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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/16406-8.txt b/16406-8.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dda3a74 --- /dev/null +++ b/16406-8.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12133 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, An Introduction to Philosophy, by George +Stuart Fullerton + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: An Introduction to Philosophy + + +Author: George Stuart Fullerton + + + +Release Date: August 1, 2005 [eBook #16406] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY*** + + +E-text prepared by Al Haines + + + +AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY + +by + +GEORGE STUART FULLERTON + +Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University +New York + +New York +The MacMillan Company +London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. + +1915 + +Norwood Press +J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co. +Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. + + + + + + + +PREFACE + +As there cannot be said to be a beaten path in philosophy, and as +"Introductions" to the subject differ widely from one another, it is +proper that I should give an indication of the scope of the present +volume. + +It undertakes:-- + +1. To point out what the word "philosophy" is made to cover in our +universities and colleges at the present day, and to show why it is +given this meaning. + +2. To explain the nature of reflective or philosophical thinking, and +to show how it differs from common thought and from science. + +3. To give a general view of the main problems with which philosophers +have felt called upon to deal. + +4. To give an account of some of the more important types of +philosophical doctrine which have arisen out of the consideration of +such problems. + +5. To indicate the relation of philosophy to the so-called +philosophical sciences, and to the other sciences. + +6. To show, finally, that the study of philosophy is of value to us +all, and to give some practical admonitions on spirit and method. Had +these admonitions been impressed upon me at a time when I was in +especial need of guidance, I feel that they would have spared me no +little anxiety and confusion of mind. For this reason, I recommend +them to the attention of the reader. + +Such is the scope of my book. It aims to tell what philosophy is. It +is not its chief object to advocate a particular type of doctrine. At +the same time, as it is impossible to treat of the problems of +philosophy except from some point of view, it will be found that, in +Chapters III to XI, a doctrine is presented. It is the same as that +presented much more in detail, and with a greater wealth of reference, +in my "System of Metaphysics," which was published a short time ago. +In the Notes in the back of this volume, the reader will find +references to those parts of the larger work which treat of the +subjects more briefly discussed here. It will be helpful to the +teacher to keep the larger work on hand, and to use more or less of the +material there presented as his undergraduate classes discuss the +chapters of this one. Other references are also given in the Notes, +and it may be profitable to direct the attention of students to them. + +The present book has been made as clear and simple as possible, that no +unnecessary difficulties may be placed in the path of those who enter +upon the thorny road of philosophical reflection. The subjects treated +are deep enough to demand the serious attention of any one; and they +are subjects of fascinating interest. That they are treated simply and +clearly does not mean that they are treated superficially. Indeed, +when a doctrine is presented in outline and in a brief and simple +statement, its meaning may be more readily apparent than when it is +treated more exhaustively. For this reason, I especially recommend, +even to those who are well acquainted with philosophy, the account of +the external world contained in Chapter IV. + +For the doctrine I advocate I am inclined to ask especial consideration +on the ground that it is, on the whole, a justification of the attitude +taken by the plain man toward the world in which he finds himself. The +experience of the race is not a thing that we may treat lightly. + +Thus, it is maintained that there is a real external world presented in +our experience--not a world which we have a right to regard as the +sensations or ideas of any mind. It is maintained that we have +evidence that there are minds in certain relations to that world, and +that we can, within certain limits, determine these relations. It is +pointed out that the plain man's belief in the activity of his mind and +his notion of the significance of purposes and ends are not without +justification. It is indicated that theism is a reasonable doctrine, +and it is held that the human will is free in the only proper sense of +the word "freedom." Throughout it is taken for granted that the +philosopher has no private system of weights and measures, but must +reason as other men reason, and must prove his conclusions in the same +sober way. + +I have written in hopes that the book may be of use to undergraduate +students. They are often repelled by philosophy, and I cannot but +think that this is in part due to the dry and abstract form in which +philosophers have too often seen fit to express their thoughts. The +same thoughts can be set forth in plain language, and their +significance illustrated by a constant reference to experiences which +we all have--experiences which must serve as the foundation to every +theory of the mind and the world worthy of serious consideration. + +But there are many persons who cannot attend formal courses of +instruction, and who, nevertheless, are interested in philosophy. +These, also, I have had in mind; and I have tried to be so clear that +they could read the work with profit in the absence of a teacher. + +Lastly, I invite the more learned, if they have found my "System of +Metaphysics" difficult to understand in any part, to follow the simple +statement contained in the chapters above alluded to, and then to +return, if they will, to the more bulky volume. + + +GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. + +New York, 1906. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +PART I + +INTRODUCTORY + + +CHAPTER I + +THE MEANING OF THE WORD "PHILOSOPHY" IN THE PAST AND IN THE PRESENT + + 1. The Beginnings of Philosophy. + 2. The Greek Philosophy at its Height. + 3. Philosophy as a Guide to Life. + 4. Philosophy in the Middle Ages. + 5. The Modern Philosophy. + 6. What Philosophy means in our Time. + +CHAPTER II + +COMMON THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT + + 7. Common Thought. + 8. Scientific Knowledge. + 9. Mathematics. + 10. The Science of Psychology. + 11. Reflective Thought. + + +PART II + +PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE EXTERNAL WORLD + +CHAPTER III + +IS THERE AN EXTERNAL WORLD? + + 12. How the Plain Man thinks he knows the World. + 13. The Psychologist and the External World. + 14. The "Telephone Exchange." + +CHAPTER IV + +SENSATIONS AND "THINGS" + + 15. Sense and Imagination. + 16. May we call "Things" Groups of Sensations? + 17. The Distinction between Sensations and "Things." + 18. The Existence of Material Things. + +CHAPTER V + +APPEARANCES AND REALITIES + + 19. Things and their Appearances. + 20. Real Things. + 21. Ultimate Real Things. + 22. The Bugbear of the "Unknowable". + +CHAPTER VI + +OF SPACE + + 23. What we are supposed to know about It. + 24. Space as Necessary and Space as Infinite. + 25. Space as Infinitely Divisible. + 26. What is Real Space? + +CHAPTER VII + +OF TIME + + 27. Time as Necessary, Infinite, and Infinitely Divisible. + 28. The Problem of Past, Present, and Future. + 29. What is Real Time? + + +PART III + +PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE MIND + +CHAPTER VIII + +WHAT IS THE MIND? + + 30. Primitive Notions of Mind. + 31. The Mind as Immaterial. + 32. Modern Common Sense Notions of the Mind. + 33. The Psychologist and the Mind. + 34. The Metaphysician and the Mind. + +CHAPTER IX + +MIND AND BODY + + 35. Is the Mind in the Body? + 36. The Doctrine of the Interactionist. + 37. The Doctrine of the Parallelist. + 38. In what Sense Mental Phenomena have a Time and Place. + 39. Objections to Parallelism. + +CHAPTER X + +HOW WE KNOW THERE ARE OTHER MINDS + + 40. Is it Certain that we know It? + 41. The Argument for Other Minds. + 42. What Other Minds are there? + 43. The Doctrine of Mind-stuff. + +CHAPTER XI + +OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND + + 44. Is the Material World a Mechanism? + 45. The Place of Mind in Nature. + 46. The Order of Nature and "Free-will." + 47. The Physical World and the Moral World. + + +PART IV + +SOME TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY + +CHAPTER XII + +THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND + + 48. The Doctrine of Representative Perception. + 49. The Step to Idealism. + 50. The Revolt of "Common Sense." + 51. The Critical Philosophy. + +CHAPTER XIII + +REALISM AND IDEALISM + + 52. Realism. + 53. Idealism. + +CHAPTER XIV + +MONISM AND DUALISM + + 54. The Meaning of the Words. + 55. Materialism. + 56. Spiritualism. + 57. The Doctrine of the One Substance. + 58. Dualism. + 59. Singularism and Pluralism. + +CHAPTER XV + +RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM + + 60. Rationalism. + 61. Empiricism. + 62. Criticism. + 63. Critical Empiricism. + 64. Pragmatism. + + +PART V + +THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES + +CHAPTER XVI + +LOGIC + + 65. Introductory; the Philosophical Sciences. + 66. The Traditional Logic. + 67. The "Modern" Logic. + 68. Logic and Philosophy. + +CHAPTER XVII + +PSYCHOLOGY + + 69. Psychology and Philosophy. + 70. The Double Affiliation of Psychology. + +CHAPTER XVIII + +ETHICS AND AESTHETICS + + 71. Common Sense Ethics. + 72. Ethics and Philosophy. + 73. Aesthetics. + + +CHAPTER XIX + +METAPHYSICS + + 74. What is Metaphysics? + 75. Epistemology. + +CHAPTER XX + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION + + 76. Religion and Reflection. + 77. The Philosophy of Religion. + +CHAPTER XXI + +PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER SCIENCES + + 78. The Philosophical and the Non-philosophical Sciences. + 79. The study of Scientific Principles and Methods. + + +PART VI + +ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + +CHAPTER XXII + +THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + + 80. The Question of Practical Utility. + 81. Why Philosophical Studies are Useful. + 82. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion. + +CHAPTER XXIII + +WHY WE SHOULD STUDY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY + + 83. The Prominence given to the Subject. + 84. The Especial Importance of Historical Studies to Reflective Thought. + 85. The Value of Different Points of View. + 86. Philosophy as Poetry and Philosophy as Science. + 87. How to read the History of Philosophy. + +CHAPTER XXIV + +SOME PRACTICAL ADMONITIONS + + 88. Be prepared to enter upon a New Way of Looking at Things. + 89. Be willing to consider Possibilities which at first strike one + as Absurd. + 90. Do not have too much Respect for Authority. + 91. Remember that Ordinary Rules of Evidence Apply. + 92. Aim at Clearness and Simplicity. + 93. Do not hastily accept a Doctrine. + + +NOTES + + + + +AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY + + +I. INTRODUCTORY + +CHAPTER I + +THE MEANING OF THE WORD "PHILOSOPHY" IN THE PAST AND IN THE PRESENT + +I must warn the reader at the outset that the title of this chapter +seems to promise a great deal more than he will find carried out in the +chapter itself. To tell all that philosophy has meant in the past, and +all that it means to various classes of men in the present, would be a +task of no small magnitude, and one quite beyond the scope of such a +volume as this. But it is not impossible to give within small compass +a brief indication, at least, of what the word once signified, to show +how its signification has undergone changes, and to point out to what +sort of a discipline or group of disciplines educated men are apt to +apply the word, notwithstanding their differences of opinion as to the +truth or falsity of this or that particular doctrine. Why certain +subjects of investigation have come to be grouped together and to be +regarded as falling within the province of the philosopher, rather than +certain other subjects, will, I hope, be made clear in the body of the +work. Only an indication can be given in this chapter. + +1. THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY.--The Greek historian Herodotus +(484-424 B.C.) appears to have been the first to use the verb "to +philosophize." He makes Croesus tell Solon how he has heard that he +"from a desire of knowledge has, philosophizing, journeyed through many +lands." The word "philosophizing" seems to indicate that Solon pursued +knowledge for its own sake, and was what we call an investigator. As +for the word "philosopher" (etymologically, a lover of wisdom), a +certain somewhat unreliable tradition traces it back to Pythagoras +(about 582-500 B.C.). As told by Cicero, the story is that, in a +conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius, in the Peloponnesus, he +described himself as a philosopher, and said that his business was an +investigation into the nature of things. + +At any rate, both the words "philosopher" and "philosophy" are freely +used in the writings of the disciples of Socrates (470-399 B.C.), and +it is possible that he was the first to make use of them. The seeming +modesty of the title philosopher--for etymologically it is a modest +one, though it has managed to gather a very different signification +with the lapse of time--the modesty of the title would naturally appeal +to a man who claimed so much ignorance, as Socrates; and Plato +represents him as distinguishing between the lover of wisdom and the +wise, on the ground that God alone may be called wise. From that date +to this the word "philosopher" has remained with us, and it has meant +many things to many men. But for centuries the philosopher has not +been simply the investigator, nor has he been simply the lover of +wisdom. + +An investigation into the origin of words, however interesting in +itself, can tell us little of the uses to which words are put after +they have come into being. If we turn from etymology to history, and +review the labors of the men whom the world has agreed to call +philosophers, we are struck by the fact that those who head the list +chronologically appear to have been occupied with crude physical +speculations, with attempts to guess what the world is made out of, +rather than with that somewhat vague something that we call philosophy +to-day. + +Students of the history of philosophy usually begin their studies with +the speculations of the Greek philosopher Thales (b. 624 B.C.). We are +told that he assumed water to be the universal principle out of which +all things are made, and that he maintained that "all things are full +of gods." We find that Anaximander, the next in the list, assumed as +the source out of which all things proceed and that to which they all +return "the infinite and indeterminate"; and that Anaximenes, who was +perhaps his pupil, took as his principle the all-embracing air. + +This trio constitutes the Ionian school of philosophy, the earliest of +the Greek schools; and one who reads for the first time the few vague +statements which seem to constitute the sum of their contributions to +human knowledge is impelled to wonder that so much has been made of the +men. + +This wonder disappears, however, when one realizes that the appearance +of these thinkers was really a momentous thing. For these men turned +their faces away from the poetical and mythologic way of accounting for +things, which had obtained up to their time, and set their faces toward +Science. Aristotle shows us how Thales may have been led to the +formulation of his main thesis by an observation of the phenomena of +nature. Anaximander saw in the world in which he lived the result of a +process of evolution. Anaximenes explains the coming into being of +fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth, as due to a condensation and +expansion of the universal principle, air. The boldness of their +speculations we may explain as due to a courage born of ignorance, but +the explanations they offer are scientific in spirit, at least. + +Moreover, these men do not stand alone. They are the advance guard of +an army whose latest representatives are the men who are enlightening +the world at the present day. The evolution of science--taking that +word in the broad sense to mean organized and systematized +knowledge--must be traced in the works of the Greek philosophers from +Thales down. Here we have the source and the rivulet to which we can +trace back the mighty stream which is flowing past our own doors. +Apparently insignificant in its beginnings, it must still for a while +seem insignificant to the man who follows with an unreflective eye the +course of the current. + +It would take me too far afield to give an account of the Greek schools +which immediately succeeded the Ionic: to tell of the Pythagoreans, who +held that all things were constituted by numbers; of the Eleatics, who +held that "only Being is," and denied the possibility of change, +thereby reducing the shifting panorama of the things about us to a mere +delusive world of appearances; of Heraclitus, who was so impressed by +the constant flux of things that he summed up his view of nature in the +words: "Everything flows"; of Empedocles, who found his explanation of +the world in the combination of the four elements, since become +traditional, earth, water, fire, and air; of Democritus, who developed +a materialistic atomism which reminds one strongly of the doctrine of +atoms as it has appeared in modern science; of Anaxagoras, who traced +the system of things to the setting in order of an infinite +multiplicity of different elements,--"seeds of things,"--which setting +in order was due to the activity of the finest of things, Mind. + +It is a delight to discover the illuminating thoughts which came to the +minds of these men; and, on the other hand, it is amusing to see how +recklessly they launched themselves on boundless seas when they were +unprovided with chart and compass. They were like brilliant children, +who know little of the dangers of the great world, but are ready to +undertake anything. These philosophers regarded all knowledge as their +province, and did not despair of governing so great a realm. They were +ready to explain the whole world and everything in it. Of course, this +can only mean that they had little conception of how much there is to +explain, and of what is meant by scientific explanation. + +It is characteristic of this series of philosophers that their +attention was directed very largely upon the external world. It was +natural that this should be so. Both in the history of the race and in +that of the individual, we find that the attention is seized first by +material things, and that it is long before a clear conception of the +mind and of its knowledge is arrived at. Observation precedes +reflection. When we come to think definitely about the mind, we are +all apt to make use of notions which we have derived from our +experience of external things. The very words we use to denote mental +operations are in many instances taken from this outer realm. We +"direct" the attention; we speak of "apprehension," of "conception," of +"intuition." Our knowledge is "clear" or "obscure"; an oration is +"brilliant"; an emotion is "sweet" or "bitter." What wonder that, as +we read over the fragments that have come down to us from the +Pre-Socratic philosophers, we should be struck by the fact that they +sometimes leave out altogether and sometimes touch lightly upon a +number of those things that we regard to-day as peculiarly within the +province of the philosopher. They busied themselves with the world as +they saw it, and certain things had hardly as yet come definitely +within their horizon. + +2. THE GREEK PHILOSOPHY AT ITS HEIGHT.--The next succeeding period sees +certain classes of questions emerge into prominence which had attracted +comparatively little attention from the men of an earlier day. +Democritus of Abdera, to whom reference has been made above, belongs +chronologically to this latter period, but his way of thinking makes us +class him with the earlier philosophers. It was characteristic of +these latter that they assumed rather naïvely that man can look upon +the world and can know it, and can by thinking about it succeed in +giving a reasonable account of it. That there may be a difference +between the world as it really is and the world as it appears to man, +and that it may be impossible for man to attain to a knowledge of the +absolute truth of things, does not seem to have occurred to them. + +The fifth century before Christ was, in Greece, a time of intense +intellectual ferment. One is reminded, in reading of it, of the +splendid years of the Renaissance in Italy, of the awakening of the +human mind to a vigorous life which cast off the bonds of tradition and +insisted upon the right of free and unfettered development. Athens was +the center of this intellectual activity. + +In this century arose the Sophists, public teachers who busied +themselves with all departments of human knowledge, but seemed to lay +no little emphasis upon certain questions that touched very nearly the +life of man. Can man attain to truth at all--to a truth that is more +than a mere truth to him, a seeming truth? Whence do the laws derive +their authority? Is there such a thing as justice, as right? It was +with such questions as these that the Sophists occupied themselves, and +such questions as these have held the attention of mankind ever since. +When they make their appearance in the life of a people or of an +individual man, it means that there has been a rebirth, a birth into +the life of reflection. + +When Socrates, that greatest of teachers, felt called upon to refute +the arguments of these men, he met them, so to speak, on their own +ground, recognizing that the subjects of which they discoursed were, +indeed, matter for scientific investigation. His attitude seemed to +many conservative persons in his day a dangerous one; he was regarded +as an innovator; he taught men to think and to raise questions where, +before, the traditions of the fathers had seemed a sufficient guide to +men's actions. + +And, indeed, he could not do otherwise. Men had learned to reflect, +and there had come into existence at least the beginnings of what we +now sometimes rather loosely call the mental and moral sciences. In +the works of Socrates' disciple Plato (428-347 B.C.) and in those of +Plato's disciple Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), abundant justice is done to +these fields of human activity. These two, the greatest among the +Greek philosophers, differ from each other in many things, but it is +worthy of remark that they both seem to regard the whole sphere of +human knowledge as their province. + +Plato is much more interested in the moral sciences than in the +physical, but he, nevertheless, feels called upon to give an account of +how the world was made and out of what sort of elements. He evidently +does not take his own account very seriously, and recognizes that he is +on uncertain ground. But he does not consider the matter beyond his +jurisdiction. + +As for Aristotle, that wonderful man seems to have found it possible to +represent worthily every science known to his time, and to have marked +out several new fields for his successors to cultivate. His philosophy +covers physics, cosmology, zoölogy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, +psychology, politics and economics, rhetoric and poetics. + +Thus we see that the task of the philosopher was much the same at the +period of the highest development of the Greek philosophy that it had +been earlier. He was supposed to give an account of the system of +things. But the notion of what it means to give an account of the +system of things had necessarily undergone some change. The +philosopher had to be something more than a natural philosopher. + +3. PHILOSOPHY AS A GUIDE TO LIFE.--At the close of the fourth century +before Christ there arose the schools of the Stoics, the Epicureans, +and the Skeptics. In them we seem to find a somewhat new conception of +philosophy--philosophy appears as chiefly a guide to life. The Stoic +emphasizes the necessity of living "according to nature," and dwells +upon the character of the wise man; the Epicurean furnishes certain +selfish maxims for getting through life as pleasantly as possible; the +Skeptic counsels apathy, an indifference to all things,--blessed is he +who expects nothing, for he shall not be disappointed. + +And yet, when we examine more closely these systems, we find a +conception of philosophy not really so very different from that which +had obtained before. We do not find, it is true, that disinterested +passion for the attainment of truth which is the glory of science. Man +seems quite too much concerned with the problem of his own happiness or +unhappiness; he has grown morbid. Nevertheless, the practical maxims +which obtain in each of these systems are based upon a certain view of +the system of things as a whole. + +The Stoic tells us of what the world consists; what was the beginning +and what will be the end of things; what is the relation of the system +of things to God. He develops a physics and a logic as well as a +system of ethics. The Epicurean informs us that the world originated +in a rain of atoms through space; he examines into the foundations of +human knowledge; and he proceeds to make himself comfortable in a world +from which he has removed those disturbing elements, the gods. The +Skeptic decides that there is no such thing as truth, before he +enunciates the dogma that it is not worth while to worry about +anything. The philosophy of each school includes a view of the system +of things as a whole. The philosopher still regarded the universe of +knowledge as his province. + +4. PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES.--I cannot do more than mention +Neo-Platonism, that half Greek and half Oriental system of doctrine +which arose in the third century after Christ, the first system of +importance after the schools mentioned above. But I must not pass it +by without pointing out that the Neo-Platonic philosopher undertook to +give an account of the origin, development, and end of the whole system +of things. + +In the Middle Ages there gradually grew up rather a sharp distinction +between those things that can be known through the unaided reason and +those things that can only be known through a supernatural revelation. +The term "philosophy" came to be synonymous with knowledge attained by +the natural light of reason. This seems to imply some sort of a +limitation to the task of the philosopher. Philosophy is not +synonymous with all knowledge. + +But we must not forget to take note of the fact that philosophy, even +with this limitation, constitutes a pretty wide field. It covers both +the physical and the moral sciences. Nor should we omit to notice that +the scholastic philosopher was at the same time a theologian. Albert +the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas, the famous scholastics of the +thirteenth century, had to write a "_Summa Theologiae_," or system of +theology, as well as to treat of the other departments of human +knowledge. + +Why were these men not overwhelmed with the task set them by the +tradition of their time? It was because the task was not, after all, +so great as a modern man might conceive it to be. Gil Blas, in Le +Sage's famous romance, finds it possible to become a skilled physician +in the twinkling of an eye, when Dr. Sangrado has imparted to him the +secret that the remedy for all diseases is to be found in bleeding the +patient and in making him drink copiously of hot water. When little is +known about things, it does not seem impossible for one man to learn +that little. During the Middle Ages and the centuries preceding, the +physical sciences had a long sleep. Men were much more concerned in +the thirteenth century to find out what Aristotle had said than they +were to address questions to nature. The special sciences, as we now +know them, had not been called into existence. + +5. THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY.--The submission of men's minds to the +authority of Aristotle and of the church gradually gave way. A revival +of learning set in. Men turned first of all to a more independent +choice of authorities, and then rose to the conception of a philosophy +independent of authority, of a science based upon an observation of +nature, of a science at first hand. The special sciences came into +being. + +But the old tradition of philosophy as universal knowledge remained. +If we pass over the men of the transition period and turn our attention +to Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the two +who are commonly regarded as heading the list of the modern +philosophers, we find both of them assigning to the philosopher an +almost unlimited field. + +Bacon holds that philosophy has for its objects God, man, and nature, +and he regards it as within his province to treat of "_philosophia +prima_" (a sort of metaphysics, though he does not call it by this +name), of logic, of physics and astronomy, of anthropology, in which he +includes psychology, of ethics, and of politics. In short, he attempts +to map out the whole field of human knowledge, and to tell those who +work in this corner of it or in that how they should set about their +task. + +As for Descartes, he writes of the trustworthiness of human knowledge, +of the existence of God, of the existence of an external world, of the +human soul and its nature, of mathematics, physics, cosmology, +physiology, and, in short, of nearly everything discussed by the men of +his day. No man can accuse this extraordinary Frenchman of a lack of +appreciation of the special sciences which were growing up. No one in +his time had a better right to be called a scientist in the modern +sense of the term. But it was not enough for him to be a mere +mathematician, or even a worker in the physical sciences generally. He +must be all that has been mentioned above. + +The conception of philosophy as of a something that embraces all +departments of human knowledge has not wholly passed away even in our +day. I shall not dwell upon Spinoza (1632-1677), who believed it +possible to deduce a world _a priori_ with mathematical precision; upon +Christian Wolff (1679-1754), who defined philosophy as the knowledge of +the causes of what is or comes into being; upon Fichte (1762-1814), who +believed that the philosopher, by mere thinking, could lay down the +laws of all possible future experience; upon Schelling (1775-1854), +who, without knowing anything worth mentioning about natural science, +had the courage to develop a system of natural philosophy, and to +condemn such investigators as Boyle and Newton; upon Hegel (1770-1831), +who undertakes to construct the whole system of reality out of +concepts, and who, with his immediate predecessors, brought philosophy +for a while into more or less disrepute with men of a scientific turn +of mind. I shall come down quite to our own times, and consider a man +whose conception of philosophy has had and still has a good deal of +influence, especially with the general public--with those to whom +philosophy is a thing to be taken up in moments of leisure, and cannot +be the serious pursuit of a life. + +"Knowledge of the lowest kind," says Herbert Spencer, "is _un-unified_ +knowledge; Science is _partially-unified_ knowledge; Philosophy is +_completely-unified_ knowledge." [1] Science, he argues, means merely +the family of the Sciences--stands for nothing more than the sum of +knowledge formed of their contributions. Philosophy is the fusion of +these contributions into a whole; it is knowledge of the greatest +generality. In harmony with this notion Spencer produced a system of +philosophy which includes the following: A volume entitled "First +Principles," which undertakes to show what man can and what man cannot +know; a treatise on the principles of biology; another on the +principles of psychology; still another on the principles of sociology; +and finally one on the principles of morality. To complete the scheme +it would have been necessary to give an account of inorganic nature +before going on to the phenomena of life, but our philosopher found the +task too great and left this out. + +Now, Spencer was a man of genius, and one finds in his works many +illuminating thoughts. But it is worthy of remark that those who +praise his work in this or in that field are almost always men who have +themselves worked in some other field and have an imperfect +acquaintance with the particular field that they happen to be praising. +The metaphysician finds the reasonings of the "First Principles" rather +loose and inconclusive; the biologist pays little heed to the +"Principles of Biology"; the sociologist finds Spencer not particularly +accurate or careful in the field of his predilection. He has tried to +be a professor of all the sciences, and it is too late in the world's +history for him or for any man to cope with such a task. In the days +of Plato a man might have hoped to accomplish it. + +6. WHAT PHILOSOPHY MEANS IN OUR TIME.--It savors of temerity to write +down such a title as that which heads the present section. There are +men living to-day to whom philosophy means little else than the +doctrine of Kant, or of Hegel, or of the brothers Caird, or of Herbert +Spencer, or even of St. Thomas Aquinas, for we must not forget that +many of the seminaries of learning in Europe and some in America still +hold to the mediaeval church philosophy. + +But let me gather up in a few words the purport of what has been said +above. Philosophy once meant the whole body of scientific knowledge. +Afterward it came to mean the whole body of knowledge which could be +attained by the mere light of human reason, unaided by revelation. The +several special sciences sprang up, and a multitude of men have for a +long time past devoted themselves to definite limited fields of +investigation with little attention to what has been done in other +fields. Nevertheless, there has persisted the notion of a discipline +which somehow concerns itself with the whole system of things, rather +than with any limited division of that broad field. It is a notion not +peculiar to the disciples of Spencer. There are many to whom +philosophy is a "_Weltweisheit_," a world-wisdom. Shall we say that +this is the meaning of the word philosophy now? And if we do, how +shall we draw a line between philosophy and the body of the special +sciences? + +Perhaps the most just way to get a preliminary idea of what philosophy +means to the men of our time is to turn away for the time being from +the definition of any one man or group of men, and to ask ourselves +what a professor of philosophy in an American or European university is +actually supposed to teach. + +It is quite clear that he is not supposed to be an Aristotle. He does +not represent all the sciences, and no one expects him to lecture on +mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, zoölogy, botany, economics, +politics, and various other disciplines. There was a time when he +might have been expected to teach all that men could know, but that +time is long past. + +Nevertheless, there is quite a group of sciences which are regarded as +belonging especially to his province; and although a man may devote a +large part of his attention to some one portion of the field, he would +certainly be thought remiss if he wholly neglected the rest. This +group of sciences includes logic, psychology, ethics and aesthetics, +metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I have not included +epistemology or the "theory of knowledge" as a separate discipline, for +reasons which will appear later (Chapter XIX); and I have included the +history of philosophy, because, whether we care to call this a special +science or not, it constitutes a very important part of the work of the +teacher of philosophy in our day. + +Of this group of subjects the student who goes to the university to +study philosophy is supposed to know something before he leaves its +walls, whatever else he may or may not know. + +It should be remarked, again, that there is commonly supposed to be a +peculiarly close relation between philosophy and religion. Certainly, +if any one about a university undertakes to give a course of lectures +on theism, it is much more apt to be the professor of philosophy than +the professor of mathematics or of chemistry. The man who has written +an "Introduction to Philosophy," a "Psychology," a "Logic," and an +"Outlines of Metaphysics" is very apt to regard it as his duty to add +to the list a "Philosophy of Religion." The students in the +theological seminaries of Europe and America are usually encouraged, if +not compelled, to attend courses in philosophy. + +Finally, it appears to be definitely accepted that even the disciplines +that we never think of classing among the philosophical sciences are +not wholly cut off from a connection with philosophy. When we are +occupied, not with adding to the stock of knowledge embraced within the +sphere of any special science, but with an examination of the methods +of the science, with, so to speak, a criticism of the foundations upon +which the science rests, our work is generally recognized as +philosophical. It strikes no one as odd in our day that there should +be established a "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific +Methods," but we should think it strange if some one announced the +intention to publish a "Journal of Philosophy and Comparative Anatomy." +It is not without its significance that, when Mach, who had been +professor of physics at Prague, was called (in 1895) to the University +of Vienna to lecture on the history and theory of the inductive +sciences, he was made, not professor of physics, but professor of +philosophy. + +The case, then, stands thus: a certain group of disciplines is regarded +as falling peculiarly within the province of the professor of +philosophy, and the sciences which constitute it are frequently called +the philosophical sciences; moreover, it is regarded as quite proper +that the teacher of philosophy should concern himself with the problems +of religion, and should pry into the methods and fundamental +assumptions of special sciences in all of which it is impossible that +he should be an adept. The question naturally arises: Why has his task +come to be circumscribed as it is? Why should he teach just these +things and no others? + +To this question certain persons are at once ready to give an answer. +There was a time, they argue, when it seemed possible for one man to +embrace the whole field of human knowledge. But human knowledge grew; +the special sciences were born; each concerned itself with a definite +class of facts and developed its own methods. It became possible and +necessary for a man to be, not a scientist at large, but a chemist, a +physicist, a biologist, an economist. But in certain portions of the +great field men have met with peculiar difficulties; here it cannot be +said that we have sciences, but rather that we have attempts at +science. The philosopher is the man to whom is committed what is left +when we have taken away what has been definitely established or is +undergoing investigation according to approved scientific methods. He +is Lord of the Uncleared Ground, and may wander through it in his +compassless, irresponsible way, never feeling that he is lost, for he +has never had any definite bearings to lose. + +Those who argue in this way support their case by pointing to the lack +of a general consensus of opinion which obtains in many parts of the +field which the philosopher regards as his own; and also by pointing +out that, even within this field, there is a growing tendency on the +part of certain sciences to separate themselves from philosophy and +become independent. Thus the psychologist and the logician are +sometimes very anxious to have it understood that they belong among the +scientists and not among the philosophers. + +Now, this answer to the question that we have raised undoubtedly +contains some truth. As we have seen from the sketch contained in the +preceding pages, the word philosophy was once a synonym for the whole +sum of the sciences or what stood for such; gradually the several +sciences have become independent and the field of the philosopher has +been circumscribed. We must admit, moreover, that there is to be found +in a number of the special sciences a body of accepted facts which is +without its analogue in philosophy. In much of his work the +philosopher certainly seems to be walking upon more uncertain ground +than his neighbors; and if he is unaware of that fact, it must be +either because he has not a very nice sense of what constitutes +scientific evidence, or because he is carried away by his enthusiasm +for some particular form of doctrine. + +Nevertheless, it is just to maintain that the answer we are discussing +is not a satisfactory one. For one thing, we find in it no indication +of the reason why the particular group of disciplines with which the +philosopher occupies himself has been left to him, when so many +sciences have announced their independence. Why have not these, also, +separated off and set up for themselves? Is it more difficult to work +in these fields than in others? and, if so, what reason can be assigned +for the fact? + +Take psychology as an instance. How does it happen that the physicist +calmly develops his doctrine without finding it necessary to make his +bow to philosophy at all, while the psychologist is at pains to explain +that his book is to treat psychology as "a natural science," and will +avoid metaphysics as much as possible? For centuries men have been +interested in the phenomena of the human mind. Can anything be more +open to observation than what passes in a man's own consciousness? +Why, then, should the science of psychology lag behind? and why these +endless disputes as to whether it can really be treated as a "natural +science" at all? + +Again. May we assume that, because certain disciplines have taken a +position of relative independence, therefore all the rest of the field +will surely come to be divided up in the same way, and that there will +be many special sciences, but no such thing as philosophy? It is hasty +to assume this on no better evidence than that which has so far been +presented. Before making up one's mind upon this point, one should +take a careful look at the problems with which the philosopher occupies +himself. + +A complete answer to the questions raised above can only be given in +the course of the book, where the main problems of philosophy are +discussed, and the several philosophical sciences are taken up and +examined. But I may say, in anticipation, as much as this:-- + +(1) Philosophy is reflective knowledge. What is meant by reflective +knowledge will be explained at length in the next chapter. + +(2) The sciences which are grouped together as philosophical are those +in which we are forced back upon the problems of reflective thought, +and cannot simply put them aside. + +(3) The peculiar difficulties of reflective thought may account for the +fact that these sciences are, more than others, a field in which we may +expect to find disputes and differences of opinion. + +(4) We need not be afraid that the whole field of human knowledge will +come to be so divided up into special sciences that philosophy will +disappear. The problems with which the philosopher occupies himself +are real problems, which present themselves unavoidably to the +thoughtful mind, and it is not convenient to divide these up among the +several sciences. This will become clearer as we proceed. + + +[1] "First Principles," Part II, section 37. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +COMMON THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT + +7. COMMON THOUGHT.--Those who have given little attention to the study +of the human mind are apt to suppose that, when the infant opens its +eyes upon the new world of objects surrounding its small body, it sees +things much as they do themselves. They are ready to admit that it +does not know much _about_ things, but it strikes them as absurd for +any one to go so far as to say that it does not see things--the things +out there in space before its eyes. + +Nevertheless, the psychologist tells us that it requires quite a course +of education to enable us to see things--not to have vague and +unmeaning sensations, but to see things, things that are known to be +touchable as well as seeable, things that are recognized as having size +and shape and position in space. And he aims a still severer blow at +our respect for the infant when he goes on to inform us that the little +creature is as ignorant of itself as it is of things; that in its small +world of as yet unorganized experiences there is no self that is +distinguished from other things; that it may cry vociferously without +knowing who is uncomfortable, and may stop its noise without knowing +who has been taken up into the nurse's arms and has experienced an +agreeable change. + +This chaotic little world of the dawning life is not our world, the +world of common thought, the world in which we all live and move in +maturer years; nor can we go back to it on the wings of memory. We +seem to ourselves to have always lived in a world of things,--things in +time and space, material things. Among these things there is one of +peculiar interest, and which we have not placed upon a par with the +rest, our own body, which sees, tastes, touches, other things. We +cannot remember a time when we did not know that with this body are +somehow bound up many experiences which interest us acutely; for +example, experiences of pleasure and pain. Moreover, we seem always to +have known that certain of the bodies which surround our own rather +resemble our own, and are in important particulars to be distinguished +from the general mass of bodies. + +Thus, we seem always to have been living in a world of _things_ and to +have recognized in that world the existence of ourselves and of other +people. When we now think of "ourselves" and of "other people," we +think of each of the objects referred to as possessing a _mind_. May +we say that, as far back as we can remember, we have thought of +ourselves and of other persons as possessing minds? + +Hardly. The young child does not seem to distinguish between mind and +body, and, in the vague and fragmentary pictures which come back to us +from our early life, certainly this distinction does not stand out. +The child may be the completest of egoists, it may be absorbed in +itself and all that directly concerns this particular self, and yet it +may make no conscious distinction between a bodily self and a mental, +between mind and body. It does not explicitly recognize its world as a +world that contains minds as well as bodies. + +But, however it may be with the child in the earlier stages of its +development, we must all admit that the mature man does consciously +recognize that the world in which he finds himself is a world that +contains minds as well as bodies. It never occurs to him to doubt that +there are bodies, and it never occurs to him to doubt that there are +minds. + +Does he not perceive that he has a body and a mind? Has he not +abundant evidence that his mind is intimately related to his body? +When he shuts his eyes, he no longer sees, and when he stops his ears, +he no longer hears; when his body is bruised, he feels pain; when he +wills to raise his hand, his body carries out the mental decree. Other +men act very much as he does; they walk and they talk, they laugh and +they cry, they work and they play, just as he does. In short, they act +precisely as though they had minds like his own. What more natural +than to assume that, as he himself gives expression, by the actions of +his body, to the thoughts and emotions in his mind, so his neighbor +does the same? + +We must not allow ourselves to underrate the plain man's knowledge +either of bodies or of minds. It seems, when one reflects upon it, a +sufficiently wonderful thing that a few fragmentary sensations should +automatically receive an interpretation which conjures up before the +mind a world of real things; that, for example, the little patch of +color sensation which I experience when I turn my eyes toward the +window should seem to introduce me at once to a world of material +objects lying in space, clearly defined in magnitude, distance, and +direction; that an experience no more complex should be the key which +should unlock for me the secret storehouse of another mind, and lay +before me a wealth of thoughts and emotions not my own. From the poor, +bare, meaningless world of the dawning intelligence to the world of +common thought, a world in which real things with their manifold +properties, things material and things mental, bear their part, is +indeed a long step. + +And we should never forget that he who would go farther, he who would +strive to gain a better knowledge of matter and of mind by the aid of +science and of philosophical reflection, must begin his labors on this +foundation which is common to us all. How else can he begin than by +accepting and more critically examining the world as it seems revealed +in the experience of the race? + +8. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.--Still, the knowledge of the world which we +have been discussing is rather indefinite, inaccurate, and +unsystematic. It is a sufficient guide for common life, but its +deficiencies may be made apparent. He who wishes to know matter and +mind better cannot afford to neglect the sciences. + +Now, it is important to observe that although, when the plain man grows +scientific, great changes take place in his knowledge of things, yet +his way of looking at the mind and the world remains in general much +what it was before. To prevent this statement from being +misunderstood, I must explain it at some length. + +Let us suppose that the man in question takes up the study of botany. +Need he do anything very different from what is done more imperfectly +by every intelligent man who interests himself in plants? There in the +real material world before him are the same plants that he observed +somewhat carelessly before. He must collect his information more +systematically and must arrange it more critically, but his task is not +so much to do something different as it is to do the same thing much +better. + +The same is evidently true of various other sciences, such as geology, +zoölogy, physiology, sociology. Some men have much accurate +information regarding rocks, animals, the functions of the bodily +organs, the development of a given form of society, and other things of +the sort, and other men have but little; and yet it is usually not +difficult for the man who knows much to make the man who knows little +understand, at least, what he is talking about. He is busying himself +with _things_--the same things that interest the plain man, and of +which the plain man knows something. He has collected information +touching their properties, their changes, their relationships; but to +him, as to his less scientific neighbor, they are the same things they +always were,--things that he has known from the days of childhood. + +Perhaps it will be admitted that this is true of such sciences as those +above indicated, but doubted whether it is true of all the sciences, +even of all the sciences which are directly concerned with _things_ of +_some_ sort. For example, to the plain man the world of material +things consists of things that can be seen and touched. Many of these +seem to fill space continuously. They may be divided, but the parts +into which they may be divided are conceived as fragments of the +things, and as of the same general nature as the wholes of which they +are parts. Yet the chemist and the physicist tell us that these same +extended things are not really continuous, as they seem to us to be, +but consist of swarms of imperceptible atoms, in rapid motion, at +considerable distances from one another in space, and grouped in +various ways. + +What has now become of the world of realities to which the plain man +pinned his faith? It has come to be looked upon as a world of +appearances, of phenomena, of manifestations, under which the real +things, themselves imperceptible, make their presence evident to our +senses. Is this new, real world the world of things in which the plain +man finds himself, and in which he has felt so much at home? + +A closer scrutiny reveals that the world of atoms and molecules into +which the man of science resolves the system of material things is not, +after all, so very different in kind from the world to which the plain +man is accustomed. He can understand without difficulty the language +in which it is described to him, and he can readily see how a man may +be led to assume its existence. + +The atom is not, it is true, directly perceivable by sense, but it is +conceived as though it and its motions were thus perceivable. The +plain man has long known that things consist of parts which remain, +under some circumstances, invisible. When he approaches an object from +a distance, he sees parts which he could not see before; and what +appears to the naked eye a mere speck without perceptible parts is +found under the microscope to be an insect with its full complement of +members. Moreover, he has often observed that objects which appear +continuous when seen from a distance are evidently far from continuous +when seen close at hand. As we walk toward a tree we can see the +indefinite mass of color break up into discontinuous patches; a fabric, +which presents the appearance of an unbroken surface when viewed in +certain ways may be seen to be riddled with holes when held between the +eye and the light. There is no man who has not some acquaintance with +the distinction between appearance and reality, and who does not make +use of the distinction in common life. + +Nor can it seem a surprising fact that different combinations of atoms +should exhibit different properties. Have we not always known that +things in combination are apt to have different properties from the +same things taken separately? He who does not know so much as this is +not fit even to be a cook. + +No, the imperceptible world of atoms and molecules is not by any means +totally different from the world of things in which the plain man +lives. These little objects and groups of objects are discussed very +much as we discuss the larger objects and groups of objects to which we +are accustomed. We are still concerned with _things_ which exist in +space and move about in space; and even if these things are small and +are not very familiarly known, no intellectual revolution is demanded +to enable a man to understand the words of the scientist who is talking +about them, and to understand as well the sort of reasonings upon which +the doctrine is based. + +9. MATHEMATICS.