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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1672-0.txt b/1672-0.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e154ff --- /dev/null +++ b/1672-0.txt @@ -0,0 +1,7021 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook of Gorgias, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States and +most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no restrictions +whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online at +www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United States, you +will have to check the laws of the country where you are located before +using this eBook. + +Title: Gorgias + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: March, 1999 [eBook #1672] +[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: UTF-8 + +Produced by: Sue Asscher + +*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS *** + + + + +GORGIAS + +by Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +Contents + + INTRODUCTION + GORGIAS + + + + +INTRODUCTION + + +In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his +interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is +the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no +severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to +think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the +digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the +dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the +beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and +references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of +the whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt +to confine the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single +idea. (Compare Introduction to the Phaedrus.) + +Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this +matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one +another by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite +and contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The +mantle of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have +applied his method with the most various results. The value and use of +the method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. +Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each +separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all +difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they +have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily +pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we +can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more +familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is +needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of +other great artists. We may hardly admit that the moral antithesis of +good and pleasure, or the intellectual antithesis of knowledge and +opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic +discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring +them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally in all the +dialogues. + +There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines +of the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily +exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural +form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues +are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and +lose the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great +works receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether +these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their +agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence +which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away +with us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, +and recalling us to the indications of the text. + +Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the +appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher +themes are introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the +good and evil of man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a +sound definition of his art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the +existence of a universal art of flattery or simulation having several +branches:—this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the +highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life +which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at +last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. These two +aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of the +dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the +treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the +forms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition +there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes +of Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as +they may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is worse than to +suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be +punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic +paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not what +they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure +is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of +pleasure and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain +cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not +merely rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole +tribe of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class +of flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the +judgment-seat of the gods below. + +The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three +characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; +and the form and manner change with the stages of the argument. +Socrates is deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in +dealing with the youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his +encounter with Callicles. In the first division the question is +asked—What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, for Gorgias +is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is +transferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the +defence of his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates +himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must +enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus +finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he replies +that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. Socrates +denies that they have any real power, and hence arise the three +paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is +at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow +legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue +closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that +pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but +the combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is +confuted he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive +at the conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two +kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a lower—that which makes the +people better, and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts +Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus +of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or +disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric. + +The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts +which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now +advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, +and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the +dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain +dignity, and is treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he +is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching +rhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own art. +When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that +rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this +lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables +Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is +described as of a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of +Socrates’ manner of approaching a question; he is quite “one of +Socrates’ sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,” and very +eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by +experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but +he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything +and know nothing. + +Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway “colt,” as Socrates describes +him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the +pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the +earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of +a work on rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the +inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.). +At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his +master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon +restored to good-humour, and compelled to assent to the required +conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he +is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to +suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and +dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher +arguments. Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a +youth maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has +never heard the other side of the question, and he listens to the +paradoxes, as they appear to him, of Socrates with evident +astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of Archelaus being +miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. When +the argument with him has fairly run out. + +Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the +stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for +if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the +foundations of society are upside down. In him another type of +character is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but +man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be +described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of +power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining +both. There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the +interests of morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like +Thrasymachus in the Republic, though he is not of the same weak and +vulgar class, he consistently maintains that might is right. His great +motive of action is political ambition; in this he is +characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of +the Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as +an excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind +as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a +violation of the order of nature, which intended that the stronger +should govern the weaker (compare Republic). Like other men of the +world who are of a speculative turn of mind, he generalizes the bad +side of human nature, and has easily brought down his principles to his +practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with distinctions +suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, whose +talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which +he makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the +argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the +world; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, who showed no +weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, Themistocles, +Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character is a man of +great passions and great powers, which he has developed to the utmost, +and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of others. +Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom we know +nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed +to reflect the history of his life. + +And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist +or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which +Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many +contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he +describes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the +authors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public +opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance, +with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal +vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his +servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound +earnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but +the more he is irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does +Socrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really +made to the “omniscient” Hippias, according to the testimony of +Xenophon (Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular +declaimer, and certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of +Gorgias, of being “as long as he pleases,” or “as short as he pleases” +(compare Protag.). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending +himself and attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and +word-splitting; he is scandalized that the legitimate consequences of +his own argument should be stated in plain terms; after the manner of +men of the world, he wishes to preserve the decencies of life. But he +cannot consistently maintain the bad sense of words; and getting +confused between the abstract notions of better, superior, stronger, he +is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to continue the +argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is describing +the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself with +the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words. + +The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the +Protagoras and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the +Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards +as another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by +that of his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part +is met by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak, +for philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more +ironical and provoking than in any other of Plato’s writings: for he is +“fooled to the top of his bent” by the worldliness of Callicles. But he +is also more deeply in earnest. He rises higher than even in the Phaedo +and Crito: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust +and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in +them. As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside the veil of +irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his +adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of +his own fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single +real teacher of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely +go to war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will +be condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the +position of Socrates and Callicles will be reversed; all those things +“unfit for ears polite” which Callicles has prophesied as likely to +happen to him in this life, the insulting language, the box on the +ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare Republic, and the +similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in +the Theaetetus). + +There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of +the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically +attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the +assembly should be taken. This is said to have happened “last year” +(B.C. 406), and therefore the assumed date of the dialogue has been +fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man. +The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another +indication of time, viz. the “recent” usurpation of Archelaus, which +occurred in the year 413; and still less with the “recent” death of +Pericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.) and +is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age; or with the +mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as a +living witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that +although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the +Dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his +commentators (Preface to Republic). + +The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly +characteristic declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true +nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time +that no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The +profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively +Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in the +Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the +fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this “among the +multitude of questions” which agitate human life “as the principle +which alone remains unshaken.” He does not insist here, any more than +in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the +soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is +worse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for +the next best thing to a man’s being just is that he should be +corrected and become just; also that he should avoid all flattery, +whether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric should be employed +for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation of another life +is a recapitulation of the argument in a figure. + +(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only +true politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the +Apology, he disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced +that he or any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will +would be put to death before he had done any good to himself or others. +Here he anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is +“the only man of the present day who performs his public duties at +all.” The two points of view are not really inconsistent, but the +difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a +public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but +in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same +consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither +can he separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a +politician, although he foresees the dangers which await him; but he +must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well as Callicles +is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty. And yet there is an +inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens +better than to put him to death? + +And now, as he himself says, we will “resume the argument from the +beginning.” + +Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, +meets Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has +just missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was +desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of +interrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes +that they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying. +There they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and +disciple Polus. + +SOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon. + +CHAEREPHON: What question? + +SOCRATES: Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the +answer, “I am a cobbler.” + +Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for +him. “Who is Gorgias?” asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his +master Socrates. “One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best +and noblest of experimental arts,” etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical +and balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and +unmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that +he has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to +Gorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not how to +answer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is +willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,—that +he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, “boasts himself to be a +good one.” At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for “he +can be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.” Socrates +would have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him a +number of questions, which are answered by him to his own great +satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of +Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:— + +Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other +particular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then +does rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the +arts which deal with words, and the arts which have to do with external +actions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all +productive arts into two classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in +silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, or in which words +are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. +But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was +the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words +there are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other +arts which have to do with words? “The words which rhetoric uses relate +to the best and greatest of human things.” But tell me, Gorgias, what +are the best? “Health first, beauty next, wealth third,” in the words +of the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you +in a body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is +superior to that of the rest—How will you choose between them? “I +should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom +to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest +good.” But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?—is the +persevering retort: You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even +as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures; +neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because +there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an +art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see +the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as +the art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the +just and unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which +gives knowledge, and another which gives belief without knowledge; and +knowledge is always true, but belief may be either true or false,—there +is therefore a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion +does rhetoric effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that +which gives belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can +impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few +minutes. And there is another point to be considered:—when the assembly +meets to advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the +rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the architect, or the +general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to +become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not +Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach +us to persuade or advise the state? + +Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of +Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and +walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about +the middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar +power over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a +physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete +with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the +multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the +rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should +abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all +good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art +to be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of +the lessons which they have learned from him. + +Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will +quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he +has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be +refuted. Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears +that the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and +Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points +out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have +fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a +misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by +Gorgias to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or +any other expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of +his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the +trouble of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is +of medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did +not know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part +of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a +carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has +learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and +rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite +of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may +act unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained? + +The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man +may know justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts +and the virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly +the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of +justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus +is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; +of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit +that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the +interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners +is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically +replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs +again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in +error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. +Polus is in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words +as he pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet +harder will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to +them. After some altercation they agree (compare Protag.), that Polus +shall ask and Socrates answer. + +“What is the art of Rhetoric?” says Polus. Not an art at all, replies +Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created +art. Polus asks, “What thing?” and Socrates answers, An experience or +routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. “But is not +rhetoric a fine thing?” I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will +you ask me another question—What is cookery? “What is cookery?” An +experience or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. +Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and +rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. “What is +rhetoric?” asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, +which may be termed flattery, is the reply. “But what part?” A shadow +of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly +unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his +meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or +appearances and realities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul, +and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations +of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon them, first +the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a legislative +part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the body, which +has no generic name, but may also be described as having two divisions, +one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding with +these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of +them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no +reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or +simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is +the simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be +summed up in an arithmetical formula:— + +Tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation. + +And, + +Cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice. + +And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the +gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and +return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of +his speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and +begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him. + +“Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?” +They are not esteemed at all. “Why, have they not great power, and can +they not do whatever they desire?” They have no power, and they only do +what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain +the true object of desire, which is the good. “As if you, Socrates, +would not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, +exile, kill any one whom he pleases.” But Socrates replies that he has +no wish to put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is +not to be envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is +better to suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going +about with a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house +on fire, is real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such +acts would be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if +they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son +of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him +happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce +even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral +condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of +a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of +Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle +and then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was +very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to +have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he +will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers, +Aristocrates, the house of Pericles, or any other great family—this is +the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth +depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his +appeal is to one witness only,—that is to say, the person with whom he +is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is +prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked +man and yet happy. + +The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he +suffers punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he +suffers than if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as +this hardly deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently +refuted by the fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the +successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, +having been detected in a criminal attempt against the state, is +crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both +criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more +miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads +Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus +replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of +the company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates +rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct +at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable +to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent +occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the +person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion +of any man to do is worse than to suffer evil. + +Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to +do evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But +what is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, +colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with +reference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter +doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must +exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the +suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus +doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more +hurtful than suffering. + +There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is +punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done +justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if +to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and +therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved. +There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him +in estate, body, and soul;—these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and +the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that +brings the greatest hurt. And there are three arts which heal these +evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the fairest of these is justice. +Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second +degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal +should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge +away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper +colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary +penalty. And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to +punish him, but that he shall go unpunished and become worse and worse, +taking care only that he does no injury to himself. These are at least +conceivable uses of the art, and no others have been discovered by us. + +Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks +Chaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the +assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates +himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned +upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to +be doing. + +Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can +understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a +community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of +them are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of +Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the +beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity of +Callicles is that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his +Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both +his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at +his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a +free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the +explanation of Socrates’ peculiarities also. He is always repeating +what his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other +love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute +her, or he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is +far worse than the discord of musical sounds. + +Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, +in compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil +did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been +similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to +suffer is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom “yes,” but +not by nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between +the two points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In +this very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has +been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that +“injustice is dishonourable,” but nature says that “might is right.” +And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the +conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert +his original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then +the light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar says, “Law, the king +of all, does violence with high hand;” as is indeed proved by the +example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid +for them. + +This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave +philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little +philosophy is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who +has not “passed his metaphysics” before he has grown up to manhood will +never know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to +politics, and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when +they take to philosophy: “Every man,” as Euripides says, “is fondest of +that in which he is best.” Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the +lisp of infancy, and should be cultivated as a part of education; but +when a grown-up man lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat +him. None of those over-refined natures ever come to any good; they +avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few +admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any noble sentiments. + +For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as +Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have “a noble soul +disguised in a puerile exterior.” And I would have you consider the +danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know +how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,—there you +would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, +robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get +a little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the +ways of the wealthy and be wise. + +Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher’s +touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree +must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are +needed in a critic—knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, +although learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them +contradict themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not +too modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his +good-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the +same caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers +hearing him give long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge +himself to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which +Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he +and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of +justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?” “There is no +difference.” Then are not the many superior to the one, and the +opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is +equality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. +And as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must +be in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. “Why +will you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the +superior is the better?” But what do you mean by the better? Tell me +that, and please to be a little milder in your language, if you do not +wish to drive me away. “I mean the worthier, the wiser.” You mean to +say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? “Yes, +that is my meaning.” Ought the physician then to have a larger share of +meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler +larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? “You are always saying the same +things, Socrates.” Yes, and on the same subjects too; but you are never +saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to be the +stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;—what DO you mean? +“I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have more +than the governed.” Than themselves? “What do you mean?” I mean to say +that every man is his own governor. “I see that you mean those dolts, +the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his desires +grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is +impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a +king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To +invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have the +enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and +self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.” + +Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other +men only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not +happy. “Why,” says Callicles, “if they were, stones and the dead would +be happy.” Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic +vein of reflection. “Who knows,” as Euripides says, “whether life may +not be death, and death life?” Nay, there are philosophers who maintain +that even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb +(sema) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, +in which he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be +carrying water to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly +holey sieve, and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, +but nevertheless is a figure of a truth which I want to make you +acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment is better than the life +of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? “Far otherwise.” Then +hear another parable. The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence +may be represented respectively by two men, who are filling jars with +streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of the one are sound, and the +jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, and has no more +trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would suffer +extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? “Yes, +Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a +perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always +eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other +desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of +happiness.” And to be itching and always scratching? “I do not deny +that there may be happiness even in that.” And to indulge unnatural +desires, if they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at +the introduction of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that +they are introduced, not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity +of pleasure and good. Will Callicles still maintain this? “Yes, for the +sake of consistency, he will.” The answer does not satisfy Socrates, +who fears that he is losing his touchstone. A profession of seriousness +on the part of Callicles reassures him, and they proceed with the +argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but knowledge and courage are +not the same either with pleasure or good, or with one another. +Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that two +opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be +well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are +simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the +case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not +simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure +cannot be the same as good. + +Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go +on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded +against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from +pleasure and good, proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good, +and the bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are +good, and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure +is good, and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain +in nearly the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a +greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave +or may be even better. + +Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming +that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others +bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we +should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates +observes, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that +all things should be done for the sake of the good. + +Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed +in distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of +empirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, +and the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and +body. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to +anything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of the +arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral +exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on +the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who +was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of +Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in +general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, +and children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to +what is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were +children. + +Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have +a real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two +species of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard +for the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the +latter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were +such in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great +Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were +true artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out +of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running +through his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he +desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all +virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the +physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with +a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising +self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the +unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving. + +Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, +turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own +questions. “Then,” says Socrates, “one man must do for two;” and though +he had hoped to have given Callicles an “Amphion” in return for his +“Zethus,” he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that +Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates +the advantages which he has already won:— + +The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed +about that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and +the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things +good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or +soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to +order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is +better than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate +and is therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is +temperate is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the +perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate +whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He +therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid +intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but +if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this way states and +individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, +is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never +discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would +have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this, +and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox +is true that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation, and Polus +was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and +Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. +And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in +saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears +with impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than +to be stricken—to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast +in adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, +but I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do +wrong is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next +greatest evil. He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the +friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be the equal of the +ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer +no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all +the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the greatest of all +evils will befall him. “But this imitator of the tyrant,” rejoins +Callicles, “will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.” +Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that +repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a +good one. “Yes, and that is the provoking thing.” Not provoking to a +man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve him from +danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of +justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from +death, and are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of +swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least +as much service as the rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina +to Athens he does not charge more than two obols, and when he +disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The reason is that he +is not certain whether he has done his passengers any good in saving +them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and still more if +he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer too will often save +whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your son to +marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is there +in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own +or another’s, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of +saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and +being saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to +disregard length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving +all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have +influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of +Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this? + +“There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely +believe you.” + +That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little +more conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was +directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as +good as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make +the citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public +building, if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had +never constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of +state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else? +Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And +as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him? +Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the +statesman’s proper business. And we must ask the same question about +Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they +make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave +them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they +condemned him to death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals +who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man +is an animal; and Pericles who had the charge of man only made him +wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have +been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon, +Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his seat at first +is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The +inference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than +those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and +harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I +have told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images) +that the soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways—there is the +meaner and the higher art. You seemed to understand what I said at the +time, but when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you +answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered, +Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian +cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I +told you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make +them thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of +finding fault with them, and lay the blame of their subsequent +disorders on their physicians. In this respect, Callicles, you are like +them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices of +the citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but +neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the +citizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and +others, will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will +suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always +being repeated—“after all his services, the ungrateful city banished +him, or condemned him to death.” As if the statesman should not have +taught the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having +unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault +with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in +the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise sophistic, +whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher of the +arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no money, +because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple +desirous of requiting his teacher. + +Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of +serving the state Callicles invites him:—“to the inferior and +ministerial one,” is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of +avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and +would rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But +he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he +remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of +politics. And very probably, as in the case which he described to +Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He +cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any +one charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he +will not be able to make them understand that he has only been actuated +by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what his +fate may be. “And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself +is in a good condition?” Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, +which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If +I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for +want of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no +evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of +evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:— + +Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, +and when judgment had been given upon them they departed—the good to +the islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as +they were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they +were being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the +throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after +death, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the +foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed +to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos +was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul +and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their +characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all +distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king +himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, +though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and +iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment. + +For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable +and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their +punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by +becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and +potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same +power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus, not Thersites, are +supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that +there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is +shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But +to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are +stripped of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to +Tartarus, labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love +and admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the +islands of the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos +overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him + +“Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.” + + +My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls +undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to +meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which +you cast upon me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and +with dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all +manner of evil. + +Perhaps you think that this is an old wives’ fable. But you, who are +the three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one +will ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should +study to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become +good, and avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few. + +Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no +harm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to +politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of +ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in +the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you, +Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth. + +We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the +dialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical +character of his writings, we may compare him with himself, and with +other great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his +critics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another +upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he +teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are +enveloped. + +(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we +are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old +difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the +arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, +such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. +The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real +and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The +possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits of +application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which +remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at +the present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also +apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on +the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment +in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction +which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see +above). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a +false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion +that an agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates;—a +mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the +Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a “robust sophistry” are likewise +discernible in his argument with Callicles. + +(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the +argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts +himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may +sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, +or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the +ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as +useless to examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, +as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If +we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that +mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier +when punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to +the stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has +already admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to +say that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that +the sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of +the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as +in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion +which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? +His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, +which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among +mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that +he will be understood or appreciated by very few. + +He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea +of happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls +in battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or +that their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental +satisfaction. Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand +times rather have their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only +because we believe that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or +that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their +enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found +in a few instances to do what is right, without reference to public +opinion or to consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground +only, much as Socrates’ friends in the opening of the Phaedo are +described as regarding him; or as was said of another, “they looked +upon his face as upon the face of an angel.” We are not concerned to +justify this idealism by the standard of utility or public opinion, but +merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the better +part of human nature. + +The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain +that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and +that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is +thought to have erred in “considering the agent only, and making no +reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.” But the +happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really +quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as +Plato’s conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the +greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which +will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of +utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant +consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely +self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty +of imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget +that the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged +in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the +social principle, though taking another form, is really far more +prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics. + +The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have +exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological +import of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the +idea may have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that +the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not +receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk +deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture of +suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an +allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, +somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or after death. In +the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured +here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition of human +things the wise and good are weak and miserable; such an one is like a +man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and +obloquy. + +Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that +if “the ways of God” to man are to be “justified,” the hopes of another +life must be included. If the question could have been put to him, +whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he +suggests in the Apology, “death be only a long sleep,” we can hardly +tell what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite +independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, +or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to +sacrifice their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say +how far in such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a +general faith in the victory of good in the world, may have supported +the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the +spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in which the good +are to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as he says in the +Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories +about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind +is true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. +Even in the Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought, +when the superior happiness of the just has been established on what is +thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a +point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter +consequences. + +(3) Plato’s theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly +corrective. In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a +few great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But +most men have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence +of evil. They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for +their improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like +sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. On this +representation of Plato’s the criticism has been made, that the analogy +of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead +of improving men, may have just the opposite effect. + +Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of +disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly +imperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the +mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from +visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect +under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them +for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake of +the imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too +strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were +not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of +his age. + +Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the +suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of +ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal +law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and +supplies no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off +the higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and +to be continued in other stages of existence, which is further +developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured +out of the beaten track in their meditations on the “last things,” have +found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or +in what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. +He has not followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, +that “God is the author of evil only with a view to good,” and that +“they were the better for being punished.” Still his doctrine of a +future state of rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with +that perversion of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting +punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on +the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which +has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner +sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor +very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation. + +We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of +argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the +horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. +The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a +future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and +to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according +to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or +transcendental virtue in the description of the just man in the +Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the +Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a +state of the world which always has existed and always will exist among +men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And +such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the +natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the +ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen +very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly +involved in the general condemnation. + +Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other +questions, which may be briefly considered:— + +a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is +supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with +the transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, +knowledge and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue +and pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, +harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so +many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another, +and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that +Plato’s conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux transferred to +the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in +opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of +pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of +good is only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had +Plato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the +subjective consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be +as transient and precarious as pleasure. + +b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the +improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike +dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To +Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on +self-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to +have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is +the only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to +another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up +for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the +parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is +merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, +which he describes in the Republic. + +c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between +the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, +and the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and +language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal +similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of +Plato’s life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of +which the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak +combining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is +indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed +in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man, +the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another +life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, +are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic +they are expelled by the State, because they are imitators, and +minister to the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to +rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the +Protagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In +some other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a +parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of +Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two +dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic +notion, as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and +in the Phaedo, pleasure and good are distinctly opposed. + +This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the +Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief +good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the +Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, +are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias’ +definition of rhetoric (Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of +persuasion, of all arts the best, for to it all things submit, not by +compulsion, but of their own free will—marks a close and perhaps +designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of +measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful +and the good. + +In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to +public opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, +and portions of the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from +another point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to +Plato’s theory of morals which the Theaetetus bears to his theory of +knowledge. + +d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant +irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot’s modest charge; +and in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of +self-condemnation; and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in +both worlds. (2) The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion +should not be overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals +such as Archelaus; the retaliation of the box on the ears; the +nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the clothes +or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided +for them (compare Swift’s notion that the universe is a suit of +clothes, Tale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in +the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal +likeness after death. (3) The appeal of the authority of Homer, who +says that Odysseus saw Minos in his court “holding a golden sceptre,” +which gives verisimilitude to the tale. + +It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing “both sides of +the game,” and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, +we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only +attempting to analyze the “dramatis personae’ as they were conceived by +him. Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that +Plato is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be +assumed to be those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any +other speaker who appears to have the best of the argument; or to +repeat the observation that he is a poet as well as a philosopher; or +to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern standard, but +interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought and +the opinion of his time. + +It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is +the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this +mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of +Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting +any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived +from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings +(e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of +intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the “liberty +of prophesying;’ and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this +nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true +man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same +time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to +avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of +consequences, will probably share the fate of Socrates. + + +The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to +which he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, +he puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of +ridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against +themselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables +of the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half +conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more +ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical +than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the +objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to +be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest +sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the +argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher +reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all +ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found +the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of +the wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but +by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At +length he makes even Polus in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument, +and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in +a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his +adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return +to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of +the dialogue. + +First Thesis:— + +It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice. + +Compare the New Testament— + +“It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.”—1 Pet. + +And the Sermon on the Mount— + +“Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness’ sake.”—Matt. + +The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but +they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous +may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no +reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by +Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is +dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the +offender (compare Republic). But they are not equally willing to +acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil, +and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes are +committed on the great scale—the crimes of tyrants, ancient or +modern—after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have +become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not +from any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted +by time, and “to forgive is convenient to them.” The tangle of good and +evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end +cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out +of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the +tyrant now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and +has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is +the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will +be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or +for evil cannot alter a hair’s breadth the morality of actions which +are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates +holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are +of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level +of our practice. + +And so of private individuals—to them, too, the world occasionally +speaks of the consequences of their actions:—if they are lovers of +pleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, +they will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not +of what will be, but of what is—of the present consequence of lowering +and degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men +everywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would +agree with him—they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators +of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death +comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an +unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but +to a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering +ideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a +new life in us. + +Second Thesis:— + +It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer. + +There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty +followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would +then be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid +vice as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening +and enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the +consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort +of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business +of early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation +and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be +unfortunate—he had better have suffered when he was young, and been +saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally +unfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing +from him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are +revealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have +been caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by +the pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on +the means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them, +and make allowances for them; but we do not consider that the same +principle applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found +out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious +point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil +doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have +given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, +and therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are +healed by time; + +“While rank corruption, mining all within, +Infects unseen.” + + +The “accustomed irony” of Socrates adds a corollary to the +argument:—“Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape +unpunished”—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of +Proverbs, “Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,” etc., quoted in +Romans.) + +Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own +lives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are +very kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love +is always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar +figure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence +but in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather +than by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must +speak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint +in eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any +suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to +submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed +in another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not +we too accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the +rhetoric of prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while +the struggle between the better and the worse is going on within us. +And sometimes we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to +restore the balance which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and +then again we may hear a voice as of a parent consoling us. In +religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the consciences +of men “accusing or else excusing them.” For all our life long we are +talking with ourselves:—What is thought but speech? What is feeling but +rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always +in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at +first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us. + +Third Thesis:— + +We do not what we will, but what we wish. + +Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn—that good +intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by +wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which +we afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be +inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often +be the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase +pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to +changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately +disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we +regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an advantage +over us—we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of +which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this +impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has “the least +possible power” while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually +bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of +nature is open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will +exercise ordinary attention; every day offers him experiences of his +own and of other men’s characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The +contemplation of the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men +in regard to them, seems to have led Socrates to his famous +thesis:—“Virtue is knowledge;” which is not so much an error or paradox +as a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but +also the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present +age. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine +a right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other +hand, have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But +Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though +the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental +systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem +to lie at the basis of morality. (Compare the following: “Now, and for +us, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have +Hebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and +discipline received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal +possession. And as humanity is constituted, one must never assign the +second rank to-day without being ready to restore them to the first +to-morrow.” Sir William W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa.) + +Fourth Thesis:— + +To be and not to seem is the end of life. + +The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief +incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their +fellows is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of +seeming enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear +better than they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of +others. A man of ability can easily feign the language of piety or +virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy +which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is +the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different +opinions about themselves and one another which prevail in different +ranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind by the study of +one department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and +stronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest +in certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of +medicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of +these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very +ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we +have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry +of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a +religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has +been accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and +nothing on the other. The conventions and customs which we observe in +conversation, and the opposition of our interests when we have dealings +with one another (“the buyer saith, it is nought—it is nought,” etc.), +are always obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of +human nature is far more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few +persons speak freely from their own natures, and scarcely any one dares +to think for himself: most of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions +of those around us, which we partly help to make. A man who would shake +himself loose from them, requires great force of mind; he hardly knows +where to begin in the search after truth. On every side he is met by +the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the most +real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded +collectively and subjected to the influences of society. + +Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the +unreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that +they must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must +have the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must +acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of +doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have +nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire +firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to +take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must +try to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men. +A single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be +true and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, +and what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can +form a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most +secret actions he can show the same high principle (compare Republic) +which he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on +some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right, +even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition, +may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and +lawyers, and be too much for them. + +Who is the true and who the false statesman?— + +The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first +organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and +having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with +those of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a +dealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his +mind; while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although +obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts +are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an +ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health +and life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the +moral and intellectual qualities of every individual are freely +developed, and “the idea of good” is the animating principle of the +whole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how +to unite freedom with order is the problem which he has to solve. + +The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken +a task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself +before he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage +them. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal +enmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such +meannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed +in the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country +and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation +will say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but +because he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be +more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans; +not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; +but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed +time, for he knows that human life, “if not long in comparison with +eternity” (Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great +purposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he +is no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers +are failing, think of that other “city of which the pattern is in +heaven” (Republic). + +The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to +govern men he becomes like them; their “minds are married in +conjunction;” they “bear themselves” like vulgar and tyrannical +masters, and he is their obedient servant. The true politician, if he +would rule men, must make them like himself; he must “educate his +party” until they cease to be a party; he must breathe into them the +spirit which will hereafter give form to their institutions. Politics +with him are not a mechanism for seeming what he is not, or for +carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a representative man, he +is the representative not of the lower but of the higher elements of +the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion of +which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human +affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are +threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by +force—two or three moves on the political chess board are all that he +can fore see—two or three weeks moves on the political chessboard are +all that he can foresee—two or three weeks or months are granted to him +in which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also +that there are permanent principles of politics which are always +tending to the well-being of states—better administration, better +education, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased +security against external enemies. These are not “of to-day or +yesterday,” but are the same in all times, and under all forms of +government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he +knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato’s +captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye +and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into +port. + +The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of +the world—not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures +of which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no +intention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of +politics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which +political convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity, +and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon +follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than +themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity; +they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the +popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. +Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most +unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done +what might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received +justice at their hands. + +The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and +circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; +he must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act +together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the +majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader +and not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He +will neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman, +neither adopting the “laissez faire” nor the “paternal government” +principle; but he will, whether he is dealing with children in +politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the +government can do for them, and what, from imperfect education or +deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He +knows that if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that +if he does nothing for them they will in some states of society be +utterly helpless. For the many cannot exist without the few, if the +material force of a country is from below, wisdom and experience are +from above. It is not a small part of human evils which kings and +governments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a great +purpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be +executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by +some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown +element of politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill +are combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will +not be always consistent, for the world is changing; and though he +depends upon the support of a party, he will remember that he is the +minister of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for the +future, and he is not at all sure that he will be appreciated either +now or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him, +and may not be remembered by a distant posterity. + +There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates +in the Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, +not excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy +feeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as +the actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the +actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and +egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent +men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those +who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own +powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at +all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes +the more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more +conscientious, because he has not equally deceived expectations. Such +sentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread; we constantly +find them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still oftener in +private conversation. + +We may further observe that the art of government, while in some +respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as +institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot +easily be combined with governing by the people: the interests of +classes are too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a +comprehensive view of the whole. According to Socrates the true +governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and will only +be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man +than himself (Republic). And in modern times, though the world has +grown milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no +longer await an English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a +blind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a work in which +he is most likely to fail; and even if he succeed, will rarely be +rewarded by the gratitude of his own generation. + +Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only +real politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words +by applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said +that not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real +politicians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, +Ricardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an +inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private +persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in the +next generation have become an irresistible power. “Herein is that +saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.” We may imagine with Plato +an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly +harmonized; for there is no necessary opposition between them. But +experience shows that they are commonly divorced—the ordinary +politician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others, +and hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or +two only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have +created the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally +unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by the +many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet +perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also +happier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They +have the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers +and visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no +longer here, those who would have been ashamed of them during their +lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be called by their +names. (Compare Thucyd.) + +Who is the true poet? + +Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to +sense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice +removed from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in +the Gorgias that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure +and not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry +admitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in +primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem +to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation +of our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art of +review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of +seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer +censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers? + +Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to +give amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, +good or bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There +have been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have +not forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of +the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character. +The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are +still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty, +and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of +men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary +life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are +ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old +he makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new +dignity; he finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality +and politics. He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is +beyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the +better part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is +strengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of +poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to +disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature, +and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry +is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the +happiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, +of the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to +his greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know +what may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the +poetical and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of +religion, with truth, may still be possible. Neither is the element of +pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a +lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist, +too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a +thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of +poetic and artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of +the noble purposes to which art may be applied (Republic). + +Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato’s language, a +flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, +the poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language +and metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he +has the “savoir faire,” or trick of writing, but he has not the higher +spirit of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order +out of disorder; that it should make provision for the soul’s highest +interest; that it should be pursued only with a view to “the +improvement of the citizens.” He ministers to the weaker side of human +nature (Republic); he idealizes the sensual; he sings the strain of +love in the latest fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he +brings them back to the “tyranny of the many masters,” from which all +his life long a good man has been praying to be delivered. And often, +forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that which is +truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and +nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated +brain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the +master of his words, but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the +faded reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the +better of him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we +suppose that such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence +on the minds of men? + +“Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:” Art then must be +true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and +not a seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of +disorder, truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the +greatest improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way “we +can best spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.” Plato +does not say that God will order all things for the best (compare +Phaedo), but he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be +corrected in another. And as we are very far from the best imaginable +world at present, Plato here, as in the Phaedo and Republic, supposes a +purgatory or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very +few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not +the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in +the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can +reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on +Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner +in which we are “born again” (Republic). Only he is prepared to +maintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no +one, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine +without being ridiculous. + +There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are +held to be indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without +regard to consequences is happiness. From this elevation or +exaggeration of feeling Plato seems to shrink: he leaves it to the +Stoics in a later generation to maintain that when impaled or on the +rack the philosopher may be happy (compare Republic). It is observable +that in the Republic he raises this question, but it is not really +discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another life, are +allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or +sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in +raptures, having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if +there were no future, might he not still be happy in the performance of +an action which was attended only by a painful death? He himself may be +ready to thank God that he was thought worthy to do Him the least +service, without looking for a reward; the joys of another life may not +have been present to his mind at all. Do we suppose that the mediaeval +saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of Sienna, or the +Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a lingering +disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the +“sweets” of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and enough. +Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or +of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in +God will be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour. +If he were certain that there were no life to come, he would not have +wished to speak or act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or +of humanity. Neither, on the other hand, will he suppose that God has +forsaken him or that the future is to be a mere blank to him. The +greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot pass away, is his +who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the sons of +men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present, +or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already +present with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of +immortality; he has in him already a principle stronger than death. He +who serves man without the thought of reward is deemed to be a more +faithful servant than he who works for hire. May not the service of +God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the higher? And +although only a very few in the course of the world’s history—Christ +himself being one of them—have attained to such a noble conception of +God and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be present to us, +and the remembrance of them be an example to us, and their lives may +shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and theology. + +THE MYTHS OF PLATO. + +The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are +four longer ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and +Republic. That in the Republic is the most elaborate and finished of +them. Three of these greater myths, namely those contained in the +Phaedo, the Gorgias and the Republic, relate to the destiny of human +souls in a future life. The magnificent myth in the Phaedrus treats of +the immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in which is +included a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may +be added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in +which the life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man +and the consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of +Atlantis, an imaginary history, which is a fragment only, commenced in +the Timaeus and continued in the Critias: (3) the much less artistic +fiction of the foundation of the Cretan colony which is introduced in +the preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the background: (4) the +beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus +narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue called +after him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a +parody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the +recantation of it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the +grasshoppers, and (7) the tale of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the +Phaedrus: (8) the parable of the Cave (Republic), in which the previous +argument is recapitulated, and the nature and degrees of knowledge +having been previously set forth in the abstract are represented in a +picture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Republic; compare +Laws), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new +beginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the +division of the sexes, Sym.: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the +pilot, and the mutinous sailors (Republic), in which is represented the +relation of the better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to +the mob of politicians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies +between Athens and Aegina charging only a small payment for saving men +from death, the reason being that he is uncertain whether to live or +die is better for them (Gor.): (13) the treatment of freemen and +citizens by physicians and of slaves by their apprentices,—a somewhat +laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate the two different ways +in which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also occur in Plato +continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing +and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless +(paupers and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are +generated in the transition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which +is to the visible world what the idea of good is to the intellectual, +in the Sixth Book of the Republic: the composite animal, having the +form of a man, but containing under a human skin a lion and a +many-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e. the populace: and +the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are always liable +to break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation of philosophy +by the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the +parricide, who “beats his father, having first taken away his arms”: +the dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather paltry +image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), which is +repeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument personified as +veiling her face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us +in a first, second and third wave:—on these figures of speech the +changes are rung many times over. It is observable that nearly all +these parables or continuous images are found in the Republic; that +which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the midwifery of Socrates, is +perhaps the only exception. To make the list complete, the mathematical +figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the numerical interval +which separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten. + +The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life +which, like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences +of the mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which +await good and bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue +and to be in another world what it has become in this. It includes a +Paradiso, Purgatorio, and Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo +and the Republic. The Inferno is reserved for great criminals only. The +argument of the dialogue is frequently referred to, and the meaning +breaks through so as rather to destroy the liveliness and consistency +of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very slight, the chief +point or moral being that in the judgments of another world there is no +possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of +foreseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their +judges naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to +view, stripped of the veils and clothes which might prevent them from +seeing into or being seen by one another. + +The myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more +cosmological, and also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy +occurs to Plato that the upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in +one, a glorified earth, fairer and purer than that in which we dwell. +As the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are living in a lower sphere, +out of which they put their heads for a moment or two and behold a +world beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the coarser +particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly +earth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of +the myth consists of description of the interior of the earth, which +gives the opportunity of introducing several mythological names and of +providing places of torment for the wicked. There is no clear +distinction of soul and body; the spirits beneath the earth are spoken +of as souls only, yet they retain a sort of shadowy form when they cry +for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the philosopher alone is said +to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in Plato which relate +to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as well as other +homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural +reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of +human character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind +are between them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of +the Phaedo they are carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian +lake, where they dwell, and are purified of their evil deeds, and +receive the rewards of their good. There are also incurable sinners, +who are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the penalty of atrocious +crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another class of +hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach +the shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for +mercy; which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from +their torments. + +Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps +any allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent +with itself. The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; +abstract ideas are transformed into persons, figures of speech into +realities. These myths may be compared with the Pilgrim’s Progress of +Bunyan, in which discussions of theology are mixed up with the +incidents of travel, and mythological personages are associated with +human beings: they are also garnished with names and phrases taken out +of Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition. + +The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than +either of the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they +have, and is full of touches which recall the experiences of human +life. It will be noticed by an attentive reader that the twelve days +during which Er lay in a trance after he was slain coincide with the +time passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It is a curious +observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a +well-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable +society?) are more likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than +those who have had more experience of the world and of evil. It is a +more familiar remark that we constantly blame others when we have only +ourselves to blame; and the philosopher must acknowledge, however +reluctantly, that there is an element of chance in human life with +which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. That men drink more +of the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a poetical +description of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, like +Odysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We +should like to know what became of the infants “dying almost as soon as +they were born,” but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our +curiosity. The two companies of souls, ascending and descending at +either chasm of heaven and earth, and conversing when they come out +into the meadow, the majestic figures of the judges sitting in heaven, +the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of the great allegory which +have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark already made +respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be extended +also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a +picture of the Day of Judgment. + +The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an +Oriental, or rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an +affinity to the mysteries and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a +certain extent they are un-Greek; at any rate there is hardly anything +like them in other Greek writings which have a serious purpose; in +spirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be termed the +underground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented in +the most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as +true; it is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a +future life. Plato seems to make use of them when he has reached the +limits of human knowledge; or, to borrow an expression of his own, when +he is standing on the outside of the intellectual world. They are very +simple in style; a few touches bring the picture home to the mind, and +make it present to us. They have also a kind of authority gained by the +employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere fragments of the +words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to any +subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry +and mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of +them may be summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and +“there is some better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.” + +All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for +example, the tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at +first sight to be an extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety +when we remember that it is based on a legendary belief. The art of +making stories of ghosts and apparitions credible is said to consist in +the manner of telling them. The effect is gained by many literary and +conversational devices, such as the previous raising of curiosity, the +mention of little circumstances, simplicity, picturesqueness, the +naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is possessed by +Plato in a degree which has never been equalled. + +The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been +already described, but is of a different character. It treats of a +former rather than of a future life. It represents the conflict of +reason aided by passion or righteous indignation on the one hand, and +of the animal lusts and instincts on the other. The soul of man has +followed the company of some god, and seen truth in the form of the +universal before it was born in this world. Our present life is the +result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is +relative to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We +ask the question, Where were men before birth? As we likewise enquire, +What will become of them after death? The first question is unfamiliar +to us, and therefore seems to be unnatural; but if we survey the whole +human race, it has been as influential and as widely spread as the +other. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of speech in which the +“spiritual combat” of this life is represented. The majesty and power +of the whole passage—especially of what may be called the theme or +proem (beginning “The mind through all her being is immortal”)—can only +be rendered very inadequately in another language. + +The myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in +which men were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth’s +motion had their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: +the dead came to life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged +young; the youth became a child, the child an infant, the infant +vanished into the earth. The connection between the reversal of the +earth’s motion and the reversal of human life is of course verbal only, +yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues from the consistency +of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was immediately +under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which men +had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all +things spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the +animals. There were no great estates, or families, or private +possessions, nor any traditions of the past, because men were all born +out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the “reign of Cronos;” and +in like manner he connects the reversal of the earth’s motion with some +legend of which he himself was probably the inventor. + +The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of +existence was man the happier,—under that of Cronos, which was a state +of innocence, or that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while +Plato balances the two sides of the serious controversy, which he has +suggested in a figure. The answer depends on another question: What use +did the children of Cronos make of their time? They had boundless +leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only with one another, but +with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a view to +philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of +knowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and +telling stories to one another and to the beasts?—in either case there +would be no difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather +mischievously adds, “Nobody knows what they did,” and therefore the +doubt must remain undetermined. + +To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural +convulsion, in which the order of the world and of human life is once +more reversed, God withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the +government of himself. The world begins again, and arts and laws are +slowly and painfully invented. A secular age succeeds to a +theocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has dropped, or almost +dropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious and +important thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence, +the existence of a world without traditions, and the difference between +human and divine government. He has also carried a step further his +speculations concerning the abolition of the family and of property, +which he supposes to have no place among the children of Cronos any +more than in the ideal state. + +It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract +to the concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of +the seen, and also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A +great writer knows how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining +within the sphere of the visible, and then again comprehending a wider +range and soaring to the abstract and universal. Even in the same +sentence he may employ both modes of speech not improperly or +inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors of +Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as +can be painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the +reader. A poem may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not +one but many latent images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the +thoughts of many hearts. Often the rapid transition from one image to +another is pleasing to us: on the other hand, any single figure of +speech if too often repeated, or worked out too much at length, becomes +prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we necessarily include +both “the moral law within and the starry heaven above,” and pass from +one to the other (compare for examples Psalms xviii. and xix.). Whether +such a use of language is puerile or noble depends upon the genius of +the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the associations +employed. + +In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation +is not forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are +told to a living audience, and so well told that we are more than +half-inclined to believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation +too, the striking image or figure of speech is not forgotten, but is +quickly caught up, and alluded to again and again; as it would still be +in our own day in a genial and sympathetic society. The descriptions of +Plato have a greater life and reality than is to be found in any modern +writing. This is due to their homeliness and simplicity. Plato can do +with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed “more plastic +than wax” (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing speech and +writing, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language in +which they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest +truths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of +daily life are not overlooked. + + + + + +GORGIAS + +By Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, +Polus. + +SCENE: The house of Callicles. + +CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but +not for a feast. + +SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast? + +CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been +exhibiting to us many fine things. + +SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to +blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora. + +CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been +the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I +will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, +at some other time. + +CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear +Gorgias? + +CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming. + +CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, +and he shall exhibit to you. + +SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I +want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is +which he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, +defer the exhibition to some other time. + +CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to +answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only +just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and +that he would answer. + +SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon—? + +CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him? + +SOCRATES: Ask him who he is. + +CHAEREPHON: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had +been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you +understand? + +CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our +friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any +questions which you are asked? + +GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; +and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me +a new one. + +CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias. + +GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial. + +POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of +me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is +tired. + +CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than +Gorgias? + +POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you? + +CHAEREPHON: Not at all:—and you shall answer if you like. + +POLUS: Ask:— + +CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his +brother Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the +name which is given to his brother? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician? + +POLUS: Yes. + +CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, +or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him? + +POLUS: Clearly, a painter. + +CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he +is skilled. + +POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are +experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes +the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according +to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in +different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend +Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is +the noblest. + +SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; +but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon. + +GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he +was asked. + +GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself? + +SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to +answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he +has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to +dialectic. + +POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art +which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one +who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was. + +POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody +asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by +what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you +briefly and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at +first, to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or +rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,—what +are we to call you, and what is the art which you profess? + +GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art. + +SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician? + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that +which, in Homeric language, “I boast myself to be.” + +SOCRATES: I should wish to do so. + +GORGIAS: Then pray do. + +SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men +rhetoricians? + +GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at +Athens, but in all places. + +SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, +as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer +mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, +and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you? + +GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do +my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession +is that I can be as short as any one. + +SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method +now, and the longer one at some other time. + +GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard +a man use fewer words. + +SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a +maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: +I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would +you not?), with the making of garments? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies? + +GORGIAS: It is. + +SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your +answers. + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that. + +SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about +rhetoric: with what is rhetoric concerned? + +GORGIAS: With discourse. + +SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would +teach the sick under what treatment they might get well? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak? + +GORGIAS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now +mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases? + +GORGIAS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the +good or evil condition of the body? + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them +treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally +have to do. + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of +discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call +them arts of rhetoric? + +GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to +do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no +such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only +through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying +that rhetoric treats of discourse. + +SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare +say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:—you would +allow that there are arts? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part +concerned with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, +and statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and +of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the +province of rhetoric. + +GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium +of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for +example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of +playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive +with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater—they +depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your +meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort? + +GORGIAS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of +these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used +was, that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through +the medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious +might say, “And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.” But I do +not think that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than +geometry would be so called by you. + +GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my +meaning. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:—seeing +that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of +words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is +that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:—Suppose that a +person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; +he might say, “Socrates, what is arithmetic?” and I should reply to +him, as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which +take effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: “Words +about what?” and I should reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and +how many there are of each. And if he asked again: “What is the art of +calculation?” I should say, That also is one of the arts which is +concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, “Concerned with +what?” I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, “as aforesaid” of +arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of +calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, +but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. +And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words—he would +ask, “Words about what, Socrates?” and I should answer, that astronomy +tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their +relative swiftness. + +GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about +rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those +arts which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of +words? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do +the words which rhetoric uses relate? + +GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things. + +SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for +which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you +have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the +singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, +thirdly, as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained. + +GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the +author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, +the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will +say: “O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned +with the greatest good of men and not his.” And when I ask, Who are +you? he will reply, “I am a physician.” What do you mean? I shall say. +Do you mean that your art produces the greatest good? “Certainly,” he +will answer, “for is not health the greatest good? What greater good +can men have, Socrates?” And after him the trainer will come and say, +“I too, Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more +good of his art than I can show of mine.” To him again I shall say, Who +are you, honest friend, and what is your business? “I am a trainer,” he +will reply, “and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in +body.” When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the +money-maker, and he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. +“Consider Socrates,” he will say, “whether Gorgias or any one else can +produce any greater good than wealth.” Well, you and I say to him, and +are you a creator of wealth? “Yes,” he replies. And who are you? “A +money-maker.” And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of +man? “Of course,” will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our +friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than +yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, “What good? Let +Gorgias answer.” Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question +is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, is +the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us. + +GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that +which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the +power of ruling over others in their several states. + +SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be? + +GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges +in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the +assembly, or at any other political meeting?—if you have the power of +uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the +trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found +to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak +and to persuade the multitude. + +SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained +what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I +am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having +this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you +know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing +persuasion? + +GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for +persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric. + +SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever +was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of +knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you. + +GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know +what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of +that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; +although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am +going to ask—what is this power of persuasion which is given by +rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask +instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the +argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth +the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking this +further question: If I asked, “What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?” and +you said, “The painter of figures,” should I not be right in asking, +“What kind of figures, and where do you find them?” + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that +there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, +then you would have answered very well? + +GORGIAS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is +rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have +the same effect? I mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade +men of that which he teaches or not? + +GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that. + +SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now +speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the +properties of number? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of +persuasion? + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about +what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and +even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we +were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, +and about what. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but +that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question +has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the +artificer, and about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the +question? + +GORGIAS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the +answer? + +GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in +courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about +the just and unjust. + +SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your +notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found +repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute +you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, +and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the +meaning of one another’s words; I would have you develope your own +views in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis. + +GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as +“having learned”? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there is also “having believed”? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is the “having learned” the same as “having believed,” +and are learning and belief the same things? + +GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. + +SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this +way:—If a person were to say to you, “Is there, Gorgias, a false belief +as well as a true?”—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there +is. + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief +differ. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have +believed are persuaded? + +GORGIAS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is +the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge? + +GORGIAS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts +of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of +persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives +knowledge? + +GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a +persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no +instruction about them? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or +other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief +about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast +multitude about such high matters in a short time? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about +rhetoric; for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the +assembly meets to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other +craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For +at every election he ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, +again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to be +constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or +when generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a +position taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: +what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a +maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the nature of your +art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your interest in +view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of the +young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see +some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too +modest to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, +I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. “What is +the use of coming to you, Gorgias?” they will say—“about what will you +teach us to advise the state?—about the just and unjust only, or about +those other things also which Socrates has just mentioned?” How will +you answer them? + +GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will +endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have +heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the +plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, +partly of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the +suggestion of the builders. + +SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I +myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle +wall. + +GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be +given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the +men who win their point. + +SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is +the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the +matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness. + +GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric +comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me +offer you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been +with my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his +patients, who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or +apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for +me what he would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. +And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, +and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to +which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would +have no chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; +and in a contest with a man of any other profession the rhetorician +more than any one would have the power of getting himself chosen, for +he can speak more persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and +on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric! +And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other competitive +art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to abuse his +strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of +fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for +friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his +friends. Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a +skilful boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his +father or mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no +reason why the trainers or fencing-masters should be held in +detestation or banished from the city;—surely not. For they taught +their art for a good purpose, to be used against enemies and +evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and others have +perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own +strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, +neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that +those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument +holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men +and upon any subject,—in short, he can persuade the multitude better +than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should not +therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his +reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric +fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having +become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his +instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation +or banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of +his instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person +who ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and +not his instructor. + +SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of +disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not +always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either +party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are +apt to arise—somebody says that another has not spoken truly or +clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both +parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal +feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the +question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another +until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever +listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot +help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or +accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am +afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some +animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of +discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of +my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you +alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are +very willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and +very willing to refute any one else who says what is not true, and +quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the +greater gain of the two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of +a very great evil than of curing another. For I imagine that there is +no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about +the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my +sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have +done, no matter;—let us make an end of it. + +GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you +indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before +you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the +argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we +should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the +company when they are wanting to do something else. + +CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which +shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that +I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a +discussion so interesting and so ably maintained. + +CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at +many discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, +and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better +pleased. + +SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is. + +GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, +especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with +the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any +question which you like. + +SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your +words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have +misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will +learn of you, a rhetorician? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the +multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by +persuasion? + +GORGIAS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have +greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of +health? + +GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,—that is. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know +he cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the +physician, he will have greater power than he who knows? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:—is he? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of +what the physician knows. + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the +physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he +who has knowledge?—is not that the inference? + +GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the +other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he +has only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has +more knowledge than those who know? + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?