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+The Project Gutenberg eBook of Gorgias, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and
+most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions
+whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms
+of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at
+www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you
+will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before
+using this eBook.
+
+Title: Gorgias
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Translator: Benjamin Jowett
+
+Release Date: March, 1999 [eBook #1672]
+[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022]
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: UTF-8
+
+Produced by: Sue Asscher
+
+*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS ***
+
+
+
+
+GORGIAS
+
+by Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+Contents
+
+ INTRODUCTION
+ GORGIAS
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION
+
+
+In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his
+interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is
+the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no
+severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to
+think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the
+digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the
+dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the
+beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and
+references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of
+the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt
+to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single
+idea. (Compare Introduction to the Phaedrus.)
+
+Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this
+matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one
+another by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite
+and contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The
+mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have
+applied his method with the most various results. The value and use of
+the method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them.
+Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each
+separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all
+difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they
+have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily
+pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we
+can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more
+familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is
+needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of
+other great artists. We may hardly admit that the moral antithesis of
+good and pleasure, or the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and
+opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic
+discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring
+them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally in all the
+dialogues.
+
+There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines
+of the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily
+exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural
+form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues
+are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and
+lose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great
+works receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether
+these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their
+agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence
+which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away
+with us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation,
+and recalling us to the indications of the text.
+
+Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the
+appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher
+themes are introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the
+good and evil of man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a
+sound definition of his art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the
+existence of a universal art of flattery or simulation having several
+branches:—this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the
+highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life
+which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at
+last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. These two
+aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the
+dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the
+treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the
+forms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition
+there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes
+of Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as
+they may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is worse than to
+suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be
+punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic
+paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not what
+they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure
+is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of
+pleasure and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain
+cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not
+merely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole
+tribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class
+of flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the
+judgment-seat of the gods below.
+
+The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three
+characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond;
+and the form and manner change with the stages of the argument.
+Socrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in
+dealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his
+encounter with Callicles. In the first division the question is
+asked—What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias
+is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is
+transferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the
+defence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates
+himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must
+enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus
+finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies
+that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates
+denies that they have any real power, and hence arise the three
+paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is
+at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow
+legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue
+closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that
+pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but
+the combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is
+confuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive
+at the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two
+kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower—that which makes the
+people better, and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts
+Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus
+of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or
+disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric.
+
+The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts
+which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now
+advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents,
+and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the
+dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain
+dignity, and is treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he
+is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching
+rhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own art.
+When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that
+rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this
+lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables
+Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is
+described as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of
+Socrates’ manner of approaching a question; he is quite “one of
+Socrates’ sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,” and very
+eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by
+experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but
+he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything
+and know nothing.
+
+Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway “colt,” as Socrates describes
+him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the
+pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the
+earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of
+a work on rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the
+inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.).
+At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his
+master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon
+restored to good-humour, and compelled to assent to the required
+conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he
+is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to
+suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and
+dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher
+arguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a
+youth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has
+never heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the
+paradoxes, as they appear to him, of Socrates with evident
+astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Archelaus being
+miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. When
+the argument with him has fairly run out.
+
+Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the
+stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for
+if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the
+foundations of society are upside down. In him another type of
+character is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but
+man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be
+described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of
+power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining
+both. There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the
+interests of morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like
+Thrasymachus in the Republic, though he is not of the same weak and
+vulgar class, he consistently maintains that might is right. His great
+motive of action is political ambition; in this he is
+characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of
+the Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as
+an excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind
+as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a
+violation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger
+should govern the weaker (compare Republic). Like other men of the
+world who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad
+side of human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his
+practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions
+suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose
+talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which
+he makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the
+argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the
+world; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, who showed no
+weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles,
+Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character is a man of
+great passions and great powers, which he has developed to the utmost,
+and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of others.
+Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom we know
+nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed
+to reflect the history of his life.
+
+And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist
+or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which
+Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many
+contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he
+describes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the
+authors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public
+opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance,
+with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal
+vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his
+servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound
+earnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but
+the more he is irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does
+Socrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really
+made to the “omniscient” Hippias, according to the testimony of
+Xenophon (Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular
+declaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of
+Gorgias, of being “as long as he pleases,” or “as short as he pleases”
+(compare Protag.). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending
+himself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and
+word-splitting; he is scandalized that the legitimate consequences of
+his own argument should be stated in plain terms; after the manner of
+men of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he
+cannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words; and getting
+confused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he
+is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the
+argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing
+the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with
+the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words.
+
+The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the
+Protagoras and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the
+Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards
+as another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by
+that of his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part
+is met by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak,
+for philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more
+ironical and provoking than in any other of Plato’s writings: for he is
+“fooled to the top of his bent” by the worldliness of Callicles. But he
+is also more deeply in earnest. He rises higher than even in the Phaedo
+and Crito: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust
+and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in
+them. As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside the veil of
+irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his
+adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of
+his own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single
+real teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely
+go to war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will
+be condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the
+position of Socrates and Callicles will be reversed; all those things
+“unfit for ears polite” which Callicles has prophesied as likely to
+happen to him in this life, the insulting language, the box on the
+ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare Republic, and the
+similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in
+the Theaetetus).
+
+There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of
+the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically
+attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the
+assembly should be taken. This is said to have happened “last year”
+(B.C. 406), and therefore the assumed date of the dialogue has been
+fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man.
+The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another
+indication of time, viz. the “recent” usurpation of Archelaus, which
+occurred in the year 413; and still less with the “recent” death of
+Pericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.) and
+is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age; or with the
+mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a
+living witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that
+although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the
+Dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his
+commentators (Preface to Republic).
+
+The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly
+characteristic declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true
+nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time
+that no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The
+profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively
+Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in the
+Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the
+fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this “among the
+multitude of questions” which agitate human life “as the principle
+which alone remains unshaken.” He does not insist here, any more than
+in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the
+soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is
+worse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for
+the next best thing to a man’s being just is that he should be
+corrected and become just; also that he should avoid all flattery,
+whether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric should be employed
+for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life
+is a recapitulation of the argument in a figure.
+
+(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only
+true politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the
+Apology, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced
+that he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will
+would be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others.
+Here he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is
+“the only man of the present day who performs his public duties at
+all.” The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the
+difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a
+public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but
+in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same
+consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither
+can he separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a
+politician, although he foresees the dangers which await him; but he
+must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles
+is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty. And yet there is an
+inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens
+better than to put him to death?
+
+And now, as he himself says, we will “resume the argument from the
+beginning.”
+
+Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon,
+meets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has
+just missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was
+desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of
+interrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes
+that they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying.
+There they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and
+disciple Polus.
+
+SOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon.
+
+CHAEREPHON: What question?
+
+SOCRATES: Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the
+answer, “I am a cobbler.”
+
+Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for
+him. “Who is Gorgias?” asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his
+master Socrates. “One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best
+and noblest of experimental arts,” etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical
+and balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and
+unmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that
+he has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to
+Gorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not how to
+answer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is
+willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,—that
+he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, “boasts himself to be a
+good one.” At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for “he
+can be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.” Socrates
+would have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him a
+number of questions, which are answered by him to his own great
+satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of
+Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:—
+
+Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other
+particular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then
+does rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the
+arts which deal with words, and the arts which have to do with external
+actions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all
+productive arts into two classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in
+silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, or in which words
+are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric.
+But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was
+the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words
+there are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other
+arts which have to do with words? “The words which rhetoric uses relate
+to the best and greatest of human things.” But tell me, Gorgias, what
+are the best? “Health first, beauty next, wealth third,” in the words
+of the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you
+in a body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is
+superior to that of the rest—How will you choose between them? “I
+should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom
+to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest
+good.” But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?—is the
+persevering retort: You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even
+as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures;
+neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because
+there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an
+art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see
+the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as
+the art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the
+just and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which
+gives knowledge, and another which gives belief without knowledge; and
+knowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or false,—there
+is therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion
+does rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that
+which gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can
+impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few
+minutes. And there is another point to be considered:—when the assembly
+meets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the
+rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect, or the
+general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to
+become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not
+Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach
+us to persuade or advise the state?
+
+Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of
+Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and
+walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about
+the middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar
+power over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a
+physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete
+with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the
+multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the
+rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should
+abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all
+good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art
+to be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of
+the lessons which they have learned from him.
+
+Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will
+quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he
+has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be
+refuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears
+that the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and
+Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points
+out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have
+fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a
+misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by
+Gorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or
+any other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of
+his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the
+trouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is
+of medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did
+not know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part
+of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a
+carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has
+learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and
+rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite
+of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may
+act unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained?
+
+The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man
+may know justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts
+and the virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly
+the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of
+justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus
+is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect;
+of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit
+that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the
+interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners
+is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically
+replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs
+again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in
+error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity.
+Polus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words
+as he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet
+harder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to
+them. After some altercation they agree (compare Protag.), that Polus
+shall ask and Socrates answer.
+
+“What is the art of Rhetoric?” says Polus. Not an art at all, replies
+Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created
+art. Polus asks, “What thing?” and Socrates answers, An experience or
+routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. “But is not
+rhetoric a fine thing?” I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will
+you ask me another question—What is cookery? “What is cookery?” An
+experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification.
+Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and
+rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. “What is
+rhetoric?” asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole,
+which may be termed flattery, is the reply. “But what part?” A shadow
+of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly
+unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his
+meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or
+appearances and realities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul,
+and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations
+of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first
+the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative
+part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which
+has no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions,
+one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with
+these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of
+them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no
+reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or
+simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is
+the simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be
+summed up in an arithmetical formula:—
+
+Tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation.
+
+And,
+
+Cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice.
+
+And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the
+gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and
+return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of
+his speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and
+begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him.
+
+“Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?”
+They are not esteemed at all. “Why, have they not great power, and can
+they not do whatever they desire?” They have no power, and they only do
+what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain
+the true object of desire, which is the good. “As if you, Socrates,
+would not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison,
+exile, kill any one whom he pleases.” But Socrates replies that he has
+no wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is
+not to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is
+better to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going
+about with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house
+on fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such
+acts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if
+they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son
+of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him
+happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce
+even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral
+condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of
+a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of
+Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle
+and then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was
+very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to
+have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he
+will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers,
+Aristocrates, the house of Pericles, or any other great family—this is
+the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth
+depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his
+appeal is to one witness only,—that is to say, the person with whom he
+is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is
+prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked
+man and yet happy.
+
+The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he
+suffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he
+suffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as
+this hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently
+refuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the
+successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who,
+having been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is
+crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both
+criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more
+miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads
+Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus
+replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of
+the company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates
+rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct
+at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable
+to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent
+occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the
+person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion
+of any man to do is worse than to suffer evil.
+
+Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to
+do evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But
+what is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies,
+colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with
+reference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter
+doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must
+exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the
+suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus
+doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more
+hurtful than suffering.
+
+There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is
+punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done
+justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if
+to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and
+therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved.
+There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him
+in estate, body, and soul;—these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and
+the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that
+brings the greatest hurt. And there are three arts which heal these
+evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the fairest of these is justice.
+Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second
+degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal
+should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge
+away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper
+colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary
+penalty. And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to
+punish him, but that he shall go unpunished and become worse and worse,
+taking care only that he does no injury to himself. These are at least
+conceivable uses of the art, and no others have been discovered by us.
+
+Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks
+Chaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the
+assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates
+himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned
+upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to
+be doing.
+
+Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can
+understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a
+community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of
+them are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of
+Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the
+beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity of
+Callicles is that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his
+Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both
+his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at
+his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a
+free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the
+explanation of Socrates’ peculiarities also. He is always repeating
+what his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other
+love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute
+her, or he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is
+far worse than the discord of musical sounds.
+
+Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said,
+in compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil
+did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been
+similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to
+suffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom “yes,” but
+not by nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between
+the two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In
+this very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has
+been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that
+“injustice is dishonourable,” but nature says that “might is right.”
+And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the
+conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert
+his original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then
+the light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar says, “Law, the king
+of all, does violence with high hand;” as is indeed proved by the
+example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid
+for them.
+
+This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave
+philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little
+philosophy is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who
+has not “passed his metaphysics” before he has grown up to manhood will
+never know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to
+politics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when
+they take to philosophy: “Every man,” as Euripides says, “is fondest of
+that in which he is best.” Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the
+lisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education; but
+when a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat
+him. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good; they
+avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few
+admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments.
+
+For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as
+Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have “a noble soul
+disguised in a puerile exterior.” And I would have you consider the
+danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know
+how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,—there you
+would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered,
+robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get
+a little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the
+ways of the wealthy and be wise.
+
+Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher’s
+touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree
+must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are
+needed in a critic—knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus,
+although learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them
+contradict themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not
+too modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his
+good-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the
+same caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers
+hearing him give long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge
+himself to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which
+Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he
+and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of
+justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?” “There is no
+difference.” Then are not the many superior to the one, and the
+opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is
+equality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong.
