a further and distinct question. We are +taught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has +been reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves +that the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises, +whether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove +the conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte +throws no light. He supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he +neither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his +successors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is +real) nor proposes any other in lieu of it: and of induction he has no +canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any +general criterion by which to decide whether a given inductive inference +is correct or not. Yet he does not, with Dr Whewell, regard an inductive +theory as proved if it accounts for the facts: on the contrary, he sets +himself in the strongest opposition to those scientific hypotheses +which, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof, +and are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude for explaining +phenomena. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is +susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true +unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that +its falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He therefore needs a test +of inductive proof; and in assigning none, he seems to give up as +impracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the +beginning of his treatise he speaks of a doctrine of Method, apart from +particular applications, as conceivable, but not needful: method, +according to him, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the +logic of a science can only usefully be taught through the science +itself. Towards the end of the work, he assumes a more decidedly +negative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic +otherwise than in its applications as chimerical. He got on, in his +subsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part +of Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but +did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it.</p> + +<p>This hiatus in M. Comte's system is not unconnected with a defect in his +original conception of the subject matter of scientific investigation, +which has been generally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is +more apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that +he rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation, +true, for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as +distinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The +causes that he regards as inaccessible are causes which are not +themselves phaenomena. Like other people he admits the study of causes, +in every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another. +But he has an objection to the <i>word</i> cause; he will only consent to +speak of Laws of Succession: and depriving himself of the use of a word +which has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses. He +sees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler's laws, and +such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real +distinction between the laws of succession and coexistence which +thinkers of a different school call Laws of Phaenomena, and those of +what they call the action of Causes: the former exemplified by the +succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation which +causes it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable +sequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to +the sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another; why? +Because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not +unconditionally so: those facts only succeed each other, provided that +the presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this +alternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfollowed +by one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, +the one unconditional, the other conditional on the first: laws of +causation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate +laws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale +of mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely, that every +phaenomenon has a phaenomenal cause; has some phaenomenon other than +itself, or some combination of phaenomena, on which it is invariably and +unconditionally consequent. It is on the universality of this law that +the possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general +proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when +the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been +correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be +inconsistent with the constancy of causation; with the universality of +the fact that the phaenomena of nature take place according to +invariable laws of succession.<a name="FNanchor_9_9" id="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9" class="fnanchor">[9]</a> It is probable, therefore, that M. +Comte's determined abstinence from the word and the idea of Cause, had +much to do with his inability to conceive an Inductive Logic, by +diverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be +founded.</p> + +<p>We are afraid it must also be said, though shown only by slight +indications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence +only in his later writings—that M. Comte, at bottom, was not so +solicitous about completeness of proof as becomes a positive +philosopher, and that the unimpeachable objectivity, as he would have +called it, of a conception—its exact correspondence to the realities of +outward fact—was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting +it, if it was subjectively useful, by affording facilities to the mind +for grouping phaenomena. This appears very curiously in his chapters on +the philosophy of Chemistry. He recommends, as a judicious use of "the +degree of liberty left to our intelligence by the end and purpose of +positive science," that we should accept as a convenient generalization +the doctrine that all chemical composition is between two elements only; +that every substance which our analysis decomposes, let us say into four +elements, has for its immediate constituents two hypothetical +substances, each compounded of two simpler ones. There would have been +nothing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed +tentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth may +be tested. With this for its destination, the conception, would have +been legitimate and philosophical; the more so, as, if confirmed, it +would have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances +which analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances in +the same proportions, differ in their general properties, as for +instance, sugar and gum.<a name="FNanchor_10_10" id="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10" class="fnanchor">[10]</a> And if, besides affording a reason for +difference between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a +reason for agreement between things which agree; if the intermediate +link by which the quaternary compound was resolved into two binary ones, +could have been so chosen as to bring each of them within the analogies +of some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose +possible, and which in some particular instances actually happens);<a name="FNanchor_11_11" id="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11" class="fnanchor">[11]</a> +the universality of binary composition would have been a successful +example of an hypothesis in anticipation of a positive theory, to give a +direction to inquiry which might end in its being either proved or +abandoned. But M. Comte evidently thought that even though it should +never be proved—however many cases of chemical composition might always +remain in which the theory was still as hypothetical as at first—so +long as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the +nature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be +retained, for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of +phaenomena under a general conception. In a <i>résumé</i> of the general +principles of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, in +express terms, an unlimited license of adopting "without any vain +scruple" hypothetical conceptions of this sort; "in order to satisfy, +within proper limits, our just mental inclinations, which always turn, +with an instinctive predilection, towards simplicity, continuity, and +generality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of +external laws in so far as accessible to us" (vi. 639). "The most +philosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws +as destined to represent the external world so as to give as much +satisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is +consistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate of +our practical wants" (vi. 642). Among these "essential inclinations" he +includes not only our "instinctive predilection for order and harmony," +which makes us relish any conception, even fictitious, that helps to +reduce phaenomena to system; but even our feelings of taste, "les +convenances purement esthétiques," which, he says, have a legitimate +part in the employment of the "genre de liberté" resté facultatif pour +notre intelligence." After the due satisfaction of our "most eminent +mental inclinations," there will still remain "a considerable margin of +indeterminateness, which should be made use of to give a direct +gratification to our <i>besoin</i> of ideality, by embellishing our +scientific thoughts, without injury to their essential reality" (vi. +647). In consistency with all this, M. Comte warns thinkers against too +severe a scrutiny of the exact truth of scientific laws, and stamps with +"severe reprobation" those who break down "by too minute an +investigation" generalizations already made, without being able to +substitute others (vi. 639): as in the case of Lavoisier's general +theory of chemistry, which would have made that science more +satisfactory than at present to "the instinctive inclinations of our +intelligence" if it had turned out true, but unhappily it did not. These +mental dispositions in M. Comte account for his not having found or +sought a logical criterion of proof; but they are scarcely consistent +with his inveterate hostility to the hypothesis of the luminiferous +ether, which certainly gratifies our "predilection for order and +harmony," not to say our "besoin d'idéalite", in no ordinary degree. +This notion of the "destination" of the study of natural laws is to our +minds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the +Positive conception of science; and contained the germ of the perversion +of his own philosophy which marked his later years. It might be +interesting, but scarcely worth while, to attempt to penetrate to the +just thought which misled M. Comte, for there is almost always a grain +of truth in the errors of an original and powerful mind. There is +another grave aberration in M. Comte's view of the method of positive +science, which though not more unphilosophical than the last mentioned, +is of greater practical importance. He rejects totally, as an invalid +process, psychological observation properly so called, or in other +words, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual +operations. He gives no place in his series of the science of +Psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental +phaenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions, +has a place in his scheme, under the head of Biology, but only as a +branch of physiology. Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks, +be acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other +people's mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without +having learnt what the signs mean by knowledge of ourselves, he does not +state. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the +feelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation. +Our intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot +observe ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning: and if we +could, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate its object, +by stopping the process observed.</p> + +<p>There is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting +which the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Two answers +may be given to it. In the first place, M. Comte might be referred to +experience, and to the writings of his countryman M. Cardaillac and our +own Sir William Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be +conscious of, but attend to, more than one, and even a considerable +number, of impressions at once.<a name="FNanchor_12_12" id="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12" class="fnanchor">[12]</a> It is true that attention is +weakened by being divided; and this forms a special difficulty in +psychological observation, as psychologists (Sir William Hamilton in +particular) have fully recognised; but a difficulty is not an +impossibility. Secondly, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact +may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of +our perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in +which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. +We reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when +its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these +ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies us +to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have +affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We +know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or +by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not +(like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their +results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. +Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe.</p> + +<p>And what Organon for the study of "the moral and intellectual functions" +does M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation which he +repudiates? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is Phrenology! Not, +indeed, he says, as a science formed, but as one still to be created; +for he rejects almost all the special organs imagined by phrenologists, +and accepts only their general division of the brain into the three +regions of the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect,<a name="FNanchor_13_13" id="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13" class="fnanchor">[13]</a> and +the subdivision of the latter region between the organs of meditation +and those of observation. Yet this mere first outline of an +apportionment of the mental functions among different organs, he regards +as extricating the mental study of man from the metaphysical stage, and +elevating it to the positive. The condition of mental science would be +sad indeed if this were its best chance of being positive; for the later +course of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to +confirm, but to discredit, the phrenological hypothesis. And even if +that hypothesis were true, psychological observation would still be +necessary; for how is it possible to ascertain the correspondence +between two things, by observation of only one of them? To establish a +relation between mental functions and cerebral conformations, requires +not only a parallel system of observations applied to each, but (as M. +Comte himself, with some inconsistency, acknowledges) an analysis of the +mental faculties, "des diverses facultés élémentaires," (iii. 573), +conducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the +proof of the theory would lie in the correspondence between the division +of the brain into organs and that of the mind into faculties, each shown +by separate evidence. To accomplish this analysis requires direct +psychological study carried to a high pitch of perfection; it being +necessary, among other things, to investigate the degree in which mental +character is created by circumstances, since no one supposes that +cerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing. The +phrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its necessary preparation +the whole of the Association psychology. Without, then, rejecting any +aid which study of the brain and nerves can afford to psychology (and it +has afforded, and will yet afford, much), we may affirm that M. Comte +has done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental +science. He refused to profit by the very valuable commencements made by +his predecessors, especially by Hartley, Brown, and James Mill (if +indeed any of those philosophers were known to him), and left the +psychological branch of the positive method, as well as psychology +itself, to be put in their true position as a part of Positive +Philosophy by successors who duly placed themselves at the twofold point +of view of physiology and psychology, Mr Bain and Mr Herbert Spencer. +This great mistake is not a mere hiatus in M. Comte's system, but the +parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science. He +is indeed very skilful in estimating the effect of circumstances in +moulding the general character of the human race; were he not, his +historical theory could be of little worth: but in appreciating the +influence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in +producing diversities of character, collective or individual, he is +sadly at fault.</p> + +<p>After this summary view of M. Comte's conception of Positive Philosophy, +it remains to give some account of his more special and equally +ambitious attempt to create the Science of Sociology, or, as he +expresses it, to elevate the study of social phaenomena to the positive +state.</p> + +<p>He regarded all who profess any political opinions as hitherto divided +between the adherents of the theological and those of the metaphysical +mode of thought: the former deducing all their doctrines from divine +ordinances, the latter from abstractions. This assertion, however, +cannot be intended in the same sense as when the terms are applied to +the sciences of inorganic nature; for it is impossible that acts +evidently proceeding from the human will could be ascribed to the agency +(at least immediate) of either divinities or abstractions. No one ever +regarded himself or his fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked +by a god, or as the abode of an entity which was the true author of what +the man himself appeared to do. True, it was believed that the gods, or +God, could move or change human wills, as well as control their +consequences, and prayers were offered to them accordingly, rather as +able to overrule the spontaneous course of things, than as at each +instant carrying it on. On the whole, however, the theological and +metaphysical conceptions, in their application to sociology, had +reference not to the production of phaenomena, but to the rule of duty, +and conduct in life. It is this which was based, either on a divine +will, or on abstract mental conceptions, which, by an illusion of the +rational faculty, were invested with objective validity. On the one +hand, the established rules of morality were everywhere referred to a +divine origin. In the majority of countries the entire civil and +criminal law was looked upon as revealed from above; and it is to the +petty military communities which escaped this delusion, that man is +indebted for being now a progressive being. The fundamental institutions +of the state were almost everywhere believed to have been divinely +established, and to be still, in a greater or less degree, of divine +authority. The divine right of certain lines of kings to rule, and even +to rule absolutely, was but lately the creed of the dominant party in +most countries of Europe; while the divine right of popes and bishops to +dictate men's beliefs (and not respecting the invisible world alone) is +still striving, though under considerable difficulties, to rule mankind. +When these opinions began to be out of date, a rival theory presented +itself to take their place. There were, in truth, many such theories, +and to some of them the term metaphysical, in M. Comte's sense, cannot +justly be applied. All theories in which the ultimate standard of +institutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and +observation and experience the guides (and some such there have been in +all periods of free speculation), are entitled to the name Positive, +whatever, in other respects, their imperfections may be. But these were +a small minority. M. Comte was right in affirming that the prevailing +schools of moral and political speculation, when not theological, have +been metaphysical. They affirmed that moral rules, and even political +institutions, were not means to an end, the general good, but +corollaries evolved from the conception of Natural Rights. This was +especially the case in all the countries in which the ideas of +publicists were the offspring of the Roman Law. The legislators of +opinion on these subjects, when not theologians, were lawyers: and the +Continental lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who followed the Greek +metaphysicians, in acknowledging as the ultimate source of right and +wrong in morals, and consequently in institutions, the imaginary law of +the imaginary being Nature. The first systematizers of morals in +Christian Europe, on any other than a purely theological basis, the +writers on International Law, reasoned wholly from these premises, and +transmitted them to a long line of successors. This mode of thought +reached its culmination in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as +powerful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for +directing the future. The complete victory which this philosophy gained, +in speculation, over the old doctrines, was temporarily followed by an +equally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, having +had, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its +tendencies, and showing what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously +as to determine a partial reaction to the doctrines of feudalism and +Catholicism. Between these and the political metaphysics (meta-politics +as Coleridge called it) of the Revolution, society has since oscillated; +raising up in the process a hybrid intermediate party, termed +Conservative, or the party of Order, which has no doctrines of its own, +but attempts to hold the scales even between the two others, borrowing +alternately the arguments of each, to use as weapons against whichever +of the two seems at the moment most likely to prevail.</p> + +<p>Such, reduced to a very condensed form, is M. Comte's version of the +state of European opinion on politics and society. An Englishman's +criticism would be, that it describes well enough the general division +of political opinion in France and the countries which follow her lead, +but not in England, or the communities of English origin: in all of +which, divine right died out with the Jacobites, and the law of nature +and natural rights have never been favourites even with the extreme +popular party, who preferred to rest their claims on the historical +traditions of their own country, and on maxims drawn from its law books, +and since they outgrew this standard, almost always base them on general +expediency. In England, the preference of one form of government to +another seldom turns on anything but the practical consequences which it +produces, or which are expected from it. M. Comte can point to little of +the nature of metaphysics in English politics, except "la métaphysique +constitutionnelle," a name he chooses to give to the conventional +fiction by which the occupant of the throne is supposed to be the source +from whence all power emanates, while nothing can be further from the +belief or intention of anybody than that such should really be the case. +Apart from this, which is a matter of forms and words, and has no +connexion with any belief except belief in the proprieties, the severest +criticism can find nothing either worse or better, in the modes of +thinking either of our conservative or of our liberal party, than a +particularly shallow and flimsy kind of positivism. The working classes +indeed, or some portion of them, perhaps still rest their claim to +universal suffrage on abstract right, in addition to more substantial +reasons, and thus far and no farther does metaphysics prevail in the +region of English politics. But politics is not the entire art of social +existence: ethics is a still deeper and more vital part of it: and in +that, as much in England as elsewhere, the current opinions are still +divided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical. +What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns supreme +wherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of +Bentham's philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of +ethical science? What else, indeed, is the whole <i>a priori</i> philosophy, +in morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for +it does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of +observation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the +metaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of +erecting a mere creation of the mind into a test or <i>norma</i> of external +truth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already +entertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies them. Of those +who still adhere to the old opinions we need not speak; but when one of +the most vigorous as well as boldest thinkers that English speculation +has yet produced, full of the true scientific spirit, Mr Herbert +Spencer, places in the front of his philosophy the doctrine that the +ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of +its negative; when, following in the steps of Mr Spencer, an able +expounder of positive philosophy like Mr Lewes, in his meritorious and +by no means superficial work on Aristotle, after laying, very justly, +the blame of almost every error of the ancient thinkers on their +neglecting to <i>verify</i> their opinions, announces that there are two +kinds of verification, the Real and the Ideal, the ideal test of truth +being that its negative is unthinkable, and by the application of that +test judges that gravitation must be universal even in the stellar +regions, because in the absence of proof to the contrary, "the idea of +matter without gravity is unthinkable;"—when those from whom it was +least to be expected thus set up acquired necessities of thought in the +minds of one or two generations as evidence of real necessities in the +universe, we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still +rules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature, +and far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and +social being.</p> + +<p>But, while M. Comte is so far in the right, we often, as already +intimated, find him using the name metaphysical to denote certain +practical conclusions, instead of a particular kind of theoretical +premises. Whatever goes by the different names of the revolutionary, the +radical, the democratic, the liberal, the free-thinking, the sceptical, +or the negative and critical school or party in religion, politics, or +philosophy, all passes with him under the designation of metaphysical, +and whatever he has to say about it forms part of his description of the +metaphysical school of social science. He passes in review, one after +another, what he deems the leading doctrines of the revolutionary school +of politics, and dismisses them all as mere instruments of attack upon +the old social system, with no permanent validity as social truth.</p> + +<p>He assigns only this humble rank to the first of all the articles of the +liberal creed, "the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of +unlimited liberty of conscience." As far as this doctrine only means +that opinions, and their expression, should be exempt from <i>legal</i> +restraint, either in the form of prevention or of penalty, M. Comte is a +firm adherent of it: but the <i>moral</i> right of every human being, however +ill-prepared by the necessary instruction and discipline, to erect +himself into a judge of the most intricate as well as the most important +questions that can occupy the human intellect, he resolutely denies. +"There is no liberty of conscience," he said in an early work, "in +astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense +that every one would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the +principles established in those sciences by the competent persons. If it +is otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old +doctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there +are not properly, during the interval, any established opinions." When +first mankind outgrew the old doctrines, an appeal from doctors and +teachers to the outside public was inevitable and indispensable, since +without the toleration and encouragement of discussion and criticism +from all quarters, it would have been impossible for any new doctrines +to grow up. But in itself, the practice of carrying the questions which +more than all others require special knowledge and preparation, before +the incompetent tribunal of common opinion, is, he contends, radically +irrational, and will and ought to cease when once mankind have again +made up their minds to a system of doctrine. The prolongation of this +provisional state, producing an ever-increasing divergence of opinions, +is already, according to him, extremely dangerous, since it is only when +there is a tolerable unanimity respecting the rule of life, that a real +moral control can be established over the self-interest and passions of +individuals. Besides which, when every man is encouraged to believe +himself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he +cannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most +important public duties, and the baneful competition for power and +official functions spreads constantly downwards to a lower and lower +grade of intelligence. In M. Comte's opinion, the peculiarly complicated +nature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous +knowledge and intellectual discipline requisite for them, together with +the serious consequences that may be produced by even, temporary errors +on such subjects, render it necessary in the case of ethics and +politics, still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever +legal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of +mankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number +of minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough +and laborious mental preparation: and that the questioning of their +conclusions by any one, not of an equivalent grade of intellect and +instruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous, and more +blamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sciolists to refute the +Newtonian astronomy. All this is, in a sense, true: but we confess our +sympathy with those who feel towards it like the man in the story, who +being asked whether he admitted that six and five make eleven, refused +to give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it. The +doctrine is one of a class of truths which, unless completed by other +truths, are so liable to perversion, that we may fairly decline to take +notice of them except in connexion with some definite application. In +justice to M. Comte it should be said that he does not wish this +intellectual dominion to be exercised over an ignorant people. Par from +him is the thought of promoting the allegiance of the mass to scientific +authority by withholding from them scientific knowledge. He holds it the +duty of society to bestow on every one who grows up to manhood or +womanhood as complete a course of instruction in every department of +science, from mathematics to sociology, as can possibly be made general: +and his ideas of what is possible in that respect are carried to a +length to which few are prepared to follow him. There is something +startling, though, when closely looked into, not Utopian or chimerical, +in the amount of positive knowledge of the most varied kind which he +believes may, by good methods of teaching, be made the common +inheritance of all persons with ordinary faculties who are born into the +world: not the mere knowledge of results, to which, except for the +practical arts, he attaches only secondary value, but knowledge also of +the mode in which those results were attained, and the evidence on which +they rest, so far as it can be known and understood by those who do not +devote their lives to its study.</p> + +<p>We have stated thus fully M. Comte's opinion on the most fundamental +doctrine of liberalism, because it is the clue to much of his general +conception of politics. If his object had only been to exemplify by that +doctrine the purely negative character of the principal liberal and +revolutionary schools of thought, he need not have gone so far: it would +have been enough to say, that the mere liberty to hold and express any +creed, cannot itself <i>be</i> that creed. Every one is free to believe and +publish that two and two make ten, but the important thing is to know +that they make four. M. Comte has no difficulty in making out an equally +strong case against the other principal tenets of what he calls the +revolutionary school; since all that they generally amount to is, that +something ought not to be: which cannot possibly be the whole truth, and +which M. Comte, in general, will not admit to be even part of it. Take +for instance the doctrine which denies to governments any initiative in +social progress, restricting them to the function of preserving order, +or in other words keeping the peace: an opinion which, so far as +grounded on so-called rights of the individual, he justly regards as +purely metaphysical; but does not recognise that it is also widely held +as an inference from the laws of human nature and human affairs, and +therefore, whether true or false, as a Positive doctrine. Believing with +M. Comte that there are no absolute truths in the political art, nor +indeed in any art whatever, we agree with him that the <i>laisser faire</i> +doctrine, stated without large qualifications, is both unpractical and +unscientific; but it does not follow that those who assert it are not, +nineteen times out of twenty, practically nearer the truth than those +who deny it. The doctrine of Equality meets no better fate at M. Comte's +hands. He regards it as the erection into an absolute dogma of a mere +protest against the inequalities which came down from the middle ages, +and answer no legitimate end in modern society. He observes, that +mankind in a normal state, having to act together, are necessarily, in +practice, organized and classed with some reference to their unequal +aptitudes, natural or acquired, which demand that some should be under +the direction of others: scrupulous regard being at the same time had to +the fulfilment towards all, of "the claims rightfully inherent in the +dignity of a human being; the aggregate of which, still very +insufficiently appreciated, will constitute more and more the principle +of universal morality as applied to daily use... a grand moral +obligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition of +slavery" (iv. 51). There is not a word to be said against these +doctrines: but the practical question is one which M. Comte never even +entertains—viz., when, after being properly educated, people are left +to find their places for themselves, do they not spontaneously class +themselves in a manner much more conformable to their unequal or +dissimilar aptitudes, than governments or social institutions are likely +to do it for them? The Sovereignty of the People, again,—that +metaphysical axiom which in France and the rest of the Continent has so +long been the theoretic basis of radical and democratic politics,—he +regards as of a purely negative character, signifying the right of the +people to rid themselves by insurrection of a social order that has +become oppressive; but, when erected into a positive principle of +government, which condemns indefinitely all superiors to "an arbitrary +dependence upon the multitude of their inferiors," he considers it as a +sort of "transportation to peoples of the divine right so much +reproached to kings" (iv. 55, 56). On the doctrine as a metaphysical +dogma or an absolute principle, this criticism is just; but there is +also a Positive doctrine, without any pretension to being absolute, +which claims the direct participation of the governed in their own +government, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends, +under the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose. +The general result of M. Comte's criticism on the revolutionary +philosophy, is that he deems it not only incapable of aiding the +necessary reorganization of society, but a serious impediment thereto, +by setting up, on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation +of authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and +the solution of all problems: the extreme point of this aberration being +reached by Rousseau and his followers, when they extolled the savage +state, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more +or less marked and complete.</p> + +<p>The state of sociological speculation being such as has been +described—divided between a feudal and theological school, now effete, +and a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the +destruction of the former; the problem, how to render the social science +positive, must naturally have presented itself, more or less distinctly, +to superior minds. M. Comte examines and criticises, for the most part +justly, some of the principal efforts which have been made by individual +thinkers for this purpose. But the weak side of his philosophy comes out +prominently in his strictures on the only systematic attempt yet made by +any body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social +phenomena generally, but of one great class or division of them. We +mean, of course, political economy, which (with a reservation in favour +of the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for +science) he deems unscientific, unpositive, and a mere branch of +metaphysics, that comprehensive category of condemnation in which he +places all attempts at positive science which are not in his opinion +directed by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with the +writings of political economists need only read his few pages of +animadversions on them (iv. 193 to 205), to learn how extremely +superficial M. Comte can sometimes be. He affirms that they have added +nothing really new to the original <i>aperçus</i> of Adam Smith; when every +one who has read them knows that they have added so much as to have +changed the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying and clearing +up in the most essential points the <i>aperçus</i> themselves. He lays an +almost puerile stress, for the purpose of disparagement, on the +discussions about the meaning of words which are found in the best books +on political economy, as if such discussions were not an indispensable +accompaniment of the progress of thought, and abundant in the history of +every physical science. On the whole question he has but one remark of +any value, and that he misapplies; namely, that the study of the +conditions of national wealth as a detached subject is unphilosophical, +because, all the different aspects of social phaenomena acting and +reacting on one another, they cannot be rightly understood apart: which +by no means proves that the material and industrial phaenomena of +society are not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful +generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be +relative to a given form of civilization and a given stage of social +advancement. This, we apprehend, is what no political economist would +deny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values, +prices, and the like, set down in their treatises, would be strictly +true, or many of them true at all, in the savage state (for example), or +in a community composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with +good reason, that whoever understands the political economy of a country +with the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe, +can deduce without difficulty the political economy of any other state +of society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally +well acquainted.<a name="FNanchor_14_14" id="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14" class="fnanchor">[14]</a> We do not pretend that political economy has never +been prosecuted or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is +cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it narrow conclusions. +If a political economist is deficient in general knowledge, he will +exaggerate the importance and universality of the limited class of +truths which he knows. All kinds of scientific men are liable to this +imputation, and M. Comte is never weary of urging it against them; +reproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their +thoughts, their incapacity for large views, and the stupidity of those +they occasionally attempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects. +Political economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other +classes of positive inquirers, but less than most. The principal error +of narrowness with which they are frequently chargeable, is that of +regarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of +mankind, as of universal validity; mistaking temporary or local phases +of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the +wonderful pliability of the human mind; deeming it impossible, in spite +of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a +different type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or +even, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this +narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that a +person is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing +else.</p> + +<p>Thus far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist, only in his +critical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor—the +author of a sociological system. The first question is that of the +Method proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive.</p> + +<p>The Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the +same as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of +experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its +mode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity. In +general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary +facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are +thought out deductively: specific observation of complex phaenomena +yields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function +is to verify the laws obtained by deduction. This mode of philosophizing +is not adequate to the exigencies of sociological investigation. In +social phaemomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the +laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the +results of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phaenomena of man +in society result from his nature as an individual being, it might be +thought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science +must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the +facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been +the conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured +to render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte +considers this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal +laws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think, +rather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human +progress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical +records. But as society proceeds in its development, its phaenomena are +determined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal +human nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over +the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature +the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but +historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by +human society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable +any one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a +world such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human +agency, to predict and calculate the phaenomena of his development such +as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically +considered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study +of history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible +conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been +otherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive +whole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of +development: though history alone cannot prove this to be a necessary +law, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins +the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the +social science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data +of sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the +deductive physical sciences: for while, in these, specific experience +commonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it +is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which +verifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical +evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if +(to use M. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any +very decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it +supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the +desires, or the disinterested desires over the personal; we may know +that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On +the other hand, if laws of social phaenomena, empirically generalized +from history, can when once suggested be affiliated to the known laws of +human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and +changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of +man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical +generalizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a +science.</p> + +<p>Much has been said and written for centuries past, by the practical or +empirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on +principles of human nature, without an historical basis; and the +theorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated on the +practicalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had +penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of +historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the +true footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself +able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as +a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of +the age; while the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for +parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single +instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal +a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited.</p> + +<p>The inversion of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction +is not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper +to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The +common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The +method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There +is no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding +from the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever +point is most open to our observation. In the phaenomena of the social +state, the collective phaenomenon is more accessible to us than the +parts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true +of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and +it is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The +state of every part of the social whole at any time, is intimately +connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious +belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, +commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on +one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in +one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded +or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to +another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a +single impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can +therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even +be detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood +except by examining them in the <i>ensemble</i>. In constructing, therefore, +a theory of society, all the different aspects of the social +organization must be taken into consideration at once.</p> + +<p>Our space is not consistent with inquiring into all the limitations of +this doctrine. It requires many of which M. Comte's theory takes no +account. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice +familiar to students of science, especially of the applications of +mathematics to the study of nature. When an effect depends on several +variable conditions, some of which change less, or more slowly, than +others, we are often able to determine, either by reasoning or by +experiment, what would be the law of variation of the effect if its +changes depended only on some of the conditions, the remainder being +supposed constant. The law so found will be sufficiently near the truth +for all times and places in which the latter set of conditions do not +vary greatly, and will be a basis to set out from when it becomes +necessary to allow for the variations of those conditions also. Most of +the conclusions of social science applicable to practical use are of +this description. M. Comte's system makes no room for them. We have seen +how he deals with the part of them which are the most scientific in +character, the generalizations of political economy.</p> + +<p>There is one more point in the general philosophy of sociology requiring +notice. Social phaenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the +statical, and the dynamical; the phaenomena of equilibrium, and those of +motion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, +considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to +the progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that +of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the +conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics +studies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the +<i>consensus,</i> or interdependence of social phaenomena. The second is the +theory of their filiation.</p> + +<p>The first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more +summary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the +weakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself +to have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,<a name="FNanchor_15_15" id="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15" class="fnanchor">[15]</a> unless +his revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so +considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in +which even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite, while in +our judgment far from being always true.</p> + +<p>He begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which +make social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the +society of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively, for its own +sake, and not out of regard to the advantages it procures for him, +which, in many conditions of humanity, must appear to him very +problematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of +natural benevolence. On the other hand, these social propensities are by +nature weaker than his selfish ones; and the social state, being mainly +kept in existence through the former, involves an habitual antagonism +between the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely +organic upwards, can only be satisfied by means of labour, nor does +bodily labour suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labour, +especially when prolonged and monotonous, is naturally hateful, and +mental labour the most irksome of all; and hence a second antagonism, +which must exist in all societies whatever. The character of the society +is principally determined by the degree in which the better incentive, +in each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In both the +points, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social +instincts may approximate much nearer to the strength of the personal +ones, though never entirely coming up to it; the aversion to labour in +general, and to intellectual labour in particular, may be much weakened, +and the predominance of the inclinations over the reason greatly +diminished, though never completely destroyed. The spirit of improvement +results from the increasing strength of the social instincts, combined +with the growth of an intellectual activity, which guiding the personal +propensities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to +improve his condition. The personal instincts left to their own +guidance, and the indolence and apathy natural to mankind, are the +sources which mainly feed the spirit of Conservation. The struggle +between the two spirits is an universal incident of the social state.</p> + +<p>The next of the universal elements in human society is family life; +which M. Comte regards as originally the sole, and always the principal, +source of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in +general, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and +conduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. M. Comte takes +this opportunity of declaring his opinions on the proper constitution of +the family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of +the most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to +the popular Christian, but to the Catholic view of marriage in its +utmost strictness, and rebukes Protestant nations for having tampered +with the indissolubility of the engagement, by permitting divorce. He +admits that the marriage institution has been, in various respects, +beneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not +yet have reached the last of these modifications; but strenuously +maintains that such changes cannot possibly affect what he regards as +the essential principles of the institution—the irrevocability of the +engagement, and the complete subordination of the wife to the husband, +and of women generally to men; which are precisely the great vulnerable +points of the existing constitution of society on this important +subject. It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but the +incidents of his life which have been made public by his biographers +afford an explanation of one of these two opinions: he had quarrelled +with his wife.<a name="FNanchor_16_16" id="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16" class="fnanchor">[16]</a> At a later period, under the influence of +circumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting +women were very much modified, without becoming more rational: in his +final scheme of society, instead of being treated as grown children, +they were exalted into goddesses: honours, privileges, and immunities, +were lavished on them, only not simple justice. On the other question, +the irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for +impartiality, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his +personal convenience: but we can give him no other credit, for his +argument is not only futile but refutes itself. He says that with +liberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of +experiments and failures; and in the same breath congratulates himself +on the fact, that modern manners and sentiments have in the main +prevented the baneful effects which the toleration of divorce in +Protestant countries might have been expected to produce. He did not +perceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted +what he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage law, it must be +because modern habits and feelings are inconsistent with the perpetual +series of new trials which he dreaded. If there are tendencies in human +nature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand +fixity, in matters which touch the daily sources of happiness; and one +who had studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that +ever since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural, +the latter tendencies have been always gaining ground on the former. All +experience testifies that regularity in domestic relations is almost in +direct proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military +life with its long intervals of idleness, are the conditions to which, +either sexual profligacy, or prolonged vagaries of imagination on that +subject, are congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too +much other occupation for their thoughts: they require that home should +be a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and +disturbance. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has +passed, there is no probability that marriages would often be contracted +without a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent. +That this has been the case hitherto in countries where divorce was +permitted, we have on M. Comte's own showing: and everything leads us to +believe that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in general be used +only for its legitimate purpose—for enabling those who, by a blameless +or excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic +happiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests +concerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favourable +auspices, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social +questions would evidently be incompatible with the nature and limits of +the present paper.</p> + +<p>Lastly, a phaenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly +assuming a wider extension as they advance in their progress, is the +co-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments +and interchange of commodities and services; a communion which extends +to nations as well as individuals. The economic importance of this +spontaneous organization of mankind as joint workers with and for one +another, has often been illustrated. Its moral effects, in connecting +them by their interests, and as a more remote consequence, by their +sympathies, are equally salutary. But there are some things to be said +on the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments; the +division of mankind into innumerable small fractions, each engrossed by +an extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without +inconveniences, as well moral as intellectual, which, if they could not +be remedied, would be a serious abatement from the benefits of advanced +civilization. The interests of the whole—the bearings of things on the +ends of the social union—are less and less present to the minds of men +who have so contracted a sphere of activity. The insignificant detail +which forms their whole occupation—the infinitely minute wheel they +help to turn in the machinery of society—does not arouse or gratify any +feeling of public spirit, or unity with their fellow-men. Their work is +a mere tribute to physical necessity, not the glad performance of a +social office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labour +tells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of +the rest. A man's mind is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards +the great ends of humanity as miserably stunted, by giving all his +thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a +few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of +pins. The "dispersive speciality" of the present race of scientific men, +who, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged +views, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of +mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit, is dwelt on by M. +Comte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one +which most retards moral and intellectual regeneration. To contend +against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the +forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and +liberal general education, preparatory to all special pursuits: and this +is M. Comte's opinion: but the education of youth is not in his +estimation enough: he requires an agency set apart for obtruding upon +all classes of persons through the whole of life, the paramount claims +of the general interest, and the comprehensive ideas that demonstrate +the mode in which human actions promote or impair it. In other words, he +demands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of +guiding men's opinions and enlightening and warning their consciences; a +Spiritual Power, whose judgments on all matters of high moment should +deserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is +paid to the united judgment of astronomers in matters astronomical. The +very idea of such an authority implies that an unanimity has been +attained, at least in essentials, among moral and political thinkers, +corresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other +sciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of +positive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as +they have been applied to the study of physical science: to this, +however, there is no real obstacle; and when once it is accomplished, +the same degree of accordance will naturally follow. The undisputed +authority which astronomers possess in astronomy, will be possessed on +the great social questions by Positive Philosophers; to whom will belong +the spiritual government of society, subject to two conditions: that +they be entirely independent, within their own sphere, of the temporal +government, and that they be peremptorily excluded from all share in it, +receiving instead the entire conduct of education.</p> + +<p>This is the leading feature in M. Comte's conception of a regenerated +society; and however much this ideal differs from that which is implied +more or less confusedly in the negative philosophy of the last three +centuries, we hold the amount of truth in the two to be about the same. +M. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or +revolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other +does not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it +which to the other appear mischievously absurd. It is, without doubt, +the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on +the authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which +they relate. The wisest can act on no other rule, on subjects with which +they are not themselves thoroughly conversant; and the mass of mankind +have always done the like on all the great subjects of thought and +conduct, acting with implicit confidence on opinions of which they did +not know, and were often incapable of understanding, the grounds, but on +which as long as their natural guides were unanimous they fully relied, +growing uncertain and sceptical only when these became divided, and +teachers who as far as they could judge were equally competent, +professed contradictory opinions. Any doctrines which come recommended +by the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt +continue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving +by the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion of +scientific education among the whole people, demanded by M. Comte, their +faith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be +the blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent +deference of those who know much, to those who know still more. It is +those who have some knowledge of astronomy, not those who have none at +all, who best appreciate how prodigiously more Lagrange or Laplace knew +than themselves. This is what can be said in favour of M. Comte. On the +contrary side it is to be said, that in order that this salutary +ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent +thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and +organized. The ascendancy will come of itself when the unanimity is +attained, without which it is neither desirable nor possible. It is +because astronomers agree in their teaching that astronomy is trusted, +and not because there is an Academy of Sciences or a Royal Society +issuing decrees or passing resolutions. A constituted moral authority +can only be required when the object is not merely to promulgate and +diffuse principles of conduct, but to direct the detail of their +application; to declare and inculcate, not duties, but each person's +duty, as was attempted by the spiritual authority of the middle ages. +From this extreme application of his principle M. Comte does not shrink. +A function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged +by individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted to any +organized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism. +This however is what M. Comte really contemplated, though it would +practically nullify that peremptory separation of the spiritual from the +temporal power, which he justly deemed essential to a wholesome state of +society. Those whom an irresistible public opinion invested with the +right to dictate or control the acts of rulers, though without the means +of backing their advice by force, would have all the real power of the +temporal authorities, without their labours or their responsibilities. +M. Comte would probably have answered that the temporal rulers, having +the whole legal power in their hands, would certainly not pay to the +spiritual authority more than a very limited obedience: which amounts to +saying that the ideal form of society which he sets up, is only fit to +be an ideal because it cannot possibly be realized.</p> + +<p>That education should be practically directed by the philosophic class, +when there is a philosophic class who have made good their claim to the +place in opinion hitherto filled by the clergy, would be natural and +indispensable. But that all education should be in the hands of a +centralized authority, whether composed of clergy or of philosophers, +and be consequently all framed on the same model, and directed to the +perpetuation of the same type, is a state of things which instead of +becoming more acceptable, will assuredly be more repugnant to mankind, +with every step of their progress in the unfettered exercise of their +highest faculties. We shall see, in the Second Part, the evils with +which the conception of the new Spiritual Power is pregnant, coming out +into full bloom in the more complete development which M. Comte gave to +the idea in his later years.</p> + +<p>After this unsatisfactory attempt to trace the outline of Social +Statics, M. Comte passes to a topic on which he is much more at +home—the subject of his most eminent speculations; Social Dynamics, or +the laws of the evolution of human society.</p> + +<p>Two questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in +human affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves +them both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of +society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to +our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity +towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached +though incapable of being completely realized. This is the character and +tendency of human development, or of what is called civilization; and +the obligation of seconding this movement—of working in the direction +of it—is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to +a general principle or standard of morality.</p> + +<p>But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various +orders, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic, the question presents +itself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant +agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main +agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development.</p> + +<p>Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, +for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but +because it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength +alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can +draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot +act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the +speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, in +the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual +conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it +is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, +and become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing one +another. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our +animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for a +long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our +intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more +and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are +the prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead, not by its own +strength, but because in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it +points out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least +resistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can +only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and +the necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human +society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, +which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which when provided, +directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. +And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has +always been the leading element in the history of mankind.