--Let us now turn to take a glance at the mathematical +sciences. Of course, these have to do with things sooner or later, for +our mathematical reasonings would be absolutely useless to us if they +could not be applied to the world of things; but in mathematical +reasonings we abstract from things for the time being, confident that +we can come back to them when we want to do so, and can make use of the +results obtained in our operations. + +Now, every civilized man who is not mentally deficient can perform the +fundamental operations of arithmetic. He can add and subtract, +multiply and divide. In other words, he can use _numbers_. The man +who has become an accomplished mathematician can use numbers much +better; but if we are capable of following intelligently the intricate +series of operations that he carries out on the paper before us, and +can see the significance of the system of signs which he uses as an +aid, we shall realize that he is only doing in more complicated ways +what we have been accustomed to do almost from our childhood. + +If we are interested, not so much in performing the operations, as in +inquiring into what really takes place in a mind when several units are +grasped together and made into a new unit,--for example, when twelve +units are thought as one dozen,--the mathematician has a right to say: +I leave all that to the psychologist or to the metaphysician; every one +knows in a general way what is meant by a unit, and knows that units +can be added and subtracted, grouped and separated; I only undertake to +show how one may avoid error in doing these things. + +It is with geometry as it is with arithmetic. No man is wholly +ignorant of points, lines, surfaces, and solids. We are all aware that +a short line is not a point, a narrow surface is not a line, and a thin +solid is not a mere surface. A door so thin as to have only one side +would be repudiated by every man of sense as a monstrosity. When the +geometrician defines for us the point, the line, the surface, and the +solid, and when he sets before us an array of axioms, or self-evident +truths, we follow him with confidence because he seems to be telling us +things that we can directly see to be reasonable; indeed, to be telling +us things that we have always known. + +The truth is that the geometrician does not introduce us to a new world +at all. He merely gives us a fuller and a more exact account than was +before within our reach of the space relations which obtain in the +world of external objects, a world we already know pretty well. + +Suppose that we say to him: You have spent many years in dividing up +space and in scrutinizing the relations that are to be discovered in +that realm; now tell us, what is space? Is it real? Is it a thing, or +a quality of a thing, or merely a relation between things? And how can +any man think space, when the ideas through which he must think it are +supposed to be themselves non-extended? The space itself is not +supposed to be in the mind; how can a collection of non-extended ideas +give any inkling of what is meant by extension? + +Would any teacher of mathematics dream of discussing these questions +with his class before proceeding to the proof of his propositions? It +is generally admitted that, if such questions are to be answered at +all, it is not with the aid of geometrical reasonings that they will be +answered. + +10. THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.--Now let us come back to a science which +has to do directly with things. We have seen that the plain man has +some knowledge of minds as well as of material things. Every one +admits that the psychologist knows minds better. May we say that his +knowledge of minds differs from that of the plain man about as the +knowledge of plants possessed by the botanist differs from that of all +intelligent persons who have cared to notice them? Or is it a +knowledge of a quite different kind? + +Those who are familiar with the development of the sciences within +recent years have had occasion to remark the fact that psychology has +been coming more and more to take its place as an independent science. +Formerly it was regarded as part of the duty of the philosopher to +treat of the mind and its knowledge; but the psychologist who pretends +to be no more than a psychologist is a product of recent times. This +tendency toward specialization is a natural thing, and is quite in line +with what has taken place in other fields of investigation. + +When any science becomes an independent discipline, it is recognized +that it is a more or less limited field in which work of a certain kind +is done in a certain way. Other fields and other kinds of work are to +some extent ignored. But it is quite to be expected that there should +be some dispute, especially at first, as to what does or does not +properly fall within the limits of a given science. Where these limits +shall be placed is, after all, a matter of convenience; and sometimes +it is not well to be too strict in marking off one field from another. +It is well to watch the actual development of a science, and to note +the direction instinctively taken by investigators in that particular +field. + +If we compare the psychology of a generation or so ago with that of the +present day, we cannot but be struck with the fact that there is an +increasing tendency to treat psychology as a _natural science_. By +this is not meant, of course, that there is no difference between +psychology and the sciences that concern themselves with the world of +material things--psychology has to do primarily with minds and not with +bodies. But it is meant that, as the other sciences improve upon the +knowledge of the plain man without wholly recasting it, as they accept +the world in which he finds himself and merely attempt to give us a +better account of it, so the psychologist may accept the world of +matter and of minds recognized by common thought, and may devote +himself to the study of minds, without attempting to solve a class of +problems discussed by the metaphysician. For example, he may refuse to +discuss the question whether the mind can really know that there is an +external world with which it stands in relation, and from which it +receives messages along the avenues of the senses. He may claim that +it is no more his business to treat of this than it is the business of +the mathematician to treat of the ultimate nature of space. + +Thus the psychologist assumes without question the existence of an +external real world, a world of matter and motion. He finds in this +world certain organized bodies that present phenomena which he regards +as indicative of the presence of minds. He accepts it as a fact that +each mind knows its own states directly, and knows everything else by +inference from those states, receiving messages from the outer world +along one set of nerves and reacting along another set. He conceives +of minds as wholly dependent upon messages thus conveyed to them from +without. He tells us how a mind, by the aid of such messages, +gradually builds up for itself the notion of the external world and of +the other minds which are connected with bodies to be found in that +world. + +We may fairly say that all this is merely a development of and an +improvement upon the plain man's knowledge of minds and of bodies. +There is no normal man who does not know that his mind is more +intimately related to his body than it is to other bodies. We all +distinguish between our ideas of things and the external things they +represent, and we believe that our knowledge of things comes to us +through the avenues of the senses. Must we not open our eyes to see, +and unstop our ears to hear? We all know that we do not perceive other +minds directly, but must infer their contents from what takes place in +the bodies to which they are referred--from words and actions. +Moreover, we know that a knowledge of the outer world and of other +minds is built up gradually, and we never think of an infant as knowing +what a man knows, much as we are inclined to overrate the minds of +infants. + +The fact that the plain man and the psychologist do not greatly differ +in their point of view must impress every one who is charged with the +task of introducing students to the study of psychology and philosophy. +It is rather an easy thing to make them follow the reasonings of the +psychologist, so long as he avoids metaphysical reflections. The +assumptions which he makes seem to them not unreasonable; and, as for +his methods of investigation, there is no one of them which they have +not already employed themselves in a more or less blundering way. They +have had recourse to _introspection_, _i.e._ they have noticed the +phenomena of their own minds; they have made use of the _objective +method_, i.e. they have observed the signs of mind exhibited by other +persons and by the brutes; they have sometimes _experimented_--this is +done by the schoolgirl who tries to find out how best to tease her +roommate, and by the boy who covers and uncovers his ears in church to +make the preacher sing a tune. + +It may not be easy to make men good psychologists, but it is certainly +not difficult to make them understand what the psychologist is doing +and to make them realize the value of his work. He, like the workers +in the other natural sciences, takes for granted the world of the plain +man, the world of material things in space and time and of minds +related to those material things. But when it is a question of +introducing the student to the reflections of the philosophers the case +is very different. We seem to be enticing him into a new and a strange +world, and he is apt to be filled with suspicion and distrust. The +most familiar things take on an unfamiliar aspect, and questions are +raised which it strikes the unreflective man as highly absurd even to +propose. Of this world of reflective thought I shall say just a word +in what follows. + +11. REFLECTIVE THOUGHT.--If we ask our neighbor to meet us somewhere at +a given hour, he has no difficulty in understanding what we have +requested him to do. If he wishes to do so, he can be on the spot at +the proper moment. He may never have asked himself in his whole life +what he means by space and by time. He may be quite ignorant that +thoughtful men have disputed concerning the nature of these for +centuries past. + +And a man may go through the world avoiding disaster year after year by +distinguishing with some success between what is real and what is not +real, and yet he may be quite unable to tell us what, in general, it +means for a thing to be real. Some things are real and some are not; +as a rule he seems to be able to discover the difference; of his method +of procedure he has never tried to give an account to himself. + +That he has a mind he cannot doubt, and he has some idea of the +difference between it and certain other minds; but even the most ardent +champion of the plain man must admit that he has the most hazy of +notions touching the nature of his mind. He seems to be more doubtful +concerning the nature of the mind and its knowledge than he is +concerning the nature of external things. Certainly he appears to be +more willing to admit his ignorance in this realm. + +And yet the man can hold his own in the world of real things. He can +distinguish between this thing and that, this place and that, this time +and that. He can think out a plan and carry it into execution; he can +guess at the contents of other minds and allow this knowledge to find +its place in his plan. + +All of which proves that our knowledge is not necessarily useless +because it is rather dim and vague. It is one thing to use a mental +state; it is another to have a clear comprehension of just what it is +and of what elements it may be made up. The plain man does much of his +thinking as we all tie our shoes and button our buttons. It would be +difficult for us to describe these operations, but we may perform them +very easily nevertheless. When we say that we _know_ how to tie our +shoes, we only mean that we can tie them. + +Now, enough has been said in the preceding sections to make clear that +the vagueness which characterizes many notions which constantly recur +in common thought is not wholly dispelled by the study of the several +sciences. The man of science, like the plain man, may be able to use +very well for certain purposes concepts which he is not able to analyze +satisfactorily. For example, he speaks of space and time, cause and +effect, substance and qualities, matter and mind, reality and +unreality. He certainly is in a position to add to our knowledge of +the things covered by these terms. But we should never overlook the +fact that the new knowledge which he gives us is a knowledge of the +same kind as that which we had before. He measures for us spaces and +times; he does not tell us what space and time are. He points out the +causes of a multitude of occurrences; he does not tell us what we mean +whenever we use the word "cause." He informs us what we should accept +as real and what we should repudiate as unreal; he does not try to show +us what it is to be real and what it is to be unreal. + +In other words, the man of science _extends_ our knowledge and makes it +more accurate; he does not _analyze_ certain fundamental conceptions, +which we all use, but of which we can usually give a very poor account. + +On the other hand, it is the task of _reflective thought_, not in the +first instance, to extend the limits of our knowledge of the world of +matter and of minds, but rather _to make us more clearly conscious of +what that knowledge really is_. Philosophical reflection takes up and +tries to analyze complex thoughts that men use daily without caring to +analyze them, indeed, without even realizing that they may be subjected +to analysis. + +It is to be expected that it should impress many of those who are +introduced to it for the first time as rather a fantastic creation of +problems that do not present themselves naturally to the healthy mind. +There is no thoughtful man who does not reflect sometimes and about +some things; but there are few who feel impelled to go over the whole +edifice of their knowledge and examine it with a critical eye from its +turrets to its foundations. In a sense, we may say that philosophical +thought is not natural, for he who is examining the assumptions upon +which all our ordinary thought about the world rests is no longer in +the world of the plain man. He is treating things as men do not +commonly treat them, and it is perhaps natural that it should appear to +some that, in the solvent which he uses, the real world in which we all +rejoice should seem to dissolve and disappear. + +I have said that it is not the task of reflective thought, _in the +first instance_, to extend the limits of our knowledge of the world of +matter and of minds. This is true. But this does not mean that, as a +result of a careful reflective analysis, some errors which may creep +into the thought both of the plain man and of the scientist may not be +exploded; nor does it mean that some new extensions of our knowledge +may not be suggested. + +In the chapters to follow I shall take up and examine some of the +problems of reflective thought. And I shall consider first those +problems that present themselves to those who try to subject to a +careful scrutiny our knowledge of the external world. It is well to +begin with this, for, even in our common experience, it seems to be +revealed that the knowledge of material things is a something less +vague and indefinite than the knowledge of minds. + + + + +II. PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE EXTERNAL WORLD + + +CHAPTER III + +IS THERE AN EXTERNAL WORLD? + +12. HOW THE PLAIN MAN THINKS HE KNOWS THE WORLD.--As schoolboys we +enjoyed Cicero's joke at the expense of the "minute philosophers." +They denied the immortality of the soul; he affirmed it; and he +congratulated himself upon the fact that, if they were right, they +would not survive to discover it and to triumph over him. + +At the close of the seventeenth century the philosopher John Locke was +guilty of a joke of somewhat the same kind. "I think," said he, +"nobody can, in earnest, be so skeptical as to be uncertain of the +existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that +can doubt so far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will +never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say +anything contrary to his own opinion." + +Now, in this chapter and in certain chapters to follow, I am going to +take up and turn over, so that we may get a good look at them, some of +the problems that have presented themselves to those who have reflected +upon the world and the mind as they seem given in our experience. I +shall begin by asking whether it is not possible to doubt that there is +an external world at all. + +The question cannot best be answered by a jest. It may, of course, be +absurd to maintain that there is no external world; but surely he, too, +is in an absurd position who maintains dogmatically that there is one, +and is yet quite unable to find any flaw in the reasonings of the man +who seems to be able to show that this belief has no solid foundation. +And we must not forget that the men who have thought it worth while to +raise just such questions as this, during the last twenty centuries, +have been among the most brilliant intellects of the race. We must not +assume too hastily that they have occupied themselves with mere +trivialities. + +Since, therefore, so many thoughtful men have found it worth while to +ask themselves seriously whether there is an external world, or, at +least, how we can know that there is an external world, it is not +unreasonable to expect that, by looking for it, we may find in our +common experience or in science some difficulty sufficient to suggest +the doubt which at first strikes the average man as preposterous. In +what can such a doubt take its rise? Let us see. + +I think it is scarcely too much to say that the plain man believes that +he _does not_ directly perceive an external world, and that he, at the +same time, believes that he _does_ directly perceive one. It is quite +possible to believe contradictory things, when one's thought of them is +somewhat vague, and when one does not consciously bring them together. + +As to the first-mentioned belief. Does not the plain man distinguish +between his ideas of things and the things themselves? Does he not +believe that his ideas come to him through the avenues of the senses? +Is he not aware of the fact that, when a sense is disordered, the thing +as he perceives it is not like the thing "as it is"? A blind man does +not see things when they are there; a color-blind man sees them as +others do not see them; a man suffering under certain abnormal +conditions of the nervous system sees things when they are not there at +all, _i.e._ he has hallucinations. The thing itself, as it seems, is +not in the man's mind; it is the idea that is in the man's mind, and +that represents the thing. Sometimes it appears to give a true account +of it; sometimes it seems to give a garbled account; sometimes it is a +false representative throughout--there is no reality behind it. It is, +then, the _idea_ that is immediately known, and not the _thing_; the +thing is merely _inferred_ to exist. + +I do not mean to say that the plain man is conscious of drawing this +conclusion. I only maintain that it seems a natural conclusion to draw +from the facts which he recognizes, and that sometimes he seems to draw +the conclusion half-consciously. + +On the other hand, we must all admit that when the plain man is not +thinking about the distinction between ideas and things, but is looking +at some material object before him, is touching it with his fingers and +turning it about to get a good look at it, it never occurs to him that +he is not directly conscious of the thing itself. + +He seems to himself to perceive the thing immediately; to perceive it +_as_ it is and _where_ it is; to perceive it as a really extended +thing, out there in space before his body. He does not think of +himself as occupied with mere images, representations of the object. +He may be willing to admit that his mind is in his head, but he cannot +think that what he sees is in his head. Is not the object _there_? +does he not _see_ and _feel_ it? Why doubt such evidence as this? He +who tells him that the external world does not exist seems to be +denying what is immediately given in his experience. + +The man who looks at things in this way assumes, of course, that the +external object is known directly, and is not a something merely +inferred to exist from the presence of a representative image. May one +embrace this belief and abandon the other one? If we elect to do this, +we appear to be in difficulties at once. All the considerations which +made us distinguish so carefully between our ideas of things and the +things themselves crowd in upon us. Can it be that we know things +independently of the avenues of the senses? Would a man with different +senses know things just as we do? How can any man suffer from an +hallucination, if things are not inferred from images, but are known +independently? + +The difficulties encountered appear sufficiently serious even if we +keep to that knowledge of things which seems to be given in common +experience. But even the plain man has heard of atoms and molecules; +and if he accepts the extension of knowledge offered him by the man of +science, he must admit that, whatever this apparently immediately +perceived external thing may be, it cannot be the external thing that +science assures him is out there in space beyond his body, and which +must be a very different sort of thing from the thing he seems to +perceive. The thing he perceives must, then, be _appearance_; and +where can that appearance be if not in his own mind? + +The man who has made no study of philosophy at all does not usually +think these things out; but surely there are interrogation marks +written up all over his experience, and he misses them only because he +does not see clearly. By judiciously asking questions one may often +lead him either to affirm or to deny that he has an immediate knowledge +of the external world, pretty much as one pleases. If he affirms it, +his position does not seem to be a wholly satisfactory one, as we have +seen; and if he denies it, he makes the existence of the external world +wholly a matter of inference from the presence of ideas in the mind, +and he must stand ready to justify this inference. + +To many men it has seemed that the inference is not an easy one to +justify. One may say: We could have no ideas of things, no sensations, +if real things did not exist and make an impression upon our senses. +But to this it may be answered: How is that statement to be proved? Is +it to be proved by observing that, when things are present and affect +the senses, there come into being ideas which represent the things? +Evidently such a proof as this is out of the question, for, if it is +true that we know external things only by inference and never +immediately, then we can never prove by observation that ideas and +things are thus connected. And if it is not to be proved by +observation, how shall it be proved? Shall we just assume it +dogmatically and pass on to something else? Surely there is enough in +the experience of the plain man to justify him in raising the question +whether he can certainly know that there is an external world. + +13. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD.--We have seen just above +that the doubt regarding the existence of the world seems to have its +root in the familiar distinction between ideas and things, appearances +and the realities which they are supposed to represent. The +psychologist has much to say about ideas; and if sharpening and making +clear this distinction has anything to do with stirring up doubts, it +is natural to suppose that they should become more insistent when one +has exchanged the ignorance of everyday life for the knowledge of the +psychologist. + +Now, when the psychologist asks how a given mind comes to have a +knowledge of any external thing, he finds his answer in the messages +which have been brought to the mind by means of the bodily senses. He +describes the sense-organs and the nervous connections between these +and the brain, and tells us that when certain nervous impulses have +traveled, let us say, from the eye or the ear to the brain, one has +sensations of sight or sound. + +He describes for us in detail how, out of such sensations and the +memories of such sensations, we frame mental images of external things. +Between the mental image and the thing that it represents he +distinguishes sharply, and he informs us that the mind knows no more +about the external thing than is contained in such images. That a +thing is present can be known only by the fact that a message from the +thing is sent along the nerves, and what the thing is must be +determined from the character of the message. Given the image in the +absence of the thing,--that is to say, an hallucination,--the mind will +naturally suppose that the thing is present. This false supposition +cannot be corrected by a direct inspection of the thing, for such a +direct inspection of things is out of the question. The only way in +which the mind concerned can discover that the thing is absent is by +referring to its other experiences. This image is compared with other +images and is discovered to be in some way abnormal. We decide that it +is a false representative and has no corresponding reality behind it. + +This doctrine taken as it stands seems to cut the mind off from the +external world very completely; and the most curious thing about it is +that it seems to be built up on the assumption that it is not really +true. How can one know certainly that there is a world of material +things, including human bodies with their sense-organs and nerves, if +no mind has ever been able to inspect directly anything of the sort? +How can we tell that a sensation arises when a nervous impulse has been +carried along a sensory nerve and has reached the brain, if every mind +is shut up to the charmed circle of its own ideas? The anatomist and +the physiologist give us very detailed accounts of the sense-organs and +of the brain; the physiologist even undertakes to measure the speed +with which the impulse passes along a nerve; the psychologist accepts +and uses the results of their labors. But can all this be done in the +absence of any first-hand knowledge of the things of which one is +talking? Remember that, if the psychologist is right, any external +object, eye, ear, nerve, or brain, which we can perceive directly, is a +mental complex, a something in the mind and not external at all. How +shall we prove that there are objects, ears, eyes, nerves, and +brains,--in short, all the requisite mechanism for the calling into +existence of sensations,--in an outer world which is not immediately +perceived but is only inferred to exist? + +I do not wish to be regarded as impugning the right of the psychologist +to make the assumptions which he does, and to work as he does. He has +a right to assume, with the plain man, that there is an external world +and that we know it. But a very little reflection must make it +manifest that he seems, at least, to be guilty of an inconsistency, and +that he who wishes to think clearly should strive to see just where the +trouble lies. + +So much, at least, is evident: the man who is inclined to doubt whether +there is, after all, any real external world, appears to find in the +psychologist's distinction between ideas and things something like an +excuse for his doubt. To get to the bottom of the matter and to +dissipate his doubt one has to go rather deeply into metaphysics. I +merely wish to show just here that the doubt is not a gratuitous one, +but is really suggested to the thoughtful mind by a reflection upon our +experience of things. And, as we are all apt to think that the man of +science is less given to busying himself with useless subtleties than +is the philosopher, I shall, before closing this chapter, present some +paragraphs upon the subject from the pen of a professor of mathematics +and mechanics. + +14. THE "TELEPHONE EXCHANGE."--"We are accustomed to talk," writes +Professor Karl Pearson,[1] "of the 'external world,' of the 'reality' +outside us. We speak of individual objects having an existence +independent of our own. The store of past sense-impressions, our +thoughts and memories, although most probably they have beside their +psychical element a close correspondence with some physical change or +impress in the brain, are yet spoken of as _inside_ ourselves. On the +other hand, although if a sensory nerve be divided anywhere short of +the brain, we lose the corresponding class of sense impression, we yet +speak of many sense-impressions, such as form and texture, as existing +outside ourselves. How close then can we actually get to this supposed +world outside ourselves? Just as near but no nearer than the brain +terminals of the sensory nerves. We are like the clerk in the central +telephone exchange who cannot get nearer to his customers than his end +of the telephone wires. We are indeed worse off than the clerk, for to +carry out the analogy properly we must suppose him _never to have been +outside the telephone exchange, never to have seen a customer or any +one like a customer--in short, never, except through the telephone +wire, to have come in contact with the outside universe_. Of that +'real' universe outside himself he would be able to form no direct +impression; the real universe for him would be the aggregate of his +constructs from the messages which were caused by the telephone wires +in his office. About those messages and the ideas raised in his mind +by them he might reason and draw his inferences; and his conclusions +would be correct--for what? For the world of telephonic messages, for +the type of messages that go through the telephone. Something definite +and valuable he might know with regard to the spheres of action and of +thought of his telephonic subscribers, but outside those spheres he +could have no experience. Pent up in his office he could never have +seen or touched even a telephonic subscriber _in himself_. Very much +in the position of such a telephone clerk is the conscious _ego_ of +each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves. +Not a step nearer than those terminals can the _ego_ get to the 'outer +world,' and what in and for themselves are the subscribers to its nerve +exchange it has no means of ascertaining. Messages in the form of +sense-impressions come flowing in from that 'outside world,' and these +we analyze, classify, store up, and reason about. But of the nature of +'things-in-themselves,' of what may exist at the other end of our +system of telephone wires, we know nothing at all. + +"But the reader, perhaps, remarks, 'I not only see an object, but I can +_touch_ it. I can trace the nerve from the tip of my finger to the +brain. I am not like the telephone clerk, I can follow my network of +wires to their terminals and find what is at the other end of them.' +Can you, reader? Think for a moment whether your _ego_ has for one +moment got away from his brain exchange. The sense-impression that you +call touch was just as much as sight felt only at the brain end of a +sensory nerve. What has told you also of the nerve from the tip of +your finger to your brain? Why, sense-impressions also, messages +conveyed along optic or tactile sensory nerves. In truth, all you have +been doing is to employ one subscriber to your telephone exchange to +tell you about the wire that goes to a second, but you are just as far +as ever from tracing out for yourself the telephone wires to the +individual subscriber and ascertaining what his nature is in and for +himself. The immediate sense-impression is just as far removed from +what you term the 'outside world' as the store of impresses. If our +telephone clerk had recorded by aid of a phonograph certain of the +messages from the outside world on past occasions, then if any +telephonic message on its receipt set several phonographs repeating +past messages, we have an image analogous to what goes on in the brain. +Both telephone and phonograph are equally removed from what the clerk +might call the 'real outside world,' but they enable him through their +sounds to construct a universe; he projects those sounds, which are +really inside his office, outside his office, and speaks of them as the +external universe. This outside world is constructed by him from the +contents of the inside sounds, which differ as widely from +things-in-themselves as language, the symbol, must always differ from +the thing it symbolizes. For our telephone clerk sounds would be the +real world, and yet we can see how conditioned and limited it would be +by the range of his particular telephone subscribers and by the +contents of their messages. + +"So it is with our brain; the sounds from telephone and phonograph +correspond to immediate and stored sense-impressions. These +sense-impressions we project as it were outwards and term the real +world outside ourselves. But the things-in-themselves which the +sense-impressions symbolize, the 'reality,' as the metaphysicians wish +to call it, at the other end of the nerve, remains unknown and is +unknowable. Reality of the external world lies for science and for us +in combinations of form and color and touch--sense-impressions as +widely divergent from the thing 'at the other end of the nerve' as the +sound of the telephone from the subscriber at the other end of the +wire. We are cribbed and confined in this world of sense-impressions +like the exchange clerk in his world of sounds, and not a step beyond +can we get. As his world is conditioned and limited by his particular +network of wires, so ours is conditioned by our nervous system, by our +organs of sense. Their peculiarities determine what is the nature of +the outside world which we construct. It is the similarity in the +organs of sense and in the perceptive faculty of all normal human +beings which makes the outside world the same, or _practically_ the +same, for them all. To return to the old analogy, it is as if two +telephone exchanges had very nearly identical groups of subscribers. +In this case a wire between the two exchanges would soon convince the +imprisoned clerks that they had something in common and peculiar to +themselves. That conviction corresponds in our comparison to the +recognition of other consciousness." + +I suggest that this extract be read over carefully, not once but +several times, and that the reader try to make quite clear to himself +the position of the clerk in the telephone exchange, _i.e._ the +position of the mind in the body, as depicted by Professor Pearson, +before recourse is had to the criticisms of any one else. One cannot +find anywhere better material for critical philosophical reflection. + +As has been seen, our author accepts without question, the +psychological doctrine that the mind is shut up within the circle of +the messages that are conducted to it along the sensory nerves, and +that it cannot directly perceive anything truly external. He carries +his doctrine out to the bitter end in the conclusion that, since we +have never had experience of anything beyond sense-impressions, and +have no ground for an inference to anything beyond, we must recognize +that the only external world of which we know anything is an external +world built up out of sense-impressions. It is, thus, in the mind, and +is not external at all; it is only "projected outwards," _thought of_ +as though it were beyond us. Shall we leave the inconsistent position +of the plain man and of the psychologist and take our refuge in this +world of projected mental constructs? + +Before the reader makes up his mind to do this, I beg him to consider +the following:-- + +(1) If the only external world of which we have a right to speak at all +is a construct in the mind or _ego_, we may certainly affirm that the +world is in the _ego_, but does it sound sensible to say that the _ego_ +is somewhere in the world? + +(2) If all external things are really inside the mind, and are only +"projected" outwards, of course our own bodies, sense-organs, nerves, +and brains, are really inside and are merely projected outwards. Now, +do the sense-impressions of which everything is to be constructed "come +flowing in" along these nerves that are really inside? + +(3) Can we say, when a nerve lies entirely within the mind or _ego_, +that this same mind or _ego_ is nearer to one end of the nerve than it +is to the other? How shall we picture to ourselves "the conscious +_ego_ of each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory +nerves"? How can the _ego_ place the whole of itself at the end of a +nerve which it has constructed within itself? And why is it more +difficult for it to get to one end of a nerve like this than it is to +get to the other? + +(4) Why should the thing "at the other end of the nerve" remain unknown +and unknowable? Since the nerve is entirely in the mind, is purely a +mental construct, can anything whatever be at the end of it without +being in the mind? And if the thing in question is not in the mind, +how are we going to prove that it is any nearer to one end of a nerve +which is inside the mind than it is to the other? If it may really be +said to be at the end of the nerve, why may we not know it quite as +well as we do the end of the nerve, or any other mental construct? + +It must be clear to the careful reader of Professor Pearson's +paragraphs, that he does not confine himself strictly to the world of +mere "projections," to an outer world which is really _inner_. If he +did this, the distinction between inner and outer would disappear. Let +us consider for a moment the imprisoned clerk. He is in a telephone +exchange, about him are wires and subscribers. He gets only sounds and +must build up his whole universe of things out of sounds. Now we are +supposing him to be in a telephone exchange, to be receiving messages, +to be building up a world out of these messages. Do we for a moment +think of him as building up, out of the messages which came along the +wires, those identical wires which carried the messages and the +subscribers which sent them? Never! we distinguish between the +exchange, with its wires and subscribers, and the messages received and +worked up into a world. In picturing to ourselves the telephone +exchange, we are doing what the plain man and the psychologist do when +they distinguish between mind and body,--they never suppose that the +messages which come through the senses are identical with the senses +through which they come. + +But suppose we maintain that there is no such thing as a telephone +exchange, with its wires and subscribers, which is not to be found +within some clerk. Suppose the real external world is something +_inner_ and only "projected" without, mistakenly supposed by the +unthinking to be without. Suppose it is nonsense to speak of a wire +which is not in the mind of a clerk. May we under such circumstances +describe any clerk as _in a telephone exchange_? as _receiving +messages_? as _no nearer_ to his subscribers than his end of the wire? +May we say that sense-impressions _come flowing in_ to him? The whole +figure of the telephone exchange becomes an absurdity when we have once +placed the exchange within the clerk. Nor can we think of two clerks +as connected by a wire, when it is affirmed that every wire must +"really" be in some clerk. + +The truth is, that, in the extracts which I have given above and in +many other passages in the same volume, the real external world, the +world which does not exist in the mind but _without_ it, is much +discredited, and is yet not actually discarded. The ego is placed at +the brain terminals of the sensory nerves, and it receives messages +which _flow in_; _i.e._ the clerk is actually placed in an exchange. +That the existence of the exchange is afterward denied in so many words +does not mean that it has not played and does not continue to play an +important part in the thought of the author. + +It is interesting to see how a man of science, whose reflections compel +him to deny the existence of the external world that we all seem to +perceive and that we somehow recognize as distinct from anything in our +minds, is _nevertheless compelled to admit the existence of this world +at every turn_. + +But if we do admit it, what shall we make of it? Shall we deny the +truth of what the psychologist has to tell us about a knowledge of +things only through the sensations to which they give rise? We cannot, +surely, do that. Shall we affirm that we know the external world +directly, and at the same time that we do not know it directly, but +only indirectly, and through the images which arise in our minds? That +seems inconsistent. Certainly there is material for reflection here. + +Nevertheless the more we reflect on that material, the more evident +does it become that the plain man cannot be wrong in believing in the +external world which seems revealed in his experiences. We find that +all attempts to discredit it rest upon the implicit assumption of its +existence, and fall to the ground when that existence is honestly +denied. So our problem changes its form. We no longer ask: Is there +an external world? but rather: _What_ is the external world, and how +does it differ from the world of mere ideas? + + +[1] "The Grammar of Science," 2d Ed., London, 1900, pp. 60-63. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SENSATIONS AND "THINGS" + +15. SENSE AND IMAGINATION.--Every one distinguishes between things +perceived and things only imagined. With open eyes I see the desk +before me; with eyes closed, I can imagine it. I lay my hand on it and +feel it; I can, without laying my hand on it, imagine that I feel it. +I raise my eyes, and see the pictures on the wall opposite me; I can +sit here and call before my mind the image of the door by which the +house is entered. + +What is the difference between sense and imagination? It must be a +difference of which we are all somehow conscious, for we unhesitatingly +distinguish between the things we perceive and the things we merely +imagine. + +It is well to remember at the outset that the two classes of +experiences are not wholly different. The blue color that I imagine +seems blue. It does not lose this quality because it is only +imaginary. The horse that I imagine seems to have four legs, like a +horse perceived. As I call it before my mind, it seems as large as the +real horse. Neither the color, nor the size, nor the distribution of +parts, nor any other attribute of the sort appears to be different in +the imaginary object from what it is in the object as given in +sensation. + +The two experiences are, nevertheless, not the same; and every one +knows that they are not the same. One difference that roughly marks +out the two classes of experiences from one another is that, as a rule, +our sense-experiences are more vivid than are the images that exist in +the imagination. + +I say, as a rule, for we cannot always remark this difference. +Sensations may be very clear and unmistakable, but they may also be +very faint and indefinite. When a man lays his hand firmly on my +shoulder, I may be in little doubt whether I feel a sensation or do +not; but when he touches my back very lightly, I may easily be in +doubt, and may ask myself in perplexity whether I have really been +touched or whether I have merely imagined it. As a vessel recedes and +becomes a mere speck upon the horizon, I may well wonder, before I feel +sure that it is really quite out of sight, whether I still see the dim +little point, or whether I merely imagine that I see it. + +On the other hand, things merely imagined may sometimes be very vivid +and insistent. To some persons, what exists in the imagination is dim +and indefinite in the extreme. Others imagine things vividly, and can +describe what is present only to the imagination almost as though it +were something seen. Finally, we know that an image may become so +vivid and insistent as to be mistaken for an external thing. That is +to say, there are such things as hallucinations. + +The criterion of vividness will not, therefore, always serve to +distinguish between what is given in the sense and what is only +imagined. And, indeed, it becomes evident, upon reflection, that we do +not actually make it our ultimate test. We may be quite willing to +admit that faint sensations may come to be confused with what is +imagined, with "ideas," but we always regard such a confusion as +somebody's error. We are not ready to admit that things perceived +faintly are things imagined, or that vivid "ideas" are things perceived +by sense. + +Let us come back to the illustrations with which we started. How do I +know that I perceive the desk before me; and how do I know that, +sitting here, I imagine, and do not see, the front door of the house? + +My criterion is this: when I have the experience I call "seeing my +desk," the bit of experience which presents itself as my desk is in a +certain setting. That is to say, the desk seen must be in a certain +relation to my body, and this body, as I know it, also consists of +experiences. Thus, if I am to know that I see the desk, I must realize +that my eyes are open, that the object is in front of me and not behind +me, etc. + +The desk as seen varies with the relation to the body in certain ways +that we regard as natural and explicable. When I am near it, the +visual experience is not just what it is when I recede from it. But +how can I know that I am near the desk or far from it? What do these +expressions mean? Their full meaning will become clearer in the next +chapter, but here I may say that nearness and remoteness must be +measured for me in experiences of some sort, or I would never know +anything as near to or far from my body. + +Thus, all our sensory experiences are experiences that fall into a +certain system or order. It is a system which we all recognize +implicitly, for we all reject as merely imaginary those experiences +which lack this setting. If my eyes are shut--I am speaking now of the +eyes as experienced, as felt or perceived, as given in sensation--I +never say; "I see my desk," no matter how vivid the image of the +object. Those who believe in "second sight" sometimes talk of seeing +things not in this setting, but the very name they give to the supposed +experience indicates that there is something abnormal about it. No one +thinks it remarkable that I see the desk before which I perceive myself +to be sitting with open eyes. Every one would think it strange if I +could see and describe the table in the next room, now shut away from +me. When a man thinks he hears his name pronounced, and, turning his +head, seeks in vain for the speaker, he sets his experience down as a +hallucination. He says, I did not really hear that; I merely imagined +it. + +May one not, with open eyes, have a hallucination of vision, just as +one may seem to hear one's name pronounced when no one is by? +Certainly. But in each case the experience may be proved to be a +hallucination, nevertheless. It may be recognized that the sensory +setting is incomplete, though it may not, at first, seem so. Thus the +unreal object which seems to be seen may be found to be a thing that +cannot be touched. Or, when one has attained to a relatively complete +knowledge of the system of experiences recognized as sensory, one may +make use of roundabout methods of ascertaining that the experience in +question does not really have the right setting. Thus, the ghost which +is seen by the terrified peasant at midnight, but which cannot be +photographed, we may unhesitatingly set down as something imagined and +not really seen. + +All our sensations are, therefore, experiences which take their place +in a certain setting. This is our ultimate criterion. We need not +take the word of the philosopher for it. We need only reflect, and ask +ourselves how we know that, in a given case, we are seeing or hearing +or touching something, and are not merely imagining it. In every case, +we shall find that we come back to the same test. In common life, we +apply the test instinctively, and with little realization of what we +are doing. + +And if we turn to the psychologist, whose business it is to be more +exact and scientific, we find that he gives us only a refinement of +this same criterion. It is important to him to distinguish between +what is given in sensation and what is furnished by memory or +imagination, and he tells us that sensation is the result of a message +conducted along a sensory nerve to the brain. + +Here we see emphasized the relation to the body which has been +mentioned above. If we ask the psychologist how he knows that the body +he is talking about is a real body, and not merely an imagined one, he +has to fall back upon the test which is common to us all. A real hand +is one which we see with the eyes open, and which we touch with the +other hand. If our experiences of our own body had not the setting +which marks all sensory experiences, we could never say: I _perceive_ +that my body is near the desk. When we call our body real, as +contrasted with things imaginary, we recognize that this group of +experiences belongs to the class described; it is given in sensation, +and is not merely thought of. + +It will be observed that, in distinguishing between sensations and +things imaginary, we never go beyond the circle of our experiences. We +do not reach out to a something _beyond_ or _behind_ experiences, and +say: When such a reality is present, we may affirm that we have a +sensation, and when it is not, we may call the experience imaginary. +If there were such a reality as this, it would do us little good, for +since it is not supposed to be perceived directly, we should have to +depend upon the sensations to prove the presence of the reality, and +could not turn to the reality and ask it whether we were or were not +experiencing a sensation. The distinction between sensations and what +is imaginary is an _observed_ distinction. It can be _proved_ that +some experiences are sensory and that some are not. This means that, +in drawing the distinction, we remain within the circle of our +experiences. + +There has been much unnecessary mystification touching this supposed +reality behind experiences. In the next chapter we shall see in what +senses the word "reality" may properly be used, and in what sense it +may not. There is a danger in using it loosely and vaguely. + +16. MAY WE CALL "THINGS" GROUPS OF SENSATIONS?--Now, the external world +seems to the plain man to be directly given in his sense experiences. +He is willing to admit that the table in the next room, of which he is +merely thinking, is known at one remove, so to speak. But this desk +here before him: is it not known directly? Not the mental image, the +mere representative, but the desk itself, a something that is physical +and not mental? + +And the psychologist, whatever his theory of the relation between the +mind and the world, seems to support him, at least, in so far as to +maintain that in sensation the external world is known as directly as +it is possible for the external world to be known, and that one can get +no more of it than is presented in sensation. If a sense is lacking, +an aspect of the world as given is also lacking; if a sense is +defective, as in the color-blind, the defect is reflected in the world +upon which one gazes. + +Such considerations, especially when taken together with what has been +said at the close of the last section about the futility of looking for +a reality behind our sensations, may easily suggest rather a startling +possibility. May it not be, if we really are shut up to the circle of +our experiences, that the physical things, which we have been +accustomed to look upon as non-mental, are nothing more than complexes +of sensations? Granted that there seems to be presented in our +experience a material world as well as a mind, may it not be that this +material world is a mental thing of a certain kind--a mental thing +contrasted with other mental things, such as imaginary things? + +This question has always been answered in the affirmative by the +idealists, who claim that all existence must be regarded as psychical +existence. Their doctrine we shall consider later (sections 49 and +53). It will be noticed that we seem to be back again with Professor +Pearson in the last chapter. + +To this question I make the following answer: In the first place, I +remark that even the plain man distinguishes somehow between his +sensations and external things. He thinks that he has reason to +believe that things do not cease to exist when he no longer has +sensations. Moreover, he believes that things do not always appear to +his senses as they really are. If we tell him that his sensations +_are_ the things, it shocks his common sense. He answers: Do you mean +to tell me that complexes of sensation can be on a shelf or in a +drawer? can be cut with a knife or broken with the hands? He feels +that there must be some real distinction between sensations and the +things without him. + +Now, the notions of the plain man on such matters as these are not very +clear, and what he says about sensations and things is not always +edifying. But it is clear that he feels strongly that the man who +would identify them is obliterating a distinction to which his +experience testifies unequivocally. We must not hastily disregard his +protest. He is sometimes right in his feeling that things are not +identical, even when he cannot prove it. + +In the second place, I remark that, in this instance, the plain man is +in the right, and can be shown to be in the right. "Things" are not +groups of sensations. The distinction between them will be explained +in the next section. + +17. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSATIONS AND "THINGS"--Suppose that I +stand in my study and look at the fire in the grate. I am experiencing +sensations, and am not busied merely with an imaginary fire. But may +my whole experience of the fire be summed up as an experience of +sensations and their changes? Let us see. + +If I shut my eyes, the fire disappears. Does any one suppose that the +fire has been annihilated? No. We say, I no longer see it, but +nothing has happened to the fire. + +Again, I may keep my eyes open, and simply turn my head. The fire +disappears once more. Does any one suppose that my turning my head has +done anything to the fire? We say unhesitatingly, my sensations have +changed, but the fire has remained as it was. + +Still, again, I may withdraw from the fire. Its heat seems to be +diminished. Has the fire really grown less hot? And if I could +withdraw to a sufficient distance, I know that the fire would appear to +me smaller and less bright. Could I get far enough away to make it +seem the faintest speck in the field of vision, would I be tempted to +claim that the fire shrunk and grew faint merely because I walked away +from it? Surely not. + +Now, suppose that I stand on the same spot and look at the fire without +turning my head. The stick at which I am gazing catches the flame, +blazes up, turns red, and finally falls together, a little mass of gray +ashes. Shall I describe this by saying that my sensations have +changed, or may I say that the fire itself has changed? The plain man +and the philosopher alike use the latter expression in such a case as +this. + +Let us take another illustration. I walk towards the distant house on +the plain before me. What I see as my goal seems to grow larger and +brighter. It does not occur to me to maintain that the house changes +as I advance. But, at a given instant, changes of a different sort +make their appearance. Smoke arises, and flames burst from the roof. +Now I have no hesitation in saying that changes are taking place in the +house. It would seem foolish to describe the occurrence as a mere +change in my sensations. Before it was my sensations that changed; now +it is the house itself. + +We are drawing this distinction between changes in our sensations and +changes in things at every hour in the day. I cannot move without +making things appear and disappear. If I wag my head, the furniture +seems to dance, and I regard it as a mere seeming. I count on the +clock's going when I no longer look upon its face. It would be absurd +to hold that the distinction is a mere blunder, and has no foundation +in our experience. The rôle it plays is too important for that. If we +obliterate it, the real world of material things which seems to be +revealed in our experience melts into a chaos of fantastic experiences +whose appearances and disappearances seem to be subject to no law. + +And it is worthy of remark that it is not merely in common life that +the distinction is drawn. Every man of science must give heed to it. +The psychologist does, it is true, pay much attention to sensations; +but even he distinguishes between the sensations which he is studying +and the material things to which he relates them, such as brains and +sense-organs. And those who cultivate the physical sciences strive, +when they give an account of things and their behavior, to lay before +us a history of changes analogous to the burning of the stick and of +the house, excluding mere changes in sensations. + +There is no physicist or botanist or zoölogist who has not our common +experience that things as perceived by us--our experiences of +things--appear or disappear or change their character when we open or +shut our eyes or move about. But nothing of all this appears in their +books. What they are concerned with is things and their changes, and +they do not consider such matters as these as falling within their +province. If a botanist could not distinguish between the changes +which take place in a plant, and the changes which take place in his +sensations as he is occupied in studying the plant, but should tell us +that the plant grows smaller as one recedes from it, we should set him +down as weak-minded. + +That the distinction is everywhere drawn, and that we must not +obliterate it, is very evident. But we are in the presence of what has +seemed to many men a grave difficulty. Are not things presented in our +experience only as we have sensations? what is it to perceive a thing? +is it not to have sensations? how, then, _can_ we distinguish between +sensations and things? We certainly do so all the time, in spite of +the protest of the philosopher; but many of us do so with a haunting +sense that our behavior can scarcely be justified by the reason. + +Our difficulty, however, springs out of an error of our own. Grasping +imperfectly the full significance of the word "sensation," we extend +its use beyond what is legitimate, and we call by that name experiences +which are not sensations at all. Thus the external world comes to seem +to us to be not really a something contrasted with the mental, but a +part of the mental world. We accord to it the attributes of the +latter, and rob it of those distinguishing attributes which belong to +it by right. When we have done this, we may feel impelled to say, as +did Professor Pearson, that things are not really "outside" of us, as +they seem to be, but are merely "projected" outside--thought of as if +they were "outside." All this I must explain at length. + +Let us come back to the first of the illustrations given above, the +case of the fire in my study. As I stand and look at it, what shall I +call the red glow which I observe? Shall I call it a _quality of a +thing_, or shall I call it a _sensation_? + +To this I answer: _I may call it either the one or the other, according +to its setting among other experiences_. + +We have seen (section 15) that sensations and things merely imaginary +are distinguished from one another by their setting. With open eyes we +see things; with our eyes closed we can imagine them: we see what is +before us; we imagine what lies behind our backs. If we confine our +attention to the bit of experience itself, we have no means of +determining whether it is sensory or imaginary. Only its setting can +decide that point. Here, we have come to another distinction of much +the same sort. That red glow, that bit of experience, taken by itself +and abstracted from all other experiences, cannot be called either a +sensation or the quality of a thing. Only its context can give us the +right to call it the one or the other. + +This ought to become clear when we reflect upon the illustration of the +fire. We have seen that one whole series of changes has been +unhesitatingly described as a series of changes in my sensations. Why +was this? Because it was observed to depend upon changes in the +relations of my body, my senses (a certain group of experiences), to +the bit of experience I call the fire. Another series was described as +a series of changes in the fire. Why? Because, the relation to my +senses remaining unchanged, changes still took place, and had to be +accounted for in other ways. + +It is a matter of common knowledge that they can be accounted for in +other ways. This is not a discovery of the philosopher. He can only +invite us to think over the matter and see what the unlearned and the +learned are doing at every moment. Sometimes they are noticing that +experiences change as they turn their heads or walk toward or away from +objects; sometimes they abstract from this, and consider the series of +changes that take place independently of this. + +That bit of experience, that red glow, is not related only to my body. +Such experiences are related also to each other; they stand in a vast +independent system of relations, which, as we have seen, the man of +science can study without troubling himself to consider sensations at +all. This system is the external world--the external world as known or +as knowable, the only external world that it means anything for us to +talk about. As having its place in this system, a bit of experience is +not a sensation, but is a quality or aspect of a thing. + +Sensations, then, to be sensations, must be bits of experience +considered in their relation to some organ of sense. They should never +be confused with qualities of things, which are experiences in a +different setting. It is as unpardonable to confound the two as it is +to confound sensations with things imaginary. + +We may not, therefore, say that "things" are groups of sensations. We +may, if we please, describe them as complexes of qualities. And we may +not say that the "things" we perceive are really "inside" of us and are +merely "projected outside." + +What can "inside" and "outside" mean? Only this. We recognize in our +experience two distinct orders, the _objective order_, the system of +phenomena which constitutes the material world, and the _subjective +order_, the order of things mental, to which belong sensations and +"ideas." That is "outside" which belongs to the objective order. The +word has no other meaning when used in this connection. That is +"inside" which belongs to the subjective order, and is contrasted with +the former. + +If we deny that there is an objective order, an external world, and say +that everything is "inside," we lose our distinction, and even the word +"inside" becomes meaningless. It indicates no contrast. When men fall +into the error of talking in this way, what they do is to _keep_ the +external world and gain the distinction, and at the same time to _deny_ +the existence of the world which has furnished it. In other words, +they put the clerk into a telephone exchange, and then tell us that the +exchange does not really exist. He is inside--of what? He is inside +of nothing. Then, can he really be inside? + +We see, thus, that the plain man and the man of science are quite right +in accepting the external world. The objective order is known as +directly as is the subjective order. Both are orders of experiences; +they are open to observation, and we have, in general, little +difficulty in distinguishing between them, as the illustrations given +above amply prove. + +18. THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL THINGS.--One difficulty seems to remain +and to call for a solution. We all believe that material things exist +when we no longer perceive them. We believe that they existed before +they came within the field of our observation. + +In these positions the man of science supports us. The astronomer has +no hesitation in saying that the comet, which has sailed away through +space, exists, and will return. The geologist describes for us the +world as it was in past ages, when no eye was opened upon it. + +But has it not been stated above that the material world is an order of +_experiences_? and can there be such a thing as an experience that is +not _experienced_ by somebody? In other words, can the world exist, +except as it is _perceived to exist_? + +This seeming difficulty has occasioned much trouble to philosophers in +the past. Bishop Berkeley (1684-1753) said, "To exist is to be +perceived." There are those who agree with him at the present day. + +Their difficulty would have disappeared had they examined with +sufficient care the meaning of the word "exist." We have no right to +pass over the actual uses of such words, and to give them a meaning of +our own. If one thing seems as certain as any other, it is that +material things exist when we do not perceive them. On what ground may +the philosopher combat the universal opinion, the dictum of common +sense and of science? When we look into his reasonings, we find that +he is influenced by the error discussed at length in the last +section--he has confused the phenomena of the two orders of experience. + +I have said that, when we concern ourselves with the objective order, +we abstract or should abstract, from the relations which things bear to +our senses. We account for phenomena by referring to other phenomena +which we have reason to accept as their physical conditions or causes. +We do not consider that a physical cause is effective only while we +perceive it. When we come back to this notion of our perceiving a +thing or not perceiving it, we have left the objective order and passed +over to the subjective. We have left the consideration of "things" and +have turned to sensations. + +There is no reason why we should do this. The physical order is an +independent order, as we have seen. The man of science, when he is +endeavoring to discover whether some thing or quality of a thing really +existed at some time in the past, is not in the least concerned to +establish the fact that some one saw it. No one ever saw the primitive +fire-mist from which, as we are told, the world came into being. But +the scientist cares little for that. He is concerned only to prove +that the phenomena he is investigating really have a place in the +objective order. If he decides that they have, he is satisfied; he has +proved something to exist. _To belong to the objective order is to +exist as a physical thing or quality_. + +When the plain man and the man of science maintain that a physical +thing exists, they use the word in precisely the same sense. The +meaning they give to it is the proper meaning of the word. It is +justified by immemorial usage, and it marks a real distinction. Shall +we allow the philosopher to tell us that we must not use it in this +sense, but must say that only sensations and ideas exist? Surely not. +This would mean that we permit him to obliterate for us the distinction +between the external world and what is mental. + +But is it right to use the word "experience" to indicate the phenomena +which have a place in the objective order? Can an experience be +anything but mental? + +There can be no doubt that the suggestions of the word are +unfortunate--it has what we may call a subjective flavor. It suggests +that, after all, the things we perceive are sensations or percepts, and +must, to exist at all, exist in a mind. As we have seen, this is an +error, and an error which we all avoid in actual practice. We do not +take sensations for things, and we recognize clearly enough that it is +one thing for a material object to exist and another for it to be +perceived. + +Why, then, use the word "experience"? Simply because we have no better +word. We must use it, and not be misled by the associations which +cling to it. The word has this great advantage: it brings out clearly +the fact that all our knowledge of the external world rests ultimately +upon those phenomena which, when we consider them in relation to our +senses, we recognize as sensations. We cannot start out from mere +imaginings to discover what the world was like in the ages past. + +It is this truth that is recognized by the plain man, when he maintains +that, in the last resort, we can know things only in so far as we see, +touch, hear, taste, and smell them; and by the psychologist, when he +tells us that, in sensation, the external world is revealed as directly +as it is possible that it could be revealed. But it is a travesty on +this truth to say that we do not know things, but know only our +sensations of sight, touch, taste, hearing, and the like.[1] + + +[1] See the note on this chapter at the close of the volume. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +APPEARANCES AND REALITIES + +19. THINGS AND THEIR APPEARANCES.--We have seen in the last chapter +that there is an external world and that it is given in our experience. +There is an objective order, and we are all capable of distinguishing +between it and the subjective. He who says that we perceive only +sensations and ideas flies in the face of the common experience of +mankind. + +But we are not yet through with the subject. We all make a distinction +between things as they _appear_ and things as they _really are_. + +If we ask the plain man, What is the real external world? the first +answer that seems to present itself to his mind is this: Whatever we +can see, hear, touch, taste, or smell may be regarded as belonging to +the real world. What we merely imagine does not belong to it. + +That this answer is not a very satisfactory one occurred to men's minds +very early in the history of reflective thought. The ancient skeptic +said to himself: The colors of objects vary according to the light, and +according to the position and distance of the objects; can we say that +any object has a real color of its own? A staff stuck into water looks +bent, but feels straight to the touch; why believe the testimony of one +sense rather than that of another? + +Such questionings led to far-reaching consequences. They resulted in a +forlorn distrust of the testimony of the senses, and to a doubt as to +our ability to know anything as it really is. + +Now, the distinction between appearances and realities exists for us as +well as for the ancient skeptic, and without being tempted to make such +extravagant statements as that there is no such thing as truth, and +that every appearance is as real as any other, we may admit that it is +not very easy to see the full significance of the distinction, although +we are referring to it constantly. + +For example, we look from our window and see, as we say, a tree at a +distance. What we are conscious of is a small bluish patch of color. +Now, a small bluish patch of color is not, strictly speaking, a tree; +but for us it represents the tree. Suppose that we walk toward the +tree. Do we continue to see what we saw before? Of course, we say +that we continue to see the same tree; but it is plain that what we +immediately perceive, what is given in consciousness, does not remain +the same as we move. Our blue patch of color grows larger and larger; +it ceases to be blue and faint; at the last it has been replaced by an +expanse of vivid green, and we see the tree just before us. + +During our whole walk we have been seeing the tree. This appears to +mean that we have been having a whole series of visual experiences, no +two of which were just alike, and each of which was taken as a +representative of the tree. Which of these representatives is most +like the tree? Is the tree _really_ a faint blue, or is it _really_ a +vivid green? Or is it of some intermediate color? + +Probably most persons will be inclined to maintain that the tree only +seems blue at a distance, but that it really is green, as it appears +when one is close to it. In a sense, the statement is just; yet some +of those who make it would be puzzled to tell by what right they pick +out of the whole series of experiences, each of which represents the +tree as seen from some particular position, one individual experience, +which they claim not only represents the tree as seen from a given +point but also represents it as it is. Does this particular experience +bear some peculiar earmark which tells us that it is like the real tree +while the others are unlike it? + +20. REAL THINGS.--And what is this _real tree_ that we are supposed to +see as it is when we are close to it? + +About two hundred years ago the philosopher Berkeley pointed out that +the distinction commonly made between things as they look, the +apparent, and things as they are, the real, is at bottom the +distinction between things as presented to the sense of sight and +things as presented to the sense of touch. The acute analysis which he +made has held its own ever since. + +We have seen that, in walking towards the tree, we have a long series +of visual experiences, each of which differs more or less from all of +the others. Nevertheless, from the beginning of our progress to the +end, we say that we are looking at the same tree. The images change +color and grow larger. We do not say that the tree changes color and +grows larger. Why do we speak as we do? It is because, all along the +line, we mean by the real tree, not what is given to the sense of +sight, but something for which this stands as a sign. This something +must be given in our experience somewhere, we must be able to perceive +it under some circumstances or other, or it would never occur to us to +recognize the visual experiences as _signs_, and we should never say +that in being conscious of them in succession we are looking at the +same tree. They are certainly not the same with each other; how can we +know that they all stand for the same thing, unless we have had +experience of a connection of the whole series with one thing? + +This thing for which so many different visual experiences may serve as +signs is the thing revealed in experiences of touch. When we ask: In +what direction is the tree? How far away is the tree? How big is the +tree? we are always referring to the tree revealed in touch. It is +nonsense to say that _what we see_ is far away, if by what we see we +mean the visual experience itself. As soon as we move we lose that +visual experience and get another, and to recover the one we lost we +must go back where we were before. When we say we see a tree at a +distance, we must mean, then, that we know from certain visual +experiences which we have that by moving a certain distance we will be +able to touch a tree. And what does it mean to move a certain +distance? In the last analysis it means to us to have a certain +quantity of movement sensations. + +Thus the real world of things, for which experiences of sight serve as +signs, is a world revealed in experiences of touch and movement, and +when we speak of real positions, distances, and magnitudes, we are +always referring to this world. But this is a world revealed in our +experience, and it does not seem a hopeless task to discover what may +properly be called real and what should be described as merely +apparent, when both the real and the apparent are open to our +inspection. + +Can we not find in this analysis a satisfactory explanation of the +plain man's claim that under certain circumstances he sees the tree as +it is and under others he does not? What he is really asserting is +that one visual experience gives him better information regarding the +real thing, the touch thing, than does another. + +But what shall we say of his claim that the tree is really green, and +only looks blue under certain circumstances? Is it not just as true +that the tree only looks green under certain circumstances? Is color +any part of the touch thing? Is it ever more than a sign of the touch +thing? How can one color be more real than another? + +Now, we may hold to Berkeley's analysis and maintain that, in general, +the real world, as contrasted with the apparent, means to us the world +that is revealed in experiences of touch and movement; and yet we may +admit that the word "real" is sometimes used in rather different senses. + +It does not seem absurd for a woman to Say: This piece of silk really +is yellow; it only looks white under this light. We all admit that a +white house may look pink under the rays of the setting sun, and we +never call it a pink house. We have seen that it is not unnatural to +say: That tree is really green; it is only its distance that makes it +look blue. + +When one reflects upon these uses of the word "real," one recognizes +the fact that, among all the experiences in which things are revealed +to us, certain experiences impress us as being more prominent or +important or serviceable than certain others, and they come to be +called _real_. Things are not commonly seen by artificial light; the +sun is not always setting; the tree looks green when it is seen most +satisfactorily. In each case, the real color of the thing is the color +that it has under circumstances that strike us as normal or as +important. We cannot say that we always regard as most real that +aspect under which we most commonly perceive things, for if a more +unusual experience is more serviceable and really gives us more +information about the thing, we give the preference to that. Thus we +look with the naked eye at a moving speck on the table before us, and +we are unable to distinguish its parts. We place a microscope over the +speck and perceive an insect with all its members. The second +experience is the more unusual one, but would not every one say: Now we +perceive the thing _as it is_? + +21. ULTIMATE REAL THINGS.--Let us turn away from the senses of the word +"real," which recognize one color or taste or odor as more real than +another, and come back to the real world of things presented in +sensations of touch. All other classes of sensations may be regarded +as related to this as the series of visual experiences above mentioned +was related to the one tree which was spoken of as revealed in them +all, the touch tree of which they gave information. + +Can we say that this world is always to be regarded as reality and +never as appearance? We have already seen (section 8) that science +does not regard as anything more than appearance the real things which +seem to be directly presented in our experience. + +This pen that I hold in my hand seems, as I pass my fingers over it, to +be continuously extended. It does not appear to present an alternation +of filled spaces and empty spaces. I am told that it is composed of +molecules in rapid motion and at considerable distances from one +another. I am further told that each molecule is composed of atoms, +and is, in its turn, not a continuous thing, but, so to speak, a group +of little things. + +If I accept this doctrine, as it seems I must, am I not forced to +conclude that the reality which is given in my experience, the reality +with which I have contrasted appearances and to which I have referred +them, is, after all, itself only an appearance? The touch things which +I have hitherto regarded as the real things that make up the external +world, the touch things for which all my visual experiences have served +as signs, are, then, not themselves real external things, but only the +appearances under which real external things, themselves imperceptible, +manifest themselves to me. + +It seems, then, that I do not directly perceive any real thing, or, at +least, anything that can be regarded as more than an appearance. What, +then, is the external world? What are things really like? Can we give +any true account of them, or are we forced to say with the skeptics +that we only know how things seem to us, and must abandon the attempt +to tell what they are really like? + +Now, before one sets out to answer a question it is well to find out +whether it is a sensible question to ask and a sensible question to try +to answer. He who asks: Where is the middle of an infinite line? When +did all time begin? Where is space as a whole? does not deserve a +serious answer to his questions. And it is well to remember that he +who asks: What is the external world like? must keep his question a +significant one, if he is to retain his right to look for an answer at +all. He has manifestly no right to ask us: How does the external world +look when no one is looking? How do things feel when no one feels +them? How shall I think of things, not as I think of them, but as they +are? + +If we are to give an account of the external world at all, it must +evidently be _an account_ of the external world; _i.e._ it must be +given in terms of our experience of things. The only legitimate +problem is to give a true account instead of a false one, to +distinguish between what only appears and is not real and what both +appears and is real. + +Bearing this in mind, let us come back to the plain man's experience of +the world. He certainly seems to himself to perceive a real world of +things, and he constantly distinguishes, in a way very serviceable to +himself, between the merely apparent and the real. There is, of +course, a sense in which every experience is real; it is, at least, an +experience; but when he contrasts real and apparent he means something +more than this. Experiences are not relegated to this class or to that +merely at random, but the final decision is the outcome of a long +experience of the differences which characterize different individual +experiences and is an expression of the relations which are observed to +hold between them. Certain experiences are accepted as signs, and +certain others come to take the more dignified position of thing +signified; the mind rests in them and regards them as the real. + +We have seen above that the world of real things in which the plain man +finds himself is a world of objects revealed in experiences of touch. +When he asks regarding anything: How far away is it? How big is it? +In what direction is it? it is always the touch thing that interests +him. What is given to the other senses is only a sign of this. + +We have also seen (section 8) that the world of atoms and molecules of +which the man of science tells us is nothing more than a further +development of the world of the plain man. The real things with which +science concerns itself are, after all, only minute touch things, +conceived just as are the things with which the plain man is familiar. +They exist in space and move about in space, as the things about us are +perceived to exist in space and move about in space. They have size +and position, and are separated by distances. We do not _perceive_ +them, it is true; but we _conceive_ them after the analogy of the +things that we do perceive, and it is not inconceivable that, if our +senses were vastly more acute, we might perceive them directly. + +Now, when we conclude that the things directly perceptible to the sense +of touch are to be regarded as appearances, as signs of the presence of +these minuter things, do we draw such a conclusion arbitrarily? By no +means. The distinction between appearance and reality is drawn here +just as it is drawn in the world of our common everyday experiences. +The great majority of the touch things about us we are not actually +touching at any given moment. We only _see_ the things, _i.e._ we have +certain _signs_ of their presence. None the less we believe that the +things exist all the time. And in the same way the man of science does +not doubt the existence of the real things of which he speaks; he +perceives their _signs_. That certain experiences are to be taken as +signs of such realities he has established by innumerable observations +and careful deductions from those observations. To see the full force +of his reasonings one must read some work setting forth the history of +the atomic theory. + +If, then, we ask the question: What is the real external world? it is +clear that we cannot answer it satisfactorily without taking into +consideration the somewhat shifting senses of the word "real." What is +the real external world to the plain man? It is the world of touch +things, of objects upon which he can lay his hands. What is the real +external world to the man of science? It is the world of atoms and +molecules, of minuter touch things that he cannot actually touch, but +which he conceives as though he could touch them. + +It should be observed that the man of science has no right to deny the +real world which is revealed in the experience of the plain man. In +all his dealings with the things which interest him in common life, he +refers to this world just as the plain man does. He sees a tree and +walks towards it, and distinguishes between its real and its apparent +color, its real and its apparent size. He talks about seeing things as +they are, or not seeing things as they are. These distinctions in his +experience of things remain even after he has come to believe in atoms +and molecules. + +Thus, the touch object, the tree as he feels it under his hand, may +come to be regarded as the sign of the presence of those entities that +science seems, at present, to regard as ultimate. Does this prevent it +from being the object which has stood as the interpreter of all those +diverse visual sensations that we have called different views of the +tree? They are still the appearances, and it, relatively to them, is +the reality. Now we find that it, in its turn, can be used as a sign +of something else, can be regarded as an appearance of a reality more +ultimate. It is clear, then, that the same thing may be regarded both +as appearance and as reality--appearance as contrasted with one thing, +and reality as contrasted with another. + +But suppose one says: _I do not want to know what the real external +world is to this man or to that man; I want to know what the real +external world is_. What shall we say to such a demand? + +There is a sense in which such a demand is not purely meaningless, +though it may not be a very sensible demand to make. We have seen that +an increase of knowledge about things compels a man to pass from the +real things of common life to the real things of science, and to look +upon the former as appearance. Now, a man may arbitrarily decide that +he will use the word "reality" to indicate only that which can never in +its turn be regarded as appearance, a reality which must remain an +ultimate reality; and he may insist upon our telling him about that. +How a man not a soothsayer can tell when he has come to ultimate +reality, it is not easy to see. + +Suppose, however, that we could give any one such information. We +should then be telling him about things _as they are_, it is true, but +his knowledge of things would not be different in _kind_ from what it +was before. The only difference between such a knowledge of things and +a knowledge of things not known to be ultimate would be that, in the +former case, it would be recognized that no further extension of +knowledge was possible. The distinction between appearance and reality +would remain just what it was in the experience of the plain man. + +22. THE BUGBEAR OF THE "UNKNOWABLE."--It is very important to recognize +that we must not go on talking about appearance and reality, as if our +words really meant something, when we have quite turned our backs upon +our experience of appearances and the realities which they represent. + +That appearances and realities are connected we know very well, for we +perceive them to be connected. What we see, we can touch. And we not +only know that appearances and realities are connected, but we know +with much detail what appearances are to be taken as signs of what +realities. The visual experience which I call the house as seen from a +distance I never think of taking for a representative of the hat which +I hold in my hand. This visual experience I refer to its own +appropriate touch thing, and not to another. If what _looks like_ a +beefsteak could _really be_ a fork or a mountain or a kitten +indifferently,--but I must not even finish the sentence, for the words +"look like" and "could really be" lose all significance when we loosen +the bond between appearances and the realities to which they are +properly referred. + +Each appearance, then, must be referred to some particular real thing +and not to any other. This is true of the appearances which we +recognize as such in common life, and it is equally true of the +appearances recognized as such in science. The pen which I feel +between my fingers I may regard as appearance and refer to a swarm of +moving atoms. But it would be silly for me to refer it to atoms "in +general." The reality to which I refer the appearance in question is a +particular group of atoms existing at a particular point in space. The +chemist never supposes that the atoms within the walls of his test-tube +are identical with those in the vial on the shelf. Neither in common +life nor in science would the distinction between appearances and real +things be of the smallest service were it not possible to distinguish +between this appearance and that, and this reality and that, and to +refer each appearance to its appropriate reality. Indeed, it is +inconceivable that, under such circumstances, the distinction should +have been drawn at all. + +These points ought to be strongly insisted upon, for we find certain +philosophic writers falling constantly into a very curious abuse of the +distinction and making much capital of it. It is argued that what we +see, what we touch, what we conceive as a result of scientific +observation and reflection--all is, in the last analysis, material +which is given us in sensation. The various senses furnish us with +different classes of sensations; we work these up into certain +complexes. But sensations are only the impressions which something +outside of us makes upon us. Hence, although we seem to ourselves to +know the external world as it is, our knowledge can never extend beyond +the impressions made upon us. Thus, we are absolutely shut up to +_appearances_, and can know nothing about the _reality_ to which they +must be referred. + +Touching this matter Herbert Spencer writes[1] as follows: "When we are +taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, +cannot be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions +produced on us, we are yet, by the relativity of thought, compelled to +think of these in relation to a cause--the notion of a real existence +which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved +that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is +inconsistent with itself,--that matter, however conceived by us, cannot +be matter as it actually is,--our conception, though transfigured, is +not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far +as possible from those special forms under which it was before +represented in thought." + +This means, in plain language, that we must regard everything we know +and can know as appearance and must refer it to an unknown reality. +Sometimes Mr. Spencer calls this reality the Unknowable, sometimes he +calls it the Absolute, and sometimes he allows it to pass by a variety +of other names, such as Power, Cause, etc. He wishes us to think of it +as "lying behind appearances" or as "underlying appearances." + +Probably it has already been remarked that this Unknowable has brought +us around again to that amusing "telephone exchange" discussed in the +third chapter. But if the reader feels within himself the least +weakness for the Unknowable, I beg him to consider carefully, before he +pins his faith to it, the following:-- + +(1) If we do perceive external bodies, our own bodies and others, then +it is conceivable that we may have evidence from observation to the +effect that other bodies affecting our bodies may give rise to +sensations. In this case we cannot say that we know nothing but +sensations; we know real bodies as well as sensations, and we may refer +the sensations to the real bodies. + +(2) If we do not perceive that we have bodies, and that our bodies are +acted upon by others, we have no evidence that what we call our +sensations are due to messages which come from "external things" and +are conducted along the nerves. It is then, absurd to talk of such +"external things" as though they existed, and to call them the reality +to which sensations, as appearances, must be referred, + +(3) In other words, if there is perceived to be a telephone exchange +with its wires and subscribers, we may refer the messages received to +the subscribers, and call this, if we choose, a reference of appearance +to reality. + +But if there is perceived no telephone exchange, and if it is concluded +that any wires or subscribers of which it means anything to speak must +be composed of what we have heretofore called "messages," then it is +palpably absurd to refer the "messages" as a whole to subscribers not +supposed to be composed of "messages"; and it is a blunder to go on +calling the things that we know "messages," as though we had evidence +that they came from, and must be referred to, something beyond +themselves. + +We must recognize that, with the general demolition of the exchange, we +lose not only known subscribers, but the very notion of a subscriber. +It will not do to try to save from this wreck some "unknowable" +subscriber, and still pin our faith to him. + +(4) We have seen that the relation of appearance to reality is that of +certain experiences to certain other experiences. When we take the +liberty of calling the Unknowable a _reality_, we blunder in our use of +the word. The Unknowable cannot be an experience either actual, +possible, or conceived as possible, and it cannot possibly hold the +relation to any of our experiences that a real thing of any kind holds +to the appearances that stand as its signs. + +(5) Finally, no man has ever made an assumption more perfectly useless +and purposeless than the assumption of the Unknowable. We have seen +that the distinction between appearance and reality is a serviceable +one, and it has been pointed out that it would be of no service +whatever if it were not possible to refer particular appearances to +their own appropriate realities. The realities to which we actually +refer appearances serve to explain them. Thus, when I ask: Why do I +perceive that tree now as faint and blue and now as vivid and green? +the answer to the question is found in the notion of distance and +position in space; it is found, in other words, in a reference to the +real world of touch things, for which visual experiences serve as +signs. Under certain circumstances, the mountain _ought_ to be robed +in its azure hue, and, under certain circumstances, it _ought not_. +The circumstances in each case are open to investigation. + +Now, let us substitute for the real world of touch things, which +furnishes the explanation of given visual experiences, that philosophic +fiction, that pseudo-real nonentity, the Unknowable. Now I perceive a +tree as faint and blue, now as bright and green; will a reference to +the Unknowable explain why the experiences differed? Was the +Unknowable in the one instance farther off in an unknowable space, and +in the other nearer? This, even if it means anything, must remain +unknowable. And when the chemist puts together a volume of chlorine +gas and a volume of hydrogen gas to get two volumes of hydrochloric +acid gas, shall we explain the change which has taken place by a +reference to the Unknowable, or shall we turn to the doctrine of atoms +and their combinations? + +The fact is that no man in his senses tries to account for any +individual fact by turning for an explanation to the Unknowable. It is +a life-preserver by which some set great store, but which no man dreams +of using when he really falls into the water. + +If, then, we have any reason to believe that there is a real external +world at all, we have reason to believe that we know what it is. That +some know it imperfectly, that others know it better, and that we may +hope that some day it will be known still more perfectly, is surely no +good reason for concluding that we do not know it at all. + + +[1] "First Principles," Part I, Chapter IV, section 26. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +OF SPACE + +23. WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO KNOW ABOUT IT.--The plain man may admit +that he is not ready to hazard a definition of space, but he is +certainly not willing to admit that he is wholly ignorant of space and +of its attributes. He knows that it is something in which material +objects have position and in which they move about; he knows that it +has not merely length, like a line, nor length and breadth, like a +surface, but has the three dimensions of length, breadth, and depth; he +knows that, except in the one circumstance of its position, every part +of space is exactly like every other part, and that, although objects +may move about in space, it is incredible that the spaces themselves +should be shifted about. + +Those who are familiar with the literature of the subject know that it +has long been customary to make regarding space certain other +statements to which the plain man does not usually make serious +objection when he is introduced to them. Thus it is said:-- + +(1) The idea of space is _necessary_. We can think of objects in space +as annihilated, but we cannot conceive space to be annihilated. We can +clear space of things, but we cannot clear away space itself, even in +thought. + +(2) Space must be _infinite_. We cannot conceive that we should come +to the end of space. + +(3) Every space, however small, is _infinitely divisible_. That is to +say, even the most minute space must be composed of spaces. We cannot, +even theoretically, split a solid into mere surfaces, a surface into +mere lines, or a line into mere points. + +Against such statements the plain man is not impelled to rise in +rebellion, for he can see that there seems to be some ground for making +them. He can conceive of any particular material object as +annihilated, and of the place which it occupied as standing empty; but +he cannot go on and conceive of the annihilation of this bit of empty +space. Its annihilation would not leave a gap, for a gap means a bit +of empty space; nor could it bring the surrounding spaces into +juxtaposition, for one cannot shift spaces, and, in any case, a +shifting that is not a shifting through space is an absurdity. + +Again, he cannot conceive of any journey that would bring him to the +end of space. There is no more reason for stopping at one point than +at another; why not go on? What could end space? + +As to the infinite divisibility of space, have we not, in addition to +the seeming reasonableness of the doctrine, the testimony of all the +mathematicians? Does any one of them ever dream of a line so short +that it cannot be divided into two shorter lines, or of an angle so +small that it cannot be bisected? + +24. SPACE AS NECESSARY AND SPACE AS INFINITE.--That these statements +about space contain truth one should not be in haste to deny. It seems +silly to say that space can be annihilated, or that one can travel +"over the mountains of the moon" in the hope of reaching the end of it. +And certainly no prudent man wishes to quarrel with that coldly +rational creature the mathematician. + +But it is well worth while to examine the statements carefully and to +see whether there is not some danger that they may be understood in +such a way as to lead to error. Let us begin with the doctrine that +space is necessary and cannot be "thought away." + +As we have seen above, it is manifestly impossible to annihilate in +thought a certain portion of space and leave the other portions intact. +There are many things in the same case. We cannot annihilate in +thought one side of a door and leave the other side; we cannot rob a +man of the outside of his hat and leave him the inside. But we can +conceive of a whole door as annihilated, and of a man as losing a whole +hat. May we or may we not conceive of space as a whole as nonexistent? + +I do not say, be it observed, can we conceive of something as attacking +and annihilating space? Whatever space may be, we none of us think of +it as a something that may be threatened and demolished. I only say, +may we not think of a system of things--not a world such as ours, of +course, but still a system of things of some sort--in which space +relations have no part? May we not conceive such to be possible? + +It should be remarked that space relations are by no means the only +ones in which we think of things as existing. We attribute to them +time relations as well. Now, when we think of occurrences as related +to each other in time, we do, in so far as we concentrate our attention +upon these relations, turn our attention away from space and +contemplate another aspect of the system of things. Space is not such +a necessity of thought that we must keep thinking of space when we have +turned our attention to something else. And is it, indeed, +inconceivable that there should be a system of things (not extended +things in space, of course), characterized by time relations and +perhaps other relations, but not by space relations? + +It goes without saying that we cannot go on thinking of space and at +the same time not think of space. Those who keep insisting upon space +as a necessity of thought seem to set us such a task as this, and to +found their conclusion upon our failure to accomplish it. "We can +never represent to ourselves the nonexistence of space," says the +German philosopher Kant (1724-1804), "although we can easily conceive +that there are no objects in space." + +It would, perhaps, be fairer to translate the first half of this +sentence as follows: "We can never picture to ourselves the +nonexistence of space." Kant says we cannot make of it a +_Vorstellung_, a representation. This we may freely admit, for what +does one try to do when one makes the effort to imagine the +nonexistence of space? Does not one first clear space of objects, and +then try to clear space of space in much the same way? We try to +"think space away," _i.e. to remove it from the place where it was and +yet keep that place_. + +What does it mean to imagine or represent to oneself the nonexistence +of material objects? Is it not to represent to oneself the objects as +no longer in space, _i.e._ to imagine the space as empty, as cleared of +the objects? It means something in this case to speak of a +_Vorstellung_, or representation. We can call before our minds the +empty space. But if we are to think of space as nonexistent, what +shall we call before our minds? Our procedure must not be analogous to +what it was before; we must not try to picture to our minds _the +absence of space_, as though that were in itself a something that could +be pictured; we must turn our attention to other relations, such as +time relations, and ask whether it is not conceivable that such should +be the only relations obtaining within a given system. + +Those who insist upon the fact that we cannot but conceive space as +infinite employ a very similar argument to prove their point. They set +us a self-contradictory task, and regard our failure to accomplish it +as proof of their position. Thus, Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) +argues: "We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded--as +finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there is no further space." +And Herbert Spencer echoes approvingly: "We find ourselves totally +unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is no space." + +Now, whatever one may be inclined to think about the infinity of space, +it is clear that this argument is an absurd one. Let me write it out +more at length: "We are altogether unable to conceive space as +bounded--as finite; that is, as a whole _in the space_ beyond which +there is no further space." "We find ourselves totally unable to +imagine bounds, _in the space_ beyond which there is no further space." +The words which I have added were already present implicitly. What can +the word "beyond" mean if it does not signify space beyond? What Sir +William and Mr. Spencer have asked us to do is to imagine a limited +space with a _beyond_ and yet _no beyond_. + +There is undoubtedly some reason why men are so ready to affirm that +space is infinite, even while they admit that they do not know that the +world of material things is infinite. To this we shall come back again +later. But if one wishes to affirm it, it is better to do so without +giving a reason than it is to present such arguments as the above. + +25. SPACE AS INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--For more than two thousand years +men have been aware that certain very grave difficulties seem to attach +to the idea of motion, when we once admit that space is infinitely +divisible. To maintain that we can divide any portion of space up into +ultimate elements which are not themselves spaces, and which have no +extension, seems repugnant to the idea we all have of space. And if we +refuse to admit this possibility there seems to be nothing left to us +but to hold that every space, however small, may theoretically be +divided up into smaller spaces, and that there is no limit whatever to +the possible subdivision of spaces. Nevertheless, if we take this most +natural position, we appear to find ourselves plunged into the most +hopeless of labyrinths, every turn of which brings us face to face with +a flat self-contradiction. + +To bring the difficulties referred to clearly before our minds, let us +suppose a point to move uniformly over a line an inch long, and to +accomplish its journey in a second. At first glance, there appears to +be nothing abnormal about this proceeding. But if we admit that this +line is infinitely divisible, and reflect upon this property of the +line, the ground seems to sink from beneath our feet at once. + +For it is possible to argue that, under the conditions given, the point +must move over one half of the line in half a second; over one half of +the remainder, or one fourth of the line, in one fourth of a second; +over one eighth of the line, in one eighth of a second, etc. Thus the +portions of line moved over successively by the point may be +represented by the descending series: + +1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, . . . [Greek omicron symbol] + +Now, it is quite true that the motion of the point can be described in +a number of different ways; but the important thing to remark here is +that, if the motion really is uniform, and if the line really is +infinitely divisible, this series must, as satisfactorily as any other, +describe the motion of the point. And it would be absurd to maintain +that _a part_ of the series can describe the whole motion. We cannot +say, for example, that, when the point has moved over one half, one +fourth, and one eighth of the line, it has completed its motion. If +even a single member of the series is left out, the whole line has not +been passed over; and this is equally true whether the omitted member +represent a large bit of line or a small one. + +The whole series, then, represents the whole line, as definite parts of +the series represent definite parts of the line. The line can only be +completed when the series is completed. But when and how can this +series be completed? In general, a series is completed when we reach +the final term, but here there appears to be no final term. We cannot +make zero the final term, for it does not belong to the series at all. +It does not obey the law of the series, for it is not one half as large +as the term preceding it--what space is so small that dividing it by 2 +gives us [omicron]? On the other hand, some term just before zero +cannot be the final term; for if it really represents a little bit of +the line, however small, it must, by hypothesis, be made up of lesser +bits, and a smaller term must be conceivable. There can, then, be no +last term to the series; _i.e._ what the point is doing at the very +last is absolutely indescribable; it is inconceivable that there should +be a _very last_. + +It was pointed out many centuries ago that it is equally inconceivable +that there should be a _very first_. How can a point even begin to +move along an infinitely divisible line? Must it not before it can +move over any distance, however short, first move over half that +distance? And before it can move over that half, must it not move over +the half of that? Can it find something to move over that has no +halves? And if not, how shall it even start to move? To move at all, +it must begin somewhere; it cannot begin with what has no halves, for +then it is not moving over any part of the line, as all parts have +halves; and it cannot begin with what has halves, for that is not the +beginning. _What does the point do first?_ that is the question. +Those who tell us about points and lines usually leave us to call upon +gentle echo for an answer. + +The perplexities of this moving point seem to grow worse and worse the +longer one reflects upon them. They do not harass it merely at the +beginning and at the end of its journey. This is admirably brought out +by Professor W. K. Clifford (1845-1879), an excellent mathematician, +who never had the faintest intention of denying the possibility of +motion, and who did not desire to magnify the perplexities in the path +of a moving point. He writes:-- + +"When a point moves along a line, we know that between any two +positions of it there is an infinite number . . . of intermediate +positions. That is because the motion is continuous. Each of those +positions is where the point was at some instant or other. Between the +two end positions on the line, the point where the motion began and the +point where it stopped, there is no point of the line which does not +belong to that series. We have thus an infinite series of successive +positions of a continuously moving point, and in that series are +included all the points of a certain piece of line-room." [1] + +Thus, we are told that, when a point moves along a line, between any +two positions of it there is an infinite number of intermediate +positions. Clifford does not play with the word "infinite"; he takes +it seriously and tells us that it means without any end: "_Infinite_; +it is a dreadful word, I know, until you find out that you are familiar +with the thing which it expresses. In this place it means that between +any two positions there is some intermediate position; between that and +either of the others, again, there is some other intermediate; and so +on _without any end_. Infinite means without any end." + +But really, if the case is as stated, the point in question must be at +a desperate pass. I beg the reader to consider the following, and ask +himself whether he would like to change places with it:-- + +(1) If the series of positions is really endless, the point must +complete one by one the members of an endless series, and reach a +nonexistent final term, for a really endless series cannot have a final +term. + +(2) The series of positions is supposed to be "an infinite series of +successive positions." The moving point must take them one after +another. But how can it? _Between any two positions of the point +there is an infinite number of intermediate positions_. That is to +say, no two of these successive positions must be regarded as _next to_ +each other; every position is separated from every other by an infinite +number of intermediate ones. How, then, shall the point move? It +cannot possibly move from one position to the next, for there is no +next. Shall it move first to some position that is not the next? Or +shall it in despair refuse to move at all? + +Evidently there is either something wrong with this doctrine of the +infinite divisibility of space, or there is something wrong with our +understanding of it, if such absurdities as these refuse to be cleared +away. Let us see where the trouble lies. + +26. WHAT IS REAL SPACE?