+And as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must
+be in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. “Why
+will you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the
+superior is the better?” But what do you mean by the better? Tell me
+that, and please to be a little milder in your language, if you do not
+wish to drive me away. “I mean the worthier, the wiser.” You mean to
+say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? “Yes,
+that is my meaning.” Ought the physician then to have a larger share of
+meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler
+larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? “You are always saying the same
+things, Socrates.” Yes, and on the same subjects too; but you are never
+saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to be the
+stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;—what DO you mean?
+“I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have more
+than the governed.” Than themselves? “What do you mean?” I mean to say
+that every man is his own governor. “I see that you mean those dolts,
+the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his desires
+grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is
+impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a
+king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To
+invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have the
+enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and
+self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.”
+
+Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other
+men only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not
+happy. “Why,” says Callicles, “if they were, stones and the dead would
+be happy.” Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic
+vein of reflection. “Who knows,” as Euripides says, “whether life may
+not be death, and death life?” Nay, there are philosophers who maintain
+that even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb
+(sema) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory,
+in which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be
+carrying water to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly
+holey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful,
+but nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you
+acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life
+of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? “Far otherwise.” Then
+hear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence
+may be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with
+streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of the one are sound, and the
+jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more
+trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would suffer
+extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? “Yes,
+Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a
+perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always
+eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other
+desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of
+happiness.” And to be itching and always scratching? “I do not deny
+that there may be happiness even in that.” And to indulge unnatural
+desires, if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at
+the introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that
+they are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity
+of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? “Yes, for the
+sake of consistency, he will.” The answer does not satisfy Socrates,
+who fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness
+on the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the
+argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are
+not the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another.
+Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two
+opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be
+well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are
+simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the
+case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not
+simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure
+cannot be the same as good.
+
+Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go
+on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded
+against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from
+pleasure and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good,
+and the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are
+good, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure
+is good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain
+in nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a
+greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave
+or may be even better.
+
+Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming
+that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others
+bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we
+should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates
+observes, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that
+all things should be done for the sake of the good.
+
+Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed
+in distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of
+empirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only,
+and the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and
+body. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to
+anything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the
+arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral
+exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on
+the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who
+was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of
+Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in
+general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women,
+and children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to
+what is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were
+children.
+
+Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have
+a real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two
+species of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard
+for the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the
+latter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were
+such in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great
+Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were
+true artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out
+of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running
+through his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he
+desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all
+virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the
+physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with
+a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising
+self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the
+unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving.
+
+Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point,
+turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own
+questions. “Then,” says Socrates, “one man must do for two;” and though
+he had hoped to have given Callicles an “Amphion” in return for his
+“Zethus,” he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that
+Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates
+the advantages which he has already won:—
+
+The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed
+about that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and
+the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things
+good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or
+soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to
+order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is
+better than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate
+and is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is
+temperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the
+perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate
+whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He
+therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid
+intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but
+if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and
+individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us,
+is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never
+discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would
+have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this,
+and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox
+is true that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation, and Polus
+was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and
+Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man.
+And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in
+saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears
+with impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than
+to be stricken—to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast
+in adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things,
+but I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do
+wrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next
+greatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the
+friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the
+ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer
+no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all
+the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all
+evils will befall him. “But this imitator of the tyrant,” rejoins
+Callicles, “will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.”
+Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that
+repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a
+good one. “Yes, and that is the provoking thing.” Not provoking to a
+man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from
+danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of
+justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from
+death, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of
+swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least
+as much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina
+to Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he
+disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he
+is not certain whether he has done his passengers any good in saving
+them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if
+he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer too will often save
+whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to
+marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there
+in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own
+or another’s, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of
+saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and
+being saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to
+disregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving
+all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have
+influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of
+Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this?
+
+“There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely
+believe you.”
+
+That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little
+more conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was
+directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as
+good as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make
+the citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public
+building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had
+never constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of
+state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else?
+Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And
+as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him?
+Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the
+statesman’s proper business. And we must ask the same question about
+Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they
+make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave
+them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they
+condemned him to death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals
+who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man
+is an animal; and Pericles who had the charge of man only made him
+wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have
+been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon,
+Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his seat at first
+is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The
+inference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than
+those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and
+harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I
+have told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images)
+that the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways—there is the
+meaner and the higher art. You seemed to understand what I said at the
+time, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you
+answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered,
+Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian
+cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I
+told you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make
+them thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of
+finding fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent
+disorders on their physicians. In this respect, Callicles, you are like
+them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices of
+the citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but
+neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the
+citizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and
+others, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will
+suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always
+being repeated—“after all his services, the ungrateful city banished
+him, or condemned him to death.” As if the statesman should not have
+taught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having
+unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault
+with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in
+the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic,
+whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the
+arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money,
+because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple
+desirous of requiting his teacher.
+
+Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of
+serving the state Callicles invites him:—“to the inferior and
+ministerial one,” is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of
+avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and
+would rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But
+he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he
+remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of
+politics. And very probably, as in the case which he described to
+Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He
+cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any
+one charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he
+will not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated
+by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his
+fate may be. “And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself
+is in a good condition?” Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help,
+which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If
+I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for
+want of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no
+evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of
+evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:—
+
+Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death,
+and when judgment had been given upon them they departed—the good to
+the islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as
+they were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they
+were being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the
+throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after
+death, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the
+foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed
+to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos
+was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul
+and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their
+characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all
+distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king
+himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him,
+though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and
+iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment.
+
+For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable
+and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their
+punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by
+becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and
+potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same
+power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus, not Thersites, are
+supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that
+there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is
+shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But
+to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are
+stripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to
+Tartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love
+and admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the
+islands of the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos
+overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him
+
+“Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.”
+
+
+My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls
+undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to
+meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which
+you cast upon me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and
+with dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all
+manner of evil.
+
+Perhaps you think that this is an old wives’ fable. But you, who are
+the three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one
+will ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should
+study to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become
+good, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few.
+
+Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no
+harm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to
+politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of
+ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in
+the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you,
+Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth.
+
+We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the
+dialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical
+character of his writings, we may compare him with himself, and with
+other great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his
+critics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another
+upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he
+teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are
+enveloped.
+
+(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we
+are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old
+difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the
+arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words,
+such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up.
+The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real
+and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The
+possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of
+application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which
+remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at
+the present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also
+apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on
+the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment
+in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction
+which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see
+above). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a
+false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion
+that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates;—a
+mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the
+Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a “robust sophistry” are likewise
+discernible in his argument with Callicles.
+
+(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the
+argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts
+himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may
+sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists,
+or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the
+ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as
+useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic,
+as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If
+we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that
+mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier
+when punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to
+the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has
+already admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to
+say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that
+the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of
+the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as
+in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion
+which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning?
+His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions,
+which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among
+mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that
+he will be understood or appreciated by very few.
+
+He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea
+of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls
+in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or
+that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental
+satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand
+times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only
+because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or
+that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their
+enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found
+in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public
+opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground
+only, much as Socrates’ friends in the opening of the Phaedo are
+described as regarding him; or as was said of another, “they looked
+upon his face as upon the face of an angel.” We are not concerned to
+justify this idealism by the standard of utility or public opinion, but
+merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better
+part of human nature.
+
+The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain
+that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and
+that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is
+thought to have erred in “considering the agent only, and making no
+reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.” But the
+happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really
+quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as
+Plato’s conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the
+greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which
+will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of
+utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant
+consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely
+self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty
+of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget
+that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged
+in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the
+social principle, though taking another form, is really far more
+prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics.
+
+The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have
+exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological
+import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the
+idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that
+the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not
+receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk
+deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of
+suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an
+allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that,
+somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In
+the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured
+here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human
+things the wise and good are weak and miserable; such an one is like a
+man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and
+obloquy.
+
+Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that
+if “the ways of God” to man are to be “justified,” the hopes of another
+life must be included. If the question could have been put to him,
+whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he
+suggests in the Apology, “death be only a long sleep,” we can hardly
+tell what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite
+independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation,
+or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to
+sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say
+how far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a
+general faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported
+the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the
+spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good
+are to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as he says in the
+Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories
+about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind
+is true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future.
+Even in the Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought,
+when the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is
+thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a
+point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter
+consequences.
+
+(3) Plato’s theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly
+corrective. In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a
+few great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But
+most men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence
+of evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for
+their improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like
+sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this
+representation of Plato’s the criticism has been made, that the analogy
+of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead
+of improving men, may have just the opposite effect.
+
+Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of
+disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly
+imperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the
+mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from
+visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect
+under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them
+for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of
+the imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too
+strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were
+not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of
+his age.
+
+Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the
+suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of
+ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal
+law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and
+supplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off
+the higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and
+to be continued in other stages of existence, which is further
+developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured
+out of the beaten track in their meditations on the “last things,” have
+found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or
+in what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind.
+He has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic,
+that “God is the author of evil only with a view to good,” and that
+“they were the better for being punished.” Still his doctrine of a
+future state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with
+that perversion of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting
+punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on
+the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which
+has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner
+sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor
+very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation.
+
+We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of
+argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the
+horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design.
+The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a
+future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and
+to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according
+to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or
+transcendental virtue in the description of the just man in the
+Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the
+Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a
+state of the world which always has existed and always will exist among
+men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And
+such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the
+natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the
+ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen
+very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly
+involved in the general condemnation.
+
+Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other
+questions, which may be briefly considered:—
+
+a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is
+supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with
+the transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure,
+knowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue
+and pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite,
+harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so
+many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another,
+and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that
+Plato’s conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux transferred to
+the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in
+opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of
+pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of
+good is only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had
+Plato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the
+subjective consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be
+as transient and precarious as pleasure.
+
+b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the
+improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike
+dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To
+Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on
+self-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to
+have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is
+the only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to
+another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up
+for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the
+parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is
+merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast,
+which he describes in the Republic.
+
+c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between
+the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus,
+and the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and
+language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal
+similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of
+Plato’s life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of
+which the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak
+combining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is
+indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed
+in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man,
+the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another
+life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians,
+are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic
+they are expelled by the State, because they are imitators, and
+minister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to
+rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the
+Protagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In
+some other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a
+parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of
+Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two
+dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic
+notion, as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and
+in the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed.
+
+This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the
+Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief
+good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the
+Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains,
+are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias’
+definition of rhetoric (Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of
+persuasion, of all arts the best, for to it all things submit, not by
+compulsion, but of their own free will—marks a close and perhaps
+designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of
+measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful
+and the good.
+
+In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to
+public opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito,
+and portions of the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from
+another point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to
+Plato’s theory of morals which the Theaetetus bears to his theory of
+knowledge.
+
+d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant
+irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot’s modest charge;
+and in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of
+self-condemnation; and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in
+both worlds. (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion
+should not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals
+such as Archelaus; the retaliation of the box on the ears; the
+nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes
+or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided
+for them (compare Swift’s notion that the universe is a suit of
+clothes, Tale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in
+the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal
+likeness after death. (3) The appeal of the authority of Homer, who
+says that Odysseus saw Minos in his court “holding a golden sceptre,”
+which gives verisimilitude to the tale.
+
+It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing “both sides of
+the game,” and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus,
+we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only
+attempting to analyze the “dramatis personae’ as they were conceived by
+him. Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that
+Plato is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be
+assumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any
+other speaker who appears to have the best of the argument; or to
+repeat the observation that he is a poet as well as a philosopher; or
+to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but
+interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and
+the opinion of his time.
+
+It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is
+the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this
+mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of
+Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting
+any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived
+from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings
+(e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of
+intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the “liberty
+of prophesying;’ and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this
+nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true
+man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same
+time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to
+avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of
+consequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates.
+
+
+The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to
+which he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive,
+he puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of
+ridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against
+themselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables
+of the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half
+conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more
+ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical
+than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the
+objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to
+be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest
+sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the
+argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher
+reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all
+ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found
+the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of
+the wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but
+by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At
+length he makes even Polus in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument,
+and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in
+a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his
+adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return
+to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of
+the dialogue.
+
+First Thesis:—
+
+It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.
+
+Compare the New Testament—
+
+“It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.”—1 Pet.
+
+And the Sermon on the Mount—
+
+“Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness’ sake.”—Matt.
+
+The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but
+they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous
+may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no
+reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by
+Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is
+dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the
+offender (compare Republic). But they are not equally willing to
+acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil,
+and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes are
+committed on the great scale—the crimes of tyrants, ancient or
+modern—after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have
+become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not
+from any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted
+by time, and “to forgive is convenient to them.” The tangle of good and
+evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end
+cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out
+of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the
+tyrant now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and
+has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is
+the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will
+be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or
+for evil cannot alter a hair’s breadth the morality of actions which
+are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates
+holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are
+of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level
+of our practice.
