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diff --git a/1672-h/1672-h.htm b/1672-h/1672-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e71a890 --- /dev/null +++ b/1672-h/1672-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,9226 @@ +<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" +"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd"> +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xml:lang="en" lang="en"> +<head> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;charset=utf-8" /> +<meta http-equiv="Content-Style-Type" content="text/css" /> +<title>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Gorgias, by Plato</title> + +<style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + +body { margin-left: 20%; + margin-right: 20%; + text-align: justify; } + +h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 {text-align: center; font-style: normal; font-weight: +normal; line-height: 1.5; margin-top: .5em; margin-bottom: .5em;} + +h1 {font-size: 300%; + margin-top: 0.6em; + margin-bottom: 0.6em; + letter-spacing: 0.12em; + word-spacing: 0.2em; + text-indent: 0em;} +h2 {font-size: 150%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} +h3 {font-size: 130%; margin-top: 1em;} +h4 {font-size: 120%;} +h5 {font-size: 110%;} + +.no-break {page-break-before: avoid;} /* for epubs */ + +div.chapter {page-break-before: always; margin-top: 4em;} + +hr {width: 80%; margin-top: 2em; margin-bottom: 2em;} + +p {text-indent: 1em; + margin-top: 0.25em; + margin-bottom: 0.25em; } + +p.poem {text-indent: 0%; + margin-left: 10%; + font-size: 90%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; } + +a:link {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:visited {color:blue; text-decoration:none} +a:hover {color:red} + +</style> +</head> +<body> + +<div style='text-align:center; font-size:1.2em; font-weight:bold'>The Project Gutenberg eBook of Gorgias, by Plato</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Gorgias</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Plato</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Benjamin Jowett</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March, 1999 [eBook #1672]<br /> +[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Sue Asscher</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS ***</div> + +<h1>GORGIAS</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">by Plato</h2> + +<h3>Translated by Benjamin Jowett</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">GORGIAS</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<hr /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters +as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The +speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict +them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae +in the Theaetetus, that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the +most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or +unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and +references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the +whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine +the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare +Introduction to the Phaedrus.) +</p> + +<p> +Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. +First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the +slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and contradictory +assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher +has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most +various results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all, +examined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost +indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that +they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in +generality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions +easily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we +can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar +theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art +of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may +hardly admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or the +intellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are +never far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, +we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally +in all the dialogues. +</p> + +<p> +There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the +building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may +give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his +thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may +find a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which +is simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original +mind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on +their agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence +which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us, +criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to +the indications of the text. +</p> + +<p> +Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance +of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher themes are +introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of +man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his +art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the existence of a universal art of flattery +or simulation having several branches:—this is the genus of which +rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the +true and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to +others, and which at last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. +These two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of +the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the +treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of +true and false art. In the development of this opposition there arise various +other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as +they are to the world in general, ideals as they may be more worthily called): +(1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done +evil he had better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a +third Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not +what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is +to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and +pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as +great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely rhetoricians, but +poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well +as present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally +appear before the judgment-seat of the gods below. +</p> + +<p> +The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three +characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and the +form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential +towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus, +ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In the first division +the question is asked—What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, +for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is +transferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the defence of +his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before +he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great +subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to +the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, +have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and hence +arise the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, +Polus is at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow +legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes. +Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is +good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of +the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the +argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The +conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a +lower—that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters +them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates +with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or +disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric. +</p> + +<p> +The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts which +are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years, +who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout +Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and +boastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is treated by Socrates with +considerable respect. But he is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has +been teaching rhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own +art. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric +can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering +sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect +him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous +nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates’ manner of approaching a +question; he is quite “one of Socrates’ sort, ready to be refuted +as well as to refute,” and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should +have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great +influence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric +can teach everything and know nothing. +</p> + +<p> +Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway “colt,” as Socrates +describes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under +the pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the earliest +opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on +rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the inventor of balanced +or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.). At first he is violent and +ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the +judicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good-humour, and compelled +to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he +compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable +than to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and +dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. +Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining +the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of +the question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of +Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of +Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. +When the argument with him has fairly run out. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is +with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are +true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside +down. In him another type of character is represented; he is neither sophist +nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. +He might be described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of +power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. +There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of +morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, +though he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains +that might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this +he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of the +Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent +weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he is of +philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the order of +nature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker (compare +Republic). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind, +he generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down his +principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with +distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, +whose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he +makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like +Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian +statesmen of a former generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, +such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of +human character is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has +developed to the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the +government of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about +whom we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have +seemed to reflect the history of his life. +</p> + +<p> +And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist or +rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is +contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending against +the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in the Republic, +are the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves carried away by the +great tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a +distance, with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his +personal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his +servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as +Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is +irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A +repartee of his which appears to have been really made to the +“omniscient” Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon +(Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and +certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being +“as long as he pleases,” or “as short as he pleases” +(compare Protag.). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and +attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is +scandalized that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be +stated in plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to +preserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad +sense of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, +superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to +continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is +describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself +with the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words. +</p> + +<p> +The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the Protagoras +and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and +rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of +the same species. His behaviour is governed by that of his opponents; the least +forwardness or egotism on their part is met by a corresponding irony on the +part of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy will not allow him to be +silent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking than in any other of +Plato’s writings: for he is “fooled to the top of his bent” +by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply in earnest. He +rises higher than even in the Phaedo and Crito: at first enveloping his moral +convictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, +his life, himself, in them. As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside +the veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his +adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own +fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of +politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the +whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will +be justified in the world below. Then the position of Socrates and Callicles +will be reversed; all those things “unfit for ears polite” which +Callicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this life, the insulting +language, the box on the ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare +Republic, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the +philosopher in the Theaetetus). +</p> + +<p> +There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the +generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his +ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken. This +is said to have happened “last year” (B.C. 406), and therefore the +assumed date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would +already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely +reconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the “recent” +usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413; and still less with +the “recent” death of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years +previously (429 B.C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past +age; or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken +of as a living witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that +although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the Dialogues +of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his commentators (Preface +to Republic). +</p> + +<p> +The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly characteristic +declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of +these things, while he affirms at the same time that no one can maintain any +other view without being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of +the earlier and more exclusively Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor +in the Apology, nor in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any +doubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this +“among the multitude of questions” which agitate human life +“as the principle which alone remains unshaken.” He does not insist +here, any more than in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only +on the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is +worse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for the next +best thing to a man’s being just is that he should be corrected and +become just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of +others; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right +only. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a +figure. +</p> + +<p> +(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true +politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the Apology, he +disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other +good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before +he had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for +himself, from the fact that he is “the only man of the present day who +performs his public duties at all.” The two points of view are not really +inconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is +and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or +Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same +consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he +separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although +he foresees the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and +wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and +uncertainty. And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too +have taught the citizens better than to put him to death? +</p> + +<p> +And now, as he himself says, we will “resume the argument from the +beginning.” +</p> + +<p> +Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets +Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed an +exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of +hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the +nature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own +house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great rhetorician and his +younger friend and disciple Polus. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: What question? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the +answer, “I am a cobbler.” +</p> + +<p> +Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. +“Who is Gorgias?” asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his +master Socrates. “One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best +and noblest of experimental arts,” etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and +balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of +the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the +quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has +learnt how to make a speech, but not how to answer a question. He wishes that +Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to the +question asked by Chaerephon,—that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric +language, “boasts himself to be a good one.” At the request of +Socrates he promises to be brief; for “he can be as long as he pleases, +and as short as he pleases.” Socrates would have him bestow his length on +others, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by +him to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the +admiration of Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as +follows:— +</p> + +<p> +Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other particular +arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then does rhetoric differ +from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the arts which deal with words, +and the arts which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this +distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two classes: (1) arts +which may be carried on in silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, +or in which words are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, +rhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was +the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there are +differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to +do with words? “The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and +greatest of human things.” But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best? +“Health first, beauty next, wealth third,” in the words of the old +song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a body, each +claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the +rest—How will you choose between them? “I should say, Socrates, +that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals +power in the state, is the greatest good.” But what is the exact nature +of this persuasion?—is the persevering retort: You could not describe +Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other +painters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of +persuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, +which is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to +see the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the +art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and +unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge, +and another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, +but belief may be either true or false,—there is therefore a further +question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts +of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives +knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of +persons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be +considered:—when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or +military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the +architect, or the general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who +intend to become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not +Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach us +to persuade or advise the state? +</p> + +<p> +Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of +Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and +of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle wall of +the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of +his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he +pleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and +influence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his +rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a +boxer should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like +all good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to +be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the +lessons which they have learned from him. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel +with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or +whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias declares that +he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the +company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to +proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which +Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out +of a misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias +to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. +And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias +as a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble of learning. But is he as +ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is +compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them +from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned +carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he +who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and +rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of +this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act +unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained? +</p> + +<p> +The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know +justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts and the +virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of +natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but not +sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally exasperated +at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he says, the +rhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows justice (how can he +do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks +that great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. +Socrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on +their legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be +in error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is +in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in +the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own +case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation +they agree (compare Protag.), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer. +</p> + +<p> +“What is the art of Rhetoric?” says Polus. Not an art at all, +replies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created +art. Polus asks, “What thing?” and Socrates answers, An experience +or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. “But is not +rhetoric a fine thing?” I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will +you ask me another question—What is cookery? “What is +cookery?” An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or +gratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and +rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. “What is +rhetoric?” asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, +which may be termed flattery, is the reply. “But what part?” A +shadow of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly +unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning +to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and +realities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of +them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and +body have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends +on the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art +attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as +having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. +Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or +simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give +no reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or +simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the +simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in +an arithmetical formula:— +</p> + +<p> +Tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation. +</p> + +<p> +And, +</p> + +<p> +Cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice. +</p> + +<p> +And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the +gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to +their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which +was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not +unnecessarily to retaliate on him. +</p> + +<p> +“Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?” +They are not esteemed at all. “Why, have they not great power, and can +they not do whatever they desire?” They have no power, and they only do +what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the +true object of desire, which is the good. “As if you, Socrates, would not +envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one +whom he pleases.” But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one +to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who +kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do +injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men +out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus +assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of +opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He +instances Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not +Socrates think him happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he +cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental +and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son +of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of +Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle and +then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked, +and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to have his place. +Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the +rich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates, the house of +Pericles, or any other great family—this is the kind of evidence which is +adduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates +employs proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,—that is +to say, the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own +mouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a +wicked man and yet happy. +</p> + +<p> +The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers +punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he +escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves +refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has +only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, +and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the +state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both +criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable +of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that +laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already +refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one +agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and +(referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals after the battle of +Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a +recent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the +person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any +man to do is worse than to suffer evil. +</p> + +<p> +Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil +is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is fair and +what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, colours, figures, laws, +habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and +utility? Polus assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily persuaded that +the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing +cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. +Thus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more +hurtful than suffering. +</p> + +<p> +There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is +punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done justly +is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if to punish is +just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore beneficent; and +the benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three evils from which a +man may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, and soul;—these +are, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the +evil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. And there are three +arts which heal these evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the +fairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and +happy in the second degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore +the criminal should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and +purge away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper +colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary penalty. +And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to punish him, but that +he shall go unpunished and become worse and worse, taking care only that he +does no injury to himself. These are at least conceivable uses of the art, and +no others have been discovered by us. +</p> + +<p> +Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chaerephon +whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is, +proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such doctrines +are true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us are doing the +opposite of what we ought to be doing. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can understand +one another they must have some common feeling. And such a community of feeling +exists between himself and Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they +have both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and +Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and +philosophy. The peculiarity of Callicles is that he can never contradict his +loves; he changes as his Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the +countenance of both his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is +surprised at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not +a free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the +explanation of Socrates’ peculiarities also. He is always repeating what +his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other love, +Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will +never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse than the +discord of musical sounds. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in +compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not +know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly +entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more +honourable than to do injustice. By custom “yes,” but not by +nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points +of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what +Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law +of nature. For convention says that “injustice is dishonourable,” +but nature says that “might is right.” And we are always taming +down the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a +great man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot +all our formularies, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar +says, “Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand;” as is +indeed proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and +never paid for them. +</p> + +<p> +This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy +and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent +thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not “passed his +metaphysics” before he has grown up to manhood will never know the world. +Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that +politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy: “Every +man,” as Euripides says, “is fondest of that in which he is +best.” Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and +should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man lisps or +studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined +natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in +corners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any +noble sentiments. +</p> + +<p> +For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says +to Amphion in the play, that you have “a noble soul disguised in a +puerile exterior.” And I would have you consider the danger which you and +other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any +one accused you in a law-court,—there you would stand, with gaping mouth +and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with +impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others +these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher’s +touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be +the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a +critic—knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, although +learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict +themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not too modest to speak +out (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown both by +his own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to +Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago to his own clique +of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into which he may have +fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of +all what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule +of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?” “There is +no difference.” Then are not the many superior to the one, and the +opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and +that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. And as they are the +superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural +as well as conventional justice. “Why will you continue splitting words? +Have I not told you that the superior is the better?” But what do you +mean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your +language, if you do not wish to drive me away. “I mean the worthier, the +wiser.” You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten +thousand fools? “Yes, that is my meaning.” Ought the physician then +to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, +or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? “You are always +saying the same things, Socrates.” Yes, and on the same subjects too; but +you are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to +be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;—what DO you +mean? “I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have +more than the governed.” Than themselves? “What do you mean?” +I mean to say that every man is his own governor. “I see that you mean +those dolts, the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his +desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is +impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a king, and +has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To invite the common +herd to be lord over him, when he might have the enjoyment of all things! For +the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and +happiness; all the rest is mere talk.” +</p> + +<p> +Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men only +think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. +“Why,” says Callicles, “if they were, stones and the dead +would be happy.” Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic +vein of reflection. “Who knows,” as Euripides says, “whether +life may not be death, and death life?” Nay, there are philosophers who +maintain that even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb +(sema) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which +he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water +to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve +is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a +truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment +is better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? +“Far otherwise.” Then hear another parable. The life of +self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two +men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of +the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, +and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would +suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? +“Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure +is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always +eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires +and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.” And to +be itching and always scratching? “I do not deny that there may be +happiness even in that.” And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are +abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such +topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him, +but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles +still maintain this? “Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.” +The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his +touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him, +and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but +knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with +one another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that +two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be +well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, +and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the case of drinking and +thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease +simultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on by +the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against +objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good, +proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad +by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and +foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is +bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes +the bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is +as good as the brave or may be even better. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming that he +and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good are +the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should choose the one and +avoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a return to the old +doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be done for the sake of +the good. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in +distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical +habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the arts which +are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does Callicles agree +to this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in order that he may get +through the argument. Which of the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, +harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally +condemned on the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the +harp-player, who was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately +muse of Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in +general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and +children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is +best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a real +regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species of +oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the citizens. +But where are the orators among whom you find the latter? Callicles admits that +there are none remaining, but there were such in the days when Themistocles, +Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies +that none of these were true artists, setting before themselves the duty of +bringing order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled +design, running through his life, to which he conforms all his words and +actions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all +virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician +who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of +meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is +good for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles +was recently approving. +</p> + +<p> +Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, turns +restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. +“Then,” says Socrates, “one man must do for two;” and +though he had hoped to have given Callicles an “Amphion” in return +for his “Zethus,” he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he +hopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates +the advantages which he has already won:— +</p> + +<p> +The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed about +that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the +good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have +acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things +or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious +arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is +without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the +intemperate is bad. And he who is temperate is also just and brave and pious, +and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the +intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He +therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and +if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he +must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to +attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of +gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical +proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess. +But if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of +happiness, then the paradox is true that the only use of rhetoric is in +self-accusation, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than +to suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a +just man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and +in saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with +impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be +stricken—to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast in +adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know +that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the +greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would +avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend +he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his +protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he +not rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the +greatest of all evils will befall him. “But this imitator of the +tyrant,” rejoins Callicles, “will kill any one who does not +similarly imitate him.” Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he +has heard that repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will +kill a good one. “Yes, and that is the provoking thing.” Not +provoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve +him from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of +justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and +are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of swimming, or +the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the +rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge +more than two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his +demeanour? The reason is that he is not certain whether he has done his +passengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in +body, and still more if he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer +too will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow +your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is +there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or +another’s, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving +arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I +would have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of +life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of +Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian +Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do +you say to this? +</p> + +<p> +“There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely +believe you.” +</p> + +<p> +That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more +conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was directed to +pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. And +those who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as +possible. But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a +teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before? or +who would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never cured either +himself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with +the office? And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not +examine him? Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is +the statesman’s proper business. And we must ask the same question about +Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make +better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave them pay, +and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they condemned him to +death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals who, having received them +gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man is an animal; and Pericles who +had the charge of man only made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and +therefore he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be +repeated about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his +seat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The +inference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than those of our +own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, but they +did not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you again and again +(and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like the body, may be +treated in two ways—there is the meaner and the higher art. You seemed to +understand what I said at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good +statesmen, you answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and +you answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian +cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you +that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And +those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them, +and lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. In this +respect, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who +pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and +harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, +the citizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and others, +will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the +misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being +repeated—“after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him, +or condemned him to death.” As if the statesman should not have taught +the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him, +any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they +cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire +rhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the +two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics +takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the +disciple desirous of requiting his teacher. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the +state Callicles invites him:—“to the inferior and ministerial +one,” is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of avoiding death, +replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear +again, that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is +very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who +teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which he +described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. +He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one +charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he will not be +able to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for +their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. “And +do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good +condition?” Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never +to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of +self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering +rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world +below laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell +you a tale:— +</p> + +<p> +Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and when +judgment had been given upon them they departed—the good to the islands +of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living, +and had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was +favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the throne, was obliged to alter the +mode of procedure, and try them after death, having first sent down Prometheus +to take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and +Aeacus were appointed to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for +Europe, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation +of soul and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their +characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all +distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, +appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not +who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the +house of torment. +</p> + +<p> +For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable and +the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the +incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to +them. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons, +happily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus +and Tityus, not Thersites, are supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting +punishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good +one, as is shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. +But to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped +of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled +either as curable or incurable, and looks with love and admiration on the soul +of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the +practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as +Odysseus in Homer saw him +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.” +</p> + +<p> +My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls +undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet +death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon +me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain, +and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps you think that this is an old wives’ fable. But you, who are the +three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever +show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and +not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all +flattery, whether of the many or of the few. +</p> + +<p> +Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And +when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, but not +until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in +which we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and +not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing +worth. +</p> + +<p> +We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue. +Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his +writings, we may compare him with himself, and with other great teachers, and +we may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) casting one +eye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the +great lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in +which they are enveloped. +</p> + +<p> +(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made +aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing +a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also +continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the +honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering +about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the +basis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, +which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty +which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the +present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also apparent in +Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of +his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can +be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered +in the answers of Gorgias (see above). The advantages which he gains over Polus +are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous +assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar +predicates;—a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects +in the Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a “robust sophistry” are +likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles. +</p> + +<p> +(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the +argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself +and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that +we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the +rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the +like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements +of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of +view. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that +mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when +punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical +paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that +the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is +tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled +criminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious +enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a +calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the +Phaedo. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate +best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have +always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself +implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few. +</p> + +<p> +He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of +happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, +we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical +suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them +as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful +life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality +of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their +enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a +few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to +consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as +Socrates’ friends in the opening of the Phaedo are described as regarding +him; or as was said of another, “they looked upon his face as upon the +face of an angel.” We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the +standard of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of +such a sentiment in the better part of human nature. +</p> + +<p> +The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in +some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other +goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in +“considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of +others, as affected by him.” But the happiness of others or of mankind, +if regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to +the common understanding as Plato’s conception of happiness. For the +greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of +the individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. +Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant +consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely self-regarding, +considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth +when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which +regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and +Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking +another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on +ethics. +</p> + +<p> +The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the +greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the +consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not +now enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words +the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets +spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture +of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion +to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, +such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he +endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered +state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak +and miserable; such an one is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to +every sort of wrong and obloquy. +</p> + +<p> +Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if +“the ways of God” to man are to be “justified,” the +hopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been put to +him, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests +in the Apology, “death be only a long sleep,” we can hardly tell +what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite +independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any +other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives +for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an +unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in +the world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not +in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in +which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as he says +in the Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories +about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is +true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the +Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior +happiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an +immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main +thesis independently of remoter consequences. +</p> + +<p> +(3) Plato’s theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. +In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few great criminals, +chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have never had the +opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and +their punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because +they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. +On this representation of Plato’s the criticism has been made, that the +analogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead +of improving men, may have just the opposite effect. +</p> + +<p> +Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease +and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. But ideas +must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can +only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these +figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be +considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the +ideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of language, and must +not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them +as if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical +analysis of his age. +</p> + +<p> +Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering +which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception +of punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that +such punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or +development. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be +begun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is +further developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured +out of the beaten track in their meditations on the “last things,” +have found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in +what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not +followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that “God is +the author of evil only with a view to good,” and that “they were +the better for being punished.” Still his doctrine of a future state of +rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion of +Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human beings +depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And +he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the +future destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are +neither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal +damnation. +</p> + +<p> +We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument; +and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his +vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the +Gorgias is not to answer questions about a future world, but to place in +antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions +of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of +representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the description of the +just man in the Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the +Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the +world which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals +act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not +mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense +of right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest +statesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore +justly involved in the general condemnation. +</p> + +<p> +Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which +may be briefly considered:— +</p> + +<p> +a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed +to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and +relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and +opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the +apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and +rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass +into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not +forget that Plato’s conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux +transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness +in opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of +pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is +only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his +mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness of +happiness, that would have been found to be as transient and precarious as +pleasure. +</p> + +<p> +b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the +improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike dependent +upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To Plato the whole +world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. To this is opposed +the one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, yet strong in the +conviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with +reference to this world or to another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, +poets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, +and their arts are the parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call +science is merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, +which he describes in the Republic. +</p> + +<p> +c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between the +Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, and the +Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language in the +Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending to show that +they were written at the same period of Plato’s life. For the Republic +supplies that education and training of which the Gorgias suggests the +necessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few strong in the +formation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of +them, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of +the just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in +another life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, +are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they are +expelled by the State, because they are imitators, and minister to the weaker +side of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the +analogous notion, which occurs in the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were +the Sophists of their day. In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers +a contrast than a parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with +that of Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two +dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion, +as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo, +pleasure and good are distinctly opposed. +</p> + +<p> +This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the +Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good, +but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the Gorgias. For +innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are allowed to rank +in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias’ definition of rhetoric +(Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of persuasion, of all arts the best, for +to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free +will—marks a close and perhaps designed connection between the two +dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting +links between the beautiful and the good. +</p> + +<p> +In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public +opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, and portions of +the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from another point of view, may be +thought to stand in the same relation to Plato’s theory of morals which +the Theaetetus bears to his theory of knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony +in the reason which is assigned for the pilot’s modest charge; and in the +proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation; and in the +mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds. (2) The reference of the +mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved +for incurable criminals such as Archelaus; the retaliation of the box on the +ears; the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the +clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided +for them (compare Swift’s notion that the universe is a suit of clothes, +Tale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of +supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death. (3) +The appeal of the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his +court “holding a golden sceptre,” which gives verisimilitude to the +tale. +</p> + +<p> +It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing “both sides of +the game,” and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, +we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting +to analyze the “dramatis personae’ as they were conceived by him. +Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that Plato is a +dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which +he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have +the best of the argument; or to repeat the observation that he is a poet as +well as a philosopher; or to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern +standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought +and the opinion of his time. +</p> + +<p> +It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is the +assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of +stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of +ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract right or +duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed, +in some other parts of his writings (e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself +open to the charge of intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting +the “liberty of prophesying;’ and Plato is not affirming any +abstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the +one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At +the same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to +avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, +will probably share the fate of Socrates. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p> +The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which he +soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts on an +armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are taken out +of their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The disguises which +Socrates assumes are like the parables of the New Testament, or the oracles of +the Delphian God; they half conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is +in earnest, the more ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or +more ironical than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer +seriously the objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes +appears to be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the +highest sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the +argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason. +He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words +of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared +for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his humour; +he is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, to be jesting +when he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus in earnest. +Finally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the forms of +dialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the same time he +retaliates upon his adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we +may now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main +theses of the dialogue. +</p> + +<p> +First Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice. +</p> + +<p> +Compare the New Testament— +</p> + +<p> +“It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil +doing.”—1 Pet. +</p> + +<p> +And the Sermon on the Mount— +</p> + +<p> +“Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness’ +sake.”—Matt. +</p> + +<p> +The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they +equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may suffer +or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, would be +happier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is ready, when they +are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, and for their own +sakes men are willing to punish the offender (compare Republic). But they are +not equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is +essentially evil, and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when +crimes are committed on the great scale—the crimes of tyrants, ancient or +modern—after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have become +a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from any +magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by time, and +“to forgive is convenient to them.” The tangle of good and evil can +no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end cannot justify the +means, they feel also that good has often come out of evil. But Socrates would +have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant now and always; though he is +surrounded by his satellites, and has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing +in his ears; though he is the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he +is, and always will be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences +for good or for evil cannot alter a hair’s breadth the morality of +actions which are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which +Socrates holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, +are of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of +our practice. +</p> + +<p> +And so of private individuals—to them, too, the world occasionally speaks +of the consequences of their actions:—if they are lovers of pleasure, +they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, they will lose +their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, but of +what is—of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the soul. +And all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were not tempted +by interest or passion, would agree with him—they would rather be the +victims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason +tells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil +as an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to +a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of +truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us. +</p> + +<p> +Second Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer. +</p> + +<p> +There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty followed +at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would then be scarcely +distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice as they avoid pain or +death. But nature, with a view of deepening and enlarging our characters, has +for the most part hidden from us the consequences of our actions, and we can +only foresee them by an effort of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of +reflection is the business of early education, which is continued in maturer +years by observation and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to +be unfortunate—he had better have suffered when he was young, and been +saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate +whose education and manner of life are always concealing from him the +consequences of his own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in +some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own +fault? Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who +scarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass their +immediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them; but we do not +consider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. Not to +have been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or +religious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our +evil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have +given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and +therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by time; +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“While rank corruption, mining all within,<br/> +Infects unseen.” +</p> + +<p> +The “accustomed irony” of Socrates adds a corollary to the +argument:—“Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to +escape unpunished”—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the +obscure verse of Proverbs, “Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed +him,” etc., quoted in Romans.) +</p> + +<p> +Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives: +they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind and +very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always pleading +with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar figure of speech, Socrates +would have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in accusation of themselves. +As they are guided by feeling rather than by reason, to their feelings the +appeal must be made. They must speak to themselves; they must argue with +themselves; they must paint in eloquent words the character of their own evil +deeds. To any suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves +to submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in +another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too +accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of +prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle +between the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are +too hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love +has overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent +consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the +consciences of men “accusing or else excusing them.” For all our +life long we are talking with ourselves:—What is thought but speech? What +is feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be +always in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at +first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us. +</p> + +<p> +Third Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +We do not what we will, but what we wish. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn—that good +intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by wisdom, +are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we afterwards +find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be inevitable, for they +may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be the very opposite of what +is expected by us. When we increase pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up +property without regard to changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what +we deliberately disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon +reflection we regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an +advantage over us—we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All +actions of which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this +impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has “the least +possible power” while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually +bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of nature is +open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary +attention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other men’s +characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of the +consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to +have led Socrates to his famous thesis:—“Virtue is +knowledge;” which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth, +seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the +truth which is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown +older men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from +consequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve them +wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides +nor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian +or transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements +which seem to lie at the basis of morality. (Compare the following: “Now, +and for us, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have +Hebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and discipline +received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal possession. And as +humanity is constituted, one must never assign the second rank to-day without +being ready to restore them to the first to-morrow.” Sir William W. +Hunter, Preface to Orissa.) +</p> + +<p> +Fourth Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +To be and not to seem is the end of life. +</p> + +<p> +The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief incentives +to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is a leading +principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters into all things; +all or almost all desire to appear better than they are, that they may win the +esteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can easily feign the language +of piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious +hypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there +is the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different opinions +about themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society. +There is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department of human +knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the prejudice +engendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. There is the +sophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the +sophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; +some of them are very ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from +them; for we have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The +sophistry of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of +a religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been +accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the +other. The conventions and customs which we observe in conversation, and the +opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another (“the +buyer saith, it is nought—it is nought,” etc.), are always +obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far +more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their +own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us +imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly help +to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires great force of +mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after truth. On every side +he is met by the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the +most real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded +collectively and subjected to the influences of society. +</p> + +<p> +Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality and +untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be and not +seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit and desire to +be. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; +if they are conscious of doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are +weak, and have nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must +acquire firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to +take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must try to +be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men. A single +individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be true and +innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and what he does +not know; and though not without an effort, he can form a judgment of his own, +at least in common matters. In his most secret actions he can show the same +high principle (compare Republic) which he shows when supported and watched by +public opinion. And on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or +truth or right, even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his +disposition, may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians +and lawyers, and be too much for them. +</p> + +<p> +Who is the true and who the false statesman?— +</p> + +<p> +The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first organizes +and then administers the government of his own country; and having made a +nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those of Europe and of +mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in expedients; the whole +and the parts grow together in his mind; while the head is conceiving, the hand +is executing. Although obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. +His thoughts are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on +an ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and +life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and +intellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and “the +idea of good” is the animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment +of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to unite freedom with order is the +problem which he has to solve. +</p> + +<p> +The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a task +which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before he can +control others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He has no +private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under the +disguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which men too +often fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of his mission, +and in his love for his country and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself +what the next generation will say of him; not because he is careful of +posthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of his life as a whole +will then be more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his +plans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; +but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for +he knows that human life, “if not long in comparison with eternity” +(Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He knows, +too, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer here; and he +will sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, think of that other +“city of which the pattern is in heaven” (Republic). +</p> + +<p> +The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to govern men he +becomes like them; their “minds are married in conjunction;” they +“bear themselves” like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is +their obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make +them like himself; he must “educate his party” until they cease to +be a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form +to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming what +he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a +representative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the higher +elements of the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion +of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human +affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are threatening +him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by force—two or three +moves on the political chess board are all that he can fore see—two or +three weeks moves on the political chessboard are all that he can +foresee—two or three weeks or months are granted to him in which he can +provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that there are permanent +principles of politics which are always tending to the well-being of +states—better administration, better education, the reconciliation of +conflicting elements, increased security against external enemies. These are +not “of to-day or yesterday,” but are the same in all times, and +under all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, +though he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like +Plato’s captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with +penetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide +her into port. +</p> + +<p> +The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the +world—not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of +which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of +fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is unwilling to +incur the persecution and enmity which political convictions would entail upon +him. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But +unpopularity soon follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and +wiser than themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in +extremity; they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of +the popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. +Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most +unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done what +might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received justice at their +hands. +</p> + +<p> +The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and +circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he must +enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act together. +Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the majority, he must win +over the majority to himself. He is their leader and not their follower, but in +order to lead he must also follow. He will neither exaggerate nor undervalue +the power of a statesman, neither adopting the “laissez faire” nor +the “paternal government” principle; but he will, whether he is +dealing with children in politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the +people what the government can do for them, and what, from imperfect education +or deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows +that if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that if he does +nothing for them they will in some states of society be utterly helpless. For +the many cannot exist without the few, if the material force of a country is +from below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of +human evils which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well +aware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at +last be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by +some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of +politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, if he +plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always consistent, +for the world is changing; and though he depends upon the support of a party, +he will remember that he is the minister of the whole. He lives not for the +present, but for the future, and he is not at all sure that he will be +appreciated either now or then. For he may have the existing order of society +against him, and may not be remembered by a distant posterity. +</p> + +<p> +There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates in the +Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not excepting +the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling that they ought +to be better governed than they are. Just as the actual philosopher falls short +of the one wise man, so does the actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And +so partly from vanity and egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the +faults of eminent men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up +among those who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own +powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at +all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the +more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because +he has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but +they are widely spread; we constantly find them recurring in reviews and +newspapers, and still oftener in private conversation. +</p> + +<p> +We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects +tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions +become more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with +governing by the people: the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas +of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. According to +Socrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and +will only be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man +than himself (Republic). And in modern times, though the world has grown +milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an +English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only +undertake from a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail; and +even if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own +generation. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real +politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by applying +them to the history of our own country. He would have said that not Pitt or +Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of their time, but +Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during the greater part of +their lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They +were private persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which +in the next generation have become an irresistible power. “Herein is that +saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.” We may imagine with Plato +an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly harmonized; +for there is no necessary opposition between them. But experience shows that +they are commonly divorced—the ordinary politician is the interpreter or +executor of the thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new +political conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian +statesman Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher +is naturally unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by +the many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet +perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier +than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise +of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by their +own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who would have been +ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be +called by their names. (Compare Thucyd.) +</p> + +<p> +Who is the true poet? +</p> + +<p> +Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to sense; +because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from the +ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the Gorgias that the +stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In modern +times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. The poet and +the prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in +later ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that +peculiar creation of our own and the last century, which, together with the +sister art of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less +of seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer +censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers? +</p> + +<p> +Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give +amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or +even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets in modern +times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their high vocation +of teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity +to their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and +sweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes +them with beauty, and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and +memories of men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary +life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are +ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he +makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he +finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. He +uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises us through +earth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and +the half-conscious feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own +critic, for the spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His +mission is not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own +nature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry +is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest +and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the greatest +deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his greater calling of +the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may not be effected for the +human race by a better use of the poetical and imaginative faculty. The +reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with truth, may still be possible. +Neither is the element of pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a +higher pleasure for a lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not +the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better +than a thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic +and artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of the noble +purposes to which art may be applied (Republic). +</p> + +<p> +Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato’s language, a +flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, the poet +lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. Such an +one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the “savoir +faire,” or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry. +He has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder; that it +should make provision for the soul’s highest interest; that it should be +pursued only with a view to “the improvement of the citizens.” He +ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Republic); he idealizes the +sensual; he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of raising +men above themselves he brings them back to the “tyranny of the many +masters,” from which all his life long a good man has been praying to be +delivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that +which is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and +nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is +worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words, +but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the faded reflection of +some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though we are +not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any +healing or life-giving influence on the minds of men? +</p> + +<p> +“Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:” Art then must be +true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a +seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, truth +out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest improvement of +man. And so, having considered in what way “we can best spend the +appointed time, we leave the result with God.” Plato does not say that +God will order all things for the best (compare Phaedo), but he indirectly +implies that the evils of this life will be corrected in another. And as we are +very far from the best imaginable world at present, Plato here, as in the +Phaedo and Republic, supposes a purgatory or place of education for mankind in +general, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the +dialogue is not the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, +whether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing +can reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture, +is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner in which we are +“born again” (Republic). Only he is prepared to maintain the +ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not even the +wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without being ridiculous. +</p> + +<p> +There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are held to be +indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without regard to +consequences is happiness. From this elevation or exaggeration of feeling Plato +seems to shrink: he leaves it to the Stoics in a later generation to maintain +that when impaled or on the rack the philosopher may be happy (compare +Republic). It is observable that in the Republic he raises this question, but +it is not really discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another +life, are allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or +sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in raptures, +having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if there were no future, +might he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended +only by a painful death? He himself may be ready to thank God that he was +thought worthy to do Him the least service, without looking for a reward; the +joys of another life may not have been present to his mind at all. Do we +suppose that the mediaeval saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of +Sienna, or the Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a +lingering disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the +“sweets” of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and +enough. Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or +of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in God will +be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour. If he were +certain that there were no life to come, he would not have wished to speak or +act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or of humanity. Neither, on the +other hand, will he suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to +be a mere blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot +pass away, is his who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the +sons of men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present, +or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already present +with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of immortality; he +has in him already a principle stronger than death. He who serves man without +the thought of reward is deemed to be a more faithful servant than he who works +for hire. May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in +like manner the higher? And although only a very few in the course of the +world’s history—Christ himself being one of them—have +attained to such a noble conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal +of them may be present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us, +and their lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and +theology. +</p> + +<p> +THE MYTHS OF PLATO. +</p> + +<p> +The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are four longer +ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic. That in the +Republic is the most elaborate and finished of them. Three of these greater +myths, namely those contained in the Phaedo, the Gorgias and the Republic, +relate to the destiny of human souls in a future life. The magnificent myth in +the Phaedrus treats of the immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in +which is included a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may +be added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in which +the life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man and the +consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of Atlantis, an imaginary +history, which is a fragment only, commenced in the Timaeus and continued in +the Critias: (3) the much less artistic fiction of the foundation of the Cretan +colony which is introduced in the preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the +background: (4) the beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and +Epimetheus narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue +called after him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a +parody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the recantation +of it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the grasshoppers, and (7) the tale +of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the Phaedrus: (8) the parable of the Cave +(Republic), in which the previous argument is recapitulated, and the nature and +degrees of knowledge having been previously set forth in the abstract are +represented in a picture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Republic; +compare Laws), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new +beginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the +division of the sexes, Sym.: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the pilot, +and the mutinous sailors (Republic), in which is represented the relation of +the better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to the mob of +politicians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies between Athens and +Aegina charging only a small payment for saving men from death, the reason +being that he is uncertain whether to live or die is better for them (Gor.): +(13) the treatment of freemen and citizens by physicians and of slaves by their +apprentices,—a somewhat laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate +the two different ways in which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also occur +in Plato continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing +and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless (paupers +and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are generated in the +transition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which is to the visible world +what the idea of good is to the intellectual, in the Sixth Book of the +Republic: the composite animal, having the form of a man, but containing under +a human skin a lion and a many-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e. +the populace: and the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are +always liable to break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation of +philosophy by the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the +parricide, who “beats his father, having first taken away his +arms”: the dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather +paltry image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), which is +repeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument personified as veiling +her face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us in a first, +second and third wave:—on these figures of speech the changes are rung +many times over. It is observable that nearly all these parables or continuous +images are found in the Republic; that which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the +midwifery of Socrates, is perhaps the only exception. To make the list +complete, the mathematical figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the +numerical interval which separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten. +</p> + +<p> +The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life which, +like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences of the +mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which await good and +bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue and to be in another +world what it has become in this. It includes a Paradiso, Purgatorio, and +Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo and the Republic. The Inferno is +reserved for great criminals only. The argument of the dialogue is frequently +referred to, and the meaning breaks through so as rather to destroy the +liveliness and consistency of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very +slight, the chief point or moral being that in the judgments of another world +there is no possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of +foreseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their judges +naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to view, stripped +of the veils and clothes which might prevent them from seeing into or being +seen by one another. +</p> + +<p> +The myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more cosmological, and +also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy occurs to Plato that the +upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in one, a glorified earth, fairer and +purer than that in which we dwell. As the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are +living in a lower sphere, out of which they put their heads for a moment or two +and behold a world beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the +coarser particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly +earth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of the myth +consists of description of the interior of the earth, which gives the +opportunity of introducing several mythological names and of providing places +of torment for the wicked. There is no clear distinction of soul and body; the +spirits beneath the earth are spoken of as souls only, yet they retain a sort +of shadowy form when they cry for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the +philosopher alone is said to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in +Plato which relate to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as +well as other homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural +reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of human +character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind are between +them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of the Phaedo they are +carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian lake, where they dwell, and +are purified of their evil deeds, and receive the rewards of their good. There +are also incurable sinners, who are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the +penalty of atrocious crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another +class of hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach +the shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for mercy; +which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from their torments. +</p> + +<p> +Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps any +allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent with itself. +The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; abstract ideas are +transformed into persons, figures of speech into realities. These myths may be +compared with the Pilgrim’s Progress of Bunyan, in which discussions of +theology are mixed up with the incidents of travel, and mythological personages +are associated with human beings: they are also garnished with names and +phrases taken out of Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition. +</p> + +<p> +The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than either of +the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they have, and is full of +touches which recall the experiences of human life. It will be noticed by an +attentive reader that the twelve days during which Er lay in a trance after he +was slain coincide with the time passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It +is a curious observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a +well-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable society?) are +more likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than those who have had +more experience of the world and of evil. It is a more familiar remark that we +constantly blame others when we have only ourselves to blame; and the +philosopher must acknowledge, however reluctantly, that there is an element of +chance in human life with which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. +That men drink more of the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a +poetical description of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, +like Odysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We should +like to know what became of the infants “dying almost as soon as they +were born,” but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our curiosity. The +two companies of souls, ascending and descending at either chasm of heaven and +earth, and conversing when they come out into the meadow, the majestic figures +of the judges sitting in heaven, the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of +the great allegory which have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark +already made respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be +extended also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a +picture of the Day of Judgment. +</p> + +<p> +The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an Oriental, or +rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an affinity to the mysteries +and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a certain extent they are un-Greek; at +any rate there is hardly anything like them in other Greek writings which have +a serious purpose; in spirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be +termed the underground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented +in the most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as true; +it is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a future life. Plato +seems to make use of them when he has reached the limits of human knowledge; +or, to borrow an expression of his own, when he is standing on the outside of +the intellectual world. They are very simple in style; a few touches bring the +picture home to the mind, and make it present to us. They have also a kind of +authority gained by the employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere +fragments of the words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to +any subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry and +mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of them may be +summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and “there is some +better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.” +</p> + +<p> +All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for example, the +tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at first sight to be an +extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety when we remember that it is +based on a legendary belief. The art of making stories of ghosts and +apparitions credible is said to consist in the manner of telling them. The +effect is gained by many literary and conversational devices, such as the +previous raising of curiosity, the mention of little circumstances, simplicity, +picturesqueness, the naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is +possessed by Plato in a degree which has never been equalled. +</p> + +<p> +The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been already +described, but is of a different character. It treats of a former rather than +of a future life. It represents the conflict of reason aided by passion or +righteous indignation on the one hand, and of the animal lusts and instincts on +the other. The soul of man has followed the company of some god, and seen truth +in the form of the universal before it was born in this world. Our present life +is the result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is relative +to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We ask the question, +Where were men before birth? As we likewise enquire, What will become of them +after death? The first question is unfamiliar to us, and therefore seems to be +unnatural; but if we survey the whole human race, it has been as influential +and as widely spread as the other. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of +speech in which the “spiritual combat” of this life is represented. +The majesty and power of the whole passage—especially of what may be +called the theme or proem (beginning “The mind through all her being is +immortal”)—can only be rendered very inadequately in another +language. +</p> + +<p> +The myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in which men +were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth’s motion had +their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: the dead came to +life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged young; the youth became a +child, the child an infant, the infant vanished into the earth. The connection +between the reversal of the earth’s motion and the reversal of human life +is of course verbal only, yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues +from the consistency of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was +immediately under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which +men had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all things +spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the animals. There were no +great estates, or families, or private possessions, nor any traditions of the +past, because men were all born out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the +“reign of Cronos;” and in like manner he connects the reversal of +the earth’s motion with some legend of which he himself was probably the +inventor. +</p> + +<p> +The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of existence was +man the happier,—under that of Cronos, which was a state of innocence, or +that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while Plato balances the two +sides of the serious controversy, which he has suggested in a figure. The +answer depends on another question: What use did the children of Cronos make of +their time? They had boundless leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only +with one another, but with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a +view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of +knowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and telling +stories to one another and to the beasts?—in either case there would be +no difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather mischievously adds, +“Nobody knows what they did,” and therefore the doubt must remain +undetermined. +</p> + +<p> +To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural convulsion, +in which the order of the world and of human life is once more reversed, God +withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the government of himself. The +world begins again, and arts and laws are slowly and painfully invented. A +secular age succeeds to a theocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has +dropped, or almost dropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious +and important thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence, the +existence of a world without traditions, and the difference between human and +divine government. He has also carried a step further his speculations +concerning the abolition of the family and of property, which he supposes to +have no place among the children of Cronos any more than in the ideal state. +</p> + +<p> +It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract to the +concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of the seen, and +also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A great writer knows +how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining within the sphere of the +visible, and then again comprehending a wider range and soaring to the abstract +and universal. Even in the same sentence he may employ both modes of speech not +improperly or inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors +of Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as can be +painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the reader. A poem +may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not one but many latent +images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the thoughts of many hearts. +Often the rapid transition from one image to another is pleasing to us: on the +other hand, any single figure of speech if too often repeated, or worked out +too much at length, becomes prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we +necessarily include both “the moral law within and the starry heaven +above,” and pass from one to the other (compare for examples Psalms +xviii. and xix.). Whether such a use of language is puerile or noble depends +upon the genius of the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the +associations employed. +</p> + +<p> +In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation is not +forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are told to a +living audience, and so well told that we are more than half-inclined to +believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation too, the striking image or +figure of speech is not forgotten, but is quickly caught up, and alluded to +again and again; as it would still be in our own day in a genial and +sympathetic society. The descriptions of Plato have a greater life and reality +than is to be found in any modern writing. This is due to their homeliness and +simplicity. Plato can do with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed +“more plastic than wax” (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing +speech and writing, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language +in which they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest +truths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of daily +life are not overlooked. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>GORGIAS</h2> + +<h3>By Plato</h3> + +<h3>Translated by Benjamin Jowett</h3> + +<p> +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, Polus. +</p> + +<p> +SCENE: The house of Callicles. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a +feast. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to +us many fine things. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for +he would keep us loitering in the Agora. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause +I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give +the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear +Gorgias? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he +shall exhibit to you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to +hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes +and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the exhibition to some +other time. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer +questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that +any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon—? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ask him who he is. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a +maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend +Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you +are asked? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may +add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, +for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Not at all:—and you shall answer if you like. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Ask:— +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother +Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is +given to his brother? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of +his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly, a painter. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he is +skilled. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, +and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to +proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different +persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best +persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the +art in which he is a proficient is the noblest. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he +is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was +asked. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I +see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to +the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which +Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault +with it, but you never said what the art was. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked +what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we +were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you +answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and +what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask +the same question,—what are we to call you, and what is the art which you +profess? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in +Homeric language, “I boast myself to be.” +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should wish to do so. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Then pray do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, +but in all places. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are +at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech +which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the +questions which are asked of you? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best +to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be +as short as any one. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and +the longer one at some other time. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man +use fewer words. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of +rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with +what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the +making of garments? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: It is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with +what is rhetoric concerned? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: With discourse. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach +the sick under what treatment they might get well? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, +also make men able to understand and speak about the sick? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Just so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or +evil condition of the body? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them +treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to +do. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and +all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with +some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of +the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of +discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of +discourse. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I +shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:—you would allow +that there are arts? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with +doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many +other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you +would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of +language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the +arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in +some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of +them the verbal element is greater—they depend wholly on words for their +efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of +this latter sort? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Exactly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these +arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that +rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of +discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, “And so, +Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.” But I do not think that you +really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by +you. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:—seeing that +rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there +are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with +which rhetoric is concerned:—Suppose that a person asks me about some of +the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, “Socrates, what +is arithmetic?” and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that +arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he +would proceed to ask: “Words about what?” and I should reply, Words +about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked +again: “What is the art of calculation?” I should say, That also is +one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, +“Concerned with what?” I should say, like the clerks in the +assembly, “as aforesaid” of arithmetic, but with a difference, the +difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities +of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and +to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only +words—he would ask, “Words about what, Socrates?” and I +should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun +and moon, and their relative swiftness. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: +which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always +and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the +words which rhetoric uses relate? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which +are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men +singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the +goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song +says, wealth honestly obtained. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of +the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, +will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: “O Socrates, +Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men +and not his.” And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, “I am a +physician.” What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art +produces the greatest good? “Certainly,” he will answer, “for +is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, +Socrates?” And after him the trainer will come and say, “I too, +Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art +than I can show of mine.” To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest +friend, and what is your business? “I am a trainer,” he will reply, +“and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.” When +I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I +expect, will utterly despise them all. “Consider Socrates,” he will +say, “whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than +wealth.” Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? +“Yes,” he replies. And who are you? “A money-maker.” +And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? “Of +course,” will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend +Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he +will be sure to go on and ask, “What good? Let Gorgias answer.” Now +I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and +by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of +which you are the creator? Answer us. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which +gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of +ruling over others in their several states. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the +courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at +any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, +you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the +money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for +himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what +you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not +mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no +other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other +effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is +the chief end of rhetoric. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a +man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the +truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, +according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that +persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have +a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask—what +is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But +why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, +but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely +to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking +this further question: If I asked, “What sort of a painter is +Zeuxis?” and you said, “The painter of figures,” should I not +be right in asking, “What kind of figures, and where do you find +them?” +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there +are other painters besides, who paint many other figures? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you +would have answered very well? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Quite so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric +the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I +mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he +teaches or not? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now +speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the +properties of number? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about +what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and +even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were +just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about +what. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that +other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen +which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and +about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts +of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and +unjust. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I +would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain +question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the +argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of +anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another’s words; I would +have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever may be your +hypothesis. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as +“having learned”? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And there is also “having believed”? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is the “having learned” the same as “having +believed,” and are learning and belief the same things? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this +way:—If a person were to say to you, “Is there, Gorgias, a false +belief as well as a true?”—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, +that there is. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are +persuaded? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Just so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the +source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: By all means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law +and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which +gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion +which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about +them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other +assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for +no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high +matters in a short time? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I +do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a +physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken +into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is +most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to +be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when +generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position +taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, +Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I +cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me +assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely +enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your +pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but +they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are +interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. +“What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?” they will +say—“about what will you teach us to advise the state?—about +the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has +just mentioned?” How will you answer them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to +reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that +the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were +devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of +Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself +heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given +in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win +their point. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the +nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in +this way, to be a marvel of greatness. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends +and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking +example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or +some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the +physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I +have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by +the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go +to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to +which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no +chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest +with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have +the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the +multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of +the art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other +competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to +abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of +fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for +friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. +Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful +boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or +mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the +trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the +city;—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be +used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and +others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own +strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is +the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a +bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric; +for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject,—in +short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything +which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or +any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to +use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after +having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his +instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or +banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his +instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to +be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, +and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in +mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which +they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise—somebody says +that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion +and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing +from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in +the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until +the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such +fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now +saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at +first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should +think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the +sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of +my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. +And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be +refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one +else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; +for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is +greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I +imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous +opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one +of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, +no matter;—let us make an end of it. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; +but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had +already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a +great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not +be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something +else. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows +their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have +any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting +and so ably maintained. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many +discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and therefore +if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, +especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the +wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you +like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; +though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your +meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a +rhetorician? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude +on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Quite so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater +powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,—that is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot +be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he +will have greater power than he who knows? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:—is he? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what +the physician knows. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the +ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has +knowledge?—is not that the inference? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; +the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover +some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who +know? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?—not to have +learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way +inferior to the professors of them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a +question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any +service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as +ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is +of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of +what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he +only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be +esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must +the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire +the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric +will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will make him seem to +the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good +man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless +he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By +heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as +you were saying that you would. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know +them, he will have to learn of me these things as well. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a +rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he +must be taught by you. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He +who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be +accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; +and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his +rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be +banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his +rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, it was. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never +have done injustice at all? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of +discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but about just and unjust? +Was not this said? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that +rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an +unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician +might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into +which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was +a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the +question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our +investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged +to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do +injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, +before we get at the truth of all this. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying +about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician +knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who +came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this +admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you dearly love, +and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious +questions—(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?) +For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the +nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in +bringing the argument to such a pass. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends +and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be +at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, +if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for +my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have +fallen-upon one condition: +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What condition? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you +indulged at first. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, +which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you +alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that would be hard +indeed. But then consider my case:—shall not I be very hardly used, if, +when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, +I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if +you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, +have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you +please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute +and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias +knows—would you not? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he +pleases, and you will know how to answer him? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which +Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say +that you have made an art. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What thing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: An experience in what? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a +fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight +gratification to me? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I will. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What then? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should say an experience. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, +Polus. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Of what profession? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to +answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. +For whether or not this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I +really cannot tell:—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of +what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not +very creditable whole. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is +not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to +manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word “flattery”; and +it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may +seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not +an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry +are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things +answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been +informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet +answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not +think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a +fine thing or not, until I have first answered, “What is rhetoric?” +For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will +ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the +ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And noble or ignoble? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what +is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and +our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away. (This is +an untranslatable play on the name “Polus,” which means “a +colt.”) +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that +rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am +mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of +bodies and of souls? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of +them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? +I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and +whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good +health. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in +either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the +reality? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: +The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the +art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, +of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two +divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there +is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; +and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same +subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but +with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on +the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or +rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or +simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and +pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men’s +highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and +deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. +Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is +the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a +competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense +than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of +food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and +of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it +aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but +only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the +nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; +but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them. +</p> + +<p> +Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; +and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, +and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of +lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious +beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic. +</p> + +<p> +I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner +of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow) +</p> + +<p> +as tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine; +</p> + +<p> +or rather, +</p> + +<p> +as tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation; +</p> + +<p> +and +</p> + +<p> +as cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice. +</p> + +<p> +And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the +sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up +together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men +know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not +under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate +between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the +rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word +of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, +would prevail far and wide: “Chaos” would come again, and cookery, +health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have +told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery +is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I +would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, +because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I +spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show +an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal +length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your +brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot +remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea +that they are flatterers? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I am asking a question. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the +citizens. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile any one +whom they please. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, +whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I am asking a question of you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: How two questions? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, +and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I +will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants +have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do +literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And is not that a great power? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you +say that power is a good to him who has the power. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this +is a good, and would you call this great power? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that +rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so you will have refuted me; +but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think +best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate +themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time +that what is done without sense is an evil. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes; I admit that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in +states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they +will? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: This fellow— +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I say so still. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then surely they do as they will? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I deny it. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: But they do what they think best? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Aye. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but +if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give +the answer yourself. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that +further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for +example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the +medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly, the health. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will +that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of +a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will, to have the wealth +for the sake of which they go on a voyage. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the +sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake +of which he does it. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and +indifferent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and +their opposites evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake +sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are +such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the +like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Exactly so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the +good for the sake of the indifferent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea +that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of +the good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his +goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of +something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing +for the sake of which we do them? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Most true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to +despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, +and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as +you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or +simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You are right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a +rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, +under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his +own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not +answer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Well, I suppose not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have +great power in a state? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: He will not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him +in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what +seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when +you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus! +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why “forbear”? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but +only to pity them. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly +slays him, is pitiable and wretched? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be +envied. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is +also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is +wretched, and to be pitied? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is +justly killed. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: How can that be, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of +evils. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would +rather suffer than do. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you +in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply +to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. +Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for +if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man +whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break +his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn +in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe +me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort +of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house which he +pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other +vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere +doing as you think best is great power? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I can. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why then? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a +benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the +meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. +But let us look at the matter in another way:—do we not acknowledge that +the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and +the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they +are evil—what principle do you lay down? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that +question. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say +that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that +statement? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to +you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that +refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events +which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that +many men who do wrong are happy. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What events? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler +of Macedonia? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with +him, whether a man is happy? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Most certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether +the great king was a happy man? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the +matter of education and justice. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are +gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are +miserable. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the +throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the +slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right +was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have +remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been +happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the +greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, +to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne +which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, +who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, +he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and +got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he +never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far +from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger +brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, +and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to +bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his +notion of happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and +drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while +running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest +criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable +and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and +you would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than +Archelaus! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a +reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy +that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the +unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot +admit a word which you have been saying. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the +manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party +think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses +of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a +single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is +the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who +have a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, +Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring +witnesses in disproof of my statement;—you may, if you will, summon +Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods +which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon +Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering +which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any +other great Athenian family whom you choose;—they will all agree with +you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me; +although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving +me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth +speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of +my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter +about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is +yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort—let +us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue +about matters which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know +or not to know happiness and misery—that is the chief of them. And what +knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And +therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is +unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus +unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility—here is one point about +which we are at issue:—very good. And do you mean to say also that if he +meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to +you, he will be happy? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is +miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and +does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets +with retribution at the hands of gods and men. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I +regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are they not? I +was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Exactly so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you said the opposite? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: By Zeus, I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are +punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this proposition +also? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make +himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned +out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and +having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred +and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and +continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of +government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the +paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of +refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to +refresh my memory a little; did you say—“in an unjust attempt to +make himself a tyrant”? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the +other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in +the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who +escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, +Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,—when any one says +anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, +when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe +were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the +votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I +failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but +if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a +turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is +required; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he +is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with +the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I +ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? +For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to +do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to +be punished. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for +example, suffer rather than do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But will you answer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am +beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the +worst?—to do injustice or to suffer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is +not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, +such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them +beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in +proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the +spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were +beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, +or of both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as +they are useful or pleasant or both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I think not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty +by the standard of pleasure and utility. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite +standard of pain and evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure +of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in +pleasure or utility or both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or +disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, +about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more +evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more +disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: +does not that also follow? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds +the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the +injured? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore +be a greater evil than suffering injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is +more disgraceful than to suffer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less +one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly +resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without +shrinking, and either say “Yes” or “No” to me. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should say “No.” +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would +rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the +two. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is the conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how +unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of +thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,—I have no +need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough +of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the +greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or +whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. +Consider:—You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for +being justly corrected when you do wrong? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far +as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be +a patient? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should say so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will +not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if +a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck +will be struck violently or quickly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the +act of him who strikes? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned +will be burned in the same way? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Truly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something +cut? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the +cut will be of the same nature? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I +was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the +affection of the agent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is +suffering or acting? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Justly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers +what is honourable? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is +either pleasant or useful? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he is benefited? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term +“benefited”? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is +improved. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Surely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the +matter in this way:—In respect of a man’s estate, do you see any +greater evil than poverty? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: There is no greater evil. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, in a man’s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is +weakness and disease and deformity? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her +own? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and +the like? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed +out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most +disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: By far the most. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to +be most painful or hurtful, or both. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to +be most disgraceful? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: It has been admitted. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing +excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and +ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your +premises. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul +is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused +by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of +evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the +soul, are the greatest of evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the +art of making money? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at +once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To the judges, you mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: —Who are to punish them? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance +with a certain rule of justice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from +disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Will you enumerate them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or +both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being +healed pleased? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I think not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A useful thing, then? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is +the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is +healed, or who never was out of health? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from +evils, but in never having had them. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their +bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is +not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the +greatest of evils, which is vice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine +of our vice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never +had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from +injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, +being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or +punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other +tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the +conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet +contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his +constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the +pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, truly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily +vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a +like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are +blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable +a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is +corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to +avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they +provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their +powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or +shall we draw out the consequences in form? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: If you please. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the +greatest of evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is quite clear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from +this evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do +wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed +Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the +other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has +not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that +the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes +punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? +If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard +himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of +his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the +judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may +not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we +not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to +stand:—is any other inference consistent with them? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse +his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but +may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to +accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his +friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the iniquity and not +conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should +even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave +men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the +pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has +done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be +bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to +die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using +rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, +and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest +evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say +“Yes” or “No” to that? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though +probably in agreement with your premises. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes; it certainly is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm +another, whether an enemy or not—I except the case of +self-defence—then I have to be upon my guard—but if my enemy +injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I +should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if +he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: +if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it +on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things +worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, +if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he +can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of +any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no +such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but +you may well ask him. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or +only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the +whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, +in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among +mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if every +man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest +of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions +to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a +common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves +apiece:—I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of +philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of Pyrilampes. +Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict +your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, +backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are +saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with +Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist +the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at +the strangeness of what you say from time to time when under their influence, +you would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you cannot help +saying what your loves say unless they are prevented; and that you can only be +silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, +and therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence +philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling +you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of +Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy is +always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, and you +have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, +that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils; +or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O +Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole +life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should +be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I +provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose +me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict +myself. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot +in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has +fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:—for he +said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who +wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice, +Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind +in general would be displeased if he answered “No”; and then in +consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, +that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed +at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same +trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is +more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which +led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say what he +thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who +pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular +and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. +Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if +a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict +himself; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby +gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to +be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of +nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very +discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the +conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of +nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace +because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more +disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a +slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and +trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. +The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are +weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to +themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of +men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may +not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and +unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than +his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too +glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is +conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare +Republic), whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to +have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways +she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities +and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more +than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, +or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, +but these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and +according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, +which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and +strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young +lions,—charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, +that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable +and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake +off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot +all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against +nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of +natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of +Pindar, when he says in his poem, that +</p> + +<p> +“Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;” +</p> + +<p> +this, as he says, +</p> + +<p> +“Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer +from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—” (Fragm. +Incert. 151 (Bockh).) —I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning +is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried +off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the +oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the +stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will +leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if +pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but +too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, +still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of +all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is +inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be +used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly +ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in +general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or +business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make +their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says, +</p> + +<p> +“Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest +portion of the day to that in which he most excels,” (Antiope, fragm. 20 +(Dindorf).) +</p> + +<p> +but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and praises +the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will +thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part +of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he +is young in pursuing such a study; but when he is more advanced in years, the +thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those +who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of +an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace +and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But when +I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the +sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear +a man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me +ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about +students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged,—the study +appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal education, and +him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire +to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later +life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was +saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. +He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, +men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and +talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out +like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined +towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards +Amphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am +disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, +Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and +that you +</p> + +<p> +“Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior; Neither +in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason or proof, Or +offer valiant counsel on another’s behalf.” +</p> + +<p> +And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of +good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus +defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all +those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one +were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you +had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not +know what to do:—there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a +word to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a +poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim +the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,” +</p> + +<p> +who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is +in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his +goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of citizenship?—he +being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with +impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more: +</p> + +<p> +“Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom. +But leave to others these niceties,” +</p> + +<p> +whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities: +</p> + +<p> +“For they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your +dwelling.” +</p> + +<p> +Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the +man of substance and honour, who is well to do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to +discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best +possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I agreed in +approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory +state, and that no other test was needed by me. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired +touchstone. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Why? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions +which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that +if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought +to have three qualities—knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are +all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because +they are not wise as you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the +truth, because they have not the same interest in me which you have; and these +two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good +friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their +modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one +and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the +highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are +deficient, having received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can +testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that +you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and +Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four of you, +and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the +pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the +conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were +cautioning one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom +might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you +giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, +I have a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness +of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the +assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in the +present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any +point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not +require to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with +me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from +a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And +therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of +perfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you +censure me for making,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what +his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For +be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from +ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until +I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may +acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing +that to which I assented, call me “dolt,” and deem me unworthy of +receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar +mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the +property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the +noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could +not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the +superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you +seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance +with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the +superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be +also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is +to be defined in the same way as superior:—this is the point which I want +to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or +different? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you +were saying, they make the laws? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far +better, as you were saying? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by +nature good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that +justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer +injustice?—is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be +found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus?—I +must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify +myself by the assent of so competent an authority. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more +disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you +seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said +that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly +playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, +and to nature when the argument is about custom? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, +are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal +slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean +better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, +who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, +their ipsissima verba are laws? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been +in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,—What is the +superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think +that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you +because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the +better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be +a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You are ironical. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now +saying many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, whom you +mean, by the better? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no +meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you +mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten +thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his subjects, +and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I believe that you +mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), if you allow that the +one is superior to the ten thousand? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural +justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the +inferior. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let +us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and +we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of +persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one +of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and +he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will +he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this +matter of food? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, +because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason +of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them +on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;—his share will +exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest +of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, +Callicles:—am I not right, my friend? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I +am not speaking of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer +“Yes” or “No.” +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver +ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about +clothed in the best and finest of them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Fudge about coats! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the +advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest +shoes, and have the greatest number of them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise +and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and +have as much seed as possible for his own land? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and +fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser +in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor +offer one? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not +cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a +state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their +designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against +you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always +saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same +things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the +stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the +superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I +wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to +be the better and superior, and in what they are better? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and +courageous in the administration of a state—they ought to be the rulers +of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more +than themselves, my friend? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that +there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule +others? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What do you mean by his “ruling over himself”? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should +be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and +passions. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be +happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that +he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and +not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have +courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. +And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this however the many +cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their +own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that +intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler +natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance +and justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the +son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or +sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a +man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to +stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of +other men to be lords over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom +the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his +friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, +Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is +this:—that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with +means, are virtue and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements +contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the +argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do not like +to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life +may become manifest. Tell me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the +rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we +should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that +this is virtue? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of +all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and indeed +I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, +</p> + +<p> +“Who knows if life be not death and death life;” +</p> + +<p> +and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at this +moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb (sema +(compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the +desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down; and some +ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, +invented a tale in which he called the soul—because of its believing and +make-believe nature—a vessel (An untranslatable pun,—dia to +pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.), and the ignorant he called the +uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which +the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared +to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your +way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, +meaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky persons are +the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of +holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my +informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander +is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore +incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange +enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; +that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate +life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for +daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the +opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to +persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the +same opinion still? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same +school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as +an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a +figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one +man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of +milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them +are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and +difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any +more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in +like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his +vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling +them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their +respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate +is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite +is the truth? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself +has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the +life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the +pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes must +be large for the liquid to escape. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of +a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, +and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, +too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you +include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your +life in scratching, in your notion of happiness? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until +they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be too modest +and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue +the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would +reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort +you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? +Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough +of what they want? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the +argument? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he +who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever +manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad +pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are +the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are +the same. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no +longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what +is contrary to your real opinion. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you +to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, +if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly +intimated must follow, and many others. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Indeed I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, “I am in profound earnest.”) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for +me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied +knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I was. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things +different from one another? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly I was. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not +the same? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that +pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the +same, either with one another, or with the good. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he +assent to this, or not? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself +truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to +each other? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, +they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, +at the same time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the +complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same +time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the +health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both +together? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their +opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly he has. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same +time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to +answer without consideration. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I entirely agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to +hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, very. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants +or desires are painful? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, +is pleasant? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word +“thirsty” implies pain? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of +the satisfaction of the want? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: When you are thirsty? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in pain? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are +simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not +simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of +the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be +of any consequence: Is not this true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: It is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the +same time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as +evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what +a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in +drinking at the same time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to +hear the argument out. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of +Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates +argue in his own fashion. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, +since Gorgias wishes to have them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great +mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was +not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from +thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from +the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you +have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the +pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure +and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. +How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have +you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been +considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they +have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present +with them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying +just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say +so? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And a foolish man too? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or +the brave? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they +rejoiced about equally. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Greatly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or +are the brave also pained? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Both are pained. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are they equally pained? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I dare say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all +pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the +cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the +cowardly are the bad? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal +degree? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or +have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure +and more pain.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good +was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods +and pains evils? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I remember. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who +rejoice—if they do rejoice? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the +presence of evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of +pain? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and +pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should say that he has. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our +admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice +over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has +more of them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the +good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which +follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the +pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I +remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to +keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any +other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I +were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were +meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and +would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was +mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as +they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.—Well, then, as I +understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others +evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are +those which do some evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which +we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote +health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But not the evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our +actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree with +us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our +actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake +of them?—will you add a third vote to our two? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I will. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of +that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, +or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: He must have art. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I +was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes +which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there +are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, +which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, +which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class +which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg +you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not +answer at random and contrary to your real opinion—for you will observe +that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense +at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should +follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the +manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging +in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he +should pursue the life of philosophy;—and in what the latter way differs +from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I +did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we +may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them +we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No, I do not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have +agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as +pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and +process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the +pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish +that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not—do you +agree? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and +whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and +Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; +and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution +of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery +in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that +pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever +considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just +preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing +pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was +saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do +with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the +soul’s highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in +the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may +be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no +other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, +Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term +flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed +with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now +I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or +whether you differ. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall +soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for +their true interests? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, +if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the +pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of +flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, +Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I assent. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the +art of playing the lyre at festivals? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic +poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the +son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his +hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he +perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard +even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of +harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they +not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That is my notion of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august +personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to +give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to +speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths +welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her character? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned +towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now +describing as flattery? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and +metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to +a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much +to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses +the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the +rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to +improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of +mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the +thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and +trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse +for this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the +public in what they say, while others are such as you describe. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, +which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble +and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and +strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but +have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any +rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among +the orators who are at present living. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may +be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them +better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know +of such a man. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon +and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard +yourself? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true +virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of +others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the +satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we +ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in +distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did +distinguish them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose +that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described. +Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak +with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, +whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them +to their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but +strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, +and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he +has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all +artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke +before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in +which there is disorder, evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in +which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in +the body? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of +harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for +the other. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say +whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. +“Healthy,” as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular +order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is +that true or not? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And “lawful” and “law” are the names which +are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men +lawful and orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his +art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the +souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he +takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens +and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to +implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man +who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink +or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave +him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I will not say No to it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his +body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not +right? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to +eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires +as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires +at all: even you will admit that? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While +she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, +her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing +anything which does not tend to her own improvement. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than +intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask +some one who does. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject +himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks! +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered +hitherto out of civility to Gorgias. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but people say that “a tale should have a head and not +break off in the middle,” and I should not like to have the argument +going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little +longer, and put the head on. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument +would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or +questioning and answering yourself? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, “Two men spoke before, but now +one shall be enough”? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if +I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not +only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is +false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now +I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think +that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, +for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer +like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, +I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that +the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off +and go our ways. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have +completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of +the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with +Callicles, and then I might have given him an “Amphion” in return +for his “Zethus”; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to +continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be +in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with +me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of +my soul. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the +pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about +that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good +for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the +good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is +good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all +good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, +Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or +soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them +not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are +imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue +of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which +makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. +And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no +order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that +which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No +other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good +soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and +intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true. +</p> + +<p> +And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods +and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he +will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; +and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what +is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be +courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what +he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, +and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate +man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be +other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well +and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy +and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he +whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the opposite of the +temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if +they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must +pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his +legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; +but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are +in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, +if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to +have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and +of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with +him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the +never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber’s life. Such a one is +the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who +is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers +tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and +temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and +that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or +misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to +have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you +think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about +geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy +by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the +possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the +consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about +which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to +accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to +this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And +that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, +viz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that +degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias +admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be +just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true. +</p> + +<p> +And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place +to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to +help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity +of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom any one +may do what he likes,—he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of +yours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a +condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one +which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I +tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst +evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that +to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; +aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me +and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me +who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state +them in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted +by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are +like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more +enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I +say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these +things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more +than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what +I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of +injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils +(compare Republic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that +defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the +defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the +worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or +his family or his friends?—and next will come that which is unable to +avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third +greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the +honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace +of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, quite right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and +the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, +and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—by what devices can a man succeed +in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not +suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I +mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to +escape, or must he have provided himself with the power? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient, +and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided +himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he +be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus +and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong +voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order +that we may do no injustice? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, +yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think +that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant +himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to praise +you when you talk sense. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: +To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to +him—like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected to +fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be +perfectly friendly with him. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, +for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a +friend. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That again is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will +be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and +is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man +who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with +impunity:—is not that so? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and +formidable, this would seem to be the way—he will accustom himself, from +his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, +and will contrive to be as like him as possible? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends +would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite +be true,—if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have +influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as +possible, and not be punished? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus +acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the +greatest evil to him? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert +everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a +mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great +many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I +wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a +mind—the bad man will kill the good and true. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that +all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to +the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of +rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to +cultivate? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of +any great pretensions? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No, indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are +occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I +will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only +saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity +of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpresuming: it has no +airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same +salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings +us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the +utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger +and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the +Piraeus,—this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon; +and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks +about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to +reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has +benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. +He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they +embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and +he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily +diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by +him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and +incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more +valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad +man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other +devourer;—and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he +cannot live well. (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not +usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either +the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he +sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the +pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would +bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all +of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking +about; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, +and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters +to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your +principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you +to despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning? I +know that you will say, “I am better, and better born.” But if the +better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and +his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and +of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my +friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something +different from saving and being saved:—May not he who is truly a man +cease to care about living a certain time?—he knows, as women say, that +no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all +that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed +term;—whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he +lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as +possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to +have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is +for the interest of either of us;—I would not have us risk that which is +dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, +who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own +perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming +great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, +whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, +Callides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the +Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes’ darling who is called after them, +must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make +you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for +every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and +dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. +What do you say? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be +good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by +them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your +soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same +matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. +Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things, +including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to +pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not +indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar +flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was +ministered to, whether body or soul? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our +city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we +have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other +good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or +office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set about some +public business, and were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as +walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, +first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught +us?—would not that be necessary, Callicles? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever +constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and +whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration +we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in +constructing many fine buildings, not only with their assistance, but without +them, by our own unaided skill—in that case prudence would not dissuade +us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master +to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, +it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another +to undertake them. Is not this true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were +physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as +state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about me, +Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else +ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the +same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, +whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the +medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to +think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as +state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without +having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired +experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when +you are learning the potter’s art; which is a foolish thing? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public +character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose +that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about +making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, +or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good +and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or +freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, +what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your +conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by +you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not +answer? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really +want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among +us—whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any +other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted +many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said +so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this +is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me +to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, +Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still +think that they were good citizens. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the +citizens better instead of worse? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, +the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, “likely” is not the word; for if he was a +good citizen, the inference is certain. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And what difference does that make? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are +supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have +been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people +pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk +and money. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise their +ears. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well +known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his +character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was during the +time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they had been made +good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of +theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a +malefactor. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles’ badness? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or +horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting +nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be +a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer +than they were when he received them? What do you say? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying “yes.” +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an +animal? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly he is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who +were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, +and not more unjust? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of +another mind? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, +and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very +far from desiring. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted then. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and +inferior? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted again. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That is, upon your view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case +of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in +order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? and they did just the +same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that +Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he +was only saved by the Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as +you say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good +charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they +have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are +thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any +profession.—What do you think? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should think not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in the +Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman—you +admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former +ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no +better than our present ones; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they +did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have +fallen out of favour. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them +in his performances. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the +serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more +serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the +wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them +to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion +or of force, in the improvement of their fellow citizens, which is the prime +object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were +a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were +more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I +have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are +always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding +one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than +once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body, +and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if +our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives +them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, +and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in +order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may +provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of +them,—the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the +currier; and in so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by +himself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there +is another art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true +minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use +their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of +the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts +which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and +gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I +say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and +understand and assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come +repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you +who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are +or have been good trainers?—and you had replied, Thearion, the baker, +Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these +are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes +admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital +wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom +you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My +friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me +are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble +notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men’s +bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their +original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and +yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of +flesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit +brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the +time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could +they would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have +been the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, is just what you +are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their +desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the +swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder +statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls +and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. +And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers +of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real +authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and +my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but +also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these +misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great +piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; about +our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that +there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to +them; “after all their many services to the State, that they should +unjustly perish,”—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for +no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the +head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of +the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are +nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of +virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding +them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be +more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice +has been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by +their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in +them? Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, +compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to +answer? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am +making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the +god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not appear to you +to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then +blaming him for being bad? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this +inconsistent manner? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and +declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless +upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city:—do you +think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, +the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or +nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and +sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as +much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or +gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are +the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from +that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of +having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly it is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are +the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have +been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, +if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly +defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no +agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the +utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, +but by reason of injustice. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated +unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be +really able to make them good—am I not right? (Compare Protag.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man +receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best +govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is +held to be dishonourable? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite +them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the +benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: It is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine for +me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make +the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of +the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and +ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the +consequences will be— +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and +get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a +bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, +but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, +basely, and if basely, hurtfully. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! +you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be +brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some +miserable and mean person. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the +Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and +incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to +trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. +Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I +anticipate this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By all means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who +practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, +seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining +favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, +having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have +nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was +arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried +in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply +under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my +boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, +especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and +suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest +potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats +and sweets on which I feasted you!” What do you suppose that the +physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? +If he told the truth he could only say, “All these evil things, my boys, +I did for your health,” and then would there not just be a clamour among +a jury like that? How they would cry out! +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I dare say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: He certainly would. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am +brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the +pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed +to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be +benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and +perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words +towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I +truly might:—“All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a +view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore +there is no saying what may happen to me. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in +a good position? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often +acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have never said +or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been +repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any one +could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I +should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, +or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would +indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or +rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no +man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is +afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul +full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I +say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I +dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I +believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us (Il.), +how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from +their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the +destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in +Heaven,—that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall +go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect +happiness out of the reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and +impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called +Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of +Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the +judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the +judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands +of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the +wrong places. Zeus said: “I shall put a stop to this; the judgments are +not well given, because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for +they are alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in +fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment +arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they +have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too +have their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies +are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to +them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the +judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place, I +will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present: +this power which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take +from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are +judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be +naked, that is to say, dead—he with his naked soul shall pierce into the +other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their +kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth—conducted in +this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any +of you, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and +Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall +give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads +lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. +Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come +from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court +of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt:—then the +judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.” +</p> + +<p> +From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following +inferences:—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation +from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are +separated they retain their several natures, as in life; the body keeps the +same habit, and the results of treatment or accident are distinctly visible in +it: for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he +was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain +fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, +will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints +of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same +in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, +the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was +the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either +perfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine +that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the +body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to +view.—And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to +Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not +knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great +king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his +soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries +and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with +falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without +truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which +is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches +him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he +deserves. +</p> + +<p> +Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished +ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an +example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become +better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are +those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also +in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can +be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst +crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as +they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. +They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring +for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of +their sins—there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of +the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come +thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if +Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these +fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and +kings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest +and most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to +the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has +described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were +Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any +private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as +incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not +in his power, and he was happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, +the very bad men come from the class of those who have power (compare +Republic). And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of +all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live +and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are +who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will +be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust +righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, +the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend. +</p> + +<p> +As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows +nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only +that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or +incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his +proper recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just +one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; +and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher +who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other +men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. +Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone +has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares +that he saw him: +</p> + +<p> +“Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.” +</p> + +<p> +Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how +I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. +Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the +truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can. +And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in +return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great +combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly +conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able +to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, +comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he +has got you in his grip and is carrying you off, you will gape and your head +will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very +likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort +of insult. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you +will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by +searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you +and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are +not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in +another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing +remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided +than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue +is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and +that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that +the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be +chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as +well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art +should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view +to justice. +</p> + +<p> +Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after +death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a +fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do +you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never +come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true +man. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to +politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may +seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present +condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important +subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, +then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best +way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way +let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to which you +trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is +nothing worth. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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