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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1676-h.zip b/1676-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..86a7d5d --- /dev/null +++ b/1676-h.zip diff --git a/1676-h/1676-h.htm b/1676-h/1676-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..298d57c --- /dev/null +++ b/1676-h/1676-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,4258 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Alcibiades I, by Plato (see Appendix I) + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Alcibiades I, by (may be spurious) Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Alcibiades I + +Author: (may be spurious) Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: September 21, 2008 [EBook #1676] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ALCIBIADES I *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + ALCIBIADES I + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + by Plato <br /><br />(see Appendix I) + </h2> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h2> + APPENDIX I. + </h2> + <p> + It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of + Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of + much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a + century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the + Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty + concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to + him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and + some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. + Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, + general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the + genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more + likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, + than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or + panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, + again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later + age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a + motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which + seem to have originated in a name or statement really occurring in some + classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance + of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence + with length. A really great and original writer would have no object in + fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary + hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or + genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a + Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic + writing was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, + Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to + have composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have + occurred. Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost + as voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular + publication, or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An + unknown writing was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works + bore the same character; and the name once appended easily obtained + authority. A tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions + of the master with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the + difference between Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to + ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but + a part of a considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we + must consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a + particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. + </p> + <p> + These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of + genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes + to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great + excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the + Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be + distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various + degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning + Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the + Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They + may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in + the case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; + those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in + their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle + was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case + of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, + e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, + and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty + years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous + citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found + in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark + that one or two great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, + which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly + attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) + accordance with the general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater + part of the evidence for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be + summed up under two heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of + tradition—a kind of evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, + is of inferior value. + </p> + <p> + Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion + that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed + to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, + including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the + ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, + Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and + external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there + still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that + they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or + possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the + compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some + contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, + or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his + master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should + lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of + execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive + of their spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or + who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits + the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, + and in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his + later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be + expected to think in the same manner during a period of authorship + extending over above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual + activity, as well as of political and literary transition? Certainly not + Plato, whose earlier writings are separated from his later ones by as wide + an interval of philosophical speculation as that which separates his later + writings from Aristotle. + </p> + <p> + The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which + appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, + are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First + Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited + by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric. + Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of + both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. + From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps + infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same + name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of + a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon + both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias + does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who + was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. + The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. + Mem., and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from + Xenophon in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the + upholders of the genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a + true Socratic spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in + subject and treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they + will detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning + upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is + ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point + we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is + asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the + argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is + also in accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The + resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, + which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced + on either side of the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour + of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. + </p> + <p> + The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting + as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the + Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting + a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an + acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, + intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the + Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and + the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; + the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the + Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other + writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned + in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same + manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention + of Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the + Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the + Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A + similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the + Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + </p> + <p> + To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, + which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and + is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony + of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the + description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser + Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of + Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of + the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by + the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher + has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At + the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more + transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that + Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues + bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to + contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real + external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot + be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks + either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that + we have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings + bearing the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment + on the genuineness of the extant dialogue. + </p> + <p> + Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute + line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They + fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been + degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly + degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the + oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of + semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character + which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them + is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, + seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this + was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable + excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to + the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; + they may be altogether spurious;—that is an alternative which must + be frankly admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as + the Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable + objection can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the + weight (chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other + hand, can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are + usually rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be + genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require + more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and with + forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can + finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine + until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still + more often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some + of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until + further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that + the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws + are genuine. + </p> + <p> + On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the + name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves + and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by + those who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may + have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable + portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a + thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to + the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. + </p> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h1> + ALCIBIADES I + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. + Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in + the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in + others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; + in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a + lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told + differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades is + depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving + the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for + the aspiring and ambitious youth. + </p> + <p> + Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on + public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant + ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a + revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for + carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians—about what? + Not about any particular art, but about politics—when to fight and + when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, + and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace + and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between + them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught by + some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If he + has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he + may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. + Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a + time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played + with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a + knowledge of just and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had + learned of the multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the + nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this + Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach + justice; for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about + the other: and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he + must either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the + nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth. + </p> + <p> + Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but + about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice + and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels + him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus + reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, + even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient. + </p> + <p> + However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not + need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that he + has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies—with + the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and he can only + attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that + Socrates himself professes to have attained the truth, but the questions + which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the + first step in the practice of virtue. + </p> + <p> + The dialogue continues:—We wish to become as good as possible. But + to be good in what? Alcibiades replies—'Good in transacting + business.' But what business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at + Athens.' The cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good + in that; he is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he + good in the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean,' + replies Alcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.' But to + command what—horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I + mean to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political + relations.' And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of the city.' + But when is a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such as exists + between husband and wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform their own + special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor can a city be + well ordered when each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having + stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and + then in each of them doing his own separate work, is brought to the + required point of self-contradiction, leading him to confess his own + ignorance. + </p> + <p> + But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he + is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that is + to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer + self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own + business, but they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can + be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is + the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye. And + if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or + belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs. Both + for the sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at + justice and temperance, not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should + have no power,—they should be the slaves of better men than + themselves. None but the virtuous are deserving of freedom. + </p> + <p> + And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, + Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I + will never leave you.' + </p> + <p> + The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted + dialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind with + that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the + Euthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers + which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by + successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. + Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of + ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the + commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive + at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been + convicted of error. The process by which the soul is elevated is not + unlike that which religious writers describe under the name of + 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for the + consciousness of sin. + </p> + <p> + In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition. + The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the + antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and + the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humour in the manner + in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed + to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian queens; and the dialogue has + considerable dialectical merit. But we have a difficulty in supposing that + the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the + characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium, should have + treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or + that he would have ascribed to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning + boast that Alcibiades could not attain the objects of his ambition without + his help; or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his + could have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. + For the arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the + writer of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked + and tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism + of making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, + Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, + which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian + statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There is + none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little + dramatic verisimilitude. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES I + </p> + <p> + by + </p> + <p> + Plato (see Appendix I above) + </p> + <p> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </p> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of Cleinias, + that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you for many years, + when the rest of the world were wearying you with their attentions, am the + last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The cause of my silence has + been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of which I will some + day explain to you the nature; this impediment has now been removed; I + therefore here present myself before you, and I greatly hope that no + similar hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed that your + pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers; they were numerous + and high-spirited, but they have all run away, overpowered by your + superior force of character; not one of them remains. And I want you to + understand the reason why you have been too much for them. You think that + you have no need of them or of any other man, for you have great + possessions and lack nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the + soul. In the first place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and + tallest of the citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be + true; in the second place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly + connected both on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one + of the most distinguished families in your own state, which is the + greatest in Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, + who can assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is + more to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your + father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he + pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and + mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you + value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these things + have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have + acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked their + absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of them, + have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to + ask you the very same question—What do you want? And what is your + motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of + coming? (Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should + greatly like to know. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will + be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor + who will remain, and will not run away? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling + to end as I have hitherto been to begin. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one + who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an effort, + and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to + confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw + you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in + the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which + you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye + on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: + Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are + forbidden to make any further acquisition?—I verily believe that you + would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at + present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will + come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are + more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and + having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the state. When + you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go on to other + Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who + inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you + again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross + over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you + would choose to live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must + be filled with your power and name—no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes + is of any account with you. Such I know to be your hopes—I am not + guessing only—and very likely you, who know that I am speaking the + truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the + explanation which you promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that + is what I am now going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. + The explanation is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished + by you without my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to + have over you and your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why + the God has hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been + long expecting his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great + value to the state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute + power, so do I indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you, + if I am able to prove my own great value to you, and to show you that + neither guardian, nor kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your + hands the power which you desire, but I only, God being my helper. When + you were young (compare Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I + should have wasted my time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade + me to converse with you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for + now you will listen to me. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never + could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to + speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a + matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and + therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, + that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance + necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you + are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, + that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant + me one little favour. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Not at all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then please to answer. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Ask me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what + more you have to say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little + while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that + when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, + Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians—do you know + the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?—How + would you answer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter + which I do know better than they. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or + found out yourself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is all. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you + had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you + supposed that you knew? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know + what you are now supposed to know? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your + acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to + my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, + and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your + accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and + I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out + of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give + them advice about writing? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, + in the assembly? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Hardly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise + them? Surely not about building? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor about divination? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or + ignoble—makes no difference. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has + riches, but because he has knowledge? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which + will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about + the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a + physician. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you + will be justified in getting up and advising them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is + what sort of ships they ought to build? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:—is + that the reason? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: It is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other + concerns of the state. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make + peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better + to go to war? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when it is better? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to + close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or + the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics + would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and + how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with + those against whom it is best to wrestle? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And as much as is best? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And at such times as are best? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When it is well to do so? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And as much as is well? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Just so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in + wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell + me what this latter is;—the excellence of wrestling I call + gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is + universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: You did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I was right? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I think that you were. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, now,—for you should learn to argue prettily—let + me ask you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing + and singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,—what is + the name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the + Goddesses who are the patronesses of art? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after + them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art + of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was + gymnastic—what is the excellence of music—to be what? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of + war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more + gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the + more excellent in war and peace? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to him—This + food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said + to you—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would + have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although + you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which + you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and + advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be + able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of + 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those + against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against + one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we + give them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been + employed, or that we have been defrauded. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be + a difference in the manner. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these + things justly or unjustly? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Exactly. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and + unjust. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or + with the unjust? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person + did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were + just. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in + going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought + not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you + do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my + knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who + is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you + shall introduce me. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the + God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am + not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the + knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought + that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you + say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and + enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that + our discussion may not be in vain. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you + knew all the same? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child—were you + not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, + or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not + hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very + confident—crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a + cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did + not know whether you were wronged or not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the + nature of just and unjust? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when did you discover them—not, surely, at the time + when you thought that you knew them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant—if you + consider, you will find that there never was such a time? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; + now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do + you come to know them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them + through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the + same way that other people learn. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Of the many. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your teachers. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you + would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than + justice? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far + better things than to play at draughts. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What things? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I + cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge + of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of + Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought + to have. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What qualities? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any + teacher? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they + differ? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: They cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the + nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they + are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece + of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty + nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are + agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states + use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some + another. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: They do not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in + sending him to be taught by our friends the many? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and + which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would + the many still be able to inform us? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these + things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never + agreed about them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, + but what healthy or diseased men are like—would the many be able to + teach us? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: They would not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these + matters, if you saw them at variance? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one + another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: None. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling + over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to + war and kill one another for the sake of them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you + have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including + Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and + Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with + Odysseus. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at + Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father + Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice—this was the + sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are + quarrelling to the death? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the + teachers to whom you are appealing. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and + injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned + them of others nor discovered them yourself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades! + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: In what respect? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In saying that I say so. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and + unjust? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No; I did not. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Did I, then? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: How was that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater + number, two or one; you would reply 'two'? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And by how much greater? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: By one. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who answer + me? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I am. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up + the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I am. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question + and answer, who is the speaker,—the questioner or the answerer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you the answerer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Just so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, + not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did + understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what + he did not know? Was not that said? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of + Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not + from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but + you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, + the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have + not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the + Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see + no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which + course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between + justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by + their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so + much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient + for mankind, or why a thing is expedient? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?—But I am not going to be asked again + from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be + refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different + refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no + longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. + Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,—Where + did you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is + your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will + manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you + know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered + it yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste + of a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what + is expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply + request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency + are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have + examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by + yourself. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to + discuss the matter with you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the + ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men + individually. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual + singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, + for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and + persuade many? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can + persuade many? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you + know? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, + and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to + persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude + can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that + the just is not always expedient. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that + which you will not prove to me. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Proceed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Answer my questions—that is all. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I think not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that + the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe + another man again. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to + any harm. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether + you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was + dishonourable and yet just? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Never. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All just things are honourable? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, + or are they always good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are + evil. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:—In time of war, + men have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, + when others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in + safety? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in + respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is + courage? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and + the death another? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of + view, but evil in another? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now whether + I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage which is + shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or evil? Look + at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or evil? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and + would least like to be deprived of them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be + willing to be deprived of courage? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and + cowardice? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their + opposites you would least desire? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death + and cowardice the worst? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, + in as much as courage does a good work? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:—You + may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, + and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and + dishonourable in so far as they are evil? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is + honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is + good and yet evil? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor + anything base, regarded as base, good. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts + honourably acts well? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Of course. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And happiness is a good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Manifestly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we + shall also find to be good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Expedient. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly + must also act honourably. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should infer so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you + answer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the + expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, + pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up + to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just + may be the evil? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am + saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me + I am of different minds in successive instants. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my + friend? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have + two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you + would then be of different minds in successive instants? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I + should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you + would know? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is + clearly that you are ignorant? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, + honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, + the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. + Is not that clear? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed + about that of which he has no knowledge? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Tell me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you + do not think that you know. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which + you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the + preparation of food. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of + food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The latter. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by + considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do + you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you + know that you do not know it? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I imagine not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are + likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what + we are doing? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their + business to others? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make + mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are + ignorant? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of + course, be those who know? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do + not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think + that they know. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is + mischievous? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with + the greatest matters? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: By far. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the + honourable, the good, and the expedient? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There cannot be. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has + shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being + ignorant you fancy that you know them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like + to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, + you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you + are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own + argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. + Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of + almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, + Pericles. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom + by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the + philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now + in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was + unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you + letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked + wise. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he + thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making + his sons wise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, + what has that to do with the matter? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were + simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be + as you are? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond + or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles,—as + I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of + Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which + privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae + (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their wisdom and fame. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain + as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you + speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree + with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite + uneducated. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What is the inference? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained + athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and + experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians + without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning + and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get + the better of them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your noble + form and your high estate! + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: At what? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is + with people here. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, + would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while + acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look + to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow + combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not + even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will + do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which + you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action + really worthy of yourself and of the state. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are + better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior + and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the + generals of the enemy. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with + the Lacedaemonians and with the great king? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True enough. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be + right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your + true rivals? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought + rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like + him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may + still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as + on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and + not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not + trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: + there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or + practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter + on a political career. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not + suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really + different from anybody else. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of + yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are + not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take + care of yourself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of + yours is bad. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: How so? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in + noble races or not in noble races? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be + perfect in virtue? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the + Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have + we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from + Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go + back to Perseus, son of Zeus? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus! + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, + son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they are + descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings—either kings of Argos + and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of + Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times + sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but + private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a + display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of + Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before + Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them + both in the derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you + never observe how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their + wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers + and watch over them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of + the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; + for no one entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia + can be any one but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of + the queen, that any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the + kingdom is born, all the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his + birth is for ever afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by + all Asia; whereas, when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet + says, the neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth + of the royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, + but by the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of + him, and especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, + in order that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, + they are held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years + old he is put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to + go out hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the + royal schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, + reputed to be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of + them is the wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a + fourth the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of + Zoroaster, the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and + teaches him also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the + justest, teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most + temperate, forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he + may be accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,—lord of himself + first, and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and + fearless, telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; + whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a + slave of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture + and education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have + said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only to + remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or nurture + or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he + has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on the wealth, the + luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the anointings with myrrh, + the multitudes of attendants, and all the other bravery of the Persians, + you will be ashamed when you discern your own inferiority; or if you look + at the temperance and orderliness and ease and grace and magnanimity and + courage and endurance and love of toil and desire of glory and ambition of + the Lacedaemonians—in all these respects you will see that you are + but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of wealth, if you + value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you stand; for if you + form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that + our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here can compete with + them either in the extent and fertility of their own and the Messenian + territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, + or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the Messenian + pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and silver, there + is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, for during + many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from the whole + Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never going out, as + in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of + those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money + going out of Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the + inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that + their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these + things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very + considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the + wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the + Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person + who went up to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of + excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of + the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her + veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved + for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several + habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were + to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to + her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty + minae—and that will be more than the value—and she has a son + who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a + mind to go to war with your son—would she not wonder to what this + Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would + say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom—these are the things + which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making + the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and + when his lover tells him that he ought to get education and training + first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is + well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On what, then, + does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his beauty, and + stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think that we were + mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you possess with + those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, the daughter of + Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were + kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, + you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she too would be equally + astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion + of what is required in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the + qualities which are required in their assailants! O my friend, be + persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'—not + the men whom you think, but these kings are our rivals, and we can only + overcome them by pains and skill. And if you fail in the required + qualities, you will fail also in becoming renowned among Hellenes and + Barbarians, which you seem to desire more than any other man ever desired + anything. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which + are required, Socrates,—can you tell me? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the + manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you + of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and + there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What is that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, + Pericles. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to + converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially + designed to bring you to honour. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly + need pains and care, and you and I above all men. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But what can we do? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we not + wish to be as good as possible? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: We do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Who are good in what? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the + unwise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The wise. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of + shoes? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he is good in that? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also + bad? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But over men? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When they are sick? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or on a voyage? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using one + another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the + services of other men? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the + rowers? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No; they are not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who + lead the singers and use the services of the dancers? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use + other men? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of + citizenship, and dealings with one another. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, + as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their + fellow-sailors,—how would you answer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables + them to rule over their fellow-singers? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now + mentioning. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But good counsel? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,—good counsel, of which + the aim is the preservation of the voyagers. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which + you speak? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and + preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that + of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the + body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. + You would say the same? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I + should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of + blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and + were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in + them. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence + or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:—the presence of friendship and + the absence of hatred and division. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Agreement. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And private individuals? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The same. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: The same. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the + comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of + measure? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, + equally? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about + what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to + the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent + with himself and with another? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?—answer, and faint + not. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and + agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their + son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning + of wool, which she understands and he does not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No, truly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, + which she has never learned? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a + male accomplishment? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: It would. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There is not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Plainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: No. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own + work? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the + truth. (Compare Republic.) + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when + friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone + secures their good order? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this + very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean + now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How + can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of + which the other is in ignorance? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing + what is just or unjust? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no + friendship among them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about + which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I + cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same + persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I + have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your + deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of + yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the + discovery should be made. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by + the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very + improving to both of us. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by + appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when + we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when + does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what + belongs to him? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I should think so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of + them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I do not understand. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong + to the finger, and to the finger only? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our + feet? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a + thing is a correct expression? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other + art which improves the feet? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: By some other art. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of + the body? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of + that which belongs to our feet? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of + graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of + weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from + that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care + of yourself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be + the same as that which takes care of ourselves? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care + of ourselves? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not + one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if + we did not know a shoe? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not + know a ring? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not + know what we are ourselves? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be + lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is + self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at + other times the task appears to be very difficult. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no + other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of + ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be + discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own + existence, which otherwise we can never know. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: You say truly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing?—with + whom but with me? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As I am, with you? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I in talking use words? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: To be sure. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, + and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Of course not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be + distinguished from the harper himself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: It is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user + to be always different from that which he uses? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his + tools only or with his hands? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He uses his hands too? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He does. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which + he uses? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from + the hands and feet which they use? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is the inference. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What is he, then? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the soul rules? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally + admitted. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What is it? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That man is one of three things. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What are they? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body + is man? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: It would seem not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, + and consequently that this is man? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is + subject, the two united cannot possibly rule. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, + either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Just so. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall + be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have + discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry + would be too much protracted. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What was that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first + considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been + considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be + sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly + ourselves than the soul? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There is nothing. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with + one another, soul to soul? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before—that I, + Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with + the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his + soul? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of + a man, and not the man himself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the + trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He does not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing + themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? + When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even + further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of + the body, which minister to the body. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his + art none of them is temperate? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and + are not such as a good man would practise? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what + belongs to him? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor + his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I agree. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his + own concerns? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, + he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul + follows after virtue? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when + you are no longer young and the rest are gone? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you + will remain. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I will. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son + of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and + he is his darling,—Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on + the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other + men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading + away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never + desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; + for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the + people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined + in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair + countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution + which I give you. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What caution? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to + know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote + which will keep you out of harm's way. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me + in what way I am to take care of myself. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably + well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we + once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of + something which is not ourselves. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to + that? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very good. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the + soul?—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. + Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian + inscription, of which we were just now speaking? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of + that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine + to be the only one suitable to my purpose. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as + you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of + this precept? Would not his meaning be:—That the eye should look at + that in which it would see itself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror + in our own eyes? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into + the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ + which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort + of image of the person looking? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is quite true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye + which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there + see itself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and + not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and + at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye + resides? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, + must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in + which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that + which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: There is none. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; + and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be + most likely to know himself? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know + our own good and evil? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no + possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really + his? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything + belonged, if we did not know ourselves? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: How could we? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we + know the belongings of our belongings? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that + a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather + he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment + of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of + self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in + like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the + affairs of states? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Nor an economist? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He will not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public + and private capacity? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, very. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is + delivered from his misery? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or + triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue? + (Compare Arist. Pol.) + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer + their affairs rightly or nobly? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not + only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of + the state, must in the first place acquire virtue. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to + enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and + wisdom. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act + according to the will of God? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and + divine, and act with a view to them? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own + good? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I accept the security. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and + godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will + probably do deeds of darkness. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Very possibly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he + likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either + to him as an individual or to the state—for example, if he be sick + and is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician—having + moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will + happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he + likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will + happen to him and to his fellow-sailors? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and + authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, + ensue? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the + aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is + better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.) + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: True. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know + whether you are a freeman or not? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even + like to name to my beauty? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: How? + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: By the help of God. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to + be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have + followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the + stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched. + </p> + <p> + ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think + about justice. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not + because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too + much for both of us. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Alcibiades I, by (may be spurious) Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ALCIBIADES I *** + +***** This file should be named 1676-h.htm or 1676-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/7/1676/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Alcibiades I + +Author: (may be spurious) Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: September 21, 2008 [EBook #1676] +Release Date: March, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ALCIBIADES I *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by Plato (may be spurious--see Appendix I) + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +APPENDIX I. + +It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings +of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is +of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of +a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the +Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty +concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to +him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, +and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are +taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular +author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the +genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are +more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous +designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as +epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than +others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the +ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, +or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be +detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really +occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while +there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery, +which combines excellence with length. A really great and original +writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the +forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the +Gods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to +balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not +forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of +his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the +next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and +mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in +the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and +without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding, +or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed +to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once +appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to +blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars. +To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was +not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the +Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature +which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the +question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost +literature had been preserved to us. + +These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of +genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle +attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) +great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of +the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always +be distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various +degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning +Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the +Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They +may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in +the case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; +those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective +in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that +Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars +in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more +important work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was +living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during +the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all +his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes +any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And +lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the +Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian +(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2) +length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit +of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the +genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads +only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of +evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. + +Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion +that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been +ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of +them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by +the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, +Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and +external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there +still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either +that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, +or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly +the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some +contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of +Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to +imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy +we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority +of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered +decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to +himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not +Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the +formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings +are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with +the Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during +a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age +of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary +transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated +from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation +as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle. + +The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and +which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic +writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the +First Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration +are cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the +Rhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his +citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the +extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by +Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second +dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a +Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does +to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very +clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain +anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student +of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading +thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., and there is +no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an +undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the +genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic +spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and +treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will +detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning +upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is +ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last +point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the +author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely +following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion +is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier +dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, +and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with +certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more +may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it. + +The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is +interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators +praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and +dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. +It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and +was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the +proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The +satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to +the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, +like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by +a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of +Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have +suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to +be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to +Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages +in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be +founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody +appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the +Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + +To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First +Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the +greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not +verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance +with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates +and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be +compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may, +perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades +describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the +disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue +there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson +imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted +dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite +thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed +current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates +and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for +the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as +trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of +poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have +express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing +the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the +genuineness of the extant dialogue. + +Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an +absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of +Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may +have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there +are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The +traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have +formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the +same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, +although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato, +unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with +the writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite +form, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which +we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may +be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether +spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor +can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and +the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged +against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly) +of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can +we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually +rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be +genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require +more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and +with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we +can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as +genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained +and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but +should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor +disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are +as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the +Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine. + +On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under +the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients +themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly +doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change +and growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That +twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment +of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some +interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance +to the general reader. + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. +Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself +in the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in +others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; +in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that +of a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told +differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades +is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly +receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies +in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth. + +Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on +public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant +ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a +revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary +for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians--about +what? Not about any particular art, but about politics--when to fight +and when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just +grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter +into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the +difference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must +either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the +nature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to +be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades +admits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He +may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But +he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he +charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just +and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had learned of the +multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of +justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this Socrates +answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; for +they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other: +and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must +either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the +nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth. + +Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, +but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of +justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, +compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. +Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows +nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the +expedient. + +However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not +need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that +he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their +enemies--with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and +he can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of +Socrates. Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained the +truth, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of +themselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue. + +The dialogue continues:--We wish to become as good as possible. But to +be good in what? Alcibiades replies--'Good in transacting business.' But +what business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.' The +cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he +is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in +the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean,' replies +Alcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.' But to command +what--horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I mean +to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political +relations.' And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of the +city.' But when is a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such as +exists between husband and wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform +their own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor +can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only. +Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity +of the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work, +is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to +confess his own ignorance. + +But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he +is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that +is to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or +truer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows +his own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves. +Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue +of the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image +in another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what +belongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part +in political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of the +state, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or +power. The evil and unjust should have no power,--they should be +the slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are +deserving of freedom. + +And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, +Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward +I will never leave you.' + +The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted +dialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind +with that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the +Euthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the +answers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is +narrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical +with knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness +not of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to +knowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he +is, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his +life, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soul +is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under +the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for +the consciousness of sin. + +In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic +composition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process +by which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic +writings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of +humour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks +generally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian +queens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But we +have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so +profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades +and Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin and +superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he would have ascribed +to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Alcibiades +could not attain the objects of his ambition without his help; or that +he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have +been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the +arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer +of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and +tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of +making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, +Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, +which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian +statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There +is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little +dramatic verisimilitude. + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates. + + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of +Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you +for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with their +attentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The +cause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more +than human, of which I will some day explain to you the nature; this +impediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself before +you, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur. +Meanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for the +pride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they +have all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; not +one of them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why you +have been too much for them. You think that you have no need of them +or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing, +beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first +place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the +citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the +second place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected +both on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the +most distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in +Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can +assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more +to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your +father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he +pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and +mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that +you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these +things have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have +acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked +their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of +them, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining. + +ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going +to ask you the very same question--What do you want? And what is your +motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of +coming? (Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should +greatly like to know. + +SOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you +will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an +auditor who will remain, and will not run away? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as +unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin. + +ALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen. + +SOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with +one who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an +effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly +like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, +if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to +pass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts +of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have +always had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to +you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant +if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?--I verily believe +that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you +are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you +will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that +you are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever +lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the +state. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go +on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the +barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were +then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire, +and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I +do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the +world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name--no man +less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be +your hopes--I am not guessing only--and very likely you, who know that +I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have +my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your +unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you, +sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation is, that all these +designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great +is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns; +and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden +me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission. +For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having +proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope +that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own +great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman, +nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you +desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare +Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my +time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with +you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will +listen to me. + +ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never +could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun +to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, +is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and +therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if +I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your +assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why? + +SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you +are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, +that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant +me one little favour. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. + +SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? + +ALCIBIADES: Not at all. + +SOCRATES: Then please to answer. + +ALCIBIADES: Ask me. + +SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? + +ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what +more you have to say. + +SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in +a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And +suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve +and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do you +know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than +they?--How would you answer? + +ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a +matter which I do know better than they. + +SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, +or found out yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is all. + +SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you +had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: I should not. + +SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what +you supposed that you knew? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know +what you are now supposed to know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your +acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according +to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the +lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum +of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in +secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not +have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing +you. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling. + +SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give +them advice about writing? + +ALCIBIADES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, +in the assembly? + +ALCIBIADES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise +them? Surely not about building? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that? + +ALCIBIADES: He will. + +SOCRATES: Nor about divination? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or +ignoble--makes no difference. + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has +riches, but because he has knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter +which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are +deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he +should be a physician. + +ALCIBIADES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you +will be justified in getting up and advising them? + +ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is +what sort of ships they ought to build? + +ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that. + +SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is +that the reason? + +ALCIBIADES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? + +ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other +concerns of the state. + +SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make +peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is +better to go to war? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when it is better? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought +to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would +you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics. + +SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics +would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and +how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with +those against whom it is best to wrestle? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And as much as is best? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And at such times as are best? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and +dance? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When it is well to do so? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And as much as is well? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in +wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would +tell me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I call +gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other. + +ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you. + +SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is +universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: You did. + +SOCRATES: And I was right? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that you were. + +SOCRATES: Well, now,--for you should learn to argue prettily--let me ask +you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and +singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,--what is the +name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell. + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call +the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art? + +ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called +after them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the +art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was +gymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what? + +ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose. + +SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of +war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more +gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to +the more excellent in war and peace? + +ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you. + +SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to +him--This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, +and he said to you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word +'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more +wholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the +subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which +you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, +when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not +disgraceful? + +ALCIBIADES: Very. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning +of 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those +against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer? + +ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell. + +SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring +against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what +name we give them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been +employed, or that we have been defrauded. + +SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may +be a difference in the manner. + +ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these +things justly or unjustly? + +SOCRATES: Exactly. + +ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and +unjust. + +SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just +or with the unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person +did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were +just. + +SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? + +ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable. + +SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in +going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or +ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that +you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my +knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? +Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--you +shall introduce me. + +ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the +God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am +not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. + +ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the +knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? + +SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them. + +ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them? + +SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them. + +ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire? + +SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. + +ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think? + +SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you +thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? +What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious +ignorance and enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to +answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain. + +ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew. + +SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, +you knew all the same? + +ALCIBIADES: I did. + +SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. + +ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure? + +SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's +house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, +not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very +confident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a +cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true? + +ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? + +SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you +did not know whether you were wronged or not? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being +cheated. + +SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the +nature of just and unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then. + +SOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time when +you thought that you knew them? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if you +consider, you will find that there never was such a time? + +ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by +learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and +whence do you come to know them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them +through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in +the same way that other people learn. + +SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me. + +ALCIBIADES: Of the many. + +SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your +teachers. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach? + +SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you +would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than +justice? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the +worse? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far +better things than to play at draughts. + +SOCRATES: What things? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I +cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge +of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers +of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly +praised. + +ALCIBIADES: Why is that? + +SOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought +to have. + +ALCIBIADES: What qualities? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any +teacher? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they +differ? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them? + +ALCIBIADES: They cannot. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the +nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they +are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a +piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be +pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are +agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states +use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some +another. + +ALCIBIADES: They do not. + +SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right +in sending him to be taught by our friends the many? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and +which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would +the many still be able to inform us? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these +things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never +agreed about them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, +but what healthy or diseased men are like--would the many be able to +teach us? + +ALCIBIADES: They would not. + +SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of +these matters, if you saw them at variance? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one +another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance? + +ALCIBIADES: None. + +SOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling +over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to +war and kill one another for the sake of them? + +ALCIBIADES: No indeed. + +SOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if +you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, +including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those +poems? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans +and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel +with Odysseus. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell +at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your +father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice--this was +the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are +quarrelling to the death? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the +teachers to whom you are appealing. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and +injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned +them of others nor discovered them yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades! + +ALCIBIADES: In what respect? + +SOCRATES: In saying that I say so. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and +unjust? + +SOCRATES: No; I did not. + +ALCIBIADES: Did I, then? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +ALCIBIADES: How was that? + +SOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater +number, two or one; you would reply 'two'? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: And by how much greater? + +ALCIBIADES: By one. + +SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who +answer me? + +ALCIBIADES: I am. + +SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make +up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? + +ALCIBIADES: I am. + +SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a +question and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the +answerer? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. + +SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you the answerer? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker? + +ALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. + +SOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of +Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he +did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about +what he did not know? Was not that said? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language +of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and +not from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, +but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear +fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, +and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. + +ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of +the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they +see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider +which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference +between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and +profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no +good. + +SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so +much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient +for mankind, or why a thing is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked again +from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. + +SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be +refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different +refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no +longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and +new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over +again,--Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the +expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single +question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and +will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you +learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive +that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will +enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is +not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say +why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or +different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you, +or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself. + +ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to +discuss the matter with you. + +SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the +ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men +individually. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual +singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The +grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about +letters. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and +persuade many? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician? + +ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can +persuade many? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you +know? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are +doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one +seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same +things. + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude +can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that +the just is not always expedient. + +ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of +that which you will not prove to me. + +ALCIBIADES: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all. + +ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. + +SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? + +ALCIBIADES: I think not. + +SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that +the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe +another man again. + +ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come +to any harm. + +SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether +you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not? + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was +dishonourable and yet just? + +ALCIBIADES: Never. + +SOCRATES: All just things are honourable? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not +good, or are they always good? + +ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are +evil. + +SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men +have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when +others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in +safety? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, +in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this +is courage? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and +the death another? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of +view, but evil in another? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now +whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage +which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or +evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or +evil? + +ALCIBIADES: Good. + +SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and +would least like to be deprived of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be +willing to be deprived of courage? + +ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward. + +SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and +cowardice? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their +opposites you would least desire? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death +and cowardice the worst? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle +honourable, in as much as courage does a good work? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--You +may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, +and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and +dishonourable in so far as they are evil? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is +honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is +good and yet evil? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor +anything base, regarded as base, good. + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who +acts honourably acts well? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? + +ALCIBIADES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And happiness is a good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified. + +ALCIBIADES: Manifestly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we +shall also find to be good? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not? + +ALCIBIADES: Expedient. + +SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted +justly must also act honourably. + +SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: I should infer so. + +SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you +answer? + +ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true. + +SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the +expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, +pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets +up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the +just may be the evil? + +ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am +saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to +me I am of different minds in successive instants. + +SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my +friend? + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. + +SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you +have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, +you would then be of different minds in successive instants? + +ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that +I should. + +SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because you +would know? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is +clearly that you are ignorant? + +ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, +honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, +the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in +perplexity. Is not that clear? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily +perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you? + +ALCIBIADES: Tell me. + +SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but +you do not think that you know. + +ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which +you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the +preparation of food. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of +food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art? + +ALCIBIADES: The latter. + +SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by +considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do +you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing? + +ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. + +SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you +know that you do not know it? + +ALCIBIADES: I imagine not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice +are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of +knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what +we are doing? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust +their business to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make +mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they +are ignorant? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of +course, be those who know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they +do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and +think that they know. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those. + +SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is +mischievous? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do +with the greatest matters? + +ALCIBIADES: By far. + +SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the +honourable, the good, and the expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: There cannot be. + +SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has +shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being +ignorant you fancy that you know them? + +ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right. + +SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly +like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good +friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of +this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by +your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are +educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say +the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of +your guardian, Pericles. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his +wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of +the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, +and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who +was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught +you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he +liked wise. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he +thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter. + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by +making his sons wise? + +ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, +what has that to do with the matter? + +SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise? + +ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him. + +SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were +simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you +be as you are? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him. + +SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, +bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of +Pericles,--as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and +Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of +Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of +a hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their +wisdom and fame. + +ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one. + +SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain +as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you +speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I +agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite +uneducated. + +SOCRATES: What is the inference? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained +athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge +and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become +politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble +of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature +I shall get the better of them. + +SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your +noble form and your high estate! + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love. + +ALCIBIADES: At what? + +SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is +with people here. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there? + +SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask? + +ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these? + +SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, +would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, +while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, +rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your +fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they +will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as +inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind +of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to +accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state. + +ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim. + +SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are +better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior +and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the +generals of the enemy. + +ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then +with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king? + +ALCIBIADES: True enough. + +SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not +be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were +your true rivals? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right. + +SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought +rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others +like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, +you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds +as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to +flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and +then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in +such a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what +has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when +thoroughly prepared enter on a political career. + +ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not +suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really +different from anybody else. + +SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying. + +ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of +yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you +are not? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them. + +SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take +care of yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited. + +SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of +yours is bad. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably +false. + +ALCIBIADES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found +in noble races or not in noble races? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races. + +SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to +be perfect in virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the +Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? +Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the +latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of +Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus! + +SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, +son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they +are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings--either kings +of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the +descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at +various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our +fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if +you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island +of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient +Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how +inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other +particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the +Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori, +who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as +far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the +difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that +the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is +the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is +needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of +the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept +as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and +I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly +knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is +tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the +royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with +the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may +be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in +great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put +upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out +hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal +schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to +be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the +wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth +the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, +the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him +also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, +teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, +forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be +accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,--lord of himself first, +and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, +telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas +Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave +of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and +education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have +said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only +to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or +nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, +unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on +the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the +anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other +bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own +inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease +and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil +and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all these +respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them. +Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must +reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth +of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short +of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent +and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number +of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of +the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough +of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon +than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has +been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often +from the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop +the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in +are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of +Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are +the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are +the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and +they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet +the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the +other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and +their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up +to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellent +land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the +country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her +veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved +for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several +habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one +were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and +say to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not +worth fifty minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has a +son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he +has a mind to go to war with your son--would she not wonder to what this +Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would +say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom--these are the things +which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who +is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly +uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education +and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says +that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On +what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his +beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think +that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you +possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido, +the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis, +all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present +uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she +too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not +have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies' +wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their +assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian +inscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but these kings +are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And +if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming +renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more +than any other man ever desired anything. + +ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which +are required, Socrates,--can you tell me? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the +manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling +you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; +and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you. + +ALCIBIADES: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, +Pericles. + +ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to +converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially +designed to bring you to honour. + +ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men +greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men. + +ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me. + +SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself. + +ALCIBIADES: But what can we do? + +SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend. + +ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we +not wish to be as good as possible? + +ALCIBIADES: We do. + +SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men. + +SOCRATES: Who are good in what? + +ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs. + +SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them? + +ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen. + +SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the +unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: The wise. + +SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making +of shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he is good in that? + +ALCIBIADES: He is. + +SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and +also bad? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good? + +ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city. + +SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But over men? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When they are sick? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Or on a voyage? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing? + +ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say. + +SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is. + +ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using +one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life. + +SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the +services of other men? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the +rowers? + +ALCIBIADES: No; they are not. + +SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who +lead the singers and use the services of the dancers? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who +use other men? + +ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of +citizenship, and dealings with one another. + +SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you +again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their +fellow-sailors,--how would you answer? + +ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot. + +SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables +them to rule over their fellow-singers? + +ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just +now mentioning. + +SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: But good counsel? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,--good counsel, of which the +aim is the preservation of the voyagers. + +SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which +you speak? + +ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city. + +SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves +and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is +that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order +of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of +disease. You would say the same? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I +should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of +blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved +and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was +present in them. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the +presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed +and ordered? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and the +absence of hatred and division. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement? + +ALCIBIADES: Agreement. + +SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers? + +ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic. + +SOCRATES: And private individuals? + +ALCIBIADES: The same. + +SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself? + +ALCIBIADES: The same. + +SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the +comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of +measure? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and +states, equally? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about +what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to +the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent +with himself and with another? + +ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so. + +SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faint +not. + +ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and +agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their +son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife. + +SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the +spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not? + +ALCIBIADES: No, truly. + +SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, +which she has never learned? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a +male accomplishment? + +ALCIBIADES: It would. + +SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of +knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and +men? + +ALCIBIADES: There is not. + +SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? + +ALCIBIADES: Plainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their +own work? + +ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the +truth. (Compare Republic.) + +SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered +when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, +alone secures their good order? + +ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for +this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. + +SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean +now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How +can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of +which the other is in ignorance? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing +what is just or unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no +friendship among them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about +which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? +I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the +same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. + +ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I +have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. + +SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your +deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of +yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the +discovery should be made. + +ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the +discovery? + +SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, +by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very +improving to both of us. + +ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. + +SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived +by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves +when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? +and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes +care of what belongs to him? + +ALCIBIADES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care +of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? + +ALCIBIADES: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring +belong to the finger, and to the finger only? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our +feet? + +ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a +thing is a correct expression? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking. + +SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some +other art which improves the feet? + +ALCIBIADES: By some other art. + +SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of +the body? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking +of that which belongs to our feet? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of +graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of +weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from +that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take +care of yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to +be the same as that which takes care of ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care +of ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is +not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves +better? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if +we did not know a shoe? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not +know a ring? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not +know what we are ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be +lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is +self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? + +ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; +at other times the task appears to be very difficult. + +SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is +no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of +ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be +discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own +existence, which otherwise we can never know. + +ALCIBIADES: You say truly. + +SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are +conversing?--with whom but with me? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: As I am, with you? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And I in talking use words? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square +tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the +tool? + +ALCIBIADES: Of course not. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be +distinguished from the harper himself? + +ALCIBIADES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the +user to be always different from that which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his +tools only or with his hands? + +ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well. + +SOCRATES: He uses his hands too? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? + +ALCIBIADES: He does. + +SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things +which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from +the hands and feet which they use? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body? + +ALCIBIADES: That is the inference. + +SOCRATES: What is he, then? + +ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul. + +SOCRATES: And the soul rules? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally +admitted. + +ALCIBIADES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That man is one of three things. + +ALCIBIADES: What are they? + +SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the +body is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did. + +SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking? + +ALCIBIADES: It would seem not. + +SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, +and consequently that this is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is +subject, the two united cannot possibly rule. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, +either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient. + +SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we +shall be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we have +discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry +would be too much protracted. + +ALCIBIADES: What was that? + +SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be +first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been +considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, +be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more +properly ourselves than the soul? + +ALCIBIADES: There is nothing. + +SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with +one another, soul to soul? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates, +am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real +Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his +soul? + +ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true. + +SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things +of a man, and not the man himself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the +trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself? + +ALCIBIADES: He does not. + +SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from +knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own +belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise +they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know +the belongings of the body, which minister to the body. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his +art none of them is temperate? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, +and are not such as a good man would practise? + +ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but +what belongs to him? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor +his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his +own concerns? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of +Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover? + +ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference. + +SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth +fades? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul +follows after virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, +when you are no longer young and the rest are gone? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you +will remain. + +SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best. + +ALCIBIADES: I will. + +SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the +son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any +other; and he is his darling,--Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and +Phaenarete. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were +on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas +other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, +is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will +never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian +people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover +of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has +been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is +of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe +the caution which I give you. + +ALCIBIADES: What caution? + +SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to +know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote +which will keep you out of harm's way. + +ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to +me in what way I am to take care of myself. + +SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably +well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as +we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of +something which is not ourselves. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look +to that? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to +others? + +ALCIBIADES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the +soul?--For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. +Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian +inscription, of which we were just now speaking? + +ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson +of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I +imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose. + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' +as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and +meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should +look at that in which it would see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. + +SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a +mirror in our own eyes? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into +the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ +which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a +sort of image of the person looking? + +ALCIBIADES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye +which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there +see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, +and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, +and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye +resides? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, +must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul +in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that +which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: There is none. + +SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; +and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will +be most likely to know himself? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever +know our own good and evil? + +ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would +be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was +really his? + +ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible. + +SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything +belonged, if we did not know ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: How could we? + +SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we +know the belongings of our belongings? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now +that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, +rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the +discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the +things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of +the same art. + +ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed. + +SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will +in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know +the affairs of states? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor an economist? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing? + +ALCIBIADES: He will not. + +SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public +and private capacity? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable? + +ALCIBIADES: Very. + +SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting? + +ALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, very. + +SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is +delivered from his misery? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or +triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue? +(Compare Arist. Pol.) + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not. + +SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to +administer their affairs rightly or nobly? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not +only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of +the state, must in the first place acquire virtue. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in +order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but +justice and wisdom. + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act +according to the will of God? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright +and divine, and act with a view to them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own +good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness. + +ALCIBIADES: I accept the security. + +SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark +and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will +probably do deeds of darkness. + +ALCIBIADES: Very possibly. + +SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he +likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either +to him as an individual or to the state--for example, if he be sick and +is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician--having +moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will +happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he +likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will +happen to him and to his fellow-sailors? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power +and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like +manner, ensue? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the +aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is +better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.) + +ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be +avoided? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know +whether you are a freeman or not? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state. + +SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not +even like to name to my beauty? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: How? + +ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades. + +ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said? + +SOCRATES: By the help of God. + +ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely +to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you +have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. + +SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the +stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched. + +ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think +about justice. + +SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not +because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too +much for both of us. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Alcibiades I, by (may be spurious) Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ALCIBIADES I *** + +***** This file should be named 1676.txt or 1676.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/7/1676/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon + University" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". + +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by Plato (see Appendix I) + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +APPENDIX I. + +It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings of +Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is of +much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of a +century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the +Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty +concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to +him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato, and +some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are taken. +Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular author, +general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the genuineness +of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are more likely to +have been forged, or to have received an erroneous designation, than longer +ones; and some kinds of composition, such as epistles or panegyrical +orations, are more liable to suspicion than others; those, again, which +have a taste of sophistry in them, or the ring of a later age, or the +slighter character of a rhetorical exercise, or in which a motive or some +affinity to spurious writings can be detected, or which seem to have +originated in a name or statement really occurring in some classical +author, are also of doubtful credit; while there is no instance of any +ancient writing proved to be a forgery, which combines excellence with +length. A really great and original writer would have no object in +fathering his works on Plato; and to the forger or imitator, the 'literary +hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the Gods did not grant originality or +genius. Further, in attempting to balance the evidence for and against a +Platonic dialogue, we must not forget that the form of the Platonic writing +was common to several of his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, +Antisthenes, and in the next generation Aristotle, are all said to have +composed dialogues; and mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. +Greek literature in the third century before Christ was almost as +voluminous as our own, and without the safeguards of regular publication, +or printing, or binding, or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing +was naturally attributed to a known writer whose works bore the same +character; and the name once appended easily obtained authority. A +tendency may also be observed to blend the works and opinions of the master +with those of his scholars. To a later Platonist, the difference between +Plato and his imitators was not so perceptible as to ourselves. The +Memorabilia of Xenophon and the Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a +considerable Socratic literature which has passed away. And we must +consider how we should regard the question of the genuineness of a +particular writing, if this lost literature had been preserved to us. + +These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of +genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle attributes +to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3) great +excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of the Platonic +writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always be distinguished +from that of a later age (see above); and has various degrees of +importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning Plato, under +their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the Phaedo, etc., +have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They may have been +supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in the case of +really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible; those again +which are quoted but not named, are still more defective in their external +credentials. There may be also a possibility that Aristotle was mistaken, +or may have confused the master and his scholars in the case of a short +writing; but this is inconceivable about a more important work, e.g. the +Laws, especially when we remember that he was living at Athens, and a +frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during the last twenty years of +Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all his numerous citations from +the Platonic writings he never attributes any passage found in the extant +dialogues to any one but Plato. And lastly, we may remark that one or two +great writings, such as the Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly +devoid of Aristotelian (1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, +on the ground of (2) length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the +general spirit of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence +for the genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two +heads only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of +evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value. + +Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion that +nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been ascribed to +Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of them, +including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by the +ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute, Demodocus, +Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and external +evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there still +remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either that they +are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth, or possibly +like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly the compositions +of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some contemporary +transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of Plato, or of some +Platonist in the next generation who aspired to imitate his master. Not +that on grounds either of language or philosophy we should lightly reject +them. Some difference of style, or inferiority of execution, or +inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered decisive of their +spurious character. For who always does justice to himself, or who writes +with equal care at all times? Certainly not Plato, who exhibits the +greatest differences in dramatic power, in the formation of sentences, and +in the use of words, if his earlier writings are compared with his later +ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with the Laws. Or who can be expected +to think in the same manner during a period of authorship extending over +above fifty years, in an age of great intellectual activity, as well as of +political and literary transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier +writings are separated from his later ones by as wide an interval of +philosophical speculation as that which separates his later writings from +Aristotle. + +The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and which +appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic writings, +are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the First +Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration are cited +by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the Rhetoric. +Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his citation of +both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the extant dialogues. +From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by Aristotle, we may perhaps +infer that he was unacquainted with a second dialogue bearing the same +name. Moreover, the mere existence of a Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of +a First and Second Alcibiades, does to a certain extent throw a doubt upon +both of them. Though a very clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias +does not appear to contain anything beyond the power of an imitator, who +was also a careful student of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. +The motive or leading thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., +and there is no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon +in an undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the +genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic +spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and +treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will detect +in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning upon Homer, in +the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is ignorance, traces of +a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last point we are doubtful, as +in some of the other dialogues, whether the author is asserting or +overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely following the argument +'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion is arrived at is also in +accordance with the character of the earlier dialogues. The resemblances +or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Euthydemus, which have been +observed in the Hippias, cannot with certainty be adduced on either side of +the argument. On the whole, more may be said in favour of the genuineness +of the Hippias than against it. + +The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is interesting +as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators praised 'the +Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and dates, and casting a +veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history. It exhibits an +acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and was, perhaps, +intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the proper place of the +Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The satirical opening and +the concluding words bear a great resemblance to the earlier dialogues; the +oration itself is professedly a mimetic work, like the speeches in the +Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by a comparison of the other +writings of Plato. The funeral oration of Pericles is expressly mentioned +in the Phaedrus, and this may have suggested the subject, in the same +manner that the Cleitophon appears to be suggested by the slight mention of +Cleitophon and his attachment to Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the +Theages by the mention of Theages in the Apology and Republic; or as the +Second Alcibiades seems to be founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A +similar taste for parody appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the +Protagoras, in the Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides. + +To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First Alcibiades, +which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the greatest merit, and +is somewhat longer than any of them, though not verified by the testimony +of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance with the Symposium in the +description of the relations of Socrates and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser +Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be compared to the earlier writings of +Plato. The motive of the piece may, perhaps, be found in that passage of +the Symposium in which Alcibiades describes himself as self-convicted by +the words of Socrates. For the disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher +has spoken of this dialogue there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At +the same time, the lesson imparted is simple, and the irony more +transparent than in the undoubted dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that +Alcibiades was a favourite thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues +bearing this name passed current in antiquity, and are attributed to +contemporaries of Socrates and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real +external evidence (for the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot +be regarded as trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks +either of poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we +have express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing +the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the +genuineness of the extant dialogue. + +Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an absolute +line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of Plato. They +fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may have been +degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there are certainly +degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The traditions of the +oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have formed the basis of +semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the same mixed character +which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates, although the form of them +is different. But the writings of Plato, unlike the writings of Aristotle, +seem never to have been confused with the writings of his disciples: this +was probably due to their definite form, and to their inimitable +excellence. The three dialogues which we have offered in the Appendix to +the criticism of the reader may be partly spurious and partly genuine; they +may be altogether spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly +admitted. Nor can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the +Parmenides, and the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection +can be urged against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight +(chiefly) of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, +can we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually +rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be genuine. +The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require more careful +study and more comparison of them with one another, and with forged +writings in general, than they have yet received, before we can finally +decide on their character. We do not consider them all as genuine until +they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained and still more +often implied in this and similar discussions; but should say of some of +them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor disproven until further +evidence about them can be adduced. And we are as confident that the +Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the Timaeus, and the Laws are +genuine. + +On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under the +name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients themselves +and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly doubted by those +who are willing to allow that a considerable change and growth may have +taken place in his philosophy (see above). That twentieth debatable +portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment of Plato, either as a +thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some interesting questions to +the scholar and critic, is of little importance to the general reader. + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. +Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself in +the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in +others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium; +in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that of a +lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told +differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades is +depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly receiving +the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies in wait for +the aspiring and ambitious youth. + +Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on +public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant +ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a +revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary for +carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians--about what? Not +about any particular art, but about politics--when to fight and when to +make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just grounds, and +therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter into peace and +war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the difference between +them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must either have been taught +by some master, or he must have discovered the nature of them himself. If +he has had a master, Socrates would like to be informed who he is, that he +may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades admits that he has never learned. +Then has he enquired for himself? He may have, if he was ever aware of a +time when he was ignorant. But he never was ignorant; for when he played +with other boys at dice, he charged them with cheating, and this implied a +knowledge of just and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had +learned of the multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the +nature of justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this +Socrates answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; +for they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other: +and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must either +have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the nature of +justice, is convicted out of his own mouth. + +Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just, but +about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of justice +and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions, compels +him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide. Alcibiades is thus +reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows nothing of politics, +even if, as he says, they are concerned with the expedient. + +However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not need +training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that he has +to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their enemies--with +the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and he can only attain +this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of Socrates. Not that +Socrates himself professes to have attained the truth, but the questions +which he asks bring others to a knowledge of themselves, and this is the +first step in the practice of virtue. + +The dialogue continues:--We wish to become as good as possible. But to be +good in what? Alcibiades replies--'Good in transacting business.' But +what business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.' The +cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he is +not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in the +sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean,' replies +Alcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.' But to command +what--horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I mean to say, +that he is able to command men living in social and political relations.' +And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of the city.' But when is +a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such as exists between husband +and wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform their own special duties, +there can be no unanimity between them; nor can a city be well ordered when +each citizen does his own work only. Alcibiades, having stated first that +goodness consists in the unanimity of the citizens, and then in each of +them doing his own separate work, is brought to the required point of self- +contradiction, leading him to confess his own ignorance. + +But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he is +willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that is to +say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or truer self. +The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows his own business, but +they do not necessarily know themselves. Self-knowledge can be obtained +only by looking into the mind and virtue of the soul, which is the diviner +part of a man, as we see our own image in another's eye. And if we do not +know ourselves, we cannot know what belongs to ourselves or belongs to +others, and are unfit to take a part in political affairs. Both for the +sake of the individual and of the state, we ought to aim at justice and +temperance, not at wealth or power. The evil and unjust should have no +power,--they should be the slaves of better men than themselves. None but +the virtuous are deserving of freedom. + +And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope, +Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward I +will never leave you.' + +The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted dialogues +of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind with that which +Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the Euthydemus; and he +characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the answers which he has +elicited from him. The definition of good is narrowed by successive +questions, and virtue is shown to be identical with knowledge. Here, as +elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness not of sin but of ignorance. +Self-humiliation is the first step to knowledge, even of the commonest +things. No man knows how ignorant he is, and no man can arrive at virtue +and wisdom who has not once in his life, at least, been convicted of error. +The process by which the soul is elevated is not unlike that which +religious writers describe under the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute +the sense of ignorance for the consciousness of sin. + +In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic composition. +The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process by which the +antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic writings, and +the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of humour in the manner +in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks generally, is supposed +to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian queens; and the dialogue has +considerable dialectical merit. But we have a difficulty in supposing that +the same writer, who has given so profound and complex a notion of the +characters both of Alcibiades and Socrates in the Symposium, should have +treated them in so thin and superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that +he would have ascribed to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast +that Alcibiades could not attain the objects of his ambition without his +help; or that he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could +have been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the +arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer of +the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and +tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of +making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle, +Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation, +which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian +statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There is +none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little +dramatic verisimilitude. + + +ALCIBIADES I + +by + +Plato (see Appendix I above) + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates. + + +SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of Cleinias, +that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you for many years, +when the rest of the world were wearying you with their attentions, am the +last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The cause of my silence has +been that I was hindered by a power more than human, of which I will some +day explain to you the nature; this impediment has now been removed; I +therefore here present myself before you, and I greatly hope that no +similar hindrance will again occur. Meanwhile, I have observed that your +pride has been too much for the pride of your admirers; they were numerous +and high-spirited, but they have all run away, overpowered by your superior +force of character; not one of them remains. And I want you to understand +the reason why you have been too much for them. You think that you have no +need of them or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack +nothing, beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first +place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the +citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the second +place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected both on the +father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the most +distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in Hellas, +and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can assist you +when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more to you than all +the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your father left guardian of +you, and of your brother, and who can do as he pleases not only in this +city, but in all Hellas, and among many and mighty barbarous nations. +Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that you value yourself least of all +upon your possessions. And all these things have lifted you up; you have +overcome your lovers, and they have acknowledged that you were too much for +them. Have you not remarked their absence? And now I know that you wonder +why I, unlike the rest of them, have not gone away, and what can be my +motive in remaining. + +ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going to +ask you the very same question--What do you want? And what is your motive +in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of coming? +(Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should greatly like +to know. + +SOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you will +be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an auditor +who will remain, and will not run away? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear. + +SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as unwilling +to end as I have hitherto been to begin. + +ALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen. + +SOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with one +who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an effort, +and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly like to +confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself, if I saw you +loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to pass life in the +enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts of yours, which you +keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have always had my eye on +you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to you and said: +Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant if you are +forbidden to make any further acquisition?