+
+And so of private individuals—to them, too, the world occasionally
+speaks of the consequences of their actions:—if they are lovers of
+pleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest,
+they will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not
+of what will be, but of what is—of the present consequence of lowering
+and degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men
+everywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would
+agree with him—they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators
+of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death
+comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an
+unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but
+to a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering
+ideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a
+new life in us.
+
+Second Thesis:—
+
+It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer.
+
+There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty
+followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would
+then be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid
+vice as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening
+and enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the
+consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort
+of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business
+of early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation
+and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be
+unfortunate—he had better have suffered when he was young, and been
+saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally
+unfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing
+from him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are
+revealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have
+been caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by
+the pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on
+the means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them,
+and make allowances for them; but we do not consider that the same
+principle applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found
+out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious
+point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil
+doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have
+given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins,
+and therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are
+healed by time;
+
+“While rank corruption, mining all within,
+Infects unseen.”
+
+
+The “accustomed irony” of Socrates adds a corollary to the
+argument:—“Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape
+unpunished”—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of
+Proverbs, “Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,” etc., quoted in
+Romans.)
+
+Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own
+lives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are
+very kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love
+is always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar
+figure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence
+but in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather
+than by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must
+speak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint
+in eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any
+suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to
+submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed
+in another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not
+we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the
+rhetoric of prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while
+the struggle between the better and the worse is going on within us.
+And sometimes we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to
+restore the balance which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and
+then again we may hear a voice as of a parent consoling us. In
+religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the consciences
+of men “accusing or else excusing them.” For all our life long we are
+talking with ourselves:—What is thought but speech? What is feeling but
+rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always
+in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at
+first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us.
+
+Third Thesis:—
+
+We do not what we will, but what we wish.
+
+Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn—that good
+intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by
+wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which
+we afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be
+inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often
+be the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase
+pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to
+changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately
+disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we
+regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an advantage
+over us—we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of
+which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this
+impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has “the least
+possible power” while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually
+bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of
+nature is open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will
+exercise ordinary attention; every day offers him experiences of his
+own and of other men’s characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The
+contemplation of the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men
+in regard to them, seems to have led Socrates to his famous
+thesis:—“Virtue is knowledge;” which is not so much an error or paradox
+as a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but
+also the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present
+age. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine
+a right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other
+hand, have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But
+Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though
+the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental
+systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem
+to lie at the basis of morality. (Compare the following: “Now, and for
+us, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have
+Hebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and
+discipline received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal
+possession. And as humanity is constituted, one must never assign the
+second rank to-day without being ready to restore them to the first
+to-morrow.” Sir William W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa.)
+
+Fourth Thesis:—
+
+To be and not to seem is the end of life.
+
+The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief
+incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their
+fellows is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of
+seeming enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear
+better than they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of
+others. A man of ability can easily feign the language of piety or
+virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy
+which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is
+the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different
+opinions about themselves and one another which prevail in different
+ranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind by the study of
+one department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and
+stronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest
+in certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of
+medicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of
+these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very
+ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we
+have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry
+of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a
+religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has
+been accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and
+nothing on the other. The conventions and customs which we observe in
+conversation, and the opposition of our interests when we have dealings
+with one another (“the buyer saith, it is nought—it is nought,” etc.),
+are always obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of
+human nature is far more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few
+persons speak freely from their own natures, and scarcely any one dares
+to think for himself: most of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions
+of those around us, which we partly help to make. A man who would shake
+himself loose from them, requires great force of mind; he hardly knows
+where to begin in the search after truth. On every side he is met by
+the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the most
+real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded
+collectively and subjected to the influences of society.
+
+Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the
+unreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that
+they must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must
+have the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must
+acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of
+doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have
+nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire
+firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to
+take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must
+try to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men.
+A single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be
+true and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does,
+and what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can
+form a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most
+secret actions he can show the same high principle (compare Republic)
+which he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on
+some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right,
+even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition,
+may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and
+lawyers, and be too much for them.
+
+Who is the true and who the false statesman?—
+
+The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first
+organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and
+having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with
+those of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a
+dealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his
+mind; while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although
+obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts
+are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an
+ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health
+and life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the
+moral and intellectual qualities of every individual are freely
+developed, and “the idea of good” is the animating principle of the
+whole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how
+to unite freedom with order is the problem which he has to solve.
+
+The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken
+a task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself
+before he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage
+them. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal
+enmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such
+meannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed
+in the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country
+and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation
+will say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but
+because he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be
+more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans;
+not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them;
+but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed
+time, for he knows that human life, “if not long in comparison with
+eternity” (Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great
+purposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he
+is no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers
+are failing, think of that other “city of which the pattern is in
+heaven” (Republic).
+
+The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to
+govern men he becomes like them; their “minds are married in
+conjunction;” they “bear themselves” like vulgar and tyrannical
+masters, and he is their obedient servant. The true politician, if he
+would rule men, must make them like himself; he must “educate his
+party” until they cease to be a party; he must breathe into them the
+spirit which will hereafter give form to their institutions. Politics
+with him are not a mechanism for seeming what he is not, or for
+carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a representative man, he
+is the representative not of the lower but of the higher elements of
+the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion of
+which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human
+affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are
+threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by
+force—two or three moves on the political chess board are all that he
+can fore see—two or three weeks moves on the political chessboard are
+all that he can foresee—two or three weeks or months are granted to him
+in which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also
+that there are permanent principles of politics which are always
+tending to the well-being of states—better administration, better
+education, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased
+security against external enemies. These are not “of to-day or
+yesterday,” but are the same in all times, and under all forms of
+government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he
+knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato’s
+captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye
+and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into
+port.
+
+The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of
+the world—not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures
+of which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no
+intention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of
+politics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which
+political convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity,
+and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon
+follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than
+themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity;
+they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the
+popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed.
+Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most
+unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done
+what might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received
+justice at their hands.
+
+The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and
+circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world;
+he must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act
+together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the
+majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader
+and not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He
+will neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman,
+neither adopting the “laissez faire” nor the “paternal government”
+principle; but he will, whether he is dealing with children in
+politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the
+government can do for them, and what, from imperfect education or
+deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He
+knows that if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that
+if he does nothing for them they will in some states of society be
+utterly helpless. For the many cannot exist without the few, if the
+material force of a country is from below, wisdom and experience are
+from above. It is not a small part of human evils which kings and
+governments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a great
+purpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be
+executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by
+some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown
+element of politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill
+are combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will
+not be always consistent, for the world is changing; and though he
+depends upon the support of a party, he will remember that he is the
+minister of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for the
+future, and he is not at all sure that he will be appreciated either
+now or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him,
+and may not be remembered by a distant posterity.
+
+There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates
+in the Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present,
+not excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy
+feeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as
+the actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the
+actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and
+egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent
+men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those
+who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own
+powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at
+all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes
+the more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more
+conscientious, because he has not equally deceived expectations. Such
+sentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread; we constantly
+find them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still oftener in
+private conversation.
+
+We may further observe that the art of government, while in some
+respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as
+institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot
+easily be combined with governing by the people: the interests of
+classes are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a
+comprehensive view of the whole. According to Socrates the true
+governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and will only
+be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man
+than himself (Republic). And in modern times, though the world has
+grown milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no
+longer await an English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a
+blind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a work in which
+he is most likely to fail; and even if he succeed, will rarely be
+rewarded by the gratitude of his own generation.
+
+Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only
+real politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words
+by applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said
+that not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real
+politicians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham,
+Ricardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an
+inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private
+persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in the
+next generation have become an irresistible power. “Herein is that
+saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.” We may imagine with Plato
+an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly
+harmonized; for there is no necessary opposition between them. But
+experience shows that they are commonly divorced—the ordinary
+politician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others,
+and hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or
+two only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have
+created the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally
+unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by the
+many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet
+perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also
+happier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They
+have the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers
+and visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no
+longer here, those who would have been ashamed of them during their
+lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be called by their
+names. (Compare Thucyd.)
+
+Who is the true poet?
+
+Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to
+sense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice
+removed from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in
+the Gorgias that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure
+and not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry
+admitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in
+primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem
+to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation
+of our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art of
+review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of
+seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer
+censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers?
+
+Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to
+give amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind,
+good or bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There
+have been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have
+not forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of
+the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character.
+The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are
+still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty,
+and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of
+men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary
+life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are
+ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old
+he makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new
+dignity; he finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality
+and politics. He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is
+beyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the
+better part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is
+strengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of
+poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to
+disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature,
+and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry
+is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the
+happiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man,
+of the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to
+his greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know
+what may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the
+poetical and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of
+religion, with truth, may still be possible. Neither is the element of
+pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a
+lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist,
+too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a
+thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of
+poetic and artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of
+the noble purposes to which art may be applied (Republic).
+
+Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato’s language, a
+flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose,
+the poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language
+and metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he
+has the “savoir faire,” or trick of writing, but he has not the higher
+spirit of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order
+out of disorder; that it should make provision for the soul’s highest
+interest; that it should be pursued only with a view to “the
+improvement of the citizens.” He ministers to the weaker side of human
+nature (Republic); he idealizes the sensual; he sings the strain of
+love in the latest fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he
+brings them back to the “tyranny of the many masters,” from which all
+his life long a good man has been praying to be delivered. And often,
+forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that which is
+truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and
+nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated
+brain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the
+master of his words, but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the
+faded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the
+better of him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we
+suppose that such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence
+on the minds of men?
+
+“Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:” Art then must be
+true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and
+not a seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of
+disorder, truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the
+greatest improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way “we
+can best spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.” Plato
+does not say that God will order all things for the best (compare
+Phaedo), but he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be
+corrected in another. And as we are very far from the best imaginable
+world at present, Plato here, as in the Phaedo and Republic, supposes a
+purgatory or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very
+few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not
+the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in
+the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can
+reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on
+Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner
+in which we are “born again” (Republic). Only he is prepared to
+maintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no
+one, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine
+without being ridiculous.
+
+There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are
+held to be indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without
+regard to consequences is happiness. From this elevation or
+exaggeration of feeling Plato seems to shrink: he leaves it to the
+Stoics in a later generation to maintain that when impaled or on the
+rack the philosopher may be happy (compare Republic). It is observable
+that in the Republic he raises this question, but it is not really
+discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another life, are
+allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or
+sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in
+raptures, having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if
+there were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of
+an action which was attended only by a painful death? He himself may be
+ready to thank God that he was thought worthy to do Him the least
+service, without looking for a reward; the joys of another life may not
+have been present to his mind at all. Do we suppose that the mediaeval
+saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of Sienna, or the
+Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a lingering
+disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the
+“sweets” of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and enough.
+Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or
+of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in
+God will be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour.
+If he were certain that there were no life to come, he would not have
+wished to speak or act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or
+of humanity. Neither, on the other hand, will he suppose that God has
+forsaken him or that the future is to be a mere blank to him. The
+greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot pass away, is his
+who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the sons of
+men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present,
+or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already
+present with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of
+immortality; he has in him already a principle stronger than death. He
+who serves man without the thought of reward is deemed to be a more
+faithful servant than he who works for hire. May not the service of
+God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher? And
+although only a very few in the course of the world’s history—Christ
+himself being one of them—have attained to such a noble conception of
+God and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be present to us,
+and the remembrance of them be an example to us, and their lives may
+shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and theology.
+
+THE MYTHS OF PLATO.
+
+The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are
+four longer ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and
+Republic. That in the Republic is the most elaborate and finished of
+them. Three of these greater myths, namely those contained in the
+Phaedo, the Gorgias and the Republic, relate to the destiny of human
+souls in a future life. The magnificent myth in the Phaedrus treats of
+the immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in which is
+included a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may
+be added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in
+which the life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man
+and the consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of
+Atlantis, an imaginary history, which is a fragment only, commenced in
+the Timaeus and continued in the Critias: (3) the much less artistic
+fiction of the foundation of the Cretan colony which is introduced in
+the preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the background: (4) the
+beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus
+narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue called
+after him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a
+parody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the
+recantation of it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the
+grasshoppers, and (7) the tale of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the
+Phaedrus: (8) the parable of the Cave (Republic), in which the previous
+argument is recapitulated, and the nature and degrees of knowledge
+having been previously set forth in the abstract are represented in a
+picture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Republic; compare
+Laws), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new
+beginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the
+division of the sexes, Sym.: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the
+pilot, and the mutinous sailors (Republic), in which is represented the
+relation of the better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to
+the mob of politicians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies
+between Athens and Aegina charging only a small payment for saving men
+from death, the reason being that he is uncertain whether to live or
+die is better for them (Gor.): (13) the treatment of freemen and
+citizens by physicians and of slaves by their apprentices,—a somewhat
+laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate the two different ways
+in which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also occur in Plato
+continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing
+and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless
+(paupers and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are
+generated in the transition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which
+is to the visible world what the idea of good is to the intellectual,
+in the Sixth Book of the Republic: the composite animal, having the
+form of a man, but containing under a human skin a lion and a
+many-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e. the populace: and
+the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are always liable
+to break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation of philosophy
+by the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the
+parricide, who “beats his father, having first taken away his arms”:
+the dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather paltry
+image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), which is
+repeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument personified as
+veiling her face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us
+in a first, second and third wave:—on these figures of speech the
+changes are rung many times over. It is observable that nearly all
+these parables or continuous images are found in the Republic; that
+which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the midwifery of Socrates, is
+perhaps the only exception. To make the list complete, the mathematical
+figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the numerical interval
+which separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten.