--It is plain that men are willing to make a +number of statements about space, the ground for making which is not at +once apparent. It is a bold man who will undertake to say that the +universe of matter is infinite in extent. We feel that we have the +right to ask him how he knows that it is. But most men are ready +enough to affirm that space is and must be infinite. How do they know +that it is? They certainly do not directly perceive all space, and +such arguments as the one offered by Hamilton and Spencer are easily +seen to be poor proofs. + +Men are equally ready to affirm that space is infinitely divisible. +Has any man ever looked upon a line and perceived directly that it has +an infinite number of parts? Did any one ever succeed in dividing a +space up infinitely? When we try to make clear to ourselves how a +point moves along an infinitely divisible line, do we not seem to land +in sheer absurdities? On what sort of evidence does a man base his +statements regarding space? They are certainly very bold statements. + +A careful reflection reveals the fact that men do not speak as they do +about space for no reason at all. When they are properly understood, +their statements can be seen to be justified, and it can be seen also +that the difficulties which we have been considering can be avoided. +The subject is a deep one, and it can scarcely be discussed +exhaustively in an introductory volume of this sort, but one can, at +least, indicate the direction in which it seems most reasonable to look +for an answer to the questions which have been raised. How do we come +to a knowledge of space, and what do we mean by space? This is the +problem to solve; and if we can solve this, we have the key which will +unlock many doors. + +Now, we saw in the last chapter that we have reason to believe that we +know what the real external world is. It is a world of things which we +perceive, or can perceive, or, not arbitrarily but as a result of +careful observation and deductions therefrom, conceive as though we did +perceive it--a world, say, of atoms and molecules. It is not an +Unknowable behind or beyond everything that we perceive, or can +perceive, or conceive in the manner stated. + +And the space with which we are concerned is real space, the space in +which real things exist and move about, the real things which we can +directly know or of which we can definitely know something. In some +sense it must be given in our experience, if the things which are in +it, and are known to be in it, are given in our experience. How must +we think of this real space? + +Suppose we look at a tree at a distance. We are conscious of a certain +complex of color. We can distinguish the kind of color; in this case, +we call it blue. But the quality of the color is not the only thing +that we can distinguish in the experience. In two experiences of color +the quality may be the same, and yet the experiences may be different +from each other. In the one case we may have more of the same +color--we may, so to speak, be conscious of a larger patch; but even if +there is not actually more of it, there may be such a difference that +we can know from the visual experience alone that the touch object +before us is, in the one case, of the one shape, and, in the other +case, of another. Thus we may distinguish between the _stuff_ given in +our experience and the _arrangement_ of that stuff. This is the +distinction which philosophers have marked as that between "matter" and +"form." It is, of course, understood that both of these words, so +used, have a special sense not to be confounded with their usual one. + +This distinction between "matter" and "form" obtains in all our +experiences. I have spoken just above of the shape of the touch object +for which our visual experiences stand as signs. What do we mean by +its shape? To the plain man real things are the touch things of which +he has experience, and these touch things are very clearly +distinguishable from one another in shape, in size, in position, nor +are the different parts| of the things to be confounded with each +other. Suppose that, as we pass our hand over a table, all the +sensations of touch and movement which we experience fused into an +undistinguishable mass. Would we have any notion of size or shape? It +is because our experiences of touch and movement do not fuse, but +remain distinguishable from each other, and we are conscious of them as +_arranged_, as constituting a system, that we can distinguish between +this part of a thing and that, this thing and that. + +This arrangement, this order, of what is revealed by touch and +movement, we may call the "form" of the touch world. Leaving out of +consideration, for the present, time relations, we may say that the +"form" of the touch world is the whole system of actual and possible +relations of arrangement between the elements which make it up. It is +because there is such a system of relations that we can speak of things +as of this shape or of that, as great or small, as near or far, as here +or there. + +Now, I ask, is there any reason to believe that, when the plain man +speaks of _space_, the word means to him anything more than this system +of actual and possible relations of arrangement among the touch things +that constitute his real world? He may talk sometimes as though space +were some kind of a _thing_, but he does not really think of it as a +thing. + +This is evident from the mere fact that he is so ready to make about it +affirmations that he would not venture to make about things. It does +not strike him as inconceivable that a given material object should be +annihilated; it does strike him as inconceivable that a portion of +space should be blotted out of existence. Why this difference? Is it +not explained when we recognize that space is but a name for all the +actual and possible relations of arrangement in which things in the +touch world may stand? We cannot drop out some of these relations and +yet keep _space_, _i.e._ the system of relations which we had before. +That this is what space means, the plain man may not recognize +explicitly, but he certainly seems to recognize it implicitly in what +he says about space. Men are rarely inclined to admit that space is a +_thing_ of any kind, nor are they much more inclined to regard it as a +quality of a thing. Of what could it be the quality? + +And if space really were a thing of any sort, would it not be the +height of presumption for a man, in the absence of any direct evidence +from observation, to say how much there is of it--to declare it +infinite? Men do not hesitate to say that space must be infinite. But +when we realize that we do not mean by space merely the actual +relations which exist between the touch things that make up the world, +but also the _possible_ relations, _i.e._ that we mean the whole _plan_ +of the world system, we can see that it is not unreasonable to speak of +space as infinite. + +The material universe may, for aught we know, be limited in extent. +The actual space relations in which things stand to each other may not +be limitless. But these actual space relations taken alone do not +constitute space. Men have often asked themselves whether they should +conceive of the universe as limited and surrounded by void space. It +is not nonsense to speak of such a state of things. It would, indeed, +appear to be nonsense to say that, if the universe is limited, it does +not lie in void space. What can we mean by void space but the system +of possible relations in which things, if they exist, must stand? To +say that, beyond a certain point, no further relations are possible, +seems absurd. + +Hence, when a man has come to understand what we have a right to mean +by space, it does not imply a boundless conceit on his part to hazard +the statement that space is infinite. When he has said this, he has +said very little. What shall we say to the statement that space is +infinitely divisible? + +To understand the significance of this statement we must come back to +the distinction between appearances and the real things for which they +stand as signs, the distinction discussed at length in the last chapter. + +When I see a tree from a distance, the visual experience which I have +is, as we have seen, not an indivisible unit, but is a complex +experience; it has parts, and these parts are related to each other; in +other words, it has both "matter" and "form." It is, however, one +thing to say that this experience has parts, and it is another to say +that it has an infinite number of parts. No man is conscious of +perceiving an infinite number of parts in the patch of color which +represents to him a tree at a distance; to say that it is constituted +of such strikes us in our moments of sober reflection as a monstrous +statement. + +Now, this visual experience is to us the sign of the reality, the real +tree; it is not taken as the tree itself. When we speak of the size, +the shape, the number of parts, of the tree, we do not have in mind the +size, the shape, the number of parts, of just this experience. We pass +from the sign to the thing signified, and we may lay our hand upon this +thing, thus gaining a direct experience of the size and shape of the +touch object. + +We must recognize, however, that just as no man is conscious of an +infinite number of parts in what he sees, so no man is conscious of an +infinite number of parts in what he touches. He who tells me that, +when I pass my finger along my paper cutter, _what I perceive_ has an +infinite number of parts, tells me what seems palpably untrue. When an +object is very small, I can see it, and I cannot see that it is +composed of parts; similarly, when an object is very small, I can feel +it with my finger, but I cannot distinguish its parts by the sense of +touch. There seem to be limits beyond which I cannot go in either case. + +Nevertheless, men often speak of thousandths of an inch, or of +millionths of an inch, or of distances even shorter. Have such +fractions of the magnitudes that we do know and can perceive any real +existence? The touch world of real things as it is revealed in our +experience does not appear to be divisible into such; it does not +appear to be divisible even so far, and much less does it appear to be +infinitely divisible. + +But have we not seen that the touch world given in our experience must +be taken by the thoughtful man as itself the sign or appearance of a +reality more ultimate? The speck which appears to the naked eye to +have no parts is seen under the microscope to have parts; that is to +say, an experience apparently not extended has become the sign of +something that is seen to have part out of part. We have as yet +invented no instrument that will make directly perceptible to the +finger tip an atom of hydrogen or of oxygen, but the man of science +conceives of these little things as though they could be perceived. +They and the space in which they move--the system of actual and +possible relations between them--seem to be related to the world +revealed in touch very much as the space revealed in the field of the +microscope is related to the space of the speck looked at with the +naked eye. + +Thus, when the thoughtful man speaks of _real space_, he cannot mean by +the word only the actual and possible relations of arrangement among +the things and the parts of things directly revealed to his sense of +touch. He may speak of real things too small to be thus perceived, and +of their motion as through spaces too small to be perceptible at all. +What limit shall he set to the possible subdivision of _real_ things? +Unless he can find an ultimate reality which cannot in its turn become +the appearance or sign of a further reality, it seems absurd to speak +of a limit at all. + +We may, then, say that real space is infinitely divisible. By this +statement we should mean that certain experiences may be represented by +others, and that we may carry on our division in the case of the +latter, when a further subdivision of the former seems out of the +question. But it should not mean that any single experience furnished +us by any sense, or anything that we can represent in the imagination, +is composed of an infinite number of parts. + +When we realize this, do we not free ourselves from the difficulties +which seemed to make the motion of a point over a line an impossible +absurdity? The line as revealed in a single experience either of sight +or of touch is not composed of an infinite number of parts. It is +composed of points seen or touched--least experiences of sight or +touch, _minima sensibilia_. These are next to each other, and the +point, in moving, takes them one by one. + +But such a single experience is not what we call a line. It is but one +experience of a line. Though the experience is not infinitely +divisible, the line may be. This only means that the visual or tactual +point of the single experience may stand for, may represent, what is +not a mere point but has parts, and is, hence, divisible. Who can set +a limit to such possible substitutions? in other words, who can set a +limit to the divisibility of a _real line_? + +It is only when we confuse the single experience with the real line +that we fall into absurdities. What the mathematician tells us about +real points and real lines has no bearing on the constitution of the +single experience and its parts. Thus, when he tells us that between +any two points on a line there are an infinite number of other points, +he only means that we may expand the line indefinitely by the system of +substitutions described above. We do this for ourselves within limits +every time that we approach from a distance a line drawn on a +blackboard. The mathematician has generalized our experience for us, +and that is all he has done. We should try to get at his real meaning, +and not quote him as supporting an absurdity. + + +[1] "Seeing and Thinking," p. 149. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +OF TIME + +27. TIME AS NECESSARY, INFINITE, AND INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--Of course, we +all know something about time; we know it as past, present, and future; +we know it as divisible into parts, all of which are successive; we know +that whatever happens must happen in time. Those who have thought a good +deal about the matter are apt to tell us that time is a necessity of +thought, we cannot but think it; that time is and must be infinite; and +that it is infinitely divisible. + +These are the same statements that were made regarding space, and, as +they have to be criticised in just the same way, it is not necessary to +dwell upon them at great length. However, we must not pass them over +altogether. + +As to the statement that time is a _necessary_ idea, we may freely admit +that we cannot in thought _annihilate_ time, or _think it away_. It does +not seem to mean anything to attempt such a task. Whatever time may be, +it does not appear to be a something of such a nature that we can +demolish it or clear it away from something else. But is it necessarily +absurd to speak of a system of things--not, of course, a system of things +in which there is change, succession, an earlier and a later, but still a +system of things of some sort--in which there obtain no time relations? +The problem is, to be sure, one of theoretical interest merely, for such +a system of things is not the world we know. + +And as for the infinity of time, may we not ask on what ground any one +ventures to assert that time is infinite? No man can say that infinite +time is directly given in his experience. If one does not directly +perceive it to be infinite, must one not seek for some proof of the fact? +The only proof which appears to be offered us is contained in the +statement that we cannot conceive of a time before which there was no +time, nor of a time after which there will be no time; a proof which is +no proof, for written out at length it reads as follows: we cannot +conceive of a time _in the time_ before which there was no time, nor of a +time _in the time_ after which there will be no time. As well say: We +cannot conceive of a number the number before which was no number, nor of +a number the number after which will be no number. Whatever may be said +for the conclusion arrived at, the argument is a very poor one. + +When we turn to the consideration of time as infinitely divisible, we +seem to find ourselves confronted with the same difficulties which +presented themselves when we thought of space as infinitely divisible. +Certainly no man was immediately conscious of an infinite number of parts +in the minute which just slipped by. Shall he assert that it did, +nevertheless, contain an infinite number of parts? Then how did it +succeed in passing? how did it even _begin_ to pass away? It is +infinitely divisible, that is, there is no end to the number of parts +into which it may be divided; those parts and parts of parts are all +successive, no two can pass at once, they must all do it in a certain +order, one after the other. + +Thus, something must pass _first_. What can it be? If that something +has parts, is divisible, the whole of it cannot pass first. It must +itself pass bit by bit, as must the whole minute; and if it is infinitely +divisible we have precisely the problem that we had at the outset. +Whatever passes first cannot, then, have parts. + +Let us assume that it has no parts, and bid it Godspeed! Has the minute +begun? Our minute is, by hypothesis, infinitely divisible; it is +composed of parts, and those parts of other parts, and so on without end. +We cannot by subdivision come to any part which is itself not composed of +smaller parts. The partless thing that passed, then, is no part of the +minute. That is all still waiting at the gate, and no member of its +troop can prove that it has a right to lead the rest. In the same outer +darkness is waiting the point on the line that misbehaved itself in the +last chapter. + +28. THE PROBLEM OF PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE.--It seems bad enough to +have on our hands a minute which must pass away in successive bits, and +to discover that no bit of it can possibly pass first. But if we follow +with approval the reflections of certain thinkers, we may find ourselves +at such a pass that we would be glad to be able to prove that we may have +on our hands a minute of any sort. Men sometimes are so bold as to +maintain that they know time to be infinite; would it not be well for +them to prove first that they can know time at all? + +The trouble is this; as was pointed out long ago by Saint Augustine +(354-430) in his famous "Confessions," [1] the parts of time are +successive, and of the three divisions, past, present, and future, only +one can be regarded as existing: "Those two times, past and future, how +can they be, when the past is not now, and the future is not yet?" The +present is, it seems, the only existent; how long is the present? + +"Even a single hour passes in fleeting moments; as much of it as has +taken flight is past, what remains is future. If we can comprehend any +time that is divisible into no parts at all, or perhaps into the minutest +parts of moments, this alone let us call present; yet this speeds so +hurriedly from the future to the past that it does not endure even for a +little space. If it has duration, it is divided into a past and a +future; but the present has no duration. + +"Where, then, is the time that we may call long? Is it future? We do +not say of the future: it _is_ long; for as yet there exists nothing to +be long. We say: it _will be_ long. But when? If while yet future it +will not be long, for nothing will yet exist to be long. And if it will +be long, when, from a future as yet nonexistent, it has become a present, +and has begun to be, that it may be something that is long, then present +time cries out in the words of the preceding paragraph that it cannot be +long." + +Augustine's way of presenting the difficulty is a quaint one, but the +problem is as real at the beginning of the twentieth century as it was at +the beginning of the fifth. Past time does not exist now, future time +does not exist yet, and present time, it seems, has no duration. Can a +man be said to be conscious of time as past, present, and future? Who +can be conscious of the nonexistent? And the existent is not _time_, it +has no duration, there is no before and after in a mere limiting point. + +Augustine's way out of the difficulty is the suggestion that, although we +cannot, strictly speaking, measure time, we can measure _memory_ and +_expectation_. Before he begins to repeat a psalm, his expectation +extends over the whole of it. After a little a part of it must be +referred to expectation and a part of it to memory. Finally, the whole +psalm is "extended along" the memory. We can measure this, at least. + +But how is the psalm in question "extended along" the memory or the +expectation? Are the parts of it successive, or do they thus exist +simultaneously? If everything in the memory image exists at once, if all +belongs to the punctual present, to the mere point that divides past from +future, how can a man get from it a consciousness of time, of a something +whose parts cannot exist together but must follow each other? + +Augustine appears to overlook the fact that on his own hypothesis, the +present, the only existent, the only thing a man can be conscious of, is +an indivisible instant. In such there can be no change; the man who is +shut up to such cannot be aware that the past is growing and the future +diminishing. Any such change as this implies at least two instants, an +earlier and a later. He who has never experienced a change of any sort, +who has never been conscious of the relation of earlier and later, of +succession, cannot think of the varied content of memory as of _that +which has been present_. It cannot mean to him what memory certainly +means to us; he cannot be conscious of a past, a present, and a future. +To extract the notion of time, of past, present, and future, from an +experience which contains no element of succession, from an indivisible +instant, is as hopeless a task as to extract a line from a mathematical +point. + +It appears, then, that, if we are to be conscious of time at all, if we +are to have the least conception of it, we must have some direct +experience of change. We cannot really be shut up to that punctual +present, that mere point or limit between past and future, that the +present has been described as being. But does this not imply that we can +be directly conscious of what is not present, that we can _now_ perceive +what does _not now_ exist? How is this possible? + +It is not easy for one whose reading has been somewhat limited in any +given field to see the full significance of the problems which present +themselves in that field. Those who read much in the history of modern +philosophy will see that this ancient difficulty touching our +consciousness of time has given rise to some exceedingly curious +speculations, and some strange conclusions touching the nature of the +mind. + +Thus, it has been argued that, since the experience of each moment is +something quite distinct from the experience of the next, a something +that passes away to give place to its successor, we cannot explain the +consciousness of time, of a whole in which successive moments are +recognized as having their appropriate place, unless we assume a +something that knows each moment and knits it, so to speak, to its +successor. This something is the self or consciousness, which is +independent of time, and does not exist in time, as do the various +experiences that fill the successive moments. It is assumed to be +_timelessly_ present _at all times_, and thus to connect the nonexistent +past with the existent present. + +I do not ask the reader to try to make clear to himself how anything can +be timelessly present at all times, for I do not believe that the words +can be made to represent any clear thought whatever. Nor do I ask him to +try to conceive how this timeless something can join past and present. I +merely wish to point out that these modern speculations, which still +influence the minds of many distinguished men, have their origin in a +difficulty which suggested itself early in the history of reflective +thought, and are by no means to be regarded as a gratuitous and useless +exercise of the ingenuity. They are serious attempts to solve a real +problem, though they may be unsuccessful ones, and they are worthy of +attention even from those who incline to a different solution. + +29. WHAT IS REAL TIME?--From the thin air of such speculations as we have +been discussing let us come back to the world of the plain man, the world +in which we all habitually live. It is from this that we must start out +upon all our journeys, and it is good to come back to it from time to +time to make sure of our bearings. + +We have seen (Chapter V) that we distinguish between the real and the +apparent, and that we recognize as the real world the objects revealed to +the sense of touch. These objects stand to each other in certain +relations of arrangement; that is to say, they exist in space. And just +as we may distinguish between the object as it appears and the object as +it is, so we may distinguish between apparent space and real space, +_i.e._ between the relations of arrangement, actual and possible, which +obtain among the parts of the object as it appears, and those which +obtain among the parts of the object as it really is. + +But our experience does not present us only with objects in space +relations; it presents us with a succession of changes in those objects. +And if we will reason about those changes as we have reasoned about space +relations, many of our difficulties regarding the nature of time may, as +it seems, be made to disappear. + +Thus we may recognize that we are directly conscious of duration, of +succession, and may yet hold that this crude and immediate experience of +duration is not what we mean by real time. Every one distinguishes +between apparent time and real time now and then. We all know that a +sermon may _seem _long and not _be_ long; that the ten years that we live +over in a dream are not ten real years; that the swallowing of certain +drugs may be followed by the illusion of the lapse of vast spaces of +time, when really very little time has elapsed. What is this _real_ time? + +It is nothing else than the order of the changes which take place or may +take place in real things. In the last chapter I spoke of space as the +"form" of the real world; it would be better to call it _a_ "form" of the +real world, and to give the same name also to time. + +It is very clear that, when we inquire concerning the real time of any +occurrence, or ask how long a series of such lasted, we always look for +our answer to something that has happened in the external world. The +passage of a star over the meridian, the position of the sun above the +horizon, the arc which the moon has described since our last observation, +the movement of the hands of a clock, the amount of sand which has fallen +in the hourglass, these things and such as these are the indicators of +real time. There may be indicators of a different sort; we may decide +that it is noon because we are hungry, or midnight because we are tired; +we may argue that the preacher must have spoken more than an hour because +he quite wore out the patience of the congregation. These are more or +less uncertain signs of the lapse of time, but they cannot be regarded as +experiences of the passing of time either apparent or real. + +Thus, we see that real space and real time are the _plan_ of the world +system. They are not _things_ of any sort, and they should not be +mistaken for things. They are not known independently of things, though, +when we have once had an experience of things and their changes, we can +by abstraction from the things themselves fix our attention upon their +arrangement and upon the order of their changes. We can divide and +subdivide spaces and times without much reference to the things. But we +should never forget that it would never have occurred to us to do this, +indeed, that the whole procedure would be absolutely meaningless to us, +were not a real world revealed in our experience as it is. + +He who has attained to this insight into the nature of time is in a +position to offer what seem to be satisfactory solutions to the problems +which have been brought forward above. + +(1) He can see, thus, why it is absurd to speak of any portion of time as +becoming nonexistent. Time is nothing else than an order, a great system +of relations. One cannot drop out certain of these and leave the rest +unchanged, for the latter imply the former. Day-after-to-morrow would +not be day-after-to-morrow, if to-morrow did not lie between it and +to-day. To speak of dropping out to-morrow and leaving it the time it +was conceived to be is mere nonsense. + +(2) He can see why it does not indicate a measureless conceit for a man +to be willing to say that time is infinite. One who says this need not +be supposed to be acquainted with the whole past and future history of +the real world, of which time is an aspect. We constantly abstract from +things, and consider only the order of their changes, and in this order +itself there is no reason why one should set a limit at some point; +indeed, to set such a limit seems a gratuitous absurdity. He who says +that time is infinite does not say much; he is not affirming the +existence of some sort of a thing; he is merely affirming a theoretical +possibility, and is it not a theoretical possibility that there may be an +endless succession of real changes in a real world? + +(3) It is evident, furthermore, that, when one has grasped firmly the +significance of the distinction between apparent time and real time, one +may with a clear conscience speak of time as infinitely divisible. Of +course, the time directly given in any single experience, the minute or +the second of which we are conscious as it passes, cannot be regarded as +composed of an infinite number of parts. We are not directly conscious +of these subdivisions, and it is a monstrous assumption to maintain that +they must be present in the minute or second as perceived. + +But no such single experience of duration constitutes what we mean by +real time. We have seen that real time is the time occupied by the +changes in real things, and the question is, How far can one go in the +subdivision of this time? + +Now, the touch thing which usually is for us in common life the real +thing is not the real thing for science; it is the appearance under which +the real world of atoms and molecules reveals itself. The atom is not +directly perceivable, and we may assign to its motions a space so small +that no one could possibly perceive it as space, as a something with part +out of part, a something with a here and a there. But, as has been +before pointed out (section 26), this does not prevent us from believing +the atom and the space in which it moves to be real, and we can +_represent_ them to ourselves as we can the things and the spaces with +which we have to do in common life. + +It is with time just as it is with space. We can perceive an inch to +have parts; we cannot perceive a thousandth of an inch to have parts, if +we can perceive it at all; but we can represent it to ourselves as +extended, that is, we can let an experience which is extended stand for +it, and can dwell upon the parts of that. We can perceive a second to +have duration; we cannot perceive a thousandth of a second to have +duration; but we can conceive it as having duration, _i.e._ we can let +some experience of duration stand for it and serve as its representative. + +It is, then, reasonable to speak of the space covered by the vibration of +an atom, and it is equally reasonable to speak of the time taken up by +its vibration. It is not necessary to believe that the duration that we +actually experience as a second must itself be capable of being divided +up into the number of parts indicated by the denominator of the fraction +that we use in indicating such a time, and that each of these parts must +be perceived as duration. + +There is, then, a sense in which we may affirm that time is infinitely +divisible. But we must remember that apparent time--the time presented +in any single experience of duration--is never infinitely divisible; and +that real time, in any save a relative sense of the word, is not a single +experience of duration at all. It is a recognition of the fact that +experiences of duration may be substituted for each other without +assignable limit. + +(4) But what shall we say to the last problem--to the question how we can +be conscious of time at all, when the parts of time are all successive? +How can we even have a consciousness of "crude" time, of apparent time, +of duration in any sense of the word, when duration must be made up of +moments no two of which can exist together and no one of which alone can +constitute time? The past is not now, the future is not yet, the present +is a mere point, as we are told, and cannot have parts. If we are +conscious of time as past, present, and future, must we not be conscious +of a series as a series when every member of it save one is nonexistent? +Can a man be conscious of the nonexistent? + +The difficulty does seem a serious one, and yet I venture to affirm that, +if we examine it carefully, we shall see that it is a difficulty of our +own devising. The argument quietly makes an assumption--and makes it +gratuitously--with which any consciousness of duration is incompatible, +and then asks us how there can be such a thing as a consciousness of +duration. + +The assumption is that _we can be conscious only of the existent_, and +this, written out a little more at length, reads as follows: _we can be +conscious only of the now existent_, or, in other words _of the present_. +Of course, this determines from the outset that we cannot be conscious of +the past and the future, of duration. + +The past and the future are, to be sure, nonexistent from the point of +view of the present; but it should be remarked as well that the present +is nonexistent from the point of view of the past or the future. If we +are talking of time at all we are talking of that no two parts of which +are simultaneous; it would be absurd to speak of a past that existed +simultaneously with the present, just as it would be absurd to speak of a +present existing simultaneously with the past. But we should not deny to +past, present, and future, respectively, their appropriate existence; nor +is it by any means self-evident that there cannot be a consciousness of +past, present, and future as such. + +We fall in with the assumption, it seems, because we know very well that +we are not directly conscious of a remote past and a remote future. We +represent these to ourselves by means of some proxy--we have present +memories of times long past and present anticipations of what will be in +the time to come. Moreover, we use the word "present" very loosely; we +say the present year, the present day, the present hour, the present +minute, or the present second. When we use the word thus loosely, there +seems no reason for believing that there should be such a thing as a +direct consciousness that extends beyond the present. It appears +reasonable to say: No one can be conscious save of the present. + +It should be remembered, however, that the generous present of common +discourse is by no means identical with the ideal point between past and +future dealt with in the argument under discussion. We all say: I now +see that the cloud is moving; I now see that the snow is falling. But +there can be no moving, no falling, no change, in the timeless "now" with +which we have been concerned. Is there any evidence whatever that we are +shut up, for all our immediate knowledge, to such a "now"? There is none +whatever. + +The fact is that this timeless "now" is a product of reflective thought +and not a something of which we are directly conscious. It is an ideal +point in the real time of which this chapter has treated, the time that +is in a certain sense infinitely divisible. It is first cousin to the +ideal mathematical point, the mere limit between two lines, a something +not perceptible to any sense. We have a tendency to carry over to it +what we recognize to be true of the very different present of common +discourse, a present which we distinguish from past and future in a +somewhat loose way, but a present in which there certainly is the +consciousness of change, of duration. And when we do this, we dig for +ourselves a pit into which we proceed to fall. + +We may, then, conclude that we are directly conscious of more than the +present, in the sense in which Augustine used the word. We are conscious +of _time_, of "crude" time, and from this we can pass to a knowledge of +real time, and can determine its parts with precision. + + +[1] Book XI, Chapters 14 and 15. + + + + +III. PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE MIND + + +CHAPTER VIII + +WHAT IS THE MIND? + +30. PRIMITIVE NOTIONS OF MIND.--The soul or mind, that something to +which we refer sensations and ideas of all sorts, is an object that men +do not seem to know very clearly and definitely, though they feel so +sure of its existence that they regard it as the height of folly to +call it in question. That he has a mind, no man doubts; what his mind +is, he may be quite unable to say. + +We have seen (section 7) that children, when quite young, can hardly be +said to recognize that they have minds at all. This does not mean that +what is mental is not given in their experience. They know that they +must open their eyes to see things, and must lay their hands upon them +to feel them; they have had pains and pleasures, memories and fancies. +In short, they have within their reach all the materials needed in +framing a conception of the mind, and in drawing clearly the +distinction between their minds and external things. Nevertheless, +they are incapable of using these materials; their attention is +engrossed with what is physical,--with their own bodies and the bodies +of others, with the things that they can eat, with the toys with which +they can play, and the like. It is only later that there emerges even +a tolerably clear conception of a self or mind different from the +physical and contrasted with it. + +Primitive man is almost as material in his thinking as is the young +child. Of this we have traces in many of the words which have come to +be applied to the mind. Our word "spirit" is from the Latin +_spiritus_, originally a breeze. The Latin word for the soul, the word +used by the great philosophers all through the Middle Ages, _anima_ +(Greek, anemos), has the same significance. In the Greek New +Testament, the word used for spirit (pneuma) carries a similar +suggestion. When we are told in the Book of Genesis that "man became a +living soul," we may read the word literally "a breath." + +What more natural than that the man who is just awakening to a +consciousness of that elusive entity the mind should confuse it with +that breath which is the most striking outward and visible sign that +distinguishes a living man from a dead one? + +That those who first tried to give some scientific account of the soul +or mind conceived it as a material thing, and that it was sufficiently +common to identify it with the breath, we know from direct evidence. A +glance at the Greek philosophy, to which we owe so much that is of +value in our intellectual life, is sufficient to disclose how difficult +it was for thinking men to attain to a higher conception. + +Thus, Anaximenes of Miletus, who lived in the sixth century before +Christ, says that "our soul, which is air, rules us." A little later, +Heraclitus, a man much admired for the depth of his reflections, +maintains that the soul is a fiery vapor, evidently identifying it with +the warm breath of the living creature. In the fifth century, B.C., +Anaxagoras, who accounts for the ordering of the elements into a system +of things by referring to the activity of Mind or Reason, calls mind +"the finest of things," and it seems clear that he did not conceive of +it as very different in nature from the other elements which enter into +the constitution of the world. + +Democritus of Abdera (between 460 and 360 B.C.), that great +investigator of nature and brilliant writer, developed a materialistic +doctrine that admits the existence of nothing save atoms and empty +space. He conceived the soul to consist of fine, smooth, round atoms, +which are also atoms of fire. These atoms are distributed through the +whole body, but function differently in different places--in the brain +they give us thought, in the heart, anger, and in the liver, desire. +Life lasts just so long as we breathe in and breathe out such atoms. + +The doctrine of Democritus was taken up by Epicurus, who founded his +school three hundred years before Christ--a school which lived and +prospered for a very long time. Those who are interested in seeing how +a materialistic psychology can be carried out in detail by an ingenious +mind should read the curious account of the mind presented in his great +poem, "On Nature," by the Roman poet Lucretius, an ardent Epicurean, +who wrote in the first century B.C. + +The school which we commonly think of contrasting with the Epicurean, +and one which was founded at about the same time, is that of the +Stoics. Certainly the Stoics differed in many things from the +Epicureans; their view of the world, and of the life of man, was a much +nobler one; but they were uncompromising materialists, nevertheless, +and identified the soul with the warm breath that animates man. + +31. THE MIND AS IMMATERIAL.--It is scarcely too much to say that the +Greek philosophy as a whole impresses the modern mind as representing +the thought of a people to whom it was not unnatural to think of the +mind as being a breath, a fire, a collection of atoms, a something +material. To be sure, we cannot accuse those twin stars that must ever +remain the glory of literature and science, Plato and Aristotle, of +being materialists. Plato (427-347, B.C.) distributes, it is true, the +three-fold soul, which he allows man, in various parts of the human +body, in a way that at least suggests the Democritean distribution of +mind-atoms. The lowest soul is confined beneath the diaphragm; the one +next in rank has its seat in the chest; and the highest, the rational +soul, is enthroned in the head. However, he has said quite enough +about this last to indicate clearly that he conceived it to be free +from all taint of materiality. + +As for Aristotle (384-322, B.C.), who also distinguished between the +lower psychical functions and the higher, we find him sometimes +speaking of soul and body in such a way as to lead men to ask +themselves whether he is really speaking of two things at all; but when +he specifically treats of the _nous_ or reason, he insists upon its +complete detachment from everything material. Man's reason is not +subjected to the fate of the lower psychical functions, which, as the +"form" of the body, perish with the body; it enters from without, and +it endures after the body has passed away. It is interesting to note, +however, an occasional lapse even in Aristotle. When he comes to speak +of the relation to the world of the Divine Mind, the First Cause of +Motion, which he conceives as pure Reason, he represents it as +_touching_ the world, although it remains itself _untouched_. We seem +to find here just a flavor--an inconsistent one--of the material. + +Such reflections as those of Plato and Aristotle bore fruit in later +ages. When we come down to Plotinus the Neo-Platonist (204-269, A.D.), +we have left the conception of the soul as a warm breath, or as +composed of fine round atoms, far behind. It has become curiously +abstract and incomprehensible. It is described as an immaterial +substance This substance is, in a sense, in the body, or, at least, it +is present to the body. But it is not in the body as material things +are in this place or in that. _It is as a whole in the whole body, and +it is as a whole in every part of the body_. Thus the soul may be +regarded as divisible, since it is distributed throughout the body; but +it must also be regarded as indivisible, since it is wholly in every +part. + +Let the man to whom such sentences as these mean anything rejoice in +the meaning that he is able to read into them! If he can go as far as +Plotinus, perhaps he can go as far as Cassiodorus (477-570, A.D.), and +maintain that the soul is not merely as a whole in every part of the +body, but is wholly in each of its own parts. + +Upon reading such statements one's first impulse is to exclaim: How is +it possible that men of sense should be led to speak in this +irresponsible way? and when they do speak thus, is it conceivable that +other men should seriously occupy themselves with what they say? + +But if one has the historic sense, and knows something of the setting +in which such doctrines come to the birth, one cannot regard it as +remarkable that men of sense should urge them. No one coins them +independently out of his own brain; little by little men are impelled +along the path that leads to such conclusions. Plotinus was a careful +student of the philosophers that preceded him. He saw that mind must +be distinguished from matter, and he saw that what is given a location +in space, in the usual sense of the words, is treated like a material +thing. On the other hand, he had the common experience that we all +have of a relation between mind and body. How do justice to this +relation, and yet not materialize mind? + +What he tried to do is clear, and it seems equally clear that he had +good reason for trying to do it. But it appears to us now that what he +actually did was to make of the mind or soul a something very like an +inconsistent bit of matter, that is somehow in space, and yet not +exactly in space, a something that can be in two places at once, a +logical monstrosity. That his doctrine did not meet with instant +rejection was due to the fact, already alluded to, that our experience +of the mind is something rather dim and elusive. It is not easy for a +man to say what it is, and, hence, it is not easy for a man to say what +it is not. + +The doctrine of Plotinus passed over to Saint Augustine, and from him +it passed to the philosophers of the Middle Ages. How extremely +difficult it has been for the world to get away from it at all, is made +clearly evident in the writings of that remarkable man Descartes. + +Descartes wrote in the seventeenth century. The long sleep of the +Middle Ages was past, and the several sciences had sprung into a +vigorous and independent life. It was not enough for Descartes to +describe the relation of mind and body in the loose terms that had +prevailed up to his time. He had made a careful study of anatomy, and +he realized that the brain is a central organ to which messages are +carried by the nerves from all parts of the body. He knew that an +injury to the nerve might prevent the receipt of a message, _i.e._ he +knew that a conscious sensation did not come into being until something +happened in the brain. + +Nor was he content merely to refer the mind to the brain in a general +way. He found the "little pineal gland" in the midst of the brain to +be in what he regarded as an admirable position to serve as the seat of +the soul. To this convenient little central office he relegated it; +and he describes in a way that may to-day well provoke a smile the +movements that the soul imparts to the pineal gland, making it incline +itself in this direction and in that, and making it push the "animal +spirits," the fluid contained in the cavities of the brain, towards +various "pores." + +Thus he writes:[1] "Let us, then, conceive of the soul as having her +chief seat in the little gland that is in the middle of the brain, +whence she radiates to all the rest of the body by means of the +spirits, the nerves, and even the blood, which, participating in the +impressions of the spirits, can carry them through the arteries to all +the members." And again: "Thus, when the soul wills to call anything +to remembrance, this volition brings it about that the gland, inclining +itself successively in different directions, pushes the spirits towards +divers parts of the brain, until they find the part which has the +traces that the object which one wishes to recollect has left there." + +We must admit that Descartes' scientific studies led him to make this +mind that sits in the little pineal gland something very material. It +is spoken of as though it pushed the gland about; it is affected by the +motions of the gland, as though it were a bit of matter. It seems to +be a less inconsistent thing than the "all in the whole body" soul of +Plotinus; but it appears to have purchased its comprehensibility at the +expense of its immateriality. + +Shall we say that Descartes frankly repudiated the doctrine that had +obtained for so many centuries? We cannot say that; he still held to +it. But how could he? The reader has perhaps remarked above that he +speaks of the soul as having her _chief_ seat in the pineal gland. It +seems odd that he should do so, but he still held, even after he had +come to his definite conclusions as to the soul's seat, to the ancient +doctrine that the soul is united to all the parts of the body +"conjointly." He could not wholly repudiate a venerable tradition. + +We have seen, thus, that men first conceived of the mind as material +and later came to rebel against such a conception. But we have seen, +also, that the attempt to conceive it as immaterial was not wholly +successful. It resulted in a something that we may describe as +inconsistently material rather than as not material at all. + +32. MODERN COMMON SENSE NOTIONS OF THE MIND.--Under this heading I mean +to sum up the opinions as to the nature of the mind usually held by the +intelligent persons about us to-day who make no claim to be regarded as +philosophers. Is it not true that a great many of them believe:-- + +(1) That the mind is in the body? + +(2) That it acts and reacts with matter? + +(3) That it is a substance with attributes? + +(4) That it is nonextended and immaterial? + +I must remark at the outset that this collection of opinions is by no +means something gathered by the plain man from his own experience. +These opinions are the echoes of old philosophies. They are a heritage +from the past, and have become the common property of all intelligent +persons who are even moderately well-educated. Their sources have been +indicated in the preceding sections; but most persons who cherish them +have no idea of their origin. + +Men are apt to suppose that these opinions seem reasonable to them +merely for the reason that they find in their own experience evidence +of their truth. But this is not so. + +Have we not seen above how long it took men to discover that they must +not think of the mind as being a breath, or a flame, or a collection of +material atoms? The men who erred in this way were abler than most of +us can pretend to be, and they gave much thought to the matter. And +when at last it came to be realized that mind must not thus be +conceived as material, those who endeavored to conceive it as something +else gave, after their best efforts, a very queer account of it indeed. + +Is it in the face of such facts reasonable to suppose that our friends +and acquaintances, who strike us as having reflective powers in nowise +remarkable, have independently arrived at the conception that the mind +is a nonextended and immaterial substance? Surely they have not +thought all this out for themselves. They have taken up and +appropriated unconsciously notions which were in the air, so to speak. +They have inherited their doctrines, not created them. It is well to +remember this, for it may make us the more willing to take up and +examine impartially what we have uncritically turned into articles of +belief. + +The first two articles, namely, that the mind is in the body and that +it acts upon, and is acted upon by, material things, I shall discuss at +length in the next chapter. Here I pause only to point out that the +plain man does not put the mind into the body quite unequivocally. I +think it would surprise him to be told that a line might be drawn +through two heads in such a way as to transfix two minds. And I +remark, further, that he has no clear idea of what it means for mind to +act upon body or body to act upon mind. How does an immaterial thing +set a material thing in motion? Can it touch it? Can it push it? +Then what does it do? + +But let us pass on to the last two articles of faith mentioned above. + +We all draw the distinction between _substance_ and its _attributes_ or +_qualities_. The distinction was remarked and discussed many centuries +ago, and much has been written upon it. I take up the ruler on my +desk; it is recognized at once as a bit of wood. How? It has such and +such qualities. My paper-knife is of silver. How do I know it? It +has certain other qualities. I speak of my mind. How do I know that I +have a mind? I have sensations and ideas. If I experienced no mental +phenomena of any sort, evidence of the existence of a mind would be +lacking. + +Now, whether I am concerned with the ruler, with the paper-knife, or +with the mind, have I direct evidence of the existence of anything more +than the whole group of qualities? Do I ever perceive the substance? + +In the older philosophy, the substance (_substantia_) was conceived to +be a something not directly perceived, but only inferred to exist--a +something underlying the qualities of things and, as it were, holding +them together. It was believed in by philosophers who were quite ready +to admit that they could not tell anything about it. For example, John +Locke (1632-1704), the English philosopher, holds to it stoutly, and +yet describes it as a mere "we know not what," whose function it is to +hold together the bundles of qualities that constitute the things we +know. + +In the modern philosophy men still distinguish between substance and +qualities. It is a useful distinction, and we could scarcely get on +without it. But an increasing number of thoughtful persons repudiate +the old notion of substance altogether. + +We may, they say, understand by the word "substance" the whole group of +qualities _as a group_--not merely the qualities that are revealed at a +given time, but all those that we have reason to believe a fuller +knowledge would reveal. In short, we may understand by it just what is +left when the "we know not what" of the Lockian has been discarded. + +This notion of substance we may call the more modern one; yet we can +hardly say that it is the notion of the plain man. He does not make +very clear to himself just what is in his thought, but I think we do +him no injustice in maintaining that he is something of a Lockian, even +if he has never heard of Locke. The Lockian substance is, as the +reader has seen, a sort of "unknowable." + +And now for the doctrine that the mind is nonextended and immaterial. +With these affirmations we may heartily agree; but we must admit that +the plain man enunciates them without having a very definite idea of +what the mind is. + +He regards as in his mind all his sensations and ideas, all his +perceptions and mental images of things. Now, suppose I close my eyes +and picture to myself a barber's pole. Where is the image? We say, in +the mind. Is it extended? We feel impelled to answer, No. But it +certainly _seems_ to be extended; the white and the red upon it appear +undeniably side by side. May I assert that this mental image has no +extension whatever? Must I deny to it _parts_, or assert that its +parts are not side by side? + +It seems odd to maintain that a something as devoid of parts as is a +mathematical point should yet appear to have parts and to be extended. +On the other hand, if we allow the image to be extended, how can we +refer it to a nonextended mind? + +To such questions as these, I do not think that the plain man has an +answer. That they can be answered, I shall try to show in the last +section of this chapter. But one cannot answer them until one has +attained to rather a clear conception of what is meant by the mind. + +And until one has attained to such a conception, the statement that the +mind is immaterial must remain rather vague and indefinite. As we saw +above, even the Plotinic soul was inconsistently material rather than +immaterial. It was not excluded from space; it was referred to space +in an absurd way. The mind as common sense conceives it, is the +successor of this Plotinic soul, and seems to keep a flavor of what is +material after all. This will come out in the next chapter, where we +shall discuss mind and body. + +33. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE MIND.