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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Alcibiades I, by (may be spurious) Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Alcibiades I
+
+Author: (may be spurious) Plato
+
+Translator: Benjamin Jowett
+
+Posting Date: September 21, 2008 [EBook #1676]
+Release Date: March, 1999
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ALCIBIADES I ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sue Asscher
+
+
+
+
+
+ALCIBIADES I
+
+by Plato (may be spurious--see Appendix I)
+
+
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+APPENDIX I.
+
+It seems impossible to separate by any exact line the genuine writings
+of Plato from the spurious. The only external evidence to them which is
+of much value is that of Aristotle; for the Alexandrian catalogues of
+a century later include manifest forgeries. Even the value of the
+Aristotelian authority is a good deal impaired by the uncertainty
+concerning the date and authorship of the writings which are ascribed to
+him. And several of the citations of Aristotle omit the name of Plato,
+and some of them omit the name of the dialogue from which they are
+taken. Prior, however, to the enquiry about the writings of a particular
+author, general considerations which equally affect all evidence to the
+genuineness of ancient writings are the following: Shorter works are
+more likely to have been forged, or to have received an erroneous
+designation, than longer ones; and some kinds of composition, such as
+epistles or panegyrical orations, are more liable to suspicion than
+others; those, again, which have a taste of sophistry in them, or the
+ring of a later age, or the slighter character of a rhetorical exercise,
+or in which a motive or some affinity to spurious writings can be
+detected, or which seem to have originated in a name or statement really
+occurring in some classical author, are also of doubtful credit; while
+there is no instance of any ancient writing proved to be a forgery,
+which combines excellence with length. A really great and original
+writer would have no object in fathering his works on Plato; and to the
+forger or imitator, the 'literary hack' of Alexandria and Athens, the
+Gods did not grant originality or genius. Further, in attempting to
+balance the evidence for and against a Platonic dialogue, we must not
+forget that the form of the Platonic writing was common to several of
+his contemporaries. Aeschines, Euclid, Phaedo, Antisthenes, and in the
+next generation Aristotle, are all said to have composed dialogues; and
+mistakes of names are very likely to have occurred. Greek literature in
+the third century before Christ was almost as voluminous as our own, and
+without the safeguards of regular publication, or printing, or binding,
+or even of distinct titles. An unknown writing was naturally attributed
+to a known writer whose works bore the same character; and the name once
+appended easily obtained authority. A tendency may also be observed to
+blend the works and opinions of the master with those of his scholars.
+To a later Platonist, the difference between Plato and his imitators was
+not so perceptible as to ourselves. The Memorabilia of Xenophon and the
+Dialogues of Plato are but a part of a considerable Socratic literature
+which has passed away. And we must consider how we should regard the
+question of the genuineness of a particular writing, if this lost
+literature had been preserved to us.
+
+These considerations lead us to adopt the following criteria of
+genuineness: (1) That is most certainly Plato's which Aristotle
+attributes to him by name, which (2) is of considerable length, of (3)
+great excellence, and also (4) in harmony with the general spirit of
+the Platonic writings. But the testimony of Aristotle cannot always
+be distinguished from that of a later age (see above); and has various
+degrees of importance. Those writings which he cites without mentioning
+Plato, under their own names, e.g. the Hippias, the Funeral Oration, the
+Phaedo, etc., have an inferior degree of evidence in their favour. They
+may have been supposed by him to be the writings of another, although in
+the case of really great works, e.g. the Phaedo, this is not credible;
+those again which are quoted but not named, are still more defective
+in their external credentials. There may be also a possibility that
+Aristotle was mistaken, or may have confused the master and his scholars
+in the case of a short writing; but this is inconceivable about a more
+important work, e.g. the Laws, especially when we remember that he was
+living at Athens, and a frequenter of the groves of the Academy, during
+the last twenty years of Plato's life. Nor must we forget that in all
+his numerous citations from the Platonic writings he never attributes
+any passage found in the extant dialogues to any one but Plato. And
+lastly, we may remark that one or two great writings, such as the
+Parmenides and the Politicus, which are wholly devoid of Aristotelian
+(1) credentials may be fairly attributed to Plato, on the ground of (2)
+length, (3) excellence, and (4) accordance with the general spirit
+of his writings. Indeed the greater part of the evidence for the
+genuineness of ancient Greek authors may be summed up under two heads
+only: (1) excellence; and (2) uniformity of tradition--a kind of
+evidence, which though in many cases sufficient, is of inferior value.
+
+Proceeding upon these principles we appear to arrive at the conclusion
+that nineteen-twentieths of all the writings which have ever been
+ascribed to Plato, are undoubtedly genuine. There is another portion of
+them, including the Epistles, the Epinomis, the dialogues rejected by
+the ancients themselves, namely, the Axiochus, De justo, De virtute,
+Demodocus, Sisyphus, Eryxias, which on grounds, both of internal and
+external evidence, we are able with equal certainty to reject. But there
+still remains a small portion of which we are unable to affirm either
+that they are genuine or spurious. They may have been written in youth,
+or possibly like the works of some painters, may be partly or wholly
+the compositions of pupils; or they may have been the writings of some
+contemporary transferred by accident to the more celebrated name of
+Plato, or of some Platonist in the next generation who aspired to
+imitate his master. Not that on grounds either of language or philosophy
+we should lightly reject them. Some difference of style, or inferiority
+of execution, or inconsistency of thought, can hardly be considered
+decisive of their spurious character. For who always does justice to
+himself, or who writes with equal care at all times? Certainly not
+Plato, who exhibits the greatest differences in dramatic power, in the
+formation of sentences, and in the use of words, if his earlier writings
+are compared with his later ones, say the Protagoras or Phaedrus with
+the Laws. Or who can be expected to think in the same manner during
+a period of authorship extending over above fifty years, in an age
+of great intellectual activity, as well as of political and literary
+transition? Certainly not Plato, whose earlier writings are separated
+from his later ones by as wide an interval of philosophical speculation
+as that which separates his later writings from Aristotle.
+
+The dialogues which have been translated in the first Appendix, and
+which appear to have the next claim to genuineness among the Platonic
+writings, are the Lesser Hippias, the Menexenus or Funeral Oration, the
+First Alcibiades. Of these, the Lesser Hippias and the Funeral Oration
+are cited by Aristotle; the first in the Metaphysics, the latter in the
+Rhetoric. Neither of them are expressly attributed to Plato, but in his
+citation of both of them he seems to be referring to passages in the
+extant dialogues. From the mention of 'Hippias' in the singular by
+Aristotle, we may perhaps infer that he was unacquainted with a second
+dialogue bearing the same name. Moreover, the mere existence of a
+Greater and Lesser Hippias, and of a First and Second Alcibiades, does
+to a certain extent throw a doubt upon both of them. Though a very
+clever and ingenious work, the Lesser Hippias does not appear to contain
+anything beyond the power of an imitator, who was also a careful student
+of the earlier Platonic writings, to invent. The motive or leading
+thought of the dialogue may be detected in Xen. Mem., and there is
+no similar instance of a 'motive' which is taken from Xenophon in an
+undoubted dialogue of Plato. On the other hand, the upholders of the
+genuineness of the dialogue will find in the Hippias a true Socratic
+spirit; they will compare the Ion as being akin both in subject and
+treatment; they will urge the authority of Aristotle; and they will
+detect in the treatment of the Sophist, in the satirical reasoning
+upon Homer, in the reductio ad absurdum of the doctrine that vice is
+ignorance, traces of a Platonic authorship. In reference to the last
+point we are doubtful, as in some of the other dialogues, whether the
+author is asserting or overthrowing the paradox of Socrates, or merely
+following the argument 'whither the wind blows.' That no conclusion
+is arrived at is also in accordance with the character of the earlier
+dialogues. The resemblances or imitations of the Gorgias, Protagoras,
+and Euthydemus, which have been observed in the Hippias, cannot with
+certainty be adduced on either side of the argument. On the whole, more
+may be said in favour of the genuineness of the Hippias than against it.
+
+The Menexenus or Funeral Oration is cited by Aristotle, and is
+interesting as supplying an example of the manner in which the orators
+praised 'the Athenians among the Athenians,' falsifying persons and
+dates, and casting a veil over the gloomier events of Athenian history.
+It exhibits an acquaintance with the funeral oration of Thucydides, and
+was, perhaps, intended to rival that great work. If genuine, the
+proper place of the Menexenus would be at the end of the Phaedrus. The
+satirical opening and the concluding words bear a great resemblance to
+the earlier dialogues; the oration itself is professedly a mimetic work,
+like the speeches in the Phaedrus, and cannot therefore be tested by
+a comparison of the other writings of Plato. The funeral oration of
+Pericles is expressly mentioned in the Phaedrus, and this may have
+suggested the subject, in the same manner that the Cleitophon appears to
+be suggested by the slight mention of Cleitophon and his attachment to
+Thrasymachus in the Republic; and the Theages by the mention of Theages
+in the Apology and Republic; or as the Second Alcibiades seems to be
+founded upon the text of Xenophon, Mem. A similar taste for parody
+appears not only in the Phaedrus, but in the Protagoras, in the
+Symposium, and to a certain extent in the Parmenides.