+
+The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life
+which, like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences
+of the mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which
+await good and bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue
+and to be in another world what it has become in this. It includes a
+Paradiso, Purgatorio, and Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo
+and the Republic. The Inferno is reserved for great criminals only. The
+argument of the dialogue is frequently referred to, and the meaning
+breaks through so as rather to destroy the liveliness and consistency
+of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very slight, the chief
+point or moral being that in the judgments of another world there is no
+possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of
+foreseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their
+judges naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to
+view, stripped of the veils and clothes which might prevent them from
+seeing into or being seen by one another.
+
+The myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more
+cosmological, and also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy
+occurs to Plato that the upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in
+one, a glorified earth, fairer and purer than that in which we dwell.
+As the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are living in a lower sphere,
+out of which they put their heads for a moment or two and behold a
+world beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the coarser
+particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly
+earth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of
+the myth consists of description of the interior of the earth, which
+gives the opportunity of introducing several mythological names and of
+providing places of torment for the wicked. There is no clear
+distinction of soul and body; the spirits beneath the earth are spoken
+of as souls only, yet they retain a sort of shadowy form when they cry
+for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the philosopher alone is said
+to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in Plato which relate
+to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as well as other
+homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural
+reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of
+human character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind
+are between them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of
+the Phaedo they are carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian
+lake, where they dwell, and are purified of their evil deeds, and
+receive the rewards of their good. There are also incurable sinners,
+who are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the penalty of atrocious
+crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another class of
+hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach
+the shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for
+mercy; which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from
+their torments.
+
+Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps
+any allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent
+with itself. The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology;
+abstract ideas are transformed into persons, figures of speech into
+realities. These myths may be compared with the Pilgrim’s Progress of
+Bunyan, in which discussions of theology are mixed up with the
+incidents of travel, and mythological personages are associated with
+human beings: they are also garnished with names and phrases taken out
+of Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition.
+
+The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than
+either of the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they
+have, and is full of touches which recall the experiences of human
+life. It will be noticed by an attentive reader that the twelve days
+during which Er lay in a trance after he was slain coincide with the
+time passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It is a curious
+observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a
+well-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable
+society?) are more likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than
+those who have had more experience of the world and of evil. It is a
+more familiar remark that we constantly blame others when we have only
+ourselves to blame; and the philosopher must acknowledge, however
+reluctantly, that there is an element of chance in human life with
+which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. That men drink more
+of the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a poetical
+description of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, like
+Odysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We
+should like to know what became of the infants “dying almost as soon as
+they were born,” but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our
+curiosity. The two companies of souls, ascending and descending at
+either chasm of heaven and earth, and conversing when they come out
+into the meadow, the majestic figures of the judges sitting in heaven,
+the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of the great allegory which
+have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark already made
+respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be extended
+also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a
+picture of the Day of Judgment.
+
+The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an
+Oriental, or rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an
+affinity to the mysteries and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a
+certain extent they are un-Greek; at any rate there is hardly anything
+like them in other Greek writings which have a serious purpose; in
+spirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be termed the
+underground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented in
+the most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as
+true; it is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a
+future life. Plato seems to make use of them when he has reached the
+limits of human knowledge; or, to borrow an expression of his own, when
+he is standing on the outside of the intellectual world. They are very
+simple in style; a few touches bring the picture home to the mind, and
+make it present to us. They have also a kind of authority gained by the
+employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere fragments of the
+words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to any
+subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry
+and mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of
+them may be summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and
+“there is some better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.”
+
+All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for
+example, the tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at
+first sight to be an extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety
+when we remember that it is based on a legendary belief. The art of
+making stories of ghosts and apparitions credible is said to consist in
+the manner of telling them. The effect is gained by many literary and
+conversational devices, such as the previous raising of curiosity, the
+mention of little circumstances, simplicity, picturesqueness, the
+naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is possessed by
+Plato in a degree which has never been equalled.
+
+The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been
+already described, but is of a different character. It treats of a
+former rather than of a future life. It represents the conflict of
+reason aided by passion or righteous indignation on the one hand, and
+of the animal lusts and instincts on the other. The soul of man has
+followed the company of some god, and seen truth in the form of the
+universal before it was born in this world. Our present life is the
+result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is
+relative to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We
+ask the question, Where were men before birth? As we likewise enquire,
+What will become of them after death? The first question is unfamiliar
+to us, and therefore seems to be unnatural; but if we survey the whole
+human race, it has been as influential and as widely spread as the
+other. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of speech in which the
+“spiritual combat” of this life is represented. The majesty and power
+of the whole passage—especially of what may be called the theme or
+proem (beginning “The mind through all her being is immortal”)—can only
+be rendered very inadequately in another language.
+
+The myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in
+which men were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth’s
+motion had their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty:
+the dead came to life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged
+young; the youth became a child, the child an infant, the infant
+vanished into the earth. The connection between the reversal of the
+earth’s motion and the reversal of human life is of course verbal only,
+yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues from the consistency
+of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was immediately
+under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which men
+had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all
+things spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the
+animals. There were no great estates, or families, or private
+possessions, nor any traditions of the past, because men were all born
+out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the “reign of Cronos;” and
+in like manner he connects the reversal of the earth’s motion with some
+legend of which he himself was probably the inventor.
+
+The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of
+existence was man the happier,—under that of Cronos, which was a state
+of innocence, or that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while
+Plato balances the two sides of the serious controversy, which he has
+suggested in a figure. The answer depends on another question: What use
+did the children of Cronos make of their time? They had boundless
+leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only with one another, but
+with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a view to
+philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of
+knowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and
+telling stories to one another and to the beasts?—in either case there
+would be no difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather
+mischievously adds, “Nobody knows what they did,” and therefore the
+doubt must remain undetermined.
+
+To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural
+convulsion, in which the order of the world and of human life is once
+more reversed, God withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the
+government of himself. The world begins again, and arts and laws are
+slowly and painfully invented. A secular age succeeds to a
+theocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has dropped, or almost
+dropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious and
+important thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence,
+the existence of a world without traditions, and the difference between
+human and divine government. He has also carried a step further his
+speculations concerning the abolition of the family and of property,
+which he supposes to have no place among the children of Cronos any
+more than in the ideal state.
+
+It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract
+to the concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of
+the seen, and also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A
+great writer knows how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining
+within the sphere of the visible, and then again comprehending a wider
+range and soaring to the abstract and universal. Even in the same
+sentence he may employ both modes of speech not improperly or
+inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors of
+Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as
+can be painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the
+reader. A poem may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not
+one but many latent images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the
+thoughts of many hearts. Often the rapid transition from one image to
+another is pleasing to us: on the other hand, any single figure of
+speech if too often repeated, or worked out too much at length, becomes
+prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we necessarily include
+both “the moral law within and the starry heaven above,” and pass from
+one to the other (compare for examples Psalms xviii. and xix.). Whether
+such a use of language is puerile or noble depends upon the genius of
+the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the associations
+employed.
+
+In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation
+is not forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are
+told to a living audience, and so well told that we are more than
+half-inclined to believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation
+too, the striking image or figure of speech is not forgotten, but is
+quickly caught up, and alluded to again and again; as it would still be
+in our own day in a genial and sympathetic society. The descriptions of
+Plato have a greater life and reality than is to be found in any modern
+writing. This is due to their homeliness and simplicity. Plato can do
+with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed “more plastic
+than wax” (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing speech and
+writing, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language in
+which they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest
+truths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of
+daily life are not overlooked.
+
+
+
+
+
+GORGIAS
+
+By Plato
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias,
+Polus.
+
+SCENE: The house of Callicles.
+
+CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but
+not for a feast.
+
+SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been
+exhibiting to us many fine things.
+
+SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to
+blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora.
+
+CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been
+the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I
+will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer,
+at some other time.
+
+CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear
+Gorgias?
+
+CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming.
+
+CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me,
+and he shall exhibit to you.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I
+want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is
+which he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest,
+defer the exhibition to some other time.
+
+CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to
+answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only
+just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and
+that he would answer.
+
+SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon—?
+
+CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him?
+
+SOCRATES: Ask him who he is.
+
+CHAEREPHON: What do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had
+been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you
+understand?
+
+CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our
+friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any
+questions which you are asked?
+
+GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now;
+and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me
+a new one.
+
+CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias.
+
+GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial.
+
+POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of
+me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is
+tired.
+
+CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than
+Gorgias?
+
+POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you?
+
+CHAEREPHON: Not at all:—and you shall answer if you like.
+
+POLUS: Ask:—
+
+CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his
+brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the
+name which is given to his brother?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon,
+or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him?
+
+POLUS: Clearly, a painter.
+
+CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he
+is skilled.
+
+POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are
+experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes
+the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according
+to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in
+different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend
+Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is
+the noblest.
+
+SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias;
+but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon.
+
+GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he
+was asked.
+
+GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself?
+
+SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to
+answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he
+has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to
+dialectic.
+
+POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art
+which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one
+who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was.
+
+POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody
+asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by
+what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you
+briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at
+first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or
+rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,—what
+are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess?
+
+GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that
+which, in Homeric language, “I boast myself to be.”
+
+SOCRATES: I should wish to do so.
+
+GORGIAS: Then pray do.
+
+SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men
+rhetoricians?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at
+Athens, but in all places.
+
+SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias,
+as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer
+mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise,
+and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you?
+
+GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do
+my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession
+is that I can be as short as any one.
+
+SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method
+now, and the longer one at some other time.
+
+GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard
+a man use fewer words.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a
+maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned:
+I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would
+you not?), with the making of garments?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies?
+
+GORGIAS: It is.
+
+SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your
+answers.
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that.
+
+SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about
+rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned?
+
+GORGIAS: With discourse.
+
+SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would
+teach the sick under what treatment they might get well?
+
+GORGIAS: No.
+
+SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse?
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak?
+
+GORGIAS: Of course.
+
+SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now
+mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick?
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases?
+
+GORGIAS: Just so.
+
+SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the
+good or evil condition of the body?
+
+GORGIAS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them
+treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally
+have to do.
+
+GORGIAS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of
+discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call
+them arts of rhetoric?
+
+GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to
+do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no
+such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only
+through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying
+that rhetoric treats of discourse.
+
+SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare
+say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:—you would
+allow that there are arts?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part
+concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting,
+and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and
+of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the
+province of rhetoric.
+
+GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium
+of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for
+example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of
+playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive
+with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater—they
+depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your
+meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort?
+
+GORGIAS: Exactly.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of
+these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used
+was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through
+the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious
+might say, “And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.” But I do
+not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than
+geometry would be so called by you.
+
+GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my
+meaning.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:—seeing
+that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of
+words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is
+that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:—Suppose that a
+person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now;
+he might say, “Socrates, what is arithmetic?” and I should reply to
+him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which
+take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: “Words
+about what?” and I should reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and
+how many there are of each. And if he asked again: “What is the art of
+calculation?” I should say, That also is one of the arts which is
+concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, “Concerned with
+what?” I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, “as aforesaid” of
+arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of
+calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers,
+but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another.
+And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words—he would
+ask, “Words about what, Socrates?” and I should answer, that astronomy
+tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their
+relative swiftness.
+
+GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about
+rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those
+arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of
+words?
+
+GORGIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do
+the words which rhetoric uses relate?
+
+GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things.
+
+SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for
+which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you
+have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the
+singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next,
+thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained.
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift?
+
+SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the
+author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer,
+the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will
+say: “O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned
+with the greatest good of men and not his.” And when I ask, Who are
+you? he will reply, “I am a physician.” What do you mean? I shall say.
+Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? “Certainly,” he
+will answer, “for is not health the greatest good? What greater good
+can men have, Socrates?” And after him the trainer will come and say,
+“I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more
+good of his art than I can show of mine.” To him again I shall say, Who
+are you, honest friend, and what is your business? “I am a trainer,” he
+will reply, “and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in
+body.” When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the
+money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all.
+“Consider Socrates,” he will say, “whether Gorgias or any one else can
+produce any greater good than wealth.” Well, you and I say to him, and
+are you a creator of wealth? “Yes,” he replies. And who are you? “A
+money-maker.” And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of
+man? “Of course,” will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our
+friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than
+yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, “What good? Let
+Gorgias answer.” Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question
+is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is
+the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us.
+
+GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that
+which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the
+power of ruling over others in their several states.
+
+SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be?