—not to have +learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in +no way inferior to the professors of them? + +SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is +a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to +be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he +is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, +good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, +does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or +honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the +ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to +know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must the +pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can +acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher +of rhetoric will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will +make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know +them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable +to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things +first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish +that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying +that you would. + +GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to +know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well. + +SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make +a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust +already, or he must be taught by you. + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like +manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his +knowledge makes him. + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? + +GORGIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just? + +GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference. + +SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do +injustice? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just +man? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? + +GORGIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not +to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his +pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and +unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his +teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made +a bad use of his rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said? + +GORGIAS: Yes, it was. + +SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will +never have done injustice at all? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric +treated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but +about just and unjust? Was not this said? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that +rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly +be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the +rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the +inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you +thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would +be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would +leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see +yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of +making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By +the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we +get at the truth of all this. + +POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now +saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that +the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and +admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could +teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a +contradiction—the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but +you, brought the argument by your captious questions—(do you seriously +believe that there is any truth in all this?) For will any one ever +acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of +justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing +the argument to such a pass. + +SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with +friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger +generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and +in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you +who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error +into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition: + +POLUS: What condition? + +SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which +you indulged at first. + +POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please? + +SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to +Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got +there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that +would be hard indeed. But then consider my case:—shall not I be very +hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to +answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, +and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the +argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it +on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn +ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute and be refuted: for I +suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows—would you not? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything +which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him? + +POLUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer? + +POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question +which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my +opinion. + +POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, +you say that you have made an art. + +POLUS: What thing? + +SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience. + +POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? + +SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind. + +POLUS: An experience in what? + +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and +gratification. + +POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine +thing? + +SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether +rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what +rhetoric is? + +POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? + +SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a +slight gratification to me? + +POLUS: I will. + +SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? + +POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? + +SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus. + +POLUS: What then? + +SOCRATES: I should say an experience. + +POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me. + +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and +gratification, Polus. + +POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? + +SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession. + +POLUS: Of what profession? + +SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I +hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of +his own profession. For whether or not this is that art of rhetoric +which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:—from what he was just now +saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the +rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. + +GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind +me. + +SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a +part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which +knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word +“flattery”; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which +is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an +experience or routine and not an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the +art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four +branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may +ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of +flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him +when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think +rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a +fine thing or not, until I have first answered, “What is rhetoric?” For +that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you +will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric? + +POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my +view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. + +POLUS: And noble or ignoble? + +SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I +call what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I +was saying before. + +GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. + +SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained +myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt +to run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name “Polus,” which +means “a colt.”) + +GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that +rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. + +SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I +am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the +existence of bodies and of souls? + +GORGIAS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of +either of them? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in +appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be +in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at +first sight not to be in good health. + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: +in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and +not the reality? + +GORGIAS: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what +I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to +them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another +art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which +may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and +the other medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which +answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts +run into one another, justice having to do with the same subject as +legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with +a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending +on the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery +knowing, or rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into +four shams or simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one +or other of them, and pretends to be that which she simulates, and +having no regard for men’s highest interests, is ever making pleasure +the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the belief that she is +of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the disguise of +medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the body; and +if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in which +children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, +as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, +the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be +and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, +because it aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I +do not call it, but only an experience, because it is unable to explain +or to give a reason of the nature of its own applications. And I do not +call any irrational thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am +prepared to argue in defence of them. + +Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of +medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the +form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working +deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and +garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the +true beauty which is given by gymnastic. + +I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the +manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be +able to follow) + +as tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine; + +or rather, + +as tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation; + +and + +as cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice. + +And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and +the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be +jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, +nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided +over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul +did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the +body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the +bodily delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, +that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would +prevail far and wide: “Chaos” would come again, and cookery, health, +and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have +told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what +cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long +speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think +that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and could +make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to +enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use +of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able +to understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only +fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer. + +POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery? + +SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you +cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older? + +POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under +the idea that they are flatterers? + +SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech? + +POLUS: I am asking a question. + +SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all. + +POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? + +SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor. + +POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say. + +SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all +the citizens. + +POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile +any one whom they please. + +SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of +yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a +question of me. + +POLUS: I am asking a question of you. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once. + +POLUS: How two questions? + +SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like +tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they +please? + +POLUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, +and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that +rhetoricians and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I +was just now saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but +only what they think best. + +POLUS: And is not that a great power? + +SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse. + +POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert. + +SOCRATES: No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you say +that power is a good to him who has the power. + +POLUS: I do. + +SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks +best, this is a good, and would you call this great power? + +POLUS: I should not. + +SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and +that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so you will have refuted +me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what +they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon +which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a +good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an +evil. + +POLUS: Yes; I admit that. + +SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power +in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they +do as they will? + +POLUS: This fellow— + +SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me. + +POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? + +SOCRATES: And I say so still. + +POLUS: Then surely they do as they will? + +SOCRATES: I deny it. + +POLUS: But they do what they think best? + +SOCRATES: Aye. + +POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. + +SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar +style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I +am in error or give the answer yourself. + +POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. + +SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will +that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take +medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the +drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake +of which they drink? + +POLUS: Clearly, the health. + +SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do +not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to +take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will, to +have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage. + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for +the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that +for the sake of which he does it. + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate +and indifferent? + +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call +goods, and their opposites evils? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which +partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or +of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, +wood, stones, and the like:—these are the things which you call neither +good nor evil? + +POLUS: Exactly so. + +SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, +or the good for the sake of the indifferent? + +POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. + +SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the +idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for +the sake of the good? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil +him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the +good? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of +something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other +thing for the sake of which we do them? + +POLUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or +to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to +our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will +it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is +neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you +silent, Polus? Am I not right? + +POLUS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant +or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of +his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when +really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best +to him? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do +you not answer? + +POLUS: Well, I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one +have great power in a state? + +POLUS: He will not. + +SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good +to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? + +POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of +doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would +not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or +imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no! + +SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean? + +POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied? + +SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus! + +POLUS: Why “forbear”? + +SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be +envied, but only to pity them. + +POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches? + +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are. + +POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and +justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched? + +SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he +is to be envied. + +POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case +he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him +justly. + +POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death +is wretched, and to be pitied? + +SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as +he who is justly killed. + +POLUS: How can that be, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the +greatest of evils. + +POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater +evil? + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice? + +SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, +I would rather suffer than do. + +POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant? + +SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean. + +POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good +to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like. + +SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do +you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a +dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare +power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom +you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is +as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his +garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an +instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe +me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in +that sort of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house +which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all +their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that +this mere doing as you think best is great power? + +POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this. + +SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power? + +POLUS: I can. + +SOCRATES: Why then? + +POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be +punished. + +SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power +is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and +that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is +an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another +way:—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, +the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are +sometimes a good and sometimes not a good? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when +that they are evil—what principle do you lay down? + +POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask +that question. + +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, +I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are +unjust. + +POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child +refute that statement? + +SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally +grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my +foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing +good to a friend. + +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; +events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and +to prove that many men who do wrong are happy. + +SOCRATES: What events? + +POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now +the ruler of Macedonia? + +SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is. + +POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable? + +SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance +with him. + +POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance +with him, whether a man is happy? + +SOCRATES: Most certainly not. + +POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know +whether the great king was a happy man? + +SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands +in the matter of education and justice. + +POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women +who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust +and evil are miserable. + +POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is +miserable? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked. + +POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to +the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who +was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore +in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do +rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your +doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably +miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first +place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under +the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas +has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was +his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, +he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew +them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all +this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of +all men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he +showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years +old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the +kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he +ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of +happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned +him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while +running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the +greatest criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the +most miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there +are many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would +rather be any other Macedonian than Archelaus! + +SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather +than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with +which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand +refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good +friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have +been saying. + +POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do. + +SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me +after the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For +there the one party think that they refute the other when they bring +forward a number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their +allegations, and their adversary has only a single one or none at all. +But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may +often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great +air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian +and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring +witnesses in disproof of my statement;—you may, if you will, summon +Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of +tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you +may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that +famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole +house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you +choose;—they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot +agree, for you do not convince me; although you produce many false +witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, +which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth speaking of will +have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of my words; +nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter +about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one +which is yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another +sort—let us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we +are at issue about matters which to know is honourable and not to know +disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness and misery—that is the +chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more +disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin by asking you whether +you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be +happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I +assume this to be your opinion? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility—here is one point +about which we are at issue:—very good. And do you mean to say also +that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be +happy? + +POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable. + +SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, +according to you, he will be happy? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust +actions is miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not +punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he +be punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men. + +POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a +friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are +they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice? + +POLUS: Exactly so. + +SOCRATES: And you said the opposite? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted +me? + +POLUS: By Zeus, I did. + +SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus. + +POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right. + +SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be +unpunished? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who +are punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this +proposition also? + +POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, +Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth? + +POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to +make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his +eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries +inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the +like, is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier +than if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life +doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and +admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, +as you say, cannot be refuted? + +SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead +of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But +please to refresh my memory a little; did you say—“in an unjust attempt +to make himself a tyrant”? + +POLUS: Yes, I did. + +SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the +other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers +in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but +that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the +two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,—when +any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him. + +POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently +refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the +company. + +SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my +tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their +president to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was +unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count +the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no +better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial +of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall +produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person +with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the +many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May +I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to +the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really +believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not +to be punished than to be punished. + +POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for +example, suffer rather than do injustice? + +SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would. + +POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man. + +SOCRATES: But will you answer? + +POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have +to say. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I +am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your +opinion, is the worst?—to do injustice or to suffer? + +POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst. + +SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer. + +POLUS: To do. + +SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the +honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful +things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you +not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for +example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the +sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other +account of personal beauty? + +POLUS: I cannot. + +SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they +were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of +their use, or of both? + +POLUS: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same +reason? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in +so far as they are useful or pleasant or both? + +POLUS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge? + +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring +beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility. + +SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the +opposite standard of pain and evil? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the +measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is +to say, in pleasure or utility or both? + +POLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity +or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now +made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering +wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful? + +POLUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the +more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in +evil or both: does not that also follow? + +POLUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice +exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer +more than the injured? + +POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain? + +POLUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will +therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice? + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do +injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to +a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm +if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as +to a physician without shrinking, and either say “Yes” or “No” to me. + +POLUS: I should say “No.” + +SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil? + +POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any +man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the +greater evil of the two. + +POLUS: That is the conclusion. + +SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of +refutations, how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of +myself, are of your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness +are enough for me,—I have no need of any other, I take your suffrage, +and am regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed +to the next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a +guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to +escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:—You +would say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly +corrected when you do wrong? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable +in so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your +opinion. + +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are. + +SOCRATES: Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also +be a patient? + +POLUS: I should say so. + +SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, +and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for +example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is +stricken? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which +is struck will be struck violently or quickly? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same +nature as the act of him who strikes? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing +burned will be burned in the same way? + +POLUS: Truly. + +SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be +something cut? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause +pain, the cut will be of the same nature? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition +which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient +answers to the affection of the agent? + +POLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished +is suffering or acting? + +POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that. + +SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent? + +POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher. + +SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly? + +POLUS: Justly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers +justly? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished +suffers what is honourable? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the +honourable is either pleasant or useful? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good? + +POLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then he is benefited? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term +“benefited”? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is +improved. + +POLUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his +soul? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at +the matter in this way:—In respect of a man’s estate, do you see any +greater evil than poverty? + +POLUS: There is no greater evil. + +SOCRATES: Again, in a man’s bodily frame, you would say that the evil +is weakness and disease and deformity? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil +of her own? + +POLUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and +cowardice, and the like? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have +pointed out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the +most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the +soul? + +POLUS: By far the most. + +SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst? + +POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already +admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both. + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted +by us to be most disgraceful? + +POLUS: It has been admitted. + +SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing +excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and +ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick? + +POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow +from your premises. + +SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of +the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of +disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or +extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil. + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the +greatest of evils? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity +of the soul, are the greatest of evils? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does +not the art of making money? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of +medicine? + +POLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to +answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom +we take them. + +POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate? + +POLUS: To the judges, you mean. + +SOCRATES: —Who are to punish them? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in +accordance with a certain rule of justice? + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; +medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three? + +POLUS: Will you enumerate them? + +SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice. + +POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others. + +SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or +advantage or both? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who +are being healed pleased? + +POLUS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: A useful thing, then? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and +this is the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who +is healed, or who never was out of health? + +POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health. + +SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered +from evils, but in never having had them. + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in +their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, +and another is not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the +most miserable? + +POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed. + +SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from +the greatest of evils, which is vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the +medicine of our vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who +has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the +greatest of evils. + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and +punishment? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no +deliverance from injustice? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and +who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or +correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished +by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? +(Compare Republic.) + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to +the conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and +yet contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins +against his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, +he is afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel +case? + +POLUS: Yes, truly. + +SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and +bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, +they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to +be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not +knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a +diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and +unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to +avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide +themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their +powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what +follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in form? + +POLUS: If you please. + +SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, +is the greatest of evils? + +POLUS: That is quite clear. + +SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be +released from this evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but +to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all? + +POLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You +deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and +unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who +like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, +the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more +miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more +miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of +rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in +every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby +suffer great evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he +ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he +will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the +disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the +incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, +Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:—is any other inference +consistent with them? + +POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to +excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children +or country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of +excusing he ought to accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree +his family or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should +bring to light the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer +may suffer and be made whole; and he should even force himself and +others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the +physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, +in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has +done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of +bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be +exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself +and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and +their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may +be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, +rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say “Yes” or “No” to that? + +POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, +though probably in agreement with your premises. + +SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not +disproven? + +POLUS: Yes; it certainly is. + +SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty +to harm another, whether an enemy or not—I except the case of +self-defence—then I have to be upon my guard—but if my enemy injures a +third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I +should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the +judge; and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and +not suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep +what he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion +and justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not +die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not +possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For +such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any +use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there +was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. + +CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he +joking? + +CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound +earnest; but you may well ask him. + +CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in +earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say +is true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we +not doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought +to be doing? + +SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings +among mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if +every man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by +the rest of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our +impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that +you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us +have two loves apiece:—I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of +Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of +Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your +cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or +opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. +When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the +assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus, +the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist +the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express +surprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when +under their influence, you would probably reply to him, if you were +honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say unless they are +prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must +understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not +wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who is +my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my +friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of +Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but +philosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are +now wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, +and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape +punishment is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word +unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that +Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life +will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre +should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus +which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with +me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with +myself, and contradict myself. + +CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be +running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way +because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he +accused Gorgias:—for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, +whether, if some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did +not know justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty +replied that he would, because he thought that mankind in general would +be displeased if he answered “No”; and then in consequence of this +admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, that being just +the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you +deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same +trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that +to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the +admission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was +too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the +truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit +of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, +which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are +generally at variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too +modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; +and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby +gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which +is to be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the +rule of nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in +this very discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus +was speaking of the conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from +the point of view of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer +injustice is the greater disgrace because the greater evil; but +conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For the suffering +of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had +better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is +unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, +as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are +weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a +view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the +stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, +in order that they may not get the better of them; and they say, that +dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the +desire of a man to have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own +inferiority, I suspect that they are too glad of equality. And +therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally +said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare +Republic), whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the +better to have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; +and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and +indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in the +superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. For on what +principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father the +Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these +are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according +to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, +which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best +and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young +lions,—charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, +that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the +honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient +force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; +he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and +all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in +rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would +shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he +says in his poem, that + +“Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;” + +this, as he says, + +“Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer +from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—” (Fragm. Incert. +151 (Bockh).) —I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, +that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he +carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, +and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior +properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you +may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: +for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper +age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin +of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries +philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those +things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is +inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought +to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, +and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of +human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake +themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the +politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of +philosophy. For, as Euripides says, + +“Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest +portion of the day to that in which he most excels,” (Antiope, fragm. +20 (Dindorf).) + +but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and +praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks +that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. +Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is +no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but +when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I +feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate +children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to +speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and +freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But +when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am +offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of +slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a child, +his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of +stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when +I see a youth thus engaged,—the study appears to me to be in character, +and becoming a man of liberal education, and him who neglects +philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to +anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later +life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as +I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, +becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, +in which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a +corner for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or +four admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a +satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards +you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards +Amphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for +I am disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that +you, Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be +careful; and that you + +“Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior; +Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any +reason or proof, Or offer valiant counsel on another’s behalf.” + +And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out +of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being +thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only +but of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For +suppose that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to +prison, declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, +you must allow that you would not know what to do:—there you would +stand giddy and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went +up before the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not +good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty +of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of + +“An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,” + + +who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, +when he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his +enemies of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his +rights of citizenship?—he being a man who, if I may use the expression, +may be boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my +advice, and refute no more: + +“Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of +wisdom. But leave to others these niceties,” + +whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities: + +“For they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.” + +Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate +only the man of substance and honour, who is well to do. + +SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not +rejoice to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and +the very best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the +stone and I agreed in approving of her training, then I should know +that I was in a satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed +by me. + +CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired +touchstone. + +CALLICLES: Why? + +SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the +opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. +For I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or +evil of the soul, he ought to have three qualities—knowledge, +good-will, outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I +meet are unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you +are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they +have not the same interest in me which you have; and these two +strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good +friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. +Why, their modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict +themselves, first one and then the other of them, in the face of a +large company, on matters of the highest moment. But you have all the +qualities in which these others are deficient, having received an +excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And you are my +friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you, Callicles, +and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and +Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four +of you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent +to which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, +you came to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much +into detail. You were cautioning one another not to be overwise; you +were afraid that too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be +the ruin of you. And now when I hear you giving the same advice to me +which you then gave to your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient +evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness of your +nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the +assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in +the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument +about any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, +and will not require to be submitted to any further test. For you could +not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or from +superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for you +are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and I +are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now +there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me +for making,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what his +pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? +For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err +intentionally, but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, +now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is +which I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me +assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I +assented, call me “dolt,” and deem me unworthy of receiving further +instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by +natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the +property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the +worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my +recollection? + +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I +could not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant +by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the +stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack +small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior +and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the +same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and +the superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same +way as superior:—this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are +the superior and better and stronger the same or different? + +CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same. + +SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against +whom, as you were saying, they make the laws? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class +are far better, as you were saying? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them +are by nature good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, +that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to +suffer injustice?—is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no +modesty be found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not +think thus?—I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree +with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an +authority. + +CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say. + +SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is +more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is +equality; so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, +when accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that +I, knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to +custom when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the +argument is about custom? + +CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, +Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling +over some verbal slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that +by superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble +of slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their +physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws? + +SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must +have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,—What +is the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you +surely do not think that two men are better than one, or that your +slaves are better than you because they are stronger? Then please to +begin again, and tell me who the better are, if they are not the +stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your +instructions, or I shall have to run away from you. + +CALLICLES: You are ironical. + +SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just +now saying many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, +whom you mean, by the better? + +CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have +no meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me +whether you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom? + +CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser. + +SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to +ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his +subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I +believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am +word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten +thousand? + +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be +natural justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more +than the inferior. + +SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this +case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are +several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, +and there are all sorts of persons in our company having various +degrees of strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is +wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably +stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will he not, being +wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this matter of +food? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and +drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all +of them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use +of a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be +punished;—his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of +others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will +have the smallest share of all, Callicles:—am I not right, my friend? + +CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other +nonsense; I am not speaking of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer +“Yes” or “No.” + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share? + +CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks. + +SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver +ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go +about clothed in the best and finest of them? + +CALLICLES: Fudge about coats! + +SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have +the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in +the largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them? + +CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking? + +SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that +the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger +share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land? + +CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates! + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. + +CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of +cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with +our argument. + +SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior +and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a +suggestion, nor offer one? + +CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by +superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand +the administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also +valiant and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint +from want of soul. + +SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge +against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach +me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying +the same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the +better and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, +and now you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are +now declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, +that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better +and superior, and in what they are better? + +CALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and +courageous in the administration of a state—they ought to be the rulers +of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their +subjects. + +SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not +have more than themselves, my friend? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think +that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required +to rule others? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean by his “ruling over himself”? + +SOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man +should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own +pleasures and passions. + +CALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate? + +SOCRATES: Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning. + +CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a +man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly +assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax +to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to +their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to +them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural +justice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they +blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, +which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is +base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and +being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and +justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally +the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a +tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than +temperance—to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every +good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom +and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?—must not +he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and +temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, +even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess +to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:—that luxury and +intemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue +and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to +nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.) + +SOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of +approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the +world think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to +persevere, that the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell +me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the +passions ought not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow +to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is +virtue? + +CALLICLES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy? + +CALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the +happiest of all. + +SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and +indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, + +“Who knows if life be not death and death life;” + +and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that +at this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our +tomb (sema (compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is +the seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown +up and down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an +Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the +soul—because of its believing and make-believe nature—a vessel (An +untranslatable pun,—dia to pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.), +and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in +the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the +intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of +holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of +thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, +meaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky +persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel +which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. +The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul +which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is +likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad +memory and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they +show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you +should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate +life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due +provision for daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you +coming over to the opinion that the orderly are happier than the +intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I +rehearse to you, do you continue of the same opinion still? + +CALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth. + +SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the +same school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept +this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in +a figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the +one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, +and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the +streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them +with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once +filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble +with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure +streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and +unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if +he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their +respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the +intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince +you that the opposite is the truth? + +CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled +himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now +saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he +is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the +influx. + +SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the +holes must be large for the liquid to escape. + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead +man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be +hungering and eating? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking? + +CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires +about him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them. + +SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no +shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you +tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have +enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of +happiness? + +CALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular +mob-orator. + +SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and +Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you +will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. +And now, answer my question. + +CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. + +SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I +pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how +you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in +the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not +terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too +are happy, if they only get enough of what they want? + +CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics +into the argument? + +SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these +topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel +pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction +between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say +that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure +which is not a good? + +CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that +they are the same. + +SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will +no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you +say what is contrary to your real opinion. + +CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would +ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is +the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences +which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others. + +CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are +saying? + +CALLICLES: Indeed I do. + +SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the +argument? + +CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, “I am in profound earnest.”) + +SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question +for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? + +CALLICLES: There is. + +SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied +knowledge? + +CALLICLES: I was. + +SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things +different from one another? + +CALLICLES: Certainly I was. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, +or not the same? + +CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, +says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and +courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good. + +CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he +assent to this, or not? + +SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees +himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune +are opposed to each other? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and +disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be +without them both, at the same time? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the +complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the +same time? + +CALLICLES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of +the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of +them both together? + +CALLICLES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd? + +CALLICLES: Very. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them +in turns? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by +fits? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their +opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare +Republic.) + +CALLICLES: Certainly he has. + +SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the +same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not +to answer without consideration. + +CALLICLES: I entirely agree. + +SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to +hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? + +CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is +pleasant. + +SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not +right? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful? + +CALLICLES: Yes, very. + +SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all +wants or desires are painful? + +CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more +instances. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are +thirsty, is pleasant? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word +“thirsty” implies pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of the +satisfaction of the want? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: When you are thirsty? + +SOCRATES: And in pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are +simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they +not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same +part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot +be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true? + +CALLICLES: It is. + +SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune +at the same time? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I did. + +SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the +same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the +pleasant? + +CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. + +SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. + +CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know +what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. + +SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in +drinking at the same time? + +CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying. + +GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like +to hear the argument out. + +CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling +of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. + +GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let +Socrates argue in his own fashion. + +CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling +questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. + +SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the +great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought +that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a +man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same +moment? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not +cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, +as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the +same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a +cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and +evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as +good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in +another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you +when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good +present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present +with them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were +saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you +not say so? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And a foolish man too? + +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? + +SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer. + +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish? + +CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. + +SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the +coward or the brave? + +CALLICLES: I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced +about equally. + +SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? + +CALLICLES: Greatly. + +SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their +enemies, or are the brave also pained? + +CALLICLES: Both are pained. + +SOCRATES: And are they equally pained? + +CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. + +SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure? + +CALLICLES: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the +brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal +degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish +and the cowardly are the bad? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly +equal degree? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal +degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in +having more pleasure and more pain.) + +CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean. + +SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good +because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that +pleasures were goods and pains evils? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who +rejoice—if they do rejoice? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with +them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with +them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of +the presence of evil? + +CALLICLES: I should. + +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain +evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of +pleasure and of pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy +and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has +more? + +CALLICLES: I should say that he has. + +SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from +our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice +and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we +allow to be good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the +evil has more of them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad +as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference +which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the +good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles? + +CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, +Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, +you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do +you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some +pleasures are good and others bad? + +SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me +as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as +if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you +were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have +helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must +make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I +can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may +assume that some pleasures are good and others evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the +hurtful are those which do some evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and +drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those +which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and +their opposites evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil +pains? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and +pains? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But not the evil? + +CALLICLES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all +our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree +with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and +that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not +the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two? + +CALLICLES: I will. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the +sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are +evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail? + +CALLICLES: He must have art. + +SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and +Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were +some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better +and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And +I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an +experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, +and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with +the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, +not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at +random and contrary to your real opinion—for you will observe that we +are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense +at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should +follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you +call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating +rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles +now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and +in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had +better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have +come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider +in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should +choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean? + +CALLICLES: No, I do not. + +SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and +I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is +such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, +and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is +pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of +the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you +agree with me thus far or not—do you agree? + +CALLICLES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, +and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to +Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and +not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to +the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of +action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure +never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she +devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or +calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just +preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing +pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved +what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar +processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art, +making a provision for the soul’s highest interest—others despising the +interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure +of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what +pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford +gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are +such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, +whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with +a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And +now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this +notion, or whether you differ. + +CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I +shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend +Gorgias. + +SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? + +CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more. + +SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no +regard for their true interests? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, +if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them +belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first +place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art +which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? + +CALLICLES: I assent. + +SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for +example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic +poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias +the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of +his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude? + +CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did +he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said +to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his +audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what +would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: That is my notion of them. + +SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august +personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to +give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and +refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word +and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her +character? + +CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face +turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were +just now describing as flattery? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm +and metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.) + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be +rhetoricians? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is +addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. +And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having +the nature of flattery. + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which +addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other +states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is +best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or +are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, +forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, +playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but +never considering whether they are better or worse for this? + +CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of +the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe. + +SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two +sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the +other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the +souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome +or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; +or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, +who is he? + +CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such +among the orators who are at present living. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, +who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse +and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, +indeed, I do not know of such a man. + +CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, +and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom +you heard yourself? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, +true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and +those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to +acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of +others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and +there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these +statesmen who did distinguish them? + +CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. +Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I +have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a +view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at +random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, +the shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do +not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a +definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and +compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until +he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of +all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom +we spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny +this? + +CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it. + +SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; +that in which there is disorder, evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be +that in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony +and order? + +CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions. + +SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and +order in the body? + +CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the +effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for +this as well as for the other. + +CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall +say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer +me. “Healthy,” as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular +order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily +excellence: is that true or not? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And “lawful” and “law” are the names which are given to the +regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and +orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not? + +CALLICLES: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and +understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words +which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in +what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant +justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to +implant temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue +and take away every vice? Do you not agree? + +CALLICLES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a +sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most +delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be +really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if +rightly estimated. Is not that true? + +CALLICLES: I will not say No to it. + +SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his +body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not +right? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow +him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to +satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer +him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? +While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust +and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be +prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own +improvement. + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than +intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now +preferring? + +CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would +ask some one who does. + +SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to +subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks! + +CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only +answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias. + +SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle? + +CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself. + +SOCRATES: Well, but people say that “a tale should have a head and not +break off in the middle,” and I should not like to have the argument +going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a +little longer, and put the head on. + +CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your +argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with +you. + +SOCRATES: But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument. + +CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight +on, or questioning and answering yourself? + +SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, “Two men spoke before, but +now one shall be enough”? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. +And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all +remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know +what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the +truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my +own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which +are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from +any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, +and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall +be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that +the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us +leave off and go our ways. + +GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you +have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of +the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what +more you have to say. + +SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument +with Callicles, and then I might have given him an “Amphion” in return +for his “Zethus”; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, +I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in +error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are +with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the +tablets of my soul. + +CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on. + +SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the +pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed +about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? +or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued +for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which +we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? +To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when +some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my +conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, +instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to +them not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art +which are imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And +is not the virtue of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, +I say. And that which makes a thing good is the proper order inhering +in each thing? Such is my view. And is not the soul which has an order +of her own better than that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul +which has order is orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is +temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No other answer +can I give, Callicles dear; have you any? + +CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow. + +SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is +the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, +the foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true. + +And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to +the gods and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not? +Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he +will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what +is holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? +Very true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate +man is not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, +whether things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure +when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as +we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other +than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well +and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity +be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now +this latter is he whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the +opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I +affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he +who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run +away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had +better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or +any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of +punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if +he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought +to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of +himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and +justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be +unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a +robber’s life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he +is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is also +incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that +communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice +bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe +is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my +friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have +observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; +you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not +care about geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy +are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the +miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if +it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences +which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I +was in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his +son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he +should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And that which +you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., +that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that +degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, +Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a +rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also +turned out to be true. + +And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next +place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I +am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save +them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another +like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,—he may box my +ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or +banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you +say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been +already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell +you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the +worst evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut +open, but that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more +disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, +or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and +evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These +truths, which have been already set forth as I state them in the +previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by +us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which +are like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still +more enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of +denying what I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am +ignorant how these things are, but that I have never met any one who +could say otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. +This is my position still, and if what I am saying is true, and +injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet +there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils (compare +Republic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that +defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not +the defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And +will not the worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable +to defend himself or his family or his friends?—and next will come that +which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is +unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is +the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to avert them in +their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to avert +them. Am I not right Callicles? + +CALLICLES: Yes, quite right. + +SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing +injustice and the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do +injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—by what +devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of +not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the +power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man +will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he +have provided himself with the power? + +CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only +sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he +have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied +and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, +Callicles, whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting +the conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do +wrong against their will? + +CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. + +SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in +order that we may do no injustice? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not +wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with +me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a +ruler or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling +power. + +CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to +praise you when you talk sense. + +SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view +of mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is +most like to him—like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not +agree to this? + +CALLICLES: I should. + +SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be +expected to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never +be able to be perfectly friendly with him. + +CALLICLES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his +inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously +regard him as a friend. + +CALLICLES: That again is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can +have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes +and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and +subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and +no one will injure him with impunity:—is not that so? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and +formidable, this would seem to be the way—he will accustom himself, +from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as +his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your +friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering +injury? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very +opposite be true,—if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and +to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much +wrong as possible, and not be punished? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he +thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not +this be the greatest evil to him? + +CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert +everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he +has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods? + +SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a +great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in +the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he +will kill him if he has a mind—the bad man will kill the good and true. + +CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing? + +SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you +think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the +uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger +always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and +which you advise me to cultivate? + +CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too. + +SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that +an art of any great pretensions? + +CALLICLES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are +occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the +swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the +pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and +properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his +art is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of doing +anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is +given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from +Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the +utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the +passenger and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked +them at the Piraeus,—this is the payment which he asks in return for so +great a boon; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all +this, gets out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an +unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot +tell which of his fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them +he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they +are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, +and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he +considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily +diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way +benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who +has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, +which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having +nor of any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, +or the law-courts, or any other devourer;—and so he reflects that such +a one had better not live, for he cannot live well. (Compare Republic.) + +And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is +not usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all +behind either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving +power, for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison +between him and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your +grandiose style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring +and insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no +other profession is worth thinking about; he would have plenty to say. +Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an +engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, +or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what +justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to +despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now +mentioning? I know that you will say, “I am better, and better born.” +But if the better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man +saving himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your +censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other +arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that +the noble and the good may possibly be something different from saving +and being saved:—May not he who is truly a man cease to care about +living a certain time?—he knows, as women say, that no man can escape +fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with +God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed +term;—whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which +he lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as +like as possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their +good graces, and to have power in the state; whereas I want you to +think and see whether this is for the interest of either of us;—I would +not have us risk that which is dearest on the acquisition of this +power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down +the moon from heaven at the risk of their own perdition. But if you +suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming great in the +city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, whether +for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, +Callides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the +Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes’ darling who is called after +them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, +who will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a +statesman and orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in +his own language and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, +sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. What do you say? + +CALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me +to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite +convinced by them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.) + +SOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides +in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to +these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be +convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two +processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one, +as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other +with a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist +them: was not that the distinction which we drew? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar +flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions? + +CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it. + +SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that +which was ministered to, whether body or soul? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of +our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as +possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in +imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to +have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be +gentle and good. Shall we say that? + +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set +about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake +buildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought +we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not +know the art of building, and who taught us?—would not that be +necessary, Callicles? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we +had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our +friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if +upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, +and had been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only +with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill—in +that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the +construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only +a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would +be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another +to undertake them. Is not this true? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I +were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent +to practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would +you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good +health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether +slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And +if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or +stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical +skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to +think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as +state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, +without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, +and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin +with the big jar when you are learning the potter’s art; which is a +foolish thing? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a +public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being +one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, +Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever +a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and +became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a +man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, +if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? +Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There +may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a +private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not +answer? + +CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I +really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be +administered among us—whether, when you come to the administration of +them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have +we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a +public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for +yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought +to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you +the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and +Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think +that they were good citizens. + +CALLICLES: I do. + +SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have +made the citizens better instead of worse? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the +assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? + +CALLICLES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, “likely” is not the word; for if he was a +good citizen, the inference is certain. + +CALLICLES: And what difference does that make? + +SOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the +Athenians are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the +contrary, to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the +first who gave the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and +encouraged them in the love of talk and money. + +CALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise +their ears. + +SOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but +well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and +his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was +during the time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they +had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they +convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the +notion that he was a malefactor. + +CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles’ badness? + +SOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses +or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor +butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? +Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, +and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you +say? + +CALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying “yes.” + +SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is +an animal? + +CALLICLES: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the +animals who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to +have become more just, and not more unjust? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of +another mind? + +CALLICLES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received +them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must +have been very far from desiring. + +CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you? + +SOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth. + +CALLICLES: Granted then. + +SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more +unjust and inferior? + +CALLICLES: Granted again. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman? + +CALLICLES: That is, upon your view. + +SOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take +the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving +ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten +years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty +of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should +be thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis. +And yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things +would never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not +those who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in +their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown +out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any +profession.—What do you think? + +CALLICLES: I should think not. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in +the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good +statesman—you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but +not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they +have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore, +if they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or +of flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour. + +CALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one +of them in his performances. + +SOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the +serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more +serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify +the wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not +allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, +whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow +citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not +see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present +statesmen, although I do admit that they were more clever at providing +ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous +way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going +round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one +another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more +than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with +the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is +ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and +if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them +with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same +images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the +better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale +or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,—the baker, or the +cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing, +being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and every one +to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another +art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the +body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their +results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of +the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other +arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and +illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their +mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, +you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and +then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State +had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you +reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have +been good trainers?—and you had replied, Thearion, the baker, +Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: +these are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first +makes admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third +capital wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the +statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if +I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom +you are speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, +who have no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be +filling and fattening men’s bodies and gaining their approval, although +the result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and +become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their +simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to +their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit +brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them +at the time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and +if they could they would do him some harm; while they proceed to +eulogize the men who have been the real authors of the mischief. And +that, Callicles, is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who +feasted the citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that +they have made the city great, not seeing that the swollen and +ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder +statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and +walls and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and +temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will +blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and +Pericles, who are the real authors of their calamities; and if you are +not careful they may assail you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are +losing not only their new acquisitions, but also their original +possessions; not that you are the authors of these misfortunes of +theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great piece +of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; +about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, +I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed +wrong which is done to them; “after all their many services to the +State, that they should unjustly perish,”—so the tale runs. But the cry +is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by +the city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman +is, I believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the +sophists, although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a +strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will +often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of +their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be +more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose +injustice has been taken away from them, and who have had justice +implanted in them by their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of +the injustice which is not in them? Can anything be more irrational, my +friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be a mob-orator, +because you will not answer. + +CALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some +one to answer? + +SOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches +which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But +I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether +there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that +you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad? + +CALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me. + +SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in +this inconsistent manner? + +CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing? + +SOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, +and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and +nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the +city:—do you think that there is any difference between one and the +other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying +to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy +that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; +whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as +legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The +orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who +cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which +they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of +having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this +a fact? + +CALLICLES: Certainly it is. + +SOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then +they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to +those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been +benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run +by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer +left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should +receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not +because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason +of injustice. + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being +treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his +pupils, if he be really able to make them good—am I not right? (Compare +Protag.) + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a +man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any +other art? + +CALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason. + +SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and +best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no +advice gratis is held to be dishonourable? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to +requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred +when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true? + +CALLICLES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me? +determine for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive +and struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be +the servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, +freely and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell +me your entire mind. + +CALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State. + +SOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation. + +CALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, +the consequences will be— + +SOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me +and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that +he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be +of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly +took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully. + +CALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to +harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can +never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be +brought by some miserable and mean person. + +SOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know +that in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am +brought to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a +villain who brings me to trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man +would accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to +death. Shall I tell you why I anticipate this? + +CALLICLES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living +who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my +time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any +view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what +is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you +recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you +might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just +as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the +indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, +if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my boys, many evil things +has this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the +younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and +suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the +bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the +variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!” What do you +suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself +in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, “All +these evil things, my boys, I did for your health,” and then would +there not just be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry +out! + +CALLICLES: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply? + +CALLICLES: He certainly would. + +SOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, +if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse +to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, +although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of +them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one +says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak +evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private +or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:—“All this I +do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my +judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore there is no saying what may +happen to me. + +CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus +defenceless is in a good position? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have +often acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have +never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; +and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of +defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself +or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was +convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I +died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if +I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure +that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an +utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of +doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul full of +injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I +say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story. + +CALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done. + +SOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, +which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, +but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. +Homer tells us (Il.), how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the +empire which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of +Cronos there existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has +always been, and still continues to be in Heaven,—that he who has lived +all his life in justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the +Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the +reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall +go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. +And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus, +the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; +the judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was +that the judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities +from the Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls +found their way to the wrong places. Zeus said: “I shall put a stop to +this; the judgments are not well given, because the persons who are +judged have their clothes on, for they are alive; and there are many +who, having evil souls, are apparelled in fair bodies, or encased in +wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous +witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they have lived +righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too have +their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole +bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a +hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes +of the judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place, +I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at +present: this power which they have Prometheus has already received my +orders to take from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely +stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are +dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead—he with +his naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall +die suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their +brave attire strewn upon the earth—conducted in this manner, the +judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any of you, +and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and +Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are +dead, shall give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, +whence the two roads lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the +other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, +and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the +primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either of the two +others are in any doubt:—then the judgment respecting the last journey +of men will be as just as possible.” + +From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the +following inferences:—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the +separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. +And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in +life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or +accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or +training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he +was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and +the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have +flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of +the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the +same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when +he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in +a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be +distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure +and for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true +of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the +natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.—And +when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, +he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not +knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the +great king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in +him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints +and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained +him, and he is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no +straightness, because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus +beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by +licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him +ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment +which he deserves. + +Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly +punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to +be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, +and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are +punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they +are improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and +suffering; for there is no other way in which they can be delivered +from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and +are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as +they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any +benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get good when they +behold them enduring for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful +sufferings as the penalty of their sins—there they are, hanging up as +examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a +warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I +confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of +him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, +most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and +potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and +most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses +to the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he +has described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: +such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described +Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering +everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst +crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was +happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men +come from the class of those who have power (compare Republic). And yet +in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of all +admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to +live and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and +few there are who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, +there have been, and will be again, at Athens and in other states, who +have fulfilled their trust righteously; and there is one who is quite +famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in +general, great men are also bad, my friend. + +As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, +knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he +knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he +stamps him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, +whither he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks +with admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness +and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, +Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has +done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other +men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the +Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; +but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as +Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: + +“Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.” + +Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I +consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the +judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I +desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when +I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I +exhort all other men to do the same. And, in return for your +exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, +which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly +conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not +be able to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I +was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of +Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is carrying you off, +you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine would in the +courts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully box you +on the ears, and put upon you any sort of insult. + +Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you +will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, +if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you +see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the +Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life +which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all +that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do +injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the +reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all +things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has +been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next best +thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be +chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of +himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric +and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be +done always, with a view to justice. + +Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and +after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises +you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, +by Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting +blow, for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if +you are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue +together, we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, +or we will advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall +be better able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to +give ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are +always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take +the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way +of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This +way let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to +which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, +Callicles, is nothing worth. + + + + +*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS *** + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions will +be renamed. + +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the +United States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General Terms of Use part +of this license, apply to copying and distributing Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works to protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +concept and trademark. 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You may copy it, give it away or re-use it under the terms +of the Project Gutenberg License included with this eBook or online +at <a href="https://www.gutenberg.org">www.gutenberg.org</a>. If you +are not located in the United States, you will have to check the laws of the +country where you are located before using this eBook. +</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Title: Gorgias</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Author: Plato</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-top:1em; margin-bottom:1em; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Translator: Benjamin Jowett</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Release Date: March, 1999 [eBook #1672]<br /> +[Most recently updated: April 27, 2022]</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Language: English</div> +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'>Character set encoding: UTF-8</div> +<div style='display:block; margin-left:2em; text-indent:-2em'>Produced by: Sue Asscher</div> +<div style='margin-top:2em; margin-bottom:4em'>*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS ***</div> + +<h1>GORGIAS</h1> + +<h2 class="no-break">by Plato</h2> + +<h3>Translated by Benjamin Jowett</h3> + +<hr /> + +<h2>Contents</h2> + +<table summary="" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto"> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap01">INTRODUCTION</a></td> +</tr> + +<tr> +<td> <a href="#chap02">GORGIAS</a></td> +</tr> + +</table> + +<hr /> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap01"></a>INTRODUCTION</h2> + +<p> +In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his interpreters +as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the main thesis. The +speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe rules of art restrict +them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with one of the dramatis personae +in the Theaetetus, that the digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the +most irregular of the dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or +unity; the beginning is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and +references are interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the +whole. We must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine +the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare +Introduction to the Phaedrus.) +</p> + +<p> +Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. +First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the +slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and contradictory +assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of Schleiermacher +has descended upon his successors, who have applied his method with the most +various results. The value and use of the method has been hardly, if at all, +examined either by him or them. Secondly, they have extended almost +indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in this way they think that +they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in +generality they have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions +easily pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which we +can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more familiar +theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is needed (his own art +of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may +hardly admit that the moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or the +intellectual antithesis of knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are +never far off in a Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, +we should not bring them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally +in all the dialogues. +</p> + +<p> +There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of the +building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily exaggerated. We may +give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form and connection of his +thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are finished works of art, we may +find a reason for everything, and lose the highest characteristic of art, which +is simplicity. Most great works receive a new light from a new and original +mind. But whether these new lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on +their agreement with the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence +which can be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with us, +criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to +the indications of the text. +</p> + +<p> +Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the appearance +of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher themes are +introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the good and evil of +man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound definition of his +art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the existence of a universal art of flattery +or simulation having several branches:—this is the genus of which +rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To flattery is opposed the +true and noble art of life which he who possesses seeks always to impart to +others, and which at last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. +These two aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of +the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the +treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the forms of +true and false art. In the development of this opposition there arise various +other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as +they are to the world in general, ideals as they may be more worthily called): +(1) that to do is worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done +evil he had better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a +third Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not +what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is +to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure and +pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases pleasures as +great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely rhetoricians, but +poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of statesmen, past as well +as present, are included in the class of flatterers. The true and false finally +appear before the judgment-seat of the gods below. +</p> + +<p> +The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three +characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and the +form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is deferential +towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the youthful Polus, +ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In the first division +the question is asked—What is rhetoric? To this there is no answer given, +for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by Socrates, and the argument is +transferred to the hands of his disciple Polus, who rushes to the defence of +his master. The answer has at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before +he can even explain his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great +subject of shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to +the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, +have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real power, and hence +arise the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, +Polus is at last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow +legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue closes. +Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is +good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the combination of +the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the +argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. The +conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher and a +lower—that which makes the people better, and that which only flatters +them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The dialogue terminates +with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there will be no more flattery or +disguise, and no further use for the teaching of rhetoric. +</p> + +<p> +The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts which +are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced in years, +who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is celebrated throughout +Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of Plato, he is vain and +boastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is treated by Socrates with +considerable respect. But he is no match for him in dialectics. Although he has +been teaching rhetoric all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own +art. When his ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric +can be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering +sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to detect +him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of a generous +nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates’ manner of approaching a +question; he is quite “one of Socrates’ sort, ready to be refuted +as well as to refute,” and very eager that Callicles and Socrates should +have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric exercises great +influence over other men, but he is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric +can teach everything and know nothing. +</p> + +<p> +Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway “colt,” as Socrates +describes him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under +the pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the earliest +opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on +rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the inventor of balanced +or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.). At first he is violent and +ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. But in the +judicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good-humour, and compelled +to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he +compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable +than to suffer injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and +dazzled by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. +Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining +the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of +the question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of +Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning of +Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self-accusation. +When the argument with him has fairly run out. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: he is +with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these things are +true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of society are upside +down. In him another type of character is represented; he is neither sophist +nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. +He might be described in modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of +power and also of pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. +There is no desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of +morality; nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, +though he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains +that might is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this +he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of the +Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent +weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he is of +philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the order of +nature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker (compare +Republic). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind, +he generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down his +principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him with +distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will to Socrates, +whose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the puerile use which he +makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual interest in the argument. Like +Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian +statesmen of a former generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, +such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of +human character is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has +developed to the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the +government of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about +whom we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have +seemed to reflect the history of his life. +</p> + +<p> +And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist or +rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is +contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending against +the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in the Republic, +are the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves carried away by the +great tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a +distance, with a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his +personal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his +servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as +Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is +irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. A +repartee of his which appears to have been really made to the +“omniscient” Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon +(Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and +certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being +“as long as he pleases,” or “as short as he pleases” +(compare Protag.). Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and +attacking Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is +scandalized that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be +stated in plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to +preserve the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad +sense of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, +superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced to +continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates is +describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify himself +with the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words. +</p> + +<p> +The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the Protagoras +and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the Sophists and +rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as another variety of +the same species. His behaviour is governed by that of his opponents; the least +forwardness or egotism on their part is met by a corresponding irony on the +part of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy will not allow him to be +silent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking than in any other of +Plato’s writings: for he is “fooled to the top of his bent” +by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply in earnest. He +rises higher than even in the Phaedo and Crito: at first enveloping his moral +convictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends by losing his method, +his life, himself, in them. As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside +the veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his +adversary has refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own +fate is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of +politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to war with the +whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will +be justified in the world below. Then the position of Socrates and Callicles +will be reversed; all those things “unfit for ears polite” which +Callicles has prophesied as likely to happen to him in this life, the insulting +language, the box on the ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare +Republic, and the similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the +philosopher in the Theaetetus). +</p> + +<p> +There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the +generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to his +ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be taken. This +is said to have happened “last year” (B.C. 406), and therefore the +assumed date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would +already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely +reconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the “recent” +usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413; and still less with +the “recent” death of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years +previously (429 B.C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past +age; or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken +of as a living witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that +although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the Dialogues +of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his commentators (Preface +to Republic). +</p> + +<p> +The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly characteristic +declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true nature and bearing of +these things, while he affirms at the same time that no one can maintain any +other view without being ridiculous. The profession of ignorance reminds us of +the earlier and more exclusively Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor +in the Apology, nor in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any +doubt of the fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this +“among the multitude of questions” which agitate human life +“as the principle which alone remains unshaken.” He does not insist +here, any more than in the Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only +on the soundness of the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is +worse than suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for the next +best thing to a man’s being just is that he should be corrected and +become just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of +others; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the right +only. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a +figure. +</p> + +<p> +(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true +politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the Apology, he +disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any other +good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to death before +he had done any good to himself or others. Here he anticipates such a fate for +himself, from the fact that he is “the only man of the present day who +performs his public duties at all.” The two points of view are not really +inconsistent, but the difference between them is worth noticing: Socrates is +and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or +Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will sooner or later entail the same +consequences on him. He cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he +separate morals from politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although +he foresees the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and +wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and +uncertainty. And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too +have taught the citizens better than to put him to death? +</p> + +<p> +And now, as he himself says, we will “resume the argument from the +beginning.” +</p> + +<p> +Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets +Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed an +exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of +hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning the +nature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to his own +house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great rhetorician and his +younger friend and disciple Polus. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: What question? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Who is he?—such a question as would elicit from a man the +answer, “I am a cobbler.” +</p> + +<p> +Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. +“Who is Gorgias?” asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his +master Socrates. “One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best +and noblest of experimental arts,” etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and +balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness of +the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the +quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has +learnt how to make a speech, but not how to answer a question. He wishes that +Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to the +question asked by Chaerephon,—that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric +language, “boasts himself to be a good one.” At the request of +Socrates he promises to be brief; for “he can be as long as he pleases, +and as short as he pleases.” Socrates would have him bestow his length on +others, and proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by +him to his own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the +admiration of Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as +follows:— +</p> + +<p> +Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other particular +arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then does rhetoric differ +from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the arts which deal with words, +and the arts which have to do with external actions. Socrates extends this +distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two classes: (1) arts +which may be carried on in silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, +or in which words are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, +rhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was +the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there are +differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to +do with words? “The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and +greatest of human things.” But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best? +“Health first, beauty next, wealth third,” in the words of the old +song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a body, each +claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior to that of the +rest—How will you choose between them? “I should say, Socrates, +that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals +power in the state, is the greatest good.” But what is the exact nature +of this persuasion?—is the persevering retort: You could not describe +Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, if there were other +painters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of +persuasion, because there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, +which is an art of persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to +see the necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the +art of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and +unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge, +and another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always true, +but belief may be either true or false,—there is therefore a further +question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric effect in courts +of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief and not that which gives +knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge of such matters to a crowd of +persons in a few minutes. And there is another point to be +considered:—when the assembly meets to advise about walls or docks or +military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into counsel, but the +architect, or the general. How would Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who +intend to become disciples, of whom there are several in the company, and not +Socrates only, are eagerly asking:—About what then will rhetoric teach us +to persuade or advise the state? +</p> + +<p> +Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of +Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, and +of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle wall of +the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over the patients of +his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by the assembly if he +pleased, for no physician could compete with a rhetorician in popularity and +influence. He could persuade the multitude of anything by the power of his +rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a +boxer should abuse the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like +all good things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to +be deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the +lessons which they have learned from him. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel +with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, or +whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias declares that +he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may be tedious to the +company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to +proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed inconsistency into which +Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out +of a misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias +to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. +And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias +as a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble of learning. But is he as +ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is +compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn them +from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned +carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a musician, and he +who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and +rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of +this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act +unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained? +</p> + +<p> +The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may know +justice and not be just—here is the old confusion of the arts and the +virtues;—nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of +natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but not +sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally exasperated +at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he says, the +rhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows justice (how can he +do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks +that great want of manners is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. +Socrates ironically replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on +their legs again; and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be +in error, but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is +in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in +the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own +case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation +they agree (compare Protag.), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer. +</p> + +<p> +“What is the art of Rhetoric?” says Polus. Not an art at all, +replies Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created +art. Polus asks, “What thing?” and Socrates answers, An experience +or routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. “But is not +rhetoric a fine thing?” I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will +you ask me another question—What is cookery? “What is +cookery?” An experience or routine of making a sort of delight or +gratification. Then they are the same, or rather fall under the same class, and +rhetoric has still to be distinguished from cookery. “What is +rhetoric?” asks Polus once more. A part of a not very creditable whole, +which may be termed flattery, is the reply. “But what part?” A +shadow of a part of politics. This, as might be expected, is wholly +unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning +to them, Socrates draws a distinction between shadows or appearances and +realities; e.g. there is real health of body or soul, and the appearance of +them; real arts and sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and +body have two arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends +on the soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art +attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as +having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. +Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or +simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give +no reason of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or +simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the +simulation of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in +an arithmetical formula:— +</p> + +<p> +Tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation. +</p> + +<p> +And, +</p> + +<p> +Cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice. +</p> + +<p> +And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the +gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return to +their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his speech, which +was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs Polus not +unnecessarily to retaliate on him. +</p> + +<p> +“Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?” +They are not esteemed at all. “Why, have they not great power, and can +they not do whatever they desire?” They have no power, and they only do +what they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the +true object of desire, which is the good. “As if you, Socrates, would not +envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one +whom he pleases.” But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one +to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who +kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do +injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting men +out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this Polus +assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is still of +opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy enough. He +instances Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not +Socrates think him happy?—Socrates would like to know more about him; he +cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental +and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son +of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of +Macedon—and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle and +then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was very wicked, +and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to have his place. +Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he will, may summon all the +rich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates, the house of +Pericles, or any other great family—this is the kind of evidence which is +adduced in courts of justice, where truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates +employs proof of another sort; his appeal is to one witness only,—that is +to say, the person with whom he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own +mouth. And he is prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a +wicked man and yet happy. +</p> + +<p> +The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers +punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he +escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves +refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates has +only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the world, +and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt against the +state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that if they are both +criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable +of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that +laughter is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already +refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find that no one +agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not a public man, and +(referring to his own conduct at the trial of the generals after the battle of +Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a +recent occasion; he can only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the +person with whom he is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any +man to do is worse than to suffer evil. +</p> + +<p> +Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do evil +is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is fair and +what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, colours, figures, laws, +habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to pleasure and +utility? Polus assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily persuaded that +the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing +cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. +Thus doing is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more +hurtful than suffering. +</p> + +<p> +There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is +punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done justly +is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if to punish is +just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore beneficent; and +the benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three evils from which a +man may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, and soul;—these +are, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these is injustice, the +evil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. And there are three +arts which heal these evils—trading, medicine, justice—and the +fairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and +happy in the second degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore +the criminal should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and +purge away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper +colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary penalty. +And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to punish him, but that +he shall go unpunished and become worse and worse, taking care only that he +does no injury to himself. These are at least conceivable uses of the art, and +no others have been discovered by us. +</p> + +<p> +Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chaerephon +whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is, +proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such doctrines +are true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us are doing the +opposite of what we ought to be doing. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can understand +one another they must have some common feeling. And such a community of feeling +exists between himself and Callicles, for both of them are lovers, and they +have both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles are the Athenian Demos and +Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and +philosophy. The peculiarity of Callicles is that he can never contradict his +loves; he changes as his Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the +countenance of both his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is +surprised at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not +a free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the +explanation of Socrates’ peculiarities also. He is always repeating what +his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other love, +Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will +never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse than the +discord of musical sounds. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in +compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not +know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly +entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more +honourable than to do injustice. By custom “yes,” but not by +nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points +of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what +Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a law +of nature. For convention says that “injustice is dishonourable,” +but nature says that “might is right.” And we are always taming +down the nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a +great man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot +all our formularies, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar +says, “Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand;” as is +indeed proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and +never paid for them. +</p> + +<p> +This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave philosophy +and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy is an excellent +thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not “passed his +metaphysics” before he has grown up to manhood will never know the world. +Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I dare say that +politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to philosophy: “Every +man,” as Euripides says, “is fondest of that in which he is +best.” Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, and +should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man lisps or +studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those over-refined +natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of men, and skulk in +corners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and never giving utterance to any +noble sentiments. +</p> + +<p> +For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus says +to Amphion in the play, that you have “a noble soul disguised in a +puerile exterior.” And I would have you consider the danger which you and +other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if any +one accused you in a law-court,—there you would stand, with gaping mouth +and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears with +impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave to others +these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher’s +touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be +the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a +critic—knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, although +learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict +themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not too modest to speak +out (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown both by +his own profession and by his giving the same caution against philosophy to +Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago to his own clique +of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error into which he may have +fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he would like to know first of +all what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule +of justice is the rule of the stronger or of the better?” “There is +no difference.” Then are not the many superior to the one, and the +opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and +that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. And as they are the +superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural +as well as conventional justice. “Why will you continue splitting words? +Have I not told you that the superior is the better?” But what do you +mean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder in your +language, if you do not wish to drive me away. “I mean the worthier, the +wiser.” You mean to say that one man of sense ought to rule over ten +thousand fools? “Yes, that is my meaning.” Ought the physician then +to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver to have more coats, +or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more seed? “You are always +saying the same things, Socrates.” Yes, and on the same subjects too; but +you are never saying the same things. For, first, you defined the superior to +be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now something else;—what DO you +mean? “I mean men of political ability, who ought to govern and to have +more than the governed.” Than themselves? “What do you mean?” +I mean to say that every man is his own governor. “I see that you mean +those dolts, the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a man should let his +desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To the many this is +impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. But if he is a king, and +has power, how base would he be in submitting to them! To invite the common +herd to be lord over him, when he might have the enjoyment of all things! For +the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and +happiness; all the rest is mere talk.” +</p> + +<p> +Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men only +think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. +“Why,” says Callicles, “if they were, stones and the dead +would be happy.” Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic +vein of reflection. “Who knows,” as Euripides says, “whether +life may not be death, and death life?” Nay, there are philosophers who +maintain that even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb +(sema) of the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which +he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water +to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this sieve +is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a figure of a +truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life of contentment +is better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to admit that? +“Far otherwise.” Then hear another parable. The life of +self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two +men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,—the jars of +the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fills his jars, +and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, and would +suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? +“Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure +is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always +eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires +and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.” And to +be itching and always scratching? “I do not deny that there may be +happiness even in that.” And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are +abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such +topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by him, +but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will Callicles +still maintain this? “Yes, for the sake of consistency, he will.” +The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing his +touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles reassures him, +and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are the same, but +knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure or good, or with +one another. Socrates disproves the first of these statements by showing that +two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate with one another—to be +well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, +and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. in the case of drinking and +thirsting, whereas good and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease +simultaneously, and therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on by +the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against +objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good, +proceeds:—The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad +by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly and +foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels pain is +bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and sometimes +the bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is +as good as the brave or may be even better. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming that he +and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. The good are +the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should choose the one and +avoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a return to the old +doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be done for the sake of +the good. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in +distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical +habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the arts which +are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does Callicles agree +to this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in order that he may get +through the argument. Which of the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, +harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally +condemned on the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the +harp-player, who was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately +muse of Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in +general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, and +children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view to what is +best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were children. +</p> + +<p> +Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a real +regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species of +oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the citizens. +But where are the orators among whom you find the latter? Callicles admits that +there are none remaining, but there were such in the days when Themistocles, +Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies +that none of these were true artists, setting before themselves the duty of +bringing order out of disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled +design, running through his life, to which he conforms all his words and +actions; he desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all +virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the physician +who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites with a variety of +meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising self-restraint. And this is +good for the soul, and better than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles +was recently approving. +</p> + +<p> +Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, turns +restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. +“Then,” says Socrates, “one man must do for two;” and +though he had hoped to have given Callicles an “Amphion” in return +for his “Zethus,” he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he +hopes that Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates +the advantages which he has already won:— +</p> + +<p> +The pleasant is not the same as the good—Callicles and I are agreed about +that,—but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the +good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have +acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of things +or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and harmonious +arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the soul which is +without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore good, and the +intemperate is bad. And he who is temperate is also just and brave and pious, +and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the +intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He +therefore who would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and +if possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong he +must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should seek to +attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of +gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the power of geometrical +proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim at disproportion and excess. +But if he be wrong in this, and if self-control is the true secret of +happiness, then the paradox is true that the only use of rhetoric is in +self-accusation, and Polus was right in saying that to do wrong is worse than +to suffer wrong, and Gorgias was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a +just man. And you were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and +in saying that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with +impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be +stricken—to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast in +adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know +that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the +greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would +avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend +he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his +protection he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he +not rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the +greatest of all evils will befall him. “But this imitator of the +tyrant,” rejoins Callicles, “will kill any one who does not +similarly imitate him.” Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he +has heard that repeated many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will +kill a good one. “Yes, and that is the provoking thing.” Not +provoking to a man of sense who is not studying the arts which will preserve +him from danger; and this, as you say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of +justice. But how many other arts are there which also save men from death, and +are yet quite humble in their pretensions—such as the art of swimming, or +the art of the pilot? Does not the pilot do men at least as much service as the +rhetorician, and yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge +more than two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his +demeanour? The reason is that he is not certain whether he has done his +passengers any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in +body, and still more if he is diseased in mind—who can say? The engineer +too will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow +your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is +there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your own or +another’s, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of saving +arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being saved? I +would have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard length of +life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides to the will of +Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either with the Athenian +Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do +you say to this? +</p> + +<p> +“There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely +believe you.” +</p> + +<p> +That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more +conversation. You remember the two processes—one which was directed to +pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. And +those who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as +possible. But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a +teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building before? or +who would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never cured either +himself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with +the office? And as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not +examine him? Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is +the statesman’s proper business. And we must ask the same question about +Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make +better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave them pay, +and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they condemned him to +death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals who, having received them +gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and man is an animal; and Pericles who +had the charge of man only made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and +therefore he could not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be +repeated about Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his +seat at first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The +inference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than those of our +own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, but they +did not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you again and again +(and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like the body, may be +treated in two ways—there is the meaner and the higher art. You seemed to +understand what I said at the time, but when I ask you who were the really good +statesmen, you answer—as if I asked you who were the good trainers, and +you answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian +cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you +that these are a parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And +those whom they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them, +and lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. In this +respect, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who +pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and +harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, +the citizens who in like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and others, +will lay hold of you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the +misdeeds of your predecessors. The old story is always being +repeated—“after all his services, the ungrateful city banished him, +or condemned him to death.” As if the statesman should not have taught +the city better! He surely cannot blame the state for having unjustly used him, +any more than the sophist or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they +cheat him. And the sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire +rhetoric and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the +two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics +takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the +disciple desirous of requiting his teacher. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving the +state Callicles invites him:—“to the inferior and ministerial +one,” is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of avoiding death, +replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear +again, that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is +very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person who +teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case which he +described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury of children. +He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one +charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he will not be +able to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for +their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. “And +do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good +condition?” Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is never +to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not this kind of +self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of your flattering +rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, but to go to the world +below laden with offences is the worst of evils. In proof of which I will tell +you a tale:— +</p> + +<p> +Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and when +judgment had been given upon them they departed—the good to the islands +of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were still living, +and had their clothes on at the time when they were being judged, there was +favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the throne, was obliged to alter the +mode of procedure, and try them after death, having first sent down Prometheus +to take away from them the foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and +Aeacus were appointed to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for +Europe, and Minos was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation +of soul and body, but after death soul and body alike retain their +characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all +distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, +appears before Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not +who he is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the +house of torment. +</p> + +<p> +For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment—the curable and +the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their punishment; the +incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by becoming a warning to +them. The latter class are generally kings and potentates; meaner persons, +happily for themselves, have not the same power of doing injustice. Sisyphus +and Tityus, not Thersites, are supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting +punishment. Not that there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good +one, as is shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. +But to Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped +of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled +either as curable or incurable, and looks with love and admiration on the soul +of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the +practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as +Odysseus in Homer saw him +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.” +</p> + +<p> +My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls +undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet +death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast upon +me,—that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy brain, +and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps you think that this is an old wives’ fable. But you, who are the +three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will ever +show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to be, and +not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid all +flattery, whether of the many or of the few. +</p> + +<p> +Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. And +when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, but not +until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and uncertainty in +which we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue and justice, and +not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing +worth. +</p> + +<p> +We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue. +Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his +writings, we may compare him with himself, and with other great teachers, and +we may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) casting one +eye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the +great lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in +which they are enveloped. +</p> + +<p> +(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are made +aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty of framing +a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the virtues also +continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, custom, the +honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are still floundering +about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures of speech are made the +basis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, +which admits of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty +which remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at the +present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also apparent in +Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of +his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can +be more fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered +in the answers of Gorgias (see above). The advantages which he gains over Polus +are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous +assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar +predicates;—a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects +in the Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a “robust sophistry” are +likewise discernible in his argument with Callicles. +</p> + +<p> +(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the +argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts himself +and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may sometimes wish that +we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or pointed out to them the +rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms good, pleasure, and the +like. But it would be as useless to examine his arguments by the requirements +of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of +view. If we say that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that +mankind will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when +punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical +paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that +the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is +tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled +criminal are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious +enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a +calculation of pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the +Phaedo. What then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate +best by parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have +always existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself +implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few. +</p> + +<p> +He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of +happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in battle, +we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that their physical +suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. Still we regard them +as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have their death than a shameful +life. Nor is this only because we believe that they will obtain an immortality +of fame, or that they will have crowns of glory in another world, when their +enemies and persecutors will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a +few instances to do what is right, without reference to public opinion or to +consequences. And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as +Socrates’ friends in the opening of the Phaedo are described as regarding +him; or as was said of another, “they looked upon his face as upon the +face of an angel.” We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the +standard of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of +such a sentiment in the better part of human nature. +</p> + +<p> +The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain that in +some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and that all other +goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is thought to have erred in +“considering the agent only, and making no reference to the happiness of +others, as affected by him.” But the happiness of others or of mankind, +if regarded as an end, is really quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to +the common understanding as Plato’s conception of happiness. For the +greatest happiness of the greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of +the individual which will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. +Ideas of utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant +consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely self-regarding, +considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth +when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which +regards others is by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and +Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking +another form, is really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on +ethics. +</p> + +<p> +The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised the +greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or into the +consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, we need not +now enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine Sufferer, whose words +the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets +spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human race. It is a similar picture +of suffering goodness which Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion +to the fate of his master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, +such an one must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he +endeavours to show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered +state. But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak +and miserable; such an one is like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to +every sort of wrong and obloquy. +</p> + +<p> +Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if +“the ways of God” to man are to be “justified,” the +hopes of another life must be included. If the question could have been put to +him, whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests +in the Apology, “death be only a long sleep,” we can hardly tell +what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite +independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any +other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives +for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an +unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in +the world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not +in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, in +which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as he says +in the Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of the stories +about another world are true, he will insist that something of the kind is +true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the +Republic he introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior +happiness of the just has been established on what is thought to be an +immutable foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main +thesis independently of remoter consequences. +</p> + +<p> +(3) Plato’s theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. +In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few great criminals, +chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have never had the +opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are not incurable, and +their punishment is intended for their improvement. They are to suffer because +they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to the physician and be healed. +On this representation of Plato’s the criticism has been made, that the +analogy of disease and injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead +of improving men, may have just the opposite effect. +</p> + +<p> +Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of disease +and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. But ideas +must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is unseen can +only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. If these +figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may be +considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding with the +ideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of language, and must +not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them +as if they were not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical +analysis of his age. +</p> + +<p> +Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the suffering +which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of ethics a conception +of punishment which is really derived from criminal law. He does not see that +such punishment is only negative, and supplies no principle of moral growth or +development. He is not far off the higher notion of an education of man to be +begun in this world, and to be continued in other stages of existence, which is +further developed in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured +out of the beaten track in their meditations on the “last things,” +have found a ray of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in +what way punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not +followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that “God is +the author of evil only with a view to good,” and that “they were +the better for being punished.” Still his doctrine of a future state of +rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion of +Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human beings +depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And +he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the +future destiny of the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are +neither very good nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal +damnation. +</p> + +<p> +We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of argument; +and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon of his +vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main purpose of the +Gorgias is not to answer questions about a future world, but to place in +antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the judgments and opinions +of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato may be accused of +representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the description of the +just man in the Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the +Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the +world which always has existed and always will exist among men. But such ideals +act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such condemnations are not +mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural rebellion of the higher sense +of right in man against the ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest +statesmen have fallen very far short of the political ideal, and are therefore +justly involved in the general condemnation. +</p> + +<p> +Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, which +may be briefly considered:— +</p> + +<p> +a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is supposed +to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the transient and +relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge and sense, truth and +opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, the real and the +apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and discord, dialectic and +rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, which in Plato easily pass +into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not +forget that Plato’s conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux +transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness +in opposing the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of +pleasure, which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is +only based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed his +mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective consciousness of +happiness, that would have been found to be as transient and precarious as +pleasure. +</p> + +<p> +b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the +improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike dependent +upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To Plato the whole +world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. To this is opposed +the one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, yet strong in the +conviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether regarded with +reference to this world or to another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, +poets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, +and their arts are the parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call +science is merely the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, +which he describes in the Republic. +</p> + +<p> +c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between the +Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, and the +Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language in the +Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending to show that +they were written at the same period of Plato’s life. For the Republic +supplies that education and training of which the Gorgias suggests the +necessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few strong in the +formation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of +them, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of +the just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in +another life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, +are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they are +expelled by the State, because they are imitators, and minister to the weaker +side of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the +analogous notion, which occurs in the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were +the Sophists of their day. In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers +a contrast than a parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with +that of Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two +dialogues; being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion, +as deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo, +pleasure and good are distinctly opposed. +</p> + +<p> +This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the +Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief good, +but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the Gorgias. For +innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are allowed to rank +in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias’ definition of rhetoric +(Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of persuasion, of all arts the best, for +to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their own free +will—marks a close and perhaps designed connection between the two +dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the connecting +links between the beautiful and the good. +</p> + +<p> +In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public +opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, and portions of +the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from another point of view, may be +thought to stand in the same relation to Plato’s theory of morals which +the Theaetetus bears to his theory of knowledge. +</p> + +<p> +d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant irony +in the reason which is assigned for the pilot’s modest charge; and in the +proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation; and in the +mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds. (2) The reference of the +mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the fate reserved +for incurable criminals such as Archelaus; the retaliation of the box on the +ears; the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are stript of the +clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have hitherto provided +for them (compare Swift’s notion that the universe is a suit of clothes, +Tale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of +supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death. (3) +The appeal of the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in his +court “holding a golden sceptre,” which gives verisimilitude to the +tale. +</p> + +<p> +It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing “both sides of +the game,” and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, +we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting +to analyze the “dramatis personae’ as they were conceived by him. +Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that Plato is a +dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which +he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have +the best of the argument; or to repeat the observation that he is a poet as +well as a philosopher; or to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern +standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of thought +and the opinion of his time. +</p> + +<p> +It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is the +assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of +stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of +ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract right or +duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of thought; indeed, +in some other parts of his writings (e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself +open to the charge of intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting +the “liberty of prophesying;’ and Plato is not affirming any +abstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the +one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At +the same time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to +avert, that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, +will probably share the fate of Socrates. +</p> + +<hr /> + +<p> +The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which he +soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts on an +armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are taken out +of their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The disguises which +Socrates assumes are like the parables of the New Testament, or the oracles of +the Delphian God; they half conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is +in earnest, the more ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or +more ironical than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer +seriously the objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes +appears to be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the +highest sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the +argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason. +He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words +of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared +for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his humour; +he is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, to be jesting +when he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus in earnest. +Finally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the forms of +dialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the same time he +retaliates upon his adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we +may now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main +theses of the dialogue. +</p> + +<p> +First Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice. +</p> + +<p> +Compare the New Testament— +</p> + +<p> +“It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil +doing.”—1 Pet. +</p> + +<p> +And the Sermon on the Mount— +</p> + +<p> +“Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness’ +sake.”—Matt. +</p> + +<p> +The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they +equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may suffer +or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, would be +happier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is ready, when they +are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, and for their own +sakes men are willing to punish the offender (compare Republic). But they are +not equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is +essentially evil, and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when +crimes are committed on the great scale—the crimes of tyrants, ancient or +modern—after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have become +a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from any +magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by time, and +“to forgive is convenient to them.” The tangle of good and evil can +no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end cannot justify the +means, they feel also that good has often come out of evil. But Socrates would +have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant now and always; though he is +surrounded by his satellites, and has the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing +in his ears; though he is the civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he +is, and always will be, the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences +for good or for evil cannot alter a hair’s breadth the morality of +actions which are right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which +Socrates holds up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, +are of a mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of +our practice. +</p> + +<p> +And so of private individuals—to them, too, the world occasionally speaks +of the consequences of their actions:—if they are lovers of pleasure, +they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, they will lose +their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, but of +what is—of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the soul. +And all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were not tempted +by interest or passion, would agree with him—they would rather be the +victims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason +tells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil +as an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to +a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of +truth and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us. +</p> + +<p> +Second Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer. +</p> + +<p> +There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty followed +at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would then be scarcely +distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice as they avoid pain or +death. But nature, with a view of deepening and enlarging our characters, has +for the most part hidden from us the consequences of our actions, and we can +only foresee them by an effort of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of +reflection is the business of early education, which is continued in maturer +years by observation and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to +be unfortunate—he had better have suffered when he was young, and been +saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate +whose education and manner of life are always concealing from him the +consequences of his own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in +some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own +fault? Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who +scarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass their +immediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them; but we do not +consider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. Not to +have been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or +religious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our +evil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have +given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and +therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by time; +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“While rank corruption, mining all within,<br/> +Infects unseen.” +</p> + +<p> +The “accustomed irony” of Socrates adds a corollary to the +argument:—“Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to +escape unpunished”—this is the true retaliation. (Compare the +obscure verse of Proverbs, “Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed +him,” etc., quoted in Romans.) +</p> + +<p> +Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives: +they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind and +very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always pleading +with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar figure of speech, Socrates +would have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in accusation of themselves. +As they are guided by feeling rather than by reason, to their feelings the +appeal must be made. They must speak to themselves; they must argue with +themselves; they must paint in eloquent words the character of their own evil +deeds. To any suffering which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves +to submit. Under the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in +another form, admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too +accuse as well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of +prayer and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle +between the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are +too hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love +has overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent +consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the +consciences of men “accusing or else excusing them.” For all our +life long we are talking with ourselves:—What is thought but speech? What +is feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be +always in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at +first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us. +</p> + +<p> +Third Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +We do not what we will, but what we wish. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn—that good +intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by wisdom, +are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we afterwards +find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be inevitable, for they +may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be the very opposite of what +is expected by us. When we increase pauperism by almsgiving; when we tie up +property without regard to changes of circumstances; when we say hastily what +we deliberately disapprove; when we do in a moment of passion what upon +reflection we regret; when from any want of self-control we give another an +advantage over us—we are doing not what we will, but what we wish. All +actions of which the consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this +impotent and paralytic sort; and the author of them has “the least +possible power” while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually +bringing about the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of nature is +open to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary +attention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other men’s +characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of the +consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to +have led Socrates to his famous thesis:—“Virtue is +knowledge;” which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth, +seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the +truth which is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown +older men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from +consequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve them +wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, neither divides +nor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived either for utilitarian +or transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he recognizes the two elements +which seem to lie at the basis of morality. (Compare the following: “Now, +and for us, it is a time to Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have +Hebraized too much and have overvalued doing. But the habits and discipline +received from Hebraism remain for our race an eternal possession. And as +humanity is constituted, one must never assign the second rank to-day without +being ready to restore them to the first to-morrow.” Sir William W. +Hunter, Preface to Orissa.) +</p> + +<p> +Fourth Thesis:— +</p> + +<p> +To be and not to seem is the end of life. +</p> + +<p> +The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief incentives +to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is a leading +principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters into all things; +all or almost all desire to appear better than they are, that they may win the +esteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can easily feign the language +of piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious as well as a conscious +hypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there +is the sophistry of classes and professions. There are the different opinions +about themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society. +There is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department of human +knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the prejudice +engendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. There is the +sophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the +sophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; +some of them are very ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from +them; for we have inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The +sophistry of an ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of +a religious order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been +accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the +other. The conventions and customs which we observe in conversation, and the +opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another (“the +buyer saith, it is nought—it is nought,” etc.), are always +obscuring our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far +more subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their +own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us +imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly help +to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires great force of +mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after truth. On every side +he is met by the world, which is not an abstraction of theologians, but the +most real of all things, being another name for ourselves when regarded +collectively and subjected to the influences of society. +</p> + +<p> +Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality and +untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be and not +seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit and desire to +be. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; +if they are conscious of doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are +weak, and have nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must +acquire firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to +take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must try to +be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men. A single +individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be true and +innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and what he does +not know; and though not without an effort, he can form a judgment of his own, +at least in common matters. In his most secret actions he can show the same +high principle (compare Republic) which he shows when supported and watched by +public opinion. And on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or +truth or right, even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his +disposition, may be found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians +and lawyers, and be too much for them. +</p> + +<p> +Who is the true and who the false statesman?— +</p> + +<p> +The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first organizes +and then administers the government of his own country; and having made a +nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those of Europe and of +mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in expedients; the whole +and the parts grow together in his mind; while the head is conceiving, the hand +is executing. Although obliged to descend to the world, he is not of the world. +His thoughts are fixed not on power or riches or extension of territory, but on +an ideal state, in which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and +life, and the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and +intellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and “the +idea of good” is the animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment +of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to unite freedom with order is the +problem which he has to solve. +</p> + +<p> +The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a task +which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before he can +control others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He has no +private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under the +disguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which men too +often fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of his mission, +and in his love for his country and for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself +what the next generation will say of him; not because he is careful of +posthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of his life as a whole +will then be more fairly judged. He will take time for the execution of his +plans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; +but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for +he knows that human life, “if not long in comparison with eternity” +(Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He knows, +too, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer here; and he +will sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, think of that other +“city of which the pattern is in heaven” (Republic). +</p> + +<p> +The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to govern men he +becomes like them; their “minds are married in conjunction;” they +“bear themselves” like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is +their obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make +them like himself; he must “educate his party” until they cease to +be a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form +to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming what +he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a +representative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the higher +elements of the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) public opinion +of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper current of human +affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the shore are threatening +him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world by force—two or three +moves on the political chess board are all that he can fore see—two or +three weeks moves on the political chessboard are all that he can +foresee—two or three weeks or months are granted to him in which he can +provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that there are permanent +principles of politics which are always tending to the well-being of +states—better administration, better education, the reconciliation of +conflicting elements, increased security against external enemies. These are +not “of to-day or yesterday,” but are the same in all times, and +under all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, +though he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like +Plato’s captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with +penetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide +her into port. +</p> + +<p> +The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the +world—not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of +which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of +fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is unwilling to +incur the persecution and enmity which political convictions would entail upon +him. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But +unpopularity soon follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and +wiser than themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in +extremity; they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of +the popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. +Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most +unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have done what +might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received justice at their +hands. +</p> + +<p> +The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and +circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he must +enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act together. +Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the majority, he must win +over the majority to himself. He is their leader and not their follower, but in +order to lead he must also follow. He will neither exaggerate nor undervalue +the power of a statesman, neither adopting the “laissez faire” nor +the “paternal government” principle; but he will, whether he is +dealing with children in politics, or with full-grown men, seek to do for the +people what the government can do for them, and what, from imperfect education +or deficient powers of combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows +that if he does too much for them they will do nothing; and that if he does +nothing for them they will in some states of society be utterly helpless. For +the many cannot exist without the few, if the material force of a country is +from below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of +human evils which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well +aware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at +last be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by +some accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of +politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, if he +plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always consistent, +for the world is changing; and though he depends upon the support of a party, +he will remember that he is the minister of the whole. He lives not for the +present, but for the future, and he is not at all sure that he will be +appreciated either now or then. For he may have the existing order of society +against him, and may not be remembered by a distant posterity. +</p> + +<p> +There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates in the +Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not excepting +the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling that they ought +to be better governed than they are. Just as the actual philosopher falls short +of the one wise man, so does the actual statesman fall short of the ideal. And +so partly from vanity and egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the +faults of eminent men, a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up +among those who are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own +powers. No matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at +all—they are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the +more unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because +he has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but +they are widely spread; we constantly find them recurring in reviews and +newspapers, and still oftener in private conversation. +</p> + +<p> +We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects +tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions +become more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily be combined with +governing by the people: the interests of classes are too strong for the ideas +of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. According to +Socrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him in the face, and +will only be induced to govern from the fear of being governed by a worse man +than himself (Republic). And in modern times, though the world has grown +milder, and the terrible consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an +English statesman, any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only +undertake from a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail; and +even if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own +generation. +</p> + +<p> +Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real +politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by applying +them to the history of our own country. He would have said that not Pitt or +Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of their time, but +Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during the greater part of +their lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They +were private persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which +in the next generation have become an irresistible power. “Herein is that +saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.” We may imagine with Plato +an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly harmonized; +for there is no necessary opposition between them. But experience shows that +they are commonly divorced—the ordinary politician is the interpreter or +executor of the thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new +political conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian +statesman Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher +is naturally unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood by +the many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet +perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier +than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise +of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by their +own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who would have been +ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred with them, and are proud to be +called by their names. (Compare Thucyd.) +</p> + +<p> +Who is the true poet? +</p> + +<p> +Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to sense; +because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from the +ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the Gorgias that the +stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In modern +times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. The poet and +the prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in +later ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that +peculiar creation of our own and the last century, which, together with the +sister art of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less +of seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer +censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers? +</p> + +<p> +Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give +amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, or +even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets in modern +times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their high vocation +of teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe their sublimity +to their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in the purest and +sweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes +them with beauty, and has a power of making them enter into the hearts and +memories of men. He has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary +life, but to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are +ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he +makes young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he +finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. He +uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises us through +earth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and +the half-conscious feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own +critic, for the spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His +mission is not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own +nature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry +is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest +and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the greatest +deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his greater calling of +the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may not be effected for the +human race by a better use of the poetical and imaginative faculty. The +reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with truth, may still be possible. +Neither is the element of pleasure to be excluded. For when we substitute a +higher pleasure for a lower we raise men in the scale of existence. Might not +the novelist, too, make an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better +than a thousand sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic +and artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of the noble +purposes to which art may be applied (Republic). +</p> + +<p> +Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato’s language, a +flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, the poet +lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. Such an +one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the “savoir +faire,” or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry. +He has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder; that it +should make provision for the soul’s highest interest; that it should be +pursued only with a view to “the improvement of the citizens.” He +ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Republic); he idealizes the +sensual; he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of raising +men above themselves he brings them back to the “tyranny of the many +masters,” from which all his life long a good man has been praying to be +delivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express not that +which is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great and +nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is +worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words, +but his words—perhaps borrowed from another—the faded reflection of +some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though we are +not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such utterances have any +healing or life-giving influence on the minds of men? +</p> + +<p> +“Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:” Art then must be +true, and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a +seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, truth +out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest improvement of +man. And so, having considered in what way “we can best spend the +appointed time, we leave the result with God.” Plato does not say that +God will order all things for the best (compare Phaedo), but he indirectly +implies that the evils of this life will be corrected in another. And as we are +very far from the best imaginable world at present, Plato here, as in the +Phaedo and Republic, supposes a purgatory or place of education for mankind in +general, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the +dialogue is not the revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, +whether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing +can reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture, +is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner in which we are +“born again” (Republic). Only he is prepared to maintain the +ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not even the +wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without being ridiculous. +</p> + +<p> +There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are held to be +indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without regard to +consequences is happiness. From this elevation or exaggeration of feeling Plato +seems to shrink: he leaves it to the Stoics in a later generation to maintain +that when impaled or on the rack the philosopher may be happy (compare +Republic). It is observable that in the Republic he raises this question, but +it is not really discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the shadow of another +life, are allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of sight. The martyr or +sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often supposed to die in raptures, +having his eye fixed on a city which is in heaven. But if there were no future, +might he not still be happy in the performance of an action which was attended +only by a painful death? He himself may be ready to thank God that he was +thought worthy to do Him the least service, without looking for a reward; the +joys of another life may not have been present to his mind at all. Do we +suppose that the mediaeval saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of +Sienna, or the Catholic priest who lately devoted himself to death by a +lingering disease that he might solace and help others, was thinking of the +“sweets” of heaven? No; the work was already heaven to him and +enough. Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or +of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of right, and trust in God will +be sufficient, and as far as the mind can reach, in that hour. If he were +certain that there were no life to come, he would not have wished to speak or +act otherwise than he did in the cause of truth or of humanity. Neither, on the +other hand, will he suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to +be a mere blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot +pass away, is his who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few among the +sons of men have made themselves independent of circumstances, past, present, +or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind has already present +with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to convince him of immortality; he +has in him already a principle stronger than death. He who serves man without +the thought of reward is deemed to be a more faithful servant than he who works +for hire. May not the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in +like manner the higher? And although only a very few in the course of the +world’s history—Christ himself being one of them—have +attained to such a noble conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal +of them may be present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us, +and their lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and +theology. +</p> + +<p> +THE MYTHS OF PLATO. +</p> + +<p> +The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are four longer +ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic. That in the +Republic is the most elaborate and finished of them. Three of these greater +myths, namely those contained in the Phaedo, the Gorgias and the Republic, +relate to the destiny of human souls in a future life. The magnificent myth in +the Phaedrus treats of the immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in +which is included a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may +be added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in which +the life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man and the +consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of Atlantis, an imaginary +history, which is a fragment only, commenced in the Timaeus and continued in +the Critias: (3) the much less artistic fiction of the foundation of the Cretan +colony which is introduced in the preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the +background: (4) the beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and +Epimetheus narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue +called after him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a +parody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the recantation +of it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the grasshoppers, and (7) the tale +of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the Phaedrus: (8) the parable of the Cave +(Republic), in which the previous argument is recapitulated, and the nature and +degrees of knowledge having been previously set forth in the abstract are +represented in a picture: (9) the fiction of the earth-born men (Republic; +compare Laws), in which by the adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new +beginning for his society: (10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the +division of the sexes, Sym.: (11) the parable of the noble captain, the pilot, +and the mutinous sailors (Republic), in which is represented the relation of +the better part of the world, and of the philosopher, to the mob of +politicians: (12) the ironical tale of the pilot who plies between Athens and +Aegina charging only a small payment for saving men from death, the reason +being that he is uncertain whether to live or die is better for them (Gor.): +(13) the treatment of freemen and citizens by physicians and of slaves by their +apprentices,—a somewhat laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate +the two different ways in which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also occur +in Plato continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, appearing +and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and stingless (paupers +and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are generated in the +transition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which is to the visible world +what the idea of good is to the intellectual, in the Sixth Book of the +Republic: the composite animal, having the form of a man, but containing under +a human skin a lion and a many-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e. +the populace: and the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are +always liable to break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation of +philosophy by the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the +parricide, who “beats his father, having first taken away his +arms”: the dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather +paltry image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), which is +repeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument personified as veiling +her face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us in a first, +second and third wave:—on these figures of speech the changes are rung +many times over. It is observable that nearly all these parables or continuous +images are found in the Republic; that which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the +midwifery of Socrates, is perhaps the only exception. To make the list +complete, the mathematical figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the +numerical interval which separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten. +</p> + +<p> +The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life which, +like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences of the +mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which await good and +bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue and to be in another +world what it has become in this. It includes a Paradiso, Purgatorio, and +Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo and the Republic. The Inferno is +reserved for great criminals only. The argument of the dialogue is frequently +referred to, and the meaning breaks through so as rather to destroy the +liveliness and consistency of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very +slight, the chief point or moral being that in the judgments of another world +there is no possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of +foreseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their judges +naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to view, stripped +of the veils and clothes which might prevent them from seeing into or being +seen by one another. +</p> + +<p> +The myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more cosmological, and +also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy occurs to Plato that the +upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in one, a glorified earth, fairer and +purer than that in which we dwell. As the fishes live in the ocean, mankind are +living in a lower sphere, out of which they put their heads for a moment or two +and behold a world beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the +coarser particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly +earth what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of the myth +consists of description of the interior of the earth, which gives the +opportunity of introducing several mythological names and of providing places +of torment for the wicked. There is no clear distinction of soul and body; the +spirits beneath the earth are spoken of as souls only, yet they retain a sort +of shadowy form when they cry for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the +philosopher alone is said to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in +Plato which relate to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as +well as other homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural +reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of human +character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind are between +them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of the Phaedo they are +carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian lake, where they dwell, and +are purified of their evil deeds, and receive the rewards of their good. There +are also incurable sinners, who are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the +penalty of atrocious crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another +class of hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach +the shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for mercy; +which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from their torments. +</p> + +<p> +Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps any +allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent with itself. +The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; abstract ideas are +transformed into persons, figures of speech into realities. These myths may be +compared with the Pilgrim’s Progress of Bunyan, in which discussions of +theology are mixed up with the incidents of travel, and mythological personages +are associated with human beings: they are also garnished with names and +phrases taken out of Homer, and with other fragments of Greek tradition. +</p> + +<p> +The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than either of +the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they have, and is full of +touches which recall the experiences of human life. It will be noticed by an +attentive reader that the twelve days during which Er lay in a trance after he +was slain coincide with the time passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It +is a curious observation, not often made, that good men who have lived in a +well-governed city (shall we say in a religious and respectable society?) are +more likely to make mistakes in their choice of life than those who have had +more experience of the world and of evil. It is a more familiar remark that we +constantly blame others when we have only ourselves to blame; and the +philosopher must acknowledge, however reluctantly, that there is an element of +chance in human life with which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. +That men drink more of the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a +poetical description of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, +like Odysseus, have wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We should +like to know what became of the infants “dying almost as soon as they +were born,” but Plato only raises, without satisfying, our curiosity. The +two companies of souls, ascending and descending at either chasm of heaven and +earth, and conversing when they come out into the meadow, the majestic figures +of the judges sitting in heaven, the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of +the great allegory which have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark +already made respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be +extended also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, and a +picture of the Day of Judgment. +</p> + +<p> +The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an Oriental, or +rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an affinity to the mysteries +and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a certain extent they are un-Greek; at +any rate there is hardly anything like them in other Greek writings which have +a serious purpose; in spirit they are mediaeval. They are akin to what may be +termed the underground religion in all ages and countries. They are presented +in the most lively and graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as true; +it is only affirmed that nothing better can be said about a future life. Plato +seems to make use of them when he has reached the limits of human knowledge; +or, to borrow an expression of his own, when he is standing on the outside of +the intellectual world. They are very simple in style; a few touches bring the +picture home to the mind, and make it present to us. They have also a kind of +authority gained by the employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere +fragments of the words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to +any subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry and +mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of them may be +summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and “there is some +better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.” +</p> + +<p> +All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for example, the +tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at first sight to be an +extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety when we remember that it is +based on a legendary belief. The art of making stories of ghosts and +apparitions credible is said to consist in the manner of telling them. The +effect is gained by many literary and conversational devices, such as the +previous raising of curiosity, the mention of little circumstances, simplicity, +picturesqueness, the naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is +possessed by Plato in a degree which has never been equalled. +</p> + +<p> +The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been already +described, but is of a different character. It treats of a former rather than +of a future life. It represents the conflict of reason aided by passion or +righteous indignation on the one hand, and of the animal lusts and instincts on +the other. The soul of man has followed the company of some god, and seen truth +in the form of the universal before it was born in this world. Our present life +is the result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is relative +to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We ask the question, +Where were men before birth? As we likewise enquire, What will become of them +after death? The first question is unfamiliar to us, and therefore seems to be +unnatural; but if we survey the whole human race, it has been as influential +and as widely spread as the other. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of +speech in which the “spiritual combat” of this life is represented. +The majesty and power of the whole passage—especially of what may be +called the theme or proem (beginning “The mind through all her being is +immortal”)—can only be rendered very inadequately in another +language. +</p> + +<p> +The myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in which men +were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth’s motion had +their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: the dead came to +life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged young; the youth became a +child, the child an infant, the infant vanished into the earth. The connection +between the reversal of the earth’s motion and the reversal of human life +is of course verbal only, yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues +from the consistency of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was +immediately under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which +men had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all things +spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the animals. There were no +great estates, or families, or private possessions, nor any traditions of the +past, because men were all born out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the +“reign of Cronos;” and in like manner he connects the reversal of +the earth’s motion with some legend of which he himself was probably the +inventor. +</p> + +<p> +The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of existence was +man the happier,—under that of Cronos, which was a state of innocence, or +that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while Plato balances the two +sides of the serious controversy, which he has suggested in a figure. The +answer depends on another question: What use did the children of Cronos make of +their time? They had boundless leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only +with one another, but with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a +view to philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store of +knowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and telling +stories to one another and to the beasts?—in either case there would be +no difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather mischievously adds, +“Nobody knows what they did,” and therefore the doubt must remain +undetermined. +</p> + +<p> +To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural convulsion, +in which the order of the world and of human life is once more reversed, God +withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the government of himself. The +world begins again, and arts and laws are slowly and painfully invented. A +secular age succeeds to a theocratical. In this fanciful tale Plato has +dropped, or almost dropped, the garb of mythology. He suggests several curious +and important thoughts, such as the possibility of a state of innocence, the +existence of a world without traditions, and the difference between human and +divine government. He has also carried a step further his speculations +concerning the abolition of the family and of property, which he supposes to +have no place among the children of Cronos any more than in the ideal state. +</p> + +<p> +It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract to the +concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of the seen, and +also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A great writer knows +how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining within the sphere of the +visible, and then again comprehending a wider range and soaring to the abstract +and universal. Even in the same sentence he may employ both modes of speech not +improperly or inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors +of Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as can be +painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the reader. A poem +may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not one but many latent +images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the thoughts of many hearts. +Often the rapid transition from one image to another is pleasing to us: on the +other hand, any single figure of speech if too often repeated, or worked out +too much at length, becomes prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we +necessarily include both “the moral law within and the starry heaven +above,” and pass from one to the other (compare for examples Psalms +xviii. and xix.). Whether such a use of language is puerile or noble depends +upon the genius of the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the +associations employed. +</p> + +<p> +In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation is not +forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are told to a +living audience, and so well told that we are more than half-inclined to +believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation too, the striking image or +figure of speech is not forgotten, but is quickly caught up, and alluded to +again and again; as it would still be in our own day in a genial and +sympathetic society. The descriptions of Plato have a greater life and reality +than is to be found in any modern writing. This is due to their homeliness and +simplicity. Plato can do with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed +“more plastic than wax” (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing +speech and writing, poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language +in which they are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest +truths; and in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of daily +life are not overlooked. +</p> + +<hr /> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div class="chapter"> + +<h2><a name="chap02"></a>GORGIAS</h2> + +<h3>By Plato</h3> + +<h3>Translated by Benjamin Jowett</h3> + +<p> +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, Polus. +</p> + +<p> +SCENE: The house of Callicles. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a +feast. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been exhibiting to +us many fine things. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to blame; for +he would keep us loitering in the Agora. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the cause +I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make him give +the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other time. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon—does Socrates want to hear +Gorgias? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and he +shall exhibit to you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I want to +hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which he professes +and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the exhibition to some +other time. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to answer +questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just now, that +any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he would answer. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon—? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ask him who he is. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been a +maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our friend +Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions which you +are asked? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and I may +add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new one. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me too, +for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than Gorgias? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Not at all:—and you shall answer if you like. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Ask:— +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother +Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which is +given to his brother? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or of +his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly, a painter. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him—what is the art in which he is +skilled. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are experimental, +and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the days of men to +proceed according to art, and inexperience according to chance, and different +persons in different ways are proficient in different arts, and the best +persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one of the best, and the +art in which he is a proficient is the noblest. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but he +is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he was +asked. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: for I +see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended more to +the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which +Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found fault +with it, but you never said what the art was. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody asked +what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by what name we +were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly and clearly, as you +answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say what this art is, and +what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask +the same question,—what are we to call you, and what is the art which you +profess? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that which, in +Homeric language, “I boast myself to be.” +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should wish to do so. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Then pray do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men rhetoricians? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at Athens, +but in all places. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as we are +at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode of speech +which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and answer shortly the +questions which are asked of you? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my best +to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that I can be +as short as any one. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, and +the longer one at some other time. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a man +use fewer words. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker of +rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might ask with +what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), with the +making of garments? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: It is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your answers. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: with +what is rhetoric concerned? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: With discourse. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?—such discourse as would teach +the sick under what treatment they might get well? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now mentioning, +also make men able to understand and speak about the sick? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Just so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the good or +evil condition of the body? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:—all of them +treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have to +do. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of discourse, and +all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them arts of rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do with +some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such action of +the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through the medium of +discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that rhetoric treats of +discourse. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say I +shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:—you would allow +that there are arts? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned with +doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, and many +other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I suppose you +would say that they do not come within the province of rhetoric. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of +language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the +arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; in +some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in most of +them the verbal element is greater—they depend wholly on words for their +efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of +this latter sort? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Exactly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of these +arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, that +rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the medium of +discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, “And so, +Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.” But I do not think that you +really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so called by +you. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my meaning. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:—seeing that +rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and there +are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in words with +which rhetoric is concerned:—Suppose that a person asks me about some of +the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, “Socrates, what +is arithmetic?” and I should reply to him, as you replied to me, that +arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through words. And then he +would proceed to ask: “Words about what?” and I should reply, Words +about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. And if he asked +again: “What is the art of calculation?” I should say, That also is +one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, +“Concerned with what?” I should say, like the clerks in the +assembly, “as aforesaid” of arithmetic, but with a difference, the +difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the quantities +of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to themselves and +to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only +words—he would ask, “Words about what, Socrates?” and I +should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and sun +and moon, and their relative swiftness. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: +which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act always +and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do the +words which rhetoric uses relate? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for which +are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have heard men +singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers enumerate the +goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the writer of the song +says, wealth honestly obtained. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the author of +the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the money-maker, +will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: “O Socrates, +Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the greatest good of men +and not his.” And when I ask, Who are you? he will reply, “I am a +physician.” What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean that your art +produces the greatest good? “Certainly,” he will answer, “for +is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, +Socrates?” And after him the trainer will come and say, “I too, +Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art +than I can show of mine.” To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest +friend, and what is your business? “I am a trainer,” he will reply, +“and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.” When +I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I +expect, will utterly despise them all. “Consider Socrates,” he will +say, “whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than +wealth.” Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? +“Yes,” he replies. And who are you? “A money-maker.” +And do you consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? “Of +course,” will be his reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend +Gorgias contends that his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he +will be sure to go on and ask, “What good? Let Gorgias answer.” Now +I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and +by me; What is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of +which you are the creator? Answer us. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that which +gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the power of +ruling over others in their several states. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in the +courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the assembly, or at +any other political meeting?—if you have the power of uttering this word, +you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer your slave, and the +money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather treasures, not for +himself, but for you who are able to speak and to persuade the multitude. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what +you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not +mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no +other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other +effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is +the chief end of rhetoric. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a +man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the +truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, +according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that +persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have +a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask—what +is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But +why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, +but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely +to set forth the truth. And I would have you observe, that I am right in asking +this further question: If I asked, “What sort of a painter is +Zeuxis?” and you said, “The painter of figures,” should I not +be right in asking, “What kind of figures, and where do you find +them?” +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that there +are other painters besides, who paint many other figures? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then you +would have answered very well? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Quite so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;—is rhetoric +the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same effect? I +mean to say—Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that which he +teaches or not? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,—there can be no mistake about that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now +speaking:—do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the +properties of number? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about +what,—we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and +even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were +just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about +what. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but that +other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has arisen +which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the artificer, and +about what?—is not that a fair way of putting the question? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I think so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in courts +of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the just and +unjust. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; yet I +would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a seemingly plain +question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I was saying that the +argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not get the habit of +anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another’s words; I would +have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever may be your +hypothesis. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as +“having learned”? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And there is also “having believed”? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is the “having learned” the same as “having +believed,” and are learning and belief the same things? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this +way:—If a person were to say to you, “Is there, Gorgias, a false +belief as well as a true?”—you would reply, if I am not mistaken, +that there is. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief differ. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have believed are +persuaded? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Just so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,—one which is the +source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: By all means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of law +and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion which +gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion +which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction about +them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other +assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; for +no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such high +matters in a short time? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; for I +do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets to elect a +physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the rhetorician be taken +into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he ought to be chosen who is +most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be built or harbours or docks to +be constructed, not the rhetorician but the master workman will advise; or when +generals have to be chosen and an order of battle arranged, or a position +taken, then the military will advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, +Gorgias? Since you profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I +cannot do better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me +assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For likely +enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to become your +pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but +they would be too modest to question you. And therefore when you are +interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. +“What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?” they will +say—“about what will you teach us to advise the state?—about +the just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates has +just mentioned?” How will you answer them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour to +reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I think, that +the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the harbour were +devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of Themistocles, and partly of +Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the builders. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself +heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be given +in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men who win +their point. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is the +nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the matter in +this way, to be a marvel of greatness. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric comprehends +and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer you a striking +example of this. On several occasions I have been with my brother Herodicus or +some other physician to see one of his patients, who would not allow the +physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or hot iron to him; and I +have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do for the physician just by +the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go +to any city, and had there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to +which of them should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no +chance; but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest +with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one would have +the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the +multitude than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of +the art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other +competitive art, not against everybody,—the rhetorician ought not to +abuse his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of +fence;—because he has powers which are more than a match either for +friend or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. +Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful +boxer,—he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or +mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the +trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the +city;—surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be +used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and +others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own +strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither is +the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who make a +bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good of rhetoric; +for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any subject,—in +short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man of anything +which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud the physician or +any other artist of his reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to +use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after +having become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his +instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or +banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his +instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who ought to +be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his instructor. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of disputations, +and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always terminate in +mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of the subjects which +they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise—somebody says +that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they get into a passion +and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing +from personal feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in +the question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another until +the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever listening to such +fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now +saying what is not quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at +first about rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should +think that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the +sake of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of +my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. +And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing to be +refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to refute any one +else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be refuted as to refute; +for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, just as the gain is +greater of being cured of a very great evil than of curing another. For I +imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure so great as an erroneous +opinion about the matters of which we are speaking; and if you claim to be one +of my sort, let us have the discussion out, but if you would rather have done, +no matter;—let us make an end of it. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you indicate; +but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you came, I had +already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument may run on to a +great length. And therefore I think that we should consider whether we may not +be detaining some part of the company when they are wanting to do something +else. +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which shows +their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I should have +any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion so interesting +and so ably maintained. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many +discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and therefore +if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, +especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the +wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any question which you +like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; +though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your +meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a +rhetorician? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the multitude +on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Quite so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater +powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,—that is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he cannot +be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the physician, he +will have greater power than he who knows? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:—is he? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of what +the physician knows. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the physician, the +ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who has +knowledge?—is not that the inference? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: In the case supposed:—yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other arts; +the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to discover +some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge than those who +know? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?—not to have +learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no way +inferior to the professors of them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a +question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any +service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as +ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is +of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of +what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he +only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be +esteemed to know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must +the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire +the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric +will not teach him—it is not your business; but you will make him seem to +the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good +man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless +he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By +heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as +you were saying that you would. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know +them, he will have to learn of me these things as well. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a +rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he +must be taught by you. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He +who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Clearly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be +accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; +and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his +rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be +banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his +rhetoric—he is to be banished—was not that said? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, it was. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never +have done injustice at all? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of +discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but about just and unjust? +Was not this said? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that +rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an +unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician +might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into +which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was +a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the +question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our +investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged +to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do +injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, +before we get at the truth of all this. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying +about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician +knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to any one who +came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this +admission there arose a contradiction—the thing which you dearly love, +and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious +questions—(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?) +For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the +nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in +bringing the argument to such a pass. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends +and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be +at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, +if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for +my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have +fallen-upon one condition: +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What condition? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you +indulged at first. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, +which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you +alone, should be deprived of the power of speech—that would be hard +indeed. But then consider my case:—shall not I be very hardly used, if, +when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, +I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if +you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, +have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you +please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias—refute +and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias +knows—would you not? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything which he +pleases, and you will know how to answer him? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which +Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say +that you have made an art. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What thing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: An experience in what? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a +fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight +gratification to me? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I will. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What then? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should say an experience. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, +Polus. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Of what profession? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to +answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. +For whether or not this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I +really cannot tell:—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of +what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not +very creditable whole. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is +not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to +manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word “flattery”; and +it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may +seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not +an art:—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry +are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things +answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been +informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet +answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not +think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a +fine thing or not, until I have first answered, “What is rhetoric?” +For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will +ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the +ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And noble or ignoble? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what +is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and +our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away. (This is +an untranslatable play on the name “Polus,” which means “a +colt.”) +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that +rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am +mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of +bodies and of souls? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of +them? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? +I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and +whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good +health. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in +either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the +reality? +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Yes, certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: +The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the +art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, +of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two +divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there +is a legislative part, which answers to gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; +and the two parts run into one another, justice having to do with the same +subject as legislation, and medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but +with a difference. Now, seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on +the body and two on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or +rather guessing their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or +simulations of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and +pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men’s +highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and +deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. +Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is +the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a +competition in which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense +than children, as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of +food, the physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and +of an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it +aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but +only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the +nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing an art; +but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence of them. +</p> + +<p> +Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of medicine; +and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of gymnastic, +and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully by the help of +lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making men affect a spurious +beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is given by gymnastic. +</p> + +<p> +I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the manner +of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be able to follow) +</p> + +<p> +as tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine; +</p> + +<p> +or rather, +</p> + +<p> +as tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation; +</p> + +<p> +and +</p> + +<p> +as cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice. +</p> + +<p> +And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the +sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled up +together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other men +know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and were not +under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and discriminate +between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge of them, and the +rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by them, then the word +of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, +would prevail far and wide: “Chaos” would come again, and cookery, +health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have +told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery +is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when I +would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be excused, +because you did not understand me, and could make no use of my answer when I +spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an explanation. And if I show +an equal inability to make use of yours, I hope that you will speak at equal +length; but if I am able to understand you, let me have the benefit of your +brevity, as is only fair: And now you may do what you please with my answer. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you cannot +remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the idea +that they are flatterers? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I am asking a question. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the +citizens. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile any one +whom they please. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of yours, +whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question of me. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I am asking a question of you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: How two questions? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like tyrants, +and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and I +will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and tyrants +have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; for they do +literally nothing which they will, but only what they think best. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And is not that a great power? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, by the great—what do you call him?—not you, for you +say that power is a good to him who has the power. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, this +is a good, and would you call this great power? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that +rhetoric is an art and not a flattery—and so you will have refuted me; +but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think +best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate +themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time +that what is done without sense is an evil. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes; I admit that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in +states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they +will? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: This fellow— +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;—now refute me. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I say so still. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then surely they do as they will? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I deny it. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: But they do what they think best? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Aye. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but +if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give +the answer yourself. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that +further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for +example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the +medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly, the health. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will +that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of +a voyage or the trouble of business?—But they will, to have the wealth +for the sake of which they go on a voyage. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the +sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake +of which he does it. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and +indifferent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and +their opposites evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake +sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are +such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the +like:—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Exactly so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the +good for the sake of the indifferent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea +that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of +the good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his +goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of +something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing +for the sake of which we do them? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Most true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to +despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, +and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as +you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or +simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You are right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a +rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, +under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his +own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not +answer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Well, I suppose not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have +great power in a state? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: He will not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him +in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what +seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when +you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus! +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why “forbear”? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but +only to pity them. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and justly +slays him, is pitiable and wretched? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be +envied. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is +also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is +wretched, and to be pitied? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is +justly killed. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: How can that be, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of +evils. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would +rather suffer than do. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you +in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply +to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. +Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for +if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man +whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break +his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn +in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe +me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort +of way any one may have great power—he may burn any house which he +pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other +vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere +doing as you think best is great power? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I can. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why then? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a +benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the +meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. +But let us look at the matter in another way:—do we not acknowledge that +the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and +the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they +are evil—what principle do you lay down? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that +question. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say +that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that +statement? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to +you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that +refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events +which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that +many men who do wrong are happy. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What events? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler +of Macedonia? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with +him, whether a man is happy? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Most certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether +the great king was a happy man? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the +matter of education and justice. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are +gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are +miserable. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the +throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the +slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right +was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have +remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been +happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the +greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, +to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne +which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, +who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, +he threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and +got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he +never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far +from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had a younger +brother, a child of seven years old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, +and to him of right the kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to +bring him up as he ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his +notion of happiness; but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and +drowned him, and declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while +running after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest +criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable +and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and +you would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than +Archelaus! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather than a +reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with which you fancy +that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted when I say that the +unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is the refutation? I cannot +admit a word which you have been saying. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after the +manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one party +think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of witnesses +of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary has only a +single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no value where truth is +the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who +have a great air of respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, +Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring +witnesses in disproof of my statement;—you may, if you will, summon +Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods +which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon +Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous offering +which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of Pericles, or any +other great Athenian family whom you choose;—they will all agree with +you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do not convince me; +although you produce many false witnesses against me, in the hope of depriving +me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But I consider that nothing worth +speaking of will have been effected by me unless I make you the one witness of +my words; nor by you, unless you make me the one witness of yours; no matter +about the rest of the world. For there are two ways of refutation, one which is +yours and that of the world in general; but mine is of another sort—let +us compare them, and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue +about matters which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know +or not to know happiness and misery—that is the chief of them. And what +knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And +therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is +unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus +unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your opinion? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility—here is one point about +which we are at issue:—very good. And do you mean to say also that if he +meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, according to +you, he will be happy? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions is +miserable in any case,—more miserable, however, if he be not punished and +does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished and meets +with retribution at the hands of gods and men. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a friend I +regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us—are they not? I +was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Exactly so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you said the opposite? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: By Zeus, I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be unpunished? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are +punished are less miserable—are you going to refute this proposition +also? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to make +himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes burned +out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on him, and +having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last impaled or tarred +and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape and become a tyrant, and +continue all through life doing what he likes and holding the reins of +government, the envy and admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the +paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of +refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to +refresh my memory a little; did you say—“in an unjust attempt to +make himself a tyrant”? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the +other,—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in +the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who +escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, +Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,—when any one says +anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, +when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe +were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the +votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I +failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but +if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a +turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is +required; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he +is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with +the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I +ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? +For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to +do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to +be punished. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for +example, suffer rather than do injustice? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But will you answer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am +beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the +worst?—to do injustice or to suffer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?—Answer. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is +not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, +such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them +beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in +proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the +spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were +beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, +or of both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as +they are useful or pleasant or both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I think not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty +by the standard of pleasure and utility. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite +standard of pain and evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure +of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in +pleasure or utility or both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or +disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil—must it not be so? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, +about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more +evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more +disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: +does not that also follow? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds +the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the +injured? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: No. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore +be a greater evil than suffering injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is +more disgraceful than to suffer? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less +one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly +resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without +shrinking, and either say “Yes” or “No” to me. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should say “No.” +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would +rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the +two. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is the conclusion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, how +unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your way of +thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,—I have no +need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the rest. Enough +of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which is, Whether the +greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or +whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. +Consider:—You would say that to suffer punishment is another name for +being justly corrected when you do wrong? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in so far +as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Consider again:—Where there is an agent, must there not also be +a patient? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should say so. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and will +not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for example, that if +a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is struck +will be struck violently or quickly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature as the +act of him who strikes? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing burned +will be burned in the same way? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Truly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds—there will be something +cut? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, the +cut will be of the same nature? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition which I +was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers to the +affection of the agent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is +suffering or acting? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Justly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished suffers +what is honourable? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable is +either pleasant or useful? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he is benefited? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term +“benefited”? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is +improved. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Surely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at the +matter in this way:—In respect of a man’s estate, do you see any +greater evil than poverty? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: There is no greater evil. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Again, in a man’s bodily frame, you would say that the evil is +weakness and disease and deformity? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of her +own? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Of course. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, and +the like? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have pointed +out three corresponding evils—injustice, disease, poverty? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?—Is not the most +disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: By far the most. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already admitted to +be most painful or hurtful, or both. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by us to +be most disgraceful? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: It has been admitted. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing +excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and +ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from your +premises. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the soul +is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must be caused +by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest of +evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of the +soul, are the greatest of evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not the +art of making money? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of medicine? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer at +once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take them. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To the judges, you mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: —Who are to punish them? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in accordance +with a certain rule of justice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine from +disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is evident. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Will you enumerate them? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or advantage or +both? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are being +healed pleased? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: I think not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A useful thing, then? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and this is +the advantage of enduring the pain—that you get well? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is +healed, or who never was out of health? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered from +evils, but in never having had them. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their +bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another is +not healed, but retains the evil—which of them is the most miserable? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the +greatest of evils, which is vice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the medicine +of our vice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has never +had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of evils. +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and punishment? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance from +injustice? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and who, +being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or correction or +punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by Archelaus and other +tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the +conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet +contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his +constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of the +pain of being burned or cut:—Is not that a parallel case? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes, truly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and bodily +vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, they are in a +like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be painful, but are +blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing how far more miserable +a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is +corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they do all that they can to +avoid punishment and to avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they +provide themselves with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their +powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or +shall we draw out the consequences in form? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: If you please. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is the +greatest of evils? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is quite clear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released from +this evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to do +wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You deemed +Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and unpunished: I, on the +other hand, maintained that he or any other who like him has done wrong and has +not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most miserable of all men; and that +the doer of injustice is more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes +punishment, more miserable than he who suffers.—Was not that what I said? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of rhetoric? +If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in every way to guard +himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer great evil? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought of +his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run to the +judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of injustice may +not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of the soul; must we +not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former admissions are to +stand:—is any other inference consistent with them? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to excuse +his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or country; but +may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he ought to +accuse—himself above all, and in the next degree his family or any of his +friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the iniquity and not +conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made whole; and he should +even force himself and others not to shrink, but with closed eyes like brave +men to let the physician operate with knife or searing iron, not regarding the +pain, in the hope of attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has +done things worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be +bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to +die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using +rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, +and that they themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest +evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say +“Yes” or “No” to that? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though +probably in agreement with your premises. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven? +</p> + +<p> +POLUS: Yes; it certainly is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to harm +another, whether an enemy or not—I except the case of +self-defence—then I have to be upon my guard—but if my enemy +injures a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I +should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if +he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: +if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it +on him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things +worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, +if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he +can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of +any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no +such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking? +</p> + +<p> +CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; but +you may well ask him. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in earnest, or +only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is true, is not the +whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not doing, as would appear, +in everything the opposite of what we ought to be doing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among +mankind, however varying in different persons—I mean to say, if every +man’s feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest +of his species—I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions +to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a +common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves +apiece:—I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of +philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of Pyrilampes. +Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not venture to contradict +your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as he changes you change, +backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are +saying in the assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with +Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist +the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express surprise at +the strangeness of what you say from time to time when under their influence, +you would probably reply to him, if you were honest, that you cannot help +saying what your loves say unless they are prevented; and that you can only be +silent when they are. Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, +and therefore you need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence +philosophy, who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling +you, my friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of +Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy is +always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, and you +have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as I was saying, +that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the worst of all evils; +or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O +Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole +life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre should +be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus which I +provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with me, and oppose +me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with myself, and contradict +myself. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running riot +in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus has +fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:—for he +said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him who +wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him justice, +Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought that mankind +in general would be displeased if he answered “No”; and then in +consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict himself, +that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed +at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen into the same +trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is +more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which +led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say what he +thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who +pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular +and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. +Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another: and hence, if +a person is too modest to say what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict +himself; and you, in your ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby +gained, slyly ask of him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to +be determined by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of +nature, you slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very +discussion about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the +conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of +nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace +because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more +disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a +slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and +trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. +The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are +weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to +themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of +men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that they may +not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and +unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than +his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are too +glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is +conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice (compare +Republic), whereas nature herself intimates that it is just for the better to +have more than the worse, the more powerful than the weaker; and in many ways +she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities +and races, that justice consists in the superior ruling over and having more +than the inferior. For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, +or his father the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, +but these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and +according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, +which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and +strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young +lions,—charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, +that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable +and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake +off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot +all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against +nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of +natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the sentiment of +Pindar, when he says in his poem, that +</p> + +<p> +“Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;” +</p> + +<p> +this, as he says, +</p> + +<p> +“Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer +from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them—” (Fragm. +Incert. 151 (Bockh).) —I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning +is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried +off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the +oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the +stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will +leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if +pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but +too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, +still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of +all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is +inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought to be +used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, and utterly +ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of human character in +general. And people of this sort, when they betake themselves to politics or +business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the politicians to be, when they make +their appearance in the arena of philosophy. For, as Euripides says, +</p> + +<p> +“Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest +portion of the day to that in which he most excels,” (Antiope, fragm. 20 +(Dindorf).) +</p> + +<p> +but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and praises +the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that he will +thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. Philosophy, as a part +of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no disgrace to a man while he +is young in pursuing such a study; but when he is more advanced in years, the +thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those +who lisp and imitate children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of +an age to speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace +and freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But when +I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the +sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear +a man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me +ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling about +students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged,—the study +appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal education, and +him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire +to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later +life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was +saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. +He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the poet says, +men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the rest of his life, and +talks in a whisper with three or four admiring youths, but never speaks out +like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined +towards you, and my feeling may be compared with that of Zethus towards +Amphion, in the play of Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am +disposed to say to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, +Socrates, are careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and +that you +</p> + +<p> +“Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior; Neither +in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason or proof, Or +offer valiant counsel on another’s behalf.” +</p> + +<p> +And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of +good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus +defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all +those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that some one +were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, declaring that you +had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must allow that you would not +know what to do:—there you would stand giddy and gaping, and not having a +word to say; and when you went up before the Court, even if the accuser were a +poor creature and not good for much, you would die if he were disposed to claim +the penalty of death. And yet, Socrates, what is the value of +</p> + +<p class="poem"> +“An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,” +</p> + +<p> +who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he is +in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of all his +goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of citizenship?—he +being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed on the ears with +impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and refute no more: +</p> + +<p> +“Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom. +But leave to others these niceties,” +</p> + +<p> +whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities: +</p> + +<p> +“For they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your +dwelling.” +</p> + +<p> +Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only the +man of substance and honour, who is well to do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice to +discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very best +possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I agreed in +approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a satisfactory +state, and that no other test was needed by me. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired +touchstone. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Why? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the opinions +which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I consider that +if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of the soul, he ought +to have three qualities—knowledge, good-will, outspokenness, which are +all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable to make trial of me, because +they are not wise as you are; others are wise, but they will not tell me the +truth, because they have not the same interest in me which you have; and these +two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good +friends, but they are not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their +modesty is so great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one +and then the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the +highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others are +deficient, having received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can +testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that +you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and +Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four of you, +and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to which the +pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the +conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were +cautioning one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom +might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you +giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate friends, +I have a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And of the frankness +of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the +assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, the inference in the +present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument about any +point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us, and will not +require to be submitted to any further test. For you could not have agreed with +me, either from lack of knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from +a desire to deceive me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And +therefore when you and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of +perfect truth. Now there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you +censure me for making,—What ought the character of a man to be, and what +his pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For +be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but from +ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have begun, until +I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, and how I may +acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and hereafter not doing +that to which I assented, call me “dolt,” and deem me unworthy of +receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar +mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior should take the +property of the inferior by force; that the better should rule the worse, the +noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my recollection? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I could +not make out what you were saying at the time—whether you meant by the +superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as you +seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in accordance +with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as though the +superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the better may be +also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or whether better is +to be defined in the same way as superior:—this is the point which I want +to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and stronger the same or +different? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, as you +were saying, they make the laws? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are far +better, as you were saying? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are by +nature good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that +justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer +injustice?—is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be +found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus?—I +must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify +myself by the assent of so competent an authority. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more +disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that you +seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you said +that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was dishonestly +playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is about nature, +and to nature when the argument is about custom? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, Socrates, +are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over some verbal +slip? do you not see—have I not told you already, that by superior I mean +better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of slaves and nondescripts, +who are of no use except perhaps for their physical strength, get together, +their ipsissima verba are laws? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have been +in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,—What is the +superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not think +that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than you +because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who the +better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great Sir, to be +a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run away from you. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You are ironical. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just now +saying many ironical things against me, I am not:—tell me, then, whom you +mean, by the better? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no +meaning and that you are explaining nothing?—will you tell me whether you +mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten +thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his subjects, +and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I believe that you +mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), if you allow that the +one is superior to the ten thousand? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be natural +justice—that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the +inferior. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: Let +us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of us, and +we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all sorts of +persons in our company having various degrees of strength and weakness, and one +of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food than all the rest, and +he is probably stronger than some and not so strong as others of us—will +he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and our superior in this +matter of food? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and drinks, +because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of them by reason +of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a larger share of them +on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished;—his share will +exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and if he be the weakest +of all, he being the best of all will have the smallest share of all, +Callicles:—am I not right, my friend? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other nonsense; I +am not speaking of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer +“Yes” or “No.” +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats—the skilfullest weaver +ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go about +clothed in the best and finest of them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Fudge about coats! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the +advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the largest +shoes, and have the greatest number of them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the wise +and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of seeds, and +have as much seed as possible for his own land? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates! +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and +fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and wiser +in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a suggestion, nor +offer one? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by superiors not +cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the administration of a +state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and able to carry out their +designs, and not the men to faint from want of soul. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge against +you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me with always +saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same about the same +things, for at one time you were defining the better and the superior to be the +stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring forward a new notion; the +superior and the better are now declared by you to be the more courageous: I +wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to +be the better and superior, and in what they are better? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and +courageous in the administration of a state—they ought to be the rulers +of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their subjects. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have more +than themselves, my friend? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think that +there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to rule +others? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What do you mean by his “ruling over himself”? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man should +be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures and +passions. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,—the temperate? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Certainly:—any one may know that to be my meaning. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a man be +happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly assert, that +he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to the uttermost, and +not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their greatest he should have +courage and intelligence to minister to them and to satisfy all his longings. +And this I affirm to be natural justice and nobility. To this however the many +cannot attain; and they blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their +own weakness, which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that +intemperance is base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler +natures, and being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance +and justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the +son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or +sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than temperance—to a +man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to +stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of +other men to be lords over him?—must not he be in a miserable plight whom +the reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his +friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, +Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is +this:—that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with +means, are virtue and happiness—all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements +contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching the +argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do not like +to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of human life +may become manifest. Tell me, then:—you say, do you not, that in the +rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but that we +should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy them, and that +this is virtue? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes; I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest of +all. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and indeed +I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, +</p> + +<p> +“Who knows if life be not death and death life;” +</p> + +<p> +and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at this +moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb (sema +(compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is the seat of the +desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down; and some +ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with the word, +invented a tale in which he called the soul—because of its believing and +make-believe nature—a vessel (An untranslatable pun,—dia to +pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.), and the ignorant he called the +uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in which +the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, he compared +to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your +way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, +meaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky persons are +the most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of +holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as my +informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to a colander +is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, and therefore +incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. These notions are strange +enough, but they show the principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; +that you should change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate +life, choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for +daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the +opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to +persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the +same opinion still? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same +school:—Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as +an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a +figure:—There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one +man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of +milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them +are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil and +difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed them any +more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. The other, in +like manner, can procure streams, though not without difficulty; but his +vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling +them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their +respective lives:—And now would you say that the life of the intemperate +is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you that the opposite +is the truth? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled himself +has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now saying, is the +life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is once filled; but the +pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes must +be large for the liquid to escape. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, or of +a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and eating? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about him, +and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; I, +too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me whether you +include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of them and pass your +life in scratching, in your notion of happiness? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, until +they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be too modest +and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, answer my question. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue +the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would +reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort +you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? +Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough +of what they want? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the +argument? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he +who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever +manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad +pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are +the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are +the same. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no +longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what +is contrary to your real opinion. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you +to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, +if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly +intimated must follow, and many others. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Indeed I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, “I am in profound earnest.”) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for +me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied +knowledge? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I was. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things +different from one another? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly I was. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not +the same? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that +pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the +same, either with one another, or with the good. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he +assent to this, or not? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself +truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to +each other? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, +they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, +at the same time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What do you mean? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the +complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same +time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the +health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both +together? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their +opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly he has. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same +time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not to +answer without consideration. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I entirely agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to +hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, very. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants +or desires are painful? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, +is pleasant? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word +“thirsty” implies pain? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of +the satisfaction of the want? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: When you are thirsty? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in pain? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are +simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not +simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of +the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be +of any consequence: Is not this true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: It is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the +same time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I did. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as +evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what +a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in +drinking at the same time? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like to +hear the argument out. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of +Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates +argue in his own fashion. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, +since Gorgias wishes to have them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great +mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was +not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a man cease from +thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from +the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you +have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the +pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure +and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. +How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have +you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been +considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they +have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present +with them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying +just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you not say +so? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And a foolish man too? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or +the brave? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they +rejoiced about equally. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Greatly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or +are the brave also pained? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Both are pained. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are they equally pained? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I dare say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all +pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the +cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the +cowardly are the bad? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal +degree? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or +have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure +and more pain.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good +was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods +and pains evils? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, I remember. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who +rejoice—if they do rejoice? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the +presence of evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of +pain? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and +pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should say that he has. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our +admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice +over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has +more of them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the +good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference which +follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the +pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I +remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to +keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any +other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I +were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you were +meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my friend, and +would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see that I was +mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad business, as +they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.—Well, then, as I +understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good and others +evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful are +those which do some evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, which +we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those which promote +health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil pains? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But not the evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Clearly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our +actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree with +us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our +actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the sake +of them?—will you add a third vote to our two? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I will. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the sake of +that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are evil, +or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: He must have art. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; I +was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some processes +which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and worse, and there +are other processes which know good and evil. And I considered that cookery, +which I do not call an art, but only an experience, was of the former class, +which is concerned with pleasure, and that the art of medicine was of the class +which is concerned with the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg +you, Callicles, not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not +answer at random and contrary to your real opinion—for you will observe +that we are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense +at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should +follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the +manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging +in public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he +should pursue the life of philosophy;—and in what the latter way differs +from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, as I +did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are distinct, we +may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, and which of them +we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No, I do not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I have +agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a thing as +pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the pursuit and +process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is different from the +pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which is good—I wish +that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far or not—do you +agree? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and +whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and +Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at all; +and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and constitution +of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in each case, cookery +in attending upon pleasure never regards either the nature or reason of that +pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever +considers or calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just +preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing +pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved what I was +saying, and then whether there are not other similar processes which have to do +with the soul—some of them processes of art, making a provision for the +soul’s highest interest—others despising the interest, and, as in +the previous case, considering only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may +be acquired, but not considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no +other aim but to afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, +Callicles, there are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term +flattery, whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed +with a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now +I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or +whether you differ. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I shall +soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend Gorgias. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard for +their true interests? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather, +if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to the +pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say you of +flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only pleasure, +Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I assent. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, the +art of playing the lyre at festivals? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic +poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the +son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his +hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did he +perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to regard +even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his audience. And of +harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what would you say? Have they +not been invented wholly for the sake of pleasure? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That is my notion of them. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august +personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to +give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse to +speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song truths +welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her character? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face turned +towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just now +describing as flattery? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm and +metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be rhetoricians? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is addressed to +a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And this is not much +to our taste, for we have described it as having the nature of flattery. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which addresses +the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other states? Do the +rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, and do they seek to +improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they too, like the rest of +mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting the public good in the +thought of their own interest, playing with the people as with children, and +trying to amuse them, but never considering whether they are better or worse +for this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the +public in what they say, while others are such as you describe. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; one, +which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which is noble +and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, and +strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to the audience; but +have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and can point out any +rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such among +the orators who are at present living. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who may +be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made them +better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do not know +of such a man. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and Cimon +and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you heard +yourself? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, true +virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those of +others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to acknowledge, the +satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of others, worse, and we +ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there is an art in +distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these statesmen who did +distinguish them? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. Suppose +that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I have described. +Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a view to the best, speak +with a reference to some standard and not at random; just as all other artists, +whether the painter, the builder, the shipwright, or any other look all of them +to their own work, and do not select and apply at random what they apply, but +strive to give a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, +and compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he +has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all +artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke +before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; that in +which there is disorder, evil? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that in +which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and order? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and order in +the body? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the effect of +harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this as well as for +the other. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say +whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. +“Healthy,” as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular +order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is +that true or not? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And “lawful” and “law” are the names which +are given to the regular order and action of the soul, and these make men +lawful and orderly:—and so we have temperance and justice: have we not? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands his +art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses to the +souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in what he +takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of his citizens +and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away intemperance, to +implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not agree? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a sick man +who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful food or drink +or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for him as if you gave +him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not that true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I will not say No to it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man’s life if his +body is in an evil plight—in that case his life also is evil: am I not +right? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him to +eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his desires +as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy his desires +at all: even you will admit that? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? While +she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and unholy, +her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented from doing +anything which does not tend to her own improvement. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: To be sure. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than +intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would ask +some one who does. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to subject +himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks! +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only answered +hitherto out of civility to Gorgias. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but people say that “a tale should have a head and not +break off in the middle,” and I should not like to have the argument +going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little +longer, and put the head on. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your argument +would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But who else is willing?—I want to finish the argument. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, or +questioning and answering yourself? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, “Two men spoke before, but now +one shall be enough”? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if +I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not +only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what is +false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. And now +I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of you think +that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose and refute me, +for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer +like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, +I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that +the argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave off +and go our ways. +</p> + +<p> +GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have +completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest of +the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have to say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with +Callicles, and then I might have given him an “Amphion” in return +for his “Zethus”; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to +continue, I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be +in error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with +me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of +my soul. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:—Is the +pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed about +that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or the good +for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for the sake of the +good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are pleased, and that is +good at the presence of which we are good? To be sure. And we are good, and all +good things whatever are good when some virtue is present in us or them? That, +Callicles, is my conviction. But the virtue of each thing, whether body or +soul, instrument or creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them +not by chance but as the result of the order and truth and art which are +imparted to them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue +of each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which +makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. +And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which has no +order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of course. And that +which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the temperate soul is good? No +other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have you any? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the good +soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the foolish and +intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true. +</p> + +<p> +And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the gods +and to men;—for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly he +will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is just; +and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who does what +is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he not be +courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to avoid what +he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or pleasures or pains, +and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate +man, being, as we have described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be +other than a perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well +and perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be happy +and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now this latter is he +whom you were applauding—the intemperate who is the opposite of the +temperate. Such is my position, and these things I affirm to be true. And if +they are true, then I further affirm that he who desires to be happy must +pursue and practise temperance and run away from intemperance as fast as his +legs will carry him: he had better order his life so as not to need punishment; +but if either he or any of his friends, whether private individual or city, are +in need of punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, +if he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to +have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself and +of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present with +him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in the +never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber’s life. Such a one is +the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and he who +is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And philosophers +tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and orderliness and +temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and gods and men, and +that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or +misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to +have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you +think that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about +geometry.—Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made happy +by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable miserable by the +possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is granted, what will be the +consequences? All the consequences which I drew before, Callicles, and about +which you asked me whether I was in earnest when I said that a man ought to +accuse himself and his son and his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to +this end he should use his rhetoric—all those consequences are true. And +that which you thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, +viz., that, to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that +degree worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias +admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be +just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be true. +</p> + +<p> +And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next place +to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am unable to +help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in the extremity +of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an outlaw to whom any one +may do what he likes,—he may box my ears, which was a brave saying of +yours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his worst and kill me; a +condition which, as you say, is the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one +which has been already often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I +tell you, Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst +evil which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that +to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; +aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me +and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me +who am the sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state +them in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted +by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which are +like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more +enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I +say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these +things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, any more +than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position still, and if what +I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of evils to the doer of +injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater than this greatest of evils +(compare Republic), in an unjust man not suffering retribution, what is that +defence of which the want will make a man truly ridiculous? Must not the +defence be one which will avert the greatest of human evils? And will not the +worst of all defences be that with which a man is unable to defend himself or +his family or his friends?—and next will come that which is unable to +avert the next greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third +greatest evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the +honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace +of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, quite right. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice and +the suffering injustice—and we affirm that to do injustice is a greater, +and to suffer injustice a lesser evil—by what devices can a man succeed +in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other of not +suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to obtain them? I +mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has only the will to +escape, or must he have provided himself with the power? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only sufficient, +and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have provided +himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and practised, will he +be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, whether you think that Polus +and I were right in admitting the conclusion that no one does wrong +voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their will? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in order +that we may do no injustice? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not wholly, +yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; for I think +that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or even tyrant +himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to praise +you when you talk sense. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of mine: +To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most like to +him—like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected to +fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be +perfectly friendly with him. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his inferior, +for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard him as a +friend. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That again is true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, will +be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and dislikes, and +is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to him; he is the man +who will have power in the state, and no one will injure him with +impunity:—is not that so? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and +formidable, this would seem to be the way—he will accustom himself, from +his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his master, +and will contrive to be as like him as possible? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your friends +would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering injury? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very opposite +be true,—if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to have +influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong as +possible, and not be punished? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he thus +acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this be the +greatest evil to him? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert +everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he has a +mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a great +many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the city, but I +wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill him if he has a +mind—the bad man will kill the good and true. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think that +all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, and to +the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like that art of +rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise me to +cultivate? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an art of +any great pretensions? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: No, indeed. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are +occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the swimmers, I +will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, who not only +saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties from the extremity +of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest and unpresuming: it has no +airs or pretences of doing anything extraordinary, and, in return for the same +salvation which is given by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings +us from Aegina to Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the +utmost two drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger +and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the +Piraeus,—this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon; +and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks +about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to +reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has +benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be drowned. +He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them as when they +embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in their souls; and +he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily +diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by +him in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and +incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more +valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to the bad +man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or any other +devourer;—and so he reflects that such a one had better not live, for he +cannot live well. (Compare Republic.) +</p> + +<p> +And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not +usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind either +the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for he +sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and the +pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, he would +bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that we ought all +of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is worth thinking +about; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you despise him and his art, +and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters +to marry his son, or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your +principle, what justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you +to despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning? I +know that you will say, “I am better, and better born.” But if the +better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving himself and +his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and +of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my +friend! I want you to see that the noble and the good may possibly be something +different from saving and being saved:—May not he who is truly a man +cease to care about living a certain time?—he knows, as women say, that +no man can escape fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all +that with God, and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed +term;—whether by assimilating himself to the constitution under which he +lives, as you at this moment have to consider how you may become as like as +possible to the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to +have power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is +for the interest of either of us;—I would not have us risk that which is +dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, +who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own +perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of becoming +great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of the city, +whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are mistaken, +Callides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend of the +Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes’ darling who is called after them, +must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make +you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for +every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and +dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another mind. +What do you say? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to be +good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite convinced by +them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.) +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in your +soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these same +matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for all that. +Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of training all things, +including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we treat them with a view to +pleasure, and in the other with a view to the highest good, and then we do not +indulge but resist them: was not that the distinction which we drew? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar +flattery:—was not that another of our conclusions? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which was +ministered to, whether body or soul? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of our +city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? For we +have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them any other +good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether money, or +office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we say that? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set about some +public business, and were advising one another to undertake buildings, such as +walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to examine ourselves, +first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of building, and who taught +us?—would not that be necessary, Callicles? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had ever +constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, and +whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon consideration +we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had been successful in +constructing many fine buildings, not only with their assistance, but without +them, by our own unaided skill—in that case prudence would not dissuade +us from proceeding to the construction of public works. But if we had no master +to show, and only a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, +it would be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another +to undertake them. Is not this true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I were +physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to practise as +state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not ask about me, +Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and was any one else +ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? And I should make the +same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the conclusion that no one, +whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever been any the better for the +medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to +think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as +state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, without +having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, and acquired +experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin with the big jar when +you are learning the potter’s art; which is a foolish thing? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public +character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, suppose +that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, Callicles, how about +making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a man who was once vicious, +or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became by the help of Callicles good +and noble? Was there ever such a man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or +freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a person were to ask these questions of you, +what would you answer? Whom would you say that you had improved by your +conversation? There may have been good deeds of this sort which were done by +you as a private person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not +answer? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I really +want to know in what way you think that affairs should be administered among +us—whether, when you come to the administration of them, you have any +other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we not already admitted +many times over that such is the duty of a public man? Nay, we have surely said +so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must answer for you. But if this +is what the good man ought to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me +to recall to you the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, +Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still +think that they were good citizens. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I do. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made the +citizens better instead of worse? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the assembly, +the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very likely. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, “likely” is not the word; for if he was a +good citizen, the inference is certain. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And what difference does that make? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians are +supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to have +been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the people +pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the love of talk +and money. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise their +ears. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but well +known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and his +character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians—this was during the +time when they were not so good—yet afterwards, when they had been made +good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him of +theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was a +malefactor. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles’ badness? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or +horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor butting +nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? Would he not be +a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and made them fiercer +than they were when he received them? What do you say? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying “yes.” +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an +animal? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly he is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals who +were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become more just, +and not more unjust? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Quite true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?—or are you of +another mind? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I agree. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received them, +and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have been very +far from desiring. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted then. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more unjust and +inferior? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Granted again. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: That is, upon your view. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the case +of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving ostracize him, in +order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? and they did just the +same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; and they voted that +Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into the pit of death, and he +was only saved by the Prytanis. And yet, if they had been really good men, as +you say, these things would never have happened to them. For the good +charioteers are not those who at first keep their place, and then, when they +have broken-in their horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are +thrown out—that is not the way either in charioteering or in any +profession.—What do you think? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I should think not. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in the +Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman—you +admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of former +ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out to be no +better than our present ones; and therefore, if they were rhetoricians, they +did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or they would not have +fallen out of favour. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of them +in his performances. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the +serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more +serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the +wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing them +to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of persuasion +or of force, in the improvement of their fellow citizens, which is the prime +object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these respects they were +a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do admit that they were +more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I +have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are +always going round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding +one another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more than +once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with the body, +and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if +our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives +them drink, or if they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, +and all that they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in +order that you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may +provide them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of +them,—the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the +currier; and in so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by +himself and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there +is another art—an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true +minister of the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use +their results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of +the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts +which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and +gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, when I +say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to know and +understand and assent to my words, and then a little while afterwards you come +repeating, Has not the State had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you +who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are +or have been good trainers?—and you had replied, Thearion, the baker, +Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these +are ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes +admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital +wine;—to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom +you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to you, My +friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me +are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble +notions of their art, and may very likely be filling and fattening men’s +bodies and gaining their approval, although the result is that they lose their +original flesh in the long run, and become thinner than they were before; and +yet they, in their simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of +flesh to their entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit +brings the attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the +time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could +they would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who have +been the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, is just what you +are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and satisfied their +desires, and people say that they have made the city great, not seeing that the +swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be attributed to these elder +statesmen; for they have filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls +and revenues and all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. +And when the crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers +of the hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real +authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and +my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but +also their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these +misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A great +piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of old; about +our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that +there is a great uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to +them; “after all their many services to the State, that they should +unjustly perish,”—so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for +no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the +head. The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that of +the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, are +nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be teachers of +virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging them, and defrauding +them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be +more absurd than that men who have become just and good, and whose injustice +has been taken away from them, and who have had justice implanted in them by +their teachers, should act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in +them? Can anything be more irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, +compel me to be a mob-orator, because you will not answer. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one to +answer? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which I am +making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure you by the +god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does not appear to you +to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made a man good, and then +blaming him for being bad? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this +inconsistent manner? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, and +declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and nevertheless +upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city:—do you +think that there is any difference between one and the other? My good friend, +the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are the same, or +nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and +sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as +much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the practice of law, or +gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are +the only class who cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from +that which they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of +having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Certainly it is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then they are +the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those who have +been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in any other way, +if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he might possibly +defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to him, and made no +agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as he had given him the +utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, +but by reason of injustice. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very true. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being treated +unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, if he be +really able to make them good—am I not right? (Compare Protag.) +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man +receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and best +govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice gratis is +held to be dishonourable? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: True. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to requite +them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when the +benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: It is. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine for +me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle to make +the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and flatterer of +the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as you did at first and +ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, the +consequences will be— +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story—that he who likes will kill me and +get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will be a +bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use to him, +but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if wrongly, +basely, and if basely, hurtfully. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to harm! +you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can never be +brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought by some +miserable and mean person. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that in the +Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to trial and +incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who brings me to +trial—of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse the innocent. +Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell you why I +anticipate this? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: By all means. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living who +practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my time. Now, +seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view of gaining +favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most pleasant, +having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, I shall have +nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with me, as I was +arguing with Polus:—I shall be tried just as a physician would be tried +in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. What would he reply +under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse him, saying, “O my +boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is the death of you, +especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and +suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest +potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats +and sweets on which I feasted you!” What do you suppose that the +physician would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? +If he told the truth he could only say, “All these evil things, my boys, +I did for your health,” and then would there not just be a clamour among +a jury like that? How they would cry out! +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: I dare say. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply? +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: He certainly would. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I am +brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the people the +pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I am not disposed +to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are deemed by them to be +benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I corrupt young men, and +perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old men, and use bitter words +towards them, whether in private or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I +truly might:—“All this I do for the sake of justice, and with a +view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.” And therefore +there is no saying what may happen to me. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless is in +a good position? +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often +acknowledged he should have—if he be his own defence, and have never said +or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been +repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any one +could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this sort, I +should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or before a few, +or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do so, that would +indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of flattery or +rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at death. For no +man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is +afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one’s soul +full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I +say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story. +</p> + +<p> +CALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done. +</p> + +<p> +SOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which I +dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, as I +believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells us (Il.), +how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they inherited from +their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law respecting the +destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues to be in +Heaven,—that he who has lived all his life in justice and holiness shall +go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and dwell there in perfect +happiness out of the reach of evil; but that he who has lived unjustly and +impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and punishment, which is called +Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of +Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the +judges were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the +judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands +of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the +wrong places. Zeus said: “I shall put a stop to this; the judgments are +not well given, because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for +they are alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in +fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment +arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that they +have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they themselves too +have their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies +are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to +them; there are the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the +judged.—What is to be done? I will tell you:—In the first place, I +will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present: +this power which they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take +from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are +judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge too shall be +naked, that is to say, dead—he with his naked soul shall pierce into the +other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly and be deprived of all their +kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon the earth—conducted in +this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew all about the matter before any +of you, and therefore I have made my sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and +Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall +give judgment in the meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads +lead, one to the Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. +Rhadamanthus shall judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come +from Europe. And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court +of appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt:—then the +judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as possible.” +</p> + +<p> +From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the following +inferences:—Death, if I am right, is in the first place the separation +from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. And after they are +separated they retain their several natures, as in life; the body keeps the +same habit, and the results of treatment or accident are distinctly visible in +it: for example, he who by nature or training or both, was a tall man while he +was alive, will remain as he was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain +fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, +will have flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints +of the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the same +in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, +the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was +the habit of the body during life would be distinguishable after death, either +perfectly, or in a great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine +that this is equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the +body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to +view.—And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to +Rhadamanthus, he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not +knowing whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great +king, or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his +soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries +and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all crooked with +falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he has lived without +truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity and disproportion, which +is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and incontinence, and despatches +him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he +deserves. +</p> + +<p> +Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished +ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an +example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and become +better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and men, are +those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this world so also +in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way in which they can +be delivered from their evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst +crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as +they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. +They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them enduring +for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of +their sins—there they are, hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of +the world below, a spectacle and a warning to all unrighteous men who come +thither. And among them, as I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if +Polus truly reports of him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these +fearful examples, most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and +kings and potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest +and most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to +the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has +described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such were +Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described Thersites, or any +private person who was a villain, as suffering everlasting punishment, or as +incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, as I am inclined to think, was not +in his power, and he was happier than those who had the power. No, Callicles, +the very bad men come from the class of those who have power (compare +Republic). And yet in that very class there may arise good men, and worthy of +all admiration they are, for where there is great power to do wrong, to live +and to die justly is a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are +who attain to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will +be again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust +righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, +the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend. +</p> + +<p> +As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows +nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows only +that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as curable or +incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and receives his +proper recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the soul of some just +one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been a private man or not; +and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher +who has done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other +men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. +Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone +has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares +that he saw him: +</p> + +<p> +“Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.” +</p> + +<p> +Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider how +I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that day. +Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know the +truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as I can. +And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the same. And, in +return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take part in the great +combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than every other earthly +conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able +to help yourself when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, +comes upon you; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he +has got you in his grip and is carrying you off, you will gape and your head +will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and very +likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort +of insult. +</p> + +<p> +Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife’s tale, which you +will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if by +searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see that you +and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of our day, are +not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not profit in +another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, nothing +remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be avoided +than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the appearance of virtue +is to be followed above all things, as well in public as in private life; and +that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that +the next best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and be +chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of himself as +well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric and any other art +should be used by him, and all his actions should be done always, with a view +to justice. +</p> + +<p> +Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and after +death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises you as a +fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by Zeus, and do +you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for you will never +come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a really good and true +man. When we have practised virtue together, we will apply ourselves to +politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise about whatever else may +seem good to us, for we shall be better able to judge then. In our present +condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, for even on the most important +subjects we are always changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, +then, take the argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best +way of life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way +let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to which you +trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is +nothing worth. +</p> + +</div><!--end chapter--> + +<div style='display:block; margin-top:4em'>*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS ***</div> +<div style='text-align:left'> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will +be renamed. +</div> + +<div style='display:block; margin:1em 0'> +Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S. copyright +law means that no one owns a United States copyright in these works, +so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United +States without permission and without paying copyright +royalties. 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Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b13b53 --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #1672 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1672) diff --git a/old/1672.txt b/old/1672.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a7e9aff --- /dev/null +++ b/old/1672.txt @@ -0,0 +1,6975 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Gorgias, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Gorgias + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: October 5, 2008 [EBook #1672] +Release Date: March, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +GORGIAS + +by Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his +interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them +is the main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no +severe rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to +think, with one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the +digressions have the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the +dialogues there is also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning +is not forgotten at the end, and numerous allusions and references are +interspersed, which form the loose connecting links of the whole. We +must not neglect this unity, but neither must we attempt to confine +the Platonic dialogue on the Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare +Introduction to the Phaedrus.) + +Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this +matter. First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one +another by the slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and +contradictory assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle +of Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied +his method with the most various results. The value and use of the +method has been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. +Secondly, they have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each +separate dialogue; in this way they think that they have escaped all +difficulties, not seeing that what they have gained in generality they +have lost in truth and distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily +pass into one another; and the simpler notions of antiquity, which +we can only realize by an effort, imperceptibly blend with the more +familiar theories of modern philosophers. An eye for proportion is +needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of Plato, as well as of +other great artists. We may hardly admit that the moral antithesis +of good and pleasure, or the intellectual antithesis of knowledge +and opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a Platonic +discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not bring +them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally in all the +dialogues. + +There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines +of the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily +exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural +form and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues +are finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and lose +the highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great works +receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether these new +lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their agreement with +the spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence which can +be urged in support of them. When a theory is running away with +us, criticism does a friendly office in counselling moderation, and +recalling us to the indications of the text. + +Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the +appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher +themes are introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the +good and evil of man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a +sound definition of his art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the +existence of a universal art of flattery or simulation having several +branches:--this is the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the +highest species. To flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life +which he who possesses seeks always to impart to others, and which at +last triumphs, if not here, at any rate in another world. These two +aspects of life and knowledge appear to be the two leading ideas of +the dialogue. The true and the false in individuals and states, in the +treatment of the soul as well as of the body, are conceived under the +forms of true and false art. In the development of this opposition +there arise various other questions, such as the two famous paradoxes of +Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in general, ideals as they +may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is worse than to suffer +evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had better be punished +than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third Socratic paradox or +ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not what they desire, +for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure is to be +distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of pleasure +and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain cases +pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely +rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe +of statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class of +flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the judgment-seat +of the gods below. + +The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three +characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and +the form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is +deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the +youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. +In the first division the question is asked--What is rhetoric? To this +there is no answer given, for Gorgias is soon made to contradict +himself by Socrates, and the argument is transferred to the hands of his +disciple Polus, who rushes to the defence of his master. The answer has +at last to be given by Socrates himself, but before he can even explain +his meaning to Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great subject of +shams or flatteries. When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to +the level of cookery, he replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like +despots, have great power. Socrates denies that they have any real +power, and hence arise the three paradoxes already mentioned. Although +they are strange to him, Polus is at last convinced of their truth; at +least, they seem to him to follow legitimately from the premises. Thus +the second act of the dialogue closes. Then Callicles appears on the +scene, at first maintaining that pleasure is good, and that might is +right, and that law is nothing but the combination of the many weak +against the few strong. When he is confuted he withdraws from the +argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the conclusion by himself. +The conclusion is that there are two kinds of statesmanship, a higher +and a lower--that which makes the people better, and that which only +flatters them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the higher. The +dialogue terminates with a mythus of a final judgment, in which there +will be no more flattery or disguise, and no further use for the +teaching of rhetoric. + +The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts +which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now +advanced in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, +and is celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the +dialogues of Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain +dignity, and is treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he is +no match for him in dialectics. Although he has been teaching rhetoric +all his life, he is still incapable of defining his own art. When his +ideas begin to clear up, he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric can +be wholly separated from justice and injustice, and this lingering +sentiment of morality, or regard for public opinion, enables Socrates to +detect him in a contradiction. Like Protagoras, he is described as of +a generous nature; he expresses his approbation of Socrates' manner of +approaching a question; he is quite 'one of Socrates' sort, ready to +be refuted as well as to refute,' and very eager that Callicles and +Socrates should have the game out. He knows by experience that rhetoric +exercises great influence over other men, but he is unable to explain +the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything and know nothing. + +Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway 'colt,' as Socrates describes +him, who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under +the pretext that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the +earliest opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author +of a work on rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the +inventor of balanced or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.). +At first he is violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his +master overthrown. But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon +restored to good-humour, and compelled to assent to the required +conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is overthrown because he compromises; he is +unwilling to say that to do is fairer or more honourable than to suffer +injustice. Though he is fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and dazzled +by the splendour of success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. +Plato may have felt that there would be an incongruity in a youth +maintaining the cause of injustice against the world. He has never heard +the other side of the question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as +they appear to him, of Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly +understand the meaning of Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric +being only useful in self-accusation. When the argument with him has +fairly run out. + +Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the +stage: he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; +for if these things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the +foundations of society are upside down. In him another type of character +is represented; he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but man of the +world, and an accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be described in +modern language as a cynic or materialist, a lover of power and also of +pleasure, and unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. There is no +desire on his part to offer any compromise in the interests of morality; +nor is any concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, +though he is not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently +maintains that might is right. His great motive of action is political +ambition; in this he is characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the +Meno, he is the enemy of the Sophists; but favours the new art of +rhetoric, which he regards as an excellent weapon of attack and defence. +He is a despiser of mankind as he is of philosophy, and sees in the laws +of the state only a violation of the order of nature, which intended +that the stronger should govern the weaker (compare Republic). Like +other men of the world who are of a speculative turn of mind, he +generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily brought down +his principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike supply him +with distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a good will +to Socrates, whose talents he evidently admires, while he censures the +puerile use which he makes of them. He expresses a keen intellectual +interest in the argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a sympathy with +other men of the world; the Athenian statesmen of a former generation, +who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, +Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character +is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has developed to +the utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government +of others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom +we know nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have +seemed to reflect the history of his life. + +And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist +or rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which +Socrates is contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the +many contending against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as +he describes them in the Republic, are the imitators rather than the +authors, being themselves carried away by the great tide of public +opinion. Socrates approaches his antagonist warily from a distance, with +a sort of irony which touches with a light hand both his personal vices +(probably in allusion to some scandal of the day) and his servility +to the populace. At the same time, he is in most profound earnest, as +Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his temper, but the more he is +irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact does Socrates become. +A repartee of his which appears to have been really made to the +'omniscient' Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon (Mem.), is +introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and certainly +shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being 'as long +as he pleases,' or 'as short as he pleases' (compare Protag.). Callicles +exhibits great ability in defending himself and attacking Socrates, whom +he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is scandalized that the +legitimate consequences of his own argument should be stated in plain +terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to preserve the +decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad sense +of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, +superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only +induced to continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when +Socrates is describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to +identify himself with the people, he partially recognizes the truth of +his words. + +The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the +Protagoras and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the +Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as +another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by that +of his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part is met +by a corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak, for +philosophy will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more ironical +and provoking than in any other of Plato's writings: for he is 'fooled +to the top of his bent' by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also +more deeply in earnest. He rises higher than even in the Phaedo and +Crito: at first enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust and +dialectics, he ends by losing his method, his life, himself, in them. +As in the Protagoras and Phaedrus, throwing aside the veil of irony, he +makes a speech, but, true to his character, not until his adversary has +refused to answer any more questions. The presentiment of his own fate +is hanging over him. He is aware that Socrates, the single real teacher +of politics, as he ventures to call himself, cannot safely go to +war with the whole world, and that in the courts of earth he will +be condemned. But he will be justified in the world below. Then the +position of Socrates and Callicles will be reversed; all those things +'unfit for ears polite' which Callicles has prophesied as likely to +happen to him in this life, the insulting language, the box on the +ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare Republic, and the similar +reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in the +Theaetetus). + +There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial +of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically +attributes to his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the +assembly should be taken. This is said to have happened 'last year' +(B.C. 406), and therefore the assumed date of the dialogue has been +fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates would already have been an old man. +The date is clearly marked, but is scarcely reconcilable with another +indication of time, viz. the 'recent' usurpation of Archelaus, which +occurred in the year 413; and still less with the 'recent' death of +Pericles, who really died twenty-four years previously (429 B.C.) and +is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a past age; or with the +mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is nevertheless spoken of as +a living witness. But we shall hereafter have reason to observe, that +although there is a general consistency of times and persons in the +Dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an invention of his +commentators (Preface to Republic). + +The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly +characteristic declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true +nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time +that no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The +profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively +Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in +the Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the +fundamental truths of morality. He evidently regards this 'among the +multitude of questions' which agitate human life 'as the principle which +alone remains unshaken.' He does not insist here, any more than in the +Phaedo, on the literal truth of the myth, but only on the soundness of +the doctrine which is contained in it, that doing wrong is worse than +suffering, and that a man should be rather than seem; for the next best +thing to a man's being just is that he should be corrected and become +just; also that he should avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of +others; and that rhetoric should be employed for the maintenance of the +right only. The revelation of another life is a recapitulation of the +argument in a figure. + +(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true +politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the Apology, he +disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or +any other good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be +put to death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here he +anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is 'the only +man of the present day who performs his public duties at all.' The two +points of view are not really inconsistent, but the difference between +them is worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a public man. Not in the +ordinary sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but in a higher one; and +this will sooner or later entail the same consequences on him. He +cannot be a private man if he would; neither can he separate morals from +politics. Nor is he unwilling to be a politician, although he foresees +the dangers which await him; but he must first become a better and +wiser man, for he as well as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and +uncertainty. And yet there is an inconsistency: for should not Socrates +too have taught the citizens better than to put him to death? + +And now, as he himself says, we will 'resume the argument from the +beginning.' + +Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets +Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just +missed an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he +was desirous, not of hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of +interrogating him concerning the nature of his art. Callicles proposes +that they shall go with him to his own house, where Gorgias is staying. +There they find the great rhetorician and his younger friend and +disciple Polus. + +SOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon. + +CHAEREPHON: What question? + +SOCRATES: Who is he?--such a question as would elicit from a man the +answer, 'I am a cobbler.' + +Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. +'Who is Gorgias?' asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his master +Socrates. 'One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best and +noblest of experimental arts,' etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical +and balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and +unmeaningness of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that +he has mistaken the quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to +Gorgias, that Polus has learnt how to make a speech, but not how to +answer a question. He wishes that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is +willing enough, and replies to the question asked by Chaerephon,--that +he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric language, 'boasts himself to be a +good one.' At the request of Socrates he promises to be brief; for 'he +can be as long as he pleases, and as short as he pleases.' Socrates +would have him bestow his length on others, and proceeds to ask him +a number of questions, which are answered by him to his own great +satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of +Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:-- + +Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other +particular arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then +does rhetoric differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the +arts which deal with words, and the arts which have to do with external +actions. Socrates extends this distinction further, and divides all +productive arts into two classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in +silence; and (2) arts which have to do with words, or in which words +are coextensive with action, such as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. +But still Gorgias could hardly have meant to say that arithmetic was the +same as rhetoric. Even in the arts which are concerned with words there +are differences. What then distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts +which have to do with words? 'The words which rhetoric uses relate to +the best and greatest of human things.' But tell me, Gorgias, what are +the best? 'Health first, beauty next, wealth third,' in the words of +the old song, or how would you rank them? The arts will come to you in a +body, each claiming precedence and saying that her own good is superior +to that of the rest--How will you choose between them? 'I should say, +Socrates, that the art of persuasion, which gives freedom to all men, +and to individuals power in the state, is the greatest good.' But what +is the exact nature of this persuasion?