+
+To these two doubtful writings of Plato I have added the First
+Alcibiades, which, of all the disputed dialogues of Plato, has the
+greatest merit, and is somewhat longer than any of them, though not
+verified by the testimony of Aristotle, and in many respects at variance
+with the Symposium in the description of the relations of Socrates
+and Alcibiades. Like the Lesser Hippias and the Menexenus, it is to be
+compared to the earlier writings of Plato. The motive of the piece may,
+perhaps, be found in that passage of the Symposium in which Alcibiades
+describes himself as self-convicted by the words of Socrates. For the
+disparaging manner in which Schleiermacher has spoken of this dialogue
+there seems to be no sufficient foundation. At the same time, the lesson
+imparted is simple, and the irony more transparent than in the undoubted
+dialogues of Plato. We know, too, that Alcibiades was a favourite
+thesis, and that at least five or six dialogues bearing this name passed
+current in antiquity, and are attributed to contemporaries of Socrates
+and Plato. (1) In the entire absence of real external evidence (for
+the catalogues of the Alexandrian librarians cannot be regarded as
+trustworthy); and (2) in the absence of the highest marks either of
+poetical or philosophical excellence; and (3) considering that we have
+express testimony to the existence of contemporary writings bearing
+the name of Alcibiades, we are compelled to suspend our judgment on the
+genuineness of the extant dialogue.
+
+Neither at this point, nor at any other, do we propose to draw an
+absolute line of demarcation between genuine and spurious writings of
+Plato. They fade off imperceptibly from one class to another. There may
+have been degrees of genuineness in the dialogues themselves, as there
+are certainly degrees of evidence by which they are supported. The
+traditions of the oral discourses both of Socrates and Plato may have
+formed the basis of semi-Platonic writings; some of them may be of the
+same mixed character which is apparent in Aristotle and Hippocrates,
+although the form of them is different. But the writings of Plato,
+unlike the writings of Aristotle, seem never to have been confused with
+the writings of his disciples: this was probably due to their definite
+form, and to their inimitable excellence. The three dialogues which
+we have offered in the Appendix to the criticism of the reader may
+be partly spurious and partly genuine; they may be altogether
+spurious;--that is an alternative which must be frankly admitted. Nor
+can we maintain of some other dialogues, such as the Parmenides, and
+the Sophist, and Politicus, that no considerable objection can be urged
+against them, though greatly overbalanced by the weight (chiefly)
+of internal evidence in their favour. Nor, on the other hand, can
+we exclude a bare possibility that some dialogues which are usually
+rejected, such as the Greater Hippias and the Cleitophon, may be
+genuine. The nature and object of these semi-Platonic writings require
+more careful study and more comparison of them with one another, and
+with forged writings in general, than they have yet received, before we
+can finally decide on their character. We do not consider them all as
+genuine until they can be proved to be spurious, as is often maintained
+and still more often implied in this and similar discussions; but
+should say of some of them, that their genuineness is neither proven nor
+disproven until further evidence about them can be adduced. And we are
+as confident that the Epistles are spurious, as that the Republic, the
+Timaeus, and the Laws are genuine.
+
+On the whole, not a twentieth part of the writings which pass under
+the name of Plato, if we exclude the works rejected by the ancients
+themselves and two or three other plausible inventions, can be fairly
+doubted by those who are willing to allow that a considerable change
+and growth may have taken place in his philosophy (see above). That
+twentieth debatable portion scarcely in any degree affects our judgment
+of Plato, either as a thinker or a writer, and though suggesting some
+interesting questions to the scholar and critic, is of little importance
+to the general reader.
+
+
+ALCIBIADES I
+
+by
+
+Plato (see Appendix I above)
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+The First Alcibiades is a conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades.
+Socrates is represented in the character which he attributes to himself
+in the Apology of a know-nothing who detects the conceit of knowledge in
+others. The two have met already in the Protagoras and in the Symposium;
+in the latter dialogue, as in this, the relation between them is that
+of a lover and his beloved. But the narrative of their loves is told
+differently in different places; for in the Symposium Alcibiades
+is depicted as the impassioned but rejected lover; here, as coldly
+receiving the advances of Socrates, who, for the best of purposes, lies
+in wait for the aspiring and ambitious youth.
+
+Alcibiades, who is described as a very young man, is about to enter on
+public life, having an inordinate opinion of himself, and an extravagant
+ambition. Socrates, 'who knows what is in man,' astonishes him by a
+revelation of his designs. But has he the knowledge which is necessary
+for carrying them out? He is going to persuade the Athenians--about
+what? Not about any particular art, but about politics--when to fight
+and when to make peace. Now, men should fight and make peace on just
+grounds, and therefore the question of justice and injustice must enter
+into peace and war; and he who advises the Athenians must know the
+difference between them. Does Alcibiades know? If he does, he must
+either have been taught by some master, or he must have discovered the
+nature of them himself. If he has had a master, Socrates would like to
+be informed who he is, that he may go and learn of him also. Alcibiades
+admits that he has never learned. Then has he enquired for himself? He
+may have, if he was ever aware of a time when he was ignorant. But
+he never was ignorant; for when he played with other boys at dice, he
+charged them with cheating, and this implied a knowledge of just
+and unjust. According to his own explanation, he had learned of the
+multitude. Why, he asks, should he not learn of them the nature of
+justice, as he has learned the Greek language of them? To this Socrates
+answers, that they can teach Greek, but they cannot teach justice; for
+they are agreed about the one, but they are not agreed about the other:
+and therefore Alcibiades, who has admitted that if he knows he must
+either have learned from a master or have discovered for himself the
+nature of justice, is convicted out of his own mouth.
+
+Alcibiades rejoins, that the Athenians debate not about what is just,
+but about what is expedient; and he asserts that the two principles of
+justice and expediency are opposed. Socrates, by a series of questions,
+compels him to admit that the just and the expedient coincide.
+Alcibiades is thus reduced to the humiliating conclusion that he knows
+nothing of politics, even if, as he says, they are concerned with the
+expedient.
+
+However, he is no worse than other Athenian statesmen; and he will not
+need training, for others are as ignorant as he is. He is reminded that
+he has to contend, not only with his own countrymen, but with their
+enemies--with the Spartan kings and with the great king of Persia; and
+he can only attain this higher aim of ambition by the assistance of
+Socrates. Not that Socrates himself professes to have attained the
+truth, but the questions which he asks bring others to a knowledge of
+themselves, and this is the first step in the practice of virtue.
+
+The dialogue continues:--We wish to become as good as possible. But to
+be good in what? Alcibiades replies--'Good in transacting business.' But
+what business? 'The business of the most intelligent men at Athens.' The
+cobbler is intelligent in shoemaking, and is therefore good in that; he
+is not intelligent, and therefore not good, in weaving. Is he good in
+the sense which Alcibiades means, who is also bad? 'I mean,' replies
+Alcibiades, 'the man who is able to command in the city.' But to command
+what--horses or men? and if men, under what circumstances? 'I mean
+to say, that he is able to command men living in social and political
+relations.' And what is their aim? 'The better preservation of the
+city.' But when is a city better? 'When there is unanimity, such as
+exists between husband and wife.' Then, when husbands and wives perform
+their own special duties, there can be no unanimity between them; nor
+can a city be well ordered when each citizen does his own work only.
+Alcibiades, having stated first that goodness consists in the unanimity
+of the citizens, and then in each of them doing his own separate work,
+is brought to the required point of self-contradiction, leading him to
+confess his own ignorance.
+
+But he is not too old to learn, and may still arrive at the truth, if he
+is willing to be cross-examined by Socrates. He must know himself; that
+is to say, not his body, or the things of the body, but his mind, or
+truer self. The physician knows the body, and the tradesman knows
+his own business, but they do not necessarily know themselves.
+Self-knowledge can be obtained only by looking into the mind and virtue
+of the soul, which is the diviner part of a man, as we see our own image
+in another's eye. And if we do not know ourselves, we cannot know what
+belongs to ourselves or belongs to others, and are unfit to take a part
+in political affairs. Both for the sake of the individual and of the
+state, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth or
+power. The evil and unjust should have no power,--they should be
+the slaves of better men than themselves. None but the virtuous are
+deserving of freedom.
+
+And are you, Alcibiades, a freeman? 'I feel that I am not; but I hope,
+Socrates, that by your aid I may become free, and from this day forward
+I will never leave you.'
+
+The Alcibiades has several points of resemblance to the undoubted
+dialogues of Plato. The process of interrogation is of the same kind
+with that which Socrates practises upon the youthful Cleinias in the
+Euthydemus; and he characteristically attributes to Alcibiades the
+answers which he has elicited from him. The definition of good is
+narrowed by successive questions, and virtue is shown to be identical
+with knowledge. Here, as elsewhere, Socrates awakens the consciousness
+not of sin but of ignorance. Self-humiliation is the first step to
+knowledge, even of the commonest things. No man knows how ignorant he
+is, and no man can arrive at virtue and wisdom who has not once in his
+life, at least, been convicted of error. The process by which the soul
+is elevated is not unlike that which religious writers describe under
+the name of 'conversion,' if we substitute the sense of ignorance for
+the consciousness of sin.