+
+GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges
+in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the
+assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of
+uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the
+trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found
+to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak
+and to persuade the multitude.
+
+SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained
+what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I
+am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having
+this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you
+know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing
+persuasion?
+
+GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for
+persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
+
+SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever
+was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of
+knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.
+
+GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know
+what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of
+that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric;
+although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am
+going to ask—what is this power of persuasion which is given by
+rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask
+instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the
+argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth
+the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this
+further question: If I asked, “What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?” and
+you said, “The painter of figures,” should I not be right in asking,
+“What kind of figures, and where do you find them?”
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that
+there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures?
+
+GORGIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them,
+then you would have answered very well?
+
+GORGIAS: Quite so.
+
+SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is
+rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have
+the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade
+men of that which he teaches or not?
+
+GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that.
+
+SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now
+speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the
+properties of number?
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of
+persuasion?
+
+GORGIAS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about
+what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and
+even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we
+were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort,
+and about what.
+
+GORGIAS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion?
+
+GORGIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but
+that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question
+has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the
+artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the
+question?
+
+GORGIAS: I think so.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the
+answer?
+
+GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in
+courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about
+the just and unjust.
+
+SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your
+notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found
+repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute
+you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively,
+and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the
+meaning of one another’s words; I would have you develope your own
+views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis.
+
+GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as
+“having learned”?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And there is also “having believed”?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And is the “having learned” the same as “having believed,”
+and are learning and belief the same things?
+
+GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same.
+
+SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this
+way:—If a person were to say to you, “Is there, Gorgias, a false belief
+as well as a true?”—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there
+is.
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true?
+
+GORGIAS: No.
+
+SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief
+differ.
+
+GORGIAS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have
+believed are persuaded?
+
+GORGIAS: Just so.
+
+SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is
+the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge?
+
+GORGIAS: By all means.
+
+SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts
+of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of
+persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives
+knowledge?
+
+GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief.
+
+SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a
+persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no
+instruction about them?
+
+GORGIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or
+other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief
+about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast
+multitude about such high matters in a short time?
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about
+rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the
+assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other
+craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For
+at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and,
+again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be
+constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or
+when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a
+position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians:
+what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a
+maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your
+art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in
+view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of the
+young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see
+some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too
+modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me,
+I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. “What is
+the use of coming to you, Gorgias?” they will say—“about what will you
+teach us to advise the state?—about the just and unjust only, or about
+those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned?” How will
+you answer them?
+
+GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will
+endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have
+heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the
+plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels,
+partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the
+suggestion of the builders.
+
+SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I
+myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle
+wall.
+
+GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be
+given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the
+men who win their point.
+
+SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is
+the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the
+matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness.
+
+GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric
+comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me
+offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been
+with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his
+patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or
+apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for
+me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric.
+And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city,
+and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to
+which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would
+have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished;
+and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician
+more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for
+he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and
+on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric!
+And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive
+art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his
+strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of
+fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for
+friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his
+friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a
+skilful boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his
+father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no
+reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in
+detestation or banished from the city;—surely not. For they taught
+their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and
+evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have
+perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own
+strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad,
+neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that
+those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument
+holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men
+and upon any subject,—in short, he can persuade the multitude better
+than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not
+therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his
+reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric
+fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having
+become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his
+instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation
+or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of
+his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person
+who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and
+not his instructor.
+
+SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of
+disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not
+always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either
+party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are
+apt to arise—somebody says that another has not spoken truly or
+clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both
+parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal
+feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the
+question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another
+until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever
+listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot
+help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or
+accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am
+afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some
+animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of
+discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of
+my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you
+alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are
+very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and
+very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and
+quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the
+greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of
+a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is
+no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about
+the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my
+sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have
+done, no matter;—let us make an end of it.
+
+GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you
+indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before
+you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the
+argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we
+should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the
+company when they are wanting to do something else.
+
+CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which
+shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that
+I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a
+discussion so interesting and so ably maintained.
+
+CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at
+many discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before,
+and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better
+pleased.
+
+SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is.
+
+GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused,
+especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with
+the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any
+question which you like.
+
+SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your
+words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have
+misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will
+learn of you, a rhetorician?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the
+multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by
+persuasion?
+
+GORGIAS: Quite so.
+
+SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have
+greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of
+health?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,—that is.
+
+SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know
+he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion.
+
+GORGIAS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the
+physician, he will have greater power than he who knows?
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:—is he?
+
+GORGIAS: No.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of
+what the physician knows.
+
+GORGIAS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the
+physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he
+who has knowledge?—is not that the inference?
+
+GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the
+other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he
+has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has
+more knowledge than those who know?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?—not to have
+learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in
+no way inferior to the professors of them?
+
+SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is
+a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to
+be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he
+is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable,
+good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say,
+does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or
+honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the
+ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to
+know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the
+pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can
+acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher
+of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will
+make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know
+them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable
+to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things
+first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish
+that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying
+that you would.
+
+GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to
+know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well.
+
+SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make
+a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust
+already, or he must be taught by you.
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like
+manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his
+knowledge makes him.
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just?
+
+GORGIAS: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just?
+
+GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference.
+
+SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do
+injustice?
+
+GORGIAS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just
+man?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice?
+
+GORGIAS: Clearly not.
+
+SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not
+to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his
+pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and
+unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his
+teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made
+a bad use of his rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, it was.
+
+SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will
+never have done injustice at all?
+
+GORGIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric
+treated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but
+about just and unjust? Was not this said?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that
+rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly
+be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the
+rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the
+inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you
+thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would
+be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would
+leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see
+yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of
+making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By
+the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we
+get at the truth of all this.
+
+POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now
+saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that
+the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and
+admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could
+teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a
+contradiction—the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but
+you, brought the argument by your captious questions—(do you seriously
+believe that there is any truth in all this?) For will any one ever
+acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of
+justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing
+the argument to such a pass.
+
+SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with
+friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger
+generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and
+in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you
+who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error
+into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition:
+
+POLUS: What condition?
+
+SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which
+you indulged at first.
+
+POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please?
+
+SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to
+Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got
+there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that
+would be hard indeed. But then consider my case:—shall not I be very
+hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to
+answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you,
+and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the
+argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it
+on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn
+ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted: for I
+suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows—would you not?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything
+which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him?
+
+POLUS: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer?
+
+POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question
+which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric?
+
+SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my
+opinion.
+
+POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric?
+
+SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours,
+you say that you have made an art.
+
+POLUS: What thing?
+
+SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience.
+
+POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience?
+
+SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind.
+
+POLUS: An experience in what?
+
+SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and
+gratification.
+
+POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine
+thing?
+
+SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether
+rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what
+rhetoric is?
+
+POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience?
+
+SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a
+slight gratification to me?
+
+POLUS: I will.
+
+SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery?
+
+POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery?
+
+SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus.
+
+POLUS: What then?
+
+SOCRATES: I should say an experience.
+
+POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me.
+
+SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and
+gratification, Polus.
+
+POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same?
+
+SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession.
+
+POLUS: Of what profession?
+
+SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I
+hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of
+his own profession. For whether or not this is that art of rhetoric
+which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:—from what he was just now
+saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the
+rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole.
+
+GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind
+me.
+
+SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a
+part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which
+knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word
+“flattery”; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which
+is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an
+experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the
+art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four
+branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may
+ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of
+flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him
+when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think
+rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a
+fine thing or not, until I have first answered, “What is rhetoric?” For
+that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you
+will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric?
+
+POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric?
+
+SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my
+view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics.
+
+POLUS: And noble or ignoble?
+
+SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I
+call what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I
+was saying before.
+
+GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself.
+
+SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained
+myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt
+to run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name “Polus,” which
+means “a colt.”)
+
+GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that
+rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics.
+
+SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I
+am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the
+existence of bodies and of souls?
+
+GORGIAS: Of course.
+
+SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of
+either of them?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in
+appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be
+in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at
+first sight not to be in good health.
+
+GORGIAS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul:
+in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and
+not the reality?
+
+GORGIAS: Yes, certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what
+I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to
+them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another
+art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which
+may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and
+the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which
+answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts
+run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as
+legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with
+a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending
+on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery
+knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into
+four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one
+or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and
+having no regard for men’s highest interests, is ever making pleasure
+the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is
+of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of
+medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and
+if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which
+children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children,
+as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food,
+the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be
+and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself,
+because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I
+do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain
+or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not
+call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am
+prepared to argue in defence of them.
+
+Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of
+medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the
+form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working
+deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and
+garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the
+true beauty which is given by gymnastic.
+
+I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the
+manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be
+able to follow)
+
+as tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine;
+
+or rather,
+
+as tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation;
+
+and
+
+as cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice.
+
+And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and
+the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be
+jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves,
+nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided
+over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul
+did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the
+body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the
+bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras,
+that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would
+prevail far and wide: “Chaos” would come again, and cookery, health,
+and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have
+told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what
+cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long
+speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think
+that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could
+make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to
+enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use
+of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able
+to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only
+fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer.
+
+POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery?
+
+SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you
+cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older?
+
+POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under
+the idea that they are flatterers?
+
+SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech?
+
+POLUS: I am asking a question.
+
+SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all.
+
+POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states?
+
+SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor.
+
+POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all
+the citizens.
+
+POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile
+any one whom they please.
+
+SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of
+yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a
+question of me.
+
+POLUS: I am asking a question of you.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once.
+
+POLUS: How two questions?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like
+tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they
+please?
+
+POLUS: I did.
+
+SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one,
+and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that
+rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I
+was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but
+only what they think best.
+
+POLUS: And is not that a great power?
+
+SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse.
+
+POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert.
+
+SOCRATES: No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you say
+that power is a good to him who has the power.
+
+POLUS: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks
+best, this is a good, and would you call this great power?
+
+POLUS: I should not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and
+that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so you will have refuted
+me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what
+they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon
+which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a
+good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an
+evil.
+
+POLUS: Yes; I admit that.
+
+SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power
+in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they
+do as they will?
+
+POLUS: This fellow—
+
+SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me.
+
+POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best?
+
+SOCRATES: And I say so still.
+
+POLUS: Then surely they do as they will?
+
+SOCRATES: I deny it.
+
+POLUS: But they do what they think best?
+
+SOCRATES: Aye.
+
+POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd.
+
+SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar
+style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I
+am in error or give the answer yourself.
+
+POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean.
+
+SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will
+that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take
+medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the
+drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake
+of which they drink?
+
+POLUS: Clearly, the health.
+
+SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do
+not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to
+take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will, to
+have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage.
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for
+the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that
+for the sake of which he does it.
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate
+and indifferent?
+
+POLUS: To be sure, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call
+goods, and their opposites evils?
+
+POLUS: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which
+partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or
+of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again,
+wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither
+good nor evil?
+
+POLUS: Exactly so.
+
+SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good,
+or the good for the sake of the indifferent?
+
+POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good.
+
+SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the
+idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for
+the sake of the good?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil
+him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the
+good?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of
+something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other
+thing for the sake of which we do them?
+
+POLUS: Most true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or
+to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to
+our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will
+it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is
+neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you
+silent, Polus? Am I not right?
+
+POLUS: You are right.
+
+SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant
+or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of
+his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when
+really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best
+to him?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do
+you not answer?
+
+POLUS: Well, I suppose not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one
+have great power in a state?
+
+POLUS: He will not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good
+to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills?
+
+POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of
+doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would
+not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or
+imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no!
+
+SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean?
+
+POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied?
+
+SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus!
+
+POLUS: Why “forbear”?
+
+SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be
+envied, but only to pity them.
+
+POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are.
+
+POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and
+justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched?
+
+SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he
+is to be envied.
+
+POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case
+he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him
+justly.
+
+POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death
+is wretched, and to be pitied?
+
+SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as
+he who is justly killed.
+
+POLUS: How can that be, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the
+greatest of evils.
+
+POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater
+evil?
+
+SOCRATES: Certainly not.
+
+POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
+
+SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them,
+I would rather suffer than do.
+
+POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
+
+SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
+
+POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good
+to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.
+
+SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do
+you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a
+dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare
+power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom
+you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is
+as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his
+garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an
+instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe
+me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in
+that sort of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house
+which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all
+their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that
+this mere doing as you think best is great power?
+
+POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this.
+
+SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
+
+POLUS: I can.
+
+SOCRATES: Why then?
+
+POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be
+punished.
+
+SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power
+is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and
+that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is
+an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another
+way:—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking,
+the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are
+sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when
+that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?
+
+POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask
+that question.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me,
+I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are
+unjust.
+
+POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child
+refute that statement?
+
+SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally
+grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my
+foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing
+good to a friend.
+
+POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity;
+events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and
+to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.
+
+SOCRATES: What events?