--When we ask how the psychologist +conceives of the mind, we must not forget that psychologists are many +and that they differ more or less from each other in their opinions. +When we say "the psychologist" believes this or that, we mean usually +no more than that the opinion referred to is prevalent among men of +that class, or that it is the opinion of those whom we regard as its +more enlightened members. + +Taking the words in this somewhat loose sense, I shall ask what the +psychologist's opinion is touching the four points set forth in the +preceding section. How far does he agree with the plain man? + +(1) There can be no doubt that he refers the mind to the body in some +way, although he may shake his head over the use of the word "in." + +(2) As to whether the mind acts and reacts with matter, in any sense of +the words analogous to that in which they are commonly used, there is a +division in the camp. Some affirm such interaction; some deny it. The +matter will be discussed in the next chapter. + +(3) The psychologist--the more modern one--inclines to repudiate any +substance or substratum of the sort accepted in the Middle Ages and +believed in by many men now. To him the mind is the whole complex of +mental phenomena in their interrelations. In other words, the mind is +not an unknown and indescribable something that is merely inferred; it +is something revealed in consciousness and open to observation. + +(4) The psychologist is certainly not inclined to regard the mind or +any idea belonging to it as material or as extended. But he does +recognize implicitly, if not explicitly, that ideas are composite. To +him, as to the plain man, the image held in the memory or imagination +_seems_ to be extended, and he can distinguish its parts. He does not +do much towards clearing away the difficulty alluded to at the close of +the last section. It remains for the metaphysician to do what he can +with it, and to him we must turn if we wish light upon this obscure +subject. + +34. THE METAPHYSICIAN AND THE MIND.--I have reserved for the next +chapter the first two points mentioned as belonging to the plain man's +doctrine of the mind. In what sense the mind may be said to be in the +body, and how it may be conceived to be related to the body, are topics +that deserve to be treated by themselves in a chapter on "Mind and +Body." Here I shall consider what the metaphysician has to say about +the mind as substance, and about the mind as nonextended and immaterial. + +It has been said that the Lockian substance is really an "unknowable." +No one pretends to have experience of it; it is revealed to no sense; +it is, indeed, a name for a mere nothing, for when we abstract from a +thing, in thought, every single quality, we find that there is left to +us nothing whatever. + +We cannot say that the substance, in this sense of the word, is the +_reality_ of which the qualities are _appearances_. In Chapter V we +saw just what we may legitimately mean by realities and appearances, +and it was made clear that an unknowable of any sort cannot possibly be +the reality to which this or that appearance is referred. Appearances +and realities are experiences which are observed to be related in +certain ways. That which is not open to observation at all, that of +which we have, and can have, no experience, we have no reason to call +the reality of anything. We have, in truth, no reason to talk about it +at all, for we know nothing whatever about it; and when we do talk +about it, it is because we are laboring under a delusion. + +This is equally true whether we are concerned with the substance of +material things or with the substance of minds. An "unknowable" is an +"unknowable" in any case, and we may simply discard it. We lose +nothing by so doing, for one cannot lose what one has never had, and +what, by hypothesis, one can never have. The loss of a mere word +should occasion us no regret. + +Now, we have seen that we do not lose the world of real material things +in rejecting the "Unknowable" (Chapter V). The things are complexes of +qualities, of physical phenomena; and the more we know about these, the +more do we know about real things. + +But we have also seen (Chapter IV) that physical phenomena are not the +only phenomena of which we have experience. We are conscious of mental +phenomena as well, of the phenomena of the subjective order, of +sensations and ideas. Why not admit that these _constitute_ the mind, +as physical phenomena constitute the things which belong to the +external world? + +He who says this says no more than that the mind is known and is +knowable. It is what it is perceived to be; and the more we know of +mental phenomena, the more do we know of the mind. Shall we call the +mind as thus known a _substance_? That depends on the significance +which we give to this word. It is better, perhaps, to avoid it, for it +is fatally easy to slip into the old use of the word, and then to say, +as men have said, that we do not know the mind as it is, but only as it +appears to us to be--that we do not know the reality, but only its +appearances. + +And if we keep clearly before us the view of the mind which I am +advocating, we shall find an easy way out of the difficulties that seem +to confront us when we consider it as nonextended and immaterial. + +Certain complexes of mental phenomena--for example, the barber's pole +above alluded to--certainly appear to be extended. Are they really +extended? If I imagine a tree a hundred feet high, is it really a +hundred feet high? Has it any real size at all? + +Our problem melts away when we realize what we mean by this "real +size." In Chapter V, I have distinguished between apparent space and +real space. Real space is, as was pointed out, the "plan" of the real +physical world. To occupy any portion of real space, a thing must be a +real external thing; that is, the experiences constituting it must +belong to the objective order, they must not be of the class called +mental. We all recognize this, in a way. We know that a real material +foot rule cannot be applied to an imaginary tree. We say, How big did +the tree seen in a dream _seem_; we do not say, How big was it +_really_? If we did ask such a question, we should be puzzled to know +where to look for an answer. + +And this for a very good reason. He who asks: How big was that +imaginary tree really? asks, in effect: How much real space did the +unreal tree fill? The question is a foolish one. It assumes that +phenomena not in the objective order are in the objective order. As +well ask how a color smells or how a sound looks. When we are dealing +with the material we are not dealing with the mental, and we must never +forget this. + +The tree imagined or seen in a dream seems extended. Its extension is +_apparent_ extension, and this apparent extension has no place in the +external world whatever. But we must not confound this apparent +extension with a real mathematical point, and call the tree nonextended +in this sense. If we do this we are still in the old error--we have +not gotten away from real space, but have substituted position in that +space for extension in that space. Nothing mental can have even a +position in real space. To do that it would have to be a real thing in +the sense indicated. + +Let us, then, agree with the plain man in affirming that the mind is +nonextended, but let us avoid misconception. The mind is constituted +of experiences of the subjective order. None of these are in +space--real space. But some of them have apparent extension, and we +must not overlook all that this implies. + +Now for the mind as immaterial. We need not delay long over this +point. If we mean by the mind the phenomena of the subjective order, +and by what is material the phenomena of the objective order, surely we +may and must say that the mind is immaterial. The two classes of +phenomena separate themselves out at once. + + +[1] "The Passions," Articles 34 and 42. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +MIND AND BODY + +35. IS THE MIND IN THE BODY?--There was a time, as we have seen in the +last chapter (section 30), when it did not seem at all out of the way +to think of the mind as in the body, and very literally in the body. +He who believes the mind to be a breath, or a something composed of +material atoms, can conceive it as being in the body as unequivocally +as chairs can be in a room. Breath can be inhaled and exhaled; atoms +can be in the head, or in the chest, or the heart, or anywhere else in +the animal economy. There is nothing dubious about this sense of the +preposition "in." + +But we have also seen (section 31) that, as soon as men began to +realize that the mind is not material, the question of its presence in +the body became a serious problem. If I say that a chair is in a room, +I say what is comprehensible to every one. It is assumed that it is in +a particular place in the room and is not in some other place. If, +however, I say that the chair is, as a whole, in every part of the room +at once, I seem to talk nonsense. This is what Plotinus and those who +came after him said about the mind. Are their statements any the less +nonsensical because they are talking about minds? When one speaks +about things mental, one must not take leave of good sense and utter +unmeaning phrases. + +If minds are enough like material things to be in anything, they must +be in things in some intelligible sense of the word. It will not do to +say: I use the word "in," but I do not really mean _in_. If the +meaning has disappeared, why continue to use the word? It can only +lead to mystification. + +Descartes seemed to come back to something like an intelligible meaning +when he put the mind in the pineal gland in the brain. Yet, as we have +seen, he clung to the old conception. He could not go back to the +frank materialization of mind. + +And the plain man to-day labors under the same difficulty. He puts the +mind in the body, in the brain, but he does not put it there frankly +and unequivocally. It is in the brain and yet not exactly in the +brain. Let us see if this is not the case. + +If we ask him: Does the man who wags his head move his mind about? does +he who mounts a step raise his mind some inches? does he who sits down +on a chair lower his mind? I think we shall find that he hesitates in +his answers. And if we go on to say: Could a line be so drawn as to +pass through your image of me and my image of you, and to measure their +distance from one another? I think he will say, No. He does not +regard minds and their ideas as existing in space in this fashion. + +Furthermore, it would not strike the plain man as absurd if we said to +him: Were our senses far more acute than they are, it is conceivable +that we should be able to perceive every atom in a given human body, +and all its motions. But would he be willing to admit that an increase +in the sharpness of sense would reveal to us directly the mind +connected with such a body? It is not, then, in the body as the atoms +are. It cannot be seen or touched under any conceivable circumstances. +What can it mean, hence, to say that it is _there_? Evidently, the +word is used in a peculiar sense, and the plain man cannot help us to a +clear understanding of it. + +His position becomes intelligible to us when we realize that he has +inherited the doctrine that the mind is immaterial, and that he +struggles, at the same time, with the tendency so natural to man to +conceive it after the analogy of things material. He thinks of it as +in the body, and, nevertheless, tries to dematerialize this "in." His +thought is sufficiently vague, and is inconsistent, as might be +expected. + +If we will bear in mind what was said in the closing section of the +last chapter, we can help him over his difficulty. That mind and body +are related there can be no doubt. But should we use the word "in" to +express this relation? + +The body is a certain group of phenomena in the objective order; that +is, it is a part of the external world. The mind consists of +experiences in the subjective order. We have seen that no mental +phenomenon can occupy space--real space, the space of the external +world--and that it cannot even have a position in space (section 34). +As mental, it is excluded from the objective order altogether. The +mind is not, then, strictly speaking, _in_ the body, although it is +related to it. It remains, of course, to ask ourselves how we ought to +conceive the relation. This we shall do later in the present chapter. + +But, it may be said, it would sound odd to deny that the mind is in the +body. Does not every one use the expression? What can we substitute +for it? I answer: If it is convenient to use the expression let us +continue to do so. Men must talk so as to be understood. But let us +not perpetuate error, and, as occasion demands it, let us make clear to +ourselves and to others what we have a right to understand by this _in_ +when we use it. + +36. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INTERACTIONIST.--There is no man who does not +know that his mind is related to his body as it is not to other +material things. We open our eyes, and we see things; we stretch out +our hand, and we feel them; our body receives a blow, and we feel pain; +we wish to move, and the muscles are set in motion. + +These things are matters of common experience. We all perceive, in +other words, that there is an interaction, in some sense of the term, +between mind and body. + +But it is important to realize that one may be quite well aware of all +such facts, and yet may have very vague notions of what one means by +body and by mind, and may have no definite theory at all of the sort of +relation that obtains between them. The philosopher tries to attain to +a clearer conception of these things. His task, be it remembered, is +to analyze and explain, not to deny, the experiences which are the +common property of mankind. + +In the present day the two theories of the relation of mind and body +that divide the field between them and stand opposed to each other are +_interactionism_ and _parallelism_. I have used the word "interaction" +a little above in a loose sense to indicate our common experience of +the fact that we become conscious of certain changes brought about in +our body, and that our purposes realize themselves in action. But +every one who accepts this fact is not necessarily an interactionist. +The latter is a man who holds a certain more or less definite theory as +to what is implied by the fact. Let us take a look at his doctrine. + +Physical things interact. A billiard ball in motion strikes one which +has been at rest; the former loses its motion, the latter begins to +roll away. We explain the occurrence by a reference to the laws of +mechanics; that is to say, we point out that it is merely an instance +of the uniform behavior of matter in motion under such and such +circumstances. We distinguish between the state of things at one +instant and the state of things at the next, and we call the former +_cause_ and the latter _effect_. + +It should be observed that both cause and effect here belong to the one +order, the objective order. They have their place in the external +world. Both the balls are material things; their motion, and the space +in which they move, are aspects of the external world. + +If the balls did not exist in the same space, if the motion of the one +could not be towards or away from the other, if contact were +impossible, we would manifestly have no interaction _in the sense of +the word employed above_. As it is, the interaction of physical things +is something that we can describe with a good deal of definiteness. +Things interact in that they stand in certain physical relations, and +undergo changes of relations according to certain laws. + +Now, to one who conceives the mind in a grossly material way, the +relation of mind and body can scarcely seem to be a peculiar problem, +different from the problem of the relation of one physical thing to +another. If my mind consists of atoms disseminated through my body, +its presence in the body appears as unequivocal as the presence of a +dinner in a man who has just risen from the table. Nor can the +interaction of mind and matter present any unusual difficulties, for +mind is matter. Atoms may be conceived to approach each other, to +clash, to rearrange themselves. Interaction of mind and body is +nothing else than an interaction of bodies. One is not forced to give +a new meaning to the word. + +When, however, one begins to think of the mind as immaterial, the case +is very different. How shall we conceive an immaterial thing to be +related to a material one? + +Descartes placed the mind in the pineal gland, and in so far he seemed +to make its relation to the gland similar to that between two material +things. When he tells us that the soul brings it about that the gland +bends in different directions, we incline to view the occurrence as +very natural--is not the soul in the gland? + +But, on the other hand, Descartes also taught that the essence of mind +is _thought_ and the essence of body is _extension_. He made the two +natures so different from each other that men began to ask themselves +how the two things could interact at all. The mind wills, said one +philosopher, but that volition does not set matter in motion; when the +mind wills, God brings about the appropriate change in material things. +The mind perceives things, said another, but that is not because they +affect it directly; it sees things in God. Ideas and things, said a +third, constitute two independent series; no idea can cause a change in +things, and no thing can cause a change in ideas. + +The interactionist is a man who refuses to take any such turn as these +philosophers. His doctrine is much nearer to that of Descartes than it +is to any of theirs. He uses the one word "interaction" to describe +the relation between material things and also the relation between mind +and body, nor does he dwell upon the difference between the two. He +insists that mind and matter stand in the one causal nexus; that a +change in the outside world may be the _cause_ of a perception coming +into being in a mind, and that a volition may be the _cause_ of changes +in matter. + +What shall we call the plain man? I think we may call him an +interactionist in embryo. The stick in his hand knocks an apple off of +the tree; his hand seems to him to be set in motion because he wills +it. The relation between his volition and the motion of his hand +appears to him to be of much the same sort as that between the motion +of the stick and the fall of the apple. In each case he thinks he has +to do with the relation of cause and effect. + +The opponent of the interactionist insists, however, that the plain man +is satisfied with this view of the matter only because he has not +completely stripped off the tendency to conceive the mind as a material +thing. And he accuses the interactionist of having fallen a prey to +the same weakness. + +Certainly, it is not difficult to show that the interactionists write +as though the mind were material, and could be somewhere in space. The +late Dr. McCosh fairly represents the thought of many, and he was +capable of expressing himself as follows;[1] "It may be difficult to +ascertain the exact point or surface at which the mind and body come +together and influence each other, in particular, how far into the body +(Descartes without proof thought it to be in the pineal gland), but it +is certain, that when they do meet mind knows body as having its +essential properties of extension and resisting energy." + +How can an immaterial thing be located at some point or surface within +the body? How can a material thing and an immaterial thing "come +together" at a point or surface? And if they cannot come together, +what have we in mind when we say they interact? + +The parallelist, for it is he who opposes interactionism, insists that +we must not forget that mental phenomena do not belong to the same +order as physical phenomena. He points out that, when we make the word +"interaction" cover the relations of mental phenomena to physical +phenomena as well as the relations of the latter to each other, we are +assimilating heedlessly facts of two different kinds and are +obliterating an important distinction. He makes the same objection to +calling the relations between mental phenomena and physical phenomena +_causal_. If the relation of a volition to the movement of the arm is +not the same as that of a physical cause to its physical effect, why, +he argues, do you disguise the difference by calling them by the same +name? + +37. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PARALLELIST.--Thus, the parallelist is a man +who is so impressed by the gulf between physical facts and mental facts +that he refuses to regard them as parts of the one order of causes and +effects. You cannot, he claims, make a single chain out of links so +diverse. + +Some part of a human body receives a blow; a message is carried along a +sensory nerve and reaches the brain; from the brain a message is sent +out along a motor nerve to a group of muscles; the muscles contract, +and a limb is set in motion. The immediate effects of the blow, the +ingoing message, the changes in the brain, the outgoing message, the +contraction of the muscles--all these are physical facts. One and all +may be described as motions in matter. + +But the man who received the blow becomes conscious that he was struck, +and both interactionist and parallelist regard him as becoming +conscious of it when the incoming message reaches some part of the +brain. What shall be done with this consciousness? The interactionist +insists that it must be regarded as a link in the physical chain of +causes and effects--he breaks the chain to insert it. The parallelist +maintains that it is inconceivable that such an insertion should be +made. He regards the physical series as complete in itself, and he +places the consciousness, as it were, on a _parallel_ line. + +It must not be supposed that he takes this figure literally. It is his +effort to avoid materializing the mind that forces him to hold the +position which he does. To put the mind in the brain is to make of it +a material thing; to make it parallel to the brain, in the literal +sense of the word, would be just as bad. All that we may understand +him to mean is that mental phenomena and physical, although they are +related, cannot be built into the one series of causes and effects. He +is apt to speak of them as _concomitant_. + +We must not forget that neither parallelist nor interactionist ever +dreams of repudiating our common experiences of the relations of mental +phenomena and physical. Neither one will, if he is a man of sense, +abandon the usual ways of describing such experiences. Whatever his +theory, he will still say: I am suffering because I struck my hand +against that table; I sat down because I chose to do so. His doctrine +is not supposed to deny the truth contained in such statements; it is +supposed only to give a fuller understanding of it. Hence, we cannot +condemn either doctrine simply by an uncritical appeal to such +statements and to the experiences they represent. We must look much +deeper. + +Now, what can the parallelist mean by _referring_ sensations and ideas +to the brain and yet denying that they are _in_ the brain? What is +this reference? + +Let us come back to the experiences of the physical and the mental as +they present themselves to the plain man. They have been discussed at +length in Chapter IV. It was there pointed out that every one +distinguishes without difficulty between sensations and things, and +that every one recognizes explicitly or implicitly that a sensation is +an experience referred in a certain way to the body. + +When the eyes are open, we _see_; when the ears are open, we _hear_; +when the hand is laid on things, we _feel_. How do we know that we are +experiencing sensations? The setting tells us that. The experience in +question is given together with an experience of the body. This is +_concomitance of the mental and the physical_ as it appears in the +experience of us all; and from such experiences as these the +philosopher who speaks of the concomitance of physical and mental +phenomena must draw the whole meaning of the word. + +Let us here sharpen a little the distinction between sensations and +things. Standing at some distance from the tree, I see an apple fall +to the ground. Were I only half as far away, my experience would not +be exactly the same--I should have somewhat different sensations. As +we have seen (section 17), the apparent sizes of things vary as we +move, and this means that the quantity of sensation, when I observe the +apple from a nearer point, is greater. The man of science tells me +that the image which the object looked at projects upon the retina of +the eye grows larger as we approach objects. The thing, then, may +remain unchanged; our sensations will vary according to the impression +which is made upon our body. + +Again. When I have learned something of physics, I am ready to admit +that, although light travels with almost inconceivable rapidity, still, +its journey through space does take time. Hence the impression made +upon my eye by the falling apple is not simultaneous with the fall +itself; and if I stand far away it is made a little later than when I +am near. In the case in point the difference is so slight as to pass +unnoticed, but there are cases in which it seems apparent even to the +unlearned that sensations arise later than the occurrences of which we +take them to be the report. + +Thus, I stand on a hill and watch a laborer striking with his sledge +upon the distant railway. I hear the sound of the blow while I see his +tool raised above his head. I account for this by saying that it has +taken some time for the sound-waves to reach my ear, and I regard my +sensation as arising only when this has been accomplished. + +But this conclusion is not judged sufficiently accurate by the man of +science. The investigations of the physiologist and the psychologist +have revealed that the brain holds a peculiar place in the economy of +the body. If the nerve which connects the sense organ with the brain +be severed, the sensation does not arise. Injuries to the brain affect +the mental life as injuries to other parts of the body do not. Hence, +it is concluded that, to get the real time of the emergence of a +sensation, we must not inquire merely when an impression was made upon +the organ of sense, but must determine when the message sent along the +nerve has reached some part of the brain. The resulting brain change +is regarded as the true concomitant of the sensation. If there is a +brain change of a certain kind, there is the corresponding sensation. +It need hardly be said that no one knows as yet much about the brain +motions which are supposed to be concomitants of sensations, although a +good deal is said about them. + +It is very important to remark that in all this no new meaning has been +given to the word "concomitance." The plain man remarks that +sensations and their changes must be referred to the body. With the +body disposed in a certain way, he has sensations of a certain kind; +with changes in the body, the sensations change. He does not perceive +the sensations to be in the body. As I recede from a house I have a +whole series of visual experiences differing from each other and ending +in a faint speck which bears little resemblance to the experience with +which I started. I have had, as we say, a series of sensations, or +groups of such. Did any single group, did the experience which I had +at any single moment, seem to me to be _in my body_? Surely not. Its +relation to my body is other than that. + +And when the man of science, instead of referring sensations vaguely to +the body, refers them to the brain, the reference is of precisely the +same nature. From our common experience of the relation of the +physical and the mental he starts out. He has no other ground on which +to stand. He can only mark the reference with greater exactitude. + +I have been speaking of the relation of sensations to the brain. It is +scarcely necessary for me to show that all other mental phenomena must +be referred to the brain as well, and that the reference must be of the +same nature. The considerations which lead us to refer ideas to the +brain are set forth in our physiologies and psychologies. The effects +of cerebral disease, injuries to the brain, etc., are too well known to +need mention; and it is palpably as absurd to put ideas in the brain as +it is to put sensations there. + +Now, the parallelist, if he be a wise man, will not attempt to +_explain_ the reference of mental phenomena to the brain--to _explain_ +the relation between mind and matter. The relation appears to be +unique. Certainly it is not identical with the relation between two +material things. We explain things, in the common acceptation of the +word, when we show that a case under consideration is an +exemplification of some general law--when we show, in other words, that +it does not stand alone. But this does stand alone, and is admitted to +stand alone. We admit as much when we say that the mind is immaterial, +and yet hold that it is related to the body. We cannot, then, ask for +an _explanation_ of the relation. + +But this does not mean that the reference of mental phenomena to the +body is a meaningless expression. We can point to those experiences of +concomitance that we all have, distinguish them carefully from +relations of another kind, and say: This is what the word means, +whether it be used by the plain man or by the man of science. + +I have said above: "If there is a brain change of a certain kind, there +is the corresponding sensation." Perhaps the reader will feel inclined +to say here: If you can say as much as this, why can you not go a +little farther and call the brain change the _cause_ of the sensation? + +But he who speaks thus, forgets what has been said above about the +uniqueness of the relation. In the objective order of our experiences, +in the external world, we can distinguish between antecedents and +consequents, between causes and their effects. The causes and their +effects belong to the one order, they stand in the same series. The +relation of the physical to the mental is, as we have seen, a different +relation. Hence, the parallelist seems justified in objecting to the +assimilation of the two. He prefers the word "concomitance," just +because it marks the difference. He does not mean to indicate that the +relation is any the less uniform or dependable when he denies that it +is causal. + +38. IN WHAT SENSE MENTAL PHENOMENA HAVE A TIME AND PLACE.--We have seen +in Chapters VI and VII what space and time--real space and time--are. +They are the plan of the real external world and its changes; they are +aspects of the objective order of experience. + +To this order no mental phenomenon can belong. It cannot, as we have +seen (section 35), occupy any portion of space or even have a location +in space. It is equally true that no series of mental changes can +occupy any portion of time, real time, or even fill a single moment in +the stream of time. There are many persons to whom this latter +statement will seem difficult of acceptance; but the relation of mental +phenomena to space and to time is of the same sort, and we can consider +the two together. + +Psychologists speak unhesitatingly of the localization of sensations in +the brain, and they talk as readily of the moment at which a sensation +arises and of the duration of the sensation. What can they mean by +such expressions? + +We have seen that sensations are not in the brain, and their +localization means only the determination of their concomitant physical +phenomena, of the corresponding brain-change. And it ought to be clear +even from what has been said above that, in determining the moment at +which a sensation arises, we are determining only the time of the +concomitant brain process. Why do we say that a sensation arises later +than the moment at which an impression is made upon the organ of sense +and earlier than the resulting movement of some group of muscles? +Because the change in the brain, to which we refer the sensation, +occurs later than the one and earlier than the other. This has a place +in real time, it belongs to that series of world changes whose +succession constitutes real time. If we ask _when_ anything happened, +we always refer to this series of changes. We try to determine its +place in the world order. + +Thus, we ask: When was Julius Caesar born? We are given a year and a +day. How is the time which has elapsed since measured? By changes in +the physical world, by revolutions of the earth about the sun. We ask: +When did he conceive the plan of writing his Commentaries? If we get +an answer at all, it must be an answer of the same kind--some point in +the series of physical changes which occur in real time must be +indicated. Where else should we look for an answer? In point of fact, +we never do look elsewhere. + +Again. We have distinguished between apparent space and real space +(section 34). We have seen that, when we deny that a mental image can +occupy any portion of space, we need not think of it as losing its +parts and shrivelling to a point. We may still attribute to it +apparent space; may affirm that it seems extended. Let us mark the +same distinction when we consider time. The psychologist speaks of the +duration of a sensation. Has it real duration? It is not in time at +all, and, of course, it cannot, strictly speaking, occupy a portion of +time. But we can try to measure the duration of the physical +concomitant, and call this the real duration of the sensation. + +We all distinguish between the real time of mental phenomena, in the +sense indicated just above, and the apparent time. We know very well +that the one may give us no true measure of the other. A sermon +_seems_ long; was it _really_ long? There is only one way of measuring +its real length. We must refer to the clock, to the sun, to some +change in the physical world. We _seem_ to live years in a dream; was +the dream _really_ a long one? The real length can only be determined, +if at all, by a physical reference. Those apparent years of the dream +have no place in the real time which is measured by the clock. We do +not have to cut it and insert them somewhere. They belong to a +different order, and cannot be inserted any more than the thought of a +patch can be inserted in a rent in a real coat. + +We see, thus, when we reflect upon the matter, that mental phenomena +cannot, strictly speaking, be said to have a time and place. He who +attributes these to them materializes them. But their physical +concomitants have a time and place, and mental phenomena can be +ordered by a reference to these. They can be assigned a time and +place of existing in a special sense of the words not to be confounded +with the sense in which we use them when we speak of the time and place +of material things. This makes it possible to relate every mental +phenomenon to the world system in a definite way, and to distinguish it +clearly from every other, however similar. + +We need not, when we come to understand this, change our usual modes of +speech. We may still say: The pain I had two years ago is like the +pain I have to-day; my sensation came into being at such a moment; my +regret lasted two days. We speak that we may be understood; and such +phrases express a truth, even if they are rather loose and inaccurate. +But we must not be deceived by such phrases, and assume that they mean +what they have no right to mean. + +39. OBJECTIONS TO PARALLELISM.--What objections can be brought against +parallelism? It is sometimes objected by the interactionist that it +abandons the plain man's notion of the mind as a substance with its +attributes, and makes of it a mere collection of mental phenomena. It +must be admitted that the parallelist usually holds a view which +differs rather widely from that of the unlearned. + +But even supposing this objection well taken, it can no longer be +regarded as an objection specifically to the doctrine of parallelism, +for the view of the mind in question is becoming increasingly popular, +and it is now held by influential interactionists as well as by +parallelists. One may believe that the mind consists of ideas, and may +still hold that ideas can cause motions in matter. + +There is, however, another objection that predisposes many thoughtful +persons to reject parallelism uncompromisingly. It is this. If we +admit that the chain of physical causes and effects, from a blow given +to the body to the resulting muscular movements made in self-defense, +is an unbroken one, what part can we assign to the mind in the whole +transaction? Has it _done_ anything? Is it not reduced to the +position of a passive spectator? Must we not regard man as "a physical +automaton with parallel psychical states"? + +Such an account of man cannot fail to strike one as repugnant; and yet +it is the parallelist himself whom we must thank for introducing us to +it. The account is not a caricature from the pen of an opponent. "An +automaton," writes Professor Clifford,[2] "is a thing that goes by +itself when it is wound up, and we go by ourselves when we have had +food. Excepting the fact that other men are conscious, there is no +reason why we should not regard the human body as merely an exceedingly +complicated machine which is wound up by putting food into the mouth. +But it is not _merely_ a machine, because consciousness goes with it. +The mind, then, is to be regarded as a stream of feelings which runs +parallel to, and simultaneous with, a certain part of the action of the +body, that is to say, that particular part of the action of the brain +in which the cerebrum and the sensory tracts are excited." + +The saving statement that the body is not _merely_ a machine, because +consciousness goes with it, does not impress one as being sufficient to +redeem the illustration. Who wants to be an automaton with an +accompanying consciousness? Who cares to regard his mind as an +"epiphenomenon"--a thing that exists, but whose existence or +nonexistence makes no difference to the course of affairs? + +The plain man's objection to such an account of himself seems to be +abundantly justified. As I have said earlier in this chapter, neither +interactionist nor parallelist has the intention of repudiating the +experience of world and mind common to us all. We surely have evidence +enough to prove that minds count for something. No house was ever +built, no book was ever written, by a creature without a mind; and the +better the house or book, the better the mind. _That_ there is a fixed +and absolutely dependable relation between the planning mind and the +thing accomplished, no man of any school has the right to deny. The +only legitimate question is: _What is the nature_ of the relation? Is +it _causal_, or should it be conceived to be _something else_? + +The whole matter will be more fully discussed in Chapter XI. This +chapter I shall close with a brief summary of the points which the +reader will do well to bear in mind when he occupies himself with +parallelism. + +(1) Parallelism is a protest against the interactionist's tendency to +materialize the mind. + +(2) The name is a figurative expression, and must not be taken +literally. The true relation between mental phenomena and physical is +given in certain common experiences that have been indicated, and it is +a unique relation. + +(3) It is a fixed and absolutely dependable relation. It is impossible +that there should be a particular mental fact without its corresponding +physical fact; and it is impossible that this physical fact should +occur without its corresponding mental fact. + +(4) The parallelist objects to calling this relation _causal_, because +this obscures the distinction between it and the relation between facts +both of which are physical. He prefers the word "concomitance." + +(5) Such objections to parallelism as that cited above assume that the +concomitance of which the parallelist speaks is analogous to physical +concomitance. The chemist puts together a volume of hydrogen gas and a +volume of chlorine gas, and the result is two volumes of hydrochloric +acid gas. We regard it as essential to the result that there should be +the two gases and that they should be brought together. But the fact +that the chemist has red hair we rightly look upon as a concomitant +phenomenon of no importance. The result would be the same if he had +black hair or were bald. But this is not the concomitance that +interests the parallelist. The two sorts of concomitance are alike +only in the one point. Some phenomenon is regarded as excluded from +the series of causes and effects under discussion. On the other hand, +the difference between the two is all-important; in the one case, the +concomitant phenomenon is an accidental circumstance that might just as +well be absent; in the other, it is nothing of the sort; it _cannot_ be +absent--the mental fact _must_ exist if the brain-change in question +exists. + +It is quite possible that, on reading this list of points, one may be +inclined to make two protests. + +First: Is a parallelism so carefully guarded as this properly called +_parallelism_ at all? To this I answer: The name matters little. I +have used it because I have no better term. Certainly, it is not the +parallelism which is sometimes brought forward, and which peeps out +from the citation from Clifford. It is nothing more than an insistence +upon the truth that we should not treat the mind as though it were a +material thing. If any one wishes to take the doctrine and discard the +name, I have no objection. As so guarded, the doctrine is, I think, +true. + +Second: If it is desirable to avoid the word "cause," in speaking of +the relation of the mental and the physical, on the ground that +otherwise we give the word a double sense, why is it not desirable to +avoid the word "concomitance"? Have we not seen that the word is +ambiguous? I admit the inconsistency and plead in excuse only that I +have chosen the lesser of two evils. It is fatally easy to slip into +the error of thinking of the mind as though it were material and had a +place in the physical world. In using the word "concomitance" I enter +a protest against this. But I have, of course, no right to use it +without showing just what kind of concomitance I mean. + + +[1] "First and Fundamental Truths," Book I, Part II, Chapter II. New +York, 1889. + +[2] "Lectures and Essays," Vol. II, p. 57. London, 1879. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +HOW WE KNOW THERE ARE OTHER MINDS + +40. IS IT CERTAIN THAT WE KNOW IT?--I suppose there is no man in his +sober senses who seriously believes that no other mind than his own +exists. There is, to be sure, an imaginary being more or less +discussed by those interested in philosophy, a creature called the +Solipsist, who is credited with this doctrine. But men do not become +solipsists, though they certainly say things now and then that other +men think logically lead to some such unnatural view of things; and +more rarely they say things that sound as if the speaker, in some +moods, at least, might actually harbor such a view. + +Thus the philosopher Fichte (1762-1814) talks in certain of his +writings as though he believed himself to be the universe, and his +words cause Jean Paul Richter, the inimitable, to break out in his +characteristic way: "The very worst of it all is the lazy, aimless, +aristocratic, insular life that a god must lead; he has no one to go +with. If I am not to sit still for all time and eternity, if I let +myself down as well as I can and make myself finite, that I may have +something in the way of society, still I have, like petty princes, only +my own creatures to echo my words. . . . Every being, even the highest +Being, wishes something to love and to honor. But the Fichtean +doctrine that I am my own body-maker leaves me with nothing +whatever--with not so much as the beggar's dog or the prisoner's +spider. . . . Truly I wish that there were men, and that I were one of +them. . . . If there exists, as I very much fear, no one but myself, +unlucky dog that I am, then there is no one at such a pass as I." + +Just how much Fichte's words meant to the man who wrote them may be a +matter for dispute. Certainly no one has shown a greater moral +earnestness or a greater regard for his fellowmen than this +philosopher, and we must not hastily accuse any one of being a +solipsist. But that to certain men, and, indeed, to many men, there +have come thoughts that have seemed to point in this direction--that +not a few have had doubts as to their ability to _prove_ the existence +of other minds--this we must admit. + +It appears somewhat easier for a man to have doubts upon this subject +when he has fallen into the idealistic error of regarding the material +world, which seems to be revealed to him, as nothing else than his +"ideas" or "sensations" or "impressions." If we will draw the whole +"telephone exchange" into the clerk, there seems little reason for not +including all the subscribers as well. If other men's bodies are my +sensations, may not other men's minds be my imaginings? But doubts may +be felt also by those who are willing to admit a real external world. +How do we know that our inference to the existence of other minds is a +justifiable inference? Can there be such a thing as _verification_ in +this field? + +For we must remember that no man is directly conscious of any mind +except his own. Men cannot exhibit their minds to their neighbors as +they exhibit their wigs. However close may seem to us to be our +intercourse with those about us, do we ever attain to anything more +than our ideas of the contents of their minds? We do not experience +these contents; we picture them, we represent them by certain proxies. +To be sure, we believe that the originals exist, but can we be quite +sure of it? Can there be a _proof_ of this right to make the leap from +one consciousness to another? We seem to assume that we can make it, +and then we make it again and again; but suppose, after all, that there +were nothing there. Could we ever find out our error? And in a field +where it is impossible to prove error, must it not be equally +impossible to prove truth? + +The doubt has seemed by no means a gratuitous one to certain very +sensible practical men. "It is wholly impossible," writes Professor +Huxley,[1] "absolutely to prove the presence or absence of +consciousness in anything but one's own brain, though by analogy, we +are justified in assuming its existence in other men." "The existence +of my conception of you in my consciousness," says Clifford,[2] +"carries with it a belief in the existence of you outside of my +consciousness. . . . How this inference is justified, how +consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of +itself, I do not pretend to say: I need not untie a knot which the +world has cut for me long ago. It may very well be that I myself am +the only existence, but it is simply ridiculous to suppose that anybody +else is. The position of absolute idealism may, therefore, be left out +of count, although each individual may be unable to justify his dissent +from it." + +These are writers belonging to our own modern age, and they are men of +science. Both of them deny that the existence of other minds is a +thing that can be _proved_; but the one tells us that we are "justified +in assuming" their existence, and the other informs us that, although +"it may very well be" that no other mind exists, we may leave that +possibility out of count. + +Neither position seems a sensible one. Are we justified in assuming +what cannot be proved? or is the argument "from analogy" really a proof +of some sort? Is it right to close our eyes to what "may very well +be," just because we choose to do so? The fact is that both of these +writers had the conviction, shared by us all, that there are other +minds, and that we know something about them; and yet neither of them +could see that the conviction rested upon an unshakable foundation. + +Now, I have no desire to awake in the mind of any one a doubt of the +existence of other minds. But I think we must all admit that the man +who recognizes that such minds are not directly perceived, and who +harbors doubts as to the nature of the inference which leads to their +assumption, may, perhaps, be able to say that _he feels certain_ that +there are other minds; but must we not at the same time admit that he +is scarcely in a position to say: _it is certain_ that there are other +minds? The question will keep coming back again: May there not, after +all, be a legitimate doubt on the subject? + +To set this question at rest there seems to be only one way, and that +is this: to ascertain the nature of the inference which is made, and to +see clearly what can be meant by _proof_ when one is concerned with +such matters as these. If it turns out that we have proof, in the only +sense of the word in which it is reasonable to ask for proof, our doubt +falls away of itself. + +41. THE ARGUMENT FOR OTHER MINDS.--I have said early in this volume +(section 7) that the plain man perceives that other men act very much +as he does, and that he attributes to them minds more or less like his +own. He reasons from like to like--other bodies present phenomena +which, in the case of his own body, he perceives to be indicative of +mind, and he accepts them as indicative of mind there also. The +psychologist makes constant use of this inference; indeed, he could not +develop his science without it. + +John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), whom it is always a pleasure to read +because he is so clear and straightforward, presents this argument in +the following form:[3]-- + +"By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to +believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking +and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and +thoughts, or, in other words, possess Minds? The most strenuous +Intuitionist does not include this among the things that I know by +direct intuition. I conclude it from certain things, which my +experience of my own states of feeling proves to me to be marks of it. +These marks are of two kinds, antecedent and subsequent; the previous +conditions requisite for feeling, and the effects or consequences of +it. I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, +first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be +the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they +exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know +by experience to be caused by feelings. I am conscious in myself of a +series of facts connected by a uniform sequence, of which the beginning +is modifications of my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward +demeanor. In the case of other human beings I have the evidence of my +senses for the first and last links of the series, but not for the +intermediate link. I find, however, that the sequence between the +first and last is as regular and constant in those other cases as it is +in mine. In my own case I know that the first link produces the last +through the intermediate link, and could not produce it without. +Experience, therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an +intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in +myself, or a different one. I must either believe them to be alive, or +to be automatons; and by believing them to be alive, that is, by +supposing the link to be of the same nature as in the case of which I +have experience, and which is in all respects similar, I bring other +human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalizations which I know +by experience to be the true theory of my own existence. And in doing +so I conform to the legitimate rules of experimental inquiry. The +process is exactly parallel to that by which Newton proved that the +force which keeps the planets in their orbits is identical with that by +which an apple falls to the ground. It was not incumbent on Newton to +prove the impossibility of its being any other force; he was thought to +have made out his point when he had simply shown that no other force +need be supposed. We know the existence of other beings by +generalization from the knowledge of our own; the generalization merely +postulates that what experience shows to be a mark of the existence of +something within the sphere of our consciousness, may be concluded to +be a mark of the same thing beyond that sphere." + +Now, the plain man accepts the argument from analogy, here insisted +upon, every day of his life. He is continually forming an opinion as +to the contents of other minds on a basis of the bodily manifestations +presented to his view. The process of inference is so natural and +instinctive that we are tempted to say that it hardly deserves to be +called an inference. Certainly the man is not conscious of distinct +steps in the process; he perceives certain phenomena, and they are at +once illuminated by their interpretation. He reads other men as we +read a book--the signs on the paper are scarcely attended to, our whole +thought is absorbed in that for which they stand. As I have said +above, the psychologist accepts the argument, and founds his +conclusions upon it. + +Upon what ground can one urge that this inference to other minds is a +doubtful one? It is made universally. We have seen that even those +who have theoretic objections against it, do not hesitate to draw it, +as a matter of fact. It appears unnatural in the extreme to reject it. +What can induce men to regard it with suspicion? + +I think the answer to this question is rather clearly suggested in the +sentence already quoted from Professor Huxley: "It is wholly +impossible absolutely to prove the presence or absence of consciousness +in anything but one's own brain, though, by analogy, we are justified +in assuming its existence in other men." + +Here Professor Huxley admits that we have something like a proof, for +he regards the inference as _justified_. But he does not think that we +have _absolute proof_--the best that we can attain to appears to be a +degree of probability falling short of the certainty which we should +like to have. + +Now, it should be remarked that the discredit cast upon the argument +for other minds has its source in the fact that it does not satisfy a +certain assumed standard. What is that standard? It is the standard +of proof which we may look for and do look for where we are concerned +to establish the existence of material things with the highest degree +of certainty. + +There are all sorts of indirect ways of proving the existence of +material things. We may read about them in a newspaper, and regard +them as highly doubtful; we may have the word of a man whom, on the +whole, we regard as veracious; we may infer their existence, because we +perceive that certain other things exist, and are to be accounted for. +Under certain circumstances, however, we may have proof of a different +kind: we may see and touch the things themselves. Material things are +open to direct inspection. Such a direct inspection constitutes +_absolute proof_, so far as material things are concerned. + +But we have no right to set this up as our standard of absolute proof, +when we are talking about other minds. In this field it is not proof +at all. Anything that can be directly inspected is not another mind. +We cannot cast a doubt upon the existence of colors by pointing to the +fact that we cannot smell them. If they could be smelt, they would not +be colors. We must in each case seek a proof of the appropriate kind. + +What have we a right to regard as absolute proof of the existence of +another mind? Only this: the analogy upon which we depend in making +our inference must be a very close one. As we shall see in the next +section, the analogy is sometimes very remote, and we draw the +inference with much hesitation, or, perhaps, refuse to draw it at all. +It is not, however, the _kind of inference_ that makes the trouble; it +is the lack of detailed information that may serve as a basis for +inference. Our inference to other minds is unsatisfactory only in so +far as we are ignorant of our own minds and bodies and of other bodies. +Were our knowledge in these fields complete, we should know without +fail the signs of mind, and should know whether an inference were or +were not justified. + +And _justified_ here means proved--proved in the only sense in which we +have a right to ask for proof. No single fact is known that can +discredit such a proof. Our doubt is, then, gratuitous and can be +dismissed. We may claim that we have _verification_ of the existence +of other minds. Such verification, however, must consist in showing +that, in any given instance, the signs of mind really are present. It +cannot consist in presenting minds for inspection as though they were +material things. + +One more matter remains to be touched upon in this section. It has +doubtless been observed that Mill, in the extract given above, seems to +place "feelings," in other words, mental phenomena, between one set of +bodily motions and another. He makes them the middle link in a chain +whose first and third links are material. The parallelist cannot treat +mind in this way. He claims that to make mental phenomena effects or +causes of bodily motions is to make them material. + +Must, then, the parallelist abandon the argument for other minds? Not +at all. The force of the argument lies in interpreting the phenomena +presented by other bodies as one knows by experience the phenomena of +one's own body must be interpreted. He who concludes that the relation +between his own mind and his own body can best be described as a +"parallelism," must judge that other men's minds are related to their +bodies in the same way. He must treat his neighbor as he treats +himself. The argument from analogy remains the same. + +42. WHAT OTHER MINDS ARE THERE?