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diff --git a/16695-8.txt b/16695-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d319a96 --- /dev/null +++ b/16695-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12637 @@ +Project Gutenberg's Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816, by Julian S. Corbett + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 + Publications Of The Navy Records Society Vol. XXIX. + +Author: Julian S. Corbett + +Release Date: September 15, 2005 [EBook #16695] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS, 1530-1816 *** + + + + +Produced by Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Jeroen +Hellingman, Greg Lindahl, Carol David and the Online +Distributed Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net + + + + + + + PUBLICATIONS + OF THE + NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY + VOL. XXIX. + + FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS + 1530-1816 + + EDITED + WITH ELUCIDATIONS FROM CONTEMPORARY AUTHORITIES + BY + JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M. + + PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY + MDCCCCV + + THE COUNCIL + OF THE + NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY + 1904-1905 + + * * * * * + + PATRON + H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.T., K.P. + + PRESIDENT + EARL SPENCER, K.G. + + VICE-PRESIDENTS +BRIDGE, ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN | PROTHERO, G.W., + A.G., G.C.B. | LL.D. +HAWKESBURY, LORD. | YORKE, SIR HENRY, K.C.B. + + COUNCILLORS + +ATKINSON, C.T. | KIPLING, RUDYARD. +BATTENBURG, PRINCE LOUIS OF, | LORAINE, REAR-ADMIRAL SIR + G.C.B. | LAMBTON, BART. +BEAUMONT, VICE-ADMIRAL SIR | LYALL, SIR ALFRED C., G.C.I.E. + LEWIS, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. | MARKHAM, SIR CLEMENTS R., +CLARKE, COL. SIR GEORGE S., | K.C.B., F.R.S. + K.C.M.G. | MARSDEN, R.G. +CORBETT, JULIAN S. | NEWBOLT, HENRY. +DESART, THE EARL OF, K.C.B. | PARR, REAR-ADMIRAL A.C. +DRURY, VICE-ADMIRAL SIR | SLADE, CAPTAIN EDMOND J.W., + CHARLES, K.C.S.I. | R.N. +FIRTH, PROFESSOR G.H., LL.D. | TANNER, J.R. +GINSBURG, B.W., LL.D. | THURSFIELD, J.R. +GODLEY, SIR ARTHUR, K.C.B. | TRACEY, ADMIRAL SIR RICHARD, +HAMILTON, ADMIRAL SIR R. | K.C.B. + VESEY, G.C.B. | WATTS, PHILIP, D.SC., F.R.S. + + SECRETARY + PROFESSOR J.K. LAUGHTON, D.Litt., King's College, London, W.C. + + TREASURER + W. GRAHAM GREENE, C.B., Admiralty, S.W. + +The COUNCIL of the NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY wish it to be distinctly +understood that they are not answerable for any opinions or +observations that may appear in the Society's publications; For these +the responsibility rests entirely with the Editors of the several +works. + + + + +PREFACE + + +The inaccessibility of the official Fighting Instructions from time to +time issued to the fleet has long been a recognised stumbling-block to +students of naval history. Only a few copies of them were generally +known to exist; fewer still could readily be consulted by the public, +and of these the best known had been wrongly dated. The discovery +therefore of a number of seventeenth century Instructions amongst the +Earl of Dartmouth's papers, which he had generously placed at the +disposal of the Society, seemed to encourage an attempt to make +something like a complete collection. The result, such as it is, is +now offered to the Society. It is by no means exhaustive. Some sets of +Instructions seem to be lost beyond recall; but, on the other hand, a +good deal of hitherto barren ground has been filled, and it is hoped +that the collection may be of some assistance for a fresh study of the +principles which underlie the development of naval tactics. + +It is of course as documents in the history of tactics that the +Fighting Instructions have the greatest practical value, and with this +aspect of them in view I have done my best to illustrate their +genesis, intention, and significance by extracts from contemporary +authorities. Without such illustration the Instructions would be but +barren food, neither nutritive nor easily digested. The embodiment of +this illustrative matter has to some extent involved a departure from +the ordinary form of the Society's publications. Instead of a general +introduction, a series of introductory notes to each group of +Instructions has been adopted, which it is feared will appear to bear +an excessive proportion to the Instructions themselves. There seemed, +however, no other means of dealing with the illustrative matter in a +consecutive way. The extracts from admirals' despatches and +contemporary treatises, and the remarks of officers and officials +concerned with the preparation or the execution of the Instructions, +were for the most part too fragmentary to be treated as separate +documents, or too long or otherwise unsuitable for foot-notes. The +only adequate way therefore was to embody them in Introductory Notes, +and this it is hoped will be found to justify their bulk. + +A special apology is, however, due for the Introductory Note on +Nelson's memoranda. For this I can only plead their great importance, +and the amount of illustrative matter that exists from the pens of +Nelson's officers and opponents. For no other naval battle have we so +much invaluable comment from men of the highest capacity who were +present. The living interest of it all is unsurpassed, and I have +therefore been tempted to include all that came to hand, encouraged by +the belief that the fullest material for the study of Nelson's tactics +at the battle of Trafalgar could not be out of place in a volume +issued by the Society in the centenary year. + +As to the general results, perhaps the most striking feature which the +collection brings out is that sailing tactics was a purely English +art. The idea that we borrowed originally from the Dutch is no longer +tenable. The Dutch themselves do not even claim the invention of the +line. Indeed in no foreign authority, either Dutch, French or Spanish, +have I been able to discover a claim to the invention of any device in +sailing tactics that had permanent value. Even the famous tactical +school which was established in France at the close of the Seven +Years' War, and by which the French service so brilliantly profited in +the War of American Independence, was worked on the old lines of +Hoste's treatise. Morogues' _Tactique Navale_ was its text-book, +and his own teaching was but a scientific and intelligent elaboration +of a system from which the British service under the impulse of Anson, +Hawke, and Boscawen was already shaking itself free. + +Much of the old learning which the volume contains is of course of +little more than antiquarian interest, but the bulk of it in the +opinion of those best able to judge should be found of living value. +All systems of tactics must rest ultimately on the dominant weapon in +use, and throughout the sailing period the dominant weapon was, as +now, the gun. In face of so fundamental a resemblance no tactician +can afford to ignore the sailing system merely because the method of +propulsion and the nature of the material have changed. It is not the +principles of tactics that such changes affect, but merely the method +of applying them. + +Of even higher present value is the process of thought, the line of +argument by which the old tacticians arrived at their conclusions good +and bad. In studying the long series of Instructions we are able to +detach certain attitudes of mind which led to the atrophy of +principles essentially good, and others which pushed the system +forward on healthy lines and flung off obsolete restraints. In an art +so shifting and amorphous as naval tactics, the difference between +health and disease must always lie in a certain vitality of mind with +which it must be approached and practised. It is only in the history +of tactics, under all conditions of weapons, movement and material, +that the conditions of that vitality can be studied. + +For a civilian to approach the elucidation of such points without +professional assistance would be the height of temerity, and my thanks +therefore are particularly due for advice and encouragement to Admiral +Sir Cyprian Bridge, Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, Rear-Admiral +H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, and to Captain Slade, Captain of +the Royal Naval College. To Sir Reginald Custance and Professor +Laughton I am under a special obligation, for not only have they been +kind enough to read the proofs of the work, but they have been +indefatigable in offering suggestions, the one from his high +professional knowledge and the other from his unrivalled learning in +naval history. Any value indeed the work may be found to possess must +in a large measure be attributed to them. Nor can I omit to mention +the valuable assistance which I have received from Mr. Ferdinand Brand +and Captain Garbett, R.N., in unearthing forgotten material in the +Libraries of the Admiralty and the United Service Institution. + +I have also the pleasure of expressing my obligations to the Earl of +Dartmouth, the Earl of St. Germans, and Vice-Admiral Sir Charles +Knowles, Bart., for the use of the documents in their possession, as +well as to many others whose benefits to the Society will be found +duly noted in the body of the work. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +PART I.--EARLY TUDOR PERIOD + +1. INTRODUCTORY. ALONSO DE CHAVES ON SAILING TACTICS 3 + Espejo de Navegantes, _circa_ 1530 6 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. AUDLEY'S FLEET ORDERS, _circa_ 1530 14 + Orders to be used by the King's Majesty's Navy by the Sea 15 + +3. INTRODUCTORY. THE ADOPTION OF SPANISH TACTICS BY HENRY VIII 18 + Lord Lisle, 1545, No. 1 20 + " " No. 2 23 + +PART II.--ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN + +INTRODUCTORY. THE ELIZABETHAN ORIGIN OF RALEGH'S INSTRUCTIONS 27 + Sir Walter Ralegh, 1617 36 + +PART III.--CAROLINGIAN + +1. INTRODUCTORY. THE ATTEMPT TO APPLY LAND FORMATIONS + TO THE FLEET 49 + Lord Wimbledon, 1625. No. 1 52 + " " No. 2 61 + " " No. 3 63 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. THE SHIP-MONEY FLEETS, _circa_ 1635 73 + The Earl of Lindsey, 1635 77 + +PART IV.--THE FIRST DUTCH WAR + +1. INTRODUCTORY. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE + EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-53 81 + Parliamentary Orders, 1648 87 + Supplementary Instructions, _circa_ 1650 88 + Marten Tromp, 1652 91 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR, 1653 and 1654 92 + Commonwealth Orders, 1653 99 + +PART V.--THE SECOND DUTCH WAR + +1. INTRODUCTORY. ORDERS OF THE RESTORATION 107 + The Earl of Sandwich, 1665 108 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. MONCK, PRINCE RUPERT, AND THE DUKE OF YORK 110 + The Duke of York, 1665 122 + His Additional Instructions, 1665 126 + His Supplementary Order 128 + Prince Rupert, 1666 129 + +PART VI.--THE THIRD DUTCH WAR TO THE REVOLUTION + +1. INTRODUCTORY. PROGRESS OF TACTICS DURING THE WAR 133 + The Duke of York, 1672 146 + His Supplementary Orders, 1672 148 + The Duke of York, 1672-3 149 + Final form of the Duke of York's Orders, 1673, with additions + and observations subsequently made 152 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678 164 + Sir John Narbrough, 1678 165 + +3. INTRODUCTORY. THE LAST STUART ORDERS 168 + Lord Dartmouth, 1688 170 + +PART VII.--WILLIAM III. AND ANNE + +1. INTRODUCTORY. LORD TORRINGTON, TOURVILLE, AND HOSTE 175 + Admiral Edward Russell, 1691 188 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. THE PERMANENT INSTRUCTIONS, 1703-1783 195 + Sir George Rooke, 1703 197 + +PART VIII.--ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY + +INTRODUCTORY, ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS 203 + Admiral Vernon, _circa_ 1740 214 + Lord Anson, _circa_ 1747 216 + Sir Edward Hawke, 1756 317 + Admiral Boscawen, 1759 219 + Sir George Rodney, 1782 225 + Lord Hood's Additions, 1783 228 + +PART IX.--THE LAST PHASE + +1. INTRODUCTORY. THE NEW SIGNAL BOOK INSTRUCTIONS 233 + Lord Howe, 1782 239 + +2. INTRODUCTORY. THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR 252 + Lord Howe's Explanatory Instructions, 1799 268 + +3. INTRODUCTORY. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA 280 + The Toulon Memorandum, 1803 313 + The Trafalgar Memorandum, 1805 316 + +4. INTRODUCTORY. INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR 321 + Admiral Gambier, 1807 327 + Lord Collingwood, 1808-1810 328 + Sir Alexander Cochrane, 1805-14 330 + +5. INTRODUCTORY, THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816 335 + The Instructions of 1816 342 + +APPENDIX. 'FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT' 351 + +INDEX 359 + + + + +PART 1 + +EARLY TUDOR PERIOD + +I. ALONSO DE CHAVES, _circa_ 1530 + +II. SIR THOMAS AUDLEY, 1530 + +III. LORD LISLE, 1545 + + + +ALONSO DE CHAVES ON SAILING TACTICS + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The following extract from the _Espejo de Navegantes_, or +_Seamen's Glass_, of Alonso de Chaves serves to show the +development which naval tactics had reached at the dawn of the sailing +epoch. The treatise was apparently never published. It was discovered +by Captain Fernandez Duro, the well-known historian of the Spanish +navy, amongst the manuscripts in the library of the Academy of History +at Madrid. The exact date of its production is not known; but Alonso +de Chaves was one of a group of naval writers and experts who +flourished at the court of the Emperor Charles V in the first half of +the sixteenth century.[1] He was known to Hakluyt, who mentions him in +connection with his own cherished idea of getting a lectureship in +navigation established in London. 'And that it may appear,' he writes +in dedicating the second edition of his _Voyages_ to the lord +admiral, 'that this is no vain fancy nor device of mine it may please +your lordship to understand that the late Emperor Charles the +Fifth ... established not only a Pilot-Major for the examination of such +as sought to take charge of ships in that voyage' (_i.e._ to the +Indies), 'but also founded a notable lecture of the Art of Navigation +which is read to this day in the Contractation House at Seville. The +Readers of the Lecture have not only carefully taught and instructed +the Spanish mariners by word of mouth, but also have published sundry +exact and worthy treatises concerning marine causes for the direction +and encouragement of posterity. The learned works of three of which +Readers, namely of Alonso de Chaves, of Hieronymus de Chaves, and of +Roderigo Zamorano, came long ago very happily to my hands, together +with the straight and severe examining of all such Masters as desire +to take charge for the West Indies.' Since therefore De Chaves was an +official lecturer to the Contractation House, the Admiralty of the +Indies, we may take it that he speaks with full authority of the +current naval thought of the time. That he represented a somewhat +advanced school seems clear from the pains he takes in his treatise to +defend his opinions against the old idea which still prevailed, that +only galleys and oared craft could be marshalled in regular +order. 'Some may say,' he writes, 'that at sea it is not possible to +order ships and tactics in this way, nor to arrange beforehand so +nicely for coming to the attack or bringing succour just when wanted, +and that therefore there is no need to labour an order of battle since +order cannot be kept. To such I answer that the same objection binds +the enemy, and that with equal arms he who has taken up the best +formation and order will be victor, because it is not possible so to +break up an order with wind and sea as that he who is more without +order shall not be worse broken up and the sooner defeated. For ships +at sea are as war-horses on land, since admitting they are not very +nimble at turning at any pace, nevertheless a regular formation +increases their power. Moreover, at sea, so long as there be no storm, +there will be nothing to hinder the using of any of the orders with +which we have dealt, and if there be a storm the same terror will +strike the one side as the other; for the storm is enough for all to +war with, and in fighting it they will have peace with one another.' + +At first sight it would seem that De Chaves in this argument takes no +account of superiority of seamanship--the factor which was destined to +turn the scale against Spain upon the sea. But the following passage +with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the +controlling factor in every case. 'And if,' he argues, 'they say that +the enemy will take the same thought and care as I, I answer that when +both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be +more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the +which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as +much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and +counsel. Just as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more +dexterous gives more and better hits than the other who does not +understand the beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger. And +the same holds good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been +seen that the smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.' + +From the work in question Captain Fernandez Duro gives four sections +or chapters in Appendix 12 to the first volume of his history,[2] +namely, 1. 'Of war or battle at sea,' relating to single ship +actions. 2. 'The form of a battle and the method of fighting,' +relating to armament, fire discipline, boarding and the like. 3. 'Of a +battle of one fleet against another.' 4. 'Battle.' In the last two +sections is contained the earliest known attempt to formulate a +definite fighting formation and tactical system for sailing fleets, +and it is from these that the following extracts have been translated. + +It will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as +possible to close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the +proposed system is still quite mediæval and founded mainly upon +galley tactics. But a new and advanced note is struck in the author's +insistence on the captain-general's keeping out of action as long as +possible, instead of leading the attack in the time-honoured way. We +should also remark the differentiation of types, for all of which a +duty was provided in action. This was also a survival of galley +warfare, and rapidly disappeared with the advance of the sailing +man-of-war, never to be revived, unless perhaps it be returning in the +immediate future, and we are to see torpedo craft of the latest +devising taking the place and function of the _barcas_, with +their axes and augers, and armoured cruisers those of the _naos de +succurro_. + + + +_ESPEJO DE NAVEGANTES, +circa_ 1530. + +[+Fernandez Duro, Armada Española i. App. 12+.] + +_Chapter III.--Of a Battle between One Fleet and Another_. + +[_Extract_.] + + +... When the time for battle is at hand the captain-general should +order the whole fleet to come together that he may set them in order, +since a regular order is no less necessary in a fleet of ships for +giving battle to another fleet than it is in an army of soldiers for +giving battle to another army. + +Thus, as in an army, the men-at-arms form by themselves in one quarter +to make and meet charges, and the light horse in another quarter to +support, pursue, and harass[3] so in a fleet, the captain-general +ought to order the strongest and largest ships to form in one quarter +to attack, grapple, board and break-up the enemy, and the lesser and +weaker ships in another quarter apart, with their artillery and +munitions to harass, pursue, and give chase to the enemy if he flies, +and to come to the rescue wherever there is most need. + +The captain-general should form a detachment of his smaller and +lighter vessels, to the extent of one-fourth part of his whole fleet, +and order them to take station on either side of the main body. I mean +that they should always keep as a separate body on the flanks of the +main body, so that they can see what happens on one side and on the +other. + +He should admonish and direct every one of the ships that she shall +endeavour to grapple with the enemy in such a way that she shall not +get between two of them so as to be boarded and engaged on both sides +at once.[4] + + * * * * * + +Having directed and set in order all the aforesaid matters, the +captain-general should then marshal the other three-quarters of the +fleet that remain in the following manner. + +He should consider his position and the direction of the wind, and how +to get the advantage of it with his fleet. + +Then he should consider the order in which the enemy is formed, +whether they come in a close body or in line ahead,[5] and whether +they are disposed in square bodies or in a single line,[6] and whether +the great ships are in the centre or on the flanks, and in what +station is the flagship; and all the other considerations which are +essential to the case he should take in hand. + +By all means he should do his best that his fleet shall have the +weather-gage; for if there was no other advantage he will always keep +free from being blinded by the smoke of the guns, so as to be able to +see one to another; and for the enemy it will be the contrary, because +the smoke and fire of our fleet and of their own will keep driving +upon them, and blinding them in such a manner that they will not be +able to see one another, and they will fight among themselves from not +being able to recognise each other. + +Everything being now ready, if the enemy have made squadrons of their +fleet we should act in the same manner in ours, placing always the +greater ships in one body as a vanguard to grapple first and receive +the first shock; and the captain-general should be stationed in the +centre squadron, so that he may see those which go before and those +which follow. + +Each of the squadrons ought to sail in line abreast,[7] so that all +can see the enemy and use their guns without getting in each other's +way, and they must not sail in file one behind the other, because +thence would come great trouble, as only the leading ships could +fight. In any case a ship is not so nimble as a man to be able to face +about and do what is best.[8] + +The rearguard should be the ships that I have called the supports, +which are to be the fourth part of the fleet, and the lightest and +best sailers; but they must not move in rear of the fleet, because +they would not see well what is passing so as to give timely succour, +and therefore they ought always to keep an offing on that side or +flank of the fleet where the flagship is, or on both sides if they are +many; and if they are in one body they should work to station +themselves to windward for the reasons aforesaid. + +And if the fleet of the enemy shall come on in one body in line +abreast,[9] ours should do the same, placing the largest and strongest +ships in the centre and the lightest on the flanks of the battle, +seeing that those which are in the centre always receive greater +injury because necessarily they have to fight on both sides. + +And if the enemy bring their fleet into the form of a lance-head or +triangle, then ours ought to form in two lines [_alas_], keeping +the advanced extremities furthest apart and closing in the rear, so as +to take the enemy between them and engage them on both fronts, placing +the largest ships in the rear and the lightest at the advanced points, +seeing that they can most quickly tack in upon the enemy opposed to +them. + +And if the enemy approach formed in two lines [_alas_], ours +ought to do the same, placing always the greatest ships over against +the greatest of the enemy, and being always on the look-out to take +the enemy between them; and on no account must ours penetrate into the +midst of the enemy's formation [_batalla_], because arms and +smoke will envelope them on every side and there will be no way of +relieving them. + +The captain-general having now arrayed his whole fleet in one of the +aforesaid orders according as it seems best to him for giving battle, +and everything being ready for battle, all shall bear in mind the +signals he shall have appointed with flag or shot or topsail, that all +may know at what time to attack or board or come to rescue or retreat, +or give chase. The which signals all must understand and remember what +they are to do when such signals are made, and likewise the armed +boats shall take the same care and remember what they ought to do, and +perform their duty.[10] + +_Chapter IV.--Battle_ + +Then the flagship shall bid a trumpet sound, and at that signal all +shall move in their aforesaid order; and as they come into range they +shall commence to play their most powerful artillery, taking care that +the first shots do not miss, for, as I have said, when the first shots +hit, inasmuch as they are the largest, they strike great dread and +terror into the enemy; for seeing how great hurt they suffer, they +think how much greater it will be at close range and so mayhap they +will not want to fight, but strike and surrender or fly, so as not to +come to close quarters. + +Having so begun firing, they shall always first play the largest guns, +which are on the side or board towards the enemy, and likewise they +shall move over from the other side those guns which have wheeled +carriages to run on the upper part of the deck and poop.[11] And then +when nearer they should use the smaller ones, and by no means should +they fire them at first, for afar off they will do no hurt, and +besides the enemy will know there is dearth of good artillery and will +take better heart to make or abide an attack. And after having come to +closer quarters then they ought to play the lighter artillery. And so +soon as they come to board or grapple all the other kinds of arms +shall be used, of which I have spoken more particularly: first, +missiles, such as harpoons [_dardos_] and stones, hand-guns +[_escopetas_] and cross-bows, and then the fire-balls aforesaid, +as well from the tops as from the castles, and at the same time the +calthrops, linstocks, stink-balls [_pildoras_], grenades, and the +scorpions for the sails and rigging. At this moment they should sound +all the trumpets, and with a lusty cheer from every ship at once they +should grapple and fight with every kind of weapon, those with staffed +scythes or shear-hooks cutting the enemy's rigging, and the others +with the fire instruments [_trompas y bocas de fuego_] raining +fire down on the enemy's rigging and crew. + +The captain-general should encourage all in the battle, and because he +cannot be heard with his voice he should bid the signal for action to +be made with his trumpet or flag or with his topsail. + +And he should keep a look-out in every direction in readiness, when he +sees any of his ships in danger, to order the ships of reserve to give +succour, if by chance they have not seen it, or else himself to bear +in with his own ship. + +The flagship should take great care not to grapple another, for then +he could not see what is passing in the battle nor control it. And +besides his own side in coming to help and support him might find +themselves out of action; or peradventure if any accident befell him, +the rest of the fleet would be left without guidance and would not +have care to succour one another, but so far as they were able would +fly or take their own course. Accordingly the captain-general should +never be of the first who are to grapple nor should he enter into the +press, so that he may watch the fighting and bring succour where it is +most needed. + +The ships of support in like manner should have care to keep somewhat +apart and not to grapple till they see where they should first bring +succour. The more they keep clear the more will they have opportunity +of either standing off and using their guns, or of coming to close +range with their other firearms. Moreover, if any ship of the enemy +takes to flight, they will be able to give chase or get athwart her +hawse, and will be able to watch and give succour wherever the +captain-general signals. + +The boats in like manner should not close in till they see the ships +grappled, and then they should come up on the opposite side in the +manner stated above, and carry out their special duties as occasion +arises either with their bases,[12] of which each shall carry its own, +and with their harquebuses, or else by getting close in and wedging up +the rudders, or cutting them and their gear away, or by leaping in +upon the enemy, if they can climb in without being seen, or from +outside by setting fire to them, or scuttling them with augers.[13] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Fernandez Duro, _De algunas obras desconocidas de Cosmografia y de +Namgaaon, &c._ Reprinted from the _Revista de Navegacion y Comercio_. +Madrid, 1894-5. + +[2] _Armada Española desde la union de los Reines de Castilla y de +Aragon_. + +[3] _Entrar y salir_--lit. 'to go in and come out,' a technical military +expression used of light cavalry. It seems generally to signify short +sudden attacks on weak points. + +[4] Here follow directions for telling off a fourth of the largest boats +in the fleet for certain duties which are sufficiently explained in the +section on 'Battle' below. + +[5] _Unos en pos de otros á la hila_--lit. one behind the other in file. + +[6] _En escuadrones ó en ala_. In military diction these words meant +'deep formation' and 'single line.' Here probably _ala_ means line +abreast. See next note. + +[7] _Cado uno de los escuadrones debe ir en ala_. Here _escuadrone_ must +mean 'squadron' in the modern sense of a division, and from the context +_ala_ can mean nothing but 'line abreast,' 'line ahead' being strictly +forbidden. + +[8] This, of course, refers to fire tactics ashore. The meaning is that +a ship, when she has delivered her fire, cannot retire by countermarch +and leave her next in file to deliver its fire in turn. The whole +system, it will be seen, is based on end-on fire, as a preparation for +boarding and small-arm fighting. + +[9] _Viniere toda junta puesta in ala_. + +[10] This sentence in the original is incomplete, running on into the +next chapter. For clearness the construction has been altered in the +translation. + +[11] This remarkable evolution is a little obscure. The Spanish has '_y +moviendo asimismo los otros del otro bordo, aquellos que tienen sus +carretones que andan per cima de cubierta y toldo_.' + +[12] _Versos_, breech-loading pieces of the secondary armament of ships, +and for aiming boats. Bases were of the high penetration or 'culverin' +type. + +[13] _Dando barrenos_. This curious duty of the armed boats he has more +fully explained in the section on single ship actions, as follows: 'The +ships being grappled, the boat ready equipped should put off to the +enemy's ship under her poop, and get fast hold of her, and first cut +away her rudder, or at least jam it with half a dozen wedges in such +wise that it cannot steer or move, and if there is a chance for more, +without being seen, bore half a dozen auger holes below the water-line, +so that the ship founders.' + +The rest of the chapter is concerned with the treatment of the dead and +wounded, pursuit of the enemy when victory is won, and the refitting of +the fleet. + + + +AUDLEY'S FLEET ORDERS, +_circa_ 1530 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The instructions drawn up by Thomas Audley by order of Henry VIII may +be taken as the last word in England of the purely mediæval time, +before the development of gunnery, and particularly of broadside fire, +had sown the seeds of more modern tactics. They were almost certainly +drafted from long-established precedents, for Audley was a lawyer. +The document is undated, but since Audley is mentioned without any +rank or title, it was probably before November 1531, when he became +serjeant-at-law and king's serjeant, and certainly before May 1632 +when he was knighted. It was at this time that Henry VIII was plunging +into his Reformation policy, and had every reason to be prepared for +complications abroad, and particularly with Spain, which was then the +leading naval Power. + +The last two articles, increasing the authority of the council of war, +were probably insisted on, as Mr. Oppenheim has pointed out in view +of Sir Edward Howard's attempts on French ports in 1512 and 1513, the +last of which ended in disaster.[1] + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] _Administration of the Royal Navy_, p. 63. + + + +_ORDERS TO BE USED BY THE KING'S MAJESTY'S NAVY BY THE SEA_. + +[+Brit. Mus. Harleian MSS. 309, fol. 42, et seq.+[1]] + +[_Extract_.] + + +If they meet with the enemy the admiral must apply to get the wind of +the enemy by all the means he can, for that is the advantage. No +private captain should board the admiral enemy but the admiral of the +English, except he cannot come to the enemy's, as the matter may so +fall out without they both the one seek the other. And if they chase +the enemy let them that chase shoot no ordnance till he be ready to +board him, for that will let[2] his ship's way. + +Let every ship match equally as near as they can, and leave some +pinnaces at liberty to help the overmatched. And one small ship when +they shall join battle [is] to be attending on the admiral to relieve +him, for the overcoming of the admiral is a great discouragement of +the rest of the other side. + +In case you board your enemy enter not till you see the smoke gone and +then shoot off[3] all your pieces, your port-pieces, the pieces of +hail-shot, [and] cross-bow shot to beat his cage deck, and if you see +his deck well ridden[4] then enter with your best men, but first win +his tops in any wise if it be possible. In case you see there come +rescue bulge[5] the enemy ship [but] first take heed your own men be +retired, [and] take the captain with certain of the best with him, the +rest [to be] committed to the sea, for else they will turn upon you to +your confusion. + +The admiral ought to have this order before he joins battle with the +enemy, that all his ships shall bear a flag in their mizen-tops, and +himself one in the foremast beside the mainmast, that everyone may +know his own fleet by that token. If he see a hard match with the +enemy and be to leeward, then to gather his fleet together and seem to +flee, and flee indeed for this purpose till the enemy draw within +gunshot. And when the enemy doth shoot then [he shall] shoot again, +and make all the smoke he can to the intent the enemy shall not see +the ships, and [then] suddenly hale up his tackle aboard,[6] and have +the wind of the enemy. And by this policy it is possible to win the +weather-gage of the enemy, and then he hath a great advantage, and +this may well be done if it be well foreseen beforehand, and every +captain and master made privy to it beforehand at whatsoever time such +disadvantage shall happen. + +The admiral shall not take in hand any exploit to land or enter into +any harbour enemy with the king's ships, but[7] he call a council and +make the captains privy to his device and the best masters in the +fleet or pilots, known to be skilful men on that coast or place where +he intendeth to do his exploit, and by good advice. Otherwise the +fault ought to be laid on the admiral if anything should happen but +well.[8] + +And if he did an exploit without assent of the captains and [it] +proved well, the king ought to put him out of his room for purposing a +matter of such charge of his own brain, whereby the whole fleet might +fall into the hands of the enemy to the destruction of the king's +people.[29] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _A Book of Orders for the War both by Land and Sea, written by +Thomas Audley at the command of King Henry VIII. + +[2] _I.e._ hinder. + +[3] MS. 'the shot of.' The whole MS. has evidently been very carelessly +copied and is full of small blunders, which have been corrected in the +text above. 'Board' till comparatively recent times meant to close with +a ship. 'Enter' was our modern 'board.' + +[4] 'Ridden' = 'cleared.' + +[5] 'Bulge' = 'scuttle.' A ship was said to bulge herself when she ran +aground and filled. + +[6] The passage should probably read 'hale or haul his tacks aboard.' + +[7] _I.e._ 'without,' 'unless.' + +[8] It was under this old rule that Boroughs lodged his protest against +Drake's entering Cadiz in 1587. + +[9] The rest of the articles relate to discipline, internal order of +ships, and securing prize cargoes. + + + +THE ADOPTION OF SPANISH TACTICS BY HENRY VIII + +INTRODUCTORY + + +These two sets of orders were drawn up by the lord high admiral in +rapid succession in August 1545, during the second stage of Henry +VIII's last war with France. In the previous month D'Annibault, the +French admiral, had been compelled to abandon his attempt on +Portsmouth and the Isle of Wight, and retire to recruit upon his own +coast; and Lord Lisle was about to go out and endeavour to bring him +to action. + +The orders, it will be seen, are a distinct advance on those of 1530, +and betray strongly the influence of Spanish ideas as formulated, by +De Chaves. So striking indeed is the resemblance in many points; that +we perhaps may trace it to Henry's recent alliance with Charles V. The +main difference was that Henry's 'wings' were composed of oared craft, +and to form them of sufficient strength he had had some of the newest +and smartest 'galliasses,' or 'galleys'--that is, his vessels +specially built for men-of-war--fitted with oars. The reason for this +was that the French fleet was a mixed one, the sailing division having +been reinforced by a squadron of galleys from the Mediterranean. The +elaborate attempts to combine the two types tactically--a problem +which the Italian admirals had hitherto found insoluble--points to an +advanced study of the naval art that is entirely characteristic of +Henry VIII. + +The main idea of the first order is of a vanguard in three ranks, +formed of the most powerful hired merchant ships and the king's own +galleons and great ships, and supported by a strong rearguard of +smaller armed merchantmen, and by two oared wings on either flank +composed of royal and private vessels combined. The vanguard was to be +marshalled with its three ranks so adjusted that its general form was +that of a blunt wedge. In the first rank come eight of the large +merchantmen, mainly Hanseatic vessels; in the second, ten of the royal +navy and one private vessel; in the third, nineteen second-rate +merchantmen. The tactical aim is clearly that the heavy Hanseatic +ships should, as De Chaves says, receive the first shock and break up +the enemy's formation for the royal ships, while the third rank are in +position to support. The wings, which were specially told off to keep +the galleys in check, correspond to the reserve of De Chaves, and the +importance attached to them is seen in the fact that they contained +all the king's galleons of the latest type. + +In the second set of instructions, issued on August 10, this order was +considerably modified. The fleet had been increased by the arrival of +some of the west-country ships, and a new order of battle was drawn up +which is printed in the _State Papers, Henry VIII_ (Old Series), +i. 810. The formation, though still retaining the blunt wedge design, +was simplified. We have now a vanguard of 24 ships, a 'battaill' or +main body of 40 ships, and one 'wing' of 40 oared 'galliasses, +shallops and boats of war.' The 'wing' however, was still capable of +acting in two divisions, for, unlike the vanguard and 'battaill,' it +had a vice-admiral as well as an admiral. + + + +_LORD LISLE, No._ 1, 1545. + +[+Le Fleming MSS. No. 2+.][1] + +_The Order of Battle_.[2] + +THE VANGUARD. + + +These be the ships appointed for the first rank of the vanguard: + +In primis: + +The Great Argosy. +The Samson Lubeck. +The Johannes Lubeck. +The Trinity of Dantzig. +The Mary of Hamburg. +The Pellican. +The Morion [of Dantzig]. +The 'Sepiar' of Dantzig. + = 8. + +The second rank of the vanguard: + +The Harry Grace à Dieu. +The Venetian. +The Peter Pomegranate. +The Mathew Gonson. +The Pansy. +The Great Galley. +The Sweepstake. +The Minion. +The Swallow. +The New Bark. +The Saul 'Argaly.' + = 12 (_sic_). + +The third rank of the vanguard: + +The 'Berste Denar.' +The Falcon Lively. +The Harry Bristol. +The Trinity Smith. +The Margaret of Bristol. +The Trinity Reniger. +The Mary James. +The Pilgrim of Dartmouth. +The Mary Gorge of Rye. +The Thomas Tipkins. +The Gorges Brigges. +The Anne Lively. + = 12. + +The John Evangelist. +The Thomas Modell. +The Lartycke [or 'Lartigoe']. +The Christopher Bennet. +The Mary Fortune. +The Mary Marten. +The Trinity Bristol. + = 7. + +THE OARED WINGS. + +Galleys and ships of the right wing: + +The Great Mistress of England. +The Salamander. +The Jennet. +The Lion. +The Greyhound. +The Thomas Greenwich. +The Lesser Pinnace. +The Hind. +The Harry. +The Galley Subtle. +Two boats of Rye. + = 12. + +Galleys and ships of the left wing: + +The Anne Gallant. +The Unicorn. +The Falcon. +The Dragon. +The Sacre. +The Merlin. +The Rae. +The Reniger pinnace. +The Foyst. +Two boats of Rye. + = 11. + +_The Fighting Instructions_. + +_Item_. It is to be considered that the ranks must keep such +order in sailing that none impeach another. Wherefore it is requisite +that every of the said ranks keep right way with another, and take +such regard to the observing of the same that no ship pass his fellows +forward nor backward nor slack anything, but [keep] as they were in +one line, and that there may be half a cable length between every of +the ships. + +_Item_. The first rank shall make sail straight to the front of +the battle and shall pass through them, and so shall make a short +return to the midwards as they may, and they [are] to have a special +regard to the course of the second rank; which two ranks is appointed +to lay aboard the principal ships of the enemy, every man choosing[3] +his mate as they may, reserving the admiral for my lord admiral. + +_Item_. That every ship of the first rank shall bear a flag of +St. George's cross upon the fore topmast for the space of the fight, +which upon the king's determination shall be on Monday, the 10th of +August, _anno_ 1545.[4] + +And every ship appointed to the middle rank shall for the space of the +fight bear a flag of St. George's cross upon her mainmast. + +And every ship of the third rank shall bear a like flag upon his +mizen[5] mast top, and every of the said wings shall have in their +tops a flag of St. George. + +_Item_. The victuallers shall follow the third rank and shall +bear in their tops their flags. Also that neither of the said wings +shall further enter into fight; but, having advantage as near +anigh[6] as they can of the wind, shall give succour as they shall +see occasion, and shall not give care to any of the small vessels to +weaken our force. There be, besides the said ships mentioned, to be +joined to the foresaid battle fifty sail of western ships, and whereof +be seven great hulks of 888 ton apiece, and there is also the number +of 1,200 of soldiers beside mariners in all the said ships. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] A similar list of ships is in a MS. in the Cambridge University +Library. + +[2] This paper gives the order of the wings and vanguard only. The fifty +west-country ships that were presumably to form the rearguard had not +yet joined. + +[3] MS. 'closing.' + +[4] The fleets did not get contact till August 15. + +[5] MS. 'messel.' + +[6] MS. 'a snare a nye.' The passage is clearly corrupt. Perhaps it +should read 'neither of the said wings shall further enter into the +fight but as nigh as they can keeping advantage of the wind [_i.e._ +without losing the weather-gage of any part of the enemy's fleet] but +shall give succour,' &c. + + + +_LORD LISLE, No. 2._ + +[+Record Office, State Papers, Henry VIII.+] + +_The Order for the said Fleet taken by the Lord Admiral the 10th day +of August, 1545_.[1] + + +1. First, it is to be considered that every of the captains with the +said ships appointed by this order to the vanward, battle and wing +shall ride at anchor according as they be appointed to sail by the +said order; and no ship of any of the said wards or wing shall presume +to come to an anchor before the admiral of the said ward. + +2. _Item_, that every captain of the said wards or wing shall be +in everything ordered by the admiral of the same. + +3. _Item_, when we shall see a convenient time to fight with the +enemies our vanward shall make with their vanward if they have any; +and if they be in one company, our vanward, taking the advantage of +the wind, shall set upon their foremost rank, bringing them out of +order; and our vice-admiral shall seek to board their vice-admiral, +and every captain shall choose his equal as near as he may. + +4. _Item_, the admiral of the wing shall be always in the wind +with his whole company; and when we shall join with the enemies he +shall keep still the advantage of the wind, to the intent he with his +company may the better beat off the galleys from the great ships.[2] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The articles are preceded, like the first ones, by a list of ships +or 'battle order,' showing an organisation into a vanward, main body +(battle), and one wing of oared craft. See Introductory Note, p. 19. + +[2] Of the remaining seven articles, five relate to distinguishing +squadronal flags and lights as in the earlier instructions, and the last +one to the Watchword of the night. It is to be 'God save King Henry,' +and the answer, 'And long to reign over us.' + + + + +PART II + +ELIZABETHAN AND JACOBEAN + +SIR WALTER RALEGH, 1617 + + + +THE ELIZABETHAN ORIGIN OF RALEGH'S INSTRUCTIONS + +INTRODUCTORY + + +No fighting instructions known to have been issued in the reign of +Elizabeth have been found, nor is there any indication that a regular +order of battle was ever laid down by the seamen-admirals of her +time.[1] Even Howard's great fleet of 1588 had twice been in action +with the Armada before it was so much as organised into squadrons. If +anything of the kind was introduced later in her reign Captain +Nathaniel Boteler, who had served in the Jacobean navy and wrote on +the subject early in the reign of Charles I, was ignorant of it. In +his _Dialogues about Sea Services_, he devotes the sixth to +'Ordering of Fleets in Sailing, Chases, Boardings and Battles,' but +although he suggests a battle order which we know was never put in +practice, he is unable to give one that had been used by an English +fleet.[2] It is not surprising. In the despatches of the Elizabethan +admirals, though they have much to say on strategy, there is not a +word of fleet-tactics, as we understand the thing. The domination of +the seamen's idea of naval warfare, the increasing handiness of ships, +the improved design of their batteries, the special progress made by +Englishmen in guns and gunnery led rapidly to the preference of +broadside gunfire over boarding, and to an exaggeration of the value +of individual mobility; and the old semi-military formations based on +small-arm fighting were abandoned. + +At the same time, although the seamen-admirals did not trouble or were +not sufficiently advanced to devise a battle order to suit their new +weapon, there are many indications that, consciously or unconsciously, +they developed a tendency inherent in the broadside idea to fall in +action into a rough line ahead; that is to say, the practice was +usually to break up into groups as occasion dictated, and for each +group to deliver its broadsides in succession on an exposed point of +the enemy's formation. That the armed merchantmen conformed regularly +to this idea is very improbable. The faint pictures we have of their +well-meant efforts present them to us attacking in a loose throng and +masking each other's fire. But that the queen's ships did not attempt +to observe any order is not so clear. When the combined fleet of +Howard and Drake was first sighted by the Armada, it is said by two +Spanish eye-witnesses to have been _in ala_, and 'in very fine +order.' And the second of Adams's charts, upon which the famous House +of Lords' tapestries were designed, actually represents the queen's +ships standing out of Plymouth in line ahead, and coming to the attack +in a similar but already disordered formation. Still there can be no +doubt that, however far a rudimentary form of line ahead was carried +by the Elizabethans, it was a matter of minor tactics and not of a +battle order, and was rather instinctive than the perfected result of +a serious attempt to work out a tactical system. The only actual +account of a fleet formation which we have is still on the old lines, +and it was for review purposes only. Ubaldino, in his second +narrative, which he says was inspired by Drake,[3] relates that when +Drake put out of Plymouth to receive Howard 'he sallied from port to +meet him with his thirty ships in equal ranks, three ships deep, +making honourable display of his masterly and diligent handling, with +the pinnaces and small craft thrown forward as though to reconnoitre +the ships that were approaching, which is their office.' Nothing, +however, is more certain in the unhappily vague accounts of the 1588 +campaign than that no such battle order as this was used in action +against the Armada. + +It is not till the close of the West Indian Expedition of 1596, when, +after Hawkins and Drake were both dead, Colonel-General Sir Thomas +Baskerville, the commander of the landing force, was left in charge of +the retreating fleet, that we get any trace of a definite battle +formation. In his action off the Isla de Pinos he seems, so far as we +can read the obscure description, to have formed his fleet into two +divisions abreast, each in line ahead. The queen's ships are described +at least as engaging in succession according to previous directions +till all had had 'their course.' Henry Savile, whose intemperate and +enthusiastic defence of his commander was printed by Hakluyt, further +says: 'Our general was the foremost and so held his place until, by +order of fight, other ships were to have their turns according to his +former direction, who wisely and politicly had so ordered his vanguard +and rearward; and as the manner of it was altogether strange to the +Spaniard, so might they have been without hope of victory, if their +general had been a man of judgment in sea-fights.' + +Here, then, if we may trust Savile, a definite battle order must have +been laid down beforehand on the new lines, and it is possible that in +the years which had elapsed since the Armada campaign the seamen had +been giving serious attention to a tactical system, which the absence +of naval actions prevented reaching any degree of development. Had +the idea been Baskerville's own it is very unlikely that the veteran +sea-captains on his council of war would have assented to its +adoption. At any rate we may assert that the idea of ships attacking +in succession so as to support one another without masking each +other's broadside fire (which is the essential germ of the true line +ahead) was in the air, and it is clearly on the principle that +underlay Baskerville's tactics that Ralegh's fighting instructions +were based twenty years later.[4] + +These which are the first instructions known to have been issued to an +English fleet since Henry VIII's time were signed by Sir Walter Ralegh +on May 3, 1617, at Plymouth, on the eve of his sailing for his +ill-fated expedition to Guiana. Most of the articles are in the nature +of 'Articles of War' and 'Sailing Instructions' rather than 'Fighting +Instructions,' but the whole are printed below for their general +interest. A contemporary writer, quoted by Edwards in his _Life of +Ralegh_, says of them: 'There is no precedent of so godly, severe, +and martial government, fit to be written and engraven in every man's +soul that covets to do honour to his king and country in this or like +attempts.' But this cannot be taken quite literally. So far at least +as they relate to discipline, some of Ralegh's articles may be traced +back in the _Black Book of the Admiralty_ to the fourteenth +century, while the illogical arrangement of the whole points, as in +the case of the Additional Fighting Instructions of the eighteenth +century, to a gradual growth from precedent to precedent by the +accretion of expeditional orders added from time to time by individual +admirals. The process of formation may be well studied in Lord +Wimbledon's first orders, where Ralegh's special expeditional +additions will be found absorbed and adapted to the conditions of a +larger fleet. Moreover, there is evidence that, with the exception of +those articles which were designed in view of the special destination +of Ralegh's voyage, the whole of them were based on an early +Elizabethan precedent. For the history of English tactics the point +is of considerable importance, especially in view of his twenty-ninth +article, which lays down the method of attack when the weather-gage +has been secured. This has hitherto been believed to be new and +presumably Ralegh's own, in spite of the difficulty of believing that +a man entirely without experience of fleet actions at sea could have +hit upon so original and effective a tactical design. The evidence, +however, that Ralegh borrowed it from an earlier set of orders is +fairly clear. + +Amongst the _Stowe MSS._ in the British Museum there is a small +quarto treatise (No. 426) entitled 'Observations and overtures for a +sea fight upon our own coasts, and what kind of order and discipline +is fitted to be used in martialling and directing our navies against +the preparations of such Spanish Armadas or others as shall at any +time come to assail us.' From internal evidence and directly from +another copy of it in the _Lansdown MSS._ (No. 213), we know it +to be the work of 'William Gorges, gentleman.' He is to be identified +as a son of Sir William Gorges, for he tells us he was afloat with his +father in the Dreadnought as early as 1578, when Sir William was +admiral on the Irish station with a squadron ordered to intercept the +filibustering expedition which Sir Thomas Stucley was about to attempt +under the auspices of Pope Gregory XIII. Sir William was a cousin of +Ralegh's and brother to Sir Arthur Gorges, who was Ralegh's captain in +the Azores expedition of 1597, and who in Ralegh's interest wrote the +account of the campaign which Purchas printed. Though William, the +son, freely quotes the experiences of the Armada campaign of 1588, he +is not known to have ever held a naval command, and he calls himself +'unexperienced.' We may take it therefore that his treatise was mainly +inspired by Ralegh, to whom indeed a large part of it is sometimes +attributed. This question, however, is of small importance. The gist +of the matter is a set of fleet orders which he has appended as a +precedent at the end of his treatise, and it is on these orders that +Ralegh's are clearly based. They commence with fourteen articles, +consisting mainly of sailing instructions, similar to those which +occur later in Ralegh's set. The fifteenth deals with fighting and +bloodshed among the crews, and the sixteenth enjoins morning and +evening prayer, with a psalm at setting the watch, and further +provides that any man absenting himself from divine service without +good cause shall suffer the 'bilboes,' with bread and water for twelve +hours. The whole of this drastic provision for improving the seamen's +morals has been struck out by a hurried and less clerkly hand, and in +the margin is substituted another article practically word for word +the same as that which Ralegh adopted as his first article. The same +hand has also erased the whole numbering of the articles up to No. 16, +and has noted that the new article on prayers is to come first.[5] +The articles which follow correspond closely both in order and +expression to Ralegh's, ending with No. 36, where Ralegh's special +articles relating to landing in Guiana begin. Ralegh's important +twenty-ninth article dealing with the method of attack is practically +identical with that of Gorges. Ralegh, however, has several articles +which are not in Gorges's set, and wherever the two sets are not word +for word the same, Ralegh's is the fuller, having been to all +appearances expanded from Gorges's precedent. This, coupled with the +fact that other corrections beside those of the prayer article are +embodied in Ralegh's articles, leaves practically no doubt that +Gorges's set was the earlier and the precedent upon which Ralegh's was +based. + +An apparent difficulty in the date of Gorges's treatise need not +detain us. It was dedicated on March 16, 1618-9, to Buckingham, the +new lord high admiral, but it bears indication of having been written +earlier, and in any case the date of the dedication is no guide to the +date of the orders in the Appendix. + +The important question is, how much earlier than Ralegh's are these +orders of Gorges's treatise? Can we approximately fix their date? +Certainly not with any degree of precision, but nevertheless we are +not quite without light. To begin with there is the harsh punishment +for not attending prayers, which is thoroughly characteristic of Tudor +times. Then there is an article, which Ralegh omits, relating to the +use of 'musket-arrows.' Gorges's article runs: 'If musket-arrows be +used, to have great regard that they use not but half the ordinary +charge of powder, otherwise more powder will make the arrow fly +double.' Now these arrows we know to have been in high favour for +their power of penetrating musket-proof defences about the time of the +Armada. They were a purely English device, and were taken by Richard +Hawkins upon his voyage to the South Sea in 1593. He highly commends +them, but nevertheless they appear to have fallen out of fashion, and +no trace of their use in Jacobean times has been found.[6] + +A still more suggestive indication exists in the heading which is +prefixed to Gorges's Appendix. It runs as follows:--'A form of orders +and directions to be given by an admiral in conducting a fleet through +the Narrow Seas for the better keeping together or relieving one +another upon any occasion of distress or separation by weather or by +giving chase. For the understanding whereof suppose that a fleet of +his majesty's consisting of twenty or thirty sail were bound for +serving on the west part of Ireland, as Kinsale haven for example.' +The words 'his majesty' show the Appendix was penned under James I; +but why did Gorges select this curious example for explaining his +orders? We can only remember that it was exactly upon such an occasion +that he had served with his father in 1578. There is therefore at +least a possibility that the orders in question may be a copy or an +adaptation of some which Sir William Gorges had issued ten years +before the Armada. Certainly no situation had arisen since Elizabeth's +death to put such an idea into the writer's head, and the points of +rendezvous mentioned in Gorges's first article are exactly those which +Sir William would naturally have given. + +On evidence so inconclusive no certainty can be attained. All we can +say is that Gorges's Appendix points to a possibility that Ralegh's +remarkable twenty-ninth article may have been as old as the middle of +Elizabeth's reign, and that the reason why it has not survived in the +writings of any of the great Elizabethan admirals is either that the +tactics it enjoins were regarded as a secret of the seamen's 'mystery' +or were too trite or commonplace to need enunciation. At any rate in +the face of the Gorges precedent it cannot be said, without +reservation, that this rudimentary form of line ahead or attack in +succession was invented by Ralegh, or that it was not known to the men +who fought the Armada. + +Amongst other articles of special interest, as showing how firmly the +English naval tradition was already fixed, should be noticed the +twenty-fifth, relating to seamen gunners, the twenty-sixth, forbidding +action at more than point-blank range, and above all the fifth and +sixth, aimed at obliterating all distinction between soldiers and +sailors aboard ship, and at securing that unity of service between the +land and sea forces which has been the peculiar distinction of the +national instinct for war. + +As to the tactical principle upon which the Elizabethan form of attack +was based, it must be noted that was to demoralise the enemy--to drive +him into 'utter confusion.' The point is important, for this +conception of tactics held its place till it was ultimately supplanted +by the idea of concentrating on part of his fleet. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Hakluyt printed several sets of instructions issued to armed fleets +intended for discovery, viz.: 1. Those drawn by Sebastian Cabota for Sir +Hugh Willoughby's voyage in 1553. 2. Those for the first voyage of +Anthony Jenkinson, 1557, which refers to other standing orders. 3. Those +issued by the lords of the Council for Edward Fenton in 1582, the 20th +article of which directs him to draw up orders 'for their better +government both at sea and land.' But none of these contain any fighting +instructions. + +[2] Boteler's MS. was not published till 1685, when the publisher +dedicated it to Samuel Pepys. The date at which it was written can only +be inferred from internal evidence. At p. 47 he refers to 'his Majesty's +late augmentation of seamen's pay in general.' Such an augmentation took +place in 1625 and 1626. He also refers to the 'late king' and to the +colony of St. Christopher's, which was settled in 1623, but not to that +of New Providence, settled in 1629. He served in the Cadiz Expedition of +1625, but does not mention it or any event of the rest of the war. The +battle order, however, which he recommends closely resembles that +proposed by Sir E. Cecil (_post_, p. 65). The probability is, then, that +his work was begun at the end of James I's reign, and was part of the +large output of military literature to which the imminent prospect of +war with Spain gave rise at that time. + +[3] See _Drake and the Tudor Navy_, ii. Appendix B. + +[4] See Article 1 of the Instructions of 1816, _post_, p. 342. + +[5] In all previous English instructions the prayer article had come +towards the end. In the Spanish service it came first, and it was thence +probably that Ralegh got his idea. + +[6] Laughton, _Defeat of the Armada_, i. 126; _Account, &c_. +(_Exchequer, Queen's Remembrancer_), lxiv. 9, April 9, 1588; Hawkins's +_Observations_ (Hakl. Soc), § lxvi. + + + +_SIR WALTER RALEGH_, 1617.[1] + +[+State Papers Domestic xcii. f. 9+.] + +_Orders to be observed by the commanders of the fleet and land +companies under the charge and conduct of Sir Walter Ralegh, Knight, +bound for the south parts of America or elsewhere_. + +_Given at Plymouth in Devon, the 3rd of May, 1617_. + + +First. Because no action nor enterprise can prosper, be it by sea or +by land, without the favour and assistance of Almighty God, the Lord +and strength of hosts and armies, you shall not fail to cause divine +service to be read in your ship morning and evening, in the morning +before dinner, and in the evening before supper, or at least (if there +be interruption by foul weather) once in the day, praising God every +night with the singing of a psalm at the setting of the watch. + +2. You shall take especial care that God be not blasphemed in your +ship, but that after admonition given, if the offenders do not reform +themselves, you shall cause them of the meaner sort to be ducked at +yard-arm; and the better sort to be fined out of their adventure. By +which course if no amendment be found, you shall acquaint me withal, +delivering me the names of the offenders. For if it be threatened in +the Scriptures that the curse shall not depart from the house of the +swearer, much less shall it depart from the ship of the swearer. + +3. Thirdly, no man shall refuse to obey his officer in all that he is +commanded for the benefit of the journey. No man being in health shall +refuse to watch his turn as he shall be directed, the sailors by the +master and boatswain, the landsmen by their captain, lieutenant, or +other officers. + +4. You shall make in every ship two captains of the watch, who shall +make choice of two soldiers every night to search between the decks +that no fire or candlelight be carried about the ship after the watch +be set, nor that any candle be burning in any cabin without a lantern; +and that neither, but whilst they are to make themselves unready. For +there is no danger so inevitable as the ship firing, which may also as +well happen by taking of tobacco between the decks, and therefore [it +is] forbidden to all men but aloft the upper deck. + +5. You shall cause all your landsmen to learn the names and places of +the ropes, that they may assist the sailors in their labour upon the +decks, though they cannot go up to the tops and yards. + +*6. You shall train and instruct your sailors, so many as shall be +found fit, as you do your landsmen, and register their names in the +list of your companies, making no difference of professions, but that +all be esteemed sailors and all soldiers, for your troops will be very +weak when you come to land without the assistance of your seafaring +men. + +7. You shall not give chase nor send abroad any ship but by order from +the general, and if you come near any ship in your course, if she be +belonging to any prince or state in league or amity with his majesty, +you shall not take anything from them by force, upon pain to be +punished as pirates; although in manifest extremity you may (agreeing +for the price) relieve yourselves with things necessary, giving bonds +for the same. Provided that it be not to the disfurnishing of any such +ship, whereby the owner or merchant be endangered for the ship or +goods. + +*8. You shall every night fall astern the general's ship, and follow +his light, receiving instructions in the morning what course to +hold. And if you shall at any time be separated by foul weather, you +shall receive billets sealed up, the first to be opened on this side +the North Cape,[2] if there be cause, the second to be opened beyond +the South Cape,[3] the third after you shall pass 23 degrees, and the +fourth from the height of Cape Verd.[4] + +9. If you discover any sail at sea, either to windward or to leeward +of the admiral, or if any two or three of our fleet shall discover any +such like sail which the admiral cannot discern, if she be a great +ship and but one, you shall strike your main topsail and hoist it +again so often as you judge the ship to be hundred tons of burthen; or +if you judge her to be 200 tons to strike and hoist twice; if 300 tons +thrice, and answerable to your opinion of her greatness. + +*10. If you discover a small ship, you shall do the like with your +fore topsail; but if you discover many great ships you shall not only +strike your main topsail often, but put out your ensign in the +maintop. And if such fleet or ship go large before the wind, you shall +also after your sign given go large and stand as any of the fleet +doth: I mean no longer than that you may judge that the admiral and +the rest have seen your sign and you so standing. And if you went +large at the time of the discovery you shall hale of your sheets for a +little time, and then go large again that the rest may know that you +go large to show us that the ship or fleet discovered keeps that +course. + +*11. So shall you do if the ship or fleet discovered have her tacks +aboard, namely, if you had also your tacks aboard at the time of the +discovery, you shall bear up for a little time, and after hale your +sheets again to show us what course the ship or fleet holds. + +*12. If you discover any ship or fleet by night, if the ship or fleet +be to windward of you, and you to windward of the admiral, you shall +presently bear up to give us knowledge. But if you think that (did you +not bear up) you might speak with her, then you shall keep your +luff,[5] and shoot off a piece of ordnance to give us knowledge +thereby. + +13. For a general rule: Let none presume to shoot off a piece of +ordnance but in discovery of a ship or fleet by night, or by being in +danger of an enemy, or in danger of fire, or in danger of sinking, +that it may be unto us all a most certain intelligence of some matter +of importance. + +*14. And you shall make us know the difference by this: if you give +chase and being near a ship you shall shoot to make her strike, we +shall all see and know that you shoot to that end if it be by day; if +by night, we shall then know that you have seen a ship or fleet none +of our company; and if you suspect we do not hear the first piece then +you may shoot a second, but not otherwise, and you must take almost a +quarter of an hour between your two pieces. + +*15. If you be in danger of a leak--I mean in present danger--you +shall shoot off two pieces presently one after another, and if in +danger of fire, three pieces presently one after another; but if there +be time between we will know by your second piece that you doubt that +we do not hear your first piece, and therefore you shoot a second, to +wit by night, and give time between. + +16. There is no man that shall strike any officer be he captain, +lieutenant, ensign, sergeant, corporal of the field,[6] +quartermaster, &c. + +17. Nor the master of any ship, master's mate, or boatswain, or +quartermaster. I say no man shall strike or offer violence to any of +these but the supreme officer to the inferior, in time of service, +upon pain of death. + +18. No private man shall strike another, upon pain of receiving such +punishment as a martial court[7] shall think him worthy of. + +19. If any man steal any victuals, either by breaking into the hold or +otherwise, he shall receive the punishment as of a thief or murderer +of his fellows. + +20. No man shall keep any feasting or drinking between meals, nor +drink any healths upon your ship's provisions. + +21. Every captain by his purser, stewards, or other officers shall +take a weekly account how his victuals waste. + +22. The steward shall not deliver any candle to any private man nor +for any private use. + +23. Whosoever shall steal from his fellows either apparel or anything +else shall be punished as a thief. + +24. In foul weather every man shall fit his sails to keep company with +the fleet, and not run so far ahead by day but that he may fall astern +the admiral by night. + +25. In case we shall be set upon by sea, the captain shall appoint +sufficient company to assist the gunners; after which, if the fight +require it, in the cabins between the decks shall be taken down [and] +all beds and sacks employed for bulwarks.[8] + +*The musketeers of every ship shall be divided under captains or other +officers, some for the forecastle, others for the waist, and others +for the poop, where they shall abide if they be not otherwise +directed.[9] + +26. The gunners shall not shoot any great ordnance at other distance +than point blank. + +27. An officer or two shall be appointed to take care that no loose +powder be carried between the decks, or near any linstock or match in +hand. You shall saw divers hogsheads in two parts, and filling them +with water set them aloft the decks. You shall divide your carpenters, +some in hold if any shot come between wind and water, and the rest +between the decks, with plates of leads, plugs, and all things +necessary laid by them. You shall also lay by your tubs of water +certain wet blankets to cast upon and choke any fire.[10] + +28. The master and boatswain shall appoint a certain number of sailors +to every sail, and to every such company a master's mate, a +boatswain's mate or quartermaster; so as when every man knows his +charge and his place things may be done without noise or confusion, +and no man [is] to speak but the officers. As, for example, if the +master or his mate bid heave out the main topsail, the master's mate, +boatswain's mate or quartermaster which hath charge of that sail shall +with his company perform it, without calling out to others and without +rumour[11], and so for the foresail, fore topsail, spritsail and the +rest; the boatswain himself taking no particular charge of any sail, +but overlooking all and seeing every man to do his duty. + +29. No man shall board his enemy's ship without order, because the +loss of a ship to us is of more importance than the loss of ten ships +to the enemy, as also by one man's boarding all our fleet may be +engaged; it being too great a dishonour to lose the least of our +fleet. But every ship, if we be under the lee of an enemy, shall +labour to recover the wind if the admiral endeavours it. But if we +find an enemy to be leewards of us, the whole fleet shall follow the +admiral, vice-admiral, or other leading ship within musket shot of the +enemy; giving so much liberty to the leading ship as after her +broadside delivered she may stay and trim her sails. Then is the +second ship to tack as the first ship and give the other side, keeping +the enemy under a perpetual shot. This you must do upon the windermost +ship or ships of an enemy, which you shall either batter in pieces, or +force him or them to bear up and so entangle them, and drive them foul +one of another to their utter confusion[12]. + +30. The musketeers, divided into quarters of the ship, shall not +deliver their shot but at such distance as their commanders shall +direct them. + +31. If the admiral give chase and be headmost man, the next ship shall +take up his boat, if other order be not given. Or if any other ship be +appointed to give chase, the next ship (if the chasing ship have a +boat at her stern) shall take it. + +32. If any make a ship to strike, he shall not enter her until the +admiral come up. + +33. You shall take especial care for the keeping of your ships clean +between the decks, [and] to have your ordnance ready in order, and not +cloyed with chests and trunks. + +34. Let those that have provision of victual deliver it to the +steward, and every man put his apparel in canvas cloak bags, except +some few chests which do not pester the ship. + +35. Everyone that useth any weapon of fire, be it musket or other +piece, shall keep it clean, and if he be not able to amend it being +out of order, he shall presently acquaint his officer therewith, who +shall command the armourer to mend it. + +36. No man shall play at cards or dice either for his apparel or arms +upon pain of being disarmed and made a swabber of the ship. + +*37. Whosoever shall show himself a coward upon any landing or +otherwise, he shall be disarmed and made a labourer or carrier of +victuals for the rest. + +*38. No man shall land any man in any foreign ports without order from +the general, by the sergeant-major[13] or other officer, upon pain of +death. + +*39. You shall take especial care when God shall send us to land in +the Indies, not to eat of any fruit unknown, which fruit you do not +find eaten with worms or beasts under the tree. + +*40. You shall avoid sleeping on the ground, and eating of new fish +until it be salted two or three hours, which will otherwise breed a +most dangerous flux; so will the eating of over-fat hogs or fat +turtles. + +*41. You shall take care that you swim not in any rivers but where you +see the Indians swim, because most rivers are full of alligators. + +*42. You shall not take anything from any Indian by force, for if you +do it we shall never from thenceforth be relieved by them, but you +must use them with all courtesy. But for trading and exchanging with +them, it must be done by one or two of every ship for all the rest, +and those to be directed by the cape merchant[14] of the ship, +otherwise all our commodities will become of vile price, greatly to +our hindrance. + +*43. For other orders on the land we will establish them (when God +shall send us thither) by general consent. In the meantime I shall +value every man, honour the better sort, and reward the meaner +according to their sobriety and taking care for the service of God and +prosperity of our enterprise. + +*44. When the admiral shall hang out a flag in the main shrouds, you +shall know it to be a flag of council. Then come aboard him. + +*45. And wheresoever we shall find cause to land, no man shall force +any woman be she Christian or heathen, upon pain of death. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The articles marked with an asterisk do not appear in the Gorges +set, and were presumably those which Ralegh added to suit the conditions +of his expedition or which he borrowed from other precedents. + +[2] Cape Finisterre. + +[3] Cape St. Vincent. + +[4] MS. Cape Devert. + +[5] MS. 'loofe.' + +[6] Corporal of the field meant the equivalent of an A.D.C. or orderly. + +[7] This appears to be the first known mention of a court-martial being +provided for officially at sea. + +[8] This passage is corrupt in the MS. and is restored from Wimbledon's +Article 32, _post_, p. 58. + +[9] This was the Spanish practice. There is no known mention of it +earlier in the English service. + +[10] Gorges's article about 'Musket-arrows' is here omitted by Ralegh. + +[11] _I.e._ 'noisy confusion.' Shakspeare has 'I heard a bustling rumour +like a fray.' + +[12] The corresponding article in Gorges's set (_Stowe MSS._ 426) is as +follows:-- + +'No man shall board any enemy's ship but by order from a principal +commander, as the admiral, vice-admiral or rear-admiral, for that by one +ship's boarding all the fleet may be engaged to their dishonour or loss. +But every ship that is under the lee of an enemy shall labour to recover +the wind if the admiral endeavour it. But if we find an enemy to leeward +of us the whole fleet shall follow the admiral, vice-admiral or other +leading ship within musket-shot of the enemy, giving so much liberty to +the leading ship, as after her broadside is delivered she may stay and +trim her sails. Then is the second ship to give her side and the third, +fourth, and rest, which done they shall all tack as the first ship and +give the other side, keeping the enemy under a perpetual volley. This +you must do upon the windermost ship or ships of the enemy, which you +shall either batter in pieces, or force him or them to bear up and so +entangle them, and drive them foul one of another to their utter +confusion.' For the evidence that this may have been drawn up and used +as early as 1578, and consequently in the Armada campaign, see +Introductory Note, _supra_, pp. 34-5. + +[13] 'Sergeant-major' at this time was the equivalent to our 'chief of +the staff' or 'adjutant-general.' In the fleet orders issued by the Earl +of Essex for the Azores expedition in 1597 there was a similar article, +which Ralegh was accused of violating by landing at Fayal without +authority; it ran as follows:--'No captain of any ship nor captain of +any company if he be severed from the fleet shall land without direction +from the general or some other principal commander upon pain of death,' +&c. Ralegh met the charge by pleading he was himself a 'principal +commander.'--Purchas, iv. 1941. + +[14] This expression has not been found elsewhere. It may stand for +'chap merchant,' _i.e._ 'barter-merchant.' + + + + +PART III + +CAROLINGIAN + +I. VISCOUNT WIMBLEDON, 1625 + +II. THE EARL OF LINDSEY, 1635 + + + +THE ATTEMPT TO APPLY LAND FORMATIONS TO THE FLEET, 1625 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +From the point of view of command perhaps the most extraordinary naval +expedition that ever left our shores was that of Sir Edward Cecil, +Viscount Wimbledon, against Cadiz in 1625. Every flag officer both of +the fleet and of the squadrons was a soldier. Cecil himself and the +Earl of Essex, his vice-admiral, were Low Country colonels of no great +experience in command even ashore, and Lord Denbigh, the rear-admiral, +was a nobleman of next to none at all. Even Cecil's captain, who was +in effect 'captain of the fleet,' was Sir Thomas Love, a sailor of +whose service nothing is recorded, and the only seaman of tried +capacity who held a staff appointment was Essex's captain, Sir Samuel +Argall. It was probably due to this recrudescence of military +influence in the navy that we owe the first attempt to establish a +regular order of battle since the days of Henry VIII. + +These remarkable orders appear to have been an after-thought, for they +were not proposed until a day or two after the fleet had sailed. The +first orders issued were a set of general instructions, 'for the +better government of the fleet' dated October 3, when the fleet was +still at Plymouth. + +They were, it will be seen, on the traditional lines. Those used by +Ralegh are clearly the precedent upon which they were drawn, and in +particular the article relating to engaging an enemy's fleet follows +closely that recommended by Gorges, with such modifications as the +squadronal organisation of a large fleet demanded. On October 9, the +day the fleet got to sea, a second and more condensed set of 'Fighting +Instructions' was issued, which is remarkable for the modification it +contains of the method of attack from windward.[1] For instead of an +attack by squadrons it seems to contemplate the whole fleet going into +action in succession after the leading ship, an order which has the +appearance of another advance towards the perfected line. + +Two days later however the fleet was becalmed, and Cecil took the +opportunity of calling a council to consider a wholly new set of +'Fighting Instructions' which had been drafted by Sir Thomas Love. +This step we are told was taken because Cecil considered the original +articles provided no adequate order of battle such as he had been +accustomed to ashore. The fleet had already been divided into three +squadrons, the Dutch contingent forming a fourth, but beyond this, we +are told, nothing had been done 'about the form of a sea fight.' Under +the new system it will be seen each of the English squadrons was to be +further divided into three sub-squadrons of nine ships, and these +apparently were to sail three deep, as in Drake's parade formation of +1588, and were to 'discharge and fall off three and three as they were +filed in the list,' or order of battle. That is, instead of the ships +of each squadron attacking in succession as the previous orders had +enjoined, they were to act in groups of three, with a reserve in +support. The Dutch, it was expressly provided, were not to be bound by +these orders, but were to be free 'to observe their own order and +method of fighting.' What this was is not stated, but there can be no +doubt that the reference is to the boarding tactics which the Dutch, +in common with all continental navies, continued to prefer to the +English method of first overpowering the enemy with the guns. This +proviso, in view of the question as to what country it was that first +perfected a single line ahead, should be borne in mind. + +As appears from the minutes of the council of war, printed below, +Love's revolutionary orders met with strong opposition. Still, so +earnest was Cecil in pressing them, and so well conceived were many of +the articles that they were not entirely rejected, but were recognised +as a counsel of perfection, which, though not binding, was to be +followed as near as might be. Their effect upon the officers, or some +of them, was that they understood the 'order of fight' to be as +follows:--'The several admirals to be in square bodies' (that is, each +flag officer would command a division or sub-squadron formed in three +ranks of three files), 'and to give their broadsides by threes and so +fall off. The rear-admiral to stand for a general reserve, and not to +engage himself without great cause.'[2] The confusion, however, must +have been considerable and the difference of opinion great as to how +far the new orders were binding; for the 'Journal of the Vanguard' +merely notes that a council was called on the 11th 'wherein some +things were debated touching the well ordering of the fleet,' and with +this somewhat contemptuous entry the subject is dismissed. + +Still it must be said that on the whole these orders are a great +advance over anything we know of in Elizabethan times, and +particularly in the careful provisions for mutual support they point +to a happy reversion to the ideas which De Chaves had formulated, and +which the Elizabethans had too drastically abandoned. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] 'Journal of the Vanguard' (Essex's flagship), and Cecil to Essex, +_S.P. Dom. Car. I_, xi. + +[2] 'Journal of the Expedition,' _S. P. Dom. Car., I_, x. 67. + + + +_LORD WIMBLEDON_, 1625, _No._ 1, _Oct._ 3. + +[+State Papers Domestic, Car. I, ix.+] + + +_A copy of those instructions which were sent unto the Earl of Essex +and given by Sir Edward Cecil, Knight, admiral of the fleet, +lieutenant-general and marshal of his majesty's land force now at sea, +to be duly performed by all commanders, and their captains and +masters, and other inferior officers, both by sea and land, for the +better government of his majesty's fleet. Dated in the Sound of +Plymouth, aboard his majesty's good ship the Anne Royal, the third of +October_, 1625. + +1. First above all things you shall provide that God be duly served +twice every day by all the land and sea companies in your ship, +according to the usual prayers and liturgy of the Church of England, +and shall set and discharge every watch with the singing of a psalm +and prayer usual at sea. + +2. You shall keep the company from swearing, blaspheming, drunkenness, +dicing, carding, cheating, picking and stealing, and the like +disorders. + +3. You shall take care to have all your company live orderly and +peaceable, and shall charge your officers faithfully to perform their +office and duty of his and their places. And if any seaman or soldier +shall raise tumult, mutiny or conspiracy, or commit murder, quarrel, +fight or draw weapon to that end, or be a sleeper at his watch, or +make noise, or not betake himself to his place of rest after his watch +is out, or shall not keep his cabin cleanly, or be discontented with +the proportion of victuals assigned unto him, or shall spoil or waste +them or any other necessary provisions in the ships, or shall not keep +clean his arms, or shall go ashore without leave, or shall be found +guilty of any other crime or offence, you shall use due severity in +the punishment or reformation thereof according to the known orders of +the sea. + +4. For any capital or heinous offence that shall be committed in your +ship by the land or sea men, the land and sea commanders shall join +together to take a due examination thereof in writing, and shall +acquaint me therewith, to the end that I may proceed in judgment +according to the quality of the offence. + +5. No sea captain shall meddle with the punishing of any land +soldiers, but shall leave them to their commanders; neither shall the +land commanders meddle with the punishing of the seamen. + +6. You shall with the master take a particular account of the stores +of the boatswain and carpenters of the ship, examining their receipts, +expenses and remains, not suffering any unnecessary waste to be made +of their provisions, or any work to be done which shall not be needful +for the service. + +7. You shall every week take the like account of the purser and +steward of the quantity and quality of victuals that are spent, and +provide for the preservation thereof without any superfluous +expense. And if any person be in that office suspected[1] for the +wasting and consuming of victuals, you shall remove him and acquaint +me thereof, and shall give me a particular account from time to time +of the expense, goodness, quantity and quality of your victuals. + +8. You shall likewise take a particular account of the master gunner +for the shot, powder, munition and all other manner of stores +contained in his indenture, and shall not suffer any part thereof to +be sold, embezzled or wasted, nor any piece of ordnance to be shot off +without directions, keeping also an account of every several piece +shot off in your ship, to the end I may know how the powder is spent. + +9. You shall suffer no boat to go from your ship without special leave +and upon necessary causes, to fetch water or some other needful thing, +and then you shall send some of your officers or men of trust, for +whose good carriage and speedy return you will answer. + +10. You shall have a special care to prevent the dreadful accident of +fire, and let no candles be used without lanterns, nor any at all in +or about the powder room. Let no tobacco be taken between the decks, +or in the cabins or in any part of the ship, but upon the forecastle +or upper deck, where shall stand tubs of water for them to throw their +ashes into and empty their pipes. + +11. Let no man give offence to his officer, or strike his equal or +inferior on board, and let mutinous persons be punished in most severe +manner. + +12. Let no man depart out of his ship in which he is first entered +without leave of his commander, and let no captain give him +entertainment after he is listed, upon pain of severity of the law in +that case. + +13. If any fire should happen in your ship, notwithstanding your care +(which God forbid!), then you shall shoot off two pieces of ordnance, +one presently after the other, and if it be in the night you shall +hang out four lanterns with lights upon the yards, that the next ships +to you may speed to succour you. + +14. If the ship should happen to spend a mast, or spring a leak, which +by increasing upon you may grow to present danger, then you shall +shoot off two pieces of ordnance, the one a good while after the +other, and hang out two lights on the main shrouds, the one a man's +height over the other, so as they may be discernible. + +15. If the ship should happen to ran on ground upon any danger (which +God forbid!) then you shall shoot off four pieces of ordnance +distinctly, one after the other; if in the night, hang out as many +lights as you can, to the end the fleet may take notice thereof. + +16. You shall favour your topmasts and the head of your mainmast by +bearing indifferent sail, especially in foul weather and in a head sea +and when your ship goeth by the wind; lest, by the loss of a mast upon +a needless adventure, the service is deprived of your help when there +is greatest cause to use it. + +17. The whole fleet is to be divided into three squadrons: the +admiral's squadron to wear red flags and red pennants on the main +topmast-head; the vice-admiral's squadron to wear blue flags and blue +pennants on the fore topmast-heads; the rear-admiral's squadron to +wear white flags and white pennants on the mizen topmast-heads.[2] + +18. The admirals and officers are to speak with me twice a day, +morning and evening, to receive my directions and commands, which the +rest of the ships are duly to perform. If I be ahead I will stay for +them, if to leeward I will bear up to them. If foul weather should +happen, you are not to come too near me or any other ship to hazard +any danger at all. And when I have hailed you, you are to fall +astern, that the rest of the ships in like manner may come up to +receive my commands. + +19. You shall make in every ship two captains of the watch, or more +(if need be), who shall make choice of soldiers or seamen to them to +search every watch in the night between the decks, that no fire or +candle be carried about the ship after the watch is set, nor that no +candle be burning in any cabin without a lantern, nor that neither but +whilst they are making themselves ready, and to see the fire put out +in the cook's room, for there is no danger so inevitable as the ship's +firing. + +20. You shall cause the landmen to learn the names and places of the +ropes that they may assist the sailors in their labours upon the +decks, though they cannot go up to the tops and yards. + +21. You shall train and instruct such sailors and mariners as shall be +found fit to the use of the musket, as you do your landmen, and +register their names in a list by themselves, making no difference for +matter of discipline between the sailors and soldiers aboard you. + +22. You shall not give chase nor send aboard any ship but by order +from me, or my vice-admiral or rear-admiral; and if you come near any +ship in your course belonging to any prince or state you shall only +make stay of her, and bring her to me or the next officer, without +taking anything from them or their companies by force, but shall +charge all your company from pillaging between decks or breaking up +any hold, or embezzling any goods so seized and taken, upon pain of +severity of the law in that case. + +23. You shall fall astern of me and the admirals of your several +squadrons unto the places assigned unto you, and follow their lights +as aforesaid, receiving such instructions from me or them in the +morning what course to hold. And if you shall at any time be separated +from the fleet by foul weather, chase or otherwise, you shall shape +your course for the southward cape upon the coast of Spain in the +latitude of 37, one of the places of rendezvous; if you miss me there, +then sail directly for the Bay of Cales or St. Lucar, which is the +other place assigned for rendezvous. + +24. You must have a special care in times of calms and foggy weather +to give such a berth one unto the other as to keep your ships clear, +and not come foul one of another. Especially in fogs and mists you +shall sound with drum or trumpet, or make a noise with your men, or +shoot off muskets, to give warning to other ships to avoid the danger +of boarding or coming foul one of another. + +25. If you or any other two or three of the fleet discover any sail at +sea to the windward or leeward of the admiral, which the admiral +cannot discern, if she be a great ship you shall signify the same by +striking or hoisting of your main topsail so often as you conceive the +ship to be hundred tons of burthen; and if you discover a small ship +you shall give the like signs by striking your fore topsail; but if +you discover many ships you shall strike your main topsail often and +put out your ensign in the maintop; and if such ship or fleet go large +before the wind, you shall after your sign given do the like, till you +perceive that the admiral and the rest of the squadrons have seen your +sign and your so standing; and if you went large at the time of +discovery of such ship or fleet, you shall for a little time hale aft +your sheets and then go large again, that the rest of the fleet and +squadrons may know that you go large to show that the ship or fleet +discovered keeps that course. + +26. If the ship or fleet discovered have their tacks aboard and stand +upon a wind, then if you had your tack aboard at the time of the +discovery you shall bear up for a little time, and after hale aft your +sheets again to show us what course the ship or fleet holdeth. + +27. If you discover any ship or fleet by night, and they be [to] +windward of you, the general or admirals, you shall presently bear up +to give us knowledge if you can speak with her; if not, you may keep +your luff and shoot off a piece of ordnance by which we shall know you +give chase, to the end that the rest may follow accordingly. + +28. For a general rule let no man presume to shoot off any pieces of +ordnance but in discovery of ships or fleet by night, or being in +danger of the enemy, or of fire, or of sinking, that it may be unto us +a most certain intelligence of some matter of importance. + +29. If any man shall steal any victuals by breaking into the hold or +otherwise, he shall receive the punishment of a thief and murderer of +his fellows. + +30. No man shall keep any feasting or drinking between meals, or drink +any health upon the ship's provisions; neither shall the steward +deliver any candle to any private man or for any private use. + +31. In foul weather every man shall set his sail to keep company with +the rest of the fleet, and not run too far ahead by day but that he +may fall astern the admiral before night. + +32. In case the fleet or any part of us should be set upon, the +sea-captain shall appoint sufficient company to assist the gunners, +after which (if the fight require it) the cabins between the decks +shall be taken down, [and] all beds and sacks employed for +bulwarks. The musketeers of every ship shall be divided under captains +or other officers, some for the forecastle, some for the waist, and +others for the poop, where they shall abide if they be not otherwise +directed. + +33. An officer or two shall be appointed to take care that no loose +powder be carried between [the decks] nor near any linstock or match +in hand. You shall saw divers hogsheads in two parts, and, filling +them with water, set them aloft the decks. You shall divide your +carpenters, some in hold, if any shot come between wind and water, and +the rest between the decks, with plates of lead, plugs and all things +necessary laid by them. You shall also lay by your tubs of water +certain wet blankets, to cast upon and cloak any fire. + +34. The master and boatswain shall appoint a convenient number of +sailors to every sail, and to every such company a master's mate or a +quartermaster, so as when every man knows his charge and his place, +things may be done without noise or confusion; and no man [is] to +speak but the officers. + +35. No man shall board any enemy's ship, especially such as command +the king's ships, without special order from me. The loss of one of +our ships will be an encouragement to the enemy, and by that means our +fleet may be engaged, it being a great dishonour to lose the least of +our fleet. If we be under the lee of an enemy, every squadron and ship +shall labour to recover the wind (if the admiral endeavour it). But if +we find an enemy to leeward of us the whole fleet shall follow in +their several places, the admirals with the head of the enemy, the +vice-admirals with the body, and the rear-admirals with the sternmost +ships of the chase, (or other leading ships which shall be appointed) +within musket-shot of the enemy, giving so much liberty to the leading +ship as after her broadside[3] delivered she may stay and trim her +sails; then is the second ship to give her side, and the third and +fourth, with the rest of that division; which done they shall all tack +as the first ship and give their other sides, keeping the enemy under +perpetual volley. This you must do upon the windermost ship or ships +of an enemy, which you shall either batter in pieces, or force him or +them to bear up, and so entangle them or drive them foul one of +another to their utter confusion. + +36. Your musketeers, divided into quarters of the ship, shall not +discharge their shot but at such a distance as their commanders shall +direct them. + +37. If the admiral or admirals give chase, and be the headmost man, +the next ship shall take up his boat if other order be not given, or +if any other ship be appointed to give chase, the next ship (if the +[4] chasing ship have[5] a boat at her stern) shall take it. + +38. Whosoever shall show himself a coward upon any landing or +otherwise, he shall be disarmed and made a labourer or carrier of +victuals for the army. + +39. No man shall land anywhere in any foreign parts without order from +me, or by the sergeant-major or other officer upon pain of death. + +40. Wheresoever we shall land no man shall force any woman upon pain +of death. + +41. You shall avoid sleeping upon the ground and the drinking of new +wines, and eating new fruits, and fresh fish until it has been salted +three hours, and also forbear sleeping upon the deck in the night +time, for fear of the serene[6] that falls, all which will breed +dangerous fluxes and diseases. + +42. When the admiral shall hang out the arms of England in the mizen +shrouds, then shall the council of war come aboard; and when that +shall be taken in and the St. George hung in the main shrouds, that is +for a general council.[7] + +For any orders upon the land (if God send us thither) we shall +establish them. For matter of sailing or discipline at sea if there be +cause you shall receive other directions, to which I refer you. + +Likewise it is ordered between the seamen and the landmen that after +the captain of the ship is cabined, he shall if possible lodge the +captain of the foot in the same cabin, after the master of the ship is +cabined the lieutenant, and after the master's mates the ensign. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] MS. 'if any suspected persons be in that office,' &c. + +[2] This is the first known occasion of red, blue and white flags being +used to distinguish squadrons, though the idea was apparently suggested +in Elizabeth's time. See _Navy Records Society, Miscellany_, i. p. 30. + +[3] MS. has 'to the leading ships as after their broadside,' &c. + +[4] MS. 'a' + +[5] MS. 'with.' + +[6] Spanish _'sereno,'_ the cold evening air. + +[7] The 'council of war' was composed of the flag officers and the +colonels of regiments. Sir Thos. Love was also a member of it, but +probably as treasurer of the expedition and not as flag captain. The +'general council' included besides all captains of ships and the +masters. + + + +_LORD WIMBLEDON_, 1625, _No._ 2, _October_ 11. + +[+State Papers Domestic, Charles I, xi.+] + + +_Instructions when we come to fight with an enemy, sent by the +Lieutenant-General unto the Earl of Essex_. + +1. That you shall see the admiral make way to the admiral enemy, so +likewise the vice-admiral and the rear-admiral, and then every ship +[is] to set upon the next according to his order, yet to have such a +care that those that come after may be ready to second one another +after the manner here following. + +2. If we happen to be encountered by an enemy at sea, you shall then +appoint a sufficient company to assist the gunners. You shall pull +down all the cabins betwixt the decks and use the beds and sacks for +bulwarks, and shall appoint your muskets to several officers, some to +make good the forecastle, some the waist, and others abaft the mast, +from whence they shall not stir till they be otherwise directed, +neither shall they or the gunners shoot a shot till they be commanded +by the captain. + +3. You shall appoint a certain number of mariners to stand by sails +and maintops, that every of them knowing his place and duty there be +no confusion or disorder in the command; and shall divide carpenters +some in hold, some betwixt the decks, with plates of lead, plugs and +other things necessary for stopping up breaches made with great shot; +and saw divers hogsheads in halves and set them upon the deck full of +water, with wet blankets by them to cloak and quench any fire that +shall happen in the fight. + +4. No man shall board any enemy's ships without special order, but +every ship if we be to leeward shall labour to recover the wind. If we +be to windward of them, then shall the whole fleet, or so many of them +as shall be appointed, follow the leading ship within musket-shot of +the enemy, and give them first the chase pieces, then the broadside, +afterwards a volley of small shot; and when the headmost ship hath +done, the next ship shall observe the same course, and so every ship +in order, that the headmost may be ready to renew the fight against +such time as the sternmost hath made an end; by that means keeping the +weather of the enemy and in continual fight till they be sunk in the +sea, or forced by bearing up to entangle themselves, and to come +[foul] one of another to their utter confusion. + + + +_LORD WIMBLEDON_, 1625, _No._ 3. + +[+The Earl of St. Germans's MS. Extract+.[1]] + +_At a Council of War holden aboard the Anne Royal, Tuesday, the 11th +of October_, 1625. + + +The council, being assembled, entered into consultation touching the +form of a sea-fight performed against any fleet or ships of the King +of Spain or other enemy, and touching some directions to be observed +for better preparation to be made for such a fight and the better +managing thereof when we should come to action. + +The particulars for this purpose considerable were many; insomuch that +no pertinent consultation could well be had concerning the same +without some principles in writing, whereby to direct and bound the +discourse. And therefore, by the special command of my lord +lieutenant-general, a form of articles for this service (drawn +originally by Sir Thomas Love, Kt., treasurer for this action, captain +of the Anne Royal and one of the council of war) was presented to the +assembly, and several times read over to them. + +After the reading, all the parts thereof were well weighed and +examined, whereby it was observed that it intended to enjoin our fleet +to advance and fight at sea, much after the manner of an army at land, +assigning every ship to a particular division, rank, file, and +station; which order and regularity was not only improbable but almost +impossible to be observed by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place +as the sea. Hereupon some little doubt arose whether or no this form +of articles should be confirmed; but then it was alleged that the same +articles had in them many other points of direction, preparation, and +caution for a sea-fight, which were agreed by all men to be most +reasonable and necessary. And if so strict a form of proceeding to +fight were not or could not be punctually observed, yet might these +articles beget in our commanders and officers a right understanding of +the conception and intent thereof; which with an endeavour to come as +near as could be to perform, the particulars might be of great use to +keep us from confusion in the general. Neither could the limiting of +every several ship to such a rank or file [and] to such certain place +in the same, bring upon the fleet intricacy and difficulty of +proceeding, so [long] as (if the proper ships were absent or not +ready) those in the next place were left at liberty, or rather +commanded, to supply their rooms and maintain the instructions, if not +absolutely, yet as near as they could. In conclusion therefore the +form of articles which was so presented, read, and considered of, was +with some few alterations and additions ratified by my lord +lieutenant-general and by the whole council as act of theirs passed +and confirmed, and to be duly observed and put in execution by all +captains, mariners, gunners, and officers in every ship, and all +others, to whom it might appertain, at their perils, leaving only to +my lord lieutenant the naming and ranking of the ships of every +division in order as they should proceed for the execution of the same +articles; which in conclusion were these, touching the whole fleet in +general and the admiral's squadron in particular, namely:-- + +1. That when the fleet or ships of the enemy should be discovered the +admiral of our fleet with the ships of his squadron should put +themselves into the form undermentioned and described, namely, that +the same squadron should be separated into three divisions of nine +ships in a division, and so should advance, set forward, and charge +upon the enemy as hereafter more particularly is directed. + +That these nine ships should discharge and fall off three and three, +as they are filed in this list. + +Anne Royal Admiral +Prudence Captain Vaughan +Royal Defence Captain Ellis. + +Barbara Constance Captain Hatch +Talbot Captain Burdon +Abraham Captain Downes. + +Golden Cock Captain Beaumont +Amity Captain Malyn +Anthony Captain Blague. + +That these nine ships should second the admiral of this squadron three +and three, as they are filed in this list. + +St. George Vice-admiral +Lesser Sapphire Captain Bond +Sea Venture Captain Knevet. + +Assurance Captain Osborne +Camelion Captain Seymour +Return Captain Bonithon. + +Jonathan Captain Butler[2] +William Captain White +Hopewell Captain ---- + +That these nine ships should second the vice-admiral of this squadron +three and three, as they are filed in this list. + +Convertine Rear-admiral +Globe Captain Stokes +Assurance of Dover Captain Bargey. + +Great Sapphire Captain Raymond +Anne Captain Wollaston +Jacob Captain Gosse. + +George Captain Stevens +Hermit Captain Turner +Mary Magdalen Captain Cooper. + +These three ships should fall into the rear of the three former +divisions, to charge where and when there should be occasion, or to +help the engaged, or supply the place of any that should be +unserviceable. + +Hellen Captain Mason +Amity of Hull Captain Frisby +Anne Speedwell Captain Polkenhorne. + +2. That the admiral of the Dutch and his squadron should take place on +the starboard side of our admiral, and observe their own order and +method in fighting. + +3. That the vice-admiral of our fleet and his squadron should make the +like division, and observe the same order and form as the admiral's +squadron was to observe, and so should keep themselves in their +several divisions on the larboard side of the admiral, and there +advance and charge if occasion were when the admiral did. + +4. That the rear-admiral of the fleet and his squadron should also put +themselves into the like order of the admiral's squadron as near as it +might be, and in that form should attend for a reserve or supply. And +if any squadron, ship or ships of ours should happen to be engaged by +over-charge of the enemies, loss of masts or yards, or other main +distress needing special succour, that then the rear-admiral with all +his force, or one of his divisions proportionable to the occasion, +should come to their rescue; which being accomplished they should +return to their first order and place assigned. + +5. That the distance between ship and ship in every squadron should be +such as none might hinder one another in advancing or falling off. + +6. That the distance between squadron and squadron should be more or +less as the order of the enemy's fleet or ships should require, +whereof the captains and commanders of our fleet were to be very +considerate. + +7. That if the enemy's approach happened to be in such sort as the +admiral of the Dutch and his squadron, or the vice-admiral of our +fleet [and] his squadron, might have opportunity to begin the fight, +it should be lawful for them to do so until the admiral could come up, +using the form, method, and care prescribed. + +8. That if the enemy should be forced to bear up, or to be entangled +among themselves, whereby an advantage might be had, then our +rear-admiral and his squadron with all his divisions should lay hold +thereof and prosecute it to effect. + +9. That the rear-admiral's squadron should keep most strict and +special watch to see what squadrons or ships distressed of our fleet +should need extraordinary relief, and what advantage might be had upon +the enemy, that a speedy and present course might be taken to perform +the service enjoined. + +10. That if any ship or ships of the enemy should break out or fly, +the admiral of any squadron which should happen to be in the next and +most convenient place for that purpose should send out a competent +number of the fittest ships of his squadron to chase, assault, or take +such ship or ships so breaking out; but no ship should undertake such +a chase without the command of the admiral, or at leastwise the +admiral of his squadron. + +11. That no man should shoot any small or great shot at the enemy till +he came at the distance of caliver or pistol shot, whereby no shot +might be made fruitless or in vain; whereof the captains and officers +in every ship should have an especial care. + +12. That no man should presume or attempt to board any ship of the +enemy without special order and direction from the admiral, or at +leastwise the admiral of his squadron. + +13. That if any of our fleet happened to be [to] leeward of the enemy, +every of our ships should labour and endeavour what they might to take +all opportunity to get to windward of them, and to hold that advantage +having once obtained it. + +14. That the captains and officers of every ship should have an +especial care as much as in them lay to keep the enemies in continual +fight without any respite or intermission to be offered them; which, +with the advantage of the wind if it might be had, was thought the +likeliest way to enforce them to bear up and entangle themselves, or +fall foul one of another in disorder and confusion. + +15. That an especial care should be had in every ship that the gunners +should load some of their pieces with case shot, handspikes, nails, +bars of iron, or with what else might do most mischief to the enemy's +men, upon every fit opportunity, and to come near and lay the ordnance +well to pass for that purpose, which would be apt to do great spoil to +the enemy. + +16. That the cabins in every ship should be broken down so far as was +requisite to clear the way of the ordnance. + +17. That all beds and sacks in every ship should be disposed and used +as bulwarks for defence against the shot of the enemy. + +18. That there should be ten, eight, six, or four men to attend every +piece of ordnance as the master gunner should choose out and assign +them to their several places of service, that every one of them might +know what belonged properly to him to do. And that this choice and +assignation should be made with speed so as we might not be taken +unprovided. + +19. That there should be one, two, or three men of good understanding +and diligence, according to the burden of every ship, forthwith +appointed to fill cartouches[3] of powder, and to carry them in cases +or barrels covered to their places assigned. + +20. That the hold in every ship should be rummaged and made predy,[4] +especially by the ship's sides, and a carpenter with some man of trust +appointed to go fore and after in hold to seek for shot that may come +in under water; and that there should be provided in readiness plugs, +pieces of sheet lead, and pieces of elm board to stop all leaks that +might be found within board or without. + +21. That in every ship where any soldiers were aboard the men should +be divided into two or three parts, whereof only one part should fight +at once and the rest should be in hold, to be drawn up upon occasion +to relieve and rescue the former. + +22. That the men in every ship should be kept as close as reasonably +might be till the enemy's first volley of small shot should be past. + +23. That the mariners in every ship should be divided and separated +into three or four parts or divisions, so as every one might know the +place where he was to perform his duty for the avoiding of confusion. + +24. That the master or boatswain of every ship, by command of the +captain, should appoint a sufficient and select number of seamen to +stand by and attend the sails. + +25. That more especially they should by like command appoint +sufficient helmsmen to steer the ship. + +26. That the sailors and helmsmen should in no sort presume to depart +or stir from their charge. + +27. That the mainyard, foreyard, and topsail sheets in every ship +should be slung, and the topsail yards if the wind were not too high; +hereby to avoid the shooting down of sails. + +28. That there should be butts or hogsheads sawn into two parts filled +with salt water, set upon the upper and lower decks in several places +convenient in every ship, with buckets, gowns, and blankets to quench +and put out wild-fire or other fire if need be. + +29. That if a fight began by day and continued till night, every ship +should be careful to observe the admiral of her squadron; that if the +admiral fell off and forbore the fight for the present every other +ship might do the like, repairing under her own squadron to amend +anything amiss, and be ready to charge again when the admiral should +begin. + +30. That if any of the ships belonging to any squadron or division +happened to be absent or not ready in convenient time and place to +keep and make good the order herein prescribed, then every squadron +and division should maintain these directions as near as they could, +although the number of ships in every division were the less, without +attending the coming in of all the ships of every division. + +31. And that these ten ships, in regard of the munition and materials +for the army and the horses which were carried in them, should attend +the rear-admiral and not engage themselves without order, but should +remain and expect such directions as might come from our admiral or +rear-admiral. + +Peter Bonaventure Captain Johnson +Sarah Bonaventure Captain Carew +Christian Captain Wharey +Susan and Ellen Captain Levett +William of London Captain Amadas +Hope Sir Thomas Pigott, Knt. +Chestnut +Fortune +Fox +Truelove + +There was no difference between the articles for the admiral's +squadron and those for the vice-admiral's and rear-admiral's, save in +the names of the ships of every division, and that their squadrons had +not any particular reserve, nor above five or six ships apiece in the +third division, for want of ships to make up the number of nine; the +munition and horse ships which belonged to their squadrons being unapt +to fight, and therefore disposed into a special division of ten ships +by themselves to attend the general reserve. + + * * * * * + +At the rising of the council a motion was made to have some of the +best sailers of our fleet chosen out and assigned to lie off from the +main body of the fleet, some to sea and some to shoreward, the better +to discover, chase, and take some ships or boats of the enemy's; which +might give us intelligence touching the Plate Fleet, whether it were +come home or no, or when it would be expected and in what place, and +touching such other matters whereof we might make our best advantage. +But nothing herein was now resolved, it being conceived, as it seemed, +that we might soon enough and more opportunely consider of this +proposition and settle an order therein when we came nearer to the +enemy's coasts; so the council was dissolved. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _A Relation Touching the Fleet and Army of the King's most excellent +majesty King Charles, set forth in the first year of his highness's +reign, and touching the order, proceedings, and actions of the same +fleet and army_, by Sir John Glanville, the younger, serjeant-at-law, +and secretary to the council of war. [Printed for the Camden Society, +1883, N.S. vol. xxxii.] + +[2] Elsewhere in the MS. spelt 'Boteler.' Probably Nathaniel Boteler, +author of the _Dialogues about Sea Services_. + +[3] MS. 'carthouses.' + +[4] MS. 'pridie'=Boteler's 'predy.' 'To make the ship predy,' he says, +is to clear for action. 'And likewise to make the hold predy is to +bestow everything handsomely there and to remove anything that may be +troublesome.'--_Dialogues_, 283. + + + +THE SHIP-MONEY FLEETS, +_circa_ 1635 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +That Cecil's unconfirmed orders produced some impression beyond the +circle of the military flag-officers is clear. Captain Nathaniel +Boteler, in the work already cited,[1] quotes the system they +enjoined as the one he would himself adopt if he were to command a +large fleet in action. In his sixth dialogue on the 'Ordering of +Fleets,' after recommending the division of all fleets of eighty sail +and upwards into five squadrons, an organisation that was subsequently +adopted by the Dutch, he proceeds to explain his system of signals, +and the advantages of scout vessels being attached to every squadron, +especially, he says, the 'van and wings,' which looks as though the +ideas of De Chaves were still alive. Boteler's work is cast in the +form of a conversation between a landsman admiral and an experienced +sea captain, who is supposed to be instructing him. In reply to the +admiral's query about battle formations, the captain says that +'neither the whole present age [_i.e._ century] with the half of +the last have afforded any one thorough example of this kind.' In the +few actions between sailing fleets that had taken place in the +previous seventy-five years he says 'we find little or nothing as +touching the form of these fights.' Being pressed for his own ideas on +the subject, he consents to give them as follows: 'I say, then, that +wheresoever a fleet is either to give or take a battle with another +every way equal with it, every squadron of such fleet, whether they be +three in number as generally they are, or five (as we prescribed in +the beginning of the dialogue) shall do well to order and subdivide +itself into three equal divisions, with a reserve of certain ships out +of every squadron to bring up their rears, the which may amount in +number to the third part of every one of those divisions. And every +one of these (observing a due berth and distance) are in the fight to +second one another, and (the better to avoid confusion, and the +falling foul one upon another) to charge, discharge and fall off by +threes or fives, more or less, as the fleet in gross is greater or +smaller; the ships of reserve being to be instructed either to succour +and relieve any that shall be anyway engaged and in danger, or to +supply and put themselves in the place of those that shall be made +unserviceable; and this order and course to be constantly kept and +observed during the whole time of the battle. + +Asked if there are no other forms he says: 'Some forms besides, and +different from this (I know well), have been found prescribed and +practised; as for a fleet which consisteth but of a few ships and +being in fight in an open sea, that it should be brought up to the +battle in one only front, with the chief admiral in the midst of them, +and on each side of him the strongest and best provided ships of the +fleet, who, keeping themselves in as convenient a distance as they +shall be able, are to have a eye and regard in the fight to all the +weaker and worser ships of the party, and to relieve and succour them +upon all occasions, and withal being near the admiral may both guard +him and aptly receive his instructions. And for a numerous fleet they +propound that it should be ordered also (when there is sea-room +sufficient) into one only front, but that the ablest and most warlike +ships should be so stationed as that the agility of the smaller ships +and the strength of the other may be communicated[2] to a mutual +relief, and for the better serving in all occasions either of chase or +charge; to which end they order that all the files of the front that +are to the windwards should be made up of the strongest and best +ships, that so they may the surer and speedier relieve all such of the +weaker ships, being to leewards of them, as shall be endangered or +anyway oppressed by any of the enemy.' All this is a clear echo of De +Chaves and the system which still obtained in all continental +navies. For a large fleet at least Boteler evidently disapproved all +tactics based on the line abreast, and preferred a system of small +groups attacking in line ahead, on Cecil's proposed system. Asked +about the campaign of 1588, he has nothing to tell of any English +formation. Of the crescent order of the Armada he says--and modern +research has fully confirmed his statement--that it was not a battle +order at all, but only a defensive sailing formation 'to keep +themselves together and in company until they might get up to be +athwart Gravelines, which was the rendezvous for their meeting with +the Prince of Parma; and in this regard this their order was +commendable.' + +How far these ideas really represented current naval opinion we cannot +precisely tell, but we know that Boteler was an officer held in high +enough esteem to receive the command of the landing flotilla at Cadiz, +and to be described as 'an able and experienced sea captain.' But +whatever tendency there may have been to tactical progress under +Buckingham's inspiring personality, it must have been smothered by the +lamentable conduct of his war. Later on in the reign, in the period of +the 'Ship-money' fleets, when Charles was endeavouring to establish a +real standing navy on modern lines, we find in the Earl of Lindsey's +orders of 1635, which Monson selected for publication in his +_Tracts_, no sign of anything but tactical stagnation. The early +Tudor tradition seems to have completely re-established itself, and +Monson, who represents that tradition better than anyone, though he +approved the threefold subdivision of squadrons, thought all battle +formations for sailing ships a mistake. Writing not long after +Boteler, he says: 'Ships which must be carried by wind and sails, and +the sea affording no firm or steadfast footing, cannot be commanded to +take their ranks like soldiers in a battle by land. The weather at sea +is never certain, the winds variable, ships unequal in sailing; and +when they strictly keep their order, commonly they fall foul one of +another, and in such cases they are more careful to observe their +directions than to offend the enemy, whereby they will be brought into +disorder amongst themselves.' + +Of Lindsey's orders only Article 18 is given here out of the +thirty-four which Monson prints in full. It is the only one relating +to tactics. The rest, which follow the old pattern, are the usual +medley of articles of war, sailing instructions, and general +directions for the conduct of the fleet at sea. We cannot therefore +safely assume that Article 18 fairly represents the tactical thought +of the time. It may be that Lindsey's orders were merely in the nature +of 'General Instructions,' to be supplemented by more particular +'Fighting Instructions,' as was the practice later. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _Ante_, p. 27. + +[2] The obsolete meaning of 'communicate' is to 'share' or +'participate,' to 'enjoy in common.' + + + +_THE EARL OF LINDSEY_, 1635. + +_Such instructions as were given in the Voyage in 1635 by the Right +Honourable Robert, Earl of Lindsey_.[1] + +[+Monson's Naval Tracts, Book III. Extract+.] + + +Art. 18. If we happen to descry any fleet at sea which we may probably +know or conjecture designs to oppose, encounter or affront us, I will +first strive to get the wind (if I be to leeward), and so shall the +whole fleet in due order do the like. And when we shall join battle no +ship shall presume to assault the admiral, vice-admiral or +rear-admiral, but only myself, my vice-admiral or rear-admiral, if we +be able to reach them; and the other ships are to match themselves +accordingly as they can, and to secure one another as cause shall +require, not wasting their powder at small vessels or victuallers, nor +firing till they come side to side. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] This was a fleet of forty sail, designed, under colour of securing +the sovereignty of the Seas and protecting commerce against pirates, to +assist Spain as far as possible against the French and Dutch. It never +fought. + + + + +PART IV + +THE FIRST DUTCH WAR + +I. ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-52 + +II. ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR, 1653-54 + + + +I + +ENGLISH AND DUTCH ORDERS ON THE EVE OF THE WAR, 1648-53 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +From the foregoing examples it will be seen that at the advent of the +Commonwealth, which was to set on foot so sweeping a revolution in the +naval art, all attempts to formulate a tactical system had been +abandoned. This is confirmed by the following extract from the orders +issued by the Long Parliament in 1648. It was the time when the revolt +of a part of the fleet and a rising in the South Eastern counties led +the government to apprehend a naval coalition of certain foreign +powers in favour of Charles. It is printed by Granville Penn in his +_Memorials of Sir William Penn_ as having been issued in 1647, +but the original copy of the orders amongst the Penn Tracts (_Sloane +MSS._ 1709, f. 55) is marked as having been delivered on May 2, +1648, to 'Captain William Penn, captain of the Assurance frigate and +rear-admiral of the Irish Squadron.' They are clearly based on the +later precedents of Charles I, but it must be noted that Penn is told +'to expect more particular instructions' in regard to the fighting +article. We may assume therefore that the admiralty authorities +already recognised the inadequacy of the established fighting +instructions, and so soon as the pressure of that critical time +permitted intended to amplify them. + +Amongst those responsible for the orders however there is no name that +can be credited with advanced views. They were signed by five members +of the Navy Committee, and at their head is Colonel Edward Mountagu, +afterwards Earl of Sandwich, but then only twenty-two years old.[1] +Whether anything further was done is uncertain. No supplementary +orders have been found bearing date previous to the outbreak of the +Dutch war. But there exists an undated set which it seems impossible +not to attribute to this period. It exists in the _Harleian +MSS._ (1247, ff. 43b), amongst a number of others which appear to +have been used by the Duke of York as precedents in drawing up his +famous instructions of 1665. To begin with it is clearly later than +the orders of 1648, upon which it is an obvious advance. Then the use +of the word 'general' for admiral, and of the word 'sign' for 'signal' +fixes it to the Commonwealth or very early Restoration. Finally, +internal evidence shows it is previous to the orders of 1653, for +those orders will be seen to be an expansion of the undated set so far +as they go, and further, while these undated orders have no mention of +the line, those of 1653 enjoin it. They must therefore lie between +1648 and 1653, and it seems worth while to give them here +conjecturally as being possibly the supplementary, or 'more particular +instructions,' which the government contemplated; particularly as this +hypothesis gains colour from the unusual form of the heading +'Instructions for the better ordering.' Though this form became fixed +from this time forward, there is, so far as is known, no previous +example of it except in the orders which Lord Wimbledon propounded to +his council of war in 1625, and those were also supplementary +articles.[2] + +Be this as it may, the orders in question do not affect the position +that up to the outbreak of the First Dutch War we have no orders +enjoining the line ahead as a battle formation. Still we cannot +entirely ignore the fact that, in spite of the lack of orders on the +subject, traces of a line ahead are to be detected in the earliest +action of the war. Gibson, for instance, in his _Reminiscences_ +has the following passage relating to Blake's brush with Tromp over +the honour of the flag on May 9, 1652, before the outbreak of the +war:[3] 'When the general had got half Channel over he could see the +Dutch fleet with their starboard tacks aboard standing towards him, +having the weather-gage. Upon which the general made a sign for the +fleet to tack. After which, having their starboard tacks aboard (the +general's ship, the Old James, being the southernmost and sternmost +ship in the fleet), the rest of his fleet tacking, first placed +themselves in a line ahead of the general, who after tacking hauled up +his mainsail in the brails, fitted his ship to fight, slung his yards, +and run out his lower tier of guns and clapt his fore topsail upon the +mast.' If Gibson could be implicitly trusted this passage would be +conclusive on the existence of the line formation earlier than any of +the known Fighting Instructions which enjoined it; but unfortunately, +as Dr. Gardiner pointed out, Gibson did not write his account till +1702, when he was 67. He is however to some extent corroborated by +Blake himself, who in his official despatch of May 20, relating the +incident, says that on seeing Tromp bearing down on him 'we lay by and +put ourselves into a fighting posture'--_i.e._ battle order--but +what the 'posture' was he does not say. If however this posture was +actually the one Gibson describes, we have the important fact that in +the first recorded instance of the complete line, it was taken as a +defensive formation to await an attack from windward. + +The only other description we have of English tactics at this time +occurs in a despatch of the Dutch commander-in-chief in the +Mediterranean, Van Galen, in which he describes how Captain Richard +Badiley, then commanding a squadron on the station, engaged him with +an inferior force and covered his convoy off Monte Christo in August +1652. When the fleets were in contact, he says, as though he were +speaking of something that was quite unfamiliar to him, 'then every +captain bore up from leeward close to us to get into range, and so all +gave their broadsides first of the one side and then again of the +other, and then bore away with their ships before the wind till they +were ready again; and then as before with the guns of the whole +broadside they fired into my flagship, one after the other, meaning to +shoot my masts overboard.'[4] From this it would seem that Badiley +attacked in succession in the time-honoured way, and that the old +rudimentary form of the line ahead was still the ordinary practice. +The evidence however is far from strong, but really little is +needed. Experience teaches us that the line ahead formation would +never have been adopted as a standing order unless there had been some +previous practice in the service to justify it or unless the idea was +borrowed from abroad. But, as we shall see, the oft-repeated assertion +that it was imitated from the Dutch is contrary to all the evidence +and quite untenable. The only experience the framers of the order of +1653 can have had of a line ahead formation must have been in our own +service. + +The clearest proof of this lies in the annexed orders which Tromp +issued on June 20, 1652, immediately before the declaration of war, +and after he had had his brush with Blake, in which, if Gibson is to +be trusted, Tromp had seen Blake's line. From these orders it is +clear that the Dutch conception of a naval action was still +practically identical with that of Lindsey's instructions of 1635, +that is, mutual support of squadrons or groups, with no trace of a +regular battle formation. In the detailed 'organisation' of the fleet +each of the three squadrons has its own three flag officers--that is +to say, it was organised, like that of Lord Wimbledon in 1625, in +three squadrons and nine sub-squadrons, and was therefore clearly +designed for group tactics. It is on this point alone, if at all, that +it can be said to show any advance on the tactics which had obtained +throughout the century, or on those which Tromp himself had adopted +against Oquendo in 1639. + +Yet further proof is to be found in the orders issued by Witte +Corneliszoon de With to his captains in October 1652, as +commander-in-chief of the Dutch fleet. In these he very strictly +enjoins, as a matter of real importance, 'that they shall all keep +close up by the others and as near together as possible, to the end +that thereby they may act with united force ... and prevent any +isolation or cutting off of ships occurring in time of fight;' adding +'that it behoved them to stand by and relieve one another loyally, and +rescue such as might be hotly attacked.' This is clearly no more than +an amplification of Tromp's order of the previous June. It introduces +no new principle, and is obviously based on the time-honoured idea of +group tactics and mutual support. It is true that De Jonghe, the +learned historian of the Dutch navy, regards it as conclusive that the +line was then in use by the Dutch, because, as he says, several Dutch +captains, after the next action, were found guilty and condemned for +not having observed their instructions. But really there is nothing +in it from which a line can be inferred. It is all explained on the +theory of groups. And in spite of De Jonghe's deep research and his +anxiety to show that the line was practised by his countrymen as well +as by the English in the first Dutch War, he is quite unable to +produce any orders like the English instructions of 1653, in which a +line formation is clearly laid down. + +But whether or not we can accept De Jonghe's conclusions as to the +time the line was introduced into the Dutch service, one thing is +clear enough--that he never ventured to suggest that the English +copied the idea from his own countrymen. It is evident that he found +nothing either in the Dutch archives or elsewhere even to raise such +an idea in his mind. But, on the other hand, his conspicuous +impartiality leads him to give abundant testimony that throughout +these wars thoughtful Dutch officers were continually praising the +order and precision of the English tactics, and lamenting the +blundering and confusion of their own. It may be added that Dr. +Gardiner's recent researches in the same field equally failed to +produce any document upon which we can credit the Dutch admirals with +serious tactical reforms. Even De Ruyter's improvements in squadronal +organisation consisted mainly in superseding a multiplicity of small +squadrons by a system of two or three large squadrons, divided into +sub-Squadrons, a system which was already in use with the English, and +was presumably imitated by De Ruyter, if it was indeed he who +introduced it and not Tromp, from the well-established Commonwealth +practice.[5] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The others were John Rolle, member for Truro, a merchant and +politician, who died in November 1648, and who as early as 1645 had been +proposed, though unsuccessfully, for the Navy Committee; and three less +conspicuous members of Parliament: Sir Walter Earle (of the Presbyterian +party), Giles Greene, and Alexander Bence. They were all superseded the +following year by the new Admiralty Committee of the Council of State. + +[2] _Supra_, p. 63. It may also be noted that these articles are +intended for a fleet not large enough to be divided into squadrons--just +such a fleet in fact as that in which Penn was flying his flag. The +units contemplated, _e.g._ in Articles 2-4, are 'ships,' whereas in the +corresponding articles of 1653 the units are 'squadrons.' + +[3] Gardiner, _Dutch War_, i. 9. + +[4] This at least is what Van Galen's crabbed old Dutch seems to mean. +'Alsoo naer bij quam dat se couden toe schieter dragen, de elcken heer +onder den windt, gaven so elck hare laghe dan vinjt d'eene sijde, dan +veer van d'anden sijde, hielden alsdan met haer schepen voor den vindt +tal dat se weer claer waren, dan wast alsvooren met cannoneren van de +heele lagh en in sonderheijt op mijn onderhebbende schip vier gaven van +meeninge masten aft stengen overboort to schieten.' A copy of Van +Galen's despatch is amongst Dr. Gardiner's _Dutch War_ transcripts. + +[5] See De Jonghe's introduction to his Third Book on 'The Condition of +the British and Dutch Navies at the outbreak of and during the Second +English War,' _Geschiedenis van het Nederlandsche Zeewesen_, vol. ii. +part ii. pp. 132-141, and his digression on Tactics, pp. 290 _et seq._, +and p. 182 note. De Witte's order is p. 311. + + + +_PARLIAMENTARY ORDERS_, 1648. + +[+Sloane MSS. 1709, f. 55. Extract+] + +_Instructions given by the Right Honourable the Committee of the +Lords and Commons for the Admiralty and Cinque Ports, to be duly +observed by all captains and officers whatsoever and common men +respectively in their fleet, provided to the glory of God, the honour +and service of Parliament, and the safety of the Kingdom of +England_. [_Fol._ 59.] + + +If any fleet shall be discovered at sea which may probably be +conjectured to have a purpose to encounter, oppose, or affront the +fleet in the Parliament's service, you may in that case expect more +particular directions. But for the present you are to take notice, +that in case of joining battle you are to leave it to the vice-admiral +to assail the enemy's admiral, and to match yourself as equally as you +can, to succour the rest of the fleet as cause shall require, not +wasting your powder nor shooting afar off, nor till you come side to +side. + + + +_SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUCTIONS, +circa_ 1650. + +[+Harleian MSS. 1247, 43b. Draft unsigned+.] + +_Instructions for the better ordering and managing the fleet in +fighting_. + + +1. Upon discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general's +ship, which is putting abroad the sign made for each ship or frigate, +they are to make sail and stand with them so nigh as to gain knowledge +what they are and of what quality, how many fireships and others, and +what order the fleet is in; which being done the frigates or vessels +are to speak together and conclude on the report they are to give, and +accordingly report to the general or commander-in-chief of the +squadron, and not to engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number +except it shall appear to them on the place that they have the +advantage. + +2. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral or he that commands in +the second place, and the rear-admiral or he that commands in the +third place, are to make what sail they can to come up with the +admiral on each wing, as also each ship according to her quality, +giving a competent distance from each other if there be sea-room +enough. + +3. As soon as they shall [see] the general engage, or [he] shall make +a sign by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag on the fore +topmast-head, that each ship shall take the best advantage they can to +engage with the enemy next unto him. + +4. If any ship shall happen to be over-charged and distressed the next +ship or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and +assistance upon signal given; which signal shall be, if the admiral, +then a pennant in the fore topmast-head; the vice-admiral or commander +in the second place, a pennant in the main topmast-head; and the +rear-admiral the like. + +5. In case any ship shall be distressed or disabled by loss of masts, +shot under water, or otherwise so as she is in danger of sinking or +taking, he or they are to give a signal thereof so as, the fleet +having knowledge, they may be ready to be relieved. Therefore the +flagships are to have a special care to them, that such provisions may +be made that they may not be left in distress to the mercy of the +enemy; and the signal is to be a weft[1] of the ensign of the ship so +distressed. + +6. That it is the duty of the commanders and masters of all the small +frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the fleet to know the +fireships that belong to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their +motion to do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible), or if +opportunity serve that they lay them on board, fire and destroy them; +and to this purpose they are to keep to windward of the fleet in time +of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming +on board us by coming between us and them, which by all means possible +they are to endeavour, that then, in such a case, they show themselves +men in such an exigent,[2] and shear aboard them, and with their +boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them; +which service, if honourably done, according to its merit shall be +rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely called to +account. + +7. That the fireships belonging to the fleet endeavour to keep the +wind, and they with the small frigate's to be as near the great ships +as they can, and to attend the signal from the commander-in-chief and +to act accordingly. + +8. If any engagement shall happen to continue until night and the +general please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor in as +good order as may be, the signal being as in the instructions for +sailing; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, then +the signal to be firing two guns so nigh one the other as the report +may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like +with two guns more. And the commander of this ship is to sign copies +of these instructions to all ships and other vessels of this +fleet. Given on board the ---- + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] See note, p. 99. +[Transcriber's note: The text for this note reads: +'_Waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). It is any flag or ensign +stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up +lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a +ship.'--Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_).] + +[2] 'Exigent' = exigence, emergency. Shakespeare has 'Why do you cross +me in this exigent?'--_Jul. Cæs._ v. i. + + + +_MARTEN TROMP, June_ 20, 1652. + +[+Dr. Gardiner's First Dutch War, vol. i. p. 321. Extract+.] + +_June_ 20/30, 1652. _The resolution of Admiral Tromp on the +distribution of the fleet in case of its being attacked_. + + +Each captain is expressly ordered, on penalty of 300 guilders, _to +keep near_[1] the flag officer under whom he serves. Also he is to +have his guns in a serviceable condition. The squadron under +Vice-Admiral Jan Evertsen is to lie or sail immediately ahead of the +admiral. Further Captain Pieter Floriszoon (who provisionally carries +the flag at the mizen as rear-admiral) is always to remain with his +squadron close astern of the admiral; and the Admiral Tromp is to take +his station between both with his squadron. The said superior officers +and captains are to stand by one another with all fidelity; and each +squadron when another is vigorously attacked shall second and free the +other, using therein all the qualities of a soldier and seaman. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] The Dutch has 'troppen' = to gather round (_cf._ our 'trooping the +colour'). De With's corresponding order has 'dat zij allen bij den +anderen ... gesloten zou den blijven.' _Supra_, p. 86. + + + +II + +ORDERS ISSUED DURING THE WAR +1653 AND 1654 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The earliest known 'Fighting Instructions' in any language which aimed +at a single line ahead as a battle formation, were issued by the +Commonwealth's 'generals-at-sea' on March 29, 1653, in the midst of +the Dutch War. This is placed beyond doubt by an office copy amongst +the Duke of Portland's MSS. at Welbeck Abbey.[1] It is of high +importance for the history of naval tactics that we are at last able +to fix the date of these memorable orders. Endless misapprehension on +the subject of our battle formations during the First Dutch War has +been caused by a chronological error into which Mr. Granville Penn was +led in his _Memorials of Penn_ (Appendix L). Sir William Penn's +copy of these Instructions is merely dated 'March 1653,'[2] and his +biographer hazarded the very natural conjecture that, as this is an +'old style' date, it meant 'March 1654.' This would have been true of +any day in March before the 25th, but as we now can fix the date as +the 29th, we know the year is really 1653 and not 1654.[3] There was +perhaps some anxiety on Mr. Penn's part to get his hero some share in +the orders, and as William Penn was not appointed one of the +'generals-at-sea' till December 2, 1653, he could not officially have +had the credit of orders issued in the previous March. This point +however is also set at rest by the Welbeck copy, which besides the +date has the signatures of the generals, and they are those of Blake, +Deane and Monck. Penn did not sign them at all, but this really in no +way affects his claim as a tactical reformer. For as he was +vice-admiral of the fleet and an officer of high reputation, his share +in the orders was probably as great as that of anyone else. + +The winter of 1652-3 was the turning point of the war. The summer +campaign had shown how serious the struggle was to be, and no terms +for ending it could be arranged. Large reinforcements consequently had +been ordered, and Monck and Deane nominated to assist Blake as joint +generals-at-sea for the next campaign. Four days later, on November +30, 1652, Blake had been defeated by Tromp off Dungeness, and several +of his captains were reported to have behaved badly. An inquiry was +ordered, and the famous 'Laws of War and Ordinances of the Sea,' +prepared by Sir Harry Vane by order of Parliament for the better +enforcement of discipline, were put in force. Notwithstanding these +vigorous efforts to increase the strength and efficiency of the sea +service, it was not till after the first action of the new campaign +that an attempt was made to improve the fleet tactics. The action off +Portland on February 18, 1653, and the ensuing chase of Tromp, marked +the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded +in delivering a severe blow to the Dutch admiral and his convoy, it +must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat +through a want of cohesion between their squadrons. On the 19th and +20th Tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent +or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is +there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[4] On the 25th +the fleet had put into Stokes Bay to refit, and between this time and +March 29 the new orders were produced.[5] + +The first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the +'Supplementary Instructions' on p. 99, but in the third, relating to +'general action,' instead of the ships engaging 'according to the +order presented,' as was enjoined in the previous set, 'they are to +endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,' as the order which will +enable them 'to take the best advantage they can to engage with the +enemy.' Article 6 directs that where a flagship is distressed captains +are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy. Article 7 +however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward +station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed 'upon severest +punishment,' and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre. Article +9 provides a similar signal for flagships. + +Compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less +than revolutionary. But it is by no means certain that they were +so. Here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience +for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and +particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the +air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some +evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at +least on a small scale. The natural presumption therefore is that the +new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps +somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not +universal in the service. A consideration of the men who were +responsible for the change points to the same conclusion. Blake, the +only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval +actions, was ashore disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take +part, at least formally, in the business of the fleet. Deane, another +soldier like Blake, though he had commanded fleets, had never before +seen an action, but had done much to improve the organisation of the +service, and at this time, as his letters show, was more active and +ardent in the work than ever. Monck before the late cruise had never +been to sea at all, since as a boy he sailed in the disastrous Cadiz +expedition of 1625; but he was the typical and leading scientific +soldier of his time, with an unmatched power of organisation and an +infallible eye for both tactics and strategy, at least so far as it +had then been tried. Penn, the vice-admiral of the fleet, was a +professional naval officer of considerable experience, and it was he +who by a bold and skilful movement had saved the action off Portland +from being a severe defeat for Blake and Deane. Monck's therefore was +the only new mind that was brought to bear on the subject. Yet it is +impossible to credit him with introducing a revolution in naval +tactics. All that can be said is that possibly his genius for war and +his scientific and well-drilled spirit revealed to him in the +traditional minor tactics of the seamen the germ of a true tactical +system, and caused him to urge its reduction into a definite set of +fighting instructions which would be binding on all, and would +co-ordinate the fleet into the same kind of homogeneous and handy +fighting machine that he and the rest of the Low Country officers had +made of the New Model Army. In any case he could not have carried the +thing through unless it had commended itself to the experience of such +men as Penn and the majority of the naval officers of the council of +war. And they would hardly have been induced to agree had they not +felt that the new instructions were calculated to bring out the best +of the methods which they had empirically practised. + +How far the new orders were carried out during the rest of the war is +difficult to say. In both official and unofficial reports of the +actions of this time an almost superstitious reverence is shown in +avoiding tactical details. Nevertheless that a substantial improvement +was the result seems clear, and further the new tactics appear to have +made a marked impression upon the Dutch. Of the very next action, that +off the Gabbard on June 2, when Monck was left in sole command, we +have a report from the Hague that the English 'having the wind, they +stayed on a tack for half an hour until they put themselves into the +order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at half +cannon-shot,' and the suggestion is that this was something new to the +Dutch. 