</p> + +<p>This doctrine has been combated by Mr Herbert Spencer, in the pamphlet +already referred to; and we will quote, in his own words, the theory he +propounds in opposition to it:—</p> + +<div class="blockquot"><p>"Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world; the world is governed +or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The +social mechanism does not rest finally upon opinions, but almost +wholly upon character. Not intellectual anarchy, but moral +antagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phaenomena +are produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs, of +which the emotions are mainly predetermined, while the beliefs are +mainly post-determined. Men's desires are chiefly inherited; but +their beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding +conditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on +the social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The +social state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the +ambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences, indignations, +sympathies, &c., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The +ideas current in this social state must, on the average, lie +congruous with the feelings of citizens, and therefore, on the +average, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas +wholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, and if +introduced from without, cannot get accepted—or, if accepted, die +out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their +acceptance ends. Hence, though advanced ideas, when once +established, act upon society and aid its further advance, yet the +establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society for +receiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social +state determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current +ideas determining the social state and the character. The +modification of men's moral natures, caused by the continuous +discipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to +social relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social +progress."<a name="FNanchor_17_17" id="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17" class="fnanchor">[17]</a> </p></div> + +<p>A great part of these statements would have been acknowledged as true by +M. Comte, and belong as much to his theory as to Mr Spencer's. The +re-action of all other mental and social elements upon the intellectual +not only is fully recognized by him, but his philosophy of history makes +great use of it, pointing out that the principal intellectual changes +could not have taken place unless changes in other elements of society +had preceded; but also showing that these were themselves consequences +of prior intellectual changes. It will not be found, on a fair +examination of what M. Comte has written, that he has overlooked any of +the truth that there is in Mr Spencer's theory. He would not indeed have +said (what Mr Spencer apparently wishes us to say) that the effects +which can be historically traced, for example to religion, were not +produced by the belief in God, but by reverence and fear of him. He +would have said that the reverence and fear presuppose the belief: that +a God must be believed in before he can be feared or reverenced. The +whole influence of the belief in a God upon society and civilization, +depends on the powerful human sentiments which are ready to attach +themselves to the belief; and yet the sentiments are only a social force +at all, through the definite direction given to them by that or some +other intellectual conviction; nor did the sentiments spontaneously +throw up the belief in a God, since in themselves they were equally +capable of gathering round some other object. Though it is true that +men's passions and interests often dictate their opinions, or rather +decide their choice among the two or three forms of opinion, which the +existing condition of human intelligence renders possible, this +disturbing cause is confined to morals, politics, and religion; and it +is the intellectual movement in other regions than these, which is at +the root of all the great changes in human affairs. It was not human +emotions and passions which discovered the motion of the earth, or +detected the evidence of its antiquity; which exploded Scholasticism, +and inaugurated the exploration of nature; which invented printing, +paper, and the mariner's compass. Yet the Reformation, the English and +French revolutions, and still greater moral and social changes yet to +come, are direct consequences of these and similar discoveries. Even +alchemy and astrology were not believed because people thirsted for gold +and were anxious to pry into the future, for these desires are as strong +now as they were then: but because alchemy and astrology were +conceptions natural to a particular stage in the growth of human +knowledge, and consequently determined during that stage the particular +means whereby the passions which always exist, sought their +gratification. To say that men's intellectual beliefs do not determine +their conduct, is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and +not by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the +steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch; +yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which +decide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go.</p> + +<p>Examining next what is the natural order of intellectual progress among +mankind, M. Comte observes, that as their general mode of conceiving the +universe must give its character to all their conceptions of detail, the +determining fact in their intellectual history must be the natural +succession of theories of the universe; which, it has been seen, +consists of three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the +positive. The passage of mankind through these stages, including the +successive modifications of the theological conception by the rising +influence of the other two, is, to M. Comte's mind, the most decisive +fact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously, however, there has +been going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely +temporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the +military mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen) +and its replacement by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there is +a necessary connexion and interdependence between this historical +sequence and the other: and he easily shows that the progress of +industry and that of positive science are correlative; man's power to +modify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has +acquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in +showing a natural connexion between the theological mode of thought and +the military system of society: but since they both belong to the same +age of the world—since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and +they are together modified and together undermined by the same cause, +the progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in +considering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind +emerge from them as a single evolution.</p> + +<p>These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of +social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a +connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large +volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a +sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest +achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects +more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass +of an essay like the present, to give even a faint conception of the +extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be +appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be +made a science, should suspend his judgment until he has read these +volumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change +his opinion; but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance.</p> + +<p>We shall not attempt the vain task of abridgment, a few words are all we +can give to the subject. M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of +human progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van, +and regarding as the successors of a people not their actual +descendants, but those who took up the thread of progress after them. +His object is to characterize truly, though generally, the successive +states of society through which the advanced guard of our species has +passed, and the filiation of these states on one another—how each grew +out of the preceding and was the parent of the following state. A more +detailed explanation, taking into account minute differences and more +special and local phaenomena, M. Comte does not aim at, though he does +not avoid it when it falls in his path. Here, as in all his other +speculations, we meet occasional misjudgments, and his historical +correctness in minor matters is now and then at fault; but we may well +wonder that it is not oftener so, considering the vastness of the field, +and a passage in one of his prefaces in which he says of himself that he +<i>rapidly</i> amassed the materials for his great enterprise (vi. 34). This +expression in his mouth does not imply what it would in that of the +majority of men, regard being had to his rare capacity of prolonged and +concentrated mental labour: and it is wonderful that he so seldom gives +cause to wish that his collection of materials had been less "rapid." +But (as he himself remarks) in an inquiry of this sort the vulgarest +facts are the most important. A movement common to all mankind—to all +of them at least who do move—must depend on causes affecting them all; +and these, from the scale on which they operate, cannot require abstruse +research to bring them to light: they are not only seen, but best seen, +in the most obvious, most universal, and most undisputed phaenomena. +Accordingly M. Comte lays no claim to new views respecting the mere +facts of history; he takes them as he finds them, builds almost +exclusively on those concerning which there is no dispute, and only +tries what positive results can be obtained by combining them. Among the +vast mass of historical observations which he has grouped and +co-ordinated, if we have found any errors they are in things which do +not affect his main conclusions. The chain of causation by which he +connects the spiritual and temporal life of each era with one another +and with the entire series, will be found, we think, in all essentials, +irrefragable. When local or temporary disturbing causes have to be taken +into the account as modifying the general movement, criticism has more +to say. But this will only become important when the attempt is made to +write the history or delineate the character of some given society on M. +Comte's principles.</p> + +<p>Such doubtful statements, or misappreciations of states of society, as +we have remarked, are confined to cases which stand more or less apart +from the principal line of development of the progressive societies. For +instance, he makes greatly too much of what, with many other Continental +thinkers, he calls the Theocratic state. He regards this as a natural, +and at one time almost an universal, stage of social progress, though +admitting that it either never existed or speedily ceased in the two +ancient nations to which mankind are chiefly indebted for being +permanently progressive. We hold it doubtful if there ever existed what +M. Comte means by a theocracy. There was indeed no lack of societies in +which, the civil and penal law being supposed to have been divinely +revealed, the priests were its authorized interpreters. But this is the +case even in Mussulman countries, the extreme opposite of theocracy. By +a theocracy we understand to be meant, and we understand M. Comte to +mean, a society founded on caste, and in which the speculative, +necessarily identical with the priestly caste, has the temporal +government in its hands or under its control. We believe that no such +state of things ever existed in the societies commonly cited as +theocratic. There is no reason to think that in any of them, the king, +or chief of the government, was ever, unless by occasional usurpation, a +member of the priestly caste.<a name="FNanchor_18_18" id="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18" class="fnanchor">[18]</a> It was not so in Israel, even in the +time of the Judges; Jephtha, for example, was a Gileadite, of the tribe +of Manasseh, and a military captain, as all governors in such an age and +country needed to be. Priestly rulers only present themselves in two +anomalous cases, of which next to nothing is known: the Mikados of Japan +and the Grand Lamas of Thibet: in neither of which instances was the +general constitution of society one of caste, and in the latter of them +the priestly sovereignty is as nominal as it has become in the former. +India is the typical specimen of the institution of caste—the only case +in which we are certain that it ever really existed, for its existence +anywhere else is a matter of more or less probable inference in the +remote past. But in India, where the importance of the sacerdotal order +was greater than in any other recorded state of society, the king not +only was not a priest, but, consistently with the religious law, could +not be one: he belonged to a different caste. The Brahmins were invested +with an exalted character of sanctity, and an enormous amount of civil +privileges; the king was enjoined to have a council of Brahmin advisers; +but practically he took their advice or disregarded it exactly as he +pleased. As is observed by the historian who first threw the light of +reason on Hindoo society,<a name="FNanchor_19_19" id="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19" class="fnanchor">[19]</a> the king, though in dignity, to judge by +the written code, he seemed vastly inferior to the Brahmins, had always +the full power of a despotic monarch: the reason being that he had the +command of the army, and the control of the public revenue. There is no +case known to authentic history in which either of these belonged to the +sacerdotal caste. Even in the cases most favourable to them, the +priesthood had no voice in temporal affairs, except the "consultative" +voice which M. Comte's theory allows to every spiritual power. His +collection of materials must have been unusually "rapid" in this +instance, for he regards almost all the societies of antiquity, except +the Greek and Roman, as theocratic, even Gaul under the Druids, and +Persia under Darius; admitting, however, that in these two countries, +when they emerge into the light of history, the theocracy had already +been much broken down by military usurpation. By what evidence he could +have proved that it ever existed, we confess ourselves unable to divine.</p> + +<p>The only other imperfection worth noticing here, which we find in M. +Comte's view of history, is that he has a very insufficient +understanding of the peculiar phaenomena of English development; though +he recognizes, and on the whole correctly estimates, its exceptional +character in relation to the general European movement. His failure +consists chiefly in want of appreciation of Protestantism; which, like +almost all thinkers, even unbelievers, who have lived and thought +exclusively in a Catholic atmosphere, he sees and knows only on its +negative side, regarding the Reformation as a mere destructive movement, +stopped short in too early a stage. He does not seem to be aware that +Protestantism has any positive influences, other than the general ones +of Christianity; and misses one of the most important facts connected +with it, its remarkable efficacy, as contrasted with Catholicism, in +cultivating the intelligence and conscience of the individual believer. +Protestantism, when not merely professed but actually taken into the +mind, makes a demand on the intelligence; the mind is expected to be +active, not passive, in the reception of it. The feeling of a direct +responsibility of the individual immediately to God, is almost wholly a +creation of Protestantism. Even when Protestants were nearly as +persecuting as Catholics (quite as much so they never were); even when +they held as firmly as Catholics that salvation depended on having the +true belief, they still maintained that the belief was not to be +accepted from a priest, but to be sought and found by the believer, at +his eternal peril if he failed; and that no one could answer to God for +him, but that he had to answer for himself. The avoidance of fatal error +thus became in a great measure a question of culture; and there was the +strongest inducement to every believer, however humble, to seek culture +and to profit by it. In those Protestant countries, accordingly, whose +Churches were not, as the Church of England always was, principally +political institutions—in Scotland, for instance, and the New England +States—an amount of education was carried down to the poorest of the +people, of which there is no other example; every peasant expounded the +Bible to his family (many to their neighbours), and had a mind practised +in meditation and discussion on all the points of his religious creed. +The food may not have been the most nourishing, but we cannot be blind +to the sharpening and strengthening exercise which such great topics +gave to the understanding—the discipline in abstraction and reasoning +which such mental occupation brought down to the humblest layman, and +one of the consequences of which was the privilege long enjoyed by +Scotland of supplying the greater part of Europe with professors for its +universities, and educated and skilled workmen for its practical arts.</p> + +<p>This, however, notwithstanding its importance, is, in a comprehensive +view of universal history, only a matter of detail. We find no +fundamental errors in M. Comte's general conception of history. He is +singularly exempt from most of the twists and exaggerations which we are +used to find in almost all thinkers who meddle with speculations of this +character. Scarcely any of them is so free (for example) from the +opposite errors of ascribing too much or too little influence to +accident, and to the qualities of individuals. The vulgar mistake of +supposing that the course of history has no tendencies of its own, and +that great events usually proceed from small causes, or that kings, or +conquerors, or the founders of philosophies and religions, can do with +society what they please, no one has more completely avoided or more +tellingly exposed. But he is equally free from the error of those who +ascribe all to general causes, and imagine that neither casual +circumstances, nor governments by their acts, nor individuals of genius +by their thoughts, materially accelerate or retard human progress. This +is the mistake which pervades the instructive writings of the thinker +who in England and in our own times bore the nearest, though a very +remote, resemblance to M. Comte—the lamented Mr Buckle; who, had he not +been unhappily cut off in an early stage of his labours, and before the +complete maturity of his powers, would probably have thrown off an +error, the more to be regretted as it gives a colour to the prejudice +which regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as +identical with fatalism. Mr Buckle also fell into another mistake which +M. Comte avoided, that of regarding the intellectual as the only +progressive element in man, and the moral as too much the same at all +times to affect even the annual average of crime. M. Comte shows, on the +contrary, a most acute sense of the causes which elevate or lower the +general level of moral excellence; and deems intellectual progress in no +other way so beneficial as by creating a standard to guide the moral +sentiments of mankind, and a mode of bringing those sentiments +effectively to bear on conduct.</p> + +<p>M. Comte is equally free from the error of considering any practical +rule or doctrine that can be laid down in politics as universal and +absolute. All political truth he deems strictly relative, implying as +its correlative a given state or situation of society. This conviction +is now common to him with all thinkers who are on a level with the age, +and comes so naturally to any intelligent reader of history, that the +only wonder is how men could have been prevented from reaching it +sooner. It marks one of the principal differences between the political +philosophy of the present time and that of the past; but M. Comte +adopted it when the opposite mode of thinking was still general, and +there are few thinkers to whom the principle owes more in the way of +comment and illustration.</p> + +<p>Again, while he sets forth the historical succession of systems of +belief and forms of political society, and places in the strongest light +those imperfections in each which make it impossible that any of them +should be final, this does not make him for a moment unjust to the men +or the opinions of the past. He accords with generous recognition the +gratitude due to all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or +even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human +improvement. In all past modes of thought and forms of society he +acknowledged a useful, in many a necessary, office, in carrying mankind +through one stage of improvement into a higher. The theological spirit +in its successive forms, the metaphysical in its principal varieties, +are honoured by him for the services they rendered in bringing mankind +out of pristine savagery into a state in which more advanced modes of +belief became possible. His list of heroes and benefactors of mankind +includes, not only every important name in the scientific movement, from +Thales of Miletus to Fourier the mathematician and Blainville the +biologist, and in the aesthetic from Homer to Manzoni, but the most +illustrious names in the annals of the various religions and +philosophies, and the really great politicians in all states of +society.<a name="FNanchor_20_20" id="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20" class="fnanchor">[20]</a> Above all, he has the most profound admiration for the +services rendered by Christianity, and by the Church of the middle ages. +His estimate of the Catholic period is such as the majority of +Englishmen (from whom we take the liberty to differ) would deem +exaggerated, if not absurd. The great men of Christianity, from St Paul +to St Francis of Assisi, receive his warmest homage: nor does he forget +the greatness even of those who lived and thought in the centuries in +which the Catholic Church, having stopt short while the world had gone +on, had become a hindrance to progress instead of a promoter of it; such +men as Fénélon and St Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Joseph de Maistre. A +more comprehensive, and, in the primitive sense of the term, more +catholic, sympathy and reverence towards real worth, and every kind of +service to humanity, we have not met with in any thinker. Men who would +have torn each other in pieces, who even tried to do so, if each +usefully served in his own way the interests of mankind, are all +hallowed to him.</p> + +<p>Neither is his a cramped and contracted notion of human excellence, +which cares only for certain forms of development. He not only +personally appreciates, but rates high in moral value, the creations of +poets and artists in all departments, deeming them, by their mixed +appeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to +educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual +horizon of people of the world.<a name="FNanchor_21_21" id="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21" class="fnanchor">[21]</a> He regards the law of progress as +applicable, in spite of appearances, to poetry and art as much as to +science and politics. The common impression to the contrary he ascribes +solely to the fact, that the perfection of aesthetic creation requires +as its condition a consentaneousness in the feelings of mankind, which +depends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions: +while the last five centuries have been a period not of settling, but of +unsettling and decomposing, the most general beliefs and sentiments of +mankind. The numerous monuments of poetic and artistic genius which the +modern mind has produced even under this great disadvantage, are (he +maintains) sufficient proof what great productions it will be capable +of, when one harmonious vein of sentiment shall once more thrill through +the whole of society, as in the days of Homer, of Aeschylus, of Phidias, +and even of Dante.</p> + +<p>After so profound and comprehensive a view of the progress of human +society in the past, of which the future can only be a prolongation, it +is natural to ask, to what use does he put this survey as a basis of +practical recommendations? Such recommendations he certainly makes, +though, in the present Treatise, they are of a much less definite +character than in his later writings. But we miss a necessary link; +there is a break in the otherwise close concatenation of his +speculations. We fail to see any scientific connexion between his +theoretical explanation of the past progress of society, and his +proposals for future improvement. The proposals are not, as we might +expect, recommended as that towards which human society has been tending +and working through the whole of history. It is thus that thinkers have +usually proceeded, who formed theories for the future, grounded on +historical analysis of the past. Tocqueville, for example, and others, +finding, as they thought, through all history, a steady progress in the +direction of social and political equality, argued that to smooth this +transition, and make the best of what is certainly coming, is the proper +employment of political foresight. We do not find M. Comte supporting +his recommendations by a similar line of argument. They rest as +completely, each on its separate reasons of supposed utility, as with +philosophers who, like Bentham, theorize on politics without any +historical basis at all. The only bridge of connexion which leads from +his historical speculations to his practical conclusions, is the +inference, that since the old powers of society, both in the region of +thought and of action, are declining and destined to disappear, leaving +only the two rising powers, positive thinkers on the one hand, leaders +of industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these: +spiritual power to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of +historical forecast this is very deficient; for are there not the masses +as well as the leaders of industry? and is not theirs also a growing +power? Be this as it may, M. Comte's conceptions of the mode in which +these growing powers should be organized and used, are grounded on +anything rather than on history. And we cannot but remark a singular +anomaly in a thinker of M. Comte's calibre. After the ample evidence he +has brought forward of the slow growth of the sciences, all of which +except the mathematico-astronomical couple are still, as he justly +thinks, in a very early stage, it yet appears as if, to his mind, the +mere institution of a positive science of sociology were tantamount to +its completion; as if all the diversities of opinion on the subject, +which set mankind at variance, were solely owing to its having been +studied in the theological or the metaphysical manner, and as if when +the positive method which has raised up real sciences on other subjects +of knowledge, is similarly employed on this, divergence would at once +cease, and the entire body of positive social inquirers would exhibit as +much agreement in their doctrines as those who cultivate any of the +sciences of inorganic life. Happy would be the prospects of mankind if +this were so. A time such as M. Comte reckoned upon may come; unless +something stops the progress of human improvement, it is sure to come: +but after an unknown duration of hard thought and violent controversy. +The period of decomposition, which has lasted, on his own computation, +from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the present, is not yet +terminated: the shell of the old edifice will remain standing until +there is another ready to replace it; and the new synthesis is barely +begun, nor is even the preparatory analysis completely finished. On +other occasions M. Comte is very well aware that the Method of a science +is not the science itself, and that when the difficulty of discovering +the right processes has been overcome, there remains a still greater +difficulty, that of applying them. This, which is true of all sciences, +is truest of all in Sociology. The facts being more complicated, and +depending on a greater concurrence of forces, than in any other science, +the difficulty of treating them deductively is proportionally increased, +while the wide difference between any one case and every other in some +of the circumstances which affect the result, makes the pretence of +direct induction usually no better than empiricism. It is therefore, out +of all proportion, more uncertain than in any other science, whether two +inquirers equally competent and equally disinterested will take the same +view of the evidence, or arrive at the same conclusion. When to this +intrinsic difficulty is added the infinitely greater extent to which +personal or class interests and predilections interfere with impartial +judgment, the hope of such accordance of opinion among sociological +inquirers as would obtain, in mere deference to their authority, the +universal assent which M. Comte's scheme of society requires, must be +adjourned to an indefinite distance.</p> + +<p>M. Comte's own theory is an apt illustration of these difficulties, +since, though prepared for these speculations as no one had ever been +prepared before, his views of social regeneration even in the +rudimentary form in which they appear above-ground in this treatise (not +to speak of the singular system into which he afterwards enlarged them) +are such as perhaps no other person of equal knowledge and capacity +would agree in. Were those views as true as they are questionable, they +could not take effect until the unanimity among positive thinkers, to +which he looked forward, shall have been attained; since the mainspring +of his system is a Spiritual Power composed of positive philosophers, +which only the previous attainment of the unanimity in question could +call into existence. A few words will sufficiently express the outline +of his scheme. A corporation of philosophers, receiving a modest support +from the state, surrounded by reverence, but peremptorily excluded not +only from all political power or employment, but from all riches, and +all occupations except their own, are to have the entire direction of +education: together with, not only the right and duty of advising and +reproving all persons respecting both their public and their private +life, but also a control (whether authoritative or only moral is not +defined) over the speculative class itself, to prevent them from wasting +time and ingenuity on inquiries and speculations of no value to mankind +(among which he includes many now in high estimation), and compel them +to employ all their powers on the investigations which may be judged, at +the time, to be the most urgently important to the general welfare. The +temporal government which is to coexist with this spiritual authority, +consists of an aristocracy of capitalists, whose dignity and authority +are to be in the ratio of the degree of generality of their conceptions +and operations—bankers at the summit, merchants next, then +manufacturers, and agriculturists at the bottom of the scale. No +representative system, or other popular organization, by way of +counterpoise to this governing power, is ever contemplated. The checks +relied upon for preventing its abuse, are the counsels and remonstrances +of the Spiritual Power, and unlimited liberty of discussion and comment +by all classes of inferiors. Of the mode in which either set of +authorities should fulfil the office assigned to it, little is said in +this treatise: but the general idea is, while regulating as little as +possible by law, to make the pressure of opinion, directed by the +Spiritual Power, so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the +most powerful, as to render legal obligation, in as many cases as +possible, needless. Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals +form no part of the scheme. M. Comte looks on them with as great +jealousy as any scholastic pedagogue, or ecclesiastical director of +consciences. Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be +open to the public eye, and to be kept, by the power of opinion, in the +course which the Spiritual corporation shall judge to be the most right.</p> + +<p>This is not a sufficiently tempting picture to have much chance of +making converts rapidly, and the objections to the scheme are too +obvious to need stating. Indeed, it is only thoughtful persons to whom +it will be credible, that speculations leading to this result can +deserve the attention necessary for understanding them. We propose in +the next Essay to examine them as part of the elaborate and coherent +system of doctrine, which M. Comte afterwards put together for the +reconstruction of society. Meanwhile the reader will gather, from what +has been said, that M. Comte has not, in our opinion, created Sociology. +Except his analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but +which we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features, +superseded, he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to +be done over again, and better. Nevertheless, he has greatly advanced +the study. Besides the great stores of thought, of various and often of +eminent merit, with which he has enriched the subject, his conception of +its method is so much truer and more profound than that of any one who +preceded him, as to constitute an era in its cultivation. If it cannot +be said of him that he has created a science, it may be said truly that +he has, for the first time, made the creation possible. This is a great +achievement, and, with the extraordinary merit of his historical +analysis, and of his philosophy of the physical sciences, is enough to +immortalize his name. But his renown with posterity would probably have +been greater than it is now likely to be, if after showing the way in +which the social science should be formed, he had not flattered himself +that he had formed it, and that it was already sufficiently solid for +attempting to build upon its foundation the entire fabric of the +Political Art.</p> + + + +<hr style='width: 45%;' /> + + + +<h3>PART II.</h3> + +<h2>THE LATER SPECULATIONS OF M. COMTE.<a name="FNanchor_22_22" id="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22" class="fnanchor">[22]</a></h2> + + +<p>The appended list of publications contain the materials for knowing and +estimating what M. Comte termed his second career, in which the +<i>savant</i>, historian, and philosopher of his fundamental treatise, came +forth transfigured as the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity. They +include all his writings except the Cours de Philosophic Positive: for +his early productions, and the occasional publications of his later life, +are reprinted as Preludes or Appendices to the treatises here enumerated, +or in Dr Robinet's volume, which, as well as that of M. Littré, +also contains copious extracts from his correspondence.</p> + +<p>In the concluding pages of his great systematic work, M. Comte had +announced four other treatises as in contemplation: on Politics; on the +Philosophy of Mathematics; on Education, a project subsequently enlarged +to include the systematization of Morals; and on Industry, or the action +of man upon external nature. Our list comprises the only two of these +which he lived to execute. It further contains a brief exposition of his +final doctrines, in the form of a Dialogue, or, as he terms it, a +Catechism, of which a translation has been published by his principal +English adherent, Mr Congreve. There has also appeared very recently, +under the title of "A General View of Positivism," a translation by Dr +Bridges, of the Preliminary Discourse in six chapters, prefixed to the +Système de Politique Positive. The remaining three books on our list are +the productions of disciples in different degrees. M. Littré, the only +thinker of established reputation who accepts that character, is a +disciple only of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, and can see the weak +points even in that. Some of them he has discriminated and discussed +with great judgment: and the merits of his volume, both as a sketch of +M. Comte's life and an appreciation of his doctrines, would well deserve +a fuller notice than we are able to give it here. M. de Blignières is a +far more thorough adherent; so much so, that the reader of his +singularly well and attractively written condensation and popularization +of his master's doctrines, does not easily discover in what it falls +short of that unqualified acceptance which alone, it would seem, could +find favour with M. Comte. For he ended by casting off M. de Blignières, +as he had previously cast off M. Littré, and every other person who, +having gone with him a certain length, refused to follow him to the end. +The author of the last work in our enumeration, Dr Robinet, is a +disciple after M. Comte's own heart; one whom no difficulty stops, and +no absurdity startles. But it is far from our disposition to speak +otherwise than respectfully of Dr Robinet and the other earnest men, who +maintain round the tomb of their master an organized co-operation for +the diffusion of doctrines which they believe destined to regenerate the +human race. Their enthusiastic veneration for him, and devotion to the +ends he pursued, do honour alike to them and to their teacher, and are +an evidence of the personal ascendancy he exercised over those who +approached him; an ascendancy which for a time carried away even M. +Littré, as he confesses, to a length which his calmer judgment does not +now approve.</p> + +<p>These various writings raise many points of interest regarding M. +Comte's personal history, and some, not without philosophic bearings, +respecting his mental habits: from all which matters we shall abstain, +with the exception of two, which he himself proclaimed with great +emphasis, and a knowledge of which is almost indispensable to an +apprehension of the characteristic difference between his second career +and his first. It should be known that during his later life, and even +before completing his first great treatise, M. Comte adopted a rule, to +which he very rarely made any exception: to abstain systematically, not +only from newspapers or periodical publications, even scientific, but +from all reading whatever, except a few favourite poets in the ancient +and modern European languages. This abstinence he practised for the sake +of mental health; by way, as he said, of "<i>hygiène cérébrale</i>." We are +far from thinking that the practice has nothing whatever to recommend +it. For most thinkers, doubtless, it would be a very unwise one; but we +will not affirm that it may not sometimes be advantageous to a mind of +the peculiar quality of M. Comte's—one that can usefully devote itself +to following out to the remotest developments a particular line of +meditations, of so arduous a kind that the complete concentration of the +intellect upon its own thoughts is almost a necessary condition of +success. When a mind of this character has laboriously and +conscientiously laid in beforehand, as M. Comte had done, an ample stock +of materials, he may be justified in thinking that he will contribute +most to the mental wealth of mankind by occupying himself solely in +working upon these, without distracting his attention by continually +taking in more matter, or keeping a communication open with other +independent intellects. The practice, therefore, may be legitimate; but +no one should adopt it without being aware of what he loses by it. He +must resign the pretension of arriving at the whole truth on the +subject, whatever it be, of his meditations. That he should effect this, +even on a narrow subject, by the mere force of his own mind, building on +the foundations of his predecessors, without aid or correction from his +contemporaries, is simply impossible. He may do eminent service by +elaborating certain sides of the truth, but he must expect to find that +there are other sides which have wholly escaped his attention. However +great his powers, everything that he can do without the aid of incessant +remindings from other thinkers, is merely provisional, and will require +a thorough revision. He ought to be aware of this, and accept it with +his eyes open, regarding himself as a pioneer, not a constructor. If he +thinks that he can contribute most towards the elements of the final +synthesis by following out his own original thoughts as far as they will +go, leaving to other thinkers, or to himself at a subsequent time, the +business of adjusting them to the thoughts by which they ought to be +accompanied, he is right in doing so. But he deludes himself if he +imagines that any conclusions he can arrive at, while he practises M. +Comte's rule of <i>hygiène cérébrale</i>, can possibly be definitive.</p> + +<p>Neither is such a practice, in a hygienic point of view, free from the +gravest dangers to the philosopher's own mind. When once he has +persuaded himself that he can work out the final truth on any subject, +exclusively from his own sources, he is apt to lose all measure or +standard by which to be apprized when he is departing from common sense. +Living only with his own thoughts, he gradually forgets the aspect they +present to minds of a different mould from his own; he looks at his +conclusions only from the point of view which suggested them, and from +which they naturally appear perfect; and every consideration which from +other points of view might present itself, either as an objection or as +a necessary modification, is to him as if it did not exist. When his +merits come to be recognised and appreciated, and especially if he +obtains disciples, the intellectual infirmity soon becomes complicated +with a moral one. The natural result of the position is a gigantic +self-confidence, not to say self-conceit. That of M. Comte is colossal. +Except here and there in an entirely self-taught thinker, who has no +high standard with which to compare himself, we have met with nothing +approaching to it. As his thoughts grew more extravagant, his +self-confidence grew more outrageous. The height it ultimately attained +must be seen, in his writings, to be believed.</p> + +<p>The other circumstance of a personal nature which it is impossible not +to notice, because M. Comte is perpetually referring to it as the origin +of the great superiority which he ascribes to his later as compared with +his earlier speculations, is the "moral regeneration" which he underwent +from "une angélique influence" and "une incomparable passion privée." He +formed a passionate attachment to a lady whom he describes as uniting +everything which is morally with much that is intellectually admirable, +and his relation to whom, besides the direct influence of her character +upon his own, gave him an insight into the true sources of human +happiness, which changed his whole conception of life. This attachment, +which always remained pure, gave him but one year of passionate +enjoyment, the lady having been cut off by death at the end of that +short period; but the adoration of her memory survived, and became, as +we shall see, the type of his conception of the sympathetic culture +proper for all human beings. The change thus effected in his personal +character and sentiments, manifested itself at once in his speculations; +which, from having been only a philosophy, now aspired to become a +religion; and from having been as purely, and almost rudely, scientific +and intellectual, as was compatible with a character always enthusiastic +in its admirations and in its ardour for improvement, became from this +time what, for want of a better name, may be called sentimental; but +sentimental in a way of its own, very curious to contemplate. In +considering the system of religion, politics, and morals, which in his +later writings M. Comte constructed, it is not unimportant to bear in +mind the nature of the personal experience and inspiration to which he +himself constantly attributed this phasis of his philosophy. But as we +shall have much more to say against, than in favour of, the conclusions +to which he was in this manner conducted, it is right to declare that, +from the evidence of his writings, we really believe the moral influence +of Madame Clotilde de Vaux upon his character to have been of the +ennobling as well as softening character which he ascribes to it. Making +allowance for the effects of his exuberant growth in self-conceit, we +perceive almost as much improvement in his feelings, as deterioration in +his speculations, compared with those of the Philosophie Positive. Even +the speculations are, in some secondary aspects, improved through the +beneficial effect of the improved feelings; and might have been more so, +if, by a rare good fortune, the object of his attachment had been +qualified to exercise as improving an influence over him intellectually +as morally, and if he could have been contented with something less +ambitious than being the supreme moral legislator and religious pontiff +of the human race.</p> + +<p>When we say that M. Comte has erected his philosophy into a religion, +the word religion must not be understood in its ordinary sense. He made +no change in the purely negative attitude which he maintained towards +theology: his religion is without a God. In saying this, we have done +enough to induce nine-tenths of all readers, at least in our own +country, to avert their faces and close their ears. To have no religion, +though scandalous enough, is an idea they are partly used to: but to +have no God, and to talk of religion, is to their feelings at once an +absurdity and an impiety. Of the remaining tenth, a great proportion, +perhaps, will turn away from anything which calls itself by the name of +religion at all. Between the two, it is difficult to find an audience +who can be induced to listen to M. Comte without an insurmountable +prejudice. But, to be just to any opinion, it ought to be considered, +not exclusively from an opponent's point of view, but from that of the +mind which propounds it. Though conscious of being in an extremely small +minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief +in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, +an instructive and profitable object of contemplation.</p> + +<p>What, in truth, are the conditions necessary to constitute a religion? +There must be a creed, or conviction, claiming authority over the whole +of human life; a belief, or set of beliefs, deliberately adopted, +respecting human destiny and duty, to which the believer inwardly +acknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate. Moreover, +there must be a sentiment connected with this creed, or capable of being +invoked by it, sufficiently powerful to give it in fact, the authority +over human conduct to which it lays claim in theory. It is a great +advantage (though not absolutely indispensable) that this sentiment +should crystallize, as it were, round a concrete object; if possible a +really existing one, though, in all the more important cases, only +ideally present. Such an object Theism and Christianity offer to the +believer: but the condition may be fulfilled, if not in a manner +strictly equivalent, by another object. It has been said that whoever +believes in "the Infinite nature of Duty," even if he believe in nothing +else, is religious. M. Comte believes in what is meant by the infinite +nature of duty, but ho refers the obligations of duty, as well as all +sentiments of devotion, to a concrete object, at once ideal and real; +the Human Race, conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the +present, and the future. This great collective existence, this "Grand +Etre," as he terms it, though the feelings it can excite are necessarily +very different from those which direct themselves towards an ideally +perfect Being, has, as he forcibly urges, this advantage in respect to +us, that it really needs our services, which Omnipotence cannot, in any +genuine sense of the term, be supposed to do: and M. Comte says, that +assuming the existence of a Supreme Providence (which he is as far from +denying as from affirming), the best, and even the only, way in which we +can rightly worship or serve Him, is by doing our utmost to love and +serve that other Great Being, whose inferior Providence has bestowed on +us all the benefits that we owe to the labours and virtues of former +generations. It may not be consonant to usage to call this a religion; +but the term so applied has a meaning, and one which is not adequately +expressed by any other word. Candid persons of all creeds may be willing +to admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense +of duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other +sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that +person has a religion: and though everyone naturally prefers his own +religion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this +attachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our +fellow-creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and +conscience, be called an intrinsically bad one. Many, indeed, may be +unable to believe that this object is capable of gathering round it +feelings sufficiently strong: but this is exactly the point on which a +doubt can hardly remain in an intelligent reader of M. Comte: and we +join with him in contemning, as equally irrational and mean, the +conception of human nature as incapable of giving its love and devoting +its existence to any object which cannot afford in exchange an eternity +of personal enjoyment.</p> + +<p>The power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general +interest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as a motive +to conduct, many have perceived; but we know not if any one, before M. +Comte, realized so fully as he has done, all the majesty of which that +idea is susceptible. It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, +embraces the manifold present, and descends into the indefinite and +unforeseeable future, forming a collective Existence without assignable +beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is +deeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the +imposingness of all our highest conceptions. Of the vast unrolling web +of human life, the part best known to us is irrevocably past; this we +can no longer serve, but can still love: it comprises for most of us the +far greater number of those who have loved us, or from whom we have +received benefits, as well as the long series of those who, by their +labours and sacrifices for mankind, have deserved to be held in +everlasting and grateful remembrance. As M. Comte truly says, the +highest minds, even now, live in thought with the great dead, far more +than with the living; and, next to the dead, with those ideal human +beings yet to come, whom they are never destined to see. If we honour as +we ought those who have served mankind in the past, we shall feel that +we are also working for those benefactors by serving that to which their +lives were devoted. And when reflection, guided by history, has taught +us the intimacy of the connexion of every age of humanity with every +other, making us see in the earthly destiny of mankind the playing out +of a great drama, or the action of a prolonged epic, all the generations +of mankind become indissolubly united into a single image, combining all +the power over the mind of the idea of Posterity, with our best feelings +towards the living world which surrounds us, and towards the +predecessors who have made us what we are. That the ennobling power of +this grand conception may have its full efficacy, we should, with M. +Comte, regard the Grand Etre, Humanity, or Mankind, as composed, in the +past, solely of those who, in every age and variety of position, have +played their part worthily in life. It is only as thus restricted that +the aggregate of our species becomes an object deserving our veneration. +The unworthy members of it are best dismissed from our habitual +thoughts; and the imperfections which adhered through life, even to +those of the dead who deserve honourable remembrance, should be no +further borne in mind than is necessary not to falsify our conception of +facts. On the other hand, the Grand Etre in its completeness ought to +include not only all whom we venerate, but all sentient beings to which +we owe duties, and which have a claim on our attachment. M. Comte, +therefore, incorporates into the ideal object whose service is to be the +law of our life, not our own species exclusively, but, in a subordinate +degree, our humble auxiliaries, those animal races which enter into real +society with man, which attach themselves to him, and voluntarily +co-operate with him, like the noble dog who gives his life for his human +friend and benefactor. For this M. Comte has been subjected to unworthy +ridicule, but there is nothing truer or more honourable to him in the +whole body of his doctrines. The strong sense he always shows of the +worth of the inferior animals, and of the duties of mankind towards +them, is one of the very finest traits of his character.</p> + +<p>We, therefore, not only hold that M. Comte was justified in the attempt +to develope his philosophy into a religion, and had realized the +essential conditions of one, but that all other religions are made +better in proportion as, in their practical result, they are brought to +coincide with that which he aimed at constructing. But, unhappily, the +next thing we are obliged to do, is to charge him with making a complete +mistake at the very outset of his operations—with fundamentally +misconceiving the proper office of a rule of life. He committed the +error which is often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of +utilitarian moralists; he required that the test of conduct should also +be the exclusive motive to it. Because the good of the human race is the +ultimate standard of right and wrong, and because moral discipline +consists in cultivating the utmost possible repugnance to all conduct +injurious to the general good, M. Comte infers that the good of others +is the only inducement on which we should allow ourselves to act; and +that we should endeavour to starve the whole of the desires which point +to our personal satisfaction, by denying them all gratification not +strictly required by physical necessities. The golden rule of morality, +in M. Comte's religion, is to live for others, "vivre pour autrui." To +do as we would be done by, and to love our neighbour as ourself, are not +sufficient for him: they partake, he thinks, of the nature of personal +calculations. We should endeavour not to love ourselves at all. We shall +not succeed in it, but we should make the nearest approach to it +possible. Nothing less will satisfy him, as towards humanity, than the +sentiment which one of his favourite writers, Thomas à Kempis, addresses +to God: Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te. All education and +all moral discipline should have but one object, to make altruism (a +word of his own coming) predominate over egoism. If by this were only +meant that egoism is bound, and should be taught, always to give way to +the well-understood interests of enlarged altruism, no one who +acknowledges any morality at all would object to the proposition. But M. +Comte, taking his stand on the biological fact that organs are +strengthened by exercise and atrophied by disuse, and firmly convinced +that each of our elementary inclinations has its distinct cerebral +organ, thinks it the grand duty of life not only to strengthen the +social affections by constant habit and by referring all our actions to +them, but, as far as possible, to deaden the personal passions and +propensities by desuetude. Even the exercise of the intellect is +required to obey as an authoritative rule the dominion of the social +feelings over the intelligence (du coeur sur l'esprit). The physical and +other personal instincts are to be mortified far beyond the demands of +bodily health, which indeed the morality of the future is not to insist +much upon, for fear of encouraging "les calculs personnels." M. Comte +condemns only such austerities as, by diminishing the vigour of the +constitution, make us less capable of being useful to others. Any +indulgence, even in food, not necessary to health and strength, he +condemns as immoral. All gratifications except those of the affections, +are to be tolerated only as "inevitable infirmities." Novalis said of +Spinoza that he was a God-intoxicated man: M. Comte is a +morality-intoxicated man. Every question with him is one of morality, +and no motive but that of morality is permitted.</p> + +<p>The explanation of this we find in an original mental twist, very common +in French thinkers, and by which M. Comte was distinguished beyond them +all. He could not dispense with what he called "unity." It was for the +sake of Unity that a religion was, in his eyes, desirable. Not in the +mere sense of Unanimity, but in a far wider one. A religion must be +something by which to "systematize" human life. His definition of it, in +the "Catéchisme," is "the state of complete unity which distinguishes +our existence, at once personal and social, when all its parts, both +moral and physical, converge habitually to a common destination.... Such +a harmony, individual and collective, being incapable of complete +realization in an existence so complicated as ours, this definition of +religion characterizes the immovable type towards which tends more and +more the aggregate of human efforts. Our happiness and our merit consist +especially in approaching as near as possible to this unity, of which +the gradual increase constitutes the best measure of real improvement, +personal or social." To this theme he continually returns, and argues +that this unity or harmony among all the elements of our life is not +consistent with the predominance of the personal propensities, since +these drag us in different directions; it can only result from the +subordination of them all to the social icelings, which may be made to +act in a uniform direction by a common system of convictions, and which +differ from the personal inclinations in this, that we all naturally +encourage them in one another, while, on the contrary, social life is a +perpetual restraint upon the selfish propensities.</p> + +<p>The <i>fons errorum</i> in M. Comte's later speculations is this inordinate +demand for "unity" and "systematization." This is the reason why it does +not suffice to him that all should be ready, in case of need, to +postpone their personal interests and inclinations to the requirements +of the general good: he demands that each should regard as vicious any +care at all for his personal interests, except as a means to the good of +others—should be ashamed of it, should strive to cure himself of it, +because his existence is not "systematized," is not in "complete unity," +as long as he cares for more than one thing. The strangest part of the +matter is, that this doctrine seems to M. Comte to be axiomatic. That +all perfection consists in unity, he apparently considers to be a maxim +which no sane man thinks of questioning. It never seems to enter into +his conceptions that any one could object <i>ab initio</i>, and ask, why this +universal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing? Why is it +necessary that all human life should point but to one object, and be +cultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the +fact that mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings, +obtain a greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the +rules and conditions required by the good of the rest, than when each +makes the good of the rest his only subject, and allows himself no +personal pleasures not indispensable to the preservation of his +faculties? The regimen of a blockaded town should be cheerfully +submitted to when high purposes require it, but is it the ideal +perfection of human existence? M. Comte sees none of these difficulties. +The only true happiness, he affirms, is in the exercise of the +affections. He had found it so for a whole year, which was enough to +enable him to get to the bottom of the question, and to judge whether he +could do without everything else. Of course the supposition was not to +be heard of that any other person could require, or be the better for, +what M. Comte did not value. "Unity" and "systematization" absolutely +demanded that all other people should model themselves after M. Comte. +It would never do to suppose that there could be more than one road to +human happiness, or more than one ingredient in it.</p> + +<p>The most prejudiced must admit that this religion without theology is +not chargeable with relaxation of moral restraints. On the contrary, it +prodigiously exaggerates them. It makes the same ethical mistake as the +theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the glory +of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive +that between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate +space, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons +should be bound, by other people's opinion, to do everything that they +would deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which +all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not +obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain +the pursuit of his personal objects within the limits consistent with +the essential interests of others. What those limits are, it is the +province of ethical science to determine; and to keep all individuals +and aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of +punishment and of moral blame. If in addition to fulfilling this +obligation, persons make the good of others a direct object of +disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent +personal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit +objects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this +conduct by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a +necessary condition is its spontaneity; since the notion of a happiness +for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is +really felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spontaneity by +no means excludes sympathetic encouragement; but the encouragement +should take the form of making self-devotion pleasant, not that of +making everything else painful. The object should be to stimulate +services to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the pursuit +of our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the +reproaches of other and of our own conscience. The proper office of +those sanctions is to enforce upon every one, the conduct necessary to +give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists +in not doing them harm, and not impeding them in anything which without +harming others does good to themselves. To this must of course be added, +that when we either expressly or tacitly undertake to do more, we are +bound to keep our promise. And inasmuch as every one, who avails himself +of the advantages of society, leads others to expect from him all such +positive good offices and disinterested services as the moral +improvement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he deserves +moral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that expectation. +Through this principle the domain of moral duty is always widening. When +what once was uncommon virtue becomes common virtue, it comes to be +numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding what has grown +common, remains simply meritorious.</p> + +<p>M. Comte is accustomed to draw most of his ideas of moral cultivation +from the discipline of the Catholic Church. Had he followed that +guidance in the present case, he would have been less wide of the mark. +For the distinction which we have drawn was fully recognized by the +sagacious and far-sighted men who created the Catholic ethics. It is +even one of the stock reproaches against Catholicism, that it has two +standards of morality, and does not make obligatory on all Christians +the highest rule of Christian perfection. It has one standard which, +faithfully acted up to, suffices for salvation, another and a higher +which when realized constitutes a saint. M. Comte, perhaps +unconsciously, for there is nothing that he would have been more +unlikely to do if he had been aware of it, has taken a leaf out of the +book of the despised Protestantism. Like the extreme Calvinists, he +requires that all believers shall be saints, and damns then (after his +own fashion) if they are not.</p> + +<p>Our conception of human life is different. We do not conceive life to be +so rich in enjoyments, that it can afford to forego the cultivation of +all those which address themselves to what M. Comte terms the egoistic +propensities. On the contrary, we believe that a sufficient +gratification of these, short of excess, but up to the measure which +renders the enjoyment greatest, is almost always favourable to the +benevolent affections. The moralization of the personal enjoyments we +deem to consist, not in reducing them to the smallest possible amount, +but in cultivating the habitual wish to share them with others, and with +all others, and scorning to desire anything for oneself which is +incapable of being so shared. There is only one passion or inclination +which is permanently incompatible with this condition—the love of +domination, or superiority, for its own sake; which implies, and is +grounded on, the equivalent depression of other people. As a rule of +conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be +attempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting +to do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this, +society, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more; for the +natural activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions, +will expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception of the moral +rule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard +there is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted +heroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement, +though not converted into an obligation. It is as much a part of our +scheme as of M. Comte's, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and +the subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute +moral duty, should be one of the chief aims of education, both +individual and collective. We even recognize the value, for this end, of +ascetic discipline, in the original Greek sense of the word. We think +with Dr Johnson, that he who has never denied himself anything which is +not wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself everything which +is so. We do not doubt that children and young persons will one day be +again systematically disciplined in self-mortification; that they will +be taught, as in antiquity, to control their appetites, to brave +dangers, and submit voluntarily to pain, as simple exercises in +education. Something has been lost as well as gained by no longer giving +to every citizen the training necessary for a soldier. Nor can any pains +taken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being +useful to others and to the world, by the practice, independently of +reward and of every personal consideration, of positive virtue beyond +the bounds of prescribed duty. No efforts should be spared to associate +the pupil's self-respect, and his desire of the respect of others, with +service rendered to Humanity; when possible, collectively, but at all +events, what is always possible, in the persons of its individual +members. There are many remarks and precepts in M. Comte's volumes, +which, as no less pertinent to our conception of morality than to his, +we fully accept. For example; without admitting that to make "calculs +personnels" is contrary to morality, we agree with him in the opinion, +that the principal hygienic precepts should be inculcated, not solely or +principally as maxims of prudence, but as a matter of duty to others, +since by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering to +our fellow-creatures the services to which they are entitled. As M. +Comte truly says, the prudential motive is by no means fully sufficient +for the purpose, even physicians often disregarding their own precepts. +The personal penalties of neglect of health are commonly distant, as +well as more or less uncertain, and require the additional and more +immediate sanction of moral responsibility. M. Comte, therefore, in this +instance, is, we conceive, right in principle; though we have not the +smallest doubt that he would have gone into extreme exaggeration in +practice, and would have wholly ignored the legitimate liberty of the +individual to judge for himself respecting his own bodily conditions, +with due relation to the sufficiency of his means of knowledge, and +taking the responsibility of the result.