--is the persevering retort: You +could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or even as a painter of figures, +if there were other painters of figures; neither can you define rhetoric +simply as an art of persuasion, because there are other arts which +persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an art of persuasion about odd +and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see the necessity of a further +limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the art of persuading in the +law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and unjust. But still +there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives knowledge, and +another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge is always +true, but belief may be either true or false,--there is therefore a +further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric +effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives +belief and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can impart a real +knowledge of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few minutes. And +there is another point to be considered:--when the assembly meets to +advise about walls or docks or military expeditions, the rhetorician +is not taken into counsel, but the architect, or the general. How would +Gorgias explain this phenomenon? All who intend to become disciples, +of whom there are several in the company, and not Socrates only, are +eagerly asking:--About what then will rhetoric teach us to persuade or +advise the state? + +Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example +of Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and +walls, and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about +the middle wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar +power over the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a +physician by the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete +with a rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade +the multitude of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the +rhetorician ought to abuse this power any more than a boxer should abuse +the art of self-defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good +things, may be unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be +deemed unjust because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the +lessons which they have learned from him. + +Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will +quarrel with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he +has fallen, or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. +Gorgias declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that +the argument may be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and +Chaerephon and Callicles exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points +out the supposed inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to +have fallen, and which he is inclined to think may arise out of a +misapprehension of his own. The rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias +to be more persuasive to the ignorant than the physician, or any other +expert. And he is said to be ignorant, and this ignorance of his is +regarded by Gorgias as a happy condition, for he has escaped the trouble +of learning. But is he as ignorant of just and unjust as he is of +medicine or building? Gorgias is compelled to admit that if he did not +know them previously he must learn them from his teacher as a part of +the art of rhetoric. But he who has learned carpentry is a carpenter, +and he who has learned music is a musician, and he who has learned +justice is just. The rhetorician then must be a just man, and rhetoric +is a just thing. But Gorgias has already admitted the opposite of this, +viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that the rhetorician may act +unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be explained? + +The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man +may know justice and not be just--here is the old confusion of the arts +and the virtues;--nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly +the bent of natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of +justice, but not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus +is naturally exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; +of course, he says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit +that he knows justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the +interrogations of Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners +is shown in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically +replies, that when old men trip, the young set them on their legs again; +and he is quite willing to retract, if he can be shown to be in error, +but upon one condition, which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is +in great indignation at not being allowed to use as many words as he +pleases in the free state of Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder +will be his own case, if he is compelled to stay and listen to them. +After some altercation they agree (compare Protag.), that Polus shall +ask and Socrates answer. + +'What is the art of Rhetoric?' says Polus. Not an art at all, replies +Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created art. +Polus asks, 'What thing?' and Socrates answers, An experience or routine +of making a sort of delight or gratification. 'But is not rhetoric a +fine thing?' I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will you ask me +another question--What is cookery? 'What is cookery?' An experience or +routine of making a sort of delight or gratification. Then they are the +same, or rather fall under the same class, and rhetoric has still to be +distinguished from cookery. 'What is rhetoric?' asks Polus once more. +A part of a not very creditable whole, which may be termed flattery, +is the reply. 'But what part?' A shadow of a part of politics. This, as +might be expected, is wholly unintelligible, both to Gorgias and +Polus; and, in order to explain his meaning to them, Socrates draws a +distinction between shadows or appearances and realities; e.g. there is +real health of body or soul, and the appearance of them; real arts and +sciences, and the simulations of them. Now the soul and body have two +arts waiting upon them, first the art of politics, which attends on the +soul, having a legislative part and a judicial part; and another art +attending on the body, which has no generic name, but may also be +described as having two divisions, one of which is medicine and the +other gymnastic. Corresponding with these four arts or sciences there +are four shams or simulations of them, mere experiences, as they may be +termed, because they give no reason of their own existence. The art of +dressing up is the sham or simulation of gymnastic, the art of cookery, +of medicine; rhetoric is the simulation of justice, and sophistic of +legislation. They may be summed up in an arithmetical formula:-- + +Tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine:: sophistic: legislation. + +And, + +Cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: the art of justice. + +And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the +gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and +return to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of +his speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and +begs Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him. + +'Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?' They +are not esteemed at all. 'Why, have they not great power, and can they +not do whatever they desire?' They have no power, and they only do what +they think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the +true object of desire, which is the good. 'As if you, Socrates, would +not envy the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill +any one whom he pleases.' But Socrates replies that he has no wish to +put any one to death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be +envied, and he who kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to +suffer than to do injustice. He does not consider that going about with +a dagger and putting men out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is +real power. To this Polus assents, on the ground that such acts would +be punished, but he is still of opinion that evil-doers, if they +are unpunished, may be happy enough. He instances Archelaus, son +of Perdiccas, the usurper of Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him +happy?--Socrates would like to know more about him; he cannot pronounce +even the great king to be happy, unless he knows his mental and moral +condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was a slave, being the son of +a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of Perdiccas king of +Macedon--and he, by every species of crime, first murdering his uncle +and then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the kingdom. This was +very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, would like to +have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; Polus, if he +will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias and his brothers, +Aristocrates, the house of Pericles, or any other great family--this is +the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where truth +depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; his +appeal is to one witness only,--that is to say, the person with whom +he is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is +prepared to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked +man and yet happy. + +The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers +punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than +if he escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly +deserves refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the +fact. Socrates has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who +is the envy of the world, and of the wretch who, having been detected +in a criminal attempt against the state, is crucified or burnt to +death. Socrates replies, that if they are both criminal they are both +miserable, but that the unpunished is the more miserable of the two. At +this Polus laughs outright, which leads Socrates to remark that laughter +is a new species of refutation. Polus replies, that he is already +refuted; for if he will take the votes of the company, he will find +that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates rejoins, that he is not +a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at the trial of the +generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable to take the suffrages +of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can only deal +with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he is +arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any man to do is worse +than to suffer evil. + +Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do +evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what +is fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, +colours, figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined +with reference to pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter +doctrine, and is easily persuaded that the fouler of two things must +exceed either in pain or in hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the +suffering of evil in pain, and therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing +is proved by the testimony of Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful +than suffering. + +There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is +punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done +justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if +to punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and +therefore beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved. +There are three evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him +in estate, body, and soul;--these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and +the foulest of these is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that +brings the greatest hurt. And there are three arts which heal these +evils--trading, medicine, justice--and the fairest of these is justice. +Happy is he who has never committed injustice, and happy in the second +degree he who has been healed by punishment. And therefore the criminal +should himself go to the judge as he would to the physician, and purge +away his crime. Rhetoric will enable him to display his guilt in proper +colours, and to sustain himself and others in enduring the necessary +penalty. And similarly if a man has an enemy, he will desire not to +punish him, but that he shall go unpunished and become worse and worse, +taking care only that he does no injury to himself. These are at least +conceivable uses of the art, and no others have been discovered by us. + +Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks +Chaerephon whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the +assurance that he is, proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates +himself. For if such doctrines are true, life must have been turned +upside down, and all of us are doing the opposite of what we ought to be +doing. + +Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can +understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a +community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both +of them are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of +Callicles are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the +beloved of Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity of +Callicles is that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his +Demos changes in all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both +his loves, and repeats their sentiments, and if any one is surprised +at his sayings and doings, the explanation of them is, that he is not a +free agent, but must always be imitating his two loves. And this is the +explanation of Socrates' peculiarities also. He is always repeating what +his mistress, Philosophy, is saying to him, who unlike his other love, +Alcibiades, is ever the same, ever true. Callicles must refute her, or +he will never be at unity with himself; and discord in life is far worse +than the discord of musical sounds. + +Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, +in compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil +did not know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been +similarly entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer +is more honourable than to do injustice. By custom 'yes,' but not by +nature, says Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two +points of view, and putting one in the place of the other. In this +very argument, what Polus only meant in a conventional sense has +been affirmed by him to be a law of nature. For convention says that +'injustice is dishonourable,' but nature says that 'might is right.' +And we are always taming down the nobler spirits among us to the +conventional level. But sometimes a great man will rise up and reassert +his original rights, trampling under foot all our formularies, and then +the light of natural justice shines forth. Pindar says, 'Law, the +king of all, does violence with high hand;' as is indeed proved by the +example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon and never paid for +them. + +This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave +philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy +is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not +'passed his metaphysics' before he has grown up to manhood will never +know the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, +and I dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to +philosophy: 'Every man,' as Euripides says, 'is fondest of that in which +he is best.' Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, +and should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man +lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those +over-refined natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts +of men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and +never giving utterance to any noble sentiments. + +For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, +as Zethus says to Amphion in the play, that you have 'a noble soul +disguised in a puerile exterior.' And I would have you consider the +danger which you and other philosophers incur. For you would not know +how to defend yourself if any one accused you in a law-court,--there you +would stand, with gaping mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, +robbed, boxed on the ears with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a +little common sense; leave to others these frivolities; walk in the ways +of the wealthy and be wise. + +Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher's +touchstone; and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree +must be the very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are +needed in a critic--knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, +although learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them +contradict themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not +too modest to speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his +good-will is shown both by his own profession and by his giving the same +caution against philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing +him give long ago to his own clique of friends. He will pledge himself +to retract any error into which he may have fallen, and which Callicles +may point out. But he would like to know first of all what he and Pindar +mean by natural justice. Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the +rule of the stronger or of the better?' 'There is no difference.' Then +are not the many superior to the one, and the opinions of the many +better? And their opinion is that justice is equality, and that to do is +more dishonourable than to suffer wrong. And as they are the superior or +stronger, this opinion of theirs must be in accordance with natural as +well as conventional justice. 'Why will you continue splitting words? +Have I not told you that the superior is the better?' But what do you +mean by the better? Tell me that, and please to be a little milder +in your language, if you do not wish to drive me away. 'I mean the +worthier, the wiser.' You mean to say that one man of sense ought to +rule over ten thousand fools? 'Yes, that is my meaning.' Ought the +physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the weaver +to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more +seed? 'You are always saying the same things, Socrates.' Yes, and on the +same subjects too; but you are never saying the same things. For, first, +you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now +something else;--what DO you mean? 'I mean men of political ability, who +ought to govern and to have more than the governed.' Than themselves? +'What do you mean?' I mean to say that every man is his own governor. 'I +see that you mean those dolts, the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a +man should let his desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. +To the many this is impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent +him. But if he is a king, and has power, how base would he be in +submitting to them! To invite the common herd to be lord over him, when +he might have the enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, +that luxury and self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest +is mere talk.' + +Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men +only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. +'Why,' says Callicles, 'if they were, stones and the dead would be +happy.' Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic vein +of reflection. 'Who knows,' as Euripides says, 'whether life may not be +death, and death life?' Nay, there are philosophers who maintain that +even in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb (sema) of +the soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which +he represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying +water to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, +and this sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless +is a figure of a truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that +the life of contentment is better than the life of indulgence. Are you +disposed to admit that? 'Far otherwise.' Then hear another parable. +The life of self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented +respectively by two men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, +honey, milk,--the jars of the one are sound, and the jars of the other +leaky; the first fils his jars, and has no more trouble with them; the +second is always filling them, and would suffer extreme misery if he +desisted. Are you of the same opinion still? 'Yes, Socrates, and the +figure expresses what I mean. For true pleasure is a perpetual stream, +flowing in and flowing out. To be hungry and always eating, to be +thirsty and always drinking, and to have all the other desires and to +satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of happiness.' And to +be itching and always scratching? 'I do not deny that there may be +happiness even in that.' And to indulge unnatural desires, if they are +abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction of such +topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, not by +him, but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. Will +Callicles still maintain this? 'Yes, for the sake of consistency, he +will.' The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing +his touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles +reassures him, and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good +are the same, but knowledge and courage are not the same either with +pleasure or good, or with one another. Socrates disproves the first of +these statements by showing that two opposites cannot coexist, but must +alternate with one another--to be well and ill together is impossible. +But pleasure and pain are simultaneous, and the cessation of them is +simultaneous; e.g. in the case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good +and evil are not simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and +therefore pleasure cannot be the same as good. + +Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go +on by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded +against objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure +and good, proceeds:--The good are good by the presence of good, and the +bad are bad by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, +and the cowardly and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, +and he who feels pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly +the same degree, and sometimes the bad man or coward in a greater +degree. Therefore the bad man or coward is as good as the brave or may +be even better. + +Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming +that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others +bad. The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and +we should choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates +observes, is a return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that all +things should be done for the sake of the good. + +Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed +in distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of +empirical habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, +and the arts which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and +body. Does Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to +anything, in order that he may get through the argument. Which of +the arts then are flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral +exhibitions, the dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on +the ground that they give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who +was the father of Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of +Tragedy is bent upon pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in +general is only a rhetorical address to a mixed audience of men, women, +and children. And the orators are very far from speaking with a view +to what is best; their way is to humour the assembly as if they were +children. + +Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have +a real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two +species of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard +for the citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the +latter? Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were +such in the days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great +Pericles were still alive. Socrates replies that none of these were true +artists, setting before themselves the duty of bringing order out of +disorder. The good man and true orator has a settled design, running +through his life, to which he conforms all his words and actions; he +desires to implant justice and eradicate injustice, to implant all +virtue and eradicate all vice in the minds of his citizens. He is the +physician who will not allow the sick man to indulge his appetites +with a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on his exercising +self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better than the +unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving. + +Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, +turns restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own +questions. 'Then,' says Socrates, 'one man must do for two;' and though +he had hoped to have given Callicles an 'Amphion' in return for his +'Zethus,' he is willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that +Callicles will correct him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates the +advantages which he has already won:-- + +The pleasant is not the same as the good--Callicles and I are agreed +about that,--but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and +the good is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things +good have acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or +soul, of things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to +order and harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is better +than the soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate and is +therefore good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is temperate +is also just and brave and pious, and has attained the perfection +of goodness and therefore of happiness, and the intemperate whom you +approve is the opposite of all this and is wretched. He therefore who +would be happy must pursue temperance and avoid intemperance, and if +possible escape the necessity of punishment, but if he have done wrong +he must endure punishment. In this way states and individuals should +seek to attain harmony, which, as the wise tell us, is the bond of +heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles has never discovered the +power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he would have men aim +at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in this, and if +self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox is true +that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation, and Polus was right +in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and Gorgias +was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. And you +were wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in saying +that I might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with +impunity. For I may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to +be stricken--to do than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast in +adamantine bonds. I myself know not the true nature of these things, but +I know that no one can deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong +is the greatest of evils, and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. +He who would avoid the last must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; +and to be the friend he must be the equal of the ruler, and must also +resemble him. Under his protection he will suffer no evil, but will he +also do no evil? Nay, will he not rather do all the evil which he can +and escape? And in this way the greatest of all evils will befall him. +'But this imitator of the tyrant,' rejoins Callicles, 'will kill any +one who does not similarly imitate him.' Socrates replies that he is +not deaf, and that he has heard that repeated many times, and can +only reply, that a bad man will kill a good one. 'Yes, and that is the +provoking thing.' Not provoking to a man of sense who is not studying +the arts which will preserve him from danger; and this, as you say, is +the use of rhetoric in courts of justice. But how many other arts are +there which also save men from death, and are yet quite humble in their +pretensions--such as the art of swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does +not the pilot do men at least as much service as the rhetorician, and +yet for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge more than +two obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? +The reason is that he is not certain whether he has done his passengers +any good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, +and still more if he is diseased in mind--who can say? The engineer too +will often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not +allow your son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But +what reason is there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of +life, whether your own or another's, you have no right to despise him or +any practiser of saving arts. But is not virtue something different from +saving and being saved? I would have you rather consider whether you +ought not to disregard length of life, and think only how you can live +best, leaving all besides to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect +to have influence either with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son +of Pyrilampes, unless you become like them. What do you say to this? + +'There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely +believe you.' + +That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little +more conversation. You remember the two processes--one which was +directed to pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good +as possible. And those who have the care of the city should make the +citizens as good as possible. But who would undertake a public building, +if he had never had a teacher of the art of building, and had never +constructed a building before? or who would undertake the duty of +state-physician, if he had never cured either himself or any one else? +Should we not examine him before we entrusted him with the office? And +as Callicles is about to enter public life, should we not examine him? +Whom has he made better? For we have already admitted that this is the +statesman's proper business. And we must ask the same question about +Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles. Whom did they make +better? Nay, did not Pericles make the citizens worse? For he gave +them pay, and at first he was very popular with them, but at last they +condemned him to death. Yet surely he would be a bad tamer of animals +who, having received them gentle, taught them to kick and butt, and +man is an animal; and Pericles who had the charge of man only made him +wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could not have +been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about Cimon, +Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his seat at +first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The +inference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than +those of our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and +harbours, but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I have +told you again and again (and I purposely use the same images) that the +soul, like the body, may be treated in two ways--there is the meaner and +the higher art. You seemed to understand what I said at the time, but +when I ask you who were the really good statesmen, you answer--as if I +asked you who were the good trainers, and you answered, Thearion, the +baker, Mithoecus, the author of the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, +the vintner. And you would be affronted if I told you that these are a +parcel of cooks who make men fat only to make them thin. And those whom +they have fattened applaud them, instead of finding fault with them, and +lay the blame of their subsequent disorders on their physicians. In this +respect, Callicles, you are like them; you applaud the statesmen of +old, who pandered to the vices of the citizens, and filled the city with +docks and harbours, but neglected virtue and justice. And when the +fit of illness comes, the citizens who in like manner applauded +Themistocles, Pericles, and others, will lay hold of you and my friend +Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the misdeeds of your predecessors. +The old story is always being repeated--'after all his services, the +ungrateful city banished him, or condemned him to death.' As if the +statesman should not have taught the city better! He surely cannot blame +the state for having unjustly used him, any more than the sophist +or teacher can find fault with his pupils if they cheat him. And the +sophist and orator are in the same case; although you admire rhetoric +and despise sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the +two. The teacher of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or +politics takes no money, because this is the only kind of service which +makes the disciple desirous of requiting his teacher. + +Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes +of serving the state Callicles invites him:--'to the inferior and +ministerial one,' is the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of +avoiding death, replies Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and +would rather not hear again, that the bad man will kill the good. But +he thinks that such a fate is very likely reserved for him, because he +remarks that he is the only person who teaches the true art of politics. +And very probably, as in the case which he described to Polus, he may be +the physician who is tried by a jury of children. He cannot say that he +has procured the citizens any pleasure, and if any one charges him with +perplexing them, or with reviling their elders, he will not be able +to make them understand that he has only been actuated by a desire for +their good. And therefore there is no saying what his fate may be. +'And do you think that a man who is unable to help himself is in a good +condition?' Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self-help, which is +never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. If I had not +this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for want of +your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no evil, +but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of evils. +In proof of which I will tell you a tale:-- + +Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and +when judgment had been given upon them they departed--the good to the +islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they +were still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they were +being judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the +throne, was obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after +death, having first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the +foreknowledge of death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed +to be the judges; Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos +was to hold the court of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul and +body, but after death soul and body alike retain their characteristics; +the fat man, the dandy, the branded slave, are all distinguishable. Some +prince or potentate, perhaps even the great king himself, appears before +Rhadamanthus, and he instantly detects him, though he knows not who he +is; he sees the scars of perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the +house of torment. + +For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment--the curable +and the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their +punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by +becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and +potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same +power of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus, not Thersites, are +supposed by Homer to be undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that +there is anything to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is +shown by the famous example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But to +Rhadamanthus the souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped +of their dignities and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, +labelled either as curable or incurable, and looks with love and +admiration on the soul of some just one, whom he sends to the islands of +the blest. Similar is the practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, +holding a golden sceptre, as Odysseus in Homer saw him + + 'Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.' + +My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls +undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to +meet death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you +cast upon me,--that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with +dizzy brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner +of evil. + +Perhaps you think that this is an old wives' fable. But you, who are the +three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will +ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study +to be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and +avoid all flattery, whether of the many or of the few. + +Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no +harm. And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to +politics, but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of +ignorance and uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow +in the way of virtue and justice, and not in the way to which you, +Callicles, invite us; for that way is nothing worth. + +We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the +dialogue. Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical +character of his writings, we may compare him with himself, and with +other great teachers, and we may note in passing the objections of his +critics. And then (2) casting one eye upon him, we may cast another upon +ourselves, and endeavour to draw out the great lessons which he +teaches for all time, stripped of the accidental form in which they are +enveloped. + +(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, +we are made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old +difficulty of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the +arts and the virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, +such as nature, custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. +The Sophists are still floundering about the distinction of the real +and seeming. Figures of speech are made the basis of arguments. The +possibility of conceiving a universal art or science, which admits +of application to a particular subject-matter, is a difficulty which +remains unsolved, and has not altogether ceased to haunt the world at +the present day (compare Charmides). The defect of clearness is also +apparent in Socrates himself, unless we suppose him to be practising on +the simplicity of his opponent, or rather perhaps trying an experiment +in dialectics. Nothing can be more fallacious than the contradiction +which he pretends to have discovered in the answers of Gorgias (see +above). The advantages which he gains over Polus are also due to a false +antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an erroneous assertion that an +agent and a patient may be described by similar predicates;--a mistake +which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in the Nicomachean +Ethics. Traces of a 'robust sophistry' are likewise discernible in his +argument with Callicles. + +(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the +argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts +himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may +sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, +or pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous +terms good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to +examine his arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to +criticise this ideal from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say +that the ideal is generally regarded as unattainable, and that mankind +will by no means agree in thinking that the criminal is happier when +punished than when unpunished, any more than they would agree to the +stoical paradox that a man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already +admitted that the world is against him. Neither does he mean to say +that Archelaus is tormented by the stings of conscience; or that the +sensations of the impaled criminal are more agreeable than those of the +tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. Neither is he speaking, as in the +Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of pleasure, an opinion which +he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What then is his meaning? His +meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by parallel notions, which, +whether justifiable by logic or not, have always existed among mankind. +We must remind the reader that Socrates himself implies that he will be +understood or appreciated by very few. + +He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of +happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in +battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that +their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. +Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have +their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe +that they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have +crowns of glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors +will be proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do +what is right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. +And we regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' +friends in the opening of the Phaedo are described as regarding him; or +as was said of another, 'they looked upon his face as upon the face of +an angel.' We are not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard +of utility or public opinion, but merely to point out the existence of +such a sentiment in the better part of human nature. + +The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain +that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and +that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is +thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only, and making no +reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the +happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really +quite as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding +as Plato's conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the +greatest number may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which +will procure the greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of +utility, like those of duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant +consequences. Nor can Plato in the Gorgias be deemed purely +self-regarding, considering that Socrates expressly mentions the duty of +imparting the truth when discovered to others. Nor must we forget that +the side of ethics which regards others is by the ancients merged in +politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well as in the Stoics, +the social principle, though taking another form, is really far more +prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics. + +The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have +exercised the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import +of this, or into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may +have given rise, we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of +the Divine Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of +sorrows of whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart +of the human race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which +Plato desires to pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his +master Socrates. He is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one +must be happy in life or after death. In the Republic, he endeavours to +show that his happiness would be assured here in a well-ordered state. +But in the actual condition of human things the wise and good are weak +and miserable; such an one is like a man fallen among wild beasts, +exposed to every sort of wrong and obloquy. + +Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that +if 'the ways of God' to man are to be 'justified,' the hopes of another +life must be included. If the question could have been put to him, +whether a man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests +in the Apology, 'death be only a long sleep,' we can hardly tell +what would have been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite +independently of rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, +or any other influence of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice +their lives for the good of others. It is difficult to say how far in +such cases an unconscious hope of a future life, or a general faith in +the victory of good in the world, may have supported the sufferers. But +this extreme idealism is not in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He +supposes a day of retribution, in which the good are to be rewarded and +the wicked punished. Though, as he says in the Phaedo, no man of sense +will maintain that the details of the stories about another world are +true, he will insist that something of the kind is true, and will frame +his life with a view to this unknown future. Even in the Republic he +introduces a future life as an afterthought, when the superior happiness +of the just has been established on what is thought to be an immutable +foundation. At the same time he makes a point of determining his main +thesis independently of remoter consequences. + +(3) Plato's theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly +corrective. In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few +great criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men +have never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. +They are not incurable, and their punishment is intended for their +improvement. They are to suffer because they have sinned; like sick men, +they must go to the physician and be healed. On this representation of +Plato's the criticism has been made, that the analogy of disease and +injustice is partial only, and that suffering, instead of improving men, +may have just the opposite effect. + +Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy +of disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly +imperfect. But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the +mind which is unseen can only be represented under figures derived from +visible objects. If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect +under which the mind may be considered, we cannot find fault with them +for not exactly coinciding with the ideas represented. They partake +of the imperfect nature of language, and must not be construed in too +strict a manner. That Plato sometimes reasons from them as if they were +not figures but realities, is due to the defective logical analysis of +his age. + +Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the +suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of +ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal +law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and supplies +no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off the +higher notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and to +be continued in other stages of existence, which is further developed +in the Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured out of the +beaten track in their meditations on the 'last things,' have found a ray +of light in his writings. But he has not explained how or in what way +punishment is to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not +followed out the principle which he affirms in the Republic, that 'God +is the author of evil only with a view to good,' and that 'they were +the better for being punished.' Still his doctrine of a future state of +rewards and punishments may be compared favourably with that perversion +of Christian doctrine which makes the everlasting punishment of human +beings depend on a brief moment of time, or even on the accident of +an accident. And he has escaped the difficulty which has often beset +divines, respecting the future destiny of the meaner sort of men +(Thersites and the like), who are neither very good nor very bad, by not +counting them worthy of eternal damnation. + +We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of +argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the +horizon of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. +The main purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a +future world, but to place in antagonism the true and false life, and +to contrast the judgments and opinions of men with judgment according +to the truth. Plato may be accused of representing a superhuman or +transcendental virtue in the description of the just man in the Gorgias, +or in the companion portrait of the philosopher in the Theaetetus; and +at the same time may be thought to be condemning a state of the world +which always has existed and always will exist among men. But +such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of mankind. And such +condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, but the natural +rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the ordinary +conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen very far +short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly involved in the +general condemnation. + +Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other +questions, which may be briefly considered:-- + +a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is +supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the +transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge +and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue and +pleasure, the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or +beauty and discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs +of opposites, which in Plato easily pass into one another, and are +seldom kept perfectly distinct. And we must not forget that Plato's +conception of pleasure is the Heracleitean flux transferred to the +sphere of human conduct. There is some degree of unfairness in opposing +the principle of good, which is objective, to the principle of pleasure, +which is subjective. For the assertion of the permanence of good is only +based on the assumption of its objective character. Had Plato fixed +his mind, not on the ideal nature of good, but on the subjective +consciousness of happiness, that would have been found to be as +transient and precarious as pleasure. + +b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the +improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike +dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. +To Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on +self-interest. To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to +have found truth, yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life +is the only good, whether regarded with reference to this world or to +another. Statesmen, Sophists, rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up +for judgment. They are the parodies of wise men, and their arts are the +parodies of true arts and sciences. All that they call science is merely +the result of that study of the tempers of the Great Beast, which he +describes in the Republic. + +c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between +the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, +and the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit +and language in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal +similarity tending to show that they were written at the same period of +Plato's life. For the Republic supplies that education and training of +which the Gorgias suggests the necessity. The theory of the many weak +combining against the few strong in the formation of society (which is +indeed a partial truth), is similar in both of them, and is expressed in +nearly the same language. The sufferings and fate of the just man, the +powerlessness of evil, and the reversal of the situation in another +life, are also points of similarity. The poets, like the rhetoricians, +are condemned because they aim at pleasure only, as in the Republic they +are expelled the State, because they are imitators, and minister to +the weaker side of human nature. That poetry is akin to rhetoric may be +compared with the analogous notion, which occurs in the Protagoras, that +the ancient poets were the Sophists of their day. In some other respects +the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a parallel. The character +of Protagoras may be compared with that of Gorgias, but the conception +of happiness is different in the two dialogues; being described in the +former, according to the old Socratic notion, as deferred or accumulated +pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo, pleasure and good are +distinctly opposed. + +This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the +Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief +good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the +Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, +are allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias' +definition of rhetoric (Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of +persuasion, of all arts the best, for to it all things submit, not +by compulsion, but of their own free will--marks a close and perhaps +designed connection between the two dialogues. In both the ideas of +measure, order, harmony, are the connecting links between the beautiful +and the good. + +In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to +public opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, +and portions of the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from another +point of view, may be thought to stand in the same relation to Plato's +theory of morals which the Theaetetus bears to his theory of knowledge. + +d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant +irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot's modest charge; and +in the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation; +and in the mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds. (2) +The reference of the mythus to the previous discussion should not be +overlooked: the fate reserved for incurable criminals such as Archelaus; +the retaliation of the box on the ears; the nakedness of the souls and +of the judges who are stript of the clothes or disguises which rhetoric +and public opinion have hitherto provided for them (compare Swift's +notion that the universe is a suit of clothes, Tale of a Tub). The +fiction seems to have involved Plato in the necessity of supposing that +the soul retained a sort of corporeal likeness after death. (3) The +appeal of the authority of Homer, who says that Odysseus saw Minos in +his court 'holding a golden sceptre,' which gives verisimilitude to the +tale. + +It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing 'both sides of +the game,' and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, +we are not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only +attempting to analyze the 'dramatis personae' as they were conceived by +him. Neither is it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that Plato +is a dramatic writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be +those which he puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who +appears to have the best of the argument; or to repeat the observation +that he is a poet as well as a philosopher; or to remark that he is not +to be tried by a modern standard, but interpreted with reference to his +place in the history of thought and the opinion of his time. + +It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias +is the assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this +mode of stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of +Plato and of ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting +any abstract right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived +from freedom of thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings +(e.g. Laws), he has fairly laid himself open to the charge of +intolerance. No speculations had as yet arisen respecting the 'liberty +of prophesying;' and Plato is not affirming any abstract right of this +nature: but he is asserting the duty and right of the one wise and true +man to dissent from the folly and falsehood of the many. At the same +time he acknowledges the natural result, which he hardly seeks to avert, +that he who speaks the truth to a multitude, regardless of consequences, +will probably share the fate of Socrates. + +***** + +The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to +which he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, +he puts on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of +ridicule are taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against +themselves. The disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables +of the New Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half +conceal, half reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more +ironical he becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical +than in the Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the +objections of Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to +be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest +sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the +argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher +reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all +ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found +the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of +the wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but +by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At +length he makes even Polus in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument, +and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in +a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his +adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return +to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of the +dialogue. + +First Thesis:-- + +It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice. + +Compare the New Testament-- + +'It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.'--1 Pet. + +And the Sermon on the Mount-- + +'Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake.'--Matt. + +The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but +they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous +may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had +no reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by +Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is +dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish +the offender (compare Republic). But they are not equally willing to +acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil, +and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes +are committed on the great scale--the crimes of tyrants, ancient or +modern--after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have +become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from +any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by +time, and 'to forgive is convenient to them.' The tangle of good and +evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end +cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out +of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant +now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and has +the applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is the +civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will be, +the most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or for +evil cannot alter a hair's breadth the morality of actions which are +right or wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates holds +up to us. Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are of a +mixed nature we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of +our practice. + +And so of private individuals--to them, too, the world occasionally +speaks of the consequences of their actions:--if they are lovers of +pleasure, they will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, +they will lose their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of +what will be, but of what is--of the present consequence of lowering +and degrading the soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men +everywhere, if they were not tempted by interest or passion, would agree +with him--they would rather be the victims than the perpetrators of +an act of treachery or of tyranny. Reason tells them that death comes +sooner or later to all, and is not so great an evil as an unworthy life, +or rather, if rightly regarded, not an evil at all, but to a good man +the greatest good. For in all of us there are slumbering ideals of truth +and right, which may at any time awaken and develop a new life in us. + +Second Thesis:-- + +It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer. + +There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty +followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would +then be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice +as they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening and +enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the +consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort +of reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business +of early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation +and experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be +unfortunate--he had better have suffered when he was young, and been +saved from suffering afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally +unfortunate whose education and manner of life are always concealing +from him the consequences of his own actions, until at length they are +revealed to him in some terrible downfall, which may, perhaps, have been +caused not by his own fault? Another illustration is afforded by the +pauper and criminal classes, who scarcely reflect at all, except on the +means by which they can compass their immediate ends. We pity them, and +make allowances for them; but we do not consider that the same principle +applies to human actions generally. Not to have been found out in some +dishonesty or folly, regarded from a moral or religious point of view, +is the greatest of misfortunes. The success of our evil doings is a +proof that the gods have ceased to strive with us, and have given +us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind us of our sins, and +therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, they are healed by +time; + + 'While rank corruption, mining all within, + Infects unseen.' + +The 'accustomed irony' of Socrates adds a corollary to the +argument:--'Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape +unpunished'--this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of +Proverbs, 'Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,' etc., quoted in +Romans.) + +Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own +lives: they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are +very kind and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love +is always pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar +figure of speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence +but in accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather +than by reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must +speak to themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint in +eloquent words the character of their own evil deeds. To any suffering +which they have deserved, they must persuade themselves to submit. Under +the figure there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in another form, +admits of an easy application to ourselves. For do not we too accuse as +well as excuse ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of prayer +and preaching, which the mind silently employs while the struggle +between the better and the worse is going on within us. And sometimes +we are too hard upon ourselves, because we want to restore the balance +which self-love has overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear +a voice as of a parent consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of +drama is often enacted by the consciences of men 'accusing or +else excusing them.' For all our life long we are talking with +ourselves:--What is thought but speech? What is feeling but rhetoric? +And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be always in danger +of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at first sounded +paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us. + +Third Thesis:-- + +We do not what we will, but what we wish. + +Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn--that good +intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by +wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which +we afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be +inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be +the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase pauperism +by almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to changes of +circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately disapprove; when +we do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we regret; when from +any want of self-control we give another an advantage over us--we are +doing not what we will, but what we wish. All actions of which the +consequences are not weighed and foreseen, are of this impotent and +paralytic sort; and the author of them has 'the least possible power' +while seeming to have the greatest. For he is actually bringing about +the reverse of what he intended. And yet the book of nature is open +to him, in which he who runs may read if he will exercise ordinary +attention; every day offers him experiences of his own and of other +men's characters, and he passes them unheeded by. The contemplation of +the consequences of actions, and the ignorance of men in regard to them, +seems to have led Socrates to his famous thesis:--'Virtue is knowledge;' +which is not so much an error or paradox as a half truth, seen first in +the twilight of ethical philosophy, but also the half of the truth which +is especially needed in the present age. For as the world has grown +older men have been too apt to imagine a right and wrong apart from +consequences; while a few, on the other hand, have sought to resolve +them wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, or Plato for him, +neither divides nor identifies them; though the time has not yet arrived +either for utilitarian or transcendental systems of moral philosophy, he +recognizes the two elements which seem to lie at the basis of morality. +(Compare the following: 'Now, and for us, it is a time to Hellenize and +to praise knowing; for we have Hebraized too much and have overvalued +doing. But the habits and discipline received from Hebraism remain for +our race an eternal possession. And as humanity is constituted, one must +never assign the second rank to-day without being ready to restore them +to the first to-morrow.' Sir William W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa.) + +Fourth Thesis:-- + +To be and not to seem is the end of life. + +The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief +incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows +is a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming +enters into all things; all or almost all desire to appear better than +they are, that they may win the esteem or admiration of others. A man of +ability can easily feign the language of piety or virtue; and there +is an unconscious as well as a conscious hypocrisy which, according +to Socrates, is the worst of the two. Again, there is the sophistry +of classes and professions. There are the different opinions about +themselves and one another which prevail in different ranks of society. +There is the bias given to the mind by the study of one department +of human knowledge to the exclusion of the rest; and stronger far the +prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party interest in certain tenets. +There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry of medicine, the sophistry +of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of these disguises wear the +appearance of the truth; some of them are very ancient, and we do not +easily disengage ourselves from them; for we have inherited them, and +they have become a part of us. The sophistry of an ancient Greek sophist +is nothing compared with the sophistry of a religious order, or of a +church in which during many ages falsehood has been accumulating, and +everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the other. The +conventions and customs which we observe in conversation, and the +opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another ('the +buyer saith, it is nought--it is nought,' etc.), are always obscuring +our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far more +subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from +their own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most +of us imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which +we partly help to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, +requires great force of mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the +search after truth. On every side he is met by the world, which is not +an abstraction of theologians, but the most real of all things, being +another name for ourselves when regarded collectively and subjected to +the influences of society. + +Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the +unreality and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that +they must be and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must +have the spirit and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must +acknowledge their ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of +doing evil, they must learn to do well; if they are weak, and have +nothing in them which they can call themselves, they must acquire +firmness and consistency; if they are indifferent, they must begin to +take an interest in the great questions which surround them. They must +try to be what they would fain appear in the eyes of their fellow-men. +A single individual cannot easily change public opinion; but he can be +true and innocent, simple and independent; he can know what he does, and +what he does not know; and though not without an effort, he can form +a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In his most secret +actions he can show the same high principle (compare Republic) which he +shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And on some fitting +occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right, even an +ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition, may be +found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and lawyers, +and be too much for them. + +Who is the true and who the false statesman?-- + +The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first +organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and +having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with +those of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a +dealer in expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his mind; +while the head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although obliged to +descend to the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts are fixed not +on power or riches or extension of territory, but on an ideal state, in +which all the citizens have an equal chance of health and life, and +the highest education is within the reach of all, and the moral and +intellectual qualities of every individual are freely developed, and +'the idea of good' is the animating principle of the whole. Not the +attainment of freedom alone, or of order alone, but how to unite freedom +with order is the problem which he has to solve. + +The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken +a task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself +before he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage +them. He has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal +enmity under the disguise of moral or political principle: such +meannesses, into which men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed +in the consciousness of his mission, and in his love for his country and +for mankind. He will sometimes ask himself what the next generation will +say of him; not because he is careful of posthumous fame, but because +he knows that the result of his life as a whole will then be more fairly +judged. He will take time for the execution of his plans; not hurrying +them on when the mind of a nation is unprepared for them; but like the +Ruler of the Universe Himself, working in the appointed time, for +he knows that human life, 'if not long in comparison with eternity' +(Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of many great purposes. He +knows, too, that the work will be still going on when he is no longer +here; and he will sometimes, especially when his powers are failing, +think of that other 'city of which the pattern is in heaven' (Republic). + +The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to govern +men he becomes like them; their 'minds are married in conjunction;' they +'bear themselves' like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is their +obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make +them like himself; he must 'educate his party' until they cease to be +a party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give +form to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for +seeming what he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. +Himself a representative man, he is the representative not of the lower +but of the higher elements of the nation. There is a better (as well as +a worse) public opinion of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also +a deeper current of human affairs in which he is borne up when the waves +nearer the shore are threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot +take the world by force--two or three moves on the political chess board +are all that he can fore see--two or three weeks moves on the political +chessboard are all that he can foresee--two or three weeks or months are +granted to him in which he can provide against a coming struggle. But +he knows also that there are permanent principles of politics which +are always tending to the well-being of states--better administration, +better education, the reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased +security against external enemies. These are not 'of to-day or +yesterday,' but are the same in all times, and under all forms of +government. Then when the storm descends and the winds blow, though he +knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the pilot, not like Plato's +captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but with penetrating eye +and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship and guide her into +port. + +The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of +the world--not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures +of which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no +intention of fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of +politics. He is unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which +political convictions would entail upon him. He begins with popularity, +and in fair weather sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon +follows him. For men expect their leaders to be better and wiser than +themselves: to be their guides in danger, their saviours in extremity; +they do not really desire them to obey all the ignorant impulses of the +popular mind; and if they fail them in a crisis they are disappointed. +Then, as Socrates says, the cry of ingratitude is heard, which is most +unreasonable; for the people, who have been taught no better, have +done what might be expected of them, and their statesmen have received +justice at their hands. + +The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and +circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; +he must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to +act together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the +majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader +and not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He +will neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman, neither +adopting the 'laissez faire' nor the 'paternal government' principle; +but he will, whether he is dealing with children in politics, or with +full-grown men, seek to do for the people what the government can do +for them, and what, from imperfect education or deficient powers of +combination, they cannot do for themselves. He knows that if he does too +much for them they will do nothing; and that if he does nothing for them +they will in some states of society be utterly helpless. For the many +cannot exist without the few, if the material force of a country is from +below, wisdom and experience are from above. It is not a small part of +human evils which kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is +well aware that a great purpose carried out consistently during many +years will at last be executed. He is playing for a stake which may be +partly determined by some accident, and therefore he will allow largely +for the unknown element of politics. But the game being one in which +chance and skill are combined, if he plays long enough he is certain of +victory. He will not be always consistent, for the world is changing; +and though he depends upon the support of a party, he will remember that +he is the minister of the whole. He lives not for the present, but for +the future, and he is not at all sure that he will be appreciated either +now or then. For he may have the existing order of society against him, +and may not be remembered by a distant posterity. + +There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates +in the Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, +not excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy +feeling that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as the +actual philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the actual +statesman fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and +egotism, but partly also from a true sense of the faults of eminent men, +a temper of dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those who +are ready enough to acknowledge the inferiority of their own powers. No +matter whether a statesman makes high professions or none at all--they +are reduced sooner or later to the same level. And sometimes the more +unscrupulous man is better esteemed than the more conscientious, because +he has not equally deceived expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, +but they are widely spread; we constantly find them recurring in reviews +and newspapers, and still oftener in private conversation. + +We may further observe that the art of government, while in some +respects tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as +institutions become more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily +be combined with governing by the people: the interests of classes are +too strong for the ideas of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view +of the whole. According to Socrates the true governor will find ruin or +death staring him in the face, and will only be induced to govern from +the fear of being governed by a worse man than himself (Republic). And +in modern times, though the world has grown milder, and the terrible +consequences which Plato foretells no longer await an English statesman, +any one who is not actuated by a blind ambition will only undertake from +a sense of duty a work in which he is most likely to fail; and even +if he succeed, will rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own +generation. + +Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only +real politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words +by applying them to the history of our own country. He would have +said that not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real +politicians of their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, +Ricardo. These during the greater part of their lives occupied an +inconsiderable space in the eyes of the public. They were private +persons; nevertheless they sowed in the minds of men seeds which in +the next generation have become an irresistible power. 'Herein is that +saying true, One soweth and another reapeth.' We may imagine with +Plato an ideal statesman in whom practice and speculation are perfectly +harmonized; for there is no necessary opposition between them. +But experience shows that they are commonly divorced--the ordinary +politician is the interpreter or executor of the thoughts of others, and +hardly ever brings to the birth a new political conception. One or two +only in modern times, like the Italian statesman Cavour, have created +the world in which they moved. The philosopher is naturally unfitted for +political life; his great ideas are not understood by the many; he is a +thousand miles away from the questions of the day. Yet perhaps the lives +of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also happier than the +lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have the promise +of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and visionaries by +their own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, those who +would have been ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred with +them, and are proud to be called by their names. (Compare Thucyd.) + +Who is the true poet? + +Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to +sense; because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice +removed from the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the +Gorgias that the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and +not of truth. In modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry +admitting of a moral. The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in +primitive antiquity are one and the same; but in later ages they seem +to fall apart. The great art of novel writing, that peculiar creation +of our own and the last century, which, together with the sister art +of review writing, threatens to absorb all literature, has even less of +seriousness in her composition. Do we not often hear the novel writer +censured for attempting to convey a lesson to the minds of his readers? + +Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give +amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or +bad, or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have +been poets in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not +forgotten their high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of the +Greek dramatists owe their sublimity to their ethical character. The +noblest truths, sung of in the purest and sweetest language, are still +the proper material of poetry. The poet clothes them with beauty, and +has a power of making them enter into the hearts and memories of men. He +has not only to speak of themes above the level of ordinary life, but +to speak of them in a deeper and tenderer way than they are ordinarily +felt, so as to awaken the feeling of them in others. The old he makes +young again; the familiar principle he invests with a new dignity; he +finds a noble expression for the common-places of morality and politics. +He uses the things of sense so as to indicate what is beyond; he raises +us through earth to heaven. He expresses what the better part of us +would fain say, and the half-conscious feeling is strengthened by +the expression. He is his own critic, for the spirit of poetry and of +criticism are not divided in him. His mission is not to disguise men +from themselves, but to reveal to them their own nature, and make +them better acquainted with the world around them. True poetry is the +remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the happiest +and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of the +greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his +greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what +may not be effected for the human race by a better use of the poetical +and imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, +with truth, may still be possible. Neither is the element of pleasure +to be excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a lower we +raise men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist, too, make +an ideal, or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand +sermons? Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic and +artistic influences. But he is not without a true sense of the noble +purposes to which art may be applied (Republic). + +Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato's language, a +flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, +the poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and +metre. Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the +'savoir faire,' or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit +of poetry. He has no conception that true art should bring order out of +disorder; that it should make provision for the soul's highest interest; +that it should be pursued only with a view to 'the improvement of the +citizens.' He ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Republic); +he idealizes the sensual; he sings the strain of love in the latest +fashion; instead of raising men above themselves he brings them back to +the 'tyranny of the many masters,' from which all his life long a good +man has been praying to be delivered. And often, forgetful of measure +and order, he will express not that which is truest, but that which is +strongest. Instead of a great and nobly-executed subject, perfect +in every part, some fancy of a heated brain is worked out with the +strangest incongruity. He is not the master of his words, but his +words--perhaps borrowed from another--the faded reflection of some +French or German or Italian writer, have the better of him. Though +we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that such +utterances have any healing or life-giving influence on the minds of +men? + +'Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:' Art then must be true, +and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a +seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, +truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest +improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way 'we can best +spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.' Plato does not +say that God will order all things for the best (compare Phaedo), but +he indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be corrected +in another. And as we are very far from the best imaginable world at +present, Plato here, as in the Phaedo and Republic, supposes a purgatory +or place of education for mankind in general, and for a very few a +Tartarus or hell. The myth which terminates the dialogue is not the +revelation, but rather, like all similar descriptions, whether in the +Bible or Plato, the veil of another life. For no visible thing can +reveal the invisible. Of this Plato, unlike some commentators on +Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will he dogmatize about the manner +in which we are 'born again' (Republic). Only he is prepared to maintain +the ultimate triumph of truth and right, and declares that no one, not +even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any other doctrine without +being ridiculous. + +There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are +held to be indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without +regard to consequences is happiness. From this elevation or exaggeration +of feeling Plato seems to shrink: he leaves it to the Stoics in a later +generation to maintain that when impaled or on the rack the philosopher +may be happy (compare Republic). It is observable that in the Republic +he raises this question, but it is not really discussed; the veil of the +ideal state, the shadow of another life, are allowed to descend upon it +and it passes out of sight. The martyr or sufferer in the cause of right +or truth is often supposed to die in raptures, having his eye fixed on a +city which is in heaven. But if there were no future, might he not still +be happy in the performance of an action which was attended only by a +painful death? He himself may be ready to thank God that he was thought +worthy to do Him the least service, without looking for a reward; the +joys of another life may not have been present to his mind at all. Do +we suppose that the mediaeval saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. +Catharine of Sienna, or the Catholic priest who lately devoted himself +to death by a lingering disease that he might solace and help others, +was thinking of the 'sweets' of heaven? No; the work was already heaven +to him and enough. Much less will the dying patriot be dreaming of +the praises of man or of an immortality of fame: the sense of duty, of +right, and trust in God will be sufficient, and as far as the mind can +reach, in that hour. If he were certain that there were no life to come, +he would not have wished to speak or act otherwise than he did in the +cause of truth or of humanity. Neither, on the other hand, will he +suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to be a mere +blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which cannot +pass away, is his who has not known, but yet has believed. A very few +among the sons of men have made themselves independent of circumstances, +past, present, or to come. He who has attained to such a temper of mind +has already present with him eternal life; he needs no arguments to +convince him of immortality; he has in him already a principle stronger +than death. He who serves man without the thought of reward is deemed +to be a more faithful servant than he who works for hire. May not the +service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner +the higher? And although only a very few in the course of the world's +history--Christ himself being one of them--have attained to such a noble +conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be +present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us, and +their lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and +theology. + +THE MYTHS OF PLATO. + +The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are four +longer ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic. +That in the Republic is the most elaborate and finished of them. Three +of these greater myths, namely those contained in the Phaedo, the +Gorgias and the Republic, relate to the destiny of human souls in +a future life. The magnificent myth in the Phaedrus treats of the +immortality, or rather the eternity of the soul, in which is included +a former as well as a future state of existence. To these may be added, +(1) the myth, or rather fable, occurring in the Statesman, in which the +life of innocence is contrasted with the ordinary life of man and the +consciousness of evil: (2) the legend of the Island of Atlantis, an +imaginary history, which is a fragment only, commenced in the Timaeus +and continued in the Critias: (3) the much less artistic fiction of the +foundation of the Cretan colony which is introduced in the preface to +the Laws, but soon falls into the background: (4) the beautiful but +rather artificial tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus narrated in his +rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue called after him: (5) +the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a parody of the +orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the recantation of it. +To these may be added (6) the tale of the grasshoppers, and (7) the tale +of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the Phaedrus: (8) the parable of the +Cave (Republic), in which the previous argument is recapitulated, and +the nature and degrees of knowledge having been previously set forth +in the abstract are represented in a picture: (9) the fiction of the +earth-born men (Republic; compare Laws), in which by the adaptation of +an old tradition Plato makes a new beginning for his society: (10) the +myth of Aristophanes respecting the division of the sexes, Sym.: (11) +the parable of the noble captain, the pilot, and the mutinous sailors +(Republic), in which is represented the relation of the better part of +the world, and of the philosopher, to the mob of politicians: (12) the +ironical tale of the pilot who plies between Athens and Aegina charging +only a small payment for saving men from death, the reason being that he +is uncertain whether to live or die is better for them (Gor.): (13) the +treatment of freemen and citizens by physicians and of slaves by +their apprentices,--a somewhat laboured figure of speech intended to +illustrate the two different ways in which the laws speak to men (Laws). +There also occur in Plato continuous images; some of them extend over +several pages, appearing and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees +stinging and stingless (paupers and thieves) in the Eighth Book of +the Republic, who are generated in the transition from timocracy to +oligarchy: the sun, which is to the visible world what the idea of good +is to the intellectual, in the Sixth Book of the Republic: the composite +animal, having the form of a man, but containing under a human skin a +lion and a many-headed monster (Republic): the great beast, i.e. the +populace: and the wild beast within us, meaning the passions which are +always liable to break out: the animated comparisons of the degradation +of philosophy by the arts to the dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant +to the parricide, who 'beats his father, having first taken away his +arms': the dog, who is your only philosopher: the grotesque and rather +paltry image of the argument wandering about without a head (Laws), +which is repeated, not improved, from the Gorgias: the argument +personified as veiling her face (Republic), as engaged in a chase, as +breaking upon us in a first, second and third wave:--on these figures +of speech the changes are rung many times over. It is observable +that nearly all these parables or continuous images are found in the +Republic; that which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the midwifery of +Socrates, is perhaps the only exception. To make the list complete, +the mathematical figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the +numerical interval which separates king from tyrant, should not be +forgotten. + +The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life +which, like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences +of the mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which +await good and bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue +and to be in another world what it has become in this. It includes a +Paradiso, Purgatorio, and Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo +and the Republic. The Inferno is reserved for great criminals only. +The argument of the dialogue is frequently referred to, and the meaning +breaks through so as rather to destroy the liveliness and consistency +of the picture. The structure of the fiction is very slight, the chief +point or moral being that in the judgments of another world there is +no possibility of concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of +foreseeing death, and brings together the souls both of them and their +judges naked and undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to +view, stripped of the veils and clothes which might prevent them from +seeing into or being seen by one another. + +The myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more cosmological, +and also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy occurs +to Plato that the upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in one, a +glorified earth, fairer and purer than that in which we dwell. As the +fishes live in the ocean, mankind are living in a lower sphere, out +of which they put their heads for a moment or two and behold a world +beyond. The earth which we inhabit is a sediment of the coarser +particles which drop from the world above, and is to that heavenly earth +what the desert and the shores of the ocean are to us. A part of the +myth consists of description of the interior of the earth, which +gives the opportunity of introducing several mythological names and +of providing places of torment for the wicked. There is no clear +distinction of soul and body; the spirits beneath the earth are spoken +of as souls only, yet they retain a sort of shadowy form when they cry +for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the philosopher alone is said +to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in Plato which relate +to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as well as +other homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural +reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of +human character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind +are between them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of +the Phaedo they are carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian +lake, where they dwell, and are purified of their evil deeds, and +receive the rewards of their good. There are also incurable sinners, +who are cast into Tartarus, there to remain as the penalty of atrocious +crimes; these suffer everlastingly. And there is another class of +hardly-curable sinners who are allowed from time to time to approach +the shores of the Acherusian lake, where they cry to their victims for +mercy; which if they obtain they come out into the lake and cease from +their torments. + +Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps +any allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent +with itself. The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; +abstract ideas are transformed into persons, figures of speech into +realities. These myths may be compared with the Pilgrim's Progress of +Bunyan, in which discussions of theology are mixed up with the incidents +of travel, and mythological personages are associated with human beings: +they are also garnished with names and phrases taken out of Homer, and +with other fragments of Greek tradition. + +The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than +either of the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they +have, and is full of touches which recall the experiences of human life. +It will be noticed by an attentive reader that the twelve days during +which Er lay in a trance after he was slain coincide with the time +passed by the spirits in their pilgrimage. It is a curious observation, +not often made, that good men who have lived in a well-governed city +(shall we say in a religious and respectable society?) are more likely +to make mistakes in their choice of life than those who have had more +experience of the world and of evil. It is a more familiar remark that +we constantly blame others when we have only ourselves to blame; and +the philosopher must acknowledge, however reluctantly, that there is an +element of chance in human life with which it is sometimes impossible +for man to cope. That men drink more of the waters of forgetfulness than +is good for them is a poetical description of a familiar truth. We have +many of us known men who, like Odysseus, have wearied of ambition +and have only desired rest. We should like to know what became of the +infants 'dying almost as soon as they were born,' but Plato only raises, +without satisfying, our curiosity. The two companies of souls, ascending +and descending at either chasm of heaven and earth, and conversing +when they come out into the meadow, the majestic figures of the judges +sitting in heaven, the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of the +great allegory which have an indescribable grandeur and power. The +remark already made respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths +must be extended also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the +heavens, and a picture of the Day of Judgment. + +The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an Oriental, +or rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an affinity to the +mysteries and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a certain extent they +are un-Greek; at any rate there is hardly anything like them in +other Greek writings which have a serious purpose; in spirit they are +mediaeval. They are akin to what may be termed the underground religion +in all ages and countries. They are presented in the most lively and +graphic manner, but they are never insisted on as true; it is only +affirmed that nothing better can be said about a future life. Plato +seems to make use of them when he has reached the limits of human +knowledge; or, to borrow an expression of his own, when he is standing +on the outside of the intellectual world. They are very simple in style; +a few touches bring the picture home to the mind, and make it present +to us. They have also a kind of authority gained by the employment +of sacred and familiar names, just as mere fragments of the words of +Scripture, put together in any form and applied to any subject, have a +power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry and mythology; and +they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of them may be summed up +in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and 'there is some better +thing remaining for the good than for the evil.' + +All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for +example, the tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at first +sight to be an extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety when +we remember that it is based on a legendary belief. The art of making +stories of ghosts and apparitions credible is said to consist in the +manner of telling them. The effect is gained by many literary and +conversational devices, such as the previous raising of curiosity, +the mention of little circumstances, simplicity, picturesqueness, the +naturalness of the occasion, and the like. This art is possessed by +Plato in a degree which has never been equalled. + +The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have +been already described, but is of a different character. It treats of +a former rather than of a future life. It represents the conflict of +reason aided by passion or righteous indignation on the one hand, and +of the animal lusts and instincts on the other. The soul of man has +followed the company of some god, and seen truth in the form of the +universal before it was born in this world. Our present life is the +result of the struggle which was then carried on. This world is relative +to a former world, as it is often projected into a future. We ask the +question, Where were men before birth? As we likewise enquire, What will +become of them after death? The first question is unfamiliar to us, and +therefore seems to be unnatural; but if we survey the whole human race, +it has been as influential and as widely spread as the other. In the +Phaedrus it is really a figure of speech in which the 'spiritual +combat' of this life is represented. The majesty and power of the whole +passage--especially of what may be called the theme or proem (beginning +'The mind through all her being is immortal')--can only be rendered very +inadequately in another language. + +The myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in +which men were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth's +motion had their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: +the dead came to life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged +young; the youth became a child, the child an infant, the infant +vanished into the earth. The connection between the reversal of the +earth's motion and the reversal of human life is of course verbal only, +yet Plato, like theologians in other ages, argues from the consistency +of the tale to its truth. The new order of the world was immediately +under the government of God; it was a state of innocence in which men +had neither wants nor cares, in which the earth brought forth all things +spontaneously, and God was to man what man now is to the animals. There +were no great estates, or families, or private possessions, nor any +traditions of the past, because men were all born out of the earth. +This is what Plato calls the 'reign of Cronos;' and in like manner he +connects the reversal of the earth's motion with some legend of which he +himself was probably the inventor. + +The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of existence +was man the happier,--under that of Cronos, which was a state of +innocence, or that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while +Plato balances the two sides of the serious controversy, which he has +suggested in a figure. The answer depends on another question: What +use did the children of Cronos make of their time? They had boundless +leisure and the faculty of discoursing, not only with one another, +but with the animals. Did they employ these advantages with a view to +philosophy, gathering from every nature some addition to their store +of knowledge? or, Did they pass their time in eating and drinking and +telling stories to one another and to the beasts?--in either case +there would be no difficulty in answering. But then, as Plato rather +mischievously adds, 'Nobody knows what they did,' and therefore the +doubt must remain undetermined. + +To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural +convulsion, in which the order of the world and of human life is once +more reversed, God withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the +government of himself. The world begins again, and arts and laws are +slowly and painfully invented. A secular age succeeds to a theocratical. +In this fanciful tale Plato has dropped, or almost dropped, the garb of +mythology. He suggests several curious and important thoughts, such +as the possibility of a state of innocence, the existence of a world +without traditions, and the difference between human and divine +government. He has also carried a step further his speculations +concerning the abolition of the family and of property, which he +supposes to have no place among the children of Cronos any more than in +the ideal state. + +It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract +to the concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of +the seen, and also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A +great writer knows how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining +within the sphere of the visible, and then again comprehending a wider +range and soaring to the abstract and universal. Even in the same +sentence he may employ both modes of speech not improperly or +inharmoniously. It is useless to criticise the broken metaphors of +Plato, if the effect of the whole is to create a picture not such as +can be painted on canvas, but which is full of life and meaning to the +reader. A poem may be contained in a word or two, which may call up not +one but many latent images; or half reveal to us by a sudden flash the +thoughts of many hearts. Often the rapid transition from one image +to another is pleasing to us: on the other hand, any single figure of +speech if too often repeated, or worked out too much at length, becomes +prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy we necessarily include +both 'the moral law within and the starry heaven above,' and pass from +one to the other (compare for examples Psalms xviii. and xix.). Whether +such a use of language is puerile or noble depends upon the genius of +the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the associations employed. + +In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation +is not forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which +are told to a living audience, and so well told that we are more than +half-inclined to believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation +too, the striking image or figure of speech is not forgotten, but is +quickly caught up, and alluded to again and again; as it would still be +in our own day in a genial and sympathetic society. The descriptions of +Plato have a greater life and reality than is to be found in any modern +writing. This is due to their homeliness and simplicity. Plato can do +with words just as he pleases; to him they are indeed 'more plastic than +wax' (Republic). We are in the habit of opposing speech and writing, +poetry and prose. But he has discovered a use of language in which they +are united; which gives a fitting expression to the highest truths; and +in which the trifles of courtesy and the familiarities of daily life are +not overlooked. + +***** + + + + +GORGIAS + +By Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, +Polus. + +SCENE: The house of Callicles. + + +CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but +not for a feast. + +SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast? + +CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been +exhibiting to us many fine things. + +SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to +blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora. + +CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been +the cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I +will make him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, +at some other time. + +CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon--does Socrates want to hear +Gorgias? + +CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming. + +CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and +he shall exhibit to you. + +SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for +I want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is +which he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, +defer the exhibition to some other time. + +CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to +answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only +just now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and +that he would answer. + +SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon--? + +CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him? + +SOCRATES: Ask him who he is. + +CHAEREPHON: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he +had been a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you +understand? + +CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our +friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any +questions which you are asked? + +GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; +and I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a +new one. + +CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias. + +GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial. + +POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of +me too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is +tired. + +CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than +Gorgias? + +POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you? + +CHAEREPHON: Not at all:--and you shall answer if you like. + +POLUS: Ask:-- + +CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother +Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name +which is given to his brother? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician? + +POLUS: Yes. + +CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, +or of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him? + +POLUS: Clearly, a painter. + +CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him--what is the art in which he +is skilled. + +POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are +experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes +the days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according +to chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in +different arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend +Gorgias is one of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is +the noblest. + +SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; +but he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon. + +GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he +was asked. + +GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself? + +SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to +answer: for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he +has attended more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic. + +POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art +which Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one +who found fault with it, but you never said what the art was. + +POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody +asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by +what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly +and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, +to say what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, +Gorgias, let me turn to you, and ask the same question,--what are we to +call you, and what is the art which you profess? + +GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art. + +SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician? + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that +which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.' + +SOCRATES: I should wish to do so. + +GORGIAS: Then pray do. + +SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men +rhetoricians? + +GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at +Athens, but in all places. + +SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, +as we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer +mode of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, +and answer shortly the questions which are asked of you? + +GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do +my best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession +is that I can be as short as any one. + +SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method +now, and the longer one at some other time. + +GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard +a man use fewer words. + +SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a +maker of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: +I might ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would +you not?), with the making of garments? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies? + +GORGIAS: It is. + +SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your +answers. + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that. + +SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: +with what is rhetoric concerned? + +GORGIAS: With discourse. + +SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?--such discourse as would +teach the sick under what treatment they might get well? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak? + +GORGIAS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now +mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases? + +GORGIAS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the +good or evil condition of the body? + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:--all of them +treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally +have to do. + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of +discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call +them arts of rhetoric? + +GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to +do with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no +such action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only +through the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying +that rhetoric treats of discourse. + +SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare +say I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:--you would +allow that there are arts? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned +with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and +statuary, and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and +of such arts I suppose you would say that they do not come within the +province of rhetoric. + +GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium +of language, and require either no action or very little, as, for +example, the arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of +playing draughts; in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive +with action, but in most of them the verbal element is greater--they +depend wholly on words for their efficacy and power: and I take your +meaning to be that rhetoric is an art of this latter sort? + +GORGIAS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of +these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, +that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the +medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might +say, 'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think +that you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be +so called by you. + +GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my +meaning. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:--seeing +that rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of +words, and there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is +that quality in words with which rhetoric is concerned:--Suppose that a +person asks me about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; +he might say, 'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, +as you replied to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take +effect through words. And then he would proceed to ask: 'Words about +what?' and I should reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and how +many there are of each. And if he asked again: 'What is the art of +calculation?' I should say, That also is one of the arts which is +concerned wholly with words. And if he further said, 'Concerned with +what?' I should say, like the clerks in the assembly, 'as aforesaid' of +arithmetic, but with a difference, the difference being that the art of +calculation considers not only the quantities of odd and even numbers, +but also their numerical relations to themselves and to one another. +And suppose, again, I were to say that astronomy is only words--he would +ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I should answer, that astronomy +tells us about the motions of the stars and sun and moon, and their +relative swiftness. + +GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about +rhetoric: which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts +which act always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do +the words which rhetoric uses relate? + +GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things. + +SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for +which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you +have heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the +singers enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, +as the writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained. + +GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the +author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, +the money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will +say: 'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with +the greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he +will reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you +mean that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will +answer, 'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men +have, Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, +Socrates, shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of +his art than I can show of mine.' To him again I shall say, Who are +you, honest friend, and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will +reply, 'and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' +When I have done with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and +he, as I expect, will utterly despise them all. 'Consider Socrates,' he +will say, 'whether Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater +good than wealth.' Well, you and I say to him, and are you a creator of +wealth? 'Yes,' he replies. And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And do you +consider wealth to be the greatest good of man? 'Of course,' will be his +reply. And we shall rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that +his art produces a greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to +go on and ask, 'What good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, +to imagine that this question is asked of you by them and by me; What +is that which, as you say, is the greatest good of man, and of which you +are the creator? Answer us. + +GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that +which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the +power of ruling over others in their several states. + +SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be? + +GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges +in the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the +assembly, or at any other political meeting?--if you have the power +of uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the +trainer your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found +to gather treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak +and to persuade the multitude. + +SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained +what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I +am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having +this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do +you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing +persuasion? + +GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for +persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric. + +SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever +was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of +knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you. + +GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, +according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that +persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although +I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to +ask--what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and +about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling +you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in +such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would +have you observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I +asked, 'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter +of figures,' should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and +where do you find them?' + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that +there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then +you would have answered very well? + +GORGIAS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;--is +rhetoric the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the +same effect? I mean to say--Does he who teaches anything persuade men of +that which he teaches or not? + +GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,--there can be no mistake about that. + +SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now +speaking:--do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the +properties of number? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of +persuasion? + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about +what,--we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and +even; and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we +were just now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, +and about what. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but +that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question +has arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric +the artificer, and about what?--is not that a fair way of putting the +question? + +GORGIAS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the +answer? + +GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in +courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about +the just and unjust. + +SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your +notion; yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found +repeating a seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute +you, but as I was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, +and that we may not get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the +meaning of one another's words; I would have you develope your own views +in your own way, whatever may be your hypothesis. + +GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as +'having learned'? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there is also 'having believed'? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and +are learning and belief the same things? + +GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. + +SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this +way:--If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief +as well as a true?'--you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there +is. + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief +differ. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have +believed are persuaded? + +GORGIAS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,--one which is +the source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge? + +GORGIAS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts +of law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of +persuasion which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives +knowledge? + +GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a +persuasion which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no +instruction about them? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or +other assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief +about them; for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude +about such high matters in a short time? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; +for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets +to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the +rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he +ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to +be built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but +the master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and +an order of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will +advise and not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you +profess to be a rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do +better than learn the nature of your art from you. And here let me +assure you that I have your interest in view as well as my own. For +likely enough some one or other of the young men present might desire to +become your pupil, and in fact I see some, and a good many too, who have +this wish, but they would be too modest to question you. And therefore +when you are interrogated by me, I would have you imagine that you are +interrogated by them. 'What is the use of coming to you, Gorgias?' they +will say--'about what will you teach us to advise the state?--about the +just and unjust only, or about those other things also which Socrates +has just mentioned?' How will you answer them? + +GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will +endeavour to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have +heard, I think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the +plan of the harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly +of Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of +the builders. + +SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I +myself heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle +wall. + +GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be +given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the +men who win their point. + +SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is +the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the +matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness. + +GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric +comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer +you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with +my brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, +who would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the +knife or hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he +would not do for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say +that if a rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had +there to argue in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them +should be elected state-physician, the physician would have no chance; +but he who could speak would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest +with a man of any other profession the rhetorician more than any one +would have the power of getting himself chosen, for he can speak more +persuasively to the multitude than any of them, and on any subject. +Such is the nature and power of the art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, +rhetoric should be used like any other competitive art, not against +everybody,--the rhetorician ought not to abuse his strength any more +than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of fence;--because he has +powers which are more than a match either for friend or enemy, he ought +not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. Suppose a man to +have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful boxer,--he in the +fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or mother or one +of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the trainers +or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from the +city;--surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be +used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, +and others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use +their own strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers +bad, neither is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather +say that those who make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same +argument holds good of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against +all men and upon any subject,--in short, he can persuade the multitude +better than any other man of anything which he pleases, but he should +not therefore seek to defraud the physician or any other artist of his +reputation merely because he has the power; he ought to use rhetoric +fairly, as he would also use his athletic powers. And if after having +become a rhetorician he makes a bad use of his strength and skill, his +instructor surely ought not on that account to be held in detestation or +banished. For he was intended by his teacher to make a good use of his +instructions, but he abuses them. And therefore he is the person who +ought to be held in detestation, banished, and put to death, and not his +instructor. + +SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of +disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not +always terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either +party of the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements +are apt to arise--somebody says that another has not spoken truly or +clearly; and then they get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both +parties conceiving that their opponents are arguing from personal +feeling only and jealousy of themselves, not from any interest in the +question at issue. And sometimes they will go on abusing one another +until the company at last are quite vexed at themselves for ever +listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? Why, because I cannot +help feeling that you are now saying what is not quite consistent or +accordant with what you were saying at first about rhetoric. And I am +afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think that I have some +animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake of discovering +the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of my sort, I +should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you alone. And +what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very willing +to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing to +refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be +refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the +two, just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil +than of curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man +can endure so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which +we are speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the +discussion out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;--let us +make an end of it. + +GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you +indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before +you came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the +argument may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we +should consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company +when they are wanting to do something else. + +CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which +shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid +that I should have any business on hand which would take me away from a +discussion so interesting and so ably maintained. + +CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many +discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, +and therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better +pleased. + +SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is. + +GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, +especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance +with the wishes of the company, then, do you begin, and ask of me any +question which you like. + +SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your +words; though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have +misunderstood your meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will +learn of you, a rhetorician? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the +multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion? + +GORGIAS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have +greater powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of +health? + +GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,--that is. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he +cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the +physician, he will have greater power than he who knows? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:--is he? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of +what the physician knows. + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the +physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who +has knowledge?--is not that the inference? + +GORGIAS: In the case supposed:--yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the +other arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has +only to discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more +knowledge than those who know? + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?--not to have +learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in +no way inferior to the professors of them? + +SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is +a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to +be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he +is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, +good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to +say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or +honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the +ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to +know more about these things than some one else who knows? Or must +the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can +acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher +of rhetoric will not teach him--it is not your business; but you will +make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; +and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to +teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things +first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish +that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying +that you would. + +GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to +know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well. + +SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you +make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust +already, or he must be taught by you. + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like +manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge +makes him. + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? + +GORGIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just? + +GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference. + +SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just +man? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? + +GORGIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not +to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his +pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and +unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his +teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made +a bad use of his rhetoric--he is to be banished--was not that said? + +GORGIAS: Yes, it was. + +SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will +never have done injustice at all? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric +treated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but +about just and unjust? Was not this said? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that +rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly +be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the +rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise +the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you +thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would +be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave +off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, +the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an +unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, +Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the +truth of all this. + +POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now +saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that +the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and +admitted that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach +them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction--the +thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the +argument by your captious questions--(do you seriously believe that +there is any truth in all this?) For will any one ever acknowledge that +he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, +that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a +pass. + +SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with +friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger +generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and +in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you +who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error +into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition: + +POLUS: What condition? + +SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you +indulged at first. + +POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please? + +SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to +Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got +there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech--that +would be hard indeed. But then consider my case:--shall not I be very +hardly used, if, when you are making a long oration, and refusing to +answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, +and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the +argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it +on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn +ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias--refute and be refuted: for I +suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows--would you not? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything +which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him? + +POLUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer? + +POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question +which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my +opinion. + +POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you +say that you have made an art. + +POLUS: What thing? + +SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience. + +POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? + +SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind. + +POLUS: An experience in what? + +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and +gratification. + +POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? + +SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric +is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric +is? + +POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? + +SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a +slight gratification to me? + +POLUS: I will. + +SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? + +POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? + +SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus. + +POLUS: What then? + +SOCRATES: I should say an experience. + +POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me. + +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and +gratification, Polus. + +POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? + +SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession. + +POLUS: Of what profession? + +SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I +hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of +his own profession. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric +which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:--from what he was just now +saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric +which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. + +GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me. + +SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a +part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, +which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word +'flattery'; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which +is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an +experience or routine and not an art:--another part is rhetoric, and +the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four +branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may +ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of +flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him +when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think +rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a +fine thing or not, until I have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For +that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you +will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric? + +POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, +is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. + +POLUS: And noble or ignoble? + +SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call +what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was +saying before. + +GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. + +SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained +myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt +to run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name 'Polus,' which +means 'a colt.') + +GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that +rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. + +SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if +I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the +existence of bodies and of souls? + +GORGIAS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of +either of them? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in +appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to +be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at +first sight not to be in good health. + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: +in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not +the reality? + +GORGIAS: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I +mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: +there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art +attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be +described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other +medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to +gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one +another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and +medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, +seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two +on the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing +their natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations +of them; she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and +pretends to be that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's +highest interests, is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and +deceiving them into the belief that she is of the highest value to them. +Cookery simulates the disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what +food is the best for the body; and if the physician and the cook had to +enter into a competition in which children were the judges, or men who +had no more sense than children, as to which of them best understands +the goodness or badness of food, the physician would be starved to +death. A flattery I deem this to be and of an ignoble sort, Polus, for +to you I am now addressing myself, because it aims at pleasure +without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, but only an +experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason of the +nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational thing +an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in defence +of them. + +Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of +medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the +form of gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working +deceitfully by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and +garments, and making men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the +true beauty which is given by gymnastic. + +I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the +manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be +able to follow) + +as tiring: gymnastic:: cookery: medicine; + +or rather, + +as tiring: gymnastic:: sophistry: legislation; + +and + +as cookery: medicine:: rhetoric: justice. + +And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and +the sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be +jumbled up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, +nor do other men know what to make of them. For if the body presided +over itself, and were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul +did not discern and discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the +body was made the judge of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily +delight which was given by them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word +with which you, friend Polus, are so well acquainted, would prevail far +and wide: 'Chaos' would come again, and cookery, health, and medicine +would mingle in an indiscriminate mass. And now I have told you my +notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation to the soul, what cookery is +to the body. I may have been inconsistent in making a long speech, when +I would not allow you to discourse at length. But I think that I may be +excused, because you did not understand me, and could make no use of +my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an +explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of yours, I +hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to understand +you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: And now +you may do what you please with my answer. + +POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery? + +SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you +cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older? + +POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under +the idea that they are flatterers? + +SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech? + +POLUS: I am asking a question. + +SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all. + +POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? + +SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor. + +POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say. + +SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the +citizens. + +POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile +any one whom they please. + +SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance +of yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a +question of me. + +POLUS: I am asking a question of you. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once. + +POLUS: How two questions? + +SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like +tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they +please? + +POLUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, +and I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians +and tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now +saying; for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what +they think best. + +POLUS: And is not that a great power? + +SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse. + +POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert. + +SOCRATES: No, by the great--what do you call him?--not you, for you say +that power is a good to him who has the power. + +POLUS: I do. + +SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks +best, this is a good, and would you call this great power? + +POLUS: I should not. + +SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and +that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery--and so you will have refuted +me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what +they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon +which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, +admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil. + +POLUS: Yes; I admit that. + +SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power +in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they +do as they will? + +POLUS: This fellow-- + +SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;--now refute me. + +POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? + +SOCRATES: And I say so still. + +POLUS: Then surely they do as they will? + +SOCRATES: I deny it. + +POLUS: But they do what they think best? + +SOCRATES: Aye. + +POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. + +SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar +style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I +am in error or give the answer yourself. + +POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. + +SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will +that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take +medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the +drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of +which they drink? + +POLUS: Clearly, the health. + +SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not +will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take +the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?--But they will, to have +the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage. + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for +the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that +for the sake of which he does it. + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate +and indifferent? + +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call +goods, and their opposites evils? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which +partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or +of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, +wood, stones, and the like:--these are the things which you call neither +good nor evil? + +POLUS: Exactly so. + +SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or +the good for the sake of the indifferent? + +POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. + +SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the +idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for +the sake of the good? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him +of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the +good? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of +something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other +thing for the sake of which we do them? + +POLUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to +despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our +good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for +we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither +good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, +Polus? Am I not right? + +POLUS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant +or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of +his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when +really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best +to him? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do +you not answer? + +POLUS: Well, I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one +have great power in a state? + +POLUS: He will not. + +SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good +to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? + +POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of +doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would +not be jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning +whom he pleased, Oh, no! + +SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean? + +POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied? + +SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus! + +POLUS: Why 'forbear'? + +SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be +envied, but only to pity them. + +POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches? + +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are. + +POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and +justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched? + +SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he +is to be envied. + +POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case +he is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him +justly. + +POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death +is wretched, and to be pitied? + +SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he +who is justly killed. + +POLUS: How can that be, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the +greatest of evils. + +POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater +evil? + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice? + +SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I +would rather suffer than do. + +POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant? + +SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean. + +POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good +to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like. + +SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you +reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger +under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and +become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought +to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as +dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he +will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my +great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you +the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any +one may have great power--he may burn any house which he pleases, and +the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, +whether public or private--but can you believe that this mere doing as +you think best is great power? + +POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this. + +SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power? + +POLUS: I can. + +SOCRATES: Why then? + +POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be +punished. + +SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power +is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that +this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an +evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:--do +we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the +infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are +sometimes a good and sometimes not a good? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when +that they are evil--what principle do you lay down? + +POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask +that question. + +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, +I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are +unjust. + +POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child +refute that statement? + +SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally +grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my +foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing +good to a friend. + +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; +events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and +to prove that many men who do wrong are happy. + +SOCRATES: What events? + +POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now +the ruler of Macedonia? + +SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is. + +POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable? + +SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance +with him. + +POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance +with him, whether a man is happy? + +SOCRATES: Most certainly not. + +POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know +whether the great king was a happy man? + +SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands +in the matter of education and justice. + +POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who +are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and +evil are miserable. + +POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is +miserable? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked. + +POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to +the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who +was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore +in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do +rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your +doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, +for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place +he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the +pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas has +usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his +own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he +threw them into a waggon and carried them off by night, and slew them, +and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this +wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all +men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his +remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years old, who +was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the kingdom +belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he ought +and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; +but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and +declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running +after a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest +criminal of all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most +miserable and not the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are +many Athenians, and you would be at the head of them, who would rather +be any other Macedonian than Archelaus! + +SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather +than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with +which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand +refuted when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good +friend, where is the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have +been saying. + +POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do. + +SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after +the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the +one party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a +number of witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and +their adversary has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of +proof is of no value where truth is the aim; a man may often be +sworn down by a multitude of false witnesses who have a great air of +respectability. And in this argument nearly every one, Athenian and +stranger alike, would be on your side, if you should bring witnesses in +disproof of my statement;--you may, if you will, summon Nicias the son +of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who gave the row of tripods which +stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with him; or you may summon +Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver of that famous +offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole house of +Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose;--they will +all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for you do +not convince me; although you produce many false witnesses against me, +in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But +I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me +unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you +make me the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. +For there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the +world in general; but mine is of another sort--let us compare them, +and see in what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters +which to know is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or +not to know happiness and misery--that is the chief of them. And what +knowledge can be nobler? or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? +And therefore I will begin by asking you whether you do not think that +a man who is unjust and doing injustice can be happy, seeing that you +think Archelaus unjust, and yet happy? May I assume this to be your +opinion? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility--here is one point +about which we are at issue:--very good. And do you mean to say also +that if he meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy? + +POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable. + +SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, +according to you, he will be happy? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust +actions is miserable in any case,--more miserable, however, if he be not +punished and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be +punished and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men. + +POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a +friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us--are +they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice? + +POLUS: Exactly so. + +SOCRATES: And you said the opposite? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me? + +POLUS: By Zeus, I did. + +SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus. + +POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right. + +SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be +unpunished? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are +punished are less miserable--are you going to refute this proposition +also? + +POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, +Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth? + +POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to +make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has +his eyes burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries +inflicted on him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the like, +is at last impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier than +if he escape and become a tyrant, and continue all through life +doing what he likes and holding the reins of government, the envy and +admiration both of citizens and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as +you say, cannot be refuted? + +SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead +of refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But +please to refresh my memory a little; did you say--'in an unjust attempt +to make himself a tyrant'? + +POLUS: Yes, I did. + +SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the +other,--neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers +in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but +that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the +two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,--when +any one says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him. + +POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently +refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the +company. + +SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my +tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president +to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take +them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages +of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument +than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of +proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness +only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am +arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have +nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then +whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? +For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, +that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be +punished than to be punished. + +POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for +example, suffer rather than do injustice? + +SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would. + +POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man. + +SOCRATES: But will you answer? + +POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to +say. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am +beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is +the worst?--to do injustice or to suffer? + +POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst. + +SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?--Answer. + +POLUS: To do. + +SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the +honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful +things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do +you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for +example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight +of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account +of personal beauty? + +POLUS: I cannot. + +SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they +were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of +their use, or of both? + +POLUS: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same +reason? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so +far as they are useful or pleasant or both? + +POLUS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge? + +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring +beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility. + +SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the +opposite standard of pain and evil? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the +measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to +say, in pleasure or utility or both? + +POLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or +disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil--must it not be so? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now +made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering +wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful? + +POLUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the +more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil +or both: does not that also follow? + +POLUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice +exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer +more than the injured? + +POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain? + +POLUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will +therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice? + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do +injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to +a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if +you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a +physician without shrinking, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me. + +POLUS: I should say 'No.' + +SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil? + +POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any +man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the +greater evil of the two. + +POLUS: That is the conclusion. + +SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, +how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of +your way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough +for me,--I have no need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am +regardless of the rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the +next question; which is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty +man is to suffer punishment, as you supposed, or whether to escape +punishment is not a greater evil, as I supposed. Consider:--You would +say that to suffer punishment is another name for being justly corrected +when you do wrong? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in +so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion. + +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are. + +SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent, must there not also +be a patient? + +POLUS: I should say so. + +SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, +and will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, +for example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is +stricken? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is +struck will be struck violently or quickly? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature +as the act of him who strikes? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing +burned will be burned in the same way? + +POLUS: Truly. + +SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds--there will be +something cut? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause +pain, the cut will be of the same nature? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition +which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient +answers to the affection of the agent? + +POLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished +is suffering or acting? + +POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that. + +SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent? + +POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher. + +SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly? + +POLUS: Justly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers +justly? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished +suffers what is honourable? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the +honourable is either pleasant or useful? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good? + +POLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then he is benefited? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term +'benefited'? I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved. + +POLUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his +soul? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at +the matter in this way:--In respect of a man's estate, do you see any +greater evil than poverty? + +POLUS: There is no greater evil. + +SOCRATES: Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is +weakness and disease and deformity? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of +her own? + +POLUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, +and the like? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have +pointed out three corresponding evils--injustice, disease, poverty? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?--Is not the +most disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul? + +POLUS: By far the most. + +SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst? + +POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already +admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both. + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted +by us to be most disgraceful? + +POLUS: It has been admitted. + +SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing +excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and +ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick? + +POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow +from your premises. + +SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil +of the soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess +of disgrace must be caused by some preternatural greatness, or +extraordinary hurtfulness of the evil. + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the +greatest of evils? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity +of the soul, are the greatest of evils? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does +not the art of making money? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of +medicine? + +POLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to +answer at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we +take them. + +POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate? + +POLUS: To the judges, you mean. + +SOCRATES: --Who are to punish them? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in +accordance with a certain rule of justice? + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; +medicine from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three? + +POLUS: Will you enumerate them? + +SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice. + +POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others. + +SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or +advantage or both? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who +are being healed pleased? + +POLUS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: A useful thing, then? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and +this is the advantage of enduring the pain--that you get well? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who +is healed, or who never was out of health? + +POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health. + +SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered +from evils, but in never having had them. + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in +their bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, +and another is not healed, but retains the evil--which of them is the +most miserable? + +POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed. + +SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the +greatest of evils, which is vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the +medicine of our vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness +who has never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the +greatest of evils. + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and +punishment? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no +deliverance from injustice? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, +and who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or +correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished +by Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? (Compare +Republic.) + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the +conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet +contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against +his constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is +afraid of the pain of being burned or cut:--Is not that a parallel case? + +POLUS: Yes, truly. + +SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and +bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, +they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to +be painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not +knowing how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than +a diseased body; a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and +unholy. And hence they do all that they can to avoid punishment and to +avoid being released from the greatest of evils; they provide themselves +with money and friends, and cultivate to the utmost their powers of +persuasion. But if we, Polus, are right, do you see what follows, or +shall we draw out the consequences in form? + +POLUS: If you please. + +SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, +is the greatest of evils? + +POLUS: That is quite clear. + +SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be +released from this evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but +to do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all? + +POLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? +You deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and +unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who +like him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, +the most miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is +more miserable than the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more +miserable than he who suffers.--Was not that what I said? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of +rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in +every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby +suffer great evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he +ought of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he +will run to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that +the disease of injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the +incurable cancer of the soul; must we not allow this consequence, +Polus, if our former admissions are to stand:--is any other inference +consistent with them? + +POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to +excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or +country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing +he ought to accuse--himself above all, and in the next degree his family +or any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light +the iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer +and be made whole; and he should even force himself and others not to +shrink, but with closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate +with knife or searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of +attaining the good and the honourable; let him who has done things +worthy of stripes, allow himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be +bound, if of a fine, to be fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of +death, to die, himself being the first to accuse himself and his own +relations, and using rhetoric to this end, that his and their unjust +actions may be made manifest, and that they themselves may be delivered +from injustice, which is the greatest evil. Then, Polus, rhetoric would +indeed be useful. Do you say 'Yes' or 'No' to that? + +POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though +probably in agreement with your premises. + +SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven? + +POLUS: Yes; it certainly is. + +SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our +duty to harm another, whether an enemy or not--I except the case of +self-defence--then I have to be upon my guard--but if my enemy injures +a third person, then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I +should try to prevent his being punished, or appearing before the judge; +and if he appears, I should contrive that he should escape, and not +suffer punishment: if he has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what +he has stolen and spend it on him and his, regardless of religion and +justice; and if he have done things worthy of death, let him not die, +but rather be immortal in his wickedness; or, if this is not possible, +let him at any rate be allowed to live as long as he can. For such +purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of small if of any use +to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at least, there was no +such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. + +CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking? + +CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound +earnest; but you may well ask him. + +CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in +earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is +true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not +doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to +be doing? + +SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings +among mankind, however varying in different persons--I mean to say, if +every man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by +the rest of his species--I do not see how we could ever communicate our +impressions to one another. I make this remark because I perceive that +you and I have a common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of +us have two loves apiece:--I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of +Cleinias, and of philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of +Demus the son of Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your +cleverness, do not venture to contradict your favourite in any word or +opinion of his; but as he changes you change, backwards and forwards. +When the Athenian Demus denies anything that you are saying in the +assembly, you go over to his opinion; and you do the same with Demus, +the fair young son of Pyrilampes. For you have not the power to resist +the words and ideas of your loves; and if a person were to express +surprise at the strangeness of what you say from time to time when under +their influence, you would probably reply to him, if you were honest, +that you cannot help saying what your loves say unless they are +prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. Now you must +understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you need not +wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, who +is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my +friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son +of Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but +philosophy is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are +now wondering, and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, +and either show, as I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape +punishment is not the worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word +unrefuted, by the dog the god of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that +Callicles will never be at one with himself, but that his whole life +will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I would rather that my lyre +should be inharmonious, and that there should be no music in the chorus +which I provided; aye, or that the whole world should be at odds with +me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should be at odds with +myself, and contradict myself. + +CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be +running riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way +because Polus has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused +Gorgias:--for he said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if +some one came to him who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know +justice, he would teach him justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that +he would, because he thought that mankind in general would be displeased +if he answered 'No'; and then in consequence of this admission, Gorgias +was compelled to contradict himself, that being just the sort of thing +in which you delight. Whereupon Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I +think; but now he has himself fallen into the same trap. I cannot +say very much for his wit when he conceded to you that to do is more +dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was the admission which +led to his being entangled by you; and because he was too modest to say +what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth is, Socrates, +that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are +appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not +natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at +variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say +what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your +ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of +him who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined +by the rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you +slip away to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion +about doing and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the +conventionally dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view +of nature; for by the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater +disgrace because the greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the +more disgraceful. For the suffering of injustice is not the part of a +man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he +is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other +about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of +laws are the majority who are weak; and they make laws and distribute +praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own +interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who +are able to get the better of them, in order that they may not get the +better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; +meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to have more than +his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they +are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more +than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is +called injustice (compare Republic), whereas nature herself intimates +that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more +powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well +as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice +consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. +For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father +the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but +these are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and +according to the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that +artificial law, which we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we +take the best and strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like +young lions,--charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to +them, that with equality they must be content, and that the equal is +the honourable and the just. But if there were a man who had sufficient +force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; +he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and +all our laws which are against nature: the slave would rise in rebellion +and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice would shine forth. +And this I take to be the sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, +that + +'Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;' + +this, as he says, + +'Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer +from the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them--' (Fragm. Incert. +151 (Bockh).) --I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning +is, that without buying them, and without their being given to him, he +carried off the oxen of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, +and that the oxen and other possessions of the weaker and inferior +properly belong to the stronger and superior. And this is true, as you +may ascertain, if you will leave philosophy and go on to higher things: +for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper +age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the +ruin of human life. Even if a man has good parts, still, if he carries +philosophy into later life, he is necessarily ignorant of all those +things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought to know; he is +inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language which ought +to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or public, +and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of +human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake +themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine +the politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of +philosophy. For, as Euripides says, + +'Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest +portion of the day to that in which he most excels,' (Antiope, fragm. 20 +(Dindorf).) + +but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and +praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks +that he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. +Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there +is no disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but +when he is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and +I feel towards philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate +children. For I love to see a little child, who is not of an age to +speak plainly, lisping at his play; there is an appearance of grace and +freedom in his utterance, which is natural to his childish years. But +when I hear some small creature carefully articulating its words, I am +offended; the sound is disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of +slavery. So when I hear a man lisping, or see him playing like a +child, his behaviour appears to me ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of +stripes. And I have the same feeling about students of philosophy; when +I see a youth thus engaged,--the study appears to me to be in character, +and becoming a man of liberal education, and him who neglects philosophy +I regard as an inferior man, who will never aspire to anything great +or noble. But if I see him continuing the study in later life, and not +leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; for, as I was saying, +such a one, even though he have good natural parts, becomes effeminate. +He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in which, as the +poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner for the +rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four admiring +youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory manner. +Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling +may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of +Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say +to you much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are +careless about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that you + +'Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior; +Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason +or proof, Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.' + +And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out +of good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being +thus defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but +of all those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose +that some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, +declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must +allow that you would not know what to do:--there you would stand giddy +and gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went up before +the Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for +much, you would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. +And yet, Socrates, what is the value of + + 'An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,' + +who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when +he is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies +of all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of +citizenship?--he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be +boxed on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, +and refute no more: + +'Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom. +But leave to others these niceties,' + +whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities: + +'For they will only Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.' + +Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only +the man of substance and honour, who is well to do. + +SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice +to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very +best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I +agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a +satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me. + +CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired +touchstone. + +CALLICLES: Why? + +SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the +opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For +I consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil +of the soul, he ought to have three qualities--knowledge, good-will, +outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are +unable to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are; others +are wise, but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the +same interest in me which you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and +Polus, are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are +not outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so +great that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then +the other of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the +highest moment. But you have all the qualities in which these others +are deficient, having received an excellent education; to this many +Athenians can testify. And you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I +think so? I know that you, Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and +Andron the son of Androtion, and Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, +studied together: there were four of you, and I once heard you advising +with one another as to the extent to which the pursuit of philosophy +should be carried, and, as I know, you came to the conclusion that the +study should not be pushed too much into detail. You were cautioning one +another not to be overwise; you were afraid that too much wisdom might +unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And now when I hear you +giving the same advice to me which you then gave to your most intimate +friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real good-will to me. And +of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by +yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well then, +the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me +in an argument about any point, that point will have been sufficiently +tested by us, and will not require to be submitted to any further test. +For you could not have agreed with me, either from lack of knowledge or +from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive me, for +you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you and +I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now +there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure +me for making,--What ought the character of a man to be, and what his +pursuits, and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in +youth? For be assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err +intentionally, but from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, +now that you have begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which +I am to practise, and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting +to your words, and hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call +me 'dolt,' and deem me unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once +more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you +not mean that the superior should take the property of the inferior by +force; that the better should rule the worse, the noble have more than +the mean? Am I not right in my recollection? + +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I +could not make out what you were saying at the time--whether you +meant by the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the +stronger, as you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack +small ones in accordance with natural right, because they are superior +and stronger, as though the superior and stronger and better were the +same; or whether the better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the +superior the worse, or whether better is to be defined in the same way +as superior:--this is the point which I want to have cleared up. Are the +superior and better and stronger the same or different? + +CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same. + +SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, +as you were saying, they make the laws? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class +are far better, as you were saying? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them +are by nature good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, +that justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to +suffer injustice?--is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no +modesty be found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not +think thus?--I must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree +with me I may fortify myself by the assent of so competent an authority. + +CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say. + +SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is +more disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; +so that you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when +accusing me you said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, +knowing this, was dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom +when the argument is about nature, and to nature when the argument is +about custom? + +CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, +Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over +some verbal slip? do you not see--have I not told you already, that by +superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of +slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their +physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws? + +SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must +have been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,--What +is the superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely +do not think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are +better than you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, +and tell me who the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will +ask you, great Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I +shall have to run away from you. + +CALLICLES: You are ironical. + +SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just +now saying many ironical things against me, I am not:--tell me, then, +whom you mean, by the better? + +CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no +meaning and that you are explaining nothing?--will you tell me whether +you mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom? + +CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser. + +SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to +ten thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his +subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what +I believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am +word-catching), if you allow that the one is superior to the ten +thousand? + +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be +natural justice--that the better and wiser should rule and have more +than the inferior. + +SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this +case: Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are +several of us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and +there are all sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of +strength and weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the +matter of food than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some +and not so strong as others of us--will he not, being wiser, be also +better than we are, and our superior in this matter of food? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and +drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of +them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of +a larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be +punished;--his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of +others, and if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will +have the smallest share of all, Callicles:--am I not right, my friend? + +CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other +nonsense; I am not speaking of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer +'Yes' or 'No.' + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share? + +CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks. + +SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats--the skilfullest weaver +ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go +about clothed in the best and finest of them? + +CALLICLES: Fudge about coats! + +SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have +the advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the +largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them? + +CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking? + +SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that +the wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger +share of seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land? + +CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates! + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. + +CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of +cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with +our argument. + +SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior +and wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a +suggestion, nor offer one? + +CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by +superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the +administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant +and able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want +of soul. + +SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge +against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach +me with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the +same about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better +and the superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now +you bring forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now +declared by you to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that +you would tell me, once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and +superior, and in what they are better? + +CALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and +courageous in the administration of a state--they ought to be the rulers +of their states, and justice consists in their having more than their +subjects. + +SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have +more than themselves, my friend? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think +that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required +to rule others? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'? + +SOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a +man should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own +pleasures and passions. + +CALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,--the temperate? + +SOCRATES: Certainly:--any one may know that to be my meaning. + +CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a +man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly +assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax +to the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to +their greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to +them and to satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural +justice and nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they +blame the strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, +which they desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is +base. As I have remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and +being unable to satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and +justice out of their own cowardice. For if a man had been originally +the son of a king, or had a nature capable of acquiring an empire or +a tyranny or sovereignty, what could be more truly base or evil than +temperance--to a man like him, I say, who might freely be enjoying every +good, and has no one to stand in his way, and yet has admitted custom +and reason and the opinion of other men to be lords over him?--must +not he be in a miserable plight whom the reputation of justice and +temperance hinders from giving more to his friends than to his enemies, +even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, Socrates, for you profess +to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is this:--that luxury and +intemperance and licence, if they be provided with means, are virtue and +happiness--all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements contrary to nature, +foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare Republic.) + +SOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of +approaching the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world +think, but do not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that +the true rule of human life may become manifest. Tell me, then:--you +say, do you not, that in the rightly-developed man the passions ought +not to be controlled, but that we should let them grow to the utmost and +somehow or other satisfy them, and that this is virtue? + +CALLICLES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy? + +CALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest +of all. + +SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and +indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, + +'Who knows if life be not death and death life;' + +and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at +this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb +(sema (compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is the +seat of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up +and down; and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an +Italian, playing with the word, invented a tale in which he called the +soul--because of its believing and make-believe nature--a vessel (An +untranslatable pun,--dia to pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.), +and the ignorant he called the uninitiated or leaky, and the place in +the souls of the uninitiated in which the desires are seated, being the +intemperate and incontinent part, he compared to a vessel full of holes, +because it can never be satisfied. He is not of your way of thinking, +Callicles, for he declares, that of all the souls in Hades, meaning the +invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated or leaky persons are the +most miserable, and that they pour water into a vessel which is full of +holes out of a colander which is similarly perforated. The colander, as +my informer assures me, is the soul, and the soul which he compares to +a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is likewise full of holes, +and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory and want of faith. +These notions are strange enough, but they show the principle which, if +I can, I would fain prove to you; that you should change your mind, +and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, choose that which +is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for daily needs. Do I +make any impression on you, and are you coming over to the opinion that +the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I fail to persuade +you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you continue of the +same opinion still? + +CALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth. + +SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the +same school:--Let me request you to consider how far you would accept +this as an account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in +a figure:--There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the +one man has his casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, +and a third of milk, besides others filled with other liquids, and the +streams which fill them are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them +with a great deal of toil and difficulty; but when his casks are once +filled he has no need to feed them any more, and has no further trouble +with them or care about them. The other, in like manner, can procure +streams, though not without difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and +unsound, and night and day he is compelled to be filling them, and if +he pauses for a moment, he is in an agony of pain. Such are their +respective lives:--And now would you say that the life of the +intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do I not convince you +that the opposite is the truth? + +CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled +himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now +saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he +is once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the +influx. + +SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes +must be large for the liquid to escape. + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead +man, or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be +hungering and eating? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking? + +CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about +him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them. + +SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no +shame; I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you +tell me whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have +enough of them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of +happiness? + +CALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator. + +SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and +Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you +will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. +And now, answer my question. + +CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. + +SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I +pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how +you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in +the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not +terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too +are happy, if they only get enough of what they want? + +CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics +into the argument? + +SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, +or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in +whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good +and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure +and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a +good? + +CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they +are the same. + +SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will +no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you +say what is contrary to your real opinion. + +CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would +ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is +the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which +have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others. + +CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying? + +CALLICLES: Indeed I do. + +SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the +argument? + +CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, 'I am in profound earnest.') + +SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question +for me:--There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? + +CALLICLES: There is. + +SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied +knowledge? + +CALLICLES: I was. + +SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things +different from one another? + +CALLICLES: Certainly I was. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or +not the same? + +CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, +says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage +are not the same, either with one another, or with the good. + +CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say--does he +assent to this, or not? + +SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees +himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are +opposed to each other? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and +disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be +without them both, at the same time? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:--a man may have the +complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the +same time? + +CALLICLES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of +the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of +them both together? + +CALLICLES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd? + +CALLICLES: Very. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in +turns? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by +fits? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and +their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare +Republic.) + +CALLICLES: Certainly he has. + +SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the +same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil--do we agree? Please not +to answer without consideration. + +CALLICLES: I entirely agree. + +SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.--Did you say that to +hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? + +CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is +pleasant. + +SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not +right? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful? + +CALLICLES: Yes, very. + +SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all +wants or desires are painful? + +CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more +instances. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are +thirsty, is pleasant? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word +'thirsty' implies pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the +satisfaction of the want? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: When you are thirsty? + +SOCRATES: And in pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are +simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they +not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, +whether of the soul or the body?--which of them is affected cannot be +supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true? + +CALLICLES: It is. + +SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at +the same time? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I did. + +SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the +same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the +pleasant? + +CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. + +SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. + +CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what +a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. + +SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in +drinking at the same time? + +CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying. + +GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;--we should like +to hear the argument out. + +CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of +Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. + +GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let +Socrates argue in his own fashion. + +CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling +questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. + +SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the +great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought +that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:--Does not a +man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same +moment? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not +cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, +as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the +same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a +cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and +evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, +or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another +light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you +identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present +with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were +saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good--would you +not say so? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And a foolish man too? + +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? + +SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer. + +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most--the wise or the foolish? + +CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. + +SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the +coward or the brave? + +CALLICLES: I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced +about equally. + +SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? + +CALLICLES: Greatly. + +SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their +enemies, or are the brave also pained? + +CALLICLES: Both are pained. + +SOCRATES: And are they equally pained? + +CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. + +SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure? + +CALLICLES: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the +brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal +degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish +and the cowardly are the bad? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly +equal degree? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal +degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in +having more pleasure and more pain.) + +CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean. + +SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good +because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that +pleasures were goods and pains evils? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who +rejoice--if they do rejoice? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with +them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with +them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of +the presence of evil? + +CALLICLES: I should. + +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain +evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure +and of pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy +and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has +more? + +CALLICLES: I should say that he has. + +SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our +admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and +thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow +to be good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the +evil has more of them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad +as the good, or, perhaps, even better?--is not this a further inference +which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the +good and the pleasant are the same:--can this be denied, Callicles? + +CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; +and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a +child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really +suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are +good and others bad? + +SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as +if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if +you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were +my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But +I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best +of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of +you.--Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some +pleasures are good and others evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the +hurtful are those which do some evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and +drinking, which we were just now mentioning--you mean to say that those +which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and +their opposites evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil +pains? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and +pains? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But not the evil? + +CALLICLES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all +our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;--and will you agree +with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that +all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the +good for the sake of them?--will you add a third vote to our two? + +CALLICLES: I will. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the +sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are +evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail? + +CALLICLES: He must have art. + +SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and +Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were +some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better +and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And +I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an +experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, +and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with +the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, +not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at +random and contrary to your real opinion--for you will observe that we +are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense +at all, what question can be more serious than this?--whether he should +follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what +you call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating +rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles +now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;--and +in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had +better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have +come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider +in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should +choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean? + +CALLICLES: No, I do not. + +SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I +have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such +a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that +the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, +is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, +which is good--I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me +thus far or not--do you agree? + +CALLICLES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, +and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to +Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and +not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to +the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of +action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure +never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she +devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or +calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just +preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing +pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved +what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar +processes which have to do with the soul--some of them processes of art, +making a provision for the soul's highest interest--others despising the +interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure +of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what +pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford +gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are +such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, +whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a +view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now +I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, +or whether you differ. + +CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I +shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend +Gorgias. + +SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? + +CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more. + +SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no +regard for their true interests? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind--or rather, +if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong +to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, +what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which +seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? + +CALLICLES: I assent. + +SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, +the art of playing the lyre at festivals? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic +poetry?--are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias +the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of +his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude? + +CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did +he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said +to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his +audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what +would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: That is my notion of them. + +SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august +personage--what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only +to give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and +refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word +and song truths welcome and unwelcome?--which in your judgment is her +character? + +CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face +turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were +just now describing as flattery? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm +and metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.) + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be +rhetoricians? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is +addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. +And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having +the nature of flattery. + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which +addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other +states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, +and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are +they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, +forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing +with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never +considering whether they are better or worse for this? + +CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of +the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe. + +SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two +sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the +other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the +souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome +or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; +or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, +who is he? + +CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such +among the orators who are at present living. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, +who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse +and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, +indeed, I do not know of such a man. + +CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, +and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom +you heard yourself? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, +true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and +those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to +acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of +others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and +there is an art in distinguishing them,--can you tell me of any of these +statesmen who did distinguish them? + +CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. +Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I +have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with +a view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at +random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the +shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do +not select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give +a definite form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and +compels the one part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until +he has constructed a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of +all artists, and in the same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we +spoke before, give order and regularity to the body: do you deny this? + +CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it. + +SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; +that in which there is disorder, evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that +in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and +order? + +CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions. + +SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and +order in the body? + +CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the +effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for +this as well as for the other. + +CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall +say whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer +me. 'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the +regular order of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily +excellence: is that true or not? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the +regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and +orderly:--and so we have temperance and justice: have we not? + +CALLICLES: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and +understands his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words +which he addresses to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in +what he gives and in what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant +justice in the souls of his citizens and take away injustice, to implant +temperance and take away intemperance, to implant every virtue and take +away every vice? Do you not agree? + +CALLICLES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of +a sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most +delightful food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be +really as bad for him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if +rightly estimated. Is not that true? + +CALLICLES: I will not say No to it. + +SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his +body is in an evil plight--in that case his life also is evil: am I not +right? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow +him to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to +satisfy his desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer +him to satisfy his desires at all: even you will admit that? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? +While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust +and unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to +be prevented from doing anything which does not tend to her own +improvement. + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul +than intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now +preferring? + +CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would +ask some one who does. + +SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to +subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks! + +CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only +answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias. + +SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle? + +CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself. + +SOCRATES: Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not +break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the argument +going about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little +longer, and put the head on. + +CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your +argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with +you. + +SOCRATES: But who else is willing?--I want to finish the argument. + +CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight +on, or questioning and answering yourself? + +SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'Two men spoke before, but +now one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. +And if I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all +remark that not only I but all of us should have an ambition to know +what is true and what is false in this matter, for the discovery of the +truth is a common good. And now I will proceed to argue according to my +own notion. But if any of you think that I arrive at conclusions which +are untrue you must interpose and refute me, for I do not speak from +any knowledge of what I am saying; I am an enquirer like yourselves, and +therefore, if my opponent says anything which is of force, I shall be +the first to agree with him. I am speaking on the supposition that the +argument ought to be completed; but if you think otherwise let us leave +off and go our ways. + +GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you +have completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of +the rest of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what +more you have to say. + +SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument +with Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return +for his 'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, +I hope that you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in +error. And if you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are +with me, but I shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the +tablets of my soul. + +CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on. + +SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:--Is the +pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed +about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? +or the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued +for the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which +we are pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? +To be sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when +some virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. +But the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or +creature, when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance +but as the result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to +them: Am I not right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of +each thing dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which +makes a thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is +my view. And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than +that which has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is +orderly? Of course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. +And the temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles +dear; have you any? + +CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow. + +SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is +the good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the +foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true. + +And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation +to the gods and to men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not? +Certainly he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he +will do what is just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is +holy; and he who does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very +true. And must he not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is +not to follow or to avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether +things or men or pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he +ought; and therefore, Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have +described, also just and courageous and holy, cannot be other than a +perfectly good man, nor can the good man do otherwise than well and +perfectly whatever he does; and he who does well must of necessity be +happy and blessed, and the evil man who does evil, miserable: now +this latter is he whom you were applauding--the intemperate who is +the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and these things I +affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further affirm that he +who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance and run +away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had better +order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any +of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of +punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if +he would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought +to have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both +of himself and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and +justice present with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be +unrestrained, and in the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a +robber's life. Such a one is the friend neither of God nor man, for he +is incapable of communion, and he who is incapable of communion is +also incapable of friendship. And philosophers tell us, Callicles, that +communion and friendship and orderliness and temperance and justice bind +together heaven and earth and gods and men, and that this universe is +therefore called Cosmos or order, not disorder or misrule, my friend. +But although you are a philosopher you seem to me never to have observed +that geometrical equality is mighty, both among gods and men; you think +that you ought to cultivate inequality or excess, and do not care about +geometry.--Well, then, either the principle that the happy are made +happy by the possession of justice and temperance, and the miserable +miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, if it is +granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences which I +drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was in +earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and +his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should +use his rhetoric--all those consequences are true. And that which you +thought that Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, +to do injustice, if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree +worse; and the other position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias +admitted out of modesty, that he who would truly be a rhetorician ought +to be just and have a knowledge of justice, has also turned out to be +true. + +And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next +place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that +I am unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save +them in the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another +like an outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,--he may box my +ears, which was a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or banish +me, or even do his worst and kill me; a condition which, as you say, is +the height of disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already +often repeated, but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, +Callicles, that to be boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil +which can befall a man, nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but +that to smite and slay me and mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful +and more evil; aye, and to despoil and enslave and pillage, or in any +way at all to wrong me and mine, is far more disgraceful and evil to the +doer of the wrong than to me who am the sufferer. These truths, which +have been already set forth as I state them in the previous discussion, +would seem now to have been fixed and riveted by us, if I may use an +expression which is certainly bold, in words which are like bonds of +iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more enterprising +hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what I say. +For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how these +things are, but that I have never met any one who could say otherwise, +any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my position +still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the greatest of +evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a greater +than this greatest of evils (compare Republic), in an unjust man not +suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make +a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the +greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be +that with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his +friends?--and next will come that which is unable to avert the next +greatest evil; thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest +evil; and so of other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the +honour of being able to avert them in their several degrees, and the +disgrace of not being able to avert them. Am I not right Callicles? + +CALLICLES: Yes, quite right. + +SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing +injustice and the suffering injustice--and we affirm that to do +injustice is a greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil--by what +devices can a man succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of +not doing and the other of not suffering injustice? must he have the +power, or only the will to obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man +will escape injustice if he has only the will to escape, or must he have +provided himself with the power? + +CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only +sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he +have provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied +and practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, +whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the +conclusion that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong +against their will? + +CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. + +SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in +order that we may do no injustice? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not +wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with +me; for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler +or even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. + +CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to +praise you when you talk sense. + +SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of +mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most +like to him--like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to +this? + +CALLICLES: I should. + +SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected +to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to +be perfectly friendly with him. + +CALLICLES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his +inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously +regard him as a friend. + +CALLICLES: That again is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can +have, will be one who is of the same character, and has the same +likes and dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and +subservient to him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and +no one will injure him with impunity:--is not that so? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and +formidable, this would seem to be the way--he will accustom himself, +from his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as +his master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your +friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering +injury? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very +opposite be true,--if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and +to have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much +wrong as possible, and not be punished? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he +thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not +this be the greatest evil to him? + +CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert +everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he +has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods? + +SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a +great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in +the city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will +kill him if he has a mind--the bad man will kill the good and true. + +CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing? + +SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you +think that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the +uttermost, and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger +always; like that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and +which you advise me to cultivate? + +CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too. + +SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an +art of any great pretensions? + +CALLICLES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there +are occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the +swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the +pilot, who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and +properties from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art +is modest and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of doing anything +extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given +by the pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to +Athens, or for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the utmost two +drachmae, when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger +and his wife and children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the +Piraeus,--this is the payment which he asks in return for so great a +boon; and he who is the master of the art, and has done all this, gets +out and walks about on the sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. +For he is able to reflect and is aware that he cannot tell which of his +fellow-passengers he has benefited, and which of them he has injured in +not allowing them to be drowned. He knows that they are just the same +when he has disembarked them as when they embarked, and not a whit +better either in their bodies or in their souls; and he considers that +if a man who is afflicted by great and incurable bodily diseases is only +to be pitied for having escaped, and is in no way benefited by him +in having been saved from drowning, much less he who has great and +incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, which is the more +valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of any profit to +the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the law-courts, or +any other devourer;--and so he reflects that such a one had better not +live, for he cannot live well. (Compare Republic.) + +And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not +usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind +either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, +for he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him +and the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose +style, he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and +insisting that we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no +other profession is worth thinking about; he would have plenty to say. +Nevertheless you despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an +engine-maker, and you will not allow your daughters to marry his son, +or marry your son to his daughters. And yet, on your principle, what +justice or reason is there in your refusal? What right have you to +despise the engine-maker, and the others whom I was just now mentioning? +I know that you will say, 'I am better, and better born.' But if the +better is not what I say, and virtue consists only in a man saving +himself and his, whatever may be his character, then your censure of the +engine-maker, and of the physician, and of the other arts of salvation, +is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to see that the noble and +the good may possibly be something different from saving and being +saved:--May not he who is truly a man cease to care about living a +certain time?--he knows, as women say, that no man can escape fate, +and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, and +considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term;--whether by +assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, as you at +this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to +the Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have +power in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is +for the interest of either of us;--I would not have us risk that +which is dearest on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian +enchantresses, who, as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the +risk of their own perdition. But if you suppose that any man will +show you the art of becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming +yourself to the ways of the city, whether for better or worse, then I +can only say that you are mistaken, Callides; for he who would deserve +to be the true natural friend of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of +Pyrilampes' darling who is called after them, must be by nature like +them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who will make you most like +them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and orator: for every +man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language and spirit, and +dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may be of another +mind. What do you say? + +CALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me +to be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite +convinced by them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.) + +SOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides +in your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur +to these same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be +convinced for all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two +processes of training all things, including body and soul; in the one, +as we said, we treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with +a view to the highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: +was not that the distinction which we drew? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar +flattery:--was not that another of our conclusions? + +CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it. + +SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that +which was ministered to, whether body or soul? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment +of our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as +possible? For we have already discovered that there is no use in +imparting to them any other good, unless the mind of those who are to +have the good, whether money, or office, or any other sort of power, be +gentle and good. Shall we say that? + +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set +about some public business, and were advising one another to undertake +buildings, such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought +we not to examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know +the art of building, and who taught us?--would not that be necessary, +Callicles? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we +had ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our +friends, and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if +upon consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, +and had been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only +with their assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill--in +that case prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the +construction of public works. But if we had no master to show, and only +a number of worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would +be ridiculous in us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to +undertake them. Is not this true? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I +were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to +practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would +you not ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good +health? and was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether +slave or freeman? And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if +we arrived at the conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, +man or woman, had ever been any the better for the medical skill of +either of us, then, by Heaven, Callicles, what an absurdity to +think that we or any human being should be so silly as to set up as +state-physicians and advise others like ourselves to do the same, +without having first practised in private, whether successfully or not, +and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as they say, to begin +with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art; which is a +foolish thing? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a +public character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being +one, suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, +Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever +a man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and +became by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a +man, whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, +if a person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? +Whom would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may +have been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private +person, before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer? + +CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because +I really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be +administered among us--whether, when you come to the administration of +them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have +we not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a +public man? Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for +yourself I must answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought +to effect for the benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you +the names of those whom you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and +Cimon, and Miltiades, and Themistocles, and ask whether you still think +that they were good citizens. + +CALLICLES: I do. + +SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have +made the citizens better instead of worse? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the +assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? + +CALLICLES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, 'likely' is not the word; for if he was a good +citizen, the inference is certain. + +CALLICLES: And what difference does that make? + +SOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians +are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, +to have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave +the people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in +the love of talk and money. + +CALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise +their ears. + +SOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but +well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious +and his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians--this was +during the time when they were not so good--yet afterwards, when they +had been made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they +convicted him of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the +notion that he was a malefactor. + +CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness? + +SOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses +or horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor +butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? +Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, +and made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you +say? + +CALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying 'yes.' + +SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an +animal? + +CALLICLES: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals +who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become +more just, and not more unjust? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?--or are you of +another mind? + +CALLICLES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received +them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have +been very far from desiring. + +CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you? + +SOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth. + +CALLICLES: Granted then. + +SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more +unjust and inferior? + +CALLICLES: Granted again. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman? + +CALLICLES: That is, upon your view. + +SOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take +the case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving +ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten +years? and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty +of exile; and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be +thrown into the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis. And +yet, if they had been really good men, as you say, these things would +never have happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those +who at first keep their place, and then, when they have broken-in their +horses, and themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out--that +is not the way either in charioteering or in any profession.--What do +you think? + +CALLICLES: I should think not. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that +in the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good +statesman--you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but +not true of former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they +have turned out to be no better than our present ones; and therefore, if +they were rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of +flattery, or they would not have fallen out of favour. + +CALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of +them in his performances. + +SOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the +serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more +serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify +the wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not +allowing them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, +whether of persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow +citizens, which is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do +not see that in these respects they were a whit superior to our present +statesmen, although I do admit that they were more clever at providing +ships and walls and docks, and all that. You and I have a ridiculous +way, for during the whole time that we are arguing, we are always going +round and round to the same point, and constantly misunderstanding one +another. If I am not mistaken, you have admitted and acknowledged more +than once, that there are two kinds of operations which have to do with +the body, and two which have to do with the soul: one of the two is +ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry provides food for them, and +if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if they are cold supplies them +with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that they crave. I use the same +images as before intentionally, in order that you may understand me the +better. The purveyor of the articles may provide them either wholesale +or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,--the baker, or the +cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; and in so doing, +being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself and every one +to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is another +art--an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of the +body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their +results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of +the real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All +other arts which have to do with the body are servile and menial and +illiberal; and gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their +mistresses. Now, when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, +you seem at first to know and understand and assent to my words, and +then a little while afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State +had good and noble citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, +seemingly quite in earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been +good trainers?--and you had replied, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, +who wrote the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are +ministers of the body, first-rate in their art; for the first makes +admirable loaves, the second excellent dishes, and the third capital +wine;--to me these appear to be the exact parallel of the statesmen whom +you mention. Now you would not be altogether pleased if I said to +you, My friend, you know nothing of gymnastics; those of whom you are +speaking to me are only the ministers and purveyors of luxury, who have +no good or noble notions of their art, and may very likely be filling +and fattening men's bodies and gaining their approval, although the +result is that they lose their original flesh in the long run, and +become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their +simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to their +entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the +attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the +time, and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they +could they would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the +men who have been the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, +is just what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the +citizens and satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made +the city great, not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated condition of +the State is to be attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have +filled the city full of harbours and docks and walls and revenues and +all that, and have left no room for justice and temperance. And when the +crisis of the disorder comes, the people will blame the advisers of the +hour, and applaud Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real +authors of their calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail +you and my friend Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new +acquisitions, but also their original possessions; not that you are +the authors of these misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be +accessories to them. A great piece of work is always being made, as +I see and am told, now as of old; about our statesmen. When the State +treats any of them as malefactors, I observe that there is a great +uproar and indignation at the supposed wrong which is done to them; +'after all their many services to the State, that they should unjustly +perish,'--so the tale runs. But the cry is all a lie; for no statesman +ever could be unjustly put to death by the city of which he is the head. +The case of the professed statesman is, I believe, very much like that +of the professed sophist; for the sophists, although they are wise men, +are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of folly; professing to be +teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their disciples of wronging +them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing no gratitude for +their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men who have +become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from them, +and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should act +unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything +be more irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to +be a mob-orator, because you will not answer. + +CALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one +to answer? + +SOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches +which I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But +I adjure you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether +there does not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that +you have made a man good, and then blaming him for being bad? + +CALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me. + +SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this +inconsistent manner? + +CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing? + +SOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, +and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and +nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the +city:--do you think that there is any difference between one and the +other? My good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying +to Polus, are the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy +that rhetoric is a perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; +whereas the truth is, that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric +as legislation is to the practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The +orators and sophists, as I am inclined to think, are the only class who +cannot complain of the mischief ensuing to themselves from that which +they teach others, without in the same breath accusing themselves of +having done no good to those whom they profess to benefit. Is not this a +fact? + +CALLICLES: Certainly it is. + +SOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then +they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration +to those who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been +benefited in any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run +by a trainer, he might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer +left the matter to him, and made no agreement with him that he should +receive money as soon as he had given him the utmost speed; for not +because of any deficiency of speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of +injustice. + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being +treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his +pupils, if he be really able to make them good--am I not right? (Compare +Protag.) + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a +man receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other +art? + +CALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason. + +SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, +and best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no +advice gratis is held to be dishonourable? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to +requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred +when the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true? + +CALLICLES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine +for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and +struggle to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the +servant and flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely +and fairly as you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your +entire mind. + +CALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State. + +SOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation. + +CALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, +the consequences will be-- + +SOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story--that he who likes will kill me +and get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that +he will be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will +be of no use to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly +took, and if wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully. + +CALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to +harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and +can never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be +brought by some miserable and mean person. + +SOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that +in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought +to trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain +who brings me to trial--of that I am very sure, for no good man would +accuse the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. +Shall I tell you why I anticipate this? + +CALLICLES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living +who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my +time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any +view of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what +is most pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you +recommend, I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you +might argue with me, as I was arguing with Polus:--I shall be tried +just as a physician would be tried in a court of little boys at the +indictment of the cook. What would he reply under such circumstances, +if some one were to accuse him, saying, 'O my boys, many evil things has +this man done to you: he is the death of you, especially of the younger +ones among you, cutting and burning and starving and suffocating you, +until you know not what to do; he gives you the bitterest potions, and +compels you to hunger and thirst. How unlike the variety of meats and +sweets on which I feasted you!' What do you suppose that the physician +would be able to reply when he found himself in such a predicament? If +he told the truth he could only say, 'All these evil things, my boys, I +did for your health,' and then would there not just be a clamour among a +jury like that? How they would cry out! + +CALLICLES: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply? + +CALLICLES: He certainly would. + +SOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, +if I am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse +to the people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, +although I am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of +them, are deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one +says that I corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak +evil of old men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private +or public, it is useless for me to reply, as I truly might:--'All this I +do for the sake of justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, +and to nothing else.' And therefore there is no saying what may happen +to me. + +CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus +defenceless is in a good position? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have +often acknowledged he should have--if he be his own defence, and have +never said or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; +and this has been repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of +defence. And if any one could convict me of inability to defend myself +or others after this sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was +convicted before many, or before a few, or by myself alone; and if I +died from want of ability to do so, that would indeed grieve me. But if +I died because I have no powers of flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure +that you would not find me repining at death. For no man who is not an +utter fool and coward is afraid of death itself, but he is afraid of +doing wrong. For to go to the world below having one's soul full of +injustice is the last and worst of all evils. And in proof of what I +say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell you a story. + +CALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done. + +SOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, +which I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, +but which, as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. +Homer tells us (Il.), how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire +which they inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there +existed a law respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and +still continues to be in Heaven,--that he who has lived all his life in +justice and holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the +Blessed, and dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil; +but that he who has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the house +of vengeance and punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time +of Cronos, and even quite lately in the reign of Zeus, the judgment +was given on the very day on which the men were to die; the judges +were alive, and the men were alive; and the consequence was that the +judgments were not well given. Then Pluto and the authorities from the +Islands of the Blessed came to Zeus, and said that the souls found their +way to the wrong places. Zeus said: 'I shall put a stop to this; the +judgments are not well given, because the persons who are judged have +their clothes on, for they are alive; and there are many who, having +evil souls, are apparelled in fair bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, +and, when the day of judgment arrives, numerous witnesses come forward +and testify on their behalf that they have lived righteously. The judges +are awed by them, and they themselves too have their clothes on when +judging; their eyes and ears and their whole bodies are interposed as a +veil before their own souls. All this is a hindrance to them; there are +the clothes of the judges and the clothes of the judged.--What is to be +done? I will tell you:--In the first place, I will deprive men of the +foreknowledge of death, which they possess at present: this power which +they have Prometheus has already received my orders to take from them: +in the second place, they shall be entirely stripped before they are +judged, for they shall be judged when they are dead; and the judge +too shall be naked, that is to say, dead--he with his naked soul shall +pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall die suddenly and be +deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire strewn upon +the earth--conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. I knew +all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I have made my +sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, +Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give judgment in the +meadow at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads lead, one to the +Islands of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall +judge those who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe. +And to Minos I shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of +appeal, in case either of the two others are in any doubt:--then +the judgment respecting the last journey of men will be as just as +possible.' + +From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the +following inferences:--Death, if I am right, is in the first place the +separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. +And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in +life; the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or +accident are distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or +training or both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he +was, after he is dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and +the dead man, who in life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have +flowing hair. And if he was marked with the whip and had the prints of +the scourge, or of wounds in him when he was alive, you might see the +same in the dead body; and if his limbs were broken or misshapen when +he was alive, the same appearance would be visible in the dead. And in +a word, whatever was the habit of the body during life would be +distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a great measure and +for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is equally true of +the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, all the natural +or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.--And when they +come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, he places +them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing whose the +soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, or of +some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his +soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of +perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he +is all crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, +because he has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of +all deformity and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury +and insolence and incontinence, and despatches him ignominiously to his +prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves. + +Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly +punished ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to +be made an example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, +and fear and become better. Those who are improved when they are +punished by gods and men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are +improved, as in this world so also in another, by pain and suffering; +for there is no other way in which they can be delivered from their +evil. But they who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are +incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for, as they are +incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit. +They get no good themselves, but others get good when they behold them +enduring for ever the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings +as the penalty of their sins--there they are, hanging up as examples, +in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle and a warning to +all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as I confidently +affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of him, and +any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, most, as +I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and potentates +and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and most +impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to +the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has +described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: +such were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described +Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering +everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, +as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than +those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men come from the +class of those who have power (compare Republic). And yet in that very +class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, +for where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is +a hard thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain +to this. Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be +again, at Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust +righteously; and there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, +Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also +bad, my friend. + +As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, +knows nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he +knows only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps +him as curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither +he goes and receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks with +admiration on the soul of some just one who has lived in holiness +and truth; he may have been a private man or not; and I should say, +Callicles, that he is most likely to have been a philosopher who has +done his own work, and not troubled himself with the doings of other men +in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus sends to the Islands of the Blessed. +Aeacus does the same; and they both have sceptres, and judge; but Minos +alone has a golden sceptre and is seated looking on, as Odysseus in +Homer declares that he saw him: + +'Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.' + +Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I +consider how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the +judge in that day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I +desire only to know the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when +I die, to die as well as I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort +all other men to do the same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, +I exhort you also to take part in the great combat, which is the combat +of life, and greater than every other earthly conflict. And I retort +your reproach of me, and say, that you will not be able to help yourself +when the day of trial and judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon +you; you will go before the judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he has +got you in his grip and is carrying you off, you will gape and your head +will swim round, just as mine would in the courts of this world, and +very likely some one will shamefully box you on the ears, and put upon +you any sort of insult. + +Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you +will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, +if by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now +you see that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the +Greeks of our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life +which does not profit in another world as well as in this. And of all +that has been said, nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do +injustice is more to be avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the +reality and not the appearance of virtue is to be followed above all +things, as well in public as in private life; and that when any one has +been wrong in anything, he is to be chastised, and that the next +best thing to a man being just is that he should become just, and +be chastised and punished; also that he should avoid all flattery of +himself as well as of others, of the few or of the many: and rhetoric +and any other art should be used by him, and all his actions should be +done always, with a view to justice. + +Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and +after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises +you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by +Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, +for you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you +are a really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together, +we will apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will +advise about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better +able to judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give +ourselves airs, for even on the most important subjects we are always +changing our minds; so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take the +argument as our guide, which has revealed to us that the best way of +life is to practise justice and every virtue in life and death. This way +let us go; and in this exhort all men to follow, not in the way to +which you trust and in which you exhort me to follow you; for that way, +Callicles, is nothing worth. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Gorgias, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GORGIAS *** + +***** This file should be named 1672.txt or 1672.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/7/1672/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +GORGIAS + +by Plato + + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +In several of the dialogues of Plato, doubts have arisen among his +interpreters as to which of the various subjects discussed in them is the +main thesis. The speakers have the freedom of conversation; no severe +rules of art restrict them, and sometimes we are inclined to think, with +one of the dramatis personae in the Theaetetus, that the digressions have +the greater interest. Yet in the most irregular of the dialogues there is +also a certain natural growth or unity; the beginning is not forgotten at +the end, and numerous allusions and references are interspersed, which form +the loose connecting links of the whole. We must not neglect this unity, +but neither must we attempt to confine the Platonic dialogue on the +Procrustean bed of a single idea. (Compare Introduction to the Phaedrus.) + +Two tendencies seem to have beset the interpreters of Plato in this matter. +First, they have endeavoured to hang the dialogues upon one another by the +slightest threads; and have thus been led to opposite and contradictory +assertions respecting their order and sequence. The mantle of +Schleiermacher has descended upon his successors, who have applied his +method with the most various results. The value and use of the method has +been hardly, if at all, examined either by him or them. Secondly, they +have extended almost indefinitely the scope of each separate dialogue; in +this way they think that they have escaped all difficulties, not seeing +that what they have gained in generality they have lost in truth and +distinctness. Metaphysical conceptions easily pass into one another; and +the simpler notions of antiquity, which we can only realize by an effort, +imperceptibly blend with the more familiar theories of modern philosophers. +An eye for proportion is needed (his own art of measuring) in the study of +Plato, as well as of other great artists. We may hardly admit that the +moral antithesis of good and pleasure, or the intellectual antithesis of +knowledge and opinion, being and appearance, are never far off in a +Platonic discussion. But because they are in the background, we should not +bring them into the foreground, or expect to discern them equally in all +the dialogues. + +There may be some advantage in drawing out a little the main outlines of +the building; but the use of this is limited, and may be easily +exaggerated. We may give Plato too much system, and alter the natural form +and connection of his thoughts. Under the idea that his dialogues are +finished works of art, we may find a reason for everything, and lose the +highest characteristic of art, which is simplicity. Most great works +receive a new light from a new and original mind. But whether these new +lights are true or only suggestive, will depend on their agreement with the +spirit of Plato, and the amount of direct evidence which can be urged in +support of them. When a theory is running away with us, criticism does a +friendly office in counselling moderation, and recalling us to the +indications of the text. + +Like the Phaedrus, the Gorgias has puzzled students of Plato by the +appearance of two or more subjects. Under the cover of rhetoric higher +themes are introduced; the argument expands into a general view of the good +and evil of man. After making an ineffectual attempt to obtain a sound +definition of his art from Gorgias, Socrates assumes the existence of a +universal art of flattery or simulation having several branches:--this is +the genus of which rhetoric is only one, and not the highest species. To +flattery is opposed the true and noble art of life which he who possesses +seeks always to impart to others, and which at last triumphs, if not here, +at any rate in another world. These two aspects of life and knowledge +appear to be the two leading ideas of the dialogue. The true and the false +in individuals and states, in the treatment of the soul as well as of the +body, are conceived under the forms of true and false art. In the +development of this opposition there arise various other questions, such as +the two famous paradoxes of Socrates (paradoxes as they are to the world in +general, ideals as they may be more worthily called): (1) that to do is +worse than to suffer evil; and (2) that when a man has done evil he had +better be punished than unpunished; to which may be added (3) a third +Socratic paradox or ideal, that bad men do what they think best, but not +what they desire, for the desire of all is towards the good. That pleasure +is to be distinguished from good is proved by the simultaneousness of +pleasure and pain, and by the possibility of the bad having in certain +cases pleasures as great as those of the good, or even greater. Not merely +rhetoricians, but poets, musicians, and other artists, the whole tribe of +statesmen, past as well as present, are included in the class of +flatterers. The true and false finally appear before the judgment-seat of +the gods below. + +The dialogue naturally falls into three divisions, to which the three +characters of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles respectively correspond; and +the form and manner change with the stages of the argument. Socrates is +deferential towards Gorgias, playful and yet cutting in dealing with the +youthful Polus, ironical and sarcastic in his encounter with Callicles. In +the first division the question is asked--What is rhetoric? To this there +is no answer given, for Gorgias is soon made to contradict himself by +Socrates, and the argument is transferred to the hands of his disciple +Polus, who rushes to the defence of his master. The answer has at last to +be given by Socrates himself, but before he can even explain his meaning to +Polus, he must enlighten him upon the great subject of shams or flatteries. +When Polus finds his favourite art reduced to the level of cookery, he +replies that at any rate rhetoricians, like despots, have great power. +Socrates denies that they have any real power, and hence arise the three +paradoxes already mentioned. Although they are strange to him, Polus is at +last convinced of their truth; at least, they seem to him to follow +legitimately from the premises. Thus the second act of the dialogue +closes. Then Callicles appears on the scene, at first maintaining that +pleasure is good, and that might is right, and that law is nothing but the +combination of the many weak against the few strong. When he is confuted +he withdraws from the argument, and leaves Socrates to arrive at the +conclusion by himself. The conclusion is that there are two kinds of +statesmanship, a higher and a lower--that which makes the people better, +and that which only flatters them, and he exhorts Callicles to choose the +higher. The dialogue terminates with a mythus of a final judgment, in +which there will be no more flattery or disguise, and no further use for +the teaching of rhetoric. + +The characters of the three interlocutors also correspond to the parts +which are assigned to them. Gorgias is the great rhetorician, now advanced +in years, who goes from city to city displaying his talents, and is +celebrated throughout Greece. Like all the Sophists in the dialogues of +Plato, he is vain and boastful, yet he has also a certain dignity, and is +treated by Socrates with considerable respect. But he is no match for him +in dialectics. Although he has been teaching rhetoric all his life, he is +still incapable of defining his own art. When his ideas begin to clear up, +he is unwilling to admit that rhetoric can be wholly separated from justice +and injustice, and this lingering sentiment of morality, or regard for +public opinion, enables Socrates to detect him in a contradiction. Like +Protagoras, he is described as of a generous nature; he expresses his +approbation of Socrates' manner of approaching a question; he is quite 'one +of Socrates' sort, ready to be refuted as well as to refute,' and very +eager that Callicles and Socrates should have the game out. He knows by +experience that rhetoric exercises great influence over other men, but he +is unable to explain the puzzle how rhetoric can teach everything and know +nothing. + +Polus is an impetuous youth, a runaway 'colt,' as Socrates describes him, +who wanted originally to have taken the place of Gorgias under the pretext +that the old man was tired, and now avails himself of the earliest +opportunity to enter the lists. He is said to be the author of a work on +rhetoric, and is again mentioned in the Phaedrus, as the inventor of +balanced or double forms of speech (compare Gorg.; Symp.). At first he is +violent and ill-mannered, and is angry at seeing his master overthrown. +But in the judicious hands of Socrates he is soon restored to good-humour, +and compelled to assent to the required conclusion. Like Gorgias, he is +overthrown because he compromises; he is unwilling to say that to do is +fairer or more honourable than to suffer injustice. Though he is +fascinated by the power of rhetoric, and dazzled by the splendour of +success, he is not insensible to higher arguments. Plato may have felt +that there would be an incongruity in a youth maintaining the cause of +injustice against the world. He has never heard the other side of the +question, and he listens to the paradoxes, as they appear to him, of +Socrates with evident astonishment. He can hardly understand the meaning +of Archelaus being miserable, or of rhetoric being only useful in self- +accusation. When the argument with him has fairly run out, + +Callicles, in whose house they are assembled, is introduced on the stage: +he is with difficulty convinced that Socrates is in earnest; for if these +things are true, then, as he says with real emotion, the foundations of +society are upside down. In him another type of character is represented; +he is neither sophist nor philosopher, but man of the world, and an +accomplished Athenian gentleman. He might be described in modern language +as a cynic or materialist, a lover of power and also of pleasure, and +unscrupulous in his means of attaining both. There is no desire on his +part to offer any compromise in the interests of morality; nor is any +concession made by him. Like Thrasymachus in the Republic, though he is +not of the same weak and vulgar class, he consistently maintains that might +is right. His great motive of action is political ambition; in this he is +characteristically Greek. Like Anytus in the Meno, he is the enemy of the +Sophists; but favours the new art of rhetoric, which he regards as an +excellent weapon of attack and defence. He is a despiser of mankind as he +is of philosophy, and sees in the laws of the state only a violation of the +order of nature, which intended that the stronger should govern the weaker +(compare Republic). Like other men of the world who are of a speculative +turn of mind, he generalizes the bad side of human nature, and has easily +brought down his principles to his practice. Philosophy and poetry alike +supply him with distinctions suited to his view of human life. He has a +good will to Socrates, whose talents he evidently admires, while he +censures the puerile use which he makes of them. He expresses a keen +intellectual interest in the argument. Like Anytus, again, he has a +sympathy with other men of the world; the Athenian statesmen of a former +generation, who showed no weakness and made no mistakes, such as Miltiades, +Themistocles, Pericles, are his favourites. His ideal of human character +is a man of great passions and great powers, which he has developed to the +utmost, and which he uses in his own enjoyment and in the government of +others. Had Critias been the name instead of Callicles, about whom we know +nothing from other sources, the opinions of the man would have seemed to +reflect the history of his life. + +And now the combat deepens. In Callicles, far more than in any sophist or +rhetorician, is concentrated the spirit of evil against which Socrates is +contending, the spirit of the world, the spirit of the many contending +against the one wise man, of which the Sophists, as he describes them in +the Republic, are the imitators rather than the authors, being themselves +carried away by the great tide of public opinion. Socrates approaches his +antagonist warily from a distance, with a sort of irony which touches with +a light hand both his personal vices (probably in allusion to some scandal +of the day) and his servility to the populace. At the same time, he is in +most profound earnest, as Chaerephon remarks. Callicles soon loses his +temper, but the more he is irritated, the more provoking and matter of fact +does Socrates become. A repartee of his which appears to have been really +made to the 'omniscient' Hippias, according to the testimony of Xenophon +(Mem.), is introduced. He is called by Callicles a popular declaimer, and +certainly shows that he has the power, in the words of Gorgias, of being +'as long as he pleases,' or 'as short as he pleases' (compare Protag.). +Callicles exhibits great ability in defending himself and attacking +Socrates, whom he accuses of trifling and word-splitting; he is scandalized +that the legitimate consequences of his own argument should be stated in +plain terms; after the manner of men of the world, he wishes to preserve +the decencies of life. But he cannot consistently maintain the bad sense +of words; and getting confused between the abstract notions of better, +superior, stronger, he is easily turned round by Socrates, and only induced +to continue the argument by the authority of Gorgias. Once, when Socrates +is describing the manner in which the ambitious citizen has to identify +himself with the people, he partially recognizes the truth of his words. + +The Socrates of the Gorgias may be compared with the Socrates of the +Protagoras and Meno. As in other dialogues, he is the enemy of the +Sophists and rhetoricians; and also of the statesmen, whom he regards as +another variety of the same species. His behaviour is governed by that of +his opponents; the least forwardness or egotism on their part is met by a +corresponding irony on the part of Socrates. He must speak, for philosophy +will not allow him to be silent. He is indeed more ironical and provoking +than in any other of Plato's writings: for he is 'fooled to the top of his +bent' by the worldliness of Callicles. But he is also more deeply in +earnest. He rises higher than even in the Phaedo and Crito: at first +enveloping his moral convictions in a cloud of dust and dialectics, he ends +by losing his method, his life, himself, in them. As in the Protagoras and +Phaedrus, throwing aside the veil of irony, he makes a speech, but, true to +his character, not until his adversary has refused to answer any more +questions. The presentiment of his own fate is hanging over him. He is +aware that Socrates, the single real teacher of politics, as he ventures to +call himself, cannot safely go to war with the whole world, and that in the +courts of earth he will be condemned. But he will be justified in the +world below. Then the position of Socrates and Callicles will be reversed; +all those things 'unfit for ears polite' which Callicles has prophesied as +likely to happen to him in this life, the insulting language, the box on +the ears, will recoil upon his assailant. (Compare Republic, and the +similar reversal of the position of the lawyer and the philosopher in the +Theaetetus). + +There is an interesting allusion to his own behaviour at the trial of the +generals after the battle of Arginusae, which he ironically attributes to +his ignorance of the manner in which a vote of the assembly should be +taken. This is said to have happened 'last year' (B.C. 406), and therefore +the assumed date of the dialogue has been fixed at 405 B.C., when Socrates +would already have been an old man. The date is clearly marked, but is +scarcely reconcilable with another indication of time, viz. the 'recent' +usurpation of Archelaus, which occurred in the year 413; and still less +with the 'recent' death of Pericles, who really died twenty-four years +previously (429 B.C.) and is afterwards reckoned among the statesmen of a +past age; or with the mention of Nicias, who died in 413, and is +nevertheless spoken of as a living witness. But we shall hereafter have +reason to observe, that although there is a general consistency of times +and persons in the Dialogues of Plato, a precise dramatic date is an +invention of his commentators (Preface to Republic). + +The conclusion of the Dialogue is remarkable, (1) for the truly +characteristic declaration of Socrates that he is ignorant of the true +nature and bearing of these things, while he affirms at the same time that +no one can maintain any other view without being ridiculous. The +profession of ignorance reminds us of the earlier and more exclusively +Socratic Dialogues. But neither in them, nor in the Apology, nor in the +Memorabilia of Xenophon, does Socrates express any doubt of the fundamental +truths of morality. He evidently regards this 'among the multitude of +questions' which agitate human life 'as the principle which alone remains +unshaken.' He does not insist here, any more than in the Phaedo, on the +literal truth of the myth, but only on the soundness of the doctrine which +is contained in it, that doing wrong is worse than suffering, and that a +man should be rather than seem; for the next best thing to a man's being +just is that he should be corrected and become just; also that he should +avoid all flattery, whether of himself or of others; and that rhetoric +should be employed for the maintenance of the right only. The revelation +of another life is a recapitulation of the argument in a figure. + +(2) Socrates makes the singular remark, that he is himself the only true +politician of his age. In other passages, especially in the Apology, he +disclaims being a politician at all. There he is convinced that he or any +other good man who attempted to resist the popular will would be put to +death before he had done any good to himself or others. Here he +anticipates such a fate for himself, from the fact that he is 'the only man +of the present day who performs his public duties at all.' The two points +of view are not really inconsistent, but the difference between them is +worth noticing: Socrates is and is not a public man. Not in the ordinary +sense, like Alcibiades or Pericles, but in a higher one; and this will +sooner or later entail the same consequences on him. He cannot be a +private man if he would; neither can he separate morals from politics. Nor +is he unwilling to be a politician, although he foresees the dangers which +await him; but he must first become a better and wiser man, for he as well +as Callicles is in a state of perplexity and uncertainty. And yet there is +an inconsistency: for should not Socrates too have taught the citizens +better than to put him to death? + +And now, as he himself says, we will 'resume the argument from the +beginning.' + +Socrates, who is attended by his inseparable disciple, Chaerephon, meets +Callicles in the streets of Athens. He is informed that he has just missed +an exhibition of Gorgias, which he regrets, because he was desirous, not of +hearing Gorgias display his rhetoric, but of interrogating him concerning +the nature of his art. Callicles proposes that they shall go with him to +his own house, where Gorgias is staying. There they find the great +rhetorician and his younger friend and disciple Polus. + +SOCRATES: Put the question to him, Chaerephon. + +CHAEREPHON: What question? + +SOCRATES: Who is he?