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The only external evidence to them which is of +much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a +century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the +Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty +concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to +him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and +some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. +Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, +general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness +of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to +have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer +ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical +orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which +have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the +slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some +affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have +originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical +author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any +ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with +length. A really great and original writer would have no object in +fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary +hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or +genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a +Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing +was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, +Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have +composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. +Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as +voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, +or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing +was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same +character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A +tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master +with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between +Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The +Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a +considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must +consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a +particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. + +These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of +genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes +to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great +excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic +writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished +from that of a later age (see above); and has various degrees of +importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under +their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Phaedo, etc., +have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been +supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of +really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; those again +which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external +credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, +or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short +writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e.g. the +Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a +frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of +Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from +the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant +dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two +great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly +devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, +on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the +general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence +for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two +heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of +evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. + +Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that +nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to +Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, +including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the +ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, +Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external +evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still +remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they +are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly +like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions +of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary +transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some +Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not +that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject +them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or +inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their +spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes +with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the +greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and +in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later +ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected +to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over +above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of +political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier +writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of +philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from +Aristotle. + +The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which +appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, +are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First +Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited +by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric. +Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of +both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. +From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps +infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same +name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of +a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon +both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias +does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who +was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. +The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., +and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon +in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the +genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic +spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and +treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect +in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in +the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of +a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as +in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or +overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument +'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in +accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances +or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been +observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of +the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness +of the Hippias than against it. + +The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting +as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the +Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a +veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an +acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, +intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the +Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and +the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the +oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the +Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other +writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned +in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same +manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of +Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the +Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the +Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A +similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the +Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + +To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, +which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and +is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony +of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the +description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser +Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of +Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of +the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by +the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher +has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At +the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more +transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that +Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues +bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to +contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real +external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot +be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks +either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we +have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing +the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the +genuineness of the extant dialogue. + +Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute +line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They +fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been +degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly +degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the +oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of +semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character +which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them +is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, +seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this +was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable +excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to +the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they +may be altogether spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly +admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the +Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection +can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight +(chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, +can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually +rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. +The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful +study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged +writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally +decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until +they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more +often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of +them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further +evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the +Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are +genuine. + +On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the +name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves +and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those +who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have +taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable +portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a +thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to +the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. +Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in +the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in +others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; +in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a +lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told +differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades is +depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving +the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for +the aspiring and ambitious youth. + +Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on +public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant +ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a +revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for +carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians--about what? Not +about any particular art, but about politics--when to fight and when to +make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and +therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and +war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between +them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught +by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If +he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he +may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. +Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a +time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played +with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a +knowledge of just and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had +learned of the multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the +nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this +Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; +for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other: +and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must either +have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of +justice, is convicted out of his own mouth. + +Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but +about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice +and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels +him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus +reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, +even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient. + +However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not need +training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that he has +to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies--with +the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and he can only attain +this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that +Socrates himself professes to have attained the truth, but the questions +which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the +first step in the practice of virtue. + +The dialogue continues:--We wish to become as good as possible. But to be +good in what? Alcibiades replies--'Good in transacting business.' But +what business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.' The +cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he is +not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in the +sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean,' replies +Alcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.' But to command +what--horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I mean to say, +that he is able to command men living in social and political relations.' +And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of the city.' But when is +a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such as exists between husband +and wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform their own special duties, +there can be no unanimity between them; nor can a city be well ordered when +each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having stated first that +goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and then in each of +them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self- +contradiction, leading him to confess his own ignorance. + +But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he is +willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that is to +say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer self. +The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own business, but +they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained +only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is the diviner +part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye. And if we do not +know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to +others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs. Both for the +sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at justice and +temperance, not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should have no +power,--they should be the slaves of better men than themselves. None but +the virtuous are deserving of freedom. + +And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, +Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I +will never leave you.' + +The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted dialogues +of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind with that which +Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the Euthydemus; and he +characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers which he has +elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by successive +questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. Here, as +elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance. +Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the commonest +things. No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive at virtue +and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been convicted of error. +The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which +religious writers describe under the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute +the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin. + +In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition. +The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the +antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and +the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humour in the manner +in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed +to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian queens; and the dialogue has +considerable dialectical merit. But we have a difficulty in supposing that +the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the +characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium, should have +treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that +he would have ascribed to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast +that Alcibiades could not attain the objects of his ambition without his +help; or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could +have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the +arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer of +the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and +tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of +making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, +Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, +which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian +statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There is +none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little +dramatic verisimilitude. + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates. + + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of Cleinias, +that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you for many years, +when the rest of the world were wearying you with their attentions, am the +last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The cause of my silence has +been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of which I will some +day explain to you the nature; this impediment has now been removed; I +therefore here present myself before you, and I greatly hope that no +similar hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed that your +pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers; they were numerous +and high-spirited, but they have all run away, overpowered by your superior +force of character; not one of them remains. And I want you to understand +the reason why you have been too much for them. You think that you have no +need of them or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack +nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first +place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the +citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the second +place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the +father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most +distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, +and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can assist you +when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all +the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of +you, and of your brother, and who can do as he pleases not only in this +city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. +Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all +upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up; you have +overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for +them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder +why I, unlike the rest of them, have not gone away, and what can be my +motive in remaining. + +ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to +ask you the very same question--What do you want? And what is your motive +in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? +(Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like +to know. + +SOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will +be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor +who will remain, and will not run away? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling +to end as I have hitherto been to begin. + +ALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen. + +SOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one +who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an effort, +and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to +confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you +loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the +enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you +keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on +you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: +Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are +forbidden to make any further acquisition?--I verily believe that you would +choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present +living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before +the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of +honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved +this, you will have the greatest power in the state. When you have gained +the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and +not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same +continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in +Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia +or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to +live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with +your power and name--no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account +with you. Such I know to be your hopes--I am not guessing only--and very +likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, +Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you +promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now +going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation +is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without +my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and +your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has +hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting +his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the +state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I +indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to +prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor +kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you +desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare +Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, +and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but +now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me. + +ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never +could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to +speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a +matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and +therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, +that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance +necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why? + +SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you +are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, +that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me +one little favour. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. + +SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? + +ALCIBIADES: Not at all. + +SOCRATES: Then please to answer. + +ALCIBIADES: Ask me. + +SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? + +ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what +more you have to say. + +SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little +while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that +when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, +Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do you know the +matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?--How +would you answer? + +ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter +which I do know better than they. + +SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or +found out yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is all. + +SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you +had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: I should not. + +SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you +supposed that you knew? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know +what you are now supposed to know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your +acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to +my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, +and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your +accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I +think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of +your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling. + +SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give +them advice about writing? + +ALCIBIADES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, +in the assembly? + +ALCIBIADES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise +them? Surely not about building? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that? + +ALCIBIADES: He will. + +SOCRATES: Nor about divination? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or +ignoble--makes no difference. + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has +riches, but because he has knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which +will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about +the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a +physician. + +ALCIBIADES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you +will be justified in getting up and advising them? + +ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is +what sort of ships they ought to build? + +ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that. + +SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is that +the reason? + +ALCIBIADES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? + +ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other +concerns of the state. + +SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make +peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better +to go to war? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when it is better? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to +close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or +the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics. + +SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics +would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? +To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those +against whom it is best to wrestle? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And as much as is best? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And at such times as are best? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When it is well to do so? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And as much as is well? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in +wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell +me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and +I want to know what you call the other. + +ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you. + +SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is +universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: You did. + +SOCRATES: And I was right? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that you were. + +SOCRATES: Well, now,--for you should learn to argue prettily--let me ask +you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and +singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,--what is the name +of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell. + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the +Goddesses who are the patronesses of art? + +ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after +them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art +of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was +gymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what? + +ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose. + +SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of +war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more +gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the +more excellent in war and peace? + +ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you. + +SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to him--This +food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to +you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would have no +difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not +profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you +profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and +advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be +able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful? + +ALCIBIADES: Very. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of +'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against +whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer? + +ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell. + +SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against +one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we +give them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been +employed, or that we have been defrauded. + +SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may +be a difference in the manner. + +ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these +things justly or unjustly? + +SOCRATES: Exactly. + +ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and +unjust. + +SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or +with the unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person +did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were +just. + +SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? + +ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable. + +SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in +going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought +not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you +do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my +knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who +is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--you shall +introduce me. + +ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the +God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am +not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. + +ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the +knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? + +SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them. + +ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them? + +SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them. + +ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire? + +SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. + +ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think? + +SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought +that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you +say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and +enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that +our discussion may not be in vain. + +ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew. + +SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you +knew all the same? + +ALCIBIADES: I did. + +SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. + +ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure? + +SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, +or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not +hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very +confident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a +cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true? + +ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? + +SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did +not know whether you were wronged or not? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated. + +SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the +nature of just and unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then. + +SOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time when +you thought that you knew them? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if you consider, +you will find that there never was such a time? + +ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; +now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you +come to know them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them +through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the +same way that other people learn. + +SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me. + +ALCIBIADES: Of the many. + +SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your +teachers. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach? + +SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you +would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far +better things than to play at draughts. + +SOCRATES: What things? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I +cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of +Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of +Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised. + +ALCIBIADES: Why is that? + +SOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought +to have. + +ALCIBIADES: What qualities? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any +teacher? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they +differ? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them? + +ALCIBIADES: They cannot. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the +nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they +are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of +wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty +nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are +agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states +use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some +another. + +ALCIBIADES: They do not. + +SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in +sending him to be taught by our friends the many? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and +which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the +many still be able to inform us? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these +things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never +agreed about them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, +but what healthy or diseased men are like--would the many be able to teach +us? + +ALCIBIADES: They would not. + +SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these +matters, if you saw them at variance? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one +another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance? + +ALCIBIADES: None. + +SOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling +over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war +and kill one another for the sake of them? + +ALCIBIADES: No indeed. + +SOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you +have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including +Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and +Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with +Odysseus. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at +Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father +Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice--this was the sole +cause of the battles, and of their deaths. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are +quarrelling to the death? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the +teachers to whom you are appealing. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and +injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned +them of others nor discovered them yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades! + +ALCIBIADES: In what respect? + +SOCRATES: In saying that I say so. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and +unjust? + +SOCRATES: No; I did not. + +ALCIBIADES: Did I, then? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +ALCIBIADES: How was that? + +SOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater +number, two or one; you would reply 'two'? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: And by how much greater? + +ALCIBIADES: By one. + +SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who answer +me? + +ALCIBIADES: I am. + +SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up +the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? + +ALCIBIADES: I am. + +SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question +and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the answerer? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. + +SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you the answerer? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker? + +ALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. + +SOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, +not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did +understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he +did not know? Was not that said? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of +Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not +from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but +you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, +the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have +not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. + +ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the +Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no +difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which +course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between +justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by +their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good. + +SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so +much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for +mankind, or why a thing is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked again from +whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. + +SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be +refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different +refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no longer +put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. Now I +shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,--Where did +you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your +teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will +manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you +know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it +yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of +a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is +expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply +request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency +are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have +examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by +yourself. + +ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to +discuss the matter with you. + +SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the +ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men +individually. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual +singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, +for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and +persuade many? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician? + +ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can +persuade many? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you +know? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, +and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to +persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things. + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude +can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the +just is not always expedient. + +ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that +which you will not prove to me. + +ALCIBIADES: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all. + +ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. + +SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? + +ALCIBIADES: I think not. + +SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that +the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another +man again. + +ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to +any harm. + +SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether +you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not? + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was +dishonourable and yet just? + +ALCIBIADES: Never. + +SOCRATES: All just things are honourable? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, +or are they always good? + +ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are +evil. + +SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men +have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when +others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in +respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is +courage? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and +the death another? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of +view, but evil in another? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now +whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage +which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or +evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or +evil? + +ALCIBIADES: Good. + +SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and +would least like to be deprived of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be +willing to be deprived of courage? + +ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward. + +SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and +cowardice? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their +opposites you would least desire? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death +and cowardice the worst? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, +in as much as courage does a good work? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--You +may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, +and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and +dishonourable in so far as they are evil? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is +honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is +good and yet evil? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor +anything base, regarded as base, good. + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who +acts honourably acts well? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? + +ALCIBIADES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And happiness is a good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified. + +ALCIBIADES: Manifestly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we +shall also find to be good? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not? + +ALCIBIADES: Expedient. + +SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly +must also act honourably. + +SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: I should infer so. + +SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you +answer? + +ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true. + +SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the +expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, +pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up +to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just +may be the evil? + +ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am +saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me +I am of different minds in successive instants. + +SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my +friend? + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. + +SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have +two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you +would then be of different minds in successive instants? + +ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I +should. + +SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because you would +know? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is +clearly that you are ignorant? + +ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, +honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the +reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is +not that clear? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed +about that of which he has no knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you? + +ALCIBIADES: Tell me. + +SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you +do not think that you know. + +ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which +you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the +preparation of food. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of +food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art? + +ALCIBIADES: The latter. + +SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by +considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do +you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing? + +ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. + +SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you +know that you do not know it? + +ALCIBIADES: I imagine not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are +likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what +we are doing? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their +business to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make +mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are +ignorant? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of +course, be those who know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do +not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think +that they know. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those. + +SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is +mischievous? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with +the greatest matters? + +ALCIBIADES: By far. + +SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the +honourable, the good, and the expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: There cannot be. + +SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has +shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being +ignorant you fancy that you know them? + +ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right. + +SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like +to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, +you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you +are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own +argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. +Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of +almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, +Pericles. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom +by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the +philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now +in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was +unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you +letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked +wise. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he +thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter. + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making +his sons wise? + +ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, +what has that to do with the matter? + +SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise? + +ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him. + +SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were +simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be +as you are? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him. + +SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond +or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles,--as +I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of +Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which privilege +they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae (about 406 +pounds sterling) to the increase of their wisdom and fame. + +ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one. + +SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain +as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you +speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree +with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite +uneducated. + +SOCRATES: What is the inference? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained +athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and +experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians +without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and +practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the +better of them. + +SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your +noble form and your high estate! + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love. + +ALCIBIADES: At what? + +SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is +with people here. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there? + +SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask? + +ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these? + +SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, +would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while +acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look +to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow +combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not +even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will +do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which +you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action +really worthy of yourself and of the state. + +ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim. + +SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are +better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior and +have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals +of the enemy. + +ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with +the Lacedaemonians and with the great king? + +ALCIBIADES: True enough. + +SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be +right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true +rivals? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right. + +SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought +rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like +him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may +still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as +on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and +not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not +trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: +there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or +practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter +on a political career. + +ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not +suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really +different from anybody else. + +SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying. + +ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of +yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are +not? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them. + +SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take +care of yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited. + +SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of +yours is bad. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false. + +ALCIBIADES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in +noble races or not in noble races? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races. + +SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be +perfect in virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the +Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have +we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from +Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go +back to Perseus, son of Zeus? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus! + +SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, +son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they are +descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings--either kings of Argos and +Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of +Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns +of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private +persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display +of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the +habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of +Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the +derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe +how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under +the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over +them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid +blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one +entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one +but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that +any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all +the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever +afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, +when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the +neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the +royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by +the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and +especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order +that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are +held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is +put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out +hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal +schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to +be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the +wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the +most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the +son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the +duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him +always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to +allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a +freeman and king indeed,--lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most +valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he +is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a +tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I +might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would +be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to +be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares +about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any +other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast +an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, +the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other +bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own +inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and +grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire +of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all these respects you will +see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of +wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you +stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you +will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here +can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and +the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially +of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the +Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and +silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, +for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from +the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never +going out, as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints +of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the +trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer +that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, +and that their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share +of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very +considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the +wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the +Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person +who went up to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of +excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of +the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her +veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for +the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. +Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to +Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, +There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty +minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has a son who is +possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go +to war with your son--would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts +for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would say to herself, +'upon his training and wisdom--these are the things which Hellenes value.' +And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as +yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells +him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and +fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would +she not be amazed, and ask 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we +replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental +endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared +the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I +believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of +Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same +feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your +thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how +disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required +in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the qualities which are +required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear +the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but +these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and +skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in +becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire +more than any other man ever desired anything. + +ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which +are required, Socrates,--can you tell me? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the +manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you +of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and +there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you. + +ALCIBIADES: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, +Pericles. + +ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to +converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially +designed to bring you to honour. + +ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly +need pains and care, and you and I above all men. + +ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me. + +SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself. + +ALCIBIADES: But what can we do? + +SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend. + +ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we +not wish to be as good as possible? + +ALCIBIADES: We do. + +SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men. + +SOCRATES: Who are good in what? + +ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs. + +SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them? + +ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen. + +SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the +unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: The wise. + +SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of +shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he is good in that? + +ALCIBIADES: He is. + +SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also +bad? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good? + +ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city. + +SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But over men? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When they are sick? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Or on a voyage? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing? + +ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say. + +SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is. + +ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using one +another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life. + +SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the +services of other men? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the +rowers? + +ALCIBIADES: No; they are not. + +SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who +lead the singers and use the services of the dancers? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use +other men? + +ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of +citizenship, and dealings with one another. + +SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, +as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow- +sailors,--how would you answer? + +ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot. + +SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables +them to rule over their fellow-singers? + +ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now +mentioning. + +SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: But good counsel? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,--good counsel, of which the +aim is the preservation of the voyagers. + +SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which +you speak? + +ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city. + +SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and +preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that +of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the +body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. +You would say the same? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I +should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of +blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and +were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in +them. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence +or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and the +absence of hatred and division. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement? + +ALCIBIADES: Agreement. + +SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers? + +ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic. + +SOCRATES: And private individuals? + +ALCIBIADES: The same. + +SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself? + +ALCIBIADES: The same. + +SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the +comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of +measure? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, +equally? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about +what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to +the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with +himself and with another? + +ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so. + +SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faint not. + +ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and +agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their +son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife. + +SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning +of wool, which she understands and he does not? + +ALCIBIADES: No, truly. + +SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, +which she has never learned? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a +male accomplishment? + +ALCIBIADES: It would. + +SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men? + +ALCIBIADES: There is not. + +SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? + +ALCIBIADES: Plainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own +work? + +ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the +truth. (Compare Republic.) + +SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when +friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone +secures their good order? + +ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this +very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. + +SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean +now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How +can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of +which the other is in ignorance? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing +what is just or unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no +friendship among them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about +which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I +cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same +persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. + +ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I +have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. + +SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your +deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of +yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the +discovery should be made. + +ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? + +SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by +the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very +improving to both of us. + +ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. + +SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by +appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when +we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when +does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what +belongs to him? + +ALCIBIADES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of +them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? + +ALCIBIADES: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong +to the finger, and to the finger only? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our +feet? + +ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a +thing is a correct expression? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking. + +SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other +art which improves the feet? + +ALCIBIADES: By some other art. + +SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of +the body? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of +that which belongs to our feet? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of +graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of +weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from +that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care +of yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be +the same as that which takes care of ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care +of ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not +one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if +we did not know a shoe? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not +know a ring? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not +know what we are ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be +lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is +self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? + +ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at +other times the task appears to be very difficult. + +SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no +other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of +ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be +discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own +existence, which otherwise we can never know. + +ALCIBIADES: You say truly. + +SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing? +--with whom but with me? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: As I am, with you? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And I in talking use words? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, +and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool? + +ALCIBIADES: Of course not. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be +distinguished from the harper himself? + +ALCIBIADES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user +to be always different from that which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his +tools only or with his hands? + +ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well. + +SOCRATES: He uses his hands too? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? + +ALCIBIADES: He does. + +SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which +he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from +the hands and feet which they use? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body? + +ALCIBIADES: That is the inference. + +SOCRATES: What is he, then? + +ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul. + +SOCRATES: And the soul rules? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally +admitted. + +ALCIBIADES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That man is one of three things. + +ALCIBIADES: What are they? + +SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body +is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did. + +SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking? + +ALCIBIADES: It would seem not. + +SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, +and consequently that this is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is +subject, the two united cannot possibly rule. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, +either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient. + +SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall +be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered +that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too +much protracted. + +ALCIBIADES: What was that? + +SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first +considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been +considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be +sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly +ourselves than the soul? + +ALCIBIADES: There is nothing. + +SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with +one another, soul to soul? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates, am +not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real +Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his +soul? + +ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true. + +SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of +a man, and not the man himself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the +trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself? + +ALCIBIADES: He does not. + +SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing +themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? +When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even +further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of +the body, which minister to the body. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his +art none of them is temperate? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and +are not such as a good man would practise? + +ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what +belongs to him? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor +his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his +own concerns? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, +he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover? + +ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference. + +SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul +follows after virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when +you are no longer young and the rest are gone? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you +will remain. + +SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best. + +ALCIBIADES: I will. + +SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son +of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he +is his darling,--Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on +the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other +men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading +away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never +desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for +the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people +and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this +way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair +countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution +which I give you. + +ALCIBIADES: What caution? + +SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to +know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote +which will keep you out of harm's way. + +ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me +in what way I am to take care of myself. + +SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably +well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we +once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of +something which is not ourselves. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to +that? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the +soul?--For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we +really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of +which we were just now speaking? + +ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of +that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine +to be the only one suitable to my purpose. + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as +you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of +this precept? Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should look at that +in which it would see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. + +SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror +in our own eyes? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into +the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ +which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort +of image of the person looking? + +ALCIBIADES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye +which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there +see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and +not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and +at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, +must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in +which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that +which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: There is none. + +SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; +and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be +most likely to know himself? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know +our own good and evil? + +ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no +possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really +his? + +ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible. + +SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything +belonged, if we did not know ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: How could we? + +SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we +know the belongings of our belongings? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that +a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he +cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of +the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, +appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art. + +ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed. + +SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in +like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the +affairs of states? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor an economist? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing? + +ALCIBIADES: He will not. + +SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public +and private capacity? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable? + +ALCIBIADES: Very. + +SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting? + +ALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, very. + +SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is +delivered from his misery? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or +triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue? +(Compare Arist. Pol.) + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not. + +SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer +their affairs rightly or nobly? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not +only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the +state, must in the first place acquire virtue. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to +enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and +wisdom. + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act +according to the will of God? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and +divine, and act with a view to them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own +good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness. + +ALCIBIADES: I accept the security. + +SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and +godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will +probably do deeds of darkness. + +ALCIBIADES: Very possibly. + +SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he +likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to +him as an individual or to the state--for example, if he be sick and is +able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician--having +moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will +happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he +likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will +happen to him and to his fellow-sailors? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and +authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, +ensue? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the +aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is +better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.) + +ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know +whether you are a freeman or not? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state. + +SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even +like to name to my beauty? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: How? + +ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades. + +ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said? + +SOCRATES: By the help of God. + +ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to +be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have +followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. + +SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the +stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched. + +ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think +about justice. + +SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not +because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too +much for both of us. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Alcibiades I, by Plato + |