+
+In some respects the dialogue differs from any other Platonic
+composition. The aim is more directly ethical and hortatory; the process
+by which the antagonist is undermined is simpler than in other Platonic
+writings, and the conclusion more decided. There is a good deal of
+humour in the manner in which the pride of Alcibiades, and of the Greeks
+generally, is supposed to be taken down by the Spartan and Persian
+queens; and the dialogue has considerable dialectical merit. But we
+have a difficulty in supposing that the same writer, who has given so
+profound and complex a notion of the characters both of Alcibiades
+and Socrates in the Symposium, should have treated them in so thin and
+superficial a manner in the Alcibiades, or that he would have ascribed
+to the ironical Socrates the rather unmeaning boast that Alcibiades
+could not attain the objects of his ambition without his help; or that
+he should have imagined that a mighty nature like his could have
+been reformed by a few not very conclusive words of Socrates. For the
+arguments by which Alcibiades is reformed are not convincing; the writer
+of the dialogue, whoever he was, arrives at his idealism by crooked and
+tortuous paths, in which many pitfalls are concealed. The anachronism of
+making Alcibiades about twenty years old during the life of his uncle,
+Pericles, may be noted; and the repetition of the favourite observation,
+which occurs also in the Laches and Protagoras, that great Athenian
+statesmen, like Pericles, failed in the education of their sons. There
+is none of the undoubted dialogues of Plato in which there is so little
+dramatic verisimilitude.
+
+
+ALCIBIADES I
+
+by
+
+Plato (see Appendix I above)
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Alcibiades, Socrates.
+
+
+SOCRATES: I dare say that you may be surprised to find, O son of
+Cleinias, that I, who am your first lover, not having spoken to you
+for many years, when the rest of the world were wearying you with their
+attentions, am the last of your lovers who still speaks to you. The
+cause of my silence has been that I was hindered by a power more
+than human, of which I will some day explain to you the nature; this
+impediment has now been removed; I therefore here present myself before
+you, and I greatly hope that no similar hindrance will again occur.
+Meanwhile, I have observed that your pride has been too much for the
+pride of your admirers; they were numerous and high-spirited, but they
+have all run away, overpowered by your superior force of character; not
+one of them remains. And I want you to understand the reason why you
+have been too much for them. You think that you have no need of them
+or of any other man, for you have great possessions and lack nothing,
+beginning with the body, and ending with the soul. In the first
+place, you say to yourself that you are the fairest and tallest of the
+citizens, and this every one who has eyes may see to be true; in the
+second place, that you are among the noblest of them, highly connected
+both on the father's and the mother's side, and sprung from one of the
+most distinguished families in your own state, which is the greatest in
+Hellas, and having many friends and kinsmen of the best sort, who can
+assist you when in need; and there is one potent relative, who is more
+to you than all the rest, Pericles the son of Xanthippus, whom your
+father left guardian of you, and of your brother, and who can do as he
+pleases not only in this city, but in all Hellas, and among many and
+mighty barbarous nations. Moreover, you are rich; but I must say that
+you value yourself least of all upon your possessions. And all these
+things have lifted you up; you have overcome your lovers, and they have
+acknowledged that you were too much for them. Have you not remarked
+their absence? And now I know that you wonder why I, unlike the rest of
+them, have not gone away, and what can be my motive in remaining.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Perhaps, Socrates, you are not aware that I was just going
+to ask you the very same question--What do you want? And what is your
+motive in annoying me, and always, wherever I am, making a point of
+coming? (Compare Symp.) I do really wonder what you mean, and should
+greatly like to know.
+
+SOCRATES: Then if, as you say, you desire to know, I suppose that you
+will be willing to hear, and I may consider myself to be speaking to an
+auditor who will remain, and will not run away?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly, let me hear.
+
+SOCRATES: You had better be careful, for I may very likely be as
+unwilling to end as I have hitherto been to begin.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Proceed, my good man, and I will listen.
+
+SOCRATES: I will proceed; and, although no lover likes to speak with
+one who has no feeling of love in him (compare Symp.), I will make an
+effort, and tell you what I meant: My love, Alcibiades, which I hardly
+like to confess, would long ago have passed away, as I flatter myself,
+if I saw you loving your good things, or thinking that you ought to
+pass life in the enjoyment of them. But I shall reveal other thoughts
+of yours, which you keep to yourself; whereby you will know that I have
+always had my eye on you. Suppose that at this moment some God came to
+you and said: Alcibiades, will you live as you are, or die in an instant
+if you are forbidden to make any further acquisition?--I verily believe
+that you would choose death. And I will tell you the hope in which you
+are at present living: Before many days have elapsed, you think that you
+will come before the Athenian assembly, and will prove to them that
+you are more worthy of honour than Pericles, or any other man that ever
+lived, and having proved this, you will have the greatest power in the
+state. When you have gained the greatest power among us, you will go
+on to other Hellenic states, and not only to Hellenes, but to all the
+barbarians who inhabit the same continent with us. And if the God were
+then to say to you again: Here in Europe is to be your seat of empire,
+and you must not cross over into Asia or meddle with Asiatic affairs, I
+do not believe that you would choose to live upon these terms; but the
+world, as I may say, must be filled with your power and name--no man
+less than Cyrus and Xerxes is of any account with you. Such I know to be
+your hopes--I am not guessing only--and very likely you, who know that
+I am speaking the truth, will reply, Well, Socrates, but what have
+my hopes to do with the explanation which you promised of your
+unwillingness to leave me? And that is what I am now going to tell you,
+sweet son of Cleinias and Dinomache. The explanation is, that all these
+designs of yours cannot be accomplished by you without my help; so great
+is the power which I believe myself to have over you and your concerns;
+and this I conceive to be the reason why the God has hitherto forbidden
+me to converse with you, and I have been long expecting his permission.
+For, as you hope to prove your own great value to the state, and having
+proved it, to attain at once to absolute power, so do I indulge a hope
+that I shall be the supreme power over you, if I am able to prove my own
+great value to you, and to show you that neither guardian, nor kinsman,
+nor any one is able to deliver into your hands the power which you
+desire, but I only, God being my helper. When you were young (compare
+Symp.) and your hopes were not yet matured, I should have wasted my
+time, and therefore, as I conceive, the God forbade me to converse with
+you; but now, having his permission, I will speak, for now you will
+listen to me.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Your silence, Socrates, was always a surprise to me. I never
+could understand why you followed me about, and now that you have begun
+to speak again, I am still more amazed. Whether I think all this or not,
+is a matter about which you seem to have already made up your mind, and
+therefore my denial will have no effect upon you. But granting, if
+I must, that you have perfectly divined my purposes, why is your
+assistance necessary to the attainment of them? Can you tell me why?
+
+SOCRATES: You want to know whether I can make a long speech, such as you
+are in the habit of hearing; but that is not my way. I think, however,
+that I can prove to you the truth of what I am saying, if you will grant
+me one little favour.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, if the favour which you mean be not a troublesome one.
+
+SOCRATES: Will you be troubled at having questions to answer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Not at all.
+
+SOCRATES: Then please to answer.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Ask me.
+
+SOCRATES: Have you not the intention which I attribute to you?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I will grant anything you like, in the hope of hearing what
+more you have to say.
+
+SOCRATES: You do, then, mean, as I was saying, to come forward in
+a little while in the character of an adviser of the Athenians? And
+suppose that when you are ascending the bema, I pull you by the sleeve
+and say, Alcibiades, you are getting up to advise the Athenians--do you
+know the matter about which they are going to deliberate, better than
+they?--How would you answer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should reply, that I was going to advise them about a
+matter which I do know better than they.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you are a good adviser about the things which you know?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you know anything but what you have learned of others,
+or found out yourself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is all.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you have ever learned or discovered anything, if you
+had not been willing either to learn of others or to examine yourself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should not.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you have been willing to learn or to examine what
+you supposed that you knew?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then there was a time when you thought that you did not know
+what you are now supposed to know?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: I think that I know tolerably well the extent of your
+acquirements; and you must tell me if I forget any of them: according
+to my recollection, you learned the arts of writing, of playing on the
+lyre, and of wrestling; the flute you never would learn; this is the sum
+of your accomplishments, unless there were some which you acquired in
+secret; and I think that secrecy was hardly possible, as you could not
+have come out of your door, either by day or night, without my seeing
+you.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, that was the whole of my schooling.
+
+SOCRATES: And are you going to get up in the Athenian assembly, and give
+them advice about writing?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No, indeed.
+
+SOCRATES: Or about the touch of the lyre?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And they are not in the habit of deliberating about wrestling,
+in the assembly?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Hardly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then what are the deliberations in which you propose to advise
+them? Surely not about building?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: For the builder will advise better than you will about that?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He will.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor about divination?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: About that again the diviner will advise better than you will?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Whether he be little or great, good or ill-looking, noble or
+ignoble--makes no difference.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: A man is a good adviser about anything, not because he has
+riches, but because he has knowledge?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Assuredly.
+
+SOCRATES: Whether their counsellor is rich or poor, is not a matter
+which will make any difference to the Athenians when they are
+deliberating about the health of the citizens; they only require that he
+should be a physician.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Of course.
+
+SOCRATES: Then what will be the subject of deliberation about which you
+will be justified in getting up and advising them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: About their own concerns, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: You mean about shipbuilding, for example, when the question is
+what sort of ships they ought to build?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No, I should not advise them about that.
+
+SOCRATES: I suppose, because you do not understand shipbuilding:--is
+that the reason?
+
+ALCIBIADES: It is.
+
+SOCRATES: Then about what concerns of theirs will you advise them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: About war, Socrates, or about peace, or about any other
+concerns of the state.
+
+SOCRATES: You mean, when they deliberate with whom they ought to make
+peace, and with whom they ought to go to war, and in what manner?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And they ought to go to war with those against whom it is
+better to go to war?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And when it is better?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And for as long a time as is better?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But suppose the Athenians to deliberate with whom they ought
+to close in wrestling, and whom they should grasp by the hand, would
+you, or the master of gymnastics, be a better adviser of them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly, the master of gymnastics.