'Our fleet,' says an English report by an eye-witness, 'did +work together in better order than before and seconded one another.' +Then there is the important testimony of a Royalist intelligencer who +got his information at the Hague on June 9, from the man who had +brought ashore the despatches from the defeated Dutch fleet. After +relating the consternation which the English caused in the Dutch ranks +as well by their gunnery as their refusal to board, he goes on to say, +'It is certain that the Dutch in this fight (by the relation and +acknowledgment of Tromp's own express sent hither, with whom I spoke) +showed very great fear and were in very great confusion, and the +English he says fought in excellent order.'[6] + +Again, for the next battle--that of the Texel--fought on July 31 in +the same year, we have the statement of Hoste's informant, who was +present as a spectator, that at the opening of the action the English, +but not the Dutch, were formed in a single line close-hauled. 'Le 7 +Aoust' [_i.e._ N.S.], the French gentleman says, 'je découvris +l'armée de l'amiral composée de plus de cent vaisseaux de +guerre. Elle était rangée en trois escadrons et elle faisoit +vent-arrière pour aller tomber sur les Anglois, qu'elle rencontra +le même jour à peu près en pareil nombre rangez _[sic]_ sur une +ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre lieues Nord-Nord-Est et Sud-Sud-Ouest, +le vent étant Nord-Ouest. Le 8 et le 9 se passèrent en des +escarmouches, mais le 10 on en _[sic]_ vint à une bataille +decisive. Les Anglois avoient essaié de gagner le vent: mais +l'amiral Tromp en aiant toujours conservé l'avantage, et l'étant +rangé sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglois arriva sur +eux,' &c. This is the first known instance of a Dutch fleet forming in +single line, and, so far as it goes, would tend to show they adopted +it in imitation of the English formation.[7] At any rate, so far as +we have gone, the evidence tends to show that the English finally +adopted the regular line-ahead formation in consequence of the orders +of March 29, 1653, and there is no indication of the current belief +that they borrowed it from the Dutch. + +By the English admirals the new system must have been regarded as a +success. For the Fighting Instructions of 1653 were reissued with +nothing but a few alterations of signals and verbal changes by Blake, +Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, the new 'admirals and generals of the fleet +of the Commonwealth of England,' appointed in December 1653, when the +war was practically over. They are printed by Granville Penn +(_Memorials of Penn_, ii. 76), under date March 31, 1655, but +that cannot be the actual date of their issue, for Blake was then in +the Mediterranean, Penn in the West Indies, and Monck busy with his +pacification of the Highlands. We must suspect here then another +confusion between old and new styles, and conjecture the true date to +be March 31, 1654, that is just before Monck left for Scotland, and a +few days before the peace was signed. So that these would be the +orders under which Blake conducted his famous campaign in the +Mediterranean, Penn and Venables captured Jamaica, and the whole of +Cromwell's Spanish war was fought. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _Hist. MSS. Com._ XIII. ii. 85. It is from a transcript of this copy +made for Dr. Gardiner that I have been permitted to take the text below. +A set of 'Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in Sailing' +accompanies them. + +[2] _British Museum, Shane MSS._ 3232, f. 81. + +[3] The Sloane copy is not quite identical with that in the Portland +MSS. The variations, however, are merely verbal and in a few signals, +and are of such a nature as to be accounted for by careless +transcription. + +[4] Hoste, the author of the first great treatise on Naval Tactics, +quotes Tromp's formation as a typical method of retreat; but his account +is vitiated by what seems a curious mistake. He says: 'Il rangea son +armée en demi-lune et il mit son convoi au milieu: c'est à dire que son +vaisseau faisait au vent l'angle obtus de la demi-lune, et les autres +s'étendoient de part (_sic_) et d'autre _sur les deux lignes du plus- +près_ pour former les faces de la demi-lune qui couvroient le convoi. Ce +fut en cet ordre qu'il fit vent arrière, foudroiant à droite et à gauche +tous les anglois qui s'approchent' But if with the wind aft his two +quarter lines bore from the flagship seven points from the wind, the +formation would have been concave to the enemy and the convoy could not +have been _au milieu_. (_Evolutions Navales_, pp. 90, 95, and plate 29, +p. 91.) The passage is in any case interesting, as showing that what was +then called the crescent or half-moon formation was nothing but our own +'order of retreat,' or 'order of retreat reverted,' of Rodney's time. As +defined by Sir Charles Knowles in 1780, the order of retreat reverted +was formed on two lines of bearing, _i.e._ by the seconds of the centre +ship keeping two points abaft her starboard and larboard beams +respectively. In the simple order of retreat they kept two points before +the beam. + +[5] No reference to these orders appears in the correspondence of the +generals at this time, unless it be in a letter of John Poortmans, +deputy-treasurer of the fleet, to Robert Blackbourne, in which he writes +on March 9: 'The generals want 500 copies of the instructions for +commanders of the state's ships printed and sent down.' (_S.P. Dom._ 48, +f. 65.) + +[6] _Clarendon MSS._ 45, f. 470. + +[7] Hoste, _Evolutions Navales_, p. 78. Dr. Gardiner declared himself +sceptical as to the genuineness of the French gentleman's narrative, +mainly on the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail; but, as +Hoste certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence +of the main features of the action for which he used it. + + + +_COMMONWEALTH ORDERS_, 1653.[1] + +[+Duke of Portland's MSS.+] + +_By the Right Honourable the Generals and Admirals of the Fleet. +Instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting_. + + +First. Upon the discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the +general, which is to be striking the general's ensign, and making a +weft,[2] two frigates [3] appointed out of each squadron are to make +sail, and stand with them so nigh as they may conveniently, the better +to gain a knowledge of them what they are, and of what quality, and +how many fireships and others, and in what posture[4] the fleet is; +which being done the frigates are to speak together and conclude in +that report they are to give, and accordingly repair to their +respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not to engage if the +enemy[5] exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the +place they have the advantage: + +Ins. 2nd. At sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that +commands in chief in the 2nd place, and his squadron, as also the +rear-admiral, or he that commandeth in chief in the 3rd place, and his +squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral +on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right wing, and the rear-admiral +on the left wing, leaving a competent distance for the admiral's +squadron if the wind will permit and there be sea-room enough. + +Ins. 3rd. As soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a +signal by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag over the fore +topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage +they can to engage with the enemy next unto them; and in order +thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a +line with the chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled +(which God forbid!), whereby the said ship that wears the flag should +not come in to do the service which is requisite. Then every ship of +the said squadron shall endeavour to keep[6] in a line with the +admiral, or _he that commands in chief_[7] next unto him, and +nearest the enemy. + +Inst. 4th. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged or +distressed, the next squadron or ships are _speedily_[8] to make +towards their relief and assistance upon a signal given them; which +signal shall be, in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore +topmast-head, the vice-admiral or he that commands in chief in the +second place a pennant on the main topmast-head, [and] the +rear-admiral's squadron the like. + +Inst. 5th. If in case any ship shall be distressed or disabled for +lack of masts, shot under water, or otherwise _in danger of sinking +or taking, he or they_,[9] thus distressed shall make a sign by +the weft of his jack or ensign, and those next him are strictly +required to relieve him. + +Inst. 6th. That if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from +the enemy to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot be +otherwise repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm +or ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ships may have notice what it +is for; and if it should be that the admiral or any flagship should do +so, the ships of the fleet or the respective squadrons are to +endeavour to _keep up in a line as close_[10] as they can betwixt +him and the enemy, having always one eye to defend him in case the +enemy should come to annoy him in that condition. + +Inst. 7th. In case the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, and +that other ships of the fleet are to windward of the admiral, then +upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or the mizen +topmast,[11] every such ship then is to bear up into his wake, _and +grain upon severest punishment_[12] In case the admiral be to +leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of +him, to the end such ships to leeward may come up into the line with +their admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up, +none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their luff +to gain the wake or grain. + +Inst. 8th. If the admiral will have any of the ships _to +endeavour_[13] by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the +enemy, he will put abroad a red flag at his spritsail, topmast +shrouds, forestay or main topmast[14] stay. He that first discovers +the signal shall make sail and hoist and lower his sail[15] or ensign, +that the rest of the ships may take notice of it and follow. + +Inst. 9th. If we put out a red flag on the mizen shrouds, or mizen +yard-arm, we will have all the flagships to come up in the grain and +wake[16] of us. + +Inst. 10th. If in time of fight God shall deliver any of the enemy's +ships into our hands, special care is to be taken to save their men as +the present state of our condition will permit in such a case, but +that the ships be immediately destroyed, by sinking or burning the +same, so that our own ships be not disabled or any work interrupted by +the departing of men or boats from the ships; and this we require all +commanders to be more than mindful of.[17] + +Inst. 11th. None shall fire upon any ship of the enemy that is laid +aboard by any of our own ships, but so that he may be sure he endamage +not his friend. + +Inst. 12th. That it is the duty of commanders and masters of all small +frigates,[18] ketches, and smacks belonging to the several squadrons +to know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by +observing their motions to do their utmost to cut off their boats if +possible, or, if opportunity be, that they lay them aboard, seize or +destroy them. And to this purpose they are to keep to windward of +their squadrons in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent +the fireships [coming][19] on board by clapping between us and them +(which by all means possible they are to endeavour), that then in such +cases they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board +them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from +us and destroy them; which service (if honourably done) according to +its merit shall be rewarded, but the neglect severely to be called to +accompt. + +Inst. 13th. That the fireships in the several squadrons endeavour to +keep the wind; and they with the small frigates to be as near the +great ships as they can, to attend the signal from the general or +commander-in-chief, and to act accordingly. If the general hoist up a +white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all small frigates +in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders. + +Inst. 14th. That if any engagement by day shall continue till night +and the general shall please to anchor, then upon signal given they +all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the +'Instructions for Sailing'; and if the general please to retreat +without anchoring, the signal to be firing two guns, the one so nigh +the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes +after to do the like with two guns more. + +Given under our hands at Portsmouth, this March 29th, 1653. + +ROBERT BLAKE. +RICHARD DEANE. +GEORGE MONCK. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Re-issued in March 1654, by Blake, Monck, Disbrowe, and Penn, with +some amendments and verbal alterations. As reissued they are in _Sloane +MSS._ 3232, f. 81, and printed in Granville Penn's _Memorials of Sir +William Penn_, ii. 76. All the important amendments in the new edition, +apart from mere verbal alterations, are given below in notes to the +articles in which they occur. + +[2] '_Waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). It is any flag or ensign +stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up +lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a +ship.'--Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_). + +[3] The orders of 1654 have 'one frigate.' + +[4] _I.e._ 'formation.' + +[5] 1654, 'enemy's ships.' + +[6] 1654, 'get.' + +[7] 1654, 'or the commander-in-chief.' + +[8] 1654, 'immediately.' + +[9] 1654, 'so as she is in danger of being sunk or taken, then they.' + +[10] 1654, 'to keep on close in a line.' + +[11] 1654, 'mizen topmast-head.' + +[12] 1654, 'or grain upon pain of severe punishment.' Nothing is more +curious in naval phraseology than the loss of this excellent word +'grain,' or 'grayne,' to express the opposite of 'wake.' To come into a +ship's grain meant to take station ahead of her. There is nothing now +which exactly supplies its place, and yet it has long fallen into +oblivion, so long, indeed, that its existence was unknown to the learned +editors of the new _Oxford Dictionary_. This is to be the more regretted +as its etymology is very obscure. It may, however, be traced with little +doubt to the old Norse 'grein,' a branch or prong, surviving in the word +'grains,' a pronged harpoon or fish spear. From its meaning, 'branch,' +it might seem to be akin to 'stem' and to 'bow,' which is only another +spelling of'bough.' But this is not likely. The older meaning of 'bows' +was 'shoulders,' and this, it is agreed, is how it became applied to the +head of a ship. There is, however, a secondary and more widely used +sense of 'grain,' which means the space between forking boughs, and so +almost any angular space, like a meadow where two rivers converge. Thus +'grain,' in the naval sense, might easily mean the space enclosed by the +planks of a ship where they spring from the stem, or if it is not +actually the equivalent of 'bows,' it may mean the diverging waves +thrown up by a ship advancing through the water, and thus be the exact +analogue of 'wake.' + +[13] 1654, 'to make sail and endeavour.' + +[14] 1654, 'Fore topmast.' + +[15] 1654, 'jack.' + +[16] 1654, 'wake or grain.' + +[17] 1654, 'more than ordinarily careful of.' + +[18] It should be remembered that 'frigate' at this time meant a +'frigate-built ship.' The larger ones were 'capital ships' and lay in +the line, while the smaller ones were used as cruisers. + +[19] Inserted from 1654 copy. + + + + +PART V + +THE SECOND DUTCH WAR + +I. THE EARL OF SANDWICH, 1665 + +II. THE DUKE OF YORK AND PRINCE RUPERT, 1665-6 + + + +I + +ORDERS OF THE RESTORATION + +INTRODUCTORY + + +Though several fleets were fitted out in the first years of the +Restoration, the earliest orders of Charles II's reign that have come +down to us are those which the Earl of Sandwich issued on the eve of +the Second Dutch War. Early in the year 1665, when hostilities were +known to be inevitable, he had sailed from Portsmouth with a squadron +of fifteen sail for the North Sea. On January 27th he arrived in the +Downs, and on February 9th sailed for the coast of Holland.[1] War +was declared on March 4th following. The orders in question are only +known by a copy given to one of his frigate captains, which has +survived amongst the manuscripts of the Duke of Somerset. So far as is +known no fresh complete set of Fighting Instructions was issued before +the outbreak of the war, and as Monck and Sandwich were still among +the leading figures at the admiralty it is probable that those used in +the last Dutch and Spanish Wars were continued. The four orders here +given are supplementary to them, providing for the formation of line +abreast, and for forming from that order a line ahead to port or +starboard. It is possible however that no other orders had yet been +officially issued, and that these simple directions were regarded by +Sandwich as all that were necessary for so small a squadron. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] _Domestic Calendar_, 1664-5, pp. 181, 183. + + + +_THE EARL OF SANDWICH, Feb. 1, 1665_. + +[+Duke of Somerset's MSS., printed by the Historical MSS. Commission. +Rep. XV. part vii. p. 100+.] + +_Orders given by direction of the Earl of Sandwich to Captain Hugh +Seymour,[1] of the Pearl frigate_. + + +1665, February 1. On board the London in the Downs. + +If we shall bear up, putting abroad the standard on the ancient[2] +staff, every ship of this squadron is to draw up abreast with the +flag, on either side, in such berth as opportunity shall present most +convenient, but if there be time they are to sail in the foresaid +posture.[3] + +If the admiral put up a jack[4]-flag on the flagstaff on the mizen +topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on the +starboard side is to clap upon a wind with his starboard tacks aboard, +and all the squadron as they lie above or as they have ranked +themselves are presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a +line. + +And if the admiral make a weft with his jack-flag upon the flagstaff +on the mizen topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on +the larboard side is to clap upon a wind with his larboard tacks +aboard, and all the squadrons as they have ranked themselves are +presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a line. + +All the fifth and sixth rates[5] are to lie on that broadside of the +admiral which is away from the enemy, looking out well when any sign +is made for them. Then they are to endeavour to come up under the +admiral's stern for to receive orders. + +If we shall give the signal of hanging a pennant under the flag at the +main topmast-head, then all the ships of this squadron are, with what +speed they can, to fall into this posture, every ship in the place and +order here assigned, and sail and anchor so that they may with the +most readiness fall into the above said posture.[6] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Son of Colonel Sir Edward Seymour, 3rd baronet, Governor of +Dartmouth. + +[2] _I.e._ ensign. + +[3] _I.e._ in the 'order of battle' already given. + +[4] The earliest known use of the word 'jack' for a flag in an official +document occurs in an order issued by Sir John Pennington to his pinnace +captains in 1633. He was in command of the Channel guard in search of +pirates, particularly 'The Seahorse lately commanded by Captain Quaile' +and 'Christopher Megges, who had lately committed some outrage upon the +Isle of Lundy, and other places.' The pinnaces were to work inshore of +the admiral and to endeavour to entrap the piratical ships, and to this +end he said, 'You are also for this present service to keep in your Jack +at your boultsprit end and your pendant and your ordnance.' (_Sloane +MSS._ 2682, f. 51.) The object of the order evidently was that they +should conceal their character from the pirates, and at this time +therefore the 'jack' carried at the end of the bowsprit and the pennant +must have been the sign of a navy ship. Boteler however, who wrote his +_Sea Dialogues_ about 1625, does not mention the jack in his remarks +about flags (pp. 327-334). The etymology is uncertain. The new _Oxford +Dictionary_ inclines to the simple explanation that 'jack' was used in +this case in its common diminutive sense, and that 'jack-flag' was +merely a small flag. + +[5] _I.e._ his cruisers. + +[6] In the Report of the Historical MSS. Commission it is stated that +the position of the ships is shown in a diagram, but I have been unable +to obtain access to the document. + + + +II + +MONCK, PRINCE RUPERT AND THE DUKE OF YORK + +INTRODUCTORY + + +It has hitherto been universally supposed that the Dutch Wars of the +Restoration were fought under the set of orders printed as an appendix +to Granville Penn's _Memorials of Penn_. Mr. Penn believed them +to belong to the year 1665, but recent research shows conclusively +that these often-quoted orders, which have been the source of so much +misapprehension, are really much later and represent not the ideas +under which those wars were fought, but the experience that was gained +from them. + +This new light is mainly derived from a hitherto unknown collection of +naval manuscripts belonging to the Earl of Dartmouth, which he has +generously placed at the disposal of the Society. The invaluable +material they contain enables us to say with certainty that the orders +which the Duke of York issued as lord high admiral and +commander-in-chief at the outbreak of the war were nothing but a +slight modification of those of 1654, with a few but not unimportant +additions. Amongst the manuscripts, most of which relate to the first +Lord Dartmouth's cousin and first commander, Sir Edward Spragge, is a +'Sea Book' that must have once belonged to that admiral. It is a kind +of commonplace book, the greater part unused, in which Spragge appears +to have begun to enter various important orders and other matter of +naval interest with which he had been officially concerned, by way of +forming a collection of precedents.[1] Amongst these is a copy of +the orders set out below, dated from the Royal Charles, the Duke of +York's flagship, 'the 10th of April, 1665,' by command of his royal +highness, and signed 'Wm. Coventry.' This was the well-known +politician Sir William Coventry, the model, if not the author, of the +_Character of a Trimmer_, who had been made private secretary to the +duke on the eve of the Restoration, and was now a commissioner of the +navy and acting as secretary on the duke's staff. So closely it will +be seen do they follow the Commonwealth orders of 1653, as modified in +the following year, that it would be scarcely worth while setting them +out in full, but for the importance of finally establishing their true +origin. The scarcely concealed doubts which many writers have felt as +to whether the new system of tactics can have been due to the Duke of +York may now be laid at rest, and henceforth the great reform must be +credited not to him, but to Cromwell's 'generals-at-sea.' + +Nevertheless the credit of certain developments which were introduced +at this time must still remain with the duke and his advisers: Rupert, +Sandwich, Lawson, and probably above all Penn, his flag captain. For +instance, differences will be found in Articles 2 and 3, where, +instead of merely enjoining the line, the duke refers to a regular +'order of battle,' which has not come down to us, but which no doubt +gave every ship her station in the line, like those which Sandwich had +prepared for his squadron a few months earlier, and which Monck and +Rupert certainly drew up in the following year.[2] Then again the +truculent Article 10 of 1653 and 1654 ordering the immediate +destruction of disabled ships of the enemy after saving the crews if +possible, which contemporary authorities put down to Monck, is +reversed. At the end, moreover, two articles are added; one, numbered +15, embodying numbers 2 and 3 of Sandwich's orders of the previous +year, with such modifications as were necessary to adapt them to a +large fleet, and another numbered 16 enjoining 'close action.' Nor is +this all. Spragge's 'Sea Book' contains also a set of ten 'additional +instructions' all of which are new. They are undated, but from another +copy in Capt. Robert Moulton's 'Sea Book' we can fix them to April +18th, 1665.[3] Their whole tenour suggests that they were the +outcome of prolonged discussions in the council of war; and in the +variously dated copies which exist of sections of the orders we have +evidence that between the last week in March, when the duke hoisted +his flag, and April 21st, when he put to sea, much time must have been +spent upon the consideration of the tactical problem.[4] + +The result was a marked advance. In these ten 'additional +instructions,' for instance, we have for the first time a clear +distinction drawn between attacks from windward and attacks from +leeward. We have also the first appearance of the close-hauled line +ahead, and it is enjoined as a defensive formation when the enemy +attacks from windward. A method of attack from windward is also +provided for the case where the enemy stays to receive it. Amongst +less important developments we have an article making the half-cable's +length, originally enjoined under the Commonwealth, the regular +interval between ships, and others to prevent the line being broken +for the sake of chasing or taking possession of beaten ships. Finally +there are signals for tacking in succession either from the van or the +rear, which must have given the fleet a quite unprecedented increase +of tactical mobility. Nor are we without evidence that increased +mobility was actually exhibited when the new instructions were put to +a practical test. + +It was under the old Commonwealth orders as supplemented and modified +by these noteworthy articles of April 1665, that was fought the +memorable action of June 3rd, variously known as the battle of +Lowestoft or the Second Battle of the Texel. It is this action that +Hoste cites as the first in which two fleets engaged in close hauled +line ahead, and kept their formation throughout the day. After two +days' manoeuvring the English gained the wind, and kept it in spite of +all their enemy could do, and the various accounts of the action +certainly give the impression that the evolutions of the English were +smarter and more complex than those of the Dutch. It is true that +about the middle of the action one of the new signals, that for the +rear to tack first, threw the fleet into some confusion, and that +later the van and centre changed places; still, till almost the end, +the duke, or rather Penn, his flag captain, kept at least some control +of the fleet. Granville Penn indeed claims that the duke finally +routed the Dutch by breaking their line, and that he did it +intentionally. But this movement is only mentioned in a hasty letter +to the press written immediately after the battle. If the enemy's line +was actually cut, it must have been an accident or a mere instance of +the time-honoured practice of trying to concentrate on or 'overcharge' +a part of the enemy's fleet. Coventry in his official despatch to +Monck, who was ashore in charge of the admiralty, says nothing of it, +nor does Hoste, while the duke himself tells us the object of his +movement was merely to have 'a bout with Opdam.' Granville Penn was +naturally inclined to credit the statement in the Newsletter because +he believed the action was fought under Fighting Instructions which +contained an article about dividing the enemy's fleet. But even if +this article had been in force at the time--and we now know that it +was not--it would still have been inapplicable, for it was only +designed in view of an attack from leeward, a most important point +which modern writers appear unaccountably to have overlooked.[5] + +But although we can no longer receive this questionable movement of +the Duke of York as an instance of 'breaking the line' in the modern +sense, it is certain that the English manoeuvres in this action were +more scientific and elaborate than ever before--so much so indeed that +a reaction set in, and it is this reaction which gave rise to the idea +in later times that the order in line ahead had not been used in +Commonwealth or Restoration times. We gather that in spite of the +victory there was a widespread conviction that it ought to have been +more decisive. It was felt that there had been perhaps too much +manoeuvring and not enough hard fighting. In the end the Duke of York +and Sandwich were both tenderly relieved of their command, and +superseded by Monck. He and Rupert then became joint admirals for the +ensuing campaign. They had the reputation of being two of the hardest +fighters alive, and both were convinced of their power of sweeping the +Dutch from the sea by sheer hard hitting, a belief which so far at +least as Monck was concerned the country enthusiastically shared. The +spirit in which the two soldier-admirals put to sea in May 1666 we see +reflected in the hitherto unknown 'Additional Instructions for +Fighting' given below. For the knowledge of these remarkable orders, +which go far to solve the mystery that has clouded the subject, we are +again indebted to Lord Dartmouth. They are entered like the others in +Sir Edward Spragge's 'Sea Book.' They bear no date, but as they are +signed 'Rupert' and addressed to 'Sir Edward Spragge, Knt., +Vice-Admiral of the Blue,' we can with certainty fix them to this +time. For we know that Spragge sailed in Rupert's squadron, and on +the fourth day of the famous June battle was raised to the rank here +given him in place of Sir William Berkley, who had been killed in the +first day's action.[6] What share Monck had in the orders we cannot +tell, but Rupert, being only joint admiral with him, could hardly have +taken the step without his concurrence, and the probability is that +Rupert, who had been detached on special service, was issuing a +general fleet order to his own squadron which may have been +communicated to the rest of the fleet before he rejoined. It must at +any rate have been after he rejoined, for it was not till then that +Spragge received his promotion. Both Monck and Rupert must therefore +receive the credit of foreseeing the danger that lay in the new +system, the danger of tactical pedantry that was destined to hamper +the action of our fleets for the next half century, and of being the +first to declare, long before Anson or Hawke, and longer still before +Nelson, that line or no line, signals or no signals, 'the destruction +of the enemy is always to be made the chiefest care.' + +In the light of this discovery we can at last explain the curious +conversation recorded by Pepys, which, wrongly interpreted, has done +so much to distort the early history of tactics. The circumstances of +Monck's great action must first be recalled. At the end of May, he and +Rupert, with a fleet of about eighty sail, had put to sea to seek the +Dutch, when a sudden order reached them from the court that the French +Mediterranean fleet was coming up channel to join hands with the +enemy, and that Rupert with his squadron of twenty sail was to go +westward to stop it. The result of this foolish order was that on June +1 Monck found himself in presence of the whole Dutch fleet of nearly a +hundred sail, with no more than fifty-nine of his own.[7] Seeing an +advantage, however, he attacked them furiously, throwing his whole +weight upon their van. Though at first successful shoals forced him +to tack, and his rear fell foul of the Dutch centre and rear, so that +he came off severely handled. The next day he renewed the fight with +forty-four sail against about eighty, and with so much skill that he +was able that night to make an orderly retreat, covering his disabled +ships with those least injured 'in a line abreadth.'[8] On the 3rd +the retreat was continued. So well was it managed that the Dutch +could not touch him, and towards evening he was able near the Galloper +Sand to form a junction with Rupert, who had been recalled. Together +on the 4th day they returned to the fight with as fierce a +determination as ever. Though to leeward, they succeeded in breaking +through the enemy's line, such as it was. Being in too great an +inferiority of numbers, however, they could not reap the advantage of +their manoeuvre.[9] It only resulted in their being doubled on, and +the two fleets were soon mingled in a raging mass without order or +control; and when in the end they parted after a four days' fight, +without example for endurance and carnage in naval history, the +English had suffered a reverse at least as great as that they had +inflicted on the Dutch in the last year's action. + +Such a terrific object lesson could not be without its effects on the +great tactical question. But let us see how it looked in the eyes of a +French eye-witness, who was naturally inclined to a favourable view of +his Dutch allies. Of the second day's fight he says: 'Sur les six +heures du matin nous apperçumes la flotte des Anglais qui revenoit +dans une ordre admirable. Car ils marchent par le front comme seroit +une armée de terre, et quand ils approchent ils s'etendent et +tournent leurs bords pour combattre: parce que le front à la mer se +fait par le bord des vaisseaux': that is, of course, the English bore +down on the Dutch all together in line abreast, and then hauled their +wind into line ahead to engage. Again, in describing the danger Tromp +was in by having weathered the English fleet with his own squadron, +while the rest of the Dutch were to leeward, he says: 'J'ai déjà +dit que rien n'égale le bel ordre et la discipline des Anglais, que +jamais ligne n'a été tirée plus droite que celle que leurs +vaisseaux forment, qu'on peut être certain que lorsqu'on en +approche il les faux [_sic_] tous essuïer.' The very precision +of the English formation however, as he points out, was what saved +Tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he +had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped. On the other +hand, he says, whenever an English ship penetrated the Dutch formation +it fared badly because the Dutch kept themselves 'redoublez'--that is, +not in a single line. As a general principle, then, he declares that +it is safer to 'entrer dans une flotte d'Angleterre que de passer +auprès' (_i.e._ stand along it), 'et bien mieux de passer +auprès d'une flotte Hollandaise que se mêler au travers, si elle +combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.' But on the whole he +condemns the loose formation of the Dutch, and says it is really due +not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their +duty. It is clear, then, that whatever was De Ruyter's intention, the +Dutch did not fight in a true line. Later on in the same action he +says: 'Ruyter de son côté appliqua toute son industrie pour +donner une meilleure forme à sa ligne ... enfin par ce moyen nous +nous remismes sur une ligne parallèle à celle des Anglais.' +Finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle, +he concludes: 'A la vérité l'ordre admirable de leur [the +English] armée doit toujours être imité, et pour moi je sais +bien que si j'étais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse +des vaisseaux du Roi je songerois à battre les Anglois _par leur +propre manière et non par celle des Hollandoises, et de nous +autres, qui est de vouloir aborder_.' In defence of his view he +cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being +controlled 'avec règle' devotes itself solely to making the +opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the +enemy. Supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in +which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the +charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the +latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[10] + +From this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce +three indisputable conclusions, 1. That the formation in line ahead +was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to +boarding. 2. That it was purely English, and that, however far Dutch +tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in +forcing it on their seamen. 3. That the English certainly fought in +line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which +could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics. + +It remains to consider the precisely opposite impression we get from +English authority. To begin with, we find on close examination that +the whole of it, or nearly so, is to be traced to Pepys or Penn. The +_locus classicus_ is as follows from Pepys's _Diary_ of July +4th. 'In the evening Sir W. Penn came to me, and we walked together +and talked of the late fight. I find him very plain, that the whole +conduct of the late fight was ill.... He says three things must be +remedied, or else we shall be undone by their fleet. 1. That we must +fight in line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to our utter +demonstrable ruin: the Dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we +beat them. 2. We must not desert ships of our own in distress, as we +did, for that makes a captain desperate, and he will fling away his +ship when there are no hopes left him of succour. 3. That ships when +they are a little shattered must not take the liberty to come in of +themselves, but refit themselves the best they can and stay out, many +of our ships coming in with very little disableness. He told me that +our very commanders, nay, our very flag officers, do stand in need of +exercising amongst themselves and discoursing the business of +commanding a fleet, he telling me that even one of our flag men in the +fleet did not know which tack lost the wind or kept it in the last +engagement.... He did talk very rationally to me, insomuch that I +took more pleasure this night in hearing him discourse than I ever did +in my life in anything that he said.' + +Pepys's enjoyment is easily understood. He disliked Penn--thought him +a 'mean rogue,' a 'coxcomb,' and a 'false rascal,' but he was very +sore over the supersession of his patron, Sandwich, and so long as +Penn abused Monck, Pepys was glad enough to listen to him, and ready +to believe anything he said in disparagement of the late battle. Penn +was no less bitter against Monck, and when his chief, the Duke of +York, was retired he had sulkily refused to serve under the new +commander-in-chief. For this reason Penn had not been present at the +action, but he was as ready as Pepys to believe anything he was told +against Monck, and we may be sure the stories of grumbling officers +lost nothing when he repeated them into willing ears. That Penn +really told Pepys the English had not fought in line is quite +incredible, even if he was, as Sir George Carteret, treasurer of the +navy, called him, 'the falsest rascal that ever was in the world.' +The fleet orders and the French testimony make this practically +impossible. But he may well have expressed himself very hotly about +the new instruction issued by Monck and Rupert which modified his own, +and placed the destruction of the enemy above a pedantic adherence to +the line. Pepys must clearly have forgotten or misunderstood what Penn +said on this point, and in any case both men were far too much +prejudiced for the passage to have any historical value. Abuse of +Monck by Penn can have little weight enough, but the same abuse +filtered through Pepys's acrid and irresponsible pen can have no +weight at all.[11] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] It is a folio parchment-bound volume, labelled 'Royal Charles Sea +Book,' but this is clearly an error, due to the fact that the first +order copied into it is dated from the Royal Charles, April 24, 1666. +The first entry, however, is the list of a ship's company which Spragge +commanded in 1661-2, as appears from his noting the deaths and +desertions which took place amongst the crew in those years. At this +time he is known to have commanded the Portland. For some years the book +was evidently laid aside, and apparently resumed when in 1665 he +commissioned the Triumph for the Dutch War. + +[2] See notes _supra_, pp. 108-9, and in the _Dartmouth MSS., Hist. MSS. +Com. Rep._ XI. v. 15. + +[3] _Harleian MSS._ 1247. It contains orders addressed to Moulton and +returns for the Centurion, Vanguard and Anne, the ships he commanded in +1664-6. At p. 52 it has a copy of the above 'Additional Instructions,' +but numbered 1 to 6, articles 1 to 5 of the Dartmouth copy being in one +long article. At p. 50 it has the original articles as far as No. 6. +Then come two articles numbered as 7 and 8, giving signals for a +squadron 'to draw up in line' and to come near the admiral. They are +subscribed 'Royal James, Admiral.' The Royal James was Rupert's flagship +in 1665, and the two articles may be squadronal orders of his. Then, +numbered 9 to 12, come four 'additional instructions for sailing' by the +Duke of York, relating to chasing, and dated April 24, 1665. + +[4] Some of these articles are dated even as late as April 27, See in +the _Penn Tracts, Sloane MSS._ 3232, f. 33, _infra_, p. 128. + +[5] See _post_, p. 177. For the despatches, &c., see G. Penn, _Memorials +of Penn_, II. 322-333, 344-350. He also quotes a work published at +Amsterdam in 1668 which says: 'Le Comte de Sandwich sépara la flotte +Hollandaise en deux vers l'une heure du midi.' He explains that by the +order for the rear to tack first, Sandwich was leading, forgetting +Coventry's despatch (_ibid._ p. 328), which tells how by that time the +duke had taken Sandwich's place and was leading the line himself, and +that it was he, not Sandwich, who led the movement upon Opdam's ship in +the centre of the Dutch line. + +[6] Charnock, _Biographia Navalis_, i. 65. + +[7] Pepys, it must be said, persuaded himself that this order was +suggested and approved by the admirals. He traced it to Spragge's desire +to get away with his chief on a separate command. Pepys however was +clearly not sure about it, and he almost certainly would have been if +the Duke of York was really innocent of the blunder. The truth probably +can never be known. + +[8] Vice-Admiral Jordan to Penn, June 5, _Memorials of Penn_, II. 389. +This is the first known instance of the use of the term 'line abreast.' +In the published account a different term is used. 'By 3 or 4 in the +morning,' it says, 'a small breeze sprang up at N.E. and at a council of +flag officers, his grace the lord general resolved to draw the fleet +into a "rear line of battle" and make a fair retreat of it.' (_Brit. +Museum_, 816, m. 23(13), p. 5, and _S.P. Dom. Car. II_, vol. 158.) The +French and Dutch called it the 'crescent' formation. See note, p. 94. + +[9] See _post_, pp. 136-7. + +[10] _Mémoires d'Armand de Gramont, Comte de Guiche, concernant les +Provinces Unis des Pays-Bas servant de supplément et de confirmation à +ceux d'Aubrey du Maurier et du Comte d'Estrades_. Londres, chez Philippe +Changuion, 1744. (The italics are not in the original.) _Cf._ the +similar French account quoted by Mahan, _Sea Power_, 117 _et seq._ + +[11] _Cf._ a similar conversation that Pepys had on October 28 with a +certain Captain Guy, who had been in command of a small fourth-rate of +thirty-eight guns in Holmes's attack on the shipping at Vlie and +Shelling after the 'St. James's Fight' and of a company of the force +that landed to destroy Bandaris. The prejudice of both Pepys and Penn +comes out still more strongly in their remarks on Monck's and Rupert's +great victory of July 25, and their efforts to make out it was no +victory at all. The somewhat meagre accounts we have of this action all +point as before to the superiority of the English manoeuvring, and to +the inability or unwillingness of the Dutch, and especially of Tromp, to +preserve the line. + + + +_THE DUKE OF YORK, April_ 10, 1665. + +[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book. The Earl of Dartmouth MSS.+] + +_James, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster, Lord High Admiral +of England and Ireland, &c, Constable of Dover Castle, Lord Warden of +the Cinque Ports, and Governor of Portsmouth. + +Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in time of +fighting_. + + +Upon discovery of a fleet receiving a sign from the admiral, which is +to be striking of the admiral's ensign, and making a weft, one frigate +appointed out of each squadron are to make sail and stand in with them +so nigh as conveniently they may, the better to gain a knowledge of +what they are and what quality, how many fireships and others, and in +what posture the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to meet +together and conclude on the report they are to give, and accordingly +to repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and +not engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number, except it shall +appear to them on the place that they have an advantage. + +2. At the sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that +commands in chief in the second place, and his squadron, and the +rear-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the third place, and his +squadron are to make what sail they can to come up and put themselves +into the place and order which shall have been directed them before in +the order of battle. + +3. As soon as they shall see the admiral engage or shall make a signal +by shooting off two guns and putting out a red flag on the fore +topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage +they can to engage with the enemy according to the order prescribed. + +4. If any squadron shall happen to be overcharged and distressed, the +next squadron or ships are immediately to make towards their relief +and assistance upon a signal given them: which signal shall be in the +admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head; if any ship in +the vice-admiral's squadron, or he that commands in chief in the +second place, a pennant on the main topmast-head; and the +rear-admiral's squadron the like.[1] + +5. If any ship shall be disabled or distressed by loss of masts, shot +under water or the like, so as she is in danger of sinking or taking, +he or the [ship] thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his +jack and ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to +relieve them.[1] + +6. That if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy +to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot otherwise be +repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm or on the +ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ship's squadron may have notice +what it is for--and if it should be that the admiral or any flagships +should do so, the ships of the fleet or of the respective squadrons +are to endeavour to get up as close in a line between him and the +enemy as they can, having always an eye to defend him in case the +enemy should come to annoy him in that condition. + +7. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy and that other +ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting +up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is +then to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. +If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part +thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ships may come up into a +line with the admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and +bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or +their ship or ships luff, thereby to gain his wake or grain. + +8. If the admiral would have any of the ships to make sail or +endeavour by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy, he +will put up a red flag upon the spritsail, topmast shrouds, forestay, +or fore topmast-stay. He that first discovers this signal shall make +sail, and hoist and lower his jack and ensign, that the rest of the +ships may take notice thereof and follow. + +9. If we put a red flag on the mizen shrouds or the mizen yard-arm, +we would have all the flagships to come up in the wake or grain of us. + +10. If in time of fight God shall deliver any of the enemy's ships +into our power by their being disabled, the commanders of his +majesty's ships in condition of pursuing the enemy are not during +fight to stay, take, possess, or burn any of them, lest by so doing +the opportunity of more important service be lost, but shall expect +command from the flag officers for doing thereof when they shall see +fit to command it. + +11. None shall fire upon ships of the enemy that is laid on board by +any of our own ships but so as he may be sure he doth not endamage his +friends. + +12. That it is the duty of all commanders and masters of the small +frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the several squadrons to +know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by +observing their motion do their utmost to cut off their boats if +possible, or if opportunity be that they lay them on board, seize and +destroy them, and for this purpose they are to keep to wind[ward] of +the squadron in time of service. But in case they cannot prevent the +fireships from coming aboard of us by clapping between them and us, +which by all means possible they are to endeavour, that then in such +case they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board +them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from +us, and destroy them; which service if honourably done to its merit +shall be rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely +called to an account. + +13. That the fireships in every squadron endeavour to keep the wind, +and they, with the small frigates, to be as near the great ships as +they can, to attend the signal from the admiral and to act +accordingly. If the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen +yard-arm or topmast-head all the small frigates of his squadron are to +come under his stern for orders. + +14. If an engagement by day shall continue till night, and the +admiral shall please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor +in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the Instructions +for Sailing; and if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring, +then the sign to be by firing of two guns, so near one to the other as +the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do +the like with two guns more. + +15. If, the fleet going before the wind, the admiral would have the +vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the +wind and come to their starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the +mizen topmast-head a red flag, and in case he would have the +rear-admiral and the ships on the larboard quarter to come to their +larboard tack then he will hoist up a blue flag in the same place. + +16. That the commander of any of his majesty's ships suffer not his +guns to be fired until the ship be within distance to [do] good +execution; the contrary to be examined and severely punished by the +court-martial. + +FOOTNOTE: +[1] Modified by Article 8 of the 'Additional Instructions,' _post_, p. +127. + + + +_THE DUKE OF YORK, April_ 10 _or_ 18, 1665. + +[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book+.[1]] + +_Additional Instructions for Fighting_. + + +1. In all cases of fight with the enemy the commanders of his +majesty's ships are to endeavour to keep the fleet in one line, and as +much as may be to preserve the order of battle which shall have been +directed before the time of fight.[2] + +2. If the enemy stay to fight us, we having the wind, the headmost +squadron of his majesty's fleets shall steer for the headmost of the +enemy's ships. + +3. If the enemy have the wind of us and come to fight us, the +commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to put themselves in +one line close upon a wind. + +4. In the time of fight in reasonable weather, the commanders of his +majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about the distance of half a +cable's length one from the other,[3] but so as that according to +the discretion of the commanders they vary that distance according as +the weather shall be, and the occasion of succouring our own or +assaulting the enemy's ships shall require. + +5. The flag officers shall place themselves according to such order of +battle as shall be given. + +6. None of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall pursue any small +number of ships of the enemy before the main [body] of the enemy's +fleet shall be disabled or shall run. + +7. In case of chase none of his majesty's fleet or ships shall chase +beyond sight of the flag, and at night all chasing ships are to return +to the flag. + +8. In case it shall please God that any of his majesty's ships be +lamed in fight, not being in probability of sinking nor encompassed by +the enemy, the following ships shall not stay under pretence of +securing them, but shall follow their leaders and endeavour to do what +service they can upon the enemy, leaving the securing of the lame +ships to the sternmost of our ships, being [assured] that nothing but +beating the body of the enemy's fleet can effectually secure the lame +ships. This article is to be observed notwithstanding any seeming +contradiction in the fourth or fifth articles of the [fighting] +instructions formerly given. + +9. When the admiral would have the van of his fleet to tack first, +the admiral will put abroad the union flag at the staff of the fore +topmast-head if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be +abroad then the fore topsail shall be lowered a little, and the union +flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards. + +10. When the admiral would have the rear of the fleet to tack first, +the union flag shall be put abroad on the flagstaff of the mizen +topmast-head; and for the better notice of these signals through the +fleet, each flagship is upon sight of either of the said signals to +make the said signals, that so every ship may know what they are to +do, and they are to continue out the said signals until they be +answered. Given under my hand the 10th of April, 1665, from on board +the Royal Charles. + + By command of his royal highness. + WM. COVENTRY. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Also in Moulton's Sea Book, _Harl. MSS._ 1247, f. 52 but are there +dated April 18, differently numbered, and signed 'James.' + +[2] This is Article 17 of the complete set, which was modified by +Rupert's subsequent order of 1666. See p. 130. + +[3] It is interesting to note that the distance adopted by D'Estrées and +Tourville for the French service was a full cable. See Hoste, p. 65. + + + +_THE DUKE OF YORK'S SUPPLEMENTARY ORDER, April 27, 1665_. + +[+Penn's Tracts, Sloane MSS. 3232, f. 83+.] + +_Additional Instructions for Fighting_.[1] + + +[1.] When the admiral would have all the ships to fall into the order +of 'Battailia' prescribed, the union flag shall be put into the mizen +peak of the admiral ship; at sight whereof the admirals of [the] other +squadrons are to answer it by doing the like. + +[2.] When the admiral would have the other squadrons to make more +sail, though he himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on +the ensign staff of the admiral ship. + +_For Chasing_.[2] + +[1.] When the admiral shall put a flag striped with white and red upon +the fore topmast-head, the admiral of the white squadron shall send +out ships to chase; when on the mizen topmast-head the admiral of the +blue squadron shall send out ships to chase. + +[2.] If the admiral shall put out a flag striped with white and red +upon any other place, that ship of the admiral's own division whose +signal for call is a pennant in that place shall chase, excepting the +vice-admiral and rear-admiral of the admiral's squadron. + +[3.] If a flag striped red and white upon the main topmast shrouds +under the standard, the vice-admiral of the red is to send ships to +chase. + +If the flag striped red and white be hoisted on the ensign staff the +rear-admiral of the red is to send ships to chase. + +On board the Royal Charles, 27 April, 1665. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] This is preceded by an additional 'Sailing Instruction,' with +signals for cutting and slipping by day or night. + +[2] Also in Capt. Moulton's Sea Book (_Harl. MSS._ 1247, p. 51_b_), +headed 'James Duke of York &c. Additional Instructions for Sailing.' At +foot it has 'given under my hand on board the Royal Charles this 24 of +April, 1665. James,' and the articles are numbered 9 to 12, No. 3 above +forming 11 and 12. + + + +_PRINCE RUPERT_, 1666. + +[+Sir Edward Spragge's Sea Book+.] + +_Additional Instructions for Fighting_. + + +1st. In case of an engagement the commander of every ship is to have a +special regard to the common good, and if any flagship shall, by any +accident whatsoever, stay behind or [be] likely to lose company, or be +out of his place, then all and every ship or ships belonging to such +flag is to make all the way possible to keep up with the admiral of +the fleet and to endeavour the utmost that may be the destruction of +the enemy, which is always to be made the chiefest care. + +This instruction is strictly to be observed, not-withstanding the +seventeenth article in the Fighting Instructions formerly given +out.[1] + +2ndly. When the admiral of the fleet makes a weft with his flag, the +rest of the flag officers are to do the like, and then all the best +sailing ships are to make what way they can to engage the enemy, that +so the rear of our fleet may the better come up; and so soon as the +enemy makes a stand then they are to endeavour to fall into the best +order they can.[2] + +3rdly. If any flagship shall be so disabled as not to be fit for +service, the flag officer or commander of such ship shall remove +himself into any other ship of his division at his discretion, and +shall there command and wear the flag as he did in his own. + + RUPERT. + +For Sir Edward Spragge, Knt., vice-admiral of the blue squadron. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Meaning, of course, Article 1 of the 'Additional Instructions' of +April 18, 1665, which would be No. 17 when the orders were collected and +reissued as a complete set. No copy of the complete set to which Rupert +refers is known to be extant. + +[2] It should be noted that this instruction anticipates by a century +the favourite English signals of the Nelson period for bringing an +unwilling enemy to action, _i.e._ for general chase, and for ships to +take suitable station for neutral support and engage as they get up. + + + + +PART VI + +THE THIRD DUTCH WAR TO THE REVOLUTION + +I. THE DUKE OF YORK, 1672-3 + +II. SIR JOHN NARBROUGH, 1678 + +III. THE EARL OF DARTMOUTH, 1688 + + + +PROGRESS OF TACTICS DURING THE THIRD DUTCH WAR + +INTRODUCTORY + + +For the articles issued by the Duke of York at the outbreak of the +Third Dutch War in March 1672 we are again indebted to Lord +Dartmouth's naval manuscripts. They exist there, copied into the +beginning of an 'Order Book' which by internal evidence is shown to +have belonged to Sir Edward Spragge. It is similar to the so-called +'Royal Charles Sea Book,' and is nearly all blank, but contains two +orders addressed by Rupert to Spragge, April 29 and May 22, 1673, and +a resolution of the council of war held on board the Royal Charles on +May 27, deciding to attack the Dutch fleet in the Schoonveldt and to +take their anchorage if they retired into Flushing. + +The orders are not dated, but, as they are signed 'James' and +countersigned 'M. Wren,' their date can be fixed to a time not later +than the spring of 1672, for Dr. Matthew Wren, F.R.S., died on June 14 +in that year, having served as the lord admiral's secretary since +1667, when Coventry resigned his commissionership of the navy. They +consist of twenty-six articles, which follow those of the late war so +closely that it has not been thought worth while to print them except +in the few cases where they vary from the older ones. + +They are accompanied however in the 'Sea Book' by three 'Further +Instructions,' which do not appear in any previous set. They are of +the highest importance and mark a great stride in naval tactics, a +stride which owing to Granville Penn's error is usually supposed to +have been taken in the previous war. For the first time they +introduced rules for engaging when the two fleets get contact on +opposite tacks, and establish the much-abused system of stretching the +length of the enemy's line and then bearing down together. But it must +be noted that this rule only applies to the case where the fleets are +approaching on opposite tacks and the enemy is to leeward. There is +also a peremptory re-enunciation of the duty of keeping the line and +the order enforced by the penalty of death for firing 'over any of our +own ships.' Here then we have apparently a return to the Duke of +York's belief in formal tactics, and it is highly significant that, +although the twenty-six original articles incorporate and codify all +the other scattered additional orders of the last war, they entirely +ignore those issued by Monck and Rupert during the Four Days' Battle. + +We have pretty clear evidence of the existence at this period of two +schools of tactical opinion, which after all is no more than +experience would lead us to suspect, and which Pepys's remarks have +already indicated. As usual there was the school, represented by the +Duke of York and Penn, which inclined to formality, and by pedantic +insistence on well-meant principles tended inevitably to confuse the +means with the end. On the other hand we have the school of Monck and +Rupert, which was inclined anarchically to submit all rules to the +solvent of hard fighting, and to take tactical risks and unfetter +individual initiative to almost any extent rather than miss a chance +of overpowering the enemy by a sudden well-timed blow. Knowing as we +do the extent to which the principles of the Duke of York's school +hampered the development of fleet tactics till men like Hawke and +Nelson broke them down, we cannot but sympathise with their +opponents. Nor can we help noting as curiously significant that +whereas it was the soldier-admirals who first introduced formal +tactics, it was a seaman's school that forced them to pedantry in the +face of the last of the soldier-school, who tried to preserve their +flexibility, and keep the end clear in view above the means they had +invented. + +Still it would be wrong to claim that either school was right. In +almost every department of life two such schools must always exist, +and nowhere is such conflict less inevitable than in the art of war, +whether by sea or land. Yet just as our comparatively high degree of +success in politics is the outcome of the perpetual conflict of the +two great parties in the state, so it is probably only by the conflict +of the two normal schools of naval thought that we can hope to work +out the best adjusted compromise between free initiative and +concentrated order. + +It was the school of Penn and the Duke of York that triumphed at the +close of these great naval wars. The attempt of Monck and Rupert to +preserve individual initiative and freedom to seize opportunities was +discarded, and for nearly a century formality had the upper hand. Yet +the Duke of York must not be regarded as wholly hostile to initiative +or unwilling to learn from his rivals. The second and most remarkable +of the new instructions acquits him. This is the famous article in +which was first laid down the principle of cutting off a part of the +enemy's fleet and 'containing' the rest. + +Though always attributed to the Duke of York it seems almost certainly +to have been suggested by the tactics of Monck and Rupert on the last +day of the Four Days' Battle, June 4, 1666. According to the official +account, they sighted the Dutch early in the morning about five +leagues on their weather-bow, with the wind at SSW. 'At eight +o'clock,' it continues, 'we came up with them, and they having the +weather-gage put themselves in a line to windward of us. Our ships +then which were ahead of Sir Christopher Myngs [who was to lead the +fleet] made an easy sail, and when they came within a convenient +distance lay by; and the Dutch fleet having put themselves in order we +did the like. Sir Christopher Myngs, vice-admiral of the prince's +fleet, with his division led the van. Next his highness with his own +division followed, and then Sir Edward Spragge, his rear-admiral; and +so stayed for the rest of the fleet, which came up in very good +order. By such time as our whole fleet was come up we held close upon +a wind, our starboard tacks aboard, the wind SW and the enemy bearing +up to fall into the middle of our line with part of their fleet. At +which, as soon as Sir Christopher Myngs had their wake, he tacked and +stood in, and then the whole line tacked in the wake of him and stood +in. But Sir C. Myngs in fighting being put to the leeward, the prince +thought fit to keep the wind, and so led the whole line through the +middle of the enemy, the general [Monck] with the rest of the fleet +following in good order.' + +The account then relates how brilliantly Rupert fought his way +through, and proceeds, 'After this pass, the prince being come to the +other side and standing out, so that he could weather the end of their +fleet, part of the enemy bearing up and the rest tacking, he tacked +also, and his grace [Monck] tacking at the same time bore up to the +ships to the leeward, the prince following him; and so we stood along +backward and forward, the enemy being some to windward and some to +leeward of us; which course we four times repeated, the enemy always +keeping the greatest part of their fleet to windward, but still at so +much distance as to be able to reach our sails and rigging with their +shot and to keep themselves out of reach of our guns, the only +advantage they thought fit to take upon us at this time. But the +fourth time we plying them very sharply with our leeward guns in +passing, their windward ships bore up to relieve their leeward party; +upon which his highness tacked a fifth time and with eight or ten +frigates got to the windward of the enemy's whole fleet, and thinking +to bear in upon them, his mainstay and main topmast being terribly +shaken, came all by the board.' Monck not being able to tack for +wounded masts 'made up to the prince,' and then the Dutch, after a +threat to get between the two admirals, suddenly bore away before the +wind for Flushing.[1] + +The manoeuvre by which Myngs attempted from to windward to divide the +enemy's fleet and so gain the wind of part of it seems to be exactly +what the new instruction contemplated, while its remarkable provision +for a containing movement seems designed to prevent the disastrous +confusion that ensued after the Dutch line had been broken. This +undoubtedly is the great merit of the new instruction, and it is the +first time, so far as is known, that the principle of containing was +ever enunciated. In this it compares favourably with everything we +know of until Nelson's famous memorandum. Its relations to Rodney's +and Howe's manoeuvres for breaking the line must be considered +later. For the present it will suffice to note that it seems designed +rather as a method of gaining the wind than as a method of +concentration, and that the initiation of the manoeuvre is left to the +discretion of the leading flag officer, and cannot be signalled by the +commander-in-chief. + +As to the date at which these three 'Further Instructions' were first +drawn up there is some difficulty. It is possible that they were not +entirely new in 1672, but that their origin, at least in design, went +back to the close of the Second War. In Spragge's first 'Sea Book' +there is another copy of them identical except for a few verbal +differences with those in the second 'Sea Book.' In the first 'Sea +Book' they appear on the back of a leaf containing some 'Sailing +Instructions by the Duke of York,' which are dated November 16, 1666, +and this is the latest date in the book. Moreover in this copy they +are headed 'Additional Instructions to be observed in the next +engagement,' as though they were the outcome of a previous +action. Now, as Wren died on June 10 (o.s.), and the battle of +Solebay, the first action of the Third War, was fought on May 28 +(o.s.), it is pretty clear that it must have been the Second War and +not the Third that was in Spragge's mind at the time. Still if we have +to put them as early as November 1666 it leaves the question much +where it was. Besides the idea of containing the main body of the +enemy after cutting off part of his fleet, the death penalty for +firing over the line is obviously designed to meet certain regrettable +incidents known to have occurred in the Four Days' Battle. Nor is +there any evidence that they were used in the St. James's fight of +July 25, and as this was the last action in the war fought, the 'next +engagement' did not take place till the Third War. It is fairly clear +therefore that we must regard these remarkable orders as resulting +from the experience of the Second War, and as having been first put in +force during the Third one. + +After the battle of Solebay these supplementary articles were +incorporated into the regular instructions as Articles 27 to 29. This +appears from a MS. book belonging to Lord Dartmouth entitled 'Copies +of instructions and other papers relating to the fleets. Anno 1672' It +contains a complete copy of both Sailing and Fighting Instructions, +with a detailed 'order of sailing' for the combined Anglo-French +fleet, dated July 2, 1672, and a corresponding 'order of battle' dated +August 1672. It also contains the flag officers' reports made to the +Duke of York after the battle. + +Instructions for the 'Encouragement for the captains and companies of +fireships, small frigates, and ketches,' now appear for the first +time, and were repeated in some form or other in all subsequent +orders. + +Finally, it has been thought well to reprint from Granville Penn's +_Memorials of Penn_ the complete set of articles which he gives +in Appendix L. No date is attached to them; Granville Penn merely says +they were subsequent to 1665, and has thereby left an unfortunate +impression, adopted by himself and almost every naval historian, both +British and foreign, that followed him, that they were used in the +campaign of 1666, that is, in the Second Dutch War. From the fact +however that they incorporate the 'Further Instructions for Fighting' +countersigned by Wren, we know that they cannot have been earlier than +1667, while the newly discovered MS. of Lord Dartmouth makes it +practically certain they must have been later than August 1672. We may +even go further. + +For curiously enough there is no evidence that these orders, on which +so much doubtful reasoning has been based, were ever in force at all +as they stand. No signed copy of them is known to exist. The copy +amongst the Penn papers in the British Museum which Granville Penn +followed is a draft with no signature whatever. It is possible +therefore that they were never signed. In all probability they were +completed by James early in 1673 for the coming campaign, but had not +actually been issued when, in March of that year, the Test Act +deprived him of his office of lord high admiral, and brought his +career as a seaman to an end. What orders were used by his successor +and rival Rupert is unknown. + +Of even higher interest than this last known set of the Duke of York's +orders are certain additions and observations which were subsequently +appended to them by an unknown hand. As it has been found impossible +to fix with certainty either their date or author, I have given them +by way of notes to the text. They are to be found in a beautifully +written and richly bound manuscript in the Admiralty Library. At the +end of the volume, following the Instructions, are diagrammatic +representations of certain actions in the Third Dutch War, finely +executed in water-colour to illustrate the formation for attack, and +to every plan are appended tactical notes relating to the actions +represented, and to others which were fought in the same way. The +first one dealt with is the 'St. James's Fight,' fought on July 25, +1666, and the dates in the tactical notes, as well as in the +'Observations' appended to the articles, range as far as the last +action fought in 1673. The whole manuscript is clearly intended as a +commentary on the latest form of the duke's orders, and it may safely +be taken as an expression of some tactician's view of the lessons that +were to be drawn from his experience of the Dutch Wars. + +As to the authorship, the princely form in which the manuscript has +been preserved might suggest they were James's own meditations after +the war; but the tone of the 'Observations,' and the curious revival +of the word 'general' for 'commander-in-chief,' are enough to negative +such an attribution. Other indications that exist would point to +George Legge, Lord Dartmouth. His first experience of naval warfare +was as a volunteer and lieutenant under his cousin, Sir Edward +Spragge, in 1665. Spragge was in fact his 'sea-daddy,' and with one +exception all the examples in the 'Observations' are taken from +incidents and movements in which Spragge was the chief actor. One long +observation is directed to precautions to be taken by flag officers in +shifting their flags in action, so as to prevent a recurrence of the +catastrophe which cost Spragge his life. Indeed, with the exception of +Jordan, Spragge is the only English admiral mentioned. Dartmouth was +present at all the actions quoted, and succeeded in constituting +himself a sufficient authority on naval affairs to be appointed in +1683 to command the first important fleet that was sent out after the +termination of the war. These indications however are far too slight +to fix him with the authorship, and his own orders issued in 1688 go +far to rebut the presumption.