</p> + +<p>Connected with the same considerations is another idea of M. Comte, +which has great beauty and grandeur in it, and the realization of which, +within the bounds of possibility, would be a cultivation of the social +feelings on a most essential point. It is, that every person who lives +by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an +individual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary; +and his wages, of whatever sort, as not the remuneration or +purchase-money of his labour, which should be given freely, but as the +provision made by society to enable him to carry it on, and to replace +the materials and products which have been consumed in the process. M. +Comte observes, that in modern industry every one in fact works much +more for others than for himself, since his productions are to be +consumed by others, and it is only necessary that his thoughts and +imagination should adapt themselves to the real state of the fact. The +practical problem, however, is not quite so simple, for a strong sense +that he is working for others may lead to nothing better than feeling +himself necessary to them, and instead of freely giving his commodity, +may only encourage him to put a high price upon it. What M. Comte really +means is that we should regard working for the benefit of others as a +good in itself; that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for +the sake of remuneration, which cannot justly be claimed for doing what +we like: that the proper return for a service to society is the +gratitude of society: and that the moral claim of any one in regard to +the provision for his personal wants, is not a question of <i>quid pro +quo</i> in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the circumstances +of society permit to be assigned to him, consistently with the just +claims of others. To this opinion we entirely subscribe. The rough +method of settling the labourer's share of the produce, the competition +of the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a +moral ideal. Its defence is, that civilization has not hitherto been +equal to organizing anything better than this first rude approach to an +equitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the present go less wrong +by leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it artificially +in any mode which has yet been tried. But in whatever manner that +question may ultimately be decided, the true moral and social idea of +Labour is in no way affected by it. Until labourers and employers +perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform +that of an army, industry will never be moralized, and military life +will remain, what, in spite of the anti-social character of its direct +object, it has hitherto been—the chief school of moral co-operation.</p> + +<p>Thus far of the general idea of M. Comte's ethics and religion. We must +now say something of the details. Here we approach the ludicrous side of +the subject: but we shall unfortunately have to relate other things far +more really ridiculous.</p> + +<p>There cannot be a religion without a <i>cultus.</i> We use this term for want +of any other, for its nearest equivalent, worship, suggests a different +order of ideas. We mean by it, a set of systematic observances, intended +to cultivate and maintain the religious sentiment. Though M. Comte +justly appreciates the superior efficacy of acts, in keeping up and +strengthening the feeling which prompts them, over any mode whatever of +mere expression, he takes pains to organize the latter also with great +minuteness. He provides an equivalent both for the private devotions, +and for the public ceremonies, of other faiths. The reader will be +surprised to learn, that the former consists of prayer. But prayer, as +understood by M. Comte, does not mean asking; it is a mere outpouring of +feeling; and for this view of it he claims the authority of the +Christian mystics. It is not to be addressed to the Grand Etre, to +collective Humanity; though he occasionally carries metaphor so far as +to style this a goddess. The honours to collective Humanity are reserved +for the public celebrations. Private adoration is to be addressed to it +in the persons of worthy individual representatives, who may be either +living or dead, but must in all cases be women; for women, being the +<i>sexe aimant</i>, represent the best attribute of humanity, that which +ought to regulate all human life, nor can Humanity possibly be +symbolized in any form but that of a woman. The objects of private +adoration are the mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing +severally the past, the present, and the future, and calling into active +exercise the three social sentiments, veneration, attachment, and +kindness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian +angels, "les vrais anges gardiens." If the last two have never existed, +or if, in the particular case, any of the three types is too faulty for +the office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by some other +type of womanly excellence, even by one merely historical. Be the object +living or dead, the adoration (as we understand it) is to be addressed +only to the idea. The prayer consists of two parts; a commemoration, +followed by an effusion. By a commemoration M. Comte means an effort of +memory and imagination, summoning up with the utmost possible vividness +the image of the object: and every artifice is exhausted to render the +image as life-like, as close to the reality, as near an approach to +actual hallucination, as is consistent with sanity. This degree of +intensity having been, as far as practicable, attained, the effusion +follows. Every person should compose his own form of prayer, which +should be repeated not mentally only, but orally, and may be added to or +varied for sufficient cause, but never arbitrarily. It may be +interspersed with passages from the best poets, when they present +themselves spontaneously, as giving a felicitous expression to the +adorer's own feeling. These observances M. Comte practised to the memory +of his Clotilde, and he enjoins them on all true believers. They are to +occupy two hours of every day, divided into three parts; at rising, in +the middle of the working hours, and in bed at night. The first, which +should be in a kneeling attitude, will commonly be the longest, and the +second the shortest. The third is to be extended as nearly as possible +to the moment of falling asleep, that its effect may be felt in +disciplining even the dreams.</p> + +<p>The public <i>cultus</i> consists of a series of celebrations or festivals, +eighty-four in the year, so arranged that at least one occurs in every +week. They are devoted to the successive glorification of Humanity +itself; of the various ties, political and domestic, among mankind; of +the successive stages in the past evolution of our species; and of the +several classes into which M. Comte's polity divides mankind. M. Comte's +religion has, moreover, nine Sacraments; consisting in the solemn +consecration, by the priests of Humanity, with appropriate exhortations, +of all the great transitions in life; the entry into life itself, and +into each of its successive stages: education, marriage, the choice of a +profession, and so forth. Among these is death, which receives the name +of transformation, and is considered as a passage from objective +existence to subjective—to living in the memory of our +fellow-creatures. Having no eternity of objective existence to offer, M. +Comte's religion gives it all he can, by holding out the hope of +subjective immortality—of existing in the remembrance and in the +posthumous adoration of mankind at large, if we have done anything to +deserve remembrance from them; at all events, of those whom we loved +during life; and when they too are gone, of being included in the +collective adoration paid to the Grand Etre. People are to be taught to +look forward to this as a sufficient recompense for the devotion of a +whole life to the service of Humanity. Seven years after death, comes +the last Sacrament: a public judgment, by the priesthood, on the memory +of the defunct. This is not designed for purposes of reprobation, but of +honour, and any one may, by declaration during life, exempt himself from +it. If judged, and found worthy, he is solemnly incorporated with the +Grand Etre, and his remains are transferred from the civil to the +religious place of sepulture: "le bois sacré" qui doit entourer chaque +temple de l'Humanité."</p> + +<p>This brief abstract gives no idea of the minuteness of M. Comte's +prescriptions, and the extraordinary height to which he carries the +mania for regulation by which Frenchmen are distinguished among +Europeans, and M. Comte among Frenchmen. It is this which throws an +irresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject. There is nothing +really ridiculous in the devotional practices which M. Comte recommends +towards a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come +unprompted from the depths of the individual feeling; but there is +something ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practise +them three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his +feelings require them, but for the premeditated, purpose of getting his +feelings up. The ludicrous, however, in any of its shapes, is a +phaenomenon with which M. Comte seems to have been totally unacquainted. +There is nothing in his writings from which it could be inferred that he +knew of the existence of such things as wit and humour. The only writer +distinguished for either, of whom he shows any admiration, is Molière, +and him he admires not for his wit but for his wisdom. We notice this +without intending any reflection on M. Comte; for a profound conviction +raises a person above the feeling of ridicule. But there are passages in +his writings which, it really seems to us, could have been written by no +man who had ever laughed. We will give one of these instances. Besides +the regular prayers, M. Comte's religion, like the Catholic, has need of +forms which can be applied to casual and unforeseen occasions. These, he +says, must in general be left to the believer's own choice; but he +suggests as a very suitable one the repetition of "the fundamental +formula of Positivism," viz., "l'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base, +et le progrès pour but." Not content, however, with an equivalent for +the Paters and Aves of Catholicism, he must have one for the sign of the +cross also; and he thus delivers himself:<a name="FNanchor_23_23" id="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23" class="fnanchor">[23]</a> "Cette expansion peut être +perfectionnée par des signes universels.... Afin de mieux développer +l'aptitude nécessaire de la formule positiviste à représenter toujours +la condition humaine, il convient ordinairement de l'énoncer en touchant +successivement les principaux organes que la théorie cérébrale assigne à +ses trois éléments." This <i>may</i> be a very appropriate mode of expressing +one's devotion to the Grand Etre: but any one who had appreciated its +effect on the profane reader, would have thought it judicious to keep it +back till a considerably more advanced stage in the propagation of the +Positive Religion.</p> + +<p>As M. Comte's religion has a <i>cultus</i>, so also it has a clergy, who are +the pivot of his entire social and political system. Their nature and +office will be best shown by describing his ideal of political society +in its normal state, with the various classes of which it is composed.</p> + +<p>The necessity of a Spiritual Power, distinct and separate from the +temporal government, is the essential principle of M. Comte's political +scheme; as it may well be, since the Spiritual Power is the only +counterpoise he provides or tolerates, to the absolute dominion of the +civil rulers. Nothing can exceed his combined detestation and contempt +for government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative +institutions in any form. They are an expedient, in his opinion, only +suited to a state of transition, and even that nowhere but in England. +The attempt to naturalize them in France, or any Continental nation, he +regards as mischievous quackery. Louis Napoleon's usurpation is +absolved, is made laudable to him, because it overthrew a representative +government. Election of superiors by inferiors, except as a +revolutionary expedient, is an abomination in his sight. Public +functionaries of all kinds should name their successors, subject to the +approbation of their own superiors, and giving public notice of the +nomination so long beforehand as to admit of discussion, and the timely +revocation of a wrong choice. But, by the side of the temporal rulers, +he places another authority, with no power to command, but only to +advise and remonstrate. The family being, in his mind as in that of +Frenchmen generally, the foundation and essential type of all society, +the separation of the two powers commences there. The spiritual, or +moral and religious power, in a family, is the women of it. The +positivist family is composed of the "fundamental couple," their +children, and the parents of the man, if alive. The whole government of +the household, except as regards the education of the children, resides +in the man; and even over that he has complete power, but should forbear +to exert it. The part assigned to the women is to improve the man +through his affections, and to bring up the children, who, until the age +of fourteen, at which scientific instruction begins, are to be educated +wholly by their mother. That women may be better fitted for these +functions, they are peremptorily excluded from all others. No woman is +to work for her living. Every woman is to be supported by her husband or +her male relations, and if she has none of these, by the State. She is +to have no powers of government, even domestic, and no property. Her +legal rights of inheritance are preserved to her, that her feelings of +duty may make her voluntarily forego them. There are to be no marriage +portions, that women may no longer be sought in marriage from interested +motives. Marriages are to be rigidly indissoluble, except for a single +cause. It is remarkable that the bitterest enemy of divorce among all +philosophers, nevertheless allows it, in a case which the laws of +England, and of other countries reproached by him with tolerating +divorce, do not admit: namely, when one of the parties has been +sentenced to an infamizing punishment, involving loss of civil rights. +It is monstrous that condemnation, even for life, to a felon's +punishment, should leave an unhappy victim bound to, and in the wife's +case under the legal authority of, the culprit. M. Comte could feel for +the injustice in this special case, because it chanced to be the +unfortunate situation of his Clotilde. Minor degrees of unworthiness may +entitle the innocent party to a legal separation, but without the power +of re-marriage. Second marriages, indeed, are not permitted by the +Positive Religion. There is to be no impediment to them by law, but +morality is to condemn them, and every couple who are married +religiously as well as civilly are to make a vow of eternal widowhood, +"le veuvage éternel." This absolute monogamy is, in M. Comte's opinion, +essential to the complete fusion between two beings, which is the +essence of marriage; and moreover, eternal constancy is required by the +posthumous adoration, which is to be continuously paid by the survivor +to one who, though objectively dead, still lives "subjectively." The +domestic spiritual power, which resides in the women of the family, is +chiefly concentrated in the most venerable of them, the husband's +mother, while alive. It has an auxiliary in the influence of age, +represented by the husband's father, who is supposed to have passed the +period of retirement from active life, fixed by M. Comte (for he fixes +everything) at sixty-three; at which age the head of the family gives up +the reins of authority to his son, retaining only a consultative voice.</p> + +<p>This domestic Spiritual Power, being principally moral, and confined to +a private life, requires the support and guidance of an intellectual +power exterior to it, the sphere of which will naturally be wider, +extending also to public life. This consists of the clergy, or +priesthood, for M. Comte is fond of borrowing the consecrated +expressions of Catholicism to denote the nearest equivalents which his +own system affords. The clergy are the theoretic or philosophical class, +and are supported by an endowment from the State, voted periodically, +but administered by themselves. Like women, they are to be excluded from +all riches, and from all participation in power (except the absolute +power of each over his own household). They are neither to inherit, nor +to receive emolument from any of their functions, or from their writings +or teachings of any description, but are to live solely on their small +salaries. This M. Comte deems necessary to the complete +disinterestedness of their counsel. To have the confidence of the +masses, they must, like the masses, be poor. Their exclusion from +political and from all other practical occupations is indispensable for +the same reason, and for others equally peremptory. Those occupations +are, he contends, incompatible with the habits of mind necessary to +philosophers. A practical position, either private or public, chains the +mind to specialities and details, while a philosopher's business is with +general truths and connected views (vues d'ensemble). These, again, +require an habitual abstraction from details, which unfits the mind for +judging well and rapidly of individual cases. The same person cannot be +both a good theorist and a good practitioner or ruler, though +practitioners and rulers ought to have a solid theoretic education. The +two kinds of function must be absolutely exclusive of one another: to +attempt them both, is inconsistent with fitness for either. But as men +may mistake their vocation, up to the age of thirty-five they are +allowed to change their career.</p> + +<p>To the clergy is entrusted the theoretic or scientific instruction of +youth. The medical art also is to be in their hands, since no one is fit +to be a physician who does not study and understand the whole man, moral +as well as physical. M. Comte has a contemptuous opinion of the existing +race of physicians, who, he says, deserve no higher name than that of +veterinaires, since they concern themselves with man only in his animal, +and not in his human character. In his last years, M. Comte (as we learn +from Dr Robinet's volume) indulged in the wildest speculations on +medical science, declaring all maladies to be one and the same disease, +the disturbance or destruction of "l'unité cérébrale." The other +functions of the clergy are moral, much more than intellectual. They are +the spiritual directors, and venerated advisers, of the active or +practical classes, including the political. They are the mediators in +all social differences; between the labourers, for instance, and their +employers. They are to advise and admonish on all important violations +of the moral law. Especially, it devolves on them to keep the rich and +powerful to the performance of their moral duties towards their +inferiors. If private remonstrance fails, public denunciation is to +follow: in extreme cases they may proceed to the length of +excommunication, which, though it only operates through opinion, yet if +it carries opinion with it, may, as M. Comte complacently observes, be +of such powerful efficacy, that the richest man may be driven to produce +his subsistence by his own manual labour, through the impossibility of +inducing any other person to work for him. In this as in all other +cases, the priesthood depends for its authority on carrying with it the +mass of the people—those who, possessing no accumulations, live on the +wages of daily labour; popularly but incorrectly termed the working +classes, and by French writers, in their Roman law phraseology, +proletaires. These, therefore, who are not allowed the smallest +political rights, are incorporated into the Spiritual Power, of which +they form, after women and the clergy, the third element.</p> + +<p>It remains to give an account of the Temporal Power, composed of the +rich and the employers of labour, two classes who in M. Comte's system +are reduced to one, for he allows of no idle rich. A life made up of +mere amusement and self-indulgence, though not interdicted by law, is to +be deemed so disgraceful, that nobody with the smallest sense of shame +would choose to be guilty of it. Here, we think, M. Comte has lighted on +a true principle, towards which the tone of opinion in modern Europe is +more and more tending, and which is destined to be one of the +constitutive principles of regenerated society. We believe, for example, +with him, that in the future there will be no class of landlords living +at ease on their rents, but every landlord will be a capitalist trained +to agriculture, himself superintending and directing the cultivation of +his estate. No one but he who guides the work, should have the control +of the tools. In M. Comte's system, the rich, as a rule, consist of the +"captains of industry:" but the rule is not entirely without exception, +for M. Comte recognizes other useful modes of employing riches. In +particular, one of his favourite ideas is that of an order of Chivalry, +composed of the most generous and self-devoted of the rich, voluntarily +dedicating themselves, like knights-errant of old, to the redressing of +wrongs, and the protection of the weak and oppressed. He remarks, that +oppression, in modern life, can seldom reach, or even venture to attack, +the life or liberty of its victims (he forgets the case of domestic +tyranny), but only their pecuniary means, and it is therefore by the +purse chiefly that individuals can usefully interpose, as they formerly +did by the sword. The occupation, however, of nearly all the rich, will +be the direction of labour, and for this work they will be educated. +Reciprocally, it is in M. Comte's opinion essential, that all directors +of labour should be rich. Capital (in which he includes land) should be +concentrated in a few holders, so that every capitalist may conduct the +most extensive operations which one mind is capable of superintending. +This is not only demanded by good economy, in order to take the utmost +advantage of a rare kind of practical ability, but it necessarily +follows from the principle of M. Comte's scheme, which regards a +capitalist as a public functionary. M. Comte's conception of the +relation of capital to society is essentially that of Socialists, but he +would bring about by education and opinion, what they aim at effecting +by positive institution. The owner of capital is by no means to consider +himself its absolute proprietor. Legally he is not to be controlled in +his dealings with it, for power should be in proportion to +responsibility: but it does not belong to him for his own use; he is +merely entrusted by society with a portion of the accumulations made by +the past providence of mankind, to be administered for the benefit of +the present generation and of posterity, under the obligation of +preserving them unimpaired, and handing them down, more or less +augmented, to our successors. He is not entitled to dissipate them, or +divert them from the service of Humanity to his own pleasures. Nor has +he a moral right to consume on himself the whole even of his profits. He +is bound in conscience, if they exceed his reasonable wants, to employ +the surplus in improving either the efficiency of his operations, or the +physical and mental condition of his labourers. The portion of his gains +which he may appropriate to his own use, must be decided by himself, +under accountability to opinion; and opinion ought not to look very +narrowly into the matter, nor hold him to a rigid reckoning for any +moderate indulgence of luxury or ostentation; since under the great +responsibilities that will be imposed on him, the position of an +employer of labour will be so much less desirable, to any one in whom +the instincts of pride and vanity are not strong, than the "heureuse +insouciance" of a labourer, that those instincts must be to a certain +degree indulged, or no one would undertake the office. With this +limitation, every employer is a mere administrator of his possessions, +for his work-people and for society at large. If he indulges himself +lavishly, without reserving an ample remuneration for all who are +employed under him, he is morally culpable, and will incur sacerdotal +admonition. This state of things necessarily implies that capital should +be in few hands, because, as M. Comte observes, without great riches, +the obligations which society ought to impose, could not be fulfilled +without an amount of personal abnegation that it would be hopeless to +expect. If a person is conspicuously qualified for the conduct of an +industrial enterprise, but destitute of the fortune necessary for +undertaking it, M. Comte recommends that he should be enriched by +subscription, or, in cases of sufficient importance, by the State. Small +landed proprietors and capitalists, and the middle classes altogether, +he regards as a parasitic growth, destined to disappear, the best of the +body becoming large capitalists, and the remainder proletaires. Society +will consist only of rich and poor, and it will be the business of the +rich to make the best possible lot for the poor. The remuneration of the +labourers will continue, as at present, to be a matter of voluntary +arrangement between them and their employers, the last resort on either +side being refusal of co-operation, "refus de concours," in other words, +a strike or a lock-out; with the sacerdotal order for mediators in case +of need. But though wages are to be an affair of free contract, their +standard is not to be the competition of the market, but the application +of the products in equitable proportion between the wants of the +labourers and the wants and dignity of the employer. As it is one of M. +Comte's principles that a question cannot be usefully proposed without +an attempt at a solution, he gives his ideas from the beginning as to +what the normal income of a labouring family should be. They are on such +a scale, that until some great extension shall have taken place in the +scientific resources of mankind, it is no wonder he thinks it necessary +to limit as much as possible the number of those who are to be supported +by what is left of the produce. In the first place the labourer's +dwelling, which is to consist of seven rooms, is, with all that it +contains, to be his own property: it is the only landed property he is +allowed to possess, but every family should be the absolute owner of all +things which are destined for its exclusive use. Lodging being thus +independently provided for, and education and medical attendance being +secured gratuitously by the general arrangements of society, the pay of +the labourer is to consist of two portions, the one monthly, and of +fixed amount, the other weekly, and proportioned to the produce of his +labour. The former M. Comte fixes at 100 francs (£4) for a month of 28 +days; being £52 a year: and the rate of piece-work should be such as to +make the other part amount to an average of seven francs (5<i>s</i>. <i>6d</i>.) +per working day.</p> + +<p>Agreeably to M. Comte's rule, that every public functionary should +appoint his successor, the capitalist has unlimited power of +transmitting his capital by gift or bequest, after his own death or +retirement. In general it will be best bestowed entire upon one person, +unless the business will advantageously admit of subdivision. He will +naturally leave it to one or more of his sons, if sufficiently +qualified; and rightly so, hereditary being, in M. Comte's opinion, +preferable to acquired wealth, as being usually more generously +administered. But, merely as his sons, they have no moral right to it. +M. Comte here recognizes another of the principles, on which we believe +that the constitution of regenerated society will rest. He maintains (as +others in the present generation have done) that the father owes nothing +to his son, except a good education, and pecuniary aid sufficient for an +advantageous start in life: that he is entitled, and may be morally +bound, to leave the bulk of his fortune to some other properly selected +person or persons, whom he judges likely to make a more beneficial use +of it. This is the first of three important points, in which M. Comte's +theory of the family, wrong as we deem it in its foundations, is in +advance of prevailing theories and existing institutions. The second is +the re-introduction of adoption, not only in default of children, but to +fulfil the purposes, and satisfy the sympathetic wants, to which such +children as there are may happen to be inadequate. The third is a most +important point—the incorporation of domestics as substantive members +of the family. There is hardly any part of the present constitution of +society more essentially vicious, and morally injurious to both parties, +than the relation between masters and servants. To make this a really +human and a moral relation, is one of the principal desiderata in social +improvement. The feeling of the vulgar of all classes, that domestic +service has anything in it peculiarly mean, is a feeling than which +there is none meaner. In the feudal ages, youthful nobles of the highest +rank thought themselves honoured by officiating in what is now called a +menial capacity, about the persons of superiors of both sexes, for whom +they felt respect: and, as M. Comte observes, there are many families +who can in no other way so usefully serve Humanity, as by ministering to +the bodily wants of other families, called to functions which require +the devotion of all their thoughts. "We will add, by way of supplement +to M. Comte's doctrine, that much of the daily physical work of a +household, even in opulent families, if silly notions of degradation, +common to all ranks, did not interfere, might very advantageously be +performed by the family itself, at least by its younger members; to whom +it would give healthful exercise of the bodily powers, which has now to +be sought in modes far less useful, and also a familiar acquaintance +with the real work of the world, and a moral willingness to take their +share of its burthens, which, in the great majority of the better-off +classes, do not now get cultivated at all.</p> + +<p>We have still to speak of the directly political functions of the rich, +or, as M. Comte terms them, the patriciate. The entire political +government is to be in their hands. First, however, the existing nations +are to be broken up into small republics, the largest not exceeding the +size of Belgium, Portugal, or Tuscany; any larger nationalities being +incompatible with the unity of wants and feelings, which is required, +not only to give due strength to the sentiment of patriotism (always +strongest in small states), but to prevent undue compression; for no +territory, M. Comte thinks, can without oppression be governed from a +distant centre. Algeria, therefore, is to be given up to the Arabs, +Corsica to its inhabitants, and France proper is to be, before the end +of the century, divided into seventeen republics, corresponding to the +number of considerable towns: Paris, however, (need it be said?) +succeeding to Rome as the religious metropolis of the world. Ireland, +Scotland, and Wales, are to be separated from England, which is of +course to detach itself from all its transmarine dependencies. In each +state thus constituted, the powers of government are to be vested in a +triumvirate of the three principal bankers, who are to take the foreign, +home, and financial departments respectively. How they are to conduct +the government and remain bankers, does not clearly appear; but it must +be intended that they should combine both offices, for they are to +receive no pecuniary remuneration for the political one. Their power is +to amount to a dictatorship (M. Comte's own word): and he is hardly +justified in saying that he gives political power to the rich, since he +gives it over the rich and every one else, to three individuals of the +number, not even chosen by the rest, but named by their predecessors. As +a check on the dictators, there is to be complete freedom of speech, +writing, printing, and voluntary association; and all important acts of +the government, except in cases of emergency, are to be announced +sufficiently long beforehand to ensure ample discussion. This, and the +influences of the Spiritual Power, are the only guarantees provided +against misgovernment. When we consider that the complete dominion of +every nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men—for the +Spiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a +single Pontiff for the whole human race—one is appalled at the picture +of entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the +last and highest result of the evolution of Humanity. But the conception +rises to the terrific, when we are told the mode in which the single +High Priest of Humanity is intended to use his authority. It is the most +warning example we know, into what frightful aberrations a powerful and +comprehensive mind may be led by the exclusive following out of a single +idea.</p> + +<p>The single idea of M. Comte, on this subject, is that the intellect +should be wholly subordinated to the feelings; or, to translate the +meaning out of sentimental into logical language, that the exercise of +the intellect, as of all our other faculties, should have for its sole +object the general good. Every other employment of it should be +accounted not only idle and frivolous, but morally culpable. Being +indebted wholly to Humanity for the cultivation to which we owe our +mental powers, we are bound in return to consecrate them wholly to her +service. Having made up his mind that this ought to be, there is with M. +Comte but one step to concluding that the Grand Pontiff of Humanity must +take care that it shall be; and on this foundation he organizes an +elaborate system for the total suppression of all independent thought. +He does not, indeed, invoke the arm of the law, or call for any +prohibitions. The clergy are to have no monopoly. Any one else may +cultivate science if he can, may write and publish if he can find +readers, may give private instruction if anybody consents to receive it. +But since the sacerdotal body will absorb into itself all but those whom +it deems either intellectually or morally unequal to the vocation, all +rival teachers will, as he calculates, be so discredited beforehand, +that their competition will not be formidable. Within the body itself, +the High Priest has it in his power to make sure that there shall be no +opinions, and no exercise of mind, but such as he approves; for he alone +decides the duties and local residence of all its members, and can even +eject them from the body. Before electing to be under this rule, we feel +a natural curiosity to know in what manner it is to be exercised. +Humanity has only yet had one Pontiff, whose mental qualifications for +the post are not likely to be often surpassed, M. Comte himself. It is +of some importance to know what are the ideas of this High Priest, +concerning the moral and religious government of the human intellect.</p> + +<p>One of the doctrines which M. Comte most strenuously enforces in his +later writings is, that during the preliminary evolution of humanity, +terminated by the foundation of Positivism, the free development of our +forces of all kinds was the important matter, but that from this time +forward the principal need is to regulate them. Formerly the danger was +of their being insufficient, but henceforth, of their being abused. Let +us express, in passing, our entire dissent from this doctrine. Whoever +thinks that the wretched education which mankind as yet receive, calls +forth their mental powers (except those of a select few) in a sufficient +or even tolerable degree, must be very easily satisfied: and the abuse +of them, far from becoming proportionally greater as knowledge and +mental capacity increase, becomes rapidly less, provided always that the +diffusion of those qualities keeps pace with their growth. The abuse of +intellectual power is only to be dreaded, when society is divided +between a few highly cultivated intellects and an ignorant and stupid +multitude. But mental power is a thing which M. Comte does not want—or +wants infinitely less than he wants submission and obedience. Of all the +ingredients of human nature, he continually says, the intellect most +needs to be disciplined and reined-in. It is the most turbulent "le plus +perturbateur," of all the mental elements; more so than even the selfish +instincts. Throughout the whole modern transition, beginning with +ancient Greece (for M. Comte tells us that we have always been in a +state of revolutionary transition since then), the intellect has been in +a state of systematic insurrection against "le coeur." The +metaphysicians and literati (lettrés), after helping to pull down the +old religion and social order, are rootedly hostile to the construction +of the new, and desiring only to prolong the existing scepticism and +intellectual anarchy, which secure to them a cheap social ascendancy, +without the labour of earning it by solid scientific preparation. The +scientific class, from whom better might have been expected, are, if +possible, worse. Void of enlarged views, despising all that is too large +for their comprehension, devoted exclusively each to his special +science, contemptuously indifferent to moral and political interests, +their sole aim is to acquire an easy reputation, and in France (through +paid Academies and professorships) personal lucre, by pushing their +sciences into idle and useless inquiries (speculations oiseuses), of no +value to the real interests of mankind, and tending to divert the +thoughts from them. One of the duties most incumbent on opinion and on +the Spiritual Power, is to stigmatize as immoral, and effectually +suppress, these useless employments of the speculative faculties. All +exercise of thought should be abstained from, which has not some +beneficial tendency, some actual utility to mankind. M. Comte, of +course, is not the man to say that it must be a merely material utility. +If a speculation, though it has no doctrinal, has a logical value—if it +throws any light on universal Method—it is still more deserving of +cultivation than if its usefulness was merely practical: but, either as +method or as doctrine, it must bring forth fruits to Humanity, otherwise +it is not only contemptible, but criminal.</p> + +<p>That there is a portion of truth at the bottom of all this, we should be +the last to deny. No respect is due to any employment of the intellect +which does not tend to the good of mankind. It is precisely on a level +with any idle amusement, and should be condemned as waste of time, if +carried beyond the limit within which amusement is permissible. And +whoever devotes powers of thought which could render to Humanity +services it urgently needs, to speculations and studies which it could +dispense with, is liable to the discredit attaching to a well-grounded +suspicion of caring little for Humanity. But who can affirm positively +of any speculations, guided by right scientific methods, on subjects +really accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of +being of any use? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use, +and what is destined to be useless. The most that can be said is that +some kinds are of more certain, and above all, of more present utility +than others. How often the most important practical results have been +the remote consequence of studies which no one would have expected to +lead to them! Could the mathematicians, who, in the schools of +Alexandria, investigated the properties of the ellipse, have foreseen +that nearly two thousand years afterwards their speculations would +explain the solar system, and a little later would enable ships safely +to circumnavigate the earth? Even in M. Comte's opinion, it is well for +mankind that, in those early days, knowledge was thought worth pursuing +for its own sake. Nor has the "foundation of Positivism," we imagine, so +far changed the conditions of human existence, that it should now be +criminal to acquire, by observation and reasoning, a knowledge of the +facts of the universe, leaving to posterity to find a use for it. Even +in the last two or three years, has not the discovery of new metals, +which may prove important even in the practical arts, arisen from one of +the investigations which M. Comte most unequivocally condemns as idle, +the research into the internal constitution of the sun? How few, +moreover, of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world, +either were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming +directly at the object! Would the mariner's compass ever have been found +by direct efforts for the improvement of navigation? Should we have +reached the electric telegraph by any amount of striving for a means of +instantaneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity +with lightning, and Ampère with magnetism? The most apparently +insignificant archaeological or geological fact, is often found to throw +a light on human history, which M. Comte, the basis of whose social +philosophy is history, should be the last person to disparage. The +direction of the entrance to the three great Pyramids of Ghizeh, by +showing the position of the circumpolar stars at the time when they were +built, is the best evidence we even now have of the immense antiquity of +Egyptian civilization.<a name="FNanchor_24_24" id="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24" class="fnanchor">[24]</a> The one point on which M. Comte's doctrine +has some colour of reason, is the case of sidereal astronomy: so little +knowledge of it being really accessible to us, and the connexion of that +little with any terrestrial interests being, according to all our means +of judgment, infinitesimal. It is certainly difficult to imagine how any +considerable benefit to humanity can be derived from a knowledge of the +motions of the double stars: should these ever become important to us it +will be in so prodigiously remote an age, that we can afford to remain +ignorant of them until, at least, all our moral, political, and social +difficulties have been settled. Yet the discovery that gravitation +extends even to those remote regions, gives some additional strength to +the conviction of the universality of natural laws; and the habitual +meditation on such vast objects and distances is not without an +aesthetic usefulness, by kindling and exalting the imagination, the +worth of which in itself, and even its re-action on the intellect, M. +Comte is quite capable of appreciating. He would reply, however, that +there are better means of accomplishing these purposes. In the same +spirit he condemns the study even of the solar system, when extended to +any planets but those which are visible to the naked eye, and which +alone exert an appreciable gravitative influence on the earth. Even the +perturbations he thinks it idle to study, beyond a mere general +conception of them, and thinks that astronomy may well limit its domain +to the motions and mutual action of the earth, sun, and moon. He looks +for a similar expurgation of all the other sciences. In one passage he +expressly says that the greater part of the researches which are really +accessible to us are idle and useless. He would pare down the dimensions +of all the sciences as narrowly as possible. He is continually repeating +that no science, as an abstract study, should be carried further than is +necessary to lay the foundation for the science next above it, and so +ultimately for moral science, the principal purpose of them all. Any +further extension of the mathematical and physical sciences should be +merely "episodic;" limited to what may from time to time be demanded by +the requirements of industry and the arts; and should be left to the +industrial classes, except when they find it necessary to apply to the +sacerdotal order for some additional development of scientific theory. +This, he evidently thinks, would be a rare contingency, most physical +truths sufficiently concrete and real for practice being empirical. +Accordingly in estimating the number of clergy necessary for France, +Europe, and our entire planet (for his forethought extends thus far), +he proportions it solely to their moral and religious attributions +(overlooking, by the way, even their medical); and leaves nobody with +any time to cultivate the sciences, except abortive candidates for the +priestly office, who having been refused admittance into it for +insufficiency in moral excellence or in strength of character, may be +thought worth retaining as "pensioners" of the sacerdotal order, on +account of their theoretic abilities.</p> + +<p>It is no exaggeration to say, that M. Comte gradually acquired a real +hatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits, and was bent +on retaining no more of them than was strictly indispensable. The +greatest of his anxieties is lest people should reason, and seek to +know, more than enough. He regards all abstraction and all reasoning as +morally dangerous, by developing an inordinate pride (orgueil), and +still more, by producing dryness (scheresse). Abstract thought, he says, +is not a wholesome occupation for more than a small number of human +beings, nor of them for more than a small part of their time. Art, which +calls the emotions into play along with and more than the reason, is the +only intellectual exercise really adapted to human nature. It is +nevertheless indispensable that the chief theories of the various +abstract sciences, together with the modes in which those theories were +historically and logically arrived at, should form a part of universal +education: for, first, it is only thus that the methods can be learnt, +by which to attain the results sought by the moral and social sciences: +though we cannot perceive that M. Comte got at his own moral and social +results by those processes. Secondly, the principal truths of the +subordinate sciences are necessary to the systematization (still +systematization!) of our conceptions, by binding together our notions of +the world in a set of propositions, which are coherent, and are a +sufficiently correct representation of fact for our practical wants. +Thirdly, a familiar knowledge of the invariable laws of natural +phaenomena is a great elementary lesson of submission, which, he is +never weary of saying, is the first condition both of morality and of +happiness. For these reasons, he would cause to be taught, from the age +of fourteen to that of twenty-one, to all persons, rich and poor, girls +or youths, a knowledge of the whole series of abstract sciences, such as +none but the most highly instructed persons now possess, and of a far +more systematic and philosophical character than is usually possessed +even by them. (N.B.—They are to learn, during the same years, Greek and +Latin, having previously, between the ages of seven and fourteen, learnt +the five principal modern languages, to the degree necessary for +reading, with due appreciation, the chief poetical compositions in +each.) But they are to be taught all this, not only without encouraging, +but stifling as much as possible, the examining and questioning spirit. +The disposition which should be encouraged is that of receiving all on +the authority of the teacher. The Positivist faith, even in its +scientific part, is <i>la foi démontrable</i>, but ought by no means to be +<i>la foi toujours démontrée</i>. The pupils have no business to be +over-solicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the +proofs to them in a complete form, or as proofs. The object of +instruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves, +perceive their mutual connexion, and form by means of them a consistent +and <i>systematized</i> conception of nature. As for the demonstrations, it +is rather desirable than otherwise that even theorists should forget +them, retaining only the results. Among all the aberrations of +scientific men, M. Comte thinks none greater than the pedantic anxiety +they show for complete proof, and perfect rationalization of scientific +processes. It ought to be enough that the doctrines afford an +explanation of phaenomena, consistent with itself and with known facts, +and that the processes are justified by their fruits. This over-anxiety +for proof, he complains, is breaking down, by vain scruples, the +knowledge which seemed to have been attained; witness the present state +of chemistry. The demand of proof for what has been accepted by +Humanity, is itself a mark of "distrust, if not hostility, to the +sacerdotal order" (the naïveté of this would be charming, if it were not +deplorable), and is a revolt against the traditions of the human race. +So early had the new High Priest adopted the feelings and taken up the +inheritance of the old. One of his favourite aphorisms is the strange +one, that the living are more and more governed by the dead. As is not +uncommon with him, he introduces the dictum in one sense, and uses it in +another. What he at first means by it, is that as civilization advances, +the sum of our possessions, physical and intellectual, is due in a +decreasing proportion to ourselves, and in an increasing one to our +progenitors. The use he makes of it is, that we should submit ourselves +more and more implicitly to the authority of previous generations, and +suffer ourselves less and less to doubt their judgment, or test by our +own reason the grounds of their opinions. The unwillingness of the human +intellect and conscience, in their present state of "anarchy," to sign +their own abdication, lie calls "the insurrection of the living against +the dead." To this complexion has Positive Philosophy come at last!</p> + +<p>Worse, however, remains to be told. M. Comte selects a hundred volumes +of science, philosophy, poetry, history, and general knowledge, which he +deems a sufficient library for every positivist, even of the theoretic +order, and actually proposes a systematic holocaust of books in +general—it would almost seem of all books except these. Even that to +which he shows most indulgence, poetry, except the very best, is to +undergo a similar fate, with the reservation of select passages, on the +ground that, poetry being intended to cultivate our instinct of ideal +perfection, any kind of it that is less than the best is worse than +none. This imitation of the error, we will call it the crime, of the +early Christians—and in an exaggerated form, for even they destroyed +only those writings of pagans or heretics which were directed against +themselves—is the one thing in M. Comte's projects which merits real +indignation. When once M. Comte has decided, all evidence on the other +side, nay, the very historical evidence on which he grounded his +decision, had better perish. When mankind have enlisted under his +banner, they must burn their ships. There is, though in a less offensive +form, the same overweening presumption in a suggestion he makes, that +all species of animals and plants which are useless to man should be +systematically rooted out. As if any one could presume to assert that +the smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some +property serviceable to man. When we consider that the united power of +the whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated—that +what is once done, in the extirpation of races, can never be repaired; +one can only be thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of +mankind have to answer for, they have never come up to the measure of +the great regenerator of Humanity; mankind have not yet been under the +rule of one who assumes that he knows all there is to be known, and that +when he has put himself at the head of humanity, the book of human +knowledge may be closed.</p> + +<p>Of course M. Comte does not make this assumption consistently. He does +not imagine that he actually possesses all knowledge, but only that he +is an infallible judge what knowledge is worth possessing. He does not +believe that mankind have reached in all directions the extreme limits +of useful and laudable scientific inquiry. He thinks there is a large +scope for it still, in adding to our power over the external world, but +chiefly in perfecting our own physical, intellectual, and moral nature. +He holds that all our mental strength should be economized, for the +pursuit of this object in the mode leading most directly to the end. +With this view, some one problem should always be selected, the solution +of which would be more important than any other to the interests of +humanity, and upon this the entire intellectual resources of the +theoretic mind should be concentrated, until it is either resolved, or +has to be given up as insoluble: after which mankind should go on to +another, to be pursued with similar exclusiveness. The selection of this +problem of course rests with the sacerdotal order, or in other words, +with the High Priest. We should then see the whole speculative intellect +of the human race simultaneously at work on one question, by orders from +above, as a French minister of public instruction once boasted that a +million of boys were saying the same lesson during the same half-hour in +every town and village of France. The reader will be anxious to know, +how much better and more wisely the human intellect will be applied +under this absolute monarchy, and to what degree this system of +government will be preferable to the present anarchy, in which every +theorist does what is intellectually right in his own eyes. M. Comte has +not left us in ignorance on this point. He gives us ample means of +judging. The Pontiff of Positivism informs us what problem, in his +opinion, should be selected before all others for this united pursuit.</p> + +<p>What this problem is, we must leave those who are curious on the subject +to learn from the treatise itself. When they have done so, they will be +qualified to form their own opinion of the amount of advantage which the +general good of mankind would be likely to derive, from exchanging the +present "dispersive speciality" and "intellectual anarchy" for the +subordination of the intellect to the <i>coeur</i>, personified in a High +Priest, prescribing a single problem for the undivided study of the +theoretic mind.</p> + +<p>We have given a sufficient general idea of M. Comte's plan for the +regeneration of human society, by putting an end to anarchy, and +"systematizing" human thought and conduct under the direction of +feeling. But an adequate conception will not have been formed of the +height of his self-confidence, until something more has been told. Be it +known, then, that M. Comte by no means proposes this new constitution of +society for realization in the remote future. A complete plan of +measures of transition is ready prepared, and he determines the year, +before the end of the present century, in which the new spiritual and +temporal powers will be installed, and the regime of our maturity will +begin. He did not indeed calculate on converting to Positivism, within +that time, more than a thousandth part of all the heads of families in +Western Europe and its offshoots beyond the Atlantic. But he fixes the +time necessary for the complete political establishment of Positivism at +thirty-three years, divided into three periods, of seven, five, and +twenty-one years respectively. At the expiration of seven, the direction +of public education in France would be placed in M. Comte's hands. In +five years more, the Emperor Napoleon, or his successor, will resign his +power to a provisional triumvirate, composed of three eminent +proletaires of the positivist faith; for proletaires, though not fit for +permanent rule, are the best agents of the transition, being the most +free from the prejudices which are the chief obstacle to it. These +rulers will employ the remaining twenty-one years in preparing society +for its final constitution; and after duly installing the Spiritual +Power, and effecting the decomposition of France into the seventeen +republics before mentioned, will give over the temporal government of +each to the normal dictatorship of the three bankers. A man may be +deemed happy, but scarcely modest, who had such boundless confidence in +his own powers of foresight, and expected so complete a triumph of his +own ideas on the reconstitution of society within the possible limits of +his lifetime. If he could live (he said) to the age of Pontenelle, or of +Hobbes, or even of Voltaire, he should see all this realized, or as good +as realized. He died, however, at sixty, without leaving any disciple +sufficiently advanced to be appointed his successor. There is now a +College, and a Director, of Positivism; but Humanity no longer possesses +a High Priest.</p> + +<p>What more remains to be said may be despatched more summarily. Its +interest is philosophic rather than practical. In his four volumes of +"Politique Positive," M. Comte revises and reelaborates the scientific +and historical expositions of his first treatise. His object is to +systematize (again to systematize) knowledge from the human or +subjective point of view, the only one, he contends, from which a real +synthesis is possible. For (he says) the knowledge attainable by us of +the laws of the universe is at best fragmentary, and incapable of +reduction to a real unity. An objective synthesis, the dream of +Descartes and the best thinkers of old, is impossible. The laws of the +real world are too numerous, and the manner of their working into one +another too intricate, to be, as a general rule, correctly traced and +represented by our reason. The only connecting principle in our +knowledge is its relation to our wants, and it is upon that we must +found our systematization. The answer to this is, first, that there is +no necessity for an universal synthesis; and secondly, that the same +arguments may be used against the possibility of a complete subjective, +as of a complete objective systematization. A subjective synthesis must +consist in the arrangement and co-ordination of all useful knowledge, on +the basis of its relation to human wants and interests. But those wants +and interests are, like the laws of the universe, extremely +multifarious, and the order of preference among them in all their +different gradations (for it varies according to the degree of each) +cannot be cast into precise general propositions. M. Comte's subjective +synthesis consists only in eliminating from the sciences everything that +he deems useless, and presenting as far as possible every theoretical +investigation as the solution of a practical problem. To this, however, +he cannot consistently adhere; for, in every science, the theoretic +truths are much more closely connected with one another than with the +human purposes which they eventually serve, and can only be made to +cohere in the intellect by being, to a great degree, presented as if +they were truths of pure reason, irrespective of any practical +application.</p> + +<p>There are many things eminently characteristic of M. Comte's second +career, in this revision of the results of his first. Under the head of +Biology, and for the better combination of that science with Sociology +and Ethics, he found that he required a new system of Phrenology, being +justly dissatisfied with that of Gall and his successors. Accordingly he +set about constructing one <i>è priori</i>, grounded on the best enumeration +and classification he could make of the elementary faculties of our +intellectual, moral, and animal nature; to each of which he assigned an +hypothetical place in the skull, the most conformable that he could to +the few positive facts on the subject which he considered as +established, and to the general presumption that functions which react +strongly on one another must have their organs adjacent: leaving the +localities avowedly to be hereafter verified, by anatomical and +inductive investigation. There is considerable merit in this attempt, +though it is liable to obvious criticisms, of the same nature as his own +upon Gall. But the characteristic thing is, that while presenting all +this as hypothesis waiting for verification, he could not have taken its +truth more completely for granted if the verification had been made. In +all that he afterwards wrote, every detail of his theory of the brain is +as unhesitatingly asserted, and as confidently built upon, as any other +doctrine of science. This is his first great attempt in the "Subjective +Method," which, originally meaning only the subordination of the pursuit +of truth to human uses, had already come to mean drawing truth itself +from the fountain of his own mind. He had become, on the one hand, +almost indifferent to proof, provided he attained theoretic coherency, +and on the other, serenely confident that even the guesses which +originated with himself could not but come out true.</p> + +<p>There is one point in his later view of the sciences, which appears to +us a decided improvement on his earlier. He adds to the six fundamental +sciences of his original scale, a seventh under the name of Morals, +forming the highest step of the ladder, immediately after Sociology: +remarking that it might, with still greater propriety, be termed +Anthropology, being the science of individual human nature, a study, +when rightly understood, more special and complicated than even that of +Society. For it is obliged to take into consideration the diversities of +constitution and temperament (la réaction cérébrale des viscères +végétatifs) the effects of which, still very imperfectly understood, are +highly important in the individual, but in the theory of society may be +neglected, because, differing in different persons, they neutralize one +another on the large scale. This is a remark worthy of M. Comte in his +best days; and the science thus conceived is, as he says, the true +scientific foundation of the art of Morals (and indeed of the art of +human life), which, therefore, may, both philosophically and +didactically, be properly combined with it.</p> + +<p>His philosophy of general history is recast, and in many respects +changed; we cannot but say, greatly for the worse. He gives much greater +development than before to the Fetishistic, and to what he terms the +Theocratic, periods. To the Fetishistic view of nature he evinces a +partiality, which appears strange in a Positive philosopher. But the +reason is that Fetish-worship is a religion of the feelings, and not at +all of the intelligence. He regards it as cultivating universal love: as +a practical fact it cultivates much rather universal fear. He looks upon +Fetishism as much more akin to Positivism than any of the forms of +Theology, inasmuch as these consider matter as inert, and moved only by +forces, natural and supernatural, exterior to itself: while Fetishism +resembles Positivism in conceiving matter as spontaneously active, and +errs only by not distinguishing activity from life. As if the +superstition of the Fetishist consisted only in believing that the +objects which produce the phaenomena of nature involuntarily, produce +them voluntarily. The Fetishist thinks not merely that his Fetish is +alive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can +grant him prosperity, or afflict him with all the contrary evils. +Therein consists the lamentable effect of Fetishism—its degrading and +prostrating influence on the feelings and conduct, its conflict with all +genuine experience, and antagonism to all real knowledge of nature.</p> + +<p>M. Comte had also no small sympathy with the Oriental theocracies, as he +calls the sacerdotal castes, who indeed often deserved it by their early +services to intellect and civilization; by the aid they gave to the +establishment of regular government, the valuable though empirical +knowledge they accumulated, and the height to which they helped to carry +some of the useful arts. M. Comte admits that they became oppressive, +and that the prolongation of their ascendancy came to be incompatible +with further improvement. But he ascribes this to their having arrogated +to themselves the temporal government, which, so far as we have any +authentic information, they never did. The reason why the sacerdotal +corporations became oppressive, was because they were organized: because +they attempted the "unity" and "systematization" so dear to M. Comte, +and allowed no science and no speculation, except with their leave and +under their direction. M. Comte's sacerdotal order, which, in his +system, has all the power that ever they had, would be oppressive in the +same manner; with no variation but that which arises from the altered +state of society and of the human mind.</p> + +<p>M. Comte's partiality to the theocracies is strikingly contrasted with +his dislike of the Greeks, whom as a people he thoroughly detests, for +their undue addiction to intellectual speculation, and considers to have +been, by an inevitable fatality, morally sacrificed to the formation of +a few great scientific intellects,—principally Aristotle, Archimedes, +Apollonius, and Hipparchus. Any one who knows Grecian history as it can +now be known, will be amazed at M. Comte's travestie of it, in which the +vulgarest historical prejudices are accepted and exaggerated, to +illustrate the mischiefs of intellectual culture left to its own +guidance.</p> + +<p>There is no need to analyze further M. Comte's second view of universal +history. The best chapter is that on the Romans, to whom, because they +were greater in practice than in theory, and for centuries worked +together in obedience to a social sentiment (though only that of their +country's aggrandizement), M. Comte is as favourably affected, as he is +inimical to all but a small selection of eminent thinkers among the +Greeks. The greatest blemish in this chapter is the idolatry of Julius +Caesar, whom M. Comte regards as one of the most illustrious characters +in history, and of the greatest practical benefactors of mankind. Caesar +had many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we +are at a loss to discover, except subverting a free government: that +merit, however, with M. Comte, goes a great way. It did not, in his +former days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he +regarded with a bitterness highly honourable to himself, and whose +career he deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But +in his later writings these sentiments are considerably mitigated: he +regards Napoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe, and +thinks that his greatest error was re-establishing the Academy of +Sciences! That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon, +measures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen.</p> + +<p>The last volume which he published, that on the Philosophy of +Mathematics, is in some respects a still sadder picture of intellectual +degeneracy than those which preceded it. After the admirable résumé of +the subject in the first volume of his first great work, we expected +something of the very highest order when he returned to the subject for +a more thorough treatment of it. But, being the commencement of a +Synthèse Subjective, it contains, as might be expected, a great deal +that is much more subjective than mathematical. Nor of this do we +complain: but we little imagined of what nature this subjective matter +was to be. M. Comte here joins together the two ideas, which, of all +that he has put forth, are the most repugnant to the fundamental +principles of Positive Philosophy. One of them is that on which we have +just commented, the assimilation between Positivism and Fetishism. The +other, of which we took notice in a former article, was the "liberté +facultative" of shaping our scientific conceptions to gratify the +demands not solely of objective truth, but of intellectual and aesthetic +suitability. It would be an excellent thing, M. Comte thinks, if science +could be deprived of its <i>sécheresse</i>, and directly associated with +sentiment. Now it is impossible to prove that the external world, and +the bodies composing it, are not endowed with feeling, and voluntary +agency. It is therefore highly desirable that we should educate +ourselves into imagining that they are. Intelligence it will not do to +invest them with, for some distinction must be maintained between simple +activity and life. But we may suppose that they feel what is done to +them, and desire and will what they themselves do. Even intelligence, +which we must deny to them in the present, may be attributed to them in +the past. Before man existed, the earth, at that time an intelligent +being, may have exerted "its physico-chemical activity so as to improve +the astronomical order by changing its principal coefficients. Our +planet may be supposed to have rendered its orbit less excentric, and +thereby more habitable, by planning a long series of explosions, +analogous to those from which, according to the best hypotheses, comets +proceed. Judiciously reproduced, similar shocks may have rendered the +inclination of the earth's axis better adapted to the future wants of +the Grand Etre. <i>A fortiori</i> the Earth may have modified its own figure, +which is only beyond our intervention because our spiritual ascendancy +has not at its disposal a sufficient material force." The like may be +conceived as having been done by each of the other planets, in concert, +possibly, with the Earth and with one another. "In proportion as each +planet improved its own condition, its life exhausted itself by excess +of innervation; but with the consolation of rendering its self-devotion +more efficacious, when the extinction of its special functions, first +animal, and finally vegetative, reduced it to the universal attributes +of feeling and activity."<a name="FNanchor_25_25" id="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25" class="fnanchor">[25]</a> This stuff, though he calls it fiction, he +soon after speaks of as belief (croyance), to be greatly recommended, as +at once satisfying our natural curiosity, and "perfecting our unity" +(again unity!) "by supplying the gaps in our scientific notions with +poetic fictions, and developing sympathetic emotions and aesthetic +inspirations: the world being conceived as aspiring to second mankind in +ameliorating the universal order under the impulse of the Grand Etre." +And he obviously intends that we should be trained to make these +fantastical inventions permeate all our associations, until we are +incapable of conceiving the world and Nature apart from them, and they +become equivalent to, and are in fact transformed into, real beliefs.