+
+SOCRATES: And can you tell me on what grounds the master of gymnastics
+would decide, with whom they ought or ought not to close, and when and
+how? To take an instance: Would he not say that they should wrestle with
+those against whom it is best to wrestle?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And as much as is best?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And at such times as are best?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Again; you sometimes accompany the lyre with the song and
+dance?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: When it is well to do so?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And as much as is well?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Just so.
+
+SOCRATES: And as you speak of an excellence or art of the best in
+wrestling, and of an excellence in playing the lyre, I wish you would
+tell me what this latter is;--the excellence of wrestling I call
+gymnastic, and I want to know what you call the other.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I do not understand you.
+
+SOCRATES: Then try to do as I do; for the answer which I gave is
+universally right, and when I say right, I mean according to rule.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And was not the art of which I spoke gymnastic?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And I called the excellence in wrestling gymnastic?
+
+ALCIBIADES: You did.
+
+SOCRATES: And I was right?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I think that you were.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, now,--for you should learn to argue prettily--let me ask
+you in return to tell me, first, what is that art of which playing and
+singing, and stepping properly in the dance, are parts,--what is the
+name of the whole? I think that by this time you must be able to tell.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Indeed I cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: Then let me put the matter in another way: what do you call
+the Goddesses who are the patronesses of art?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The Muses do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name of the art which is called
+after them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose that you mean music.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning; and what is the excellence of the
+art of music, as I told you truly that the excellence of wrestling was
+gymnastic--what is the excellence of music--to be what?
+
+ALCIBIADES: To be musical, I suppose.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good; and now please to tell me what is the excellence of
+war and peace; as the more musical was the more excellent, or the more
+gymnastical was the more excellent, tell me, what name do you give to
+the more excellent in war and peace?
+
+ALCIBIADES: But I really cannot tell you.
+
+SOCRATES: But if you were offering advice to another and said to
+him--This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity,
+and he said to you--What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word
+'better'? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant 'more
+wholesome,' although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the
+subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which
+you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed,
+when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not
+disgraceful?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning
+of 'better,' in the matter of making peace and going to war with those
+against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I am thinking, and I cannot tell.
+
+SOCRATES: But you surely know what are the charges which we bring
+against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what
+name we give them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been
+employed, or that we have been defrauded.
+
+SOCRATES: And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may
+be a difference in the manner.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'how,' Socrates, whether we suffered these
+things justly or unjustly?
+
+SOCRATES: Exactly.
+
+ALCIBIADES: There can be no greater difference than between just and
+unjust.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just
+or with the unjust?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person
+did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were
+just.
+
+SOCRATES: He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Neither lawful nor honourable.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in
+going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or
+ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that
+you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my
+knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust?
+Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him--you
+shall introduce me.
+
+ALCIBIADES: You are mocking, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the
+God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am
+not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.
+
+ALCIBIADES: But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the
+knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes; if you have discovered them.
+
+ALCIBIADES: But do you not think that I could discover them?
+
+SOCRATES: I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.
+
+ALCIBIADES: And do you not think that I would enquire?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.
+
+ALCIBIADES: And was there not a time when I did so think?
+
+SOCRATES: Very good; and can you tell me how long it is since you
+thought that you did not know the nature of the just and the unjust?
+What do you say to a year ago? Were you then in a state of conscious
+ignorance and enquiry? Or did you think that you knew? And please to
+answer truly, that our discussion may not be in vain.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Well, I thought that I knew.
+
+SOCRATES: And two years ago, and three years ago, and four years ago,
+you knew all the same?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I did.
+
+SOCRATES: And more than four years ago you were a child--were you not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And then I am quite sure that you thought you knew.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why are you so sure?
+
+SOCRATES: Because I often heard you when a child, in your teacher's
+house, or elsewhere, playing at dice or some other game with the boys,
+not hesitating at all about the nature of the just and unjust; but very
+confident--crying and shouting that one of the boys was a rogue and a
+cheat, and had been cheating. Is it not true?
+
+ALCIBIADES: But what was I to do, Socrates, when anybody cheated me?
+
+SOCRATES: And how can you say, 'What was I to do'? if at the time you
+did not know whether you were wronged or not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: To be sure I knew; I was quite aware that I was being
+cheated.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you suppose yourself even when a child to have known the
+nature of just and unjust?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly; and I did know then.
+
+SOCRATES: And when did you discover them--not, surely, at the time when
+you thought that you knew them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And when did you think that you were ignorant--if you
+consider, you will find that there never was such a time?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Really, Socrates, I cannot say.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you did not learn them by discovering them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
+
+SOCRATES: But just before you said that you did not know them by
+learning; now, if you have neither discovered nor learned them, how and
+whence do you come to know them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose that I was mistaken in saying that I knew them
+through my own discovery of them; whereas, in truth, I learned them in
+the same way that other people learn.
+
+SOCRATES: So you said before, and I must again ask, of whom? Do tell me.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Of the many.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you take refuge in them? I cannot say much for your
+teachers.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why, are they not able to teach?
+
+SOCRATES: They could not teach you how to play at draughts, which you
+would acknowledge (would you not) to be a much smaller matter than
+justice?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And can they teach the better who are unable to teach the
+worse?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I think that they can; at any rate, they can teach many far
+better things than to play at draughts.
+
+SOCRATES: What things?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why, for example, I learned to speak Greek of them, and I
+cannot say who was my teacher, or to whom I am to attribute my knowledge
+of Greek, if not to those good-for-nothing teachers, as you call them.
+
+SOCRATES: Why, yes, my friend; and the many are good enough teachers
+of Greek, and some of their instructions in that line may be justly
+praised.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why is that?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, because they have the qualities which good teachers ought
+to have.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What qualities?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, you know that knowledge is the first qualification of any
+teacher?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And if they know, they must agree together and not differ?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you say that they knew the things about which they
+differ?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: Then how can they teach them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: They cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but do you imagine that the many would differ about the
+nature of wood and stone? are they not agreed if you ask them what they
+are? and do they not run to fetch the same thing, when they want a
+piece of wood or a stone? And so in similar cases, which I suspect to be
+pretty nearly all that you mean by speaking Greek.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: These, as we were saying, are matters about which they are
+agreed with one another and with themselves; both individuals and states
+use the same words about them; they do not use some one word and some
+another.
+
+ALCIBIADES: They do not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then they may be expected to be good teachers of these things?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if we want to instruct any one in them, we shall be right
+in sending him to be taught by our friends the many?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: But if we wanted further to know not only which are men and
+which are horses, but which men or horses have powers of running, would
+the many still be able to inform us?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And you have a sufficient proof that they do not know these
+things and are not the best teachers of them, inasmuch as they are never
+agreed about them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And suppose that we wanted to know not only what men are like,
+but what healthy or diseased men are like--would the many be able to
+teach us?
+
+ALCIBIADES: They would not.
+
+SOCRATES: And you would have a proof that they were bad teachers of
+these matters, if you saw them at variance?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but are the many agreed with themselves, or with one
+another, about the justice or injustice of men and things?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Assuredly not, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: There is no subject about which they are more at variance?
+
+ALCIBIADES: None.
+
+SOCRATES: I do not suppose that you ever saw or heard of men quarrelling
+over the principles of health and disease to such an extent as to go to
+war and kill one another for the sake of them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No indeed.
+
+SOCRATES: But of the quarrels about justice and injustice, even if
+you have never seen them, you have certainly heard from many people,
+including Homer; for you have heard of the Iliad and Odyssey?
+
+ALCIBIADES: To be sure, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: A difference of just and unjust is the argument of those
+poems?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Which difference caused all the wars and deaths of Trojans
+and Achaeans, and the deaths of the suitors of Penelope in their quarrel
+with Odysseus.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And when the Athenians and Lacedaemonians and Boeotians fell
+at Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle of Coronea, at which your
+father Cleinias met his end, the question was one of justice--this was
+the sole cause of the battles, and of their deaths.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: But can they be said to understand that about which they are
+quarrelling to the death?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet those whom you thus allow to be ignorant are the
+teachers to whom you are appealing.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: But how are you ever likely to know the nature of justice and
+injustice, about which you are so perplexed, if you have neither learned
+them of others nor discovered them yourself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: From what you say, I suppose not.
+
+SOCRATES: See, again, how inaccurately you speak, Alcibiades!
+
+ALCIBIADES: In what respect?
+
+SOCRATES: In saying that I say so.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why, did you not say that I know nothing of the just and
+unjust?
+
+SOCRATES: No; I did not.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Did I, then?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes.
+
+ALCIBIADES: How was that?
+
+SOCRATES: Let me explain. Suppose I were to ask you which is the greater
+number, two or one; you would reply 'two'?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And by how much greater?
+
+ALCIBIADES: By one.
+
+SOCRATES: Which of us now says that two is more than one?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: Did not I ask, and you answer the question?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then who is speaking? I who put the question, or you who
+answer me?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I am.
+
+SOCRATES: Or suppose that I ask and you tell me the letters which make
+up the name Socrates, which of us is the speaker?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I am.
+
+SOCRATES: Now let us put the case generally: whenever there is a
+question and answer, who is the speaker,--the questioner or the
+answerer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates, that the answerer was the speaker.
+
+SOCRATES: And have I not been the questioner all through?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And you the answerer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Just so.
+
+SOCRATES: Which of us, then, was the speaker?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The inference is, Socrates, that I was the speaker.