--That other men have minds nobody +really doubts, as we have seen above. They resemble us so closely, +their actions are so analogous to our own, that, although we sometimes +give ourselves a good deal of trouble to ascertain what sort of minds +they have, we never think of asking ourselves whether they have minds. + +Nor does it ever occur to the man who owns a dog, or who drives a +horse, to ask himself whether the creature has a mind. He may complain +that it has not much of a mind, or he may marvel at its +intelligence--his attitude will depend upon the expectations which he +has been led to form. But regard the animal as he would regard a +bicycle or an automobile, he will not. The brute is not precisely like +us, but its actions bear an unmistakable analogy to our own; pleasure +and pain, hope and fear, desire and aversion, are so plainly to be read +into them that we feel that a man must be "high gravel blind" not to +see their significance. + +Nevertheless, it has been possible for man, under the prepossession of +a mistaken philosophical theory, to assume the whole brute creation to +be without consciousness. When Descartes had learned something of the +mechanism of the human body, and had placed the human soul--_hospes +comesque corporis_--in the little pineal gland in the midst of the +brain, the conception in his mind was not unlike that which we have +when we picture to ourselves a locomotive engine with an engineer in +its cab. The man gives intelligent direction; but, under some +circumstances, the machine can do a good deal in the absence of the +man; if it is started, it can run of itself, and to do this, it must go +through a series of complicated motions. + +Descartes knew that many of the actions performed by the human body are +not the result of conscious choice, and that some of them are in direct +contravention of the will's commands. The eye protects itself by +dropping its lid, when the hand is brought suddenly before it; the foot +jerks away from the heated object which it has accidentally touched. +The body was seen to be a mechanism relatively independent of the mind, +and one rather complete in itself. Joined with a soul, the circle of +its functions was conceived to be widened; but even without the +assistance of the soul, it was thought that it could keep itself busy, +and could do many things that the unreflective might be inclined to +attribute to the efficiency of the mind. + +The bodies of the brutes Descartes regarded as mechanisms of the same +general nature as the human body. He was unwilling to allow a soul to +any creature below man, so nothing seemed left to him save to maintain +that the brutes are machines without consciousness, and that their +apparently purposive actions are to be classed with such human +movements as the sudden closing of the eye when it is threatened with +the hand. The melancholy results of this doctrine made themselves +evident among his followers. Even the mild and pious Malebranche could +be brutal to a dog which fawned upon him, under the mistaken notion +that it did not really hurt a dog to kick it. + +All this reasoning men have long ago set aside. For one thing, it has +come to be recognized that there may be consciousness, perhaps rather +dim, blind, and fugitive, but still consciousness, which does not get +itself recognized as do our clearly conscious purposes and volitions. +Many of the actions of man which Descartes was inclined to regard as +unaccompanied by consciousness may not, in fact, be really unconscious. +And, in the second place, it has come to be realized that we have no +right to class all the actions of the brutes with those reflex actions +in man which we are accustomed to regard as automatic. + +The belief in animal automatism has passed away, it is to be hoped, +never to return. That lower animals have minds we must believe. But +what sort of minds have they? + +It is hard enough to gain an accurate notion of what is going on in a +human mind. Men resemble each other more or less closely, but no two +are precisely alike, and no two have had exactly the same training. I +may misunderstand even the man who lives in the same house with me and +is nearly related to me. Does he really suffer and enjoy as acutely as +he seems to? or must his words and actions be accepted with a discount? +The greater the difference between us, the more danger that I shall +misjudge him. It is to be expected that men should misunderstand +women; that men and women should misunderstand children; that those who +differ in social station, in education, in traditions and habits of +life, should be in danger of reading each other as one reads a book in +a tongue imperfectly mastered. When these differences are very great, +the task is an extremely difficult one. What are the emotions, if he +has any, of the Chinaman in the laundry near by? His face seems as +difficult of interpretation as are the hieroglyphics that he has pasted +up on his window. + +When we come to the brutes, the case is distinctly worse. We think +that we can attain to some notion of the minds to be attributed to such +animals as the ape, the dog, the cat, the horse, and it is not nonsense +to speak of an animal psychology. But who will undertake to tell us +anything definite of the mind of a fly, a grasshopper, a snail, or a +cuttlefish? That they have minds, or something like minds, we must +believe; what their minds are like, a prudent man scarcely even +attempts to say. In our distribution of minds may we stop short of +even the very lowest animal organisms? It seems arbitrary to do so. + +More than that; some thoughtful men have been led by the analogy +between plant life and animal life to believe that something more or +less remotely like the consciousness which we attribute to animals must +be attributed also to plants. Upon this belief I shall not dwell, for +here we are evidently at the limit of our knowledge, and are making the +vaguest of guesses. No one pretends that we have even the beginnings +of a plant psychology. At the same time, we must admit that organisms +of all sorts do bear some analogy to each other, even if it be a remote +one; and we must admit also that we cannot _prove_ plants to be wholly +devoid of a rudimentary consciousness of some sort. + +As we begin with man and descend the scale of beings, we seem, in the +upper part of the series, to be in no doubt that minds exist. Our only +question is as to the precise contents of those minds. Further down we +begin to ask ourselves whether anything like mind is revealed at all. +That this should be so is to be expected. Our argument for other minds +is the argument from analogy, and as we move down the scale our analogy +grows more and more remote until it seems to fade out altogether. He +who harbors doubts as to whether the plants enjoy some sort of psychic +life, may well find those doubts intensified when he turns to study the +crystal; and when he contemplates inorganic matter he should admit that +the thread of his argument has become so attenuated that he cannot find +it at all. + +43. THE DOCTRINE OF MIND-STUFF.--Nevertheless, there have been those +who have attributed something like consciousness even to inorganic +matter. If the doctrine of evolution be true, argues Professor +Clifford,[4] "we shall have along the line of the human pedigree a +series of imperceptible steps connecting inorganic matter with +ourselves. To the later members of that series we must undoubtedly +ascribe consciousness, although it must, of course, have been simpler +than our own. But where are we to stop? In the case of organisms of a +certain complexity, consciousness is inferred. As we go back along the +line, the complexity of the organism and of its nerve-action insensibly +diminishes; and for the first part of our course we see reason to think +that the complexity of consciousness insensibly diminishes also. But +if we make a jump, say to the tunicate mollusks, we see no reason there +to infer the existence of consciousness at all. Yet not only is it +impossible to point out a place where any sudden break takes place, but +it is contrary to all the natural training of our minds to suppose a +breach of continuity so great." + +We must not, says Clifford, admit any breach of continuity. We must +assume that consciousness is a complex of elementary feelings, "or +rather of those remoter elements which cannot even be felt, but of +which the simplest feeling is built up." We must assume that such +elementary facts go along with the action of every organism, however +simple; but we must assume also that it is only when the organism has +reached a certain complexity of nervous structure that the complex of +psychic facts reaches the degree of complication that we call +Consciousness. + +So much for the assumption of something like mind in the mollusk, where +Clifford cannot find direct evidence of mind. But the argument does +not stop here: "As the line of ascent is unbroken, and must end at last +in inorganic matter, we have no choice but to admit that every motion +of matter is simultaneous with some . . . fact or event which might be +part of a consciousness." + +Of the universal distribution of the elementary constituents of mind +Clifford writes as follows: "That element of which, as we have seen, +even the simplest feeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A +moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or +consciousness; but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff. When +molecules are so combined together as to form the film on the under +side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with +them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of Sentience. +When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous +system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff are so +combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, changes +in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked together +that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other. When +matter takes the complex form of a living human brain, the +corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, +having intelligence and volition." + +This is the famous mind-stuff doctrine. It is not a scientific +doctrine, for it rests on wholly unproved assumptions. It is a play of +the speculative fancy, and has its source in the author's strong desire +to fit mental phenomena into some general evolutionary scheme. As he +is a parallelist, and cannot make of physical phenomena and of mental +one single series of causes and effects, he must attain his end by +making the mental series complete and independent in itself. To do +this, he is forced to make several very startling assumptions:-- + +(1) We have seen that there is evidence that there is consciousness +somewhere--it is revealed by certain bodies. Clifford assumes +consciousness, or rather its raw material, _mind-stuff_, to be +everywhere. For this assumption we have not a whit of evidence. + +(2) To make of the stuff thus attained a satisfactory evolutionary +series, he is compelled to assume that mental phenomena are related to +each other much as physical phenomena are related to each other. This +notion he had from Spinoza, who held that, just as all that takes place +in the physical world must be accounted for by a reference to physical +causes, so all happenings in the world of ideas must be accounted for +by a reference to mental causes, _i.e._ to ideas. For this assumption +there is no more evidence than for the former. + +(3) Finally, to bring the mental phenomena we are familiar with, +sensations of color, sound, touch, taste, etc., into this evolutionary +scheme, he is forced to assume that all such mental phenomena are made +up of elements which do not belong to these classes at all, of +something that "cannot even be felt." For this assumption there is as +little evidence as there is for the other two. + +The fact is that the _mind-stuff_ doctrine is a castle in the air. It +is too fanciful and arbitrary to take seriously. It is much better to +come back to a more sober view of things, and to hold that there is +evidence that other minds exist, but no evidence that every material +thing is animated. If we cannot fit this into our evolutionary scheme, +perhaps it is well to reexamine our evolutionary scheme, and to see +whether some misconception may not attach to that. + + +[1] "Collected Essays," Vol. I, p. 219, New York, 1902. + +[2] "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves," in "Lectures and Essays," +Vol. II. + +[3] "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," Chapter XII. + +[4] "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves." + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND + +44. IS THE MATERIAL WORLD A MECHANISM?--So far we have concerned +ourselves with certain leading problems touching the external world and +the mind,--problems which seem to present themselves unavoidably to those +who enter upon the path of reflection. And we have seen, I hope, that +there is much truth, as well as some misconception, contained in the +rather vague opinions of the plain man. + +But the problems that we have taken up by no means exhaust the series of +those that present themselves to one who thinks with patience and +persistency. When we have decided that men are not mistaken in believing +that an external world is presented in their experience; when we have +corrected our first crude notions of what this world is, and have cleared +away some confusions from our conceptions of space and time; when we have +attained to a reasonably clear view of the nature of the mind, and of the +nature of its connection with the body; when we have escaped from a +tumble into the absurd doctrine that no mind exists save our own, and +have turned our backs upon the rash speculations of the adherents of +"mind-stuff"; there still remain many points upon which we should like to +have definite information. + +In the present chapter I shall take up and turn over a few of these, but +it must not be supposed that one can get more than a glimpse of them +within such narrow limits. First of all we will raise the question +whether it is permissible to regard the material world, which we accept, +as through and through a mechanism. + +There can be little doubt that there is a tendency on the part of men of +science at the present day so to regard it. It should, of course, be +frankly admitted that no one is in a position to prove that, from the +cosmic mist, in which we grope for the beginnings of our universe, to the +organized whole in which vegetable and animal bodies have their place, +there is an unbroken series of changes all of which are explicable by a +reference to mechanical laws. Chemistry, physics, and biology are still +separate and distinct realms, and it is at present impossible to find for +them a common basis in mechanics. The belief of the man of science must, +hence, be regarded as a faith; the doctrine of the mechanism of nature is +a working hypothesis, and it is unscientific to assume that it is +anything more. + +There can be no objection to a frank admission that we are not here +walking in the light of established knowledge. But it does seem to savor +of dogmatism for a man to insist that no increase in our knowledge can +ever reveal that the physical world is an orderly system throughout, and +that all the changes in material things are explicable in terms of the +one unified science. Earnest objections have, however, been made to the +tendency to regard nature as a mechanism. To one of the most curious of +them we have been treated lately by Dr. Ward in his book on "Naturalism +and Agnosticism." + +It is there ingeniously argued that, when we examine with care the +fundamental concepts of the science of mechanics, we find them to be +self-contradictory and absurd. It follows that we are not justified in +turning to them for an explanation of the order of nature. + +The defense of the concepts of mechanics we may safely leave to the man +of science; remembering, of course, that, when a science is in the +making, it is to be expected that the concepts of which it makes use +should undergo revision from time to time. But there is one general +consideration that it is not well to leave out of view when we are +contemplating such an assault upon the notion of the world as mechanism +as is made by Dr. Ward. It is this. + +Such attacks upon the conception of mechanism are not purely destructive +in their aim. The man who makes them wishes to destroy one view of the +system of things in order that he may set up another. If the changes in +the system of material things cannot be accounted for mechanically, it is +argued, we are compelled to turn for our explanation to the action and +interaction of minds. This seems to give mind a very important place in +the universe, and is believed to make for a view of things that +guarantees the satisfaction of the highest hopes and aspirations of man. + +That a recognition of the mechanical order of nature is incompatible with +such a view of things as is just above indicated, I should be the last to +admit. The notion that it is so is, I believe, a dangerous error. It is +an error that tends to put a man out of sympathy with the efforts of +science to discover that the world is an orderly whole, and tempts him to +rejoice in the contemplation of human ignorance. + +But the error is rather a common one; and see to what injustice it may +lead one. It is concluded that the conception of _matter_ is an obscure +one; that we do not know clearly what we mean when we speak of the _mass_ +of a body; that there are disputes as to proper significance to be given +to the words _cause_ and _effect_; that the _laws of motion_, as they are +at present formulated, do not seem to account satisfactorily for the +behavior of all material particles. From this it is inferred that we +must give up the attempt to explain mechanically the order of physical +things. + +Now, suppose that it were considered a dangerous and heterodox doctrine, +that the changes in the system of things are due to the activities of +minds. Would not those who now love to point out the shortcomings of the +science of mechanics discover a fine field for their destructive +criticism? Are there no disputes as to the ultimate nature of mind? Are +men agreed touching the relations of mind and matter? What science even +attempts to tell us how a mind, by an act of volition, sets material +particles in motion or changes the direction of their motion? How does +one mind act upon another, and what does it mean for one mind to act upon +another? + +If the science of mechanics is not in all respects as complete a science +as it is desirable that it should be, surely we must admit that when we +turn to the field of mind we are not dealing with what is clear and free +from difficulties. Only a strong emotional bias can lead a man to dwell +with emphasis upon the difficulties to be met with in the one field, and +to pass lightly over those with which one meets in the other. + +One may, however, refuse to admit that the order of nature is throughout +mechanical, without taking any such unreasonable position as this. One +may hold that many of the changes in material things do not _appear_ to +be mechanical, and that it is too much of an assumption to maintain that +they are such, even as an article of faith. Thus, when we pass from the +world of the inorganic to that of organic life, we seem to make an +immense step. No one has even begun to show us that the changes that +take place in vegetable and animal organisms are all mechanical changes. +How can we dare to assume that they are? + +With one who reasons thus we may certainly feel a sympathy. The most +ardent advocate of mechanism must admit that his doctrine is a working +hypothesis, and not _proved_ to be true. Its acceptance would, however, +be a genuine convenience from the point of view of science, for it does +introduce, at least provisionally, a certain order into a vast number of +facts, and gives a direction to investigation. Perhaps the wisest thing +to do is, not to combat the doctrine, but to accept it tentatively and to +examine carefully what conclusions it may seem to carry with it--how it +may affect our outlook upon the world as a whole. + +45. THE PLACE OF MIND IN NATURE.--One of the very first questions which +we think of asking when we contemplate the possibility that the physical +world is throughout a mechanical system is this: How can we conceive +minds to be related to such a system? That minds, and many minds, do +exist, it is not reasonable to doubt. What shall we do with them? + +One must not misunderstand the mechanical view of things. When we use +the word "machine," we call before our minds certain gross and relatively +simple mechanisms constructed by man. Between such and a flower, a +butterfly, and a human body, the difference is enormous. He who elects +to bring the latter under the title of mechanism cannot mean that he +discerns no difference between them and a steam engine or a printing +press. He can only mean that he believes he might, could he attain to a +glimpse into their infinite complexity, find an explanation of the +physical changes which take place in them, by a reference to certain +general laws which describe the behavior of material particles everywhere. + +And the man who, having extended his notion of mechanism, is inclined to +overlook the fact that animals and men have minds, that thought and +feeling, plan and purpose, have their place in the world, may justly be +accused of a headlong and heedless enthusiasm. Whatever may be our +opinion on the subject of the mechanism of nature, we have no right to +minimize the significance of thought and feeling and will. Between that +which has no mind and that which has a mind there is a difference which +cannot be obliterated by bringing both under the concept of mechanism. +It is a difference which furnishes the material for the sciences of +psychology and ethics, and gives rise to a whole world of distinctions +which find no place in the realm of the merely physical. + +There are, then, minds as well as bodies; what place shall we assign to +these minds in the system of nature? + +Several centuries ago it occurred to the man of science that the material +world should be regarded as a system in which there is constant +transformation, but in which nothing is created. This way of looking at +things expressed itself formerly in the statement that, through all the +changes that take place in the world, the quantity of matter and motion +remains the same. To-day the same idea is better expressed in the +doctrine of the eternity of mass and the conservation of energy. In +plain language, this doctrine teaches that every change in every part of +the physical world, every motion in matter, must be preceded by physical +conditions which may be regarded as the equivalent of the change in +question. + +But this makes the physical world a closed system, a something complete +in itself. Where is there room in such a system for minds? + +It does indeed seem hard to find in such a system a place for minds, if +one conceives of minds as does the interactionist. We have seen (section +36) that the interactionist makes the mind act upon matter very much as +one particle of matter is supposed to act upon another. Between the +physical and the mental he assumes that there are _causal_ relations; +_i.e._ physical changes must be referred to mental causes sometimes, and +mental changes to physical. This means that he finds a place for mental +facts by inserting them as links in the one chain of causes and effects +with physical facts. If he is not allowed to break the chain and insert +them, he does not know what to do with them. + +The parallelist has not the same difficulty to face. He who holds that +mental phenomena must not be built into the one series of causes and +effects with physical phenomena may freely admit that physical phenomena +form a closed series, an orderly system of their own, and he may yet find +a place in the world for minds. He refuses to regard them as a part of +the world-mechanism, but he _relates_ them to physical things, conceiving +them as _parallel to_ the physical in the sense described (sections +37-39). He insists that, even if we hold that there are gaps in the +physical order of causes and effects, we cannot conceive these gaps to be +filled by mental phenomena, simply because they are mental phenomena. +They belong to an order of their own. Hence, the assumption that the +physical series is unbroken does not seem to him to crowd mental +phenomena out of their place in the world at all. They must, in any +case, occupy the place that is appropriate to them (section 38). + +It will be noticed that this doctrine that the chain of physical causes +and effects is nowhere broken, and that mental phenomena are related to +it as the parallelist conceives them to be, makes the world-system a very +orderly one. Every phenomenon has its place in it, and can be accounted +for, whether it be physical or mental. To some, the thought that the +world is such an orderly thing is in the highest degree repugnant. They +object that, in such a world, there is no room for _free-will_; and they +object, further, that there is no room for the _activity of minds_. Both +of these objections I shall consider in this chapter. + +But first, I must say a few words about a type of doctrine lately +insisted upon,[1] which bears some resemblance to interactionism as we +usually meet with it, and, nevertheless, tries to hold on to the doctrine +of the conservation of energy. It is this:-- + +The concept of energy is stretched in such a way as to make it cover +mental phenomena as well as physical. It is claimed that mental +phenomena and physical phenomena are alike "manifestations of energy," +and that the coming into being of a consciousness is a mere +"transformation," a something to be accounted for by the disappearance +from the physical world of a certain equivalent--perhaps of some motion. +It will be noticed that this is one rather subtle way of obliterating the +distinction between mental phenomena and physical. In so far it +resembles the interactionist's doctrine. + +In criticism of it we may say that he who accepts it has wandered away +from a rather widely recognized scientific hypothesis, and has +substituted for it a very doubtful speculation for which there seems to +be no whit of evidence. It is, moreover, a speculation repugnant to the +scientific mind, when its significance is grasped. Shall we assume +without evidence that, when a man wakes in the morning and enjoys a +mental life suspended or diminished during the night, his thoughts and +feelings have come into being at the expense of his body? Shall we +assume that the mass of his body has been slightly diminished, or that +motions have disappeared in a way that cannot be accounted for by a +reference to the laws of matter in motion? This seems an extraordinary +assumption, and one little in harmony with the doctrine of the eternity +of mass and the conservation of energy as commonly understood. We need +not take it seriously so long as it is quite unsupported by evidence. + +46. THE ORDER OF NATURE AND "FREE-WILL."--In a world as orderly as, in +the previous section, this world is conceived to be, is there any room +for freedom? What if the man of science is right in suspecting that the +series of physical causes and effects is nowhere broken? Must we then +conclude that we are never free? + +To many persons it has seemed that we are forced to draw this conclusion, +and it is not surprising that they view the doctrine with dismay. They +argue: Mental phenomena are made parallel with physical, and the order of +physical phenomena seems to be determined throughout, for nothing can +happen in the world of matter unless there is some adequate cause of its +happening. If, then, I choose to raise my finger, that movement must be +admitted to have physical causes, and those causes other causes, and so +on without end. If such a movement must always have its place in a +causal series of this kind, how can it be regarded as a free movement? +It is determined, and not free. + +Now, it is far from a pleasant thing to watch the man of science busily +at work trying to prove that the physical world is an orderly system, and +all the while to feel in one's heart that the success of his efforts +condemns one to slavery. It can hardly fail to make one's attitude +towards science that of alarm and antagonism. From this I shall try to +free the reader by showing that our freedom is not in the least danger, +and that we may look on unconcerned. + +When we approach that venerable dispute touching the freedom of the will, +which has inspired men to such endless discussions, and upon which they +have written with such warmth and even acrimony, the very first thing to +do is to discover what we have a right to mean when we call a man _free_. +As long as the meaning of the word is in doubt, the very subject of the +dispute is in doubt. When may we, then, properly call a man free? What +is the normal application of the term? + +I raise my finger. Every man of sense must admit that, under normal +conditions, I can raise my finger or keep it down, _as I please_. There +is no ground for a difference of opinion so far. But there is a further +point upon which men differ. One holds that my "pleasing" and the +brain-change that corresponds to it have their place in the world-order; +that is, he maintains that every volition can be _accounted for_. +Another holds that, under precisely the same circumstances, one may +"please" or not "please"; which means that the "pleasing" cannot be +wholly accounted for by anything that has preceded. The first man is a +_determinist_, and the second a "_free-willist_." I beg the reader to +observe that the word "free-willist" is in quotation marks, and not to +suppose that it means simply a believer in the freedom of the will. + +When in common life we speak of a man as free, what do we understand by +the word? Usually we mean that he is free from external compulsion. If +my finger is held by another, I am not free to raise it. But I may be +free in this sense, and yet one may demur to the statement that I am a +free man. If a pistol be held to my head with the remark, "Hands up!" my +finger will mount very quickly, and the bystanders will maintain that I +had no choice. + +We speak in somewhat the same way of men under the influence of +intoxicants, of men crazed by some passion and unable to take into +consideration the consequences of their acts, and of men bound by the +spell of hypnotic suggestion. Indeed, whenever a man is in such a +condition that he is glaringly incapable of leading a normal human life +and of being influenced by the motives that commonly move men, we are +inclined to say that he is not free. + +But does it ever occur to us to maintain that, in general, the possession +of a character and the capacity of being influenced by considerations +make it impossible for a man to be free? Surely not. If I am a prudent +man, I will invest my money in good securities. Is it sensible to say +that I cannot have been free in refusing a twenty per cent investment, +_because I am by nature prudent_? Am I a slave _because I eat when I am +hungry_, and can I partake of a meal freely, only when there is no reason +why I should eat at all? + +He who calls me free only when my acts do violence to my nature or cannot +be justified by a reference to anything whatever has strange notions of +freedom. Patriots, poets, moralists, have had much to say of freedom; +men have lived for it, and have died for it; men love it as they love +their own souls. Is the object of all this adoration the metaphysical +absurdity indicated above? + +To insist that a man is free only in so far as his actions are +unaccountable is to do violence to the meaning of a word in very common +use, and to mislead men by perverting it to strange and unwholesome uses. +Yet this is done by the "free-willist." He keeps insisting that man is +free, and then goes on to maintain that he cannot be free unless he is +"free." He does not, unfortunately, supply the quotation marks, and he +profits by the natural mistake in identity. As he defines freedom it +becomes "freedom," which is a very different thing. + +What is this "freedom"? It is not freedom from external constraint. It +is not freedom from overpowering passion. It is freedom from all the +motives, good as well as bad, that we can conceive of as influencing man, +and freedom also from oneself. + +It is well to get this quite clear. The "free-willist" maintains that, +_in so far as a man is "free,"_ his actions cannot be accounted for by a +reference to the order of causes at all--not by a reference to his +character, hereditary or acquired; not by a reference to his +surroundings. "Free" actions, in so far as they are "free," have, so to +speak, sprung into being out of the void. What follows from such a +doctrine? Listen:-- + +(1) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," I am not the author of +what appear to be my acts; who can be the cause of causeless actions? + +(2) It follows that no amount of effort on my part can prevent the +appearance of "free" acts of the most deplorable kind. If one can +condition their appearance or non-appearance, they are not "free" acts. + +(3) It follows that there is no reason to believe that there will be any +congruity between my character and my "free" acts. I may be a saint by +nature, and "freely" act like a scoundrel. + +(4) It follows that I can deserve no credit for "free" acts. I am not +their author. + +(5) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," it is useless to praise +me, to blame me, to punish me, to endeavor to persuade me. I must be +given over to unaccountable sainthood or to a reprobate mind, as it +happens to happen. I am quite beyond the pale of society, for my +neighbor cannot influence my "free" acts any more than I can. + +(6) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," I am in something very +like a state of slavery; and yet, curiously enough, it is a slavery +without a master. In the old stories of Fate, men were represented as +puppets in the hand of a power outside themselves. Here I am a puppet in +no hand; but I am a puppet just the same, for I am the passive spectator +of what appear to be my acts. I do not do the things I seem to do. They +are done for me or in me--or, rather, they are not done, but just happen. + +Such "freedom" is a wretched thing to offer to a man who longs for +freedom; for the freedom to act out his own impulses, to guide his life +according to his own ideals. It is a mere travesty on freedom, a fiction +of the philosophers, which inspires respect only so long as one has not +pierced the disguise of its respectable name. True freedom is not a +thing to be sought in a disorderly and chaotic world, in a world in which +actions are inexplicable and character does not count. Let us rinse our +minds free of misleading verbal associations, and let us realize that a +"free-will" neighbor would certainly not be to us an object of respect. +He would be as offensive an object to have in our vicinity as a +"free-will" gun or a "free-will" pocketknife. He would not be a rational +creature. + +Our only concern need be for freedom, and this is in no danger in an +orderly world. We all recognize this truth, in a way. We hold that a +man of good character freely chooses the good, and a man of evil +character freely chooses evil. Is not this a recognition of the fact +that the choice is a thing to be accounted for, and is, nevertheless, a +free choice? + +I have been considering above the world as it is conceived to be by the +parallelist, but, to the reader who may not incline towards parallelism, +I wish to point out that these reasonings touching the freedom of the +will concern the interactionist just as closely. They have no necessary +connection with parallelism. The interactionist, as well as the +parallelist, may be a determinist, a believer in freedom, or he may be a +"free-willist." + +He regards mental phenomena and physical phenomena as links in the one +chain of causes and effects. Shall he hold that certain mental links are +"free-will" links, that they are wholly unaccountable? If he does, all +that has been said above about the "free-willist" applies to him. He +believes in a disorderly world, and he should accept the consequences of +his doctrine. + +47. THE PHYSICAL WORLD AND THE MORAL WORLD.--I have said a little way +back that, when we think of bodies as having minds, we are introduced to +a world of distinctions which have no place in the realm of the merely +physical. One of the objections made to the orderly world of the +parallelist was that in it there is no room for the activity of minds. +Before we pass judgment on this matter, we should try to get some clear +notion of what we may mean by the word "activity." The science of ethics +must go by the board, if we cannot think of men as _doing_ anything, as +acting rightly or acting wrongly. + +Let us conceive a billiard ball in motion to come into collision with one +at rest. We commonly speak of the first ball as active, and of the +second as the passive subject upon which it exercises its activity. Are +we justified in thus speaking? + +In one sense, of course, we are. As I have several times had occasion to +remark, we are, in common life, justified in using words rather loosely, +provided that it is convenient to do so, and that it does not give rise +to misunderstandings. + +But, in a stricter sense, we are not justified in thus speaking, for in +doing so we are carrying over into the sphere of the merely physical a +distinction which does not properly belong there, but has its place in +another realm. The student of mechanics tells us that the second ball +has affected the first quite as much as the first has affected the +second. We cannot simply regard the first as cause and the second as +effect, nor may we regard the motion of the first as cause and the +subsequent motion of the second as its effect alone. _The whole +situation at the one instant_--both balls, their relative positions and +their motion and rest--must be taken as the cause of _the whole situation +at the next instant_, and in this whole situation the condition of the +second ball has its place as well as that of the first. + +If, then, we insist that to have causal efficiency is the same thing as +to be active, we should also admit that the second ball was active, and +quite as active as the first. It has certainly had as much to do with +the total result. But it offends us to speak of it in this way. We +prefer to say that the first was active and the second was acted upon. +What is the source of this distinction? + +Its original source is to be found in the judgments we pass upon +conscious beings, bodies with minds; and it could never have been drawn +if men had not taken into consideration the relations of minds to the +changes in the physical world. As carried over to inanimate things it is +a transferred distinction; and its transference to this field is not +strictly justifiable, as has been indicated above. + +I must make this clear by an illustration. I hurry along a street +towards the university, because the hour for my lecture is approaching. +I am struck down by a falling tile. In my advance up the street I am +regarded as active; in my fall to the ground I am regarded as passive. + +Now, looking at both occurrences from the purely physical point of view, +we have nothing before us but a series of changes in the space relations +of certain masses of matter; and in all those changes both my body and +its environment are concerned. As I advance, my body cannot be regarded +as the sole cause of the changes which are taking place. My progress +would be impossible without the aid of the ground upon which I tread. +Nor can I accuse the tile of being the sole cause of my demolition. Had +I not been what I was and where I was, the tile would have fallen in +vain. I must be regarded as a concurrent cause of my own disaster, and +my unhappy state is attributable to me as truly as it is to the tile. + +Why, then, am I in the one case regarded as active and in the other as +passive? In each case I am a cause of the result. How does it happen +that, in the first instance, I seem to most men to be _the_ cause, and in +the second to be not a cause at all? The rapidity of my motion in the +first instance cannot account for this judgment. He who rides in the +police van and he who is thrown from the car of a balloon may move with +great rapidity and yet be regarded as passive. + +Men speak as they do because they are not content to point out the +physical antecedents of this and that occurrence and stop with that. +They recognize that, between my advance up the street and my fall to the +ground there is one very important difference. In the first case what is +happening _may be referred to an idea in my mind_. Were the idea not +there, I should not do what I am doing. In the second case, what has +happened _cannot be referred to an idea in my mind_. + +Here we have come to the recognition that there are such things as +_purposes_ and _ends_; that an idea and some change in the external world +may be related as _plan_ and _accomplishment_. In other words, we have +been brought face to face with what has been given the somewhat +misleading name of _final cause_. In so far as that in the bringing +about of which I have had a share is my _end_, I am _active_; in so far +as it is not my end, but comes upon me as something not planned, I am +_passive_. The enormous importance of the distinction may readily be +seen; it is only in so far as I am a creature who can have purposes, that +_desire_ and _will_, _foresight_ and _prudence_, _right_ and _wrong_, can +have a significance for me. + +I have dwelt upon the meaning of the words "activity" and "passivity," +and have been at pains to distinguish them from cause and effect, because +the two pairs of terms have often been confounded with each other, and +this confusion has given rise to a peculiarly unfortunate error. It is +this error that lies at the foundation of the objection referred to at +the beginning of this section. + +We have seen that certain men of science are inclined to look upon the +physical world as a great system, all the changes in which may be +accounted for by an appeal to physical causes. And we have seen that the +parallelist regards ideas, not as links in this chain, but as parallel +with physical changes. + +It is argued by some that, if this is a true view of things, we must +embrace the conclusion that _the mind cannot be active at all_, that it +can _accomplish nothing_. We must look upon the mind as an +"epiphenomenon," a useless decoration; and must regard man as "a physical +automaton with parallel psychical states." + +Such abuse of one's fellow-man seems unchristian, and it is wholly +uncalled for on any hypothesis. Our first answer to it is that it seems +to be sufficiently refuted by the experiences of common life. We have +abundant evidence that men's minds do count for something. I conclude +that I want a coat, and I order one of my tailor; he believes that I will +pay for it, he wants the money, and he makes the coat; his man desires to +earn his wages and he delivers it. If I had not wanted the coat, if the +tailor had not wanted my money, if the man had not wanted to earn his +wages, the end would not have been attained. No philosopher has the +right to deny these facts. + +Ah! but, it may be answered, these three "wants" are not supposed to be +the _causes_ of the motions in matter which result in my appearing +well-dressed on Sunday. They are only _concomitant phenomena_. + +To this I reply: What of that? We must not forget what is meant by such +concomitance (section 39). We are dealing with a fixed and necessary +relation, not with an accidental one. If these "wants" had been lacking, +there would have been no coat. So my second answer to the objector is, +that, on the hypothesis of the parallelist, the relations between mental +phenomena and physical phenomena are just as dependable as that relation +between physical phenomena which we call that of cause and effect. +Moreover, since activity and causality are not the same thing, there is +no ground for asserting that the mind cannot be active, merely because it +is not material and, hence, cannot be, strictly speaking, a cause of +motions in matter. + +The plain man is entirely in the right in thinking that minds are active. +The truth is that _nothing can be active except as it has a mind_. The +relation of purpose and end is the one we have in view when we speak of +the activity of minds. + +It is, thus, highly unjust to a man to tell him that he is "a physical +automaton with parallel psychical states," and that he is wound up by +putting food into his mouth. He who hears this may be excused if he +feels it his duty to emit steam, walk with a jerk, and repudiate all +responsibility for his actions. Creatures that think, form plans, and +_act_, are not what we call automata. It is an abuse of language to call +them such, and it misleads us into looking upon them as we have no right +to look upon them. If men really were automata in the proper sense of +the word, we could not look upon them as wise or unwise, good or bad; in +short, the whole world of moral distinctions would vanish. + +Perhaps, in spite of all that has been said in this and in the preceding +section, some will feel a certain repugnance to being assigned a place in +a world as orderly as our world is in this chapter conceived to be--a +world in which every phenomenon, whether physical or mental, has its +definite place, and all are subject to law. But I suppose our content or +discontent will not be independent of our conception of what sort of a +world we conceive ourselves to be inhabiting. + +If we conclude that we are in a world in which God is revealed, if the +orderliness of it is but another name for Divine Providence, we can +scarcely feel the same as we would if we discovered in the world nothing +of the Divine. I have in the last few pages been discussing the doctrine +of purposes and ends, teleology, but I have said nothing of the +significance of that doctrine for Theism. The reader can easily see that +it lies at the very foundation of our belief in God. The only arguments +for theism that have had much weight with mankind have been those which +have maintained there are revealed in the world generally evidences of a +plan and purpose at least analogous to what we discover when we +scrutinize the actions of our fellow-man. Such arguments are not at the +mercy of either interactionist or parallelist. On either hypothesis they +stand unshaken. + +With this brief survey of some of the most interesting problems that +confront the philosopher, I must content myself here. Now let us turn +and see how some of the fundamental problems treated in previous chapters +have been approached by men belonging to certain well-recognized schools +of thought. + +And since it is peculiarly true in philosophy that, to understand the +present, one must know something of the past, we shall begin by taking a +look at the historical background of the types of philosophical doctrine +to which reference is constantly made in the books and journals of the +day. + + +[1] Ostwald, "Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie," s. 396. Leipzig, 1902. + + + + +IV. SOME TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY + + +CHAPTER XII + +THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND + +48. THE DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION.--We have seen in Chapter +II that it seems to the plain man abundantly evident that he really is +surrounded by material things and that he directly perceives such +things. This has always been the opinion of the plain man and it seems +probable that it always will be. It is only when he begins to reflect +upon things and upon his knowledge of them that it occurs to him to +call it in question. + +Very early in the history of speculative thought it occurred to men, +however, to ask how it is that we know things, and whether we are sure +we do know them. The problems of reflection started into life, and +various solutions were suggested. To tell over the whole list would +take us far afield, and we need not, for the purpose we have in view, +go back farther than Descartes, with whom philosophy took a relatively +new start, and may be said to have become, in spirit and method, at +least, modern. + +I have said (section 31) that Descartes (1596-1650) was fairly well +acquainted with the functioning of the nervous system, and has much to +say of the messages which pass along the nerves to the brain. The same +sort of reasoning that leads the modern psychologist to maintain that +we know only so much of the external world as is reflected in our +sensations led him to maintain that the mind is directly aware of the +ideas through which an external world is represented, but can know the +world itself only indirectly and through these ideas. + +Descartes was put to sore straits to prove the existence of an external +world, when he had once thus placed it at one remove from us. If we +accept his doctrine, we seem to be shut up within the circle of our +ideas, and can find no door that will lead us to a world outside. The +question will keep coming back: How do we _know_ that, corresponding to +our ideas, there are material things, if we have never perceived, in +any single instance, a material thing? And the doubt here suggested +may be reinforced by the reflection that the very expression "a +material thing" ought to be meaningless to a man who, having never had +experience of one, is compelled to represent it by the aid of something +so different from it as ideas are supposed to be. Can material things +really be to such a creature anything more than some complex of ideas? + +The difficulties presented by any philosophical doctrine are not always +evident at once. Descartes made no scruple of accepting the existence +of an external world, and his example has been followed by a very large +number of those who agree with his initial assumption that the mind +knows immediately only its own ideas. + +Preëminent among such we must regard John Locke, the English +philosopher (1632-1704), whose classic work, "An Essay concerning Human +Understanding," should not be wholly unknown to any one who pretends to +an interest in the English literature. + +Admirably does Locke represent the position of what very many have +regarded as the prudent and sensible man,--the man who recognizes that +ideas are not external things, and that things must be known through +ideas, and yet holds on to the existence of a material world which we +assuredly know. + +He recognizes, it is true, that some one may find a possible opening +for the expression of a doubt, but he regards the doubt as gratuitous; +"I think nobody can, in earnest, be so skeptical as to be uncertain of +the existence of those things which he sees and feels." As we have +seen (section 12), he meets the doubt with a jest. + +Nevertheless, those who read with attention Locke's admirably clear +pages must notice that he does not succeed in really setting to rest +the doubt that has suggested itself. It becomes clear that Locke felt +so sure of the existence of the external world because he now and then +slipped into the inconsistent doctrine that he perceived it +immediately, and not merely through his ideas. Are those things "which +he sees and feels" _external_ things? Does he see and feel them +directly, or must he infer from his ideas that he sees and feels them? +If the latter, why may one not still doubt? Evidently the appeal is to +a direct experience of material things, and Locke has forgotten that he +must be a Lockian. + +"I have often remarked, in many instances," writes Descartes, "that +there is a great difference between an object and its idea." How could +the man possibly have remarked this, when he had never in his life +perceived the object corresponding to any idea, but had been altogether +shut up to ideas? "Thus I see, whilst I write this," says Locke,[1] "I +can change the appearance of the paper, and by designing the letters +tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, by +barely drawing my pen over it, which will neither appear (let me fancy +as much as I will), if my hand stands still, or though I move my pen, +if my eyes be shut; nor, when those characters are once made on the +paper, can I choose afterward but see them as they are; that is, have +the ideas of such letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that +they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination, when I +find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own +thought do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy +it; but continue to affect the senses constantly and regularly, +according to the figures I made them." + +Locke is as bad as Descartes. Evidently he regards himself as able to +turn to the external world and perceive the relation that things hold +to ideas. Such an inconsistency may escape the writer who has been +guilty of it, but it is not likely to escape the notice of all those +who come after him. Some one is sure to draw the consequences of a +doctrine more rigorously, and to come to conclusions, it may be, very +unpalatable to the man who propounded the doctrine in the first +instance. + +The type of doctrine represented by Descartes and Locke is that of +_Representative Perception_. It holds that we know real external +things only through their mental representatives. It has also been +called _Hypothetical Realism_, because it accepts the existence of a +real world, but bases our knowledge of it upon an inference from our +sensations or ideas. + +49. THE STEP TO IDEALISM.