[2] + +Another possible author is Arthur Herbert, afterwards Lord +Torrington. He too had served a good deal under Spragge, and had been +present at all the battles named. This conjecture would explain the +curious expression used in the observation to the seventh instruction, +'The battle fought in 1666.' There was of course more than one battle +fought in 1666, but Herbert was only present in that of July 25th, the +'St. James's Fight,' represented in the manuscript--and it was his +first action. But here again all is too vague for more than a mere +guess. + +But whoever was the author, the manuscript is certainly inspired by +someone of position who had served in the last two Dutch Wars, and its +undeniable importance is that it gives us clearly the development of +tactical thought which led to the final form of Fighting Instructions +adopted under William III, and continued till the end of the +eighteenth century. The developments which it foreshadows will +therefore be best dealt with when we come to consider those +instructions. For the present it will be sufficient to note the +changes suggested. In the first place we have a desire to simplify +signals and to establish repeating ships. Secondly, for the sake of +clearness the numbering of the articles is changed, every paragraph to +which a separate signal is attached being made a separate instruction, +so that with new instructions we have thirty-three articles instead of +James's twenty-four. Thirdly, we have three new instructions +proposed: viz., No. 5, removing from flag officers the right to divide +the enemy's fleet at their discretion without signal from the admiral; +No. 8, giving a signal for any squadron that has weathered part of the +enemy by dividing or otherwise to bear down and come to close action; +and No. 17, for such a squadron to bear down through the enemy's line +and rejoin the admiral. All of these rules are obviously the outcome +of known incidents in the late war. There are also suggested additions +or alterations to the old articles to the following effect: (1) When +commanders are in doubt or out of sight of the admiral, they are to +press the headmost ships of the enemy all they can; (2) When the enemy +'stays to fight' they are to concentrate on his weathermost ships, +instead of his headmost, as under the old rule; (3) Finally, while +preserving the line, they are to remember that their first duty is 'to +press the weathermost ships and relieve such as are in distress.' + +It is this last addition to the Duke of York's sixteenth article that +contains the pith of the author's ideas. All his examples are chosen +to show that the system of bearing down together from windward in a +line parallel to that of the enemy is radically defective, even if all +the advantages of position and superior force are with you, and for +this reason--that if you succeed in defeating part of the enemy's line +you cannot follow up your success with the victorious part of your own +without sacrificing your advantage of position, and giving the enemy a +chance of turning the tables on you. Thus, if your rear defeats the +enemy's rear and follows it up, your own line will be broken, and as +your rear in pressing its beaten opponents falls to leeward of the +enemy's centre and van it will expose itself to a fatal +concentration. His own view of the proper form of attack from windward +is to bear down upon the van or weathermost ships of the enemy in line +ahead on a course oblique to the enemy's line. In this way, he points +out, you can concentrate on the ships attacked, and as they are beaten +you can deal with the next in order. For so long as you keep your own +line intact and in good order, regardless of your rear being at first +too distant to engage, you will always have fresh ships coming into +action at the vital point, and will thus be able gradually to roll up +the enemy's line without ever disturbing your own order. Fortifying +himself with the reflection that 'there can be no greater +justification than matter of fact,' he proceeds to instance various +battles in the late wars to show that this oblique form of attack +always led to a real victory, whereas whenever the parallel form was +adopted, though in some cases we had everything in our favour and had +fairly beaten the Dutch, yet no decisive result was obtained. + +From several points of view these observations are of high +interest. Not only do they contain the earliest known attempt to get +away from the unsatisfactory method of engaging in parallel lines ship +to ship, but in seeking a substitute for it they seem to foreshadow +the transition from the Elizabethan idea of throwing the enemy into +confusion to the eighteenth century idea of concentration on his most +vulnerable part. In so far as the author recommends a concentration on +the weathermost ships his idea is sound, as they were the most +difficult for the enemy to support; but since the close-hauled line +had come in, they were also the van, and a concentration on the van is +theoretically unsound, owing to the fact that the centre and rear came +up naturally to its relief. To this objection he appears to attach no +weight, partly because no doubt he was still influenced by the old +intention of throwing the enemy into confusion.[3] For since the +line ahead had taken the place of the old close formations it seemed +that to disable the leading ships came to the same thing as disabling +the weathermost. The solution eventually arrived at was of course a +concentration on the rear, but to this at the time there were +insuperable objections. The rear was normally the most leewardly end +of the line, and an oblique attack on it could be parried by wearing +together. The rear then became the van, and the attack if persisted in +would fall on the leading squadron with the rest of the fleet to +windward--the worst of all forms of attack. The only possible way +therefore of concentrating on the rear was to isolate it and contain +the van by cutting the line. But in the eyes of our author and his +school cutting the line stood condemned by the experience of war.[4] + +In his 'Observations' he clearly indicates the reasons. He would +indeed forbid the manoeuvre altogether except when your own line +outstretches that of the enemy, or when you are forced to pass through +the enemy's fleet to save yourself from being pressed on a lee +shore. The reasons given are the disorder it generally causes, the +ease with which it is parried, and the danger of your own ships firing +on each other when as the natural consequence of the manoeuvre they +proceed to double on the enemy. The fact is that fleet evolutions were +still in too immature a condition for so difficult a manoeuvre to be +admissible. Presumably therefore our author chose the attack on the +weathermost ships, although they were also the van, as the lesser evil +in spite of its serious drawbacks. + +The whole question of the principles involved in his suggestion is +worthy of the closest consideration. For the difficulty it reveals of +effecting a sound form of concentration without breaking the line as +well as of adopting any form that involved breaking the line gives us +the key of that alleged reaction of tactics in the eighteenth century +which has been so widely ridiculed. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The original draft corrected by Lord Addington, principal +secretary of state, is in _S.P. Domestic_, Car. II, 158. + +[2] See _post_, p. 170. + +[3] _Cf_. Hoste's second Remark, _post_, p. 180. + +[4] In the Instructions which Sir Chas. H. Knowles drew up about 1780, +for submission to the Admiralty he has at p. 16 a remark upon rear +concentration which helps us to see what was in the author's mind. It is +as follows: 'N.B.--In open sea the enemy (if of equal force) will never +suffer you to attack their rear, but will pass you on opposite tacks to +prevent your doing it: therefor the attempt is useless and only losing +time.' + + + +_THE DUKE OF YORK_, 1672.[1] + +[+Spragge's Second Sea Book. Dartmouth MSS.+] + +_Instructions for the better ordering of his majesty's fleet in +fighting_. + + +1. Discovery of a fleet, striking the admiral's flag and making a +weft.[2] + +2. To come into the order of battle.[2] + +3. A red flag on the fore topmast-head, to engage.[2] + +4. If overcharged or distressed, a pennant.[2] + +5. Ditto, a weft with his jack and ensign.[2] + +6. A pennant on the mizen peak or ensign staff if any ship bear away +from the enemy to stop a leak. + +If any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop +a leak or mend what is amiss which cannot otherwise be repaired, he is +to put out a pennant on the mizen peak or ensign staff, whereby the +rest of that ship's squadron may have notice what it is for; and if +the admiral or any flagship should be so, the ships of the fleet or of +the respective squadrons are to endeavour to get up as close in line +between him and the enemy as they can, having always an eye to defend +him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition; and +in case any flagship or any other ship in the fleet shall be forced to +go out of the line for stopping of leaks or repairing any other +defects in the ships, then the next immediate ships are forthwith to +endeavour to close the line either by making or shortening sail, or by +such other ways and means as they shall find most convenient for doing +of it; and if any ship, be it flagship or other that shall happen to +be disabled and go out of the line, then all the small craft shall +come in to that ship's assistance, upon signal made of her being +disabled. If any of the chief flagships or other flagships shall +happen to be so much disabled as that thereby they shall be rendered +unable for present service, in such case any chief flag officer may +get on board any other ship which he may judge most convenient in his +own squadron, and any other flag officer in that case may go on board +any ship in his division. + +7. A blue flag on the mizen yard or topmast.[3] + +8. To make sail, a red flag on the spritsail, topmast shrouds, +&c.[3] + +9. A red flag on the mizen shrouds, to come into the wake or grain of +us.[3] + +10. Not to endanger one another.[4] + +11. The small craft to attend the motion of the enemy's +fireships.[4] + +12. A white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all the small +frigates of the admiral's squadron.[4] + +13. To retreat, four guns.[4] + +14. None to fire guns till within distance.[5] + +15. For the larboard and starboard tacks.[6] + +16. To keep the line.[7] + +17. If we have the wind of the enemy.[7] + +18. If the enemy have the wind of us.[7] + +19. The distance of each ship in time of fight.[8] + +20. Not to pursue any small number of enemy's ships.[9] + +21. For leaving chase.[9] + +22. If any ship be disabled in fight.[9] + +23. The van of the fleet to tack first.[9] + +24. The rear of the fleet to tack first.[9] + +25. To fall into the order of battle.[10] + +26. To make sail.[10] + +JAMES. + +By command of his royal highness. + +M. WREN. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] This set of orders has marginal rubrics indicating the contents of +each article, and where the article does not differ from the orders of +1665 I have given the rubric only in the text. + +[2] Identical with corresponding article of April 10, 1665. + +[3] Same as corresponding article of April 10, 1665. Article 10 of +those instructions relating to 'not staying to take possession of +disabled ships' is here omitted. + +[4] These four articles are identical with 11, 12, 13 and 14 of April +10, 1665. + +[5] Same as Article 16 of April 10, 1665. + +[6] Same as Article 15 of April 10, 1665. + +[7] These three articles are the same as 1, 2, and 3, of 'Additional +Instructions' of April 18, 1665. The complete set used by Monck and +Rupert in 1666 must have been numbered as above. + +[8] Same as 4 and 5 of 'Additional Instructions,' April 18,1665. + +[9] These five articles are the same as 6 to 10 of the 'Additional +Instructions,' April 18, 1665. + +[10] These two articles are the same as the two 'Additional +Instructions' of April 27, 1665. + + + +_THE DUKE OF YORK'S SUPPLEMENTARY ORDERS_, 1672. + +[+Spragge's Second Sea Book. Dartmouth MSS.+] + +_Further Instructions for Fighting_. + + +1. To keep the enemy to leeward. + +In case we have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands +towards us and we towards them, then the van of our fleet shall keep +the wind, and when _the rear comes_[1] to a convenient distance +of the enemy's rear shall stay until our whole line is come up within +the same distance of the enemy's van, and then our whole line is to +stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy +to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in the van, and in case the +enemy tack in the rear first, then he that leads the van of our fleet +is to tack first, and the whole line is to follow, standing all along +with the same tacks on board as the enemy does. + +2. To divide the enemy's fleet. + +In case the enemy have the wind of us and we have sea-room enough, +then we are to keep the wind as close as we can lie until such time as +we see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide their fleet; +and if the van of our fleet find that they have the wake of any part +of them, they are to tack and to stand in, and strive to divide the +enemy's body, and that squadron which shall pass first being come to +the other side is to tack again, and the middle squadron is to bear up +upon that part of the enemy so divided, which the last is to second, +either by bearing down to the enemy or by endeavouring to keep off +those that are to windward, as shall be best for service. + +3. To keep the line. + +The several commanders of the fleet are to take special care that they +keep their line, and upon pain of death that they fire not over any of +our own ships. + +(Signed) JAMES. +By command of his royal highness. + +(Signed) M. WREN. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] This must be a copyist's error. In Lord Dartmouth's MS. book (see +_ante_, p. 139) it reads 'when they are come.' + + + +__THE DUKE OF YORK_, 1672-3_. + +[+Spragge's Second Sea Book. Dartmouth MSS.+] + +_Encouragement for the captains and companies of fireships, small +frigates and ketches_. + + +Although it is the duty of all persons employed in his majesty's fleet +even to the utmost hazard of their lives to endeavour as well the +destroying of his majesty's enemies, as the succouring of his +majesty's subjects, and in most especial manner to preserve and defend +his majesty's ships of war (the neglect whereof shall be at all times +strictly and severely punished), nevertheless, that no inducement may +be wanting which may oblige all persons serving in his majesty's +service valiantly and honourably to acquit themselves in their several +stations, we have thought fit to publish and declare, and do hereby +promise on his majesty's behalf: + +That if any of his majesty's fireships perform the service expected of +them in such manner that any of the enemy's ships of war of forty guns +or more shall be burnt by them, every person remaining in the fireship +till the service be performed shall receive on board the admiral, +immediately after the service done, ten pounds as a reward for that +service over and above his pay due to him; and in case any of them +shall be killed in that service it shall be paid to his executors or +next relation over and above the ordinary provision made for the +relations of such as are slain in his majesty's service; and the +captains of such fireships shall receive a medal of gold to remain as +a token of honour to him and his posterity, and shall receive such +other encouragement by preferment and command as shall be fit to +reward him, and induce others to perform the like service. The +inferior officers shall receive each ten pounds in money and be taken +care of, and placed in other ships before any persons whatsoever. + +In case any of the enemy's flagships shall be so fired, the recompense +shall be double to each man performing it, and the medal to the +commander shall be such as shall particularly express the eminence of +the service, and his and the other officers' preferments shall be +suitable to the merit of it. + +If any of his majesty's fifth or sixth rate frigates, or any ketches, +smacks or hoys in his majesty's service, shall board or destroy any +fireships of the enemy, and so prevent any of them from going on board +any of his majesty's ships, above the fifth rate, besides the +preferment which shall be given to the commanders and officers of such +ships performing such service answerable to the merit, the companies +of such ships or vessels, or in case they shall be killed in that +service, their executors or nearest relations, shall receive to every +man forty shillings as a reward, and such persons who shall by the +testimony of the commanders appear to have been eminently instrumental +in such service shall receive a further reward according to their +merit. + +If the masters of any ketches, hoys, smacks, and other vessels hired +for his majesty's service shall endeavour to perform any of the +services aforesaid, and shall by such his attempt lose his vessel or +ship, the full reward thereof shall be paid by the treasurer of his +majesty's navy, upon certificate of the service done by the council of +war, and the said commanders and men serving in her shall receive the +same recompense with those serving in his majesty's ships or vessels. + +JAMES.[1] + +By command of his royal highness. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] In Capt. Moulton's Sea Book _(Harleian MSS._ 1247, f. 53) is +another copy of these articles which concludes, 'given on board the +Royal Charles the 20th of April 1665. James.' And at foot is written 'a +copy of His Royal Highness's command received from his Excellency the +Earl of Sandwich.' They probably therefore originated in the Second War +and were reissued in the Third. + + + +_FINAL FORM OF THE DUKE OF YORK'S ORDERS, 1673_. + +_With the additions and observations subsequently made_.[1] + +[+G. Penn, Memorials of Penn+.] + +_James, Duke of York and Albany, Earl of Ulster, Lord High Admiral +of England, Scotland, and Ireland, Constable of Dover Castle, Lord +Warden of the Cinque Ports, and Governor of Portsmouth, &c._ + +_Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in +fighting_. + + +Instruction I. Upon discovery of a fleet, and receiving of a signal +from the admiral (which is to be the striking of the admiral's ensign, +and making a weft), such frigates as are appointed (that is to say, +one out of each squadron) are to make sail, and to stand with them, so +nigh as they can conveniently, the better to gain knowledge what they +are, and of what quality; how many fireships, and others; and what +posture their fleet is in; which being done, the frigates are to speak +together, and conclude on the report they are to give; and, +accordingly, to repair to their respective squadrons and +commanders-in-chief; and not to engage (if the enemy's ships exceed +them in number), unless it shall appear to them on the place that they +have an advantage. + +Instruction II. At sight of the said fleet, the vice-admiral (or he +who commands in chief in the second place), with his squadron; and the +rear-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the third squadron), with +his squadron; are to make what sail they can to come up, and to put +themselves into that order of battle which shall be given them; for +which the signal shall be the union flag put on the mizen peak of the +admiral's ship; at sight whereof, as well the vice- and rear-admirals +of the red squadron, as the admirals, vice-admirals, and rear-admirals +of the other squadrons, are to answer it by doing the like. + +Instruction III. In case the enemy have the wind of the admiral and +fleet, and they have sea-room enough, then they are to keep the wind +as close as they can lie, until such time as they see an opportunity +by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet; and if the van of +his majesty's fleet find that they have the wake of any considerable +part of them, they are to tack and stand in, and strive to divide the +enemy's body; and that squadron that shall pass first, being got to +windward, is to bear down on those ships to leeward of them; and the +middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the +enemy's van, which the last squadron is to second; and both of these +squadrons are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first +squadron that divided the enemy's fleet.[2] + +Instruction IV. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and +come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall +endeavour to put themselves in one line, close upon a wind, according +to the order of battle.[3] + +Instruction V. If the admiral would have any of the fleet to make +sail, or endeavour, by tacking or otherwise, to gain the wind of the +enemy, he will put a red flag upon the spritsail [_sic_], topmast +shrouds, fore-stay, fore topmast-stay; and he who first discovers this +signal shall make sail, and hoist and lower his jack and ensign, that +the rest of the fleet may take notice thereof, and follow.[4] + +Instruction VI.[5] If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy +when other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then, +upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or mizen topmast, +every ship is to bear up into his wake or grain, upon pain of severe +punishment. + +If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part +thereof be to leeward of him, to the end such ships that are to +leeward may come up in a line with the admiral (if he shall put a flag +as before and bear up); none that are to leeward are to bear up, but +to keep his or their ship's luff, thereby to give his ship wake or +grain. + +If it shall please God that the enemy shall be put to run, all the +frigates are to make all the sail that possibly they can after them, +and to run directly up their broadsides, and to take the best +opportunity they can of laying them on board; and some ships which are +the heavy sailers (with some persons appointed to command them) are to +keep in a body in the rear of the fleet, that so they may take care of +the enemy's ships which have yielded, and look after the manning of +the prizes.[6] + +Instruction VII.[7] In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the +enemy, and that the enemy stand towards them, and they towards the +enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind; and +when they are come within a convenient distance from the enemy's rear, +they shall stay until their whole line is come up within the same +distance from the enemy's van; and then their whole line is to tack +(every ship in his own place), and to bear down upon them so nigh as +they can (without endangering their loss of wind); and to stand along +with them, the same tacks aboard, still keeping the enemy to leeward, +and not suffering them to tack in their van; and in case the enemy +tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's is to +tack first, with as many ships, divisions, or squadrons as are those +of the enemy's; and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is +to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy +doth. + +Instruction VIII.[8] If the enemy stay to fight (his majesty's fleet +having the wind), the headmost squadron of his majesty's fleet shall +steer for the headmost of the enemy's ships.[9] + +Instruction IX.[10] If, when his majesty's fleet is going before the +wind, the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the +starboard quarter to clap by the wind and come to their starboard +tack, then he will hoist upon the mizen topmast-head a red flag. + +And in case he would have the rear-admiral and the ships of the +larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack, then he will hoist up +a blue flag in the same place. + +Instruction X.[11] If the admiral would have the van of the fleet to +tack first, he will put abroad the union flag at the staff on the fore +topmast-head, if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be +abroad, then the fore topsail shall be lowered a little, and the union +flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards. + +When the admiral would have the rear of the fleet to tack first, the +union flag shall be put abroad on the flagstaff of the mizen +topmast-head; and for the better notice of these two signals through +the fleet, each flagship is, upon sight of either of the said signals, +to make the same signals, that so every ship may know what they are to +do; and they are to continue out the same signals until they be +answered.[12] + +Instruction XI.[13] If the admiral put a red flag on the mizen +shrouds, or the mizen peak, all the flagships are to come up into his +wake or grain. + +Instruction XII.[13] When the admiral would have the other squadrons +to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall +be put on the ensign staff of the admiral's ships. + +Instruction XIII.[13] As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral +engage, or make a signal, by putting out a red flag on the fore +topmast-head, each squadron shall take the best advantage to engage +the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them. + +Instruction XIV.[13] In time of fight, if the weather be reasonable, +the commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about +the distance of half a cable one from another; but so as they may also +(according to the direction of their commanders) vary that distance, +as the weather shall prove, and as the occasion of succouring any of +his majesty's ships or of assaulting those of the enemy shall require. + +And as for the flag officers, they shall place themselves according to +such order of battle as shall be given. + +Instruction XV.[14] No commander of any of his majesty's ships shall +suffer his guns to be fired until the ship be within distance to do +good execution; and whoever shall do the contrary shall be strictly +examined, and severely punished, by a court-martial. + +Instruction XVI.[14] In all cases of fight with the enemy, the +commanders of his majesty's ships are to keep the fleet in one line, +and (as much as may be) to preserve the order of battle which they +have been directed to keep before the time of fight.[15] + +Instruction XVII.[16] None of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall +pursue any small number of the enemy's ships before the main body of +their fleet shall be disabled, or run. + +Instruction XVIII.[16] None shall fire upon the ships of the enemy's +that are laid on board by any of his majesty's ships, but so as he may +be sure he do not endamage his friend. + +Instruction XIX.[16] The several commanders in the fleet are to take +special care, upon pain of death, that they fire not over any of their +own ships. + +Instruction XX.[17] It is the duty of all commanders of the small +frigates, ketches, and smacks, belonging to the several squadrons (who +are not otherwise appointed by the admiral), to know the fireships +belonging to the enemies, and accordingly observing their motion, to +do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible); or, if they have +an opportunity, to lay them on board, seize, and destroy them; and, to +this purpose, they are to keep to windward of their squadron, in time +of service. But in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming +on board of his majesty's ships, by clapping between them (which by +all possible means they are to endeavour), they are in such an exigent +to show themselves men, by steering on board them with their boats, +and, with grapnels and other means, to clear his majesty's ships from +them, and to destroy them. Which service, if honourably performed, +shall be rewarded according to its merit; but if neglected, shall be +strictly examined, and severely punished.[18] + +Instruction XXI.[19] The fireships in the several squadrons are to +endeavour to keep the wind; and they (with their small frigates) to be +as near the great ships as they can, attending the signal from the +admiral, and acting accordingly. + +If the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen yard-arm or +topmast-head, all the small frigates in his squadron are to come under +his stern for orders. + +Instruction XXII.[20] In case it should please God that any ships of +his majesty's fleet be lamed in fight, and yet be in no danger of +sinking, nor encompassed by the enemy, the following ships shall not +stay, under pretence of succouring them, but shall follow their +leaders, and endeavour to do what service they can against the enemy; +leaving the succouring of the lame ships to the sternmost of the +fleet; being assured that nothing but beating the body of the enemy's +fleet can effectually secure the lame ships, + +Nevertheless, if any ship or ships shall be distressed or disabled, by +loss of mast, shot under water, or the like, so that it is really in +danger of sinking or taking; that or those ship or ships thus +distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his or their jack or +ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to relieve them. + +And if any ships or squadron shall happen to be overcharged or +distressed, the next squadron, or ships, are immediately to make +towards their relief and assistance. + +And if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy, to +stop a leak, or mend what is amiss (which cannot otherwise be +repaired), he is to put a pennant on the mizen peak, or ensign staff, +whereby the rest of that ship's squadron may have notice what it is +for. + +If the admiral or any flagship should be so, then the ships of the +fleet, or of the respective squadrons, are to endeavour to get up as +close into a line between him and the enemy as they can; having always +an eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in +that condition. + +And in case any flagship, or any other ship in the fleet, shall be +forced to go out of the line, for stopping of leaks, or repairing of +any other defect, then the next immediate ships are forthwith to +endeavour to close the line again, either by making or shortening +sail, or by such other ways and means as they shall find most +convenient for doing of it; and all the small craft shall come in to +that ship's assistance, upon a signal made of her being disabled. + +And if any of the chief flagships, or other flagships shall happen to +be so much disabled as that they shall be unfit for present service, +in such a case any chief flag officer may go on board any other ship +of his own squadron, as he shall judge most convenient; and any other +flag officer, in that case, may go on board any ship in his +division.[21] + +Instruction XXIII.[22] In case of fight, none of his majesty's ships +shall chase beyond sight of the admiral; and at night all chasing +ships are to return to the fleet. + +Instruction XXIV.[23] If any engagement by day shall continue till +night, and the admiral shall please to anchor, all the fleet are, upon +a signal, to anchor, in as good, order as may be, which signal will be +the same as in the 'Instructions for Sailing' _(vid._ Instr. +XVIII.); that is to say, the admiral fires two guns, a small distance +one from another, &c. + +And if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring, then he will +fire four guns, one after another, so as the report may only be +distinguished; and about three minutes after he will do the like with +four guns more.[24] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The later _Admiralty MS._ is prefaced by the following +_Observation_: 'There have happened several misfortunes and disputes for +want of a sufficient number of signals to explain the general's +pleasure, without which it is not to be avoided; and whereas it hath +often happened for want of a ready putting forth and apprehending to +what intent the signals are made, they are contracted into a shorter +method so that no time might be lost. It is most certain that in all sea +battles the flags or admiral-generals are equally concerned in any +conflict, and no manner of knowledge can be gained how the rest of the +battle goes till such time as it is past recovery. To prevent this let a +person fitly qualified command the reserve, who shall by signals make +known to the general in what condition or posture the other parts of the +fleet are in, he having his station where the whole can best be +discovered, and his signals, answering the general's, may also be +discerned by the rest of the fleet.' + +[2] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'Unless you can +outstretch their headmost ships there is hazard in breaking through the +enemy's line, and [it] commonly brings such disorders in the line of +battle that it may be rather omitted unless an enemy press you near a +lee shore. For if, according to this instruction, when you have got the +wind you are to press the enemy, then those ships which are on each side +of them shall receive more than equal damages from each other's shot if +near, and in case the enemy but observed the seventh instruction--that +is, to tack with equal numbers with you--then is your fleet divided and +not the enemy's. + +[3] The _Admiralty MS._ here inserts an additional instruction, +numbered 5, as follows: 'If in time of fight any flagship or squadron +ahead of the fleet hath an opportunity of weathering any of the enemy's +ships, they shall put abroad the same signal the general makes them for +tacking, which, if the general would have them go about, he will answer +by giving the same again, otherwise they are to continue on the same +line or station.' + +_Observation_.--'For it may prove not convenient in some cases to break +the line.' + +[4] The _Admiralty MS._ adds, 'And as soon as they have the wind to +observe what other signals the general makes; and in case they lose +sight of the general, they are to endeavour to press the headmost ships +of the enemy all they can, or assist any of ours that are annoyed by +them.' The whole makes Instruction VI. of the _Admiralty MS._ An +_Observation_ is attached to the old instruction as follows:--'This +signal was wanting in the battle fought 11th August, 1673. The fourth +squadron followed this instruction and got the wind of the enemy about +four in the afternoon, and kept the wind for want of another signal to +bear down upon the enemy, as Monsieur d'Estrées alleged at the council +of war the next day. For want of this the enemy left only five or six +ships to attend their motion, and pressed the other squadrons of ours to +such a degree they were forced to give way.' _Cf._ note, p. 181. + +[5] The _Admiralty MS._ makes of the three paragraphs of this +instruction three separate instructions, numbered 7, 9, and 10, and +inserts after the first paragraph a new instruction numbered 8, with an +_Observation_ appended. It is as follows: _Additional Instruction, No. +VIII.:_ 'When any of his majesty's ships that have gained the wind of +the enemy, and that the general or admiral would have them bear down and +come to a close fight, he will put abroad the same signal as for their +tacking, and hoist and lower the same till it be discerned; at which, +they that are to windward shall answer by bearing down upon the enemy. +_Observation_.--The same in the battle of Solebay, Sir Joseph Jordan got +the wind and kept it for want of a signal or fireships.' This +_Observation_ appears to be intended as a continuation of the previous +one, the new instruction supplies the missing signal there referred to. + +[6] The _Admiralty MS._ has this _Observation_: 'The 28th May, '73, +the battle fought in the Schooneveld, the rear-admiral of their fleet +commanded by Bankart (? Adriaen Banckers) upon a signal from De Ruyter +gave way for some time, and being immediately followed by Spragge and +his division, it proved only a design to draw us to leeward, and that De +Ruyter might have the advantage of weathering us. So that for any small +number giving way it is not safe for the like number to go after them, +but to press the others which still maintain the fight according to the +article following. + +[7] No.11 in the _Admiralty MS_. with the following _Observation_: 'In +bearing down upon an enemy when you have the wind, or standing towards +them and they towards you, if it is in your power to fall upon any part +of their ships, those to windward will be the most exposed; therefore +you must use your utmost endeavour to ruin that part. The battle fought +in _1666_, the headmost or winderly ships were beaten in three hours and +put to run before half the rest of the fleet were engaged. We suffered +the like on the 4th of June, for Tromp and De Ruyter never bore down to +engage the body of our fleet, but pressed the leading ships where +Spragge and his squadron had like to have been ruined.' + +[8] _Admiralty MS._ No. 12. + +[9] For 'headmost of the enemy's ships' the _Admiralty MS_. has +'windmost ships of the enemy's fleet, and endeavour all that can be to +force them to leeward.' Also this _Observation_: 'It may happen that the +headmost of their fleet may be the most leewardly, then in such case you +are to follow this instruction, whereas before it was said to stand with +the headmost ships of the enemy.' + +[10] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 13 and 14. It has the _Observation_: 'This +ought to be for each squadron apart.' + +[11] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 15 and l6. To the first paragraph, or No. 15, +it has the _Observation_: 'It may happen that by the winds shifting +there may be neither van nor rear; then in that case a signal for each +squadron would be better understood, so that you are to follow the 14th +and 15th of the "Sailing Instructions." For in the battle of August '73 +the wind shifted and put the whole line out of order.' + +[12] The _Admiralty MS_. here inserts a new article, No. 17: 'If the +general would have those ships to windward of the enemy to bear down +through their line to join the body of the fleet, he will put abroad a +white flag with a cross from corner to corner where it can best be +discovered.' + +[13] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 18 to 23. + +[14] _Admiralty MS_. Nos, 18 to 23. + +[15] _Admiralty MS_. adds: 'having regard to press the weathermost +ships and relieve such as are in distress.' It is worth noting that this +important relaxation of strict line tactics practically embodies the +idea of Rupert's Additional Instruction of 1666. _Supra_, p. 129. + +[16] _Admiralty MS_. Nos. 24 to 26. + +[17] _Admiralty MS_. No. 27. It adds this _Observation_: 'When the +fleet is to leeward of the enemy you to take care to put yourself in +such a station as that you may (when any signal is given) without loss +of time tack and stand in to the line. And when any part of the fleet or +ships wherein you are concerned are ordered to tack and gain the wind of +the enemy, you are to make all the sail you can and keep up with the +headmost ships that first tack.' + +[18] _Admiralty MS. 'Observation_: The reward of saving a friend to be +equal to that of destroying an enemy.' + +[19] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 28 and 29. + +[20] _Admiralty MS._ No. 30. + +[21] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation:_ 'in changing ships be +as careful as you can not to give the enemy any advantage or knowledge +thereof by striking the flag. In case of the death of any flag officer, +the flag to be continued aloft till the fight be over, notice to be +given to the next commander-in-chief, and not to bear out of the line +unless in very great danger. It hath been observed what very great +encouragement the bare shooting of an admiral's flag gives the enemy, +but this may be prevented by taking in all the flags before going to +engage. It was the ruin of Spragge in the battle of August '73 by taking +his flag in his boat, which gave the enemy an opportunity to discover +his motion, when at the same [time] we saw three flags flying on board +the main topmast-head of three ships which Tromp had quitted.' + +[22] _Admiralty MS._ No. 31. + +[23] _Admiralty MS._ Nos. 32 and 33. + +[24] The _Admiralty MS._ has the _Observation_: 'By reason that guns +are not so well to be distinguished at the latter end of a battle from +chose of the enemy, sky-rockets would be proper signals.' This appears +to be the earliest recorded suggestion for the use of rockets for naval +signalling. + + + +II + +MEDITERRANEAN ORDERS, 1678 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +In 1677 Narbrough had been sent for the second time as +commander-in-chief to the Mediterranean, to deal with the Barbary +corsairs. To enable him to operate more effectively against Tripoli, +arrangements were on foot to establish a base for him at Malta, and +meanwhile he had been using the Venetian port of Zante. It was at this +time that Charles II, in a last effort to throw off the yoke of Louis +XIV, had married his eldest niece, the Princess Mary, to the French +king's arch-enemy William of Orange, and relations between France and +England were at the highest tension. Preparations were set on foot in +the British dockyards for equipping a 'grand fleet' of eighty sail; on +February 15 was issued a new and enlarged commission to Narbrough +making him 'admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Straits'; Sicily, +which the French had occupied, was hurriedly evacuated; Duquesne, who +commanded the Toulon squadron, was expecting to be attacked at any +moment, and Colbert gave him strict orders to keep out of the British +admiral's way.[1] + +It will be seen that it was in virtue of his new commission, and in +expectation of encountering a superior French force, that Narbrough +issued his orders, and they may be profitably compared with those of +Lord Sandwich on the eve of the Second Dutch War as the typical +Fighting Instructions for a small British fleet. No collision however +occurred; for Louis could not face the threatened coalition between +Spain, Holland, and England, and was forced to assent to a general +peace, which was signed at Nymwegen in the following September. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] Corbett, _England in the Mediterranean_, ii. 97-104. The official +correspondence will be found in Mr. Tanner's _Calendar of the Pepys +MSS._, vol. i., and in the _Lettres de Colbert_, vol. iii. + + + +_SIR JOHN NARBROUGH_, 1678. + +[+Egerton MSS. 2543, f. 839+.] + +_Sir John Narbrough, Knight, admiral of his majesty's fleet in the +Mediterranean seas for this expedition. + +Instructions for all commanders to place their ships for their better +fighting and securing the whole fleet if a powerful enemy sets upon +us_. + + +When I hoist my union flag at the mizen peak, I would have every +commander in this fleet place himself in order of sailing and battle +as prescribed, observing his starboard and larboard ship and leader, +either sailing before or by the wind, and so continue sailing in order +so long as the signal is abroad. + +In case a powerful squadron of ships falls with our fleet, and will +fight us, and we see it most convenient to fight before the wind, and +the enemy follow us, I would have every commander place his ships in +this order of sailing prescribed as followeth, and so continue sailing +and fighting, doing his utmost to annoy the enemy, so long as shall be +required for defence of himself and whole fleet. + +_Larboard side_. Portsmouth frigate. + Newcastle frigate. + Samuel and Henry 30 + Advice 20 + Diamond. + Friendship 12 + Lion 20 + Bonaventure. 11 + John and Joseph 10 + Pearl frigate. + Return 10 + Benjamin and Elizabeth 14 + Concord 26 + Fountain 8 + Leopard 20 + Boneto sloop, Baltam^r.[1] + Plymouth, Admiral. + Spragge frigate, Batchelor.[1] + St. Lucar Merchant 20 + Prosperous 30 + Sapphire frigate + Mary and Martha 30 + Delight 9 + Olive Branch 10 + Italian Merchant 30 + Tiger 30 + James galley + Dragon 18 + Samuel and Mary 24 + Mediterranean 16 + James Merchant 20 + King-fisher frigate. +_Starboard side_. Portland frigate. + +In case the enemy be to leeward of us, and force us to fight by the +wind, then I would have each ship in this fleet to follow each other +in a line as afore prescribed, either wing leading the van as the +occasion shall require. + +In case I would have the van to tack first (in time of service) I will +spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and +if I would have the rear of the fleet to tack first I will spread the +union flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, each commander +being [ready] to take notice of the said signals, and to act +accordingly, following each other as prescribed, and be careful to +assist and relieve any that is in necessity. + +In case of separation by foul weather, or by any inevitable accident, +and the wind blows hard westerly, then Zante Road is the place +appointed for rendezvous. + +Given under my hand and on board his majesty's ship Plymouth, at an +anchor in Zante Road. + +This 4th of May, 1678. + +JOHN NARBROUGH. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] Neither Baltimore nor Batchelor nor any similar names of +commissioned officers occur in Pepys's Navy List, 1660-88. Tanner, _op. +cit._ + + + + +III + +THE LAST STUART ORDERS + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The next set of orders we have are those drawn up by George Legge, +first Lord Dartmouth, for the fleet with which he was entrusted by +James II, to prevent the landing of William of Orange in 1688. The +only known copy of them is in the _Sloane MSS._ 3650. It is +unfortunately not complete, the last few articles with the date and +signature being missing, so that there is no direct evidence that it +related to this fleet. There can however be no doubt about the +matter. For it is followed by the battle order of a fleet in which +both ships and captains correspond exactly with that which Dartmouth +commanded in 1688. The only other fleet which he commanded was that +which in 1683 proceeded to the Straits to carry out the evacuation of +Tangier, and it was not large enough to require such a set of +instructions. + +We know moreover that in this year he did actually draw up some +Fighting Instructions, shortly after September 24, the day his +commission was signed, and that he submitted them to King James for +approval. On October 14 Pepys, in the course of a long official letter +to him from the admiralty, writes: 'His majesty, upon a very +deliberate perusal of your two papers, one of the divisions of your +fleet and the other touching your line of battle, does extremely +approve the same, commanding me to tell you so.[1] + +Lord Dartmouth's articles follow those which James had last drawn up +in 1673 almost word for word, and the only alterations of any +importance all refer to the handling of the line in action. There can +be practically no doubt therefore that we here have the instructions +which Pepys refers to, and that the new matter relating to the line of +battle originated with Dartmouth, as the result of a considerable +experience of naval warfare. After leaving Cambridge he joined, at the +age of 17, the ship of his cousin, Sir Edward Spragge, and served with +him as a volunteer and lieutenant throughout the Second Dutch War. In +1667, before he was 20, he commanded the Pembroke, and in 1671 the +Fairfax, in Sir Robert Holmes's action with the Dutch Smyrna fleet, +and in the battle of Solebay. In 1673 he commanded the Royal Catherine +(84), and served throughout Rupert's campaign with distinction. Since +then, as has been said, he had successfully conducted the evacuation +of Tangier. If on this occasion he needed advice he had at hand some +of the best, in the person of his flag officers, Sir Roger Strickland +and Sir John Berry, two of the most seasoned old 'tarpaulins' in the +service, and both in high estimation as naval experts with James. + +The amendments introduced into these instructions, although not +extensive, point to a continued development. We note first that +James's Articles 3 and 4 are combined in Dartmouth's Article 3, so as +to ensure the close-hauled line being formed before any attempt is +made to divide the enemy's fleet. No such provision existed in the +previous instructions. Another noteworthy change under the new article +is that, whether by intention or not, any commander of a ship is given +the initiative in weathering a part of the enemy's fleet if he sees an +opportunity. If this was seriously intended it seems to point to a +reaction to the school of Monck and Rupert, perhaps under Spragge's +influence. Dartmouth's next new article, No. 5, for reforming line of +battle as convenient, regardless of the prescribed order of battle, +points in the same direction. + +The only other change of importance is the note inserted in the sixth +article, in which Dartmouth lays his finger on one of the weak points +in James's method of attack from windward by bearing down all +together, and suggests a means by which the danger of being raked as +the ships come down may be minimised. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] _Dartmouth MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission_, XI. v. 160.) + + + +_LORD DARTMOUTH, Oct._ 1688. + +[+Sloane MSS. 3650, ff. 7-11+.] + +_George, Lord Dartmouth, admiral of his majesty's fleet for the +present expedition_. + +_Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in +fighting_. + + +1 and 2. _[Same as in Duke of York's_, 1673.] + +3. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to +fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall endeavour to +put themselves into one line as close upon a wind as they can lie, +according to the order of battle given, until such time as they shall +see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet, +&c. _[rest as in Article 3 of_ 1673]. + +4. [_Same as_ 5 _of_ 1673.] [1] + +5. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, when other ships +of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a +blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is to +bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. In this +case, whether the line hath been broke or disordered by the shifting +of the wind, or otherwise, each ship or division are not unreasonably +to strive for their proper places in the first line of battle given, +but they are to form a line, the best that may be with the admiral, +and with all the expedition that can be, not regarding what place or +division they fall into or between. + +If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, &c. [_rest as in 6 +of 1673_]. + +6. In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that +the enemy stands towards them and they towards the enemy, then the van +of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come at +a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay until +their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the +enemy's van; and then the whole line is to tack, every ship in his own +place, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can without +endangering the loss of the wind--[Note that they are not to bear down +all at once, but to observe the working of the admiral and to bring to +as often as he thinks fit, the better to bring his fleet to fight in +good order; and at last only to lask away[2] when they come near +within shot towards the enemy as much as may be, and not bringing +their heads to bear against the enemy's broadsides]--and to stand +along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to +leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van. And in case the +enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's +fleet is to tack first with as many ships or divisions as are those of +the enemy's, and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to +follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth. + +7 to 9. [_Same as 8 to 10 of 1673_.] + +10. [_Same as 11 of 1673, but with yellow flag instead of red_.] + +11. When the admiral would have the other divisions to make more +sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the +ensign staff for the vice-admiral, a blue for the rear, and for both a +striped. + +12. As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage or make a +signal by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each +division shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy, +according to such order of battle as shall be given them, and no ship +or division whatsoever is upon any pretence to lie by to fight or +engage the enemy whereby to endanger parting the main body of the +fleet till such time as the whole line be brought to fight by this +signal. + +13 to 18. [_Same as 14 to 19 of 1673_.] + +18. The several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon +pain of severe punishment, that they fire not over any of their own +ships. + +19. [_Same as 20 of 1673_.] + +20. The fireships in their several divisions are to endeavour to keep +the wind, and they with the small frigates to be as near the great +ships as they can, attending the signal and acting accordingly. + +21. [_Same as 22 of 1673_.][3] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Article 4 of 1673 is omitted, being included in Article 3 above. + +[2] To sail with a quartering wind. Morogues urged this precaution a +century later (_Tactique Navale_, p. 209). + +[3] The MS. ends abruptly in the middle of this article. + + + + +PART VII + +WILLIAM III AND ANNE + +I. RUSSELL, 1691 + +II. ROOKE, 1703 + + + +LORD TORRINGTON, TOURVILLE AND HOSTE + +INTRODUCTORY + + +No one document probably possesses so much importance for the history +of naval tactics as the instructions issued by Admiral Russell in +1691. Yet it is a remarkable thing that their tenour was +unknown--indeed their existence was wholly unsuspected--until a copy +of them was happily discovered in Holland by Sir William Laird +Clowes. By him it was presented to the United Service Institution, and +the thanks of the Society are due to him and the Institution that +these instructions are now at last available for publication. + +They form part of a complete printed set of Fleet Instructions, +entitled 'Instructions made by the Right Honourable Edward Russell, +admiral, in the year 1691, for the better ordering of the fleet in +sailing by day and night, and in fighting.' Besides the Fighting +Instructions we have a full set of signals both for day and night +properly indexed, instructions for sailing in a fog, instructions to +be observed by younger captains to the elder, instructions for +masters, pilots, ketches, hoys, and smacks attending the fleet, and +the usual instructions for the encouragement of captains and companies +of fireships, small frigates and ketches. Now this is the precise form +in which all fleet instructions were issued, with scarcely any +alteration, up to the conclusion of the War of American +Independence,[1] and the peculiar importance of this set of articles +therefore is, that in them we have the first known example of those +stereotyped Fighting Instructions to which, as all modern writers seem +agreed, was due the alleged decadence of naval tactics in the +eighteenth century. + +This being so, they clearly demand the most careful +consideration. 'The English,' says Captain Mahan in his latest +discussion of the subject, 'in the period of reaction which succeeded +the Dutch Wars produced their own caricature of systematised +tactics,[2] and this may be taken as well representing the current +judgment. But when we come to study minutely these orders of Russell, +and to study them in the light of the last of the Duke of York's and +the observations thereon in the _Admiralty Manuscript_, as well +as of the views of the great French admirals of the time, we may well +doubt whether the judgment does not require modification. We may +doubt, that is, whether Russell's orders, so far from being a +caricature of what had gone before, were not rather a sagacious +attempt to secure that increase of manoeuvring power and squadronal +control which had been found essential to any real advance in tactics. + +In the first place, after noting that these instructions begin +logically with two articles for the formation of line ahead and +abreast, we are struck by this disappearance of the Duke of York's +article relating to 'dividing the enemy's fleet.' It is certainly to +this disappearance that is mainly due the belief that the new +instructions were retrograde. The somewhat hasty conclusion is +generally drawn that the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' had been +introduced during the Dutch Wars, and forgotten immediately +afterwards. But, as we have already seen, the Duke of York's article +can hardly be construed as embodying the principle of concentration by +'breaking the line,' and 'containing.' As we know, it only applied to +an attack from the leeward which the English, and indeed every power +up to that time, did all they knew to avoid, and it cannot safely be +assumed to mean anything more than a device for gaining the wind of +part of the enemy when you cannot weather his whole fleet; while the +'containing' was intended to prevent the enemy's concentrating on the +squadron that performed the manoeuvre. Now, although Russell's +instructions lay down no rule for isolating and containing, they do +provide three new and distinct articles by which the admiral can do so +if he sees fit. Under the Duke of York's instructions, it will be +remembered, it was left to the van commander to execute the manoeuvre +of dividing the enemy's fleet as he saw his opportunity, and under +those of Lord Dartmouth it was left apparently to 'any commander.' +With all that can be said for leaving the greatest possible amount of +initiative to individual officers, such a system can hardly be called +satisfactory, and in any case so important a movement ought certainly +to be as far as possible under the control of the commander-in-chief. +But under the previous instructions he could not even initiate it by +signal. The defect had already been seen, and it will be remembered +that the additions and observations to this and the following articles +which the _Admiralty Manuscript_ contains are all directed to +remedying the omission. It is to exactly the same end that Russell's +orders seem designed, and if, as we shall see to be most probable, +they were really drawn up by Lord Torrington, we know that they were +used in this way at Beachy Head. Whether the idea of concentration and +containing was in the mind of their author we cannot tell for certain, +but at any rate the new instructions provide signals by which the +admiral can order such movements not only by any squadron, but even by +any subdivision he pleases. The freedom of individual initiative it is +true is gone, but this, as the _Admiralty MS_. indicates, was +done deliberately, not as a piece of reactionary pedantry, but as the +result of experience in battle. In all other respects the tactical +flexibility that was gained is obvious, and was fully displayed in the +first engagements in which the instructions were used. + +So far as we can judge, the current view at this time was that where +fleets were equal, every known form of concentration was unadvisable +upon an unshaken enemy. The methods of the Duke of York's school were +regarded as having failed, and the result appears to have been to +convince tacticians that with the means at their disposal a strict +preservation of the line gave a sure advantage against an enemy who +attempted an attack by concentration. Tactics, in fact, in accordance +with a sound and inevitable law, having tended to become too +recklessly offensive, were exhibiting a reaction to the defensive. If +the enemy had succeeded in forming his line, it had come to be +regarded as too hazardous to attempt to divide his fleet unless you +had first forced a gap by driving ships out of the line. This idea we +see reflected in the 6th paragraph of the Duke of York's twenty-second +article (1673) and in Russell's new twenty-third article, enjoining +ships to close up any gap that may have been caused by the next ahead +or astern having been forced out of the line. Briefly stated, it may +be said that the preoccupation of naval tactics was now not so much to +break the enemy's line, as to prevent your own being broken. + +But the matter did not end here. It was seen that when your own fleet +was superior, concentration was still practicable in various ways, and +particularly by doubling. Tacticians were now mainly absorbed in +working out this form of attack and the methods of meeting it, and +Russell's elaborate articles for handling squadrons and subdivisions +independently may well have had this intention. + +The new phase of tactical opinion is that which we find expounded in +Père Hoste's famous work, _L' Art des armées navales, ou +Traité des évolutions navales_, published in 1697 at the +instigation of the Comte de Tourville. The author was a Jesuit, but +claims that he is merely giving the result of his experience while +serving with the great French admirals of that time, who had learned +all they knew either as allies or enemies of the English. 'For twelve +years,' he says in his apology for touching naval subjects, 'I have +had the honour of serving with Monsieur le Maréchal d'Estrées, +Monsieur le Duc de Mortemart, and Monsieur le Maréchal de Tourville +in all the expeditions they made in command of naval fleets; and +Monsieur le Maréchal de Tourville has been kind enough to +communicate to me his lights, bidding me write on a matter which I +think has never before been the subject of a treatise.' + +The whole system of tactics that he develops is based, like Russell's, +on the single line ahead and the independent action of squadrons. The +passages in which he elaborates the central battle idea of +concentration by doubling are as follows: 'The fleet which is the more +numerous will try to extend on the enemy in such a manner as to leave +its rearmost ships astern, which will immediately turn [_se +repliera_] upon the enemy to double him, and put him between two +fires. _Remark I_.--If the more numerous fleet has the wind it +will be able more easily to turn its rear upon that of the enemy, and +put him between two fires. But if the more numerous fleet is to +leeward it ought none the less to leave its rear astern, because the +wind may shift in the fight. Besides, the fleet that is to leeward can +edge away insensibly in fighting to give its rearmost ships a chance +of doubling on the enemy by hugging the wind. _Remark II_.--I +know that many skilful people are persuaded that you ought to double +the enemy ahead; because, if the van of the enemy is once in disorder +it falls on the rest of the fleet and throws it infallibly into +confusion.' And by the aid of diagrams he proceeds to show that this +view is unsound, because the van can easily avoid the danger while the +rear cannot. To support his view he instances the entire success with +which at the battle of La Hogue, Russell, having the superior fleet, +doubled on Tourville's rear. + +'To prevent being doubled,' he proceeds, 'you must absolutely prevent +the enemy from leaving ships astern of you, and to that end you may +adopt several devices when you are much inferior in number. + +'I. If we have the wind we may leave some of the enemy's leading ships +alone, and cause our van to fall on their second division. In this +manner their first division will be practically useless, and if it +forces sail to tack upon us it will lose much time, and will put +itself in danger of being isolated by the calm which generally befalls +in this sort of action by reason of the great noise of the guns. We +may also leave a great gap in the centre of our fleet, provided the +necessary precautions be taken to prevent our van being cut off. By +these means, however inferior we be in numbers, we may prevent the +enemy leaving ships astern of us. _Example_.--Everyone did not +disapprove the manner in which Admiral Herbert disposed his fleet when +he engaged the French in the action of Bevesier [_i.e._ Beachy +Head] in the year 1690. He had some ships fewer than ours, and he had +determined to make his chief effort against our rear. That is why he +ordered the Dutch leading division to fall on our second division. +Then he opened his fleet in the centre, leaving a great gap opposite +our centre. After which, having closed up the English to very short +intervals, he opposed them to our rear, and held off somewhat with his +own division so as to prevent the French profiting by the gap which he +had left in his fleet to double the Dutch. This order rendered our +first division nearly useless, because it had to make a very long +board to tack on the enemy's van, and the wind having fallen, it was +put to it to be in time to share the glory of the action.[3] + +'II. If the less numerous fleet is to leeward, the gap may be left +more in the centre and less in the van, but it is necessary to have a +small detachment of men-of-war and fireships so as to prevent the +enemy profiting by the gaps in the fleet to divide it. + +'III. Others prefer to give as a general rule, that the flag officers +of the less numerous fleet attack the flag officers of the enemy's +fleet;[4] for by this means several of the enemy's ships remain +useless in the intervals, and the enemy cannot double you. + +'IV. Others prefer that the three squadrons of the less numerous fleet +each attack a squadron of the more numerous fleet, taking care that +each squadron ranges up to the enemy in such a manner as not to leave +any of his ships astern, but rather leaving several vessels ahead. + +'V. Finally, there are those who would have the less numerous fleet +put so great an interval between the ships as to equalise their line +with that of the enemy. But this last method is, without doubt, the +least good, because it permits the enemy to employ the whole of its +strength against the less numerous fleet. I agree, however, that this +method might be preferred to others in certain circumstances; as when +the enemy's ships are considerably less powerful than those of the +less numerous fleet.' + +Having thus explained the system of doubling, he proceeds to give the +latest ideas of his chief on breaking the enemy's line, or, as it was +then called, passing through his fleet. 'We find,' he says, 'that in +the relations of the fights in the Channel between the English and the +Dutch that their fleets passed through one another.... In this manner +the two fleets passed through one another several times, which exposed +them to be cut off, taken, and mutually to lose several +ships. _Remark_.--This manoeuvre is as bold as it is delicate, +and consummate technical skill is necessary for it to succeed as +happily as it did with the Comte d'Estrées ... in the battle of the +Texel, in the year 1673, for he passed through the Zealand squadron, +weathered it, broke it up, and put the enemy into so great a disorder +that it settled the victory which was still in the balance.'[5] + +After pointing out by diagrams various methods of parrying the +manoeuvre, he proceeds: 'I do not see, then, that we need greatly fear +the enemy's passing through us; and I do not even think that this +manoeuvre ought ever to be performed except under one of the three +following conditions: (1) If you are compelled to do it in order to +avoid a greater evil; (2) If the enemy by leaving a great gap in the +midst of his squadrons renders a part of his fleet useless; (3) If +several of his ships are disabled.... + +'Sometimes you are compelled to pass through the enemy's fleet to +rescue ships that the enemy has cut off, and in this case you must +risk something, but you should observe several precautions: (1) You +should close up to the utmost; (2) You should carry a press of sail +without troubling to fight in passing through the enemy; (3) The ships +that have passed ought to tack the moment they can to prevent the +enemy standing off on the same tack as the fleet that passes through +them.' + +It is clear, then, that in the eyes of perhaps the finest fleet leader +of his time, and one of the finest France ever had, a man who +thoroughly understood the value of concentration, the method of +securing it by breaking the line was dangerous and unsound. In this +he thoroughly endorses the views contained in the 'Observations' of +the _Admiralty MS._ and the modifications of the standing order +which they suggest. Indeed, Hoste's remarks on breaking the line are, +in effect, little more than a logical elaboration of those ideas and +suggestions. In the 'Observations' we have the monition not to attempt +the manoeuvre 'unless an enemy press you on a lee shore.' We have the +signal for a squadron breaking the enemy's line, but only in order to +rejoin the main body, and we have the simple method of parrying the +move by tacking with an equal number of ships. The fundamental +principles of the problem in both the English and the French author +are the same, and a comparison of the two enables us to assert, with +no hesitation, that the manoeuvre of breaking the line was abandoned +by the tacticians of that era, not from ignorance nor from lack of +enterprise, but from a deliberate tactical conviction gained by +experience in war. In judging the apparent want of enterprise which +our own admirals began to display in action at this time, we should +probably be careful to refrain from joining in the unmitigated +contempt with which modern historians have so freely covered them. In +the typical battle of Malaga, for instance, Rooke did nothing but +carry out the principles which were the last word of Tourville's +brilliant career. Nor must it be forgotten that, although Rodney +executed the manoeuvre in 1782, and Hood provided a signal for its +revival which Howe at first adopted, it was never in much favour in +the British service, seeing that it was only adapted for an attack +from to leeward. The manoeuvre of breaking the line which Howe +eventually introduced was something wholly different both in form and +intention from what Rodney executed and from what was understood by +'dividing the fleet' in the seventeenth century.[6] How far the +system of doubling was approved by English admirals is doubtful. We +have seen that an 'Observation' in the _Admiralty Manuscript_ +distrusts it,[7] but I have been able to find no other expression of +opinion on the point earlier than 1780, and that entirely condemns +it. It occurs in a set of fleet instructions drawn up for submission +to the admiralty by Admiral Sir Charles H. Knowles, Bart. As Knowles +was a pupil and _protégé_ of Rodney's, we may assume he was +in possession of the great tactician's ideas on the point; and in +these _Fighting and Sailing Instructions_ the following, article +occurs: 'To double the enemy's line--that is, to send a few unengaged +ships on one side to engage, while the rest are fighting on the +other--is rendering those ships useless. Every ship which is between +two, has not only her two broadsides opposed to theirs, but has +likewise their shot which cross in her favour.'[8] No signal was +provided for 'doubling' in Lord Howe's or the later signal books, +though Nelson certainly executed the manoeuvre at the Nile. It +survived however in the French service, and the English books provided +a signal for preventing its execution by a numerically superior +enemy. Sir Alexander Cochrane also revived it after Trafalgar. + +Knowles's objection to the manoeuvre makes it easy to understand that, +however well it suited the French tactics of long bowls or boarding, +it was not well adapted to the English method of close action with the +guns. With the French service it certainly continued in favour, and +the whole of Hoste's rules were reproduced by the famous naval expert +Sébastien-Francois Bigot, Vicomte de Morogues--in his elaborate +_Tactique navale, ou traits des évolutions et des signaux_, +which appeared in 1763, and was republished at Amsterdam in 1779. Not +only was he the highest French authority on naval science of his time, +but a fine seaman as well, as he proved when in command of the +_Magnifique_ on the disastrous day at Quiberon.[9] + +The remainder of the new instructions, though less important than the +expansion of the Duke of York's third article, all tend in the same +direction. So far from insisting on a rigid observance of the single +line ahead in all circumstances, the new system seems to aim at +securing flexibility, and the power of concentration by independent +action of squadrons. This is to be specially noted in the new +article, No. 30, in which signals are provided for particular +squadrons and particular divisions forming line of battle abreast. It +is true that the old rigid form of an attack from windward is +retained, but, ineffective as the system proved, it was certainly not +inspired, as is so often said, by a mediæval conception of naval +battle as a series of single ship actions. From what has been already +said, the well-considered tactical idea that underlay it is +obvious. The injunction to range the length of the enemy's line van to +van, and rear to rear, or _vice versa_, was aimed at avoiding +being doubled at either end of the line; while the injunction to bear +down together was obviously the quickest mode of bringing the whole +fleet into action without giving the enemy a chance of weathering any +part of it by 'gaining its wake.' That it was inadequate for this +purpose is well known. It would only work when the two fleets were +exactly parallel at the moment of bearing down--as was made apparent +at the battle of Malaga, where the French from leeward almost +succeeded in dividing Rooke's fleet as it bore down. Still the idea +was sound enough. The trouble was that it did not make sufficient +allowance for the unhandiness of ships of the line in those days, and +their difficulty in taking up or preserving exact formations. + +As to the authorship of the articles, it must be remembered that the +mere fact that they were issued by Russell is not enough to attribute +them to him. He had had practically no previous experience as a flag +officer, and in all probability they followed more or less closely +those used by Lord Torrington in the previous year. Torrington was +first lord of the admiralty in 1689, and commander-in-chief of the +main fleet in 1690. It was not till after his acquittal in December of +that year that he was superseded by Russell. The instructions moreover +seem generally to be designed in close accordance with all we know of +Torrington's tactical practice, and it is scarcely doubtful that they +are due to his ripe experience and not to Russell. + +That the point cannot be settled with absolute certainty is to be the +more lamented because henceforth this set of Fighting Instructions, +and not those of Rooke in 1703, must be taken as the dominating factor +of eighteenth-century tactics. Rooke's instructions, except for the +modification of a few articles, are the same as Russell's, and +consequently it has not been thought necessary to print them in +full. For a similar reason it has been found convenient to print such +slight changes as are known to have been made in the standing form +after 1703 as notes to the corresponding articles of Russell's +instructions. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] See Introductory Note to Rooke's Instructions of 1703, p. 197. + +[2] _Types of Naval Officers_, p. 15. + +[3] This plan of attack bears a strong resemblance to that which +Nelson intended to adopt at Trafalgar. 'Nelson,' says Captain Mahan, +'doubtless had in mind the dispositions of Tourville and De +Ruyter.'--_Life of Nelson_, ii. 351. Hoste, however, it would seem, +though a devout admirer of both Tourville and De Ruyter, gives the +credit to Lord Torrington. It was not introduced officially into the +British tactical system until Lord Howe adopted it in 1792. It was +retained in the subsequent Signal Books and Instructions. + +[4] This proviso was added to the signal in the edition of 1799, and a +corresponding explanatory instruction (No. 24) was provided. See _post_, +p. 262. + +[5] It should be remembered that neither the Dutch nor the English +accounts of the action at all endorse this view of D'Estrées's +behaviour. See also the _Admiralty MS._, p. 153, note 1. + +[6] See _post_, pp. 245-9. + +[7] _Ante_, p.152, note 1. + +[8] Printed in 1798. A MS. note says 'These instructions were written +in 1780 and afterwards very much curtailed, though the general plan is +the same.' + +[9] Lacour Gayet, _La marine militaire de la France sous Louis_ XV, +1902, pp. 214-5. + + + +_ADMIRAL EDWARD RUSSELL_, 1691. + +[+From a printed copy in the Library of the United Service +Institution+.] + +_Fighting Instructions_. + + +I. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, +one ship ahead of another (according to the method given to each +captain), he will hoist a union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a +gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.[1] + +II. When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, +one ship abreast of another (according to the method given to each +captain), he will hoist a union flag and a pennant at the mizen-peak, +and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same. + +III. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his +whole squadron to tack, and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, +he will spread a white flag under the flag at the main top-mast-head, +and fire a gun, which is to be answered by the flagships in the fleet; +and when he would have the admiral of the blue do the same, he will +spread a blue flag on that place. + +IV. When the admiral would have the vice-admiral of the red, and his +division, tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will +spread a red flag from the cap at the fore topmast-head downward on +the backstay. If he would have the vice-admiral of the white do the +same, a white flag; if the vice-admiral of the blue, a blue flag at +the same place. + +V. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the red and his +division tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will +hoist a red flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head; if the +rear-admiral of the white, a white flag; if the rear-admiral of the +blue, a blue flag at the same place, and under the flag a pennant of +the same colour. + +VI. If the admiral be to leeward of the fleet, or any part of the +fleet, and he would have them bear down into his wake or grain, he +will hoist a blue flag at the mizen peak. + +VII. If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet, or any +part of them, to leeward of him, that he may bring those ships into a +line, he will bear up with a blue flag at the mizen peak under the +union flag, which is the signal for the line of battle; and then those +ships to leeward are to use their utmost endeavour to get into his +wake or grain, according to their stations in the line of battle. + +VIII. If the fleet be sailing before the wind, and the admiral would +have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap +by the wind, and come to the starboard tack, then he will hoist upon +the mizen topmast-head a red flag. And in case he would have the +rear-admiral and the ships of the larboard quarter to come to their +larboard tack, then he will hoist up a blue flag at the same place. + +IX. When the admiral would have the van of the fleet to tack first, +he will put abroad the union flag at the flagstaff on the fore +topmast-head, and fire a gun, if the red flag be not abroad; but if +the red flag be abroad, then the fore topsails shall be lowered a +little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore +topmast downwards, and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same. + +X. When the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the fleet tack +first, he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff at the mizen +topmast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by every +flagship in the fleet. + +XI. When the admiral would have all the flagships in the fleet come +into his wake or grain, he will hoist a red flag at the mizen peak, +and fire a gun; and the flagships in the fleet are to make the same +signal. + +XII. When the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his +squadron make more sail, though himself shorten sail, he will hoist a +white flag on the ensign staff; if the admiral of the blue, or he that +commands in the third post, a blue flag at the same place; and every +flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal. + +XIII. As soon as the admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstaff +at the fore topmast-head, every ship in the fleet is to use their +utmost endeavour to engage the enemy, in the order the admiral has +prescribed unto them.[2] + +XIV. When the admiral hoisteth a white flag at the mizen peak, then +all the small frigates of his squadron that are not in the line of +battle are to come under his stern. + +XV. If the fleet is sailing by a wind in a line of battle, and the +admiral would have them brace their headsails to the mast, he will +hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and +fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the +ships in the rear are to brace to first. + +XVI. The fleet lying in a line of battle, with their headsails to the +mast, and if the admiral would have them fill and stand on, he will +hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and +fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. Then the +ships in the van are to fill first, and to stand on. If it happen, +when this signal is to be made, that the red flag is abroad on the +flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, the admiral will spread the yellow +flag under the red. + +XVII. If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him, and +he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is make sail till they +come the length of the enemy's rear, and our rear abreast of the +enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack +first, and every ship one after another, as fast as they can, +throughout the line, that they may engage on the same tack with the +enemy. But in case the enemy's fleet should tack in their rear, our +fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships; and whilst they +are in fight with the enemy, to keep within half a cable's length one +of another, or if the weather be bad, according to the direction of +the commanders. + +When the admiral would have the ship that leads the van of the fleet +(or the headmost ship in the fleet) when they are in a line of battle, +hoist, lower, set or haul up any of his sails, the admiral will spread +a yellow flag under that at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun; +which the flagships that have flags at the main topmast-head are to +answer; and those flagships that have not, are to hoist the yellow +flag on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. Then +the admiral will hoist, lower, set or haul up the sail he would have +the ship that leads the van do. + +XVIII. If the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and +they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the +admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's and there to +engage them. + +XIX. Every commander is to take care that his guns are not fired till +he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a point-blank; and by no means +to suffer his guns to be fired over by any of our own ships. + +XX. None of the ships in the fleet shall pursue any small number of +the enemy's ships till the main body be disabled or run. + +XXI. If any of the ships in the fleet are in distress, and make the +signal, which is a weft with the jack or ensign, the next ship to them +is strictly required to relieve them. + +XXII. If the admiral, or any flagship, should be in distress, and +make the usual signal, the ships in the fleet are to endeavour to get +up as close into a line, between him and the enemy, as they can; +having always an eye to defend him, if the enemy should come to annoy +him in that condition. + +XXIII. In case any ship in the fleet should be forced to go out of +the line to repair damages she has received in battle the next ships +are to close up the line. + +XXIV. If any flagship be disabled, the flag may go on board any ship +of his own squadron or division. + +XXV. If the enemy be put to the run, and the admiral thinks it +convenient the whole fleet shall follow them, he will make all the +sail he can himself after the enemy, and fire two guns out of his +fore-chase; then every ship in the fleet is to use his best endeavour +to come up with the enemy, and lay them on board. + +XXVI. If the admiral would have any particular flagship, and his +squadron, or division, give chase to the enemy, he will make the same +signal that is appointed for that flagship's tacking with his squadron +or division, and weathering the enemy. + +XXVII. When the admiral would have them give over chase, he will +hoist a white flag at the fore topmast-head and fire a gun. + +XXVIII. In case any ship in the line of battle should be disabled in +her masts, rigging or hull, the ship that leads ahead of her shall +take her a-tow and the division she is in shall make good the line +with her. But the commander of the ship so disabled is not on any +pretence whatever to leave his station till he has acquainted his flag +or the next flag officer with the condition of his ship, and received +his directions therein. And in case any commander shall be wanting in +his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to +send for the said commander from his ship and appoint another in his +room. + +XXIX. If the admiral would have any flag in his division or squadron +cut or slip in the daytime, he will make the same signals that are +appointed for those flagships, and their division or squadron, to tack +and weather the enemy, as is expressed in the third, fourth, fifth, +and sixth articles before going. + +XXX. When the admiral would have the red squadron draw into a line of +battle, abreast of one another, he will put abroad a flag striped red +and white on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, with a pennant +under it, and fire a gun. If he would have the white squadron, or +those that have the second post in the fleet, to do the like, the +signal shall be a flag striped red, white, and blue, with a pennant +under it, at the aforesaid place. And if he would have the blue +squadron to do the like he will put on the said place a Genoese +ensign, together with a pennant. But when he would have either of the +said squadrons to draw into a line of battle, ahead of one another, he +will make the aforesaid signals, without a pennant; which signals are +to be answered by the flagships only of the said squadrons, and to be +kept out till I take in mine. And if the admiral would have any +vice-admiral of the fleet and his division draw into a line of battle +as aforesaid, he will make the same signals at the fore topmast-head +that he makes for that squadron at the main topmast-head. And for any +rear-admiral in the fleet and his division, the same signals at the +mizen topmast-head; which signals are to be answered by the vice- or +rear-admiral. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The instructions under which Mathews fought his action off Toulon +in 1744 add here the words 'and every ship is to observe and keep the +same distance those ships do which are next the admiral, always taking +it from the centre.' They were a MS. addition made by Mathews himself. +See 'V. A----l L----k's Rejoinder to A----l M----ws's Replies' in a +pamphlet entitled _Original Letters and Papers between Adm----l M----ws +and V. Adm----l L----k_. London, 1744, p. 31. From an undated copy of +Fighting Instructions in the Admiralty Library we know that this +addition was subsequently incorporated into the standing form. + +[2] The instructions of 1744, as quoted in the Mathews-Lestock +controversy, add here the words 'and strictly to take care not to fire +before the signal be given by the admiral.' This appears also to have +been an addition made by Mathews in 1744. It was clumsily incorporated +in the subsequent standing form thus: 'to engage the enemy and on no +account to fire before the admiral shall make the signal, in the order +the admiral has prescribed unto them.' See note to Article I., _supra._ + + + +THE PERMANENT INSTRUCTIONS, 1703-1783 + +INTRODUCTORY + + +These like Russell's are extracted from a complete printed set, also +presented to the United Service Institution by Sir W. Laird Clowes, +and entitled, 'Instructions for the directing and governing her +majesty's fleet in sailing and fighting, by the Right Honourable Sir +George Rooke, Knight, Vice-Admiral of England, and admiral and +commander-in-chief of her majesty's fleet. In the year 1703.' They +also contain all the other matter as in Russell's, while another copy +has bound with it all the fleet articles of war under the hand of +Prince George of Denmark, then lord high admiral. + +As they were not issued till 1703, the second year of the war, in +which Rooke did nothing but carry out a barren cruise in the Bay of +Biscay, we may assume that the Cadiz expedition of 1702 proceeded +under Russell's old instructions of the previous war. It was under +Rooke's new instructions, however, that the battle of Malaga was +fought in 1704. They were certainly in force in 1705, for a copy of +them exists in the log book of the Britannia for that year (_British +Museum, Add. MSS_. 28126, ff. 21-27). They were also used by Sir +Clowdisley Shovell during his last command; as we know by a printed +copy with certain manuscript additions of his own, relating to chasing +and armed boats, which he issued to his junior flag officer, Sir John +Norris, in the Mediterranean, on April 25, 1707 (_British Museum, +Add. MSS._ 28140). Nor is there any trace of their having been +changed during the remainder of the war. At the battle of Malaga they +were very strictly observed, and in the opinion of the time with an +entirely satisfactory result; that is to say that, although Rooke's +ships were foul and very short of ammunition, he was able to prevent +Toulouse breaking his line and so to fight a defensive action, which +saved Gibraltar from recapture, and discredited the French navy to +such an extent that thenceforth it was entirely neglected by Louis +XIV's government, and gave little more trouble to our fleets. + +Though no copy of these Fighting Instructions has been found with a +later date than 1707, we know that with very slight modifications they +continued in use down to the peace of 1783. The evidence is to be +found scattered in proceedings of courts-martial, in chance references +in admirals despatches, and in signal books. For instance, in the +'Mathews and Lestock Tracts' _(British Museum_, 518, g), which +deal with the courts-martial that followed the ill-fought action off +Toulon in 1744, eight of the articles then in force are printed. All +of them have the same numbering as the corresponding articles of 1703, +six are identical in wording, and two, Numbers I. and XIII., have only +the slight modifications which Admiral Mathews made, and which have +been given above in notes to the similar articles in Russell's +set. These modifications, as we have seen, were subsequently +incorporated into the standing form, and appear in the undated copy of +the complete Fighting Instructions in the Admiralty Library. Again, +Article XIV. of 1703 is referred to in the Additional Fighting +Instructions issued by Boscawen in 1759.[1] According to a MS. note +by Sir C.H. Knowles they were re-issued in 1772 and 1778, and Keppel +in 1778 was charged under Article XXXI. of 1703. Finally, there is in +the Admiralty Library a manuscript signal book prepared by an officer, +who was present at Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782. In this +book, in which 1783 is the last date mentioned, there is inserted +beside each signal the number of the article in the printed Fighting +Instructions to which it related. In this way we are able to fix the +purport of some twenty articles, and all of these correspond exactly +both in intention and number with those of 1703. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] See below, p. 224. + + + +_SIR GEORGE ROOKE_, 1703. + +[+From a printed copy in the Library of the United Service +Institution+.] + + +Articles I. to XVI.--[_The same as Russell's of_ 1691, _except +for slight modifications of wording and signals_.][1] + +Art. XVII.--If the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him +and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is to make sail till +they come the length of the enemy's rear and our rear abreast of the +enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack +first, every ship one after another as fast as they can, throughout +the line. And if the admiral would have the whole fleet tack +together, the sooner to put them in a posture of engaging the enemy, +then he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff's[2] at the fore +and mizen mast-heads and fire a gun; and all the flagships in the +fleet are to do the same. But in case the enemy's fleet should tack in +their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships, +and whilst they are in fight with the enemy to keep within half a +cable's length one of another, or if the weather be bad, according to +the direction of the commander. + +Art. XVIII.--[_Same as the remainder of Russell's XVII_.] When +the admiral would have the ship that leads the van ... by the +flagships of the fleet. + +Arts. XIX. to XXIII.--[_Same as Russell's XVIII. to XXII_.] + +Art. XXIV.--[_Replacing Russell's XXIII. and XXVIII_.] No ship in +the fleet shall leave his station upon any pretence whatsoever till he +has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer to him with the +condition of his ship and received his direction herein. But in case +any ship shall do so, the next ships are to close up the line.[3] +And if any commander shall be wanting in doing his duty, his flag or +the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said, +commander from his ship and appoint another in his room.[4] + +Arts. XXV. to XXVII., XXIX. and XXX.--[_Same as Russell's_.] + +Art. XXXI.--When the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of +battle one astern of the other with a large wind, and if he would have +those lead who are to lead with their starboard tacks aboard by a +wind, he will hoist a red and white flag at the mizen peak and fire a +gun; and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their +larboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a Genoese flag at the +same place and fire a gun; which is to be answered by the flagships of +the fleet. + +Art. XXXII.--When the fleet is in the line of battle, the signals that +are made by the admiral for any squadron or particular division are to +be repeated by all the flags that are between the admiral and that +squadron or division to whom the signal is made. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The modifications consist mainly in adding a gun to several of the +flag signals, and enjoining the flagships to repeat them. + +[2] The undated admiralty copy (_post_ 1744) has 'flagstaves.' + +[3] This manoeuvre was finely executed by Sir Clowdisley Shovell with +the van squadron at the battle of Malaga. + +[4] Burchett, the secretary of the navy, in his _Naval History_ +censures Benbow for not having acted on this instruction in 1702 or +rather on No. 28 of 1691. + + + + +PART VIII + +ADDITIONAL FIGHTING INSTRUCTIONS OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY + +I. ADMIRAL VERNON, _circa_ 1740 + +II. LORD ANSON, _circa_ 1747 + +III. SIR EDWARD HAWKE, 1756 + +IV. ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN, 1759 + +V. SIR GEORGE RODNEY, 1782 + +VI. LORD HOOD, 1783 + + + +ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF THE ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS + +INTRODUCTORY + + +Although, as we have seen, the 'Fighting Instructions' of 1691 +continued in force with no material alteration till the end of the +next century, it must not be assumed that no advance in tactics was +made. From time to time important changes were introduced, but instead +of a fresh set of 'Fighting Instructions' being drawn up according to +the earlier practice, the new ideas were embodied in what were called +'Additional Fighting Instructions.' They did not supersede the old +standing form, but were intended to be read with and be subsidiary to +it. It is to these 'Additional Instructions,' therefore, that we have +to look for the progress of tactics during the eighteenth century. By +one of those strange chances, however, which are the despair of +historians in almost every branch and period of their subject, these +Additional Instructions have almost entirely disappeared. Although it +is known in the usual way--that is, from chance references in +despatches and at courts-martial--that many such sets of Additional +Instructions were issued, only one complete set actually in force is +known to exist. They are those signed by Admiral Boscawen on April +27, 1759, in Gibraltar Bay, and are printed below. + +After his capture of Louisbourg in the previous year, Boscawen had +been chosen for the command of the Mediterranean fleet, charged with +the important duty of preventing the Toulon squadron getting round to +Brest, and so effecting the concentration which the French had planned +as the essential feature of their desperate plan of invasion. He +sailed with the reinforcement he was taking out on April 14, and must +therefore have issued these orders so soon as he reached his +station. There is every reason to believe, however, that he was not +their author; that they were, in fact, a common form which had been +settled by Lord Anson at the admiralty. In the shape in which they +have come down to us they are a set of eighteen printed articles, to +which have been added in manuscript two comparatively unimportant +articles relating to captured chases and the call for lieutenants. +These may have been either mere 'expeditional' orders, as they were +called, issued by Boscawen in virtue of his general authority as +commander-in-chief on the station, or possibly recent official +additions. More probably they were Boscawen's own, for, strictly +speaking, they should not appear as 'Additional Fighting Instructions' +at all. From the series of signal books and other sources we know +there already existed a special set of 'Chasing Instructions,' and yet +another set in which officers' calls and the like were dealt with, and +both of Boscawen's articles were subsequently incorporated into these +sets. The printed articles to which Boscawen attached them were +certainly not new. Either wholly or in part they had been used by Byng +in 1756, for at his court-martial he referred to the 'First article of +the Additional Fighting Instructions as given to the fleet by me at +the beginning of the expedition,' and this article is identical with +No. 1 of Boscawen's set. + +How much older the articles were, or, indeed, whether any were issued +before the Seven Years' War, has never yet been determined. From the +illogical order in which they succeed one another it would appear that +they were the result of a gradual development, during which one or +more orders were added from time to time by the incorporation of +'expeditional' orders of various admirals, as experience suggested +their desirability. Thus Article I. provides, in the case of the +enemy being inferior in number, for our superfluous ships to fall out +of the line and form a reserve, but it is not till Article VIII. that +we have a scientific rule laid down for the method in which the +reserve is to employ itself. Still, whatever may have been the exact +process by which these Additional Instructions grew up, evidence is in +existence which enables us to trace the system to its source with +exactitude, and there is no room for doubt that it originated in +certain expeditional orders issued by Admiral Vernon when he was in +command of the expedition against the Spanish Main in 1739-40. Amongst +the 'Mathews and Lestock' pamphlets is one sometimes attributed to +Lestock himself, but perhaps more probably inspired by him. It is +dedicated to the first lord of the admiralty, and entitled _A +Narrative of the Proceedings of his majesty's fleet in the +Mediterranean_, 1741-4, including, amongst other matter relating to +Mathews's action, 'some signals greatly wanted on the late occasion.' +At p. 108 are some 'Additional signals made use of by our fleet in the +West Indies,' meaning that of Admiral Vernon, which Lestock had +recently left. These signals relate to sailing directions by day and +by night, to 'seeing ships in the night' and to 'engaging an enemy in +the night,' and immediately following them are two 'Additional +Instructions to be added to the Fighting Instructions.' The inference +is that these two 'Additional Instructions' were something quite new +and local, since they were used by Vernon and not by Mathews. They are +given below, and will be found to correspond closely to Articles +I. and III. of the set used by Boscawen in the next war. Since, +therefore, in all the literature and proceedings relating to Mathews +and Lestock there is no reference to any 'Additional Instructions,' we +may conclude with fair safety that these two articles used by Vernon +in the West Indies were the origin and germ of the new system. + +Nor is it a mere matter of inference only, for it is confirmed by a +direct statement by the author of the pamphlet. At p. 74 he has this +interesting passage which practically clears up the history of the +whole matter. 'Men in the highest stations at sea will not deny but +what our sailing and fighting instructions might be amended, and many +added to them, which by every day's experience are found to be +absolutely necessary. Though this truth is universally acknowledged +and the necessity of the royal navy very urgent, yet since the +institution of these signals nothing has been added to them excepting +the chasing signals, excellent in their kind, by the Right Honourable +Sir J---- N----.[1] Not but that every admiral has authority to make +any additions or give such signals to the captains under his command +as he shall judge proper, which are only expeditional. Upon many +emergencies our signals at this juncture [_i.e._ in the action +before Toulon] proved to be very barren. There was no such signal in +the book, expressing an order when the admiral would have the ships to +come to a closer engagement than when they begun. After what has been +observed, it is unnecessary now to repeat the great necessity and +occasion there was for it; and boats in many cases, besides their +delay and hindrance, could not always perform that duty. + +'Mr. V[ernon], that provident, great admiral, who never suffered any +useful precaution to escape him, concerted some signals for so good a +purpose, wisely foreseeing their use and necessity, giving them to the +captains of the squadron under his command. And lest his vigilance +should be some time or other surprised by an enemy, or the exigencies +of his master's service should require him to attack or repulse by +night, he appointed signals for the line of battle, engaging, chasing, +leaving off chase, with many others altogether new, excellent and +serviceable, which show his judgment, abilities, and zeal. The author +takes the liberty to print them for the improvement of his brethren, +who, if they take the pains to peruse them, will receive benefit and +instruction.' + +Here, then, we have indisputable evidence that the system which gave +elasticity to the old rigid Fighting Instructions began with Admiral +Vernon, who as a naval reformer is now only remembered as the inventor +of grog. The high reputation he justly held as a seaman and commander +amongst his contemporaries has long been buried under his undeserved +failure at Cartagena; but trained in the flagships of Rooke and +Shovell, and afterwards as a captain under Sir John Norris in the +Baltic, there was no one till the day of his death in 1757, at the age +of 73, who held so high a place as a naval authority, and from no one +was a pregnant tactical reform more likely to come. The Lestock +pamphlet, moreover, makes it clear that through all the time of his +service--the dead time of tactics as we regard it now--tacticians so +far from slumbering had been striving to release themselves from the +bonds in which the old instructions tied them. + +This is confirmed by two manuscript authorities which have fortunately +survived, and which give us a clear insight into the new system as it +was actually set on foot. The first is a MS. copy of some Additional +Instructions in the Admiralty Library. They are less full and clearly +earlier than those used by Boscawen in 1759, and are bound up with a +printed copy of the regular Fighting Instructions already referred to, +which contain in manuscript the additions made by Mathews during his +Mediterranean command.[2] In so far as they differ from Boscawen's +they will be found below as notes to his set. + +The second is a highly interesting MS. copy of a signal book dated +1756, in which the above instructions are referred to. It is in the +United Service Institution (_Register No._ 234). At the end it +contains a memorandum of a new article by which Hawke modified the +established method of attack, and for the first time introduced the +principle of each ship steering for her opposite in the enemy's +line. It is printed below, and as will be seen was to be substituted +for 'Articles V. and VI. of the Additional Fighting Instructions by +Day' then in force, which correspond to Articles XV. and XVI. of +Boscawen's set. It does not appear in the Boscawen set, and how soon +it was regularly incorporated we do not know. No reference has been +found to it till that by Rodney, in his despatch of April 1780 +referred to below. + +Of even higher interest for our purpose is another entry in the same +place of an article also issued by Hawke for forming 'line of +bearing.' Here again the older form of the Additional Fighting +Instructions is referred to, and the new article is to be inserted +after Article IV., which was for forming the line ahead or +abreast. The important point however is that the new article is +expressly attributed to Lord Anson. Now it is known that when Anson in +April 1747 was cruising off Finisterre for De la Jonquière he kept +his fleet continually exercising 'in forming line and in manoeuvres of +battle till then absolutely unknown.'[3] + +The 'line of bearing' or 'quarter line' must have been one of these, +and we therefore reach two important conclusions: (1) that this great +tactical advance was introduced by Anson during the War of the +Austrian Succession, and (2) that the older set of Additional Fighting +Instructions was then in existence. Another improvement probably +assignable to this time was Article IV. (of Boscawen's set) for battle +order in two separate lines. Articles V., VI., VII., for extended +cruising formations certainly were then issued, for in his despatch +after his defeat of De la Jonquière Anson says: 'At daybreak I made +the signal for the fleet to spread in a line abreast, each ship +keeping at the distance of a mile from the other [Article V.] that +there might not remain the least probability for the enemy to pass by +us undiscovered.'[4] + +Then we have the notable Article XVIII., not in the earlier sets, +enjoining captains to pursue any ship they force out of the line, +regardless of the contrary order contained in Article XXI. of the +regular Fighting Instructions. We have seen the point discussed +already in the anonymous commentary on the Duke of York's final +instructions, and it remained a bone of contention till the end. Men +like Sir Charles H. Knowles were as strongly in favour of immediately +following a beaten adversary as the anonymous commentator was in +favour of maintaining the line. Knowles's idea was that it was folly +to check the ardour of a ship's company at the moment of victory, and +he tells us he tried to persuade Howe to discard the old instruction +when he was drawing up his new ones.[5] + +As to the further tactical progress which the Boscawen instructions +disclose, and which nearly all appear closely related to the events of +the War of the Austrian Succession, when Anson was supreme, we may +particularly note Article I., for equalising the lines and using +superfluous ships to form a reserve; Article III. for closer action; +Article VIII. for the reserve to endeavour to 'Cross the T,' instead +of doubling; and Articles IX. and X. for bringing a flying enemy to +action. + +With these internal inferences to corroborate the direct evidence of +our documents the conclusion is clear--that during the War of the +Austrian Succession the new system initiated by Vernon was developed +by Anson as a consequence of Mathews's miserable action off Toulon in +1744, and that its first fruits were gathered in the brilliant +successes of Hawke and Anson himself in 1747. + +Though no complete set later than those used by Boscawen is known to +exist, we may be certain from various indications that they continued +to be issued as affording a means of giving elasticity to tactics, and +that they were constantly issued in changing form. Thus Rodney, in his +report after the action off Martinique in April 1780, says, 'I made +the signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in +the enemy's line, agreeable to the twenty-first article of the +Additional Instructions.' Again in a MS. signal book in the Admiralty +Library, which was used in Rodney's great action of April 12, 1782, +and drawn up by an officer who was present, a similar article is +referred to. But there it appears as No. XVII. of the Additional +Instructions, and its effect is given in a form which closely +resembles the original article of Hawke:--'When in a line of battle +ahead and to windward of the enemy, to alter the course to lead down +to them; whereupon every ship is to steer for the ship of the enemy, +which from the disposition of the two squadrons it may be her lot to +engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept +flying.' It is clear, therefore, that between 1780 and 1782 Rodney or +the admiralty had issued a new set of 'Additional Instructions.' The +amended article was obviously designed to prevent a recurrence of the +mistake that spoiled the action of 1780. In the same volume is a +signal which carries the idea further. It has been entered +subsequently to the rest, having been issued by Lord Hood for the +detached squadron he commanded in March 1783. There is no reference +to a corresponding instruction, but it is 'for ships to steer for +(independent of each other) and engage respectively the ships opposed +to them.' In Lord Howe's second signal book, issued in 1790,[6] the +signal reappears in MS. as 'each ship of the fleet to steer for, +independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed +in situation to them in the enemy's line.' And in this case there is +a reference to an 'Additional Instruction, No. 8,' indicating that +Hood, who had meanwhile become first sea lord, had incorporated his +idea into the regular 'Additional Fighting Instructions.' + +Take, again, the case of the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' in line +ahead. This was first practised after its long abandonment by a sudden +inspiration in Rodney's action of April 12, 1782. In the MS. signal +book as used by Rodney in that year there is no corresponding signal +or instruction. But it does contain one by Hood which he must have +added soon after the battle. It is as follows:-- + +'When fetching up with the enemy to leeward and on the contrary tack +to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van +or rear.' It also contains another attributed to Admiral Pigot which +he probably added at Hood's suggestion when he succeeded to the +command in July 1782. It is for a particular ship 'to cut through the +enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to follow her in +close order to support each other.' But in both cases there is no +corresponding instruction, so that the new signals must have been +based on 'expeditional' orders issued by Pigot and Hood. The same +book has yet another additional signal 'for the leading ship to cut +through the enemy's line of battle,' apparently the latest of the +three, but not specifically attributed either to Pigot or Hood. + +With the Additional Instructions used by Rodney the system culminated. +For officers with any real feeling for tactics its work was adequate. +The criticisms of Hood and Rodney on Graves's heart-breaking action +off the Chesapeake in 1781 show this clearly enough. 'When the enemy's +van was out,' wrote Hood, 'it was greatly extended beyond the centre +and rear, and might have been attacked with the whole force of the +British fleet.' And again, 'Had the centre gone to the support of the +van and the signal for the line been hauled down ... the van of the +enemy must have been cut to pieces and the rear division of the +British fleet would have been opposed to ... the centre division.' +Here, besides the vital principle of concentration, we have a germ +even of the idea of containing, and Rodney is equally emphatic. 'His +mode of fighting I will never follow. He tells me that his line did +not extend so far as the enemy's rear. I should have been sorry if it +had, and a general battle ensued. It would have given the advantage +they wished and brought their whole twenty-four ships of the line +against the English nineteen, whereas by watching his opportunity +... by contracting his own line he might have brought his nineteen +against the enemy's fourteen or fifteen, and by a close action have +disabled them before they could have received succour from the +remainder.'[7] + +Read with such remarks as these the latest Additional Fighting +Instructions will reveal to us how ripe and sound a system of tactics +had been reached. The idea of crushing part of the enemy by +concentration had replaced the primitive intention of crowding him +into a confusion; a swift and vigorous attack had replaced the +watchful defensive, and above all the true method of concentration had +been established; for although a concentration on the van was still +permissible in exceptional circumstances, the chief of the new +articles are devoted to concentrating on the rear. Thus our tacticians +had worked out the fundamental principles on which Nelson's system +rested, even to breaking up the line into two divisions. 'Containing' +alone was not yet clearly enunciated, but by Hood's signals for +breaking the line, the best method of effecting it was made +possible. Everything indeed lay ready for the hands of Howe and Nelson +to strike into life. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Admiral Sir John Norris had been commander-in-chief in the +Mediterranean 1710-1, in the Baltic 1715-21 and 1727, in the Downs in +1734, and the Channel 1739 and following years. Professor Laughton tells +me that Norris's papers and orders for 1720-1 contain no such signals. +He must therefore have issued them later. + +[2] Catalogue, 252/24. The reason this interesting set has been +overlooked is that the volume in which they are bound bears by error the +label 'Sailing and Fighting Instructions for H.M. Fleet, 1670. Record +Office Copy.' The Instructions of 1670 were of course quite different. + +[3] _Dict. Nat. Biog._ vol. ii. p. 33. + +[4] Barrow, _Life of Anson_, p. 162 + +[5] _Observations on Naval Tactics, &c._, p. 27. + +[6] In the Admiralty Library. It is undated, but assigned to 1792-3. +For the reasons for identifying it as Howe's second code see _post_, pp. +234-7. In his first code Howe adopted Hood's wording almost exactly; see +_post_, p. 236. + +[7] _Letters of Sir Samuel Hood_, p. 46; and cf. _post_, p. 228 _n._ + + + +_ADMIRAL VERNON, circa_ 1740. + +[+Mathews-Lestock Pamphlets+.[1]] + +_An Additional Instruction to be added to the Fighting +Instructions_. + + +In case of meeting any squadron of the enemy's ships, whose number may +be less than those of the squadron of his majesty's ships under my +command, and that I would have any of the smaller ships quit the line, +I will in such case make the signal for speaking with the captain of +that ship I would have quit the line; and at the same time I will put +a flag, striped yellow and white, at the flagstaff at the main +topmast-head, upon which the said ship or ships are to quit the line +and the next ships are to close the line, for having our ships of +greatest force to form a line just equal to the enemy's. And as, upon +the squadrons engaging, it is not to be expected that the ships +withdrawn out of the line can see or distinguish signals at such a +juncture, it is therefore strictly enjoined and required of such +captain or captains, who shall have their signal or signals made to +withdraw out of the line, to demean themselves as a _corps de +réserve_ to the main squadron, and to place themselves in the +best situation for giving relief to any ship of the squadron that may +be disabled or hardest pressed by the enemy, having in the first place +regard to the ship I shall have my flag on board, as where the honour +of his majesty's flag is principally concerned. And as it is morally +impossible to fix any general rule to occurrences that must be +regulated from the weather and the enemy's disposition, this is left +to the respective captain's judgment that shall be ordered out of the +line to govern himself by as becomes an officer of prudence, and as he +will answer the contrary at his peril. + +_Memorandum_.--That whereas all signals for the respective +captains of the squadron are at some one of the mast-heads, and as +when we are in line of battle or in other situations it may be +difficult for the ships to distinguish their signal, in such case you +are to take notice that your signal will be made by fixing the pennant +higher upon the topgallant shrouds, so as it may be most conspicuous +to be seen by the respective ship it is made for. + +_A second Additional Instruction to the Fighting Instructions_. + +If, at any time after our ships being engaged with any squadron of the +enemy's ships, the admiral shall judge it proper to come to a closer +engagement with the enemy than at the distance we first began to +engage, the admiral will hoist a union flag at the main topmast-head +and fire a gun on the opposite side to which he is engaged with the +enemy, when every ship is to obey the signal, taking the distance from +the centre; and if the admiral would have any particular ship do so he +will make the same signal with the signal for the captain of that +ship. + +And in case of being to leeward of the enemy, the admiral will at the +same time he makes this signal hoist the yellow flag at the fore +topmast-head for filling and making sail to windward. + +And during the time of engagement, every ship is to appoint a proper +person to keep an eye upon the admiral and to observe signals. + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] 'A Narrative of the Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet in the +Mediterranean, &c. By a Sea Officer' London, 1744, pp. 111-2 + + + +_LORD ANSON, circa_ 1747_. + +[+MS. Signal Book, 1756, United Service Institution+.] + +_Lord Anson's Additional Fighting Instruction, to be inserted after +Article the 4th in the Additional Fighting Instructions by Day_. + + +Whereas it may often be necessary for ships in line of battle, to +regulate themselves by bearing on some particular point of the compass +from each other without having any regard to their bearing abreast or +ahead of one another; + +You are therefore hereby required and directed to strictly observe the +following instructions: + +When the signal is made for the squadron to draw into a line of battle +at any particular distance, and I would have them keep north and south +of each other, I will hoist a red flag with a white cross in the mizen +topmast shrouds to show the quarter of the compass, and for the +intermediate points I will hoist on the flagstaff at the mizen +top-mast-head, when they are to bear + + N by E and S by W, one common pennant + NNE " SSW, two common pennants + NE by N " SW by S, three " " + NE " SW, a Dutch jack. + +And I will hoist under the Dutch jack when I would have them bear + + NE by E and SW by W, one common pennant + ENE " WSW, two common pennants + E by N " W by S, three " " +and fire a gun with each signal. + +When I would have them bear from each other on any of the points on +the NW and SE quarters I will hoist a blue and white flag on the mizen +topmast shrouds, to show the quarter of the compass and distinguish +the intermediate points they are to form on from the N and S in the +same manner as in the NE and SW quarter.[1] + + ED. HAWKE. +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] From this article it would appear that the correct expression for +'line of bearing' is 'quarter line'--_i.e._ a line formed in a quarter +of the compass, and that 'bow and quarter line' is due to false +etymology. Though Hawke approved the formation, it does not appear in +the Additional Instructions used by Boscawen in 1759. It was however +regularly incorporated in those used in the War of American +Independence. See _post_, p. 225, Art. III. + + + + +_SIR EDWARD HAWKE_, 1756. + +[+MS. Signal Book, United Service Institution+.] + +_Memorandum_, + + +In room of Articles V. and VI. of the 'Additional Fighting +Instructions by Day'[1] it is in my discretion that this be +observed, viz.: + +When sailing in a line of battle, one ship ahead of another, and I +would have the ship that leads with either the starboard or larboard +tacks aboard to alter her course in order to lead down to the enemy, I +will hoist a Dutch jack under my flag at the mizen topmast-head and +fire two guns. Then every ship of the squadron is to steer for the +ship of the enemy that from the disposition of the two squadrons must +be her lot to engage, notwithstanding I shall keep the signal for the +line ahead flying, making or shortening sail in such proportion as to +preserve the distance assigned by the signal for the line, in order +that the whole squadron as soon as possible may come to action at the +same time.[2] + + ED. HAWKE. + +_Additional Signals_. + +If upon seeing an enemy I should think it necessary to alter the +disposition of the ships in the line of battle, and would have any +ships change station with each other, I will make the signal to speak +with the captains of such ships, and hoist the flag chequered red and +blue on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head.[3] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _I.e._ the older set. They were Articles XV. and XVI. of the +remodelled set used by Boscawen in 1759. + +[2] This article was presumably issued by Hawke when in July 1756 he +superseded Byng in the Mediterranean. It seems designed to prevent a +recurrence of the errors which lost the battle of Minorca, where the +British van was crushed by coming into action long before the centre and +rear. It is not in the Additional Instructions of 1759, but reappears in +a modified form in those of 1780. + +[3] This article is entered in the same signal book, but has no +signature. It may therefore have been one of Anson's innovations. + + + +_ADMIRAL BOSCAWEN_, 1759.[1] + +[+From the original in the Admiralty Library, 252/29+.] + + +I. In case of meeting with a squadron of the enemy's ships that may be +less in number than the squadron under my command, if I would have any +of the smaller ships quit the line, that those of the greatest force +may be opposed to the enemy, I will put abroad the signal for speaking +with the captains of such ships as I would have leave the line, and +hoist a flag, striped yellow and white, at the flagstaff at the main +topmast-head; then the next ships are to close the line, and those +that have quitted it are to hold themselves in readiness to assist any +ship that may be disabled, or hard pressed, or to take her station, if +she is obliged to go out of the line: in which case, the strongest +ship that is withdrawn from the line is strictly enjoined to supply +her place, and fill up the vacancy. + +II. And in case of meeting with any squadron, or ships of war of the +enemy that have merchant-men under their convoy, though the signal for +the line of battle should be out, if I would have any of the frigates +that are out of the line, or any ship of the line fall upon the +convoy, whilst the others are engaged, I will put abroad the pennant +for speaking with the captain of such ship or ships, and hoist the +flag above mentioned for quitting the line, with a pennant under it; +upon which signal, such ship or ships are to use their utmost +endeavours to take or destroy the enemy. + +III. If at any time while we are engaged with the enemy, the admiral +shall judge it proper to come to a closer engagement than at the +distance we then are, he will hoist a red and white flag on the +flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. Then every ship +is to engage the enemy at the same distance the admiral does; and if +the admiral would have any particular ship do so, he will make the +same signal, and the signal for speaking with the captain. + +IV.[2] When I would have the two divisions of the fleet form +themselves into a separate line of battle, one ship ahead of another +at the distance of a cable's length asunder, and each division to be +abreast of the other, when formed at the distance of one cable's +length and a half, I will hoist a flag chequered blue and yellow at +the mizen peak, and fire a gun, and then every ship is to get into her +station accordingly, + +*V.[3] When I would have the fleet spread in a line abreast, each +ship keeping at the distance of one mile from the other, I will hoist +a flag chequered blue and yellow, on the flagstaff at the mizen +top-mast-head, and fire a gun. + +*VI. When I would have the ships spread in a line directly ahead of +each other, and keep at the distance of a mile asunder, I will hoist a +flag chequered red and white at the mizen peak, and fire a gun. + +*VII. And when the signal is made for the ships to spread either +abreast or ahead of one another, and I would have them keep at the +distance of two miles asunder, I will hoist a pennant under the +fore-mentioned flags: then every ship is to make sail, and get into +her station accordingly. + +VIII. If I should meet with a squadron of the enemy's ships of war +inferior in number to the ships under my command, those ships of my +squadron (above the number of the enemy) that happen to fall in either +ahead of the enemy's van or astern of his rear, while the rest of the +ships are engaged, are hereby required, and directed to quit the line +without waiting for the signal, and to distress the enemy by raking +the ships in the van and rear, notwithstanding the first part of the +twenty-fourth article of the Fighting Instructions to the contrary. + +IX. And if I should chase with the whole squadron, and would have a +certain number of the ships that are nearest the enemy draw into a +line of battle ahead of me, in order to engage till the rest of the +ships of the squadron can come up with them, I will hoist a white flag +with a red cross on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire +the number of guns as follows:-- + +When I would have five ships draw into a line of battle, ahead of each +other, I will fire one gun. + +When I would have seven ships draw into a line of battle, ahead of +each other, I will fire three guns. + +X. Then those ships are immediately to form the line without any +regard to seniority or the general form delivered, but according to +their distances from the enemy, viz., The headmost and nearest ship to +the enemy is to lead, and the sternmost to bring up the rear, that no +time may be lost in the pursuit; and all the rest of the ships are to +form and strengthen that line, as soon as they can come up with them, +without any regard to my general form of the order of battle. + +XI. Whereas every ship is directed (when sailing in a line of battle) +to keep the same distances those ships do who are nearest the admiral, +always taking it from the centre: if at any time I think the ship +ahead of me is [at] too great a distance, I will make it known to him +by putting abroad a pennant at the jib-boom end, and keep it flying +till he is in his proper station: and if he finds the ship ahead of +him is at a greater distance from him than he is from the +[4]-----(or such ship as my flag shall be flying on board of), he +shall make the same signal at his jib-boom end, and keep it flying +till he thinks that ship is at a proper distance, and so on to the van +of the line. + +XII. And when I think the ship astern of me is at too great a +distance, I will make it known to him by putting abroad a pennant at +the cross-jack yard-arm, and keep it flying till he is in his station: +and if he finds the ship astern of him is at a greater distance than +he is from the ---- (or such ship as my flag shall be flying aboard +of) he shall make the same signal at the cross-jack yard-arm, and keep +it flying till he thinks that the ship is at a proper distance, and so +on to the rear of the line. + +XIII. And if at any time the captain of any particular ship in the +line thinks the ship without him is at a greater distance than those +ships who are next the centre, he shall make the above signal: and +then that ship is immediately to close, and get into his proper +station. + +XIV.[5] When the signal is made for the squadron to draw into a line +of battle, one ship ahead of another, by hoisting a union flag at the +mizen peak and firing a gun, every ship is to make all the sail he can +into his station, and keep at the distance of half a cable's length +from each other: If I would have them to be a cable's length asunder, +I will hoist a blue flag, with a red cross under the union flag at the +mizen peak and fire a gun: and if two cables' length asunder, a white +and blue flag under the union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun: +but when I would have the squadron draw into a line of battle, one +ship abreast of another, and keep at those distances as above +directed, I will hoist a pennant under the said flags at the mizen +peak. + +XV.[6] When sailing in a line of battle, one ship ahead of another, +and I would have the ship who leads to alter her course and lead more +to starboard, I will hoist a flag striped white and blue at the fore +topmast-head, and fire a gun for every point of the compass I would +have the course altered. + +XVI.[6] And if I would have the ship that leads to alter her course +and lead more to port, I will hoist a flag striped blue and white on +the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun for every +point of the compass I would have the course altered, and every ship +in the squadron is to get into her wake as fast as possible. + +XVII.[7] When I would have all the fireships to prime, I will hoist +a chequered blue and yellow pennant at the mizen topmast-head. + +*XVIII.[8] Notwithstanding the general printed Fighting +Instructions, if at any time, when engaged with an equal number of the +enemy's ships, and the ship opposed to any of his majesty's ships is +forced out of the line, you are hereby required and directed to pursue +her, and endeavour to take and destroy her. + +_Memorandum_.--When the squadron is in a line of battle ahead, +and the signal is made for the headmost and weathermost to tack, the +ship that leads on the former tack is to continue to lead after +tacking.[9] + +*XIX.[10] When I would have the ship or ships that chase bring down +their chase to me, I will hoist a blue flag pierced with white on the +fore topgallant mast, not on the flagstaff. + +*XX.[10] When I find it necessary to have the state and condition of +the ships in the squadron sent on board me, I will make the signal for +all lieutenants, and hoist a blue and white flag at the mizen peak and +fire a gun. If for the state and condition of a particular ship, I +make the signal for the lieutenant of that ship, with the flag at the +mizen peak. + +Given under my hand on board his majesty's ship Namur, in Gibraltar +Bay, this 27 April, 1759. + E. BOSCAWEN + (autograph). +To Capt. Medows, + of his majesty's ship Shannon. + By command of the admiral + ALEX. MACPHERSON + (autograph). + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The articles marked with an asterisk are additions subsequent to +and not appearing in the earlier _Admiralty MS._ 252/24, 'Additional +Fighting Instructions by Day' (see p. 108). + +[2] In the earlier _Admiralty MS._ this article is numbered VII. and +begins 'If the fleet should happen to be in two divisions and I would +have them form,' &c. + +[3] Used by Lord Anson in 1747. See _supra_, p. 209. + +[4] The earlier _Admiralty MS._ has simply 'the ship my flag shall be +aboard of.' + +[5] Article IV, in the earlier _Admiralty MS_. It is practically +identical except that it has 'she' and 'her' throughout where ships are +spoken of, and a few other verbal differences. + +[6] Articles V. and VI. in the earlier _Admiralty MS_. + +[7] The equivalent of Article XIV. in the earlier _Admiralty MS_. +which reads thus, 'When I would have the fireships to prime I will hoist +a pennant striped red and white on the flagstaff at the fore +topmast-head and fire a gun, but in case we are at any time in chase of +the enemy's fleet, the fireships are to prime as fast as possible +whether the signal be made or not.' The _Admiralty MS_. ends here with +another article relating to fireships (No. XV.): 'You are to hold his +majesty's ship under your command in a constant readiness for action, +and in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, if they have the +wind of us, to keep your barge manned and armed with hand and fire-chain +grapnels on the offside from them, to be ready to assist as well any +ship that may be attempted by the fireships of the enemy, as our own +fireships when they shall be ordered upon service.' This article +disappears from subsequent sets, and was perhaps incorporated into the +'General Instructions to Captains' to which it more properly belongs. +The MS. also contains 'Night Signals' and private signals for knowing +detached ships rejoining at night. + +[8] Whoever was the author of this article, it was generally regarded +as too risky and subsequently disappeared. The article of the 'printed +Fighting Instructions' referred to is No. XXI. + +[9] This memorandum, which concludes the printed portion, must have +been added in view of the misconception which occurred in Knowles's +action of 1748. + +[10] MS. additions by Boscawen. + + + +_SIR GEORGE RODNEY_, 1782.[1] + +[+MS. Signal Book in the Admiralty Library+.] + + +1. Line ahead at one cable. +2. Line abreast at one cable. +3. Quarter lines on various compass bearings. +4. When in line ahead to alter course to starboard or port +together--one gun for every point.[2] +5. The same when in line abreast.[2] +6. To form order of sailing.[3] +7. When in line of battle for the whole fleet to tack together. +8. When in line of battle for the next ship ahead or on the starboard +beam, which is at too great a distance, to close. +9. The same for the next astern or on the larboard beam. +10. (_Undetermined_.) +11. The fleet to form in two separate lines ahead at one cable's +distance, each division abreast of the other at two cables' +distance.[4] +12. (?) Particular ships to come under the admiral's stern without +hail.[5] +13. Ships to change stations in the line of battle. +14. When in chase for the headmost ship to engage the sternmost of +the enemy, and the next ship to pass, under cover of her fire, and +take the ship next ahead, and so on in succession, without respect to +seniority or the prescribed order of battle. To engage to windward or +leeward as directed by signal.[6] +15. The whole fleet being in chase, for some of the headmost ships to +draw into line of battle and engage the enemy's rear, at the same time +endeavouring to get up with their van. _Note_.--These ships to +form without any regard to seniority or the order of battle. The ship +nearest the enemy is to lead and the sternmost to bring up the +rear. _Signal_.--Red flag with white cross at main topmast-head +with one gun for five ships, and three for seven.[7] +16. When turning to windward in line of battle for the leading ship +to make known when she can weather the enemy. To be repeated from ship +to ship to the commander-in-chief. If he should stand on till the +sternmost ship can weather them, she is to make it known by hoisting a +common pennant at the fore topgallant mast-head; to be repeated as +before. The sternmost ship is likewise to do so whenever the squadron +shall be to windward of the enemy, and her commander shall judge +himself far enough astern of their rear to lead down out of their line +of fire. +17. When in line of battle ahead and to windward of the enemy, to +alter course to lead down to them: whereupon every ship is to steer +for the ship of the enemy which from the disposition of the two +squadrons it may be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for +the line ahead will be kept flying.[8] +18. When to windward of the enemy or in any other position that will +admit, for the headmost ship to lead down out of their line of fire +and attack their rear, the second from the leader to pass under her +fire, and take the second ship of the enemy, and so on in +succession. To engage to starboard or larboard according to signal. +19. To come to a closer engagement.[9] +20. For particular ships to quit the line. +21. For particular ships to attack the enemy's convoy.[10] +22. For all fireships to prime.[11] +23. On discovering a superior force. +24. For three-decked and heavy ships to draw out of their places in +the line of battle, and form in the van or rear of the fleet. +25. To attack the enemy's centre.[12] +26. To attack the enemy's rear.[12] +27. To attack the enemy's van.[12] +28. To make sail ahead on a bearing from the admiral.[13] +29. In cruising to form line ahead or abreast at one or two miles' +distance.[14] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The actual Additional Fighting Instructions used by Rodney for his +famous campaign of 1782 are lost; what follows are merely the drift of +those instructions so far as they can be determined from the references +to them in his signal book. It should be noted that by this time those +used in the Seven Years' War had been entirely recast in a more logical +form. + +[2] _Cf._ Boscawen's Nos. 15 and 16. + +[3] According to Sir Chas. H. Knowles the regular sailing formation at +this time for a large fleet was in three squadrons abreast, each formed +in bow and quarter line to starboard and port of its flag. He says it +was his father's treatise on Tactics which induced Howe to revert to +Hoste's method, and adopt the formation of squadrons abreast in line +ahead. This, he adds, Howe used for the first time when sailing to +relieve Gibraltar in 1782. Thenceforth it became the rule of the +service, and the subsequent signal books contain signals for forming +line of battle from two, three, and six columns of sailing respectively. +This Knowles regards as the great reform on which modern tactics were +founded. See his _Observations on Tactics_, 1830. + +[4] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 4. + +[5] This may be an Additional Sailing Instruction, the various sets of +Additional Instructions not being distinguished in the signal book. + +[6] This article may well have been the outcome of Hawke's defeat of +L'Etenduère in 1747, when he chased and engaged practically as the +instruction directs, and with complete success. + +[7] _Cf._ Boscawen's Nos. 9 and 10. + +[8] This appears to correspond to Article XXI. of the Additional +Fighting Instructions in use in 1780, to which Rodney referred in his +report on the action of April 17 in that year. + +[9] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 3. + +[10] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 2. + +[11] _Cf._ Boscawen's No. 17. + +[12] In connection with these three articles the following dictum +attributed to Rodney should be recalled: 'During all the commands Lord +Rodney has been entrusted with he made it a rule to bring his whole +force against a part of the enemy's, and never was so absurd as to bring +ship to ship when the enemy gave him an opportunity of acting +otherwise.' And _cf. supra_, p. 213. + +[13] This may be an Additional Sailing Instruction. + +[14] _Cf._ Boscawen's Nos. 5, 6 and 7. A number of other Additional +Instructions are referred to, but they seem to relate to Sailing, +Chasing or General Instructions. No more Fighting Instructions can be +identified. + + + +_LORD HOODS ADDITIONS_, 1783.[1] + +[+MS. Signal Book in the Admiralty Library+.] + + +1. For the ships to steer for (independent of each other) and engage +respectively the ships opposed to them. + +2. When in line of battle, for the leading ship to carry as much sail +as her commander judges the worst sailing ship can preserve her +station with all her plain sail set. + +3. To prepare to reef topsails together. + +4. When in line of battle or otherwise for the men to go to dinner. + +5. After an action for the ships to signify whether they are in a +condition to renew it.[2] + +6. For ships in chase or looking out to alter course to port or +starboard. + +7. To stay by or repair to the protection of prizes or ships under +convoy. + +8. When fetching up with the enemy and to leeward, or on a contrary +tack, to break through their line, and to endeavour to cut off part of +their van or rear. + +9. For the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle. + +10. To signify that the admiral will carry neither top nor stern +lights. _Note_.--The fleet immediately to close. + +11. For particular ships to reconnoitre the enemy in view, and to +return to make known their number and force. + +12. For a particular ship to keep between the fleet and that of the +enemy during the night, to communicate intelligence.[3] + +13. To signify to a ship that she mistakes the signal that was made to +her. + +14. To prepare to hoist French or Spanish colours. + +15. For a particular ship to open her fire on the ship opposed to her. + +16. When a ship is in distress in battle. + +17. Signal to call attention of larboard or starboard line of the +division only.[4] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] See pp. 211-2. These additional signals are all added in paler +ink, with those made by Admiral Pigot. In the original they occur on +various pages without numbers. In the text above they have merely been +numbered consecutively for convenience of reference. Hood was made a +viscount September 12, 1782, and began to issue these orders on March +11, 1783, when he had a squadron placed under his command. + +[2] Ascribed also to Pigot. + +[3] Also ascribed to Pigot. + +[4] The MS. has also an additional signal ascribed to Pigot for a +particular ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for the +other ships to follow her in close order to support each other. + + + + +PART IX + +THE LAST PHASE + +I. LORD HOWE'S FIRST SIGNAL BOOK + +II. SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR + +III. NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA + +IV. ADMIRAL GAMBIER, 1807 + +V. LORD COLLINGWOOD, 1808-1810 + +VI. SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE'S INSTRUCTIONS + +VII. THE SIGNAL BOOK OF 1816 + + + +THE NEW SIGNAL BOOK INSTRUCTIONS + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The time-worn Fighting Instructions of Russell and Rooke with their +accretion of Additional Instructions did not survive the American War. +Some time in that fruitful decade of naval reform which elapsed +between the peace of 1783 and the outbreak of the Great War they were +superseded. It was the indefatigable hand of Lord Howe that dealt +them the long-needed blow, and when the change came it was +sweeping. It was no mere substitution of a new set of Instructions, +but a complete revolution of method. The basis of the new tactical +code was no longer the Fighting Instructions, but the Signal +Book. Signals were no longer included in the Instructions, and the +Instructions sank to the secondary place of being 'explanatory' to the +Signal Book.[1] + +The earliest form in which these new 'Explanatory Instructions' are +known is a printed volume in the Admiralty Library containing a +complete set of Fleet Instructions, and entitled 'Instructions for the +conduct of ships of war explanatory of and relative to the Signals +contained in the Signal Book herewith delivered.' The Signal Book is +with it.[2] Neither volume bears any date, but both are in the old +folio form which had been traditional since the seventeenth +century. They are therefore presumably earlier than 1790 when the +well-known quarto form first came into use, and as we shall see from +internal evidence they cannot have been earlier than 1782. Nor is +there any direct evidence that they are the work of Lord Howe, but the +'significations' of the signals bear unmistakable marks of his +involved and cumbrous style, and the code itself closely resembles +that he used during the Great War. With these indications to guide us +there is little difficulty in fixing with practical certainty both +date and authorship from external sources.[3] + +In a pamphlet published by Admiral Sir Charles Henry Knowles in 1830, +when he was a very old man, he claims to have invented the new code of +numerical signals which Howe adopted. The pamphlet is entitled +'Observations on Naval Tactics and on the Claims of Clerk of Eldin,' +and in the course of it he says that about 1777 he devised this new +system of signals, and gave it to Howe on his arrival in the summer of +that year at Newport, in Rhode Island, 'and his lordship,' he says, +'afterwards introduced them into the Channel Fleet.' Further, he +says, he soon after invented the tabular system of flags suggested by +the chess-board, and published them in the summer of 1778. To this +work he prefixed as a preface the observations of his father, Sir +Charles Knowles, condemning the existing form of sailing order, and +recommending Père Hoste's old form in three columns, and this +order, he says, Howe adopted for the relief of Gibraltar in September +1782. He also infers that the alleged adoption of his signals in the +Channel Fleet was when Lord Howe commanded it before he became first +lord of the admiralty for the second time--that is, before he +succeeded Keppel in December 1783. For during the peace Knowles tells +us he made a second communication to Howe on tactics, of which more +must be said later on. The inference therefore is that when Knowles +says that Howe adopted his code in the Channel Fleet it must have been +the first time he took command of it--that is, on April 2, 1782.[4] + +Now if, as Knowles relates--and there is no reason to doubt this part +of his story--Howe did issue a new code of signals some time before +sailing for Gibraltar in 1782, and if at the time, as Knowles also +says, he had been studying Hoste, internal evidence shows almost +conclusively that these folios must be the Signal Book in +question. From end to end the influence of Hoste's Treatise and of +Rodney's tactics in 1782 is unmistakable.[5] + +From Hoste it takes not only the sailing formation in three columns, +but re-introduces into the British service the long-discarded +manoeuvre of 'doubling.' For this there are three signals, Nos. +222-4, for doubling the van, doubling the rear, and for the rear to +double the rear. From Hoste also it borrows the method of giving +battle to a superior force, which the French writer apparently +borrowed from Torrington. The signification of the signal is as +follows: 'No. 232. When inferior in number to the enemy, and to +prevent being doubled upon in the van or rear, for the van squadron to +engage the headmost ships of the enemy's line, the rear their +sternmost, and the centre that of the enemy, whose surplus ships will +then be left out of action in the vacant spaces between our +squadrons.' + +The author's obligations to the recent campaigns of Rodney and Hood +are equally clear. Signal 236 is, 'For ships to steer for independent +of each other and engage respectively the ships opposed to them in the +enemy's line,' and this was a new form of the signal, which, according +to the MS. Signal Book of 1782, was introduced by Hood.[6] Still +more significant is Signal 235, 'when fetching up with the enemy to +leeward, and on the contrary tack, to break through their line and +endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' This is clearly the +outcome of Rodney's famous manoeuvre, and is adopted word for word +from the signification of the signal that Hood added. Pigot, it will +be remembered, on succeeding Rodney, added two more on the same +subject, viz. (1) 'For the leading ship to cut through the enemy's +line of battle,' and (2) 'For a particular ship specified to cut +through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to +follow her in close order to support each other.' Neither of these +later signals is in the code we are considering, and the presumption +is that it was drawn up very soon after Rodney's victory and before +Pigot's signals were known at home. + +Finally there is a MS. note added by Sir Charles H. Knowles to his +'Fighting and Sailing Instructions,' to the effect that in the +instructions issued by Howe in 1782 he modified Article XXI. of the +old Fighting Instructions (_i.e._ Article XX. of Russell's). +'His lordship in 1782,' it says, 'directed by his instructions that +the line [_i.e._ his own line] should not be broken until all the +enemy's ships gave way and were beaten.' And this is practically the +effect of Article XIV. of the set we are considering. In the absence +of contrary evidence, therefore, there seems good ground for calling +these folio volumes 'Howe's First Signal Book, 1782,' and with this +tentative attribution the Explanatory Instructions are printed below. + +As has been already said, these instructions, divorced as they now +were from the signals, give but a very inadequate idea of the tactics +in vogue. For this we must go to the tactical signals themselves. In +the present case the more important ones (besides those given above) +are as follows: + +'No. 218. To attack the enemy's rear in succession by ranging up with +and opening upon the sternmost of their ships; then to tack or veer, +as being to windward or to leeward of the enemy, and form again in the +rear.' This signal, which at first sight looks like a curious +reversion to the primitive Elizabethan method of attack, immediately +follows the signals for engaging at anchor, and may have been the +outcome of Hood's experience with De Grasse in 1782. + +'No. 232. In working to gain the wind of the enemy, for the headmost +and sternmost ships to signify when they can weather them by Signal +17, p. 66; or if to windward of the enemy and on the contrary tack, +for the sternmost ship to signify when she is far enough astern of +their rear to be able to lead down out of their line of fire.' + +'No. 234. When coming up astern and to windward of the enemy to engage +by inverting the line'--that is, for the ship leading the van to +engage the sternmost of the enemy, the next ship to pass on under +cover of her fire and engage the second from the enemy's rear, and so +on. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The first attempt to provide a convenient Signal Book separate +from the Instructions was made privately by one Jonathan Greenwood about +1715. He produced a small 12mo. volume dedicated to Admiral Edward +Russell, Earl of Orford, and the other lords of the admiralty who were +then serving with him. It consists of a whole series of well-engraved +plates of ships flying the various signals contained in the Sailing and +Fighting Instructions, each properly coloured with its signification +added beneath. The author says he designed the work as a pocket +companion to the Printed Instructions and for the use of inferior +officers who had not access to them. Copies are in the British Museum +and the R.U.S.I. Library. + +[2] _Catalogue_, Nos. 252/27 and 252/26. + +[3] A still earlier Signal Book attributed to Lord Howe is in the +United Service Institution, but it is no more than a condensed and +amended form of the established one. Its nature and intention are +explained by No. 10 of the 'explanatory observations' which he attached +to it. It is as follows; 'All the signals contained in the general +printed Signal Book which are likely to be needful on the present +occasion being provided for in this Signal Book, the signals as +appointed in the general Signal Book will only be made either in +conformity to the practice of some senior officer present, or when in +company for the time being with other ships not of the fleet under the +admiral's command, and unprovided with these particular signals.' It was +therefore probably issued experimentally, but what the 'present +occasion' was is not indicated. It contains none of the additional +signals of 1782-3. + +[4] Knowles was of course too old in 1830 for his memory to be trusted +as to details. A note in his handwriting upon a copy of his code in +possession of the present baronet gives its story simply as follows: +'These signals were written in 1778, as an idea--altered and +published--then altered again in 1780--afterwards arranged differently +in 1787, and finally in 1794; but not printed at Sir C.H. Knowles's +expense until 1798, when they were sent to the admiralty, but they were +not published, although copies have been given to sea officers.' + +[5] A partial translation of Hoste had been published by Lieutenant +Christopher O'Bryen, R.N., in 1762. Captain Boswall's complete +translation was not issued till 1834. + +[6] Note that the signal differs from that which Rodney made under +Article 17 of the Additional Fighting Instructions in his action of +April 17, 1780, and which being misunderstood spoilt his whole attack. + + + +_LORD HOWE_, 1782. + +[+Admiralty Library 252/27+.] + +_Instructions respecting the Order of Battle and conduct of the +fleet, preparative to and in action with the enemy_. + + +Article I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form in order of +battle, each captain or commander is to get most speedily into his +station, and keep the prescribed distance from his seconds ahead and +astern upon the course steered, and under a proportion of sail suited +to that carried by the admiral. + +But when the signal is made for tacking, or on any similar occasion, +care is to be taken to open, in succession, to a sufficient distance +for performing the intended evolution. And the ships are to close back +to their former distance respectively as soon as it has been executed. + +II. In line of battle, the flag of the admiral commanding in chief is +always to be considered as the point of direction to the whole fleet, +for forming and preserving the line. + +III. The squadron of the second in command is to lead when forming the +line ahead, and to take the starboard side of the centre when forming +the line abreast, unless signal is made to the contrary; these +positions however are only restrained to the first forming of the +lines from the order of sailing. + +For when the fleet is formed upon a line, then in all subsequent +evolutions the squadrons are not to change their places, but preserve +the same situation in the line whatever position it may bring them +into with the centre, with respect to being in the van or the rear, on +the starboard or larboard side, unless directed so to do by signal. + +Suppose the fleet sailing in line ahead on the larboard tack, the +second in command leading, and signal is made to form a line abreast +to sail large or before the wind, the second squadron in that case is +to form on the larboard side of the centre. + +Again, suppose in this last situation signal is made to haul to the +wind, and form a line ahead on the starboard tack, in this case the +squadron of the third in command is to lead, that of the second in +command forming the rear. + +And when from a line ahead, the squadron of the second in command +leading, the admiral would immediately form the line on the contrary +tack by tacking or veering together, the squadron of the third in +command will then become the van. + +These evolutions could not otherwise be performed with regularity and +expedition. + +When forming the line from the order of sailing, the ships of each +squadron are to be ranged with respect to each other in the line in +the same manner as when in order of sailing each squadron in one line; +and, as when the second in command is in the van, the headmost ship of +his squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line, +so likewise the headmost ship of the third squadron (in sailing order) +becomes the leading ship of the line, when the third in command takes +the van, except when the signal is made to form the line reversed. + +Ships happening to have been previously detached on any service, +separate from the body of the fleet, when the signal for forming in +order of battle is made, are not meant to be comprehended in the +intention of it, until they shall first have been called back to the +fleet by the proper signal. + +IV. When the fleet is sailing in line of battle ahead, the course is +to be taken from the ship leading the van upon that occasion; the +others in succession being to steer with their seconds ahead +respectively, whilst they continue to be regulated by the example of +the leading ship.[1] + +V. The ships, which from the inequality of their rates of sailing +cannot readily keep their stations in the line, are not to obstruct +the compliance with the intent of the signal in others; nor to hazard +throwing the fleet into disorder by persisting too long in their +endeavours to preserve their stations under such circumstances; but +they are to fall astern and form in succession in the rear of the +line. + +The captains of such ships will not be thereby left in a situation +less at liberty to distinguish themselves; as they will have an +opportunity to render essential service, by placing their ships to +advantage when arrived up with the enemy already engaged with the +other part of the fleet. + +The ships next in succession in order of battle are to occupy in turn, +on this and every other similar occasion, the vacant spaces that would +be otherwise left in the line; so that it may be always kept perfect +at the appointed intervals of distance. + +And when the fleet is sailing large, or before the wind, in order of +battle, and the admiral makes the signal for coming to the wind on +either tack, the ship stationed to lead the line on that tack, first, +and the others in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship +and of their seconds ahead respectively, are to haul to the wind +without loss of time accordingly. + +And all the signals for regulating the course and motions of the fleet +by day or night, after the signal for forming in order of battle has +been made, are to be understood with reference to the continuance of +the fleet in such order, until the general signal to chase, or to form +again in order of sailing, is put abroad. + +VI. When the fleet is formed on any line pointed out by the compass +signal, the relative bearing of the ships from each other is to be +preserved through every change of course made, as often as any +alteration thereof together shall be by signal directed.[2] + +When, on the contrary, the signal to alter the course in succession +has been put abroad, the relative bearing of the ships from each other +will be then consequently changed; and any alteration of the course +subsequently directed to be made by the ships together will thereafter +have reference to the relative bearing last established. The same +distinction will take place so often as the alteration of course in +succession, as aforesaid, shall in future recur. + +VII. If the admiral should observe that the enemy has altered his +course, and the disposition of his order of battle, one, two, three, +or any greater number of points (in which case it will be necessary to +make a suitable change in the bearing of the ships from each other in +the British fleet, supposed to be formed in such respects +correspondently to the first position of the enemy), he will make the +signal for altering course in succession, according to the nature of +the occasion. The leading ship of the line is thereupon immediately to +alter to the course pointed out; and (the others taking their places +astern of her in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship +and of their seconds ahead respectively) she is to lead the fleet in +line of battle ahead on the course so denoted, until farther order. + +VIII. When it is necessary to shorten or make more sail whilst the +fleet is in order of battle, and the proper signal in either case has +been made, the fleet is to be regulated by the example of the frigate +appointed to repeat signals; which frigate is to set or take in the +sail the admiral is observed to do. + +The ship referred to is thereupon to suit her sail to the known +comparative rate of sailing between her and the admiral's ship. + +Hence it will be necessary that the captains of the fleet be very +attentive to acquire a perfect knowledge of the comparative rate of +sailing between their own and the admiral's ship, so as under whatever +sail the admiral may be, they may know what proportion to carry, to go +at an equal rate with him. + +IX. When, the ships of the fleet being more in number than the enemy, +the admiral sees proper to order any particular ships to withdraw from +the line, they are to be placed in a proper situation, in readiness to +be employed occasionally as circumstances may thereafter require--to +windward of the fleet, if then having the weather-gage of the enemy, +or towards the van and ahead, if the contrary--to relieve, or go to +the assistance of any disabled ship, or otherwise act, as by signal +directed. + +The captains of ships, stationed next astern of those so withdrawn, +are directly to close to the van, and fill up the vacant spaces +thereby made in the line. + +When, in presence of an enemy, the admiral or commander of any +division of the fleet finds it necessary to change his station in the +line, in order to oppose himself against the admiral or commander in a +similar part of the enemy's line, he will make the signal for that +purpose; and the ships referred to on this occasion are to place +themselves forthwith against the ships of the enemy, that would +otherwise by such alteration remain unopposed. + +X. When the fleet is sailing in a line of battle ahead, or upon any +other bearing, and the signal is made for the ships to keep in more +open order, it will be generally meant that they should keep from one +to two cables' length asunder, according as the milder or rougher +state of the weather may require; also that they should close to the +distance of half a cable, or at least a cable's length, in similar +circumstances, when the signal for that purpose is put abroad. + +But in both cases, the distance pointed out to the admiral's second +ahead and astern, by the continuance of the flag abroad, as intimated +in the Signal Book, is to be signified from them respectively to the +ships succeeding them on either part, by signals. + +These signals are to be continued either way, onward, throughout the +line if necessary. + +Notice is to be taken, in the same manner, of any continued deviation +from the limited distance; and to commence between the several +commanders of private ships respectively, independent of the admiral's +previous example, when they observe their seconds ahead or astern to +be at any time separated from them, further than the regulated +distance kept by the ships next to the admiral, or that which was last +appointed. + +When the admiral, being before withdrawn from the line, means to +resume his station therein, he will make the signal for the particular +ships, between which he means to place himself, to open to a greater +distance, whether it be in his former station, or in any other part of +the line, better suited for his future purpose. + +XI. When any number of ships is occasionally detached from the fleet +for the same purpose, they are, during their separation from the body +of the fleet, to comply with all such signals as shall be made at any +time, whilst the signal flag appropriated for that occasion remains +abroad. + +But the signals made to all ships so appointed, having the commander +of a squadron or division with them, will be under the flag +descriptive of such commander's squadron or division, whose signals +and instructions they are to obey. + +XII. Great care is to be taken at all times when coming to action not +to fire upon the enemy either over or near any ships of the fleet, +liable to be injured thereby; nor, when in order of battle, until the +proper signal is made, and that the ships are properly placed in +respect to situation and distance, although the signal may have been +before put abroad. + +And if, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are then +steering down for the enemy in an oblique direction from each other, +they are to haul to the wind, or to any order parallel with the enemy, +to engage them as they arrive in a proper situation and distance, +without waiting for any more particular signal or order for that +purpose: regard being only had by the several commanders in these +circumstances to the motions of the ships preceding them on the tack +whereunto the course more inclines, and upon and towards which the +enemy is formed for action, that they may have convenient space for +hauling up clear of each other. + +When our fleet is upon the contrary tack to that of the enemy, and +standing towards them, and the admiral makes the signal to engage, the +van ship is then to lead close along their line, with a moderate sail, +and engage; the rest of the fleet doing the same, passing to windward +or to leeward of the enemy, as the admiral may direct. + +XIII. When weathering the enemy upon the contrary tack, and signal is +made to engage their van, the leading ship is then to bear down to the +van ship of the enemy, and engage, passing along their line to +windward to the sternmost ship of their van squadron, then to haul off +close to the wind, the rest of the fleet doing the same in +succession.[3] + +XIV. No ship is to separate in time of action from the body of the +fleet, in pursuit of any small number of the enemy's ships beaten out +of the line; nor until their main body be also disabled or broken: but +the captains, who have disabled or forced their opponents out of the +line, are to use their best endeavours to assist any ship of the fleet +appearing to be much pressed, or the ships nearest to them, to hasten +the defeat of the enemy, unless otherwise by signal, or particular +instruction, directed.[4] + +XV. When any ship in the fleet is so much disabled as to be in the +utmost danger and hazard of being taken by the enemy, or destroyed, +and makes the signal expressive of such extremity; the Captains of the +nearest ships, most at liberty with respect to the state of their +opponents in the enemy's line, are strictly enjoined to give all +possible aid and protection to such disabled ship, as they are best +able. And the captain of any frigate (or fireship) happening to be at +that time in a situation convenient for the purpose, is equally +required to use his utmost endeavours for the relief of such disabled +ship, by joining in the attack of the ship of the enemy opposed to the +disabled ship, if he sees opportunity to place his ship to advantage, +by favouring the attempt of the fireship to lay the enemy on board, or +by taking out any of the crew of the disabled ship, if practicable and +necessary, as may be most expedient. + +XVI. No captain, though much pressed by the enemy, is to quit his +station in time of battle, if possible to be avoided, without +permission first obtained from the commanding officer of his division, +or other nearest flag officer, for that purpose; but, when compelled +thereto by extreme necessity before any adequate assistance is +furnished, or that he is ordered out of the line on that account, the +nearest ships and those on each part of the disabled ship's station +are timely to occupy the vacant space occasioned by her absence, +before the enemy can take advantage thereof. + +And if any captain shall be wanting in the due performance of his duty +in time of battle, the commander of the division, or other flag +officer nearest to him, is immediately to remove such deficient +captain from his post, and appoint another commander to take the +charge and conduct of the ship on that occasion. + +XVII. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, +or from bad weather, or otherwise, the admiral hath by signal +signified his intention to leave the captains and other commanders at +liberty to proceed at their discretion; they are then permitted to act +as they see best under such circumstances, for the good of the king's +service and the preservation of their ships, without regard to his +example. But they are, nevertheless, to endeavour at all times to gain +the appointed rendezvous in preference, if it can be done with safety. + +XVIII. The ships are to be kept at all times prepared in readiness for +action. And in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, their +boats are to be kept manned and armed, and prepared with hand and +fire-chain grapnels, and other requisites, on the off-side from the +enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ship of the fleet attempted by +the fireships of the enemy; or for supporting the fireships of the +fleet when they are to proceed on service. + +The ships appointed to protect and cover these last, or which may be +otherwise in a situation to countenance their operations, are to take +on board their crews occasionally, and proceed before them down, as +near as possible, to the ships of the enemy they are destined to +attempt. + +The captains of such ships are likewise to be particularly attentive +to employ the boats they are provided with, as well to cover the +retreat of the fireships boat, as to prevent the endeavours to be +expected from the boats of the enemy to intercept the fireship, or in +any other manner to frustrate the execution of the proposed +undertaking.[5] + +XIX. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag +officer may embark on board any private ship that he sees fit, for +carrying on the service: but it is to be of his own squadron or +division in preference when equally suitable for his purpose. + +XX. The flag officers, or commanders of divisions, are on all +occasions to repeat generally, as well as with reference to their +respective divisions, the signals from the admiral, that they may be +thereby more speedily communicated correspondent to his intentions. + +And the purpose of all signals for the conduct of particular divisions +is then only meant to be carried into execution when the signal has +been repeated, or made by the commanders of such particular divisions +respectively. In which circumstances they are to be always regarded +and complied with by the ships or divisions referred to, in the same +manner as if such signals had been made by the admiral commanding in +chief. + +XXI. When ships have been detached to attack the enemy's rear, the +headmost ship of such detachment, and the rest in succession, after +having ranged up their line as far is judged proper, is then to fall +astern; and (the ship that next follows passing between her and the +enemy) is to tack or wear as engaged to windward or leeward, and form +in the rear of the detachment. + +XXII. When the fleet is to tack in succession, the ship immediately +following the one going in stays should observe to bear up a little, +to give her room; and the moment for putting in stays is that when a +ship discovers the weather quarter of her second ahead, and which has +just tacked before her. + +On this and every other occasion, when the fleet is in order of +battle, it should be the attention of each ship strictly to regulate +her motions by those of the one preceding her; a due regard to such a +conduct being the only means of maintaining the prescribed distance +between the ships, and of preserving a regular order throughout the +line. + +XXIII. As soon as the signal is made to prepare for battle, the +fireships are to get their boarding grapnels fixed; and when in +presence of an enemy, and that they perceive the fleet is likely to +come to action, they are to prime although the signal for that purpose +should not have been made; being likewise to signify when they are +ready to proceed on service, by putting abroad the appointed signal. + +They are to place themselves abreast of the ships of the line, and not +in the openings between them, the better to be sheltered from the +enemy's fire, keeping a watchful eye upon the admiral, so as to be +prepared to put themselves in motion the moment their signal is made, +which they are to answer as soon as observed. + +A fireship ordered to proceed on service is to keep a little ahead and +to windward of the ship that is to escort her, to be the more ready to +bear down on the vessel she is to board, and to board if possible in +the fore shrouds. By proceeding in this manner she will not be in the +way of preventing the ship appointed to escort her from firing upon +the enemy, and will run less risk of being disabled herself; and the +ship so appointed and the two other nearest ships are to assist her +with their boats manned and armed. + +She is to keep her yards braced up, that when she goes down to board, +and has approached the ship she is to attempt, she may have nothing to +do but to spring her luff. + +Captains of fireships are not to quit them till they have grappled the +enemy, and have set fire to the train. + +XXIV. Frigates have it in particular charge to frustrate the attempts +of the enemy's fireships, and to favour those of our own. When a +fireship of the enemy therefore attempts to board a ship of the line, +they are to endeavour to cut off the boats that attend her, and even +to board her, if necessary. + +XXV. The boats of a ship attempted by an enemy's fireship, with those +of her seconds ahead and astern, are to use their utmost efforts to +tow her off, the ships at the same time firing to sink her. + +XXVI. In action, all the ships in the fleet are to wear red ensigns. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] This and Article II. appear to be the first mention of working the +fleet by 'guides.' + +[2] The original has here the following erasure: 'The same is to be +understood of the bearing indicated, though the admiral should shape his +course from the wind originally when the signal for forming upon a line +of bearing is made.' + +[3] It was Nelson's improvement on this unscientific method of attack +that is the conspicuous feature of his Memorandum, 1803, but it must be +remembered that Howe had not yet devised the manoeuvre of breaking the +line in all parts on which Nelson's improvement was founded. + +[4] _Cf._ note 1, p. 224. + +[5] Howe's insistence on these points both here and in Articles +XXII.-XXV. is curious in view of the fact that the use of fireships in +action had gone out of fashion. From 1714 to 1763 only one English +fireship is known to have been 'expended,' and that was by Commander +Callis when he destroyed the Spanish galleys at St. Tropez in 1742. At +the peace of 1783 the Navy List contained only 17 fireships out of a +total of 468 sail. Howe had two fireships on the First of June, 1794, +but did not use them. + + + +THE SIGNAL BOOKS OF THE GREAT WAR + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The second form in which the new Fighting Instructions, originated by +Lord Howe, have come down to us, is that which became fixed in the +service after 1790; that is, instead of two folio volumes with the +Signals in one and the Explanatory Instructions in the other, we have, +at least after 1799, one small quarto containing both, and entitled +'Signal Book for Ships of War.' The earliest known example, however, +of the new quarto form is a Signal Book only, which refers to a set of +Instructions apparently similar to those of 1799. These have not been +found, but presumably they were in a separate volume. The Signal Book +is in the Admiralty Library labelled in manuscript '1792-3(?),' but, +as before, no date or signature appears in the body of it. From +internal evidence, however, as well as from collateral testimony, +there is little difficulty in identifying it as Lord Howe's second +code issued in 1790. + +The feature of the book that first strikes us is that, though the bulk +of it is printed, all the most important battle signals, as well as +many others, have been added in MS., while at the end are the words, +'Given on board the Queen Charlotte, to Capt. ----, commander of his +majesty's ship the ----, by command of the admiral.' It is thus +obvious that the original printed form, which contains many further +unfilled blanks for additional signals, was used as a draft for a +later edition. No such edition is known to exist in print, but both +the original signals and the additions correspond exactly with the +MS. code which was used by Lord Howe in his campaign of 1794. In +editing this code for the Society in his _Logs of the Great Sea +Fights_, Admiral Sturges Jackson hazarded the conjecture that it +had not then been printed, but was supplied to each ship in the fleet +in MS. The admiralty volume goes far to support his conjecture, and it +is quite possible that we have here the final draft from which the +MS. copies were made. + +As to the actual date at which the code was completed there is not +much difficulty. The Queen Charlotte was Howe's flagship in the +Channel fleet from 1792-4, but it was also his flagship in 1790 at the +time of the 'Spanish Armament,' when he put to sea in immediate +expectation of war with Spain. While the tension lasted he is known +to have used the critical period in exercising his fleet in tactical +evolutions, in order to perfect it in a new code of signals which he +had been elaborating for several years.[1] It is probable therefore +that this Signal Book belongs to that year, and that it is one of +several copies which Howe had printed with the battle signals blank +for his own use while he was elaborating his system by practical +experiment. This conjecture is brought to practical certainty by a +rough and much-worn copy of it in the United Service Institution. It +was made by Lieut. John Walsh, of H.M.S. Marlborough, one of Howe's +fleet, and inside the cover he has written 'Earl Howe's signals by +which the Grand Fleet was governed 1790, 1791, and 1794.' + +It was upon the tactical system contained in this book that all the +great actions of the Nelson period were fought. The alterations which +took place during the war were slight. The codes used by Howe himself +in 1794, and by Duncan at Camperdown in 1797, follow it exactly. A +slightly modified form was issued by Jervis to the Mediterranean +fleet, and was used by him at St. Vincent in 1797. No copy of this is +known to exist, but from the logs of the ships there engaged it would +appear that, though the numbering of the code had been changed, the +principal battle signals remained the same. In 1799 a new edition was +printed in the small quarto form. In this the Signal Book and the +Instructions were bound together, and were issued to the whole navy, +but here again, though the numbers were changed, the alterations were +of no great importance.[2] Reprints appeared in 1806 and 1808, but +the code itself continued in use till 1816. In that year an entirely +new Signal Book based on Sir Home Popham's code was issued with a +fresh set of Explanatory Instructions, or, as they had come to be +called, 'Instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct +of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an +enemy.'[3] Both these sets of 'Explanatory Instructions' are printed +below, but, as we have seen, they throw but little light by themselves +on the progress of tactical thought during the great period they +covered. They were no longer 'Fighting Instructions' in the old sense, +unless read with the principal battle signals, and to these we have to +go to get at the ideas that underlay the tactics of Nelson and his +contemporaries. + +Now the most remarkable feature of Howe's Second Signal Book, 1790, is +the apparent disappearance from it of the signal for breaking the line +which in his first code, 1782, he had borrowed from Hood in +consequence of Rodney's manoeuvre. The other two signals introduced +by Hood and Pigot for breaking the line on Rodney's plan are equally +absent. In their stead appears a signal for an entirely new manoeuvre, +never before practised or even suggested, so far as is known, by +anyone. The 'signification' runs as follows: 'If, when having the +weather-gage of the enemy, the admiral means to pass between the ships +of their line for engaging them to leeward or, being to leeward, to +pass between them for obtaining the weather-gage. N.B.--The different +captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified +intention in either case are at liberty to act as circumstances +require.' In the Signal Book of 1799 the wording is changed. It there +runs 'To break through the enemy's line in all parts where +practicable, and engage on the other side,' and in the admiralty copy +delivered to Rear-Admiral Frederick there is added this MS. note, 'If +a blue pennant is hoisted at the fore topmast-head, to break through +the van; if at the main topmast-head, to break through the centre; if +at the mizen topmast-head, to break through the rear.'[4] + +This form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal +was something different from what is usually understood in naval +literature by 'breaking the line.' By that we generally understand the +manoeuvre practised by Lord Rodney in 1782, a manoeuvre which was +founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in +line ahead, and all the ships indicated passing through in succession +at the same point. Whereas in Lord Howe's signal the tactical idea is +wholly different. In his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by +bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each +ship passing through the enemy's line at any interval it found +practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he +adopted on June 1, 1794. In intention the two signals are as wide as +the poles asunder. In Rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's +line and cut off part of it from the rest. In Howe's case the idea of +severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an +advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is +made. The whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pass through +the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of +it. In principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in +line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a +perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead. + +Nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact +that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may +be said, so much as recognised. Whenever we read of a movement for +breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with +remarks which assume that Rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not +Howe's. Probably it is Nelson who is to blame. At Trafalgar, after +carefully elaborating an attack based on Howe's method of line +abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to +use Rodney's method. His reasons were sound enough, as will be seen +later. But as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an +engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of +approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the +ditch. When the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only +apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the +line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in +fact. + +The real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by +what process of thought Howe in his second code discarded Rodney's +manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it +in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his +own method. + +On the first point there can be little doubt. Sir Charles H. Knowles +gives us to understand that Howe still had Hoste's Treatise at his +elbow, and with Hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common +with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself +that Rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always +imperfect. Knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of +Rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and +maintained to the last that Rodney never intended it, as every one now +agrees was the truth. Nelson presumably also approved Howe's cardinal +improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have +called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever +produced.'[5] + +As to the second point--the fundamental intention of the new +manoeuvre--we get again a valuable hint from Knowles. Upon his second +visit to the admiralty, after Howe had succeeded Keppel at the end of +1783, Knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written +by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and +discussed with Howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the French +employed for avoiding decisive actions. He showed that when engaged to +leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard +pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the British +had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in +order to close again. In this way, as he pointed out, the French were +always able to clip the British wings without receiving any decisive +injury themselves. In a MS. note to his 'Fighting and Sailing +Instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'In the battle off +Granada,' he says, 'in the year 1779 the French ships partially +executed this manoeuvre, and Sir Charles [H.] Knowles (then 5th +lieutenant of the Prince of Wales of 74 guns, the flagship of the +Hon. Admiral Barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed +Admiral Lord Howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the +peace. His lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's +line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed +himself in the battle of the 1st of June, 1794.' The note adds that +before Knowles drew Howe's attention to the supposed French manoeuvre +he had been content with his original Article XIV., modifying Article +XXI. of the old Fighting Instructions as already explained. Whether +therefore Knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take +it as certain that it was to baffle the French practice of avoiding +close action by falling away to leeward that Howe hit on his brilliant +conception of breaking through their line in all parts. + +No finer manoeuvre was ever designed. In the first place it developed +the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. Secondly, +by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their +admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. Thirdly, by +seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the French +method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their +escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive _mêlée_, +such as Nelson aimed at. And, fourthly, it permitted a concentration +on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any +desired point quite as effectually as did Rodney's method. Whether +Howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it +was felt by Nelson, Hood and Rodney is doubtful. Yet his invention +did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. It had over +Rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the +very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an +overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost +development of fire-surface. Finally it could not be parried as +Rodney's usually could in Hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing +away together upon the same tack. By superior gunnery Howe's attack +might be _stopped_, but by no possibility could it be _avoided_ +except by flight. It was no wonder then that Howe's invention was +received with enthusiasm by such men as Nelson. + +Still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an +attack from the leeward, as Clerk of Eldin had pointed out, and where +it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, Rodney's manoeuvre +might still be the best. Howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief +imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the +portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. Thus, although it +is not traceable in the Signal Book, it was really reintroduced in +Howe's third code. This is clear from the last article of the +Explanatory Instructions of 1799 which distinguishes between the two +manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the Instructions of +1790 we cannot tell. The probability is that it was not, for in the +Signal Book of 1790 there is no reference to a modifying instruction. +Further, we know that in the code proposed by Sir Charles H. Knowles +the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as +Howe's. This code he drew up in its final form in 1794, but it was not +printed till 1798. The presumption is therefore that until the code of +1799 was issued Howe's method of breaking the line was the only one +recognised. In that code the primary intention of Signal 27 'for +breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for Howe's +manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a +red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to +preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and +to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as +are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to +rejoin their fleet.' This was precisely Rodney's manoeuvre with the +proviso for close order introduced by Pigot. The instruction also +provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in +the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. No doubt the distinction +between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more +logically made by entirely different signals.[6] But in practice it +was all that was wanted. It is only posterity that suffers, for in +studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell +from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the +admiral had in mind. Not only do we never find it specified whether +the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem +to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and +'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'passing through,' and 'leading +through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of +the manoeuvre. Thus in Nelson's first, or Toulon, memorandum he speaks +of 'passing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably +Howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward +when presumably he means Rodney's. In the Trafalgar memorandum he +speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward, +and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to +perform Howe's manoeuvre. Whereas Howe, in his Instruction XXXI. of +1799, uses 'breaking the line' and 'passing through it' indifferently +of both forms. + +All we can do is generally to assume that when the attack was to be +made from to-windward Howe's manoeuvre was intended, and Rodney's when +it was made from to-leeward. Yet this is far from being safe +ground. For the signification of the plain signal without the red +pennant over--_i.e._ 'to break through ... and engage on the other +side'--seems to contemplate Howe's manoeuvre being made both from +to-leeward and from to-windward. + +The only notable disappearances in Howe's second code (1790) are the +signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new +manoeuvre. For, until this device was hit upon, Rodney's method of +breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means +of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with +Hoste's method. This at least is what Clerk of Eldin seems to imply +in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of +dealing with the part cut off. Yet in spite of this disappearance +Nelson certainly doubled at the Nile, and according to Captain Edward +Berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'It is +almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his +projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely +executed in the action.... These plans however were formed two months +before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the +understanding of every captain in the fleet.' Nelson probably felt +that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are +scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose +steadiness he could trust. Still Saumarez, his second in command, +regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of +our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[7] + +Amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that +for Hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by +leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. The +wording however is changed. It is no longer enjoined as a means of +avoiding being doubled. As Howe inserted it in MS. the signification +now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of +the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the +centre the centre of the enemy. But with exception of the flag +officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy +respectively in preference.'[8] This signification again is +considerably modified by the Explanatory Instructions. Article XXIV., +it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving +regular gaps. The leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship, +and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the +largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till +the stronger are disabled. It was in effect the adoption of Hoste's +fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his +first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your +being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the English +gunnery usually made them. + +The curious signal No. 218 of 1782 for attacking the enemy's rear in +succession by 'defiling' on the Elizabethan plan was also retained. In +the Signal Book of 1799 it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the +sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in +rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is +so appointed) until otherwise directed.' + +It has been already said that the alterations in the edition of 1799 +were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be +noticed. The most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the +important rule of Article IX. of the Instructions of 1782 (Article +X. of 1799), providing for the formation of a _corps de réserve_ +when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by +Villeneuve on Gravina's advice in 1805, although fortunately for +Nelson it was not put in practice at Trafalgar. + +The other addition appears in MS. at the end of the printed signals. +It runs as follows: 'When at anchor in line of battle to let go a +bower anchor under foot, and pass a stout hawser from one ship to +another, beginning at the weathermost ship,' an addition which would +seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the Nile. +Nelson's own order was as follows: '_General Memorandum_.--As the +wind will probably blow along shore, when it is deemed necessary to +anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to +each line-of-battle ship of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the +sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[9] Another copy of the signal +book has a similar MS. addition to the signal 'Prepare for battle and +for anchoring with springs, &c.'[10] It runs thus: 'A bower is to be +unbent, and passed through the stern port and bent to the anchor, +leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.--Lord Nelson, St. +George, 26 March, 1801. If with a red pennant over with a spring +only.--Commander-in-chiefs Order Book, 27 March, 1801.' These +therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the +Danish fleet at Copenhagen. + +No other change was made, and it may be said that Howe's new method of +breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a +sailing fleet. How far its full intention and possibilities were +understood at first is doubtful. The accounts of the naval actions +that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of +British captains. On the First of June the new signal for breaking +through the line at all points was the first Howe made, and it was +followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each +ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage +respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's +line.' The result was an action along the whole line, during which +Howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's +line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet +neglected to follow either his signal or his example. + +In the next great action, that of St. Vincent, the circumstances were +not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the Spaniards had not +formed line. Jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy +morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very +probable case' which Clerk of Eldin had instanced as justifying a +perpendicular attack. Whether or not Jervis had Clerk's instance in +his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. The signal +with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the +flagship's log, was 'The admiral intends to pass through the enemy's +line.'[11] There is nothing to show whether this meant Howe's +manoeuvre or Rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the +instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be +distinguished by a pennant over. + +What followed however was that the fleet passed between the two +separated Spanish squadrons in line ahead as Clerk advised. The next +thing to do, according to Clerk, was for the British fleet to wear or +tack together, but instead of doing so Jervis signalled to tack in +succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's +line although it was still unformed. It was at this moment that Nelson +made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and +what he did was in effect as though Jervis had made the signal to tack +together as Clerk enjoined. Thereupon Jervis, with the intention +apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made +the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains +of those days believed in--viz. to take suitable stations for mutual +support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in +succession. In practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the +methods of the early Commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that +for breaking the line which made the action general. + +Again, at the battle of Camperdown, Duncan, while trying to form +single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for +each ship to steer independently for her opponent. This was +followed--the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy, +and being still in two disordered columns--by signals for the lee or +van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the +weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal +for passing through the line. The result was an action almost exactly +like that of Nelson at Trafalgar--that is, though the leading ships +duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their +opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval, +the rest was a _mêlée_; for, since what was fundamentally a +parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be +nothing but a scramble for the rear ships. + +In none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that Howe's +attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of +tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon +our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired British +officers at this time was something very different from that which +Howe had tried to instil. Writing of the battle of St. Vincent, Don +Domingo Perez de Grandallana, whose masterly studies of the French and +English naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of +state, has the following passage: 'An Englishman enters a naval action +with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help +his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst +of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary +distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his +comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by +the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. Accordingly, both he +and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment +upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not +be deserted. Experience shows, on the contrary, that a Frenchman or a +Spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict +order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support, +and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of +seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such +manoeuvres.... Thus they can never make up their minds to seize any +favourable opportunity that may present itself. They are fettered by +the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both +navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships +may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be +receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. Worst, of all, they are denied +the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely +maintained by the English as it is neglected by us, who will not learn +from them.'[12] + +This was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in +the golden signal which was the panacea of British admirals when in +doubt: 'Ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they +come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific +appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this +time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. The truth +is that in the British service formal tactics had come to be regarded +as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for +initiative in fighting him. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _Dictionary of National Biography, sub voce_ 'Howe,' p. 97. + +[2] A copy of this is in the Admiralty Library issued to 'Thomas Lenox +Frederick esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue,' and attested by the +autographs of Vice-Admiral James Gambier, Vice-Admiral James Young, and +another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by William Marsden, the +famous numismatist and Oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from +1795 to 1804. Another copy, also in the Admiralty Library, is attested +by Gambier, Sir John Colpoys and Admiral Philip Patton, and +countersigned by the new second secretary, John Barrow, all of whom came +to the admiralty under Lord Melville on Pitt's return to office in 1804. +Two other copies are in the United Service Institution. + +[3] Sir Home Popham's code had been in use for many years for +'telegraphing.' It was by this code Nelson's famous signal was made at +Trafalgar. + +[4] In one of the United Service Institution copies the signal has +been added in MS. and the note is on a slip pasted in. In the other both +signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing +pennants have been written in. + +[5] Nelson to Howe, January 8, 1799. _Nicolas_, iii. 230. + +[6] Sir Charles H. Knowles did modify his code in this way some time +after 1798. For his original signal he substituted two in MS. with the +following neatly worded significations: 'No. 32. To break through the +enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. No. 33. To break +through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.' +Had these two lucid significations been adopted by Howe there would have +been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant. + +[7] Laughton, _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 151. Ross, _Memoir +of Lord de Saumarez_, vol. i. + +[8] This last mediæval proviso was omitted in the later editions. It +is not found in Hoste. + +[9] Ross, _Memoir of Saumarez_, i. 212. Nelson refers to 'Signal 54, +Art. XXXVII. of the Instructions,' which must have been a special and +amplified set issued by Jervis. There is no Art. XXXVII. in Howe's set. + +[10] In the United Service Institution. + +[11] _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, i. 210. The log probably only +gives an abbreviation of the signification. Unless Jervis had changed +it, its exact wording was 'The admiral means to pass between the ships +of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. See _supra_, p. 255. + +[12] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Española_, viii. 111. + + + +_LORD HOWE'S EXPLANATORY INSTRUCTIONS_. + +[+Signal Book, 1799+.[1]] + +_Instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their +engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy_. + + +I. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, +each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as +expeditiously as possible, and to keep in close order, if not +otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that +carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the +line when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it. + +II. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle +are: that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in +action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships +greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to +fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own +fleet. + +III. If, after having made a signal to prepare to form the line of +battle on either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative +flag flying, should make several signals in succession, to point out +the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be +carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when +the signal for the line is hoisted again; they are to be executed in +the order in which they were made, excepting such as the admiral may +annul previously to his hoisting again the signal for the line. + +IV. If any part of the fleet should be so far to leeward, when the +signal is made for the line of battle, that the admiral should think +it necessary to bear up and stand towards them, he will do it with the +signal No. 105 hoisted.[2] The ships to leeward are thereupon to +exert themselves to get as expeditiously as possible into their +stations in the line. + +V. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet, on any +separate service, are not to obey the signal for forming the line of +battle, unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by +signal. + +VI. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as +directed in Article 9 of the General Instructions, though in the +presence of an enemy.[3] The captains of such ships will not thereby +be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have +opportunities of rendering essential service, by placing their ships +advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with +the other part of the fleet. + +VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is +made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to +place themselves in such a manner that if they were to haul to the +wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, +they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this, +every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the +line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on +which the line of battle would sail, viz., on that point of the +compass which is seven points from the direction of the wind, or six +points if the signal is made to keep _close_ to the wind. + +As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to +form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or +squadron flags, shown with the signal for such a line, will refer to +the forming of the line of battle; that division or squadron whose +flag is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form +the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station +which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind and +form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is undermost is +to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if +by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.[4] + +VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed, the ships are to +preserve that relative bearing from each other, whenever they are +directed to alter the course together; but if they are directed to +alter the course in succession, as the line of bearing will by that be +destroyed, it is no longer to be attended to. + +IX. If the signal to make more or less sail is made when the fleet is +in line of battle, the frigate appointed to repeat signals will set +the same sails as are carried by the admiral's ship; the ships are +then in succession (from the rear if to shorten, or the van, if to +make more, sail) to put themselves under a proportion of sail +correspondent to their comparative rate of sailing with the admiral's +ship. + +To enable captains to do this it will be necessary that they acquire a +perfect knowledge of the proportion of sail required for suiting their +rate of sailing to that of the admiral, under the various changes in +the quantity of sail, and state of the weather; which will enable +them, not only to keep their stations in the line of battle, but also +to keep company with the fleet on all other occasions. + +When the signal to make more sail is made, if the admiral is under his +topsails he will probably set the Foresail. + +If the signal is repeated, or if the foresail is set he will probably +set Jib and staysails. + +If the foresail, jib, and staysails are set, he will set the +Topgallant-sails. + +Or in equally weather Mainsail. + +When the signal to shorten sail is made, he will probably take in sail +in a gradation the reverse of the preceding. + +X. Ships which are ordered by signal to withdraw from the line are to +place themselves to windward of the fleet if it has the weather-gage +of the enemy, or to leeward and ahead if the contrary; and are to be +ready to assist any ship which may want their assistance, or to act in +any other manner as directed by signal. + +If the ships so withdrawn, or any others which may have been detached, +should be unable to resume their stations in the line when ordered by +signal to do so, they are to attack the enemy's ships in any part of +the line on which they may hope to make the greatest impression.[5] + +XI. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or +which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the +ships which, at either extremity of the line, are thereby left without +opponents may, after the action is begun, quit the line without +waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or +assist the ships of the fleet, in the best manner that circumstances +will allow. + +XII. When any number of ships, not having a flag officer with them, +are detached from the fleet to act together, they are to obey all +signals which are accompanied by the flag appropriated to detachments, +and are not to attend to any made without that flag. But if a flag +officer, commanding a squadron, or division, be with such detachment, +all the ships of it are to consider themselves, for the time, as +forming part of the division, or squadron, of such flag officer; and +they are to obey those signals, and only those, which are accompanied +by his distinguishing flag. + +XIII. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy, +either over, or very near to, any ships of the fleet; nor, though the +signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is +placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy. + +XIV. If, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are steering +down for the enemy, they are to haul to the wind, or to any course +parallel to the enemy, and are to engage them when properly placed, +without waiting for any particular signal; but every ship must be +attentive to the motions of that ship which will be her second ahead, +when formed parallel to the enemy, that she may have room to haul up +without running on board of her. The distance of the ships from each +other during the action must be governed by that of their respective +opponents on the enemy's line. + +XV. No ship is to Separate from the body of the fleet, in time of +action, to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have +been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some +other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled +their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any +ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their +attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled; unless +by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act +otherwise. + +XVI. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of +being destroyed, or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal, +expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are +the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her +immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a +situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the +enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate, that may be near, is to +use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, +or by joining in the attack of the enemy, or by covering the fireship; +or, if necessity require it, by taking out the crew of the disabled +ship; or by any other means which circumstances at the time will +admit.[6] + +XVII. Though a ship be disabled, and hard pressed by the enemy in +battle, she is not to quit her station in the line, if it can possibly +be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do +from the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs, +or from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of +the line, or should be obliged to quit it, before assistance can be +sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space +become vacant, to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it. + +XVIII. If there should be found a captain so lost to all sense of +honour and the great duty he owes his country, as not to exert himself +to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy +them when engaged; the commander of the squadron, or division, to +which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from +his command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship, +till the admiral's pleasure shall be known. + +XIX. When, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or +from bad weather, or from any other cause, the admiral makes the +signal for the fleet to disperse, every captain will be left to act as +he shall judge most proper for the preservation of the ship he +commands, and the good of the king's service; but he is to endeavour +to go to the appointed rendezvous, if it may be done with safety. + +XX. The ships are to be kept at all times as much prepared for battle +as circumstances will admit; and if the fleet come to action with an +enemy which has the weather-gage, boats, well armed, are to be held in +readiness, with hand and fire-chain grapnels in them; and if the +weather will admit, they are to be hoisted out, and kept on the +offside from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ships against +which fireships shall be sent; or for supporting the fireships of the +fleet, if they should be sent against the enemy.[7] + +XXI. The ships appointed to protect and cover fireships, when ordered +on service, or which, without being appointed, are in a situation to +cover and protect them, are to receive on board their crews, and, +keeping between them and the enemy, to go with them as near as +possible to the ships they are directed to destroy. All the boats of +those ships are to be well armed, and to be employed in covering the +retreat of the fireship's boats, and in defending the ship from any +attempts that may be made on her by the boats of the enemy. + +XXII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag +officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not +already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper; but he is to +hoist it in one of his own squadron or division if there be one near, +and fit for the purpose. + +XXIII. If a squadron or any detachment be directed by signal to gain +or keep the wind of the enemy, the officer commanding it is to act in +such manner as shall in his judgment be the most effectual for the +total defeat of the enemy; either by reinforcing those parts of the +fleet which are opposed to superior force, or by attacking such parts +of the enemy's line as, by their weakness, may afford reasonable hopes +of their being easily broken, + +XXIV. When the signal (30) is made to extend the line from one +extremity of the enemy's line to the other, though the enemy have a +greater number of ships, the leading ship is to engage the leading +ship, and the sternmost ship the sternmost of the enemy; and the other +ships are, as far as their situation will admit, to engage the ships +of greatest force, leaving the weaker ships unattacked till the +stronger shall have been disabled.[8] + +XXV. If the admiral, or any commander of a squadron or division, shall +think fit to change his station in the line, in order to place himself +opposite to the admiral or the commander of a similar squadron or +division in the enemy's line, he will make the Signal 47 for quitting +the line in his own ship, without showing to what other part of the +line he means to go; the ships ahead or astern (as circumstances may +require) of the station opposed to the commander in the enemy's line +are then to close and make room for him to get into it. But if the +admiral, being withdrawn from the line, should think fit to return to +any particular place in it, he will make the signal No. 269 with the +distinguishing signal of his own ship, and soon after he will hoist +the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he means to +take, his station. And if he should direct by signal any other ship to +take a station in the line, he will also hoist the distinguishing +signal of the ship astern of which he would have her placed, if she is +not to take the station assigned her in the line of battle given out. + +XXVI. When the Signal 29 is made for each ship to steer for her +opponent in the enemy's line, the ships are to endeavour, by making or +shortening sail, to close with their opponents and bring them to +action at the same time; but they must be extremely careful not to +pass too near each other, nor to do anything which may risk their +running on board each other: they may engage as soon as they are well +closed with their opponents, and properly placed for that purpose. + +XXVII. When the Signal 28 is made, for ships to form as most +convenient, and attack the enemy as they get up with them; the ships +are to engage to windward or to leeward, as from the situation of the +enemy they shall find most advantageous; but the leading ships must be +very cautious not to suffer themselves to be drawn away so far from +the body of the fleet as to risk the being surrounded and cut off. + +XXVIII. When Signal 14 is made to prepare for battle and for +anchoring, the ships are to have springs on their bower anchors, and +the end of the sheet cable taken in at the stern port, with springs on +the anchor to be prepared for anchoring without winding if they should +go to the attack with the wind aft. The boats should be hoisted out +and hawsers coiled in the launches, with the stream anchor ready to +warp them into their stations, or to assist other ships which may be +in want of assistance. Their spare yards and topmasts, if they cannot +be left in charge of some vessel, should in moderate weather be lashed +alongside, near the water, on the off-side from the battery or ship to +be attacked. The men should be directed to lie down on the off side of +the deck from the enemy, whenever they are not wanted, if the ship +should be fired at as they advance to the attack. + +XXIX. When the line of battle has been formed as most convenient, +without regard to the prescribed form, the ships which happen to be +ahead of the centre are to be considered, for the time, as the +starboard division, and those astern of the centre as the larboard +division of the fleet; and if the triangular flag, white with a red +fly, be hoisted, the line is to be considered as being divided into +the same number of squadrons and divisions as in the established line +of battle. The ship which happens at the time to lead the fleet is to +be considered as the leader of the van squadron, and every other ship +which happens to be in the station of the leader of the squadron or +division is to be considered as being the leader of that squadron or +division, and the intermediate ships are to form the squadrons or +divisions of such leaders, and to follow them as long as the +triangular flag is flying, and every flag officer is to be considered +as the commander of the squadron or division in which he may be +accidentally placed. + +XXX. If the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in line +of battle, or is sailing by the wind in a line of bearing, the leading +ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and every +other ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible, till she has +got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought +it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft, +the sternmost ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, +and the other ships are to haul close to the wind till they have +brought the sternmost ship into their wake, or on the proper point of +bearing. + +XXXI. If Signal 27, to break through the enemy's line, be made without +a 'red pennant' being hoisted, it is evident that to obey it the line +of battle must be entirely broken; but if a 'red pennant' be hoisted +at either mast-head, that fleet is to preserve the line of battle as +it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close +order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an +opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet. + +If a signal of number be made immediately after this signal, it will +show the number of ships of the enemy's van or rear which the fleet is +to endeavour to cut off. If the closing of the enemy's line should +prevent the ships passing through the part pointed out, they are to +pass through as near to it as they can. + +If any of the ships should find it impracticable, in either of the +above cases, to pass through the enemy's line, they are to act in the +best manner that circumstances will admit of for the destruction of +the enemy. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Similar but not identical instructions are referred to in the +Signal Book of 1790. The above were reproduced in all subsequent +editions till the end of the war. + +[2] 'Ships to leeward to get in the admiral's wake.' + +[3] The instructions referred to are the 'General Instructions for the +conduct of the fleet.' They are the first of the various sets which the +Signal Book contained, and relate to books to be kept, boats, keeping +station, evolutions and the like. Article IX. is 'If from any cause +whatever a ship should find it impossible to keep her station in any +line or order of sailing, she is not to break the line or order by +persisting too long in endeavouring to preserve it; but she is to quit +the line and form in the rear, doing everything she can to keep up with +the fleet.' + +[4] See at p. 235, as to the new sailing formation in three columns. + +[5] It should be noted that this is an important advance on the +corresponding Article IX. of the previous instructions, and that it +contains a germ of the organisation of Nelson's Trafalgar memorandum. + +[6] The continued insistence on fireship tactics in this and Articles +XX. and XXI. should again be noted, although from 1793 to 1802 the +number of fireships on the Navy List averaged under four out of a total +that increased from 304 to 517. + +[7] It should be remembered that at this time there were no davits and +no boats hoisted up. They were all carried in-board. + +[8] This is a considerable modification of the signification of the +signal; see _supra_, p. 263. + + + +NELSON'S TACTICAL MEMORANDA + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The first of these often quoted memoranda is the 'Plan of Attack,' +usually assigned to May 1805, when Nelson was in pursuit of +Villeneuve, and it is generally accompanied by two erroneous diagrams +based on the number of ships which he then had under his command. But, +as Professor Laughton has ingeniously conjectured, it must really +belong to a time two years earlier, when Nelson was off Toulon in +constant hope of the French coming out to engage him.[1] The +strength and organisation of Nelson's fleet at that time, as well as +the numbers of the French fleet, exactly correspond to the data of the +memorandum. To Professor Laughton's argument may be added another, +which goes far actually to fix the date. The principal signal which +Nelson's second method of attack required was 'to engage to leeward.' +Now this signal as it stood in the Signal Book of 1799 was to some +extent ambiguous. It was No. 37, and the signification was 'to engage +the enemy on their larboard side, or to leeward if by the wind,' while +No. 36 was 'to engage the enemy on their starboard side if going +before the wind, or to windward if by the wind.' Accordingly we find +Nelson issuing a general order, with the object apparently of removing +the ambiguity, and of rendering any confusion between starboard and +larboard and leeward and windward impossible. It is in Nelson's order +book, under date November 22, 1803, and runs as follows: + +'If a pennant is shown over signal No. 36, it signifies that ships are +to engage on the enemy's starboard side, whether going large or upon a +wind. + +'If a pennant is shown in like manner over No. 37, it signifies that +ships are to engage on the enemy's larboard side, whether going large +or upon a wind. + +'These additions to be noted in the Signal Book in pencil only.'[2] + +The effect of this memorandum was, of course, that Nelson had it in +his power to let every captain know, without a shadow of doubt, under +all conditions of wind, on which side he meant to engage the enemy. + +To the evidence of the Signal Book may be added a passage in Nelson's +letter to Admiral Sir A. Ball from the Magdalena Islands, November 7, +1803. He there writes: 'Our last two reconnoiterings: Toulon has +eight sail of the line apparently ready for sea ... a seventy-four +repairing. Whether they intend waiting for her I can't tell, but I +expect them every hour to put to sea.'[3] He was thus expecting to +have to deal with eight or nine of the line, which is the precise +contingency for which the memorandum provides. There can be little +doubt therefore that it was issued while Nelson lay at Magdalena, the +first week in November 1803.