+
+SOCRATES: Did not some one say that Alcibiades, the fair son of
+Cleinias, not understanding about just and unjust, but thinking that he
+did understand, was going to the assembly to advise the Athenians about
+what he did not know? Was not that said?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the result may be expressed in the language
+of Euripides. I think that you have heard all this 'from yourself, and
+not from me'; nor did I say this, which you erroneously attribute to me,
+but you yourself, and what you said was very true. For indeed, my dear
+fellow, the design which you meditate of teaching what you do not know,
+and have not taken any pains to learn, is downright insanity.
+
+ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, I think that the Athenians and the rest of
+the Hellenes do not often advise as to the more just or unjust; for they
+see no difficulty in them, and therefore they leave them, and consider
+which course of action will be most expedient; for there is a difference
+between justice and expediency. Many persons have done great wrong and
+profited by their injustice; others have done rightly and come to no
+good.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but granting that the just and the expedient are ever so
+much opposed, you surely do not imagine that you know what is expedient
+for mankind, or why a thing is expedient?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why not, Socrates?--But I am not going to be asked again
+from whom I learned, or when I made the discovery.
+
+SOCRATES: What a way you have! When you make a mistake which might be
+refuted by a previous argument, you insist on having a new and different
+refutation; the old argument is a worn-our garment which you will no
+longer put on, but some one must produce another which is clean and
+new. Now I shall disregard this move of yours, and shall ask over
+again,--Where did you learn and how do you know the nature of the
+expedient, and who is your teacher? All this I comprehend in a single
+question, and now you will manifestly be in the old difficulty, and
+will not be able to show that you know the expedient, either because you
+learned or because you discovered it yourself. But, as I perceive
+that you are dainty, and dislike the taste of a stale argument, I will
+enquire no further into your knowledge of what is expedient or what is
+not expedient for the Athenian people, and simply request you to say
+why you do not explain whether justice and expediency are the same or
+different? And if you like you may examine me as I have examined you,
+or, if you would rather, you may carry on the discussion by yourself.
+
+ALCIBIADES: But I am not certain, Socrates, whether I shall be able to
+discuss the matter with you.
+
+SOCRATES: Then imagine, my dear fellow, that I am the demus and the
+ecclesia; for in the ecclesia, too, you will have to persuade men
+individually.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And is not the same person able to persuade one individual
+singly and many individuals of the things which he knows? The
+grammarian, for example, can persuade one and he can persuade many about
+letters.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And about number, will not the same person persuade one and
+persuade many?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And this will be he who knows number, or the arithmetician?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: And cannot you persuade one man about that of which you can
+persuade many?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
+
+SOCRATES: And that of which you can persuade either is clearly what you
+know?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the only difference between one who argues as we are
+doing, and the orator who is addressing an assembly, is that the one
+seeks to persuade a number, and the other an individual, of the same
+things.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, since the same person who can persuade a multitude
+can persuade individuals, try conclusions upon me, and prove to me that
+the just is not always expedient.
+
+ALCIBIADES: You take liberties, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: I shall take the liberty of proving to you the opposite of
+that which you will not prove to me.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Proceed.
+
+SOCRATES: Answer my questions--that is all.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Nay, I should like you to be the speaker.
+
+SOCRATES: What, do you not wish to be persuaded?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly I do.
+
+SOCRATES: And can you be persuaded better than out of your own mouth?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I think not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you shall answer; and if you do not hear the words, that
+the just is the expedient, coming from your own lips, never believe
+another man again.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I won't; but answer I will, for I do not see how I can come
+to any harm.
+
+SOCRATES: A true prophecy! Let me begin then by enquiring of you whether
+you allow that the just is sometimes expedient and sometimes not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And sometimes honourable and sometimes not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: I am asking if you ever knew any one who did what was
+dishonourable and yet just?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Never.
+
+SOCRATES: All just things are honourable?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And are honourable things sometimes good and sometimes not
+good, or are they always good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I rather think, Socrates, that some honourable things are
+evil.
+
+SOCRATES: And are some dishonourable things good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: You mean in such a case as the following:--In time of war, men
+have been wounded or have died in rescuing a companion or kinsman, when
+others who have neglected the duty of rescuing them have escaped in
+safety?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And to rescue another under such circumstances is honourable,
+in respect of the attempt to save those whom we ought to save; and this
+is courage?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But evil in respect of death and wounds?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the courage which is shown in the rescue is one thing, and
+the death another?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the rescue of one's friends is honourable in one point of
+view, but evil in another?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And if honourable, then also good: Will you consider now
+whether I may not be right, for you were acknowledging that the courage
+which is shown in the rescue is honourable? Now is this courage good or
+evil? Look at the matter thus: which would you rather choose, good or
+evil?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Good.
+
+SOCRATES: And the greatest goods you would be most ready to choose, and
+would least like to be deprived of them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: What would you say of courage? At what price would you be
+willing to be deprived of courage?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I would rather die than be a coward.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you think that cowardice is the worst of evils?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: As bad as death, I suppose?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And life and courage are the extreme opposites of death and
+cowardice?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And they are what you would most desire to have, and their
+opposites you would least desire?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Is this because you think life and courage the best, and death
+and cowardice the worst?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And you would term the rescue of a friend in battle
+honourable, in as much as courage does a good work?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: But evil because of the death which ensues?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Might we not describe their different effects as follows:--You
+may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result,
+and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and
+dishonourable in so far as they are evil?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is
+honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is
+good and yet evil?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor
+anything base, regarded as base, good.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who
+acts honourably acts well?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who acts well is happy?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Of course.
+
+SOCRATES: And the happy are those who obtain good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then acting well is a good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And happiness is a good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the good and the honourable are again identified.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Manifestly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we
+shall also find to be good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And is the good expedient or not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Expedient.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you remember our admissions about the just?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted
+justly must also act honourably.
+
+SOCRATES: And the honourable is the good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the good is expedient?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should infer so.
+
+SOCRATES: And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you
+answer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I must acknowledge it to be true.
+
+SOCRATES: And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the
+expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who,
+pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets
+up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the
+just may be the evil?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am
+saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to
+me I am of different minds in successive instants.
+
+SOCRATES: And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my
+friend?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Indeed I am not.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you
+have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort,
+you would then be of different minds in successive instants?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that
+I should.
+
+SOCRATES: You would feel no doubt; and for this reason--because you
+would know?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose so.
+
+SOCRATES: And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is
+clearly that you are ignorant?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very likely.
+
+SOCRATES: And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust,
+honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient,
+the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in
+perplexity. Is not that clear?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily
+perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly he is.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you know how to ascend into heaven?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Tell me.
+
+SOCRATES: The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but
+you do not think that you know.
+
+ALCIBIADES: There again; what do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which
+you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the
+preparation of food.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of
+food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The latter.
+
+SOCRATES: Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by
+considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do
+you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?
+
+ALCIBIADES: It would be the concern of the pilot.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you
+know that you do not know it?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I imagine not.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice
+are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of
+knowledge?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Once more, what do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what
+we are doing?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But when people think that they do not know, they entrust
+their business to others?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make
+mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they
+are ignorant?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of
+course, be those who know?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: But if neither those who know, nor those who know that they
+do not know, make mistakes, there remain those only who do not know and
+think that they know.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, only those.
+
+SOCRATES: Then this is ignorance of the disgraceful sort which is
+mischievous?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And most mischievous and most disgraceful when having to do
+with the greatest matters?
+
+ALCIBIADES: By far.
+
+SOCRATES: And can there be any matters greater than the just, the
+honourable, the good, and the expedient?
+
+ALCIBIADES: There cannot be.
+
+SOCRATES: And these, as you were saying, are what perplex you?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But if you are perplexed, then, as the previous argument has
+shown, you are not only ignorant of the greatest matters, but being
+ignorant you fancy that you know them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I fear that you are right.
+
+SOCRATES: And now see what has happened to you, Alcibiades! I hardly
+like to speak of your evil case, but as we are alone I will: My good
+friend, you are wedded to ignorance of the most disgraceful kind, and of
+this you are convicted, not by me, but out of your own mouth and by
+your own argument; wherefore also you rush into politics before you are
+educated. Neither is your case to be deemed singular. For I might say
+the same of almost all our statesmen, with the exception, perhaps of
+your guardian, Pericles.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and Pericles is said not to have got his
+wisdom by the light of nature, but to have associated with several of
+the philosophers; with Pythocleides, for example, and with Anaxagoras,
+and now in advanced life with Damon, in the hope of gaining wisdom.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good; but did you ever know a man wise in anything who
+was unable to impart his particular wisdom? For example, he who taught
+you letters was not only wise, but he made you and any others whom he
+liked wise.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And you, whom he taught, can do the same?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And in like manner the harper and gymnastic-master?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: When a person is enabled to impart knowledge to another, he
+thereby gives an excellent proof of his own understanding of any matter.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, and did Pericles make any one wise; did he begin by
+making his sons wise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: But, Socrates, if the two sons of Pericles were simpletons,
+what has that to do with the matter?
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but did he make your brother, Cleinias, wise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Cleinias is a madman; there is no use in talking of him.
+
+SOCRATES: But if Cleinias is a madman and the two sons of Pericles were
+simpletons, what reason can be given why he neglects you, and lets you
+be as you are?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I believe that I am to blame for not listening to him.