--The admirable clearness with which Locke +writes makes it the easier for his reader to detect the untenability of +his position. He uses simple language, and he never takes refuge in +vague and ambiguous phrases. When he tells us that the mind is wholly +shut up to its ideas, and then later assumes that it is not shut up to +its ideas, but can perceive external things, we see plainly that there +must be a blunder somewhere. + +George Berkeley (1684-1753), Bishop of Cloyne, followed out more +rigorously the consequences to be deduced from the assumption that all +our direct knowledge is of ideas; and in a youthful work of the highest +genius entitled "The Principles of Human Knowledge," he maintained that +there is no material world at all. + +When we examine with care the objects of sense, the "things" which +present themselves to us, he argues, we find that they resolve +themselves into sensations, or "ideas of sense." What can we mean by +the word "apple," if we do not mean the group of experiences in which +alone an apple is presented to us? The word is nothing else than a +name for this group as a group. Take away the color, the hardness, the +odor, the taste; what have we left? And color, hardness, odor, taste, +and anything else that may be referred to any object as a quality, can +exist, he claims, only in a perceiving mind; for such things are +nothing else than sensations, and how can there be an unperceived +sensation? + +The things which we perceive, then, he calls complexes of ideas. Have +we any reason to believe that these ideas, which exist in the mind, are +to be accepted as representatives of things of a different kind, which +are not mental at all? Not a shadow of a reason, says Berkeley; there +is simply no basis for inference at all, and we cannot even make clear +what it is that we are setting out to infer under the name of matter. +We need not, therefore, grieve over the loss of the material world, for +we have suffered no loss; one cannot lose what one has never had. + +Thus, the objects of human knowledge, the only things of which it means +anything to speak, are: (1) Ideas of Sense; (2) Ideas of Memory and +Imagination; (3) The Passions and Operations of the Mind; and (4) The +Self that perceives all These. + +From Locke's position to that of Berkeley was a bold step, and it was +much criticised, as well it might be. It was felt then, as it has been +felt by many down to our own time, that, when we discard an external +world distinct from our ideas, and admit only the world revealed in our +ideas, we really do lose. + +It is legitimate to criticise Berkeley, but it is not legitimate to +misunderstand him; and yet the history of his doctrine may almost be +called a chronicle of misconceptions. It has been assumed that he drew +no distinction between real things and imaginary things, that he made +the world no better than a dream, etc. Arbuthnot, Swift, and a host of +the greater and lesser lights in literature, from his time to ours, +have made merry over the supposed unrealities in the midst of which the +Berkeleian must live. + +But it should be remembered that Berkeley tried hard to do full justice +to the world of things in which we actually find ourselves; not a +hypothetical, inferred, unperceived world, but the world of the things +we actually perceive. He distinguished carefully between what is real +and what is merely imaginary, though he called both "ideas"; and he +recognized something like a system of nature. And, by the argument +from analogy which we have already examined (section 41), he inferred +the existence of other finite minds and of a Divine Mind. + +But just as John Locke had not completely thought out the consequences +which might be deduced from his own doctrines, so Berkeley left, in his +turn, an opening for a successor. It was possible for that acutest of +analysts, David Hume (1711-1776), to treat him somewhat as he had +treated Locke. + +Among the objects of human knowledge Berkeley had included the _self_ +that perceives things. He never succeeded in making at all clear what +he meant by this object; but he regarded it as a substance, and +believed it to be a cause of changes in ideas, and quite different in +its nature from all the ideas attributed to it. But Hume maintained +that when he tried to get a good look at this self, to catch it, so to +speak, and to hold it up to inspection, he could not find anything +whatever save perceptions, memories, and other things of that kind. +The self is, he said, "but a bundle or collection of different +perceptions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and +are in a perpetual flux and movement." + +As for the objects of sense, our own bodies, the chairs upon which we +sit, the tables at which we write, and all the rest--these, argues +Hume, we are impelled by nature to think of as existing continuously, +but we have no evidence whatever to prove that they do thus exist. Are +not the objects of sense, after all, only sensations or impressions? +Do we not experience these sensations or impressions interruptedly? +Who sees or feels a table continuously day after day? If the table is +but a name for the experiences in question, if we have no right to +infer material things behind and distinct from such experiences, are we +not forced to conclude that the existence of the things that we see and +feel is an interrupted one? + +Hume certainly succeeded in raising more questions than he succeeded in +answering. We are compelled to admire the wonderful clearness and +simplicity of his style, and the acuteness of his intellect, in every +chapter. But we cannot help feeling that he does injustice to the +world in which we live, even when we cannot quite see what is wrong. +Does it not seem certain to science and to common sense that there is +an order of nature in some sense independent of our perceptions, so +that objects may be assumed to exist whether we do or do not perceive +them? + +When we read Hume we have a sense that we are robbed of our real +external world; and his account of the mind makes us feel as a badly +tied sheaf of wheat may be conceived to feel--in danger of falling +apart at any moment. Berkeley we unhesitatingly call an _Idealist_, +but whether we shall apply the name to Hume depends upon the extension +we are willing to give to it. His world is a world of what we may +broadly call _ideas_; but the tendencies of his philosophy have led +some to call it a _Skepticism_. + +50. THE REVOLT OF "COMMON SENSE."--Hume's reasonings were too important +to be ignored, and his conclusions too unpalatable to satisfy those who +came after him. It seemed necessary to seek a way of escape out of +this world of mere ideas, which appeared to be so unsatisfactory a +world. One of the most famous of such attempts was that made by the +Scotchman Thomas Reid (1710-1796). + +At one time Reid regarded himself as the disciple of Berkeley, but the +consequences which Hume deduced from the principles laid down by the +former led Reid to feel that he must build upon some wholly different +foundation. He came to the conclusion that the line of philosophers +from Descartes to Hume had made one capital error in assuming "that +nothing is perceived but what is in the mind that perceives it." + +Once admit, says Reid, that the mind perceives nothing save ideas, and +we must also admit that it is impossible to prove the existence either +of an external world or of a mind different from "a bundle of +perceptions." Hence, Reid maintains that we perceive--not infer, but +perceive--_things_ external to the mind. He writes:[2]-- + +"Let a man press his hand against the table--_he feels it hard_. But +what is the meaning of this? The meaning undoubtedly is, that he hath +a certain feeling of touch, from which he concludes, without any +reasoning, or comparing ideas, that there is something external really +existing, whose parts stick so firmly together that they cannot be +displaced without considerable force. + +"There is here a feeling, and a conclusion drawn from it, or some way +suggested by it. In order to compare these, we must view them +separately, and then consider by what tie they are connected, and +wherein they resemble one another. The hardness of the table is the +conclusion, the feeling is the medium by which we are led to that +conclusion. Let a man attend distinctly to this medium, and to the +conclusion, and he will perceive them to be as unlike as any two things +in nature. The one is a sensation of the mind, which can have no +existence but in a sentient being; nor can it exist one moment longer +than it is felt; the other is in the table, and we conclude, without +any difficulty, that it was in the table before it was felt, and +continues after the feeling is over. The one implies no kind of +extension, nor parts, nor cohesion; the other implies all these. Both, +indeed, admit of degrees, and the feeling, beyond a certain degree, is +a species of pain; but adamantine hardness does not imply the least +pain. + +"And as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness, so neither can our +reason perceive the least tie or connection between them; nor will the +logician ever be able to show a reason why we should conclude hardness +from this feeling, rather than softness, or any other quality +whatsoever. But, in reality, all mankind are led by their constitution +to conclude hardness from this feeling." + +It is well worth while to read this extract several times, and to ask +oneself what Reid meant to say, and what he actually said. He is +objecting, be it remembered, to the doctrine that the mind perceives +immediately only its own ideas or sensations and must infer all else. +His contention is that we _perceive_ external things. + +Does he say this? He says that we have feelings of touch _from which +we conclude_ that there is something external; that there is a feeling, +"_and a conclusion drawn from it, or some way suggested by it_;" that +"the hardness of the table is the _conclusion_, and the feeling is the +_medium_ by which we are _led to the conclusion_." + +Could Descartes or Locke have more plainly supported the doctrine of +representative perception? How could Reid imagine he was combatting +that doctrine when he wrote thus? The point in which he differs from +them is this: he maintains that we draw the conclusion in question +without any reasoning, and, indeed, in the absence of any conceivable +reason why we should draw it. We do it instinctively; we are led by +the constitution of our nature. + +In effect Reid says to us: When you lay your hand on the table, you +have a sensation, it is true, but you also know the table is hard. How +do you know it? I cannot tell you; you simply know it, and cannot help +knowing it; and that is the end of the matter. + +Reid's doctrine was not without its effect upon other philosophers. +Among them we must place Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), whose +writings had no little influence upon British philosophy in the last +half of the last century. + +Hamilton complained that Reid did not succeed in being a very good +_Natural Realist_, and that he slipped unconsciously into the position +he was concerned to condemn. Sir William tried to eliminate this +error, but the careful reader of his works will find to his amusement +that this learned author gets his feet upon the same slippery descent. +And much the same thing may be said of the doctrine of Herbert Spencer +(1820-1903), who claims that, when we have a sensation, we know +directly that there is an external thing, and then manages to sublimate +that external thing into an Unknowable, which we not only do not know +directly, but even do not know at all. + +All of these men were anxious to avoid what they regarded as the perils +of Idealism, and yet they seem quite unable to retain a foothold upon +the position which they consider the safer one. + +Reid called his doctrine the philosophy of "Common Sense," and he +thought he was coming back from the subtleties of the metaphysicians to +the standpoint of the plain man. That he should fall into difficulties +and inconsistencies is by no means surprising. As we have seen +(section 12), the thought of the plain man is far from clear. He +certainly believes that we perceive an external world of things, and +the inconsistent way in which Descartes and Locke appeal from ideas to +the things themselves does not strike him as unnatural. Why should not +a man test his ideas by turning to things and comparing the former with +the latter? On the other hand, he knows that to perceive things we +must have sense organs and sensations, and he cannot quarrel with the +psychologists for saying that we know things only in so far as they are +revealed to us through our sensations. How does he reconcile these two +positions? He does not reconcile them. He accepts them as they stand. + +Reid and various other philosophers have tried to come back to "Common +Sense" and to stay there. Now, it is a good position to come back to +for the purpose of starting out again. The experience of the plain +man, the truths which he recognizes as truths, these are not things to +be despised. Many a man whose mind has been, as Berkeley expresses it, +"debauched by learning," has gotten away from them to his detriment, +and has said very unreasonable things. But "Common Sense" cannot be +the ultimate refuge of the philosopher; it can only serve him as +material for investigation. The scholar whose thought is as vague and +inconsistent as that of the plain man has little profit in the fact +that the apparatus of his learning has made it possible for him to be +ponderously and unintelligibly vague and inconsistent. + +Hence, we may have the utmost sympathy with Reid's protest against the +doctrine of representative perception, and we may, nevertheless, +complain that he has done little to explain how it is that we directly +know external things and yet cannot be said to know things except in so +far as we have sensations or ideas. + +51. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.--The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant +(1724-1804), was moved, by the skeptical conclusions to which Hume's +philosophy seemed to lead, to seek a way of escape, somewhat as Reid +was. But he did not take refuge in "Common Sense"; he developed an +ingenious doctrine which has had an enormous influence in the +philosophical world, and has given rise to a Kantian literature of such +proportions that no man can hope to read all of it, even if he devotes +his life to it. In Germany and out of it, it has for a hundred years +and more simply rained books, pamphlets, and articles on Kant and his +philosophy, some of them good, many of them far from clear and far from +original. Hundreds of German university students have taken Kant as +the subject of the dissertation by which they hoped to win the degree +of Doctor of Philosophy;--I was lately offered two hundred and +seventy-four such dissertations in one bunch;--and no student is +supposed to have even a moderate knowledge of philosophy who has not an +acquaintance with that famous work, the "Critique of Pure Reason." + +It is to be expected from the outset that, where so many have found so +much to say, there should reign abundant differences of opinion. There +are differences of opinion touching the interpretation of Kant, and +touching the criticisms which may be made upon, and the development +which should be given to, his doctrine. It is, of course, impossible +to go into all these things here; and I shall do no more than indicate, +in untechnical language and in briefest outline, what he offers us in +place of the philosophy of Hume. + +Kant did not try to refute, as did Reid, the doctrine, urged by +Descartes and by his successors, that all those things which the mind +directly perceives are to be regarded as complexes of ideas. On the +contrary, he accepted it, and he has made the words "phenomenon" and +"noumenon" household words in philosophy. + +The world which seems to be spread out before us in space and time is, +he tells us, a world of things _as they are revealed to our senses and +our intelligence_; it is a world of manifestations, of phenomena. What +things-in-themselves are like we have no means of knowing; we know only +things as they appear to us. We may, to be sure, talk of a something +distinct from phenomena, a something not revealed to the senses, but +thought of, a _noumenon_; but we should not forget that this is a +negative conception; there is nothing in our experience that can give +it a filling, for our experience is only of phenomena. The reader will +find an unmistakable echo of this doctrine in Herbert Spencer's +doctrine of the "Unknowable" and its "manifestations." + +Now, Berkeley had called all the things we immediately perceive +_ideas_. As we have seen, he distinguished between "ideas of sense" +and "ideas of memory and imagination." Hume preferred to give to these +two classes different names--he called the first _impressions_ and the +second _ideas_. + +The associations of the word "impression" are not to be mistaken. +Locke had taught that between ideas in the memory and genuine +sensations there is the difference that the latter are due to the +"brisk acting" of objects without us. Objects impress us, and we have +sensations or impressions. To be sure, Hume, after employing the word +"impression," goes on to argue that we have no evidence that there are +external objects, which cause impressions. But he retains the word +"impression," nevertheless, and his use of it perceptibly colors his +thought. + +In Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena we have the lineal +descendant of the old distinction between the circle of our ideas and +the something outside of them that causes them and of which they are +supposed to give information. Hume said we have no reason to believe +such a thing exists, but are impelled by our nature to believe in it. +Kant is not so much concerned to prove the nonexistence of noumena, +things-in-themselves, as he is to prove that the very conception is an +empty one. His reasonings seem to result in the conclusion that we can +make no intelligible statement about things so cut off from our +experience as noumena are supposed to be; and one would imagine that he +would have felt impelled to go on to the frank declaration that we have +no reason to believe in noumena at all, and had better throw away +altogether so meaningless and useless a notion. But he was a +conservative creature, and he did not go quite so far. + +So far there is little choice between Kant and Hume. Certainly the +former does not appear to have rehabilitated the external world which +had suffered from the assaults of his predecessors. What important +difference is there between his doctrine and that of the man whose +skeptical tendencies he wished to combat? + +The difference is this: Descartes and Locke had accounted for our +knowledge of things by maintaining that things act upon us, and make an +impression or sensation--that their action, so to speak, begets ideas. +This is a very ancient doctrine as well as a very modern one; it is the +doctrine that most men find reasonable even before they devote +themselves to the study of philosophy. The totality of such +impressions received from the external world, they are accustomed to +regard as our _experience_ of external things; and they are inclined to +think that any knowledge of external things not founded upon experience +can hardly deserve the name of knowledge. + +Now, Hume, when he cast doubt upon the existence of external things, +did not, as I have said above, divest himself of the suggestions of the +word "impression." He insists strenuously that all our knowledge is +founded upon experience; and he holds that no experience can give us +knowledge that is necessary and universal. We know things as they are +revealed to us in our experience; but who can guarantee that we may not +have new experiences of a quite different kind, and which flatly +contradict the notions which we have so far attained of what is +possible and impossible, true and untrue. + +It is here that Kant takes issue with Hume. A survey of our knowledge +makes clear, he thinks, that we are in the possession of a great deal +of information that is not of the unsatisfactory kind that, according +to Hume, all our knowledge of things must be. There, for example, are +all the truths of mathematics. When we enunciate a truth regarding the +relations of the lines and angles of a triangle, we are not merely +unfolding in the predicate of our proposition what was implicitly +contained in the subject. There are propositions that do no more than +this; they are _analytical_, _i.e._ they merely analyze the subject. +Thus, when we say: Man is a rational animal, we may merely be defining +the word "man"--unpacking it, so to speak. But a _synthetic_ judgment +is one in which the predicate is not contained in the subject; it adds +to one's information. The mathematical truths are of this character. +So also is the truth that everything that happens must have a cause. + +Do we connect things with one another in this way merely because we +have had _experience_ that they are thus connected? Is it because they +are _given_ to us connected in this way? That cannot be the case, Kant +argues, for what is taken up as mere experienced act cannot be known as +universally and necessarily true. We perceive that these things _must_ +be so connected. How shall we explain this necessity? + +We can only explain it, said Kant, in this way: We must assume that +what is given us from without is merely the raw material of sensation, +the _matter_ of our experience; and that the ordering of this matter, +the arranging it into a world of phenomena, the furnishing of _form_, +is the work of the mind. Thus, we must think of space, time, +causality, and of all other relations which obtain between the elements +of our experience, as due to the nature of the mind. It perceives the +world of phenomena that it does, because it _constructs_ that world. +Its knowledge of things is stable and dependable because it cannot know +any phenomenon which does not conform to its laws. The water poured +into a cup must take the shape of the cup; and the raw materials poured +into a mind must take the form of an orderly world, spread out in space +and time. + +Kant thought that with this turn he had placed human knowledge upon a +satisfactory basis, and had, at the same time, indicated the +limitations of human knowledge. If the world we perceive is a world +which we make; if the forms of thought furnished by the mind have no +other function than the ordering of the materials furnished by sense; +then what can we say of that which may be beyond phenomena? What of +_noumena_? + +It seems clear that, on Kant's principles, we ought not to be able to +say anything whatever of _noumena_. To say that such may exist appears +absurd. All conceivable connection between them and existing things as +we know them is cut off. We cannot think of a noumenon as a +_substance_, for the notions of substance and quality have been +declared to be only a scheme for the ordering of phenomena. Nor can we +think of one as a cause of the sensations that we unite into a world, +for just the same reason. We are shut up logically to the world of +phenomena, and that world of phenomena is, after all, the successor of +the world of ideas advocated by Berkeley. + +This is not the place to discuss at length the value of Kant's +contribution to philosophy.[3] There is something terrifying in the +prodigious length at which it seems possible for men to discuss it. +Kant called his doctrine "Criticism," because it undertook to establish +the nature and limits of our knowledge. By some he has been hailed as +a great enlightener, and by others he has been accused of being as +dogmatic in his assumptions as those whom he disapproved. + +But one thing he certainly has accomplished. He has made the words +"phenomena" and "noumena" familiar to us all, and he has induced a vast +number of men to accept it as established fact that it is not worth +while to try to extend our knowledge beyond phenomena. One sees his +influence in the writings of men who differ most widely from one +another. + + +[1] "Essay," Book IV, Chapter XI, section 7. + +[2] "An Inquiry into the Human Mind," Chapter V, section 5. + +[3] The reader will find a criticism of the Critical Philosophy in +Chapter XV. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +REALISM AND IDEALISM + +52. REALISM.--The plain man is a realist. That is to say, he believes +in a world which is not to be identified with his own ideas or those of +any other mind. At the same time, as we have seen (section 12), the +distinction between the mind and the world is by no means clear to him. +It is not difficult, by judicious questioning, to set his feet upon the +slippery descent that shoots a man into idealism. + +The vague realism of the plain man may be called _Naïve_ or +_Unreflective Realism_. It has been called by some _Natural Realism_, +but the latter term is an unfortunate one. It is, of course, natural +for the unreflective man to be unreflective, but, on the other hand, it +is also natural for the reflective man to be reflective. Besides, in +dubbing any doctrine "natural," we are apt to assume that doctrines +contrasted with it may properly be called "unnatural" or "artificial." +It is an ancient rhetorical device, to obtain sympathy for a cause in +which one may happen to be interested by giving it a taking name; but +it is a device frowned upon by logic and by good sense. + +One kind of realism is, then, naïve realism. It is the position from +which we all set out, when we begin to reflect upon the system of +things. It is the position to which some try to come back, when their +reflections appear to be leading them into strange or unwelcome paths. + +We have seen how Thomas Reid (section 50) recoiled from the conclusions +to which the reasonings of the philosophers had brought him, and tried +to return to the position of the plain man. The attempt was a failure, +and was necessarily a failure, for Reid tried to come back to the +position of the plain man _and still be a philosopher_. He tried to +live in a cloud and, nevertheless, to see clearly--a task not easy to +accomplish. + +It should be remarked, however, that he tried, at least, to insist that +we know the external world _directly_. We may divide realists into two +broad classes, those who hold to this view, and those who maintain that +we know it only indirectly and through our ideas. + +The plain man belongs, of course, to the first class, if it is just to +speak of a man who says inconsistent things as being wholly in any one +class. Certainly he is willing to assert that the ground upon which he +stands and the staff in his hand are perceived by him directly. + +But we are compelled to recognize that there are subdivisions in this +first class of realists. Reid tried to place himself beside the plain +man and failed to do so. Hamilton (section 50) tried also, and he is +not to be classed precisely either with the plain man or with Reid. He +informs us that the object as it appears to us is a composite something +to the building up of which the knowing mind contributes its share, the +medium through which the object is perceived its share, and the object +in itself its share. He suggests, by way of illustration, that the +external object may contribute one third. This seems to make, at +least, _something_ external directly known. But, on the other hand, he +maintains that the mind knows immediately only what is in immediate +contact with the bodily organ--with the eyes, with the hands, etc.; and +he believes it knows this immediately because it is actually present in +all parts of the body. And, further, in distinguishing as he does +between existence "as it is in itself" and existence "as it is revealed +to us," and in shutting us up to the latter, he seems to rob us even of +the modicum of externality that he has granted us. + +I have already mentioned Herbert Spencer (section 50) as a man not +without sympathy for the attempt to rehabilitate the external world. +He is very severe with the "insanities" of idealism. He is not willing +even to take the first step toward it. + +He writes:[1] "The postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out +is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations--that we +certainly know we have these, and that if there be anything beyond +these serving as cause for them, it can be known only by inference from +them. + +"I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if I call in +question this postulate; and the surprise will rise into astonishment +if I distinctly deny it. Yet I must do this. Limiting the proposition +to those epiperipheral feelings produced in us by external objects (for +these are alone in question), I see no alternative but to affirm that +the thing primarily known is not that a sensation has been experienced, +but that there exists an outer object." + +According to this, the outer object is not known through an inference; +it is known directly. But do not be in haste to class Spencer with the +plain man, or with Reid. Listen to a citation once before made +(section 22), but worth repeating in this connection: "When we are +taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, +cannot be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions +produced on us, we are yet, by the relativity of thought, compelled to +think of these in relation to a cause--the notion of a real existence +which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved +that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is +inconsistent with itself,--that matter, however conceived by us, cannot +be matter as it actually is,--our conception, though transfigured, is +not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far +as possible from those special forms under which it was before +represented in thought." + +It is interesting to place the two extracts side by side. In the one, +we are told that we do not know external objects by an inference from +our sensations; in the other we are taught that the piece of matter +which we regard as existing externally cannot be really known; that we +can know only certain impressions produced on us, and must refer them +to a cause; that this cause cannot be what we think it. It is +difficult for the man who reads such statements not to forget that +Spencer regarded himself as a realist who held to a direct knowledge of +something external. + +There are, as it is evident, many sorts of realists that may be +gathered into the first class mentioned above--men who, however +inconsistent they may be, try, at least, to maintain that our knowledge +of the external world is a direct one. And it is equally true that +there are various sorts of realists that may be put into the second +class. + +These men have been called _Hypothetical Realists_. In the last +chapter it was pointed out that Descartes and Locke belong to this +class. Both of these men believed in an external world, but believed +that its existence is a thing to be inferred. + +Now, when a man has persuaded himself that the mind can know directly +only its own ideas, and must infer the world which they are supposed to +represent, he may conceive of that external world in three different +ways. + +(1) He may believe that what corresponds to his idea of a material +object, for example, an apple, is in very many respects like the idea +in his mind. Thus, he may believe that the odor, taste, color, +hardness, etc., that he perceives directly, or as ideas, have +corresponding to them real external odor, taste, color, hardness, etc. +It is not easy for a man to hold to this position, for a very little +reflection seems to make it untenable; but it is theoretically possible +for one to take it, and probably many persons have inclined to the view +when they have first been tempted to believe that the mind perceives +directly only its ideas. + +(2) He may believe that such things as colors, tastes, and odors cannot +be qualities of external bodies at all, but are only effects, produced +upon our minds by something very different in kind. We seem to +perceive bodies, he may argue, to be colored, to have taste, and to be +odorous; but what we thus perceive is not the external thing; the +external thing that produces these appearances cannot be regarded as +having anything more than "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, +and number." Thus did Locke reason. To him the external world as it +really exists, is, so to speak, a paler copy of the external world as +we seem to perceive it. It is a world with fewer qualities, but, +still, a world with qualities of some kind. + +(3) But one may go farther than this. One may say: How can I know that +even the extension, number, and motion of the things which I directly +perceive have corresponding to them extension, number, and motion, in +an outer world? If what is not colored can cause me to perceive color, +why may not that which is not extended cause me to perceive extension? +And, moved by such reflections, one may maintain that there exists +outside of us that which we can only characterize as an Unknown Cause, +a Reality which we cannot more nearly define. + +This last position resembles very closely one side of Spencer's +doctrine--that represented in the last of the two citations, as the +reader can easily see. It is the position of the follower of Immanuel +Kant who has not yet repudiated the noumenon or thing-in-itself +discussed in the last chapter (section 51). + +I am not concerned to defend any one of the varieties of Direct or of +Hypothetical Realism portrayed above. But I wish to point out that +they all have some sort of claim to the title _Realism_, and to remind +the reader that, when we call a man a realist, we do not do very much +in the way of defining his position. I may add that the account of the +external world contained in Chapter IV is a sort of realism also. + +If this last variety, which I advocate, _must_ be classified, let it be +placed in the first broad class, for it teaches that we know the +external world directly. But I sincerely hope that it will not be +judged wholly by the company it keeps, and that no one will assign to +it either virtues or defects to which it can lay no just claim. + +Before leaving the subject of realism it is right that I should utter a +note of warning touching one very common source of error. It is +fatally easy for men to be misled by the names which are applied to +things. Sir William Hamilton invented for a certain type of +metaphysical doctrine the offensive epithet "nihilism." It is a type +which appeals to many inoffensive and pious men at the present day, +some of whom prefer to call themselves idealists. Many have been +induced to become "free-willists" because the name has suggested to +them a proper regard for that freedom which is justly dear to all men. +We can scarcely approach with an open mind an account of ideas and +sensations which we hear described as "sensationalism," or worse yet, +as "sensualism." When a given type of philosophy is set down as +"dogmatism," we involuntarily feel a prejudice against it. + +He who reads as reflectively as he should will soon find out that +philosophers "call names" much as other men do, and that one should +always be on one's guard. "Every form of phenomenalism," asseverated a +learned and energetic old gentleman, who for many years occupied a +chair in one of our leading institutions of learning, "necessarily +leads to atheism." He inspired a considerable number of students with +such a horror for "phenomenalism" that they never took pains to find +out what it was. + +I mention these things in this connection, because I suspect that not a +few in our own day are unduly influenced by the associations which +cling to the words "realism" and "idealism." Realism in literature, as +many persons understand it, means the degradation of literature to the +portrayal of what is coarse and degrading, in a coarse and offensive +way. Realism in painting often means the laborious representation upon +canvas of things from which we would gladly avert our eyes if we met +them in real life. With the word "idealism," on the other hand, we are +apt to connect the possession of ideals, a regard for what is best and +noblest in life and literature. + +The reader must have seen that realism in the philosophic sense of the +word has nothing whatever to do with realism in the senses just +mentioned. The word is given a special meaning, and it is a weakness +to allow associations drawn from other senses of the word to color our +judgment when we use it. + +And it should be carefully held in view that the word "idealism" is +given a special sense when it is used to indicate a type of doctrine +contrasted with the doctrine of the realist. Some forms of +philosophical idealism have undoubtedly been inspiring; but some have +been, and are, far from inspiring. They should not be allowed to +posture as saints merely because they are cloaked with an ambiguous +name. + +53. IDEALISM.--Idealism we may broadly define as the doctrine that all +existence is mental existence. So far from regarding the external +world as beyond and independent of mind, it maintains that it can have +its being only in consciousness. + +We have seen (section 49) how men were led to take the step to +idealism. It is not a step which the plain man is impelled to take +without preparation. To say that the real world of things in which we +perceive ourselves to live and move is a something that exists only in +the mind strikes him as little better than insane. He who becomes an +idealist usually does so, I think, after weighing the arguments +presented by the hypothetical realist, and finding that they seem to +carry one farther than the latter appears to recognize. + +The type of idealism represented by Berkeley has been called +_Subjective Idealism_. Ordinarily our use of the words "subjective" +and "objective" is to call attention to the distinction between what +belongs to the mind and what belongs to the external order of things. +My sensations are subjective, they are referred to my mind, and it is +assumed that they can have no existence except in my mind; the +qualities of things are regarded as objective, that is, it is commonly +believed that they exist independently of my perception of them. + +Of course, when a man becomes an idealist, he cannot keep just this +distinction. The question may, then, fairly be raised: How can he be a +_subjective idealist_? Has not the word "subjective" lost its +significance? + +To this one has to answer: It has, and it has not. The man who, with +strict consistency, makes the desk at which he sits as much his "idea" +as is the pain in his finger or his memory of yesterday, cannot keep +hold of the distinction of subjective and objective. But men are not +always as consistent as this. Remember the illustration of the +"telephone exchange" (section 14). The mind is represented as situated +at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves; and then brain, nerves, +and all else are turned into ideas in this mind, which are merely +"projected outwards." + +Now, in placing the mind at a definite location in the world, and +contrasting it with the world, we retain the distinction between +subjective and objective--what is in the mind can be distinguished from +what is beyond it. On the other hand, in making the whole system of +external things a complex of ideas in the mind, we become idealists, +and repudiate realism. The position is an inconsistent one, of course, +but it is possible for men to take it, for men have taken it often +enough. + +The idealism of Professor Pearson (section 14) is more palpably +subjective than that of Berkeley, for the latter never puts the mind in +a "telephone exchange." Nevertheless, he names the objects of sense, +which other men call material things, "ideas," and he evidently +assimilates them to what we commonly call ideas and contrast with +things. Moreover, he holds them in some of the contempt which men +reserve for "mere ideas," for he believes that idolaters might be +induced to give over worshiping the heavenly bodies could they be +persuaded that these are nothing more than their own ideas. + +With the various forms of subjective idealism it is usual to contrast +the doctrine of _Objective Idealism_. This does not maintain that the +world which I perceive is my "idea"; it maintains that the world is +"idea." + +It is rather a nice question, and one which no man should decide +without a careful examination of the whole matter, whether we have any +right to retain the word "idea" when we have rubbed out the distinction +which is usually drawn between ideas and external things. If we +maintain that all men are always necessarily selfish, we stretch the +meaning of the word quite beyond what is customary, and selfishness +becomes a thing we have no reason to disapprove, since it characterizes +saint and sinner alike. Similarly, if we decide to name "idea," not +only what the plain man and the realist admit to have a right to that +name, but also the great system which these men call an external +material world, it seems right to ask; Why use the word "idea" at all? +What does it serve to indicate? Not a distinction, surely, for the +word seems to be applicable to all things without distinction. + +Such considerations as these lead me to object to the expression +"objective idealism": if the doctrine is really _objective_, _i.e._ if +it recognizes a system of things different and distinct from what men +commonly call ideas, it scarcely seems to have a right to the title +_idealism_; and if it is really _idealism_, and does not rob the word +idea of all significance, it can scarcely be _objective_ in any proper +sense of the word. + +Manifestly, there is need of a very careful analysis of the meaning of +the word "idea," and of the proper significance of the terms +"subjective" and "objective," if error is to be avoided and language +used soberly and accurately. Those who are not in sympathy with the +doctrine of the objective idealists think that in such careful analysis +and accurate statement they are rather conspicuously lacking. + +We think of Hegel (1770-1831) as the typical objective idealist. It is +not easy to give an accurate account of his doctrine, for he is far +from a clear writer, and he has made it possible for his many admirers +to understand him in many ways. But he seems to have accepted the +system of things that most men call the real external world, and to +have regarded it as the Divine Reason in its self-development. And +most of those whom we would to-day be inclined to gather together under +the title of objective idealists appear to have been much influenced, +directly or indirectly, by his philosophy. There are, however, great +differences of opinion among them, and no man should be made +responsible for the opinions of the class as a class. + +I have said a few pages back that some forms of idealism are inspiring, +and that some are not. + +Bishop Berkeley called the objects of sense ideas. He regarded all +ideas as inactive, and thought that all changes in ideas--and this +includes all the changes that take place in nature--must be referred to +the activity of minds. Some of those changes he could refer to finite +minds, his own and others. Most of them he could not, and he felt +impelled to refer them to a Divine Mind. Hence, the world became to +him a constant revelation of God; and he uses the word "God" in no +equivocal sense. It does not signify to him the system of things as a +whole, or an Unknowable, or anything of the sort. It signifies a +spirit akin to his own, but without its limitations. He writes:[2]-- + +"A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an +idea; when, therefore, we see the color, size, figure, and motions of a +man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own +minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct +collections serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and +created spirits like ourselves. Hence, it is plain we do not see a +man,--if by _man_ is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and +thinks as we do,--but only such a certain collection of ideas as +directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and +motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And +after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas +some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular +human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in +all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity--everything we see, +hear, feel, or any wise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of +the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are +produced by men." + +With Berkeley's view of the world as a constant revelation of God, many +men will sympathize who have little liking for his idealism as +idealism. They may criticise in detail his arguments to prove the +nonexistence of a genuinely external world, but they will be ready to +admit that his doctrine is an inspiring one in the view that it takes +of the world and of man. + +With this I wish to contrast the doctrine of another idealist, Mr. +Bradley, whose work, "Appearance and Reality," has been much discussed +in the last few years, in order that the reader may see how widely +different forms of idealism may differ from each other, and how absurd +it is to praise or blame a man's philosophy merely on the ground that +it is idealistic. + +Mr. Bradley holds that those aspects of our experience which we are +accustomed to regard as real--qualities of things, the relations +between things, the things themselves, space, time, motion, causation, +activity, the self--turn out when carefully examined to be +self-contradictory and absurd. They are not real; they are +unrealities, mere appearances. + +But these appearances exist, and, hence, must belong to reality. This +reality must be sentient, for "there is no being or fact outside of +that which is commonly called psychical existence." + +Now, what is this reality with which appearances--the whole world of +things which seem to be given in our experience--are contrasted? Mr. +Bradley calls it the Absolute, and indicates that it is what other men +recognize as the Deity. How shall we conceive it? + +We are told that we are to conceive it as consisting of the contents of +finite minds, or "centers of experience," subjected to "an +all-pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all material." In the +Absolute, finite things are "transmuted" and lose "their individual +natures." + +What does this mean in plain language? It means that there are many +finite minds of a higher and of a lower order, "centers of experience," +and that the contents of these are unreal appearances. There is not a +God or Absolute outside of and distinct from these, but rather one that +in some sense _is their reality_. This mass of unrealities transfused +and transmuted so that no one of them retains its individual nature is +the Absolute. That is to say, time must become indistinguishable from +space, space from motion, motion from the self, the self from the +qualities of things, etc., before they are fit to become constituents +of the Absolute and to be regarded as real. + +As the reader has seen, this Absolute has nothing in common with the +God in which Berkeley believed, and in which the plain man usually +believes. It is the night in which all cats are gray, and there +appears to be no reason why any one should harbor toward it the least +sentiment of awe or veneration. + +Whether such reasonings as Mr. Bradley's should be accepted as valid or +should not, must be decided after a careful examination into the +foundations upon which they rest and the consistency with which +inferences are drawn from premises. I do not wish to prejudge the +matter. But it is worth while to set forth the conclusions at which he +arrives, that it may be clearly realized that the associations which +often hang about the word "idealism" should be carefully stripped away +when we are forming our estimate of this or that philosophical doctrine. + + +[1] "Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chapter VI, section 404. + +[2] "Principles," section 148. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +MONISM AND DUALISM + +54. THE MEANING OF THE WORDS.--In common life men distinguish between +minds and material things, thus dividing the things, which taken +together make up the world as we know it, into two broad classes. They +think of minds as being very different from material objects, and of +the latter as being very different from minds. It does not occur to +them to find in the one class room for the other, nor does it occur to +them to think of both classes as "manifestations" or "aspects" of some +one "underlying reality." In other words, the plain man to-day is a +_Dualist_. + +In the last chapter (section 52) I have called him a Naïve Realist; and +here I shall call him a _Naïve Dualist_, for a man may regard mind and +matter as quite distinct kinds of things, without trying to elevate his +opinion, through reflection, into a philosophical doctrine. The +reflective man may stand by the opinion of the plain man, merely trying +to make less vague and indefinite the notions of matter and of mind. +He then becomes a _Philosophical Dualist_. There are several varieties +of this doctrine, and I shall consider them a little later (section 58). + +But it is possible for one to be less profoundly impressed by the +differences which characterize matter and mind. One may feel inclined +to refer mental phenomena to matter, and to deny them the prominence +accorded them by the dualist. On the other hand, one may be led by +one's reflections to resolve material objects into mere ideas, and to +claim that they can have no existence except in a mind. Finally, it is +possible to hold that both minds and material things, as we know them, +are only manifestations, phenomena, and that they must be referred to +an ulterior "reality" or "substance." One may claim that they are +"aspects" of the one reality, which is neither matter nor mind. + +These doctrines are different forms of _Monism_. In whatever else they +differ from one another, they agree in maintaining that the universe +does not contain two kinds of things fundamentally different. Out of +the duality of things as it seems to be revealed to the plain man they +try to make some kind of a unity. + +35. MATERIALISM.--The first of the forms of monism above mentioned is +_Materialism_. It is not a doctrine to which the first impulse of the +plain man leads him at the present time. Even those who have done no +reading in philosophy have inherited many of their ways of looking at +things from the thinkers who lived in the ages past, and whose opinions +have become the common property of civilized men. For more than two +thousand years the world and the mind have been discussed, and it is +impossible for any of us to escape from the influence of those +discussions and to look at things with the primitive simplicity of the +wholly untutored. + +But it was not always so. There was a time when men who were not +savages, but possessed great intellectual vigor and much cultivation, +found it easy and natural to be materialists. This I have spoken of +before (section 30), but it will repay us to take up again a little +more at length the clearest of the ancient forms of materialism, that +of the Atomists, and to see what may be said for and against it. + +Democritus of Abdera taught that nothing exists except atoms and empty +space. The atoms, he maintained, differ from one another in size, +shape, and position. In other respects they are alike. They have +always been in motion. Perhaps he conceived of that motion as +originally a fall through space, but there seems to be uncertainty upon +this point. However, the atoms in motion collide with one another, and +these collisions result in mechanical combinations from which spring +into being world-systems. + +According to this doctrine, nothing comes from nothing, and nothing can +become nonexistent. All the changes which have ever taken place in the +world are only changes in the position of material particles--they are +regroupings of atoms. We cannot directly perceive them to be such, for +our senses are too dull to make such fine observations, but our reason +tells us that such is the case. + +Where, in such a world as this, is there room for mind, and what can we +mean by mind? Democritus finds a place for mind by conceiving it to +consist of fine, smooth, round atoms, which are the same as the atoms +which constitute fire. These are distributed through the whole body, +and lie among the other atoms which compose it. They are inhaled with +and exhaled into the outer air. While they are in the body their +functions are different according as they are located in this organ or +in that. In the brain they give rise to thought, in the heart to +anger, and in the liver to desire. + +I suppose no one would care, at the present time, to become a +Democritean. The "Reason," which tells us that the mind consists of +fine, round atoms, appears to have nothing but its bare word to offer +us. But, apart from this, a peculiar difficulty seems to face us; even +supposing there are atoms of fire in the brain, the heart, and the +liver, what are the _thought_, _anger_, and _desire_, of which mention +is made? + +Shall we conceive of these last as atoms, as void space, or as the +motion of atoms? There really seems to be no place in the world for +them, and _these are the mind so far as the mind appears to be +revealed_--they are _mental phenomena_. It does not seem that they are +to be identified with anything that the Atomistic doctrine admits as +existing. They are simply overlooked. + +Is the modern materialism more satisfactory? About half a century ago +there was in the scientific world something like a revival of +materialistic thinking. It did not occur to any one to maintain that +the mind consists of fine atoms disseminated through the body, but +statements almost as crude were made. It was said, for example, that +the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. + +It seems a gratuitous labor to criticise such statements as these in +detail. There are no glands the secretions of which are not as +unequivocally material as are the glands themselves. This means that +such secretions can be captured and analyzed; the chemical elements of +which they are composed can be enumerated. They are open to inspection +in precisely the same way as are the glands which secrete them. + +Does it seem reasonable to maintain that thoughts and feelings are +related to brains in this way? Does the chemist ever dream of +collecting them in a test tube, and of drawing up for us a list of +their constituent elements? When the brain is active, there are, to be +sure, certain material products which pass into the blood and are +finally eliminated from the body; but among these products no one would +be more surprised than the materialist to discover pains and pleasures, +memories and anticipations, desires and volitions. This talk of +thought as a "secretion" we can afford to set aside. + +Nor need we take much more seriously the seemingly more sober statement +that thought is a "function" of the brain. There is, of course, a +sense in which we all admit the statement; minds are not disembodied, +and we have reason to believe that mind and brain are most intimately +related. But the word "function" is used in a very broad and loose +sense when it serves to indicate this relation; and one may employ it +in this way without being a materialist at all. In a stricter sense of +the word, the brain has no functions that may not be conceived as +mechanical changes,--as the motion of atoms in space,--and to identify +mental phenomena with these is inexcusable. It is not theoretically +inconceivable that, with finer senses, we might directly perceive the +motions of the atoms in another man's brain; it is inconceivable that +we should thus directly perceive his melancholy or his joy; they belong +to another world. + +56. SPIRITUALISM.