--I verily believe that you would +choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you are at present +living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you will come before +the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that you are more worthy of +honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever lived, and having proved +this, you will have the greatest power in the state. When you have gained +the greatest power among us, you will go on to other Hellenic states, and +not only to Hellenes, but to all the barbarians who inhabit the same +continent with us. And if the God were then to say to you again: Here in +Europe is to be your seat of empire, and you must not cross over into Asia +or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I do not believe that you would choose to +live upon these terms; but the world, as I may say, must be filled with +your power and name--no man less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account +with you. Such I know to be your hopes--I am not guessing only--and very +likely you, who know that I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, +Socrates, but what have my hopes to do with the explanation which you +promised of your unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now +going to tell you, sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation +is, that all these designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without +my help; so great is the power which I believe myself to have over you and +your concerns; and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has +hitherto forbidden me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting +his permission. For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the +state, and having proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I +indulge a hope that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to +prove my own great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor +kinsman, nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you +desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare +Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my time, +and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with you; but +now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will listen to me. + +ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never +could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun to +speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not, is a +matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and +therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if I must, +that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your assistance +necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why? + +SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you +are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however, +that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant me +one little favour. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one. + +SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer? + +ALCIBIADES: Not at all. + +SOCRATES: Then please to answer. + +ALCIBIADES: Ask me. + +SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you? + +ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what +more you have to say. + +SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in a little +while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And suppose that +when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve and say, +Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do you know the +matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than they?--How +would you answer? + +ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a matter +which I do know better than they. + +SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others, or +found out yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is all. + +SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you +had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: I should not. + +SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what you +supposed that you knew? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know +what you are now supposed to know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your +acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according to +my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the lyre, +and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum of your +accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in secret; and I +think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not have come out of +your door, either by day or night, without my seeing you. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling. + +SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give +them advice about writing? + +ALCIBIADES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling, +in the assembly? + +ALCIBIADES: Hardly. + +SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise +them? Surely not about building? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that? + +ALCIBIADES: He will. + +SOCRATES: Nor about divination? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or +ignoble--makes no difference. + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has +riches, but because he has knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter which +will make any difference to the Athenians when they are deliberating about +the health of the citizens; they only require that he should be a +physician. + +ALCIBIADES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you +will be justified in getting up and advising them? + +ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is +what sort of ships they ought to build? + +ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that. + +SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is that +the reason? + +ALCIBIADES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them? + +ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other +concerns of the state. + +SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make +peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is better +to go to war? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when it is better? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought to +close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would you, or +the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics. + +SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics +would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and how? +To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with those +against whom it is best to wrestle? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And as much as is best? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And at such times as are best? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and dance? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When it is well to do so? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And as much as is well? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in +wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would tell +me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I call gymnastic, and +I want to know what you call the other. + +ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you. + +SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is +universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: You did. + +SOCRATES: And I was right? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that you were. + +SOCRATES: Well, now,--for you should learn to argue prettily--let me ask +you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and +singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,--what is the name +of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell. + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call the +Goddesses who are the patronesses of art? + +ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called after +them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music. + +SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the art +of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was +gymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what? + +ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose. + +SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of +war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more +gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to the +more excellent in war and peace? + +ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you. + +SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to him--This +food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to +you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word 'better'? you would have no +difficulty in replying that you meant 'more wholesome,' although you do not +profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you +profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and +advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be +able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful? + +ALCIBIADES: Very. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of +'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against +whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer? + +ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell. + +SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against +one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we +give them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been +employed, or that we have been defrauded. + +SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may +be a difference in the manner. + +ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these +things justly or unjustly? + +SOCRATES: Exactly. + +ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and +unjust. + +SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or +with the unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person +did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were +just. + +SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful? + +ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable. + +SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in +going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought +not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you +do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my +knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who +is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--you shall +introduce me. + +ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the +God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am +not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists. + +ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the +knowledge of just and unjust in some other way? + +SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them. + +ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them? + +SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them. + +ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire? + +SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them. + +ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think? + +SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you thought +that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust? What do you +say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious ignorance and +enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to answer truly, that +our discussion may not be in vain. + +ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew. + +SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago, you +knew all the same? + +ALCIBIADES: I did. + +SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew. + +ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure? + +SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's house, +or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys, not +hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very +confident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a +cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true? + +ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me? + +SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you did +not know whether you were wronged or not? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being cheated. + +SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the +nature of just and unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then. + +SOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time when +you thought that you knew them? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if you consider, +you will find that there never was such a time? + +ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by learning; +now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and whence do you +come to know them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them +through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in the +same way that other people learn. + +SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me. + +ALCIBIADES: Of the many. + +SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your +teachers. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach? + +SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you +would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than justice? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the worse? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far +better things than to play at draughts. + +SOCRATES: What things? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I +cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge of +Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them. + +SOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers of +Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly praised. + +ALCIBIADES: Why is that? + +SOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought +to have. + +ALCIBIADES: What qualities? + +SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any +teacher? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they +differ? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them? + +ALCIBIADES: They cannot. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the +nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they +are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a piece of +wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be pretty +nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are +agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states +use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some +another. + +ALCIBIADES: They do not. + +SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right in +sending him to be taught by our friends the many? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and +which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would the +many still be able to inform us? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these +things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never +agreed about them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like, +but what healthy or diseased men are like--would the many be able to teach +us? + +ALCIBIADES: They would not. + +SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of these +matters, if you saw them at variance? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one +another, about the justice or injustice of men and things? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance? + +ALCIBIADES: None. + +SOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling +over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to war +and kill one another for the sake of them? + +ALCIBIADES: No indeed. + +SOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if you +have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people, including +Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those poems? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans and +Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel with +Odysseus. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell at +Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your father +Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice--this was the sole +cause of the battles, and of their deaths. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are +quarrelling to the death? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the +teachers to whom you are appealing. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and +injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned +them of others nor discovered them yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades! + +ALCIBIADES: In what respect? + +SOCRATES: In saying that I say so. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and +unjust? + +SOCRATES: No; I did not. + +ALCIBIADES: Did I, then? + +SOCRATES: Yes. + +ALCIBIADES: How was that? + +SOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater +number, two or one; you would reply 'two'? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: And by how much greater? + +ALCIBIADES: By one. + +SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who answer +me? + +ALCIBIADES: I am. + +SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make up +the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker? + +ALCIBIADES: I am. + +SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a question +and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the answerer? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker. + +SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you the answerer? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker? + +ALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker. + +SOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of Cleinias, +not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he did +understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about what he +did not know? Was not that said? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language of +Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and not +from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me, but +you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear fellow, +the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know, and have +not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity. + +ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of the +Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they see no +difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider which +course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference between +justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and profited by +their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no good. + +SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so +much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient for +mankind, or why a thing is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked again from +whom I learned, or when I made the discovery. + +SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be +refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different +refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no longer +put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and new. Now I +shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over again,--Where did +you learn and how do you know the nature of the expedient, and who is your +teacher? All this I comprehend in a single question, and now you will +manifestly be in the old difficulty, and will not be able to show that you +know the expedient, either because you learned or because you discovered it +yourself. But, as I perceive that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of +a stale argument, I will enquire no further into your knowledge of what is +expedient or what is not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply +request you to say why you do not explain whether justice and expediency +are the same or different? And if you like you may examine me as I have +examined you, or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by +yourself. + +ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to +discuss the matter with you. + +SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the +ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men +individually. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual +singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The grammarian, +for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about letters. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and +persuade many? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician? + +ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can +persuade many? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you +know? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are doing, +and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one seeks to +persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same things. + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude +can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that the +just is not always expedient. + +ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of that +which you will not prove to me. + +ALCIBIADES: Proceed. + +SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all. + +ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker. + +SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do. + +SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth? + +ALCIBIADES: I think not. + +SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that +the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe another +man again. + +ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come to +any harm. + +SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether +you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not? + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was +dishonourable and yet just? + +ALCIBIADES: Never. + +SOCRATES: All just things are honourable? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not good, +or are they always good? + +ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are +evil. + +SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men +have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when +others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in safety? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable, in +respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this is +courage? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and +the death another? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of +view, but evil in another? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now +whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage +which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or +evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or +evil? + +ALCIBIADES: Good. + +SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and +would least like to be deprived of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be +willing to be deprived of courage? + +ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward. + +SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and +cowardice? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their +opposites you would least desire? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death +and cowardice the worst? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle honourable, +in as much as courage does a good work? + +ALCIBIADES: I should. + +SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--You +may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, +and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and +dishonourable in so far as they are evil? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is +honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is +good and yet evil? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor +anything base, regarded as base, good. + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who +acts honourably acts well? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy? + +ALCIBIADES: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And happiness is a good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified. + +ALCIBIADES: Manifestly. + +SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we +shall also find to be good? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not? + +ALCIBIADES: Expedient. + +SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly +must also act honourably. + +SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the good is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: I should infer so. + +SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you +answer? + +ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true. + +SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the +expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, +pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up +to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just +may be the evil? + +ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am +saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me +I am of different minds in successive instants. + +SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my +friend? + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not. + +SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have +two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you +would then be of different minds in successive instants? + +ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I +should. + +SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because you would +know? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose so. + +SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is +clearly that you are ignorant? + +ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, +honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the +reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is +not that clear? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed +about that of which he has no knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you? + +ALCIBIADES: Tell me. + +SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you +do not think that you know. + +ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which +you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the +preparation of food. + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of +food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art? + +ALCIBIADES: The latter. + +SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by +considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do +you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing? + +ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot. + +SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you +know that you do not know it? + +ALCIBIADES: I imagine not. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are +likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what +we are doing? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their +business to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make +mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are +ignorant? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of +course, be those who know? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they do +not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and think +that they know. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those. + +SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is +mischievous? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do with +the greatest matters? + +ALCIBIADES: By far. + +SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the +honourable, the good, and the expedient? + +ALCIBIADES: There cannot be. + +SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has +shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being +ignorant you fancy that you know them? + +ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right. + +SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly like +to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good friend, +you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of this you +are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by your own +argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are educated. +Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say the same of +almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of your guardian, +Pericles. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his wisdom +by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of the +philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras, and now +in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom. + +SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who was +unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught you +letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he liked +wise. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he +thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter. + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by making +his sons wise? + +ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons, +what has that to do with the matter? + +SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise? + +ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him. + +SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were +simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you be +as you are? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him. + +SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner, bond +or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of Pericles,--as +I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and Callias, the son of +Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of Zeno, for which privilege +they have each of them paid him the sum of a hundred minae (about 406 +pounds sterling) to the increase of their wisdom and fame. + +ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one. + +SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain +as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you +speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I agree +with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite +uneducated. + +SOCRATES: What is the inference? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained +athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge and +experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become politicians +without any special training, why should I have the trouble of learning and +practising? For I know well that by the light of nature I shall get the +better of them. + +SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your +noble form and your high estate! + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so? + +SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love. + +ALCIBIADES: At what? + +SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is +with people here. + +ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there? + +SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask? + +ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these? + +SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action, +would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not, while +acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence, rather look +to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your fellow +combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they will not +even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as inferiors, will +do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind of superiority which +you must establish over them, if you mean to accomplish any noble action +really worthy of yourself and of the state. + +ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim. + +SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are +better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior and +have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the generals +of the enemy. + +ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then with +the Lacedaemonians and with the great king? + +ALCIBIADES: True enough. + +SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not be +right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were your true +rivals? + +ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right. + +SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought +rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others like +him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark, you may +still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds as well as +on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to flatter us and +not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and then you need not +trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in such a noble arena: +there is no reason why you should either learn what has to be learned, or +practise what has to be practised, and only when thoroughly prepared enter +on a political career. + +ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not +suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really +different from anybody else. + +SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying. + +ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider? + +SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of +yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you are +not? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them. + +SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take +care of yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited. + +SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of +yours is bad. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably false. + +ALCIBIADES: How so? + +SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found in +noble races or not in noble races? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races. + +SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to be +perfect in virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the +Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent? Have +we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the latter from +Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of Achaemenes go +back to Perseus, son of Zeus? + +ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus! + +SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus, +son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they are +descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings--either kings of Argos and +Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the descendants of +Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at various times sovereigns +of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our fathers were but private +persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if you were to make a display +of your ancestors and of Salamis the island of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the +habitation of the still more ancient Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of +Xerxes. You should consider how inferior we are to them both in the +derivation of our birth and in other particulars. Did you never observe +how great is the property of the Spartan kings? And their wives are under +the guardianship of the Ephori, who are public officers and watch over +them, in order to preserve as far as possible the purity of the Heracleid +blood. Still greater is the difference among the Persians; for no one +entertains a suspicion that the father of a prince of Persia can be any one +but the king. Such is the awe which invests the person of the queen, that +any other guard is needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all +the subjects of the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever +afterwards kept as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, +when you and I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the +neighbours hardly knew of the important event. After the birth of the +royal child, he is tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by +the best of the royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and +especially with the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order +that he may be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are +held in great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is +put upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out +hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal +schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to +be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the +wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth the +most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster, the +son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him also the +duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest, teaches him +always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate, forbids him to +allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be accustomed to be a +freeman and king indeed,--lord of himself first, and not a slave; the most +valiant trains him to be bold and fearless, telling him that if he fears he +is to deem himself a slave; whereas Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a +tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave of his who was past all other work. I +might enlarge on the nurture and education of your rivals, but that would +be tedious; and what I have said is a sufficient sample of what remains to +be said. I have only to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares +about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any +other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast +an eye on the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, +the anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other +bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own +inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease and +grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil and desire +of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all these respects you will +see that you are but a child in comparison of them. Even in the matter of +wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must reveal to you how you +stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth of the Lacedaemonians, you +will see that our possessions fall far short of theirs. For no one here +can compete with them either in the extent and fertility of their own and +the Messenian territory, or in the number of their slaves, and especially +of the Helots, or of their horses, or of the animals which feed on the +Messenian pastures. But I have said enough of this: and as to gold and +silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon than in all the rest of Hellas, +for during many generations gold has been always flowing in to them from +the whole Hellenic world, and often from the barbarian also, and never +going out, as in the fable of Aesop the fox said to the lion, 'The prints +of the feet of those going in are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the +trace of money going out of Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer +that the inhabitants are the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, +and that their kings are the richest of them, for they have a larger share +of these things, and they have also a tribute paid to them which is very +considerable. Yet the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the +wealth of the other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the +Persians and their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person +who went up to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of +excellent land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of +the country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her +veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved for +the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several habiliments. +Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one were to go to +Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and say to her, +There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not worth fifty +minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has a son who is +possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he has a mind to go +to war with your son--would she not wonder to what this Alcibiades trusts +for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would say to herself, +'upon his training and wisdom--these are the things which Hellenes value.' +And if she heard that this Alcibiades who is making the attempt is not as +yet twenty years old, and is wholly uneducated, and when his lover tells +him that he ought to get education and training first, and then go and +fight the king, he refuses, and says that he is well enough as he is, would +she not be amazed, and ask 'On what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we +replied: He relies on his beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental +endowments, she would think that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared +the advantages which you possess with those of her own people. And I +believe that even Lampido, the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of +Archidamus and mother of Agis, all of whom were kings, would have the same +feeling; if, in your present uneducated state, you were to turn your +thoughts against her son, she too would be equally astonished. But how +disgraceful, that we should not have as high a notion of what is required +in us as our enemies' wives and mothers have of the qualities which are +required in their assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear +the Delphian inscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but +these kings are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and +skill. And if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in +becoming renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire +more than any other man ever desired anything. + +ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which +are required, Socrates,--can you tell me? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the +manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling you +of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you; and +there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you. + +ALCIBIADES: What is that? + +SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian, +Pericles. + +ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to +converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially +designed to bring you to honour. + +ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men greatly +need pains and care, and you and I above all men. + +ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me. + +SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself. + +ALCIBIADES: But what can we do? + +SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend. + +ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we +not wish to be as good as possible? + +ALCIBIADES: We do. + +SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men. + +SOCRATES: Who are good in what? + +ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs. + +SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them? + +ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen. + +SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the +unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: The wise. + +SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making of +shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he is good in that? + +ALCIBIADES: He is. + +SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and also +bad? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good? + +ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city. + +SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: But over men? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When they are sick? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Or on a voyage? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing? + +ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say. + +SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is. + +ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using one +another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life. + +SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the +services of other men? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the +rowers? + +ALCIBIADES: No; they are not. + +SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who +lead the singers and use the services of the dancers? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who use +other men? + +ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of +citizenship, and dealings with one another. + +SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you again, +as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their fellow- +sailors,--how would you answer? + +ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot. + +SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables +them to rule over their fellow-singers? + +ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just now +mentioning. + +SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: But good counsel? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,--good counsel, of which the +aim is the preservation of the voyagers. + +SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which +you speak? + +ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city. + +SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves and +preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is that +of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order of the +body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of disease. +You would say the same? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I +should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of +blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved and +were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was present in +them. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the presence +or absence of which the state is improved and better managed and ordered? + +ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and the +absence of hatred and division. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement? + +ALCIBIADES: Agreement. + +SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers? + +ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic. + +SOCRATES: And private individuals? + +ALCIBIADES: The same. + +SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself? + +ALCIBIADES: The same. + +SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the +comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of +measure? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and states, +equally? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about +what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to +the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent with +himself and with another? + +ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so. + +SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faint not. + +ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and +agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their +son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife. + +SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the spinning +of wool, which she understands and he does not? + +ALCIBIADES: No, truly. + +SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms, +which she has never learned? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a +male accomplishment? + +ALCIBIADES: It would. + +SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men? + +ALCIBIADES: There is not. + +SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? + +ALCIBIADES: Plainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work? + +ALCIBIADES: No. + +SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own +work? + +ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the +truth. (Compare Republic.) + +SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when +friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone +secures their good order? + +ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this +very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. + +SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean +now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How +can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of +which the other is in ignorance? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing +what is just or unjust? + +ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no +friendship among them? + +ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about +which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I +cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same +persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. + +ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I +have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. + +SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your +deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of +yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the +discovery should be made. + +ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? + +SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by +the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very +improving to both of us. + +ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. + +SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by +appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when +we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when +does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what +belongs to him? + +ALCIBIADES: I should think so. + +SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of +them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? + +ALCIBIADES: I do not understand. + +SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong +to the finger, and to the finger only? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our +feet? + +ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a +thing is a correct expression? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking. + +SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other +art which improves the feet? + +ALCIBIADES: By some other art. + +SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of +the body? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of +that which belongs to our feet? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of +graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of +weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from +that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care +of yourself? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be +the same as that which takes care of ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care +of ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not +one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if +we did not know a shoe? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not +know a ring? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not +know what we are ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be +lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is +self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? + +ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at +other times the task appears to be very difficult. + +SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no +other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of +ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be +discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own +existence, which otherwise we can never know. + +ALCIBIADES: You say truly. + +SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are conversing? +--with whom but with me? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: As I am, with you? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And I in talking use words? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning? + +ALCIBIADES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square tool, +and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the tool? + +ALCIBIADES: Of course not. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be +distinguished from the harper himself? + +ALCIBIADES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the user +to be always different from that which he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his +tools only or with his hands? + +ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well. + +SOCRATES: He uses his hands too? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather? + +ALCIBIADES: He does. + +SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things which +he uses? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from +the hands and feet which they use? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body? + +ALCIBIADES: That is the inference. + +SOCRATES: What is he, then? + +ALCIBIADES: I cannot say. + +SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body. + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul. + +SOCRATES: And the soul rules? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally +admitted. + +ALCIBIADES: What is it? + +SOCRATES: That man is one of three things. + +ALCIBIADES: What are they? + +SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole. + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body +is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did. + +SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking? + +ALCIBIADES: It would seem not. + +SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, +and consequently that this is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is +subject, the two united cannot possibly rule. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, +either man has no real existence, or the soul is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient. + +SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall +be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered +that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too +much protracted. + +ALCIBIADES: What was that? + +SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first +considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been +considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be +sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly +ourselves than the soul? + +ALCIBIADES: There is nothing. + +SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with +one another, soul to soul? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates, am +not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real +Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his +soul? + +ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true. + +SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things of +a man, and not the man himself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the +trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself? + +ALCIBIADES: He does not. + +SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from knowing +themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own belongings? +When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise they are even +further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know the belongings of +the body, which minister to the body. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his +art none of them is temperate? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar, and +are not such as a good man would practise? + +ALCIBIADES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but what +belongs to him? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor +his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his +own concerns? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of Alcibiades, +he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover? + +ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference. + +SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth fades? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul +follows after virtue? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you, when +you are no longer young and the rest are gone? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you +will remain. + +SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best. + +ALCIBIADES: I will. + +SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the son +of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any other; and he +is his darling,--Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and Phaenarete. + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were on +the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other +men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading +away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never +desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for +the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people +and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this +way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is of a fair +countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution +which I give you. + +ALCIBIADES: What caution? + +SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to +know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote +which will keep you out of harm's way. + +ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me +in what way I am to take care of myself. + +SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably +well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we +once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of +something which is not ourselves. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to +that? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Very good. + +SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the +soul?--For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we +really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of +which we were just now speaking? + +ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of +that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine +to be the only one suitable to my purpose. + +ALCIBIADES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,' as +you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and meaning of +this precept? Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should look at that +in which it would see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. + +SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror +in our own eyes? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into +the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ +which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort +of image of the person looking? + +ALCIBIADES: That is quite true. + +SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye +which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there +see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and +not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and +at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, +must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in +which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? + +ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that +which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? + +ALCIBIADES: There is none. + +SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; +and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be +most likely to know himself? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know +our own good and evil? + +ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no +possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really +his? + +ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible. + +SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything +belonged, if we did not know ourselves? + +ALCIBIADES: How could we? + +SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we +know the belongings of our belongings? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that +a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he +cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of +the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, +appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art. + +ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed. + +SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in +like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? + +ALCIBIADES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the +affairs of states? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: Nor an economist? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing? + +ALCIBIADES: He will not. + +SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? + +ALCIBIADES: Assuredly. + +SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public +and private capacity? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable? + +ALCIBIADES: Very. + +SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting? + +ALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy? + +ALCIBIADES: He cannot. + +SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, very. + +SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is +delivered from his misery? + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or +triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue? +(Compare Arist. Pol.) + +ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not. + +SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to administer +their affairs rightly or nobly? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not? + +ALCIBIADES: Impossible. + +SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not +only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of the +state, must in the first place acquire virtue. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in order to +enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but justice and +wisdom. + +ALCIBIADES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act +according to the will of God? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright and +divine, and act with a view to them? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own +good? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness. + +ALCIBIADES: I accept the security. + +SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark and +godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will +probably do deeds of darkness. + +ALCIBIADES: Very possibly. + +SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he +likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either to +him as an individual or to the state--for example, if he be sick and is +able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician--having +moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will +happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined? + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he +likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will +happen to him and to his fellow-sailors? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish. + +SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power and +authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like manner, +ensue? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the +aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue. + +ALCIBIADES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is +better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.) + +ALCIBIADES: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better? + +ALCIBIADES: True. + +SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be avoided? + +ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know +whether you are a freeman or not? + +ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state. + +SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not even +like to name to my beauty? + +ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do. + +SOCRATES: How? + +ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades. + +ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said? + +SOCRATES: By the help of God. + +ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely to +be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you have +followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master. + +SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the +stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched. + +ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think +about justice. + +SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not +because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too +much for both of us. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Alcibiades I, by Plato + diff --git a/old/1lcbd10.zip b/old/1lcbd10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..13dbd8b --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1lcbd10.zip |