+
+SOCRATES: But did you ever hear of any other Athenian or foreigner,
+bond or free, who was deemed to have grown wiser in the society of
+Pericles,--as I might cite Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, and
+Callias, the son of Calliades, who have grown wiser in the society of
+Zeno, for which privilege they have each of them paid him the sum of
+a hundred minae (about 406 pounds sterling) to the increase of their
+wisdom and fame.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I certainly never did hear of any one.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, and in reference to your own case, do you mean to remain
+as you are, or will you take some pains about yourself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: With your aid, Socrates, I will. And indeed, when I hear you
+speak, the truth of what you are saying strikes home to me, and I
+agree with you, for our statesmen, all but a few, do appear to be quite
+uneducated.
+
+SOCRATES: What is the inference?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why, that if they were educated they would be trained
+athletes, and he who means to rival them ought to have knowledge
+and experience when he attacks them; but now, as they have become
+politicians without any special training, why should I have the trouble
+of learning and practising? For I know well that by the light of nature
+I shall get the better of them.
+
+SOCRATES: My dear friend, what a sentiment! And how unworthy of your
+noble form and your high estate!
+
+ALCIBIADES: What do you mean, Socrates; why do you say so?
+
+SOCRATES: I am grieved when I think of our mutual love.
+
+ALCIBIADES: At what?
+
+SOCRATES: At your fancying that the contest on which you are entering is
+with people here.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why, what others are there?
+
+SOCRATES: Is that a question which a magnanimous soul should ask?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Do you mean to say that the contest is not with these?
+
+SOCRATES: And suppose that you were going to steer a ship into action,
+would you only aim at being the best pilot on board? Would you not,
+while acknowledging that you must possess this degree of excellence,
+rather look to your antagonists, and not, as you are now doing, to your
+fellow combatants? You ought to be so far above these latter, that they
+will not even dare to be your rivals; and, being regarded by you as
+inferiors, will do battle for you against the enemy; this is the kind
+of superiority which you must establish over them, if you mean to
+accomplish any noble action really worthy of yourself and of the state.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That would certainly be my aim.
+
+SOCRATES: Verily, then, you have good reason to be satisfied, if you are
+better than the soldiers; and you need not, when you are their superior
+and have your thoughts and actions fixed upon them, look away to the
+generals of the enemy.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Of whom are you speaking, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, you surely know that our city goes to war now and then
+with the Lacedaemonians and with the great king?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True enough.
+
+SOCRATES: And if you meant to be the ruler of this city, would you not
+be right in considering that the Lacedaemonian and Persian king were
+your true rivals?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I believe that you are right.
+
+SOCRATES: Oh no, my friend, I am quite wrong, and I think that you ought
+rather to turn your attention to Midias the quail-breeder and others
+like him, who manage our politics; in whom, as the women would remark,
+you may still see the slaves' cut of hair, cropping out in their minds
+as well as on their pates; and they come with their barbarous lingo to
+flatter us and not to rule us. To these, I say, you should look, and
+then you need not trouble yourself about your own fitness to contend in
+such a noble arena: there is no reason why you should either learn what
+has to be learned, or practise what has to be practised, and only when
+thoroughly prepared enter on a political career.
+
+ALCIBIADES: There, I think, Socrates, that you are right; I do not
+suppose, however, that the Spartan generals or the great king are really
+different from anybody else.
+
+SOCRATES: But, my dear friend, do consider what you are saying.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What am I to consider?
+
+SOCRATES: In the first place, will you be more likely to take care of
+yourself, if you are in a wholesome fear and dread of them, or if you
+are not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly, if I have such a fear of them.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you think that you will sustain any injury if you take
+care of yourself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No, I shall be greatly benefited.
+
+SOCRATES: And this is one very important respect in which that notion of
+yours is bad.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: In the next place, consider that what you say is probably
+false.
+
+ALCIBIADES: How so?
+
+SOCRATES: Let me ask you whether better natures are likely to be found
+in noble races or not in noble races?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly in noble races.
+
+SOCRATES: Are not those who are well born and well bred most likely to
+be perfect in virtue?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then let us compare our antecedents with those of the
+Lacedaemonian and Persian kings; are they inferior to us in descent?
+Have we not heard that the former are sprung from Heracles, and the
+latter from Achaemenes, and that the race of Heracles and the race of
+Achaemenes go back to Perseus, son of Zeus?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Why, so does mine go back to Eurysaces, and he to Zeus!
+
+SOCRATES: And mine, noble Alcibiades, to Daedalus, and he to Hephaestus,
+son of Zeus. But, for all that, we are far inferior to them. For they
+are descended 'from Zeus,' through a line of kings--either kings
+of Argos and Lacedaemon, or kings of Persia, a country which the
+descendants of Achaemenes have always possessed, besides being at
+various times sovereigns of Asia, as they now are; whereas, we and our
+fathers were but private persons. How ridiculous would you be thought if
+you were to make a display of your ancestors and of Salamis the island
+of Eurysaces, or of Aegina, the habitation of the still more ancient
+Aeacus, before Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes. You should consider how
+inferior we are to them both in the derivation of our birth and in other
+particulars. Did you never observe how great is the property of the
+Spartan kings? And their wives are under the guardianship of the Ephori,
+who are public officers and watch over them, in order to preserve as
+far as possible the purity of the Heracleid blood. Still greater is the
+difference among the Persians; for no one entertains a suspicion that
+the father of a prince of Persia can be any one but the king. Such is
+the awe which invests the person of the queen, that any other guard is
+needless. And when the heir of the kingdom is born, all the subjects of
+the king feast; and the day of his birth is for ever afterwards kept
+as a holiday and time of sacrifice by all Asia; whereas, when you and
+I were born, Alcibiades, as the comic poet says, the neighbours hardly
+knew of the important event. After the birth of the royal child, he is
+tended, not by a good-for-nothing woman-nurse, but by the best of the
+royal eunuchs, who are charged with the care of him, and especially with
+the fashioning and right formation of his limbs, in order that he may
+be as shapely as possible; which being their calling, they are held in
+great honour. And when the young prince is seven years old he is put
+upon a horse and taken to the riding-masters, and begins to go out
+hunting. And at fourteen years of age he is handed over to the royal
+schoolmasters, as they are termed: these are four chosen men, reputed to
+be the best among the Persians of a certain age; and one of them is the
+wisest, another the justest, a third the most temperate, and a fourth
+the most valiant. The first instructs him in the magianism of Zoroaster,
+the son of Oromasus, which is the worship of the Gods, and teaches him
+also the duties of his royal office; the second, who is the justest,
+teaches him always to speak the truth; the third, or most temperate,
+forbids him to allow any pleasure to be lord over him, that he may be
+accustomed to be a freeman and king indeed,--lord of himself first,
+and not a slave; the most valiant trains him to be bold and fearless,
+telling him that if he fears he is to deem himself a slave; whereas
+Pericles gave you, Alcibiades, for a tutor Zopyrus the Thracian, a slave
+of his who was past all other work. I might enlarge on the nurture and
+education of your rivals, but that would be tedious; and what I have
+said is a sufficient sample of what remains to be said. I have only
+to remark, by way of contrast, that no one cares about your birth or
+nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian,
+unless he has a lover who looks after him. And if you cast an eye on
+the wealth, the luxury, the garments with their flowing trains, the
+anointings with myrrh, the multitudes of attendants, and all the other
+bravery of the Persians, you will be ashamed when you discern your own
+inferiority; or if you look at the temperance and orderliness and ease
+and grace and magnanimity and courage and endurance and love of toil
+and desire of glory and ambition of the Lacedaemonians--in all these
+respects you will see that you are but a child in comparison of them.
+Even in the matter of wealth, if you value yourself upon that, I must
+reveal to you how you stand; for if you form an estimate of the wealth
+of the Lacedaemonians, you will see that our possessions fall far short
+of theirs. For no one here can compete with them either in the extent
+and fertility of their own and the Messenian territory, or in the number
+of their slaves, and especially of the Helots, or of their horses, or of
+the animals which feed on the Messenian pastures. But I have said enough
+of this: and as to gold and silver, there is more of them in Lacedaemon
+than in all the rest of Hellas, for during many generations gold has
+been always flowing in to them from the whole Hellenic world, and often
+from the barbarian also, and never going out, as in the fable of Aesop
+the fox said to the lion, 'The prints of the feet of those going in
+are distinct enough;' but who ever saw the trace of money going out of
+Lacedaemon? And therefore you may safely infer that the inhabitants are
+the richest of the Hellenes in gold and silver, and that their kings are
+the richest of them, for they have a larger share of these things, and
+they have also a tribute paid to them which is very considerable. Yet
+the Spartan wealth, though great in comparison of the wealth of the
+other Hellenes, is as nothing in comparison of that of the Persians and
+their kings. Why, I have been informed by a credible person who went up
+to the king (at Susa), that he passed through a large tract of excellent
+land, extending for nearly a day's journey, which the people of the
+country called the queen's girdle, and another, which they called her
+veil; and several other fair and fertile districts, which were reserved
+for the adornment of the queen, and are named after her several
+habiliments. Now, I cannot help thinking to myself, What if some one
+were to go to Amestris, the wife of Xerxes and mother of Artaxerxes, and
+say to her, There is a certain Dinomache, whose whole wardrobe is not
+worth fifty minae--and that will be more than the value--and she has a
+son who is possessed of a three-hundred acre patch at Erchiae, and he
+has a mind to go to war with your son--would she not wonder to what this
+Alcibiades trusts for success in the conflict? 'He must rely,' she would
+say to herself, 'upon his training and wisdom--these are the things
+which Hellenes value.' And if she heard that this Alcibiades who
+is making the attempt is not as yet twenty years old, and is wholly
+uneducated, and when his lover tells him that he ought to get education
+and training first, and then go and fight the king, he refuses, and says
+that he is well enough as he is, would she not be amazed, and ask 'On
+what, then, does the youth rely?' And if we replied: He relies on his
+beauty, and stature, and birth, and mental endowments, she would think
+that we were mad, Alcibiades, when she compared the advantages which you
+possess with those of her own people. And I believe that even Lampido,
+the daughter of Leotychides, the wife of Archidamus and mother of Agis,
+all of whom were kings, would have the same feeling; if, in your present
+uneducated state, you were to turn your thoughts against her son, she
+too would be equally astonished. But how disgraceful, that we should not
+have as high a notion of what is required in us as our enemies'
+wives and mothers have of the qualities which are required in their
+assailants! O my friend, be persuaded by me, and hear the Delphian
+inscription, 'Know thyself'--not the men whom you think, but these kings
+are our rivals, and we can only overcome them by pains and skill. And
+if you fail in the required qualities, you will fail also in becoming
+renowned among Hellenes and Barbarians, which you seem to desire more
+than any other man ever desired anything.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I entirely believe you; but what are the sort of pains which
+are required, Socrates,--can you tell me?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, I can; but we must take counsel together concerning the
+manner in which both of us may be most improved. For what I am telling
+you of the necessity of education applies to myself as well as to you;
+and there is only one point in which I have an advantage over you.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What is that?