+
+POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now
+the ruler of Macedonia?
+
+SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is.
+
+POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
+
+SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance
+with him.
+
+POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance
+with him, whether a man is happy?
+
+SOCRATES: Most certainly not.
+
+POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know
+whether the great king was a happy man?
+
+SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands
+in the matter of education and justice.
+
+POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women
+who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust
+and evil are miserable.
+
+POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is
+miserable?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.
+
+POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to
+the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who
+was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore
+in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do
+rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your
+doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably
+miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first
+place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under
+the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas
+has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was
+his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk,
+he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew
+them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all
+this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of
+all men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he
+showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years
+old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the
+kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he
+ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of
+happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned
+him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while
+running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the
+greatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the
+most miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there
+are many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would
+rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus!
+
+SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather
+than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with
+which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand
+refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good
+friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have
+been saying.
+
+POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do.
+
+SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me
+after the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For
+there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring
+forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their
+allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all.
+But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may
+often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great
+air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian
+and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring
+witnesses in disproof of my statement;—you may, if you will, summon
+Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of
+tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you
+may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that
+famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole
+house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you
+choose;—they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot
+agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many false
+witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance,
+which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will
+have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words;
+nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter
+about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one
+which is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another
+sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we
+are at issue about matters which to know is honourable and not to know
+disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the
+chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more
+disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether
+you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be
+happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I
+assume this to be your opinion?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility—here is one point
+about which we are at issue:—very good. And do you mean to say also
+that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be
+happy?
+
+POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable.
+
+SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then,
+according to you, he will be happy?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust
+actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not
+punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he
+be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men.
+
+POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a
+friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are
+they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice?
+
+POLUS: Exactly so.
+
+SOCRATES: And you said the opposite?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted
+me?
+
+POLUS: By Zeus, I did.
+
+SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus.
+
+POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right.
+
+SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be
+unpunished?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who
+are punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this
+proposition also?
+
+POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other,
+Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth?
+
+POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to
+make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his
+eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries
+inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the
+like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier
+than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life
+doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and
+admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which,
+as you say, cannot be refuted?
+
+SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead
+of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But
+please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—“in an unjust attempt
+to make himself a tyrant”?
+
+POLUS: Yes, I did.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the
+other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers
+in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but
+that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the
+two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,—when
+any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him.
+
+POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently
+refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the
+company.
+
+SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my
+tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their
+president to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was
+unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count
+the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no
+better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial
+of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall
+produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person
+with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the
+many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May
+I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to
+the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really
+believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not
+to be punished than to be punished.
+
+POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for
+example, suffer rather than do injustice?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would.
+
+POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man.
+
+SOCRATES: But will you answer?
+
+POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have
+to say.
+
+SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I
+am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your
+opinion, is the worst?—to do injustice or to suffer?
+
+POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst.
+
+SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer.
+
+POLUS: To do.
+
+SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil?
+
+POLUS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the
+honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil?
+
+POLUS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful
+things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you
+not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for
+example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the
+sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other
+account of personal beauty?
+
+POLUS: I cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they
+were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of
+their use, or of both?
+
+POLUS: Yes, I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same
+reason?
+
+POLUS: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in
+so far as they are useful or pleasant or both?
+
+POLUS: I think not.
+
+SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge?
+
+POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring
+beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility.
+
+SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the
+opposite standard of pain and evil?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the
+measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is
+to say, in pleasure or utility or both?
+
+POLUS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity
+or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now
+made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering
+wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful?
+
+POLUS: I did.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the
+more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in
+evil or both: does not that also follow?
+
+POLUS: Of course.
+
+SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice
+exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer
+more than the injured?
+
+POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain?
+
+POLUS: No.
+
+SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both?
+
+POLUS: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will
+therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice?
+
+POLUS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do
+injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to
+a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm
+if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as
+to a physician without shrinking, and either say “Yes” or “No” to me.
+
+POLUS: I should say “No.”
+
+SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil?
+
+POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any
+man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the
+greater evil of the two.
+
+POLUS: That is the conclusion.
+
+SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of
+refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of
+myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness
+are enough for me,—I have no need of any other, I take your suffrage,
+and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed
+to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a
+guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to
+escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—You
+would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly
+corrected when you do wrong?
+
+POLUS: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable
+in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your
+opinion.
+
+POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are.
+
+SOCRATES: Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also
+be a patient?
+
+POLUS: I should say so.
+
+SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does,
+and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for
+example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is
+stricken?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which
+is struck will be struck violently or quickly?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same
+nature as the act of him who strikes?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing
+burned will be burned in the same way?
+
+POLUS: Truly.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be
+something cut?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause
+pain, the cut will be of the same nature?
+
+POLUS: That is evident.
+
+SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition
+which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient
+answers to the affection of the agent?
+
+POLUS: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished
+is suffering or acting?
+
+POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that.
+
+SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent?
+
+POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly?
+
+POLUS: Justly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers
+justly?
+
+POLUS: That is evident.
+
+SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished
+suffers what is honourable?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the
+honourable is either pleasant or useful?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good?
+
+POLUS: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he is benefited?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term
+“benefited”? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is
+improved.
+
+POLUS: Surely.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his
+soul?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at
+the matter in this way:—In respect of a man’s estate, do you see any
+greater evil than poverty?
+
+POLUS: There is no greater evil.
+
+SOCRATES: Again, in a man’s bodily frame, you would say that the evil
+is weakness and disease and deformity?
+
+POLUS: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil
+of her own?
+
+POLUS: Of course.
+
+SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and
+cowardice, and the like?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have
+pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the
+most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the
+soul?
+
+POLUS: By far the most.
+
+SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst?
+
+POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already
+admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both.
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted
+by us to be most disgraceful?
+
+POLUS: It has been admitted.
+
+SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing
+excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and
+ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick?
+
+POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow
+from your premises.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of
+the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of
+disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or
+extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil.
+
+POLUS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the
+greatest of evils?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity
+of the soul, are the greatest of evils?
+
+POLUS: That is evident.
+
+SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does
+not the art of making money?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of
+medicine?
+
+POLUS: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to
+answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom
+we take them.
+
+POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate?
+
+POLUS: To the judges, you mean.
+
+SOCRATES: —Who are to punish them?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in
+accordance with a certain rule of justice?
+
+POLUS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty;
+medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice?
+
+POLUS: That is evident.
+
+SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three?
+
+POLUS: Will you enumerate them?
+
+SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice.
+
+POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others.
+
+SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or
+advantage or both?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who
+are being healed pleased?
+
+POLUS: I think not.
+
+SOCRATES: A useful thing, then?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and
+this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who
+is healed, or who never was out of health?
+
+POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered
+from evils, but in never having had them.
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in
+their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil,
+and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the
+most miserable?
+
+POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed.
+
+SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from
+the greatest of evils, which is vice?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the
+medicine of our vice?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who
+has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the
+greatest of evils.
+
+POLUS: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and
+punishment?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no
+deliverance from injustice?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and
+who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or
+correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished
+by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates?
+(Compare Republic.)
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to
+the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and
+yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins
+against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child,
+he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel
+case?
+
+POLUS: Yes, truly.
+
+SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and
+bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions,
+they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to
+be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not
+knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a
+diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and
+unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to
+avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide
+themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their
+powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what
+follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form?
+
+POLUS: If you please.
+
+SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice,
+is the greatest of evils?
+
+POLUS: That is quite clear.
+
+SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be
+released from this evil?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but
+to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all?
+
+POLUS: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You
+deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and
+unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who
+like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be,
+the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more
+miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more
+miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said?
+
+POLUS: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true?
+
+POLUS: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of
+rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in
+every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby
+suffer great evil?
+
+POLUS: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he
+ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he
+will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the
+disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the
+incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence,
+Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:—is any other inference
+consistent with them?
+
+POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer.
+
+SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to
+excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children
+or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of
+excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree
+his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should
+bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer
+may suffer and be made whole; and he should even force himself and
+others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the
+physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain,
+in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has
+done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of
+bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be
+exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself
+and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and
+their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may
+be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus,
+rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say “Yes” or “No” to that?
+
+POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange,
+though probably in agreement with your premises.
+
+SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not
+disproven?
+
+POLUS: Yes; it certainly is.
+
+SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty
+to harm another, whether an enemy or not—I except the case of
+self-defence—then I have to be upon my guard—but if my enemy injures a
+third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I
+should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the
+judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and
+not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep
+what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion
+and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not
+die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not
+possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For
+such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any
+use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there
+was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion.
+
+CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he
+joking?
+
+CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound
+earnest; but you may well ask him.
+
+CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in
+earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say
+is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we
+not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought
+to be doing?
+
+SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings
+among mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if
+every man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by
+the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our
+impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that
+you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us
+have two loves apiece:—I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of
+Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of
+Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your
+cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or
+opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards.
+When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the
+assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus,
+the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist
+the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express
+surprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when
+under their influence, you would probably reply to him, if you were
+honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say unless they are
+prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must
+understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not
+wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is
+my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my
+friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of
+Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but
+philosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are
+now wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute,
+and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape
+punishment is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word
+unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that
+Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life
+will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre
+should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus
+which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with
+me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with
+myself, and contradict myself.
+
+CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be
+running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way
+because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he
+accused Gorgias:—for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you,
+whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did
+not know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty
+replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would
+be displeased if he answered “No”; and then in consequence of this
+admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just
+the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you
+deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same
+trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that
+to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the
+admission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was
+too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the
+truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit
+of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right,
+which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are
+generally at variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too
+modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself;
+and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby
+gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which
+is to be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the
+rule of nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in
+this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus
+was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from
+the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer
+injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but
+conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering
+of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had
+better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is
+unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason,
+as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are
+weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a
+view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the
+stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them,
+in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that
+dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the
+desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own
+inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And
+therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally
+said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare
+Republic), whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the
+better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker;
+and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and
+indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the
+superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what
+principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the
+Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these
+are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according
+to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law,
+which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best
+and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young
+lions,—charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them,
+that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the
+honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient
+force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this;
+he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and
+all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in
+rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would
+shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he
+says in his poem, that
+
+“Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;”
+
+this, as he says,
+
+“Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer
+from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—” (Fragm. Incert.
+151 (Bockh).) —I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is,
+that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he
+carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right,
+and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior
+properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you
+may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things:
+for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper
+age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin
+of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries
+philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those
+things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is
+inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought
+to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public,
+and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of
+human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake
+themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the
+politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of
+philosophy. For, as Euripides says,
+
+“Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest
+portion of the day to that in which he most excels,” (Antiope, fragm.
+20 (Dindorf).)
+
+but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and
+praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks
+that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them.
+Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is
+no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but
+when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I
+feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate
+children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to
+speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and
+freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But
+when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am
+offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of
+slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a child,
+his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of
+stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when
+I see a youth thus engaged,—the study appears to me to be in character,
+and becoming a man of liberal education, and him who neglects
+philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to
+anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later
+life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as
+I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts,
+becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place,
+in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a
+corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or
+four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a
+satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards
+you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards
+Amphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for
+I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that
+you, Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be
+careful; and that you
+
+“Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior;
+Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any
+reason or proof, Or offer valiant counsel on another’s behalf.”
+
+And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out
+of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being
+thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only
+but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For
+suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to
+prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong,
+you must allow that you would not know what to do:—there you would
+stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went
+up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not
+good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty
+of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of
+
+“An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,”
+
+
+who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others,
+when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his
+enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his
+rights of citizenship?—he being a man who, if I may use the expression,
+may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my
+advice, and refute no more:
+
+“Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of
+wisdom. But leave to others these niceties,”
+
+whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities:
+
+“For they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.”
+
+Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate
+only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do.
+
+SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not
+rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and
+the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the
+stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know
+that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed
+by me.
+
+CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired
+touchstone.
+
+CALLICLES: Why?
+
+SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the
+opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed.
+For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or
+evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities—knowledge,
+good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I
+meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you
+are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they
+have not the same interest in me which you have; and these two
+strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good
+friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest.
+Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict
+themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a
+large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the
+qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an
+excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And you are my
+friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you, Callicles,
+and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and
+Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four
+of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent
+to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know,
+you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much
+into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise; you
+were afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be
+the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me
+which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient
+evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your
+nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the
+assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in
+the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument
+about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us,
+and will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could
+not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or from
+superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you
+are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I
+are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now
+there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me
+for making,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what his
+pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth?
+For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err
+intentionally, but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me,
+now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is
+which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me
+assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I
+assented, call me “dolt,” and deem me unworthy of receiving further
+instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by
+natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the
+property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the
+worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my
+recollection?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I
+could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant
+by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the
+stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack
+small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior
+and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the
+same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and
+the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same
+way as superior:—this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are
+the superior and better and stronger the same or different?