</p> + +<p>Wretched as this is, it is singularly characteristic of M. Comte's later +mode of thought. A writer might be excused for introducing into an +avowed work of fancy this dance of the planets, and conception of an +animated Earth. If finely executed, he might even be admired for it. No +one blames a poet for ascribing feelings, purposes, and human +propensities to flowers. Because a conception might be interesting, and +perhaps edifying, in a poem, M. Comte would have it imprinted on the +inmost texture of every human mind in ordinary prose. If the imagination +were not taught its prescribed lesson equally with the reason, where +would be Unity? "It is important that the domain of fiction should +become as <i>systematic</i> as that of demonstration, in order that their +mutual harmony may be conformable to their respective destinations, both +equally directed towards the continual increase of <i>unity</i>, personal and +social."<a name="FNanchor_26_26" id="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26" class="fnanchor">[26]</a></p> + +<p>Nor is it enough to have created the Grand Fétiche (so he actually +proposes to call the Earth), and to be able to include it and all +concrete existence in our adoration along with the Grand Etre. It is +necessary also to extend Positivist Fetishism to purely abstract +existence; to "animate" the laws as well as the facts of nature. It is +not sufficient to have made physics sentimental, mathematics must be +made so too. This does not at first seem easy; but M. Comte finds the +means of accomplishing it. His plan is, to make Space also an object of +adoration, under the name of the Grand Milieu, and consider it as the +representative of Fatality in general. "The final <i>unity</i> disposes us to +cultivate sympathy by developing our gratitude to whatever serves the +Grand Etre. It must dispose us to venerate the Fatality on which reposes +the whole aggregate of our existence." We should conceive this Fatality +as having a fixed seat, and that seat must be considered to be Space, +which should be conceived as possessing feeling, but not activity or +intelligence. And in our abstract speculations we should imagine all our +conceptions as located in free Space. Our images of all sorts, down to +our geometrical diagrams, and even our ciphers and algebraic symbols, +should always be figured to ourselves as written in space, and not on +paper or any other material substance. M. Comte adds that they should be +conceived as green on a white ground.</p> + +<p>We cannot go on any longer with this. In spite of it all, the volume on +mathematics is full of profound thoughts, and will be very suggestive to +those who take up the subject after M. Comte. What deep meaning there +is, for example, in the idea that the infinitesimal calculus is a +conception analogous to the corpuscular hypothesis in physics; which +last M. Comte has always considered as a logical artifice; not an +opinion respecting matters of fact. The assimilation, as it seems to us, +throws a flood of light on both conceptions; on the physical one still +more than the mathematical. We might extract many ideas of similar, +though none perhaps of equal, suggestiveness. But mixed with these, what +pitiable <i>niaiseries</i>! One of his great points is the importance of the +"moral and intellectual properties of numbers." He cultivates a +superstitious reverence for some of them. The first three are sacred, +<i>les nombres sacrés</i>: One being the type of all Synthesis, Two of all +Combination, which he now says <i>is</i> always binary (in his first treatise +he only said that we may usefully represent it to ourselves as being +so), and Three of all Progression, which not only requires three terms, +but as he now maintains, never ought to have any more. To these sacred +numbers all our mental operations must be made, as far as possible, to +adjust themselves. Next to them, he has a great partiality for the +number seven; for these whimsical reasons: "Composed of two progressions +followed by a synthesis, or of one progression between two couples, the +number seven, coming next after the sum of the three sacred numbers, +determines the largest group which we can distinctly imagine. +Reciprocally, it marks the limit of the divisions which we can directly +conceive in a magnitude of any kind." The number seven, therefore, must +be foisted in wherever possible, and among other things, is to be made +the basis of numeration, which is hereafter to be septimal instead of +decimal: producing all the inconvenience of a change of system, not only +without getting rid of, but greatly aggravating, the disadvantages of +the existing one. But then, he says, it is absolutely necessary that the +basis of numeration should be a prime number. All other people think it +absolutely necessary that it should not, and regard the present basis as +only objectionable in not being divisible enough. But M. Comte's puerile +predilection for prime numbers almost passes belief. His reason is that +they are the type of irreductibility: each of them is a kind of ultimate +arithmetical fact. This, to any one who knows M. Comte in his later +aspects, is amply sufficient. Nothing can exceed his delight in anything +which says to the human mind, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. If +prime numbers are precious, doubly prime numbers are doubly so; meaning +those which are not only themselves prime numbers, but the number which +marks their place in the series of prime numbers is a prime number. +Still greater is the dignity of trebly prime numbers; when the number +marking the place of this second number is also prime. The number +thirteen fulfils these conditions: it is a prime number, it is the +seventh prime number, and seven is the fifth prime number. Accordingly +he has an outrageous partiality to the number thirteen. Though one of +the most inconvenient of all small numbers, he insists on introducing it +everywhere.</p> + +<p>These strange conceits are connected with a highly characteristic +example of M. Comte's frenzy for regulation. He cannot bear that +anything should be left unregulated: there ought to be no such thing as +hesitation; nothing should remain arbitrary, for <i>l'arbitraire</i> is +always favourable to egoism. Submission to artificial prescriptions is +as indispensable as to natural laws, and he boasts that under the reign +of sentiment, human life may be made equally, and even more, regular +than the courses of the stars. But the great instrument of exact +regulation for the details of life is numbers: fixed numbers, therefore, +should be introduced into all our conduct. M. Comte's first application +of this system was to the correction of his own literary style. +Complaint had been made, not undeservedly, that in his first great work, +especially in the latter part of it, the sentences and paragraphs were +long, clumsy, and involved. To correct this fault, of which he was +aware, he imposed on himself the following rules. No sentence was to +exceed two lines of his manuscript, equivalent to five of print. No +paragraph was to consist of more than seven sentences. He further +applied to his prose writing the rule of French versification which +forbids a <i>hiatus</i>(the concourse of two vowels), not allowing it to +himself even at the break between two sentences or two paragraphs; nor +did he permit himself ever to use the same word twice, either in the +same sentence or in two consecutive sentences, though belonging to +different paragraphs: with the exception of the monosyllabic +auxiliaries.[27] All this is well enough, especially the first two +precepts, and a good way of breaking through a bad habit. But M. Comte +persuaded himself that any arbitrary restriction, though in no way +emanating from, and therefore necessarily disturbing, the natural order +and proportion of the thoughts, is a benefit in itself, and tends to +improve style. If it renders composition vastly more difficult, he +rejoices at it, as tending to confine writing to superior minds. +Accordingly, in the Synthèse Subjective, he institutes the +following "plan for all compositions of importance." "Every volume +really capable of forming a distinct treatise" should consist of "seven +chapters, besides the introduction and the conclusion; and each of these +should be composed of three parts." Each third part of a chapter should +be divided into "seven sections, each composed of seven groups of +sentences, separated by the usual break of line. Normally formed, the +section offers a central group of seven sentences, preceded and followed +by three groups of five: the first section of each part reduces to three +sentences three of its groups, symmetrically placed; the last section +gives seven sentences to each of its extreme groups. These rules of +composition make prose approach to the regularity of poetry, when +combined with my previous reduction of the maximum length of a sentence +to two manuscript or five printed lines, that is, 250 letters." +"Normally constructed, great poems consist of thirteen cantos, +decomposed into parts, sections, and groups like my chapters, saving the +complete equality of the groups and of the sections." "This difference +of structure between volumes of poetry and of philosophy is more +apparent than real, for the introduction and the conclusion of a poem +should comprehend six of its thirteen cantos," leaving, therefore, the +cabalistic numeber seven for the body of the poem. And all this +regulation not being sufficiently meaningless, fantastic, and +oppressive, he invents an elaborate system for compelling each of his +sections and groups to begin with a letter of the alphabet, determined +beforehand, the letters being selected so as to compose words having +"a synthetic or sympathetic signification," and as close a relation as +possible to the section or part to which they are appropriated.</p> + +<p>Others may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this melancholy +decadence of a great intellect. M. Comte used to reproach his early +English admirers with maintaining the "conspiracy of silence" concerning +his later performances. The reader can now judge whether such reticence +is not more than sufficiently explained by tenderness for his fame, and +a conscientious fear of bringing undeserved discredit on the noble +speculations of his early career.</p> + +<p>M. Comte was accustomed to consider Descartes and Leibnitz as his +principal precursors, and the only great philosophers (among many +thinkers of high philosophic capacity) in modern times. It was to their +minds that he considered his own to bear the nearest resemblance. Though +we have not so lofty an opinion of any of the three as M. Comte had, we +think the assimilation just: thes were, of all recorded thinkers, the +two who bore most resemblance to M. Comte. They were +like him in earnestness, like him, though scarcely equal to him, in +confidence in themselves; they had the same extraordinary power of +concatenation and co-ordination; they enriched human knowledge with +great truths and great conceptions of method; they were, of all great +scientific thinkers, the most consistent, and for that reason often the +most absurd, because they shrank from no consequences, however contrary +to common sense, to which their premises appeared to lead. Accordingly +their names have come down to us associated with grand thoughts, with +most important discoveries, and also with some of the most extravagantly +wild and ludicrously absurd conceptions and theories which ever were +solemnly propounded by thoughtful men. "We think M. Comte as great as +either of these philosophers, and hardly more extravagant. Were we to +speak our whole mind, we should call him superior to them: though not +intrinsically, yet by the exertion of equal intellectual power in a more +advanced state of human preparation; but also in an age less tolerant of +palpable absurdities, and to which those he has committed, if not in +themselves greater, at least appear more ridiculous.</p> + +<p>THE END.</p> + + + +<div class="footnotes"><h3>FOOTNOTES:</h3> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_1_1" id="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1"><span class="label">[1]</span></a> See the Chapter on Efficient Causes in Reid's "Essays on +the Active Powers," which is avowedly grounded on Newton's ideas.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_2_2" id="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2"><span class="label">[2]</span></a> Mr Herbert Spencer, who also distinguishes between abstract +and concrete sciences, employs the terms in a different sense from that +explained above. He calls a science abstract when its truths are merely +ideal; when, like the truths of geometry, they are not exactly true of +real things—or, like the so-called law of inertia (the persistence in +direction and velocity of a motion once impressed) are "involved" in +experience but never actually seen in it, being always more or less +completely frustrated. Chemistry and biology he includes, on the +contrary, among concrete sciences, because chemical combinations and +decompositions, and the physiological action of tissues, do actually +take place (as our senses testify) in the manner in which the scientific +propositions state them to take place. We will not discuss the logical +or philological propriety of either use of the terms abstract and +concrete, in which twofold point of view very few of the numerous +acceptations of these words are entirely defensible: but of the two +distinctions M. Comte's answers to by far the deepest and most vital +difference. Mr Spencer's is open to the radical objection, that it +classifies truths not according to their subject-matter or their mutual +relations, but according to an unimportant difference in the manner in +which we come to know them. Of what consequence is it that the law of +inertia (considered as an exact truth) is not generalized from our +direct perceptions, but inferred by combining with the movements which +we see, those which we should see if it were not for the disturbing +causes? In either case we are equally certain that it <i>is</i> an exact +truth: for every dynamical law is perfectly fulfilled even when it seems +to be counteracted. There must, we should think, be many truths in +physiology (for example) which are only known by a similar indirect +process; and Mr Spencer would hardly detach these from the body of the +science, and call them abstract and the remainder concrete.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_3_3" id="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3"><span class="label">[3]</span></a> Système de Politique Positive, ii. 36.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_4_4" id="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4"><span class="label">[4]</span></a> The strongest case which Mr Spencer produces of a +scientifically ascertained law, which, though belonging to a later +science, was necessary to the scientific formation of one occupying an +earlier place in M. Comte's series, is the law of the accelerating force +of gravity; which M. Comte places in Physics, but without which the +Newtonian theory of the celestial motions could not have been +discovered, nor could even now be proved. This fact, as is judiciously +remarked by M. Littré, is not valid against the plan of M. Comte's +classification, but discloses a slight error in the detail. M. Comte +should not have placed the laws of terrestrial gravity under Physics. +They are part of the general theory of gravitation, and belong to +astronomy. Mr Spencer has hit one of the weak points in M. Comte's +scientific scale; weak however only because left unguarded. Astronomy, +the second of M. Comte's abstract sciences, answers to his own +definition of a concrete science. M. Comte however was only wrong in +overlooking a distinction. There <i>is</i> an abstract science of astronomy, +namely, the theory of gravitation, which would equally agree with and +explain the facts of a totally different solar system from the one of +which our earth forms a part. The actual facts of our own system, the +dimensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, physical constitution, +&c., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly the subject of a +concrete science, similar to natural history; but the concrete is more +inseparably united to the abstract science than in any other case, since +the few celestial facts really accessible to us are nearly all required +for discovering and proving the law of gravitation as an universal +property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable place in the +abstract science as its fundamental data.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_5_5" id="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5"><span class="label">[5]</span></a> The only point at which the general principle of the series +fails in its application, is the subdivision of Physics; and there, as +the subordination of the different branches scarcely exists, their order +is of little consequence. Thermology, indeed, is altogether an exception +to the principle of decreasing generality, heat, as Mr Spencer truly +says being as universal as gravitation. But the place of Thermology is +marked out, within certain narrow limits, by the ends of the +classification, though not by its principle. The desideratum is, that +every science should precede those which cannot be scientifically +constitute or rationally studied until it is known. It is as a means to +this end, that the arrangement of the phaenomena in the order of their +dependence on one another is important. Now, though heat is as universal +a phaenomenon as any which external nature presents, its laws do not +affect, in any manner important to us, the phaenomena of Astronomy, and +operate in the other branches of Physics only as slight modifying +agencies, the consideration of which may be postponed to a rather +advanced stage. But the phaenomena of Chemistry and Biology depend on +them often for their very existence. The ends of the classification +require therefore that Thermology should precede Chemistry and Biology, +but do not demand that it should be thrown farther back. On the other +hand, those same ends, in another point of view, require that it should +be subsequent to Astronomy, for reasons not of doctrine but of method: +Astronomy being the best school of the true art of interpreting Nature, +by which Thermology profits like other sciences, but which it was ill +adapted to originate.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_6_6" id="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6"><span class="label">[6]</span></a> The philosophy of the subject is perhaps nowhere so well +expressed as in the "Système de Politique Positive" (iii. 41). "Conçu +logiquement, l'ordre suivant lequel nos principales théories +accomplissent l'évolution fondamentale résulte nécessairement de leur +dépendence mutuelle. Toutes les sciences peuvent, sans doute, être +ébauchées à la fois: leur usage pratique exige même cette culture +simultanée. Mais elle ne peut concerner que les inductions propres à +chaque classe de spéculations. Or cet essor inductif ne saurait fournir +des principes suffisants qu'envers les plus simples études. Partout +ailleurs, ils ne peuvent être établis qu'en subordonnant chaque genre +d'inductions scientifiques à l'ensemble des déductions emanées des +domaines moins compliqués, et dès-lors moins dépendants. Ainsi nos +diverses théories reposent dogmatiquement les unes sur les autres, +suivant un ordre invariable, qui doit régler historiquement leur +avénement décisif, les plus indépendantes ayant toujours dû se +développer plus tôt."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_7_7" id="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7"><span class="label">[7]</span></a> "Science," says Mr Spencer in his "Genesis," "while purely +inductive is purely qualitative.... All quantitative prevision is +reached deductively; induction can achieve only qualitative prevision." +Now, if we remember that the very first accurate quantitative law of +physical phaenomena ever established, the law of the accelerating force +of gravity, was discovered and proved by Galileo partly at least by +experiment; that the quantitative laws on which the whole theory of the +celestial motions is grounded, were generalized by Kepler from direct +comparison of observations; that the quantitative law of the +condensation of gases by pressure, the law of Boyle and Mariotte, was +arrived at by direct experiment; that the proportional quantities in +which every known substance combines chemically with every other, were +ascertained by innumerable experiments, from which the general law of +chemical equivalents, now the ground of the most exact quantitative +previsions, was an inductive generalization; we must conclude that Mr +Spencer has committed himself to a general proposition, which a very +slight consideration of truths perfectly known to him would have shown +to be unsustainable. +</p><p> +Again, in the very pamphlet in which Mr Spencer defends himself against +the supposition of being a disciple of M. Comte ("The Classification of +the Sciences," p. 37), he speaks of "M. Comte's adherent, Mr Buckle." +Now, except in the opinion common to both, that history may be made a +subject of science, the speculations of these two thinkers are not only +different, but run in different channels, M. Comte applying himself +principally to the laws of evolution common to all mankind, Mr Buckle +almost exclusively to the diversities: and it may be affirmed without +presumption, that they neither saw the same truths, nor fell into the +same errors, nor defended their opinions, either true or erroneous, by +the same arguments. Indeed, it is one of the surprising things in the +case of Mr Buckle as of Mr Spencer, that being a man of kindred genius, +of the same wide range of knowledge, and devoting himself to +speculations of the same kind, he profited so little by M. Comte. +</p><p> +These oversights prove nothing against the general accuracy of Mr +Spencer's acquirements. They are mere lapses of inattention, such as +thinkers who attempt speculations requiring that vast multitudes of +facts should be kept in recollection at once, can scarcely hope always +to avoid.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_8_8" id="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8"><span class="label">[8]</span></a> We refer particularly to the mystical metaphysics connected +with the negative sign, imaginary quantities, infinity and +infinitesimals, &c., all cleared up and put on a rational footing in the +highly philosophical treatises of Professor De Morgan.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_9_9" id="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9"><span class="label">[9]</span></a> Those who wish to see this idea followed out, are referred +to "A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive." It is not +irrelevant to state that M. Comte, soon after the publication of that +work, expressed, both in a letter (published in M. Littré's volume) and +in print, his high approval of it (especially of the Inductive part) as +a real contribution to the construction of the Positive Method. But we +cannot discover that he was indebted to it for a single idea, or that it +influenced, in the smallest particular, the course of his subsequent +speculations.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_10_10" id="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10"><span class="label">[10]</span></a> The force, however, of this last consideration has been +much weakened by the progress of discovery since M. Comte left off +studying chemistry; it being now probable that most if not all +substances, even elementary, are susceptible of <i>allotropic</i> forms; as +in the case of oxygen and ozone, the two forms of phosphorus, &c.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_11_11" id="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11"><span class="label">[11]</span></a> Thus; by considering prussic acid as a compound of +hydrogen and cyanogen rather than of hydrogen and the elements of +cyanogen (carbon and nitrogen), it is assimilated to a whole class of +acid compounds between hydrogen and other substances, and a reason is +thus found for its agreeing in their acid properties.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_12_12" id="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12"><span class="label">[12]</span></a> According to Sir William Hamilton, as many as six; but +numerical precision in such matters is out of the question, and it is +probable that different minds have the power in different degrees.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_13_13" id="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13"><span class="label">[13]</span></a> Or, as afterwards corrected by him, the appetites and +emotions, the active capacities, and the intellectual faculties; "le +coeur," "le caractère," and "l'esprit."</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_14_14" id="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14"><span class="label">[14]</span></a> M. Littré, who, though a warm admirer, and accepting the +position of a disciple of M. Comte, is singularly free from his errors, +makes the equally ingenious and just remark, that Political Economy +corresponds in social science to the theory of the nutritive functions +in biology, which M. Comte, with all good physiologists, thinks it not +only permissible but a great and fundamental improvement to treat, in +the first place, separately, as the necessary basis of the higher +branches of the science: although the nutritive functions can no more be +withdrawn <i>in fact</i> from the influence of the animal and human +attributes, than the economical phaenomena of society from that of the +political and moral.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_15_15" id="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15"><span class="label">[15]</span></a> Indeed his claim to be the creator of Sociology does not +extend to this branch of the science; on the contrary, he, in a +subsequent work, expressly declares that the real founder of it was +Aristotle, by whom the theory of the conditions of social existence was +carried as far towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any +theory of Progress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly +possible to appreciate too highly the merit of those early efforts, +beyond which little progress had been made, until a very recent period, +either in ethical or in political science.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_16_16" id="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16"><span class="label">[16]</span></a> It is due to them both to say, that he continued to +express, in letters which have been published, a high opinion of her, +both morally and intellectually; and her persistent and strong concern +for his interests and his fame is attested both by M. Littré and by his +own correspondence.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_17_17" id="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17"><span class="label">[17]</span></a> "Of the Classification of the Sciences," pp. 37, 38.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_18_18" id="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18"><span class="label">[18]</span></a> In the case of Egypt we admit that there may be cited +against us the authority of Plato, in whose Politicus it is said that +the king of Egypt must be a member of the priestly caste, or if by +usurpation a member of any other caste acquired the sovereignty he must +be initiated with the sacerdotal order. But Plato was writing of a state +of things which already belonged to the past; nor have we any assurance +that his information on Egyptian institutions was authentic and +accurate. Had the king been necessarily or commonly a member of the +priestly order, it is most improbable that the careful Herodotus, of +whose comprehensive work an entire book was devoted to a minute account +of Egypt and its institutions, and who collected his information from +Egyptian priests in the country itself, would have been ignorant of a +part so important, and tending so much to exalt the dignity of the +priesthood, who were much more likely to affirm it falsely to Plato than +to withhold the knowledge of it if true from Heredotus. Not only is +Herodotus silent respecting any such law or custom, but he thinks it +needful to mention that in one particular instance the king (by name +Sethôs) was a priest, which he would scarcely have done if this had been +other than an exceptional case. It is likely enough that a king of Egypt +would learn the hieratic character, and would not suffer any of the +mysteries of law or religion which were in the keeping of the priests to +be withheld from him; and this was very probably all the foundation +which existed for the assertion of the Eleatic stranger in Plato's +dialogue.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_19_19" id="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19"><span class="label">[19]</span></a> Mill, History of British India, book ii. chap. iii.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_20_20" id="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20"><span class="label">[20]</span></a> At a somewhat later period M. Comte drew up what he termed +a Positivist Calendar, in which every day was dedicated to some +benefactor of humanity (generally with the addition of a similar but +minor luminary, to be celebrated in the room of his principal each +bissextile year). In this no kind of human eminence, really useful, is +omitted, except that which is merely negative and destructive. On this +principle (which is avowed) the French <i>philosophes</i> as such are +excluded, those only among them being admitted who, like Voltaire and +Diderot, had claims to admission on other grounds: and the Protestant +religious reformers are left out entirely, with the curious exception of +George Fox—who is included, we presume, in consideration of his Peace +principles.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_21_21" id="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21"><span class="label">[21]</span></a> He goes still further and deeper in a subsequent work. +"L'art ramène doucement à la réalite les contemplations trop abstraites +du théoricien, tandis qu'il pousse noblement le praticien aux +speculations désinteressées." Système de Politique Positive, i. 287.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_22_22" id="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22"><span class="label">[22]</span></a> 1. <i>Système de Politique Positive, ou Traité de +Sociologie, instituant la Religion de l'Humanité</i>. 4 vols. 8vo. Paris: +1851—1854. +</p><p> +2. <i>Catéchisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion +Universelle, en onze Entretiens Systématiques entre une Femme et un +Prêtre de l'Humanité</i>. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1852. +</p><p> +3. <i>Appel aux Conservateurs</i>. Paris: 1855 (brochure). +</p><p> +4. <i>Synthèse Subjective, ou Système Universel des Conceptions propres à +l'Etat Normal de l'Humanité</i>. Tome Premier, contenant le Système de +Logique Positive, ou Traité de Philosophie Mathématique. 8vo. Paris: +1856. +</p><p> +5. <i>Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive</i>. Par E. LITTRE. 1 vol. +8vo. Paris: 1863. +</p><p> +6. <i>Exposition Abrégée et Populaire de la Philosophie et de la Religion +Positives</i>. PAR CÉLESTIN DE BLIGNIÈRES, ancien élève de l'Ecole +Polytechnique. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1857. +</p><p> +7. <i>Notice sur l'Oeuvre et sur la Vie d'Auguste Comte</i>. Par le DOCTEUR +ROBINET, son Médecin, et l'un de ses treize Exécuteurs Testamentaires. 1 +vol. 8vo. Paris: 1860.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_23_23" id="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23"><span class="label">[23]</span></a> Système de Politique Positive, iv. 100.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_24_24" id="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24"><span class="label">[24]</span></a> See Sir John Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy, § 319.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_25_25" id="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25"><span class="label">[25]</span></a> Synthèse Subjective, pp. 10, 11.</p></div> + +<div class="footnote"><p><a name="Footnote_26_26" id="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26"><span class="label">[26]</span></a> Synthèse Subjective, pp. 11, 12.</p></div> + + + + + +</div> + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's August Comte and Positivism, by John-Stuart Mill + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AUGUST COMTE AND POSITIVISM *** + +***** This file should be named 16833-h.htm or 16833-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/8/3/16833/ + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Auguste Comte and Positivism + +Author: John-Stuart Mill + +Release Date: October 9, 2005 [EBook #16833] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM *** + + + + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe + + + + +AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM + +BY + +JOHN STUART MILL + + +1865. + + + + * * * * * + + + +PART I. + +THE COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE. + + +For some time much has been said, in England and on the Continent, +concerning "Positivism" and "the Positive Philosophy." Those phrases, +which during the life of the eminent thinker who introduced them had +made their way into no writings or discussions but those of his very few +direct disciples, have emerged from the depths and manifested themselves +on the surface of the philosophy of the age. It is not very widely known +what they represent, but it is understood that they represent something. +They are symbols of a recognised mode of thought, and one of sufficient +importance to induce almost all who now discuss the great problems of +philosophy, or survey from any elevated point of view the opinions of +the age, to take what is termed the Positivist view of things into +serious consideration, and define their own position, more or less +friendly or hostile, in regard to it. Indeed, though the mode of thought +expressed by the terms Positive and Positivism is widely spread, the +words themselves are, as usual, better known through the enemies of that +mode of thinking than through its friends; and more than one thinker who +never called himself or his opinions by those appellations, and +carefully guarded himself against being confounded with those who did, +finds himself, sometimes to his displeasure, though generally by a +tolerably correct instinct, classed with Positivists, and assailed as a +Positivist. This change in the bearings of philosophic opinion commenced +in England earlier than in France, where a philosophy of a contrary kind +had been more widely cultivated, and had taken a firmer hold on the +speculative minds of a generation formed by Royer-Collard, Cousin, +Jouffroy, and their compeers. The great treatise of M. Comte was +scarcely mentioned in French literature or criticism, when it was +already working powerfully on the minds of many British students and +thinkers. But, agreeably to the usual course of things in France, the +new tendency, when it set in, set in more strongly. Those who call +themselves Positivists are indeed not numerous; but all French writers +who adhere to the common philosophy, now feel it necessary to begin by +fortifying their position against "the Positivist school." And the mode +of thinking thus designated is already manifesting its importance by one +of the most unequivocal signs, the appearance of thinkers who attempt a +compromise or _juste milieu_ between it and its opposite. The acute +critic and metaphysician M. Taine, and the distinguished chemist M. +Berthelot, are the authors of the two most conspicuous of these +attempts. + +The time, therefore, seems to have come, when every philosophic thinker +not only ought to form, but may usefully express, a judgment respecting +this intellectual movement; endeavouring to understand what it is, +whether it is essentially a wholesome movement, and if so, what is to be +accepted and what rejected of the direction given to it by its most +important movers. There cannot be a more appropriate mode of discussing +these points than in the form of a critical examination of the +philosophy of Auguste Comte; for which the appearance of a new edition +of his fundamental treatise, with a preface by the most eminent, in +every point of view, of his professed disciples, M. Littre, affords a +good opportunity. The name of M. Comte is more identified than any other +with this mode of thought. He is the first who has attempted its +complete systematization, and the scientific extension of it to all +objects of human knowledge. And in doing this he has displayed a +quantity and quality of mental power, and achieved an amount of success, +which have not only won but retained the high admiration of thinkers as +radically and strenuously opposed as it is possible to be, to nearly the +whole of his later tendencies, and to many of his earlier opinions. It +would have been a mistake had such thinkers busied themselves in the +first instance with drawing attention to what they regarded as errors in +his great work. Until it had taken the place in the world of thought +which belonged to it, the important matter was not to criticise it, but +to help in making it known. To have put those who neither knew nor were +capable of appreciating the greatness of the book, in possession of its +vulnerable points, would have indefinitely retarded its progress to a +just estimation, and was not needful for guarding against any serious +inconvenience. While a writer has few readers, and no influence except +on independent thinkers, the only thing worth considering in him is what +he can teach us: if there be anything in which he is less wise than we +are already, it may be left unnoticed until the time comes when his +errors can do harm. But the high place which M. Comte has now assumed +among European thinkers, and the increasing influence of his principal +work, while they make it a more hopeful task than before to impress and +enforce the strong points of his philosophy, have rendered it, for the +first time, not inopportune to discuss his mistakes. Whatever errors he +may have fallen into are now in a position to be injurious, while the +free exposure of them can no longer be so. + +We propose, then, to pass in review the main principles of M. Comte's +philosophy; commencing with the great treatise by which, in this +country, he is chiefly known, and postponing consideration of the +writings of the last ten years of his life, except for the occasional +illustration of detached points. + +When we extend our examination to these later productions, we shall +have, in the main, to reverse our judgment. Instead of recognizing, as +in the Cours de Philosophic Positive, an essentially sound view of +philosophy, with a few capital errors, it is in their general character +that we deem the subsequent speculations false and misleading, while in +the midst of this wrong general tendency, we find a crowd of valuable +thoughts, and suggestions of thought, in detail. For the present we put +out of the question this signal anomaly in M. Comte's intellectual +career. We shall consider only the principal gift which he has left to +the world, his clear, full, and comprehensive exposition, and in part +creation, of what he terms the Positive Philosophy: endeavouring to +sever what in our estimation is true, from the much less which is +erroneous, in that philosophy as he conceived it, and distinguishing, as +we proceed, the part which is specially his, from that which belongs to +the philosophy of the age, and is the common inheritance of thinkers. +This last discrimination has been partially made in a late pamphlet, by +Mr Herbert Spencer, in vindication of his own independence of thought: +but this does not diminish the utility of doing it, with a less limited +purpose, here; especially as Mr Spencer rejects nearly all which +properly belongs to M. Comte, and in his abridged mode of statement does +scanty justice to what he rejects. The separation is not difficult, even +on the direct evidence given by M. Comte himself, who, far from claiming +any originality not really belonging to him, was eager to connect his +own most original thoughts with every germ of anything similar which he +observed in previous thinkers. + +The fundamental doctrine of a true philosophy, according to M. Comte, +and the character by which he defines Positive Philosophy, is the +following:--We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our +knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not the +essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only its +relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. +These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same +circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaenomena together, +and the constant sequences which unite them as antecedent and +consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of phaenomena are all we +know respecting them. Their essential nature, and their ultimate causes, +either efficient or final, are unknown and inscrutable to us. + +M. Comte claims no originality for this conception of human knowledge. +He avows that it has been virtually acted on from the earliest period by +all who have made any real contribution to science, and became +distinctly present to the minds of speculative men from the time of +Bacon, Descartes, and Galileo, whom he regards as collectively the +founders of the Positive Philosophy. As he says, the knowledge which +mankind, even in the earliest ages, chiefly pursued, being that which +they most needed, was _fore_knowledge: "savoir, pour prevoir." When they +sought for the cause, it was mainly in order to control the effect or if +it was uncontrollable, to foreknow and adapt their conduct to it. Now, +all foresight of phaenomena, and power over them, depend on knowledge of +their sequences, and not upon any notion we may have formed respecting +their origin or inmost nature. We foresee a fact or event by means of +facts which are signs of it, because experience has shown them to be its +antecedents. We bring about any fact, other than our own muscular +contractions, by means of some fact which experience has shown to be +followed by it. All foresight, therefore, and all intelligent action, +have only been possible in proportion as men have successfully attempted +to ascertain the successions of phaenomena. Neither foreknowledge, nor +the knowledge which is practical power, can be acquired by any other +means. + +The conviction, however, that knowledge of the successions and +co-existences of phaenomena is the sole knowledge accessible to us, +could not be arrived at in a very early stage of the progress of +thought. Men have not even now left off hoping for other knowledge, nor +believing that they have attained it; and that, when attained, it is, in +some undefinable manner, greatly more precious than mere knowledge of +sequences and co-existences. The true doctrine was not seen in its full +clearness even by Bacon, though it is the result to which all his +speculations tend: still less by Descartes. It was, however, correctly +apprehended by Newton.[1] + +But it was probably first conceived in its entire generality by Hume, +who carries it a step further than Comte, maintaining not merely that +the only causes of phaenomena which can be known to us are other +phaenomena, their invariable antecedents, but that there is no other +kind of causes: cause, as he interprets it, _means_ the invariable +antecedent. This is the only part of Hume's doctrine which was contested +by his great adversary, Kant; who, maintaining as strenuously as Comte +that we know nothing of Things in themselves, of Noumena, of real +Substances and real Causes, yet peremptorily asserted their existence. +But neither does Comte question this: on the contrary, all his language +implies it. Among the direct successors of Hume, the writer who has best +stated and defended Comte's fundamental doctrine is Dr Thomas Brown. The +doctrine and spirit of Brown's philosophy are entirely Positivist, and +no better introduction to Positivism than the early part of his Lectures +has yet been produced. Of living thinkers we do not speak; but the same +great truth formed the groundwork of all the speculative philosophy of +Bentham, and pre-eminently of James Mill: and Sir William Hamilton's +famous doctrine of the Relativity of human knowledge has guided many to +it, though we cannot credit Sir William Hamilton himself with having +understood the principle, or been willing to assent to it if he had. + +The foundation of M. Comte's philosophy is thus in no way peculiar to +him, but the general property of the age, however far as yet from being +universally accepted even by thoughtful minds. + +The philosophy called Positive is not a recent invention of M. Comte, +but a simple adherence to the traditions of all the great scientific +minds whose discoveries have made the human race what it is. M. Comte +has never presented it in any other light. But he has made the doctrine +his own by his manner of treating it. To know rightly what a thing is, +we require to know, with equal distinctness, what it is not. To enter +into the real character of any mode of thought, we must understand what +other modes of thought compete with it. M. Comte has taken care that we +should do so. The modes of philosophizing which, according to him, +dispute ascendancy with the Positive, are two in number, both of them +anterior to it in date; the Theological, and the Metaphysical. + +We use the words Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive, because they +are chosen by M. Comte as a vehicle for M. Comte's ideas. Any +philosopher whose thoughts another person undertakes to set forth, +has a right to require that it should be done by means of his own +nomenclature. They are not, however, the terms we should ourselves +choose. In all languages, but especially in English, they excite ideas +other than those intended. The words Positive and Positivism, in the +meaning assigned to them, are ill fitted to take, root in English soil; +while Metaphysical suggests, and suggested even to M. Comte, much that +in no way deserves to be included in his denunciation. The term +Theological is less wide of the mark, though the use of it as a term of +condemnation implies, as we shall see, a greater reach of negation than +need be included in the Positive creed. Instead of the Theological we +should prefer to speak of the Personal, or Volitional explanation of +nature; instead of Metaphysical, the Abstractional or Ontological: and +the meaning of Positive would be less ambiguously expressed in the +objective aspect by Phaenomenal, in the subjective by Experiential. But +M. Comte's opinions are best stated in his own phraseology; several of +them, indeed, can scarcely be presented in some of their bearings +without it. + +The Theological, which is the original and spontaneous form of thought, +regards the facts of the universe as governed not by invariable laws of +sequence, but by single and direct volitions of beings, real or +imaginary, possessed of life and intelligence. In the infantile state of +reason and experience, individual objects are looked upon as animated. +The next step is the conception of invisible beings, each of whom +superintends and governs an entire class of objects or events. The last +merges this multitude of divinities in a single God, who made the whole +universe in the beginning, and guides and carries on its phaenomena by +his continued action, or, as others think, only modifies them from time +to time by special interferences. + +The mode of thought which M. Comte terms Metaphysical, accounts for +phaenomena by ascribing them, not to volitions either sublunary or +celestial, but to realized abstractions. In this stage it is no longer +a god that causes and directs each of the various agencies of nature: +it is a power, or a force, or an occult quality, considered as real +existences, inherent in but distinct from the concrete bodies in which +they reside, and which they in a manner animate. Instead of Dryads +presiding over trees, producing and regulating their phaenomena, every +plant or animal has now a Vegetative Soul, the [Greek: Threptike phyge] +of Aristotle. At a later period the Vegetative Soul has become a Plastic +Force, and still later, a Vital Principle. Objects now do all that they +do because it is their Essence to do so, or by reason of an inherent +Virtue. Phaenomena are accounted for by supposed tendencies and +propensities of the abstraction Nature; which, though regarded as +impersonal, is figured as acting on a sort of motives, and in a manner +more or less analogous to that of conscious beings. Aristotle affirms a +tendency of nature towards the best, which helps him to a theory of many +natural phaenomena. The rise of water in a pump is attributed to +Nature's horror of a vacuum. The fall of heavy bodies, and the ascent of +flame and smoke, are construed as attempts of each to get to its +_natural_ place. Many important consequences are deduced from the +doctrine that Nature has no breaks (non habet saltum). In medicine the +curative force (vis medicatrix) of Nature furnishes the explanation of +the reparative processes which modern physiologists refer each to its +own particular agencies and laws. + +Examples are not necessary to prove to those who are acquainted with the +past phases of human thought, how great a place both the theological and +the metaphysical interpretations of phaenomena have historically +occupied, as well in the speculations of thinkers as in the familiar +conceptions of the multitude. Many had perceived before M. Comte that +neither of these modes of explanation was final: the warfare against +both of them could scarcely be carried on more vigorously than it +already was, early in the seventeenth century, by Hobbes. Nor is it +unknown to any one who has followed the history of the various physical +sciences, that the positive explanation of facts has substituted itself, +step by step, for the theological and metaphysical, as the progress of +inquiry brought to light an increasing number of the invariable laws of +phaenomena. In these respects M. Comte has not originated anything, but +has taken his place in a fight long since engaged, and on the side +already in the main victorious. The generalization which belongs to +himself, and in which he had not, to the best of our knowledge, been at +all anticipated, is, that every distinct class of human conceptions +passes through all these stages, beginning with the theological, and +proceeding through the metaphysical to the positive: the metaphysical +being a mere state of transition, but an indispensable one, from the +theological mode of thought to the positive, which is destined finally +to prevail, by the universal recognition that all phaemomena without +exception are governed by invariable laws, with which no volitions, +either natural or supernatural, interfere. This general theorem is +completed by the addition, that the theological mode of thought has +three stages, Fetichism, Polytheism, and Monotheism: the successive +transitions being prepared, and indeed caused, by the gradual uprising +of the two rival modes of thought, the metaphysical and the positive, +and in their turn preparing the way for the ascendancy of these; first +and temporarily of the metaphysical, finally of the positive. + +This generalization is the most fundamental of the doctrines which +originated with M. Comte; and the survey of history, which occupies the +two largest volumes of the six composing his work, is a continuous +exemplification and verification of the law. How well it accords with +the facts, and how vast a number of the greater historical phaenomena it +explains, is known only to those who have studied its exposition, where +alone it can be found--in these most striking and instructive volumes. +As this theory is the key to M. Comte's other generalizations, all of +which arc more or less dependent on it; as it forms the backbone, if we +may so speak, of his philosophy, and, unless it be true, he has +accomplished little; we cannot better employ part of our space than in +clearing it from misconception, and giving the explanations necessary to +remove the obstacles which prevent many competent persons from assenting +to it. + +It is proper to begin by relieving the doctrine from a religious +prejudice. The doctrine condemns all theological explanations, and +replaces them, or thinks them destined to be replaced, by theories which +take no account of anything but an ascertained order of phaenomena. It +is inferred that if this change were completely accomplished, mankind +would cease to refer the constitution of Nature to an intelligent will +or to believe at all in a Creator and supreme Governor of the world. +This supposition is the more natural, as M. Comte was avowedly of that +opinion. He indeed disclaimed, with some acrimony, dogmatic atheism, and +even says (in a later work, but the earliest contains nothing at +variance with it) that the hypothesis of design has much greater +verisimilitude than that of a blind mechanism. But conjecture, founded +on analogy, did not seem to him a basis to rest a theory on, in a mature +state of human intelligence. He deemed all real knowledge of a +commencement inaccessible to us, and the inquiry into it an overpassing +of the essential limits of our mental faculties. To this point, however, +those who accept his theory of the progressive stages of opinion are not +obliged to follow him. The Positive mode of thought is not necessarily a +denial of the supernatural; it merely throws back that question to the +origin of all things. If the universe had a beginning, its beginning, by +the very conditions of the case, was supernatural; the laws of nature +cannot account for their own origin. The Positive philosopher is free to +form his opinion on the subject, according to the weight he attaches to +the analogies which are called marks of design, and to the general +traditions of the human race. The value of these evidences is indeed a +question for Positive philosophy, but it is not one upon which Positive +philosophers must necessarily be agreed. It is one of M. Comte's +mistakes that he never allows of open questions. Positive Philosophy +maintains that within the existing order of the universe, or rather of +the part of it known to us, the direct determining cause of every +phaenomenon is not supernatural but natural. It is compatible with this +to believe, that the universe was created, and even that it is +continuously governed, by an Intelligence, provided we admit that the +intelligent Governor adheres to fixed laws, which are only modified or +counteracted by other laws of the same dispensation, and are never +either capriciously or providentially departed from. Whoever regards +all events as parts of a constant order, each one being the invariable +consequent of some antecedent condition, or combination of conditions, +accepts fully the Positive mode of thought: whether he acknowledges or +not an universal antecedent on which the whole system of nature was +originally consequent, and whether that universal antecedent is +conceived as an Intelligence or not. + +There is a corresponding misconception to be corrected respecting the +Metaphysical mode of thought. In repudiating metaphysics, M. Comte did +not interdict himself from analysing or criticising any of the abstract +conceptions of the mind. He was not ignorant (though he sometimes seemed +to forget) that such analysis and criticism are a necessary part of the +scientific process, and accompany the scientific mind in all its +operations. What he condemned was the habit of conceiving these mental +abstractions as real entities, which could exert power, produce +phaenomena, and the enunciation of which could be regarded as a theory +or explanation of facts. Men of the present day with difficulty believe +that so absurd a notion was ever really entertained, so repugnant is it +to the mental habits formed by long and assiduous cultivation of the +positive sciences. But those sciences, however widely cultivated, have +never formed the basis of intellectual education in any society. It is +with philosophy as with religion: men marvel at the absurdity of other +people's tenets, while exactly parallel absurdities remain in their own, +and the same man is unaffectedly astonished that words can be mistaken +for things, who is treating other words as if they were things every +time he opens his mouth to discuss. No one, unless entirely ignorant of +the history of thought, will deny that the mistaking of abstractions for +realities pervaded speculation all through antiquity and the middle +ages. The mistake was generalized and systematized in the famous Ideas +of Plato. The Aristotelians carried it on. Essences, quiddities, virtues +residing in things, were accepted as a _bona fide_ explanation of +phaenomena. Not only abstract qualities, but the concrete names of +genera and species, were mistaken for objective existences. It was +believed that there were General Substances corresponding to all the +familiar classes of concrete things: a substance Man, a substance Tree, +a substance Animal, which, and not the individual objects so called, +were directly denoted by those names. The real existence of Universal +Substances was the question at issue in the famous controversy of the +later middle ages between Nominalism and Realism, which is one of the +turning points in the history of thought, being its first struggle to +emancipate itself from the dominion of verbal abstractions. The Realists +were the stronger party, but though the Nominalists for a time +succumbed, the doctrine they rebelled against fell, after a short +interval, with the rest of the scholastic philosophy. But while +universal substances and substantial forms, being the grossest kind of +realized abstractions, were the soonest discarded, Essences, Virtues, +and Occult Qualities long survived them, and were first completely +extruded from real existence by the Cartesians. In Descartes' conception +of science, all physical phaenomena were to be explained by matter and +motion, that is, not by abstractions but by invariable physical laws: +though his own explanations were many of them hypothetical, and turned +out to be erroneous. Long after him, however, fictitious entities (as +they are happily termed by Bentham) continued to be imagined as means of +accounting for the more mysterious phaenomena; above all in physiology, +where, under great varieties of phrase, mysterious _forces_ and +_principles_ were the explanation, or substitute for explanation, of the +phaenomena of organized beings. To modern philosophers these fictions +are merely the abstract names of the classes of phaenomena which +correspond to them; and it is one of the puzzles of philosophy, how +mankind, after inventing a set of mere names to keep together certain +combinations of ideas or images, could have so far forgotten their own +act as to invest these creations of their will with objective reality, +and mistake the name of a phaenomenon for its efficient cause. What was +a mystery from the purely dogmatic point of view, is cleared up by the +historical. These abstract words are indeed now mere names of +phaenomena, but were not so in their origin. To us they denote only the +phaenomena, because we have ceased to believe in what else they once +designated; and the employment of them in explanation is to us +evidently, as M. Comte says, the naif reproduction of the phaenomenon +as the reason for itself: but it was not so in the beginning. The +metaphysical point of view was not a perversion of the positive, but a +transformation of the theological. The human mind, in framing a class of +objects, did not set out from the notion of a name, but from that of a +divinity. The realization of abstractions was not the embodiment of a +word, but the gradual disembodiment of a Fetish. + +The primitive tendency or instinct of mankind is to assimilate all the +agencies which they perceive in Nature, to the only one of which they +are directly conscious, their own voluntary activity. Every object which +seems to originate power, that is, to act without being first visibly +acted upon, to communicate motion without having first received it, they +suppose to possess life, consciousness, will. This first rude conception +of nature can scarcely, however, have been at any time extended to all +phaenomena. The simplest observation, without which the preservation of +life would have been impossible, must have pointed out many uniformities +in nature, many objects which, under given circumstances, acted exactly +like one another: and whenever this was observed, men's natural and +untutored faculties led them to form the similar objects into a class, +and to think of them together: of which it was a natural consequence to +refer effects, which were exactly alike, to a single will, rather than +to a number of wills precisely accordant. But this single will could not +be the will of the objects themselves, since they were many: it must be +the will of an invisible being, apart from the objects, and ruling them +from an unknown distance. This is Polytheism. We are not aware that in +any tribe of savages or negroes who have been observed, Fetichism has +been found totally unmixed with Polytheism, and it is probable that the +two coexisted from the earliest period at which the human mind was +capable of forming objects into classes. Fetichism proper gradually +becomes limited to objects possessing a marked individuality. A +particular mountain or river is worshipped bodily (as it is even now by +the Hindoos and the South Sea Islanders) as a divinity in itself, not +the mere residence of one, long after invisible gods have been imagined +as rulers of all the great classes of phaenomena, even intellectual and +moral, as war, love, wisdom, beauty, &c. The worship of the earth +(Tellus or Pales) and of the various heavenly bodies, was prolonged into +the heart of Polytheism. Every scholar knows, though _litterateurs_ and +men of the world do not, that in the full vigour of the Greek religion, +the Sun and Moon, not a god and goddess thereof, were sacrificed to as +deities--older deities than Zeus and his descendants, belonging to the +earlier dynasty of the Titans (which was the mythical version of the +fact that their worship was older), and these deities had a distinct set +of fables or legends connected with them. The father of Phaethon and the +lover of Endymion were not Apollo and Diana, whose identification with +the Sungod and the Moongoddess was a late invention. Astrolatry, which, +as M. Comte observes, is the last form of Fetichism, survived the other +forms, partly because its objects, being inaccessible, were not so soon +discovered to be in themselves inanimate, and partly because of the +persistent spontaneousness of their apparent motions. + +As far as Fetichism reached, and as long as it lasted, there was no +abstraction, or classification of objects, and no room consequently for +the metaphysical mode of thought. But as soon as the voluntary agent, +whose will governed the phaenomenon, ceased to be the physical object +itself, and was removed to an invisible position, from which he or she +superintended an entire class of natural agencies, it began to seem +impossible that this being should exert his powerful activity from a +distance, unless through the medium of something present on the spot. +Through the same Natural Prejudice which made Newton unable to conceive +the possibility of his own law of gravitation without a subtle ether +filling up the intervening space, and through which the attraction could +be communicated--from this same natural infirmity of the human mind, it +seemed indispensable that the god, at a distance from the object, must +act through something residing in it, which was the immediate agent, the +god having imparted to the intermediate something the power whereby it +influenced and directed the object. When mankind felt a need for naming +these imaginary entities, they called them the _nature_ of the object, +or its _essence_, or _virtues_ residing in it, or by many other +different names. These metaphysical conceptions were regarded as +intensely real, and at first as mere instruments in the hands of the +appropriate deities. But the habit being acquired of ascribing not only +substantive existence, but real and efficacious agency, to the abstract +entities, the consequence was that when belief in the deities declined +and faded away, the entities were left standing, and a semblance of +explanation of phaenomena, equal to what existed before, was furnished +by the entities alone, without referring them to any volitions. When +things had reached this point, the metaphysical mode of thought, had +completely substituted itself for the theological. + +Thus did the different successive states of the human intellect, even at +an early stage of its progress, overlap one another, the Fetichistic, +the Polytheistic, and the Metaphysical modes of thought coexisting even +in the same minds, while the belief in invariable laws, which +constitutes the Positive mode of thought, was slowly winning its way +beneath them all, as observation and experience disclosed in one class +of phaenomena after another the laws to which they are really subject. +It was this growth of positive knowledge which principally determined +the next transition in the theological conception of the universe, from +Polytheism to Monotheism. + +It cannot be doubted that this transition took place very tardily. The +conception of a unity in Nature, which would admit of attributing it to +a single will, is far from being natural to man, and only finds +admittance after a long period of discipline and preparation, the +obvious appearances all pointing to the idea of a government by many +conflicting principles. We know how high a degree both of material +civilization and of moral and intellectual development preceded the +conversion of the leading populations of the world to the belief in one +God. The superficial observations by which Christian travellers have +persuaded themselves that they found their own Monotheistic belief in +some tribes of savages, have always been contradicted by more accurate +knowledge: those who have read, for instance, Mr Kohl's Kitchigami, know +what to think of the Great Spirit of the American Indians, who belongs +to a well-defined system of Polytheism, interspersed with large remains +of an original Fetichism. We have no wish to dispute the matter with +those who believe that Monotheism was the primitive religion, +transmitted to our race from its first parents in uninterrupted +tradition. By their own acknowledgment, the tradition was lost by all +the nations of the world except a small and peculiar people, in whom it +was miraculously kept alive, but who were themselves continually lapsing +from it, and in all the earlier parts of their history did not hold it +at all in its full meaning, but admitted the real existence of other +gods, though believing their own to be the most powerful, and to be the +Creator of the world. A greater proof of the unnaturalness of Monotheism +to the human mind before a certain period in its development, could not +well be required. The highest form of Monotheism, Christianity, has +persisted to the present time in giving partial satisfaction to the +mental dispositions that lead to Polytheism, by admitting into its +theology the thoroughly polytheistic conception of a devil. When +Monotheism, after many centuries, made its way to the Greeks and Romans +from the small corner of the world where it existed, we know how the +notion of daemons facilitated its reception, by making it unnecessary +for Christians to deny the existence of the gods previously believed in, +it being sufficient to place them under the absolute power of the new +God, as the gods of Olympus were already under that of Zeus, and as the +local deities of all the subjugated nations had been subordinated by +conquest to the divine patrons of the Roman State. + +In whatever mode, natural or supernatural, we choose to account for the +early Monotheism of the Hebrews, there can be no question that its +reception by the Gentiles was only rendered possible by the slow +preparation which the human mind had undergone from the philosophers. +In the age of the Caesars nearly the whole educated and cultivated class +had outgrown the polytheistic creed, and though individually liable to +returns of the superstition of their childhood, were predisposed (such +of them as did not reject all religion whatever) to the acknowledgment +of one Supreme Providence. It is vain to object that Christianity did +not find the majority of its early proselytes among the educated class: +since, except in Palestine, its teachers and propagators were mainly of +that class--many of them, like St Paul, well versed in the mental +culture of their time; and they had evidently found no intellectual +obstacle to the new doctrine in their own minds. We must not be deceived +by the recrudescence, at a much later date, of a metaphysical Paganism +in the Alexandrian and other philosophical schools, provoked not by +attachment to Polytheism, but by distaste for the political and social +ascendancy of the Christian teachers. The fact was, that Monotheism had +become congenial to the cultivated mind: and a belief which has gained +the cultivated minds of any society, unless put down by force, is +certain, sooner or later, to reach the multitude. Indeed the multitude +itself