[4] + +The second memorandum, which Nelson communicated to his fleet, soon +after he joined it off Cadiz, is regarded by universal agreement as +the high-water mark of sailing tactics. Its interpretation however, +and the dominant ideas that inspired it, no less than the degree to +which it influenced the battle and was in the mind of Nelson and his +officers at the time, are questions of considerable uncertainty. Some +of the most capable of his captains, as we shall see presently, even +disagreed as to whether Trafalgar was fought under the memorandum at +all. From the method in which the attack was actually made, so +different apparently from the method of the memorandum, some thought +Nelson had cast it aside, while others saw that it still applied. A +careful consideration of all that was said and done at the time gives +a fairly clear explanation of the divergence of opinion, and it will +probably be agreed that those officers who had a real feeling for +tactics saw that Nelson was making his attack on what were the +essential principles of the memorandum, while some on the other hand +who were possessed of less tactical insight did not distinguish +between what was essential and what was accidental in Nelson's great +conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that +he had abandoned his carefully prepared project. + +For those who did not entirely grasp Nelson's meaning there is much +excuse. We who are able to follow step by step the progress of +tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate +without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on +foot. It was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to +bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point +at which the Elizabethans had started. Surprise is sometimes expressed +that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in +broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical +system it demanded. Should not the wonder be the converse: that the +Elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the +greatest master of the art? The attack at Gravelines in 1588 with four +mutually supporting squadrons in échelon bears strong elementary +resemblance to that at Trafalgar in 1805. It was in dexterity and +precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference +lay. The first and the last great victory of the British navy had +certainly more in common with each other than either had with Malaga +or the First of June. In the zenith of their careers Nelson and Drake +came very near to joining hands. Little wonder then if many of +Nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound +idea. Naval officers in those days were left entirely without +theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and +Nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have +been a very lucid expositor. He thought they all understood what with +pardonable pride he called the 'Nelson touch.' The most sagacious and +best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some--and +Collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them--who only grasped some +of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant +conception. + +An analysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. In the +first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against +the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single +line. Secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the +primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line +ahead. Thirdly, there is the principle of throwing one squadron in +superior force upon one end of the enemy's formation, and using the +other squadrons to cover the attack or support it if need +arose. Fourthly, there is the principle of concealment--that is, +disposing the squadrons in such a manner that even after the real +attack has been delivered the enemy cannot tell what the containing +squadrons mean to do, and in consequence are forced to hold their +parrying move in suspense. The memorandum also included the idea of +concentration, and this is often spoken of as its conspicuous +merit. But in the idea of concentration there was nothing new, even if +we go back no further than Rodney. It was only the method of +concentration, woven out of his four fundamental innovations, that was +new. Moreover, as Nelson delivered the attack, he threw away the +simple idea of concentration. For a suddenly conceived strategical +object he deliberately exposed the heads of his columns to what with +almost any other enemy would have been an overwhelming superiority. On +the other hand, by making, as he did, a perpendicular instead of a +parallel attack, as he had intended, he accentuated--it is true at +enormous risk--the cardinal points of his design; that is, he departed +still further from the old order of battle, and he still further +concealed from the enemy what the real attack was to be, and after it +was developed what the containing squadron was going to do. +Concentration in fact was only the crude and ordinary raw material of +a design of unmatched subtlety and invention. + +The keynote of his conception, then, was his revolutionary +substitution of the primitive Elizabethan and early seventeenth +century method for the fetish of the single line. For some time it is +true the established battle order had been blown upon from various +quarters, but no one as yet had been able to devise any system +convincing enough to dethrone it. It will be remembered that at least +as early as 1759 an Additional Instruction had provided for a battle +order in two lines, but it does not appear ever to have been +used.[5] Rodney's manoeuvre again had foreshadowed the use of parts +of the line independently for the purpose of concentration and +containing. In 1782 Clerk of Eldin had privately printed his +_Essay_, which contained suggestions for an attack from to-windward, +with the line broken up into écheloned divisions in close +resemblance to the disposition laid down in Nelson's memorandum. In +1790 this part of his work was published. Meanwhile an even more +elaborate and well-reasoned assault on the whole principle of the +single line had appeared in France. In 1787 the Vicomte de Grenier, a +French flag officer, had produced his _L'Art de la Guerre sur +Mer_, in which he boldly attacked the law laid down by De Grasse, +that so long as men-of-war carried their main armament in broadside +batteries there could never be any battle order but the single line +ahead. In Grenier's view the English had already begun to discard it, +and he insists that, in all the actions he had seen in the last two +wars, the English, knowing the weakness of the single line, had almost +always concentrated on part of it without regular order. The radical +defects of the line he points out are: that it is easily thrown into +disorder and easily broken, that it is inflexible, and too extended a +formation to be readily controlled by signals. He then proceeds to +lay down the principle on which a sound battle order should be framed, +and the fundamental objects at which it should aim[6]. His +postulates are thus stated: + +'1. De rendre nulle une partie des forces de l'ennemi afin de +réunir toutes les siennes contre celles qui l'on attaque, ou qui +attaquent; et de vaincre ensuite le reste avec plus de facilité et +de certitude. + +'2. De ne présenter à l'ennemi aucune partie de son armée qui +ne soit flanquée et où il ne pût combattre et vaincre s'il +vouloit se porter sur les parties de cette armée reconnues faibles +jusqu'à présent.' + +Never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with +so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. The order, however, +which Grenier worked out--that of three lines of bearing disposed on +three sides of a lozenge--was somewhat fantastic and cumbrous, and it +seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete +neglect. It had even less effect on French tactics than had Nelson's +memorandum on our own. This is all the more curious, for so +thoroughly was the change that was coming over English tactics +understood in France that Villeneuve knew quite well the kind of +attack Nelson would be likely to make. In his General Instructions, +issued in anticipation of the battle, he says: 'The enemy will not +confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours.... They will +try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those +of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and +crush them.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Grasse, +and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than +awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.' + +In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at +Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking +in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working +out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency +which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's +manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself +with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of +the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a +sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of +the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad +and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7] + +The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we +follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the +genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was +hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a +system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known +this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet +commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard +on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the +lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be +formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my +command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by +separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are +strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order, +and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their +ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own +division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in +with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home +with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best +impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable +or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three +sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these +sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to +pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it +could.'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this +organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his +captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still +there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same +time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the +striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate +divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan +admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been +broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by +divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and +Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which +he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the +signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag +officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own +division and make any signals he thought proper. + +But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other +alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in +order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as +follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At +No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack +the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen +ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be +present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.' +No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's +rear.'[10] + +Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing +his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon +which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of +battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional +leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting +are the elements of surprise and containing. + +These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five +years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French +fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it +and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on +the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the +attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in +the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's +knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an +equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and +engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own; +and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before +it can do him any damage. + +Thus, taking together the general order of 1798 and the Toulon +memorandum of 1803, we can see all the tactical ideas that were +involved at Trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to +appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the +sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them +all into play without complication or risk of mistake. This process, +which crowns Nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of +all time, we must now follow in detail. + +Shortly before he left England for the last time, he communicated to +Keats, of the Superb, a full explanation of his views as they then +existed in his mind, and Keats has preserved it in the following paper +which Nicolas printed. + +'Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Nelson and Admiral Sir +Richard Keats, the last time he was in England before the battle of +Trafalgar.[11] + +'One morning, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds of Merton, +talking on naval matters, he said to me, "No day can be long enough to +arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to +the old system. When _we_ meet them" (I was to have been with +him), "for meet them we shall, I'll tell you how I shall fight them. I +shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division +shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked +ships, which I shall keep always to windward or in a situation of +advantage, and I shall put them under an officer who, I am sure, will +employ them in the manner I wish, if possible. I consider it will +always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part I choose; +but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the enemy +where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually +and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have +followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which I +could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished +service).[12] He continued, "With the remaining part of the fleet, +formed in two lines, I shall go at them at once if I can, about one +third of their line from their leading ship." He then said, "What do +you think of it?" Such a question I felt required consideration. I +paused. Seeing it he said, "But I will tell you what _I_ think +of it. I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They won't +know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and +that is what I want."[13] + +Here we have something roughly on all-fours with the methods of the +First Dutch War. There are the three squadrons, the headlong 'charge' +and the _mêlée_. The reserve squadron to windward goes even +further back, to the treatise of De Chaves and the Instructions of +Lord Lisle in 1545. It was no wonder it took away Keats's breath. The +return to primitive methods was probably unconscious, but what was +obviously uppermost in Nelson's mind was the breaking up of the +established order in single line, leading by surprise and concealment +to a decisive _mêlée_. He seems to insist not so much upon +defeating the enemy by concentration as by throwing him into +confusion, upsetting his mental equilibrium in accordance with the +primitive idea. The notion of concentration is at any rate secondary, +while the subtle scheme for 'containing' as perfected in the +memorandum is not yet developed. As he explained his plan to Keats, he +meant to attack at once with both his main divisions, using the +reserve squadron as a general support. There is no clear statement +that he meant it as a 'containing' force, though possibly it was in +his mind.[14] + +There is one more piece of evidence relating to this time when he was +still in England. According to this story Lord Hill, about 1840, when +still Commander-in-Chief, was paying a visit to Lord Sidmouth. His +host, who, better known as Addington, had been prime minister till +1804, and was in Pitt's new cabinet till July 1805, showed him a table +bearing a Nelson inscription. He told him that shortly before leaving +England to join the fleet Nelson had drawn upon it after dinner a plan +of his intended attack, and had explained it as follows: 'I shall +attack in two lines, led by myself and Collingwood, and I am confident +I shall capture their van and centre or their centre and rear.' +'Those,' concluded Sidmouth, 'were his very words,' and remarked how +wonderfully they had been fulfilled.[15] Hill and Sidmouth at the +time were both old men and the authority is not high, but so far as it +goes it would tend to show that an attack in two lines instead of one +was still Nelson's dominant idea. It cannot however safely be taken as +evidence that he ever intended a concentration on the van, though in +view of the memorandum of 1803 this is quite possible. + +Finally, there is the statement of Clarke and McArthur that Nelson +before leaving England deposited a copy of his plan with Lord Barham, +the new first lord of the admiralty. This however is very +doubtful. The Barham papers have recently been placed at the disposal +of the Society, in the hands of Professor Laughton, and the only copy +of the memorandum he has been able to find is an incomplete one +containing several errors of transcription, and dated the Victory, +October 11, 1805. In the absence of further evidence therefore no +weight can be attached to the oft-repeated assertion that Nelson had +actually drawn up his memorandum before he left England. + +Coming now to the time when he had joined the fleet off Cadiz, the +first light we have is the well-known letter of October 1 to Lady +Hamilton. In this letter, after telling her that he had joined on +September 28, but had not been able to communicate with the fleet till +the 29th, he says, 'When I came to explain to them the _Nelson +touch_ it was like an electric shock. Some shed tears and all +approved. It was new--it was singular--it was simple.' What he meant +exactly by the 'Nelson touch' has never been clearly explained, but he +could not possibly have meant either concentration or the attack on +the enemy's rear, for neither of these ideas was either new or +singular. + +On October 3 he writes to her again: 'The reception I met with on +joining the fleet caused the sweetest sensation of my life.... As +soon as these emotions were past I laid before them the plan I had +previously arranged for attacking the enemy, and it was not only my +pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and +understood.'[16] + +The next point to notice is the 'Order of Battle and Sailing' given by +Nicolas. It is without date, but almost certainly must have been drawn +up before Nelson joined. It does not contain the Belleisle, which +Nelson knew on October 4 was to join him.[17] It also does include +the name of Sir Robert Calder and his flagship, and on September 30 +Nelson had decided to send both him and his ship home.[18] + +The order is for a fleet of forty sail, but the names of only +thirty-three are given, which were all Nelson really expected to get +in time. The remarkable feature of this order is that it contains no +trace of the triple organisation of the memorandum. The 'advanced +squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions +only. + +Then on October 9, after Calder had gone, there is this entry in +Nelson's private diary: 'Sent Admiral Collingwood the Nelson touch.' +It was enclosed in a letter in which Nelson says: 'I send you my Plan +of Attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain +position the enemy may be found in. But, my dear friend, it is to +place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give +full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' The same +day Collingwood replies, 'I have a just sense of your lordship's +kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me +inspires me with the most lively gratitude. I hope it will not be long +before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has +not been misplaced.' On these two letters there can be little doubt +that the 'Plan of Attack' which Nelson enclosed was that of the +memorandum. The draft from which Nicolas printed appears to have been +dated October 9, and originally had in one passage 'you' and 'your' +for the 'second in command,' showing that Nelson in his mind was +addressing his remarks to Collingwood, though subsequently he altered +the sentence into the third person. Only one other copy was known to +Nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to Captain Hope, of +the Defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in Collingwood s +squadron, but Codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the +captains.[19] + +So far, then, we have the case thus--that whatever Nelson may have +really told Lord Sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when +he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by October 9 +reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to Keats. Meanwhile, +however, his conception had ripened. There are marked changes in +organisation, method and intention. In organisation the reserve +squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or +one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third--reduced, +that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important +independent action. In method we have, instead of an attack with the +two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering +it. In intention we have as the primary function of the reserve +squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main +divisions as circumstances may dictate. + +The natural inference from these important changes is that Nelson's +conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength, +the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to +be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and +except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is +practically just what Clerk of Eldin had recommended and what actually +happened in the battle. It is a clear advance upon the original idea +as explained to Keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on +the primitive and indefinite plan of De Chaves and Lord Lisle as a +general reserve. It also explains Nelson's covering letter to +Collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the +pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the +general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second +in command. How largely this idea of independent control entered into +the 'Nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in +no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum. + +Such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as +enunciated in its opening paragraphs. He then proceeds to elaborate +it in two detailed plans of attack--one from to-leeward and the other +from to-windward. It was the latter he meant to make if possible. He +calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening +enunciation. The organisation is triple, but no special function is +assigned to the reserve squadron. The actual attack on the enemy's +rear is to be made by Collingwood, while Nelson with his own division +and the reserve is to cover him. In the event of an attack having to +be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. Here the containing +movement practically disappears. The fleet is still to attack the rear +and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent +divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three +points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the +severed line. To none of the divisions is assigned the duty of +containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. It is to be +dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still +capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'The whole +impression,' as Nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from +to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of +the centre to the rearmost ship. He does not say, however, that this +was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from +to-windward. 'The whole impression' there appears to be for +Collingwood to overpower the rear while Nelson with the other two +divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the +particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design +is left undetermined. + +The important point, then, in considering the relation between the +actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for +two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the +enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. The somewhat +illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly +important distinction. For Nelson interpolates between his explanation +of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his +explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not +apply. That some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his +best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves. + +After the battle Captain Harvey, of the Téméraire, whom Nelson +had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'It was noon before +the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions +given us by Lord Nelson.... Lord Nelson had given me leave to lead and +break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' _i.e._ two or +three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for +the leeward attack but not for the windward. + +On the other hand we have Captain Moorsom, of the Revenge, who was in +Collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. Writing to his +father on December 4, he says, 'I have seen several plans of the +action, but none to answer my ideas of it. A regular plan was laid +down by Lord Nelson some time before the action but not acted on. His +great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should +make off to Cadiz before he could get near them.' And on November 1, +to the same correspondent he had written, 'I am not certain that our +mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' Here then we have +two of Nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether +or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which +Nelson laid down. + +Captain Moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study +written by his son, Vice-Admiral Constantine Moorsom.[20] His remarks +on Trafalgar were presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived +till 1835. In his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the +scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he +thinks were due to what he calls the _morale_ of the enemy's +attitude--that is, that Nelson was afraid they were going to slip +through his fingers into Cadiz. The change of plan--meaning presumably +the change from the triple to the dual organisation--he thinks was not +due to the reduced numbers which Nelson actually had under his flag, +for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as +that of his hypothesis. + +The interesting testimony of Lieutenant G.L. Browne, who, as Admiral +Jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the Victory and +had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the Moorsoms.[21] +After explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established +method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an +opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum, +he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly +perceive not an instant of time could be lost. The frequent +communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in +possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known +to every officer of the fleet. Some will not fail to attribute +rashness to the conduct of Lord Nelson. But he well considered the +importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has +frequently said since we left England that, should he be so fortunate +as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on +the one side or the other.' + +Next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating +criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who +was present.' Sir Charles Ekin quotes it anonymously; but from +internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an +officer of the Conqueror, though clearly not her captain, Israel +Pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written. +Whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the +tactical basis of Nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and +he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet +unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering +his attack in line abreast as he intended. It might well have been +done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than +actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action. Loss +of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only +reason he could suppose for the change of plan. If they had all gone +down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been +more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally +borne. Nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the +memorandum if it had only been properly executed. An attack in two +great divisions with a squadron of observation--so he summarises the +'Nelson touch'--seemed to him to combine every precaution under all +circumstances. It allows of concentration and containing. Each ship +can use her full speed without fear of being isolated. The fastest +ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which +from their speed in passing are liable to the least damage, while +having passed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their +slower comrades. Finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid +action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase. But as Nelson +actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of +these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must +have been crushed as she came into action. Instead of doubling +ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on. Nelson in +fact presented the enemy's fleet with precisely the position which the +memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves--that is to say, he +suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the Victory, +Téméraire, Royal Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus, and +Bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[22] + +The last important witness is Captain Codrington, of the Orion. No one +seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact, +coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives +peculiar weight to his testimony. It is on the question of the +advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting. On +October 19 at 8 P.M., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced +by Nelson's signal for a general chase, and were steering for the +enemy, as he says, 'under every stitch of sail we can set,' he sat +down to write to his wife. In the course of the letter he tells her, +'Defence and Agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to +Cadiz; ... Colossus and Mars are stationed next. The above four and as +many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and I trust by +the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.' +Clearly then Nelson must have issued some modification of the dual +'order of battle and sailing.' Many years later in a note upon the +battle which Codrington dictated to his daughter, Lady Bourchier, he +says that on the 20th, in spite of Collingwood's advice to attack at +once, Nelson 'continued waiting upon them in two columns according to +the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was +given out to all the captains.'[23] Later still, when a veteran of +seventy-six years, he gave to Sir Harris Nicolas another note which +shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy +between the dual and the triple organisation. It runs as follows: 'In +Lord Nelson's memorandum of October 9, 1805, he refers to "an advanced +squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships" to be added +to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required; +and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut +through "two, three or four ships of the enemy's centre so as to +ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must +be made to capture";[24] and he afterwards twice speaks of the +enemy's van coming to succour their rear. Now I am under the +impression that I was expressly instructed by Lord Nelson (referring +to the probability of the enemy's van coming down upon us), being in +the Orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would +probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or +retard it.' Here then would seem to be still further confusion, due +to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of +attack. According to this statement Codrington believed the advanced +squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while Nelson with +his division contained the van. But curiously enough in a similar +note, printed by Lady Bourchier on Nicolas's authority, there is a +difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for, +seems to give the truer version of what Codrington really said. It is +there stated that Codrington told Nicolas he was strongly impressed +with the belief 'that Lord Nelson directed eight of the smaller and +handier ships, of which the Orion was one, to be ready to haul out of +the line in case the enemy's van should appear to go down to the +assistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them: that to +prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy Lord Nelson intimated +his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,' +&c. There is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of +duties which Nelson intended for the windward attack--that is, the +advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended +to assist it by himself making a feint on the enemy's van before +delivering his true attack on the centre.[25] + +From Codrington's evidence it is at any rate clear that some time +before the 19th Nelson had told off an 'advanced squadron' as provided +for in his memorandum, and that the ships that were forming the +connection between the fleet and the frigates before Cadiz formed part +of it. Now Nelson had begun to tell off these ships as early as the +4th. On that day he wrote to Captain Duff, of the Mars, 'I have to +desire you will keep with the Mars, Defence and Colossus from three to +four leagues between the fleet and Cadiz in order that I may get +information from the frigates stationed off that port as expeditiously +as possible.' On the 11th, writing to Sir Alexander Ball at Malta, he +speaks of having 'an advanced squadron of fast sailing ships between +me and the frigates.' The Agamemnon (64) was added on the 14th, the +day after she joined. On that day Nelson entered in his private diary, +'Placed Defence and Agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of Cadiz, +and Mars and Colossus four leagues east of the fleet,' &c,[26] On the +15th he wrote to Captain Hope, of the Defence: 'You will with the +Agamemnon take station west from Cadiz from seven to ten leagues, by +which means if the enemy should move I hope to have constant +information, as two or three ships will be kept as at present between +the fleet and your two ships.'[27] + +On the 12th he writes to Collingwood, of the Belleisle, the fastest +two-decker in the fleet, as though she too were an advanced ship, and +on the morning of the 19th he tells him the Leviathan was to relieve +the Defence, whose water had got low. Later in the day, when Mars and +Colossus had passed on the signal that the enemy was out, he ordered +'Mars, Orion, Belleisle, Leviathan, Bellerophon and Polyphemus to go +ahead during the night.'[28] On the eve of the battle therefore these +six ships, with Colossus and Agamemnon, made up the squadron of eight +specified on the memorandum. + +The conclusion then is that, though some of the ships destined to form +the advanced squadron had not arrived by the 9th when the memorandum +was issued, Nelson had already taken steps to organise it, and that on +the evening of the 19th, the first moment he had active contact with +the enemy, it was detached from the fleet as a separate unit. Up to +this moment it would look as though he had intended to use it as his +memorandum directed. Since with the exception of the Agamemnon and +the Leviathan, which had only temporarily replaced the Defence while +she watered, the whole of the ships named belonged to Collingwood's +division, the resulting organisation would have been, lee-line nine +ships, weather-line eight ships, and eight for the advanced +squadron--an organisation which in relative proportion was almost +exactly that which he had explained to Keats. It would therefore still +have rendered Nelson's original plan of attack possible, although it +did not preserve the balance of the divisions prescribed in the +memorandum. + +There can be little doubt, however, that Nelson on the morning of the +battle did abandon the idea of the advanced squadron altogether. Early +on the 20th it was broken up again. At 8 o'clock in the morning of +that day the captains of the Mars, Colossus and Defence (which +apparently was by this time ready again for service) were called on +board the Victory and ordered out to form a chain as before between +the admiral and his frigates.[29] The rest presumably resumed their +stations in the fleet. Even if he had not actually abandoned this part +of his plan, it is clear that in his hurry to attack Nelson would not +spend time in reforming the squadron as a separate unit, but chose +rather to carry out his design, so far as was possible, with two +divisions only. So soon as he sighted the enemy's fleet at daylight on +the 21st, he made the signal to form the line of battle in two +columns, and with one exception the whole of the advanced ships took +station in their respective divisions according to the original order +of battle and sailing.'[30] The exception was Codrington's ship, the +Orion. No importance however need be attached to this, for although he +was originally in Collingwood's division he may well have been +transferred to Nelson's some time before. It is only worthy of remark +because Codrington, of all the advanced squadron captains, was the +only one, so far as we know, who still considered the squadron a +potential factor in the fleet and acted accordingly. While Belleisle, +Mars, Bellerophon and Colossus rushed into the fight in the van of +Collingwood's line, Orion in the rear of Nelson's held her fire even +when she got into action, and cruised about the _mêlée_, carefully +seeking points where she could do most damage to an enemy, or best +help an overmatched friend--well-judged piece of service, on which he +dwells in his correspondence over and over again with pardonable +complacency. He was thus able undoubtedly to do admirable service in +the crisis of the action. + +That the bulk of his colleagues thought all idea of a reserve squadron +had been abandoned by Nelson is clear, and the resulting change was +certainly great enough to explain why some of the captains thought the +plan of the memorandum had been abandoned altogether. For not only was +the attack made in two divisions instead of one, and in line ahead +instead of line abreast, but its prescribed balance was entirely +upset. Instead of Nelson having the larger portion of the fleet for +containing the van and centre, Collingwood had the larger portion for +the attack on the rear. In other words, instead of the advanced +squadron being under Nelson's direction, the bulk of it was attached +to Collingwood. If some heads--even as clear as Codrington's--were +puzzled, it is little wonder. + +As to the way in which this impulsive change of plan was brought +about, Codrington says, 'They [the enemy] suddenly wore round so as to +have Cadiz under their lee, with every appearance of a determination +to go into that port. Lord Nelson therefore took advantage of their +confusion in wearing, and bore down to attack them with the fleet in +two columns.' This was in the note dictated to Lady Bourchier, and in +a letter of October 28, 1805, to Lord Garlies he says, 'We all +scrambled into battle as soon as we could.'[31] + +Codrington's allusion to Nelson's alleged feint on the enemy's van +brings us to the last point; the question, that is, as to whether, +apart from the substitution of the perpendicular for the parallel +attack, and in spite of the change of balance, the two lines were +actually handled in the action according to the principles of the +memorandum for the intended attack from to-windward. + +Lady Bourchier's note continues, after referring to Nelson's intention +to make a feint on the van, 'The Victory did accordingly haul to port: +and though she took in her larboard and weather studding sails, she +kept her starboard studding sails set (notwithstanding they had become +the lee ones and were shaking), thus proving that he proposed to +resume his course, as those sails would be immediately wanted to get +the Victory into her former station.' The note in Nicolas is to the +same effect, but adds that Codrington had no doubt that having taken +in his weather studding sails he kept the lee ones 'set and shaking in +order to make it clear to the fleet that his movement was merely a +feint, and that the Victory would speedily resume her course and +fulfil his intention of cutting through the centre.' And in admiration +of the movement Codrington called his first lieutenant and said, 'How +beautifully the admiral is carrying his design into effect!' Though +all this was written long after, when his memory perhaps was fading, +it is confirmed by a contemporary entry in his log: 'The Victory, +after making a feint as of attacking the enemy's van, hauled to +starboard so as to reach their centre.'[32] This is all clear enough +so far, but now we have to face a signal mentioned in the log of the +Euryalus which, as she was Nelson's repeating frigate, cannot be +ignored. According to this high authority Nelson, about a quarter of +an hour before making his immortal signal, telegraphed 'I intend to +push or go through the end of the enemy's line to prevent them from +getting into Cadiz.' It is doubtful how far this signal was taken in, +but those who saw it must have thought that Nelson meant to execute +Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's leading ships. At this time, +according to the master of the Victory, he was standing for the +enemy's van. Nelson also signalled to certain ships to keep away a +point to port. The Victory's log has this entry: 'At 4 minutes past 12 +opened our fire on the enemy's van, in passing down their line.' At 30 +minutes past 12 the Victory got up with Villeneuve's flagship and then +broke through the line. Now at first sight it might appear that Nelson +really intended to attack the van and not the centre, on the principle +of Hoste's old manoeuvre which Howe had reintroduced into the Signal +Book for attacking a numerically superior fleet--that is, van to van +and rear to rear, leaving the enemy's centre unoccupied.[33] For the +old signal provided that when this was done 'the flag officers are, if +circumstances permit, to engage the flag officers of the enemy,' which +was exactly what Nelson was doing. On this supposition his idea would +be that his ships should attack the enemy ahead of Villeneuve as they +came up. And this his second, the Téméraire, actually did. +But, as we have seen by Instruction XXIV. of 1799, the old rule of +1790 had been altered, and if Nelson intended to execute Hoste's plan +of attack he, as 'leading ship,' would or should have engaged the +enemy's 'leading ship,' leaving the rest as they could to engage the +enemy of 'greatest force.' The only explanation is that, if he really +intended to attack the van, he again changed his mind when he fetched +up with Villeneuve, and could not resist engaging him. More probably, +however, the signal was wrongly repeated by the Euryalus, and as made +by Nelson it was really an intimation to Collingwood that he meant to +cover the attack on the rear and centre by a feint on the van.[34] + +However this may be, the French appear to have regarded Nelson's +movement to port as a real attack. Their best account (which is also +perhaps the best account that exists) says that just before coming +into gun-shot the two British columns began to separate. The leading +vessels of Nelson's column, it says, passed through the same interval +astern of the Bucentaure, and then it tells how 'les vaisseaux de +queue de cette colonne, au contraire, serrèrent un peu le vent, +comme pour s'approcher des vaisseaux de l'avant-garde de la flotte +combinée: mais après avoir reçu quelques bordées de ces +vaisseaux ils abandonnérent ce dessein et se portèrent vers les +vaisseaux placés entre le Redoutable et la Santa Anna ou vinrent +unir leurs efforts à ceux des vaisseaux anglais qui combattaient +déjà le Bucentaure et la Santísima Trinidad.'[35] This is to +some extent confirmed by Dumanoir himself, who commanded the allied +van, in his official memorandum addressed to Decrès, December 30, +1809. In defending his failure to tack sooner to Villeneuve's relief, +he says, 'Au commencement du combat, la colonne du Nord [_i.e._ +Nelson's] se dirigea sur l'avant-garde qui engagea avec elle pendant +quarante minutes.'[36] In partial corroboration of this there is the +statement in the log of the Téméraire, the ship that was +immediately behind Nelson, that she opened her fire on the +Santísima Trinidad and the two ships ahead of her; that is, she +engaged the ships ahead of where Nelson broke the line, so that +Captain Harvey as well as Dumanoir may have believed that Nelson +intended his real attack to be on 'the end of the line.' + +In the face of these facts it is impossible to say categorically that +Nelson intended nothing but a feint on the van. It is equally +impossible to say he intended a real attack. The point perhaps can +never be decided with absolute certainty, but it is this very +uncertainty that brings out the true merit and the real lesson of +Nelson's attack. As we now may gather from his captains' opinions, its +true merit was not that he threw his whole fleet on part of a superior +enemy--that was a commonplace in tactics. It was not concentration on +the rear, for that also was old; and what is more, as the attack was +delivered, so far from Nelson concentrating, he boldly, almost +recklessly, exposed himself for a strategical object to what should +have been an overwhelming concentration on the leading ships of his +two columns. The true merit of it above all previous methods of +concentration and containing was that, whether, as planned or as +delivered, it prevented the enemy from knowing on which part of their +line Nelson intended to throw his squadron, just as we are prevented +from knowing to this day. 'They won't know what I am about' were his +words to Keats. + +The point is clearer still when we compare the different ways in which +Nelson and Collingwood brought their respective columns into +action. Collingwood in his Journal says that shortly before 11 +o'clock, that is, an hour before getting into action, he signalled +'for the lee division to form the larboard line of bearing.' The +effect and intention of this would be that each ship in his division +would head on the shortest course to break the enemy's line in all +parts. It was the necessary signal for enabling him to carry out +regularly Howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's rear, and his object was +declared for all to see.[37] Nelson, on the other hand, made no such +signal, but held on in line ahead, giving no indication of whether he +intended to perform the manoeuvre on the van or the centre, or whether +he meant to cut the line in line ahead. Until they knew which it was +to be, it was impossible for the enemy to take any step to concentrate +with either division, and thus Nelson held them both immobile while +Collingwood flung himself on his declared objective. + +Nothing could be finer as a piece of subtle tactics. Nothing could be +more daring as a well-judged risk. The risk was indeed enormous, +perhaps the greatest ever taken at sea. Hawke risked much at Quiberon, +and much was risked at the Nile. But both were sea-risks of the class +to which our seamen were enured. At Trafalgar it was a pure +battle-risk--a mad, perpendicular attack in which every recognised +tactical card was in the enemy's hand. But Nelson's judgment was +right. He knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual +shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw +dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed. As +Jurien de la Gravière has most wisely said 'Le génie de Nelson +c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.' + +Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the +strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather, +there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the +Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by +unnecessary haste. The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack +before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case +the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he +acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. The confusion +of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a +duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre +that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which +Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it +deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was, +every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or +trebled on. It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the +English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he +given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle +order would have been only the weaker. Had he taken time to form his +own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little +later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the +victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the +sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less, +if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, p. 382. + +[2] Nicolas, _Nelson's Despatches_, v. 287, note. It is also given in +vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated. + +[3] _Ibid._ v. 283. + +[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (_op. cit._) that the conditions +will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been 'earlier, +certainly not later.' + +[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for +anything but tactical exercises. Morogues has a similar signal and +instruction (_Tactique Navale_, p. 294, ed. 1779), 'Partager l'armée en +deux corps, ou mettre l'armée sur deux colonnes; et représentation d'un +combat.' Anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet +against the other during his tactical exercises in 1747. Warren to +Anson, _Add. MSS._ 15957, p. 172. + +[6] Mathieu-Dumas, _Précis des Evénements Militaires_, xiii. 193. + +[7] Captain Boswall, in the preface to his translation of Hoste, says +Grenier's work was translated in 1790. If this was so Nelson may well +have read it, but I have not been able to find a copy of the translation +either in the British Museum or elsewhere. + +[8] Ross, _Memoir of Saumarez_, i. 212. + +[9] Laughton, _Nelson's Letters and Despatches_, 150. + +[10] No. 182 as it stood in the signal book meant, Ships before in tow +to proceed to port. No. 183. When at anchor to veer to twice the length +of cable. No. 16. Secret instructions to be opened. + +[11] It was in the handwriting, Nicolas says, of Edward Hawke Locker, +Esq., the naval biographer and originator of the naval picture gallery +at Greenwich. He endorsed it, 'Copy of a paper communicated to me by Sir +Richard Keats, and allowed by him to be transcribed by me, 1st October, +1829.' + +[12] It was certainly not Keats himself, though afterwards Nelson meant +to offer him command of the squadron he intended to detach into the +Mediterranean. In the expected battle Keats, had he arrived in time, was +to have been Nelson's 'second' in the line. _Nelson to Sir Alexander +Ball_, October 15, 1805. + +[13] _Nelson's Despatches_, vii. 241, note. + +[14] Nelson's 'advance squadron' must not be confused with the idea of +a reserve squadron which Gravina pressed on Villeneuve at the famous +Cadiz council of war before Trafalgar. Gravina's idea was nothing but +the old one of a reserve of superfluous ships after equalising the line, +as provided by the old English Fighting Instructions and recommended by +Morogues. + +[15] Sidney, _Life of Lord Hill_, p. 368. + +[16] Clarke and McArthur say the letter was to Lady Hamilton. Nicolas, +reprinting from the _Naval Chronicle_, has the addressee's name blank. + +[17] Nelson to Captain Duff, October 4. The order to take her under his +command was despatched on September 20. Same to Marsden, October 10. + +[18] Same to Lord Barham, September 30. + +[19] See the note on Trafalgar dictated by him in _Memoirs of Sir +Edward Codrington_, edited by Lady Bourchier, 1873. + +[20] _On the Principles of Naval Tactics_, 1846. + +[21] _Great Sea Fights_, ii. 196, note. + +[22] See _post_, p. 357 Appendix, where this interesting paper is set +out in full. + +[23] _Life of Codrington_, ii. 57-8. + +[24] It should be noted that the memorandum only enjoins this for an +attack from to-leeward, and not for the 'intended attack' from +to-windward. + +[25] See _Nelson's Despatches_, vii. 154; _Life of Codrington_, ii. 77. + +[26] Nicolas, vii. 122. Before this Mars and Colossus had had the +inside station. See Nelson to Collingwood, October 12. + +[27] _Ibid._, vii. 122. + +[28] Nicolas, vii. 115, 129, 133. + +[29] Memorandum and Private Diary, Nicolas, pp. 136-7. + +[30] Some doubt has been expressed as to the signals with which Nelson +opened at daybreak on the 21st. But their actual numbers are recorded in +the logs of the Mars, Defiance, Conqueror and Bellerophon, and all but +the first in the log of the Euryalus repeating frigate. They were No. +72: 'To form order of sailing in two columns or divisions of the fleet,' +which, by the memorandum was also to be the order of battle; No. 76, +with compass signal ENE, 'when lying by or sailing by the wind to bear +up and sail large on the course pointed out'; No. 13, Prepare for +battle. Collingwood has in his journal: 'At 6.30 the commander-in-chief +made the signal to form order of sailing in two columns, and at 7.0 to +prepare for battle. At 7.40 to bear up east.' + +[31] _Life of Codrington_, ii. 59, 60. + +[32] _Great Sea Fights_, ii. 278. + +[33] A veteran French officer of the old wars took this view of +Nelson's threat in a study of the battle which he wrote. 'Nelson,' he +says, 'a d'abord feint de vouloir attaquer la tête et la queue de +l'armée. Ensuite il a rassemblé ses forces sur son centre, et a +abandonné le sort de la bataille à l'intelligence de ses capitaines.' +Mathieu-Dumas, _Précis des Evénements Militaires_, xiv. 408. + +[34] The only trace of notice having been taken by anyone of a signal +from Nelson at the time stated was Collingwood's impatient remark when +Nelson began to telegraph 'England expects,' &c. 'I wish Nelson would +stop signalling,' he is reported to have said. 'We all know well enough +what we have to do,' as though Nelson had been signalling something just +before. + +[35] _Monuments des Victoires et Conguêtes des Français_ from Nicolas, +vii. 271. It was also adopted by Mathieu-Dumas (_op. cit._ xiii. p. 178) +as the best and most impartial account. He says it was written by a +French naval officer called Parisot. + +[36] Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, ii. 220, note. + +[37] This highly important signal appears to have been generally +overlooked in accounts of the action. Yet Collingwood's journal is so +precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. Agamemnon +in Nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. Her +log says, 'Answered signal No. 50'--that is, 'To keep on the larboard +line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. Ditto starboard +bearing if on larboard tack.' Captain Moorsom also says, 'My station was +sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the Revenge sailed well +Admiral Collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him +which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' No +other ship records the signal. Probably few saw it, for in the +memorandum which Collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on +the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals +of their divisional commander. See _post_, pp. 324 and 329. + +[38] Collingwood to Marsden, October 22. same to Parker, November 1. +Same to Pasley, December 16, 1805. + +[39] See _supra_, p. 119. Villeneuve saw this. In his official despatch +from the Euryalus, November 5, he says 'Notre formation s'effectuait +avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prévoyais +que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irrégularité même dans notre ligne +ne me paraissait pas un inconvénient.'--Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres +Maritimes_, ii. 384. + + + +_LORD NELSON_, 1803. + +[+Clarke and McArthur, Life of Nelson, ii. 427+.[1]] + +_Plan of Attack_. + + +The business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's +fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (I mean that +of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as +possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating +until the business is decided), I am sensible beyond this object it is +not necessary that I should say a word, being fully assured that the +admirals and captains of the fleet I have the honour to command will, +knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply +any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond +those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably +from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to +make. Therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few +words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for +me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory +of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all +Europe, from French tyranny and oppression. + +If the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is +necessary, the less the better. A day is soon lost in that +business. Therefore I will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being +to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that I am nearly ahead of +them standing on the larboard tack. Of course I should, weather +them. The weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale +of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and +probably no decisive action would take place with the whole +fleet.[2] + +Two modes present themselves: one to stand on just out of gun-shot, +until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the +enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and] +engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy, +passing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line. This +would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery +and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be +decisive. The second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as +they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should +they persist in mixing with our ships. + +The other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail +directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from +knowing whether I should pass to leeward or to windward of him. In +that situation I would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, +and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing +very close. They being on a wind and you going large could cut their +line when you please. The van ships of the enemy would, by the time +our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van +could not expect to escape damage. I would then have our _rear_ +ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with +either the van ship or the second as it might appear most eligible +from her crippled state; and this mode pursued I see nothing to +prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. The +two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear; +and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably +than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and +at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. And +by that time I believe the battle would, from the judgment of the +admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. Signals from +these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his +duty. The great object is for us to support each other, and to keep +close to the enemy and to leeward of him. + +If the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be +to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to +pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire +into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged +notice of your intention. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] From the original in the St. Vincent Papers. Also in Nicolas, +_Despatches and Letters_, vi. 443. Obvious mistakes in punctuation have +been corrected in the text. + +[2] _Cf._ the similar remark of De Chaves, _supra_, p. 5. + + + +_LORD NELSON_, 1805. + +[+Nicolas, Despatches and Letters, vii.+[1]] + +_Memorandum_. + +_Secret_. Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805. + + +Thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the +line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other +circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the +opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in +such a manner as to make the business decisive; I have therefore made +up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the +exception of the first and second in command), that the order of +sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines +of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the +fastest sailing two-decked ships, _which_ will always make, if +wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the +commander-in-chief may direct. + +The second in command will,[2] after _my_ intentions are made +known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the +attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are +captured or destroyed. + +If the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and +that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[3] they +will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their +rear. + +I should therefore probably make the second in command's[4] signal, +to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever +he[5] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced). My line +would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to +cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to +ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must +be made to capture. + +The whole impression of the British fleet must be to overpower from +two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be +in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. I will suppose twenty sail +of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they +could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any +part of the British fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; +which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships +engaged.[6] + +Something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight +beyond all others. Shots will carry away the masts[7] and yards of +friends as well as foes; but I look with confidence to a victory +before the van of the enemy could succour their rear;[8] and then +the British fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty +sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make +off. + +If the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward +of the British fleet; if the enemy wears, the British must place +themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled British +ships; and should the enemy close, I have no fears as to the result. + +The second in command will, in all possible things, direct the +movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the +circumstances will admit. Captains are to look to their particular +line as their rallying point. But in case signals can neither be seen +nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places +his ship alongside that of an enemy. + +Of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of +battle ready to attack. + +[Illustration][9] + +The divisions of the British fleet[10] will be brought nearly within +gunshot of the enemy's centre. The signal will most probably be made +for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even +steering sails[11] in order to get as quickly as possible to the +enemy's line and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from +the enemy's rear.[12] Some ships may not get through their exact +place; but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if +any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually +complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.[13] + +Should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the +twelve ships, composing in the first position the enemy's rear, are to +be _the_ object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise +directed by the commander-in-chief; which is scarcely to be expected, +as the entire management of the lee line, after the intention of the +commander-in-chief is signified, is intended to be left to the +judgment of the admiral commanding that line. + +The remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left +to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavour to +take care that the movements of the second in command are as little +interrupted as possible. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] Sir Harris Nicolas states that he took his text from an 'Autograph +[he means holograph] draught in the possession of Vice-Admiral Sir +George Mundy, K.C.B., except the words in italics which were added by +Mr. Scott, Lord Nelson's secretary: and from the original issued to +Captain Hope of the Defence, now in possession of his son, Captain Hope, +R.N.' + +[2] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'in fact command his +line and.'--Nicolas. + +[3] Lord Nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'I shall suppose +them forty-six sail in the line of battle.'--Nicolas. + +[4] Originally 'your' but deleted.--_Ibid_. + +[5] Originally 'you' but deleted.--_Ibid_. + +[6] In the upper margin of the paper Lord Nelson wrote and Mr. Scott +added to it a reference, as marked in the text--'the enemy's fleet is +supposed to consist of 46 sail of the line, British fleet 40. If either +be less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off: +B. to be 1/4 superior to the E. cut off.--_Ibid_. + +[7] The Barham copy reads 'a mast.' + +[8] Originally 'friends.'--Nicolas. + +[9] This is the only diagram found in either of Nelson's memoranda. It +is not in the Barham copy. + +[10] Nelson presumably means the two main divisions as distinguished +from the 'advanced squadron.' This distinction is general in the +correspondence of his officers and accords with the arrangement as shown +in the diagram. The Barham copy has 'division' in the singular, as +though Nelson intended to specify one division only. It is probably a +copyist's error. + +[11] In the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by Lord Nelson +as in the text 'Vide instructions for signal yellow with blue fly. Page +17, Eighth Flag, Signal Book, with reference to Appendix.'--Nicolas. +Steering-sail, according to Admiral Smyth (_Sailors' Word-Book_, p. +654), was 'an incorrect name for a studding sail,' but it seems to have +been in common use in Nelson's time. + +[12] The Barham copy reads 'their rear.' + +[13] The Barham copy ends here. The second sheet has not been found. + + + +NELSON AND BRONTÉ.[1] + +INSTRUCTIONS AFTER TRAFALGAR + +INTRODUCTORY + + +The various tactical memoranda issued after Trafalgar by flag officers +in command of fleets are amongst the most interesting of the whole +series. The unsettled state of opinion which they display as the +result of Nelson's memorandum is very remarkable; for with one +exception they seem to show that the great tactical principles it +contained had been generally misunderstood to a surprising extent. +The failure to fathom its meaning is to be accounted for largely by +the lack of theoretical training, which made the science of tactics, +as distinguished from its practice, a sealed book to the majority of +British officers. But the trouble was certainly intensified by the +fact--as contemporary naval literature shows--that by Nelson's success +and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred +document, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss. The violent +polemics of such men as James, the naval chronicler, made it appear +profanity so much as to consider whether Nelson's attack differed in +the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine +the question in the light of general principles was likely to be +shouted down as a presumptuous heretic. Venial as was this attitude of +adulation under all the circumstances, it had a most evil influence on +the service. The last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and +oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can +never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from Nelson's +practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a +colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not +to look ahead any further. To no one did it occur to consider how the +new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted Nelson's +formation. They simply assumed an endless succession of Trafalgars. + +The first outcome of this attitude of mind is an 'Order of Battle and +Sailing,' accompanied by certain instructions, issued by Admiral +Gambier from the Prince of Wales in Yarmouth Roads, on July 23, 1807, +when he was about to sail to seize the Danish fleet.[2] His force +consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of +flag officers were as follows: + +VAN SQUADRON + + Division 1. Commodore Hood (No. 1 in line). + Division 2. Vice-Admiral Stanhope (No. 6). + +CENTRE DIVISION + + Division 1.} Admiral Gambier (No. 15). + Division 2.} + +REAR SQUADRON + + Division 1. Rear-Admiral Essington (No. 25). + Division 2. Commodore Keats (No. 30). + +Gambier's fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the +centre one called 'the centre division') and six equal subdivisions. +The commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his +division, Similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his +squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his +other subdivision. These two commodores also led the fleet on either +tack. So far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the +appended instruction what battle formation Gambier intended by his +elaborate organisation it is very baffling. Possibly we have not got +the instruction exactly as Gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is +confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation +can be constructed from it. All we can say for certain is that he +evidently believed he was adopting the principles of Trafalgar, and +perhaps going beyond them. The sailing order is to be also the battle +order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear. Independent +control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the +commodores are to control their own subdivisions 'subject to the +general direction' of their squadronal commanders, but whether the +formation was intended to follow that of Nelson the instruction +entirely fails to disclose. + +The next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by Lord +Collingwood for the Mediterranean fleet in 1808, printed in +Mr. Newnham Collingwood's _Correspondence of Lord Collingwood_. +No order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an +additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in +force. In this case we have the battle order, and it consists of +twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief +and his second in command, second in their respective divisions. There +were no other flag officers in the fleet.[3] The memorandum which is +printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of Nelson's, and +nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of Nelson's work +than to compare it with Collingwood's. Like Nelson, Collingwood begins +with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of 'a prompt and +immediate attack' and independent divisional control; and in order to +remedy certain errors of Trafalgar, he insists in addition on close +order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention +being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the +rear ships at Trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal +for line of bearing had been practically ignored. Then, after stating +broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the +van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously +attacks the rear, he differentiates like Nelson between a weather and +a lee attack. For the attack from to-windward he directs the two +divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will +come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but, +whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part +of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise. + +The attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line +ahead. In this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the +line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy's line from the +other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the +enemy's line a few ships in rear of their centre. So soon as the +leading ships have passed through and so weathered the enemy, they are +to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three +fourths to windward. This is of course practically identical with the +lee attack of Nelson's memorandum. The only addition is the course +that is to be taken after breaking the line. One cannot help wondering +how far the leading ships after passing the line would have been able +to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is +interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done +after breaking the line in line ahead after Rodney's method. Seeing +the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like +Nelson, Collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired +was a simple engagement on similar tacks. His 'intended attack' as in +Nelson's case is clearly that from to-windward. + +Turning then again to the windward attack, we see at once its +superficial resemblance to Nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it +that it is impossible to believe Collingwood ever penetrated the +subtleties of his great chiefs design. The dual organisation is there +and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. The advance +squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing +movement. There is not even the feint--the mystification of the van. +Concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on +the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. True, he may +have meant what Nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine +intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his +memorandum. But for the windward attack at least there is no trace of +these things, and Nelson's masterly conception sinks in Collingwood's +hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in +single line--that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down +instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. We can +only conclude, then, that both Collingwood and Gambier could see +nothing in the 'Nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual +organisation, and independent divisional control. + +There is a third document, however, which confirms us in the +impression already formed that there were officers who saw more +deeply. It is a tactical memorandum issued by Admiral the Hon. Sir +Alexander Forrester Inglis Cochrane, Bart., G.C.B., uncle of the more +famous Earl of Dundonald. It is printed by Sir Charles Ekin, in his +_Naval Battles_, from a paper which he found at the end of a book +in his possession containing 'Additional Signals, Instructions, &c.,' +issued by Sir A.I. Cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the +Leeward Islands station.' He commanded in chief on this station from +1805 to 1814, but appears never to have been directly under Nelson's +influence except for a few weeks, when Nelson came out in pursuit of +Villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. He was rather one of +Rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this +may explain the special note of his tactical system. His partiality +for Rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his +plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on Nelson's system +of mutually supporting squadrons. He does not even shrink from a very +free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed, and he +provides a special signal of his own for directing the execution of +the discarded manoeuvre. The 'explanation' of another of his new +signals for running aboard an enemy 'so as to disable her from getting +away' is also worthy of remark, as a recognition of Nelson's favourite +practice disapproved by Collingwood. + +Yet, although we see throughout the marks of the true 'Nelson touch,' +Cochrane's memorandum bears signs of having been largely founded on an +independent study of tactical theory. His obligations to Clerk of +Eldin are obvious. There are passages in the document which seem as +though they must have been written with the _Essay on Naval +Tactics_ at his elbow, while his expression 'an attack by forcing +the fleet from to-leeward' is directly borrowed from Morogues' 'Forcer +l'ennemi au combat elant sous le vent.' On the other hand certain +movements are entirely his own, such as his excellent device of +inverting the line after passing through the enemy's fleet, a great +improvement on Collingwood's method of leading down it in normal +order. + +The point is of some interest, for although Cochrane's memorandum is +over-elaborate and smells of the lamp, yet it seems clear that his +theoretical knowledge made him understand Nelson's principles far +better than most of the men who had actually fought at Trafalgar and +had had the advantage of Nelson's own explanations. All indeed that +Cochrane's memorandum seems to lack is that rare simplicity and +abstraction which only the highest genius can achieve. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The signature does not occur to the draught but was affixed to the +originals issued to the admirals and captains of the fleet. To the copy +signed by Lord Nelson, and delivered to Captain George Hope, of the +Defence, was added: 'N.B.--When the Defence quits the fleet for England +you are to return this secret memorandum to the Victory' Captain Hope +wrote on that paper: 'It was agreeable to these instructions that Lord +Nelson attacked the combined fleets of France and Spain off Cape +Trafalgar on the 21st of October, 1805, they having thirty-three of the +line and we twenty-seven,'--Nicolas. + +The injunction to return the memorandum may well have been added to all +copies issued, and this may account for their general disappearance. + +[2] For this document the Society is indebted to Commander G.P.W. +Hope, R.N., who has kindly placed it at my disposal. + +[3] For this document the Society is again indebted to Commander Hope, +R.N. + + + +_ADMIRAL GAMBIER_, 1807. + +[+MS. of Commander Hope, R.N. Copy+.] + +_Order of Battle and Sailing_.[1] + + +The respective flag officers will have the immediate direction of the +division in which their ships are placed, subject to the general +direction of the admiral commanding the squadron to which they belong. + +The ships in order of battle and sailing are to keep at the distance +of two cables' length from and in the wake of each other, increasing +that distance according to the state of the weather.[2] + +The leading ship of the starboard division is to keep the admiral two +points on her weather bow. The leading ship of the lee division is +when sailing on a wind to keep the leader of the weather column two +points before her beam; when sailing large, abreast of her. + +(Signed) J. GAMBIER. +Prince of Wales, Yarmouth Roads: +23 July, 1807. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] For the actual order to which the instructions are appended see +Introductory Note, _supra_, p. 322. + +[2] The normal distance was then a cable and a half. See _post_, p. +330 note. + + + +_LORD COLLINGWOOD_, 1808-10. + +[+Correspondence of Collingwood, p. 359+.] + +From every account received of the enemy it is expected they may very +soon be met with on their way from Corfu and Tarentum, and success +depends on a prompt and immediate attack upon them. In order to which +it will be necessary that the greatest care be taken to keep the +closest order in the respective columns during the night which the +state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such +a sufficient distance apart as will leave room for tacking or other +movements, so that in the event of calm or shift of wind no +embarrassment may be caused. + +Should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole +force, I shall notwithstanding probably not make the signal to form +the line of battle; but, keeping in the closest order, with the van +squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee +division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his +division the necessary signals for commencing the action with the +enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van +begins. Of his signals therefore the captains of that division will be +particularly watchful. + +If the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the +signal will be made to alter the course together, the van division +keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying +less sail; and when the fleet draws near the enemy both columns are to +preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can. + +In standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack the +lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may +be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the +weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same +period. + +The leading ship of the weather column will endeavour to pass through +the enemy's line, should the weather be such as to make that +practicable, at one fourth from the van, whatever number of ships +their line may be composed of. The lee division will pass through at a +ship or two astern of their centre, and whenever a ship has weathered +the enemy it will be found necessary to shorten sail as much as +possible for her second astern to close with her, and to keep away, +steering in a line parallel to the enemy's and engaging them on their +weather side. + +A movement of this kind may be necessary, but, considering the +difficulty of altering the position of the fleet during the time of +combat, every endeavour will be made to commence battle with the enemy +on the same tack they are; and I have only to recommend and direct +that they be fought with at the nearest distance possible, in which +getting on board of them may be avoided, which is alway +disadvantageous to us, except when they are flying.[1] + +_Additional Instruction_.[2] + +When the signal No. 43 or 44[3] is made to form the order, the fleet +is to form in one line, the rear shortening sail to allow the van to +take their station ahead. If such signal should not be made the +captains are referred to the general order of 23 March, 1808. + +COLLINGWOOD. +Ville de Paris, 4th January, 1810. + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] The remaining clauses of the memorandum do not relate to tactics. + +[2] From the original in the possession of Commander Hope, R.N. It is +attached to an order of battle in two columns. See _supra_, p. 323. + +[3] Sig. 43: 'Form line of battle in open order.' Sig. 44: 'Form line +of battle in close order at about a cable and a half distant'; with a +white pennant, 'form on weather column'; with a blue pennant, 'form on +lee column.' + + + +_SIR ALEXANDER COCHRANE_, 1805-1814. + +[+Printed in Skin's Naval Battles, pp. 394 seq. (First edit.)+] + +_Modes of Attack from the Windward, &c._ + + +When an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's rear, so as to +endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their +fleet, the same will be made known by signal No. 27, and the numeral +signal which accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's +ships that is to be attacked, counting always from the van, as stated +in page 160, Article 31 (Instructions).[1] The signal will +afterwards be made for the division intended to make the attack, or +the same will be signified by the ship's pennants, and the pennants of +the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the +number of the ship to be first attacked in the enemy's line. Should it +be intended that the leading ship in the division is to attack the +rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so as to get upon the +weather quarter of that ship; the ships following her in the line will +pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the +ship she is engaged with; and so on in succession until they have +closed with the headmost ship intended to be attacked. + +The ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the +enemy's line ahead of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged +from the rest of the enemy's fleet. + +When it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack +the rear ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pennants will be shown; +the rest of the ships in the division will invert their order, +shortening sail until they can in succession follow the rear ship, +giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like manner as above stated; +and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line as already +mentioned. + +When this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other +divisions of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will +keep to windward just out of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support +the rear, and prevent the van and centre of the enemy from doubling +upon them. This manoeuvre, if properly executed, may force the enemy +to abandon the ships on his rear, or submit to be brought to action on +equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the attack is made +from to-windward. + +When the fleet is to leeward, and the commanding officer intends to +cut through the enemy's line, the number of the ship in their line +where the attempt is to be made will be shown as already stated. + +If the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double +upon the enemy's ships ahead, the same will be made known by a blue +pennant over the Signal 27; if not they are to bear up and run to the +enemy's line to windward, engaging the ship they first meet with; each +succeeding ship giving her fire, and passing on to the next in the +rear. The ships destined to attack the enemy's rear will be pointed +out by the number of the last ship in the line that is to make this +movement, or the pennants of that ship will be shown; but, should no +signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to +bear up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut +off; the succeeding ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy, +or form, should it be necessary to prevent the enemy's van from +passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or join their cut-off +ships. + +If it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage +the enemy's rear to windward shall bear up, and prevent the part of +their rear which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same +will be made known by a red pennant being hoisted over the Signal +21,[2] and the number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral +signals or pennants. If from the centre division, a white pennant will +be hoisted over the signal. + +If the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same +will be made known by a red pennant under. The numeral signal or +pennants, counting always from the van, will show the headmost ship to +proceed on this service.[3] The ships not directed by those signals +are to form in close order, to cover the ships engaged from the rest +of the enemy's fleet. + +When the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the +rear will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy +to windward, as circumstances may require. + +When the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from +to-leeward, the same will be made known by Signal 27, &c. In this +case, if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's +van, engaging their ships in succession as they get up, the blue +pennant will be shown as already stated, and the numeral signal +pointing out the last ship from the van which is to tack, which in +general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through. The +rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require, +either by bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or +tacking or wearing to cut off the van of the enemy from passing round +the rear of the fleet to rejoin their centre. And on this service, it +is probable, should the enemy's ships bear up, that some of the rear +ships will be employed--the signal No. 21 will be made accompanied +with the number or pennants of the headmost ship--upon which she, with +the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy. + +When an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing +the fleet from to-leeward, Signal 109 will be made with a blue pennant +where best seen;[4] upon which each ship will luff up upon the +weather quarter of her second ahead, so as to leave no opening for the +leading ship of the enemy to pass through: this movement will expose +them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet they intended +to force.[5] + +It has been often remarked that Nelson founded no school of tactics, +and the instructions which were issued with the new Signal Book +immediately after the war entirely endorse the remark. They can be +called nothing else but reactionary. Nelson's drastic attempt to break +up the old rigid formation into active divisions independently +commanded seems to have come to nothing, and the new instructions are +based with almost all the old pedantry on the single line of +battle. Of anything like mutually supporting movements there is only a +single trace. It is in Article XIV., and that is only a resurrection +of the time-honoured _corps de réserve_, formed of superfluous +ships after your line has been equalised with that of a numerically +inferior enemy. The whole document, in fact, is a consecration of the +fetters which had been forged in the worst days of the seventeenth +century, and which Nelson had so resolutely set himself to break. + +The new Signal Book in which the instructions appear was founded on +the code elaborated by Sir Home Riggs Popham, but there is nothing to +show whether or not he was the author of the instructions. He was an +officer of high scientific attainments, but although he had won +considerable distinction during the war, his service had been entirely +of an amphibious character in connection with military operations +ashore, and he had never seen a fleet action at sea. He reached flag +rank in 1814, and was one of the men who received a K.C.B. on the +reconstitution of the order in 1815. Of the naval lords serving with +Lord Melville at the time none can show a career or a reputation which +would lead us to expect from them anything but the colourless +instructions they produced. The controlling influence was undoubtedly +Lord Keith. The doyen of the active list, and in command of the +Channel Fleet till he retired after the peace of 1815, he was +all-powerful as a naval authority, and his flag captain, Sir Graham +Moore, had just been given a seat on the board. A devout pupil of +St. Vincent and Howe, correct rather than brilliant, Keith represented +the old tradition, and notwithstanding the patience with which he had +borne Nelson's vagaries and insubordination, the antipathy between the +two men was never disguised. However generously Keith appreciated +Nelson's genius, he can only have regarded his methods as an evil +influence in the service for ordinary men, nor can there be much doubt +that his apprehensions had a good deal to justify them. + +The general failure to grasp the whole of Nelson's tactical principles +was not the only trouble. There are signs that during the later years +of the war a very dangerous misunderstanding of his teaching had been +growing up in the service. In days when there was practically no +higher instruction in the theory of tactics, it was easy for officers +to forget how much prolonged and patient study had enabled Nelson to +handle his fleets with the freedom he did; and the tendency was to +believe that his successes could be indefinitely repeated by mere +daring and vehemence of attack. The seed was sown immediately after +the battle and by Collingwood himself. 'It was a severe action,' he +wrote to Admiral Parker on November 1, 'no dodging or manoeuvring.' +And again on December 16, to Admiral Pasley, 'Lord Nelson determined +to substitute for exact order an impetuous attack in two distinct +bodies.' Collingwood of course with all his limitations knew well +enough it was not a mere absence of manoeuvring that had won the +victory. In the same letter he had said that although Nelson +succeeded, as it were, by enchantment, it was all the effect of system +and nice combination.' Yet such phrases as he and others employed to +describe the headlong attack, taken from their context and repeated +from mouth to mouth, would soon have raised a false impression that +many men were only too ready to receive. So the seed must have grown, +till we find the fruit in Lord Dundonald's oft-quoted phrase, 'Never +mind manoeuvres: always go at them.' So it was that Nelson's teaching +had crystallised in his mind and in the mind perhaps of half the +service. The phrase is obviously a degradation of the opening +enunciations in Nelson's memoranda, a degradation due to time, to +superficial study, and the contemptuous confidence of years of +undisputed mastery at sea. + +The conditions which brought about this attitude to tactics are +clearly seen in the way others saw us. Shortly after Trafalgar a +veteran French officer of the war of American Independence wrote some +_Reflections_ on the battle, which contain much to the point. 'It +is a noteworthy thing,' he says in dealing with the defects of the +single-line formation, 'that the English, who formerly used to employ +all the resources of tactics against our fleets, now hardly use them +at all, since our scientific tacticians have disappeared. It may +almost be said that they no longer have any regular order of sailing +or battle: they attack our ships of the line just as they used to +attack a convoy.'[6] But here the old tactician was not holding up +English methods as an example. He was citing them to show to what +easy victories a navy exposed itself in which, by neglect of +scientific study and alert observation, tactics had sunk into a mere +senile formula. 'They know,' he continues, 'that we are in no state to +oppose them with well-combined movements so as to profit by the kind +of disorder which is the natural result of this kind of attack. They +know if they throw their attack on one part of a much extended line, +that part is soon destroyed.' Thus he arrives at two fundamental laws: +'1. That our system of a long line of battle is worthless in face of +an enemy who attacks with his ships formed in groups (_réunis en +pelotons_), and told off to engage a small number of ships at +different points in our line. 2. That the only tactical system to +oppose to theirs is to have at least a double line, with reserve +squadrons on the wings stationed in such a manner as to bear down most +easily upon the points too vigorously attacked.' The whole of his +far-sighted paper is in fact an admirable study of the conditions +under which impetuous attacks and elaborate combinations are +respectively called for. But from both points of view the single line +for a large fleet is emphatically condemned, while in our instructions +of 1816 not a hint of its weakness appears. They resume practically +the same standpoint which the Duke of York had reached a century and a +half before. + +Spanish tacticians seem also to have shared the opinion that Trafalgar +had really done nothing to dethrone the line. One of the highest +reputation, on December 17, 1805, had sent to his government a +thoughtful criticism of the action, and his view of Nelson's attack +was this: 'Nothing,' he says, 'is more seamanlike or better tactics +than for a fleet which is well to windward of another to bear down +upon it in separate columns, and deploy at gun-shot from the enemy +into a line which, as it comes into action, will inflict at least as +much damage upon them as it is likely to suffer. But Admiral Nelson +did not deploy his columns at gun-shot from our line, but ran up +within pistol-shot and broke through it, so as to reduce the battle to +a series of single-ship actions. It was a manoeuvre in which I do not +think he will find many imitators. Where two fleets are equally well +trained, that which attacks in this manner must be defeated.'[7] + +So it was our enemies rightly read the lesson of Trafalgar. The false +deductions therefore which grew up in our own service are all the more +extraordinary, even as we find them in the new instructions and the +current talk of the quarter-deck. But this is not the worst. It is not +till we turn to the Signal Book itself that we get a full impression +of the extent to which tactical thought had degenerated and Nelson's +seed had been choked. The movements and formations for which signals +are provided are stubbornly on the old lines of 1799. The influence of +Nelson, however, is seen in two places. The first is a group of +signals for 'attacking the enemy at anchor by passing either outside +them or between them and the land,' and for 'anchoring and engaging +either within or outside the enemy.' Here we have a rational +embodiment of the experience of the Nile. The second is a similar +attempt to embody the teaching of Trafalgar, and the way it is done +finally confirms the failure to understand what Nelson meant. So +extraordinary is the signification of the signal and its explanatory +note that it must be given in full. + +'_Signal_.--Cut the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two +columns. + +_'Explanatory Note_.--The admiral will make known what number of +ships from the van ship of the enemy the weather division is to break +through the enemy's line, and the same from the rear at which the lee +division is to break through their line. + +'To execute this signal the fleet is to form in the order of sailing +in two columns, should it not be so formed already; the leader of each +column steering down for the position pointed out where he is to cut +through the enemy's line. + +'If the admiral wishes any particular conduct to be pursued by the +leader of the division, in which he happens not to be, after the line +is broken, he will of course point it out. If he does not it is to be +considered that the lee division after breaking through the line is +left to its commander. + +'In performing this evolution the second astern of the leader in each +column is to pass through the line astern of the ship next ahead +[_sic_] of where her leader broke through, and so on in succession, +breaking through all parts of the enemy's line ahead [_sic_] of +their leaders as described in the plate.' + +The plate represents the two columns bearing down to attack in a +strictly formed line ahead, and the ships, after the leaders have cut +through, altering course each for its proper interval in the enemy's +line, and the whole then engaging from to-leeward. The note proceeds: + +'By this arrangement no ship will have to pass the whole of the +enemy's line. If however, in consequence of any circumstance, the rear +ships should not be able to cut through in their assigned places, the +captains of those ships, as well as of the ships that are deprived of +opponents in the enemy's line by this mode of attack, are to act to +the best of their judgment for the destruction of the enemy, unless a +disposition to the contrary has been previously made. + +'It will be seen that by breaking the line in this order the enemy's +van ships will not be able to assist either their centre or rear +without tacking or wearing for that purpose.' + +This from cover to cover of the Signal Book is the sole trace to be +found of the great principles for which Nelson had lived and +died. That Lord Keith or anyone else could have believed that it +adequately represented the teaching of Trafalgar is almost incredible. + +To begin with, the wording of the note contains an inexplicable +blunder. The last paragraph shows clearly that the idea of the signal +is an attack on the rear and centre, as at Trafalgar; yet the ships of +each column as they come successively into action are told to engage +the enemy's ship _ahead_ of the point where their leaders broke +through, a movement which would resolve itself into an attack on their +centre and van, and leave the rear free to come into immediate action +with an overwhelming concentration on the lee division. + +That so grave an error should have been permitted to pass into the +Signal Book is bad enough, but that such a signal even if it had been +correctly worded should stand for Nelson's last word to the service is +almost beyond belief. The final outcome of Nelson's genius for tactics +lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he +actually adopted. Yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole +principle of the memorandum. The fundamental ideas of concentration +and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not +only this. It distorts Nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and +holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of +which Nelson had triumphed. Not a word is said of its dangers, not a +word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not +a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a +second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. It +is the last word of British sailing tactics, and surely nothing in +their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old Fighting +Instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[8] + +FOOTNOTES: + +[1] _I.e._ the Instructions of 1799, _supra_, p. 278. For Signal 27 +see p. 255. + +[2] 'To attack on bearing indicated.' + +[3] In Ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong +and destroys the sense. It should accord, as I have ventured to amend +it, with that of the previous paragraph. + +[4] Signal 109, 'To close nearer the ship or ships indicated.' + +[5] Sir Charles Elkin adds, 'In the same work he has also a signal +(No. 785) under the head "Enemy" to "Lay on board," with the following +observation:-- + +'"N.B.--This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy +unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should +run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting +away."' + +[6] Mathieu-Dumas, _Précis des Evénements Militaires: Pièces +Justificatives_, vol. xiv. p. 408. + +[7] Fernandez Duro, _Armada Española_, viii. 353. + +[8] The anonymous veteran of the old French navy, cited by +Mathieu-Dumas, explains exactly how Villeneuve might have turned the +tables on Nelson by forming two lines himself. 'There is,' he concludes, +'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but I will +venture to assert that if Admiral Villeneuve had doubled his line at the +moment he saw Nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral +would never have had the imprudence of making such an +attack.'--_Evénements Militaires_, xiv. 411. + + + +_THE INSTRUCTIONS OF_ 1816. + +[+Signal Book, United Service Institution+.] + +_Instructions relating to the Line of Battle and the Conduct of the +Fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an +enemy_. + + +I. The chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle +are, that the ships may be able, to assist and support each other in +action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships +greater in number than themselves, and that every ship may be able to +fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own +fleet. + +II. On whichever tack the fleet may be sailing, when the line of +battle is formed, the van squadron is to form the van, the centre +squadron the centre, and the rear squadron the rear of the line, +unless some other arrangement be pointed out by signal. But if a +change of wind, or tacking, or wearing, or any other circumstance, +should alter the order in which the line of battle was formed, the +squadrons are to remain in the stations in which they may so happen to +be placed, till the admiral shall direct them to take others. + +III. When the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, +each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as +expeditiously as possible; and to keep in close order, if not +otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that +carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the +line, when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it. + +IV. In forming the line of battle, each ship should haul up a little +to windward rather than to leeward of her second ahead, as a ship a +little to leeward will find great difficulty in getting into her +station, if it should be necessary to keep the line quite close to the +wind; and it may also be better to form at a distance a little +greater, rather than smaller, than the prescribed distance, as it is +easier to close the line than to extend it. + +V. If the admiral should haul out of the line, the ships astern of him +are to close up to fill the vacancy he has made, and the line is to +continue on its course, and to act in the same manner as if the +admiral had not left it All signals made to the centre will be +addressed to the senior officer remaining in it, who, during the +absence of the admiral, is to be considered as the commander of the +centre squadron. + +VI. The repeating frigates are to be abreast of the commanders of the +squadrons to which they belong, and the fireships and frigates to +windward of their squadrons, if no particular station be assigned to +them. + +VII. When the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is +made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to +place themselves in such a manner that, if they were to haul to the +wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, +they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. To do this, +every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the +line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on +which the line of battle would sail, viz. on that point of the compass +which is six points from the direction of the wind. + +As the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to +form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or +squadron flags, shown with the signals for such a line, will refer to +the forming the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag +is _uppermost_ (without considering whether it do or do not form +the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station +which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind, and +form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is +_undermost_ is to place itself in that station in which it would +become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be +formed. + +VIII. When a line of bearing has been formed the ships are to preserve +their relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to +alter their course together; but if they are directed to alter their +course in succession, as the line of bearing would by that +circumstance be destroyed, it is to be no longer attended to. + +IX. If after having made the signal to prepare to form the line of +battle, or either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the +preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession to +point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals +are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into +execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again. They are to +be executed in the order in which they are made, excepting such as the +admiral may annul previously to his again hoisting the signal for the +line. + +X. If the wind should come _forward_ when the fleet is formed in +line of battle, or is sailing by the wind on a line of bearing, the +leading ship is to steer seven points from the wind, and every ship is +to haul as close to the wind as possible till she has got into the +wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the +proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come _aft_, the +ships are to bear up until they get into the wake, or on the proper +point of bearing from the leading ship. + +XI. Ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet on any +separate service are not to obey the signal for forming the line of +battle unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by +signal. + +XII. Ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as +directed in Article XIX. in the General Instructions, though in the +presence of an enemy. The captains of such ships will not thereby be +prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have the +opportunities of rendering essential service by placing their ships +advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with +the other part of the fleet. + +XIII. If the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag +officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not +already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper, but he is to +hoist it in one of his own squadron or division, if there be one near +and fit for the purpose. + +XIV. If the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or +which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the +ships, which at either extremity of the line are thereby left without +opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line, without +waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or +assist the ships of the fleet in the best manner that circumstances +will allow. + +XV. Great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy +either over or very near to any ships of the fleet, nor, though the +signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is +placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy. + +XVI. No ship is to separate from the body of the fleet in time of +action to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been +beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other +flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their +opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of +the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack +till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled, unless by +signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act +otherwise. + +XVII. If any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of +being destroyed or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal +expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are +the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her +immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a +situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the +enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate that may be near is to +use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, +or by joining in the attack on the enemy, or by covering the fireship, +or, if necessity requires it, by taking out the crew of the disabled +ship, or by any other means which circumstances at the time will +admit. + +XVIII. Though a ship be disabled and hard pressed by the enemy in +battle, she is not to quit her station in the line if it can possibly +be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do +from the commander of the division or squadron to which he belongs, or +from some other flag officer. But if he should be ordered out of the +line, or should be obliged to quit it before assistance can be sent to +him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become +vacant to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it. + +XIX. If there should be a captain so lost to all sense of honour and +the great duty he owes his country as not to exert himself to the +utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them +when engaged, the commander of the squadron or division to which he +belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from the +command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship till +the admiral's pleasure shall be known. + + + +APPENDIX + +_FURTHER PARTICULARS OF THE TRAFALGAR FIGHT_ + +[+Sir Charles Ekin's Naval Battles, pp. 271 et seq. Extract+.] + + +The intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this +important manuscript was an eye-witness of what he has so ably +related, and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment.[1] + +'The combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard +tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which +they remained to the moment of attack. Many have considered that the +French admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from +the information I obtained after the action, connected with some +documents found on board the Bucentaur, I believe it was the intention +to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail--the +supposed force of the British fleet--and a squadron of observation +composed of twelve sail of the line, under Admiral Gravina, intended +to act according to circumstances after the British fleet were +engaged. By wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and +the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard +tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were +subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. The wind being +light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main +topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve +their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was +immediately ahead or astern of her second. The fleet had then the +appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that +the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two +in the weather-line. + +[Illustration] + +'In the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this +particularly happened where the Colossus was, who, after passing the +stern of the French Swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the +Bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly +ran alongside of the French Achille under cover of the smoke. The +Colossus was then placed between the Achille and the Bahama, being on +board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the +Swiftsure's after-guns. All these positions I believe to have been +merely accidental; and to accident alone I attribute the concave +circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. The wind shifted to +the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships +came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. The ships were +therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders; +and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable +state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience +of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity, +undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the +best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the +skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice +in gunnery. + +'Of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by +the British fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the +event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any +particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent +circumstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no +impropriety in questioning whether the same plan be likely to succeed +under all circumstances, and on all occasions. + +'The original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of +our great commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's +fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line and the British forty; +and the attack, as designed from to-windward, was to be made under the +following circumstances: + +'Under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line ahead +of forty-six sail, the British fleet was to be brought within gun-shot +of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a +division of observation consisting of the remaining eight. + +'The lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all +possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. The ships were to +break through the enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of +their stations were to assist their friends that were hard +pressed. The remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were +to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief.' + +This able officer then proceeds to describe, by a figure, the plan of +attack as originally intended; bearing a very close resemblance to +that already given in Plate XXVIII. fig. 1; but making the enemy's +fleet, as arranged in a regular line ahead, to extend the distance of +five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied; +the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. He then +observes: + +'If the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the English +fleet should have borne up together, and have sailed in a line abreast +in their respective divisions until they arrived up with the +enemy. Thus the plan which consideration had matured would have been +executed, than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory +would have been more speedily decided, and the brunt of the action +would have been more equally felt, &c. + +'With the exception of the Britannia, Dreadnought, and Prince, the +body of the fleet sailed very equally; and I have no doubt could have +been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. This +being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line ahead, +the only reason, I could suppose, that occasioned the change. + +'The advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a +squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution +under all circumstances. + +'The power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular +point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the +ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards +[so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive +attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile +fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably +lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circumstances, may +ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part +of the mutilated fleet. + +'Each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far +removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support. + +'The swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less +liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert +their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to +complete what their leaders had begun. The weather division, from +being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some +little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct +their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first +onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend +the success they may appear to have gained, &c. + +'If the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well +collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in +pursuit. + +'The mode of attack, adopted with such success in the Trafalgar +action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired +throughout the British fleet from their being commanded by their +beloved Nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two +divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack +commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the English fleet. + +'It was successful also from the consternation spread through the +combined fleet on finding the British so much stronger than was +expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed +the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile +fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss +of the admiral's ship early in the action. + +'The disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in +bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and +alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in +seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after +another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and +light airs. + +'At the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length +apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of +the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have +been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three +ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking +ship could fire a gun in her defence. + +'It is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship +does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet +great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire +directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in +their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of +them, they are placed, for the most part, _hors de combat_ for +the rest of the action. + +'Or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the +moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear +could possibly come to their assistance. + +'In proceeding to the attack of October 21, the weather was exactly +such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the +British were six or seven miles distant. By the mode of attacking in +detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to +receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the British were, on +that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of +applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was +totally lost. + +'The Victory, Téméraire, Sovereign, Belleisle, Mars, Colossus +and Bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that +nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their +guns could have extricated them. If the enemy's vessels had closed up +as they ought to have done, _from van to rear_, and had possessed +a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even +British skill and British gallantry could not have availed. The +position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which +the British were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an +opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body. + +'The French admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive +gallantry; and certainly the French Intrépide, with some others, +evinced active courage equal to the British; but there was no nautical +management, no skilful manoeuvring. + +'It may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of +the Trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages +and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment +of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances +may be well weighed before such means are applied. A plan, to be +entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. If its infallibility is +not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the +errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others. + +'Our heroic and lamented chief knew his means, and the power he had to +deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the +occasion; and that sufficed. + +'The Trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances, +and have a different result: it is right, therefore, to discuss its +merits and demerits. It cannot take one atom from the fame of the +departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability, +and of superior action.' + +FOOTNOTE: + +[1] The concluding part of the MS. is devoted to a detailed account of +the part played in the action by the Conqueror and her two seconds, +Neptune and Leviathan, with the special purpose of showing that +Villeneuve really struck to the Conqueror. In a note the author says, 'I +have been thus particular, as the capture of the French admiral has been +unblushingly attributed to others without any mention being made of the +ship that actually was the principal in engaging her, wishing to do +justice to a gallant officer who on that day considered his task not +complete until every ship was either captured or beyond distance of +pursuit.' The inference is that the author was an officer of the +Conqueror, defending his captain, Israel Pellew, younger brother of the +more famous Edward, Lord Exmouth. It is possible therefore, and even +probable, that this criticism of Trafalgar represents the ideas of the +Pellews. + + + + +INDEX + +Additional Instructions, 113, 115, 126-8, 203-229 + +Admiral, station of, inline, 12, 15, 16, 22, 24, 61, 77, 88, 91, 100, + 123, 127, 166, 243-5, 276, 317. + _See also_ Flag, and Flagship + +Advanced squadron, Nelson's, 294, 300-6, 316-7, 319 _n._, 325 + +Ammunition, supply of, 69 + +Anchor, engaging at, 264, 277, + +d'Annibault, Admiral, 18 + +Anson, Lord, 116, 204, 209-10, 216, 218 _n._, 285 _n_. + +Argall, Sir Samuel, 49 + +Armada, 27-9, 32-5, 75, 283, 288 + +Attack, from to-windward, 31, 33-5, 42, 59, 95, 113, 126, 153, 155-6, + 170-1, 227, 246, 330-3. + _See also_ Line, breaking the + Oblique, 143-5 + Parallel, 143, 148, 155-6, 170-1, 186, 191-2, 197, 218 _n_., + 245, 266, 273, 324-5 + Perpendicular, 265, 307, 324 + On contrary tacks, 245; + on opposite number, 211-2, 217-8, 227-3, 265, 377; + in coming up, 277 + By defiling, 42-3, 51, 59, 65 + On superior fleet, 180-2, 236, 262-3, 276, 308, 346 + +Audley, Sir Thomas, 14-17 + +Augers, for scuttling, 13 + +Badiley, Captain Richard, 84 + +Ball, Admiral Sir Alexander, 303 + +Banckers, Admiral Adriaen, 156 _n._ + +Barham, Admiral Lord, 293 + +Barrington, Admiral the Hon. Samuel, 258 + +Baskerville, Sir Thomas, his battle order, 29 + +Battle orders, _see_ Order of Battle + +Battles. + Gravelines (1588), 75, 283, 288 + Isla de Pinos (1596), 29 + Oquendo and Tromp (1639), 85 + Monte Christo (1652), 84 + Dungeness (1652), 93 + Portland (Feb. 1653), 94 + The Gabbard (June 1653), 97 + Lowestoft or Texel, No. 2 (1665), 113-4 + Four Days' Battle (1066), 116-9, 134, 136-7 + St. James's Fight (1666), 122 _n._, 138, 140-1 + Holmes's action (1672), 169 + Solebay (1672), 138-9, 155 _n._, 169 + Schoonveldt (1673) 133, 156 + Texel, No. 3 (1673), 154 _n_., 157 _n_., 162 _n_., 182 + Beachy Head or Bevesier (1690), 177, 181 + La Hogue (1692), 180 + Malaga (1704), 184, 186, 195-6, 198 _n._ + Toulon (1744), 188 _n._, 196, 205, 210 + Finisterre (Anson and De la Jonquière, 1747), 209 + Finisterre (Hawke and L'Etenduère, 1747), 226 _n._ + Havana (1748), 224 _n._ + Minorca (1756), 218 _n._ + Quiberon (1759), 186, 312 + Granada (1779), 258 + Martinique (1780), 211, 227 _n._ + Chesapeake (1781), 212 + Les Saintes (1782), 211-2, 237 + First of June (1794), 256, 265, 283 + St. Vincent (1797), 254, 265, 267 + Camperdown (1797), 254, 266, 287 + The Nile (1798), 262, 312 + Copenhagen (1801), 264 + Trafalgar (1805), 257, 264, 266, 282 _et seq._, 321-7, 335-42, 351-8 + +Berkley, Admiral Sir William, 116 + +Berry, Sir John, 169 + +Berry, Captain Edward, 262, 288 + +Bilboes, 33 + +Blake, Admiral Robert, 83-5, 92-9; + orders of, 99-104 + +Boarding, 7, 13, 15, 42, 51, 59, 62, 68, 97, 119, 326 + +Boats in action, 10-13, 15, 89-90, 248, 275-6 + +Boscawen, Admiral Edward, 197, 203-4, 208, 210; + his Additional Instructions, 219-25 + +Boswall, Captain, his translation of Hoste, 236 _n._, 287 _n._ + +Boteler, Captain Nathaniel, on tactics, 27, 73-6 + +Breaking the line, _see_ Line + +Browne, Lieutenant G.L., 299 + +Buckingham, George Villiers, Duke of, 33, 76 + +Byng, Admiral Sir George, 204, 218 _n._ + +Cabins, 61 + +Calder, Admiral Sir Robert Bart., 294 + +Calthrops, 11 + +Captains, lists of, 65-6, 71 + +Captains, removal of, in action, 247, 274-5, 347 + +Carteret, Admiral Sir George, 121 + +Cartouches, 69 + +Cavalry tactics at sea, 7, 119 + +Cecil, Sir Edward, Viscount Wimbledon, 31, 49, 51-72, 73, 75, 83, 85 + +Changing station, _see_ Station + +Charles V, Emperor, 1, 18 + +Chasing, 43, 56, 60, 127-9, 155, 162, 204. + _See_ also General chase + +Chaves, Alonso de, 1 _et seq._ 18-9, 52, 73, 75, 291, 296 + +Chaves, Hieronymus de, 2 + +Clearing for action, 41, 58, 62, 69 + +Clerk of Eldin, 235, 262, 265, 285, 326 + +Close action, 41, 68, 112, 159, 215, 220 + +Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander, 185, 326-7, 330-4 + +Codrington, Admiral Sir Edward, 295, 301-7 + +Collingwood, Admiral Lord, 283, 292, 295, _et seq._; + his memorandum, 323-30, 336-7 + +'Commander-in-chief,' 100 _n._ + +Concentration, 142-5, 154 _n._, 177, 213, 228, and _n._, 259, 284, 330-4 + By doubling, _see_ Doubling; + On rear, _see_ Rear-concentration + On van, 143-4, 213, 314-5 + +Confusing, 36, 144, 213, 284, 291, 315 + +Containing, 135-8, 214, 284, 297, 318-20, 325 + By feinting, _see_ Feints + +Convoy, method of attacking, 219, 227, 288; + of protecting, 94 + +Corporal of the field, 40 + +Corps de réserve, _see_ Réserve + +Coventry, Sir William, 111, 114, 128, 133 + +Cowardice, _see_ Captains, removal of + +Cross-bows, 11 + +Crossing the T, 210, 221 + +Cruisers, 29, 71-3, 88-90, 99, 103-4, 109, 122, 125,152; + duties of, in action, 151, 219, 251 + +Cruising formations, 209, 220, 228 + +Dartmouth, Admiral George Legge, first lord, 141; + his instructions, 168-172, 177 + +Dartmouth MSS. 110, 133, 139 + +Deane, Admiral Richard, 93, 95 + +Decrès, 310 + +Defeat, 247 + +Debug, William Fielding, First Earl of, 49 + +Detached ships, 240, 244, 249, 269, 272-3, 276, 345 + +Disabled ships, 101, 103, 112-3, 123-4, 127, 146, 161-2, 192-3, 246-7, + 274, 346-7; + question of following up, 224, 246, 273, 346 + +Disrobe, Colonel John, general at sea, 98; + orders of, 99-104 + +Discipline, 40, 43-5, 52-4, 58, 93 + +Dispersing, instructions for, 247, 275 + +Divisions, independent control of, 287-9, 294-6, 316-9, 323, 327. + _See also_ Sub squadrons; Order of battle + +Doubling, 117, 179-85, 210, 236, 262, 326, 331-3. + +Drake, Sir Francis, 17 _n._, 283; + his sailing order, 29, 50 + +Duff, Captain George, 303 + +Demeanor, Vice-Admiral, 310 + +Duncan, Admiral Viscount, 254, 266, 287 + +Duodenal, Admiral the Earl of, 337 + +Tuques, Admiral Abraham, 164 + +Engaging, _see_ Attack + +Equalizing speed, 228, 241, 243, 269, 271, 273 + +Essex, Robert Devereux, Earl of, 49 + +Essington, Rear-Admiral, 322 + +d'Estrées, Maréchal, 154 _n._, 179, 182 + +Etenduère, Admiral des Herbiers de l', 226 _n_. + +Exmouth, Admiral Edward Pellew, Lord, 351 _n_. + +Expeditional orders, 204-6 + +Feints, 302, 307-12 + +Fire discipline, 41-3, 51, 54, 60, 62, 68, 70, 103, 125, 159, 172, 245, + 273, 346 + +Fire, precautions against, 37, 41, 54, 58-9, 70 + +Fireships, 89, 90, 103-4; + instructions for, 139, 149, 159-60, 172, 223-4, 227, 248 and _n._, + 250-1, 274-5 + +Flag, shifting the, 130, 141, 162 _n._, 248-9, 276, 345-6 + +Flags, squadronal, 16, 22-3, 55; + abolished, 251 + +Flagship as objective, 12, 15, 273. 317, 346. + _See also_ Admiral, station of + +Forcing, 227, 334 + +Foreign views of British tactics, 97-8, 118-9, 337-9 + +Frederick, Rear-Admiral, 254 _n._, 255 + +Frigates, _see_ Cruisers + +Galen, Admiral Johann van, 84 + +Galleys, tactics of, 6; + used with sailing ships, 18-24 + +Gambier, Admiral Lord, 322-3, 325; + his instructions, 327-8 + +Gambling, 43-4, 52 + +General chase, 130, 193, 221, 226 + +'General' for naval conmander-in-chief, 82, 93, 99 + +General Instructions, 268, 342 + +George of Denmark, Prince, 195 + +Gibraltar, 196, 225, 235-6 + +Glanville, Sir John, 63 _n_. + +Gorges, Sir William, 32-5, 50 + +Grain, 101 and _n_. + +Grappling, 7, 12, 248, 250 + +Grasse, Vice-Admiral Comte de, 238, 285-6 + +Graves, Admiral Lord, 212 + +Gravina, Admiral, 264 + +Greenwood, Jonathan, his signal book, 233 _n_. + +Grenades, 11 + +Grenier, Vicomte de, his tactical treatise, 285 + +Group tactics, 50-1, 74, 85-7, 338 + +Guiche, Comte de, on English and Dutch tactics, 118-9 + +Guides, 239, 240-1, 278-9 + +Gunfire as basis of tactics, 120 + +Gunners and gun crews, 35, 62, 69. + _See also_ Seamen gunners + +Gunnery, 69, 97, 263. + _See also_ Close action, and Fire discipline + +Hand-guns, 11 + +Harpoons, 11 + +Harvey, Captain Eliab, 297, 310 + +Hawke, Lord, 116,209,210-1; + his Additional Instructions, 217-8, 312 + +Hawkins, Sir Richard, 34 + +Henry VIII, 14, 18 + +Herbert, Admiral, _See_ Torrington + +Hill, General Lord, 292 + +Holmes, Admiral Sir Robert, 132 _n_. + +Hood, Vice-Admiral Sir Samuel, 322 + +Hood, Viscount, 211-4; + his additional signals, 228-9, 236-8, 255 + +Hope, Captain George, 295, 303, 320 _n_. + +Hoste, Père Paul, his _Evolutions Navales_, 97-8, 113-4, 179-83, + 225 _n._, 235-6, 257, 262-3, 308 + +Howard of Effingham, Lord, 27, 29 + +Howard, Sir Edward, 14 + +Howe, Earl, 184-5, 225 _n._; + as first lord, 233-8, 252 _et seq._, 262-5, 267; + his great manoeuvre, 255-62, 265, 267, 287, 308, 311, 336 + +Hygiene, 44, 60 + +Initiative, 267-8, 279, 314. + _See also_ Divisions, independent control of + +Intervals, 67, 113, 127, 158, 191, 220, 222-3, 244, 327-8, 330 _n_. + +Jack-flag, 108 and _n_. + +James II, 168. + _See also_ York, Duke of + +Jervis, Admiral Sir John, Earl of St. Vincent, 254, 265-6 + +Jonquière, Admiral de la, 209 + +Jordan, Admiral Sir Joseph, 141, 155 _n_. + +Keats, Admiral Sir Richard Goodwin, 290-2, 295-6, 304, 311, 322 + +Keith, Admiral Lord, 336, 341 + +Keppel, Admiral Augustus, Viscount, 235, 258 + +Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles, 1st bart. (_ob._ 1777), 224 _n._, 235, + 258 + +Knowles, Admiral Sir Charles Henry, 2nd bart. (1754-1831), 185, 210, + 235 _n._, 235-7, 257-8, 260-1 + +Landing, 16 + +Lasking, 171 + +Lawson, Admiral Sir John, 112 + +Lestock, Admiral, 188 _n._, 205-8 + +Lindsey, Robert Bertie, Earl of, 76-7, 85 + +Line. _See also_ Orders of battle. + Abreast, 75, 107-9, 165-6, 220 + Ahead, origin of, 28-36, 42, 59, 62, 82-7; + first instructions for, 92, 95-9, 100-2, 108-9, 124-6; + insistence on, 134-5, 149, 155, 159, 335-9; + close hauled, first use of, 113; + invented by English, 118-21 + of bearing, _see_ Quarter line + Breaking the, 114, 136-7, 142, 149, 153, 158 _n._, 169-70, + 176-8, 182, 212, 229, 237, 289, 314-5, 324-5; + early objections to, 145, 153 _n._, 183-4, 256; + the two methods of, 255-62, 264-6, 279, 326-7, 330-3; + synonyms for, 261 + Closing up, 192, 198, 241, 243 + Equalising, 205, 219, 221, 227, 346. + _See also_ Reserve, corps de + Forming, as convenient, 170-1, 221, 226, 277 + Inverting, 226-7, 238, 331-2 + Position of squadrons in, 239-40 + Principles of, stated, 269, 342 + Quitting the, 161, 193, 198, 247, 273-4. + _See also_ Equalising + Early Spanish use of, 8-10; + early English, 28-36, 42, 59, 62 + Reactions against, 115-6, 159 _n._, 186, 283-9, 335-9 + Reduplication of, 118-9, 312-3, 338, 342 _n._, 352 + +Linstocks, 11 + +Lisle, John Dudley, Lord, 18-24, 291, 296 + +Louisbourg, 203 + +Love, Sir Thomas, 49-51, 61 _n._ + +Macpherson, Alexander, 225 + +Malta, 164 + +Mathews, Admiral, 188 _n._, 190 _n._, 196, 205-8, 210 + +Medows, Captain Charles, 225 + +_Mêlée_, 259, 267, 291 + +Monck, George, Duke of Albemarle, 93-9; + orders of, 99-104, 107, 111-5, 134-6 + +Monson, Sir William, on tactics, 76 + +Moore, Admiral Sir Graham, 336 + +Moorsom, Vice-Admiral Constantine, 298-9 + +Moorsom, Captain Robert, 298-9, 311 _n._ + +Morogues, Bigot de, his _Tactique navale_, 171 _n._, 185, + 285 _n._, 327 + +Mortemart, Duc de, 179 + +Moulton, Captain Robert, his seabook, 112, 126 _n._, 129 _n._, + 151 _n._ + +Musket-arrows, 34 + +Mutual support, 61, 67, 74, 85-6, 89, 91, 100-1, 123, 129, 172, 266-7, +283 + +Myngs, Admiral Sir Christopher, 136-7 + +Narbrough, Admiral Sir John, 164-7 + +Nelson, Admiral Lord, 116, 185, 214, 257, 259, 261, 266, 321-7, 335-42 + His general orders (1798-1801), 264, 287-9 + His memorandum (1803) 261, 280-1, 289-90, 313-6 + His memorandum (1805), 272 _n._, 282-313, 316-20, 353-4 + +'Nelson touch,' the, 283, 293, 296, 299-313, 326 + +Norris, Admiral Sir John, 196, 206-7 + +Oar propulsion, 18-24 + +O'Bryen, Lieutenant Christopher, his translation of Hoste, 236 _n._ + +Order of battle, forming, as convenient, 70-1 + +Orders of battle. + Early Spanish, 8-10; + English, 19-24, 50-1, 65 _et seq_,, 74-5; + wedge-shaped, 9, 19; + Baskerville's, 30; + Boteler on, 73-6; + crescent, 75, 94, 351; + in two lines, 209, 214, 220, 226, 229, 285, 294-300, 305, 323; + in three lines, 286, 289-296, 354 + +Order of sailing, 29, 50, 225 _n._, 235; + as order of battle, 316, 322, 327, 340 + +Parisot, his account of Trafalgar, 310 _n._ + +Pellew, Captain Israel, 299, 351 _n._ + +Penn, Admiral Sir William, 81, 92, 96, 98, 135; + orders of, 99-104, 114; + his talk with Pepys, 120-1 + +Pepys, Samuel, 117 _n._, 120-1, 168-9 + +Perez de Grandallana, Don Domingo, 267 + +Pigot, Admiral Hugh, 212, 228-9 _n._, 237, 255, 260 + +Popham, Admiral Sir Home, 254, 335-6 + +Prayers, 33, 36, 52 + +Preparative signals, 269 + +Prizes, treatment of, 103, 112 + +Quarter line, 209, 216-7, 225, 242, 269-71, 344; + at Trafalgar, 311-2 + +Quarters, 41-2, 58-9, 62, 69-70 + +Raking, 170, 221 + +Ralegh, Sir Walter, 27 _et seq._, 50 + +Rear-concentration, 143-4, 145 _n._, 180, 221, 226, 238, 249, 263, 289, + 293, 310, 313-9, 330-3, 339-41 + +Repeating ships, 142, 199, 243, 271, 305 _n._, 308, 344 + +Réserve, Corps de, 205, 214, 219, 221, 227, 241, 243, 269, 272, 276, +331, + 335. 345. + _See also_ Equalising and Quitting the line + +Reserve squadrons, 7, 12, 50-1, 67, 71 + +Retreat, order of, 94 and _n._, 165. + _See also_ Dispersing + +Rockets as signals, 163 _n_. + +Rodney, Lord, 184-5, 2O9, 211-3; + Additional Instructions used by, 225, 227 _n._, 228 _n._, 236-7, + 255-62, 284-5, 287 + +Rooke, Admiral Sir George, 187, 195-9, 207 + +Rupert, Prince, 111-2, 115-7; + Instructions of, 129-30, 133-6, 159 _n._, 169 + +Russell, Admiral Edward, Earl of Orford, 175 _et seq._, 187-96, + 233 _n_. + +Ruyter, Admiral Michiel de, 87, 119, 156 _n_. + +Sailing order, _see_ Order of sailing + +Sailors serving ashore, 37, 56 + +Sandwich, Edward Mountagu, Earl of, 82, 107-9, 111-2, 165 + +Saumarez, Admiral Lord de, 262 + +Scouts, _see_ Cruisers + +Sealed orders, 38 + +Seamen gunners, 35, 41 + +Ship-money fleets, 76-7 + +Ships, lists of, 20-2, 65-6, 71, 166 + Achille, 352 + Agamemnon, 301, 303-4, 311 _n._ + Anne Royal, 63, 65 + Assurance, 81 + Bahama, 352 + Belleisle, 294, 300, 304, 357 + Bellerophon, 300, 304, 305 _n._, 357 + Britannia, 195, 354 + Bucentaure, 309, 351 + Colossus, 300-1, 303-6, 352, 357 + Conqueror, 299,305 _n._, 351 _n_. + Defence, 295, 301, 303-4 + Defiance, 305 _n_. + Dreadnought (1578), 65; + (1805), 354 + Euryalus, 305 _n._, 308-9 + Leviathan, 304, 351 _n_. + Marlborough, 253 + Mars, 300-1, 303-6, 357 + Neptune, 351 _n_. + Orion, 301-2, 304-5 + Pembroke, 169 + Polyphemus, 304 + Prince, 354 + Prince of Wales, 322 + Queen Charlotte, 252 + Redoutable, 309 + Revenge, 298, 311 _n_. + Royal Catherine, 169 + Royal Charles, 111, 128-9 + Royal James, 112 _n_. + Royal Sovereign, 300, 357 + St. George, 264 + Santa Ana, 309 + Santísima Trinidad, 309-10 + Shannon, 225 + Superb, 290 + Swiftsure, 352 + Téméraire, 300, 308, 310, 357 + Vanguard, 287 + Victory, 293, 299, 300, 305, 3O7-8, 357 + +Shot-holes, 62, 69 + +Shovell, Admiral Sir Clowdisley, 195, 198 _n._ + +Sidmouth, Lord, 292, 295 + +Sign (for signal), 82 + +Signal books, introduction of, 233 and _n._, 234 and _n._ + +Signal officers, 216, 299 + +Signals, early forms of, 10, 38, 54-8, 73; + improvements in, 242, 152 _n._, 155 _n._, 163 _n._, 233, + _et seq._, 254 _n._; + numerical, 235 + +Slinging yards, 70 + +Smoke, tactical value of, 8, 10, 15, 16 + +Soldiers at sea, 35, 37, 41, 53, 56, 59,69; + as admirals, 29-30, 49, 73-6, 96 + +Spain, orders adopted from, 18, 33 _n._, 41 _n._ + +Spanish Armament, the (1790), 253 + +Squadronal organisation, 50-1, 55, 65-7, 73-4, 85-7, 186-9, 193-4, 322 + +Stanhope, Vice-Admiral, 322 + +Station, changing, 218, 226, 243, 276; + keeping, 222, 224, 228, + _See also_ Line, quitting the + +Stinkballs, 11 + +Strickland, Admiral Sir Roger, 169 + +Sub-squadrons, 50-1, 65-7, 85, 87, 322-3. + _See also_ Divisions + +Tacking in succession, first signal for, 113, 127-8 + +Tactical exercises, 209, 253, 285 _n._ + +Tactics, principles of, 283-4, 286. + _See also_ Concentration, Confusing, Containing, Mutual support + Oscillations in, 178, 213 + Dutch, 50, 66-7, 73, 85-7, 97-8, 114, 118-20, 313 + French, 185, 258-9, 267-8, 285-6 + Spanish, 267-8. + _See also_ Chaves, Alonso de + Treatises on, _see_ Hoste, Morogues, Clerk, Grenier, Knowles + +Tangier, 168 + +Telegraphing, 254 _n._ + +Tobacco smoking, 37 + +Torrington, Admiral Arthur Herbert, Earl of, 141, 177, 181, 187, 236 + +Toulouse, Comte de, 196 + +Tourville, Maréchal de, 179-181 + +Transports, 71 + +Tromp, Admiral Marten Harpertszoon, 83-7, 93-4; + orders of, 91 + +Tromp, Admiral Cornelis Martenszoon, 118, 156 _n._ + +Van, concentration on, 142-5, 154 _n._ + +Vane, Sir Harry, 93 + +Vernon, Admiral, 205-7, 210; + his Additional Instructions, 214-216 + +Villeneuve, Admiral, 264, 286, 308-9, 312-3, 342 _n._ + +Walsh, Lieutenant John, his signal book, 253 + +Warren, Vice-Admiral Sir Peter, 285 _n._ + +Weapons for close quarters, 11, 15 + +Weather-gage, 8, 15, 16, 23-4, 62, 68, 102, 114, 154, 238 + +Weft, waft or wheft, 89, 99 + +Wimbledon, _see_ Cecil + +Wing squadrons, 18-24, 73 + +With, Admiral Witte de, 86 + +Wren, Dr. Mathew, F.R.S., 133, 138-9 + +York, James, Duke of, 82; + his instructions, 110-28, 133-63, 177; + his school, 134-5, 178, 338; + end of his career, 140 + +Zamorano, Roderigo, 4 + +Zante, 164, 167 + + + + + +THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY + + * * * * * + +_PATRON_ +H.R.H. THE PRINCE OF WALES, K.G., K.T., K.P. + +_PRESIDENT_ +EARL SPENCER, K.G. + +THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY, which has been established for the purpose +of printing rare or unpublished works of naval interest, aims at +rendering accessible the sources of our naval history, and at +elucidating questions of naval archæology, construction, +administration, organisation and social life. + +The Society has already issued:-- + +In 1894: Vols. I. and II. _State Papers relating to the Defeat of +the Spanish Armada, Anno_ 1588. Edited by Professor J.K. Laughton. +(30s.) + +In 1895: Vol. III. _Letters of Lord Hood_, 1781-82. Edited by +Mr. David Hannay. (_None available_.) + +Vol. IV. _Index to James's Naval History_, By Mr. C.G. Toogood. +Edited by the Hon. T.A. Brassey. (12_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. V. _Life of Captain Stephen Martin_, 1666-1740. Edited by +Sir Clements R. Markham. (_None available_.) + +In 1896: Vol. VI. _Journal of Rear-Admiral Bartholomew James_, +1752-1828. Edited by Professor J.K. Laughton and Commander +J.Y.F. Sulivan. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. VII. _Hollond's Discourses of the Navy_, 1638 and +1658. Edited by Mr. J.R. Tanner. (12_s._ 6_d._) +Vol. VIII. _Naval Accounts and Inventories in the Reign of Henry +VII_. Edited by Mr. M. Oppenheim. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +In 1897: Vol. IX. _Journal of Sir George Rooke_. Edited by +Mr. Oscar Browning. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. X. _Letters and Papers relating to the War with France_, +1512-13. Edited by M. Alfred Spont. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. XI. _Papers relating to the Spanish War_, 1585-87. Edited +by Mr. Julian Corbett. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +In 1898: Vol. XII. _Journals and Letters of Admiral of the Fleet Sir +Thomas Byam Martin_, 1773-1854 (Vol. II.). Edited by Admiral Sir +R. Vesey Hamilton. (_See_ XXIV.) + +Vol. XIII. _Papers relating to the First Dutch War_, 1652-54 +(Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. S.R. Gardiner. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. XIV. _Papers relating to the Blockade of Brest_, 1803-5 +(Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. J. Leyland. (_See_ XXI.) + +In 1899: Vol. XV. _History of the Russian Fleet during the Reign of +Peter the Great. By a Contemporary Englishman_. Edited by Admiral +Sir Cyprian Bridge. (10_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. XVI. _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_, 1794-1805 +(Vol. I.). Edited by Vice-Admiral Sir T. Sturges Jackson. (_See_ +XVIII.) + +Vol. XVII. _Papers relating to the First Dutch War_, 1652-54 +(Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. S.R. Gardiner, (10_s._ 6_d._) + +In 1900: Vol. XVIII. _Logs of the Great Sea Fights_ +(Vol. II.). Edited by Sir T.S. Jackson. (_Two vols._ 25_s._) + +Vol. XIX. _Journals and Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_ +(Vol. III.). Edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. (_See_ XXIV.) + +In 1901: Vol. XX. _The Naval Miscellany_ (Vol. I.). Edited by +the Secretary. (15_s._) + +Vol. XXI. _Papers relating to the Blockade of Brest_, 1803-5 +(Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. John Leyland (_Two vols._ 25_s._) +In 1902: Vols. XXII. and XXIII. _The Naval Tracts of Sir +William. Monson_ (Vols. I. and II.). Edited by Mr. M. Oppenheim. +(_Two vols._ 25_s._) + +Vol XXIV. _Journals and Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin_ +(Vol. I.). Edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. (_Three vols._ +31_s._ 6_d._) + +In 1903: Vol. XXV. _Nelson and the Neapolitan Jacobins_. Edited +by Mr. H.C. Gutteridge.(12_s._ 6_d._) + +Vol. XXVI. _A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in the +Pepysian Library_ (Vol. I.). Edited by Mr. J.R. Tanner. +(15_s._) + +In 1904: Vol. XXVII. _A Descriptive Catalogue of the Naval MSS. in +the Pepysian Library_ (Vol. II.). Edited by Mr. J.R. Tanner. +(12_s_. 6_d._) + +Vol. XXVIII. _The Correspondence of Admiral John Markkam_, +1801-7. Edited by Sir Clements R. Markham. (12_s._ 6_d._) + +In 1905: Vol. XXIX. _Fighting Instructions_, 1530-1816. Edited +by Mr. Julian Corbett. + +_To follow:_ + +Vol. XXX. _Papers relating to the First Dutch War_, 1652-54 +(Vol. III.). Edited by Mr. C.T. Atkinson. + +Other works in preparation, in addition to further volumes of +Mr. Tanner's _Descriptive Catalogue_, of _Sir William Monson's +Tracts_, of _The First Dutch War_, which will be edited by +Mr. C.T. Atkinson, and of _The Naval Miscellany_, are _The +Journal of Captain_ (afterwards Sir John) _Narbrough_, 1672-73, +to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; _Official Documents +illustrating the Social Life and Internal Discipline of the Navy in +the XVIIIth Century_, to be edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; _Select +Correspondence of the great Earl of Chatham and his Sons_, to be +edited by Professor J.K. Laughton; _Select Correspondence of Sir +Charles Middleton, afterwards Lord Barham_, 1778-1806, to be edited by + +Professor J.K. Laughton; _Reminiscences of Commander James Anthony +Gardner_, 1775-1806, to be edited by Sir R. Vesey Hamilton; and a +_Collection of Naval Songs and Ballads_, to be edited by Professor +C.H. Firth and Mr. Henry Newbolt. + +Any person wishing to become a Member of the Society is requested to +apply to the Secretary (Professor Laughton, 9 Pepys Road, Wimbledon, +S.W.), who will submit his name to the Council. The Annual +Subscription is One Guinea, the payment of which entitles the Member +to receive one copy of all works issued by the Society for that +year. The publications are not offered for general sale; but Members +can obtain a complete set of the volumes on payment of the back +subscriptions. Single volumes can also be obtained by Members at the +prices marked to each. + +_May_ 1905. + +PRINTED BY + +SPOTTISWOODE AND CO. LTD., NEW-STREET SQUARE + +LONDON + +NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY + + * * * * * + +REPORT OF THE COUNCIL + + * * * * * + +_Read at the Thirteenth Annual General Meeting, Thursday, June_ +28, 1906. + + * * * * * + +THE COUNCIL have to report that the number of members and subscribers +on the Society's list is 536; a net increase of 28 over last +year. This is largely due to the additional support received from the +Admiralty, which has increased the number of its subscriptions to +fourteen, as well as to the accession of other departments of the +public service and of public institutions, including + +The War Course College, Devonport; + +The War Course College, Portsmouth; + +The Staff College, Camberley; + +The University of Liverpool; + +The Public Libraries, Cardiff; + +The Public Libraries, Croydon; + +and, in his private capacity, the Secretary of State for War. The +Society of Swedish Naval Officers, Stockholm, has also been admitted +as a subscriber. + +On the other hand, death has removed nine of our members, and among +them two who have, from the beginning, been most active in furthering +the ends and promoting the interests of the Society. These are:-- + +Captain MONTAGU BURROWS, R.N., Chichele Professor of History in the +University of Oxford, and known to all of us as the author of the +_Life of Hawke_; and + +Rear-Admiral Sir WILLIAM WHARTON, K.C.B., Hydrographer to the +Admiralty. + +The names of the others are:-- + +Sir W. LAIRD CLOWES; +Earl COWPER; +Lord CURRIE, G.C.B.; +Commander W.M. LATHAM, R.N.; +Mr. C.A. NANKIVELL; +Mr. G.R. STEVENS; +Commander W.H. WATSON, R.N.R. + +While congratulating the Society on the improving appearance of the +list, the Council would again urge on every member the necessity of +his individual co-operation in the endeavour to make the work of the +Society more generally and widely known. To this end they also invite +the assistance of the Press. It is only by such increased publicity +that the numbers, the funds, and therefore the work and usefulness, of +the Society can be maintained. + +Since the date of the last General Meeting the Society has issued: + +For 1905. Vol. XXX. _The First Dutch War_ (Vol. III.). Edited by +the late Dr. S.R. GARDINER and Mr. C.T. ATKINSON. + +For this year it is proposed to issue _The Reminiscences of +Commander James Anthony Gardner_, 1775-1806, edited by Sir R. VESEY +HAMILTON; and _Select Correspondence of Sir Charles Middleton, +afterwards Lord Barham_, edited by Professor J.K. LAUGHTON. + +These are now well advanced, and will, it is hoped, be issued in the +course of the autumn. + +Of the several works in preparation--a list of which will be found in +the Advertisement at the end of Vol. XXX--it is unnecessary to speak +here. + +The Society will, however, be interested to learn that copies have +been found of the Fighting Instructions of Hawke and Rodney. These +were described at some length by Mr. Julian S. Corbett in the +_Times_ of December 19, and, by the kind permission of the owner, +Mr. Pritchard, will be edited for the Society by Mr. Corbett, and +issued--probably next year--either as a separate volume or included in +a volume of the Miscellany. + +The Balance Sheet is appended. + +ABSTRACT OF ACCOUNTS.--JANUARY 1 TO DECEMBER 31, 1905. + RECEIPTS. + £ s. d. £ s. d. | +Balance brought forward:-- | + At Messrs. Coutts & Co. 202 5 10 | + With Treasurer 0 18 0 | + With Secretary 8 17 1 | + --------- 212 0 11 | +612 Subscriptions 642 12 0 | + Over-payment on same 0 1 4 | + --------- 642 13 4 | +Volumes sold 60 1 0 | + --------- | + £914 15 3 | + ========== | +Audited and found correct:-- + W.A. JAMES, } _Auditors_. + P.H. PRIDHAM WIPPELL,} + _May 1906_. + + PAYMENTS. + £ s. d. +Printing, &c. 370 3 3 +Indexing and Transcribing 7 8 0 +Salaries and Wages 110 18 9 +Miscellaneous 9 18 5 +Balance carried forward:-- + At Messrs. Coutts & Co. £412 10 5 + With Treasurer 1 1 0 + With Secretary 2 15 5 + --------- 416 6 10 + --------- + £914 15 3 + ========= + W. GRAHAM GREENE, + _Hon. Treasurer_. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 +by Julian S. 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