+
+CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against
+whom, as you were saying, they make the laws?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior?
+
+CALLICLES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class
+are far better, as you were saying?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them
+are by nature good?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying,
+that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to
+suffer injustice?—is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no
+modesty be found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not
+think thus?—I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree
+with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an
+authority.
+
+CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say.
+
+SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is
+more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is
+equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion,
+when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that
+I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to
+custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the
+argument is about custom?
+
+CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age,
+Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling
+over some verbal slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that
+by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble
+of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their
+physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws?
+
+SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must
+have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,—What
+is the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you
+surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your
+slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to
+begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the
+stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your
+instructions, or I shall have to run away from you.
+
+CALLICLES: You are ironical.
+
+SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just
+now saying many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then,
+whom you mean, by the better?
+
+CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have
+no meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me
+whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom?
+
+CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser.
+
+SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to
+ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his
+subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I
+believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am
+word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten
+thousand?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be
+natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more
+than the inferior.
+
+SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this
+case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are
+several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks,
+and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various
+degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is
+wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably
+stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being
+wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of
+food?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and
+drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all
+of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use
+of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be
+punished;—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of
+others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will
+have the smallest share of all, Callicles:—am I not right, my friend?
+
+CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other
+nonsense; I am not speaking of them.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer
+“Yes” or “No.”
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share?
+
+CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks.
+
+SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver
+ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go
+about clothed in the best and finest of them?
+
+CALLICLES: Fudge about coats!
+
+SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have
+the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in
+the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them?
+
+CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking?
+
+SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that
+the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger
+share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land?
+
+CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates!
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things.
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of
+cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with
+our argument.
+
+SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior
+and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a
+suggestion, nor offer one?
+
+CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by
+superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand
+the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also
+valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint
+from want of soul.
+
+SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge
+against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach
+me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying
+the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the
+better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser,
+and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are
+now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend,
+that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better
+and superior, and in what they are better?
+
+CALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and
+courageous in the administration of a state—they ought to be the rulers
+of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their
+subjects.
+
+SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not
+have more than themselves, my friend?
+
+CALLICLES: What do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think
+that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required
+to rule others?
+
+CALLICLES: What do you mean by his “ruling over himself”?
+
+SOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man
+should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own
+pleasures and passions.
+
+CALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate?
+
+SOCRATES: Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning.
+
+CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a
+man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly
+assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax
+to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to
+their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to
+them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural
+justice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they
+blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness,
+which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is
+base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and
+being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and
+justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally
+the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a
+tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than
+temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every
+good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom
+and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?—must not
+he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and
+temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies,
+even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess
+to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:—that luxury and
+intemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue
+and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to
+nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.)
+
+SOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of
+approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the
+world think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to
+persevere, that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell
+me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the
+passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow
+to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is
+virtue?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes; I do.
+
+SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy?
+
+CALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the
+happiest of all.
+
+SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and
+indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying,
+
+“Who knows if life be not death and death life;”
+
+and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that
+at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our
+tomb (sema (compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is
+the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown
+up and down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an
+Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the
+soul—because of its believing and make-believe nature—a vessel (An
+untranslatable pun,—dia to pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.),
+and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in
+the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the
+intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of
+holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of
+thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades,
+meaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky
+persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel
+which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated.
+The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul
+which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is
+likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad
+memory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they
+show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you
+should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate
+life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due
+provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you
+coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the
+intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I
+rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still?
+
+CALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the
+same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept
+this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in
+a figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the
+one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey,
+and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the
+streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them
+with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once
+filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble
+with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure
+streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and
+unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if
+he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their
+respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the
+intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince
+you that the opposite is the truth?
+
+CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled
+himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now
+saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he
+is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the
+influx.
+
+SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the
+holes must be large for the liquid to escape.
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead
+man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be
+hungering and eating?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires
+about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them.
+
+SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no
+shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you
+tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have
+enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of
+happiness?
+
+CALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular
+mob-orator.
+
+SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and
+Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you
+will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man.
+And now, answer my question.
+
+CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.
+
+SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I
+pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how
+you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in
+the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not
+terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too
+are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?
+
+CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics
+into the argument?
+
+SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these
+topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel
+pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction
+between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say
+that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure
+which is not a good?
+
+CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that
+they are the same.
+
+SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will
+no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you
+say what is contrary to your real opinion.
+
+CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would
+ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is
+the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences
+which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.
+
+CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are
+saying?
+
+CALLICLES: Indeed I do.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the
+argument?
+
+CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, “I am in profound earnest.”)
+
+SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question
+for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?
+
+CALLICLES: There is.
+
+SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied
+knowledge?
+
+CALLICLES: I was.
+
+SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things
+different from one another?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly I was.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same,
+or not the same?
+
+CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian,
+says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and
+courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.
+
+CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he
+assent to this, or not?
+
+SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees
+himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune
+are opposed to each other?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and
+disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be
+without them both, at the same time?
+
+CALLICLES: What do you mean?
+
+SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the
+complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the
+same time?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of
+the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of
+them both together?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly not.
+
+SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
+
+CALLICLES: Very.
+
+SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them
+in turns?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by
+fits?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their
+opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare
+Republic.)
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly he has.
+
+SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the
+same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not
+to answer without consideration.
+
+CALLICLES: I entirely agree.
+
+SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to
+hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
+
+CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is
+pleasant.
+
+SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not
+right?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, very.
+
+SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all
+wants or desires are painful?
+
+CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more
+instances.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are
+thirsty, is pleasant?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word
+“thirsty” implies pain?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of the
+satisfaction of the want?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: When you are thirsty?
+
+SOCRATES: And in pain?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are
+simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they
+not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same
+part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot
+be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
+
+CALLICLES: It is.
+
+SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune
+at the same time?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, I did.
+
+SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have
+pleasure?
+
+CALLICLES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the
+same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the
+pleasant?
+
+CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
+
+SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
+
+CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know
+what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
+
+SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in
+drinking at the same time?
+
+CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying.
+
+GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like
+to hear the argument out.
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling
+of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
+
+GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let
+Socrates argue in his own fashion.
+
+CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling
+questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
+
+SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the
+great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought
+that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a
+man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same
+moment?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not
+cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
+
+CALLICLES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment,
+as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the
+same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a
+cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and
+evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as
+good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in
+another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you
+when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good
+present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present
+with them?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were
+saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you
+not say so?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
+
+SOCRATES: And a foolish man too?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
+
+SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
+
+SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?
+
+CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
+
+SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the
+coward or the brave?
+
+CALLICLES: I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced
+about equally.
+
+SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
+
+CALLICLES: Greatly.
+
+SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their
+enemies, or are the brave also pained?
+
+CALLICLES: Both are pained.
+
+SOCRATES: And are they equally pained?
+
+CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
+
+SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure?
+
+CALLICLES: I dare say.
+
+SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the
+brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal
+degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish
+and the cowardly are the bad?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly
+equal degree?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal
+degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in
+having more pleasure and more pain.)
+
+CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean.
+
+SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good
+because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that
+pleasures were goods and pains evils?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, I remember.
+
+SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who
+rejoice—if they do rejoice?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with
+them?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with
+them?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of
+the presence of evil?
+
+CALLICLES: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain
+evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of
+pleasure and of pain?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy
+and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has
+more?
+
+CALLICLES: I should say that he has.
+
+SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from
+our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice
+and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we
+allow to be good?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the
+evil has more of them?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad
+as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference
+which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the
+good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?
+
+CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you,
+Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play,
+you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do
+you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some
+pleasures are good and others bad?
+
+SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me
+as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as
+if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you
+were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have
+helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must
+make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I
+can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may
+assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the
+hurtful are those which do some evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and
+drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those
+which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and
+their opposites evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil
+pains?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and
+pains?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: But not the evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Clearly.
+
+SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all
+our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree
+with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and
+that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not
+the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two?
+
+CALLICLES: I will.
+
+SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the
+sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of
+pleasure?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are
+evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
+
+CALLICLES: He must have art.
+
+SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and
+Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were
+some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better
+and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And
+I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an
+experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure,
+and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with
+the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles,
+not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at
+random and contrary to your real opinion—for you will observe that we
+are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense
+at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should
+follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you
+call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating
+rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles
+now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and
+in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had
+better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have
+come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider
+in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should
+choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?
+
+CALLICLES: No, I do not.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and
+I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is
+such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good,
+and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is
+pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of
+the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you
+agree with me thus far or not—do you agree?
+
+CALLICLES: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me,
+and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to
+Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and
+not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to
+the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of
+action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure
+never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she
+devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or
+calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just
+preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing
+pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved
+what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar
+processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art,
+making a provision for the soul’s highest interest—others despising the
+interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure
+of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what
+pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford
+gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are
+such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery,
+whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with
+a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And
+now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this
+notion, or whether you differ.
+
+CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I
+shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend
+Gorgias.
+
+SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
+
+CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more.
+
+SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no
+regard for their true interests?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather,
+if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them
+belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first
+place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art
+which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
+
+CALLICLES: I assent.
+
+SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for
+example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic
+poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias
+the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of
+his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?
+
+CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did
+he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said
+to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his
+audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what
+would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of
+pleasure?
+
+CALLICLES: That is my notion of them.
+
+SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august
+personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to
+give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and
+refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word
+and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her
+character?
+
+CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face
+turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.
+
+SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were
+just now describing as flattery?
+
+CALLICLES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm
+and metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.)
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be
+rhetoricians?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is
+addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves.
+And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having
+the nature of flattery.
+
+CALLICLES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which
+addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other
+states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is
+best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or
+are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure,
+forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest,
+playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but
+never considering whether they are better or worse for this?
+
+CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of
+the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.
+
+SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two
+sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the
+other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the
+souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome
+or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric;
+or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp,
+who is he?
+
+CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such
+among the orators who are at present living.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation,
+who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse
+and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for,
+indeed, I do not know of such a man.
+
+CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man,
+and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom
+you heard yourself?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first,
+true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and
+those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to
+acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of
+others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and
+there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these
+statesmen who did distinguish them?
+
+CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot.
+
+SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one.
+Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I
+have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a
+view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at
+random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder,
+the shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do
+not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a
+definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and
+compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until
+he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of
+all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom
+we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny
+this?
+
+CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good;
+that in which there is disorder, evil?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be
+that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony
+and order?
+
+CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions.
+
+SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and
+order in the body?
+
+CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the
+effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for
+this as well as for the other.
+
+CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall
+say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer
+me. “Healthy,” as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular
+order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily
+excellence: is that true or not?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And “lawful” and “law” are the names which are given to the
+regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and
+orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not?
+
+CALLICLES: Granted.
+
+SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and
+understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words
+which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in
+what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant
+justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to
+implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue
+and take away every vice? Do you not agree?
+
+CALLICLES: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a
+sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most
+delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be
+really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if
+rightly estimated. Is not that true?
+
+CALLICLES: I will not say No to it.
+
+SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his
+body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not
+right?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow
+him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to
+satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer
+him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir?
+While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust
+and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be
+prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own
+improvement.
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself?
+
+CALLICLES: To be sure.
+
+SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than
+intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now
+preferring?
+
+CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would
+ask some one who does.
+
+SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to
+subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks!
+
+CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only
+answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias.
+
+SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle?
+
+CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but people say that “a tale should have a head and not
+break off in the middle,” and I should not like to have the argument
+going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a
+little longer, and put the head on.
+
+CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your
+argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with
+you.
+
+SOCRATES: But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument.
+
+CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight
+on, or questioning and answering yourself?
+
+SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, “Two men spoke before, but
+now one shall be enough”? I suppose that there is absolutely no help.
+And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all
+remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know
+what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the
+truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my
+own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which
+are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from
+any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves,
+and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall
+be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that
+the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us
+leave off and go our ways.
+
+GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you
+have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of
+the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what
+more you have to say.
+
+SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument
+with Callicles, and then I might have given him an “Amphion” in return
+for his “Zethus”; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue,
+I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in
+error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are
+with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the
+tablets of my soul.
+
+CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on.
+
+SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the
+pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed
+about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good?
+or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued
+for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which
+we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good?
+To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when
+some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my
+conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul,
+instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to
+them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art
+which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And
+is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes,
+I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering
+in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order
+of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul
+which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is
+temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer
+can I give, Callicles dear; have you any?
+
+CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is
+the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is,
+the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true.
+
+And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to
+the gods and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not?
+Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he
+will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what
+is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy?
+Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate
+man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought,
+whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure
+when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as
+we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other
+than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well
+and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity
+be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now
+this latter is he whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the
+opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I
+affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he
+who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run
+away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had
+better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or
+any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of
+punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if
+he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought
+to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of
+himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and
+justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be
+unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a
+robber’s life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he
+is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also
+incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that
+communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice
+bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe
+is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my
+friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have
+observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men;
+you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not
+care about geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy
+are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the
+miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if
+it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences
+which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I
+was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his
+son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he
+should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which
+you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz.,
+that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that
+degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus,
+Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a
+rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also
+turned out to be true.