had been prepared for it, as already hinted, by the more and more +complete subordination of all other deities to the supremacy of Zeus; +from which the step to a single Deity, surrounded by a host of angels, +and keeping in recalcitrant subjection an army of devils, was by no +means difficult. + +By what means, then, had the cultivated minds of the Roman Empire been +educated for Monotheism? By the growth of a practical feeling of the +invariability of natural laws. Monotheism had a natural adaptation to +this belief, while Polytheism naturally and necessarily conflicted with +it. As men could not easily, and in fact never did, suppose that beings +so powerful had their power absolutely restricted, each to its special +department, the will of any divinity might always be frustrated by +another: and unless all their wills were in complete harmony (which +would itself be the most difficult to credit of all cases of +invariability, and would require beyond anything else the ascendancy +of a Supreme Deity) it was impossible that the course of any of the +phaenomena under their government could be invariable. But if, on the +contrary, all the phaenomena of the universe were under the exclusive +and uncontrollable influence of a single will, it was an admissible +supposition that this will might be always consistent with itself, and +might choose to conduct each class of its operations in an invariable +manner. In proportion, therefore, as the invariable laws of phaenomena +revealed themselves to observers, the theory which ascribed them all to +one will began to grow plausible; but must still have appeared +improbable until it had come to seem likely that invariability was the +common rule of all nature. The Greeks and Romans at the Christian era +had reached a point of advancement at which this supposition had become +probable. The admirable height to which geometry had already been +carried, had familiarized the educated mind with the conception of laws +absolutely invariable. The logical analysis of the intellectual +processes by Aristotle had shown a similar uniformity of law in the +realm of mind. In the concrete external world, the most imposing +phaenomena, those of the heavenly bodies, which by their power over the +imagination had done most to keep up the whole system of ideas connected +with supernatural agency, had been ascertained to take place in so +regular an order as to admit of being predicted with a precision which +to the notions of those days must have appeared perfect. And though an +equal degree of regularity had not been discerned in natural phaenomena +generally, even the most empirical observation had ascertained so many +cases of an uniformity _almost_ complete, that inquiring minds were +eagerly on the look-out for further indications pointing in the same +direction; and vied with one another in the formation of theories which, +though hypothetical and essentially premature, it was hoped would turn +out to be correct representations of invariable laws governing large +classes of phaenomena. When this hope and expectation became general, +they were already a great encroachment on the original domain of the +theological principle. Instead of the old conception, of events +regulated from day to day by the unforeseen and changeable volitions of +a legion of deities, it seemed more and more probable that all the +phaenomena of the universe took place according to rules which must have +been planned from the beginning; by which conception the function of the +gods seemed to be limited to forming the plans, and setting the +machinery in motion: their subsequent office appeared to be reduced to +a sinecure, or if they continued to reign, it was in the manner of +constitutional kings, bound by the laws to which they had previously +given their assent. Accordingly, the pretension of philosophers to +explain physical phaenomena by physical causes, or to predict their +occurrence, was, up to a very late period of Polytheism, regarded as +a sacrilegious insult to the gods. Anaxagoras was banished for it, +Aristotle had to fly for his life, and the mere unfounded suspicion of +it contributed greatly to the condemnation of Socrates. We are too well +acquainted with this form of the religious sentiment even now, to have +any difficulty in comprehending what must have been its violence then. +It was inevitable that philosophers should be anxious to get rid of at +least _these_ gods, and so escape from the particular fables which stood +immediately in their way; accepting a notion of divine government which +harmonized better with the lessons they learnt from the study of nature, +and a God concerning whom no mythos, as far as they knew, had yet been +invented. + +Again, when the idea became prevalent that the constitution of every +part of Nature had been planned from the beginning, and continued to +take place as it had been planned, this was itself a striking feature of +resemblance extending through all Nature, and affording a presumption +that the whole was the work, not of many, but of the same hand. It must +have appeared vastly more probable that there should be one indefinitely +foreseeing Intelligence and immovable Will, than hundreds and thousands +of such. The philosophers had not at that time the arguments which might +have been grounded on universal laws not yet suspected, such as the law +of gravitation and the laws of heat; but there was a multitude, obvious +even to them, of analogies and homologies in natural phaenomena, which +suggested unity of plan; and a still greater number were raised up by +their active fancy, aided by their premature scientific theories, all of +which aimed at interpreting some phaenomenon by the analogy of others +supposed to be better known; assuming, indeed, a much greater similarity +among the various processes of Nature, than ampler experience has since +shown to exist. The theological mode of thought thus advanced from +Polytheism to Monotheism through the direct influence of the Positive +mode of thought, not yet aspiring to complete speculative ascendancy. +But, inasmuch as the belief in the invariability of natural laws was +still imperfect even in highly cultivated minds, and in the merest +infancy in the uncultivated, it gave rise to the belief in one God, but +not in an immovable one. For many centuries the God believed in was +flexible by entreaty, was incessantly ordering the affairs of mankind by +direct volitions, and continually reversing the course of nature by +miraculous interpositions; and this is believed still, wherever the +invariability of law has established itself in men's convictions as a +general, but not as an universal truth. + +In the change from Polytheism to Monotheism, the Metaphysical mode of +thought contributed its part, affording great aid to the up-hill +struggle which the Positive spirit had to maintain against the +prevailing form, of the Theological. M. Comte, indeed, has considerably +exaggerated the share of the Metaphysical spirit in this mental +revolution, since by a lax use of terms he credits the Metaphysical mode +of thought with all that is due to dialectics and negative criticism--to +the exposure of inconsistencies and absurdities in the received +religions. But this operation is quite independent of the Metaphysical +mode of thought, and was no otherwise connected with it than in being +very generally carried on by the same minds (Plato is a brilliant +example), since the most eminent efficiency in it does not necessarily +depend on the possession of positive scientific knowledge. But the +Metaphysical spirit, strictly so called, did contribute largely to the +advent of Monotheism. The conception of impersonal entities, interposed +between the governing deity and the phaenomena, and forming the +machinery through which these are immediately produced, is not +repugnant, as the theory of direct supernatural volitions is, to the +belief in invariable laws. The entities not being, like the gods, framed +after the exemplar of men--being neither, like them, invested with human +passions, nor supposed, like them, to have power beyond the phaenomena +which are the special department of each, there was no fear of offending +them by the attempt to foresee and define their action, or by the +supposition that it took place according to fixed laws. The popular +tribunal which condemned Anaxagoras had evidently not risen to the +metaphysical point of view. Hippocrates, who was concerned only with a +select and instructed class, could say with impunity, speaking of what +were called the god-inflicted diseases, that to his mind they were +neither more nor less god-inflicted than all others. The doctrine of +abstract entities was a kind of instinctive conciliation between the +observed uniformity of the facts of nature, and their dependence on +arbitrary volition; since it was easier to conceive a single volition as +setting a machinery to work, which afterwards went on of itself, than to +suppose an inflexible constancy in so capricious and changeable a thing +as volition must then have appeared. But though the regime of +abstractions was in strictness compatible with Polytheism, it demanded +Monotheism as the condition of its free development. The received +Polytheism being only the first remove from Fetichism, its gods were too +closely mixed up in the daily details of phaenomena, and the habit of +propitiating them and ascertaining their will before any important +action of life was too inveterate, to admit, without the strongest shock +to the received system, the notion that they did not habitually rule by +special interpositions, but left phaenomena in all ordinary cases to the +operation of the essences or peculiar natures which they had first +implanted in them. Any modification of Polytheism which would have made +it fully compatible with the Metaphysical conception of the world, would +have been more difficult to effect than the transition to Monotheism, as +Monotheism was at first conceived. + +We have given, in our own way, and at some length, this important +portion of M. Comte's view of the evolution of human thought, as a +sample of the manner in which his theory corresponds with and interprets +historical facts, and also to obviate some objections to it, grounded on +an imperfect comprehension, or rather on a mere first glance. Some, for +example, think the doctrine of the three successive stages of +speculation and belief, inconsistent with the fact that they all three +existed contemporaneously; much as if the natural succession of the +hunting, the nomad, and the agricultural state could be refuted by the +fact that there are still hunters and nomads. That the three states were +contemporaneous, that they all began before authentic history, and still +coexist, is M. Comte's express statement: as well as that the advent of +the two later modes of thought was the very cause which disorganized and +is gradually destroying the primitive one. The Theological mode of +explaining phaenomena was once universal, with the exception, doubtless, +of the familiar facts which, being even then seen to be controllable by +human will, belonged already to the positive mode of thought. The first +and easiest generalizations of common observation, anterior to the first +traces of the scientific spirit, determined the birth of the +Metaphysical mode of thought; and every further advance in the +observation of nature, gradually bringing to light its invariable laws, +determined a further development of the Metaphysical spirit at the +expense of the Theological, this being the only medium through which the +conclusions of the Positive mode of thought and the premises of the +Theological could be temporarily made compatible. At a later period, +when the real character of the positive laws of nature had come to be in +a certain degree understood, and the theological idea had assumed, in +scientific minds, its final character, that of a God governing by +general laws, the positive spirit, having now no longer need of the +fictitious medium of imaginary entities, set itself to the easy task of +demolishing the instrument by which it had risen. But though it +destroyed the actual belief in the objective reality of these +abstractions, that belief has left behind it vicious tendencies of the +human mind, which are still far enough from being extinguished, and +which we shall presently have occasion to characterize. + +The next point on which we have to touch is one of greater importance +than it seems. If all human speculation had to pass through the three +stages, we may presume that its different branches, having always been +very unequally advanced, could not pass from one stage to another at the +same time. There must have been a certain order of succession in which +the different sciences would enter, first into the metaphysical, and +afterwards into the purely positive stage; and this order M. Comte +proceeds to investigate. The result is his remarkable conception of a +scale of subordination of the sciences, being the order of the logical +dependence of those which follow on those which precede. It is not at +first obvious how a mere classification of the sciences can be not +merely a help to their study, but itself an important part of a body of +doctrine; the classification, however, is a very important part of M. +Comte's philosophy. + +He first distinguishes between the abstract and the concrete sciences. +The abstract sciences have to do with the laws which govern the +elementary facts of Nature; laws on which all phaenomena actually +realized must of course depend, but which would have been equally +compatible with many other combinations than those which actually come +to pass. The concrete sciences, on the contrary, concern themselves only +with the particular combinations of phaenomena which are found in +existence. For example; the minerals which compose our planet, or are +found in it, have been produced and are held together by the laws of +mechanical aggregation and by those of chemical union. It is the +business of the abstract sciences, Physics and Chemistry, to ascertain +these laws: to discover how and under what conditions bodies may become +aggregated, and what are the possible modes and results of chemical +combination. The great majority of these aggregations and combinations +take place, so far as we are aware, only in our laboratories; with these +the concrete science, Mineralogy, has nothing to do. Its business is +with those aggregates, and those chemical compounds, which form +themselves, or have at some period been formed, in the natural world. +Again, Physiology, the abstract science, investigates, by such means as +are available to it, the general laws of organization and life. Those +laws determine what living beings are possible, and maintain the +existence and determine the phaenomena of those which actually exist: +but they would be equally capable of maintaining in existence plants and +animals very different from these. The concrete sciences, Zoology and +Botany, confine themselves to species which really exist, or can be +shown to have really existed: and do not concern themselves with the +mode in which even these would comport themselves under all +circumstances, but only under those which really take place. They set +forth the actual mode of existence of plants and animals, the phaenomena +which they in fact present: but they set forth all of these, and take +into simultaneous consideration the whole real existence of each +species, however various the ultimate laws on which it depends, and to +whatever number of different abstract sciences these laws may belong. +The existence of a date tree, or of a lion, is a joint result of many +natural laws, physical, chemical, biological, and even astronomical. +Abstract science deals with these laws separately, but considers each of +them in all its aspects, all its possibilities of operation: concrete +science considers them only in combination, and so far as they exist and +manifest themselves in the animals or plants of which we have +experience. The distinctive attributes of the two are summed up by M. +Comte in the expression, that concrete science relates to Beings, or +Objects, abstract science to Events.[2] + +The concrete sciences are inevitably later in their development than the +abstract sciences on which they depend. Not that they begin later to be +studied; on the contrary, they are the earliest cultivated, since in our +abstract investigations we necessarily set out from spontaneous facts. +But though we may make empirical generalizations, we can form no +scientific theory of concrete phaenomena until the laws which govern and +explain them are first known; and those laws are the subject of the +abstract sciences. In consequence, there is not one of the concrete +studies (unless we count astronomy among them) which has received, up to +the present time, its final scientific constitution, or can be accounted +a science, except in a very loose sense, but only materials for science: +partly from insufficiency of facts, but more, because the abstract +sciences, except those at the very beginning of the scale, have not +attained the degree of perfection necessary to render real concrete +sciences possible. + +Postponing, therefore, the concrete sciences, as not yet formed, but +only tending towards formation, the abstract sciences remain to be +classed. These, as marked out by M. Comte, are six in number; and the +principle which he proposes for their classification is admirably in +accordance with the conditions of our study of Nature. It might have +happened that the different classes of phaenomena had depended on laws +altogether distinct; that in changing from one to another subject of +scientific study, the student left behind all the laws he previously +knew, and passed under the dominion of a totally new set of +uniformities. The sciences would then have been wholly independent of +one another; each would have rested entirely on its own inductions, and +if deductive at all, would have drawn its deductions from premises +exclusively furnished by itself. The fact, however, is otherwise. The +relation which really subsists between different kinds of phaenomena, +enables the sciences to be arranged in such an order, that in travelling +through them we do not pass out of the sphere of any laws, but merely +take up additional ones at each step. In this order M. Comte proposes to +arrange them. He classes the sciences in an ascending series, according +to the degree of complexity of their phaenomena; so that each science +depends on the truths of all those which precede it, with the addition +of peculiar truths of its own. + +Thus, the truths of number are true of all things, and depend only on +their own laws; the science, therefore, of Number, consisting of +Arithmetic and Algebra, may be studied without reference to any other +science. The truths of Geometry presuppose the laws of Number, and a +more special class of laws peculiar to extended bodies, but require no +others: Geometry, therefore, can be studied independently of all +sciences except that of Number. + +Rational Mechanics presupposes, and depends on, the laws of number and +those of extension, and along with them another set of laws, those of +Equilibrium and Motion. The truths of Algebra and Geometry nowise depend +on these last, and would have been true if these had happened to be the +reverse of what we find them: but the phaenomena of equilibrium and +motion cannot be understood, nor even stated, without assuming the laws +of number and extension, such as they actually are. The phaenomena of +Astronomy depend on these three classes of laws, and on the law of +gravitation besides; which last has no influence on the truths of +number, geometry, or mechanics. Physics (badly named in common English +parlance Natural Philosophy) presupposes the three mathematical +sciences, and also astronomy; since all terrestrial phaenomena are +affected by influences derived from the motions of the earth and of the +heavenly bodies. Chemical phaenomena depend (besides their own laws) on +all the preceding, those of physics among the rest, especially on the +laws of heat and electricity; physiological phaenomena, on the laws of +physics and chemistry, and their own laws in addition. The phaenomena of +human society obey laws of their own, but do not depend solely upon +these: they depend upon all the laws of organic and animal life, +together with those of inorganic nature, these last influencing society +not only through their influence on life, but by determining the +physical conditions under which society has to be carried on. "Chacun de +ces degre's successifs exige des inductions qui lui sont propres; mais +elles ne peuvent jamais devenir systematiques que sous l'impulsion +deductive resultee de tous les ordres moins compliques."[3] + +Thus arranged by M. Comte in a series, of which each term represents an +advance in speciality beyond the term preceding it, and (what +necessarily accompanies increased speciality) an increase of +complexity--a set of phaenomena determined by a more numerous +combination of laws; the sciences stand in the following order: 1st, +Mathematics; its three branches following one another on the same +principle, Number, Geometry, Mechanics. 2nd, Astronomy. 3rd, Physics. +4th, Chemistry. 5th, Biology. 6th, Sociology, or the Social Science, the +phaemomena, of which depend on, and cannot be understood without, the +principal truths of all the other sciences. The subject matter and +contents of these various sciences are obvious of themselves, with the +exception of Physics, which is a group of sciences rather than a single +science, and is again divided by M. Comte into five departments: +Barology, or the science of weight; Thermology, or that of heat; +Acoustics, Optics, and Electrology. These he attempts to arrange on the +same principle of increasing speciality and complexity, but they hardly +admit of such a scale, and M. Comte's mode of placing them varied at +different periods. All the five being essentially independent of one +another, he attached little importance to their order, except that +barology ought to come first, as the connecting link with astronomy, and +electrology last, as the transition to chemistry. + +If the best classification is that which is grounded on the properties +most important for our purposes, this classification will stand the +test. By placing the sciences in the order of the complexity of their +subject matter, it presents them in the order of their difficulty. Each +science proposes to itself a more arduous inquiry than those which +precede it in the series; it is therefore likely to be susceptible, even +finally, of a less degree of perfection, and will certainly arrive later +at the degree attainable by it. In addition to this, each science, to +establish its own truths, needs those of all the sciences anterior to +it. The only means, for example, by which the physiological laws of life +could have been ascertained, was by distinguishing, among the +multifarious and complicated facts of life, the portion which physical +and chemical laws cannot account for. Only by thus isolating the effects +of the peculiar organic laws, did it become possible to discover what +these are. It follows that the order in which the sciences succeed one +another in the series, cannot but be, in the main, the historical order +of their development; and is the only order in which they can rationally +be studied. For this last there is an additional reason: since the more +special and complete sciences require not only the truths of the simpler +and more general ones, but still more their methods. The scientific +intellect, both in the individual and in the race, must learn in the +move elementary studies that art of investigation and those canons of +proof which are to be put in practice in the more elevated. No intellect +is properly qualified for the higher part of the scale, without due +practice in the lower. + +Mr Herbert Spencer, in his essay entitled "The Genesis of Science," and +more recently in a pamphlet on "the Classification of the Sciences," has +criticised and condemned M. Comte's classification, and proposed a more +elaborate one of his own: and M. Littre, in his valuable biographical +and philosophical work on M. Comte ("Auguste Comte et la Philosophie +Positive"), has at some length criticised the criticism. Mr Spencer is +one of the small number of persons who by the solidity and +encyclopedical character of their knowledge, and their power of +co-ordination and concatenation, may claim to be the peers of M. Comte, +and entitled to a vote in the estimation of him. But after giving to his +animadversions the respectful attention due to all that comes from Mr +Spencer, we cannot find that he has made out any case. It is always easy +to find fault with a classification. There are a hundred possible ways +of arranging any set of objects, and something may almost always be said +against the best, and in favour of the worst of them. But the merits of +a classification depend on the purposes to which it is instrumental. We +have shown the purposes for which M. Comte's classification is intended. +Mr Spencer has not shown that it is ill adapted to those purposes: and +we cannot perceive that his own answers any ends equally important. His +chief objection is that if the more special sciences need the truths of +the more general ones, the latter also need some of those of the former, +and have at times been stopped in their progress by the imperfect state +of sciences which follow long after them in M. Comte's scale; so that, +the dependence being mutual, there is a _consensus_, but not an +ascending scale or hierarchy of the sciences. That the earlier sciences +derive help from the later is undoubtedly true; it is part of M. Comte's +theory, and amply exemplified in the details of his work. When he +affirms that one science historically precedes another, he does not mean +that the perfection of the first precedes the humblest commencement of +those which follow. Mr Spencer does not distinguish between the +empirical stage of the cultivation of a branch of knowledge, and the +scientific stage. The commencement of every study consists in gathering +together unanalyzed facts, and treasuring up such spontaneous +generalizations as present themselves to natural sagacity. In this stage +any branch of inquiry can be carried on independently of every other; +and it is one of M. Comte's own remarks that the most complex, in a +scientific point of view, of all studies, the latest in his series, the +study of man as a moral and social being, since from its absorbing +interest it is cultivated more or less by every one, and pre-eminently +by the great practical minds, acquired at an early period a greater +stock of just though unscientific observations than the more elementary +sciences. It is these empirical truths that the later and more special +sciences lend to the earlier; or, at most, some extremely elementary +scientific truth, which happening to be easily ascertainable by direct +experiment, could be made available for carrying a previous science +already founded, to a higher stage of development; a re-action of the +later sciences on the earlier which M. Comte not only fully recognized, +but attached great importance to systematizing.[4] + +But though detached truths relating to the more complex order of +phaenomena may be empirically observed, and a few of them even +scientifically established, contemporaneously with an early stage of +some of the sciences anterior in the scale, such detached truths, as M. +Littre justly remarks, do not constitute a science. What is known of a +subject, only becomes a science when it is made a connected body of +truth; in which the relation between the general principles and the +details is definitely made out, and each particular truth can be +recognized as a case of the operation of wider laws. This point of +progress, at which the study passes from the preliminary state of mere +preparation, into a science, cannot be reached by the more complex +studies until it has been attained by the simpler ones. A certain +regularity of recurrence in the celestial appearances was ascertained +empirically before much progress had been made in geometry; but +astronomy could no more be a science until geometry was a highly +advanced one, than the rule of three could have been practised before +addition and subtraction. The truths of the simpler sciences are a part +of the laws to which the phaenomena of the more complex sciences +conform: and are not only a necessary element in their explanation, but +must be so well understood as to be traceable through complex +combinations, before the special laws which co-exist and co-operate with +them can be brought to light. This is all that M. Comte affirms, and +enough for his purpose.[5] He no doubt occasionally indulges in more +unqualified expressions than can be completely justified, regarding the +logical perfection of the construction of his series, and its exact +correspondence with the historical evolution of the sciences; +exaggerations confined to language, and which the details of his +exposition often correct. But he is sufficiently near the truth, in both +respects, for every practical purpose.[6] Minor inaccuracies must often +be forgiven even to great thinkers. Mr Spencer, in the very-writings in +which he criticises M. Comte, affords signal instances of them.[7] + +Combining the doctrines, that every science is in a less advanced state +as it occupies a higher place in the ascending scale, and that all the +sciences pass through the three stages, theological, metaphysical, and +positive, it follows that the more special a science is, the tardier is +it in effecting each transition, so that a completely positive state of +an earlier science has often coincided with the metaphysical state of +the one next to it, and a purely theological state of those further on. +This statement correctly represents the general course of the facts, +though requiring allowances in the detail. Mathematics, for example, +from the very beginning of its cultivation, can hardly at any time have +been in the theological state, though exhibiting many traces of the +metaphysical. No one, probably, ever believed that the will of a god +kept parallel lines from meeting, or made two and two equal to four; or +ever prayed to the gods to make the square of the hypothenuse equal to +more or less than the sum of the squares of the sides. The most devout +believers have recognized in propositions of this description a class of +truths independent of the devine omnipotence. Even among the truths +which popular philosophy calls by the misleading name of Contingent the +few which are at once exact and obvious were probably, from the very +first, excepted from the theological explanation. M. Comte observes, +after Adam Smith, that we are not told in any age or country of a god of +Weight. It was otherwise with Astronomy: the heavenly bodies were +believed not merely to be moved by gods, but to be gods themselves: and +when this theory was exploded, there movements were explained by +metaphysical conceptions; such as a tendency of Nature to perfection, in +virtue of which these sublime bodies, being left to themselves, move in +the most perfect orbit, the circle. Even Kepler was full of fancies of +this description, which only terminated when Newton, by unveiling the +real physical laws of the celestial motions, closed the metaphysical +period of astronomical science. As M. Comte remarks, our power of +foreseeing phaenomena, and our power of controlling them, are the two +things which destroy the belief of their being governed by changeable +wills. In the case of phaenomena which science has not yet taught us +either to foresee or to control, the theological mode of thought has not +ceased to operate: men still pray for rain, or for success in war, or to +avert a shipwreck or a pestilence, but not to put back the stars in +their courses, to abridge the time necessary for a journey, or to arrest +the tides. Such vestiges of the primitive mode of thought linger in the +more intricate departments of sciences which have attained a high degree +of positive development. The metaphysical mode of explanation, being +less antagonistic than the theological to the idea of invariable laws, +is still slower in being entirely discarded. M. Comte finds remains of +it in the sciences which are the most completely positive, with the +single exception of astronomy, mathematics itself not being, he thinks, +altogether free from them: which is not wonderful, when we see at how +very recent a date mathematicians have been able to give the really +positive interpretation of their own symbols.[8] We have already however +had occasion to notice M. Comte's propensity to use the term +metaphysical in cases containing nothing that truly answers to his +definition of the word. For instance, he considers chemistry as tainted +with the metaphysical mode of thought by the notion of chemical +affinity. He thinks that the chemists who said that bodies combine +because they have an affinity for each other, believed in a mysterious +entity residing in bodies and inducing them to combine. On any other +supposition, he thinks the statement could only mean that bodies combine +because they combine. But it really meant more. It was the abstract +expression of the doctrine, that bodies have an invariable tendency to +combine with one thing in preference to another: that the tendencies of +different substances to combine are fixed quantities, of which the +greater always prevails over the less, so that if A detaches B from C in +one case it will do so in every other; which was called having a greater +attraction, or, more technically, a greater affinity for it. This was +not a metaphysical theory, but a positive generalization, which +accounted for a great number of facts, and would have kept its place as +a law of nature, had it not been disproved by the discovery of cases in +which though A detached B from C in some circumstances, C detached it +from A in others, showing the law of elective chemical combination to be +a less simple one than had at first been supposed. In this case, +therefore, M. Comte made a mistake: and he will be found to have made +many similar ones. But in the science next after chemistry, biology, the +empty mode of explanation by scholastic entities, such as a plastic +force, a vital principle, and the like, has been kept up even to the +present day. The German physiology of the school of Oken, +notwithstanding his acknowledged genius, is almost as metaphysical as +Hegel, and there is in France a quite recent revival of the Animism of +Stahl. These metaphysical explanations, besides their inanity, did +serious harm, by directing the course of positive scientific inquiry +into wrong channels. There was indeed nothing to prevent investigating +the mode of action of the supposed plastic or vital force by observation +and experiment; but the phrases gave currency and coherence to a false +abstraction and generalization, setting inquirers to look out for one +cause of complex phaenomena which undoubtedly depended on many. + +According to M. Comte, chemistry entered into the positive stage with +Lavoisier, in the latter half of the last century (in a subsequent +treatise he places the date a generation earlier); and biology at the +beginning of the present, when Bichat drew the fundamental distinction +between nutritive or vegetative and properly animal life, and referred +the properties of organs to the general laws of the component tissues. +The most complex of all sciences, the Social, had not, he maintained, +become positive at all, but was the subject of an ever-renewed and +barren contest between the theological and the metaphysical modes of +thought. To make this highest of the sciences positive, and thereby +complete the positive character of all human speculations, was the +principal aim of his labours, and he believed himself to have +accomplished it in the last three volumes of his Treatise. But the term +Positive is not, any more than Metaphysical, always used by M. Comte in +the same meaning. There never can have been a period in any science when +it was not in some degree positive, since it always professed to draw +conclusions from experience and observation. M. Comte would have been +the last to deny that previous to his own speculations, the world +possessed a multitude of truths, of greater or less certainty, on social +subjects, the evidence of which was obtained by inductive or deductive +processes from observed sequences of phaenomena. Nor could it be denied +that the best writers on subjects upon which so many men of the highest +mental capacity had employed their powers, had accepted as thoroughly +the positive point of view, and rejected the theological and +metaphysical as decidedly, as M. Comte himself. Montesquieu; even +Macchiavelli; Adam Smith and the political economists universally, both +in France and in England; Bentham, and all thinkers initiated by +him,--had a full conviction that social phaenomena conform to invariable +laws, the discovery and illustration of which was their great object as +speculative thinkers. All that can be said is, that those philosophers +did not get so far as M. Comte in discovering the methods best adapted +to bring these laws to light. It was not, therefore, reserved for M. +Comte to make sociological inquiries positive. But what he really meant +by making a science positive, is what we will call, with M. Littre, +giving it its final scientific constitution; in other words, discovering +or proving, and pursuing to their consequences, those of its truths +which are fit to form the connecting links among the rest: truths which +are to it what the law of gravitation is to astronomy, what the +elementary properties of the tissues are to physiology, and we will add +(though M. Comte did not) what the laws of association are to +psychology. This is an operation which, when accomplished, puts an end +to the empirical period, and enables the science to be conceived as a +co-ordinated and coherent body of doctrine. This is what had not yet +been done for sociology; and the hope of effecting it was, from his +early years, the prompter and incentive of all M. Comte's philosophic +labours. + +It was with a view to this that he undertook that wonderful +systematization of the philosophy of all the antecedent sciences, from +mathematics to physiology, which, if he had done nothing else, would +have stamped him, in all minds competent to appreciate it, as one of the +principal thinkers of the age. To make its nature intelligible to those +who are not acquainted with it, we must explain what we mean by the +philosophy of a science, as distinguished from the science itself. The +proper meaning of philosophy we take to be, what the ancients understood +by it--the scientific knowledge of Man, as an intellectual, moral, and +social being. Since his intellectual faculties include his knowing +faculty, the science of Man includes everything that man can know, so +far as regards his mode of knowing it: in other words, the whole +doctrine of the conditions of human knowledge. The philosophy of a +Science thus comes to mean the science itself, considered not as to its +results, the truths which it ascertains, but as to the processes by +which the mind attains them, the marks by which it recognises them, and +the co-ordinating and methodizing of them with a view to the greatest +clearness of conception and the fullest and readiest availibility for +use: in one word, the logic of the science. M. Comte has accomplished +this for the first five of the fundamental sciences, with a success +which can hardly be too much admired. We never reopen even the least +admirable part of this survey, the volume on chemistry and biology +(which was behind the actual state of those sciences when first written, +and is far in the rear of them now), without a renewed sense of the +great reach of its speculations, and a conviction that the way to a +complete rationalizing of those sciences, still very imperfectly +conceived by most who cultivate them, has been shown nowhere so +successfully as there. + +Yet, for a correct appreciation of this great philosophical achievement, +we ought to take account of what has not been accomplished, as well as +of what has. Some of the chief deficiencies and infirmities of M. +Comte's system of thought will be found, as is usually the case, in +close connexion with its greatest successes. + +The philosophy of Science consists of two principal parts; the methods +of investigation, and the requisites of proof. The one points out the +roads by which the human intellect arrives at conclusions, the other the +mode of testing their evidence. The former if complete would be an +Organon of Discovery, the latter of Proof. It is to the first of these +that M. Comte principally confines himself, and he treats it with a +degree of perfection hitherto unrivalled. Nowhere is there anything +comparable, in its kind, to his survey of the resources which the mind +has at its disposal for investigating the laws of phaenomena; the +circumstances which render each of the fundamental modes of exploration +suitable or unsuitable to each class of phaenomena; the extensions and +transformations which the process of investigation has to undergo in +adapting itself to each new province of the field of study; and the +especial gifts with which every one of the fundamental sciences enriches +the method of positive inquiry, each science in its turn being the best +fitted to bring to perfection one process or another. These, and many +cognate subjects, such as the theory of Classification, and the proper +use of scientific Hypotheses, M. Comte has treated with a completeness +of insight which leaves little to be desired. Not less admirable is his +survey of the most comprehensive truths that had been arrived at by each +science, considered as to their relation to the general sum of human +knowledge, and their logical value as aids to its further progress. But +after all this, there remains a further and distinct question. We are +taught the right way of searching for results, but when a result has +been reached, how shall we know that it is true? How assure ourselves +that the process has been performed correctly, and that our premises, +whether consisting of generalities or of particular facts, really prove +the conclusion we have grounded on them? On this question M. Comte +throws no light. He supplies no test of proof. As regards deduction, he +neither recognises the syllogistic system of Aristotle and his +successors (the insufficiency of which is as evident as its utility is +real) nor proposes any other in lieu of it: and of induction he has no +canons whatever. He does not seem to admit the possibility of any +general criterion by which to decide whether a given inductive inference +is correct or not. Yet he does not, with Dr Whewell, regard an inductive +theory as proved if it accounts for the facts: on the contrary, he sets +himself in the strongest opposition to those scientific hypotheses +which, like the luminiferous ether, are not susceptible of direct proof, +and are accepted on the sole evidence of their aptitude for explaining +phenomena. He maintains that no hypothesis is legitimate unless it is +susceptible of verification, and that none ought to be accepted as true +unless it can be shown not only that it accords with the facts, but that +its falsehood would be inconsistent with them. He therefore needs a test +of inductive proof; and in assigning none, he seems to give up as +impracticable the main problem of Logic properly so called. At the +beginning of his treatise he speaks of a doctrine of Method, apart from +particular applications, as conceivable, but not needful: method, +according to him, is learnt only by seeing it in operation, and the +logic of a science can only usefully be taught through the science +itself. Towards the end of the work, he assumes a more decidedly +negative tone, and treats the very conception of studying Logic +otherwise than in its applications as chimerical. He got on, in his +subsequent writings, to considering it as wrong. This indispensable part +of Positive Philosophy he not only left to be supplied by others, but +did all that depended on him to discourage them from attempting it. + +This hiatus in M. Comte's system is not unconnected with a defect in his +original conception of the subject matter of scientific investigation, +which has been generally noticed, for it lies on the surface, and is +more apt to be exaggerated than overlooked. It is often said of him that +he rejects the study of causes. This is not, in the correct acceptation, +true, for it is only questions of ultimate origin, and of Efficient as +distinguished from what are called Physical causes, that he rejects. The +causes that he regards as inaccessible are causes which are not +themselves phaenomena. Like other people he admits the study of causes, +in every sense in which one physical fact can be the cause of another. +But he has an objection to the _word_ cause; he will only consent to +speak of Laws of Succession: and depriving himself of the use of a word +which has a Positive meaning, he misses the meaning it expresses. He +sees no difference between such generalizations as Kepler's laws, and +such as the theory of gravitation. He fails to perceive the real +distinction between the laws of succession and coexistence which +thinkers of a different school call Laws of Phaenomena, and those of +what they call the action of Causes: the former exemplified by the +succession of day and night, the latter by the earth's rotation which +causes it. The succession of day and night is as much an invariable +sequence, as the alternate exposure of opposite sides of the earth to +the sun. Yet day and night are not the causes of one another; why? +Because their sequence, though invariable in our experience, is not +unconditionally so: those facts only succeed each other, provided that +the presence and absence of the sun succeed each other, and if this +alternation were to cease, we might have either day or night unfollowed +by one another. There are thus two kinds of uniformities of succession, +the one unconditional, the other conditional on the first: laws of +causation, and other successions dependent on those laws. All ultimate +laws are laws of causation, and the only universal law beyond the pale +of mathematics is the law of universal causation, namely, that every +phaenomenon has a phaenomenal cause; has some phaenomenon other than +itself, or some combination of phaenomena, on which it is invariably and +unconditionally consequent. It is on the universality of this law that +the possibility rests of establishing a canon of Induction. A general +proposition inductively obtained is only then proved to be true, when +the instances on which it rests are such that if they have been +correctly observed, the falsity of the generalization would be +inconsistent with the constancy of causation; with the universality of +the fact that the phaenomena of nature take place according to +invariable laws of succession.[9] It is probable, therefore, that M. +Comte's determined abstinence from the word and the idea of Cause, had +much to do with his inability to conceive an Inductive Logic, by +diverting his attention from the only basis upon which it could be +founded. + +We are afraid it must also be said, though shown only by slight +indications in his fundamental work, and coming out in full evidence +only in his later writings--that M. Comte, at bottom, was not so +solicitous about completeness of proof as becomes a positive +philosopher, and that the unimpeachable objectivity, as he would have +called it, of a conception--its exact correspondence to the realities of +outward fact--was not, with him, an indispensable condition of adopting +it, if it was subjectively useful, by affording facilities to the mind +for grouping phaenomena. This appears very curiously in his chapters on +the philosophy of Chemistry. He recommends, as a judicious use of "the +degree of liberty left to our intelligence by the end and purpose of +positive science," that we should accept as a convenient generalization +the doctrine that all chemical composition is between two elements only; +that every substance which our analysis decomposes, let us say into four +elements, has for its immediate constituents two hypothetical +substances, each compounded of two simpler ones. There would have been +nothing to object to in this as a scientific hypothesis, assumed +tentatively as a means of suggesting experiments by which its truth may +be tested. With this for its destination, the conception, would have +been legitimate and philosophical; the more so, as, if confirmed, it +would have afforded an explanation of the fact that some substances +which analysis shows to be composed of the same elementary substances +in the same proportions, differ in their general properties, as for +instance, sugar and gum.[10] And if, besides affording a reason for +difference between things which differ, the hypothesis had afforded a +reason for agreement between things which agree; if the intermediate +link by which the quaternary compound was resolved into two binary ones, +could have been so chosen as to bring each of them within the analogies +of some known class of binary compounds (which it is easy to suppose +possible, and which in some particular instances actually happens);[11] +the universality of binary composition would have been a successful +example of an hypothesis in anticipation of a positive theory, to give +a direction to inquiry which might end in its being either proved or +abandoned. But M. Comte evidently thought that even though it should +never be proved--however many cases of chemical composition might always +remain in which the theory was still as hypothetical as at first--so +long as it was not actually disproved (which it is scarcely in the +nature of the case that it should ever be) it would deserve to be +retained, for its mere convenience in bringing a large body of +phaenomena under a general conception. In a _resume_ of the general +principles of the positive method at the end of the work, he claims, +in express terms, an unlimited license of adopting "without any vain +scruple" hypothetical conceptions of this sort; "in order to satisfy, +within proper limits, our just mental inclinations, which always turn, +with an instinctive predilection, towards simplicity, continuity, and +generality of conceptions, while always respecting the reality of +external laws in so far as accessible to us" (vi. 639). "The most +philosophic point of view leads us to conceive the study of natural laws +as destined to represent the external world so as to give as much +satisfaction to the essential inclinations of our intelligence, as is +consistent with the degree of exactitude commanded by the aggregate of +our practical wants" (vi. 642). Among these "essential inclinations" he +includes not only our "instinctive predilection for order and harmony," +which makes us relish any conception, even fictitious, that helps to +reduce phaenomena to system; but even our feelings of taste, "les +convenances purement esthetiques," which, he says, have a legitimate +part in the employment of the "genre de liberte" reste facultatif pour +notre intelligence." After the due satisfaction of our "most eminent +mental inclinations," there will still remain "a considerable margin of +indeterminateness, which should be made use of to give a direct +gratification to our _besoin_ of ideality, by embellishing our +scientific thoughts, without injury to their essential reality" (vi. +647). In consistency with all this, M. Comte warns thinkers against too +severe a scrutiny of the exact truth of scientific laws, and stamps with +"severe reprobation" those who break down "by too minute an +investigation" generalizations already made, without being able to +substitute others (vi. 639): as in the case of Lavoisier's general +theory of chemistry, which would have made that science more +satisfactory than at present to "the instinctive inclinations of our +intelligence" if it had turned out true, but unhappily it did not. These +mental dispositions in M. Comte account for his not having found or +sought a logical criterion of proof; but they are scarcely consistent +with his inveterate hostility to the hypothesis of the luminiferous +ether, which certainly gratifies our "predilection for order and +harmony," not to say our "besoin d'idealite", in no ordinary degree. +This notion of the "destination" of the study of natural laws is to our +minds a complete dereliction of the essential principles which form the +Positive conception of science; and contained the germ of the perversion +of his own philosophy which marked his later years. It might be +interesting, but scarcely worth while, to attempt to penetrate to the +just thought which misled M. Comte, for there is almost always a grain +of truth in the errors of an original and powerful mind. There is +another grave aberration in M. Comte's view of the method of positive +science, which though not more unphilosophical than the last mentioned, +is of greater practical importance. He rejects totally, as an invalid +process, psychological observation properly so called, or in other +words, internal consciousness, at least as regards our intellectual +operations. He gives no place in his series of the science of +Psychology, and always speaks of it with contempt. The study of mental +phaenomena, or, as he expresses it, of moral and intellectual functions, +has a place in his scheme, under the head of Biology, but only as a +branch of physiology. Our knowledge of the human mind must, he thinks, +be acquired by observing other people. How we are to observe other +people's mental operations, or how interpret the signs of them without +having learnt what the signs mean by knowledge of ourselves, he does not +state. But it is clear to him that we can learn very little about the +feelings, and nothing at all about the intellect, by self-observation. +Our intelligence can observe all other things, but not itself: we cannot +observe ourselves observing, or observe ourselves reasoning: and if we +could, attention to this reflex operation would annihilate its object, +by stopping the process observed. + +There is little need for an elaborate refutation of a fallacy respecting +which the only wonder is that it should impose on any one. Two answers +may be given to it. In the first place, M. Comte might be referred to +experience, and to the writings of his countryman M. Cardaillac and our +own Sir William Hamilton, for proof that the mind can not only be +conscious of, but attend to, more than one, and even a considerable +number, of impressions at once.[12] It is true that attention is +weakened by being divided; and this forms a special difficulty in +psychological observation, as psychologists (Sir William Hamilton in +particular) have fully recognised; but a difficulty is not an +impossibility. Secondly, it might have occurred to M. Comte that a fact +may be studied through the medium of memory, not at the very moment of +our perceiving it, but the moment after: and this is really the mode in +which our best knowledge of our intellectual acts is generally acquired. +We reflect on what we have been doing, when the act is past, but when +its impression in the memory is still fresh. Unless in one of these +ways, we could not have acquired the knowledge, which nobody denies us +to have, of what passes in our minds. M. Comte would scarcely have +affirmed that we are not aware of our own intellectual operations. We +know of our observings and our reasonings, either at the very time, or +by memory the moment after; in either case, by direct knowledge, and not +(like things done by us in a state of somnambulism) merely by their +results. This simple fact destroys the whole of M. Comte's argument. +Whatever we are directly aware of, we can directly observe. + +And what Organon for the study of "the moral and intellectual functions" +does M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation which he +repudiates? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is Phrenology! Not, +indeed, he says, as a science formed, but as one still to be created; +for he rejects almost all the special organs imagined by phrenologists, +and accepts only their general division of the brain into the three +regions of the propensities, the sentiments, and the intellect,[13] and +the subdivision of the latter region between the organs of meditation +and those of observation. Yet this mere first outline of an +apportionment of the mental functions among different organs, he regards +as extricating the mental study of man from the metaphysical stage, and +elevating it to the positive. The condition of mental science would be +sad indeed if this were its best chance of being positive; for the later +course of physiological observation and speculation has not tended to +confirm, but to discredit, the phrenological hypothesis. And even if +that hypothesis were true, psychological observation would still be +necessary; for how is it possible to ascertain the correspondence +between two things, by observation of only one of them? To establish a +relation between mental functions and cerebral conformations, requires +not only a parallel system of observations applied to each, but (as M. +Comte himself, with some inconsistency, acknowledges) an analysis of the +mental faculties, "des diverses facultes elementaires," (iii. 573), +conducted without any reference to the physical conditions, since the +proof of the theory would lie in the correspondence between the division +of the brain into organs and that of the mind into faculties, each shown +by separate evidence. To accomplish this analysis requires direct +psychological study carried to a high pitch of perfection; it being +necessary, among other things, to investigate the degree in which mental +character is created by circumstances, since no one supposes that +cerebral conformation does all, and circumstances nothing. The +phrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its necessary preparation +the whole of the Association psychology. Without, then, rejecting any +aid which study of the brain and nerves can afford to psychology (and it +has afforded, and will yet afford, much), we may affirm that M. Comte +has done nothing for the constitution of the positive method of mental +science. He refused to profit by the very valuable commencements made by +his predecessors, especially by Hartley, Brown, and James Mill (if +indeed any of those philosophers were known to him), and left the +psychological branch of the positive method, as well as psychology +itself, to be put in their true position as a part of Positive +Philosophy by successors who duly placed themselves at the twofold point +of view of physiology and psychology, Mr Bain and Mr Herbert Spencer. +This great mistake is not a mere hiatus in M. Comte's system, but the +parent of serious errors in his attempt to create a Social Science. He +is indeed very skilful in estimating the effect of circumstances in +moulding the general character of the human race; were he not, his +historical theory could be of little worth: but in appreciating the +influence which circumstances exercise, through psychological laws, in +producing diversities of character, collective or individual, he is +sadly at fault. + +After this summary view of M. Comte's conception of Positive Philosophy, +it remains to give some account of his more special and equally +ambitious attempt to create the Science of Sociology, or, as he +expresses it, to elevate the study of social phaenomena to the positive +state. + +He regarded all who profess any political opinions as hitherto divided +between the adherents of the theological and those of the metaphysical +mode of thought: the former deducing all their doctrines from divine +ordinances, the latter from abstractions. This assertion, however, +cannot be intended in the same sense as when the terms are applied to +the sciences of inorganic nature; for it is impossible that acts +evidently proceeding from the human will could be ascribed to the agency +(at least immediate) of either divinities or abstractions. No one ever +regarded himself or his fellow-man as a mere piece of machinery worked +by a god, or as the abode of an entity which was the true author of what +the man himself appeared to do. True, it was believed that the gods, or +God, could move or change human wills, as well as control their +consequences, and prayers were offered to them accordingly, rather as +able to overrule the spontaneous course of things, than as at each +instant carrying it on. On the whole, however, the theological and +metaphysical conceptions, in their application to sociology, had +reference not to the production of phaenomena, but to the rule of duty, +and conduct in life. It is this which was based, either on a divine +will, or on abstract mental conceptions, which, by an illusion of the +rational faculty, were invested with objective validity. On the one +hand, the established rules of morality were everywhere referred to a +divine origin. In the majority of countries the entire civil and +criminal law was looked upon as revealed from above; and it is to the +petty military communities which escaped this delusion, that man is +indebted for being now a progressive being. The fundamental institutions +of the state were almost everywhere believed to have been divinely +established, and to be still, in a greater or less degree, of divine +authority. The divine right of certain lines of kings to rule, and even +to rule absolutely, was but lately the creed of the dominant party in +most countries of Europe; while the divine right of popes and bishops to +dictate men's beliefs (and not respecting the invisible world alone) is +still striving, though under considerable difficulties, to rule mankind. +When these opinions began to be out of date, a rival theory presented +itself to take their place. There were, in truth, many such theories, +and to some of them the term metaphysical, in M. Comte's sense, cannot +justly be applied. All theories in which the ultimate standard of +institutions and rules of action was the happiness of mankind, and +observation and experience the guides (and some such there have been in +all periods of free speculation), are entitled to the name Positive, +whatever, in other respects, their imperfections may be. But these were +a small minority. M. Comte was right in affirming that the prevailing +schools of moral and political speculation, when not theological, have +been metaphysical. They affirmed that moral rules, and even political +institutions, were not means to an end, the general good, but +corollaries evolved from the conception of Natural Rights. This was +especially the case in all the countries in which the ideas of +publicists were the offspring of the Roman Law. The legislators of +opinion on these subjects, when not theologians, were lawyers: and the +Continental lawyers followed the Roman jurists, who followed the Greek +metaphysicians, in acknowledging as the ultimate source of right and +wrong in morals, and consequently in institutions, the imaginary law of +the imaginary being Nature. The first systematizers of morals in +Christian Europe, on any other than a purely theological basis, the +writers on International Law, reasoned wholly from these premises, and +transmitted them to a long line of successors. This mode of thought +reached its culmination in Rousseau, in whose hands it became as +powerful an instrument for destroying the past, as it was impotent for +directing the future. The complete victory which this philosophy gained, +in speculation, over the old doctrines, was temporarily followed by an +equally complete practical triumph, the French Revolution: when, having +had, for the first time, a full opportunity of developing its +tendencies, and showing what it could not do, it failed so conspicuously +as to determine a partial reaction to the doctrines of feudalism and +Catholicism. Between these and the political metaphysics (meta-politics +as Coleridge called it) of the Revolution, society has since oscillated; +raising up in the process a hybrid intermediate party, termed +Conservative, or the party of Order, which has no doctrines of its own, +but attempts to hold the scales even between the two others, borrowing +alternately the arguments of each, to use as weapons against whichever +of the two seems at the moment most likely to prevail. + +Such, reduced to a very condensed form, is M. Comte's version of the +state of European opinion on politics and society. An Englishman's +criticism would be, that it describes well enough the general division +of political opinion in France and the countries which follow her lead, +but not in England, or the communities of English origin: in all of +which, divine right died out with the Jacobites, and the law of nature +and natural rights have never been favourites even with the extreme +popular party, who preferred to rest their claims on the historical +traditions of their own country, and on maxims drawn from its law books, +and since they outgrew this standard, almost always base them on general +expediency. In England, the preference of one form of government to +another seldom turns on anything but the practical consequences which it +produces, or which are expected from it. M. Comte can point to little of +the nature of metaphysics in English politics, except "la metaphysique +constitutionnelle," a name he chooses to give to the conventional +fiction by which the occupant of the throne is supposed to be the source +from whence all power emanates, while nothing can be further from the +belief or intention of anybody than that such should really be the case. +Apart from this, which is a matter of forms and words, and has no +connexion with any belief except belief in the proprieties, the severest +criticism can find nothing either worse or better, in the modes of +thinking either of our conservative or of our liberal party, than a +particularly shallow and flimsy kind of positivism. The working classes +indeed, or some portion of them, perhaps still rest their claim to +universal suffrage on abstract right, in addition to more substantial +reasons, and thus far and no farther does metaphysics prevail in the +region of English politics. But politics is not the entire art of social +existence: ethics is a still deeper and more vital part of it: and in +that, as much in England as elsewhere, the current opinions are still +divided between the theological mode of thought and the metaphysical. +What is the whole doctrine of Intuitive Morality, which reigns supreme +wherever the idolatry of Scripture texts has abated and the influence of +Bentham's philosophy has not reached, but the metaphysical state of +ethical science? What else, indeed, is the whole _a priori_ philosophy, +in morals, jurisprudence, psychology, logic, even physical science, for +it does not always keep its hands off that, the oldest domain of +observation and experiment? It has the universal diagnostic of the +metaphysical mode of thought, in the Comtean sense of the word; that of +erecting a mere creation of the mind into a test or _norma_ of external +truth, and presenting the abstract expression of the beliefs already +entertained, as the reason and evidence which justifies them. Of those +who still adhere to the old opinions we need not speak; but when one of +the most vigorous as well as boldest thinkers that English speculation +has yet produced, full of the true scientific spirit, Mr Herbert +Spencer, places in the front of his philosophy the doctrine that the +ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness of +its negative; when, following in the steps of Mr Spencer, an able +expounder of positive philosophy like Mr Lewes, in his meritorious and +by no means superficial work on Aristotle, after laying, very justly, +the blame of almost every error of the ancient thinkers on their +neglecting to _verify_ their opinions, announces that there are two +kinds of verification, the Real and the Ideal, the ideal test of truth +being that its negative is unthinkable, and by the application of that +test judges that gravitation must be universal even in the stellar +regions, because in the absence of proof to the contrary, "the idea of +matter without gravity is unthinkable;"--when those from whom it was +least to be expected thus set up acquired necessities of thought in the +minds of one or two generations as evidence of real necessities in the +universe, we must admit that the metaphysical mode of thought still +rules the higher philosophy, even in the department of inorganic nature, +and far more in all that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and +social being. + +But, while M. Comte is so far in the right, we often, as already +intimated, find him using the name metaphysical to denote certain +practical conclusions, instead of a particular kind of theoretical +premises. Whatever goes by the different names of the revolutionary, the +radical, the democratic, the liberal, the free-thinking, the sceptical, +or the negative and critical school or party in religion, politics, or +philosophy, all passes with him under the designation of metaphysical, +and whatever he has to say about it forms part of his description of the +metaphysical school of social science. He passes in review, one after +another, what he deems the leading doctrines of the revolutionary school +of politics, and dismisses them all as mere instruments of attack upon +the old social system, with no permanent validity as social truth. + +He assigns only this humble rank to the first of all the articles of the +liberal creed, "the absolute right of free examination, or the dogma of +unlimited liberty of conscience." As far as this doctrine only means +that opinions, and their expression, should be exempt from _legal_ +restraint, either in the form of prevention or of penalty, M. Comte is a +firm adherent of it: but the _moral_ right of every human being, however +ill-prepared by the necessary instruction and discipline, to erect +himself into a judge of the most intricate as well as the most important +questions that can