--such a question as would elicit from a man the +answer, 'I am a cobbler.' + +Polus suggests that Gorgias may be tired, and desires to answer for him. +'Who is Gorgias?' asks Chaerephon, imitating the manner of his master +Socrates. 'One of the best of men, and a proficient in the best and +noblest of experimental arts,' etc., replies Polus, in rhetorical and +balanced phrases. Socrates is dissatisfied at the length and unmeaningness +of the answer; he tells the disconcerted volunteer that he has mistaken the +quality for the nature of the art, and remarks to Gorgias, that Polus has +learnt how to make a speech, but not how to answer a question. He wishes +that Gorgias would answer him. Gorgias is willing enough, and replies to +the question asked by Chaerephon,--that he is a rhetorician, and in Homeric +language, 'boasts himself to be a good one.' At the request of Socrates he +promises to be brief; for 'he can be as long as he pleases, and as short as +he pleases.' Socrates would have him bestow his length on others, and +proceeds to ask him a number of questions, which are answered by him to his +own great satisfaction, and with a brevity which excites the admiration of +Socrates. The result of the discussion may be summed up as follows:-- + +Rhetoric treats of discourse; but music and medicine, and other particular +arts, are also concerned with discourse; in what way then does rhetoric +differ from them? Gorgias draws a distinction between the arts which deal +with words, and the arts which have to do with external actions. Socrates +extends this distinction further, and divides all productive arts into two +classes: (1) arts which may be carried on in silence; and (2) arts which +have to do with words, or in which words are coextensive with action, such +as arithmetic, geometry, rhetoric. But still Gorgias could hardly have +meant to say that arithmetic was the same as rhetoric. Even in the arts +which are concerned with words there are differences. What then +distinguishes rhetoric from the other arts which have to do with words? +'The words which rhetoric uses relate to the best and greatest of human +things.' But tell me, Gorgias, what are the best? 'Health first, beauty +next, wealth third,' in the words of the old song, or how would you rank +them? The arts will come to you in a body, each claiming precedence and +saying that her own good is superior to that of the rest--How will you +choose between them? 'I should say, Socrates, that the art of persuasion, +which gives freedom to all men, and to individuals power in the state, is +the greatest good.' But what is the exact nature of this persuasion?--is +the persevering retort: You could not describe Zeuxis as a painter, or +even as a painter of figures, if there were other painters of figures; +neither can you define rhetoric simply as an art of persuasion, because +there are other arts which persuade, such as arithmetic, which is an art of +persuasion about odd and even numbers. Gorgias is made to see the +necessity of a further limitation, and he now defines rhetoric as the art +of persuading in the law courts, and in the assembly, about the just and +unjust. But still there are two sorts of persuasion: one which gives +knowledge, and another which gives belief without knowledge; and knowledge +is always true, but belief may be either true or false,--there is therefore +a further question: which of the two sorts of persuasion does rhetoric +effect in courts of law and assemblies? Plainly that which gives belief +and not that which gives knowledge; for no one can impart a real knowledge +of such matters to a crowd of persons in a few minutes. And there is +another point to be considered:--when the assembly meets to advise about +walls or docks or military expeditions, the rhetorician is not taken into +counsel, but the architect, or the general. How would Gorgias explain this +phenomenon? All who intend to become disciples, of whom there are several +in the company, and not Socrates only, are eagerly asking:--About what then +will rhetoric teach us to persuade or advise the state? + +Gorgias illustrates the nature of rhetoric by adducing the example of +Themistocles, who persuaded the Athenians to build their docks and walls, +and of Pericles, whom Socrates himself has heard speaking about the middle +wall of the Piraeus. He adds that he has exercised a similar power over +the patients of his brother Herodicus. He could be chosen a physician by +the assembly if he pleased, for no physician could compete with a +rhetorician in popularity and influence. He could persuade the multitude +of anything by the power of his rhetoric; not that the rhetorician ought to +abuse this power any more than a boxer should abuse the art of self- +defence. Rhetoric is a good thing, but, like all good things, may be +unlawfully used. Neither is the teacher of the art to be deemed unjust +because his pupils are unjust and make a bad use of the lessons which they +have learned from him. + +Socrates would like to know before he replies, whether Gorgias will quarrel +with him if he points out a slight inconsistency into which he has fallen, +or whether he, like himself, is one who loves to be refuted. Gorgias +declares that he is quite one of his sort, but fears that the argument may +be tedious to the company. The company cheer, and Chaerephon and Callicles +exhort them to proceed. Socrates gently points out the supposed +inconsistency into which Gorgias appears to have fallen, and which he is +inclined to think may arise out of a misapprehension of his own. The +rhetorician has been declared by Gorgias to be more persuasive to the +ignorant than the physician, or any other expert. And he is said to be +ignorant, and this ignorance of his is regarded by Gorgias as a happy +condition, for he has escaped the trouble of learning. But is he as +ignorant of just and unjust as he is of medicine or building? Gorgias is +compelled to admit that if he did not know them previously he must learn +them from his teacher as a part of the art of rhetoric. But he who has +learned carpentry is a carpenter, and he who has learned music is a +musician, and he who has learned justice is just. The rhetorician then +must be a just man, and rhetoric is a just thing. But Gorgias has already +admitted the opposite of this, viz. that rhetoric may be abused, and that +the rhetorician may act unjustly. How is the inconsistency to be +explained? + +The fallacy of this argument is twofold; for in the first place, a man may +know justice and not be just--here is the old confusion of the arts and the +virtues;--nor can any teacher be expected to counteract wholly the bent of +natural character; and secondly, a man may have a degree of justice, but +not sufficient to prevent him from ever doing wrong. Polus is naturally +exasperated at the sophism, which he is unable to detect; of course, he +says, the rhetorician, like every one else, will admit that he knows +justice (how can he do otherwise when pressed by the interrogations of +Socrates?), but he thinks that great want of manners is shown in bringing +the argument to such a pass. Socrates ironically replies, that when old +men trip, the young set them on their legs again; and he is quite willing +to retract, if he can be shown to be in error, but upon one condition, +which is that Polus studies brevity. Polus is in great indignation at not +being allowed to use as many words as he pleases in the free state of +Athens. Socrates retorts, that yet harder will be his own case, if he is +compelled to stay and listen to them. After some altercation they agree +(compare Protag.), that Polus shall ask and Socrates answer. + +'What is the art of Rhetoric?' says Polus. Not an art at all, replies +Socrates, but a thing which in your book you affirm to have created art. +Polus asks, 'What thing?' and Socrates answers, An experience or routine of +making a sort of delight or gratification. 'But is not rhetoric a fine +thing?' I have not yet told you what rhetoric is. Will you ask me another +question--What is cookery? 'What is cookery?' An experience or routine of +making a sort of delight or gratification. Then they are the same, or +rather fall under the same class, and rhetoric has still to be +distinguished from cookery. 'What is rhetoric?' asks Polus once more. A +part of a not very creditable whole, which may be termed flattery, is the +reply. 'But what part?' A shadow of a part of politics. This, as might +be expected, is wholly unintelligible, both to Gorgias and Polus; and, in +order to explain his meaning to them, Socrates draws a distinction between +shadows or appearances and realities; e.g. there is real health of body or +soul, and the appearance of them; real arts and sciences, and the +simulations of them. Now the soul and body have two arts waiting upon +them, first the art of politics, which attends on the soul, having a +legislative part and a judicial part; and another art attending on the +body, which has no generic name, but may also be described as having two +divisions, one of which is medicine and the other gymnastic. Corresponding +with these four arts or sciences there are four shams or simulations of +them, mere experiences, as they may be termed, because they give no reason +of their own existence. The art of dressing up is the sham or simulation +of gymnastic, the art of cookery, of medicine; rhetoric is the simulation +of justice, and sophistic of legislation. They may be summed up in an +arithmetical formula:-- + +Tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine :: sophistic : legislation. + +And, + +Cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : the art of justice. + +And this is the true scheme of them, but when measured only by the +gratification which they procure, they become jumbled together and return +to their aboriginal chaos. Socrates apologizes for the length of his +speech, which was necessary to the explanation of the subject, and begs +Polus not unnecessarily to retaliate on him. + +'Do you mean to say that the rhetoricians are esteemed flatterers?' They +are not esteemed at all. 'Why, have they not great power, and can they not +do whatever they desire?' They have no power, and they only do what they +think best, and never what they desire; for they never attain the true +object of desire, which is the good. 'As if you, Socrates, would not envy +the possessor of despotic power, who can imprison, exile, kill any one whom +he pleases.' But Socrates replies that he has no wish to put any one to +death; he who kills another, even justly, is not to be envied, and he who +kills him unjustly is to be pitied; it is better to suffer than to do +injustice. He does not consider that going about with a dagger and putting +men out of the way, or setting a house on fire, is real power. To this +Polus assents, on the ground that such acts would be punished, but he is +still of opinion that evil-doers, if they are unpunished, may be happy +enough. He instances Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, the usurper of +Macedonia. Does not Socrates think him happy?--Socrates would like to know +more about him; he cannot pronounce even the great king to be happy, unless +he knows his mental and moral condition. Polus explains that Archelaus was +a slave, being the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas, brother of +Perdiccas king of Macedon--and he, by every species of crime, first +murdering his uncle and then his cousin and half-brother, obtained the +kingdom. This was very wicked, and yet all the world, including Socrates, +would like to have his place. Socrates dismisses the appeal to numbers; +Polus, if he will, may summon all the rich men of Athens, Nicias and his +brothers, Aristocrates, the house of Pericles, or any other great family-- +this is the kind of evidence which is adduced in courts of justice, where +truth depends upon numbers. But Socrates employs proof of another sort; +his appeal is to one witness only,--that is to say, the person with whom he +is speaking; him he will convict out of his own mouth. And he is prepared +to show, after his manner, that Archelaus cannot be a wicked man and yet +happy. + +The evil-doer is deemed happy if he escapes, and miserable if he suffers +punishment; but Socrates thinks him less miserable if he suffers than if he +escapes. Polus is of opinion that such a paradox as this hardly deserves +refutation, and is at any rate sufficiently refuted by the fact. Socrates +has only to compare the lot of the successful tyrant who is the envy of the +world, and of the wretch who, having been detected in a criminal attempt +against the state, is crucified or burnt to death. Socrates replies, that +if they are both criminal they are both miserable, but that the unpunished +is the more miserable of the two. At this Polus laughs outright, which +leads Socrates to remark that laughter is a new species of refutation. +Polus replies, that he is already refuted; for if he will take the votes of +the company, he will find that no one agrees with him. To this Socrates +rejoins, that he is not a public man, and (referring to his own conduct at +the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae) is unable to take +the suffrages of any company, as he had shown on a recent occasion; he can +only deal with one witness at a time, and that is the person with whom he +is arguing. But he is certain that in the opinion of any man to do is +worse than to suffer evil. + +Polus, though he will not admit this, is ready to acknowledge that to do +evil is considered the more foul or dishonourable of the two. But what is +fair and what is foul; whether the terms are applied to bodies, colours, +figures, laws, habits, studies, must they not be defined with reference to +pleasure and utility? Polus assents to this latter doctrine, and is easily +persuaded that the fouler of two things must exceed either in pain or in +hurt. But the doing cannot exceed the suffering of evil in pain, and +therefore must exceed in hurt. Thus doing is proved by the testimony of +Polus himself to be worse or more hurtful than suffering. + +There remains the other question: Is a guilty man better off when he is +punished or when he is unpunished? Socrates replies, that what is done +justly is suffered justly: if the act is just, the effect is just; if to +punish is just, to be punished is just, and therefore fair, and therefore +beneficent; and the benefit is that the soul is improved. There are three +evils from which a man may suffer, and which affect him in estate, body, +and soul;--these are, poverty, disease, injustice; and the foulest of these +is injustice, the evil of the soul, because that brings the greatest hurt. +And there are three arts which heal these evils--trading, medicine, +justice--and the fairest of these is justice. Happy is he who has never +committed injustice, and happy in the second degree he who has been healed +by punishment. And therefore the criminal should himself go to the judge +as he would to the physician, and purge away his crime. Rhetoric will +enable him to display his guilt in proper colours, and to sustain himself +and others in enduring the necessary penalty. And similarly if a man has +an enemy, he will desire not to punish him, but that he shall go unpunished +and become worse and worse, taking care only that he does no injury to +himself. These are at least conceivable uses of the art, and no others +have been discovered by us. + +Here Callicles, who has been listening in silent amazement, asks Chaerephon +whether Socrates is in earnest, and on receiving the assurance that he is, +proceeds to ask the same question of Socrates himself. For if such +doctrines are true, life must have been turned upside down, and all of us +are doing the opposite of what we ought to be doing. + +Socrates replies in a style of playful irony, that before men can +understand one another they must have some common feeling. And such a +community of feeling exists between himself and Callicles, for both of them +are lovers, and they have both a pair of loves; the beloved of Callicles +are the Athenian Demos and Demos the son of Pyrilampes; the beloved of +Socrates are Alcibiades and philosophy. The peculiarity of Callicles is +that he can never contradict his loves; he changes as his Demos changes in +all his opinions; he watches the countenance of both his loves, and repeats +their sentiments, and if any one is surprised at his sayings and doings, +the explanation of them is, that he is not a free agent, but must always be +imitating his two loves. And this is the explanation of Socrates' +peculiarities also. He is always repeating what his mistress, Philosophy, +is saying to him, who unlike his other love, Alcibiades, is ever the same, +ever true. Callicles must refute her, or he will never be at unity with +himself; and discord in life is far worse than the discord of musical +sounds. + +Callicles answers, that Gorgias was overthrown because, as Polus said, in +compliance with popular prejudice he had admitted that if his pupil did not +know justice the rhetorician must teach him; and Polus has been similarly +entangled, because his modesty led him to admit that to suffer is more +honourable than to do injustice. By custom 'yes,' but not by nature, says +Callicles. And Socrates is always playing between the two points of view, +and putting one in the place of the other. In this very argument, what +Polus only meant in a conventional sense has been affirmed by him to be a +law of nature. For convention says that 'injustice is dishonourable,' but +nature says that 'might is right.' And we are always taming down the +nobler spirits among us to the conventional level. But sometimes a great +man will rise up and reassert his original rights, trampling under foot all +our formularies, and then the light of natural justice shines forth. +Pindar says, 'Law, the king of all, does violence with high hand;' as is +indeed proved by the example of Heracles, who drove off the oxen of Geryon +and never paid for them. + +This is the truth, Socrates, as you will be convinced, if you leave +philosophy and pass on to the real business of life. A little philosophy +is an excellent thing; too much is the ruin of a man. He who has not +'passed his metaphysics' before he has grown up to manhood will never know +the world. Philosophers are ridiculous when they take to politics, and I +dare say that politicians are equally ridiculous when they take to +philosophy: 'Every man,' as Euripides says, 'is fondest of that in which +he is best.' Philosophy is graceful in youth, like the lisp of infancy, +and should be cultivated as a part of education; but when a grown-up man +lisps or studies philosophy, I should like to beat him. None of those +over-refined natures ever come to any good; they avoid the busy haunts of +men, and skulk in corners, whispering to a few admiring youths, and never +giving utterance to any noble sentiments. + +For you, Socrates, I have a regard, and therefore I say to you, as Zethus +says to Amphion in the play, that you have 'a noble soul disguised in a +puerile exterior.' And I would have you consider the danger which you and +other philosophers incur. For you would not know how to defend yourself if +any one accused you in a law-court,--there you would stand, with gaping +mouth and dizzy brain, and might be murdered, robbed, boxed on the ears +with impunity. Take my advice, then, and get a little common sense; leave +to others these frivolities; walk in the ways of the wealthy and be wise. + +Socrates professes to have found in Callicles the philosopher's touchstone; +and he is certain that any opinion in which they both agree must be the +very truth. Callicles has all the three qualities which are needed in a +critic--knowledge, good-will, frankness; Gorgias and Polus, although +learned men, were too modest, and their modesty made them contradict +themselves. But Callicles is well-educated; and he is not too modest to +speak out (of this he has already given proof), and his good-will is shown +both by his own profession and by his giving the same caution against +philosophy to Socrates, which Socrates remembers hearing him give long ago +to his own clique of friends. He will pledge himself to retract any error +into which he may have fallen, and which Callicles may point out. But he +would like to know first of all what he and Pindar mean by natural justice. +Do they suppose that the rule of justice is the rule of the stronger or of +the better?' 'There is no difference.' Then are not the many superior to +the one, and the opinions of the many better? And their opinion is that +justice is equality, and that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer +wrong. And as they are the superior or stronger, this opinion of theirs +must be in accordance with natural as well as conventional justice. 'Why +will you continue splitting words? Have I not told you that the superior +is the better?' But what do you mean by the better? Tell me that, and +please to be a little milder in your language, if you do not wish to drive +me away. 'I mean the worthier, the wiser.' You mean to say that one man +of sense ought to rule over ten thousand fools? 'Yes, that is my meaning.' +Ought the physician then to have a larger share of meats and drinks? or the +weaver to have more coats, or the cobbler larger shoes, or the farmer more +seed? 'You are always saying the same things, Socrates.' Yes, and on the +same subjects too; but you are never saying the same things. For, first, +you defined the superior to be the stronger, and then the wiser, and now +something else;--what DO you mean? 'I mean men of political ability, who +ought to govern and to have more than the governed.' Than themselves? +'What do you mean?' I mean to say that every man is his own governor. 'I +see that you mean those dolts, the temperate. But my doctrine is, that a +man should let his desires grow, and take the means of satisfying them. To +the many this is impossible, and therefore they combine to prevent him. +But if he is a king, and has power, how base would he be in submitting to +them! To invite the common herd to be lord over him, when he might have +the enjoyment of all things! For the truth is, Socrates, that luxury and +self-indulgence are virtue and happiness; all the rest is mere talk.' + +Socrates compliments Callicles on his frankness in saying what other men +only think. According to his view, those who want nothing are not happy. +'Why,' says Callicles, 'if they were, stones and the dead would be happy.' +Socrates in reply is led into a half-serious, half-comic vein of +reflection. 'Who knows,' as Euripides says, 'whether life may not be +death, and death life?' Nay, there are philosophers who maintain that even +in life we are dead, and that the body (soma) is the tomb (sema) of the +soul. And some ingenious Sicilian has made an allegory, in which he +represents fools as the uninitiated, who are supposed to be carrying water +to a vessel, which is full of holes, in a similarly holey sieve, and this +sieve is their own soul. The idea is fanciful, but nevertheless is a +figure of a truth which I want to make you acknowledge, viz. that the life +of contentment is better than the life of indulgence. Are you disposed to +admit that? 'Far otherwise.' Then hear another parable. The life of +self-contentment and self-indulgence may be represented respectively by two +men, who are filling jars with streams of wine, honey, milk,--the jars of +the one are sound, and the jars of the other leaky; the first fils his +jars, and has no more trouble with them; the second is always filling them, +and would suffer extreme misery if he desisted. Are you of the same +opinion still? 'Yes, Socrates, and the figure expresses what I mean. For +true pleasure is a perpetual stream, flowing in and flowing out. To be +hungry and always eating, to be thirsty and always drinking, and to have +all the other desires and to satisfy them, that, as I admit, is my idea of +happiness.' And to be itching and always scratching? 'I do not deny that +there may be happiness even in that.' And to indulge unnatural desires, if +they are abundantly satisfied? Callicles is indignant at the introduction +of such topics. But he is reminded by Socrates that they are introduced, +not by him, but by the maintainer of the identity of pleasure and good. +Will Callicles still maintain this? 'Yes, for the sake of consistency, he +will.' The answer does not satisfy Socrates, who fears that he is losing +his touchstone. A profession of seriousness on the part of Callicles +reassures him, and they proceed with the argument. Pleasure and good are +the same, but knowledge and courage are not the same either with pleasure +or good, or with one another. Socrates disproves the first of these +statements by showing that two opposites cannot coexist, but must alternate +with one another--to be well and ill together is impossible. But pleasure +and pain are simultaneous, and the cessation of them is simultaneous; e.g. +in the case of drinking and thirsting, whereas good and evil are not +simultaneous, and do not cease simultaneously, and therefore pleasure +cannot be the same as good. + +Callicles has already lost his temper, and can only be persuaded to go on +by the interposition of Gorgias. Socrates, having already guarded against +objections by distinguishing courage and knowledge from pleasure and good, +proceeds:--The good are good by the presence of good, and the bad are bad +by the presence of evil. And the brave and wise are good, and the cowardly +and foolish are bad. And he who feels pleasure is good, and he who feels +pain is bad, and both feel pleasure and pain in nearly the same degree, and +sometimes the bad man or coward in a greater degree. Therefore the bad man +or coward is as good as the brave or may be even better. + +Callicles endeavours now to avert the inevitable absurdity by affirming +that he and all mankind admitted some pleasures to be good and others bad. +The good are the beneficial, and the bad are the hurtful, and we should +choose the one and avoid the other. But this, as Socrates observes, is a +return to the old doctrine of himself and Polus, that all things should be +done for the sake of the good. + +Callicles assents to this, and Socrates, finding that they are agreed in +distinguishing pleasure from good, returns to his old division of empirical +habits, or shams, or flatteries, which study pleasure only, and the arts +which are concerned with the higher interests of soul and body. Does +Callicles agree to this division? Callicles will agree to anything, in +order that he may get through the argument. Which of the arts then are +flatteries? Flute-playing, harp-playing, choral exhibitions, the +dithyrambics of Cinesias are all equally condemned on the ground that they +give pleasure only; and Meles the harp-player, who was the father of +Cinesias, failed even in that. The stately muse of Tragedy is bent upon +pleasure, and not upon improvement. Poetry in general is only a rhetorical +address to a mixed audience of men, women, and children. And the orators +are very far from speaking with a view to what is best; their way is to +humour the assembly as if they were children. + +Callicles replies, that this is only true of some of them; others have a +real regard for their fellow-citizens. Granted; then there are two species +of oratory; the one a flattery, another which has a real regard for the +citizens. But where are the orators among whom you find the latter? +Callicles admits that there are none remaining, but there were such in the +days when Themistocles, Cimon, Miltiades, and the great Pericles were still +alive. Socrates replies that none of these were true artists, setting +before themselves the duty of bringing order out of disorder. The good man +and true orator has a settled design, running through his life, to which he +conforms all his words and actions; he desires to implant justice and +eradicate injustice, to implant all virtue and eradicate all vice in the +minds of his citizens. He is the physician who will not allow the sick man +to indulge his appetites with a variety of meats and drinks, but insists on +his exercising self-restraint. And this is good for the soul, and better +than the unrestrained indulgence which Callicles was recently approving. + +Here Callicles, who had been with difficulty brought to this point, turns +restive, and suggests that Socrates shall answer his own questions. +'Then,' says Socrates, 'one man must do for two;' and though he had hoped +to have given Callicles an 'Amphion' in return for his 'Zethus,' he is +willing to proceed; at the same time, he hopes that Callicles will correct +him, if he falls into error. He recapitulates the advantages which he has +already won:-- + +The pleasant is not the same as the good--Callicles and I are agreed about +that,--but pleasure is to be pursued for the sake of the good, and the good +is that of which the presence makes us good; we and all things good have +acquired some virtue or other. And virtue, whether of body or soul, of +things or persons, is not attained by accident, but is due to order and +harmonious arrangement. And the soul which has order is better than the +soul which is without order, and is therefore temperate and is therefore +good, and the intemperate is bad. And he who is temperate is also just and +brave and pious, and has attained the perfection of goodness and therefore +of happiness, and the intemperate whom you approve is the opposite of all +this and is wretched. He therefore who would be happy must pursue +temperance and avoid intemperance, and if possible escape the necessity of +punishment, but if he have done wrong he must endure punishment. In this +way states and individuals should seek to attain harmony, which, as the +wise tell us, is the bond of heaven and earth, of gods and men. Callicles +has never discovered the power of geometrical proportion in both worlds; he +would have men aim at disproportion and excess. But if he be wrong in +this, and if self-control is the true secret of happiness, then the paradox +is true that the only use of rhetoric is in self-accusation, and Polus was +right in saying that to do wrong is worse than to suffer wrong, and Gorgias +was right in saying that the rhetorician must be a just man. And you were +wrong in taunting me with my defenceless condition, and in saying that I +might be accused or put to death or boxed on the ears with impunity. For I +may repeat once more, that to strike is worse than to be stricken--to do +than to suffer. What I said then is now made fast in adamantine bonds. I +myself know not the true nature of these things, but I know that no one can +deny my words and not be ridiculous. To do wrong is the greatest of evils, +and to suffer wrong is the next greatest evil. He who would avoid the last +must be a ruler, or the friend of a ruler; and to be the friend he must be +the equal of the ruler, and must also resemble him. Under his protection +he will suffer no evil, but will he also do no evil? Nay, will he not +rather do all the evil which he can and escape? And in this way the +greatest of all evils will befall him. 'But this imitator of the tyrant,' +rejoins Callicles, 'will kill any one who does not similarly imitate him.' +Socrates replies that he is not deaf, and that he has heard that repeated +many times, and can only reply, that a bad man will kill a good one. 'Yes, +and that is the provoking thing.' Not provoking to a man of sense who is +not studying the arts which will preserve him from danger; and this, as you +say, is the use of rhetoric in courts of justice. But how many other arts +are there which also save men from death, and are yet quite humble in their +pretensions--such as the art of swimming, or the art of the pilot? Does +not the pilot do men at least as much service as the rhetorician, and yet +for the voyage from Aegina to Athens he does not charge more than two +obols, and when he disembarks is quite unassuming in his demeanour? The +reason is that he is not certain whether he has done his passengers any +good in saving them from death, if one of them is diseased in body, and +still more if he is diseased in mind--who can say? The engineer too will +often save whole cities, and yet you despise him, and would not allow your +son to marry his daughter, or his son to marry yours. But what reason is +there in this? For if virtue only means the saving of life, whether your +own or another's, you have no right to despise him or any practiser of +saving arts. But is not virtue something different from saving and being +saved? I would have you rather consider whether you ought not to disregard +length of life, and think only how you can live best, leaving all besides +to the will of Heaven. For you must not expect to have influence either +with the Athenian Demos or with Demos the son of Pyrilampes, unless you +become like them. What do you say to this? + +'There is some truth in what you are saying, but I do not entirely believe +you.' + +That is because you are in love with Demos. But let us have a little more +conversation. You remember the two processes--one which was directed to +pleasure, the other which was directed to making men as good as possible. +And those who have the care of the city should make the citizens as good as +possible. But who would undertake a public building, if he had never had a +teacher of the art of building, and had never constructed a building +before? or who would undertake the duty of state-physician, if he had never +cured either himself or any one else? Should we not examine him before we +entrusted him with the office? And as Callicles is about to enter public +life, should we not examine him? Whom has he made better? For we have +already admitted that this is the statesman's proper business. And we must +ask the same question about Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and +Themistocles. Whom did they make better? Nay, did not Pericles make the +citizens worse? For he gave them pay, and at first he was very popular +with them, but at last they condemned him to death. Yet surely he would be +a bad tamer of animals who, having received them gentle, taught them to +kick and butt, and man is an animal; and Pericles who had the charge of man +only made him wilder, and more savage and unjust, and therefore he could +not have been a good statesman. The same tale might be repeated about +Cimon, Themistocles, Miltiades. But the charioteer who keeps his seat at +first is not thrown out when he gains greater experience and skill. The +inference is, that the statesman of a past age were no better than those of +our own. They may have been cleverer constructors of docks and harbours, +but they did not improve the character of the citizens. I have told you +again and again (and I purposely use the same images) that the soul, like +the body, may be treated in two ways--there is the meaner and the higher +art. You seemed to understand what I said at the time, but when I ask you +who were the really good statesmen, you answer--as if I asked you who were +the good trainers, and you answered, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, the +author of the Sicilian cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner. And you would +be affronted if I told you that these are a parcel of cooks who make men +fat only to make them thin. And those whom they have fattened applaud +them, instead of finding fault with them, and lay the blame of their +subsequent disorders on their physicians. In this respect, Callicles, you +are like them; you applaud the statesmen of old, who pandered to the vices +of the citizens, and filled the city with docks and harbours, but neglected +virtue and justice. And when the fit of illness comes, the citizens who in +like manner applauded Themistocles, Pericles, and others, will lay hold of +you and my friend Alcibiades, and you will suffer for the misdeeds of your +predecessors. The old story is always being repeated--'after all his +services, the ungrateful city banished him, or condemned him to death.' As +if the statesman should not have taught the city better! He surely cannot +blame the state for having unjustly used him, any more than the sophist or +teacher can find fault with his pupils if they cheat him. And the sophist +and orator are in the same case; although you admire rhetoric and despise +sophistic, whereas sophistic is really the higher of the two. The teacher +of the arts takes money, but the teacher of virtue or politics takes no +money, because this is the only kind of service which makes the disciple +desirous of requiting his teacher. + +Socrates concludes by finally asking, to which of the two modes of serving +the state Callicles invites him:--'to the inferior and ministerial one,' is +the ingenuous reply. That is the only way of avoiding death, replies +Socrates; and he has heard often enough, and would rather not hear again, +that the bad man will kill the good. But he thinks that such a fate is +very likely reserved for him, because he remarks that he is the only person +who teaches the true art of politics. And very probably, as in the case +which he described to Polus, he may be the physician who is tried by a jury +of children. He cannot say that he has procured the citizens any pleasure, +and if any one charges him with perplexing them, or with reviling their +elders, he will not be able to make them understand that he has only been +actuated by a desire for their good. And therefore there is no saying what +his fate may be. 'And do you think that a man who is unable to help +himself is in a good condition?' Yes, Callicles, if he have the true self- +help, which is never to have said or done any wrong to himself or others. +If I had not this kind of self-help, I should be ashamed; but if I die for +want of your flattering rhetoric, I shall die in peace. For death is no +evil, but to go to the world below laden with offences is the worst of +evils. In proof of which I will tell you a tale:-- + +Under the rule of Cronos, men were judged on the day of their death, and +when judgment had been given upon them they departed--the good to the +islands of the blest, the bad to the house of vengeance. But as they were +still living, and had their clothes on at the time when they were being +judged, there was favouritism, and Zeus, when he came to the throne, was +obliged to alter the mode of procedure, and try them after death, having +first sent down Prometheus to take away from them the foreknowledge of +death. Minos, Rhadamanthus, and Aeacus were appointed to be the judges; +Rhadamanthus for Asia, Aeacus for Europe, and Minos was to hold the court +of appeal. Now death is the separation of soul and body, but after death +soul and body alike retain their characteristics; the fat man, the dandy, +the branded slave, are all distinguishable. Some prince or potentate, +perhaps even the great king himself, appears before Rhadamanthus, and he +instantly detects him, though he knows not who he is; he sees the scars of +perjury and iniquity, and sends him away to the house of torment. + +For there are two classes of souls who undergo punishment--the curable and +the incurable. The curable are those who are benefited by their +punishment; the incurable are such as Archelaus, who benefit others by +becoming a warning to them. The latter class are generally kings and +potentates; meaner persons, happily for themselves, have not the same power +of doing injustice. Sisyphus and Tityus, not Thersites, are supposed by +Homer to be undergoing everlasting punishment. Not that there is anything +to prevent a great man from being a good one, as is shown by the famous +example of Aristeides, the son of Lysimachus. But to Rhadamanthus the +souls are only known as good or bad; they are stripped of their dignities +and preferments; he despatches the bad to Tartarus, labelled either as +curable or incurable, and looks with love and admiration on the soul of +some just one, whom he sends to the islands of the blest. Similar is the +practice of Aeacus; and Minos overlooks them, holding a golden sceptre, as +Odysseus in Homer saw him + +'Wielding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.' + +My wish for myself and my fellow-men is, that we may present our souls +undefiled to the judge in that day; my desire in life is to be able to meet +death. And I exhort you, and retort upon you the reproach which you cast +upon me,--that you will stand before the judge, gaping, and with dizzy +brain, and any one may box you on the ear, and do you all manner of evil. + +Perhaps you think that this is an old wives' fable. But you, who are the +three wisest men in Hellas, have nothing better to say, and no one will +ever show that to do is better than to suffer evil. A man should study to +be, and not merely to seem. If he is bad, he should become good, and avoid +all flattery, whether of the many or of the few. + +Follow me, then; and if you are looked down upon, that will do you no harm. +And when we have practised virtue, we will betake ourselves to politics, +but not until we are delivered from the shameful state of ignorance and +uncertainty in which we are at present. Let us follow in the way of virtue +and justice, and not in the way to which you, Callicles, invite us; for +that way is nothing worth. + +We will now consider in order some of the principal points of the dialogue. +Having regard (1) to the age of Plato and the ironical character of his +writings, we may compare him with himself, and with other great teachers, +and we may note in passing the objections of his critics. And then (2) +casting one eye upon him, we may cast another upon ourselves, and endeavour +to draw out the great lessons which he teaches for all time, stripped of +the accidental form in which they are enveloped. + +(1) In the Gorgias, as in nearly all the other dialogues of Plato, we are +made aware that formal logic has as yet no existence. The old difficulty +of framing a definition recurs. The illusive analogy of the arts and the +virtues also continues. The ambiguity of several words, such as nature, +custom, the honourable, the good, is not cleared up. The Sophists are +still floundering about the distinction of the real and seeming. Figures +of speech are made the basis of arguments. The possibility of conceiving a +universal art or science, which admits of application to a particular +subject-matter, is a difficulty which remains unsolved, and has not +altogether ceased to haunt the world at the present day (compare +Charmides). The defect of clearness is also apparent in Socrates himself, +unless we suppose him to be practising on the simplicity of his opponent, +or rather perhaps trying an experiment in dialectics. Nothing can be more +fallacious than the contradiction which he pretends to have discovered in +the answers of Gorgias (see above). The advantages which he gains over +Polus are also due to a false antithesis of pleasure and good, and to an +erroneous assertion that an agent and a patient may be described by similar +predicates;--a mistake which Aristotle partly shares and partly corrects in +the Nicomachean Ethics. Traces of a 'robust sophistry' are likewise +discernible in his argument with Callicles. + +(2) Although Socrates professes to be convinced by reason only, yet the +argument is often a sort of dialectical fiction, by which he conducts +himself and others to his own ideal of life and action. And we may +sometimes wish that we could have suggested answers to his antagonists, or +pointed out to them the rocks which lay concealed under the ambiguous terms +good, pleasure, and the like. But it would be as useless to examine his +arguments by the requirements of modern logic, as to criticise this ideal +from a merely utilitarian point of view. If we say that the ideal is +generally regarded as unattainable, and that mankind will by no means agree +in thinking that the criminal is happier when punished than when +unpunished, any more than they would agree to the stoical paradox that a +man may be happy on the rack, Plato has already admitted that the world is +against him. Neither does he mean to say that Archelaus is tormented by +the stings of conscience; or that the sensations of the impaled criminal +are more agreeable than those of the tyrant drowned in luxurious enjoyment. +Neither is he speaking, as in the Protagoras, of virtue as a calculation of +pleasure, an opinion which he afterwards repudiates in the Phaedo. What +then is his meaning? His meaning we shall be able to illustrate best by +parallel notions, which, whether justifiable by logic or not, have always +existed among mankind. We must remind the reader that Socrates himself +implies that he will be understood or appreciated by very few. + +He is speaking not of the consciousness of happiness, but of the idea of +happiness. When a martyr dies in a good cause, when a soldier falls in +battle, we do not suppose that death or wounds are without pain, or that +their physical suffering is always compensated by a mental satisfaction. +Still we regard them as happy, and we would a thousand times rather have +their death than a shameful life. Nor is this only because we believe that +they will obtain an immortality of fame, or that they will have crowns of +glory in another world, when their enemies and persecutors will be +proportionably tormented. Men are found in a few instances to do what is +right, without reference to public opinion or to consequences. And we +regard them as happy on this ground only, much as Socrates' friends in the +opening of the Phaedo are described as regarding him; or as was said of +another, 'they looked upon his face as upon the face of an angel.' We are +not concerned to justify this idealism by the standard of utility or public +opinion, but merely to point out the existence of such a sentiment in the +better part of human nature. + +The idealism of Plato is founded upon this sentiment. He would maintain +that in some sense or other truth and right are alone to be sought, and +that all other goods are only desirable as means towards these. He is +thought to have erred in 'considering the agent only, and making no +reference to the happiness of others, as affected by him.' But the +happiness of others or of mankind, if regarded as an end, is really quite +as ideal and almost as paradoxical to the common understanding as Plato's +conception of happiness. For the greatest happiness of the greatest number +may mean also the greatest pain of the individual which will procure the +greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Ideas of utility, like those of +duty and right, may be pushed to unpleasant consequences. Nor can Plato in +the Gorgias be deemed purely self-regarding, considering that Socrates +expressly mentions the duty of imparting the truth when discovered to +others. Nor must we forget that the side of ethics which regards others is +by the ancients merged in politics. Both in Plato and Aristotle, as well +as in the Stoics, the social principle, though taking another form, is +really far more prominent than in most modern treatises on ethics. + +The idealizing of suffering is one of the conceptions which have exercised +the greatest influence on mankind. Into the theological import of this, or +into the consideration of the errors to which the idea may have given rise, +we need not now enter. All will agree that the ideal of the Divine +Sufferer, whose words the world would not receive, the man of sorrows of +whom the Hebrew prophets spoke, has sunk deep into the heart of the human +race. It is a similar picture of suffering goodness which Plato desires to +pourtray, not without an allusion to the fate of his master Socrates. He +is convinced that, somehow or other, such an one must be happy in life or +after death. In the Republic, he endeavours to show that his happiness +would be assured here in a well-ordered state. But in the actual condition +of human things the wise and good are weak and miserable; such an one is +like a man fallen among wild beasts, exposed to every sort of wrong and +obloquy. + +Plato, like other philosophers, is thus led on to the conclusion, that if +'the ways of God' to man are to be 'justified,' the hopes of another life +must be included. If the question could have been put to him, whether a +man dying in torments was happy still, even if, as he suggests in the +Apology, 'death be only a long sleep,' we can hardly tell what would have +been his answer. There have been a few, who, quite independently of +rewards and punishments or of posthumous reputation, or any other influence +of public opinion, have been willing to sacrifice their lives for the good +of others. It is difficult to say how far in such cases an unconscious +hope of a future life, or a general faith in the victory of good in the +world, may have supported the sufferers. But this extreme idealism is not +in accordance with the spirit of Plato. He supposes a day of retribution, +in which the good are to be rewarded and the wicked punished. Though, as +he says in the Phaedo, no man of sense will maintain that the details of +the stories about another world are true, he will insist that something of +the kind is true, and will frame his life with a view to this unknown +future. Even in the Republic he introduces a future life as an +afterthought, when the superior happiness of the just has been established +on what is thought to be an immutable foundation. At the same time he +makes a point of determining his main thesis independently of remoter +consequences. + +(3) Plato's theory of punishment is partly vindictive, partly corrective. +In the Gorgias, as well as in the Phaedo and Republic, a few great +criminals, chiefly tyrants, are reserved as examples. But most men have +never had the opportunity of attaining this pre-eminence of evil. They are +not incurable, and their punishment is intended for their improvement. +They are to suffer because they have sinned; like sick men, they must go to +the physician and be healed. On this representation of Plato's the +criticism has been made, that the analogy of disease and injustice is +partial only, and that suffering, instead of improving men, may have just +the opposite effect. + +Like the general analogy of the arts and the virtues, the analogy of +disease and injustice, or of medicine and justice, is certainly imperfect. +But ideas must be given through something; the nature of the mind which is +unseen can only be represented under figures derived from visible objects. +If these figures are suggestive of some new aspect under which the mind may +be considered, we cannot find fault with them for not exactly coinciding +with the ideas represented. They partake of the imperfect nature of +language, and must not be construed in too strict a manner. That Plato +sometimes reasons from them as if they were not figures but realities, is +due to the defective logical analysis of his age. + +Nor does he distinguish between the suffering which improves and the +suffering which only punishes and deters. He applies to the sphere of +ethics a conception of punishment which is really derived from criminal +law. He does not see that such punishment is only negative, and supplies +no principle of moral growth or development. He is not far off the higher +notion of an education of man to be begun in this world, and to be +continued in other stages of existence, which is further developed in the +Republic. And Christian thinkers, who have ventured out of the beaten +track in their meditations on the 'last things,' have found a ray of light +in his writings. But he has not explained how or in what way punishment is +to contribute to the improvement of mankind. He has not followed out the +principle which he affirms in the Republic, that 'God is the author of evil +only with a view to good,' and that 'they were the better for being +punished.' Still his doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments +may be compared favourably with that perversion of Christian doctrine which +makes the everlasting punishment of human beings depend on a brief moment +of time, or even on the accident of an accident. And he has escaped the +difficulty which has often beset divines, respecting the future destiny of +the meaner sort of men (Thersites and the like), who are neither very good +nor very bad, by not counting them worthy of eternal damnation. + +We do Plato violence in pressing his figures of speech or chains of +argument; and not less so in asking questions which were beyond the horizon +of his vision, or did not come within the scope of his design. The main +purpose of the Gorgias is not to answer questions about a future world, but +to place in antagonism the true and false life, and to contrast the +judgments and opinions of men with judgment according to the truth. Plato +may be accused of representing a superhuman or transcendental virtue in the +description of the just man in the Gorgias, or in the companion portrait of +the philosopher in the Theaetetus; and at the same time may be thought to +be condemning a state of the world which always has existed and always will +exist among men. But such ideals act powerfully on the imagination of +mankind. And such condemnations are not mere paradoxes of philosophers, +but the natural rebellion of the higher sense of right in man against the +ordinary conditions of human life. The greatest statesmen have fallen very +far short of the political ideal, and are therefore justly involved in the +general condemnation. + +Subordinate to the main purpose of the dialogue are some other questions, +which may be briefly considered:-- + +a. The antithesis of good and pleasure, which as in other dialogues is +supposed to consist in the permanent nature of the one compared with the +transient and relative nature of the other. Good and pleasure, knowledge +and sense, truth and opinion, essence and generation, virtue and pleasure, +the real and the apparent, the infinite and finite, harmony or beauty and +discord, dialectic and rhetoric or poetry, are so many pairs of opposites, +which in Plato easily pass into one another, and are seldom kept perfectly +distinct. And we must not forget that Plato's conception of pleasure is +the Heracleitean flux transferred to the sphere of human conduct. There is +some degree of unfairness in opposing the principle of good, which is +objective, to the principle of pleasure, which is subjective. For the +assertion of the permanence of good is only based on the assumption of its +objective character. Had Plato fixed his mind, not on the ideal nature of +good, but on the subjective consciousness of happiness, that would have +been found to be as transient and precarious as pleasure. + +b. The arts or sciences, when pursued without any view to truth, or the +improvement of human life, are called flatteries. They are all alike +dependent upon the opinion of mankind, from which they are derived. To +Plato the whole world appears to be sunk in error, based on self-interest. +To this is opposed the one wise man hardly professing to have found truth, +yet strong in the conviction that a virtuous life is the only good, whether +regarded with reference to this world or to another. Statesmen, Sophists, +rhetoricians, poets, are alike brought up for judgment. They are the +parodies of wise men, and their arts are the parodies of true arts and +sciences. All that they call science is merely the result of that study of +the tempers of the Great Beast, which he describes in the Republic. + +c. Various other points of contact naturally suggest themselves between +the Gorgias and other dialogues, especially the Republic, the Philebus, and +the Protagoras. There are closer resemblances both of spirit and language +in the Republic than in any other dialogue, the verbal similarity tending +to show that they were written at the same period of Plato's life. For the +Republic supplies that education and training of which the Gorgias suggests +the necessity. The theory of the many weak combining against the few +strong in the formation of society (which is indeed a partial truth), is +similar in both of them, and is expressed in nearly the same language. The +sufferings and fate of the just man, the powerlessness of evil, and the +reversal of the situation in another life, are also points of similarity. +The poets, like the rhetoricians, are condemned because they aim at +pleasure only, as in the Republic they are expelled the State, because they +are imitators, and minister to the weaker side of human nature. That +poetry is akin to rhetoric may be compared with the analogous notion, which +occurs in the Protagoras, that the ancient poets were the Sophists of their +day. In some other respects the Protagoras rather offers a contrast than a +parallel. The character of Protagoras may be compared with that of +Gorgias, but the conception of happiness is different in the two dialogues; +being described in the former, according to the old Socratic notion, as +deferred or accumulated pleasure, while in the Gorgias, and in the Phaedo, +pleasure and good are distinctly opposed. + +This opposition is carried out from a speculative point of view in the +Philebus. There neither pleasure nor wisdom are allowed to be the chief +good, but pleasure and good are not so completely opposed as in the +Gorgias. For innocent pleasures, and such as have no antecedent pains, are +allowed to rank in the class of goods. The allusion to Gorgias' definition +of rhetoric (Philebus; compare Gorg.), as the art of persuasion, of all +arts the best, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of their +own free will--marks a close and perhaps designed connection between the +two dialogues. In both the ideas of measure, order, harmony, are the +connecting links between the beautiful and the good. + +In general spirit and character, that is, in irony and antagonism to public +opinion, the Gorgias most nearly resembles the Apology, Crito, and portions +of the Republic, and like the Philebus, though from another point of view, +may be thought to stand in the same relation to Plato's theory of morals +which the Theaetetus bears to his theory of knowledge. + +d. A few minor points still remain to be summed up: (1) The extravagant +irony in the reason which is assigned for the pilot's modest charge; and in +the proposed use of rhetoric as an instrument of self-condemnation; and in +the mighty power of geometrical equality in both worlds. (2) The reference +of the mythus to the previous discussion should not be overlooked: the +fate reserved for incurable criminals such as Archelaus; the retaliation of +the box on the ears; the nakedness of the souls and of the judges who are +stript of the clothes or disguises which rhetoric and public opinion have +hitherto provided for them (compare Swift's notion that the universe is a +suit of clothes, Tale of a Tub). The fiction seems to have involved Plato +in the necessity of supposing that the soul retained a sort of corporeal +likeness after death. (3) The appeal of the authority of Homer, who says +that Odysseus saw Minos in his court 'holding a golden sceptre,' which +gives verisimilitude to the tale. + +It is scarcely necessary to repeat that Plato is playing 'both sides of the +game,' and that in criticising the characters of Gorgias and Polus, we are +not passing any judgment on historical individuals, but only attempting to +analyze the 'dramatis personae' as they were conceived by him. Neither is +it necessary to enlarge upon the obvious fact that Plato is a dramatic +writer, whose real opinions cannot always be assumed to be those which he +puts into the mouth of Socrates, or any other speaker who appears to have +the best of the argument; or to repeat the observation that he is a poet as +well as a philosopher; or to remark that he is not to be tried by a modern +standard, but interpreted with reference to his place in the history of +thought and the opinion of his time. + +It has been said that the most characteristic feature of the Gorgias is the +assertion of the right of dissent, or private judgment. But this mode of +stating the question is really opposed both to the spirit of Plato and of +ancient philosophy generally. For Plato is not asserting any abstract +right or duty of toleration, or advantage to be derived from freedom of +thought; indeed, in some other parts of his writings (e.g. Laws), he has +fairly laid himself open to the charge of intolerance. No speculations had +as yet arisen respecting the 'liberty of prophesying;' and Plato is not +affirming any abstract right of this nature: but he is asserting the duty +and right of the one wise and true man to dissent from the folly and +falsehood of the many. At the same time he acknowledges the natural +result, which he hardly seeks to avert, that he who speaks the truth to a +multitude, regardless of consequences, will probably share the fate of +Socrates. + +... + +The irony of Plato sometimes veils from us the height of idealism to which +he soars. When declaring truths which the many will not receive, he puts +on an armour which cannot be pierced by them. The weapons of ridicule are +taken out of their hands and the laugh is turned against themselves. The +disguises which Socrates assumes are like the parables of the New +Testament, or the oracles of the Delphian God; they half conceal, half +reveal, his meaning. The more he is in earnest, the more ironical he +becomes; and he is never more in earnest or more ironical than in the +Gorgias. He hardly troubles himself to answer seriously the objections of +Gorgias and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to be careless of the +ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest sense he is always +logical and consistent with himself. The form of the argument may be +paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher reason. He is +uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all ages the words of +philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found the world unprepared +for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of the wildness of his +humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but by the rest of mankind, +to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At length he makes even Polus +in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument, and heedless any longer of the +forms of dialectic, he loses himself in a sort of triumph, while at the +same time he retaliates upon his adversaries. From this confusion of jest +and earnest, we may now return to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple +form the main theses of the dialogue. + +First Thesis:-- + +It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice. + +Compare the New Testament-- + +'It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.'--1 Pet. + +And the Sermon on the Mount-- + +'Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake.'--Matt. + +The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but they +equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous may +suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had no reward, +would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by Polus, is +ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is dishonourable, +and for their own sakes men are willing to punish the offender (compare +Republic). But they are not equally willing to acknowledge that injustice, +even if successful, is essentially evil, and has the nature of disease and +death. Especially when crimes are committed on the great scale--the crimes +of tyrants, ancient or modern--after a while, seeing that they cannot be +undone, and have become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive +them, not from any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are +blunted by time, and 'to forgive is convenient to them.' The tangle of +good and evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the +end cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out +of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant +now and always; though he is surrounded by his satellites, and has the +applauses of Europe and Asia ringing in his ears; though he is the +civilizer or liberator of half a continent, he is, and always will be, the +most miserable of men. The greatest consequences for good or for evil +cannot alter a hair's breadth the morality of actions which are right or +wrong in themselves. This is the standard which Socrates holds up to us. +Because politics, and perhaps human life generally, are of a mixed nature +we must not allow our principles to sink to the level of our practice. + +And so of private individuals--to them, too, the world occasionally speaks +of the consequences of their actions:--if they are lovers of pleasure, they +will ruin their health; if they are false or dishonest, they will lose +their character. But Socrates would speak to them, not of what will be, +but of what is--of the present consequence of lowering and degrading the +soul. And all higher natures, or perhaps all men everywhere, if they were +not tempted by interest or passion, would agree with him--they would rather +be the victims than the perpetrators of an act of treachery or of tyranny. +Reason tells them that death comes sooner or later to all, and is not so +great an evil as an unworthy life, or rather, if rightly regarded, not an +evil at all, but to a good man the greatest good. For in all of us there +are slumbering ideals of truth and right, which may at any time awaken and +develop a new life in us. + +Second Thesis:-- + +It is better to suffer for wrong doing than not to suffer. + +There might have been a condition of human life in which the penalty +followed at once, and was proportioned to the offence. Moral evil would +then be scarcely distinguishable from physical; mankind would avoid vice as +they avoid pain or death. But nature, with a view of deepening and +enlarging our characters, has for the most part hidden from us the +consequences of our actions, and we can only foresee them by an effort of +reflection. To awaken in us this habit of reflection is the business of +early education, which is continued in maturer years by observation and +experience. The spoilt child is in later life said to be unfortunate--he +had better have suffered when he was young, and been saved from suffering +afterwards. But is not the sovereign equally unfortunate whose education +and manner of life are always concealing from him the consequences of his +own actions, until at length they are revealed to him in some terrible +downfall, which may, perhaps, have been caused not by his own fault? +Another illustration is afforded by the pauper and criminal classes, who +scarcely reflect at all, except on the means by which they can compass +their immediate ends. We pity them, and make allowances for them; but we +do not consider that the same principle applies to human actions generally. +Not to have been found out in some dishonesty or folly, regarded from a +moral or religious point of view, is the greatest of misfortunes. The +success of our evil doings is a proof that the gods have ceased to strive +with us, and have given us over to ourselves. There is nothing to remind +us of our sins, and therefore nothing to correct them. Like our sorrows, +they are healed by time; + +'While rank corruption, mining all within, +Infects unseen.' + +The 'accustomed irony' of Socrates adds a corollary to the argument:-- +'Would you punish your enemy, you should allow him to escape unpunished'-- +this is the true retaliation. (Compare the obscure verse of Proverbs, +'Therefore if thine enemy hunger, feed him,' etc., quoted in Romans.) + +Men are not in the habit of dwelling upon the dark side of their own lives: +they do not easily see themselves as others see them. They are very kind +and very blind to their own faults; the rhetoric of self-love is always +pleading with them on their own behalf. Adopting a similar figure of +speech, Socrates would have them use rhetoric, not in defence but in +accusation of themselves. As they are guided by feeling rather than by +reason, to their feelings the appeal must be made. They must speak to +themselves; they must argue with themselves; they must paint in eloquent +words the character of their own evil deeds. To any suffering which they +have deserved, they must persuade themselves to submit. Under the figure +there lurks a real thought, which, expressed in another form, admits of an +easy application to ourselves. For do not we too accuse as well as excuse +ourselves? And we call to our aid the rhetoric of prayer and preaching, +which the mind silently employs while the struggle between the better and +the worse is going on within us. And sometimes we are too hard upon +ourselves, because we want to restore the balance which self-love has +overthrown or disturbed; and then again we may hear a voice as of a parent +consoling us. In religious diaries a sort of drama is often enacted by the +consciences of men 'accusing or else excusing them.' For all our life long +we are talking with ourselves:--What is thought but speech? What is +feeling but rhetoric? And if rhetoric is used on one side only we shall be +always in danger of being deceived. And so the words of Socrates, which at +first sounded paradoxical, come home to the experience of all of us. + +Third Thesis:-- + +We do not what we will, but what we wish. + +Socrates would teach us a lesson which we are slow to learn--that good +intentions, and even benevolent actions, when they are not prompted by +wisdom, are of no value. We believe something to be for our good which we +afterwards find out not to be for our good. The consequences may be +inevitable, for they may follow an invariable law, yet they may often be +the very opposite of what is expected by us. When we increase pauperism by +almsgiving; when we tie up property without regard to changes of +circumstances; when we say hastily what we deliberately disapprove; when we +do in a moment of passion what upon reflection we regret; when from any +want of self-control we give another an advantage over us--we are doing not +what we will, but what we wish. All actions of which the consequences are +not weighed and foreseen, are of this impotent and paralytic sort; and the +author of them has 'the least possible power' while seeming to have the +greatest. For he is actually bringing about the reverse of what he +intended. And yet the book of nature is open to him, in which he who runs +may read if he will exercise ordinary attention; every day offers him +experiences of his own and of other men's characters, and he passes them +unheeded by. The contemplation of the consequences of actions, and the +ignorance of men in regard to them, seems to have led Socrates to his +famous thesis:--'Virtue is knowledge;' which is not so much an error or +paradox as a half truth, seen first in the twilight of ethical philosophy, +but also the half of the truth which is especially needed in the present +age. For as the world has grown older men have been too apt to imagine a +right and wrong apart from consequences; while a few, on the other hand, +have sought to resolve them wholly into their consequences. But Socrates, +or Plato for him, neither divides nor identifies them; though the time has +not yet arrived either for utilitarian or transcendental systems of moral +philosophy, he recognizes the two elements which seem to lie at the basis +of morality. (Compare the following: 'Now, and for us, it is a time to +Hellenize and to praise knowing; for we have Hebraized too much and have +overvalued doing. But the habits and discipline received from Hebraism +remain for our race an eternal possession. And as humanity is constituted, +one must never assign the second rank to-day without being ready to restore +them to the first to-morrow.' Sir William W. Hunter, Preface to Orissa.) + +Fourth Thesis:-- + +To be and not to seem is the end of life. + +The Greek in the age of Plato admitted praise to be one of the chief +incentives to moral virtue, and to most men the opinion of their fellows is +a leading principle of action. Hence a certain element of seeming enters +into all things; all or almost all desire to appear better than they are, +that they may win the esteem or admiration of others. A man of ability can +easily feign the language of piety or virtue; and there is an unconscious +as well as a conscious hypocrisy which, according to Socrates, is the worst +of the two. Again, there is the sophistry of classes and professions. +There are the different opinions about themselves and one another which +prevail in different ranks of society. There is the bias given to the mind +by the study of one department of human knowledge to the exclusion of the +rest; and stronger far the prejudice engendered by a pecuniary or party +interest in certain tenets. There is the sophistry of law, the sophistry +of medicine, the sophistry of politics, the sophistry of theology. All of +these disguises wear the appearance of the truth; some of them are very +ancient, and we do not easily disengage ourselves from them; for we have +inherited them, and they have become a part of us. The sophistry of an +ancient Greek sophist is nothing compared with the sophistry of a religious +order, or of a church in which during many ages falsehood has been +accumulating, and everything has been said on one side, and nothing on the +other. The conventions and customs which we observe in conversation, and +the opposition of our interests when we have dealings with one another +('the buyer saith, it is nought--it is nought,' etc.), are always obscuring +our sense of truth and right. The sophistry of human nature is far more +subtle than the deceit of any one man. Few persons speak freely from their +own natures, and scarcely any one dares to think for himself: most of us +imperceptibly fall into the opinions of those around us, which we partly +help to make. A man who would shake himself loose from them, requires +great force of mind; he hardly knows where to begin in the search after +truth. On every side he is met by the world, which is not an abstraction +of theologians, but the most real of all things, being another name for +ourselves when regarded collectively and subjected to the influences of +society. + +Then comes Socrates, impressed as no other man ever was, with the unreality +and untruthfulness of popular opinion, and tells mankind that they must be +and not seem. How are they to be? At any rate they must have the spirit +and desire to be. If they are ignorant, they must acknowledge their +ignorance to themselves; if they are conscious of doing evil, they must +learn to do well; if they are weak, and have nothing in them which they can +call themselves, they must acquire firmness and consistency; if they are +indifferent, they must begin to take an interest in the great questions +which surround them. They must try to be what they would fain appear in +the eyes of their fellow-men. A single individual cannot easily change +public opinion; but he can be true and innocent, simple and independent; he +can know what he does, and what he does not know; and though not without an +effort, he can form a judgment of his own, at least in common matters. In +his most secret actions he can show the same high principle (compare +Republic) which he shows when supported and watched by public opinion. And +on some fitting occasion, on some question of humanity or truth or right, +even an ordinary man, from the natural rectitude of his disposition, may be +found to take up arms against a whole tribe of politicians and lawyers, and +be too much for them. + +Who is the true and who the false statesman?-- + +The true statesman is he who brings order out of disorder; who first +organizes and then administers the government of his own country; and +having made a nation, seeks to reconcile the national interests with those +of Europe and of mankind. He is not a mere theorist, nor yet a dealer in +expedients; the whole and the parts grow together in his mind; while the +head is conceiving, the hand is executing. Although obliged to descend to +the world, he is not of the world. His thoughts are fixed not on power or +riches or extension of territory, but on an ideal state, in which all the +citizens have an equal chance of health and life, and the highest education +is within the reach of all, and the moral and intellectual qualities of +every individual are freely developed, and 'the idea of good' is the +animating principle of the whole. Not the attainment of freedom alone, or +of order alone, but how to unite freedom with order is the problem which he +has to solve. + +The statesman who places before himself these lofty aims has undertaken a +task which will call forth all his powers. He must control himself before +he can control others; he must know mankind before he can manage them. He +has no private likes or dislikes; he does not conceal personal enmity under +the disguise of moral or political principle: such meannesses, into which +men too often fall unintentionally, are absorbed in the consciousness of +his mission, and in his love for his country and for mankind. He will +sometimes ask himself what the next generation will say of him; not because +he is careful of posthumous fame, but because he knows that the result of +his life as a whole will then be more fairly judged. He will take time for +the execution of his plans; not hurrying them on when the mind of a nation +is unprepared for them; but like the Ruler of the Universe Himself, working +in the appointed time, for he knows that human life, 'if not long in +comparison with eternity' (Republic), is sufficient for the fulfilment of +many great purposes. He knows, too, that the work will be still going on +when he is no longer here; and he will sometimes, especially when his +powers are failing, think of that other 'city of which the pattern is in +heaven' (Republic). + +The false politician is the serving-man of the state. In order to govern +men he becomes like them; their 'minds are married in conjunction;' they +'bear themselves' like vulgar and tyrannical masters, and he is their +obedient servant. The true politician, if he would rule men, must make +them like himself; he must 'educate his party' until they cease to be a +party; he must breathe into them the spirit which will hereafter give form +to their institutions. Politics with him are not a mechanism for seeming +what he is not, or for carrying out the will of the majority. Himself a +representative man, he is the representative not of the lower but of the +higher elements of the nation. There is a better (as well as a worse) +public opinion of which he seeks to lay hold; as there is also a deeper +current of human affairs in which he is borne up when the waves nearer the +shore are threatening him. He acknowledges that he cannot take the world +by force--two or three moves on the political chess board are all that he +can fore see--two or three weeks moves on the political chessboard are all +that he can foresee--two or three weeks or months are granted to him in +which he can provide against a coming struggle. But he knows also that +there are permanent principles of politics which are always tending to the +well-being of states--better administration, better education, the +reconciliation of conflicting elements, increased security against external +enemies. These are not 'of to-day or yesterday,' but are the same in all +times, and under all forms of government. Then when the storm descends and +the winds blow, though he knows not beforehand the hour of danger, the +pilot, not like Plato's captain in the Republic, half-blind and deaf, but +with penetrating eye and quick ear, is ready to take command of the ship +and guide her into port. + +The false politician asks not what is true, but what is the opinion of the +world--not what is right, but what is expedient. The only measures of +which he approves are the measures which will pass. He has no intention of +fighting an uphill battle; he keeps the roadway of politics. He is +unwilling to incur the persecution and enmity which political convictions +would entail upon him. He begins with popularity, and in fair weather +sails gallantly along. But unpopularity soon follows him. For men expect +their leaders to be better and wiser than themselves: to be their guides +in danger, their saviours in extremity; they do not really desire them to +obey all the ignorant impulses of the popular mind; and if they fail them +in a crisis they are disappointed. Then, as Socrates says, the cry of +ingratitude is heard, which is most unreasonable; for the people, who have +been taught no better, have done what might be expected of them, and their +statesmen have received justice at their hands. + +The true statesman is aware that he must adapt himself to times and +circumstances. He must have allies if he is to fight against the world; he +must enlighten public opinion; he must accustom his followers to act +together. Although he is not the mere executor of the will of the +majority, he must win over the majority to himself. He is their leader and +not their follower, but in order to lead he must also follow. He will +neither exaggerate nor undervalue the power of a statesman, neither +adopting the 'laissez faire' nor the 'paternal government' principle; but +he will, whether he is dealing with children in politics, or with full- +grown men, seek to do for the people what the government can do for them, +and what, from imperfect education or deficient powers of combination, they +cannot do for themselves. He knows that if he does too much for them they +will do nothing; and that if he does nothing for them they will in some +states of society be utterly helpless. For the many cannot exist without +the few, if the material force of a country is from below, wisdom and +experience are from above. It is not a small part of human evils which +kings and governments make or cure. The statesman is well aware that a +great purpose carried out consistently during many years will at last be +executed. He is playing for a stake which may be partly determined by some +accident, and therefore he will allow largely for the unknown element of +politics. But the game being one in which chance and skill are combined, +if he plays long enough he is certain of victory. He will not be always +consistent, for the world is changing; and though he depends upon the +support of a party, he will remember that he is the minister of the whole. +He lives not for the present, but for the future, and he is not at all sure +that he will be appreciated either now or then. For he may have the +existing order of society against him, and may not be remembered by a +distant posterity. + +There are always discontented idealists in politics who, like Socrates in +the Gorgias, find fault with all statesmen past as well as present, not +excepting the greatest names of history. Mankind have an uneasy feeling +that they ought to be better governed than they are. Just as the actual +philosopher falls short of the one wise man, so does the actual statesman +fall short of the ideal. And so partly from vanity and egotism, but partly +also from a true sense of the faults of eminent men, a temper of +dissatisfaction and criticism springs up among those who are ready enough +to acknowledge the inferiority of their own powers. No matter whether a +statesman makes high professions or none at all--they are reduced sooner or +later to the same level. And sometimes the more unscrupulous man is better +esteemed than the more conscientious, because he has not equally deceived +expectations. Such sentiments may be unjust, but they are widely spread; +we constantly find them recurring in reviews and newspapers, and still +oftener in private conversation. + +We may further observe that the art of government, while in some respects +tending to improve, has in others a tendency to degenerate, as institutions +become more popular. Governing for the people cannot easily be combined +with governing by the people: the interests of classes are too strong for +the ideas of the statesman who takes a comprehensive view of the whole. +According to Socrates the true governor will find ruin or death staring him +in the face, and will only be induced to govern from the fear of being +governed by a worse man than himself (Republic). And in modern times, +though the world has grown milder, and the terrible consequences which +Plato foretells no longer await an English statesman, any one who is not +actuated by a blind ambition will only undertake from a sense of duty a +work in which he is most likely to fail; and even if he succeed, will +rarely be rewarded by the gratitude of his own generation. + +Socrates, who is not a politician at all, tells us that he is the only real +politician of his time. Let us illustrate the meaning of his words by +applying them to the history of our own country. He would have said that +not Pitt or Fox, or Canning or Sir R. Peel, are the real politicians of +their time, but Locke, Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham, Ricardo. These during +the greater part of their lives occupied an inconsiderable space in the +eyes of the public. They were private persons; nevertheless they sowed in +the minds of men seeds which in the next generation have become an +irresistible power. 'Herein is that saying true, One soweth and another +reapeth.' We may imagine with Plato an ideal statesman in whom practice +and speculation are perfectly harmonized; for there is no necessary +opposition between them. But experience shows that they are commonly +divorced--the ordinary politician is the interpreter or executor of the +thoughts of others, and hardly ever brings to the birth a new political +conception. One or two only in modern times, like the Italian statesman +Cavour, have created the world in which they moved. The philosopher is +naturally unfitted for political life; his great ideas are not understood +by the many; he is a thousand miles away from the questions of the day. +Yet perhaps the lives of thinkers, as they are stiller and deeper, are also +happier than the lives of those who are more in the public eye. They have +the promise of the future, though they are regarded as dreamers and +visionaries by their own contemporaries. And when they are no longer here, +those who would have been ashamed of them during their lives claim kindred +with them, and are proud to be called by their names. (Compare Thucyd.) + +Who is the true poet? + +Plato expels the poets from his Republic because they are allied to sense; +because they stimulate the emotions; because they are thrice removed from +the ideal truth. And in a similar spirit he declares in the Gorgias that +the stately muse of tragedy is a votary of pleasure and not of truth. In +modern times we almost ridicule the idea of poetry admitting of a moral. +The poet and the prophet, or preacher, in primitive antiquity are one and +the same; but in later ages they seem to fall apart. The great art of +novel writing, that peculiar creation of our own and the last century, +which, together with the sister art of review writing, threatens to absorb +all literature, has even less of seriousness in her composition. Do we not +often hear the novel writer censured for attempting to convey a lesson to +the minds of his readers? + +Yet the true office of a poet or writer of fiction is not merely to give +amusement, or to be the expression of the feelings of mankind, good or bad, +or even to increase our knowledge of human nature. There have been poets +in modern times, such as Goethe or Wordsworth, who have not forgotten their +high vocation of teachers; and the two greatest of the Greek dramatists owe +their sublimity to their ethical character. The noblest truths, sung of in +the purest and sweetest language, are still the proper material of poetry. +The poet clothes them with beauty, and has a power of making them enter +into the hearts and memories of men. He has not only to speak of themes +above the level of ordinary life, but to speak of them in a deeper and +tenderer way than they are ordinarily felt, so as to awaken the feeling of +them in others. The old he makes young again; the familiar principle he +invests with a new dignity; he finds a noble expression for the common- +places of morality and politics. He uses the things of sense so as to +indicate what is beyond; he raises us through earth to heaven. He +expresses what the better part of us would fain say, and the half-conscious +feeling is strengthened by the expression. He is his own critic, for the +spirit of poetry and of criticism are not divided in him. His mission is +not to disguise men from themselves, but to reveal to them their own +nature, and make them better acquainted with the world around them. True +poetry is the remembrance of youth, of love, the embodiment in words of the +happiest and holiest moments of life, of the noblest thoughts of man, of +the greatest deeds of the past. The poet of the future may return to his +greater calling of the prophet or teacher; indeed, we hardly know what may +not be effected for the human race by a better use of the poetical and +imaginative faculty. The reconciliation of poetry, as of religion, with +truth, may still be possible. Neither is the element of pleasure to be +excluded. For when we substitute a higher pleasure for a lower we raise +men in the scale of existence. Might not the novelist, too, make an ideal, +or rather many ideals of social life, better than a thousand sermons? +Plato, like the Puritans, is too much afraid of poetic and artistic +influences. But he is not without a true sense of the noble purposes to +which art may be applied (Republic). + +Modern poetry is often a sort of plaything, or, in Plato's language, a +flattery, a sophistry, or sham, in which, without any serious purpose, the +poet lends wings to his fancy and exhibits his gifts of language and metre. +Such an one seeks to gratify the taste of his readers; he has the 'savoir +faire,' or trick of writing, but he has not the higher spirit of poetry. +He has no conception that true art should bring order out of disorder; that +it should make provision for the soul's highest interest; that it should be +pursued only with a view to 'the improvement of the citizens.' He +ministers to the weaker side of human nature (Republic); he idealizes the +sensual; he sings the strain of love in the latest fashion; instead of +raising men above themselves he brings them back to the 'tyranny of the +many masters,' from which all his life long a good man has been praying to +be delivered. And often, forgetful of measure and order, he will express +not that which is truest, but that which is strongest. Instead of a great +and nobly-executed subject, perfect in every part, some fancy of a heated +brain is worked out with the strangest incongruity. He is not the master +of his words, but his words--perhaps borrowed from another--the faded +reflection of some French or German or Italian writer, have the better of +him. Though we are not going to banish the poets, how can we suppose that +such utterances have any healing or life-giving influence on the minds of +men? + +'Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter:' Art then must be true, +and politics must be true, and the life of man must be true and not a +seeming or sham. In all of them order has to be brought out of disorder, +truth out of error and falsehood. This is what we mean by the greatest +improvement of man. And so, having considered in what way 'we can best +spend the appointed time, we leave the result with God.' Plato does not say +that God will order all things for the best (compare Phaedo), but he +indirectly implies that the evils of this life will be corrected in +another. And as we are very far from the best imaginable world at present, +Plato here, as in the Phaedo and Republic, supposes a purgatory or place of +education for mankind in general, and for a very few a Tartarus or hell. +The myth which terminates the dialogue is not the revelation, but rather, +like all similar descriptions, whether in the Bible or Plato, the veil of +another life. For no visible thing can reveal the invisible. Of this +Plato, unlike some commentators on Scripture, is fully aware. Neither will +he dogmatize about the manner in which we are 'born again' (Republic). +Only he is prepared to maintain the ultimate triumph of truth and right, +and declares that no one, not even the wisest of the Greeks, can affirm any +other doctrine without being ridiculous. + +There is a further paradox of ethics, in which pleasure and pain are held +to be indifferent, and virtue at the time of action and without regard to +consequences is happiness. From this elevation or exaggeration of feeling +Plato seems to shrink: he leaves it to the Stoics in a later generation to +maintain that when impaled or on the rack the philosopher may be happy +(compare Republic). It is observable that in the Republic he raises this +question, but it is not really discussed; the veil of the ideal state, the +shadow of another life, are allowed to descend upon it and it passes out of +sight. The martyr or sufferer in the cause of right or truth is often +supposed to die in raptures, having his eye fixed on a city which is in +heaven. But if there were no future, might he not still be happy in the +performance of an action which was attended only by a painful death? He +himself may be ready to thank God that he was thought worthy to do Him the +least service, without looking for a reward; the joys of another life may +not have been present to his mind at all. Do we suppose that the mediaeval +saint, St. Bernard, St. Francis, St. Catharine of Sienna, or the Catholic +priest who lately devoted himself to death by a lingering disease that he +might solace and help others, was thinking of the 'sweets' of heaven? No; +the work was already heaven to him and enough. Much less will the dying +patriot be dreaming of the praises of man or of an immortality of fame: +the sense of duty, of right, and trust in God will be sufficient, and as +far as the mind can reach, in that hour. If he were certain that there +were no life to come, he would not have wished to speak or act otherwise +than he did in the cause of truth or of humanity. Neither, on the other +hand, will he suppose that God has forsaken him or that the future is to be +a mere blank to him. The greatest act of faith, the only faith which +cannot pass away, is his who has not known, but yet has believed. A very +few among the sons of men have made themselves independent of +circumstances, past, present, or to come. He who has attained to such a +temper of mind has already present with him eternal life; he needs no +arguments to convince him of immortality; he has in him already a principle +stronger than death. He who serves man without the thought of reward is +deemed to be a more faithful servant than he who works for hire. May not +the service of God, which is the more disinterested, be in like manner the +higher? And although only a very few in the course of the world's history +--Christ himself being one of them--have attained to such a noble +conception of God and of the human soul, yet the ideal of them may be +present to us, and the remembrance of them be an example to us, and their +lives may shed a light on many dark places both of philosophy and theology. + +THE MYTHS OF PLATO. + +The myths of Plato are a phenomenon unique in literature. There are four +longer ones: these occur in the Phaedrus, Phaedo, Gorgias, and Republic. +That in the Republic is the most elaborate and finished of them. Three of +these greater myths, namely those contained in the Phaedo, the Gorgias and +the Republic, relate to the destiny of human souls in a future life. The +magnificent myth in the Phaedrus treats of the immortality, or rather the +eternity of the soul, in which is included a former as well as a future +state of existence. To these may be added, (1) the myth, or rather fable, +occurring in the Statesman, in which the life of innocence is contrasted +with the ordinary life of man and the consciousness of evil: (2) the +legend of the Island of Atlantis, an imaginary history, which is a fragment +only, commenced in the Timaeus and continued in the Critias: (3) the much +less artistic fiction of the foundation of the Cretan colony which is +introduced in the preface to the Laws, but soon falls into the background: +(4) the beautiful but rather artificial tale of Prometheus and Epimetheus +narrated in his rhetorical manner by Protagoras in the dialogue called +after him: (5) the speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus, which is a +parody of the orator Lysias; the rival speech of Socrates and the +recantation of it. To these may be added (6) the tale of the grasshoppers, +and (7) the tale of Thamus and of Theuth, both in the Phaedrus: (8) the +parable of the Cave (Republic), in which the previous argument is +recapitulated, and the nature and degrees of knowledge having been +previously set forth in the abstract are represented in a picture: (9) the +fiction of the earth-born men (Republic; compare Laws), in which by the +adaptation of an old tradition Plato makes a new beginning for his society: +(10) the myth of Aristophanes respecting the division of the sexes, Sym.: +(11) the parable of the noble captain, the pilot, and the mutinous sailors +(Republic), in which is represented the relation of the better part of the +world, and of the philosopher, to the mob of politicians: (12) the +ironical tale of the pilot who plies between Athens and Aegina charging +only a small payment for saving men from death, the reason being that he is +uncertain whether to live or die is better for them (Gor.): (13) the +treatment of freemen and citizens by physicians and of slaves by their +apprentices,--a somewhat laboured figure of speech intended to illustrate +the two different ways in which the laws speak to men (Laws). There also +occur in Plato continuous images; some of them extend over several pages, +appearing and reappearing at intervals: such as the bees stinging and +stingless (paupers and thieves) in the Eighth Book of the Republic, who are +generated in the transition from timocracy to oligarchy: the sun, which is +to the visible world what the idea of good is to the intellectual, in the +Sixth Book of the Republic: the composite animal, having the form of a +man, but containing under a human skin a lion and a many-headed monster +(Republic): the great beast, i.e. the populace: and the wild beast within +us, meaning the passions which are always liable to break out: the +animated comparisons of the degradation of philosophy by the arts to the +dishonoured maiden, and of the tyrant to the parricide, who 'beats his +father, having first taken away his arms': the dog, who is your only +philosopher: the grotesque and rather paltry image of the argument +wandering about without a head (Laws), which is repeated, not improved, +from the Gorgias: the argument personified as veiling her face (Republic), +as engaged in a chase, as breaking upon us in a first, second and third +wave:--on these figures of speech the changes are rung many times over. It +is observable that nearly all these parables or continuous images are found +in the Republic; that which occurs in the Theaetetus, of the midwifery of +Socrates, is perhaps the only exception. To make the list complete, the +mathematical figure of the number of the state (Republic), or the numerical +interval which separates king from tyrant, should not be forgotten. + +The myth in the Gorgias is one of those descriptions of another life which, +like the Sixth Aeneid of Virgil, appear to contain reminiscences of the +mysteries. It is a vision of the rewards and punishments which await good +and bad men after death. It supposes the body to continue and to be in +another world what it has become in this. It includes a Paradiso, +Purgatorio, and Inferno, like the sister myths of the Phaedo and the +Republic. The Inferno is reserved for great criminals only. The argument +of the dialogue is frequently referred to, and the meaning breaks through +so as rather to destroy the liveliness and consistency of the picture. The +structure of the fiction is very slight, the chief point or moral being +that in the judgments of another world there is no possibility of +concealment: Zeus has taken from men the power of foreseeing death, and +brings together the souls both of them and their judges naked and +undisguised at the judgment-seat. Both are exposed to view, stripped of +the veils and clothes which might prevent them from seeing into or being +seen by one another. + +The myth of the Phaedo is of the same type, but it is more cosmological, +and also more poetical. The beautiful and ingenious fancy occurs to Plato +that the upper atmosphere is an earth and heaven in one, a glorified earth, +fairer and purer than that in which we dwell. As the fishes live in the +ocean, mankind are living in a lower sphere, out of which they put their +heads for a moment or two and behold a world beyond. The earth which we +inhabit is a sediment of the coarser particles which drop from the world +above, and is to that heavenly earth what the desert and the shores of the +ocean are to us. A part of the myth consists of description of the +interior of the earth, which gives the opportunity of introducing several +mythological names and of providing places of torment for the wicked. +There is no clear distinction of soul and body; the spirits beneath the +earth are spoken of as souls only, yet they retain a sort of shadowy form +when they cry for mercy on the shores of the lake; and the philosopher +alone is said to have got rid of the body. All the three myths in Plato +which relate to the world below have a place for repentant sinners, as well +as other homes or places for the very good and very bad. It is a natural +reflection which is made by Plato elsewhere, that the two extremes of human +character are rarely met with, and that the generality of mankind are +between them. Hence a place must be found for them. In the myth of the +Phaedo they are carried down the river Acheron to the Acherusian lake, +where they dwell, and are purified of their evil deeds, and receive the +rewards of their good. There are also incurable sinners, who are cast into +Tartarus, there to remain as the penalty of atrocious crimes; these suffer +everlastingly. And there is another class of hardly-curable sinners who +are allowed from time to time to approach the shores of the Acherusian +lake, where they cry to their victims for mercy; which if they obtain they +come out into the lake and cease from their torments. + +Neither this, nor any of the three greater myths of Plato, nor perhaps any +allegory or parable relating to the unseen world, is consistent with +itself. The language of philosophy mingles with that of mythology; +abstract ideas are transformed into persons, figures of speech into +realities. These myths may be compared with the Pilgrim's Progress of +Bunyan, in which discussions of theology are mixed up with the incidents of +travel, and mythological personages are associated with human beings: they +are also garnished with names and phrases taken out of Homer, and with +other fragments of Greek tradition. + +The myth of the Republic is more subtle and also more consistent than +either of the two others. It has a greater verisimilitude than they have, +and is full of touches which recall the experiences of human life. It will +be noticed by an attentive reader that the twelve days during which Er lay +in a trance after he was slain coincide with the time passed by the spirits +in their pilgrimage. It is a curious observation, not often made, that +good men who have lived in a well-governed city (shall we say in a +religious and respectable society?) are more likely to make mistakes in +their choice of life than those who have had more experience of the world +and of evil. It is a more familiar remark that we constantly blame others +when we have only ourselves to blame; and the philosopher must acknowledge, +however reluctantly, that there is an element of chance in human life with +which it is sometimes impossible for man to cope. That men drink more of +the waters of forgetfulness than is good for them is a poetical description +of a familiar truth. We have many of us known men who, like Odysseus, have +wearied of ambition and have only desired rest. We should like to know +what became of the infants 'dying almost as soon as they were born,' but +Plato only raises, without satisfying, our curiosity. The two companies of +souls, ascending and descending at either chasm of heaven and earth, and +conversing when they come out into the meadow, the majestic figures of the +judges sitting in heaven, the voice heard by Ardiaeus, are features of the +great allegory which have an indescribable grandeur and power. The remark +already made respecting the inconsistency of the two other myths must be +extended also to this: it is at once an orrery, or model of the heavens, +and a picture of the Day of Judgment. + +The three myths are unlike anything else in Plato. There is an Oriental, +or rather an Egyptian element in them, and they have an affinity to the +mysteries and to the Orphic modes of worship. To a certain extent they are +un-Greek; at any rate there is hardly anything like them in other Greek +writings which have a serious purpose; in spirit they are mediaeval. They +are akin to what may be termed the underground religion in all ages and +countries. They are presented in the most lively and graphic manner, but +they are never insisted on as true; it is only affirmed that nothing better +can be said about a future life. Plato seems to make use of them when he +has reached the limits of human knowledge; or, to borrow an expression of +his own, when he is standing on the outside of the intellectual world. +They are very simple in style; a few touches bring the picture home to the +mind, and make it present to us. They have also a kind of authority gained +by the employment of sacred and familiar names, just as mere fragments of +the words of Scripture, put together in any form and applied to any +subject, have a power of their own. They are a substitute for poetry and +mythology; and they are also a reform of mythology. The moral of them may +be summed up in a word or two: After death the Judgment; and 'there is +some better thing remaining for the good than for the evil.' + +All literature gathers into itself many elements of the past: for example, +the tale of the earth-born men in the Republic appears at first sight to be +an extravagant fancy, but it is restored to propriety when we remember that +it is based on a legendary belief. The art of making stories of ghosts and +apparitions credible is said to consist in the manner of telling them. The +effect is gained by many literary and conversational devices, such as the +previous raising of curiosity, the mention of little circumstances, +simplicity, picturesqueness, the naturalness of the occasion, and the like. +This art is possessed by Plato in a degree which has never been equalled. + +The myth in the Phaedrus is even greater than the myths which have been +already described, but is of a different character. It treats of a former +rather than of a future life. It represents the conflict of reason aided +by passion or righteous indignation on the one hand, and of the animal +lusts and instincts on the other. The soul of man has followed the company +of some god, and seen truth in the form of the universal before it was born +in this world. Our present life is the result of the struggle which was +then carried on. This world is relative to a former world, as it is often +projected into a future. We ask the question, Where were men before birth? +As we likewise enquire, What will become of them after death? The first +question is unfamiliar to us, and therefore seems to be unnatural; but if +we survey the whole human race, it has been as influential and as widely +spread as the other. In the Phaedrus it is really a figure of speech in +which the 'spiritual combat' of this life is represented. The majesty and +power of the whole passage--especially of what may be called the theme or +proem (beginning 'The mind through all her being is immortal')--can only be +rendered very inadequately in another language. + +The myth in the Statesman relates to a former cycle of existence, in which +men were born of the earth, and by the reversal of the earth's motion had +their lives reversed and were restored to youth and beauty: the dead came +to life, the old grew middle-aged, and the middle-aged young; the youth +became a child, the child an infant, the infant vanished into the earth. +The connection between the reversal of the earth's motion and the reversal +of human life is of course verbal only, yet Plato, like theologians in +other ages, argues from the consistency of the tale to its truth. The new +order of the world was immediately under the government of God; it was a +state of innocence in which men had neither wants nor cares, in which the +earth brought forth all things spontaneously, and God was to man what man +now is to the animals. There were no great estates, or families, or +private possessions, nor any traditions of the past, because men were all +born out of the earth. This is what Plato calls the 'reign of Cronos;' and +in like manner he connects the reversal of the earth's motion with some +legend of which he himself was probably the inventor. + +The question is then asked, under which of these two cycles of existence +was man the happier,--under that of Cronos, which was a state of innocence, +or that of Zeus, which is our ordinary life? For a while Plato balances +the two sides of the serious controversy, which he has suggested in a +figure. The answer depends on another question: What use did the children +of Cronos make of their time? They had boundless leisure and the faculty +of discoursing, not only with one another, but with the animals. Did they +employ these advantages with a view to philosophy, gathering from every +nature some addition to their store of knowledge? or, Did they pass their +time in eating and drinking and telling stories to one another and to the +beasts?--in either case there would be no difficulty in answering. But +then, as Plato rather mischievously adds, 'Nobody knows what they did,' and +therefore the doubt must remain undetermined. + +To the first there succeeds a second epoch. After another natural +convulsion, in which the order of the world and of human life is once more +reversed, God withdraws his guiding hand, and man is left to the government +of himself. The world begins again, and arts and laws are slowly and +painfully invented. A secular age succeeds to a theocratical. In this +fanciful tale Plato has dropped, or almost dropped, the garb of mythology. +He suggests several curious and important thoughts, such as the possibility +of a state of innocence, the existence of a world without traditions, and +the difference between human and divine government. He has also carried a +step further his speculations concerning the abolition of the family and of +property, which he supposes to have no place among the children of Cronos +any more than in the ideal state. + +It is characteristic of Plato and of his age to pass from the abstract to +the concrete, from poetry to reality. Language is the expression of the +seen, and also of the unseen, and moves in a region between them. A great +writer knows how to strike both these chords, sometimes remaining within +the sphere of the visible, and then again comprehending a wider range and +soaring to the abstract and universal. Even in the same sentence he may +employ both modes of speech not improperly or inharmoniously. It is +useless to criticise the broken metaphors of Plato, if the effect of the +whole is to create a picture not such as can be painted on canvas, but +which is full of life and meaning to the reader. A poem may be contained +in a word or two, which may call up not one but many latent images; or half +reveal to us by a sudden flash the thoughts of many hearts. Often the +rapid transition from one image to another is pleasing to us: on the other +hand, any single figure of speech if too often repeated, or worked out too +much at length, becomes prosy and monotonous. In theology and philosophy +we necessarily include both 'the moral law within and the starry heaven +above,' and pass from one to the other (compare for examples Psalms xviii. +and xix.). Whether such a use of language is puerile or noble depends upon +the genius of the writer or speaker, and the familiarity of the +associations employed. + +In the myths and parables of Plato the ease and grace of conversation is +not forgotten: they are spoken, not written words, stories which are told +to a living audience, and so well told that we are more than half-inclined +to believe them (compare Phaedrus). As in conversation too, the striking +image or figure of speech is not forgotten, but is quickly caught up, and +alluded to again and again; as it would still be in our own day in a genial +and sympathetic society. The descriptions of Plato have a greater life and +reality than is to be found in any modern writing. This is due to their +homeliness and simplicity. Plato can do with words just as he pleases; to +him they are indeed 'more plastic than wax' (Republic). We are in the +habit of opposing speech and writing, poetry and prose. But he has +discovered a use of language in which they are united; which gives a +fitting expression to the highest truths; and in which the trifles of +courtesy and the familiarities of daily life are not overlooked. + + +GORGIAS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Callicles, Socrates, Chaerephon, Gorgias, Polus. + +SCENE: The house of Callicles. + + +CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not +for a feast. + +SOCRATES: And are we late for a feast? + +CALLICLES: Yes, and a delightful feast; for Gorgias has just been +exhibiting to us many fine things. + +SOCRATES: It is not my fault, Callicles; our friend Chaerephon is to +blame; for he would keep us loitering in the Agora. + +CHAEREPHON: Never mind, Socrates; the misfortune of which I have been the +cause I will also repair; for Gorgias is a friend of mine, and I will make +him give the exhibition again either now, or, if you prefer, at some other +time. + +CALLICLES: What is the matter, Chaerephon--does Socrates want to hear +Gorgias? + +CHAEREPHON: Yes, that was our intention in coming. + +CALLICLES: Come into my house, then; for Gorgias is staying with me, and +he shall exhibit to you. + +SOCRATES: Very good, Callicles; but will he answer our questions? for I +want to hear from him what is the nature of his art, and what it is which +he professes and teaches; he may, as you (Chaerephon) suggest, defer the +exhibition to some other time. + +CALLICLES: There is nothing like asking him, Socrates; and indeed to +answer questions is a part of his exhibition, for he was saying only just +now, that any one in my house might put any question to him, and that he +would answer. + +SOCRATES: How fortunate! will you ask him, Chaerephon--? + +CHAEREPHON: What shall I ask him? + +SOCRATES: Ask him who he is. + +CHAEREPHON: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean such a question as would elicit from him, if he had been +a maker of shoes, the answer that he is a cobbler. Do you understand? + +CHAEREPHON: I understand, and will ask him: Tell me, Gorgias, is our +friend Callicles right in saying that you undertake to answer any questions +which you are asked? + +GORGIAS: Quite right, Chaerephon: I was saying as much only just now; and +I may add, that many years have elapsed since any one has asked me a new +one. + +CHAEREPHON: Then you must be very ready, Gorgias. + +GORGIAS: Of that, Chaerephon, you can make trial. + +POLUS: Yes, indeed, and if you like, Chaerephon, you may make trial of me +too, for I think that Gorgias, who has been talking a long time, is tired. + +CHAEREPHON: And do you, Polus, think that you can answer better than +Gorgias? + +POLUS: What does that matter if I answer well enough for you? + +CHAEREPHON: Not at all:--and you shall answer if you like. + +POLUS: Ask:-- + +CHAEREPHON: My question is this: If Gorgias had the skill of his brother +Herodicus, what ought we to call him? Ought he not to have the name which +is given to his brother? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +CHAEREPHON: Then we should be right in calling him a physician? + +POLUS: Yes. + +CHAEREPHON: And if he had the skill of Aristophon the son of Aglaophon, or +of his brother Polygnotus, what ought we to call him? + +POLUS: Clearly, a painter. + +CHAEREPHON: But now what shall we call him--what is the art in which he is +skilled. + +POLUS: O Chaerephon, there are many arts among mankind which are +experimental, and have their origin in experience, for experience makes the +days of men to proceed according to art, and inexperience according to +chance, and different persons in different ways are proficient in different +arts, and the best persons in the best arts. And our friend Gorgias is one +of the best, and the art in which he is a proficient is the noblest. + +SOCRATES: Polus has been taught how to make a capital speech, Gorgias; but +he is not fulfilling the promise which he made to Chaerephon. + +GORGIAS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean that he has not exactly answered the question which he +was asked. + +GORGIAS: Then why not ask him yourself? + +SOCRATES: But I would much rather ask you, if you are disposed to answer: +for I see, from the few words which Polus has uttered, that he has attended +more to the art which is called rhetoric than to dialectic. + +POLUS: What makes you say so, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Because, Polus, when Chaerephon asked you what was the art which +Gorgias knows, you praised it as if you were answering some one who found +fault with it, but you never said what the art was. + +POLUS: Why, did I not say that it was the noblest of arts? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, but that was no answer to the question: nobody +asked what was the quality, but what was the nature, of the art, and by +what name we were to describe Gorgias. And I would still beg you briefly +and clearly, as you answered Chaerephon when he asked you at first, to say +what this art is, and what we ought to call Gorgias: Or rather, Gorgias, +let me turn to you, and ask the same question,--what are we to call you, +and what is the art which you profess? + +GORGIAS: Rhetoric, Socrates, is my art. + +SOCRATES: Then I am to call you a rhetorician? + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and a good one too, if you would call me that +which, in Homeric language, 'I boast myself to be.' + +SOCRATES: I should wish to do so. + +GORGIAS: Then pray do. + +SOCRATES: And are we to say that you are able to make other men +rhetoricians? + +GORGIAS: Yes, that is exactly what I profess to make them, not only at +Athens, but in all places. + +SOCRATES: And will you continue to ask and answer questions, Gorgias, as +we are at present doing, and reserve for another occasion the longer mode +of speech which Polus was attempting? Will you keep your promise, and +answer shortly the questions which are asked of you? + +GORGIAS: Some answers, Socrates, are of necessity longer; but I will do my +best to make them as short as possible; for a part of my profession is that +I can be as short as any one. + +SOCRATES: That is what is wanted, Gorgias; exhibit the shorter method now, +and the longer one at some other time. + +GORGIAS: Well, I will; and you will certainly say, that you never heard a +man use fewer words. + +SOCRATES: Very good then; as you profess to be a rhetorician, and a maker +of rhetoricians, let me ask you, with what is rhetoric concerned: I might +ask with what is weaving concerned, and you would reply (would you not?), +with the making of garments? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And music is concerned with the composition of melodies? + +GORGIAS: It is. + +SOCRATES: By Here, Gorgias, I admire the surpassing brevity of your +answers. + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, I do think myself good at that. + +SOCRATES: I am glad to hear it; answer me in like manner about rhetoric: +with what is rhetoric concerned? + +GORGIAS: With discourse. + +SOCRATES: What sort of discourse, Gorgias?--such discourse as would teach +the sick under what treatment they might get well? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric does not treat of all kinds of discourse? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And yet rhetoric makes men able to speak? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And to understand that about which they speak? + +GORGIAS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: But does not the art of medicine, which we were just now +mentioning, also make men able to understand and speak about the sick? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then medicine also treats of discourse? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Of discourse concerning diseases? + +GORGIAS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: And does not gymnastic also treat of discourse concerning the +good or evil condition of the body? + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the same, Gorgias, is true of the other arts:--all of them +treat of discourse concerning the subjects with which they severally have +to do. + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then why, if you call rhetoric the art which treats of +discourse, and all the other arts treat of discourse, do you not call them +arts of rhetoric? + +GORGIAS: Because, Socrates, the knowledge of the other arts has only to do +with some sort of external action, as of the hand; but there is no such +action of the hand in rhetoric which works and takes effect only through +the medium of discourse. And therefore I am justified in saying that +rhetoric treats of discourse. + +SOCRATES: I am not sure whether I entirely understand you, but I dare say +I shall soon know better; please to answer me a question:--you would allow +that there are arts? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: As to the arts generally, they are for the most part concerned +with doing, and require little or no speaking; in painting, and statuary, +and many other arts, the work may proceed in silence; and of such arts I +suppose you would say that they do not come within the province of +rhetoric. + +GORGIAS: You perfectly conceive my meaning, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But there are other arts which work wholly through the medium of +language, and require either no action or very little, as, for example, the +arts of arithmetic, of calculation, of geometry, and of playing draughts; +in some of these speech is pretty nearly co-extensive with action, but in +most of them the verbal element is greater--they depend wholly on words for +their efficacy and power: and I take your meaning to be that rhetoric is +an art of this latter sort? + +GORGIAS: Exactly. + +SOCRATES: And yet I do not believe that you really mean to call any of +these arts rhetoric; although the precise expression which you used was, +that rhetoric is an art which works and takes effect only through the +medium of discourse; and an adversary who wished to be captious might say, +'And so, Gorgias, you call arithmetic rhetoric.' But I do not think that +you really call arithmetic rhetoric any more than geometry would be so +called by you. + +GORGIAS: You are quite right, Socrates, in your apprehension of my +meaning. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let me now have the rest of my answer:--seeing that +rhetoric is one of those arts which works mainly by the use of words, and +there are other arts which also use words, tell me what is that quality in +words with which rhetoric is concerned:--Suppose that a person asks me +about some of the arts which I was mentioning just now; he might say, +'Socrates, what is arithmetic?' and I should reply to him, as you replied +to me, that arithmetic is one of those arts which take effect through +words. And then he would proceed to ask: 'Words about what?' and I should +reply, Words about odd and even numbers, and how many there are of each. +And if he asked again: 'What is the art of calculation?' I should say, +That also is one of the arts which is concerned wholly with words. And if +he further said, 'Concerned with what?' I should say, like the clerks in +the assembly, 'as aforesaid' of arithmetic, but with a difference, the +difference being that the art of calculation considers not only the +quantities of odd and even numbers, but also their numerical relations to +themselves and to one another. And suppose, again, I were to say that +astronomy is only words--he would ask, 'Words about what, Socrates?' and I +should answer, that astronomy tells us about the motions of the stars and +sun and moon, and their relative swiftness. + +GORGIAS: You would be quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And now let us have from you, Gorgias, the truth about rhetoric: +which you would admit (would you not?) to be one of those arts which act +always and fulfil all their ends through the medium of words? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Words which do what? I should ask. To what class of things do +the words which rhetoric uses relate? + +GORGIAS: To the greatest, Socrates, and the best of human things. + +SOCRATES: That again, Gorgias is ambiguous; I am still in the dark: for +which are the greatest and best of human things? I dare say that you have +heard men singing at feasts the old drinking song, in which the singers +enumerate the goods of life, first health, beauty next, thirdly, as the +writer of the song says, wealth honestly obtained. + +GORGIAS: Yes, I know the song; but what is your drift? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that the producers of those things which the +author of the song praises, that is to say, the physician, the trainer, the +money-maker, will at once come to you, and first the physician will say: +'O Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you, for my art is concerned with the +greatest good of men and not his.' And when I ask, Who are you? he will +reply, 'I am a physician.' What do you mean? I shall say. Do you mean +that your art produces the greatest good? 'Certainly,' he will answer, +'for is not health the greatest good? What greater good can men have, +Socrates?' And after him the trainer will come and say, 'I too, Socrates, +shall be greatly surprised if Gorgias can show more good of his art than I +can show of mine.' To him again I shall say, Who are you, honest friend, +and what is your business? 'I am a trainer,' he will reply, 'and my +business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.' When I have done +with the trainer, there arrives the money-maker, and he, as I expect, will +utterly despise them all. 'Consider Socrates,' he will say, 'whether +Gorgias or any one else can produce any greater good than wealth.' Well, +you and I say to him, and are you a creator of wealth? 'Yes,' he replies. +And who are you? 'A money-maker.' And do you consider wealth to be the +greatest good of man? 'Of course,' will be his reply. And we shall +rejoin: Yes; but our friend Gorgias contends that his art produces a +greater good than yours. And then he will be sure to go on and ask, 'What +good? Let Gorgias answer.' Now I want you, Gorgias, to imagine that this +question is asked of you by them and by me; What is that which, as you say, +is the greatest good of man, and of which you are the creator? Answer us. + +GORGIAS: That good, Socrates, which is truly the greatest, being that +which gives to men freedom in their own persons, and to individuals the +power of ruling over others in their several states. + +SOCRATES: And what would you consider this to be? + +GORGIAS: What is there greater than the word which persuades the judges in +the courts, or the senators in the council, or the citizens in the +assembly, or at any other political meeting?--if you have the power of +uttering this word, you will have the physician your slave, and the trainer +your slave, and the money-maker of whom you talk will be found to gather +treasures, not for himself, but for you who are able to speak and to +persuade the multitude. + +SOCRATES: Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained +what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am +not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and +no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any +other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion? + +GORGIAS: No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for +persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric. + +SOCRATES: Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever +was a man who entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of +knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you. + +GORGIAS: What is coming, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you: I am very well aware that I do not know what, +according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that +persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I +have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask-- +what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about +what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? +Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a +manner as is most likely to set forth the truth. And I would have you +observe, that I am right in asking this further question: If I asked, +'What sort of a painter is Zeuxis?' and you said, 'The painter of figures,' +should I not be right in asking, 'What kind of figures, and where do you +find them?' + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And the reason for asking this second question would be, that +there are other painters besides, who paint many other figures? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: But if there had been no one but Zeuxis who painted them, then +you would have answered very well? + +GORGIAS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: Now I want to know about rhetoric in the same way;--is rhetoric +the only art which brings persuasion, or do other arts have the same +effect? I mean to say--Does he who teaches anything persuade men of that +which he teaches or not? + +GORGIAS: He persuades, Socrates,--there can be no mistake about that. + +SOCRATES: Again, if we take the arts of which we were just now speaking:-- +do not arithmetic and the arithmeticians teach us the properties of number? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore persuade us of them? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then arithmetic as well as rhetoric is an artificer of +persuasion? + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And if any one asks us what sort of persuasion, and about what, +--we shall answer, persuasion which teaches the quantity of odd and even; +and we shall be able to show that all the other arts of which we were just +now speaking are artificers of persuasion, and of what sort, and about +what. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is not the only artificer of persuasion? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: Seeing, then, that not only rhetoric works by persuasion, but +that other arts do the same, as in the case of the painter, a question has +arisen which is a very fair one: Of what persuasion is rhetoric the +artificer, and about what?--is not that a fair way of putting the question? + +GORGIAS: I think so. + +SOCRATES: Then, if you approve the question, Gorgias, what is the answer? + +GORGIAS: I answer, Socrates, that rhetoric is the art of persuasion in +courts of law and other assemblies, as I was just now saying, and about the +just and unjust. + +SOCRATES: And that, Gorgias, was what I was suspecting to be your notion; +yet I would not have you wonder if by-and-by I am found repeating a +seemingly plain question; for I ask not in order to confute you, but as I +was saying that the argument may proceed consecutively, and that we may not +get the habit of anticipating and suspecting the meaning of one another's +words; I would have you develope your own views in your own way, whatever +may be your hypothesis. + +GORGIAS: I think that you are quite right, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then let me raise another question; there is such a thing as +'having learned'? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And there is also 'having believed'? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is the 'having learned' the same as 'having believed,' and +are learning and belief the same things? + +GORGIAS: In my judgment, Socrates, they are not the same. + +SOCRATES: And your judgment is right, as you may ascertain in this way:-- +If a person were to say to you, 'Is there, Gorgias, a false belief as well +as a true?'--you would reply, if I am not mistaken, that there is. + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Well, but is there a false knowledge as well as a true? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: No, indeed; and this again proves that knowledge and belief +differ. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And yet those who have learned as well as those who have +believed are persuaded? + +GORGIAS: Just so. + +SOCRATES: Shall we then assume two sorts of persuasion,--one which is the +source of belief without knowledge, as the other is of knowledge? + +GORGIAS: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And which sort of persuasion does rhetoric create in courts of +law and other assemblies about the just and unjust, the sort of persuasion +which gives belief without knowledge, or that which gives knowledge? + +GORGIAS: Clearly, Socrates, that which only gives belief. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric, as would appear, is the artificer of a persuasion +which creates belief about the just and unjust, but gives no instruction +about them? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the rhetorician does not instruct the courts of law or other +assemblies about things just and unjust, but he creates belief about them; +for no one can be supposed to instruct such a vast multitude about such +high matters in a short time? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us see what we really mean about rhetoric; +for I do not know what my own meaning is as yet. When the assembly meets +to elect a physician or a shipwright or any other craftsman, will the +rhetorician be taken into counsel? Surely not. For at every election he +ought to be chosen who is most skilled; and, again, when walls have to be +built or harbours or docks to be constructed, not the rhetorician but the +master workman will advise; or when generals have to be chosen and an order +of battle arranged, or a position taken, then the military will advise and +not the rhetoricians: what do you say, Gorgias? Since you profess to be a +rhetorician and a maker of rhetoricians, I cannot do better than learn the +nature of your art from you. And here let me assure you that I have your +interest in view as well as my own. For likely enough some one or other of +the young men present might desire to become your pupil, and in fact I see +some, and a good many too, who have this wish, but they would be too modest +to question you. And therefore when you are interrogated by me, I would +have you imagine that you are interrogated by them. 'What is the use of +coming to you, Gorgias?' they will say--'about what will you teach us to +advise the state?--about the just and unjust only, or about those other +things also which Socrates has just mentioned?' How will you answer them? + +GORGIAS: I like your way of leading us on, Socrates, and I will endeavour +to reveal to you the whole nature of rhetoric. You must have heard, I +think, that the docks and the walls of the Athenians and the plan of the +harbour were devised in accordance with the counsels, partly of +Themistocles, and partly of Pericles, and not at the suggestion of the +builders. + +SOCRATES: Such is the tradition, Gorgias, about Themistocles; and I myself +heard the speech of Pericles when he advised us about the middle wall. + +GORGIAS: And you will observe, Socrates, that when a decision has to be +given in such matters the rhetoricians are the advisers; they are the men +who win their point. + +SOCRATES: I had that in my admiring mind, Gorgias, when I asked what is +the nature of rhetoric, which always appears to me, when I look at the +matter in this way, to be a marvel of greatness. + +GORGIAS: A marvel, indeed, Socrates, if you only knew how rhetoric +comprehends and holds under her sway all the inferior arts. Let me offer +you a striking example of this. On several occasions I have been with my +brother Herodicus or some other physician to see one of his patients, who +would not allow the physician to give him medicine, or apply the knife or +hot iron to him; and I have persuaded him to do for me what he would not do +for the physician just by the use of rhetoric. And I say that if a +rhetorician and a physician were to go to any city, and had there to argue +in the Ecclesia or any other assembly as to which of them should be elected +state-physician, the physician would have no chance; but he who could speak +would be chosen if he wished; and in a contest with a man of any other +profession the rhetorician more than any one would have the power of +getting himself chosen, for he can speak more persuasively to the multitude +than any of them, and on any subject. Such is the nature and power of the +art of rhetoric! And yet, Socrates, rhetoric should be used like any other +competitive art, not against everybody,--the rhetorician ought not to abuse +his strength any more than a pugilist or pancratiast or other master of +fence;--because he has powers which are more than a match either for friend +or enemy, he ought not therefore to strike, stab, or slay his friends. +Suppose a man to have been trained in the palestra and to be a skilful +boxer,--he in the fulness of his strength goes and strikes his father or +mother or one of his familiars or friends; but that is no reason why the +trainers or fencing-masters should be held in detestation or banished from +the city;--surely not. For they taught their art for a good purpose, to be +used against enemies and evil-doers, in self-defence not in aggression, and +others have perverted their instructions, and turned to a bad use their own +strength and skill. But not on this account are the teachers bad, neither +is the art in fault, or bad in itself; I should rather say that those who +make a bad use of the art are to blame. And the same argument holds good +of rhetoric; for the rhetorician can speak against all men and upon any +subject,--in short, he can persuade the multitude better than any other man +of anything which he pleases, but he should not therefore seek to defraud +the physician or any other artist of his reputation merely because he has +the power; he ought to use rhetoric fairly, as he would also use his +athletic powers. And if after having become a rhetorician he makes a bad +use of his strength and skill, his instructor surely ought not on that +account to be held in detestation or banished. For he was intended by his +teacher to make a good use of his instructions, but he abuses them. And +therefore he is the person who ought to be held in detestation, banished, +and put to death, and not his instructor. + +SOCRATES: You, Gorgias, like myself, have had great experience of +disputations, and you must have observed, I think, that they do not always +terminate in mutual edification, or in the definition by either party of +the subjects which they are discussing; but disagreements are apt to arise +--somebody says that another has not spoken truly or clearly; and then they +get into a passion and begin to quarrel, both parties conceiving that their +opponents are arguing from personal feeling only and jealousy of +themselves, not from any interest in the question at issue. And sometimes +they will go on abusing one another until the company at last are quite +vexed at themselves for ever listening to such fellows. Why do I say this? +Why, because I cannot help feeling that you are now saying what is not +quite consistent or accordant with what you were saying at first about +rhetoric. And I am afraid to point this out to you, lest you should think +that I have some animosity against you, and that I speak, not for the sake +of discovering the truth, but from jealousy of you. Now if you are one of +my sort, I should like to cross-examine you, but if not I will let you +alone. And what is my sort? you will ask. I am one of those who are very +willing to be refuted if I say anything which is not true, and very willing +to refute any one else who says what is not true, and quite as ready to be +refuted as to refute; for I hold that this is the greater gain of the two, +just as the gain is greater of being cured of a very great evil than of +curing another. For I imagine that there is no evil which a man can endure +so great as an erroneous opinion about the matters of which we are +speaking; and if you claim to be one of my sort, let us have the discussion +out, but if you would rather have done, no matter;--let us make an end of +it. + +GORGIAS: I should say, Socrates, that I am quite the man whom you +indicate; but, perhaps, we ought to consider the audience, for, before you +came, I had already given a long exhibition, and if we proceed the argument +may run on to a great length. And therefore I think that we should +consider whether we may not be detaining some part of the company when they +are wanting to do something else. + +CHAEREPHON: You hear the audience cheering, Gorgias and Socrates, which +shows their desire to listen to you; and for myself, Heaven forbid that I +should have any business on hand which would take me away from a discussion +so interesting and so ably maintained. + +CALLICLES: By the gods, Chaerephon, although I have been present at many +discussions, I doubt whether I was ever so much delighted before, and +therefore if you go on discoursing all day I shall be the better pleased. + +SOCRATES: I may truly say, Callicles, that I am willing, if Gorgias is. + +GORGIAS: After all this, Socrates, I should be disgraced if I refused, +especially as I have promised to answer all comers; in accordance with the +wishes of the company, then, do you begin. and ask of me any question +which you like. + +SOCRATES: Let me tell you then, Gorgias, what surprises me in your words; +though I dare say that you may be right, and I may have misunderstood your +meaning. You say that you can make any man, who will learn of you, a +rhetorician? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you mean that you will teach him to gain the ears of the +multitude on any subject, and this not by instruction but by persuasion? + +GORGIAS: Quite so. + +SOCRATES: You were saying, in fact, that the rhetorician will have greater +powers of persuasion than the physician even in a matter of health? + +GORGIAS: Yes, with the multitude,--that is. + +SOCRATES: You mean to say, with the ignorant; for with those who know he +cannot be supposed to have greater powers of persuasion. + +GORGIAS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But if he is to have more power of persuasion than the +physician, he will have greater power than he who knows? + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Although he is not a physician:--is he? + +GORGIAS: No. + +SOCRATES: And he who is not a physician must, obviously, be ignorant of +what the physician knows. + +GORGIAS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then, when the rhetorician is more persuasive than the +physician, the ignorant is more persuasive with the ignorant than he who +has knowledge?--is not that the inference? + +GORGIAS: In the case supposed:--yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same holds of the relation of rhetoric to all the other +arts; the rhetorician need not know the truth about things; he has only to +discover some way of persuading the ignorant that he has more knowledge +than those who know? + +GORGIAS: Yes, Socrates, and is not this a great comfort?--not to have +learned the other arts, but the art of rhetoric only, and yet to be in no +way inferior to the professors of them? + +SOCRATES: Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a +question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of +any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is +not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, +as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know +anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in +them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not +knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than some one +else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you +knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, +you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him--it is not your +business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he +does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you +be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these +things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I +wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying +that you would. + +GORGIAS: Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to +know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well. + +SOCRATES: Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a +rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or +he must be taught by you. + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who has learned music a musician? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? +He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him. + +GORGIAS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? + +GORGIAS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And must not the just man always desire to do what is just? + +GORGIAS: That is clearly the inference. + +SOCRATES: Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice? + +GORGIAS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just +man? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? + +GORGIAS: Clearly not. + +SOCRATES: But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to +be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic +art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of +his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is +not to be banished, but the wrong-doer himself who made a bad use of his +rhetoric--he is to be banished--was not that said? + +GORGIAS: Yes, it was. + +SOCRATES: But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will +never have done injustice at all? + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric +treated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but about +just and unjust? Was not this said? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that +rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be +an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the +rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the +inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, +as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an +advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. +And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the +rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use +of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there +will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this. + +POLUS: And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now +saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the +rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted +that to any one who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and +then out of this admission there arose a contradiction--the thing which you +dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your +captious questions--(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in +all this?) For will any one ever acknowledge that he does not know, or +cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great +want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass. + +SOCRATES: Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with +friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger +generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in +our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who +should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into +which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition: + +POLUS: What condition? + +SOCRATES: That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you +indulged at first. + +POLUS: What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please? + +SOCRATES: Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, +which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and +you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech--that would be hard +indeed. But then consider my case:--shall not I be very hardly used, if, +when you are making a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are +asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I +say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my +former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any +statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself +and Gorgias--refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to +know what Gorgias knows--would you not? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And you, like him, invite any one to ask you about anything +which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him? + +POLUS: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And now, which will you do, ask or answer? + +POLUS: I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which +Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: Do you mean what sort of an art? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion. + +POLUS: Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you +say that you have made an art. + +POLUS: What thing? + +SOCRATES: I should say a sort of experience. + +POLUS: Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? + +SOCRATES: That is my view, but you may be of another mind. + +POLUS: An experience in what? + +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification. + +POLUS: And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? + +SOCRATES: What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric +is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is? + +POLUS: Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? + +SOCRATES: Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight +gratification to me? + +POLUS: I will. + +SOCRATES: Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? + +POLUS: What sort of an art is cookery? + +SOCRATES: Not an art at all, Polus. + +POLUS: What then? + +SOCRATES: I should say an experience. + +POLUS: In what? I wish that you would explain to me. + +SOCRATES: An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, +Polus. + +POLUS: Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? + +SOCRATES: No, they are only different parts of the same profession. + +POLUS: Of what profession? + +SOCRATES: I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate +to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own +profession. For whether or no this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias +practises I really cannot tell:--from what he was just now saying, nothing +appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a +part of a not very creditable whole. + +GORGIAS: A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me. + +SOCRATES: In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a +part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which +knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word +'flattery'; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is +cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an +experience or routine and not an art:--another part is rhetoric, and the +art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four +branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, +if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is +rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded +to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? +But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I +have first answered, 'What is rhetoric?' For that would not be right, +Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of +flattery is rhetoric? + +POLUS: I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? + +SOCRATES: Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, +is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. + +POLUS: And noble or ignoble? + +SOCRATES: Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call +what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was +saying before. + +GORGIAS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. + +SOCRATES: I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained +myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to +run away. (This is an untranslatable play on the name 'Polus,' which means +'a colt.') + +GORGIAS: Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that +rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. + +SOCRATES: I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am +mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of +bodies and of souls? + +GORGIAS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: You would further admit that there is a good condition of either +of them? + +GORGIAS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Which condition may not be really good, but good only in +appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in +good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first +sight not to be in good health. + +GORGIAS: True. + +SOCRATES: And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in +either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the +reality? + +GORGIAS: Yes, certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I +mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: +there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art +attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be +described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other +medicine. And in politics there is a legislative part, which answers to +gymnastic, as justice does to medicine; and the two parts run into one +another, justice having to do with the same subject as legislation, and +medicine with the same subject as gymnastic, but with a difference. Now, +seeing that there are these four arts, two attending on the body and two on +the soul for their highest good; flattery knowing, or rather guessing their +natures, has distributed herself into four shams or simulations of them; +she puts on the likeness of some one or other of them, and pretends to be +that which she simulates, and having no regard for men's highest interests, +is ever making pleasure the bait of the unwary, and deceiving them into the +belief that she is of the highest value to them. Cookery simulates the +disguise of medicine, and pretends to know what food is the best for the +body; and if the physician and the cook had to enter into a competition in +which children were the judges, or men who had no more sense than children, +as to which of them best understands the goodness or badness of food, the +physician would be starved to death. A flattery I deem this to be and of +an ignoble sort, Polus, for to you I am now addressing myself, because it +aims at pleasure without any thought of the best. An art I do not call it, +but only an experience, because it is unable to explain or to give a reason +of the nature of its own applications. And I do not call any irrational +thing an art; but if you dispute my words, I am prepared to argue in +defence of them. + +Cookery, then, I maintain to be a flattery which takes the form of +medicine; and tiring, in like manner, is a flattery which takes the form of +gymnastic, and is knavish, false, ignoble, illiberal, working deceitfully +by the help of lines, and colours, and enamels, and garments, and making +men affect a spurious beauty to the neglect of the true beauty which is +given by gymnastic. + +I would rather not be tedious, and therefore I will only say, after the +manner of the geometricians (for I think that by this time you will be able +to follow) + +as tiring : gymnastic :: cookery : medicine; + +or rather, + +as tiring : gymnastic :: sophistry : legislation; + +and + +as cookery : medicine :: rhetoric : justice. + +And this, I say, is the natural difference between the rhetorician and the +sophist, but by reason of their near connection, they are apt to be jumbled +up together; neither do they know what to make of themselves, nor do other +men know what to make of them. For if the body presided over itself, and +were not under the guidance of the soul, and the soul did not discern and +discriminate between cookery and medicine, but the body was made the judge +of them, and the rule of judgment was the bodily delight which was given by +them, then the word of Anaxagoras, that word with which you, friend Polus, +are so well acquainted, would prevail far and wide: 'Chaos' would come +again, and cookery, health, and medicine would mingle in an indiscriminate +mass. And now I have told you my notion of rhetoric, which is, in relation +to the soul, what cookery is to the body. I may have been inconsistent in +making a long speech, when I would not allow you to discourse at length. +But I think that I may be excused, because you did not understand me, and +could make no use of my answer when I spoke shortly, and therefore I had to +enter into an explanation. And if I show an equal inability to make use of +yours, I hope that you will speak at equal length; but if I am able to +understand you, let me have the benefit of your brevity, as is only fair: +And now you may do what you please with my answer. + +POLUS: What do you mean? do you think that rhetoric is flattery? + +SOCRATES: Nay, I said a part of flattery; if at your age, Polus, you +cannot remember, what will you do by-and-by, when you get older? + +POLUS: And are the good rhetoricians meanly regarded in states, under the +idea that they are flatterers? + +SOCRATES: Is that a question or the beginning of a speech? + +POLUS: I am asking a question. + +SOCRATES: Then my answer is, that they are not regarded at all. + +POLUS: How not regarded? Have they not very great power in states? + +SOCRATES: Not if you mean to say that power is a good to the possessor. + +POLUS: And that is what I do mean to say. + +SOCRATES: Then, if so, I think that they have the least power of all the +citizens. + +POLUS: What! are they not like tyrants? They kill and despoil and exile +any one whom they please. + +SOCRATES: By the dog, Polus, I cannot make out at each deliverance of +yours, whether you are giving an opinion of your own, or asking a question +of me. + +POLUS: I am asking a question of you. + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but you ask two questions at once. + +POLUS: How two questions? + +SOCRATES: Why, did you not say just now that the rhetoricians are like +tyrants, and that they kill and despoil or exile any one whom they please? + +POLUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: Well then, I say to you that here are two questions in one, and +I will answer both of them. And I tell you, Polus, that rhetoricians and +tyrants have the least possible power in states, as I was just now saying; +for they do literally nothing which they will, but only what they think +best. + +POLUS: And is not that a great power? + +SOCRATES: Polus has already said the reverse. + +POLUS: Said the reverse! nay, that is what I assert. + +SOCRATES: No, by the great--what do you call him?--not you, for you say +that power is a good to him who has the power. + +POLUS: I do. + +SOCRATES: And would you maintain that if a fool does what he thinks best, +this is a good, and would you call this great power? + +POLUS: I should not. + +SOCRATES: Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that +rhetoric is an art and not a flattery--and so you will have refuted me; but +if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think +best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to +congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting +at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil. + +POLUS: Yes; I admit that. + +SOCRATES: How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in +states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as +they will? + +POLUS: This fellow-- + +SOCRATES: I say that they do not do as they will;--now refute me. + +POLUS: Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? + +SOCRATES: And I say so still. + +POLUS: Then surely they do as they will? + +SOCRATES: I deny it. + +POLUS: But they do what they think best? + +SOCRATES: Aye. + +POLUS: That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. + +SOCRATES: Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; +but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error +or give the answer yourself. + +POLUS: Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. + +SOCRATES: Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that +further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, +for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of +the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they +drink? + +POLUS: Clearly, the health. + +SOCRATES: And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not +will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take +the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?--But they will, to have +the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage. + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And is not this universally true? If a man does something for +the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for +the sake of which he does it. + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and +indifferent? + +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, +and their opposites evils? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which +partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of +neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, +stones, and the like:--these are the things which you call neither good nor +evil? + +POLUS: Exactly so. + +SOCRATES: Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or +the good for the sake of the indifferent? + +POLUS: Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. + +SOCRATES: When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the +idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the +sake of the good? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him +of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of +something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other +thing for the sake of which we do them? + +POLUS: Most true. + +SOCRATES: Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to +despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our +good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we +will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good +nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I +not right? + +POLUS: You are right. + +SOCRATES: Hence we may infer, that if any one, whether he be a tyrant or a +rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his +property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really +not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do +you not answer? + +POLUS: Well, I suppose not. + +SOCRATES: Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have +great power in a state? + +POLUS: He will not. + +SOCRATES: Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to +him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? + +POLUS: As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing +what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be +jealous when you saw any one killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he +pleased, Oh, no! + +SOCRATES: Justly or unjustly, do you mean? + +POLUS: In either case is he not equally to be envied? + +SOCRATES: Forbear, Polus! + +POLUS: Why 'forbear'? + +SOCRATES: Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, +but only to pity them. + +POLUS: And are those of whom I spoke wretches? + +SOCRATES: Yes, certainly they are. + +POLUS: And so you think that he who slays any one whom he pleases, and +justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched? + +SOCRATES: No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is +to be envied. + +POLUS: Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he +is also to be pitied; and he is not to be envied if he killed him justly. + +POLUS: At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is +wretched, and to be pitied? + +SOCRATES: Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he +who is justly killed. + +POLUS: How can that be, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the +greatest of evils. + +POLUS: But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil? + +SOCRATES: Certainly not. + +POLUS: Then would you rather suffer than do injustice? + +SOCRATES: I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I +would rather suffer than do. + +POLUS: Then you would not wish to be a tyrant? + +SOCRATES: Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean. + +POLUS: I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to +you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like. + +SOCRATES: Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you +reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger +under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and +become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to +be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and +if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his +head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in +this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you +would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way any one may have great +power--he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes +of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private-- +but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power? + +POLUS: Certainly not such doing as this. + +SOCRATES: But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power? + +POLUS: I can. + +SOCRATES: Why then? + +POLUS: Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished. + +SOCRATES: And punishment is an evil? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is +a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this +is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is +no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:--do we not +acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of +death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and +sometimes not a good? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: About that you and I may be supposed to agree? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that +they are evil--what principle do you lay down? + +POLUS: I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask +that question. + +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I +say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust. + +POLUS: You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute +that statement? + +SOCRATES: Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful +to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I +hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend. + +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events +which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove +that many men who do wrong are happy. + +SOCRATES: What events? + +POLUS: You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the +ruler of Macedonia? + +SOCRATES: At any rate I hear that he is. + +POLUS: And do you think that he is happy or miserable? + +SOCRATES: I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with +him. + +POLUS: And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance +with him, whether a man is happy? + +SOCRATES: Most certainly not. + +POLUS: Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know +whether the great king was a happy man? + +SOCRATES: And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in +the matter of education and justice. + +POLUS: What! and does all happiness consist in this? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who +are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil +are miserable. + +POLUS: Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable? + +SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, if he is wicked. + +POLUS: That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the +throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the +slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict +right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would +have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would +have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been +guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and +master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore +to him the throne which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him +and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with +him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a waggon and carried them +off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when +he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most +miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you +how he showed his remorse? he had a younger brother, a child of seven years +old, who was the legitimate son of Perdiccas, and to him of right the +kingdom belonged; Archelaus, however, had no mind to bring him up as he +ought and restore the kingdom to him; that was not his notion of happiness; +but not long afterwards he threw him into a well and drowned him, and +declared to his mother Cleopatra that he had fallen in while running after +a goose, and had been killed. And now as he is the greatest criminal of +all the Macedonians, he may be supposed to be the most miserable and not +the happiest of them, and I dare say that there are many Athenians, and you +would be at the head of them, who would rather be any other Macedonian than +Archelaus! + +SOCRATES: I praised you at first, Polus, for being a rhetorician rather +than a reasoner. And this, as I suppose, is the sort of argument with +which you fancy that a child might refute me, and by which I stand refuted +when I say that the unjust man is not happy. But, my good friend, where is +the refutation? I cannot admit a word which you have been saying. + +POLUS: That is because you will not; for you surely must think as I do. + +SOCRATES: Not so, my simple friend, but because you will refute me after +the manner which rhetoricians practise in courts of law. For there the one +party think that they refute the other when they bring forward a number of +witnesses of good repute in proof of their allegations, and their adversary +has only a single one or none at all. But this kind of proof is of no +value where truth is the aim; a man may often be sworn down by a multitude +of false witnesses who have a great air of respectability. And in this +argument nearly every one, Athenian and stranger alike, would be on your +side, if you should bring witnesses in disproof of my statement;--you may, +if you will, summon Nicias the son of Niceratus, and let his brothers, who +gave the row of tripods which stand in the precincts of Dionysus, come with +him; or you may summon Aristocrates, the son of Scellius, who is the giver +of that famous offering which is at Delphi; summon, if you will, the whole +house of Pericles, or any other great Athenian family whom you choose;-- +they will all agree with you: I only am left alone and cannot agree, for +you do not convince me; although you produce many false witnesses against +me, in the hope of depriving me of my inheritance, which is the truth. But +I consider that nothing worth speaking of will have been effected by me +unless I make you the one witness of my words; nor by you, unless you make +me the one witness of yours; no matter about the rest of the world. For +there are two ways of refutation, one which is yours and that of the world +in general; but mine is of another sort--let us compare them, and see in +what they differ. For, indeed, we are at issue about matters which to know +is honourable and not to know disgraceful; to know or not to know happiness +and misery--that is the chief of them. And what knowledge can be nobler? +or what ignorance more disgraceful than this? And therefore I will begin +by asking you whether you do not think that a man who is unjust and doing +injustice can be happy, seeing that you think Archelaus unjust, and yet +happy? May I assume this to be your opinion? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But I say that this is an impossibility--here is one point about +which we are at issue:--very good. And do you mean to say also that if he +meets with retribution and punishment he will still be happy? + +POLUS: Certainly not; in that case he will be most miserable. + +SOCRATES: On the other hand, if the unjust be not punished, then, +according to you, he will be happy? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But in my opinion, Polus, the unjust or doer of unjust actions +is miserable in any case,--more miserable, however, if he be not punished +and does not meet with retribution, and less miserable if he be punished +and meets with retribution at the hands of gods and men. + +POLUS: You are maintaining a strange doctrine, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: I shall try to make you agree with me, O my friend, for as a +friend I regard you. Then these are the points at issue between us--are +they not? I was saying that to do is worse than to suffer injustice? + +POLUS: Exactly so. + +SOCRATES: And you said the opposite? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: I said also that the wicked are miserable, and you refuted me? + +POLUS: By Zeus, I did. + +SOCRATES: In your own opinion, Polus. + +POLUS: Yes, and I rather suspect that I was in the right. + +SOCRATES: You further said that the wrong-doer is happy if he be +unpunished? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And I affirm that he is most miserable, and that those who are +punished are less miserable--are you going to refute this proposition also? + +POLUS: A proposition which is harder of refutation than the other, +Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Say rather, Polus, impossible; for who can refute the truth? + +POLUS: What do you mean? If a man is detected in an unjust attempt to +make himself a tyrant, and when detected is racked, mutilated, has his eyes +burned out, and after having had all sorts of great injuries inflicted on +him, and having seen his wife and children suffer the like, is at last +impaled or tarred and burned alive, will he be happier than if he escape +and become a tyrant, and continue all through life doing what he likes and +holding the reins of government, the envy and admiration both of citizens +and strangers? Is that the paradox which, as you say, cannot be refuted? + +SOCRATES: There again, noble Polus, you are raising hobgoblins instead of +refuting me; just now you were calling witnesses against me. But please to +refresh my memory a little; did you say--'in an unjust attempt to make +himself a tyrant'? + +POLUS: Yes, I did. + +SOCRATES: Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other, +--neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the +attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who +escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you +laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation,--when any one says +anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him. + +POLUS: But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently +refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the +company. + +SOCRATES: O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my +tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to +take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. +And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the +company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than +numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof +which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness only of the +truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his +suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do +not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in +turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I +and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than +to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished. + +POLUS: And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for +example, suffer rather than do injustice? + +SOCRATES: Yes, and you, too; I or any man would. + +POLUS: Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man. + +SOCRATES: But will you answer? + +POLUS: To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to +say. + +SOCRATES: Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am +beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is +the worst?--to do injustice or to suffer? + +POLUS: I should say that suffering was worst. + +SOCRATES: And which is the greater disgrace?--Answer. + +POLUS: To do. + +SOCRATES: And the greater disgrace is the greater evil? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the +honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful +things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not +call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, +are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them +gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of +personal beauty? + +POLUS: I cannot. + +SOCRATES: And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were +beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their +use, or of both? + +POLUS: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same +reason? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so +far as they are useful or pleasant or both? + +POLUS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge? + +POLUS: To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring +beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility. + +SOCRATES: And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the +opposite standard of pain and evil? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the +measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to +say, in pleasure or utility or both? + +POLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or +disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil--must it not be so? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But then again, what was the observation which you just now +made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering +wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful? + +POLUS: I did. + +SOCRATES: Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the +more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or +both: does not that also follow? + +POLUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice +exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more +than the injured? + +POLUS: No, Socrates; certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they do not exceed in pain? + +POLUS: No. + +SOCRATES: But if not in pain, then not in both? + +POLUS: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: Then they can only exceed in the other? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, in evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will +therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice? + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: But have not you and the world already agreed that to do +injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And that is now discovered to be more evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a +less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you +nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a +physician without shrinking, and either say 'Yes' or 'No' to me. + +POLUS: I should say 'No.' + +SOCRATES: Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil? + +POLUS: No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, +would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater +evil of the two. + +POLUS: That is the conclusion. + +SOCRATES: You see, Polus, when you compare the two kinds of refutations, +how unlike they are. All men, with the exception of myself, are of your +way of thinking; but your single assent and witness are enough for me,--I +have no need of any other, I take your suffrage, and am regardless of the +rest. Enough of this, and now let us proceed to the next question; which +is, Whether the greatest of evils to a guilty man is to suffer punishment, +as you supposed, or whether to escape punishment is not a greater evil, as +I supposed. Consider:--You would say that to suffer punishment is another +name for being justly corrected when you do wrong? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And would you not allow that all just things are honourable in +so far as they are just? Please to reflect, and tell me your opinion. + +POLUS: Yes, Socrates, I think that they are. + +SOCRATES: Consider again:--Where there is an agent, must there not also be +a patient? + +POLUS: I should say so. + +SOCRATES: And will not the patient suffer that which the agent does, and +will not the suffering have the quality of the action? I mean, for +example, that if a man strikes, there must be something which is stricken? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if the striker strikes violently or quickly, that which is +struck will he struck violently or quickly? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And the suffering to him who is stricken is of the same nature +as the act of him who strikes? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if a man burns, there is something which is burned? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And if he burns in excess or so as to cause pain, the thing +burned will be burned in the same way? + +POLUS: Truly. + +SOCRATES: And if he cuts, the same argument holds--there will be something +cut? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if the cutting be great or deep or such as will cause pain, +the cut will be of the same nature? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Then you would agree generally to the universal proposition +which I was just now asserting: that the affection of the patient answers +to the affection of the agent? + +POLUS: I agree. + +SOCRATES: Then, as this is admitted, let me ask whether being punished is +suffering or acting? + +POLUS: Suffering, Socrates; there can be no doubt of that. + +SOCRATES: And suffering implies an agent? + +POLUS: Certainly, Socrates; and he is the punisher. + +SOCRATES: And he who punishes rightly, punishes justly? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And therefore he acts justly? + +POLUS: Justly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished and suffers retribution, suffers justly? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: And that which is just has been admitted to be honourable? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the punisher does what is honourable, and the punished +suffers what is honourable? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if what is honourable, then what is good, for the honourable +is either pleasant or useful? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished suffers what is good? + +POLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Then he is benefited? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do I understand you to mean what I mean by the term 'benefited'? +I mean, that if he be justly punished his soul is improved. + +POLUS: Surely. + +SOCRATES: Then he who is punished is delivered from the evil of his soul? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And is he not then delivered from the greatest evil? Look at +the matter in this way:--In respect of a man's estate, do you see any +greater evil than poverty? + +POLUS: There is no greater evil. + +SOCRATES: Again, in a man's bodily frame, you would say that the evil is +weakness and disease and deformity? + +POLUS: I should. + +SOCRATES: And do you not imagine that the soul likewise has some evil of +her own? + +POLUS: Of course. + +SOCRATES: And this you would call injustice and ignorance and cowardice, +and the like? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: So then, in mind, body, and estate, which are three, you have +pointed out three corresponding evils--injustice, disease, poverty? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And which of the evils is the most disgraceful?--Is not the most +disgraceful of them injustice, and in general the evil of the soul? + +POLUS: By far the most. + +SOCRATES: And if the most disgraceful, then also the worst? + +POLUS: What do you mean, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I mean to say, that is most disgraceful has been already +admitted to be most painful or hurtful, or both. + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And now injustice and all evil in the soul has been admitted by +us to be most disgraceful? + +POLUS: It has been admitted. + +SOCRATES: And most disgraceful either because most painful and causing +excessive pain, or most hurtful, or both? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And therefore to be unjust and intemperate, and cowardly and +ignorant, is more painful than to be poor and sick? + +POLUS: Nay, Socrates; the painfulness does not appear to me to follow from +your premises. + +SOCRATES: Then, if, as you would argue, not more painful, the evil of the +soul is of all evils the most disgraceful; and the excess of disgrace must +be caused by some preternatural greatness, or extraordinary hurtfulness of +the evil. + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And that which exceeds most in hurtfulness will be the greatest +of evils? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then injustice and intemperance, and in general the depravity of +the soul, are the greatest of evils? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Now, what art is there which delivers us from poverty? Does not +the art of making money? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what art frees us from disease? Does not the art of +medicine? + +POLUS: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And what from vice and injustice? If you are not able to answer +at once, ask yourself whither we go with the sick, and to whom we take +them. + +POLUS: To the physicians, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And to whom do we go with the unjust and intemperate? + +POLUS: To the judges, you mean. + +SOCRATES: --Who are to punish them? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do not those who rightly punish others, punish them in +accordance with a certain rule of justice? + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then the art of money-making frees a man from poverty; medicine +from disease; and justice from intemperance and injustice? + +POLUS: That is evident. + +SOCRATES: Which, then, is the best of these three? + +POLUS: Will you enumerate them? + +SOCRATES: Money-making, medicine, and justice. + +POLUS: Justice, Socrates, far excels the two others. + +SOCRATES: And justice, if the best, gives the greatest pleasure or +advantage or both? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But is the being healed a pleasant thing, and are those who are +being healed pleased? + +POLUS: I think not. + +SOCRATES: A useful thing, then? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Yes, because the patient is delivered from a great evil; and +this is the advantage of enduring the pain--that you get well? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And would he be the happier man in his bodily condition, who is +healed, or who never was out of health? + +POLUS: Clearly he who was never out of health. + +SOCRATES: Yes; for happiness surely does not consist in being delivered +from evils, but in never having had them. + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And suppose the case of two persons who have some evil in their +bodies, and that one of them is healed and delivered from evil, and another +is not healed, but retains the evil--which of them is the most miserable? + +POLUS: Clearly he who is not healed. + +SOCRATES: And was not punishment said by us to be a deliverance from the +greatest of evils, which is vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And justice punishes us, and makes us more just, and is the +medicine of our vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: He, then, has the first place in the scale of happiness who has +never had vice in his soul; for this has been shown to be the greatest of +evils. + +POLUS: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: And he has the second place, who is delivered from vice? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: That is to say, he who receives admonition and rebuke and +punishment? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then he lives worst, who, having been unjust, has no deliverance +from injustice? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: That is, he lives worst who commits the greatest crimes, and +who, being the most unjust of men, succeeds in escaping rebuke or +correction or punishment; and this, as you say, has been accomplished by +Archelaus and other tyrants and rhetoricians and potentates? (Compare +Republic.) + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: May not their way of proceeding, my friend, be compared to the +conduct of a person who is afflicted with the worst of diseases and yet +contrives not to pay the penalty to the physician for his sins against his +constitution, and will not be cured, because, like a child, he is afraid of +the pain of being burned or cut:--Is not that a parallel case? + +POLUS: Yes, truly. + +SOCRATES: He would seem as if he did not know the nature of health and +bodily vigour; and if we are right, Polus, in our previous conclusions, +they are in a like case who strive to evade justice, which they see to be +painful, but are blind to the advantage which ensues from it, not knowing +how far more miserable a companion a diseased soul is than a diseased body; +a soul, I say, which is corrupt and unrighteous and unholy. And hence they +do all that they can to avoid punishment and to avoid being released from +the greatest of evils; they provide themselves with money and friends, and +cultivate to the utmost their powers of persuasion. But if we, Polus, are +right, do you see what follows, or shall we draw out the consequences in +form? + +POLUS: If you please. + +SOCRATES: Is it not a fact that injustice, and the doing of injustice, is +the greatest of evils? + +POLUS: That is quite clear. + +SOCRATES: And further, that to suffer punishment is the way to be released +from this evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And not to suffer, is to perpetuate the evil? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: To do wrong, then, is second only in the scale of evils; but to +do wrong and not to be punished, is first and greatest of all? + +POLUS: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Well, and was not this the point in dispute, my friend? You +deemed Archelaus happy, because he was a very great criminal and +unpunished: I, on the other hand, maintained that he or any other who like +him has done wrong and has not been punished, is, and ought to be, the most +miserable of all men; and that the doer of injustice is more miserable than +the sufferer; and he who escapes punishment, more miserable than he who +suffers.--Was not that what I said? + +POLUS: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And it has been proved to be true? + +POLUS: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, Polus, but if this is true, where is the great use of +rhetoric? If we admit what has been just now said, every man ought in +every way to guard himself against doing wrong, for he will thereby suffer +great evil? + +POLUS: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he, or any one about whom he cares, does wrong, he ought +of his own accord to go where he will be immediately punished; he will run +to the judge, as he would to the physician, in order that the disease of +injustice may not be rendered chronic and become the incurable cancer of +the soul; must we not allow this consequence, Polus, if our former +admissions are to stand:--is any other inference consistent with them? + +POLUS: To that, Socrates, there can be but one answer. + +SOCRATES: Then rhetoric is of no use to us, Polus, in helping a man to +excuse his own injustice, that of his parents or friends, or children or +country; but may be of use to any one who holds that instead of excusing he +ought to accuse--himself above all, and in the next degree his family or +any of his friends who may be doing wrong; he should bring to light the +iniquity and not conceal it, that so the wrong-doer may suffer and be made +whole; and he should even force himself and others not to shrink, but with +closed eyes like brave men to let the physician operate with knife or +searing iron, not regarding the pain, in the hope of attaining the good and +the honourable; let him who has done things worthy of stripes, allow +himself to be scourged, if of bonds, to be bound, if of a fine, to be +fined, if of exile, to be exiled, if of death, to die, himself being the +first to accuse himself and his own relations, and using rhetoric to this +end, that his and their unjust actions may be made manifest, and that they +themselves may be delivered from injustice, which is the greatest evil. +Then, Polus, rhetoric would indeed be useful. Do you say 'Yes' or 'No' to +that? + +POLUS: To me, Socrates, what you are saying appears very strange, though +probably in agreement with your premises. + +SOCRATES: Is not this the conclusion, if the premises are not disproven? + +POLUS: Yes; it certainly is. + +SOCRATES: And from the opposite point of view, if indeed it be our duty to +harm another, whether an enemy or not--I except the case of self-defence-- +then I have to be upon my guard--but if my enemy injures a third person, +then in every sort of way, by word as well as deed, I should try to prevent +his being punished, or appearing before the judge; and if he appears, I +should contrive that he should escape, and not suffer punishment: if he +has stolen a sum of money, let him keep what he has stolen and spend it on +him and his, regardless of religion and justice; and if he have done things +worthy of death, let him not die, but rather be immortal in his wickedness; +or, if this is not possible, let him at any rate be allowed to live as long +as he can. For such purposes, Polus, rhetoric may be useful, but is of +small if of any use to him who is not intending to commit injustice; at +least, there was no such use discovered by us in the previous discussion. + +CALLICLES: Tell me, Chaerephon, is Socrates in earnest, or is he joking? + +CHAEREPHON: I should say, Callicles, that he is in most profound earnest; +but you may well ask him. + +CALLICLES: By the gods, and I will. Tell me, Socrates, are you in +earnest, or only in jest? For if you are in earnest, and what you say is +true, is not the whole of human life turned upside down; and are we not +doing, as would appear, in everything the opposite of what we ought to be +doing? + +SOCRATES: O Callicles, if there were not some community of feelings among +mankind, however varying in different persons--I mean to say, if every +man's feelings were peculiar to himself and were not shared by the rest of +his species--I do not see how we could ever communicate our impressions to +one another. I make this remark because I perceive that you and I have a +common feeling. For we are lovers both, and both of us have two loves +apiece:--I am the lover of Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, and of +philosophy; and you of the Athenian Demus, and of Demus the son of +Pyrilampes. Now, I observe that you, with all your cleverness, do not +venture to contradict your favourite in any word or opinion of his; but as +he changes you change, backwards and forwards. When the Athenian Demus +denies anything that you are saying in the assembly, you go over to his +opinion; and you do the same with Demus, the fair young son of Pyrilampes. +For you have not the power to resist the words and ideas of your loves; and +if a person were to express surprise at the strangeness of what you say +from time to time when under their influence, you would probably reply to +him, if you were honest, that you cannot help saying what your loves say +unless they are prevented; and that you can only be silent when they are. +Now you must understand that my words are an echo too, and therefore you +need not wonder at me; but if you want to silence me, silence philosophy, +who is my love, for she is always telling me what I am now telling you, my +friend; neither is she capricious like my other love, for the son of +Cleinias says one thing to-day and another thing to-morrow, but philosophy +is always true. She is the teacher at whose words you are now wondering, +and you have heard her yourself. Her you must refute, and either show, as +I was saying, that to do injustice and to escape punishment is not the +worst of all evils; or, if you leave her word unrefuted, by the dog the god +of Egypt, I declare, O Callicles, that Callicles will never be at one with +himself, but that his whole life will be a discord. And yet, my friend, I +would rather that my lyre should be inharmonious, and that there should be +no music in the chorus which I provided; aye, or that the whole world +should be at odds with me, and oppose me, rather than that I myself should +be at odds with myself, and contradict myself. + +CALLICLES: O Socrates, you are a regular declaimer, and seem to be running +riot in the argument. And now you are declaiming in this way because Polus +has fallen into the same error himself of which he accused Gorgias:--for he +said that when Gorgias was asked by you, whether, if some one came to him +who wanted to learn rhetoric, and did not know justice, he would teach him +justice, Gorgias in his modesty replied that he would, because he thought +that mankind in general would be displeased if he answered 'No'; and then +in consequence of this admission, Gorgias was compelled to contradict +himself, that being just the sort of thing in which you delight. Whereupon +Polus laughed at you deservedly, as I think; but now he has himself fallen +into the same trap. I cannot say very much for his wit when he conceded to +you that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice, for this was +the admission which led to his being entangled by you; and because he was +too modest to say what he thought, he had his mouth stopped. For the truth +is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, +are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not +natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at +variance with one another: and hence, if a person is too modest to say +what he thinks, he is compelled to contradict himself; and you, in your +ingenuity perceiving the advantage to be thereby gained, slyly ask of him +who is arguing conventionally a question which is to be determined by the +rule of nature; and if he is talking of the rule of nature, you slip away +to custom: as, for instance, you did in this very discussion about doing +and suffering injustice. When Polus was speaking of the conventionally +dishonourable, you assailed him from the point of view of nature; for by +the rule of nature, to suffer injustice is the greater disgrace because the +greater evil; but conventionally, to do evil is the more disgraceful. For +the suffering of injustice is not the part of a man, but of a slave, who +indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled +upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The +reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority who are +weak; and they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to +themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort +of men, and those who are able to get the better of them, in order that +they may not get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is +shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to +have more than his neighbours; for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect +that they are too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have +more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and +is called injustice (compare Republic), whereas nature herself intimates +that it is just for the better to have more than the worse, the more +powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as +among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice +consists in the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior. +For on what principle of justice did Xerxes invade Hellas, or his father +the Scythians? (not to speak of numberless other examples). Nay, but these +are the men who act according to nature; yes, by Heaven, and according to +the law of nature: not, perhaps, according to that artificial law, which +we invent and impose upon our fellows, of whom we take the best and +strongest from their youth upwards, and tame them like young lions,-- +charming them with the sound of the voice, and saying to them, that with +equality they must be content, and that the equal is the honourable and the +just. But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off +and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot +all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against +nature: the slave would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the +light of natural justice would shine forth. And this I take to be the +sentiment of Pindar, when he says in his poem, that + +'Law is the king of all, of mortals as well as of immortals;' + +this, as he says, + +'Makes might to be right, doing violence with highest hand; as I infer from +the deeds of Heracles, for without buying them--' (Fragm. Incert. 151 +(Bockh).) + +--I do not remember the exact words, but the meaning is, that without +buying them, and without their being given to him, he carried off the oxen +of Geryon, according to the law of natural right, and that the oxen and +other possessions of the weaker and inferior properly belong to the +stronger and superior. And this is true, as you may ascertain, if you will +leave philosophy and go on to higher things: for philosophy, Socrates, if +pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, +but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life. Even if a man has good +parts, still, if he carries philosophy into later life, he is necessarily +ignorant of all those things which a gentleman and a person of honour ought +to know; he is inexperienced in the laws of the State, and in the language +which ought to be used in the dealings of man with man, whether private or +public, and utterly ignorant of the pleasures and desires of mankind and of +human character in general. And people of this sort, when they betake +themselves to politics or business, are as ridiculous as I imagine the +politicians to be, when they make their appearance in the arena of +philosophy. For, as Euripides says, + +'Every man shines in that and pursues that, and devotes the greatest +portion of the day to that in which he most excels,' (Antiope, fragm. 20 +(Dindorf).) + +but anything in which he is inferior, he avoids and depreciates, and +praises the opposite from partiality to himself, and because he thinks that +he will thus praise himself. The true principle is to unite them. +Philosophy, as a part of education, is an excellent thing, and there is no +disgrace to a man while he is young in pursuing such a study; but when he +is more advanced in years, the thing becomes ridiculous, and I feel towards +philosophers as I do towards those who lisp and imitate children. For I +love to see a little child, who is not of an age to speak plainly, lisping +at his play; there is an appearance of grace and freedom in his utterance, +which is natural to his childish years. But when I hear some small +creature carefully articulating its words, I am offended; the sound is +disagreeable, and has to my ears the twang of slavery. So when I hear a +man lisping, or see him playing like a child, his behaviour appears to me +ridiculous and unmanly and worthy of stripes. And I have the same feeling +about students of philosophy; when I see a youth thus engaged,--the study +appears to me to be in character, and becoming a man of liberal education, +and him who neglects philosophy I regard as an inferior man, who will never +aspire to anything great or noble. But if I see him continuing the study +in later life, and not leaving off, I should like to beat him, Socrates; +for, as I was saying, such a one, even though he have good natural parts, +becomes effeminate. He flies from the busy centre and the market-place, in +which, as the poet says, men become distinguished; he creeps into a corner +for the rest of his life, and talks in a whisper with three or four +admiring youths, but never speaks out like a freeman in a satisfactory +manner. Now I, Socrates, am very well inclined towards you, and my feeling +may be compared with that of Zethus towards Amphion, in the play of +Euripides, whom I was mentioning just now: for I am disposed to say to you +much what Zethus said to his brother, that you, Socrates, are careless +about the things of which you ought to be careful; and that you + +'Who have a soul so noble, are remarkable for a puerile exterior; +Neither in a court of justice could you state a case, or give any reason or +proof, +Or offer valiant counsel on another's behalf.' + +And you must not be offended, my dear Socrates, for I am speaking out of +good-will towards you, if I ask whether you are not ashamed of being thus +defenceless; which I affirm to be the condition not of you only but of all +those who will carry the study of philosophy too far. For suppose that +some one were to take you, or any one of your sort, off to prison, +declaring that you had done wrong when you had done no wrong, you must +allow that you would not know what to do:--there you would stand giddy and +gaping, and not having a word to say; and when you went up before the +Court, even if the accuser were a poor creature and not good for much, you +would die if he were disposed to claim the penalty of death. And yet, +Socrates, what is the value of + +'An art which converts a man of sense into a fool,' + +who is helpless, and has no power to save either himself or others, when he +is in the greatest danger and is going to be despoiled by his enemies of +all his goods, and has to live, simply deprived of his rights of +citizenship?--he being a man who, if I may use the expression, may be boxed +on the ears with impunity. Then, my good friend, take my advice, and +refute no more: + +'Learn the philosophy of business, and acquire the reputation of wisdom. +But leave to others these niceties,' + +whether they are to be described as follies or absurdities: + +'For they will only +Give you poverty for the inmate of your dwelling.' + +Cease, then, emulating these paltry splitters of words, and emulate only +the man of substance and honour, who is well to do. + +SOCRATES: If my soul, Callicles, were made of gold, should I not rejoice +to discover one of those stones with which they test gold, and the very +best possible one to which I might bring my soul; and if the stone and I +agreed in approving of her training, then I should know that I was in a +satisfactory state, and that no other test was needed by me. + +CALLICLES: What is your meaning, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; I think that I have found in you the desired +touchstone. + +CALLICLES: Why? + +SOCRATES: Because I am sure that if you agree with me in any of the +opinions which my soul forms, I have at last found the truth indeed. For I +consider that if a man is to make a complete trial of the good or evil of +the soul, he ought to have three qualities--knowledge, good-will, +outspokenness, which are all possessed by you. Many whom I meet are unable +to make trial of me, because they are not wise as you are; others are wise, +but they will not tell me the truth, because they have not the same +interest in me which you have; and these two strangers, Gorgias and Polus, +are undoubtedly wise men and my very good friends, but they are not +outspoken enough, and they are too modest. Why, their modesty is so great +that they are driven to contradict themselves, first one and then the other +of them, in the face of a large company, on matters of the highest moment. +But you have all the qualities in which these others are deficient, having +received an excellent education; to this many Athenians can testify. And +you are my friend. Shall I tell you why I think so? I know that you, +Callicles, and Tisander of Aphidnae, and Andron the son of Androtion, and +Nausicydes of the deme of Cholarges, studied together: there were four of +you, and I once heard you advising with one another as to the extent to +which the pursuit of philosophy should be carried, and, as I know, you came +to the conclusion that the study should not be pushed too much into detail. +You were cautioning one another not to be overwise; you were afraid that +too much wisdom might unconsciously to yourselves be the ruin of you. And +now when I hear you giving the same advice to me which you then gave to +your most intimate friends, I have a sufficient evidence of your real good- +will to me. And of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I +am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. +Well then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree +with me in an argument about any point, that point will have been +sufficiently tested by us, and will not require to be submitted to any +further test. For you could not have agreed with me, either from lack of +knowledge or from superfluity of modesty, nor yet from a desire to deceive +me, for you are my friend, as you tell me yourself. And therefore when you +and I are agreed, the result will be the attainment of perfect truth. Now +there is no nobler enquiry, Callicles, than that which you censure me for +making,--What ought the character of a man to be, and what his pursuits, +and how far is he to go, both in maturer years and in youth? For be +assured that if I err in my own conduct I do not err intentionally, but +from ignorance. Do not then desist from advising me, now that you have +begun, until I have learned clearly what this is which I am to practise, +and how I may acquire it. And if you find me assenting to your words, and +hereafter not doing that to which I assented, call me 'dolt,' and deem me +unworthy of receiving further instruction. Once more, then, tell me what +you and Pindar mean by natural justice: Do you not mean that the superior +should take the property of the inferior by force; that the better should +rule the worse, the noble have more than the mean? Am I not right in my +recollection? + +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I was saying, and so I still aver. + +SOCRATES: And do you mean by the better the same as the superior? for I +could not make out what you were saying at the time--whether you meant by +the superior the stronger, and that the weaker must obey the stronger, as +you seemed to imply when you said that great cities attack small ones in +accordance with natural right, because they are superior and stronger, as +though the superior and stronger and better were the same; or whether the +better may be also the inferior and weaker, and the superior the worse, or +whether better is to be defined in the same way as superior:--this is the +point which I want to have cleared up. Are the superior and better and +stronger the same or different? + +CALLICLES: I say unequivocally that they are the same. + +SOCRATES: Then the many are by nature superior to the one, against whom, +as you were saying, they make the laws? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then the laws of the many are the laws of the superior? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then they are the laws of the better; for the superior class are +far better, as you were saying? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And since they are superior, the laws which are made by them are +by nature good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that +justice is equality, and that to do is more disgraceful than to suffer +injustice?--is that so or not? Answer, Callicles, and let no modesty be +found to come in the way; do the many think, or do they not think thus?--I +must beg of you to answer, in order that if you agree with me I may fortify +myself by the assent of so competent an authority. + +CALLICLES: Yes; the opinion of the many is what you say. + +SOCRATES: Then not only custom but nature also affirms that to do is more +disgraceful than to suffer injustice, and that justice is equality; so that +you seem to have been wrong in your former assertion, when accusing me you +said that nature and custom are opposed, and that I, knowing this, was +dishonestly playing between them, appealing to custom when the argument is +about nature, and to nature when the argument is about custom? + +CALLICLES: This man will never cease talking nonsense. At your age, +Socrates, are you not ashamed to be catching at words and chuckling over +some verbal slip? do you not see--have I not told you already, that by +superior I mean better: do you imagine me to say, that if a rabble of +slaves and nondescripts, who are of no use except perhaps for their +physical strength, get together, their ipsissima verba are laws? + +SOCRATES: Ho! my philosopher, is that your line? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: I was thinking, Callicles, that something of the kind must have +been in your mind, and that is why I repeated the question,--What is the +superior? I wanted to know clearly what you meant; for you surely do not +think that two men are better than one, or that your slaves are better than +you because they are stronger? Then please to begin again, and tell me who +the better are, if they are not the stronger; and I will ask you, great +Sir, to be a little milder in your instructions, or I shall have to run +away from you. + +CALLICLES: You are ironical. + +SOCRATES: No, by the hero Zethus, Callicles, by whose aid you were just +now saying many ironical things against me, I am not:--tell me, then, whom +you mean, by the better? + +CALLICLES: I mean the more excellent. + +SOCRATES: Do you not see that you are yourself using words which have no +meaning and that you are explaining nothing?--will you tell me whether you +mean by the better and superior the wiser, or if not, whom? + +CALLICLES: Most assuredly, I do mean the wiser. + +SOCRATES: Then according to you, one wise man may often be superior to ten +thousand fools, and he ought to rule them, and they ought to be his +subjects, and he ought to have more than they should. This is what I +believe that you mean (and you must not suppose that I am word-catching), +if you allow that the one is superior to the ten thousand? + +CALLICLES: Yes; that is what I mean, and that is what I conceive to be +natural justice--that the better and wiser should rule and have more than +the inferior. + +SOCRATES: Stop there, and let me ask you what you would say in this case: +Let us suppose that we are all together as we are now; there are several of +us, and we have a large common store of meats and drinks, and there are all +sorts of persons in our company having various degrees of strength and +weakness, and one of us, being a physician, is wiser in the matter of food +than all the rest, and he is probably stronger than some and not so strong +as others of us--will he not, being wiser, be also better than we are, and +our superior in this matter of food? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Either, then, he will have a larger share of the meats and +drinks, because he is better, or he will have the distribution of all of +them by reason of his authority, but he will not expend or make use of a +larger share of them on his own person, or if he does, he will be punished; +--his share will exceed that of some, and be less than that of others, and +if he be the weakest of all, he being the best of all will have the +smallest share of all, Callicles:--am I not right, my friend? + +CALLICLES: You talk about meats and drinks and physicians and other +nonsense; I am not speaking of them. + +SOCRATES: Well, but do you admit that the wiser is the better? Answer +'Yes' or 'No.' + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And ought not the better to have a larger share? + +CALLICLES: Not of meats and drinks. + +SOCRATES: I understand: then, perhaps, of coats--the skilfullest weaver +ought to have the largest coat, and the greatest number of them, and go +about clothed in the best and finest of them? + +CALLICLES: Fudge about coats! + +SOCRATES: Then the skilfullest and best in making shoes ought to have the +advantage in shoes; the shoemaker, clearly, should walk about in the +largest shoes, and have the greatest number of them? + +CALLICLES: Fudge about shoes! What nonsense are you talking? + +SOCRATES: Or, if this is not your meaning, perhaps you would say that the +wise and good and true husbandman should actually have a larger share of +seeds, and have as much seed as possible for his own land? + +CALLICLES: How you go on, always talking in the same way, Socrates! + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, and also about the same things. + +CALLICLES: Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers +and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument. + +SOCRATES: But why will you not tell me in what a man must be superior and +wiser in order to claim a larger share; will you neither accept a +suggestion, nor offer one? + +CALLICLES: I have already told you. In the first place, I mean by +superiors not cobblers or cooks, but wise politicians who understand the +administration of a state, and who are not only wise, but also valiant and +able to carry out their designs, and not the men to faint from want of +soul. + +SOCRATES: See now, most excellent Callicles, how different my charge +against you is from that which you bring against me, for you reproach me +with always saying the same; but I reproach you with never saying the same +about the same things, for at one time you were defining the better and the +superior to be the stronger, then again as the wiser, and now you bring +forward a new notion; the superior and the better are now declared by you +to be the more courageous: I wish, my good friend, that you would tell me, +once for all, whom you affirm to be the better and superior, and in what +they are better? + +CALLICLES: I have already told you that I mean those who are wise and +courageous in the administration of a state--they ought to be the rulers of +their states, and justice consists in their having more than their +subjects. + +SOCRATES: But whether rulers or subjects will they or will they not have +more than themselves, my friend? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: I mean that every man is his own ruler; but perhaps you think +that there is no necessity for him to rule himself; he is only required to +rule others? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean by his 'ruling over himself'? + +SOCRATES: A simple thing enough; just what is commonly said, that a man +should be temperate and master of himself, and ruler of his own pleasures +and passions. + +CALLICLES: What innocence! you mean those fools,--the temperate? + +SOCRATES: Certainly:--any one may know that to be my meaning. + +CALLICLES: Quite so, Socrates; and they are really fools, for how can a +man be happy who is the servant of anything? On the contrary, I plainly +assert, that he who would truly live ought to allow his desires to wax to +the uttermost, and not to chastise them; but when they have grown to their +greatest he should have courage and intelligence to minister to them and to +satisfy all his longings. And this I affirm to be natural justice and +nobility. To this however the many cannot attain; and they blame the +strong man because they are ashamed of their own weakness, which they +desire to conceal, and hence they say that intemperance is base. As I have +remarked already, they enslave the nobler natures, and being unable to +satisfy their pleasures, they praise temperance and justice out of their +own cowardice. For if a man had been originally the son of a king, or had +a nature capable of acquiring an empire or a tyranny or sovereignty, what +could be more truly base or evil than temperance--to a man like him, I say, +who might freely be enjoying every good, and has no one to stand in his +way, and yet has admitted custom and reason and the opinion of other men to +be lords over him?--must not he be in a miserable plight whom the +reputation of justice and temperance hinders from giving more to his +friends than to his enemies, even though he be a ruler in his city? Nay, +Socrates, for you profess to be a votary of the truth, and the truth is +this:--that luxury and intemperance and licence, if they be provided with +means, are virtue and happiness--all the rest is a mere bauble, agreements +contrary to nature, foolish talk of men, nothing worth. (Compare +Republic.) + +SOCRATES: There is a noble freedom, Callicles, in your way of approaching +the argument; for what you say is what the rest of the world think, but do +not like to say. And I must beg of you to persevere, that the true rule of +human life may become manifest. Tell me, then:--you say, do you not, that +in the rightly-developed man the passions ought not to be controlled, but +that we should let them grow to the utmost and somehow or other satisfy +them, and that this is virtue? + +CALLICLES: Yes; I do. + +SOCRATES: Then those who want nothing are not truly said to be happy? + +CALLICLES: No indeed, for then stones and dead men would be the happiest +of all. + +SOCRATES: But surely life according to your view is an awful thing; and +indeed I think that Euripides may have been right in saying, + +'Who knows if life be not death and death life;' + +and that we are very likely dead; I have heard a philosopher say that at +this moment we are actually dead, and that the body (soma) is our tomb +(sema (compare Phaedr.)), and that the part of the soul which is the seat +of the desires is liable to be tossed about by words and blown up and down; +and some ingenious person, probably a Sicilian or an Italian, playing with +the word, invented a tale in which he called the soul--because of its +believing and make-believe nature--a vessel (An untranslatable pun,--dia to +pithanon te kai pistikon onomase pithon.), and the ignorant he called the +uninitiated or leaky, and the place in the souls of the uninitiated in +which the desires are seated, being the intemperate and incontinent part, +he compared to a vessel full of holes, because it can never be satisfied. +He is not of your way of thinking, Callicles, for he declares, that of all +the souls in Hades, meaning the invisible world (aeides), these uninitiated +or leaky persons are the most miserable, and that they pour water into a +vessel which is full of holes out of a colander which is similarly +perforated. The colander, as my informer assures me, is the soul, and the +soul which he compares to a colander is the soul of the ignorant, which is +likewise full of holes, and therefore incontinent, owing to a bad memory +and want of faith. These notions are strange enough, but they show the +principle which, if I can, I would fain prove to you; that you should +change your mind, and, instead of the intemperate and insatiate life, +choose that which is orderly and sufficient and has a due provision for +daily needs. Do I make any impression on you, and are you coming over to +the opinion that the orderly are happier than the intemperate? Or do I +fail to persuade you, and, however many tales I rehearse to you, do you +continue of the same opinion still? + +CALLICLES: The latter, Socrates, is more like the truth. + +SOCRATES: Well, I will tell you another image, which comes out of the same +school:--Let me request you to consider how far you would accept this as an +account of the two lives of the temperate and intemperate in a figure:-- +There are two men, both of whom have a number of casks; the one man has his +casks sound and full, one of wine, another of honey, and a third of milk, +besides others filled with other liquids, and the streams which fill them +are few and scanty, and he can only obtain them with a great deal of toil +and difficulty; but when his casks are once filled he has no need to feed +them any more, and has no further trouble with them or care about them. +The other, in like manner, can procure streams, though not without +difficulty; but his vessels are leaky and unsound, and night and day he is +compelled to be filling them, and if he pauses for a moment, he is in an +agony of pain. Such are their respective lives:--And now would you say +that the life of the intemperate is happier than that of the temperate? Do +I not convince you that the opposite is the truth? + +CALLICLES: You do not convince me, Socrates, for the one who has filled +himself has no longer any pleasure left; and this, as I was just now +saying, is the life of a stone: he has neither joy nor sorrow after he is +once filled; but the pleasure depends on the superabundance of the influx. + +SOCRATES: But the more you pour in, the greater the waste; and the holes +must be large for the liquid to escape. + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The life which you are now depicting is not that of a dead man, +or of a stone, but of a cormorant; you mean that he is to be hungering and +eating? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he is to be thirsting and drinking? + +CALLICLES: Yes, that is what I mean; he is to have all his desires about +him, and to be able to live happily in the gratification of them. + +SOCRATES: Capital, excellent; go on as you have begun, and have no shame; +I, too, must disencumber myself of shame: and first, will you tell me +whether you include itching and scratching, provided you have enough of +them and pass your life in scratching, in your notion of happiness? + +CALLICLES: What a strange being you are, Socrates! a regular mob-orator. + +SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and Gorgias, +until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you will not be +too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man. And now, +answer my question. + +CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. + +SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I +pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how +you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the +last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, +foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if +they only get enough of what they want? + +CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into +the argument? + +SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, +or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in +whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good +and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure +and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a +good? + +CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they +are the same. + +SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no +longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say +what is contrary to your real opinion. + +CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would +ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the +good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have +been darkly intimated must follow, and many others. + +CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion. + +SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying? + +CALLICLES: Indeed I do. + +SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument? + +CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, 'I am in profound earnest.') + +SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for +me:--There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? + +CALLICLES: There is. + +SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied +knowledge? + +CALLICLES: I was. + +SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things +different from one another? + +CALLICLES: Certainly I was. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or +not the same? + +CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom. + +SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says +that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not +the same, either with one another, or with the good. + +CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say--does he +assent to this, or not? + +SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself +truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed +to each other? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and +disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be +without them both, at the same time? + +CALLICLES: What do you mean? + +SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:--a man may have the +complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the +same time? + +CALLICLES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the +health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both +together? + +CALLICLES: Certainly not. + +SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd? + +CALLICLES: Very. + +SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in +turns? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their +opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare Republic.) + +CALLICLES: Certainly he has. + +SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the +same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil--do we agree? Please not +to answer without consideration. + +CALLICLES: I entirely agree. + +SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.--Did you say that to +hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? + +CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is +pleasant. + +SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful? + +CALLICLES: Yes, very. + +SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all +wants or desires are painful? + +CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are +thirsty, is pleasant? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word +'thirsty' implies pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the word 'drinking' is expressive of pleasure, and of the +satisfaction of the want? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: When you are thirsty? + +SOCRATES: And in pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:--that pleasure and pain are +simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not +simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, +whether of the soul or the body?--which of them is affected cannot be +supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true? + +CALLICLES: It is. + +SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at +the same time? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I did. + +SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same +as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant? + +CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. + +SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. + +CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don't keep fooling: then you will know what +a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. + +SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in +drinking at the same time? + +CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying. + +GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;--we should like to +hear the argument out. + +CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of +Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. + +GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let +Socrates argue in his own fashion. + +CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling +questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. + +SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great +mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this +was not allowable. But to return to our argument:--Does not a man cease +from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease +from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as +you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference? + +SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same +as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation +of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they +are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? +And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could +hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are +not the good good because they have good present with them, as the +beautiful are those who have beauty present with them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were +saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good--would you +not say so? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And a foolish man too? + +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? + +SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer. + +CALLICLES: Yes, I have. + +SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most--the wise or the foolish? + +CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. + +SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the +coward or the brave? + +CALLICLES: I should say 'most' of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced +about equally. + +SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? + +CALLICLES: Greatly. + +SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their +enemies, or are the brave also pained? + +CALLICLES: Both are pained. + +SOCRATES: And are they equally pained? + +CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. + +SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy's departure? + +CALLICLES: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave +all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are +the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and +the cowardly are the bad? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly +equal degree? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, +or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more +pleasure and more pain.) + +CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean. + +SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because +good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures +were goods and pains evils? + +CALLICLES: Yes, I remember. + +SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who +rejoice--if they do rejoice? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with +them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the +presence of evil? + +CALLICLES: I should. + +SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure +and of pain? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy +and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has +more? + +CALLICLES: I should say that he has. + +SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our +admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and +thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to +be good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil +has more of them? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as +the good, or, perhaps, even better?--is not this a further inference which +follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the +pleasant are the same:--can this be denied, Callicles? + +CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; +and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a +child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really +suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good +and others bad? + +SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as +if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as if you +were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you were my +friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have helped. But I see +that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must make the best of a bad +business, as they said of old, and take what I can get out of you.--Well, +then, as I understand you to say, I may assume that some pleasures are good +and others evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the hurtful +are those which do some evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and drinking, +which we were just now mentioning--you mean to say that those which promote +health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and their opposites evil? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil +pains? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and pains? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: But not the evil? + +CALLICLES: Clearly. + +SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all our +actions are to be done for the sake of the good;--and will you agree with +us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and that all our +actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not the good for the +sake of them?--will you add a third vote to our two? + +CALLICLES: I will. + +SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the +sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are +evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail? + +CALLICLES: He must have art. + +SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and Polus; +I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were some +processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better and +worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And I +considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an +experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure, and +that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with the good. +And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles, not to jest, +or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at random and +contrary to your real opinion--for you will observe that we are arguing +about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense at all, what +question can be more serious than this?--whether he should follow after +that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you call the manly +part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating rhetoric, and engaging in +public affairs, according to the principles now in vogue; or whether he +should pursue the life of philosophy;--and in what the latter way differs +from the former. But perhaps we had better first try to distinguish them, +as I did before, and when we have come to an agreement that they are +distinct, we may proceed to consider in what they differ from one another, +and which of them we should choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now +understand what I mean? + +CALLICLES: No, I do not. + +SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and I +have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is such a +thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good, and that the +pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is pleasure, is +different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of the other, which +is good--I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with me thus far +or not--do you agree? + +CALLICLES: I do. + +SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me, and +whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to Gorgias and +Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and not an art at +all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to the nature and +constitution of the patient, and has principles of action and reason in +each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure never regards either the +nature or reason of that pleasure to which she devotes herself, but goes +straight to her end, nor ever considers or calculates anything, but works +by experience and routine, and just preserves the recollection of what she +has usually done when producing pleasure. And first, I would have you +consider whether I have proved what I was saying, and then whether there +are not other similar processes which have to do with the soul--some of +them processes of art, making a provision for the soul's highest interest-- +others despising the interest, and, as in the previous case, considering +only the pleasure of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not +considering what pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to +afford gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there +are such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery, +whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with a +view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And now I +wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this notion, or +whether you differ. + +CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I +shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend +Gorgias. + +SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more? + +CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more. + +SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no regard +for their true interests? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind--or rather, +if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them belong to +the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first place, what say +you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art which seeks only +pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else? + +CALLICLES: I assent. + +SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for example, +the art of playing the lyre at festivals? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic +poetry?--are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias the +son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of his +hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude? + +CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did +he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said to +regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his +audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what +would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of +pleasure? + +CALLICLES: That is my notion of them. + +SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august +personage--what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to +give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and refuse +to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word and song +truths welcome and unwelcome?--which in your judgment is her character? + +CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face +turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience. + +SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were just +now describing as flattery? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm +and metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.) + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be +rhetoricians? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is +addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves. And +this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having the +nature of flattery. + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which +addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other +states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is best, +and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or are they +too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure, forgetting +the public good in the thought of their own interest, playing with the +people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but never considering +whether they are better or worse for this? + +CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of the +public in what they say, while others are such as you describe. + +SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two sorts; +one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the other, which +is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the souls of the +citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome or unwelcome, to +the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric; or if you have, and +can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp, who is he? + +CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such +among the orators who are at present living. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation, who +may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse and made +them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for, indeed, I do +not know of such a man. + +CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man, and +Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom you +heard yourself? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first, +true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and those +of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to +acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of +others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and there +is an art in distinguishing them,--can you tell me of any of these +statesmen who did distinguish them? + +CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot. + +SOCRATES: Yet, surely, Callicles, if you look you will find such a one. +Suppose that we just calmly consider whether any of these was such as I +have described. Will not the good man, who says whatever he says with a +view to the best, speak with a reference to some standard and not at +random; just as all other artists, whether the painter, the builder, the +shipwright, or any other look all of them to their own work, and do not +select and apply at random what they apply, but strive to give a definite +form to it? The artist disposes all things in order, and compels the one +part to harmonize and accord with the other part, until he has constructed +a regular and systematic whole; and this is true of all artists, and in the +same way the trainers and physicians, of whom we spoke before, give order +and regularity to the body: do you deny this? + +CALLICLES: No; I am ready to admit it. + +SOCRATES: Then the house in which order and regularity prevail is good; +that in which there is disorder, evil? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same is true of a ship? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And the same may be said of the human body? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say of the soul? Will the good soul be that +in which disorder is prevalent, or that in which there is harmony and +order? + +CALLICLES: The latter follows from our previous admissions. + +SOCRATES: What is the name which is given to the effect of harmony and +order in the body? + +CALLICLES: I suppose that you mean health and strength? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I do; and what is the name which you would give to the +effect of harmony and order in the soul? Try and discover a name for this +as well as for the other. + +CALLICLES: Why not give the name yourself, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: Well, if you had rather that I should, I will; and you shall say +whether you agree with me, and if not, you shall refute and answer me. +'Healthy,' as I conceive, is the name which is given to the regular order +of the body, whence comes health and every other bodily excellence: is +that true or not? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And 'lawful' and 'law' are the names which are given to the +regular order and action of the soul, and these make men lawful and +orderly:--and so we have temperance and justice: have we not? + +CALLICLES: Granted. + +SOCRATES: And will not the true rhetorician who is honest and understands +his art have his eye fixed upon these, in all the words which he addresses +to the souls of men, and in all his actions, both in what he gives and in +what he takes away? Will not his aim be to implant justice in the souls of +his citizens and take away injustice, to implant temperance and take away +intemperance, to implant every virtue and take away every vice? Do you not +agree? + +CALLICLES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: For what use is there, Callicles, in giving to the body of a +sick man who is in a bad state of health a quantity of the most delightful +food or drink or any other pleasant thing, which may be really as bad for +him as if you gave him nothing, or even worse if rightly estimated. Is not +that true? + +CALLICLES: I will not say No to it. + +SOCRATES: For in my opinion there is no profit in a man's life if his body +is in an evil plight--in that case his life also is evil: am I not right? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: When a man is in health the physicians will generally allow him +to eat when he is hungry and drink when he is thirsty, and to satisfy his +desires as he likes, but when he is sick they hardly suffer him to satisfy +his desires at all: even you will admit that? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same argument hold of the soul, my good sir? +While she is in a bad state and is senseless and intemperate and unjust and +unholy, her desires ought to be controlled, and she ought to be prevented +from doing anything which does not tend to her own improvement. + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Such treatment will be better for the soul herself? + +CALLICLES: To be sure. + +SOCRATES: And to restrain her from her appetites is to chastise her? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then restraint or chastisement is better for the soul than +intemperance or the absence of control, which you were just now preferring? + +CALLICLES: I do not understand you, Socrates, and I wish that you would +ask some one who does. + +SOCRATES: Here is a gentleman who cannot endure to be improved or to +subject himself to that very chastisement of which the argument speaks! + +CALLICLES: I do not heed a word of what you are saying, and have only +answered hitherto out of civility to Gorgias. + +SOCRATES: What are we to do, then? Shall we break off in the middle? + +CALLICLES: You shall judge for yourself. + +SOCRATES: Well, but people say that 'a tale should have a head and not +break off in the middle,' and I should not like to have the argument going +about without a head (compare Laws); please then to go on a little longer, +and put the head on. + +CALLICLES: How tyrannical you are, Socrates! I wish that you and your +argument would rest, or that you would get some one else to argue with you. + +SOCRATES: But who else is willing?--I want to finish the argument. + +CALLICLES: Cannot you finish without my help, either talking straight on, +or questioning and answering yourself? + +SOCRATES: Must I then say with Epicharmus, 'Two men spoke before, but now +one shall be enough'? I suppose that there is absolutely no help. And if +I am to carry on the enquiry by myself, I will first of all remark that not +only I but all of us should have an ambition to know what is true and what +is false in this matter, for the discovery of the truth is a common good. +And now I will proceed to argue according to my own notion. But if any of +you think that I arrive at conclusions which are untrue you must interpose +and refute me, for I do not speak from any knowledge of what I am saying; I +am an enquirer like yourselves, and therefore, if my opponent says anything +which is of force, I shall be the first to agree with him. I am speaking +on the supposition that the argument ought to be completed; but if you +think otherwise let us leave off and go our ways. + +GORGIAS: I think, Socrates, that we should not go our ways until you have +completed the argument; and this appears to me to be the wish of the rest +of the company; I myself should very much like to hear what more you have +to say. + +SOCRATES: I too, Gorgias, should have liked to continue the argument with +Callicles, and then I might have given him an 'Amphion' in return for his +'Zethus'; but since you, Callicles, are unwilling to continue, I hope that +you will listen, and interrupt me if I seem to you to be in error. And if +you refute me, I shall not be angry with you as you are with me, but I +shall inscribe you as the greatest of benefactors on the tablets of my +soul. + +CALLICLES: My good fellow, never mind me, but get on. + +SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, while I recapitulate the argument:--Is the +pleasant the same as the good? Not the same. Callicles and I are agreed +about that. And is the pleasant to be pursued for the sake of the good? or +the good for the sake of the pleasant? The pleasant is to be pursued for +the sake of the good. And that is pleasant at the presence of which we are +pleased, and that is good at the presence of which we are good? To be +sure. And we are good, and all good things whatever are good when some +virtue is present in us or them? That, Callicles, is my conviction. But +the virtue of each thing, whether body or soul, instrument or creature, +when given to them in the best way comes to them not by chance but as the +result of the order and truth and art which are imparted to them: Am I not +right? I maintain that I am. And is not the virtue of each thing +dependent on order or arrangement? Yes, I say. And that which makes a +thing good is the proper order inhering in each thing? Such is my view. +And is not the soul which has an order of her own better than that which +has no order? Certainly. And the soul which has order is orderly? Of +course. And that which is orderly is temperate? Assuredly. And the +temperate soul is good? No other answer can I give, Callicles dear; have +you any? + +CALLICLES: Go on, my good fellow. + +SOCRATES: Then I shall proceed to add, that if the temperate soul is the +good soul, the soul which is in the opposite condition, that is, the +foolish and intemperate, is the bad soul. Very true. + +And will not the temperate man do what is proper, both in relation to the +gods and to men;--for he would not be temperate if he did not? Certainly +he will do what is proper. In his relation to other men he will do what is +just; and in his relation to the gods he will do what is holy; and he who +does what is just and holy must be just and holy? Very true. And must he +not be courageous? for the duty of a temperate man is not to follow or to +avoid what he ought not, but what he ought, whether things or men or +pleasures or pains, and patiently to endure when he ought; and therefore, +Callicles, the temperate man, being, as we have described, also just and +courageous and holy, cannot be other than a perfectly good man, nor can the +good man do otherwise than well and perfectly whatever he does; and he who +does well must of necessity be happy and blessed, and the evil man who does +evil, miserable: now this latter is he whom you were applauding--the +intemperate who is the opposite of the temperate. Such is my position, and +these things I affirm to be true. And if they are true, then I further +affirm that he who desires to be happy must pursue and practise temperance +and run away from intemperance as fast as his legs will carry him: he had +better order his life so as not to need punishment; but if either he or any +of his friends, whether private individual or city, are in need of +punishment, then justice must be done and he must suffer punishment, if he +would be happy. This appears to me to be the aim which a man ought to +have, and towards which he ought to direct all the energies both of himself +and of the state, acting so that he may have temperance and justice present +with him and be happy, not suffering his lusts to be unrestrained, and in +the never-ending desire satisfy them leading a robber's life. Such a one +is the friend neither of God nor man, for he is incapable of communion, and +he who is incapable of communion is also incapable of friendship. And +philosophers tell us, Callicles, that communion and friendship and +orderliness and temperance and justice bind together heaven and earth and +gods and men, and that this universe is therefore called Cosmos or order, +not disorder or misrule, my friend. But although you are a philosopher you +seem to me never to have observed that geometrical equality is mighty, both +among gods and men; you think that you ought to cultivate inequality or +excess, and do not care about geometry.--Well, then, either the principle +that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance, +and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice, must be refuted, or, +if it is granted, what will be the consequences? All the consequences +which I drew before, Callicles, and about which you asked me whether I was +in earnest when I said that a man ought to accuse himself and his son and +his friend if he did anything wrong, and that to this end he should use his +rhetoric--all those consequences are true. And that which you thought that +Polus was led to admit out of modesty is true, viz., that, to do injustice, +if more disgraceful than to suffer, is in that degree worse; and the other +position, which, according to Polus, Gorgias admitted out of modesty, that +he who would truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and have a knowledge +of justice, has also turned out to be true. + +And now, these things being as we have said, let us proceed in the next +place to consider whether you are right in throwing in my teeth that I am +unable to help myself or any of my friends or kinsmen, or to save them in +the extremity of danger, and that I am in the power of another like an +outlaw to whom any one may do what he likes,--he may box my ears, which was +a brave saying of yours; or take away my goods or banish me, or even do his +worst and kill me; a condition which, as you say, is the height of +disgrace. My answer to you is one which has been already often repeated, +but may as well be repeated once more. I tell you, Callicles, that to be +boxed on the ears wrongfully is not the worst evil which can befall a man, +nor to have my purse or my body cut open, but that to smite and slay me and +mine wrongfully is far more disgraceful and more evil; aye, and to despoil +and enslave and pillage, or in any way at all to wrong me and mine, is far +more disgraceful and evil to the doer of the wrong than to me who am the +sufferer. These truths, which have been already set forth as I state them +in the previous discussion, would seem now to have been fixed and riveted +by us, if I may use an expression which is certainly bold, in words which +are like bonds of iron and adamant; and unless you or some other still more +enterprising hero shall break them, there is no possibility of denying what +I say. For my position has always been, that I myself am ignorant how +these things are, but that I have never met any one who could say +otherwise, any more than you can, and not appear ridiculous. This is my +position still, and if what I am saying is true, and injustice is the +greatest of evils to the doer of injustice, and yet there is if possible a +greater than this greatest of evils (compare Republic), in an unjust man +not suffering retribution, what is that defence of which the want will make +a man truly ridiculous? Must not the defence be one which will avert the +greatest of human evils? And will not the worst of all defences be that +with which a man is unable to defend himself or his family or his friends? +--and next will come that which is unable to avert the next greatest evil; +thirdly that which is unable to avert the third greatest evil; and so of +other evils. As is the greatness of evil so is the honour of being able to +avert them in their several degrees, and the disgrace of not being able to +avert them. Am I not right Callicles? + +CALLICLES: Yes, quite right. + +SOCRATES: Seeing then that there are these two evils, the doing injustice +and the suffering injustice--and we affirm that to do injustice is a +greater, and to suffer injustice a lesser evil--by what devices can a man +succeed in obtaining the two advantages, the one of not doing and the other +of not suffering injustice? must he have the power, or only the will to +obtain them? I mean to ask whether a man will escape injustice if he has +only the will to escape, or must he have provided himself with the power? + +CALLICLES: He must have provided himself with the power; that is clear. + +SOCRATES: And what do you say of doing injustice? Is the will only +sufficient, and will that prevent him from doing injustice, or must he have +provided himself with power and art; and if he have not studied and +practised, will he be unjust still? Surely you might say, Callicles, +whether you think that Polus and I were right in admitting the conclusion +that no one does wrong voluntarily, but that all do wrong against their +will? + +CALLICLES: Granted, Socrates, if you will only have done. + +SOCRATES: Then, as would appear, power and art have to be provided in +order that we may do no injustice? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And what art will protect us from suffering injustice, if not +wholly, yet as far as possible? I want to know whether you agree with me; +for I think that such an art is the art of one who is either a ruler or +even tyrant himself, or the equal and companion of the ruling power. + +CALLICLES: Well said, Socrates; and please to observe how ready I am to +praise you when you talk sense. + +SOCRATES: Think and tell me whether you would approve of another view of +mine: To me every man appears to be most the friend of him who is most +like to him--like to like, as ancient sages say: Would you not agree to +this? + +CALLICLES: I should. + +SOCRATES: But when the tyrant is rude and uneducated, he may be expected +to fear any one who is his superior in virtue, and will never be able to be +perfectly friendly with him. + +CALLICLES: That is true. + +SOCRATES: Neither will he be the friend of any one who is greatly his +inferior, for the tyrant will despise him, and will never seriously regard +him as a friend. + +CALLICLES: That again is true. + +SOCRATES: Then the only friend worth mentioning, whom the tyrant can have, +will be one who is of the same character, and has the same likes and +dislikes, and is at the same time willing to be subject and subservient to +him; he is the man who will have power in the state, and no one will injure +him with impunity:--is not that so? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if a young man begins to ask how he may become great and +formidable, this would seem to be the way--he will accustom himself, from +his youth upward, to feel sorrow and joy on the same occasions as his +master, and will contrive to be as like him as possible? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And in this way he will have accomplished, as you and your +friends would say, the end of becoming a great man and not suffering +injury? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: But will he also escape from doing injury? Must not the very +opposite be true,--if he is to be like the tyrant in his injustice, and to +have influence with him? Will he not rather contrive to do as much wrong +as possible, and not be punished? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And by the imitation of his master and by the power which he +thus acquires will not his soul become bad and corrupted, and will not this +be the greatest evil to him? + +CALLICLES: You always contrive somehow or other, Socrates, to invert +everything: do you not know that he who imitates the tyrant will, if he +has a mind, kill him who does not imitate him and take away his goods? + +SOCRATES: Excellent Callicles, I am not deaf, and I have heard that a +great many times from you and from Polus and from nearly every man in the +city, but I wish that you would hear me too. I dare say that he will kill +him if he has a mind--the bad man will kill the good and true. + +CALLICLES: And is not that just the provoking thing? + +SOCRATES: Nay, not to a man of sense, as the argument shows: do you think +that all our cares should be directed to prolonging life to the uttermost, +and to the study of those arts which secure us from danger always; like +that art of rhetoric which saves men in courts of law, and which you advise +me to cultivate? + +CALLICLES: Yes, truly, and very good advice too. + +SOCRATES: Well, my friend, but what do you think of swimming; is that an +art of any great pretensions? + +CALLICLES: No, indeed. + +SOCRATES: And yet surely swimming saves a man from death, and there are +occasions on which he must know how to swim. And if you despise the +swimmers, I will tell you of another and greater art, the art of the pilot, +who not only saves the souls of men, but also their bodies and properties +from the extremity of danger, just like rhetoric. Yet his art is modest +and unpresuming: it has no airs or pretences of doing anything +extraordinary, and, in return for the same salvation which is given by the +pleader, demands only two obols, if he brings us from Aegina to Athens, or +for the longer voyage from Pontus or Egypt, at the utmost two drachmae, +when he has saved, as I was just now saying, the passenger and his wife and +children and goods, and safely disembarked them at the Piraeus,--this is +the payment which he asks in return for so great a boon; and he who is the +master of the art, and has done all this, gets out and walks about on the +sea-shore by his ship in an unassuming way. For he is able to reflect and +is aware that he cannot tell which of his fellow-passengers he has +benefited, and which of them he has injured in not allowing them to be +drowned. He knows that they are just the same when he has disembarked them +as when they embarked, and not a whit better either in their bodies or in +their souls; and he considers that if a man who is afflicted by great and +incurable bodily diseases is only to be pitied for having escaped, and is +in no way benefited by him in having been saved from drowning, much less he +who has great and incurable diseases, not of the body, but of the soul, +which is the more valuable part of him; neither is life worth having nor of +any profit to the bad man, whether he be delivered from the sea, or the +law-courts, or any other devourer;--and so he reflects that such a one had +better not live, for he cannot live well. (Compare Republic.) + +And this is the reason why the pilot, although he is our saviour, is not +usually conceited, any more than the engineer, who is not at all behind +either the general, or the pilot, or any one else, in his saving power, for +he sometimes saves whole cities. Is there any comparison between him and +the pleader? And if he were to talk, Callicles, in your grandiose style, +he would bury you under a mountain of words, declaring and insisting that +we ought all of us to be engine-makers, and that no other profession is +worth thinking about; he would have plenty to say. Nevertheless you +despise him and his art, and sneeringly call him an engine-maker, and you +will not allow your daughters to marry his son, or marry your son to his +daughters. And yet, on your principle, what justice or reason is there in +your refusal? What right have you to despise the engine-maker, and the +others whom I was just now mentioning? I know that you will say, 'I am +better, and better born.' But if the better is not what I say, and virtue +consists only in a man saving himself and his, whatever may be his +character, then your censure of the engine-maker, and of the physician, and +of the other arts of salvation, is ridiculous. O my friend! I want you to +see that the noble and the good may possibly be something different from +saving and being saved:--May not he who is truly a man cease to care about +living a certain time?--he knows, as women say, that no man can escape +fate, and therefore he is not fond of life; he leaves all that with God, +and considers in what way he can best spend his appointed term;--whether by +assimilating himself to the constitution under which he lives, as you at +this moment have to consider how you may become as like as possible to the +Athenian people, if you mean to be in their good graces, and to have power +in the state; whereas I want you to think and see whether this is for the +interest of either of us;--I would not have us risk that which is dearest +on the acquisition of this power, like the Thessalian enchantresses, who, +as they say, bring down the moon from heaven at the risk of their own +perdition. But if you suppose that any man will show you the art of +becoming great in the city, and yet not conforming yourself to the ways of +the city, whether for better or worse, then I can only say that you are +mistaken, Callides; for he who would deserve to be the true natural friend +of the Athenian Demus, aye, or of Pyrilampes' darling who is called after +them, must be by nature like them, and not an imitator only. He, then, who +will make you most like them, will make you as you desire, a statesman and +orator: for every man is pleased when he is spoken to in his own language +and spirit, and dislikes any other. But perhaps you, sweet Callicles, may +be of another mind. What do you say? + +CALLICLES: Somehow or other your words, Socrates, always appear to me to +be good words; and yet, like the rest of the world, I am not quite +convinced by them. (Compare Symp.: 1 Alcib.) + +SOCRATES: The reason is, Callicles, that the love of Demus which abides in +your soul is an adversary to me; but I dare say that if we recur to these +same matters, and consider them more thoroughly, you may be convinced for +all that. Please, then, to remember that there are two processes of +training all things, including body and soul; in the one, as we said, we +treat them with a view to pleasure, and in the other with a view to the +highest good, and then we do not indulge but resist them: was not that the +distinction which we drew? + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And the one which had pleasure in view was just a vulgar +flattery:--was not that another of our conclusions? + +CALLICLES: Be it so, if you will have it. + +SOCRATES: And the other had in view the greatest improvement of that which +was ministered to, whether body or soul? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And must we not have the same end in view in the treatment of +our city and citizens? Must we not try and make them as good as possible? +For we have already discovered that there is no use in imparting to them +any other good, unless the mind of those who are to have the good, whether +money, or office, or any other sort of power, be gentle and good. Shall we +say that? + +CALLICLES: Yes, certainly, if you like. + +SOCRATES: Well, then, if you and I, Callicles, were intending to set about +some public business, and were advising one another to undertake buildings, +such as walls, docks or temples of the largest size, ought we not to +examine ourselves, first, as to whether we know or do not know the art of +building, and who taught us?--would not that be necessary, Callicles? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: In the second place, we should have to consider whether we had +ever constructed any private house, either of our own or for our friends, +and whether this building of ours was a success or not; and if upon +consideration we found that we had had good and eminent masters, and had +been successful in constructing many fine buildings, not only with their +assistance, but without them, by our own unaided skill--in that case +prudence would not dissuade us from proceeding to the construction of +public works. But if we had no master to show, and only a number of +worthless buildings or none at all, then, surely, it would be ridiculous in +us to attempt public works, or to advise one another to undertake them. Is +not this true? + +CALLICLES: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And does not the same hold in all other cases? If you and I +were physicians, and were advising one another that we were competent to +practise as state-physicians, should I not ask about you, and would you not +ask about me, Well, but how about Socrates himself, has he good health? and +was any one else ever known to be cured by him, whether slave or freeman? +And I should make the same enquiries about you. And if we arrived at the +conclusion that no one, whether citizen or stranger, man or woman, had ever +been any the better for the medical skill of either of us, then, by Heaven, +Callicles, what an absurdity to think that we or any human being should be +so silly as to set up as state-physicians and advise others like ourselves +to do the same, without having first practised in private, whether +successfully or not, and acquired experience of the art! Is not this, as +they say, to begin with the big jar when you are learning the potter's art; +which is a foolish thing? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And now, my friend, as you are already beginning to be a public +character, and are admonishing and reproaching me for not being one, +suppose that we ask a few questions of one another. Tell me, then, +Callicles, how about making any of the citizens better? Was there ever a +man who was once vicious, or unjust, or intemperate, or foolish, and became +by the help of Callicles good and noble? Was there ever such a man, +whether citizen or stranger, slave or freeman? Tell me, Callicles, if a +person were to ask these questions of you, what would you answer? Whom +would you say that you had improved by your conversation? There may have +been good deeds of this sort which were done by you as a private person, +before you came forward in public. Why will you not answer? + +CALLICLES: You are contentious, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Nay, I ask you, not from a love of contention, but because I +really want to know in what way you think that affairs should be +administered among us--whether, when you come to the administration of +them, you have any other aim but the improvement of the citizens? Have we +not already admitted many times over that such is the duty of a public man? +Nay, we have surely said so; for if you will not answer for yourself I must +answer for you. But if this is what the good man ought to effect for the +benefit of his own state, allow me to recall to you the names of those whom +you were just now mentioning, Pericles, and Cimon, and Miltiades, and +Themistocles, and ask whether you still think that they were good citizens. + +CALLICLES: I do. + +SOCRATES: But if they were good, then clearly each of them must have made +the citizens better instead of worse? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And, therefore, when Pericles first began to speak in the +assembly, the Athenians were not so good as when he spoke last? + +CALLICLES: Very likely. + +SOCRATES: Nay, my friend, 'likely' is not the word; for if he was a good +citizen, the inference is certain. + +CALLICLES: And what difference does that make? + +SOCRATES: None; only I should like further to know whether the Athenians +are supposed to have been made better by Pericles, or, on the contrary, to +have been corrupted by him; for I hear that he was the first who gave the +people pay, and made them idle and cowardly, and encouraged them in the +love of talk and money. + +CALLICLES: You heard that, Socrates, from the laconising set who bruise +their ears. + +SOCRATES: But what I am going to tell you now is not mere hearsay, but +well known both to you and me: that at first, Pericles was glorious and +his character unimpeached by any verdict of the Athenians--this was during +the time when they were not so good--yet afterwards, when they had been +made good and gentle by him, at the very end of his life they convicted him +of theft, and almost put him to death, clearly under the notion that he was +a malefactor. + +CALLICLES: Well, but how does that prove Pericles' badness? + +SOCRATES: Why, surely you would say that he was a bad manager of asses or +horses or oxen, who had received them originally neither kicking nor +butting nor biting him, and implanted in them all these savage tricks? +Would he not be a bad manager of any animals who received them gentle, and +made them fiercer than they were when he received them? What do you say? + +CALLICLES: I will do you the favour of saying 'yes.' + +SOCRATES: And will you also do me the favour of saying whether man is an +animal? + +CALLICLES: Certainly he is. + +SOCRATES: And was not Pericles a shepherd of men? + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And if he was a good political shepherd, ought not the animals +who were his subjects, as we were just now acknowledging, to have become +more just, and not more unjust? + +CALLICLES: Quite true. + +SOCRATES: And are not just men gentle, as Homer says?--or are you of +another mind? + +CALLICLES: I agree. + +SOCRATES: And yet he really did make them more savage than he received +them, and their savageness was shown towards himself; which he must have +been very far from desiring. + +CALLICLES: Do you want me to agree with you? + +SOCRATES: Yes, if I seem to you to speak the truth. + +CALLICLES: Granted then. + +SOCRATES: And if they were more savage, must they not have been more +unjust and inferior? + +CALLICLES: Granted again. + +SOCRATES: Then upon this view, Pericles was not a good statesman? + +CALLICLES: That is, upon your view. + +SOCRATES: Nay, the view is yours, after what you have admitted. Take the +case of Cimon again. Did not the very persons whom he was serving +ostracize him, in order that they might not hear his voice for ten years? +and they did just the same to Themistocles, adding the penalty of exile; +and they voted that Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, should be thrown into +the pit of death, and he was only saved by the Prytanis. And yet, if they +had been really good men, as you say, these things would never have +happened to them. For the good charioteers are not those who at first keep +their place, and then, when they have broken-in their horses, and +themselves become better charioteers, are thrown out--that is not the way +either in charioteering or in any profession.--What do you think? + +CALLICLES: I should think not. + +SOCRATES: Well, but if so, the truth is as I have said already, that in +the Athenian State no one has ever shown himself to be a good statesman-- +you admitted that this was true of our present statesmen, but not true of +former ones, and you preferred them to the others; yet they have turned out +to be no better than our present ones; and therefore, if they were +rhetoricians, they did not use the true art of rhetoric or of flattery, or +they would not have fallen out of favour. + +CALLICLES: But surely, Socrates, no living man ever came near any one of +them in his performances. + +SOCRATES: O, my dear friend, I say nothing against them regarded as the +serving-men of the State; and I do think that they were certainly more +serviceable than those who are living now, and better able to gratify the +wishes of the State; but as to transforming those desires and not allowing +them to have their way, and using the powers which they had, whether of +persuasion or of force, in the improvement of their fellow citizens, which +is the prime object of the truly good citizen, I do not see that in these +respects they were a whit superior to our present statesmen, although I do +admit that they were more clever at providing ships and walls and docks, +and all that. You and I have a ridiculous way, for during the whole time +that we are arguing, we are always going round and round to the same point, +and constantly misunderstanding one another. If I am not mistaken, you +have admitted and acknowledged more than once, that there are two kinds of +operations which have to do with the body, and two which have to do with +the soul: one of the two is ministerial, and if our bodies are hungry +provides food for them, and if they are thirsty gives them drink, or if +they are cold supplies them with garments, blankets, shoes, and all that +they crave. I use the same images as before intentionally, in order that +you may understand me the better. The purveyor of the articles may provide +them either wholesale or retail, or he may be the maker of any of them,-- +the baker, or the cook, or the weaver, or the shoemaker, or the currier; +and in so doing, being such as he is, he is naturally supposed by himself +and every one to minister to the body. For none of them know that there is +another art--an art of gymnastic and medicine which is the true minister of +the body, and ought to be the mistress of all the rest, and to use their +results according to the knowledge which she has and they have not, of the +real good or bad effects of meats and drinks on the body. All other arts +which have to do with the body are servile and menial and illiberal; and +gymnastic and medicine are, as they ought to be, their mistresses. Now, +when I say that all this is equally true of the soul, you seem at first to +know and understand and assent to my words, and then a little while +afterwards you come repeating, Has not the State had good and noble +citizens? and when I ask you who they are, you reply, seemingly quite in +earnest, as if I had asked, Who are or have been good trainers?--and you +had replied, Thearion, the baker, Mithoecus, who wrote the Sicilian +cookery-book, Sarambus, the vintner: these are ministers of the body, +first-rate in their art; for the first makes admirable loaves, the second +excellent dishes, and the third capital wine;--to me these appear to be the +exact parallel of the statesmen whom you mention. Now you would not be +altogether pleased if I said to you, My friend, you know nothing of +gymnastics; those of whom you are speaking to me are only the ministers and +purveyors of luxury, who have no good or noble notions of their art, and +may very likely be filling and fattening men's bodies and gaining their +approval, although the result is that they lose their original flesh in the +long run, and become thinner than they were before; and yet they, in their +simplicity, will not attribute their diseases and loss of flesh to their +entertainers; but when in after years the unhealthy surfeit brings the +attendant penalty of disease, he who happens to be near them at the time, +and offers them advice, is accused and blamed by them, and if they could +they would do him some harm; while they proceed to eulogize the men who +have been the real authors of the mischief. And that, Callicles, is just +what you are now doing. You praise the men who feasted the citizens and +satisfied their desires, and people say that they have made the city great, +not seeing that the swollen and ulcerated condition of the State is to be +attributed to these elder statesmen; for they have filled the city full of +harbours and docks and walls and revenues and all that, and have left no +room for justice and temperance. And when the crisis of the disorder +comes, the people will blame the advisers of the hour, and applaud +Themistocles and Cimon and Pericles, who are the real authors of their +calamities; and if you are not careful they may assail you and my friend +Alcibiades, when they are losing not only their new acquisitions, but also +their original possessions; not that you are the authors of these +misfortunes of theirs, although you may perhaps be accessories to them. A +great piece of work is always being made, as I see and am told, now as of +old; about our statesmen. When the State treats any of them as +malefactors, I observe that there is a great uproar and indignation at the +supposed wrong which is done to them; 'after all their many services to the +State, that they should unjustly perish,'--so the tale runs. But the cry +is all a lie; for no statesman ever could be unjustly put to death by the +city of which he is the head. The case of the professed statesman is, I +believe, very much like that of the professed sophist; for the sophists, +although they are wise men, are nevertheless guilty of a strange piece of +folly; professing to be teachers of virtue, they will often accuse their +disciples of wronging them, and defrauding them of their pay, and showing +no gratitude for their services. Yet what can be more absurd than that men +who have become just and good, and whose injustice has been taken away from +them, and who have had justice implanted in them by their teachers, should +act unjustly by reason of the injustice which is not in them? Can anything +be more irrational, my friends, than this? You, Callicles, compel me to be +a mob-orator, because you will not answer. + +CALLICLES: And you are the man who cannot speak unless there is some one +to answer? + +SOCRATES: I suppose that I can; just now, at any rate, the speeches which +I am making are long enough because you refuse to answer me. But I adjure +you by the god of friendship, my good sir, do tell me whether there does +not appear to you to be a great inconsistency in saying that you have made +a man good, and then blaming him for being bad? + +CALLICLES: Yes, it appears so to me. + +SOCRATES: Do you never hear our professors of education speaking in this +inconsistent manner? + +CALLICLES: Yes, but why talk of men who are good for nothing? + +SOCRATES: I would rather say, why talk of men who profess to be rulers, +and declare that they are devoted to the improvement of the city, and +nevertheless upon occasion declaim against the utter vileness of the city: +--do you think that there is any difference between one and the other? My +good friend, the sophist and the rhetorician, as I was saying to Polus, are +the same, or nearly the same; but you ignorantly fancy that rhetoric is a +perfect thing, and sophistry a thing to be despised; whereas the truth is, +that sophistry is as much superior to rhetoric as legislation is to the +practice of law, or gymnastic to medicine. The orators and sophists, as I +am inclined to think, are the only class who cannot complain of the +mischief ensuing to themselves from that which they teach others, without +in the same breath accusing themselves of having done no good to those whom +they profess to benefit. Is not this a fact? + +CALLICLES: Certainly it is. + +SOCRATES: If they were right in saying that they make men better, then +they are the only class who can afford to leave their remuneration to those +who have been benefited by them. Whereas if a man has been benefited in +any other way, if, for example, he has been taught to run by a trainer, he +might possibly defraud him of his pay, if the trainer left the matter to +him, and made no agreement with him that he should receive money as soon as +he had given him the utmost speed; for not because of any deficiency of +speed do men act unjustly, but by reason of injustice. + +CALLICLES: Very true. + +SOCRATES: And he who removes injustice can be in no danger of being +treated unjustly: he alone can safely leave the honorarium to his pupils, +if he be really able to make them good--am I not right? (Compare Protag.) + +CALLICLES: Yes. + +SOCRATES: Then we have found the reason why there is no dishonour in a man +receiving pay who is called in to advise about building or any other art? + +CALLICLES: Yes, we have found the reason. + +SOCRATES: But when the point is, how a man may become best himself, and +best govern his family and state, then to say that you will give no advice +gratis is held to be dishonourable? + +CALLICLES: True. + +SOCRATES: And why? Because only such benefits call forth a desire to +requite them, and there is evidence that a benefit has been conferred when +the benefactor receives a return; otherwise not. Is this true? + +CALLICLES: It is. + +SOCRATES: Then to which service of the State do you invite me? determine +for me. Am I to be the physician of the State who will strive and struggle +to make the Athenians as good as possible; or am I to be the servant and +flatterer of the State? Speak out, my good friend, freely and fairly as +you did at first and ought to do again, and tell me your entire mind. + +CALLICLES: I say then that you should be the servant of the State. + +SOCRATES: The flatterer? well, sir, that is a noble invitation. + +CALLICLES: The Mysian, Socrates, or what you please. For if you refuse, +the consequences will be-- + +SOCRATES: Do not repeat the old story--that he who likes will kill me and +get my money; for then I shall have to repeat the old answer, that he will +be a bad man and will kill the good, and that the money will be of no use +to him, but that he will wrongly use that which he wrongly took, and if +wrongly, basely, and if basely, hurtfully. + +CALLICLES: How confident you are, Socrates, that you will never come to +harm! you seem to think that you are living in another country, and can +never be brought into a court of justice, as you very likely may be brought +by some miserable and mean person. + +SOCRATES: Then I must indeed be a fool, Callicles, if I do not know that +in the Athenian State any man may suffer anything. And if I am brought to +trial and incur the dangers of which you speak, he will be a villain who +brings me to trial--of that I am very sure, for no good man would accuse +the innocent. Nor shall I be surprised if I am put to death. Shall I tell +you why I anticipate this? + +CALLICLES: By all means. + +SOCRATES: I think that I am the only or almost the only Athenian living +who practises the true art of politics; I am the only politician of my +time. Now, seeing that when I speak my words are not uttered with any view +of gaining favour, and that I look to what is best and not to what is most +pleasant, having no mind to use those arts and graces which you recommend, +I shall have nothing to say in the justice court. And you might argue with +me, as I was arguing with Polus:--I shall be tried just as a physician +would be tried in a court of little boys at the indictment of the cook. +What would he reply under such circumstances, if some one were to accuse +him, saying, 'O my boys, many evil things has this man done to you: he is +the death of you, especially of the younger ones among you, cutting and +burning and starving and suffocating you, until you know not what to do; he +gives you the bitterest potions, and compels you to hunger and thirst. How +unlike the variety of meats and sweets on which I feasted you!' What do +you suppose that the physician would be able to reply when he found himself +in such a predicament? If he told the truth he could only say, 'All these +evil things, my boys, I did for your health,' and then would there not just +be a clamour among a jury like that? How they would cry out! + +CALLICLES: I dare say. + +SOCRATES: Would he not be utterly at a loss for a reply? + +CALLICLES: He certainly would. + +SOCRATES: And I too shall be treated in the same way, as I well know, if I +am brought before the court. For I shall not be able to rehearse to the +people the pleasures which I have procured for them, and which, although I +am not disposed to envy either the procurers or enjoyers of them, are +deemed by them to be benefits and advantages. And if any one says that I +corrupt young men, and perplex their minds, or that I speak evil of old +men, and use bitter words towards them, whether in private or public, it is +useless for me to reply, as I truly might:--'All this I do for the sake of +justice, and with a view to your interest, my judges, and to nothing else.' +And therefore there is no saying what may happen to me. + +CALLICLES: And do you think, Socrates, that a man who is thus defenceless +is in a good position? + +SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, if he have that defence, which as you have often +acknowledged he should have--if he be his own defence, and have never said +or done anything wrong, either in respect of gods or men; and this has been +repeatedly acknowledged by us to be the best sort of defence. And if any +one could convict me of inability to defend myself or others after this +sort, I should blush for shame, whether I was convicted before many, or +before a few, or by myself alone; and if I died from want of ability to do +so, that would indeed grieve me. But if I died because I have no powers of +flattery or rhetoric, I am very sure that you would not find me repining at +death. For no man who is not an utter fool and coward is afraid of death +itself, but he is afraid of doing wrong. For to go to the world below +having one's soul full of injustice is the last and worst of all evils. +And in proof of what I say, if you have no objection, I should like to tell +you a story. + +CALLICLES: Very well, proceed; and then we shall have done. + +SOCRATES: Listen, then, as story-tellers say, to a very pretty tale, which +I dare say that you may be disposed to regard as a fable only, but which, +as I believe, is a true tale, for I mean to speak the truth. Homer tells +us (Il.), how Zeus and Poseidon and Pluto divided the empire which they +inherited from their father. Now in the days of Cronos there existed a law +respecting the destiny of man, which has always been, and still continues +to be in Heaven,--that he who has lived all his life in justice and +holiness shall go, when he is dead, to the Islands of the Blessed, and +dwell there in perfect happiness out of the reach of evil; but that he who +has lived unjustly and impiously shall go to the house of vengeance and +punishment, which is called Tartarus. And in the time of Cronos, and even +quite lately in the reign of Zeus, the judgment was given on the very day +on which the men were to die; the judges were alive, and the men were +alive; and the consequence was that the judgments were not well given. +Then Pluto and the authorities from the Islands of the Blessed came to +Zeus, and said that the souls found their way to the wrong places. Zeus +said: 'I shall put a stop to this; the judgments are not well given, +because the persons who are judged have their clothes on, for they are +alive; and there are many who, having evil souls, are apparelled in fair +bodies, or encased in wealth or rank, and, when the day of judgment +arrives, numerous witnesses come forward and testify on their behalf that +they have lived righteously. The judges are awed by them, and they +themselves too have their clothes on when judging; their eyes and ears and +their whole bodies are interposed as a veil before their own souls. All +this is a hindrance to them; there are the clothes of the judges and the +clothes of the judged.--What is to be done? I will tell you:--In the first +place, I will deprive men of the foreknowledge of death, which they possess +at present: this power which they have Prometheus has already received my +orders to take from them: in the second place, they shall be entirely +stripped before they are judged, for they shall be judged when they are +dead; and the judge too shall be naked, that is to say, dead--he with his +naked soul shall pierce into the other naked souls; and they shall die +suddenly and be deprived of all their kindred, and leave their brave attire +strewn upon the earth--conducted in this manner, the judgment will be just. +I knew all about the matter before any of you, and therefore I have made my +sons judges; two from Asia, Minos and Rhadamanthus, and one from Europe, +Aeacus. And these, when they are dead, shall give judgment in the meadow +at the parting of the ways, whence the two roads lead, one to the Islands +of the Blessed, and the other to Tartarus. Rhadamanthus shall judge those +who come from Asia, and Aeacus those who come from Europe. And to Minos I +shall give the primacy, and he shall hold a court of appeal, in case either +of the two others are in any doubt:--then the judgment respecting the last +journey of men will be as just as possible.' + +From this tale, Callicles, which I have heard and believe, I draw the +following inferences:--Death, if I am right, is in the first place the +separation from one another of two things, soul and body; nothing else. +And after they are separated they retain their several natures, as in life; +the body keeps the same habit, and the results of treatment or accident are +distinctly visible in it: for example, he who by nature or training or +both, was a tall man while he was alive, will remain as he was, after he is +dead; and the fat man will remain fat; and so on; and the dead man, who in +life had a fancy to have flowing hair, will have flowing hair. And if he +was marked with the whip and had the prints of the scourge, or of wounds in +him when he was alive, you might see the same in the dead body; and if his +limbs were broken or misshapen when he was alive, the same appearance would +be visible in the dead. And in a word, whatever was the habit of the body +during life would be distinguishable after death, either perfectly, or in a +great measure and for a certain time. And I should imagine that this is +equally true of the soul, Callicles; when a man is stripped of the body, +all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.-- +And when they come to the judge, as those from Asia come to Rhadamanthus, +he places them near him and inspects them quite impartially, not knowing +whose the soul is: perhaps he may lay hands on the soul of the great king, +or of some other king or potentate, who has no soundness in him, but his +soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of +perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, and he is all +crooked with falsehood and imposture, and has no straightness, because he +has lived without truth. Him Rhadamanthus beholds, full of all deformity +and disproportion, which is caused by licence and luxury and insolence and +incontinence, and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he +undergoes the punishment which he deserves. + +Now the proper office of punishment is twofold: he who is rightly punished +ought either to become better and profit by it, or he ought to be made an +example to his fellows, that they may see what he suffers, and fear and +become better. Those who are improved when they are punished by gods and +men, are those whose sins are curable; and they are improved, as in this +world so also in another, by pain and suffering; for there is no other way +in which they can be delivered from their evil. But they who have been +guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, +are made examples; for, as they are incurable, the time has passed at which +they can receive any benefit. They get no good themselves, but others get +good when they behold them enduring for ever the most terrible and painful +and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins--there they are, +hanging up as examples, in the prison-house of the world below, a spectacle +and a warning to all unrighteous men who come thither. And among them, as +I confidently affirm, will be found Archelaus, if Polus truly reports of +him, and any other tyrant who is like him. Of these fearful examples, +most, as I believe, are taken from the class of tyrants and kings and +potentates and public men, for they are the authors of the greatest and +most impious crimes, because they have the power. And Homer witnesses to +the truth of this; for they are always kings and potentates whom he has +described as suffering everlasting punishment in the world below: such +were Tantalus and Sisyphus and Tityus. But no one ever described +Thersites, or any private person who was a villain, as suffering +everlasting punishment, or as incurable. For to commit the worst crimes, +as I am inclined to think, was not in his power, and he was happier than +those who had the power. No, Callicles, the very bad men come from the +class of those who have power (compare Republic). And yet in that very +class there may arise good men, and worthy of all admiration they are, for +where there is great power to do wrong, to live and to die justly is a hard +thing, and greatly to be praised, and few there are who attain to this. +Such good and true men, however, there have been, and will be again, at +Athens and in other states, who have fulfilled their trust righteously; and +there is one who is quite famous all over Hellas, Aristeides, the son of +Lysimachus. But, in general, great men are also bad, my friend. + +As I was saying, Rhadamanthus, when he gets a soul of the bad kind, knows +nothing about him, neither who he is, nor who his parents are; he knows +only that he has got hold of a villain; and seeing this, he stamps him as +curable or incurable, and sends him away to Tartarus, whither he goes and +receives his proper recompense. Or, again, he looks with admiration on the +soul of some just one who has lived in holiness and truth; he may have been +a private man or not; and I should say, Callicles, that he is most likely +to have been a philosopher who has done his own work, and not troubled +himself with the doings of other men in his lifetime; him Rhadamanthus +sends to the Islands of the Blessed. Aeacus does the same; and they both +have sceptres, and judge; but Minos alone has a golden sceptre and is +seated looking on, as Odysseus in Homer declares that he saw him: + +'Holding a sceptre of gold, and giving laws to the dead.' + +Now I, Callicles, am persuaded of the truth of these things, and I consider +how I shall present my soul whole and undefiled before the judge in that +day. Renouncing the honours at which the world aims, I desire only to know +the truth, and to live as well as I can, and, when I die, to die as well as +I can. And, to the utmost of my power, I exhort all other men to do the +same. And, in return for your exhortation of me, I exhort you also to take +part in the great combat, which is the combat of life, and greater than +every other earthly conflict. And I retort your reproach of me, and say, +that you will not be able to help yourself when the day of trial and +judgment, of which I was speaking, comes upon you; you will go before the +judge, the son of Aegina, and, when he has got you in his grip and is +carrying you off, you will gape and your head will swim round, just as mine +would in the courts of this world, and very likely some one will shamefully +box you on the ears, and put upon you any sort of insult. + +Perhaps this may appear to you to be only an old wife's tale, which you +will contemn. And there might be reason in your contemning such tales, if +by searching we could find out anything better or truer: but now you see +that you and Polus and Gorgias, who are the three wisest of the Greeks of +our day, are not able to show that we ought to live any life which does not +profit in another world as well as in this. And of all that has been said, +nothing remains unshaken but the saying, that to do injustice is more to be +avoided than to suffer injustice, and that the reality and not the +appearance of virtue is to be followed above all things, as well in public +as in private life; and that when any one has been wrong in anything, he is +to be chastised, and that the next best thing to a man being just is that +he should become just, and be chastised and punished; also that he should +avoid all flattery of himself as well as of others, of the few or of the +many: and rhetoric and any other art should be used by him, and all his +actions should be done always, with a view to justice. + +Follow me then, and I will lead you where you will be happy in life and +after death, as the argument shows. And never mind if some one despises +you as a fool, and insults you, if he has a mind; let him strike you, by +Zeus, and do you be of good cheer, and do not mind the insulting blow, for +you will never come to any harm in the practice of virtue, if you are a +really good and true man. When we have practised virtue together, we will +apply ourselves to politics, if that seems desirable, or we will advise +about whatever else may seem good to us, for we shall be better able to +judge then. In our present condition we ought not to give ourselves airs, +for even on the most important subjects we are always changing our minds; +so utterly stupid are we! Let us, then, take the argument as our guide, +which has revealed to us that the best way of life is to practise justice +and every virtue in life and death. This way let us go; and in this exhort +all men to follow, not in the way to which you trust and in which you +exhort me to follow you; for that way, Callicles, is nothing worth. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Gorgias, by Plato + diff --git a/old/grgis10.zip b/old/grgis10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..613780f --- /dev/null +++ b/old/grgis10.zip |