+
+SOCRATES: I have a guardian who is better and wiser than your guardian,
+Pericles.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Who is he, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: God, Alcibiades, who up to this day has not allowed me to
+converse with you; and he inspires in me the faith that I am especially
+designed to bring you to honour.
+
+ALCIBIADES: You are jesting, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Perhaps, at any rate, I am right in saying that all men
+greatly need pains and care, and you and I above all men.
+
+ALCIBIADES: You are not far wrong about me.
+
+SOCRATES: And certainly not about myself.
+
+ALCIBIADES: But what can we do?
+
+SOCRATES: There must be no hesitation or cowardice, my friend.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That would not become us, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: No, indeed, and we ought to take counsel together: for do we
+not wish to be as good as possible?
+
+ALCIBIADES: We do.
+
+SOCRATES: In what sort of virtue?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Plainly, in the virtue of good men.
+
+SOCRATES: Who are good in what?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Those, clearly, who are good in the management of affairs.
+
+SOCRATES: What sort of affairs? Equestrian affairs?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: You mean that about them we should have recourse to horsemen?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, naval affairs?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: You mean that we should have recourse to sailors about them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then what affairs? And who do them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The affairs which occupy Athenian gentlemen.
+
+SOCRATES: And when you speak of gentlemen, do you mean the wise or the
+unwise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The wise.
+
+SOCRATES: And a man is good in respect of that in which he is wise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And evil in respect of that in which he is unwise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: The shoemaker, for example, is wise in respect of the making
+of shoes?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he is good in that?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He is.
+
+SOCRATES: But in respect of the making of garments he is unwise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then in that he is bad?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then upon this view of the matter the same man is good and
+also bad?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But would you say that the good are the same as the bad?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then whom do you call the good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I mean by the good those who are able to rule in the city.
+
+SOCRATES: Not, surely, over horses?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: But over men?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: When they are sick?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: Or on a voyage?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: Or reaping the harvest?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: When they are doing something or nothing?
+
+ALCIBIADES: When they are doing something, I should say.
+
+SOCRATES: I wish that you would explain to me what this something is.
+
+ALCIBIADES: When they are having dealings with one another, and using
+one another's services, as we citizens do in our daily life.
+
+SOCRATES: Those of whom you speak are ruling over men who are using the
+services of other men?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Are they ruling over the signal-men who give the time to the
+rowers?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No; they are not.
+
+SOCRATES: That would be the office of the pilot?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But, perhaps you mean that they rule over flute-players, who
+lead the singers and use the services of the dancers?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: That would be the business of the teacher of the chorus?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then what is the meaning of being able to rule over men who
+use other men?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I mean that they rule over men who have common rights of
+citizenship, and dealings with one another.
+
+SOCRATES: And what sort of an art is this? Suppose that I ask you
+again, as I did just now, What art makes men know how to rule over their
+fellow-sailors,--how would you answer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The art of the pilot.
+
+SOCRATES: And, if I may recur to another old instance, what art enables
+them to rule over their fellow-singers?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The art of the teacher of the chorus, which you were just
+now mentioning.
+
+SOCRATES: And what do you call the art of fellow-citizens?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should say, good counsel, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And is the art of the pilot evil counsel?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: But good counsel?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, that is what I should say,--good counsel, of which the
+aim is the preservation of the voyagers.
+
+SOCRATES: True. And what is the aim of that other good counsel of which
+you speak?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The aim is the better order and preservation of the city.
+
+SOCRATES: And what is that of which the absence or presence improves
+and preserves the order of the city? Suppose you were to ask me, what is
+that of which the presence or absence improves or preserves the order
+of the body? I should reply, the presence of health and the absence of
+disease. You would say the same?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if you were to ask me the same question about the eyes, I
+should reply in the same way, 'the presence of sight and the absence of
+blindness;' or about the ears, I should reply, that they were improved
+and were in better case, when deafness was absent, and hearing was
+present in them.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And what would you say of a state? What is that by the
+presence or absence of which the state is improved and better managed
+and ordered?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should say, Socrates:--the presence of friendship and the
+absence of hatred and division.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you mean by friendship agreement or disagreement?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Agreement.
+
+SOCRATES: What art makes cities agree about numbers?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Arithmetic.
+
+SOCRATES: And private individuals?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The same.
+
+SOCRATES: And what art makes each individual agree with himself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: The same.
+
+SOCRATES: And what art makes each of us agree with himself about the
+comparative length of the span and of the cubit? Does not the art of
+measure?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Individuals are agreed with one another about this; and
+states, equally?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same holds of the balance?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But what is the other agreement of which you speak, and about
+what? what art can give that agreement? And does that which gives it to
+the state give it also to the individual, so as to make him consistent
+with himself and with another?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should suppose so.
+
+SOCRATES: But what is the nature of the agreement?--answer, and faint
+not.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I mean to say that there should be such friendship and
+agreement as exists between an affectionate father and mother and their
+son, or between brothers, or between husband and wife.
+
+SOCRATES: But can a man, Alcibiades, agree with a woman about the
+spinning of wool, which she understands and he does not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No, truly.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor has he any need, for spinning is a female accomplishment.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And would a woman agree with a man about the science of arms,
+which she has never learned?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: I suppose that the use of arms would be regarded by you as a
+male accomplishment?
+
+ALCIBIADES: It would.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, upon your view, women and men have two sorts of
+knowledge?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and
+men?
+
+ALCIBIADES: There is not.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Plainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose not.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor men by women when they do their own work?
+
+ALCIBIADES: No.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their
+own work?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the
+truth. (Compare Republic.)
+
+SOCRATES: What! do you mean to say that states are well administered
+when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying,
+alone secures their good order?
+
+ALCIBIADES: But I should say that there is friendship among them, for
+this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work.
+
+SOCRATES: That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean
+now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How
+can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of
+which the other is in ignorance?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
+
+SOCRATES: And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing
+what is just or unjust?
+
+ALCIBIADES: What is just, certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no
+friendship among them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I suppose that there must be, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about
+which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men?
+I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the
+same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not.
+
+ALCIBIADES: But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I
+have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state.
+
+SOCRATES: Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your
+deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of
+yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the
+discovery should be made.
+
+ALCIBIADES: And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the
+discovery?
+
+SOCRATES: Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which,
+by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very
+improving to both of us.
+
+ALCIBIADES: If I can be improved by answering, I will answer.
+
+SOCRATES: And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived
+by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves
+when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself?
+and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes
+care of what belongs to him?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I should think so.
+
+SOCRATES: When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care
+of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I do not understand.
+
+SOCRATES: Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring
+belong to the finger, and to the finger only?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the shoe in like manner to the foot?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our
+feet?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I do not comprehend, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a
+thing is a correct expression?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And taking proper care means improving?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And what is the art which improves our shoes?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking.
+
+SOCRATES: Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some
+other art which improves the feet?
+
+ALCIBIADES: By some other art.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of
+the body?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Which is gymnastic?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking
+of that which belongs to our feet?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of
+graving rings of that which belongs to our hands?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of
+weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from
+that which takes care of the belongings of each thing?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take
+care of yourself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to
+be the same as that which takes care of ourselves?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care
+of ourselves?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I cannot say.
+
+SOCRATES: At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is
+not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves
+better?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if
+we did not know a shoe?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not
+know a ring?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not
+know what we are ourselves?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
+
+SOCRATES: And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be
+lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is
+self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain?
+
+ALCIBIADES: At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself;
+at other times the task appears to be very difficult.
+
+SOCRATES: But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is
+no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of
+ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be
+discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own
+existence, which otherwise we can never know.
+
+ALCIBIADES: You say truly.
+
+SOCRATES: Come, now, I beseech you, tell me with whom you are
+conversing?--with whom but with me?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: As I am, with you?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: That is to say, I, Socrates, am talking?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is my hearer?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And I in talking use words?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And talking and using words have, I suppose, the same meaning?
+
+ALCIBIADES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And the user is not the same as the thing which he uses?