occupy the human intellect, he resolutely denies. +"There is no liberty of conscience," he said in an early work, "in +astronomy, in physics, in chemistry, even in physiology, in the sense +that every one would think it absurd not to accept in confidence the +principles established in those sciences by the competent persons. If it +is otherwise in politics, the reason is merely because, the old +doctrines having gone by and the new ones not being yet formed, there +are not properly, during the interval, any established opinions." When +first mankind outgrew the old doctrines, an appeal from doctors and +teachers to the outside public was inevitable and indispensable, since +without the toleration and encouragement of discussion and criticism +from all quarters, it would have been impossible for any new doctrines +to grow up. But in itself, the practice of carrying the questions which +more than all others require special knowledge and preparation, before +the incompetent tribunal of common opinion, is, he contends, radically +irrational, and will and ought to cease when once mankind have again +made up their minds to a system of doctrine. The prolongation of this +provisional state, producing an ever-increasing divergence of opinions, +is already, according to him, extremely dangerous, since it is only when +there is a tolerable unanimity respecting the rule of life, that a real +moral control can be established over the self-interest and passions of +individuals. Besides which, when every man is encouraged to believe +himself a competent judge of the most difficult social questions, he +cannot be prevented from thinking himself competent also to the most +important public duties, and the baneful competition for power and +official functions spreads constantly downwards to a lower and lower +grade of intelligence. In M. Comte's opinion, the peculiarly complicated +nature of sociological studies, and the great amount of previous +knowledge and intellectual discipline requisite for them, together with +the serious consequences that may be produced by even, temporary errors +on such subjects, render it necessary in the case of ethics and +politics, still more than of mathematics and physics, that whatever +legal liberty may exist of questioning and discussing, the opinions of +mankind should really be formed for them by an exceedingly small number +of minds of the highest class, trained to the task by the most thorough +and laborious mental preparation: and that the questioning of their +conclusions by any one, not of an equivalent grade of intellect and +instruction, should be accounted equally presumptuous, and more +blamable, than the attempts occasionally made by sciolists to refute the +Newtonian astronomy. All this is, in a sense, true: but we confess our +sympathy with those who feel towards it like the man in the story, who +being asked whether he admitted that six and five make eleven, refused +to give an answer until he knew what use was to be made of it. The +doctrine is one of a class of truths which, unless completed by other +truths, are so liable to perversion, that we may fairly decline to take +notice of them except in connexion with some definite application. In +justice to M. Comte it should be said that he does not wish this +intellectual dominion to be exercised over an ignorant people. Par from +him is the thought of promoting the allegiance of the mass to scientific +authority by withholding from them scientific knowledge. He holds it the +duty of society to bestow on every one who grows up to manhood or +womanhood as complete a course of instruction in every department of +science, from mathematics to sociology, as can possibly be made general: +and his ideas of what is possible in that respect are carried to a +length to which few are prepared to follow him. There is something +startling, though, when closely looked into, not Utopian or chimerical, +in the amount of positive knowledge of the most varied kind which he +believes may, by good methods of teaching, be made the common +inheritance of all persons with ordinary faculties who are born into the +world: not the mere knowledge of results, to which, except for the +practical arts, he attaches only secondary value, but knowledge also of +the mode in which those results were attained, and the evidence on which +they rest, so far as it can be known and understood by those who do not +devote their lives to its study. + +We have stated thus fully M. Comte's opinion on the most fundamental +doctrine of liberalism, because it is the clue to much of his general +conception of politics. If his object had only been to exemplify by that +doctrine the purely negative character of the principal liberal and +revolutionary schools of thought, he need not have gone so far: it would +have been enough to say, that the mere liberty to hold and express any +creed, cannot itself _be_ that creed. Every one is free to believe and +publish that two and two make ten, but the important thing is to know +that they make four. M. Comte has no difficulty in making out an equally +strong case against the other principal tenets of what he calls the +revolutionary school; since all that they generally amount to is, that +something ought not to be: which cannot possibly be the whole truth, and +which M. Comte, in general, will not admit to be even part of it. Take +for instance the doctrine which denies to governments any initiative in +social progress, restricting them to the function of preserving order, +or in other words keeping the peace: an opinion which, so far as +grounded on so-called rights of the individual, he justly regards as +purely metaphysical; but does not recognise that it is also widely held +as an inference from the laws of human nature and human affairs, and +therefore, whether true or false, as a Positive doctrine. Believing with +M. Comte that there are no absolute truths in the political art, nor +indeed in any art whatever, we agree with him that the _laisser faire_ +doctrine, stated without large qualifications, is both unpractical and +unscientific; but it does not follow that those who assert it are not, +nineteen times out of twenty, practically nearer the truth than those +who deny it. The doctrine of Equality meets no better fate at M. Comte's +hands. He regards it as the erection into an absolute dogma of a mere +protest against the inequalities which came down from the middle ages, +and answer no legitimate end in modern society. He observes, that +mankind in a normal state, having to act together, are necessarily, in +practice, organized and classed with some reference to their unequal +aptitudes, natural or acquired, which demand that some should be under +the direction of others: scrupulous regard being at the same time had to +the fulfilment towards all, of "the claims rightfully inherent in the +dignity of a human being; the aggregate of which, still very +insufficiently appreciated, will constitute more and more the principle +of universal morality as applied to daily use... a grand moral +obligation, which has never been directly denied since the abolition of +slavery" (iv. 51). There is not a word to be said against these +doctrines: but the practical question is one which M. Comte never even +entertains--viz., when, after being properly educated, people are left +to find their places for themselves, do they not spontaneously class +themselves in a manner much more conformable to their unequal or +dissimilar aptitudes, than governments or social institutions are likely +to do it for them? The Sovereignty of the People, again,--that +metaphysical axiom which in France and the rest of the Continent has so +long been the theoretic basis of radical and democratic politics,--he +regards as of a purely negative character, signifying the right of the +people to rid themselves by insurrection of a social order that has +become oppressive; but, when erected into a positive principle of +government, which condemns indefinitely all superiors to "an arbitrary +dependence upon the multitude of their inferiors," he considers it as a +sort of "transportation to peoples of the divine right so much +reproached to kings" (iv. 55, 56). On the doctrine as a metaphysical +dogma or an absolute principle, this criticism is just; but there is +also a Positive doctrine, without any pretension to being absolute, +which claims the direct participation of the governed in their own +government, not as a natural right, but as a means to important ends, +under the conditions and with the limitations which those ends impose. +The general result of M. Comte's criticism on the revolutionary +philosophy, is that he deems it not only incapable of aiding the +necessary reorganization of society, but a serious impediment thereto, +by setting up, on all the great interests of mankind, the mere negation +of authority, direction, or organization, as the most perfect state, and +the solution of all problems: the extreme point of this aberration being +reached by Rousseau and his followers, when they extolled the savage +state, as an ideal from which civilization was only a degeneracy, more +or less marked and complete. + +The state of sociological speculation being such as has been +described--divided between a feudal and theological school, now effete, +and a democratic and metaphysical one, of no value except for the +destruction of the former; the problem, how to render the social science +positive, must naturally have presented itself, more or less distinctly, +to superior minds. M. Comte examines and criticises, for the most part +justly, some of the principal efforts which have been made by individual +thinkers for this purpose. But the weak side of his philosophy comes out +prominently in his strictures on the only systematic attempt yet made by +any body of thinkers, to constitute a science, not indeed of social +phenomena generally, but of one great class or division of them. We +mean, of course, political economy, which (with a reservation in favour +of the speculations of Adam Smith as valuable preparatory studies for +science) he deems unscientific, unpositive, and a mere branch of +metaphysics, that comprehensive category of condemnation in which he +places all attempts at positive science which are not in his opinion +directed by a right scientific method. Any one acquainted with the +writings of political economists need only read his few pages of +animadversions on them (iv. 193 to 205), to learn how extremely +superficial M. Comte can sometimes be. He affirms that they have added +nothing really new to the original _apercus_ of Adam Smith; when every +one who has read them knows that they have added so much as to have +changed the whole aspect of the science, besides rectifying and clearing +up in the most essential points the _apercus_ themselves. He lays an +almost puerile stress, for the purpose of disparagement, on the +discussions about the meaning of words which are found in the best books +on political economy, as if such discussions were not an indispensable +accompaniment of the progress of thought, and abundant in the history of +every physical science. On the whole question he has but one remark of +any value, and that he misapplies; namely, that the study of the +conditions of national wealth as a detached subject is unphilosophical, +because, all the different aspects of social phaenomena acting and +reacting on one another, they cannot be rightly understood apart: which +by no means proves that the material and industrial phaenomena of +society are not, even by themselves, susceptible of useful +generalizations, but only that these generalizations must necessarily be +relative to a given form of civilization and a given stage of social +advancement. This, we apprehend, is what no political economist would +deny. None of them pretend that the laws of wages, profits, values, +prices, and the like, set down in their treatises, would be strictly +true, or many of them true at all, in the savage state (for example), or +in a community composed of masters and slaves. But they do think, with +good reason, that whoever understands the political economy of a country +with the complicated and manifold civilization of the nations of Europe, +can deduce without difficulty the political economy of any other state +of society, with the particular circumstances of which he is equally +well acquainted.[14] We do not pretend that political economy has never +been prosecuted or taught in a contracted spirit. As often as a study is +cultivated by narrow minds, they will draw from it narrow conclusions. +If a political economist is deficient in general knowledge, he will +exaggerate the importance and universality of the limited class of +truths which he knows. All kinds of scientific men are liable to this +imputation, and M. Comte is never weary of urging it against them; +reproaching them with their narrowness of mind, the petty scale of their +thoughts, their incapacity for large views, and the stupidity of those +they occasionally attempt beyond the bounds of their own subjects. +Political economists do not deserve these reproaches more than other +classes of positive inquirers, but less than most. The principal error +of narrowness with which they are frequently chargeable, is that of +regarding, not any economical doctrine, but their present experience of +mankind, as of universal validity; mistaking temporary or local phases +of human character for human nature itself; having no faith in the +wonderful pliability of the human mind; deeming it impossible, in spite +of the strongest evidence, that the earth can produce human beings of a +different type from that which is familiar to them in their own age, or +even, perhaps, in their own country. The only security against this +narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation, and all it proves is that +a person is not likely to be a good political economist who is nothing +else. + +Thus far, we have had to do with M. Comte, as a sociologist, only in his +critical capacity. We have now to deal with him as a constructor--the +author of a sociological system. The first question is that of the +Method proper to the study. His view of this is highly instructive. + +The Method proper to the Science of Society must be, in substance, the +same as in all other sciences; the interrogation and interpretation of +experience, by the twofold process of Induction and Deduction. But its +mode of practising these operations has features of peculiarity. In +general, Induction furnishes to science the laws of the elementary +facts, from which, when known, those of the complex combinations are +thought out deductively: specific observation of complex phaenomena +yields no general laws, or only empirical ones; its scientific function +is to verify the laws obtained by deduction. This mode of philosophizing +is not adequate to the exigencies of sociological investigation. In +social phaemomena the elementary facts are feelings and actions, and the +laws of these are the laws of human nature, social facts being the +results of human acts and situations. Since, then, the phaenomena of man +in society result from his nature as an individual being, it might be +thought that the proper mode of constructing a positive Social Science +must be by deducing it from the general laws of human nature, using the +facts of history merely for verification. Such, accordingly, has been +the conception of social science by many of those who have endeavoured +to render it positive, particularly by the school of Bentham. M. Comte +considers this as an error. We may, he says, draw from the universal +laws of human nature some conclusions (though even these, we think, +rather precarious) concerning the very earliest stages of human +progress, of which there are either no, or very imperfect, historical +records. But as society proceeds in its development, its phaenomena are +determined, more and more, not by the simple tendencies of universal +human nature, but by the accumulated influence of past generations over +the present. The human beings themselves, on the laws of whose nature +the facts of history depend, are not abstract or universal but +historical human beings, already shaped, and made what they are, by +human society. This being the case, no powers of deduction could enable +any one, starting from the mere conception of the Being Man, placed in a +world such as the earth may have been before the commencement of human +agency, to predict and calculate the phaenomena of his development such +as they have in fact proved. If the facts of history, empirically +considered, had not given rise to any generalizations, a deductive study +of history could never have reached higher than more or less plausible +conjecture. By good fortune (for the case might easily have been +otherwise) the history of our species, looked at as a comprehensive +whole, does exhibit a determinate course, a certain order of +development: though history alone cannot prove this to be a necessary +law, as distinguished from a temporary accident. Here, therefore, begins +the office of Biology (or, as we should say, of Psychology) in the +social science. The universal laws of human nature are part of the data +of sociology, but in using them we must reverse the method of the +deductive physical sciences: for while, in these, specific experience +commonly serves to verify laws arrived at by deduction, in sociology it +is specific experience which suggests the laws, and deduction which +verifies them. If a sociological theory, collected from historical +evidence, contradicts the established general laws of human nature; if +(to use M. Comte's instances) it implies, in the mass of mankind, any +very decided natural bent, either in a good or in a bad direction; if it +supposes that the reason, in average human beings, predominates over the +desires, or the disinterested desires over the personal; we may know +that history has been misinterpreted, and that the theory is false. On +the other hand, if laws of social phaenomena, empirically generalized +from history, can when once suggested be affiliated to the known laws of +human nature; if the direction actually taken by the developments and +changes of human society, can be seen to be such as the properties of +man and of his dwelling-place made antecedently probable, the empirical +generalizations are raised into positive laws, and Sociology becomes a +science. + +Much has been said and written for centuries past, by the practical or +empirical school of politicians, in condemnation of theories founded on +principles of human nature, without an historical basis; and the +theorists, in their turn, have successfully retaliated on the +practicalists. But we know not any thinker who, before M. Comte, had +penetrated to the philosophy of the matter, and placed the necessity of +historical studies as the foundation of sociological speculation on the +true footing. From this time any political thinker who fancies himself +able to dispense with a connected view of the great facts of history, as +a chain of causes and effects, must be regarded as below the level of +the age; while the vulgar mode of using history, by looking in it for +parallel cases, as if any cases were parallel, or as if a single +instance, or even many instances not compared and analysed, could reveal +a law, will be more than ever, and irrevocably, discredited. + +The inversion of the ordinary relation between Deduction and Induction +is not the only point in which, according to M. Comte, the Method proper +to Sociology differs from that of the sciences of inorganic nature. The +common order of science proceeds from the details to the whole. The +method of Sociology should proceed from the whole to the details. There +is no universal principle for the order of study, but that of proceeding +from the known to the unknown; finding our way to the facts at whatever +point is most open to our observation. In the phaenomena of the social +state, the collective phaenomenon is more accessible to us than the +parts of which it is composed. This is already, in a great degree, true +of the mere animal body. It is essential to the idea of an organism, and +it is even more true of the social organism than of the individual. The +state of every part of the social whole at any time, is intimately +connected with the contemporaneous state of all the others. Religious +belief, philosophy, science, the fine arts, the industrial arts, +commerce, navigation, government, all are in close mutual dependence on +one another, insomuch that when any considerable change takes place in +one, we may know that a parallel change in all the others has preceded +or will follow it. The progress of society from one general state to +another is not an aggregate of partial changes, but the product of a +single impulse, acting through all the partial agencies, and can +therefore be most easily traced by studying them together. Could it even +be detected in them separately, its true nature could not be understood +except by examining them in the _ensemble_. In constructing, therefore, +a theory of society, all the different aspects of the social +organization must be taken into consideration at once. + +Our space is not consistent with inquiring into all the limitations of +this doctrine. It requires many of which M. Comte's theory takes no +account. There is one, in particular, dependent on a scientific artifice +familiar to students of science, especially of the applications of +mathematics to the study of nature. When an effect depends on several +variable conditions, some of which change less, or more slowly, than +others, we are often able to determine, either by reasoning or by +experiment, what would be the law of variation of the effect if its +changes depended only on some of the conditions, the remainder being +supposed constant. The law so found will be sufficiently near the truth +for all times and places in which the latter set of conditions do not +vary greatly, and will be a basis to set out from when it becomes +necessary to allow for the variations of those conditions also. Most of +the conclusions of social science applicable to practical use are of +this description. M. Comte's system makes no room for them. We have seen +how he deals with the part of them which are the most scientific in +character, the generalizations of political economy. + +There is one more point in the general philosophy of sociology requiring +notice. Social phaenomena, like all others, present two aspects, the +statical, and the dynamical; the phaenomena of equilibrium, and those of +motion. The statical aspect is that of the laws of social existence, +considered abstractedly from progress, and confined to what is common to +the progressive and the stationary state. The dynamical aspect is that +of social progress. The statics of society is the study of the +conditions of existence and permanence of the social state. The dynamics +studies the laws of its evolution. The first is the theory of the +_consensus,_ or interdependence of social phaenomena. The second is the +theory of their filiation. + +The first division M. Comte, in his great work, treats in a much more +summary manner than the second; and it forms, to our thinking, the +weakest part of the treatise. He can hardly have seemed even to himself +to have originated, in the statics of society, anything new,[15] unless +his revival of the Catholic idea of a Spiritual Power may be so +considered. The remainder, with the exception of detached thoughts, in +which even his feeblest productions are always rich, is trite, while in +our judgment far from being always true. + +He begins by a statement of the general properties of human nature which +make social existence possible. Man has a spontaneous propensity to the +society of his fellow-beings, and seeks it instinctively, for its own +sake, and not out of regard to the advantages it procures for him, +which, in many conditions of humanity, must appear to him very +problematical. Man has also a certain, though moderate, amount of +natural benevolence. On the other hand, these social propensities are by +nature weaker than his selfish ones; and the social state, being mainly +kept in existence through the former, involves an habitual antagonism +between the two. Further, our wants of all kinds, from the purely +organic upwards, can only be satisfied by means of labour, nor does +bodily labour suffice, without the guidance of intelligence. But labour, +especially when prolonged and monotonous, is naturally hateful, and +mental labour the most irksome of all; and hence a second antagonism, +which must exist in all societies whatever. The character of the society +is principally determined by the degree in which the better incentive, +in each of these cases, makes head against the worse. In both the +points, human nature is capable of great amelioration. The social +instincts may approximate much nearer to the strength of the personal +ones, though never entirely coming up to it; the aversion to labour in +general, and to intellectual labour in particular, may be much weakened, +and the predominance of the inclinations over the reason greatly +diminished, though never completely destroyed. The spirit of improvement +results from the increasing strength of the social instincts, combined +with the growth of an intellectual activity, which guiding the personal +propensities, inspires each individual with a deliberate desire to +improve his condition. The personal instincts left to their own +guidance, and the indolence and apathy natural to mankind, are the +sources which mainly feed the spirit of Conservation. The struggle +between the two spirits is an universal incident of the social state. + +The next of the universal elements in human society is family life; +which M. Comte regards as originally the sole, and always the principal, +source of the social feelings, and the only school open to mankind in +general, in which unselfishness can be learnt, and the feelings and +conduct demanded by social relations be made habitual. M. Comte takes +this opportunity of declaring his opinions on the proper constitution of +the family, and in particular of the marriage institution. They are of +the most orthodox and conservative sort. M. Comte adheres not only to +the popular Christian, but to the Catholic view of marriage in its +utmost strictness, and rebukes Protestant nations for having tampered +with the indissolubility of the engagement, by permitting divorce. He +admits that the marriage institution has been, in various respects, +beneficially modified with the advance of society, and that we may not +yet have reached the last of these modifications; but strenuously +maintains that such changes cannot possibly affect what he regards as +the essential principles of the institution--the irrevocability of the +engagement, and the complete subordination of the wife to the husband, +and of women generally to men; which are precisely the great vulnerable +points of the existing constitution of society on this important +subject. It is unpleasant to have to say it of a philosopher, but the +incidents of his life which have been made public by his biographers +afford an explanation of one of these two opinions: he had quarrelled +with his wife.[16] At a later period, under the influence of +circumstances equally personal, his opinions and feelings respecting +women were very much modified, without becoming more rational: in his +final scheme of society, instead of being treated as grown children, +they were exalted into goddesses: honours, privileges, and immunities, +were lavished on them, only not simple justice. On the other question, +the irrevocability of marriage, M. Comte must receive credit for +impartiality, since the opposite doctrine would have better suited his +personal convenience: but we can give him no other credit, for his +argument is not only futile but refutes itself. He says that with +liberty of divorce, life would be spent in a constant succession of +experiments and failures; and in the same breath congratulates himself +on the fact, that modern manners and sentiments have in the main +prevented the baneful effects which the toleration of divorce in +Protestant countries might have been expected to produce. He did not +perceive that if modern habits and feelings have successfully resisted +what he deems the tendency of a less rigorous marriage law, it must be +because modern habits and feelings are inconsistent with the perpetual +series of new trials which he dreaded. If there are tendencies in human +nature which seek change and variety, there are others which demand +fixity, in matters which touch the daily sources of happiness; and one +who had studied history as much as M. Comte, ought to have known that +ever since the nomad mode of life was exchanged for the agricultural, +the latter tendencies have been always gaining ground on the former. All +experience testifies that regularity in domestic relations is almost in +direct proportion to industrial civilization. Idle life, and military +life with its long intervals of idleness, are the conditions to which, +either sexual profligacy, or prolonged vagaries of imagination on that +subject, are congenial. Busy men have no time for them, and have too +much other occupation for their thoughts: they require that home should +be a place of rest, not of incessantly renewed excitement and +disturbance. In the condition, therefore, into which modern society has +passed, there is no probability that marriages would often be contracted +without a sincere desire on both sides that they should be permanent. +That this has been the case hitherto in countries where divorce was +permitted, we have on M. Comte's own showing: and everything leads us to +believe that the power, if granted elsewhere, would in general be used +only for its legitimate purpose--for enabling those who, by a blameless +or excusable mistake, have lost their first throw for domestic +happiness, to free themselves (with due regard for all interests +concerned) from the burthensome yoke, and try, under more favourable +auspices, another chance. Any further discussion of these great social +questions would evidently be incompatible with the nature and limits of +the present paper. + +Lastly, a phaenomenon universal in all societies, and constantly +assuming a wider extension as they advance in their progress, is the +co-operation of mankind one with another, by the division of employments +and interchange of commodities and services; a communion which extends +to nations as well as individuals. The economic importance of this +spontaneous organization of mankind as joint workers with and for one +another, has often been illustrated. Its moral effects, in connecting +them by their interests, and as a more remote consequence, by their +sympathies, are equally salutary. But there are some things to be said +on the other side. The increasing specialisation of all employments; the +division of mankind into innumerable small fractions, each engrossed by +an extremely minute fragment of the business of society, is not without +inconveniences, as well moral as intellectual, which, if they could not +be remedied, would be a serious abatement from the benefits of advanced +civilization. The interests of the whole--the bearings of things on the +ends of the social union--are less and less present to the minds of men +who have so contracted a sphere of activity. The insignificant detail +which forms their whole occupation--the infinitely minute wheel they +help to turn in the machinery of society--does not arouse or gratify any +feeling of public spirit, or unity with their fellow-men. Their work is +a mere tribute to physical necessity, not the glad performance of a +social office. This lowering effect of the extreme division of labour +tells most of all on those who are set up as the lights and teachers of +the rest. A man's mind is as fatally narrowed, and his feelings towards +the great ends of humanity as miserably stunted, by giving all his +thoughts to the classification of a few insects or the resolution of a +few equations, as to sharpening the points or putting on the heads of +pins. The "dispersive speciality" of the present race of scientific men, +who, unlike their predecessors, have a positive aversion to enlarged +views, and seldom either know or care for any of the interests of +mankind beyond the narrow limits of their pursuit, is dwelt on by M. +Comte as one of the great and growing evils of the time, and the one +which most retards moral and intellectual regeneration. To contend +against it is one of the main purposes towards which he thinks the +forces of society should be directed. The obvious remedy is a large and +liberal general education, preparatory to all special pursuits: and this +is M. Comte's opinion: but the education of youth is not in his +estimation enough: he requires an agency set apart for obtruding upon +all classes of persons through the whole of life, the paramount claims +of the general interest, and the comprehensive ideas that demonstrate +the mode in which human actions promote or impair it. In other words, +he demands a moral and intellectual authority, charged with the duty of +guiding men's opinions and enlightening and warning their consciences; +a Spiritual Power, whose judgments on all matters of high moment should +deserve, and receive, the same universal respect and deference which is +paid to the united judgment of astronomers in matters astronomical. The +very idea of such an authority implies that an unanimity has been +attained, at least in essentials, among moral and political thinkers, +corresponding or approaching to that which already exists in the other +sciences. There cannot be this unanimity, until the true methods of +positive science have been applied to all subjects, as completely as +they have been applied to the study of physical science: to this, +however, there is no real obstacle; and when once it is accomplished, +the same degree of accordance will naturally follow. The undisputed +authority which astronomers possess in astronomy, will be possessed on +the great social questions by Positive Philosophers; to whom will belong +the spiritual government of society, subject to two conditions: that +they be entirely independent, within their own sphere, of the temporal +government, and that they be peremptorily excluded from all share in it, +receiving instead the entire conduct of education. + +This is the leading feature in M. Comte's conception of a regenerated +society; and however much this ideal differs from that which is implied +more or less confusedly in the negative philosophy of the last three +centuries, we hold the amount of truth in the two to be about the same. +M. Comte has got hold of half the truth, and the so-called liberal or +revolutionary school possesses the other half; each sees what the other +does not see, and seeing it exclusively, draws consequences from it +which to the other appear mischievously absurd. It is, without doubt, +the necessary condition of mankind to receive most of their opinions on +the authority of those who have specially studied the matters to which +they relate. The wisest can act on no other rule, on subjects with which +they are not themselves thoroughly conversant; and the mass of mankind +have always done the like on all the great subjects of thought and +conduct, acting with implicit confidence on opinions of which they did +not know, and were often incapable of understanding, the grounds, but on +which as long as their natural guides were unanimous they fully relied, +growing uncertain and sceptical only when these became divided, and +teachers who as far as they could judge were equally competent, +professed contradictory opinions. Any doctrines which come recommended +by the nearly universal verdict of instructed minds will no doubt +continue to be, as they have hitherto been, accepted without misgiving +by the rest. The difference is, that with the wide diffusion of +scientific education among the whole people, demanded by M. Comte, their +faith, however implicit, would not be that of ignorance: it would not be +the blind submission of dunces to men of knowledge, but the intelligent +deference of those who know much, to those who know still more. It is +those who have some knowledge of astronomy, not those who have none at +all, who best appreciate how prodigiously more Lagrange or Laplace knew +than themselves. This is what can be said in favour of M. Comte. On the +contrary side it is to be said, that in order that this salutary +ascendancy over opinion should be exercised by the most eminent +thinkers, it is not necessary that they should be associated and +organized. The ascendancy will come of itself when the unanimity is +attained, without which it is neither desirable nor possible. It is +because astronomers agree in their teaching that astronomy is trusted, +and not because there is an Academy of Sciences or a Royal Society +issuing decrees or passing resolutions. A constituted moral authority +can only be required when the object is not merely to promulgate and +diffuse principles of conduct, but to direct the detail of their +application; to declare and inculcate, not duties, but each person's +duty, as was attempted by the spiritual authority of the middle ages. +From this extreme application of his principle M. Comte does not shrink. +A function of this sort, no doubt, may often be very usefully discharged +by individual members of the speculative class; but if entrusted to any +organized body, would involve nothing less than a spiritual despotism. +This however is what M. Comte really contemplated, though it would +practically nullify that peremptory separation of the spiritual from the +temporal power, which he justly deemed essential to a wholesome state of +society. Those whom an irresistible public opinion invested with the +right to dictate or control the acts of rulers, though without the means +of backing their advice by force, would have all the real power of the +temporal authorities, without their labours or their responsibilities. +M. Comte would probably have answered that the temporal rulers, having +the whole legal power in their hands, would certainly not pay to the +spiritual authority more than a very limited obedience: which amounts to +saying that the ideal form of society which he sets up, is only fit to +be an ideal because it cannot possibly be realized. + +That education should be practically directed by the philosophic class, +when there is a philosophic class who have made good their claim to the +place in opinion hitherto filled by the clergy, would be natural and +indispensable. But that all education should be in the hands of a +centralized authority, whether composed of clergy or of philosophers, +and be consequently all framed on the same model, and directed to the +perpetuation of the same type, is a state of things which instead of +becoming more acceptable, will assuredly be more repugnant to mankind, +with every step of their progress in the unfettered exercise of their +highest faculties. We shall see, in the Second Part, the evils with +which the conception of the new Spiritual Power is pregnant, coming out +into full bloom in the more complete development which M. Comte gave to +the idea in his later years. + +After this unsatisfactory attempt to trace the outline of Social +Statics, M. Comte passes to a topic on which he is much more at +home--the subject of his most eminent speculations; Social Dynamics, or +the laws of the evolution of human society. + +Two questions meet us at the outset: Is there a natural evolution in +human affairs? and is that evolution an improvement? M. Comte resolves +them both in the affirmative by the same answer. The natural progress of +society consists in the growth of our human attributes, comparatively to +our animal and our purely organic ones: the progress of our humanity +towards an ascendancy over our animality, ever more nearly approached +though incapable of being completely realized. This is the character and +tendency of human development, or of what is called civilization; and +the obligation of seconding this movement--of working in the direction +of it--is the nearest approach which M. Comte makes in this treatise to +a general principle or standard of morality. + +But as our more eminent, and peculiarly human, faculties are of various +orders, moral, intellectual, and aesthetic, the question presents +itself, is there any one of these whose development is the predominant +agency in the evolution of our species? According to M. Comte, the main +agent in the progress of mankind is their intellectual development. + +Not because the intellectual is the most powerful part of our nature, +for, limited to its inherent strength, it is one of the weakest: but +because it is the guiding part, and acts not with its own strength +alone, but with the united force of all parts of our nature which it can +draw after it. In a social state the feelings and propensities cannot +act with their full power, in a determinate direction, unless the +speculative intellect places itself at their head. The passions are, +in the individual man, a more energetic power than a mere intellectual +conviction; but the passions tend to divide, not to unite, mankind: it +is only by a common belief that passions are brought to work together, +and become a collective force instead of forces neutralizing one +another. Our intelligence is first awakened by the stimulus of our +animal wants and of our stronger and coarser desires; and these for +a long time almost exclusively determine the direction in which our +intelligence shall work: but once roused to activity, it assumes more +and more the management of the operations of which stronger impulses are +the prompters, and constrains them to follow its lead, not by its own +strength, but because in the play of antagonistic forces, the path it +points out is (in scientific phraseology) the direction of least +resistance. Personal interests and feelings, in the social state, can +only obtain the maximum of satisfaction by means of co-operation, and +the necessary condition of co-operation is a common belief. All human +society, consequently, is grounded on a system of fundamental opinions, +which only the speculative faculty can provide, and which when provided, +directs our other impulses in their mode of seeking their gratification. +And hence the history of opinions, and of the speculative faculty, has +always been the leading element in the history of mankind. + +This doctrine has been combated by Mr Herbert Spencer, in the pamphlet +already referred to; and we will quote, in his own words, the theory he +propounds in opposition to it:-- + +/# + "Ideas do not govern and overthrow the world; the world is governed + or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas serve only as guides. The + social mechanism does not rest finally upon opinions, but almost + wholly upon character. Not intellectual anarchy, but moral + antagonism, is the cause of political crises. All social phaenomena + are produced by the totality of human emotions and beliefs, of + which the emotions are mainly predetermined, while the beliefs are + mainly post-determined. Men's desires are chiefly inherited; but + their beliefs are chiefly acquired, and depend on surrounding + conditions; and the most important surrounding conditions depend on + the social state which the prevalent desires have produced. The + social state at any time existing, is the resultant of all the + ambitions, self-interests, fears, reverences, indignations, + sympathies, &c., of ancestral citizens and existing citizens. The + ideas current in this social state must, on the average, lie + congruous with the feelings of citizens, and therefore, on the + average, with the social state these feelings have produced. Ideas + wholly foreign to this social state cannot be evolved, and if + introduced from without, cannot get accepted--or, if accepted, die + out when the temporary phase of feeling which caused their + acceptance ends. Hence, though advanced ideas, when once + established, act upon society and aid its further advance, yet the + establishment of such ideas depends on the fitness of society for + receiving them. Practically, the popular character and the social + state determine what ideas shall be current; instead of the current + ideas determining the social state and the character. The + modification of men's moral natures, caused by the continuous + discipline of social life, which adapts them more and more to + social relations, is therefore the chief proximate cause of social + progress."[17] +#/ + +A great part of these statements would have been acknowledged as true by +M. Comte, and belong as much to his theory as to Mr Spencer's. The +re-action of all other mental and social elements upon the intellectual +not only is fully recognized by him, but his philosophy of history makes +great use of it, pointing out that the principal intellectual changes +could not have taken place unless changes in other elements of society +had preceded; but also showing that these were themselves consequences +of prior intellectual changes. It will not be found, on a fair +examination of what M. Comte has written, that he has overlooked any of +the truth that there is in Mr Spencer's theory. He would not indeed have +said (what Mr Spencer apparently wishes us to say) that the effects +which can be historically traced, for example to religion, were not +produced by the belief in God, but by reverence and fear of him. He +would have said that the reverence and fear presuppose the belief: that +a God must be believed in before he can be feared or reverenced. The +whole influence of the belief in a God upon society and civilization, +depends on the powerful human sentiments which are ready to attach +themselves to the belief; and yet the sentiments are only a social force +at all, through the definite direction given to them by that or some +other intellectual conviction; nor did the sentiments spontaneously +throw up the belief in a God, since in themselves they were equally +capable of gathering round some other object. Though it is true that +men's passions and interests often dictate their opinions, or rather +decide their choice among the two or three forms of opinion, which the +existing condition of human intelligence renders possible, this +disturbing cause is confined to morals, politics, and religion; and it +is the intellectual movement in other regions than these, which is at +the root of all the great changes in human affairs. It was not human +emotions and passions which discovered the motion of the earth, or +detected the evidence of its antiquity; which exploded Scholasticism, +and inaugurated the exploration of nature; which invented printing, +paper, and the mariner's compass. Yet the Reformation, the English and +French revolutions, and still greater moral and social changes yet to +come, are direct consequences of these and similar discoveries. Even +alchemy and astrology were not believed because people thirsted for gold +and were anxious to pry into the future, for these desires are as strong +now as they were then: but because alchemy and astrology were +conceptions natural to a particular stage in the growth of human +knowledge, and consequently determined during that stage the particular +means whereby the passions which always exist, sought their +gratification. To say that men's intellectual beliefs do not determine +their conduct, is like saying that the ship is moved by the steam and +not by the steersman. The steam indeed is the motive power; the +steersman, left to himself, could not advance the vessel a single inch; +yet it is the steersman's will and the steersman's knowledge which +decide in what direction it shall move and whither it shall go. + +Examining next what is the natural order of intellectual progress among +mankind, M. Comte observes, that as their general mode of conceiving the +universe must give its character to all their conceptions of detail, the +determining fact in their intellectual history must be the natural +succession of theories of the universe; which, it has been seen, +consists of three stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the +positive. The passage of mankind through these stages, including the +successive modifications of the theological conception by the rising +influence of the other two, is, to M. Comte's mind, the most decisive +fact in the evolution of humanity. Simultaneously, however, there has +been going on throughout history a parallel movement in the purely +temporal department of things, consisting of the gradual decline of the +military mode of life (originally the chief occupation of all freemen) +and its replacement by the industrial. M. Comte maintains that there +is a necessary connexion and interdependence between this historical +sequence and the other: and he easily shows that the progress of +industry and that of positive science are correlative; man's power to +modify the facts of nature evidently depending on the knowledge he has +acquired of their laws. We do not think him equally successful in +showing a natural connexion between the theological mode of thought and +the military system of society: but since they both belong to the same +age of the world--since each is, in itself, natural and inevitable, and +they are together modified and together undermined by the same cause, +the progress of science and industry, M. Comte is justified in +considering them as linked together, and the movement by which mankind +emerge from them as a single evolution. + +These propositions having been laid down as the first principles of +social dynamics, M. Comte proceeds to verify and apply them by a +connected view of universal history. This survey nearly fills two large +volumes, above a third of the work, in all of which there is scarcely a +sentence that does not add an idea. We regard it as by far his greatest +achievement, except his review of the sciences, and in some respects +more striking even than that. We wish it were practicable in the compass +of an essay like the present, to give even a faint conception of the +extraordinary merits of this historical analysis. It must be read to be +appreciated. Whoever disbelieves that the philosophy of history can be +made a science, should suspend his judgment until he has read these +volumes of M. Comte. We do not affirm that they would certainly change +his opinion; but we would strongly advise him to give them a chance. + +We shall not attempt the vain task of abridgment, a few words are all we +can give to the subject. M. Comte confines himself to the main stream of +human progress, looking only at the races and nations that led the van, +and regarding as the successors of a people not their actual +descendants, but those who took up the thread of progress after them. +His object is to characterize truly, though generally, the successive +states of society through which the advanced guard of our species has +passed, and the filiation of these states on one another--how each grew +out of the preceding and was the parent of the following state. A more +detailed explanation, taking into account minute differences and more +special and local phaenomena, M. Comte does not aim at, though he does +not avoid it when it falls in his path. Here, as in all his other +speculations, we meet occasional misjudgments, and his historical +correctness in minor matters is now and then at fault; but we may well +wonder that it is not oftener so, considering the vastness of the field, +and a passage in one of his prefaces in which he says of himself that he +_rapidly_ amassed the materials for his great enterprise (vi. 34). This +expression in his mouth does not imply what it would in that of the +majority of men, regard being had to his rare capacity of prolonged and +concentrated mental labour: and it is wonderful that he so seldom gives +cause to wish that his collection of materials had been less "rapid." +But (as he himself remarks) in an inquiry of this sort the vulgarest +facts are the most important. A movement common to all mankind--to all +of them at least who do move--must depend on causes affecting them all; +and these, from the scale on which they operate, cannot require abstruse +research to bring them to light: they are not only seen, but best seen, +in the most obvious, most universal, and most undisputed phaenomena. +Accordingly M. Comte lays no claim to new views respecting the mere +facts of history; he takes them as he finds them, builds almost +exclusively on those concerning which there is no dispute, and only +tries what positive results can be obtained by combining them. Among +the vast mass of historical observations which he has grouped and +co-ordinated, if we have found any errors they are in things which do +not affect his main conclusions. The chain of causation by which he +connects the spiritual and temporal life of each era with one another +and with the entire series, will be found, we think, in all essentials, +irrefragable. When local or temporary disturbing causes have to be taken +into the account as modifying the general movement, criticism has more +to say. But this will only become important when the attempt is made to +write the history or delineate the character of some given society on M. +Comte's principles. + +Such doubtful statements, or misappreciations of states of society, as +we have remarked, are confined to cases which stand more or less apart +from the principal line of development of the progressive societies. For +instance, he makes greatly too much of what, with many other Continental +thinkers, he calls the Theocratic state. He regards this as a natural, +and at one time almost an universal, stage of social progress, though +admitting that it either never existed or speedily ceased in the two +ancient nations to which mankind are chiefly indebted for being +permanently progressive. We hold it doubtful if there ever existed what +M. Comte means by a theocracy. There was indeed no lack of societies in +which, the civil and penal law being supposed to have been divinely +revealed, the priests were its authorized interpreters. But this is the +case even in Mussulman countries, the extreme opposite of theocracy. By +a theocracy we understand to be meant, and we understand M. Comte to +mean, a society founded on caste, and in which the speculative, +necessarily identical with the priestly caste, has the temporal +government in its hands or under its control. We believe that no such +state of things ever existed in the societies commonly cited as +theocratic. There is no reason to think that in any of them, the king, +or chief of the government, was ever, unless by occasional usurpation, +a member of the priestly caste.[18] It was not so in Israel, even in the +time of the Judges; Jephtha, for example, was a Gileadite, of the tribe +of Manasseh, and a military captain, as all governors in such an age and +country needed to be. Priestly rulers only present themselves in two +anomalous cases, of which next to nothing is known: the Mikados of Japan +and the Grand Lamas of Thibet: in neither of which instances was the +general constitution of society one of caste, and in the latter of them +the priestly sovereignty is as nominal as it has become in the former. +India is the typical specimen of the institution of caste--the only case +in which we are certain that it ever really existed, for its existence +anywhere else is a matter of more or less probable inference in the +remote past. But in India, where the importance of the sacerdotal order +was greater than in any other recorded state of society, the king not +only was not a priest, but, consistently with the religious law, could +not be one: he belonged to a different caste. The Brahmins were invested +with an exalted character of sanctity, and an enormous amount of civil +privileges; the king was enjoined to have a council of Brahmin advisers; +but practically he took their advice or disregarded it exactly as he +pleased. As is observed by the historian who first threw the light of +reason on Hindoo society,[19] the king, though in dignity, to judge by +the written code, he seemed vastly inferior to the Brahmins, had always +the full power of a despotic monarch: the reason being that he had the +command of the army, and the control of the public revenue. There is no +case known to authentic history in which either of these belonged to the +sacerdotal caste. Even in the cases most favourable to them, the +priesthood had no voice in temporal affairs, except the "consultative" +voice which M. Comte's theory allows to every spiritual power. His +collection of materials must have been unusually "rapid" in this +instance, for he regards almost all the societies of antiquity, except +the Greek and Roman, as theocratic, even Gaul under the Druids, and +Persia under Darius; admitting, however, that in these two countries, +when they emerge into the light of history, the theocracy had already +been much broken down by military usurpation. By what evidence he could +have proved that it ever existed, we confess ourselves unable to divine. + +The only other imperfection worth noticing here, which we find in M. +Comte's view of history, is that he has a very insufficient +understanding of the peculiar phaenomena of English development; though +he recognizes, and on the whole correctly estimates, its exceptional +character in relation to the general European movement. His failure +consists chiefly in want of appreciation of Protestantism; which, like +almost all thinkers, even unbelievers, who have lived and thought +exclusively in a Catholic atmosphere, he sees and knows only on its +negative side, regarding the Reformation as a mere destructive movement, +stopped short in too early a stage. He does not seem to be aware that +Protestantism has any positive influences, other than the general ones +of Christianity; and misses one of the most important facts connected +with it, its remarkable efficacy, as contrasted with Catholicism, in +cultivating the intelligence and conscience of the individual believer. +Protestantism, when not merely professed but actually taken into the +mind, makes a demand on the intelligence; the mind is expected to be +active, not passive, in the reception of it. The feeling of a direct +responsibility of the individual immediately to God, is almost wholly +a creation of Protestantism. Even when Protestants were nearly as +persecuting as Catholics (quite as much so they never were); even when +they held as firmly as Catholics that salvation depended on having the +true belief, they still maintained that the belief was not to be +accepted from a priest, but to be sought and found by the believer, at +his eternal peril if he failed; and that no one could answer to God for +him, but that he had to answer for himself. The avoidance of fatal error +thus became in a great measure a question of culture; and there was the +strongest inducement to every believer, however humble, to seek culture +and to profit by it. In those Protestant countries, accordingly, whose +Churches were not, as the Church of England always was, principally +political institutions--in Scotland, for instance, and the New England +States--an amount of education was carried down to the poorest of the +people, of which there is no other example; every peasant expounded the +Bible to his family (many to their neighbours), and had a mind practised +in meditation and discussion on all the points of his religious creed. +The food may not have been the most nourishing, but we cannot be blind +to the sharpening and strengthening exercise which such great topics +gave to the understanding--the discipline in abstraction and reasoning +which such mental occupation brought down to the humblest layman, and +one of the consequences of which was the privilege long enjoyed by +Scotland of supplying the greater part of Europe with professors for its +universities, and educated and skilled workmen for its practical arts. + +This, however, notwithstanding its importance, is, in a comprehensive +view of universal history, only a matter of detail. We find no +fundamental errors in M. Comte's general conception of history. He is +singularly exempt from most of the twists and exaggerations which we are +used to find in almost all thinkers who meddle with speculations of this +character. Scarcely any of them is so free (for example) from the +opposite errors of ascribing too much or too little influence to +accident, and to the qualities of individuals. The vulgar mistake of +supposing that the course of history has no tendencies of its own, and +that great events usually proceed from small causes, or that kings, or +conquerors, or the founders of philosophies and religions, can do with +society what they please, no one has more completely avoided or more +tellingly exposed. But he is equally free from the error of those who +ascribe all to general causes, and imagine that neither casual +circumstances, nor governments by their acts, nor individuals of genius +by their thoughts, materially accelerate or retard human progress. This +is the mistake which pervades the instructive writings of the thinker +who in England and in our own times bore the nearest, though a very +remote, resemblance to M. Comte--the lamented Mr Buckle; who, had he not +been unhappily cut off in an early stage of his labours, and before the +complete maturity of his powers, would probably have thrown off an +error, the more to be regretted as it gives a colour to the prejudice +which regards the doctrine of the invariability of natural laws as +identical with fatalism. Mr Buckle also fell into another mistake which +M. Comte avoided, that of regarding the intellectual as the only +progressive element in man, and the moral as too much the same at all +times to affect even the annual average of crime. M. Comte shows, on the +contrary, a most acute sense of the causes which elevate or lower the +general level of moral excellence; and deems intellectual progress in no +other way so beneficial as by creating a standard to guide the moral +sentiments of mankind, and a mode of bringing those sentiments +effectively to bear on conduct. + +M. Comte is equally free from the error of considering any practical +rule or doctrine that can be laid down in politics as universal and +absolute. All political truth he deems strictly relative, implying as +its correlative a given state or situation of society. This conviction +is now common to him with all thinkers who are on a level with the age, +and comes so naturally to any intelligent reader of history, that the +only wonder is how men could have been prevented from reaching it +sooner. It marks one of the principal differences between the political +philosophy of the present time and that of the past; but M. Comte +adopted it when the opposite mode of thinking was still general, and +there are few thinkers to whom the principle owes more in the way of +comment and illustration. + +Again, while he sets forth the historical succession of systems of +belief and forms of political society, and places in the strongest light +those imperfections in each which make it impossible that any of them +should be final, this does not make him for a moment unjust to the men +or the opinions of the past. He accords with generous recognition the +gratitude due to all who, with whatever imperfections of doctrine or +even of conduct, contributed materially to the work of human +improvement. In all past modes of thought and forms of society he +acknowledged a useful, in many a necessary, office, in carrying mankind +through one stage of improvement into a higher. The theological spirit +in its successive forms, the metaphysical in its principal varieties, +are honoured by him for the services they rendered in bringing mankind +out of pristine savagery into a state in which more advanced modes of +belief became possible. His list of heroes and benefactors of mankind +includes, not only every important name in the scientific movement, from +Thales of Miletus to Fourier the mathematician and Blainville the +biologist, and in the aesthetic from Homer to Manzoni, but the most +illustrious names in the annals of the various religions and +philosophies, and the really great politicians in all states of +society.[20] Above all, he has the most profound admiration for the +services rendered by Christianity, and by the Church of the middle ages. +His estimate of the Catholic period is such as the majority of +Englishmen (from whom we take the liberty to differ) would deem +exaggerated, if not absurd. The great men of Christianity, from St Paul +to St Francis of Assisi, receive his warmest homage: nor does he forget +the greatness even of those who lived and thought in the centuries in +which the Catholic Church, having stopt short while the world had gone +on, had become a hindrance to progress instead of a promoter of it; such +men as Fenelon and St Vincent de Paul, Bossuet and Joseph de Maistre. +A more comprehensive, and, in the primitive sense of the term, more +catholic, sympathy and reverence towards real worth, and every kind of +service to humanity, we have not met with in any thinker. Men who would +have torn each other in pieces, who even tried to do so, if each +usefully served in his own way the interests of mankind, are all +hallowed to him. + +Neither is his a cramped and contracted notion of human excellence, +which cares only for certain forms of development. He not only +personally appreciates, but rates high in moral value, the creations of +poets and artists in all departments, deeming them, by their mixed +appeal to the sentiments and the understanding, admirably fitted to +educate the feelings of abstract thinkers, and enlarge the intellectual +horizon of people of the world.