+
+And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next
+place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I
+am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save
+them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another
+like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,—he may box my
+ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or
+banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you
+say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been
+already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell
+you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the
+worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut
+open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more
+disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage,
+or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and
+evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These
+truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the
+previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by
+us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which
+are like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still
+more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of
+denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am
+ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met any one who
+could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous.
+This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and
+injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet
+there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils (compare
+Republic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that
+defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not
+the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And
+will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable
+to defend himself or his family or his friends?—and next will come that
+which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is
+unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is
+the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in
+their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert
+them. Am I not right Callicles?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, quite right.
+
+SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing
+injustice and the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do
+injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—by what
+devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of
+not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the
+power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man
+will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he
+have provided himself with the power?
+
+CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear.
+
+SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only
+sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he
+have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied
+and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say,
+Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting
+the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do
+wrong against their will?
+
+CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done.
+
+SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in
+order that we may do no injustice?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not
+wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with
+me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a
+ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling
+power.
+
+CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to
+praise you when you talk sense.
+
+SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view
+of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is
+most like to him—like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not
+agree to this?
+
+CALLICLES: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be
+expected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never
+be able to be perfectly friendly with him.
+
+CALLICLES: That is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his
+inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously
+regard him as a friend.
+
+CALLICLES: That again is true.
+
+SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can
+have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes
+and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and
+subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and
+no one will injure him with impunity:—is not that so?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and
+formidable, this would seem to be the way—he will accustom himself,
+from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as
+his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your
+friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering
+injury?
+
+CALLICLES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very
+opposite be true,—if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and
+to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much
+wrong as possible, and not be punished?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he
+thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not
+this be the greatest evil to him?
+
+CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert
+everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he
+has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods?
+
+SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a
+great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in
+the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he
+will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true.
+
+CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing?
+
+SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you
+think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the
+uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger
+always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and
+which you advise me to cultivate?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that
+an art of any great pretensions?
+
+CALLICLES: No, indeed.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are
+occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the
+swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the
+pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and
+properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his
+art is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of doing
+anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is
+given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from
+Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the
+utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the
+passenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked
+them at the Piraeus,—this is the payment which he asks in return for so
+great a boon; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all
+this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an
+unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot
+tell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them
+he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they
+are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked,
+and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he
+considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily
+diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way
+benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who
+has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul,
+which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having
+nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea,
+or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—and so he reflects that such
+a one had better not live, for he cannot live well. (Compare Republic.)
+
+And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is
+not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all
+behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving
+power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison
+between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your
+grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring
+and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no
+other profession is worth thinking about; he would have plenty to say.
+Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an
+engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son,
+or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what
+justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to
+despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now
+mentioning? I know that you will say, “I am better, and better born.”
+But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man
+saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your
+censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other
+arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that
+the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving
+and being saved:—May not he who is truly a man cease to care about
+living a certain time?—he knows, as women say, that no man can escape
+fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with
+God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed
+term;—whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which
+he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as
+like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their
+good graces, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to
+think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;—I would
+not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this
+power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down
+the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you
+suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the
+city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether
+for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken,
+Callides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the
+Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes’ darling who is called after
+them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then,
+who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a
+statesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in
+his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you,
+sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say?
+
+CALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me
+to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite
+convinced by them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.)
+
+SOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides
+in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to
+these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be
+convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two
+processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one,
+as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other
+with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist
+them: was not that the distinction which we drew?
+
+CALLICLES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar
+flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions?
+
+CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it.
+
+SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that
+which was ministered to, whether body or soul?
+
+CALLICLES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of
+our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as
+possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in
+imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to
+have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be
+gentle and good. Shall we say that?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set
+about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake
+buildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought
+we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not
+know the art of building, and who taught us?—would not that be
+necessary, Callicles?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we
+had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our
+friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if
+upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters,
+and had been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only
+with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill—in
+that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the
+construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only
+a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would
+be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another
+to undertake them. Is not this true?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I
+were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent
+to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would
+you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good
+health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether
+slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And
+if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or
+stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical
+skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to
+think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as
+state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same,
+without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not,
+and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin
+with the big jar when you are learning the potter’s art; which is a
+foolish thing?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a
+public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being
+one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then,
+Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever
+a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and
+became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a
+man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles,
+if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer?
+Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There
+may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a
+private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not
+answer?
+
+CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I
+really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be
+administered among us—whether, when you come to the administration of
+them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have
+we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a
+public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for
+yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought
+to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you
+the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and
+Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think
+that they were good citizens.
+
+CALLICLES: I do.
+
+SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have
+made the citizens better instead of worse?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the
+assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last?
+
+CALLICLES: Very likely.
+
+SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, “likely” is not the word; for if he was a
+good citizen, the inference is certain.
+
+CALLICLES: And what difference does that make?
+
+SOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the
+Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the
+contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the
+first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and
+encouraged them in the love of talk and money.
+
+CALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise
+their ears.
+
+SOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but
+well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and
+his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was
+during the time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they
+had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they
+convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the
+notion that he was a malefactor.
+
+CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles’ badness?
+
+SOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses
+or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor
+butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks?
+Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle,
+and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you
+say?
+
+CALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying “yes.”
+
+SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is
+an animal?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly he is.
+
+SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the
+animals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to
+have become more just, and not more unjust?
+
+CALLICLES: Quite true.
+
+SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of
+another mind?
+
+CALLICLES: I agree.
+
+SOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received
+them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must
+have been very far from desiring.
+
+CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth.
+
+CALLICLES: Granted then.
+
+SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more
+unjust and inferior?
+
+CALLICLES: Granted again.
+
+SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman?
+
+CALLICLES: That is, upon your view.
+
+SOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take
+the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving
+ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten
+years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty
+of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should
+be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis.
+And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things
+would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not
+those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in
+their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown
+out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any
+profession.—What do you think?
+
+CALLICLES: I should think not.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in
+the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good
+statesman—you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but
+not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they
+have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore,
+if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or
+of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour.
+
+CALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one
+of them in his performances.
+
+SOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the
+serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more
+serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify
+the wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not
+allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had,
+whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow
+citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not
+see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present
+statesmen, although I do admit that they were more clever at providing
+ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous
+way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going
+round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one
+another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more
+than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with
+the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is
+ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and
+if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them
+with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same
+images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the
+better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale
+or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,—the baker, or the
+cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing,
+being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and every one
+to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another
+art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the
+body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their
+results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of
+the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other
+arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and
+illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their
+mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul,
+you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and
+then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State
+had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you
+reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have
+been good trainers?—and you had replied, Thearion, the baker,
+Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner:
+these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first
+makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third
+capital wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the
+statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if
+I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom
+you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury,
+who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be
+filling and fattening men’s bodies and gaining their approval, although
+the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and
+become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their
+simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to
+their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit
+brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them
+at the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and
+if they could they would do him some harm; while they proceed to
+eulogize the men who have been the real authors of the mischief. And
+that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who
+feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that
+they have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen and
+ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder
+statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and
+walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and
+temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will
+blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and
+Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are
+not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are
+losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original
+possessions; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of
+theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece
+of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old;
+about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors,
+I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed
+wrong which is done to them; “after all their many services to the
+State, that they should unjustly perish,”—so the tale runs. But the cry
+is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by
+the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman
+is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the
+sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a
+strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will
+often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of
+their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be
+more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose
+injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice
+implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of
+the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational, my
+friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator,
+because you will not answer.
+
+CALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some
+one to answer?
+
+SOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches
+which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But
+I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether
+there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that
+you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in
+this inconsistent manner?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing?
+
+SOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers,
+and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and
+nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the
+city:—do you think that there is any difference between one and the
+other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying
+to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy
+that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised;
+whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as
+legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The
+orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who
+cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which
+they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of
+having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this
+a fact?
+
+CALLICLES: Certainly it is.
+
+SOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then
+they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to
+those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been
+benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run
+by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer
+left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should
+receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not
+because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason
+of injustice.
+
+CALLICLES: Very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being
+treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his
+pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right? (Compare
+Protag.)
+
+CALLICLES: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a
+man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any
+other art?
+
+CALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason.
+
+SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and
+best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no
+advice gratis is held to be dishonourable?
+
+CALLICLES: True.
+
+SOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to
+requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred
+when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true?
+
+CALLICLES: It is.
+
+SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me?
+determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive
+and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be
+the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend,
+freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell
+me your entire mind.
+
+CALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State.
+
+SOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation.
+
+CALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse,
+the consequences will be—
+
+SOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me
+and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that
+he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be
+of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly
+took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully.
+
+CALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to
+harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can
+never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be
+brought by some miserable and mean person.
+
+SOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know
+that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am
+brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a
+villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man
+would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to
+death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this?
+
+CALLICLES: By all means.
+
+SOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living
+who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my
+time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any
+view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what
+is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you
+recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you
+might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just
+as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the
+indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances,
+if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my boys, many evil things
+has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the
+younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and
+suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the
+bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the
+variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!” What do you
+suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself
+in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, “All
+these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,” and then would
+there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry
+out!
+
+CALLICLES: I dare say.
+
+SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply?
+
+CALLICLES: He certainly would.
+
+SOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know,
+if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse
+to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which,
+although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of
+them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one
+says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak
+evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private
+or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:—“All this I
+do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my
+judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore there is no saying what may
+happen to me.
+
+CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus
+defenceless is in a good position?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have
+often acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have
+never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men;
+and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of
+defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself
+or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was
+convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I
+died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if
+I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure
+that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an
+utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of
+doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul full of
+injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I
+say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story.
+
+CALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done.
+
+SOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale,
+which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only,
+but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth.
+Homer tells us (Il.), how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the
+empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of
+Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has
+always been, and still continues to be in Heaven,—that he who has lived
+all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the
+Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the
+reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall
+go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus.
+And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus,
+the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die;
+the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was
+that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities
+from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls
+found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: “I shall put a stop to
+this; the judgments are not well given, because the persons who are
+judged have their clothes on, for they are alive; and there are many
+who, having evil souls, are apparelled in fair bodies, or encased in
+wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous
+witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they have lived
+righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have
+their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole
+bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a
+hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes
+of the judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place,
+I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at
+present: this power which they have Prometheus has already received my
+orders to take from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely
+stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are
+dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead—he with
+his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall
+die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their
+brave attire strewn upon the earth—conducted in this manner, the
+judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any of you,
+and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and
+Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are
+dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways,
+whence the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the
+other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia,
+and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the
+primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two
+others are in any doubt:—then the judgment respecting the last journey
+of men will be as just as possible.”
+
+From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the
+following inferences:—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the
+separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else.
+And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in
+life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or
+accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or
+training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he
+was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and
+the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have
+flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of
+the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the
+same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when
+he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in
+a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be
+distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure
+and for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true
+of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the
+natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.—And
+when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus,
+he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not
+knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the
+great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in
+him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints
+and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained
+him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no
+straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus
+beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by
+licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him
+ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment
+which he deserves.
+
+Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly
+punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to
+be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers,
+and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are
+punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they
+are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and
+suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered
+from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and
+are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as
+they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any
+benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they
+behold them enduring for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful
+sufferings as the penalty of their sins—there they are, hanging up as
+examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a
+warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I
+confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of
+him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples,
+most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and
+potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and
+most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses
+to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he
+has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below:
+such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described
+Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering
+everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst
+crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was
+happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men
+come from the class of those who have power (compare Republic). And yet
+in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all
+admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to
+live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and
+few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men, however,
+there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who
+have fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite
+famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in
+general, great men are also bad, my friend.
+
+As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind,
+knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he
+knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he
+stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus,
+whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks
+with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness
+and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say,
+Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has
+done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other
+men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the
+Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge;
+but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as
+Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him:
+
+“Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.”
+
+Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I
+consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the
+judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I
+desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when
+I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I
+exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your
+exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat,
+which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly
+conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not
+be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I
+was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of
+Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is carrying you off,
+you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the
+courts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully box you
+on the ears, and put upon you any sort of insult.
+
+Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you
+will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales,
+if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you
+see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the
+Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life
+which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all
+that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do
+injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the
+reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all
+things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has
+been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best
+thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be
+chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of
+himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric
+and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be
+done always, with a view to justice.
+
+Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and
+after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises
+you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you,
+by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting
+blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if
+you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue
+together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable,
+or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall
+be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to
+give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are
+always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take
+the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way
+of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This
+way let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to
+which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way,
+Callicles, is nothing worth.
+
+
+
+
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