+
+ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: I will explain; the shoemaker, for example, uses a square
+tool, and a circular tool, and other tools for cutting?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But the tool is not the same as the cutter and user of the
+tool?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Of course not.
+
+SOCRATES: And in the same way the instrument of the harper is to be
+distinguished from the harper himself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: It is.
+
+SOCRATES: Now the question which I asked was whether you conceive the
+user to be always different from that which he uses?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: Then what shall we say of the shoemaker? Does he cut with his
+tools only or with his hands?
+
+ALCIBIADES: With his hands as well.
+
+SOCRATES: He uses his hands too?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And does he use his eyes in cutting leather?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He does.
+
+SOCRATES: And we admit that the user is not the same with the things
+which he uses?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the shoemaker and the harper are to be distinguished from
+the hands and feet which they use?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: And does not a man use the whole body?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And that which uses is different from that which is used?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Then a man is not the same as his own body?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is the inference.
+
+SOCRATES: What is he, then?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I cannot say.
+
+SOCRATES: Nay, you can say that he is the user of the body.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the user of the body is the soul?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, the soul.
+
+SOCRATES: And the soul rules?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally
+admitted.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What is it?
+
+SOCRATES: That man is one of three things.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What are they?
+
+SOCRATES: Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the
+body is man?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, we did.
+
+SOCRATES: And does the body rule over itself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: It is subject, as we were saying?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
+
+ALCIBIADES: It would seem not.
+
+SOCRATES: But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body,
+and consequently that this is man?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very likely.
+
+SOCRATES: The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is
+subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man,
+either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Just so.
+
+SOCRATES: Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.
+
+SOCRATES: And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we
+shall be satisfied;--more precise proof will be supplied when we have
+discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry
+would be too much protracted.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What was that?
+
+SOCRATES: What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be
+first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been
+considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps,
+be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more
+properly ourselves than the soul?
+
+ALCIBIADES: There is nothing.
+
+SOCRATES: Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with
+one another, soul to soul?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And that is just what I was saying before--that I, Socrates,
+am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real
+Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his
+soul?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That appears to be true.
+
+SOCRATES: He whose knowledge only extends to the body, knows the things
+of a man, and not the man himself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then neither the physician regarded as a physician, nor the
+trainer regarded as a trainer, knows himself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He does not.
+
+SOCRATES: The husbandmen and the other craftsmen are very far from
+knowing themselves, for they would seem not even to know their own
+belongings? When regarded in relation to the arts which they practise
+they are even further removed from self-knowledge, for they only know
+the belongings of the body, which minister to the body.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then if temperance is the knowledge of self, in respect of his
+art none of them is temperate?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: And this is the reason why their arts are accounted vulgar,
+and are not such as a good man would practise?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: Again, he who cherishes his body cherishes not himself, but
+what belongs to him?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: But he who cherishes his money, cherishes neither himself nor
+his belongings, but is in a stage yet further removed from himself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the money-maker has really ceased to be occupied with his
+own concerns?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And if any one has fallen in love with the person of
+Alcibiades, he loves not Alcibiades, but the belongings of Alcibiades?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But he who loves your soul is the true lover?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is the necessary inference.
+
+SOCRATES: The lover of the body goes away when the flower of youth
+fades?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But he who loves the soul goes not away, as long as the soul
+follows after virtue?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And I am the lover who goes not away, but remains with you,
+when you are no longer young and the rest are gone?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, Socrates; and therein you do well, and I hope that you
+will remain.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you must try to look your best.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I will.
+
+SOCRATES: The fact is, that there is only one lover of Alcibiades the
+son of Cleinias; there neither is nor ever has been seemingly any
+other; and he is his darling,--Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus and
+Phaenarete.
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And did you not say, that if I had not spoken first, you were
+on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas
+other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you,
+is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will
+never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian
+people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover
+of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has
+been ruined in this way. For the demus of the great-hearted Erechteus is
+of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe
+the caution which I give you.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What caution?
+
+SOCRATES: Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to
+know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote
+which will keep you out of harm's way.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to
+me in what way I am to take care of myself.
+
+SOCRATES: Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably
+well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as
+we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of
+something which is not ourselves.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look
+to that?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to
+others?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very good.
+
+SOCRATES: But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the
+soul?--For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves.
+Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian
+inscription, of which we were just now speaking?
+
+ALCIBIADES: What have you in your thoughts, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson
+of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I
+imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: Consider; if some one were to say to the eye, 'See thyself,'
+as you might say to a man, 'Know thyself,' what is the nature and
+meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:--That the eye should
+look at that in which it would see itself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like.
+
+SOCRATES: Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a
+mirror in our own eyes?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into
+the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ
+which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a
+sort of image of the person looking?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye
+which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there
+see itself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is evident.
+
+SOCRATES: But looking at anything else either in man or in the world,
+and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye,
+and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye
+resides?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself,
+must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul
+in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I agree, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that
+which has to do with wisdom and knowledge?
+
+ALCIBIADES: There is none.
+
+SOCRATES: Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine;
+and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will
+be most likely to know himself?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever
+know our own good and evil?
+
+ALCIBIADES: How can we, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would
+be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was
+really his?
+
+ALCIBIADES: It would be quite impossible.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything
+belonged, if we did not know ourselves?
+
+ALCIBIADES: How could we?
+
+SOCRATES: And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we
+know the belongings of our belongings?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now
+that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay,
+rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the
+discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the
+things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of
+the same art.
+
+ALCIBIADES: So much may be supposed.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will
+in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know
+the affairs of states?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then such a man can never be a statesman?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: Nor an economist?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: He will not know what he is doing?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He will not.
+
+SOCRATES: And will not he who is ignorant fall into error?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Assuredly.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public
+and private capacity?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, indeed.
+
+SOCRATES: And failing, will he not be miserable?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very.
+
+SOCRATES: And what will become of those for whom he is acting?
+
+ALCIBIADES: They will be miserable also.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he who is not wise and good cannot be happy?
+
+ALCIBIADES: He cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: The bad, then, are miserable?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, very.
+
+SOCRATES: And if so, not he who has riches, but he who has wisdom, is
+delivered from his misery?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Cities, then, if they are to be happy, do not want walls, or
+triremes, or docks, or numbers, or size, Alcibiades, without virtue?
+(Compare Arist. Pol.)
+
+ALCIBIADES: Indeed they do not.
+
+SOCRATES: And you must give the citizens virtue, if you mean to
+administer their affairs rightly or nobly?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: But can a man give that which he has not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Impossible.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you or any one who means to govern and superintend, not
+only himself and the things of himself, but the state and the things of
+the state, must in the first place acquire virtue.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: You have not therefore to obtain power or authority, in
+order to enable you to do what you wish for yourself and the state, but
+justice and wisdom.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: You and the state, if you act wisely and justly, will act
+according to the will of God?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: As I was saying before, you will look only at what is bright
+and divine, and act with a view to them?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: In that mirror you will see and know yourselves and your own
+good?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And so you will act rightly and well?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: In which case, I will be security for your happiness.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I accept the security.
+
+SOCRATES: But if you act unrighteously, your eye will turn to the dark
+and godless, and being in darkness and ignorance of yourselves, you will
+probably do deeds of darkness.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Very possibly.
+
+SOCRATES: For if a man, my dear Alcibiades, has the power to do what he
+likes, but has no understanding, what is likely to be the result, either
+to him as an individual or to the state--for example, if he be sick and
+is able to do what he likes, not having the mind of a physician--having
+moreover tyrannical power, and no one daring to reprove him, what will
+happen to him? Will he not be likely to have his constitution ruined?
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Or again, in a ship, if a man having the power to do what he
+likes, has no intelligence or skill in navigation, do you see what will
+happen to him and to his fellow-sailors?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes; I see that they will all perish.
+
+SOCRATES: And in like manner, in a state, and where there is any power
+and authority which is wanting in virtue, will not misfortune, in like
+manner, ensue?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Not tyrannical power, then, my good Alcibiades, should be the
+aim either of individuals or states, if they would be happy, but virtue.
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: And before they have virtue, to be commanded by a superior is
+better for men as well as for children? (Compare Arist. Pol.)
+
+ALCIBIADES: That is evident.
+
+SOCRATES: And that which is better is also nobler?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And what is nobler is more becoming?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then to the bad man slavery is more becoming, because better?
+
+ALCIBIADES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Then vice is only suited to a slave?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And virtue to a freeman?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And, O my friend, is not the condition of a slave to be
+avoided?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Certainly, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And are you now conscious of your own state? And do you know
+whether you are a freeman or not?
+
+ALCIBIADES: I think that I am very conscious indeed of my own state.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you know how to escape out of a state which I do not
+even like to name to my beauty?
+
+ALCIBIADES: Yes, I do.
+
+SOCRATES: How?
+
+ALCIBIADES: By your help, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: That is not well said, Alcibiades.
+
+ALCIBIADES: What ought I to have said?
+
+SOCRATES: By the help of God.
+
+ALCIBIADES: I agree; and I further say, that our relations are likely
+to be reversed. From this day forward, I must and will follow you as you
+have followed me; I will be the disciple, and you shall be my master.
+
+SOCRATES: O that is rare! My love breeds another love: and so like the
+stork I shall be cherished by the bird whom I have hatched.
+
+ALCIBIADES: Strange, but true; and henceforward I shall begin to think
+about justice.
+
+SOCRATES: And I hope that you will persist; although I have fears, not
+because I doubt you; but I see the power of the state, which may be too
+much for both of us.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Alcibiades I, by (may be spurious) Plato
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