[21] He regards the law of progress as +applicable, in spite of appearances, to poetry and art as much as to +science and politics. The common impression to the contrary he ascribes +solely to the fact, that the perfection of aesthetic creation requires +as its condition a consentaneousness in the feelings of mankind, which +depends for its existence on a fixed and settled state of opinions: +while the last five centuries have been a period not of settling, but of +unsettling and decomposing, the most general beliefs and sentiments of +mankind. The numerous monuments of poetic and artistic genius which the +modern mind has produced even under this great disadvantage, are (he +maintains) sufficient proof what great productions it will be capable +of, when one harmonious vein of sentiment shall once more thrill through +the whole of society, as in the days of Homer, of Aeschylus, of Phidias, +and even of Dante. + +After so profound and comprehensive a view of the progress of human +society in the past, of which the future can only be a prolongation, it +is natural to ask, to what use does he put this survey as a basis of +practical recommendations? Such recommendations he certainly makes, +though, in the present Treatise, they are of a much less definite +character than in his later writings. But we miss a necessary link; +there is a break in the otherwise close concatenation of his +speculations. We fail to see any scientific connexion between his +theoretical explanation of the past progress of society, and his +proposals for future improvement. The proposals are not, as we might +expect, recommended as that towards which human society has been tending +and working through the whole of history. It is thus that thinkers have +usually proceeded, who formed theories for the future, grounded on +historical analysis of the past. Tocqueville, for example, and others, +finding, as they thought, through all history, a steady progress in the +direction of social and political equality, argued that to smooth this +transition, and make the best of what is certainly coming, is the proper +employment of political foresight. We do not find M. Comte supporting +his recommendations by a similar line of argument. They rest as +completely, each on its separate reasons of supposed utility, as with +philosophers who, like Bentham, theorize on politics without any +historical basis at all. The only bridge of connexion which leads from +his historical speculations to his practical conclusions, is the +inference, that since the old powers of society, both in the region of +thought and of action, are declining and destined to disappear, leaving +only the two rising powers, positive thinkers on the one hand, leaders +of industry on the other, the future necessarily belongs to these: +spiritual power to the former, temporal to the latter. As a specimen of +historical forecast this is very deficient; for are there not the masses +as well as the leaders of industry? and is not theirs also a growing +power? Be this as it may, M. Comte's conceptions of the mode in which +these growing powers should be organized and used, are grounded on +anything rather than on history. And we cannot but remark a singular +anomaly in a thinker of M. Comte's calibre. After the ample evidence he +has brought forward of the slow growth of the sciences, all of which +except the mathematico-astronomical couple are still, as he justly +thinks, in a very early stage, it yet appears as if, to his mind, the +mere institution of a positive science of sociology were tantamount to +its completion; as if all the diversities of opinion on the subject, +which set mankind at variance, were solely owing to its having been +studied in the theological or the metaphysical manner, and as if when +the positive method which has raised up real sciences on other subjects +of knowledge, is similarly employed on this, divergence would at once +cease, and the entire body of positive social inquirers would exhibit +as much agreement in their doctrines as those who cultivate any of the +sciences of inorganic life. Happy would be the prospects of mankind if +this were so. A time such as M. Comte reckoned upon may come; unless +something stops the progress of human improvement, it is sure to come: +but after an unknown duration of hard thought and violent controversy. +The period of decomposition, which has lasted, on his own computation, +from the beginning of the fourteenth century to the present, is not yet +terminated: the shell of the old edifice will remain standing until +there is another ready to replace it; and the new synthesis is barely +begun, nor is even the preparatory analysis completely finished. On +other occasions M. Comte is very well aware that the Method of a science +is not the science itself, and that when the difficulty of discovering +the right processes has been overcome, there remains a still greater +difficulty, that of applying them. This, which is true of all sciences, +is truest of all in Sociology. The facts being more complicated, and +depending on a greater concurrence of forces, than in any other science, +the difficulty of treating them deductively is proportionally increased, +while the wide difference between any one case and every other in some +of the circumstances which affect the result, makes the pretence of +direct induction usually no better than empiricism. It is therefore, out +of all proportion, more uncertain than in any other science, whether two +inquirers equally competent and equally disinterested will take the same +view of the evidence, or arrive at the same conclusion. When to this +intrinsic difficulty is added the infinitely greater extent to which +personal or class interests and predilections interfere with impartial +judgment, the hope of such accordance of opinion among sociological +inquirers as would obtain, in mere deference to their authority, the +universal assent which M. Comte's scheme of society requires, must be +adjourned to an indefinite distance. + +M. Comte's own theory is an apt illustration of these difficulties, +since, though prepared for these speculations as no one had ever been +prepared before, his views of social regeneration even in the +rudimentary form in which they appear above-ground in this treatise (not +to speak of the singular system into which he afterwards enlarged them) +are such as perhaps no other person of equal knowledge and capacity +would agree in. Were those views as true as they are questionable, they +could not take effect until the unanimity among positive thinkers, to +which he looked forward, shall have been attained; since the mainspring +of his system is a Spiritual Power composed of positive philosophers, +which only the previous attainment of the unanimity in question could +call into existence. A few words will sufficiently express the outline +of his scheme. A corporation of philosophers, receiving a modest support +from the state, surrounded by reverence, but peremptorily excluded not +only from all political power or employment, but from all riches, and +all occupations except their own, are to have the entire direction of +education: together with, not only the right and duty of advising and +reproving all persons respecting both their public and their private +life, but also a control (whether authoritative or only moral is not +defined) over the speculative class itself, to prevent them from wasting +time and ingenuity on inquiries and speculations of no value to mankind +(among which he includes many now in high estimation), and compel them +to employ all their powers on the investigations which may be judged, at +the time, to be the most urgently important to the general welfare. The +temporal government which is to coexist with this spiritual authority, +consists of an aristocracy of capitalists, whose dignity and authority +are to be in the ratio of the degree of generality of their conceptions +and operations--bankers at the summit, merchants next, then +manufacturers, and agriculturists at the bottom of the scale. No +representative system, or other popular organization, by way of +counterpoise to this governing power, is ever contemplated. The checks +relied upon for preventing its abuse, are the counsels and remonstrances +of the Spiritual Power, and unlimited liberty of discussion and comment +by all classes of inferiors. Of the mode in which either set of +authorities should fulfil the office assigned to it, little is said in +this treatise: but the general idea is, while regulating as little as +possible by law, to make the pressure of opinion, directed by the +Spiritual Power, so heavy on every individual, from the humblest to the +most powerful, as to render legal obligation, in as many cases as +possible, needless. Liberty and spontaneity on the part of individuals +form no part of the scheme. M. Comte looks on them with as great +jealousy as any scholastic pedagogue, or ecclesiastical director of +consciences. Every particular of conduct, public or private, is to be +open to the public eye, and to be kept, by the power of opinion, in the +course which the Spiritual corporation shall judge to be the most right. + +This is not a sufficiently tempting picture to have much chance of +making converts rapidly, and the objections to the scheme are too +obvious to need stating. Indeed, it is only thoughtful persons to whom +it will be credible, that speculations leading to this result can +deserve the attention necessary for understanding them. We propose in +the next Essay to examine them as part of the elaborate and coherent +system of doctrine, which M. Comte afterwards put together for the +reconstruction of society. Meanwhile the reader will gather, from what +has been said, that M. Comte has not, in our opinion, created Sociology. +Except his analysis of history, to which there is much to be added, but +which we do not think likely to be ever, in its general features, +superseded, he has done nothing in Sociology which does not require to +be done over again, and better. Nevertheless, he has greatly advanced +the study. Besides the great stores of thought, of various and often of +eminent merit, with which he has enriched the subject, his conception of +its method is so much truer and more profound than that of any one who +preceded him, as to constitute an era in its cultivation. If it cannot +be said of him that he has created a science, it may be said truly that +he has, for the first time, made the creation possible. This is a great +achievement, and, with the extraordinary merit of his historical +analysis, and of his philosophy of the physical sciences, is enough to +immortalize his name. But his renown with posterity would probably have +been greater than it is now likely to be, if after showing the way in +which the social science should be formed, he had not flattered himself +that he had formed it, and that it was already sufficiently solid for +attempting to build upon its foundation the entire fabric of the +Political Art. + + + + * * * * * + + + +PART II. + +THE LATER SPECULATIONS OF M. COMTE.[22] + + +The appended list of publications contain the materials for knowing and +estimating what M. Comte termed his second career, in which the +_savant_, historian, and philosopher of his fundamental treatise, came +forth transfigured as the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity. They +include all his writings except the Cours de Philosophic Positive: for +his early productions, and the occasional publications of his later life, +are reprinted as Preludes or Appendices to the treatises here enumerated, +or in Dr Robinet's volume, which, as well as that of M. Littre, also +contains copious extracts from his correspondence. + +In the concluding pages of his great systematic work, M. Comte had +announced four other treatises as in contemplation: on Politics; on the +Philosophy of Mathematics; on Education, a project subsequently enlarged +to include the systematization of Morals; and on Industry, or the action +of man upon external nature. Our list comprises the only two of these +which he lived to execute. It further contains a brief exposition of his +final doctrines, in the form of a Dialogue, or, as he terms it, a +Catechism, of which a translation has been published by his principal +English adherent, Mr Congreve. There has also appeared very recently, +under the title of "A General View of Positivism," a translation by Dr +Bridges, of the Preliminary Discourse in six chapters, prefixed to the +Systeme de Politique Positive. The remaining three books on our list are +the productions of disciples in different degrees. M. Littre, the only +thinker of established reputation who accepts that character, is a +disciple only of the Cours de Philosophie Positive, and can see the weak +points even in that. Some of them he has discriminated and discussed +with great judgment: and the merits of his volume, both as a sketch of +M. Comte's life and an appreciation of his doctrines, would well deserve +a fuller notice than we are able to give it here. M. de Blignieres is +a far more thorough adherent; so much so, that the reader of his +singularly well and attractively written condensation and popularization +of his master's doctrines, does not easily discover in what it falls +short of that unqualified acceptance which alone, it would seem, could +find favour with M. Comte. For he ended by casting off M. de Blignieres, +as he had previously cast off M. Littre, and every other person who, +having gone with him a certain length, refused to follow him to the end. +The author of the last work in our enumeration, Dr Robinet, is a +disciple after M. Comte's own heart; one whom no difficulty stops, and +no absurdity startles. But it is far from our disposition to speak +otherwise than respectfully of Dr Robinet and the other earnest men, who +maintain round the tomb of their master an organized co-operation for +the diffusion of doctrines which they believe destined to regenerate the +human race. Their enthusiastic veneration for him, and devotion to the +ends he pursued, do honour alike to them and to their teacher, and are +an evidence of the personal ascendancy he exercised over those who +approached him; an ascendancy which for a time carried away even M. +Littre, as he confesses, to a length which his calmer judgment does not +now approve. + +These various writings raise many points of interest regarding M. +Comte's personal history, and some, not without philosophic bearings, +respecting his mental habits: from all which matters we shall abstain, +with the exception of two, which he himself proclaimed with great +emphasis, and a knowledge of which is almost indispensable to an +apprehension of the characteristic difference between his second career +and his first. It should be known that during his later life, and even +before completing his first great treatise, M. Comte adopted a rule, to +which he very rarely made any exception: to abstain systematically, not +only from newspapers or periodical publications, even scientific, but +from all reading whatever, except a few favourite poets in the ancient +and modern European languages. This abstinence he practised for the sake +of mental health; by way, as he said, of "_hygiene cerebrale_." We are +far from thinking that the practice has nothing whatever to recommend +it. For most thinkers, doubtless, it would be a very unwise one; but we +will not affirm that it may not sometimes be advantageous to a mind of +the peculiar quality of M. Comte's--one that can usefully devote itself +to following out to the remotest developments a particular line of +meditations, of so arduous a kind that the complete concentration of the +intellect upon its own thoughts is almost a necessary condition of +success. When a mind of this character has laboriously and +conscientiously laid in beforehand, as M. Comte had done, an ample stock +of materials, he may be justified in thinking that he will contribute +most to the mental wealth of mankind by occupying himself solely in +working upon these, without distracting his attention by continually +taking in more matter, or keeping a communication open with other +independent intellects. The practice, therefore, may be legitimate; but +no one should adopt it without being aware of what he loses by it. He +must resign the pretension of arriving at the whole truth on the +subject, whatever it be, of his meditations. That he should effect this, +even on a narrow subject, by the mere force of his own mind, building on +the foundations of his predecessors, without aid or correction from his +contemporaries, is simply impossible. He may do eminent service by +elaborating certain sides of the truth, but he must expect to find that +there are other sides which have wholly escaped his attention. However +great his powers, everything that he can do without the aid of incessant +remindings from other thinkers, is merely provisional, and will require +a thorough revision. He ought to be aware of this, and accept it with +his eyes open, regarding himself as a pioneer, not a constructor. If he +thinks that he can contribute most towards the elements of the final +synthesis by following out his own original thoughts as far as they will +go, leaving to other thinkers, or to himself at a subsequent time, the +business of adjusting them to the thoughts by which they ought to be +accompanied, he is right in doing so. But he deludes himself if he +imagines that any conclusions he can arrive at, while he practises M. +Comte's rule of _hygiene cerebrale_, can possibly be definitive. + +Neither is such a practice, in a hygienic point of view, free from the +gravest dangers to the philosopher's own mind. When once he has +persuaded himself that he can work out the final truth on any subject, +exclusively from his own sources, he is apt to lose all measure or +standard by which to be apprized when he is departing from common sense. +Living only with his own thoughts, he gradually forgets the aspect they +present to minds of a different mould from his own; he looks at his +conclusions only from the point of view which suggested them, and from +which they naturally appear perfect; and every consideration which from +other points of view might present itself, either as an objection or as +a necessary modification, is to him as if it did not exist. When his +merits come to be recognised and appreciated, and especially if he +obtains disciples, the intellectual infirmity soon becomes complicated +with a moral one. The natural result of the position is a gigantic +self-confidence, not to say self-conceit. That of M. Comte is colossal. +Except here and there in an entirely self-taught thinker, who has no +high standard with which to compare himself, we have met with nothing +approaching to it. As his thoughts grew more extravagant, his +self-confidence grew more outrageous. The height it ultimately attained +must be seen, in his writings, to be believed. + +The other circumstance of a personal nature which it is impossible not +to notice, because M. Comte is perpetually referring to it as the origin +of the great superiority which he ascribes to his later as compared with +his earlier speculations, is the "moral regeneration" which he underwent +from "une angelique influence" and "une incomparable passion privee." He +formed a passionate attachment to a lady whom he describes as uniting +everything which is morally with much that is intellectually admirable, +and his relation to whom, besides the direct influence of her character +upon his own, gave him an insight into the true sources of human +happiness, which changed his whole conception of life. This attachment, +which always remained pure, gave him but one year of passionate +enjoyment, the lady having been cut off by death at the end of that +short period; but the adoration of her memory survived, and became, as +we shall see, the type of his conception of the sympathetic culture +proper for all human beings. The change thus effected in his personal +character and sentiments, manifested itself at once in his speculations; +which, from having been only a philosophy, now aspired to become a +religion; and from having been as purely, and almost rudely, scientific +and intellectual, as was compatible with a character always enthusiastic +in its admirations and in its ardour for improvement, became from this +time what, for want of a better name, may be called sentimental; but +sentimental in a way of its own, very curious to contemplate. In +considering the system of religion, politics, and morals, which in his +later writings M. Comte constructed, it is not unimportant to bear in +mind the nature of the personal experience and inspiration to which he +himself constantly attributed this phasis of his philosophy. But as we +shall have much more to say against, than in favour of, the conclusions +to which he was in this manner conducted, it is right to declare that, +from the evidence of his writings, we really believe the moral influence +of Madame Clotilde de Vaux upon his character to have been of the +ennobling as well as softening character which he ascribes to it. Making +allowance for the effects of his exuberant growth in self-conceit, we +perceive almost as much improvement in his feelings, as deterioration in +his speculations, compared with those of the Philosophie Positive. Even +the speculations are, in some secondary aspects, improved through the +beneficial effect of the improved feelings; and might have been more so, +if, by a rare good fortune, the object of his attachment had been +qualified to exercise as improving an influence over him intellectually +as morally, and if he could have been contented with something less +ambitious than being the supreme moral legislator and religious pontiff +of the human race. + +When we say that M. Comte has erected his philosophy into a religion, +the word religion must not be understood in its ordinary sense. He made +no change in the purely negative attitude which he maintained towards +theology: his religion is without a God. In saying this, we have done +enough to induce nine-tenths of all readers, at least in our own +country, to avert their faces and close their ears. To have no religion, +though scandalous enough, is an idea they are partly used to: but to +have no God, and to talk of religion, is to their feelings at once an +absurdity and an impiety. Of the remaining tenth, a great proportion, +perhaps, will turn away from anything which calls itself by the name of +religion at all. Between the two, it is difficult to find an audience +who can be induced to listen to M. Comte without an insurmountable +prejudice. But, to be just to any opinion, it ought to be considered, +not exclusively from an opponent's point of view, but from that of the +mind which propounds it. Though conscious of being in an extremely small +minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief +in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, +an instructive and profitable object of contemplation. + +What, in truth, are the conditions necessary to constitute a religion? +There must be a creed, or conviction, claiming authority over the whole +of human life; a belief, or set of beliefs, deliberately adopted, +respecting human destiny and duty, to which the believer inwardly +acknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate. Moreover, +there must be a sentiment connected with this creed, or capable of being +invoked by it, sufficiently powerful to give it in fact, the authority +over human conduct to which it lays claim in theory. It is a great +advantage (though not absolutely indispensable) that this sentiment +should crystallize, as it were, round a concrete object; if possible a +really existing one, though, in all the more important cases, only +ideally present. Such an object Theism and Christianity offer to the +believer: but the condition may be fulfilled, if not in a manner +strictly equivalent, by another object. It has been said that whoever +believes in "the Infinite nature of Duty," even if he believe in nothing +else, is religious. M. Comte believes in what is meant by the infinite +nature of duty, but ho refers the obligations of duty, as well as all +sentiments of devotion, to a concrete object, at once ideal and real; +the Human Race, conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the +present, and the future. This great collective existence, this "Grand +Etre," as he terms it, though the feelings it can excite are necessarily +very different from those which direct themselves towards an ideally +perfect Being, has, as he forcibly urges, this advantage in respect to +us, that it really needs our services, which Omnipotence cannot, in any +genuine sense of the term, be supposed to do: and M. Comte says, that +assuming the existence of a Supreme Providence (which he is as far from +denying as from affirming), the best, and even the only, way in which we +can rightly worship or serve Him, is by doing our utmost to love and +serve that other Great Being, whose inferior Providence has bestowed on +us all the benefits that we owe to the labours and virtues of former +generations. It may not be consonant to usage to call this a religion; +but the term so applied has a meaning, and one which is not adequately +expressed by any other word. Candid persons of all creeds may be willing +to admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense +of duty towards which are able to control and discipline all his other +sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that +person has a religion: and though everyone naturally prefers his own +religion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this +attachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our +fellow-creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and +conscience, be called an intrinsically bad one. Many, indeed, may be +unable to believe that this object is capable of gathering round it +feelings sufficiently strong: but this is exactly the point on which a +doubt can hardly remain in an intelligent reader of M. Comte: and we +join with him in contemning, as equally irrational and mean, the +conception of human nature as incapable of giving its love and devoting +its existence to any object which cannot afford in exchange an eternity +of personal enjoyment. + +The power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general +interest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as a motive +to conduct, many have perceived; but we know not if any one, before M. +Comte, realized so fully as he has done, all the majesty of which that +idea is susceptible. It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, +embraces the manifold present, and descends into the indefinite and +unforeseeable future, forming a collective Existence without assignable +beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is +deeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the +imposingness of all our highest conceptions. Of the vast unrolling web +of human life, the part best known to us is irrevocably past; this we +can no longer serve, but can still love: it comprises for most of us the +far greater number of those who have loved us, or from whom we have +received benefits, as well as the long series of those who, by their +labours and sacrifices for mankind, have deserved to be held in +everlasting and grateful remembrance. As M. Comte truly says, the +highest minds, even now, live in thought with the great dead, far more +than with the living; and, next to the dead, with those ideal human +beings yet to come, whom they are never destined to see. If we honour as +we ought those who have served mankind in the past, we shall feel that +we are also working for those benefactors by serving that to which their +lives were devoted. And when reflection, guided by history, has taught +us the intimacy of the connexion of every age of humanity with every +other, making us see in the earthly destiny of mankind the playing out +of a great drama, or the action of a prolonged epic, all the generations +of mankind become indissolubly united into a single image, combining all +the power over the mind of the idea of Posterity, with our best feelings +towards the living world which surrounds us, and towards the +predecessors who have made us what we are. That the ennobling power of +this grand conception may have its full efficacy, we should, with M. +Comte, regard the Grand Etre, Humanity, or Mankind, as composed, in the +past, solely of those who, in every age and variety of position, have +played their part worthily in life. It is only as thus restricted that +the aggregate of our species becomes an object deserving our veneration. +The unworthy members of it are best dismissed from our habitual +thoughts; and the imperfections which adhered through life, even to +those of the dead who deserve honourable remembrance, should be no +further borne in mind than is necessary not to falsify our conception of +facts. On the other hand, the Grand Etre in its completeness ought to +include not only all whom we venerate, but all sentient beings to which +we owe duties, and which have a claim on our attachment. M. Comte, +therefore, incorporates into the ideal object whose service is to be the +law of our life, not our own species exclusively, but, in a subordinate +degree, our humble auxiliaries, those animal races which enter into real +society with man, which attach themselves to him, and voluntarily +co-operate with him, like the noble dog who gives his life for his human +friend and benefactor. For this M. Comte has been subjected to unworthy +ridicule, but there is nothing truer or more honourable to him in the +whole body of his doctrines. The strong sense he always shows of the +worth of the inferior animals, and of the duties of mankind towards +them, is one of the very finest traits of his character. + +We, therefore, not only hold that M. Comte was justified in the attempt +to develope his philosophy into a religion, and had realized the +essential conditions of one, but that all other religions are made +better in proportion as, in their practical result, they are brought to +coincide with that which he aimed at constructing. But, unhappily, the +next thing we are obliged to do, is to charge him with making a complete +mistake at the very outset of his operations--with fundamentally +misconceiving the proper office of a rule of life. He committed the +error which is often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of +utilitarian moralists; he required that the test of conduct should also +be the exclusive motive to it. Because the good of the human race is the +ultimate standard of right and wrong, and because moral discipline +consists in cultivating the utmost possible repugnance to all conduct +injurious to the general good, M. Comte infers that the good of others +is the only inducement on which we should allow ourselves to act; and +that we should endeavour to starve the whole of the desires which point +to our personal satisfaction, by denying them all gratification not +strictly required by physical necessities. The golden rule of morality, +in M. Comte's religion, is to live for others, "vivre pour autrui." To +do as we would be done by, and to love our neighbour as ourself, are not +sufficient for him: they partake, he thinks, of the nature of personal +calculations. We should endeavour not to love ourselves at all. We shall +not succeed in it, but we should make the nearest approach to it +possible. Nothing less will satisfy him, as towards humanity, than the +sentiment which one of his favourite writers, Thomas a Kempis, addresses +to God: Amem te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te. All education and +all moral discipline should have but one object, to make altruism (a +word of his own coming) predominate over egoism. If by this were only +meant that egoism is bound, and should be taught, always to give way to +the well-understood interests of enlarged altruism, no one who +acknowledges any morality at all would object to the proposition. +But M. Comte, taking his stand on the biological fact that organs are +strengthened by exercise and atrophied by disuse, and firmly convinced +that each of our elementary inclinations has its distinct cerebral +organ, thinks it the grand duty of life not only to strengthen the +social affections by constant habit and by referring all our actions to +them, but, as far as possible, to deaden the personal passions and +propensities by desuetude. Even the exercise of the intellect is +required to obey as an authoritative rule the dominion of the social +feelings over the intelligence (du coeur sur l'esprit). The physical and +other personal instincts are to be mortified far beyond the demands of +bodily health, which indeed the morality of the future is not to insist +much upon, for fear of encouraging "les calculs personnels." M. Comte +condemns only such austerities as, by diminishing the vigour of the +constitution, make us less capable of being useful to others. Any +indulgence, even in food, not necessary to health and strength, he +condemns as immoral. All gratifications except those of the affections, +are to be tolerated only as "inevitable infirmities." Novalis said of +Spinoza that he was a God-intoxicated man: M. Comte is a +morality-intoxicated man. Every question with him is one of morality, +and no motive but that of morality is permitted. + +The explanation of this we find in an original mental twist, very common +in French thinkers, and by which M. Comte was distinguished beyond them +all. He could not dispense with what he called "unity." It was for the +sake of Unity that a religion was, in his eyes, desirable. Not in the +mere sense of Unanimity, but in a far wider one. A religion must be +something by which to "systematize" human life. His definition of it, in +the "Catechisme," is "the state of complete unity which distinguishes +our existence, at once personal and social, when all its parts, both +moral and physical, converge habitually to a common destination.... +Such a harmony, individual and collective, being incapable of complete +realization in an existence so complicated as ours, this definition of +religion characterizes the immovable type towards which tends more and +more the aggregate of human efforts. Our happiness and our merit consist +especially in approaching as near as possible to this unity, of which +the gradual increase constitutes the best measure of real improvement, +personal or social." To this theme he continually returns, and argues +that this unity or harmony among all the elements of our life is not +consistent with the predominance of the personal propensities, since +these drag us in different directions; it can only result from the +subordination of them all to the social icelings, which may be made to +act in a uniform direction by a common system of convictions, and which +differ from the personal inclinations in this, that we all naturally +encourage them in one another, while, on the contrary, social life is a +perpetual restraint upon the selfish propensities. + +The _fons errorum_ in M. Comte's later speculations is this inordinate +demand for "unity" and "systematization." This is the reason why it does +not suffice to him that all should be ready, in case of need, to +postpone their personal interests and inclinations to the requirements +of the general good: he demands that each should regard as vicious any +care at all for his personal interests, except as a means to the good of +others--should be ashamed of it, should strive to cure himself of it, +because his existence is not "systematized," is not in "complete unity," +as long as he cares for more than one thing. The strangest part of the +matter is, that this doctrine seems to M. Comte to be axiomatic. That +all perfection consists in unity, he apparently considers to be a maxim +which no sane man thinks of questioning. It never seems to enter into +his conceptions that any one could object _ab initio_, and ask, why this +universal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing? Why is it +necessary that all human life should point but to one object, and be +cultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the +fact that mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings, +obtain a greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the +rules and conditions required by the good of the rest, than when each +makes the good of the rest his only subject, and allows himself no +personal pleasures not indispensable to the preservation of his +faculties? The regimen of a blockaded town should be cheerfully +submitted to when high purposes require it, but is it the ideal +perfection of human existence? M. Comte sees none of these difficulties. +The only true happiness, he affirms, is in the exercise of the +affections. He had found it so for a whole year, which was enough to +enable him to get to the bottom of the question, and to judge whether he +could do without everything else. Of course the supposition was not to +be heard of that any other person could require, or be the better for, +what M. Comte did not value. "Unity" and "systematization" absolutely +demanded that all other people should model themselves after M. Comte. +It would never do to suppose that there could be more than one road to +human happiness, or more than one ingredient in it. + +The most prejudiced must admit that this religion without theology is +not chargeable with relaxation of moral restraints. On the contrary, it +prodigiously exaggerates them. It makes the same ethical mistake as the +theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the glory +of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive +that between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate +space, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons +should be bound, by other people's opinion, to do everything that they +would deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which +all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not +obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain +the pursuit of his personal objects within the limits consistent with +the essential interests of others. What those limits are, it is the +province of ethical science to determine; and to keep all individuals +and aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of +punishment and of moral blame. If in addition to fulfilling this +obligation, persons make the good of others a direct object of +disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent +personal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit +objects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this +conduct by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a +necessary condition is its spontaneity; since the notion of a happiness +for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is +really felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spontaneity by +no means excludes sympathetic encouragement; but the encouragement +should take the form of making self-devotion pleasant, not that of +making everything else painful. The object should be to stimulate +services to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the pursuit +of our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the +reproaches of other and of our own conscience. The proper office of +those sanctions is to enforce upon every one, the conduct necessary to +give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists +in not doing them harm, and not impeding them in anything which without +harming others does good to themselves. To this must of course be added, +that when we either expressly or tacitly undertake to do more, we are +bound to keep our promise. And inasmuch as every one, who avails himself +of the advantages of society, leads others to expect from him all such +positive good offices and disinterested services as the moral +improvement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he deserves +moral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that expectation. +Through this principle the domain of moral duty is always widening. +When what once was uncommon virtue becomes common virtue, it comes to be +numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding what has grown +common, remains simply meritorious. + +M. Comte is accustomed to draw most of his ideas of moral cultivation +from the discipline of the Catholic Church. Had he followed that +guidance in the present case, he would have been less wide of the mark. +For the distinction which we have drawn was fully recognized by the +sagacious and far-sighted men who created the Catholic ethics. It is +even one of the stock reproaches against Catholicism, that it has two +standards of morality, and does not make obligatory on all Christians +the highest rule of Christian perfection. It has one standard which, +faithfully acted up to, suffices for salvation, another and a higher +which when realized constitutes a saint. M. Comte, perhaps +unconsciously, for there is nothing that he would have been more +unlikely to do if he had been aware of it, has taken a leaf out of the +book of the despised Protestantism. Like the extreme Calvinists, he +requires that all believers shall be saints, and damns then (after his +own fashion) if they are not. + +Our conception of human life is different. We do not conceive life to be +so rich in enjoyments, that it can afford to forego the cultivation of +all those which address themselves to what M. Comte terms the egoistic +propensities. On the contrary, we believe that a sufficient +gratification of these, short of excess, but up to the measure which +renders the enjoyment greatest, is almost always favourable to the +benevolent affections. The moralization of the personal enjoyments we +deem to consist, not in reducing them to the smallest possible amount, +but in cultivating the habitual wish to share them with others, and with +all others, and scorning to desire anything for oneself which is +incapable of being so shared. There is only one passion or inclination +which is permanently incompatible with this condition--the love of +domination, or superiority, for its own sake; which implies, and is +grounded on, the equivalent depression of other people. As a rule of +conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be +attempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting +to do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this, +society, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more; for the +natural activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions, +will expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception of the moral +rule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard +there is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted +heroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement, +though not converted into an obligation. It is as much a part of our +scheme as of M. Comte's, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and +the subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute +moral duty, should be one of the chief aims of education, both +individual and collective. We even recognize the value, for this end, of +ascetic discipline, in the original Greek sense of the word. We think +with Dr Johnson, that he who has never denied himself anything which is +not wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself everything which +is so. We do not doubt that children and young persons will one day be +again systematically disciplined in self-mortification; that they will +be taught, as in antiquity, to control their appetites, to brave +dangers, and submit voluntarily to pain, as simple exercises in +education. Something has been lost as well as gained by no longer giving +to every citizen the training necessary for a soldier. Nor can any pains +taken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being +useful to others and to the world, by the practice, independently of +reward and of every personal consideration, of positive virtue beyond +the bounds of prescribed duty. No efforts should be spared to associate +the pupil's self-respect, and his desire of the respect of others, with +service rendered to Humanity; when possible, collectively, but at all +events, what is always possible, in the persons of its individual +members. There are many remarks and precepts in M. Comte's volumes, +which, as no less pertinent to our conception of morality than to his, +we fully accept. For example; without admitting that to make "calculs +personnels" is contrary to morality, we agree with him in the opinion, +that the principal hygienic precepts should be inculcated, not solely or +principally as maxims of prudence, but as a matter of duty to others, +since by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering to +our fellow-creatures the services to which they are entitled. As M. +Comte truly says, the prudential motive is by no means fully sufficient +for the purpose, even physicians often disregarding their own precepts. +The personal penalties of neglect of health are commonly distant, as +well as more or less uncertain, and require the additional and more +immediate sanction of moral responsibility. M. Comte, therefore, in this +instance, is, we conceive, right in principle; though we have not the +smallest doubt that he would have gone into extreme exaggeration in +practice, and would have wholly ignored the legitimate liberty of the +individual to judge for himself respecting his own bodily conditions, +with due relation to the sufficiency of his means of knowledge, and +taking the responsibility of the result. + +Connected with the same considerations is another idea of M. Comte, +which has great beauty and grandeur in it, and the realization of which, +within the bounds of possibility, would be a cultivation of the social +feelings on a most essential point. It is, that every person who lives +by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an +individual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary; +and his wages, of whatever sort, as not the remuneration or +purchase-money of his labour, which should be given freely, but as the +provision made by society to enable him to carry it on, and to replace +the materials and products which have been consumed in the process. M. +Comte observes, that in modern industry every one in fact works much +more for others than for himself, since his productions are to be +consumed by others, and it is only necessary that his thoughts and +imagination should adapt themselves to the real state of the fact. The +practical problem, however, is not quite so simple, for a strong sense +that he is working for others may lead to nothing better than feeling +himself necessary to them, and instead of freely giving his commodity, +may only encourage him to put a high price upon it. What M. Comte really +means is that we should regard working for the benefit of others as a +good in itself; that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for +the sake of remuneration, which cannot justly be claimed for doing what +we like: that the proper return for a service to society is the +gratitude of society: and that the moral claim of any one in regard to +the provision for his personal wants, is not a question of _quid pro +quo_ in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the circumstances +of society permit to be assigned to him, consistently with the just +claims of others. To this opinion we entirely subscribe. The rough +method of settling the labourer's share of the produce, the competition +of the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a +moral ideal. Its defence is, that civilization has not hitherto been +equal to organizing anything better than this first rude approach to an +equitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the present go less wrong +by leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it artificially +in any mode which has yet been tried. But in whatever manner that +question may ultimately be decided, the true moral and social idea of +Labour is in no way affected by it. Until labourers and employers +perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform +that of an army, industry will never be moralized, and military life +will remain, what, in spite of the anti-social character of its direct +object, it has hitherto been--the chief school of moral co-operation. + +Thus far of the general idea of M. Comte's ethics and religion. We must +now say something of the details. Here we approach the ludicrous side of +the subject: but we shall unfortunately have to relate other things far +more really ridiculous. + +There cannot be a religion without a _cultus._ We use this term for want +of any other, for its nearest equivalent, worship, suggests a different +order of ideas. We mean by it, a set of systematic observances, intended +to cultivate and maintain the religious sentiment. Though M. Comte +justly appreciates the superior efficacy of acts, in keeping up and +strengthening the feeling which prompts them, over any mode whatever of +mere expression, he takes pains to organize the latter also with great +minuteness. He provides an equivalent both for the private devotions, +and for the public ceremonies, of other faiths. The reader will be +surprised to learn, that the former consists of prayer. But prayer, as +understood by M. Comte, does not mean asking; it is a mere outpouring of +feeling; and for this view of it he claims the authority of the +Christian mystics. It is not to be addressed to the Grand Etre, to +collective Humanity; though he occasionally carries metaphor so far as +to style this a goddess. The honours to collective Humanity are reserved +for the public celebrations. Private adoration is to be addressed to it +in the persons of worthy individual representatives, who may be either +living or dead, but must in all cases be women; for women, being the +_sexe aimant_, represent the best attribute of humanity, that which +ought to regulate all human life, nor can Humanity possibly be +symbolized in any form but that of a woman. The objects of private +adoration are the mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing +severally the past, the present, and the future, and calling into active +exercise the three social sentiments, veneration, attachment, and +kindness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian +angels, "les vrais anges gardiens." If the last two have never existed, +or if, in the particular case, any of the three types is too faulty for +the office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by some other +type of womanly excellence, even by one merely historical. Be the object +living or dead, the adoration (as we understand it) is to be addressed +only to the idea. The prayer consists of two parts; a commemoration, +followed by an effusion. By a commemoration M. Comte means an effort of +memory and imagination, summoning up with the utmost possible vividness +the image of the object: and every artifice is exhausted to render the +image as life-like, as close to the reality, as near an approach to +actual hallucination, as is consistent with sanity. This degree of +intensity having been, as far as practicable, attained, the effusion +follows. Every person should compose his own form of prayer, which +should be repeated not mentally only, but orally, and may be added +to or varied for sufficient cause, but never arbitrarily. It may be +interspersed with passages from the best poets, when they present +themselves spontaneously, as giving a felicitous expression to the +adorer's own feeling. These observances M. Comte practised to the memory +of his Clotilde, and he enjoins them on all true believers. They are to +occupy two hours of every day, divided into three parts; at rising, in +the middle of the working hours, and in bed at night. The first, which +should be in a kneeling attitude, will commonly be the longest, and the +second the shortest. The third is to be extended as nearly as possible +to the moment of falling asleep, that its effect may be felt in +disciplining even the dreams. + +The public _cultus_ consists of a series of celebrations or festivals, +eighty-four in the year, so arranged that at least one occurs in every +week. They are devoted to the successive glorification of Humanity +itself; of the various ties, political and domestic, among mankind; of +the successive stages in the past evolution of our species; and of the +several classes into which M. Comte's polity divides mankind. M. Comte's +religion has, moreover, nine Sacraments; consisting in the solemn +consecration, by the priests of Humanity, with appropriate exhortations, +of all the great transitions in life; the entry into life itself, and +into each of its successive stages: education, marriage, the choice of a +profession, and so forth. Among these is death, which receives the name +of transformation, and is considered as a passage from objective +existence to subjective--to living in the memory of our +fellow-creatures. Having no eternity of objective existence to offer, +M. Comte's religion gives it all he can, by holding out the hope of +subjective immortality--of existing in the remembrance and in the +posthumous adoration of mankind at large, if we have done anything to +deserve remembrance from them; at all events, of those whom we loved +during life; and when they too are gone, of being included in the +collective adoration paid to the Grand Etre. People are to be taught to +look forward to this as a sufficient recompense for the devotion of a +whole life to the service of Humanity. Seven years after death, comes +the last Sacrament: a public judgment, by the priesthood, on the memory +of the defunct. This is not designed for purposes of reprobation, but of +honour, and any one may, by declaration during life, exempt himself from +it. If judged, and found worthy, he is solemnly incorporated with the +Grand Etre, and his remains are transferred from the civil to the +religious place of sepulture: "le bois sacre" qui doit entourer chaque +temple de l'Humanite." + +This brief abstract gives no idea of the minuteness of M. Comte's +prescriptions, and the extraordinary height to which he carries the +mania for regulation by which Frenchmen are distinguished among +Europeans, and M. Comte among Frenchmen. It is this which throws an +irresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject. There is nothing +really ridiculous in the devotional practices which M. Comte recommends +towards a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come +unprompted from the depths of the individual feeling; but there is +something ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practise +them three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his +feelings require them, but for the premeditated, purpose of getting his +feelings up. The ludicrous, however, in any of its shapes, is a +phaenomenon with which M. Comte seems to have been totally unacquainted. +There is nothing in his writings from which it could be inferred that he +knew of the existence of such things as wit and humour. The only writer +distinguished for either, of whom he shows any admiration, is Moliere, +and him he admires not for his wit but for his wisdom. We notice this +without intending any reflection on M. Comte; for a profound conviction +raises a person above the feeling of ridicule. But there are passages in +his writings which, it really seems to us, could have been written by no +man who had ever laughed. We will give one of these instances. Besides +the regular prayers, M. Comte's religion, like the Catholic, has need of +forms which can be applied to casual and unforeseen occasions. These, he +says, must in general be left to the believer's own choice; but he +suggests as a very suitable one the repetition of "the fundamental +formula of Positivism," viz., "l'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base, +et le progres pour but." Not content, however, with an equivalent for +the Paters and Aves of Catholicism, he must have one for the sign of the +cross also; and he thus delivers himself:[23] "Cette expansion peut etre +perfectionnee par des signes universels.... Afin de mieux developper +l'aptitude necessaire de la formule positiviste a representer toujours +la condition humaine, il convient ordinairement de l'enoncer en touchant +successivement les principaux organes que la theorie cerebrale assigne a +ses trois elements." This _may_ be a very appropriate mode of expressing +one's devotion to the Grand Etre: but any one who had appreciated its +effect on the profane reader, would have thought it judicious to keep it +back till a considerably more advanced stage in the propagation of the +Positive Religion. + +As M. Comte's religion has a _cultus_, so also it has a clergy, who are +the pivot of his entire social and political system. Their nature and +office will be best shown by describing his ideal of political society +in its normal state, with the various classes of which it is composed. + +The necessity of a Spiritual Power, distinct and separate from the +temporal government, is the essential principle of M. Comte's political +scheme; as it may well be, since the Spiritual Power is the only +counterpoise he provides or tolerates, to the absolute dominion of the +civil rulers. Nothing can exceed his combined detestation and contempt +for government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative +institutions in any form. They are an expedient, in his opinion, only +suited to a state of transition, and even that nowhere but in England. +The attempt to naturalize them in France, or any Continental nation, he +regards as mischievous quackery. Louis Napoleon's usurpation is +absolved, is made laudable to him, because it overthrew a representative +government. Election of superiors by inferiors, except as a +revolutionary expedient, is an abomination in his sight. Public +functionaries of all kinds should name their successors, subject to the +approbation of their own superiors, and giving public notice of the +nomination so long beforehand as to admit of discussion, and the timely +revocation of a wrong choice. But, by the side of the temporal rulers, +he places another authority, with no power to command, but only to +advise and remonstrate. The family being, in his mind as in that of +Frenchmen generally, the foundation and essential type of all society, +the separation of the two powers commences there. The spiritual, or +moral and religious power, in a family, is the women of it. The +positivist family is composed of the "fundamental couple," their +children, and the parents of the man, if alive. The whole government of +the household, except as regards the education of the children, resides +in the man; and even over that he has complete power, but should forbear +to exert it. The part assigned to the women is to improve the man +through his affections, and to bring up the children, who, until the age +of fourteen, at which scientific instruction begins, are to be educated +wholly by their mother. That women may be better fitted for these +functions, they are peremptorily excluded from all others. No woman is +to work for her living. Every woman is to be supported by her husband or +her male relations, and if she has none of these, by the State. She is +to have no powers of government, even domestic, and no property. Her +legal rights of inheritance are preserved to her, that her feelings of +duty may make her voluntarily forego them. There are to be no marriage +portions, that women may no longer be sought in marriage from interested +motives. Marriages are to be rigidly indissoluble, except for a single +cause. It is remarkable that the bitterest enemy of divorce among all +philosophers, nevertheless allows it, in a case which the laws of +England, and of other countries reproached by him with tolerating +divorce, do not admit: namely, when one of the parties has been +sentenced to an infamizing punishment, involving loss of civil rights. +It is monstrous that condemnation, even for life, to a felon's +punishment, should leave an unhappy victim bound to, and in the wife's +case under the legal authority of, the culprit. M. Comte could feel for +the injustice in this special case, because it chanced to be the +unfortunate situation of his Clotilde. Minor degrees of unworthiness may +entitle the innocent party to a legal separation, but without the power +of re-marriage. Second marriages, indeed, are not permitted by the +Positive Religion. There is to be no impediment to them by law, but +morality is to condemn them, and every couple who are married +religiously as well as civilly are to make a vow of eternal widowhood, +"le veuvage eternel." This absolute monogamy is, in M. Comte's opinion, +essential to the complete fusion between two beings, which is the +essence of marriage; and moreover, eternal constancy is required by the +posthumous adoration, which is to be continuously paid by the survivor +to one who, though objectively dead, still lives "subjectively." The +domestic spiritual power, which resides in the women of the family, is +chiefly concentrated in the most venerable of them, the husband's +mother, while alive. It has an auxiliary in the influence of age, +represented by the husband's father, who is supposed to have passed the +period of retirement from active life, fixed by M. Comte (for he fixes +everything) at sixty-three; at which age the head of the family gives up +the reins of authority to his son, retaining only a consultative voice. + +This domestic Spiritual Power, being principally moral, and confined to +a private life, requires the support and guidance of an intellectual +power exterior to it, the sphere of which will naturally be wider, +extending also to public life. This consists of the clergy, or +priesthood, for M. Comte is fond of borrowing the consecrated +expressions of Catholicism to denote the nearest equivalents which his +own system affords. The clergy are the theoretic or philosophical class, +and are supported by an endowment from the State, voted periodically, +but administered by themselves. Like women, they are to be excluded from +all riches, and from all participation in power (except the absolute +power of each over his own household). They are neither to inherit, nor +to receive emolument from any of their functions, or from their writings +or teachings of any description, but are to live solely on their small +salaries. This M. Comte deems necessary to the complete +disinterestedness of their counsel. To have the confidence of the +masses, they must, like the masses, be poor. Their exclusion from +political and from all other practical occupations is indispensable for +the same reason, and for others equally peremptory. Those occupations +are, he contends, incompatible with the habits of mind necessary to +philosophers. A practical position, either private or public, chains the +mind to specialities and details, while a philosopher's business is with +general truths and connected views (vues d'ensemble). These, again, +require an habitual abstraction from details, which unfits the mind for +judging well and rapidly of individual cases. The same person cannot be +both a good theorist and a good practitioner or ruler, though +practitioners and rulers ought to have a solid theoretic education. The +two kinds of function must be absolutely exclusive of one another: to +attempt them both, is inconsistent with fitness for either. But as men +may mistake their vocation, up to the age of thirty-five they are +allowed to change their career. + +To the clergy is entrusted the theoretic or scientific instruction of +youth. The medical art also is to be in their hands, since no one is fit +to be a physician who does not study and understand the whole man, moral +as well as physical. M. Comte has a contemptuous opinion of the existing +race of physicians, who, he says, deserve no higher name than that of +veterinaires, since they concern themselves with man only in his animal, +and not in his human character. In his last years, M. Comte (as we learn +from Dr Robinet's volume) indulged in the wildest speculations on +medical science, declaring all maladies to be one and the same disease, +the disturbance or destruction of "l'unite cerebrale." The other +functions of the clergy are moral, much more than intellectual. They are +the spiritual directors, and venerated advisers, of the active or +practical classes, including the political. They are the mediators in +all social differences; between the labourers, for instance, and their +employers. They are to advise and admonish on all important violations +of the moral law. Especially, it devolves on them to keep the rich and +powerful to the performance of their moral duties towards their +inferiors. If private remonstrance fails, public denunciation is to +follow: in extreme cases they may proceed to the length of +excommunication, which, though it only operates through opinion, yet if +it carries opinion with it, may, as M. Comte complacently observes, be +of such powerful efficacy, that the richest man may be driven to produce +his subsistence by his own manual labour, through the impossibility of +inducing any other person to work for him. In this as in all other +cases, the priesthood depends for its authority on carrying with it the +mass of the people--those who, possessing no accumulations, live on the +wages of daily labour; popularly but incorrectly termed the working +classes, and by French writers, in their Roman law phraseology, +proletaires. These, therefore, who are not allowed the smallest +political rights, are incorporated into the Spiritual Power, of which +they form, after women and the clergy, the third element. + +It remains to give an account of the Temporal Power, composed of the +rich and the employers of labour, two classes who in M. Comte's system +are reduced to one, for he allows of no idle rich. A life made up of +mere amusement and self-indulgence, though not interdicted by law, is to +be deemed so disgraceful, that nobody with the smallest sense of shame +would choose to be guilty of it. Here, we think, M. Comte has lighted on +a true principle, towards which the tone of opinion in modern Europe is +more and more tending, and which is destined to be one of the +constitutive principles of regenerated society. We believe, for example, +with him, that in the future there will be no class of landlords living +at ease on their rents, but every landlord will be a capitalist trained +to agriculture, himself superintending and directing the cultivation of +his estate. No one but he who guides the work, should have the control +of the tools. In M. Comte's system, the rich, as a rule, consist of the +"captains of industry:" but the rule is not entirely without exception, +for M. Comte recognizes other useful modes of employing riches. In +particular, one of his favourite ideas is that of an order of Chivalry, +composed of the most generous and self-devoted of the rich, voluntarily +dedicating themselves, like knights-errant of old, to the redressing of +wrongs, and the protection of the weak and oppressed. He remarks, that +oppression, in modern life, can seldom reach, or even venture to attack, +the life or liberty of its victims (he forgets the case of domestic +tyranny), but only their pecuniary means, and it is therefore by the +purse chiefly that individuals can usefully interpose, as they formerly +did by the sword. The occupation, however, of nearly all the rich, will +be the direction of labour, and for this work they will be educated. +Reciprocally, it is in M. Comte's opinion essential, that all directors +of labour should be rich. Capital (in which he includes land) should be +concentrated in a few holders, so that every capitalist may conduct the +most extensive operations which one mind is capable of superintending. +This is not only demanded by good economy, in order to take the utmost +advantage of a rare kind of practical ability, but it necessarily +follows from the principle of M. Comte's scheme, which regards a +capitalist as a public functionary. M. Comte's conception of the +relation of capital to society is essentially that of Socialists, but he +would bring about by education and opinion, what they aim at effecting +by positive institution. The owner of capital is by no means to consider +himself its absolute proprietor. Legally he is not to be controlled in +his dealings with it, for power should be in proportion to +responsibility: but it does not belong to him for his own use; he is +merely entrusted by society with a portion of the accumulations made by +the past providence of mankind, to be administered for the benefit of +the present generation and of posterity, under the obligation of +preserving them unimpaired, and handing them down, more or less +augmented, to our successors. He is not entitled to dissipate them, or +divert them from the service of Humanity to his own pleasures. Nor has +he a moral right to consume on himself the whole even of his profits. He +is bound in conscience, if they exceed his reasonable wants, to employ +the surplus in improving either the efficiency of his operations, or the +physical and mental condition of his labourers. The portion of his gains +which he may appropriate to his own use, must be decided by himself, +under accountability to opinion; and opinion ought not to look very +narrowly into the matter, nor hold him to a rigid reckoning for any +moderate indulgence of luxury or ostentation; since under the great +responsibilities that will be imposed on him, the position of an +employer of labour will be so much less desirable, to any one in whom +the instincts of pride and vanity are not strong, than the "heureuse +insouciance" of a labourer, that those instincts must be to a certain +degree indulged, or no one would undertake the office. With this +limitation, every employer is a mere administrator of his possessions, +for his work-people and for society at large. If he indulges himself +lavishly, without reserving an ample remuneration for all who are +employed under him, he is morally culpable, and will incur sacerdotal +admonition. This state of things necessarily implies that capital should +be in few hands, because, as M. Comte observes, without great riches, +the obligations which society ought to impose, could not be fulfilled +without an amount of personal abnegation that it would be hopeless to +expect. If a person is conspicuously qualified for the conduct of an +industrial enterprise, but destitute of the fortune necessary for +undertaking it, M. Comte recommends that he should be enriched by +subscription, or, in cases of sufficient importance, by the State. Small +landed proprietors and capitalists, and the middle classes altogether, +he regards as a parasitic growth, destined to disappear, the best of the +body becoming large capitalists, and the remainder proletaires. Society +will consist only of rich and poor, and it will be the business of the +rich to make the best possible lot for the poor. The remuneration of the +labourers will continue, as at present, to be a matter of voluntary +arrangement between them and their employers, the last resort on either +side being refusal of co-operation, "refus de concours," in other words, +a strike or a lock-out; with the sacerdotal order for mediators in case +of need. But though wages are to be an affair of free contract, their +standard is not to be the competition of the market, but the application +of the products in equitable proportion between the wants of the +labourers and the wants and dignity of the employer. As it is one of M. +Comte's principles that a question cannot be usefully proposed without +an attempt at a solution, he gives his ideas from the beginning as to +what the normal income of a labouring family should be. They are on such +a scale, that until some great extension shall have taken place in the +scientific resources of mankind, it is no wonder he thinks it necessary +to limit as much as possible the number of those who are to be supported +by what is left of the produce. In the first place the labourer's +dwelling, which is to consist of seven rooms, is, with all that it +contains, to be his own property: it is the only landed property he is +allowed to possess, but every family should be the absolute owner of all +things which are destined for its exclusive use. Lodging being thus +independently provided for, and education and medical attendance being +secured gratuitously by the general arrangements of society, the pay of +the labourer is to consist of two portions, the one monthly, and of +fixed amount, the other weekly, and proportioned to the produce of his +labour. The former M. Comte fixes at 100 francs (L4) for a month of 28 +days; being L52 a year: and the rate of piece-work should be such as to +make the other part amount to an average of seven francs (5_s_. _6d_.) +per working day. + +Agreeably to M. Comte's rule, that every public functionary should +appoint his successor, the capitalist has unlimited power of +transmitting his capital by gift or bequest, after his own death or +retirement. In general it will be best bestowed entire upon one person, +unless the business will advantageously admit of subdivision. He will +naturally leave it to one or more of his sons, if sufficiently +qualified; and rightly so, hereditary being, in M. Comte's opinion, +preferable to acquired wealth, as being usually more generously +administered. But, merely as his sons, they have no moral right to it. +M. Comte here recognizes another of the principles, on which we believe +that the constitution of regenerated society will rest. He maintains (as +others in the present generation have done) that the father owes nothing +to his son, except a good education, and pecuniary aid sufficient for an +advantageous start in life: that he is entitled, and may be morally +bound, to leave the bulk of his fortune to some other properly selected +person or persons, whom he judges likely to make a more beneficial use +of it. This is the first of three important points, in which M. Comte's +theory of the family, wrong as we deem it in its foundations, is in +advance of prevailing theories and existing institutions. The second is +the re-introduction of adoption, not only in default of children, but to +fulfil the purposes, and satisfy the sympathetic wants, to which such +children as there are may happen to be inadequate. The third is a most +important point--the incorporation of domestics as substantive members +of the family. There is hardly any part of the present constitution of +society more essentially vicious, and morally injurious to both parties, +than the relation between masters and servants. To make this a really +human and a moral relation, is one of the principal desiderata in social +improvement. The feeling of the vulgar of all classes, that domestic +service has anything in it peculiarly mean, is a feeling than which +there is none meaner. In the feudal ages, youthful nobles of the highest +rank thought themselves honoured by officiating in what is now called a +menial capacity, about the persons of superiors of both sexes, for whom +they felt respect: and, as M. Comte observes, there are many families +who can in no other way so usefully serve Humanity, as by ministering to +the bodily wants of other families, called to functions which require +the devotion of all their thoughts. "We will add, by way of supplement +to M. Comte's doctrine, that much of the daily physical work of a +household, even in opulent families, if silly notions of degradation, +common to all ranks, did not interfere, might very advantageously be +performed by the family itself, at least by its younger members; to whom +it would give healthful exercise of the bodily powers, which has now to +be sought in modes far less useful, and also a familiar acquaintance +with the real work of the world, and a moral willingness to take their +share of its burthens, which, in the great majority of the better-off +classes, do not now get cultivated at all. + +We have still to speak of the directly political functions of the rich, +or, as M. Comte terms them, the patriciate. The entire political +government is to be in their hands. First, however, the existing nations +are to be broken up into small republics, the largest not exceeding the +size of Belgium, Portugal, or Tuscany; any larger nationalities being +incompatible with the unity of wants and feelings, which is required, +not only to give due strength to the sentiment of patriotism (always +strongest in small states), but to prevent undue compression; for no +territory, M. Comte thinks, can without oppression be governed from a +distant centre. Algeria, therefore, is to be given up to the Arabs, +Corsica to its inhabitants, and France proper is to be, before the end +of the century, divided into seventeen republics, corresponding to the +number of considerable towns: Paris, however, (need it be said?) +succeeding to Rome as the religious metropolis of the world. Ireland, +Scotland, and Wales, are to be separated from England, which is of +course to detach itself from all its transmarine dependencies. In each +state thus constituted, the powers of government are to be vested in a +triumvirate of the three principal bankers, who are to take the foreign, +home, and financial departments respectively. How they are to conduct +the government and remain bankers, does not clearly appear; but it must +be intended that they should combine both offices, for they are to +receive no pecuniary remuneration for the political one. Their power is +to amount to a dictatorship (M. Comte's own word): and he is hardly +justified in saying that he gives political power to the rich, since he +gives it over the rich and every one else, to three individuals of the +number, not even chosen by the rest, but named by their predecessors. As +a check on the dictators, there is to be complete freedom of speech, +writing, printing, and voluntary association; and all important acts of +the government, except in cases of emergency, are to be announced +sufficiently long beforehand to ensure ample discussion. This, and the +influences of the Spiritual Power, are the only guarantees provided +against misgovernment. When we consider that the complete dominion of +every nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men--for the +Spiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a +single Pontiff for the whole human race--one is appalled at the picture +of entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the +last and highest result of the evolution of Humanity. But the conception +rises to the terrific, when we are told the mode in which the single +High Priest of Humanity is intended to use his authority. It is the most +warning example we know, into what frightful aberrations a powerful and +comprehensive mind may be led by the exclusive following out of a single +idea. + +The single idea of M. Comte, on this subject, is that the intellect +should be wholly subordinated to the feelings; or, to translate the +meaning out of sentimental into logical language, that the exercise of +the intellect, as of all our other faculties, should have for its sole +object the general good. Every other employment of it should be +accounted not only idle and frivolous, but morally culpable. Being +indebted wholly to Humanity for the cultivation to which we owe our +mental powers, we are bound in return to consecrate them wholly to her +service. Having made up his mind that this ought to be, there is with M. +Comte but one step to concluding that the Grand Pontiff of Humanity must +take care that it shall be; and on this foundation he organizes an +elaborate system for the total suppression of all independent thought. +He does not, indeed, invoke the arm of the law, or call for any +prohibitions. The clergy are to have no monopoly. Any one else may +cultivate science if he can, may write and publish if he can find +readers, may give private instruction if anybody consents to receive it. +But since the sacerdotal body will absorb into itself all but those whom +it deems either intellectually or morally unequal to the vocation, all +rival teachers will, as he calculates, be so discredited beforehand, +that their competition will not be formidable. Within the body itself, +the High Priest has it in his power to make sure that there shall be no +opinions, and no exercise of mind, but such as he approves; for he alone +decides the duties and local residence of all its members, and can even +eject them from the body. Before electing to be under this rule, we feel +a natural curiosity to know in what manner it is to be exercised. +Humanity has only yet had one Pontiff, whose mental qualifications for +the post are not likely to be often surpassed, M. Comte himself. It is +of some importance to know what are the ideas of this High Priest, +concerning the moral and religious government of the human intellect. + +One of the doctrines which M. Comte most strenuously enforces in his +later writings is, that during the preliminary evolution of humanity, +terminated by the foundation of Positivism, the free development of our +forces of all kinds was the important matter, but that from this time +forward the principal need is to regulate them. Formerly the danger was +of their being insufficient, but henceforth, of their being abused. Let +us express, in passing, our entire dissent from this doctrine. Whoever +thinks that the wretched education which mankind as yet receive, calls +forth their mental powers (except those of a select few) in a sufficient +or even tolerable degree, must be very easily satisfied: and the abuse +of them, far from becoming proportionally greater as knowledge and +mental capacity increase, becomes rapidly less, provided always that the +diffusion of those qualities keeps pace with their growth. The abuse of +intellectual power is only to be dreaded, when society is divided +between a few highly cultivated intellects and an ignorant and stupid +multitude. But mental power is a thing which M. Comte does not want--or +wants infinitely less than he wants submission and obedience. Of all the +ingredients of human nature, he continually says, the intellect most +needs to be disciplined and reined-in. It is the most turbulent "le plus +perturbateur," of all the mental elements; more so than even the selfish +instincts. Throughout the whole modern transition, beginning with +ancient Greece (for M. Comte tells us that we have always been in a +state of revolutionary transition since then), the intellect has been in +a state of systematic insurrection against "le coeur." The +metaphysicians and literati (lettres), after helping to pull down the +old religion and social order, are rootedly hostile to the construction +of the new, and desiring only to prolong the existing scepticism and +intellectual anarchy, which secure to them a cheap social ascendancy, +without the labour of earning it by solid scientific preparation. The +scientific class, from whom better might have been expected, are, if +possible, worse. Void of enlarged views, despising all that is too large +for their comprehension, devoted exclusively each to his special +science, contemptuously indifferent to moral and political interests, +their sole aim is to acquire an easy reputation, and in France (through +paid Academies and professorships) personal lucre, by pushing their +sciences into idle and useless inquiries (speculations oiseuses), of no +value to the real interests of mankind, and tending to divert the +thoughts from them. One of the duties most incumbent on opinion and on +the Spiritual Power, is to stigmatize as immoral, and effectually +suppress, these useless employments of the speculative faculties. All +exercise of thought should be abstained from, which has not some +beneficial tendency, some actual utility to mankind. M. Comte, of +course, is not the man to say that it must be a merely material utility. +If a speculation, though it has no doctrinal, has a logical value--if it +throws any light on universal Method--it is still more deserving of +cultivation than if its usefulness was merely practical: but, either as +method or as doctrine, it must bring forth fruits to Humanity, otherwise +it is not only contemptible, but criminal. + +That there is a portion of truth at the bottom of all this, we should be +the last to deny. No respect is due to any employment of the intellect +which does not tend to the good of mankind. It is precisely on a level +with any idle amusement, and should be condemned as waste of time, if +carried beyond the limit within which amusement is permissible. And +whoever devotes powers of thought which could render to Humanity +services it urgently needs, to speculations and studies which it could +dispense with, is liable to the discredit attaching to a well-grounded +suspicion of caring little for Humanity. But who can affirm positively +of any speculations, guided by right scientific methods, on subjects +really accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of +being of any use? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use, +and what is destined to be useless. The most that can be said is that +some kinds are of more certain, and above all, of more present utility +than others. How often the most important practical results have been +the remote consequence of studies which no one would have expected to +lead to them! Could the mathematicians, who, in the schools of +Alexandria, investigated the properties of the ellipse, have foreseen +that nearly two thousand years afterwards their speculations would +explain the solar system, and a little later would enable ships safely +to circumnavigate the earth? Even in M. Comte's opinion, it is well for +mankind that, in those early days, knowledge was thought worth pursuing +for its own sake. Nor has the "foundation of Positivism," we imagine, so +far changed the conditions of human existence, that it should now be +criminal to acquire, by observation and reasoning, a knowledge of the +facts of the universe, leaving to posterity to find a use for it. Even +in the last two or three years, has not the discovery of new metals, +which may prove important even in the practical arts, arisen from one of +the investigations which M. Comte most unequivocally condemns as idle, +the research into the internal constitution of the sun? How few, +moreover, of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world, +either were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming +directly at the object! Would the mariner's compass ever have been found +by direct efforts for the improvement of navigation? Should we have +reached the electric telegraph by any amount of striving for a means of +instantaneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity +with lightning, and Ampere with magnetism? The most apparently +insignificant archaeological or geological fact, is often found to throw +a light on human history, which M. Comte, the basis of whose social +philosophy is history, should be the last person to disparage. The +direction of the entrance to the three great Pyramids of Ghizeh, by +showing the position of the circumpolar stars at the time when they were +built, is the best evidence we even now have of the immense antiquity of +Egyptian civilization.[24] The one point on which M. Comte's doctrine +has some colour of reason, is the case of sidereal astronomy: so little +knowledge of it being really accessible to us, and the connexion of that +little with any terrestrial interests being, according to all our means +of judgment, infinitesimal. It is certainly difficult to imagine how any +considerable benefit to humanity can be derived from a knowledge of the +motions of the double stars: should these ever become important to us it +will be in so prodigiously remote an age, that we can afford to remain +ignorant of them until, at least, all our moral, political, and social +difficulties have been settled. Yet the discovery that gravitation +extends even to those remote regions, gives some additional strength to +the conviction of the universality of natural laws; and the habitual +meditation on such vast objects and distances is not without an +aesthetic usefulness, by kindling and exalting the imagination, the +worth of which in itself, and even its re-action on the intellect, M. +Comte is quite capable of appreciating. He would reply, however, that +there are better means of accomplishing these purposes. In the same +spirit he condemns the study even of the solar system, when extended to +any planets but those which are visible to the naked eye, and which +alone exert an appreciable gravitative influence on the earth. Even the +perturbations he thinks it idle to study, beyond a mere general +conception of them, and thinks that astronomy may well limit its domain +to the motions and mutual action of the earth, sun, and moon. He looks +for a similar expurgation of all the other sciences. In one passage he +expressly says that the greater part of the researches which are really +accessible to us are idle and useless. He would pare down the dimensions +of all the sciences as narrowly as possible. He is continually repeating +that no science, as an abstract study, should be carried further than is +necessary to lay the foundation for the science next above it, and so +ultimately for moral science, the principal purpose of them all. Any +further extension of the mathematical and physical sciences should be +merely "episodic;" limited to what may from time to time be demanded by +the requirements of industry and the arts; and should be left to the +industrial classes, except when they find it necessary to apply to the +sacerdotal order for some additional development of scientific theory. +This, he evidently thinks, would be a rare contingency, most physical +truths sufficiently concrete and real for practice being empirical. +Accordingly in estimating the number of clergy necessary for France, +Europe, and our entire planet (for his forethought extends thus far), +he proportions it solely to their moral and religious attributions +(overlooking, by the way, even their medical); and leaves nobody with +any time to cultivate the sciences, except abortive candidates for the +priestly office, who having been refused admittance into it for +insufficiency in moral excellence or in strength of character, may be +thought worth retaining as "pensioners" of the sacerdotal order, on +account of their theoretic abilities. + +It is no exaggeration to say, that M. Comte gradually acquired a real +hatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits, and was bent +on retaining no more of them than was strictly indispensable. The +greatest of his anxieties is lest people should reason, and seek to +know, more than enough. He regards all abstraction and all reasoning as +morally dangerous, by developing an inordinate pride (orgueil), and +still more, by producing dryness (scheresse). Abstract thought, he says, +is not a wholesome occupation for more than a small number of human +beings, nor of them for more than a small part of their time. Art, which +calls the emotions into play along with and more than the reason, is the +only intellectual exercise really adapted to human nature. It is +nevertheless indispensable that the chief theories of the various +abstract sciences, together with the modes in which those theories were +historically and logically arrived at, should form a part of universal +education: for, first, it is only thus that the methods can be learnt, +by which to attain the results sought by the moral and social sciences: +though we cannot perceive that M. Comte got at his own moral and social +results by those processes. Secondly, the principal truths of the +subordinate sciences are necessary to the systematization (still +systematization!) of our conceptions, by binding together our notions of +the world in a set of propositions, which are coherent, and are a +sufficiently correct representation of fact for our practical wants. +Thirdly, a familiar knowledge of the invariable laws of natural +phaenomena is a great elementary lesson of submission, which, he is +never weary of saying, is the first condition both of morality and of +happiness. For these reasons, he would cause to be taught, from the age +of fourteen to that of twenty-one, to all persons, rich and poor, girls +or youths, a knowledge of the whole series of abstract sciences, such as +none but the most highly instructed persons now possess, and of a far +more systematic and philosophical character than is usually possessed +even by them. (N.B.--They are to learn, during the same years, Greek and +Latin, having previously, between the ages of seven and fourteen, learnt +the five principal modern languages, to the degree necessary for +reading, with due appreciation, the chief poetical compositions in +each.) But they are to be taught all this, not only without encouraging, +but stifling as much as possible, the examining and questioning spirit. +The disposition which should be encouraged is that of receiving all on +the authority of the teacher. The Positivist faith, even in its +scientific part, is _la foi demontrable_, but ought by no means to be +_la foi toujours demontree_. The pupils have no business to be +over-solicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the +proofs to them in a complete form, or as proofs. The object of +instruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves, +perceive their mutual connexion, and form by means of them a consistent +and _systematized_ conception of nature. As for the demonstrations, it +is rather desirable than otherwise that even theorists should forget +them, retaining only the results. Among all the aberrations of +scientific men, M. Comte thinks none greater than the pedantic anxiety +they show for complete proof, and perfect rationalization of scientific +processes. It ought to be enough that the doctrines afford an +explanation of phaenomena, consistent with itself and with known facts, +and that the processes are justified by their fruits. This over-anxiety +for proof, he complains, is breaking down, by vain scruples, the +knowledge which seemed to have been attained; witness the present state +of chemistry. The demand of proof for what has been accepted by +Humanity, is itself a mark of "distrust, if not hostility, to the +sacerdotal order" (the naivete of this would be charming, if it were not +deplorable), and is a revolt against the traditions of the human race. +So early had the new High Priest adopted the feelings and taken up the +inheritance of the old. One of his favourite aphorisms is the strange +one, that the living are more and more governed by the dead. As is not +uncommon with him, he introduces the dictum in one sense, and uses it in +another. What he at first means by it, is that as civilization advances, +the sum of our possessions, physical and intellectual, is due in a +decreasing proportion to ourselves, and in an increasing one to our +progenitors. The use he makes of it is, that we should submit ourselves +more and more implicitly to the authority of previous generations, and +suffer ourselves less and less to doubt their judgment, or test by our +own reason the grounds of their opinions. The unwillingness of the human +intellect and conscience, in their present state of "anarchy," to sign +their own abdication, lie calls "the insurrection of the living against +the dead." To this complexion has Positive Philosophy come at last! + +Worse, however, remains to be told. M. Comte selects a hundred volumes +of science, philosophy, poetry, history, and general knowledge, which he +deems a sufficient library for every positivist, even of the theoretic +order, and actually proposes a systematic holocaust of books in +general--it would almost seem of all books except these. Even that to +which he shows most indulgence, poetry, except the very best, is to +undergo a similar fate, with the reservation of select passages, on the +ground that, poetry being intended to cultivate our instinct of ideal +perfection, any kind of it that is less than the best is worse than +none. This imitation of the error, we will call it the crime, of the +early Christians--and in an exaggerated form, for even they destroyed +only those writings of pagans or heretics which were directed against +themselves--is the one thing in M. Comte's projects which merits real +indignation. When once M. Comte has decided, all evidence on the other +side, nay, the very historical evidence on which he grounded his +decision, had better perish. When mankind have enlisted under his +banner, they must burn their ships. There is, though in a less offensive +form, the same overweening presumption in a suggestion he makes, that +all species of animals and plants which are useless to man should be +systematically rooted out. As if any one could presume to assert that +the smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some +property serviceable to man. When we consider that the united power of +the whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated--that +what is once done, in the extirpation of races, can never be repaired; +one can only be thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of +mankind have to answer for, they have never come up to the measure of +the great regenerator of Humanity; mankind have not yet been under the +rule of one who assumes that he knows all there is to be known, and that +when he has put himself at the head of humanity, the book of human +knowledge may be closed. + +Of course M. Comte does not make this assumption consistently. He does +not imagine that he actually possesses all knowledge, but only that he +is an infallible judge what knowledge is worth possessing. He does not +believe that mankind have reached in all directions the extreme limits +of useful and laudable scientific inquiry. He thinks there is a large +scope for it still, in adding to our power over the external world, but +chiefly in perfecting our own physical, intellectual, and moral nature. +He holds that all our mental strength should be economized, for the +pursuit of this object in the mode leading most directly to the end. +With this view, some one problem should always be selected, the solution +of which would be more important than any other to the interests of +humanity, and upon this the entire intellectual resources of the +theoretic mind should be concentrated, until it is either resolved, or +has to be given up as insoluble: after which mankind should go on to +another, to be pursued with similar exclusiveness. The selection of this +problem of course rests with the sacerdotal order, or in other words, +with the High Priest. We should then see the whole speculative intellect +of the human race simultaneously at work on one question, by orders from +above, as a French minister of public instruction once boasted that a +million of boys were saying the same lesson during the same half-hour in +every town and village of France. The reader will be anxious to know, +how much better and more wisely the human intellect will be applied +under this absolute monarchy, and to what degree this system of +government will be preferable to the present anarchy, in which every +theorist does what is intellectually right in his own eyes. M. Comte has +not left us in ignorance on this point. He gives us ample means of +judging. The Pontiff of Positivism informs us what problem, in his +opinion, should be selected before all others for this united pursuit. + +What this problem is, we must leave those who are curious on the subject +to learn from the treatise itself. When they have done so, they will be +qualified to form their own opinion of the amount of advantage which the +general good of mankind would be likely to derive, from exchanging the +present "dispersive speciality" and "intellectual anarchy" for the +subordination of the intellect to the _coeur_, personified in a High +Priest, prescribing a single problem for the undivided study of the +theoretic mind. + +We have given a sufficient general idea of M. Comte's plan for the +regeneration of human society, by putting an end to anarchy, and +"systematizing" human thought and conduct under the direction of +feeling. But an adequate conception will not have been formed of the +height of his self-confidence, until something more has been told. Be it +known, then, that M. Comte by no means proposes this new constitution of +society for realization in the remote future. A complete plan of +measures of transition is ready prepared, and he determines the year, +before the end of the present century, in which the new spiritual and +temporal powers will be installed, and the regime of our maturity will +begin. He did not indeed calculate on converting to Positivism, within +that time, more than a thousandth part of all the heads of families in +Western Europe and its offshoots beyond the Atlantic. But he fixes the +time necessary for the complete political establishment of Positivism at +thirty-three years, divided into three periods, of seven, five, and +twenty-one years respectively. At the expiration of seven, the direction +of public education in France would be placed in M. Comte's hands. In +five years more, the Emperor Napoleon, or his successor, will resign his +power to a provisional triumvirate, composed of three eminent +proletaires of the positivist faith; for proletaires, though not fit for +permanent rule, are the best agents of the transition, being the most +free from the prejudices which are the chief obstacle to it. These +rulers will employ the remaining twenty-one years in preparing society +for its final constitution; and after duly installing the Spiritual +Power, and effecting the decomposition of France into the seventeen +republics before mentioned, will give over the temporal government of +each to the normal dictatorship of the three bankers. A man may be +deemed happy, but scarcely modest, who had such boundless confidence in +his own powers of foresight, and expected so complete a triumph of his +own ideas on the reconstitution of society within the possible limits of +his lifetime. If he could live (he said) to the age of Pontenelle, or of +Hobbes, or even of Voltaire, he should see all this realized, or as good +as realized. He died, however, at sixty, without leaving any disciple +sufficiently advanced to be appointed his successor. There is now a +College, and a Director, of Positivism; but Humanity no longer possesses +a High Priest. + +What more remains to be said may be despatched more summarily. Its +interest is philosophic rather than practical. In his four volumes of +"Politique Positive," M. Comte revises and reelaborates the scientific +and historical expositions of his first treatise. His object is to +systematize (again to systematize) knowledge from the human or +subjective point of view, the only one, he contends, from which a real +synthesis is possible. For (he says) the knowledge attainable by us of +the laws of the universe is at best fragmentary, and incapable of +reduction to a real unity. An objective synthesis, the dream of +Descartes and the best thinkers of old, is impossible. The laws of the +real world are too numerous, and the manner of their working into one +another too intricate, to be, as a general rule, correctly traced and +represented by our reason. The only connecting principle in our +knowledge is its relation to our wants, and it is upon that we must +found our systematization. The answer to this is, first, that there is +no necessity for an universal synthesis; and secondly, that the same +arguments may be used against the possibility of a complete subjective, +as of a complete objective systematization. A subjective synthesis must +consist in the arrangement and co-ordination of all useful knowledge, on +the basis of its relation to human wants and interests. But those wants +and interests are, like the laws of the universe, extremely +multifarious, and the order of preference among them in all their +different gradations (for it varies according to the degree of each) +cannot be cast into precise general propositions. M. Comte's subjective +synthesis consists only in eliminating from the sciences everything that +he deems useless, and presenting as far as possible every theoretical +investigation as the solution of a practical problem. To this, however, +he cannot consistently adhere; for, in every science, the theoretic +truths are much more closely connected with one another than with the +human purposes which they eventually serve, and can only be made to +cohere in the intellect by being, to a great degree, presented as if +they were truths of pure reason, irrespective of any practical +application. + +There are many things eminently characteristic of M. Comte's second +career, in this revision of the results of his first. Under the head of +Biology, and for the better combination of that science with Sociology +and Ethics, he found that he required a new system of Phrenology, being +justly dissatisfied with that of Gall and his successors. Accordingly he +set about constructing one _e priori_, grounded on the best enumeration +and classification he could make of the elementary faculties of our +intellectual, moral, and animal nature; to each of which he assigned an +hypothetical place in the skull, the most conformable that he could to +the few positive facts on the subject which he considered as +established, and to the general presumption that functions which react +strongly on one another must have their organs adjacent: leaving the +localities avowedly to be hereafter verified, by anatomical and +inductive investigation. There is considerable merit in this attempt, +though it is liable to obvious criticisms, of the same nature as his own +upon Gall. But the characteristic thing is, that while presenting all +this as hypothesis waiting for verification, he could not have taken its +truth more completely for granted if the verification had been made. In +all that he afterwards wrote, every detail of his theory of the brain is +as unhesitatingly asserted, and as confidently built upon, as any other +doctrine of science. This is his first great attempt in the "Subjective +Method," which, originally meaning only the subordination of the pursuit +of truth to human uses, had already come to mean drawing truth itself +from the fountain of his own mind. He had become, on the one hand, +almost indifferent to proof, provided he attained theoretic coherency, +and on the other, serenely confident that even the guesses which +originated with himself could not but come out true. + +There is one point in his later view of the sciences, which appears to +us a decided improvement on his earlier. He adds to the six fundamental +sciences of his original scale, a seventh under the name of Morals, +forming the highest step of the ladder, immediately after Sociology: +remarking that it might, with still greater propriety, be termed +Anthropology, being the science of individual human nature, a study, +when rightly understood, more special and complicated than even that of +Society. For it is obliged to take into consideration the diversities of +constitution and temperament (la reaction cerebrale des visceres +vegetatifs) the effects of which, still very imperfectly understood, are +highly important in the individual, but in the theory of society may be +neglected, because, differing in different persons, they neutralize one +another on the large scale. This is a remark worthy of M. Comte in his +best days; and the science thus conceived is, as he says, the true +scientific foundation of the art of Morals (and indeed of the art of +human life), which, therefore, may, both philosophically and +didactically, be properly combined with it. + +His philosophy of general history is recast, and in many respects +changed; we cannot but say, greatly for the worse. He gives much greater +development than before to the Fetishistic, and to what he terms the +Theocratic, periods. To the Fetishistic view of nature he evinces a +partiality, which appears strange in a Positive philosopher. But the +reason is that Fetish-worship is a religion of the feelings, and not at +all of the intelligence. He regards it as cultivating universal love: as +a practical fact it cultivates much rather universal fear. He looks upon +Fetishism as much more akin to Positivism than any of the forms of +Theology, inasmuch as these consider matter as inert, and moved only by +forces, natural and supernatural, exterior to itself: while Fetishism +resembles Positivism in conceiving matter as spontaneously active, and +errs only by not distinguishing activity from life. As if the +superstition of the Fetishist consisted only in believing that the +objects which produce the phaenomena of nature involuntarily, produce +them voluntarily. The Fetishist thinks not merely that his Fetish is +alive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can +grant him prosperity, or afflict him with all the contrary evils. +Therein consists the lamentable effect of Fetishism--its degrading and +prostrating influence on the feelings and conduct, its conflict with all +genuine experience, and antagonism to all real knowledge of nature. + +M. Comte had also no small sympathy with the Oriental theocracies, as he +calls the sacerdotal castes, who indeed often deserved it by their early +services to intellect and civilization; by the aid they gave to the +establishment of regular government, the valuable though empirical +knowledge they accumulated, and the height to which they helped to carry +some of the useful arts. M. Comte admits that they became oppressive, +and that the prolongation of their ascendancy came to be incompatible +with further improvement. But he ascribes this to their having arrogated +to themselves the temporal government, which, so far as we have any +authentic information, they never did. The reason why the sacerdotal +corporations became oppressive, was because they were organized: because +they attempted the "unity" and "systematization" so dear to M. Comte, +and allowed no science and no speculation, except with their leave and +under their direction. M. Comte's sacerdotal order, which, in his +system, has all the power that ever they had, would be oppressive in the +same manner; with no variation but that which arises from the altered +state of society and of the human mind. + +M. Comte's partiality to the theocracies is strikingly contrasted with +his dislike of the Greeks, whom as a people he thoroughly detests, for +their undue addiction to intellectual speculation, and considers to have +been, by an inevitable fatality, morally sacrificed to the formation of +a few great scientific intellects,--principally Aristotle, Archimedes, +Apollonius, and Hipparchus. Any one who knows Grecian history as it can +now be known, will be amazed at M. Comte's travestie of it, in which the +vulgarest historical prejudices are accepted and exaggerated, to +illustrate the mischiefs of intellectual culture left to its own +guidance. + +There is no need to analyze further M. Comte's second view of universal +history. The best chapter is that on the Romans, to whom, because they +were greater in practice than in theory, and for centuries worked +together in obedience to a social sentiment (though only that of their +country's aggrandizement), M. Comte is as favourably affected, as he is +inimical to all but a small selection of eminent thinkers among the +Greeks. The greatest blemish in this chapter is the idolatry of Julius +Caesar, whom M. Comte regards as one of the most illustrious characters +in history, and of the greatest practical benefactors of mankind. Caesar +had many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we +are at a loss to discover, except subverting a free government: that +merit, however, with M. Comte, goes a great way. It did not, in his +former days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he +regarded with a bitterness highly honourable to himself, and whose +career he deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But +in his later writings these sentiments are considerably mitigated: he +regards Napoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe, and +thinks that his greatest error was re-establishing the Academy of +Sciences! That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon, +measures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen. + +The last volume which he published, that on the Philosophy of +Mathematics, is in some respects a still sadder picture of intellectual +degeneracy than those which preceded it. After the admirable resume of +the subject in the first volume of his first great work, we expected +something of the very highest order when he returned to the subject for +a more thorough treatment of it. But, being the commencement of a +Synthese Subjective, it contains, as might be expected, a great deal +that is much more subjective than mathematical. Nor of this do we +complain: but we little imagined of what nature this subjective matter +was to be. M. Comte here joins together the two ideas, which, of all +that he has put forth, are the most repugnant to the fundamental +principles of Positive Philosophy. One of them is that on which we have +just commented, the assimilation between Positivism and Fetishism. The +other, of which we took notice in a former article, was the "liberte +facultative" of shaping our scientific conceptions to gratify the +demands not solely of objective truth, but of intellectual and aesthetic +suitability. It would be an excellent thing, M. Comte thinks, if science +could be deprived of its _secheresse_, and directly associated with +sentiment. Now it is impossible to prove that the external world, and +the bodies composing it, are not endowed with feeling, and voluntary +agency. It is therefore highly desirable that we should educate +ourselves into imagining that they are. Intelligence it will not do to +invest them with, for some distinction must be maintained between simple +activity and life. But we may suppose that they feel what is done to +them, and desire and will what they themselves do. Even intelligence, +which we must deny to them in the present, may be attributed to them in +the past. Before man existed, the earth, at that time an intelligent +being, may have exerted "its physico-chemical activity so as to improve +the astronomical order by changing its principal coefficients. Our +planet may be supposed to have rendered its orbit less excentric, and +thereby more habitable, by planning a long series of explosions, +analogous to those from which, according to the best hypotheses, comets +proceed. Judiciously reproduced, similar shocks may have rendered the +inclination of the earth's axis better adapted to the future wants of +the Grand Etre. _A fortiori_ the Earth may have modified its own figure, +which is only beyond our intervention because our spiritual ascendancy +has not at its disposal a sufficient material force." The like may be +conceived as having been done by each of the other planets, in concert, +possibly, with the Earth and with one another. "In proportion as each +planet improved its own condition, its life exhausted itself by excess +of innervation; but with the consolation of rendering its self-devotion +more efficacious, when the extinction of its special functions, first +animal, and finally vegetative, reduced it to the universal attributes +of feeling and activity."[25] This stuff, though he calls it fiction, he +soon after speaks of as belief (croyance), to be greatly recommended, as +at once satisfying our natural curiosity, and "perfecting our unity" +(again unity!) "by supplying the gaps in our scientific notions with +poetic fictions, and developing sympathetic emotions and aesthetic +inspirations: the world being conceived as aspiring to second mankind in +ameliorating the universal order under the impulse of the Grand Etre." +And he obviously intends that we should be trained to make these +fantastical inventions permeate all our associations, until we are +incapable of conceiving the world and Nature apart from them, and they +become equivalent to, and are in fact transformed into, real beliefs. + +Wretched as this is, it is singularly characteristic of M. Comte's later +mode of thought. A writer might be excused for introducing into an +avowed work of fancy this dance of the planets, and conception of an +animated Earth. If finely executed, he might even be admired for it. No +one blames a poet for ascribing feelings, purposes, and human +propensities to flowers. Because a conception might be interesting, and +perhaps edifying, in a poem, M. Comte would have it imprinted on the +inmost texture of every human mind in ordinary prose. If the imagination +were not taught its prescribed lesson equally with the reason, where +would be Unity? "It is important that the domain of fiction should +become as _systematic_ as that of demonstration, in order that their +mutual harmony may be conformable to their respective destinations, both +equally directed towards the continual increase of _unity_, personal and +social."[26] + +Nor is it enough to have created the Grand Fetiche (so he actually +proposes to call the Earth), and to be able to include it and all +concrete existence in our adoration along with the Grand Etre. It is +necessary also to extend Positivist Fetishism to purely abstract +existence; to "animate" the laws as well as the facts of nature. It is +not sufficient to have made physics sentimental, mathematics must be +made so too. This does not at first seem easy; but M. Comte finds the +means of accomplishing it. His plan is, to make Space also an object of +adoration, under the name of the Grand Milieu, and consider it as the +representative of Fatality in general. "The final _unity_ disposes us to +cultivate sympathy by developing our gratitude to whatever serves the +Grand Etre. It must dispose us to venerate the Fatality on which reposes +the whole aggregate of our existence." We should conceive this Fatality +as having a fixed seat, and that seat must be considered to be Space, +which should be conceived as possessing feeling, but not activity or +intelligence. And in our abstract speculations we should imagine all our +conceptions as located in free Space. Our images of all sorts, down to +our geometrical diagrams, and even our ciphers and algebraic symbols, +should always be figured to ourselves as written in space, and not on +paper or any other material substance. M. Comte adds that they should be +conceived as green on a white ground. + +We cannot go on any longer with this. In spite of it all, the volume on +mathematics is full of profound thoughts, and will be very suggestive to +those who take up the subject after M. Comte. What deep meaning there +is, for example, in the idea that the infinitesimal calculus is a +conception analogous to the corpuscular hypothesis in physics; which +last M. Comte has always considered as a logical artifice; not an +opinion respecting matters of fact. The assimilation, as it seems to us, +throws a flood of light on both conceptions; on the physical one still +more than the mathematical. We might extract many ideas of similar, +though none perhaps of equal, suggestiveness. But mixed with these, what +pitiable _niaiseries_! One of his great points is the importance of the +"moral and intellectual properties of numbers." He cultivates a +superstitious reverence for some of them. The first three are sacred, +_les nombres sacres_: One being the type of all Synthesis, Two of all +Combination, which he now says _is_ always binary (in his first treatise +he only said that we may usefully represent it to ourselves as being +so), and Three of all Progression, which not only requires three terms, +but as he now maintains, never ought to have any more. To these sacred +numbers all our mental operations must be made, as far as possible, to +adjust themselves. Next to them, he has a great partiality for the +number seven; for these whimsical reasons: "Composed of two progressions +followed by a synthesis, or of one progression between two couples, the +number seven, coming next after the sum of the three sacred numbers, +determines the largest group which we can distinctly imagine. +Reciprocally, it marks the limit of the divisions which we can directly +conceive in a magnitude of any kind." The number seven, therefore, must +be foisted in wherever possible, and among other things, is to be made +the basis of numeration, which is hereafter to be septimal instead of +decimal: producing all the inconvenience of a change of system, not only +without getting rid of, but greatly aggravating, the disadvantages of +the existing one. But then, he says, it is absolutely necessary that the +basis of numeration should be a prime number. All other people think it +absolutely necessary that it should not, and regard the present basis as +only objectionable in not being divisible enough. But M. Comte's puerile +predilection for prime numbers almost passes belief. His reason is that +they are the type of irreductibility: each of them is a kind of ultimate +arithmetical fact. This, to any one who knows M. Comte in his later +aspects, is amply sufficient. Nothing can exceed his delight in anything +which says to the human mind, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. If +prime numbers are precious, doubly prime numbers are doubly so; meaning +those which are not only themselves prime numbers, but the number which +marks their place in the series of prime numbers is a prime number. +Still greater is the dignity of trebly prime numbers; when the number +marking the place of this second number is also prime. The number +thirteen fulfils these conditions: it is a prime number, it is the +seventh prime number, and seven is the fifth prime number. Accordingly +he has an outrageous partiality to the number thirteen. Though one of +the most inconvenient of all small numbers, he insists on introducing it +everywhere. + +These strange conceits are connected with a highly characteristic +example of M. Comte's frenzy for regulation. He cannot bear that +anything should be left unregulated: there ought to be no such thing as +hesitation; nothing should remain arbitrary, for _l'arbitraire_ is +always favourable to egoism. Submission to artificial prescriptions is +as indispensable as to natural laws, and he boasts that under the reign +of sentiment, human life may be made equally, and even more, regular +than the courses of the stars. But the great instrument of exact +regulation for the details of life is numbers: fixed numbers, therefore, +should be introduced into all our conduct. M. Comte's first application +of this system was to the correction of his own literary style. +Complaint had been made, not undeservedly, that in his first great work, +especially in the latter part of it, the sentences and paragraphs were +long, clumsy, and involved. To correct this fault, of which he was +aware, he imposed on himself the following rules. No sentence was to +exceed two lines of his manuscript, equivalent to five of print. No +paragraph was to consist of more than seven sentences. He further +applied to his prose writing the rule of French versification which +forbids a _hiatus_(the concourse of two vowels), not allowing it to +himself even at the break between two sentences or two paragraphs; nor +did he permit himself ever to use the same word twice, either in the +same sentence or in two consecutive sentences, though belonging to +different paragraphs: with the exception of the monosyllabic +auxiliaries.[27] All this is well enough, especially the first two +precepts, and a good way of breaking through a bad habit. But M. Comte +persuaded himself that any arbitrary restriction, though in no way +emanating from, and therefore necessarily disturbing, the natural order +and proportion of the thoughts, is a benefit in itself, and tends to +improve style. If it renders composition vastly more difficult, he +rejoices at it, as tending to confine writing to superior minds. +Accordingly, in the Synthese Subjective, he institutes the following +"plan for all compositions of importance." "Every volume really capable +of forming a distinct treatise" should consist of "seven chapters, +besides the introduction and the conclusion; and each of these should be +composed of three parts." Each third part of a chapter should be divided +into "seven sections, each composed of seven groups of sentences, +separated by the usual break of line. Normally formed, the section +offers a central group of seven sentences, preceded and followed by +three groups of five: the first section of each part reduces to three +sentences three of its groups, symmetrically placed; the last section +gives seven sentences to each of its extreme groups. These rules of +composition make prose approach to the regularity of poetry, when +combined with my previous reduction of the maximum length of a sentence +to two manuscript or five printed lines, that is, 250 letters." +"Normally constructed, great poems consist of thirteen cantos, +decomposed into parts, sections, and groups like my chapters, saving the +complete equality of the groups and of the sections." "This difference +of structure between volumes of poetry and of philosophy is more +apparent than real, for the introduction and the conclusion of a poem +should comprehend six of its thirteen cantos," leaving, therefore, the +cabalistic numeber seven for the body of the poem. And all this +regulation not being sufficiently meaningless, fantastic, and +oppressive, he invents an elaborate system for compelling each of his +sections and groups to begin with a letter of the alphabet, determined +beforehand, the letters being selected so as to compose words having +"a synthetic or sympathetic signification," and as close a relation as +possible to the section or part to which they are appropriated. + +Others may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this melancholy +decadence of a great intellect. M. Comte used to reproach his early +English admirers with maintaining the "conspiracy of silence" concerning +his later performances. The reader can now judge whether such reticence +is not more than sufficiently explained by tenderness for his fame, and +a conscientious fear of bringing undeserved discredit on the noble +speculations of his early career. + +M. Comte was accustomed to consider Descartes and Leibnitz as his +principal precursors, and the only great philosophers (among many +thinkers of high philosophic capacity) in modern times. It was to their +minds that he considered his own to bear the nearest resemblance. Though +we have not so lofty an opinion of any of the three as M. Comte had, we +think the assimilation just: thes were, of all recorded thinkers, the +two who bore most resemblance to M. Comte. They were like him in +earnestness, like him, though scarcely equal to him, in confidence in +themselves; they had the same extraordinary power of concatenation and +co-ordination; they enriched human knowledge with great truths and great +conceptions of method; they were, of all great scientific thinkers, the +most consistent, and for that reason often the most absurd, because they +shrank from no consequences, however contrary to common sense, to which +their premises appeared to lead. Accordingly their names have come down +to us associated with grand thoughts, with most important discoveries, +and also with some of the most extravagantly wild and ludicrously absurd +conceptions and theories which ever were solemnly propounded by +thoughtful men. "We think M. Comte as great as either of these +philosophers, and hardly more extravagant. Were we to speak our whole +mind, we should call him superior to them: though not intrinsically, yet +by the exertion of equal intellectual power in a more advanced state of +human preparation; but also in an age less tolerant of palpable +absurdities, and to which those he has committed, if not in themselves +greater, at least appear more ridiculous. + + +THE END. + + + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] See the Chapter on Efficient Causes in Reid's "Essays on the Active +Powers," which is avowedly grounded on Newton's ideas. + +[2] Mr Herbert Spencer, who also distinguishes between abstract and +concrete sciences, employs the terms in a different sense from that +explained above. He calls a science abstract when its truths are merely +ideal; when, like the truths of geometry, they are not exactly true of +real things--or, like the so-called law of inertia (the persistence in +direction and velocity of a motion once impressed) are "involved" in +experience but never actually seen in it, being always more or less +completely frustrated. Chemistry and biology he includes, on the +contrary, among concrete sciences, because chemical combinations and +decompositions, and the physiological action of tissues, do actually +take place (as our senses testify) in the manner in which the scientific +propositions state them to take place. We will not discuss the logical +or philological propriety of either use of the terms abstract and +concrete, in which twofold point of view very few of the numerous +acceptations of these words are entirely defensible: but of the two +distinctions M. Comte's answers to by far the deepest and most vital +difference. Mr Spencer's is open to the radical objection, that it +classifies truths not according to their subject-matter or their mutual +relations, but according to an unimportant difference in the manner in +which we come to know them. Of what consequence is it that the law of +inertia (considered as an exact truth) is not generalized from our +direct perceptions, but inferred by combining with the movements which +we see, those which we should see if it were not for the disturbing +causes? In either case we are equally certain that it _is_ an exact +truth: for every dynamical law is perfectly fulfilled even when it seems +to be counteracted. There must, we should think, be many truths in +physiology (for example) which are only known by a similar indirect +process; and Mr Spencer would hardly detach these from the body of the +science, and call them abstract and the remainder concrete. + +[3] Systeme de Politique Positive, ii. 36. + +[4] The strongest case which Mr Spencer produces of a scientifically +ascertained law, which, though belonging to a later science, was +necessary to the scientific formation of one occupying an earlier place +in M. Comte's series, is the law of the accelerating force of gravity; +which M. Comte places in Physics, but without which the Newtonian theory +of the celestial motions could not have been discovered, nor could even +now be proved. This fact, as is judiciously remarked by M. Littre, is +not valid against the plan of M. Comte's classification, but discloses a +slight error in the detail. M. Comte should not have placed the laws of +terrestrial gravity under Physics. They are part of the general theory +of gravitation, and belong to astronomy. Mr Spencer has hit one of the +weak points in M. Comte's scientific scale; weak however only because +left unguarded. Astronomy, the second of M. Comte's abstract sciences, +answers to his own definition of a concrete science. M. Comte however +was only wrong in overlooking a distinction. There _is_ an abstract +science of astronomy, namely, the theory of gravitation, which would +equally agree with and explain the facts of a totally different solar +system from the one of which our earth forms a part. The actual facts of +our own system, the dimensions, distances, velocities, temperatures, +physical constitution, &c., of the sun, earth, and planets, are properly +the subject of a concrete science, similar to natural history; but the +concrete is more inseparably united to the abstract science than in any +other case, since the few celestial facts really accessible to us are +nearly all required for discovering and proving the law of gravitation +as an universal property of bodies, and have therefore an indispensable +place in the abstract science as its fundamental data. + +[5] The only point at which the general principle of the series fails in +its application, is the subdivision of Physics; and there, as the +subordination of the different branches scarcely exists, their order is +of little consequence. Thermology, indeed, is altogether an exception to +the principle of decreasing generality, heat, as Mr Spencer truly says +being as universal as gravitation. But the place of Thermology is marked +out, within certain narrow limits, by the ends of the classification, +though not by its principle. The desideratum is, that every science +should precede those which cannot be scientifically constitute or +rationally studied until it is known. It is as a means to this end, that +the arrangement of the phaenomena in the order of their dependence on +one another is important. Now, though heat is as universal a phaenomenon +as any which external nature presents, its laws do not affect, in any +manner important to us, the phaenomena of Astronomy, and operate in the +other branches of Physics only as slight modifying agencies, the +consideration of which may be postponed to a rather advanced stage. But +the phaenomena of Chemistry and Biology depend on them often for their +very existence. The ends of the classification require therefore that +Thermology should precede Chemistry and Biology, but do not demand that +it should be thrown farther back. On the other hand, those same ends, in +another point of view, require that it should be subsequent to +Astronomy, for reasons not of doctrine but of method: Astronomy being +the best school of the true art of interpreting Nature, by which +Thermology profits like other sciences, but which it was ill adapted to +originate. + +[6] The philosophy of the subject is perhaps nowhere so well expressed +as in the "Systeme de Politique Positive" (iii. 41). "Concu logiquement, +l'ordre suivant lequel nos principales theories accomplissent +l'evolution fondamentale resulte necessairement de leur dependence +mutuelle. Toutes les sciences peuvent, sans doute, etre ebauchees a la +fois: leur usage pratique exige meme cette culture simultanee. Mais +elle ne peut concerner que les inductions propres a chaque classe de +speculations. Or cet essor inductif ne saurait fournir des principes +suffisants qu'envers les plus simples etudes. Partout ailleurs, ils ne +peuvent etre etablis qu'en subordonnant chaque genre d'inductions +scientifiques a l'ensemble des deductions emanees des domaines moins +compliques, et des-lors moins dependants. Ainsi nos diverses theories +reposent dogmatiquement les unes sur les autres, suivant un ordre +invariable, qui doit regler historiquement leur avenement decisif, les +plus independantes ayant toujours du se developper plus tot." + +[7] "Science," says Mr Spencer in his "Genesis," "while purely inductive +is purely qualitative.... All quantitative prevision is reached +deductively; induction can achieve only qualitative prevision." Now, if +we remember that the very first accurate quantitative law of physical +phaenomena ever established, the law of the accelerating force of +gravity, was discovered and proved by Galileo partly at least by +experiment; that the quantitative laws on which the whole theory of the +celestial motions is grounded, were generalized by Kepler from direct +comparison of observations; that the quantitative law of the +condensation of gases by pressure, the law of Boyle and Mariotte, was +arrived at by direct experiment; that the proportional quantities in +which every known substance combines chemically with every other, were +ascertained by innumerable experiments, from which the general law of +chemical equivalents, now the ground of the most exact quantitative +previsions, was an inductive generalization; we must conclude that Mr +Spencer has committed himself to a general proposition, which a very +slight consideration of truths perfectly known to him would have shown +to be unsustainable. + +Again, in the very pamphlet in which Mr Spencer defends himself against +the supposition of being a disciple of M. Comte ("The Classification of +the Sciences," p. 37), he speaks of "M. Comte's adherent, Mr Buckle." +Now, except in the opinion common to both, that history may be made a +subject of science, the speculations of these two thinkers are not only +different, but run in different channels, M. Comte applying himself +principally to the laws of evolution common to all mankind, Mr Buckle +almost exclusively to the diversities: and it may be affirmed without +presumption, that they neither saw the same truths, nor fell into the +same errors, nor defended their opinions, either true or erroneous, by +the same arguments. Indeed, it is one of the surprising things in the +case of Mr Buckle as of Mr Spencer, that being a man of kindred genius, +of the same wide range of knowledge, and devoting himself to +speculations of the same kind, he profited so little by M. Comte. + +These oversights prove nothing against the general accuracy of Mr +Spencer's acquirements. They are mere lapses of inattention, such as +thinkers who attempt speculations requiring that vast multitudes of +facts should be kept in recollection at once, can scarcely hope always +to avoid. + +[8] We refer particularly to the mystical metaphysics connected with the +negative sign, imaginary quantities, infinity and infinitesimals, &c, +all cleared up and put on a rational footing in the highly philosophical +treatises of Professor De Morgan. + +[9] Those who wish to see this idea followed out, are referred to "A +System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive." It is not irrelevant to +state that M. Comte, soon after the publication of that work, expressed, +both in a letter (published in M. Littre's volume) and in print, his +high approval of it (especially of the Inductive part) as a real +contribution to the construction of the Positive Method. But we cannot +discover that he was indebted to it for a single idea, or that it +influenced, in the smallest particular, the course of his subsequent +speculations. + +[10] The force, however, of this last consideration has been much +weakened by the progress of discovery since M. Comte left off studying +chemistry; it being now probable that most if not all substances, even +elementary, are susceptible of _allotropic_ forms; as in the case of +oxygen and ozone, the two forms of phosphorus, &c. + +[11] Thus; by considering prussic acid as a compound of hydrogen and +cyanogen rather than of hydrogen and the elements of cyanogen (carbon +and nitrogen), it is assimilated to a whole class of acid compounds +between hydrogen and other substances, and a reason is thus found for +its agreeing in their acid properties. + +[12] According to Sir William Hamilton, as many as six; but numerical +precision in such matters is out of the question, and it is probable +that different minds have the power in different degrees. + +[13] Or, as afterwards corrected by him, the appetites and emotions, the +active capacities, and the intellectual faculties; "le coeur," "le +caractere," and "l'esprit." + +[14] M. Littre, who, though a warm admirer, and accepting the position +of a disciple of M. Comte, is singularly free from his errors, makes the +equally ingenious and just remark, that Political Economy corresponds in +social science to the theory of the nutritive functions in biology, +which M. Comte, with all good physiologists, thinks it not only +permissible but a great and fundamental improvement to treat, in the +first place, separately, as the necessary basis of the higher branches +of the science: although the nutritive functions can no more be +withdrawn _in fact_ from the influence of the animal and human +attributes, than the economical phaenomena of society from that of the +political and moral. + +[15] Indeed his claim to be the creator of Sociology does not extend to +this branch of the science; on the contrary, he, in a subsequent work, +expressly declares that the real founder of it was Aristotle, by whom +the theory of the conditions of social existence was carried as far +towards perfection as was possible in the absence of any theory of +Progress. Without going quite this length, we think it hardly possible +to appreciate too highly the merit of those early efforts, beyond which +little progress had been made, until a very recent period, either in +ethical or in political science. + +[16] It is due to them both to say, that he continued to express, in +letters which have been published, a high opinion of her, both morally +and intellectually; and her persistent and strong concern for his +interests and his fame is attested both by M. Littre and by his own +correspondence. + +[17] "Of the Classification of the Sciences," pp. 37, 38. + +[18] In the case of Egypt we admit that there may be cited against us +the authority of Plato, in whose Politicus it is said that the king of +Egypt must be a member of the priestly caste, or if by usurpation a +member of any other caste acquired the sovereignty he must be initiated +with the sacerdotal order. But Plato was writing of a state of things +which already belonged to the past; nor have we any assurance that his +information on Egyptian institutions was authentic and accurate. Had the +king been necessarily or commonly a member of the priestly order, it is +most improbable that the careful Herodotus, of whose comprehensive work +an entire book was devoted to a minute account of Egypt and its +institutions, and who collected his information from Egyptian priests in +the country itself, would have been ignorant of a part so important, and +tending so much to exalt the dignity of the priesthood, who were much +more likely to affirm it falsely to Plato than to withhold the knowledge +of it if true from Heredotus. Not only is Herodotus silent respecting +any such law or custom, but he thinks it needful to mention that in one +particular instance the king (by name Sethos) was a priest, which he +would scarcely have done if this had been other than an exceptional +case. It is likely enough that a king of Egypt would learn the hieratic +character, and would not suffer any of the mysteries of law or religion +which were in the keeping of the priests to be withheld from him; and +this was very probably all the foundation which existed for the +assertion of the Eleatic stranger in Plato's dialogue. + +[19] Mill, History of British India, book ii. chap. iii. + +[20] At a somewhat later period M. Comte drew up what he termed a +Positivist Calendar, in which every day was dedicated to some benefactor +of humanity (generally with the addition of a similar but minor +luminary, to be celebrated in the room of his principal each bissextile +year). In this no kind of human eminence, really useful, is omitted, +except that which is merely negative and destructive. On this principle +(which is avowed) the French _philosophes_ as such are excluded, those +only among them being admitted who, like Voltaire and Diderot, had +claims to admission on other grounds: and the Protestant religious +reformers are left out entirely, with the curious exception of George +Fox--who is included, we presume, in consideration of his Peace +principles. + +[21] He goes still further and deeper in a subsequent work. "L'art +ramene doucement a la realite les contemplations trop abstraites du +theoricien, tandis qu'il pousse noblement le praticien aux speculations +desinteressees." Systeme de Politique Positive, i. 287. + +[22] 1. _Systeme de Politique Positive, ou Traite de Sociologie, +instituant la Religion de l'Humanite_. 4 vols. 8vo. Paris: 1851--1854. + +2. _Catechisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion +Universelle, en onze Entretiens Systematiques entre une Femme et un +Pretre de l'Humanite_. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1852. + +3. _Appel aux Conservateurs_. Paris: 1855 (brochure). + +4. _Synthese Subjective, ou Systeme Universel des Conceptions propres +a l'Etat Normal de l'Humanite_. Tome Premier, contenant le Systeme de +Logique Positive, ou Traite de Philosophie Mathematique. 8vo. Paris: +1856. + +5. _Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive_. Par E. LITTRE. 1 vol. +8vo. Paris: 1863. + +6. _Exposition Abregee et Populaire de la Philosophie et de la Religion +Positives_. PAR CELESTIN DE BLIGNIERES, ancien eleve de l'Ecole +Polytechnique. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1857. + +7. _Notice sur l'Oeuvre et sur la Vie d'Auguste Comte_. Par le DOCTEUR +ROBINET, son Medecin, et l'un de ses treize Executeurs Testamentaires. 1 +vol. 8vo. Paris: 1860. + +[23] Systeme de Politique Positive, iv. 100. + +[24] See Sir John Herschel's Outlines of Astronomy, Sec. 319. + +[25] Synthese Subjective, pp. 10, 11. + +[26] Synthese Subjective, pp. 11, 12. + + + + + + + + + + +End of Project Gutenberg's Auguste Comte and Positivism, by John-Stuart Mill + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AUGUSTE COMTE AND POSITIVISM *** + +***** This file should be named 16833.txt or 16833.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/8/3/16833/ + +Produced by Marc D'Hooghe. + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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