--The name _Spiritualism_ is sometimes given to the +doctrine that there is no existence which we may not properly call mind +or spirit. It errs in the one direction as materialism errs in the +other. + +One must not confound with this doctrine that very different one, +Spiritism, which teaches that a certain favored class of persons called +mediums may bring back the spirits of the departed and enable us to +hold communication with them. Such beliefs have always existed among +the common people, but they have rarely interested philosophers. I +shall have nothing to say of them in this book. + +There have been various kinds of spiritualists. The name may be +applied to the idealists, from Berkeley down to those of our day; at +some of the varieties of their doctrine we have taken a glance +(sections 49, 53). To these we need not recur; but there is one type +of spiritualistic doctrine which is much discussed at the present day +and which appears to appeal strongly to a number of scientific men. We +must consider it for a moment. + +We have examined Professor Clifford's doctrine of Mind-stuff (section +43). Clifford maintained that all the material things we perceive are +our perceptions--they are in our consciousness, and are not properly +external at all. But, believing, as he did, that all nature is +animated, he held that every material thing, every perception, may be +taken as a revelation of something not in our consciousness, of a mind +or, at least, of a certain amount of mind-stuff. How shall we conceive +the relation between what is in our mind and the something +corresponding to it not in our mind? + +We must, says Clifford, regard the latter as the _reality_ of which the +former is the _appearance_ or _manifestation_. "What I perceive as +your brain is really in itself your consciousness, is You; but then +that which I call your brain, the material fact, is merely my +perception." + +This doctrine is _Panpsychism_, in the form in which it is usually +brought to our attention. It holds that the only real existences are +minds, and that physical phenomena must be regarded as the +manifestations under which these real existences make us aware of their +presence. The term panpsychism may, it is true, be used in a somewhat +different sense. It may be employed merely to indicate the doctrine +that all nature is animated, and without implying a theory as to the +relation between bodies perceived and the minds supposed to accompany +them. + +What shall we say to panpsychism of the type represented by Clifford? +It is, I think, sufficiently answered in the earlier chapters of this +volume:-- + +(1) If I call material facts my perceptions, I do an injustice to the +distinction between the physical and the mental (Chapter IV). + +(2) If I say that all nature is animated, I extend illegitimately the +argument for other minds (Chapter X). + +(3) If I say that mind is the reality of which the brain is the +appearance, I misconceive what is meant by the distinction between +appearance and reality (Chapter V). + +57. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ONE SUBSTANCE.--In the seventeenth century +Descartes maintained that, although mind and matter may justly be +regarded as two substances, yet it should be recognized that they are +not really independent substances in the strictest sense of the word, +but that there is only one substance, in this sense, and mind and +matter are, as it were, its attributes. + +His thought was that by attribute we mean that which is not +independent, but must be referred to something else; by substance, we +mean that which exists independently and is not referred to any other +thing. It seemed to follow that there could be only one substance. + +Spinoza modified Descartes' doctrine in that he refused to regard mind +and matter as substances at all. He made them unequivocally attributes +of the one and only substance, which he called God. + +The thought which influenced Spinoza had impressed many minds before +his time, and it has influenced many since. One need not follow him in +naming the unitary something to which mind and matter are referred +substance. One may call it Being, or Reality, or the Unknowable, or +Energy, or the Absolute, or, perhaps, still something else. The +doctrine has taken many forms, but he who reads with discrimination +will see that the various forms have much in common. + +They agree in maintaining that matter and mind, as they are revealed in +our experience, are not to be regarded as, in the last analysis, two +distinct kinds of thing. They are, rather, modes or manifestations of +one and the same thing, and this is not to be confounded with either. + +Those who incline to this doctrine take issue with the materialist, who +assimilates mental phenomena to physical; and they oppose the idealist, +who assimilates physical phenomena to mental, and calls material things +"ideas." We have no right, they argue, to call that of which ideas and +things are manifestations either mind or matter. It is to be +distinguished from both. + +To this doctrine the title of _Monism_ is often appropriated. In this +chapter I have used the term in a broader sense, for both the +materialist and the spiritualist maintain that there is in the universe +but one kind of thing. Nevertheless, when we hear a man called a +monist without qualification, we may, perhaps, be justified in +assuming, in the absence of further information, that he holds to some +one of the forms of doctrine indicated above. There may be no logical +justification for thus narrowing the use of the term, but logical +justification goes for little in such matters. + +Various considerations have moved men to become monists in this sense +of the word. Some have been influenced by the assumption--one which +men felt impelled to make early in the history of speculative +thought--that the whole universe must be the expression of some unitary +principle. A rather different argument is well illustrated in the +writings of Professor Höffding, a learned and acute writer of our own +time. It has influenced so many that it is worth while to delay upon +it. + +Professor Höffding holds that mental phenomena and physical phenomena +must be regarded as parallel (see Chapter IX), and that we must not +conceive of ideas and material things as interacting. He writes:[1]-- + +"If it is contrary to the doctrine of the persistence of physical +energy to suppose a transition from the one province to the other, and +if, nevertheless, the two provinces exist in our experience as +distinct, then the two sets of phenomena must be unfolded +simultaneously, each according to its laws, so that for every +phenomenon in the world of consciousness there is a corresponding +phenomenon in the world of matter, and conversely (so far as there is +reason to suppose that conscious life is correlated with material +phenomena). The parallels already drawn point directly to such a +relation; it would be an amazing accident, if, while the characteristic +marks repeated themselves in this way, there were not at the foundation +an inner connection. Both the _parallelism_ and the _proportionality_ +between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an +_identity_ at bottom. The difference which remains in spite of the +points of agreement compels us to suppose that one and the same +principle has found its expression in a double form. We have no right +to take mind and body for two beings or substances in reciprocal +interaction. We are, on the contrary, impelled to conceive the +material interaction between the elements composing the brain and +nervous system _as an outer form of the inner ideal unity of +consciousness_. What we in our inner experience become conscious of as +thought, feeling, and resolution, is thus represented in the material +world by certain material processes of the brain, which as such are +subject to the law of the persistence of energy, although this law +cannot be applied to the relation between cerebral and conscious +processes. It is as though the same thing were said in two languages." + +Some monists are in the habit of speaking of the one Being to which +they refer phenomena of all sorts as the "Absolute." The word is a +vague one, and means very different things in different philosophies. +It has been somewhat broadly defined as "the ultimate principle of +explanation of the universe." He who turns to one principle of +explanation will conceive the Absolute in one way, and he who turns to +another will, naturally, understand something else by the word. + +Thus, the idealist may conceive of the Absolute as an all-inclusive +Mind, of which finite minds are parts. To Spencer, it is the +Unknowable, a something behind the veil of phenomena. Sometimes it +means to a writer much the same thing that the word God means to other +men; sometimes it has a significance at the farthest remove from this +(section 53). Indeed, the word is so vague and ambiguous, and has +proved itself the mother of so many confusions, that it would seem a +desirable thing to drop it out of philosophy altogether, and to +substitute for it some less ambiguous expression. + +It seems clear from the preceding pages, that, before one either +accepts or rejects monism, one should very carefully determine just +what one means by the word, and should scrutinize the considerations +which may be urged in favor of the particular doctrine in question. +There are all sorts of monism, and men embrace them for all sorts of +reasons. Let me beg the reader to bear in mind;-- + +(1) The monist may be a materialist; he may be an idealist; he may be +neither. In the last case, he may, with Spinoza, call the one +Substance God; that is, he may be a Pantheist. On the other hand, he +may, with Spencer, call it the Unknowable, and be an Agnostic. Other +shades of opinion are open to him, if he cares to choose them. + +(2) It does not seem wise to assent hastily to such statements as; "The +universe is the manifestation of one unitary Being"; or: "Mind and +matter are the expression of one and the same principle." We find +revealed in our experience mental phenomena and physical phenomena. In +what sense they are one, or whether they are one in any sense,--this is +something to be determined by an examination of the phenomena and of +the relations in which we find them. It may turn out that the universe +is one only in the sense that all phenomena belong to the one orderly +system. If we find that this is the case, we may still, if we choose, +call our doctrine monism, but we should carefully distinguish such a +monism from those represented by Höffding and Spencer and many others. +There seems little reason to use the word, when the doctrine has been +so far modified. + +58. DUALISM.--The plain man finds himself in a world of physical things +and of minds, and it seems to him that his experience directly +testifies to the existence of both. This means that the things of +which he has experience appear to belong to two distinct classes. + +It does not mean, of course, that he has only two kinds of experiences. +The phenomena which are revealed to us are indefinitely varied; all +physical phenomena are not just alike, and all mental phenomena are not +just alike. + +Nevertheless, amid all the bewildering variety that forces itself upon +our attention, there stands out one broad distinction, that of the +physical and the mental. It is a distinction that the man who has done +no reading in the philosophers is scarcely tempted to obliterate; to +him the world consists of two kinds of things widely different from +each other; minds are not material things and material things are not +minds. We are justified in regarding this as the opinion of the plain +man even when we recognize that, in his endeavor to make clear to +himself what he means by minds, he sometimes speaks as though he were +talking about something material or semi-material. + +Now, the materialist allows these two classes to run together; so does +the idealist. The one says that everything is matter; the other, that +everything is mind. It would be foolish to maintain that nothing can +be said for either doctrine, for men of ability have embraced each. +But one may at least say that both seem to be refuted by our common +experience of the world, an experience which, so far as it is permitted +to testify at all, lifts up its voice in favor of _Dualism_. + +Dualism is sometimes defined as the doctrine that there are in the +world two kinds of substances, matter and mind, which are different in +kind and should be kept distinct. There are dualists who prefer to +avoid the use of the word substance, and to say that the world of our +experiences consists of physical phenomena and of mental phenomena, and +that these two classes of facts should be kept separate. + +The dualist may maintain that we have a direct knowledge of matter and +of mind, and he may content himself with such a statement, doing little +to make clear what we mean by matter and by mind. In this case, his +position is little different from that of the plain man who does not +attempt to philosophize. Thomas Reid (section 50) belongs to this +class. + +On the other hand, the dualist may attempt to make clear, through +philosophical reflection, what we mean by the matter and mind which +experience seems to give us. He may conclude:-- + +(1) That he must hold, as did Sir William Hamilton, that we perceive +directly only physical and mental phenomena, but are justified in +inferring that, since the phenomena are different, there must be two +kinds of underlying substances to which the phenomena are referred. +Thus, he may distinguish between the two substances and their +manifestations, as some monists distinguish between the one substance +and its manifestations. + +(2) Or he may conclude that it is futile to search for substances or +realities of any sort _behind_ phenomena, arguing that such realities +are never revealed in experience, and that no sound reason for their +assumption can be adduced. In this case, he may try to make plain what +mind and matter are, by simply analyzing our experiences of mind and +matter and coming to a clearer comprehension of their nature. + +As the reader has probably remarked, the philosophy presented in the +earlier chapters of this book (Chapters III to XI) is _dualistic_ as +well as _realistic_. That is to say, it refuses to rub out the +distinction between physical phenomena and mental phenomena, either by +dissolving the material world into ideas; by calling ideas secretions +or functions of the brain; or by declaring them one in a fictitious +entity behind the veil and not supposed to be exactly identical with +either. And as it teaches that the only reality that it means anything +to talk about must be found in experience, it is a dualism of the type +described in the paragraph which immediately precedes. + +Such a philosophy does not seem to do violence to the common experience +of minds and of physical things shared by us all, whether we are +philosophers or are not. It only tries to make clear what we all know +dimly and vaguely. This is, I think, a point in its favor. However, +men of great ability and of much learning have inclined to doctrines +very different; and we have no right to make up our minds on such a +subject as this without trying to give them an attentive and an +impartial hearing. + +59. SINGULARISM AND PLURALISM.--There are those who apply to the +various forms of monism the title _Singularism_, and who contrast with +this _Pluralism_, a word which is meant to cover the various doctrines +which maintain that there is more than one ultimate principle or being +in the universe. + +It is argued that we should have some word under which we may bring +such a doctrine, for example, as that of the Greek philosopher +Empedocles (born about 490 B.C.). This thinker made earth, water, +fire, and air the four material principles or "roots" of things. He +was not a monist, and we can certainly not call him a dualist. + +Again. The term pluralism has been used to indicate the doctrine that +individual finite minds are not parts or manifestations of one +all-embracing Mind,--of God or the Absolute,--but are relatively +independent beings. This doctrine has been urged in our own time, with +eloquence and feeling, by Professor Howison.[2] Here we have a +pluralism which is idealistic, for it admits in the universe but one +_kind_ of thing, minds; and yet refuses to call itself monistic. It +will readily be seen that in this paragraph and in the one preceding +the word is used in different senses. + +I have added the above sentences to this chapter that the reader may +have an explanation of the meaning of a word sometimes met with. But +the title of the chapter is "Monism and Dualism," and it is of this +contrast that it is especially important to grasp the significance. + + +[1] "Outlines of Psychology," pp. 64-65, English translation, 1891. + +[2] "The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays," revised edition. New +York, 1905. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM + +60. RATIONALISM.--As the content of a philosophical doctrine must be +determined by the _initial assumptions_ which a philosopher makes and +by the _method_ which he adopts in his reasonings, it is well to +examine with some care certain broad differences in this respect which +characterize different philosophers, and which help to explain how it +is that the results of their reflections are so startlingly different. + +I shall first speak of _Rationalism_, which I may somewhat loosely +define as the doctrine that the reason can attain truths independently +of observation--can go beyond experienced fact and the deductions which +experience seems to justify us in making from experienced fact. The +definition cannot mean much to us until it is interpreted by a concrete +example, and I shall turn to such. It must, however, be borne in mind +that the word "rationalism" is meant to cover a great variety of +opinions, and we have said comparatively little about him when we have +called a man a rationalist in philosophy. Men may agree in believing +that the reason can go beyond experienced fact, and yet may differ +regarding the particular truths which may be thus attained. + +Now, when Descartes found himself discontented with the philosophy that +he and others had inherited from the Middle Ages, and undertook a +reconstruction, he found it necessary to throw over a vast amount of +what had passed as truth, if only with a view to building up again upon +a firmer foundation. It appeared to him that much was uncritically +accepted as true in philosophy and in the sciences which a little +reflection revealed to be either false or highly doubtful. +Accordingly, he decided to clear the ground by a sweeping doubt, and to +begin his task quite independently. + +In accordance with this principle, he rejected the testimony of the +senses touching the existence of a world of external things. Do not +the senses sometimes deceive us? And, since men seem to be liable to +error in their reasonings, even in a field so secure as that of +mathematical demonstration, he resolved further to repudiate all the +reasonings he had heretofore accepted. He would not even assume +himself to be in his right mind and awake; might he not be the victim +of a diseased fancy, or a man deluded by dreams? + +Could anything whatever escape this all-devouring doubt? One truth +seemed unshakable: his own existence, at least, emerged from this sea +of uncertainties. I may be deceived in thinking that there is an +external world, and that I am awake and really perceive things; but I +surely cannot be deceived unless I exist. _Cogito, ergo sum_--I think, +hence I exist; this truth Descartes accepted as the first principle of +the new and sounder philosophy which he sought. + +As we read farther in Descartes we discover that he takes back again a +great many of those things that he had at the outset rejected as +uncertain. Thus, he accepts an external world of material things. How +does he establish its existence? He cannot do it as the empiricist +does it, by a reference to experienced fact, for he does not believe +that the external world is directly given in our experience. He thinks +we are directly conscious only of our _ideas_ of it, and must somehow +prove that it exists over against our ideas. + +By his principles, Descartes is compelled to fall back upon a curious +roundabout argument to prove that there is a world. He must first +prove that God exists, and then argue that God would not deceive us +into thinking that it exists when it does not. + +Now, when we come to examine Descartes' reasonings in detail we find +what appear to us some very uncritical assumptions. Thus, he proves +the existence of God by the following argument:-- + +I exist, and I find in me the idea of God; of this idea I cannot be the +author, for it represents something much greater than I, and its cause +must be as great as the reality it represents. In other words, nothing +less than God can be the cause of the idea of God which I find in me, +and, hence, I may infer that God exists. + +Where did Descartes get this notion that every idea must have a cause +which contains as much external reality as the idea does represented +reality? How does he prove his assumption? He simply appeals to what +he calls "the natural light," which is for him a source of all sorts of +information which cannot be derived from experience. This "natural +light" furnishes him with a vast number of "eternal truths", these he +has not brought under the sickle of his sweeping doubt, and these help +him to build up again the world he has overthrown, beginning with the +one indubitable fact discussed above. + +To the men of a later time many of Descartes' eternal truths are simply +inherited philosophical prejudices, the results of the reflections of +earlier thinkers, and in sad need of revision. I shall not criticise +them in detail. The important point for us to notice is that we have +here a type of philosophy which depends upon truths revealed by the +reason, independently of experience, to carry one beyond the sphere of +experience. + +I again remind the reader that there are all sorts of rationalists, in +the philosophical sense of the word. Some trust the power of the +unaided reason without reserve. Thus Spinoza, the pantheist, made the +magnificent but misguided attempt to deduce the whole system of things +physical and things mental from what he called the attributes of God, +Extension and Thought. + +On the other hand, one may be a good deal of an empiricist, and yet +something of a rationalist, too. Thus Professor Strong, in his recent +brilliant book, "Why the Mind has a Body," maintains that we know +intuitively that other minds than our own exist; know it without +gathering our information from experience, and without having to +establish the fact in any way. This seems, at least, akin to the +doctrine of the "natural light," and yet no one can say that Professor +Strong does not, in general, believe in a philosophy of observation and +experiment. + +61. EMPIRICISM.--I suppose every one who has done some reading in the +history of philosophy will, if his mother tongue be English, think of +the name of John Locke when empiricism is mentioned. + +Locke, in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding," undertakes "to +inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, +together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." +His sober and cautious work, which was first published in 1690, was +peculiarly English in character; and the spirit which it exemplifies +animates also Locke's famous successors, George Berkeley (1684-1753), +David Hume (1711-1776), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Although +Locke was a realist, Berkeley an idealist, Hume a skeptic, and Mill +what has been called a sensationalist; yet all were empiricists of a +sort, and emphasized the necessity of founding our knowledge upon +experience. + +Now, Locke was familiar with the writings of Descartes, whose work he +admired, but whose rationalism offended him. The first book of the +"Essay" is devoted to the proof that there are in the mind of man no +"innate ideas" and no "innate principles." That is to say, Locke tries +to show that one must not seek, in the "natural light" to which +Descartes turned, a distinct and independent source of information, + +"Let us, then," he continues, "suppose the mind to be, as we say, white +paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be +furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and +boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless +variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To +this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge +is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our +observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about +the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by +ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the +materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from +whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." [1] + +Thus, all we know and all we ever shall know of the world of matter and +of minds must rest ultimately upon observation,--observation of +external things and of our own mind. We must clip the erratic wing of +a "reason" which seeks to soar beyond such knowledge; which leaves the +solid earth, and hangs suspended in the void. + +"But hold," exclaims the critical reader; "have we not seen that Locke, +as well as Descartes (section 48), claims to know what he cannot prove +by direct observation or even by a legitimate inference from what has +been directly observed? Does he not maintain that the mind has an +immediate knowledge or experience only of its own ideas? How can he +prove that there are material extended things outside causing these +ideas? And if he cannot prove it by an appeal to experience, to direct +observation, is he not, in accepting the existence of the external +world at all, just as truly as Descartes, a rationalist?" + +The objection is well taken. On his own principles, Locke had no right +to believe in an external world. He has stolen his world, so to speak; +he has taken it by violence. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in the +section above referred to, Locke is not a rationalist of _malice +prepense_. He _tries_ to be an empiricist. He believes in the +external world because he thinks it is directly revealed to the +senses--he inconsistently refers to experience as evidence of its +existence. + +It has often been claimed by those who do not sympathize with +empiricism that the empiricists make assumptions much as others do, but +have not the grace to admit it. I think we must frankly confess that a +man may try hard to be an empiricist and may not be wholly successful. +Moreover, reflection forces us to the conclusion that when we have +defined empiricism as a doctrine which rests throughout upon an appeal +to "experience" we have not said anything very definite. + +What is _experience_? What may we accept as directly revealed fact? +The answer to such questions is far from an easy one to give. It is a +harder matter to discuss intelligently than any one can at all realize +until he has spent some years in following the efforts of the +philosophers to determine what is "revealed fact." We are supposed to +have experience of our own minds, of space, of time, of matter. What +are these things as revealed in our experience? We have seen in the +earlier chapters of this book that one cannot answer such questions +off-hand. + +62. CRITICISM.--I have in another chapter (section 51) given a brief +account of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He called his doctrine +"Criticism," and he distinguished it from "Dogmatism" and "Empiricism." + +Every philosophy that transcends experience, without first critically +examining our faculty of knowledge and determining its right to spread +its wings in this way, Kant calls "dogmatism." The word seems rather +an offensive one, in its usual signification, at least; and it is as +well not to use it. As Kant used the word, Descartes was a dogmatist; +but let us rather call him a rationalist. He certainly had no +intention of proceeding uncritically, as we shall see a little later. +If we call him a dogmatist we seem to condemn him in advance, by +applying to him an abusive epithet. + +Empiricism, according to Kant, confines human knowledge to experience, +and thus avoids the errors which beset the dogmatist. But then, as +Hume seemed to have shown, empiricism must run out into skepticism. If +all our knowledge has its foundations in experience, how can we expect +to find in our possession any universal or necessary truths? May not a +later experience contradict an earlier? How can we be sure that what +has been will be? Can we _know_ that there is anything fixed and +certain in our world? + +Skepticism seemed a forlorn doctrine, and, casting about for a way of +escape from it, Kant hit upon the expedient which I have described. So +long as we maintain that our knowledge has no other source than the +experiences which the world imprints upon us, so to speak, from +without, we are without the power of prediction, for new experiences +may annihilate any generalizations we have founded upon those already +vouchsafed us; but if we assume that the world upon which we gaze, the +world of phenomena, is made what it is by the mind that perceives it, +are we not in a different position? + +Suppose, for example, we take the statement that there must be an +adequate cause of all the changes that take place in the world. Can a +mere experience of what has been in the past guarantee that this law +will hold good in the future? But, when we realize that the world of +which we are speaking is nothing more than a world of phenomena, of +experiences, and realize further that this whole world is constructed +by the mind out of the raw materials furnished by the senses, may we +not have a greater confidence in our law? If it is the nature of the +mind to connect the phenomena presented to it with one another as cause +and effect, may we not maintain that no phenomenon can possibly make +its appearance that defies the law in question? How could it appear +except under the conditions laid upon all phenomena? If it is our +nature to think the world as an orderly one, and if we can know no +world save the one we construct ourselves, the orderliness of all the +things we can know seems to be guaranteed to us. + +It will be noticed that Kant's doctrine has a negative side. He limits +our knowledge to phenomena, to experiences, and he is himself, in so +far, an empiricist. But in that he finds in experience an order, an +arrangement of things, not derived from experience in the usual sense +of the word, he is not an empiricist. He has paid his own doctrine the +compliment of calling it "criticism," as I have said. + +Now, I beg the reader to be here, as elsewhere, on his guard against +the associations which attach to words. In calling Kant's doctrine +"the critical philosophy," we are in some danger of uncritically +assuming and leading others to believe uncritically that it is free +from such defects as may be expected to attach to "dogmatism" and to +empiricism. Such a position should not be taken until one has made a +most careful examination of each of the three types of doctrine, of the +assumptions which it makes, and of the rigor with which it draws +inferences upon the basis of such assumptions. That we may be the +better able to withstand "undue influence," I call attention to the +following points:-- + +(1) We must bear in mind that the attempt to make a critical +examination into the foundations of our knowledge, and to determine its +scope, is by no means a new thing. Among the Greeks, Plato, Aristotle, +the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Skeptics, all attacked the problem. +It did not, of course, present itself to these men in the precise form +in which it presented itself to Kant, but each and all were concerned +to find an answer to the question: Can we know anything with certainty; +and, if so, what? They may have failed to be thoroughly critical, but +they certainly made the attempt. + +I shall omit mention of the long series of others, who, since that +time, have carried on the tradition, and shall speak only of Descartes +and Locke, whom I have above brought forward as representatives of the +two types of doctrine that Kant contrasts with his own. + +To see how strenuously Descartes endeavored to subject his knowledge to +a critical scrutiny and to avoid unjustifiable assumptions of any sort, +one has only to read that charming little work of genius, the +"Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason." + +In his youth Descartes was, as he informs us, an eager student; but, +when he had finished the whole course of education usually prescribed, +he found himself so full of doubts and errors that he did not feel that +he had advanced in learning at all. Yet he had been well tutored, and +was considered as bright in mind as others. He was led to judge his +neighbor by himself, and to conclude that there existed no such certain +science as he had been taught to suppose. + +Having ripened with years and experience, Descartes set about the task +of which I have spoken above, the task of sweeping away the whole body +of his opinions and of attempting a general and systematic +reconstruction. So important a work should be, he thought, approached +with circumspection; hence, he formulated certain Rules of Method. + +"The first," he writes, "was never to accept anything for true which I +did not clearly know to be such; that is, carefully to avoid haste and +prejudice, and to include nothing more in my judgments than what was +presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all reason +for doubt." + +Such was our philosopher's design, and such the spirit in which he set +about it. We have seen the result above. It is as if Descartes had +decided that a certain room full of people did not appear to be free +from suspicious characters, and had cleared out every one, afterwards +posting himself at the door to readmit only those who proved themselves +worthy. When we examine those who succeeded in passing muster, we +discover he has favored all his old friends. He simply _cannot_ doubt +them; are they not vouched for by the "natural light"? Nevertheless, +we must not forget that Descartes sifted his congregation with much +travail of spirit. He did try to be critical. + +As for John Locke, he reveals in the "Epistle to the Reader," which +stands as a preface to the "Essay," the critical spirit in which his +work was taken up. "Were it fit to trouble thee," he writes, "with the +history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends +meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from +this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that +rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without +coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it +came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before we +set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to +examine our own abilities, and to see what objects our understandings +were, or were not, fitted to deal with." + +This problem, proposed by himself to his little circle of friends, +Locke attacked with earnestness, and as a result he brought out many +years later the work which has since become so famous. The book is +literally a critique of the reason, although a very different critique +from that worked out by Kant. + +"If, by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding," says Locke, +"I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things +they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose +it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more +cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop +when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a +quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are found to be +beyond the reach of our capacities." [2] + +To the difficulties of the task our author is fully alive: "The +understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all +other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains +to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be +the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry, whatever it be +that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves, sure I am that all the +light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can +make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but +bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search, of +other things." [3] + +(2) Thus, many men have attempted to produce a critical philosophy, and +in much the same sense as that in which Kant uses the words. Those who +have come after them have decided that they were not sufficiently +critical, that they have made unjustifiable assumptions. When we come +to read Kant, we will, if we have read the history of philosophy with +profit, not forget to ask ourselves if he has not sinned in the same +way. + +For example, we will ask;-- + +(a) Was Kant right in maintaining that we find in experience synthetic +judgments (section 51) that are not founded upon experience, but yield +such information as is beyond the reach of the empiricist? There are +those who think that the judgments to which he alludes in evidence of +his contention--the mathematical, for instance--are not of this +character. + +(b) Was he justified in assuming that all the ordering of our world is +due to the activity of mind, and that merely the raw material is +"given" us through the senses? There are many who demur against such a +statement, and hold that it is, if not in all senses untrue, at least +highly misleading, since it seems to argue that there is no really +external world at all. Moreover, they claim that the doctrine is +neither self-evident nor susceptible of proper proof. + +(c) Was Kant justified in assuming that, even if we attribute the +"form" or arrangement of the world we know to the native activity of +the mind, the necessity and universality of our knowledge is assured? +Let us grant that the proposition, whatever happens must have an +adequate cause, is a "form of thought." What guarantee have we that +the "forms of thought" must ever remain changeless? If it is an +assumption for the empiricist to declare that what has been true in the +past will be true in the future, that earlier experiences of the world +will not be contradicted by later; what is it for the Kantian to +maintain that the order which he finds in his experience will +necessarily and always be the order of all future experiences? +Transferring an assumption to the field of mind does not make it less +of an assumption. + +Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to charge Kant with being a good +deal of a rationalist. He tried to confine our knowledge to the field +of experience, it is true; but he made a number of assumptions as to +the nature of experience which certainly do not shine by their own +light, and which many thoughtful persons regard as incapable of +justification. + +Kant's famous successors in the German philosophy, Fichte (1762-1814), +Schelling (1775-1854), Hegel (1770-1831), and Schopenhauer (1788-1860), +all received their impulse from the "critical philosophy," and yet each +developed his doctrine in a relatively independent way. + +I cannot here take the space to characterize the systems of these men; +I may merely remark that all of them contrast strongly in doctrine and +method with the British philosophers mentioned in the last section, +Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. They are _un-empirical_, if one may +use such a word; and, to one accustomed to reading the English +philosophy, they seem ever ready to spread their wings and hazard the +boldest of flights without a proper realization of the thinness of the +atmosphere in which they must support themselves. + +However, no matter what may be one's opinion of the actual results +attained by these German philosophers, one must frankly admit that no +one who wishes to understand clearly the development of speculative +thought can afford to dispense with a careful reading of them. Much +even of the English philosophy of our own day must remain obscure to +those who have not looked into their pages. Thus, the thought of Kant +and Hegel molded the thought of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) and of +the brothers Caird; and their influence has made itself widely felt +both in England and in America. One cannot criticise intelligently +books written from their standpoint, unless one knows how the authors +came by their doctrine and out of what it has been developed. + +63. CRITICAL EMPIRICISM.--We have seen that the trouble with the +rationalists seemed to be that they made an appeal to "eternal truths," +which those who followed them could not admit to be eternal truths at +all. They proceeded on a basis of assumptions the validity of which +was at once called in question. + +Locke, the empiricist, repudiated all this, and then also made +assumptions which others could not, and cannot, approve. Kant did +something of much the same sort; we cannot regard his "criticism" as +wholly critical. + +How can we avoid such errors? How walk cautiously, and go around the +pit into which, as it seems to us, others have fallen? I may as well +tell the reader frankly that he sets his hope too high if he expects to +avoid all error and to work out for himself a philosophy in all +respects unassailable. The difficulties of reflective thought are very +great, and we should carry with us a consciousness of that fact and a +willingness to revise our most cherished conclusions. + +Our initial difficulty seems to be that we must begin by assuming +_something_, if only as material upon which to work. We must begin our +philosophizing _somewhere_. Where shall we begin? May we not fall +into error at the very outset? + +The doctrine set forth in the earlier chapters of this volume maintains +that we must accept as our material the revelation of the mind and the +world which seems to be made in our common experience, and which is +extended and systematized in the sciences. But it insists that we must +regard such an acceptance as merely provisional, must subject our +concepts to a careful criticism, and must always be on our guard +against hasty assumptions. + +It emphasizes the value of the light which historical study casts upon +the real meaning of the concepts which we all use and must use, but +which have so often proved to be stones of stumbling in the path of +those who have employed them. Its watchword is analysis, always +analysis; and a settled distrust of what have so often passed as +"self-evident" truths. It regards it as its task to analyze +experience, while maintaining that only the satisfactory carrying out +of such an analysis can reveal what experience really is, and clear our +notions of it from misinterpretations. + +No such attempt to give an account of experience can be regarded as +fundamentally new in its method. Every philosopher, in his own way, +criticises experience, and seeks its interpretation. But one may, +warned by the example of one's predecessors, lay emphasis upon the +danger of half-analyses and hasty assumptions, and counsel the +observance of sobriety and caution. + +For convenience, I have called the doctrine _Critical Empiricism_. I +warn the reader against the seductive title, and advise him not to +allow it to influence him unduly in his judgment of the doctrine. + +64. PRAGMATISM.--It seems right that I should, before closing this +chapter, say a few words about Pragmatism, which has been so much +discussed in the last few years. + +In 1878 Mr. Charles S. Peirce wrote an article for the _Popular Science +Monthly_ in which he proposed as a maxim for the attainment of +clearness of apprehension the following: "Consider what effects, which +might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of +our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the +whole of our conception of the object." + +This thought has been taken up by others and given a development which +Mr. Peirce regards with some suspicion. He refers[4] especially to the +development it has received at the hands of Professor William James, in +his two essays, "The Will to Believe" and "Philosophical Conceptions +and Practical Results." [5] Professor James is often regarded as +foremost among the pragmatists. + +I shall not attempt to define pragmatism, for I do not believe that the +doctrine has yet attained to that definiteness of formulation which +warrants a definition. We seem to have to do not so much with a +clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been +worked out in detail, as with a tendency which makes itself apparent in +the works of various writers under somewhat different forms. + +I may roughly describe it as the tendency to take that to be _true_ +which is _useful_ or _serviceable_. It is well illustrated in the two +essays to which reference is made above. + +Thus, Professor James dwells upon the unsatisfactoriness and +uncertainty of philosophical and scientific knowledge: "Objective +evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but +where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found?" + +Now, among those things regarding which it appears impossible to attain +to intellectual certitude, there are matters of great practical moment, +and which affect deeply the conduct of life; for example, the doctrines +of religion. Here a merely skeptical attitude seems intolerable. + +In such cases, argues Professor James, "we have the right to believe at +our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will." + +It is important to notice that there is no question here of a logical +right. We are concerned with matters regarding which, according to +Professor James, we cannot look for intellectual evidence. It is +assumed that we believe simply because we choose to believe--we believe +arbitrarily. + +It is further important to notice that what is a "live" hypothesis to +one man need not tempt the will of another man at all. As our author +points out, a Turk would naturally will to believe one thing and a +Christian would will to believe another. Each would will to believe +what struck him as a satisfactory thing to believe. + +What shall we say to this doctrine? I think we must say that it is +clearly not a philosophical _method of attaining to truth_. Hence, it +has not properly a place in this chapter among the attempts which have +been made to attain to the truth of things. + +It is, in fact, not concerned with truths, but with assumptions, and +with assumptions which are supposed to be made on the basis of no +evidence. It is concerned with "seemings." + +The distinction is a very important one. Our Turk cannot, by willing +to believe it, make his hypothesis true; but he can make it _seem_ +true. Why should he wish to make it seem true whether it is true or +not? Why should he strive to attain to a feeling of subjective +certainty, not by logically resolving his doubts, but by ignoring them? + +The answer is given us by our author. He who lives in the midst of +doubts, and refuses to cut his knot with the sword of belief, misses +the good of life. This is a practical problem, and one of no small +moment. In the last section of this book I have tried to indicate what +it is wise for a man to do when he is confronted by doubts which he +cannot resolve. + +Into the general question whether even a false belief may not, under +some circumstances, be more serviceable than no belief at all, I shall +not enter. The point I wish to emphasize is that there is all the +difference in the world between _producing a belief_ and _proving a +truth_. + +We are compelled to accept it as a fact that men, under the influence +of feeling, can believe in the absence of evidence, or, for that +matter, can believe in spite of evidence. But a truth cannot be +established in the absence of evidence or in the face of adverse +evidence. And there is a very wide field in which it is made very +clear to us that beliefs adopted in the absence of evidence are in +danger of being false beliefs. + +The pragmatist would join with the rest of us in condemning the Turk or +the Christian who would simply will to believe in the rise or the fall +of stocks, and would refuse to consult the state of the market. Some +hypotheses are, in the ordinary course of events, put to the test of +verification. We are then made painfully aware that beliefs and truths +are quite distinct things, and may not be in harmony. + +Now, the pragmatist does not apply his principle to this field. He +confines it to what may not inaptly be called the field of the +unverifiable. The Turk, who wills to believe in the hypothesis that +appeals to him as a pious Turk, is in no such danger of a rude +awakening as is the man who wills to believe that stocks will go up or +down. But mark what this means: it means that _he is not in danger of +finding out what the truth really is_. It does not mean that he is in +possession of the truth. + +So I say, the doctrine which we are discussing is not a method of +attaining to truth. What it really attempts to do is to point out to +us how it is prudent for us to act when we cannot discover what the +truth is.[6] + + +[1] "An Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book II, Chapter I, +section 2. + +[2] Book I, Chapter I, section 4. + +[3] Book I, Chapter I, section 1. + +[4] "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology," article "Pragmatism." + +[5] Published in 1897 and 1898. + +[6] For references to later developments of pragmatism, see the note on +page 312. + + + + +V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES + + +CHAPTER XVI + +LOGIC + +65. INTRODUCTORY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.--I have said in the first +chapter of this book (section 6) that there is quite a group of +sciences that are regarded as belonging peculiarly to the province of +the teacher of philosophy to-day. Having, in the chapters preceding, +given some account of the nature of reflective thought, of the problems +touching the world and the mind which present themselves to those who +reflect, and of some types of philosophical theory which have their +origin in such reflection, I turn to a brief consideration of the +philosophical sciences. + +Among these I included logic, psychology, ethics, and aesthetics, +metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I did not include +epistemology or "the theory of knowledge" as a separate discipline, and +my reasons for this will appear in Chapter XIX. I remarked that, to +complete the list, we should have to add the philosophy of religion and +an investigation into the principles and methods of the sciences +generally. + +Why, it was asked, should this group of disciplines be regarded as the +field of the philosopher, when others are excluded? The answer to this +question which finds the explanation of the fact to lie in a mere +historical accident was declared unsatisfactory, and it was maintained +that the philosophical sciences are those in which we find ourselves +carried back to the problems of reflective thought. + +With a view to showing the truth of this opinion, I shall take up one +by one the philosophical sciences. Of the history of philosophy I +shall not speak in this part of the work, but shall treat of it in +Chapter XXIII. + +66. THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC.--Most of us begin our acquaintance with +logic in the study of some such elementary manual as Jevons' "Lessons +in Logic." + +In such books we are shown how terms represent things and classes of +things or their attributes, and how we unite them into propositions or +statements. It is indicated at length what statements may be made on a +basis of certain other statements and what may not; and emphasis is +laid upon the dangers which arise out of a misunderstanding of the +language in which we are forced to express our thoughts. Finally, +there are described for us the experimental methods by which the +workers in the sciences have attained to the general information about +the world which has become our heritage. + +Such books are useful. It is surely no small profit for a student to +gain the habit of scrutinizing the steps by which he has come into the +possession of a certain bit of information, and to have a quick eye for +loose and inconsistent reasonings. + +But it is worthy of remark that one may study such a book as this and +yet remain pretty consistently on what may be called the plane of the +common understanding. One seems to make the assumptions made in all +the special sciences, _e.g._ the assumption that there is a world of +real things and that we can know them and reason about them. We are +not introduced to such problems as: What _is_ truth? and Is _any_ +knowledge valid? Nor does it seem at once apparent that the man who is +studying logic in this way is busying himself with a philosophical +discipline. + +67. THE "MODERN LOGIC."--It is very puzzling for the student to turn +from such a text-book as the one above mentioned to certain others +which profess to be occupied with the same science, and which, yet, +appear to treat of quite different things. + +Thus, in Dr. Bosanquet's little work on "The Essentials of Logic," the +reader is at once plunged into such questions as the nature of +knowledge, and what is meant by the real world. We seem to be dealing +with metaphysics, and not with logic, as we have learned to understand +the term. How is it that the logician comes to regard these things as +within his province? + +A multitude of writers at the present day are treating logic in this +way, and in some great prominence is given to problems which the +philosopher recognizes as indisputably his own. The term "modern +logic" is often employed to denote a logic of this type; one which does +not, after the fashion of the natural sciences generally, proceed on +the basis of certain assumptions, and leave deeper questions to some +other discipline, but tries to get to the bottom of things for itself. +The tendency to run into metaphysics is peculiarly marked in those +writers who have been influenced by the work of the philosopher Hegel. + +I shall not here ask why those who belong to one school are more +inclined to be metaphysical than are those who belong to another, but +shall approach the broader question why the logicians generally are +inclined to be more metaphysical than those who work in certain other +special sciences, such as mathematics, for example. Of the general +tendency there can be no question. The only problem is: Why does this +tendency exist? + +68. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.--Let us contrast the science of arithmetic +with logic; and let us notice, regarding it, the following points:-- + +It is, like logic, a _general_ science, in that the things treated of +in many sciences may be numbered. It considers only a certain aspect +of the things. + +Now, that things may be counted, added together, subtracted, etc., is +guaranteed by the experience of the plain man; and the methods of +determining the numerical relations of things are gradually developed +before his eyes, beginning with operations of great simplicity. +Moreover, verification is possible, and within certain limits +verification by direct inspection. + +To this we may add, that there has gradually been built up a fine +system of unambiguous symbols, and it is possible for a man to know +just what he is dealing with. + +Thus, a certain beaten path has been attained, and a man may travel +this very well without having forced on his attention the problems of +reflective thought. The knowledge of numbers with which he starts is +sufficient equipment with which to undertake the journey. That one is +on the right road is proved by the results one obtains. As a rule, +disputes can be settled by well-tried mathematical methods. + +There is, then, a common agreement as to initial assumptions and +methods of work, and useful results are attained which seem to justify +both. Here we have the normal characteristics of a special science. + +We must not forget, however, that, even in the mathematical sciences, +before a beaten path was attained, disputes as to the significance of +numbers and the cogency of proofs were sufficiently common. And we +must bear in mind that even to-day, where the beaten path does not seem +wholly satisfactory, men seem to be driven to reflect upon the +significance of their assumptions and the nature of their method. + +Thus, we find it not unnatural that a man should be led to ask; What is +a minus quantity really? Can anything be less than nothing? or that he +should raise the questions: Can one rightly speak of an infinite +number? Can one infinite number be greater than another, and, if so, +what can greater mean? What are infinitesimals? and what can be meant +by different orders of infinitesimals? + +He who has interested himself in such questions as these has betaken +himself to philosophical reflection. They are not answered by +employing mathematical methods. + +Let us now turn to logic. And let us notice, to begin with, that it is +broader in its application than the mathematical sciences. It is +concerned to discover what constitutes _evidence_ in every field of +investigation. + +There is, it is true, a part of logic that may be developed somewhat +after the fashion of mathematics. Thus, we may examine the two +statements: All men are mortal, and Caesar is a man; and we may see +clearly that, given the truth of these, we must admit that Caesar is +mortal. We may make a list of possible inferences of this kind, and +point out under what circumstances the truth of two statements implies +the truth of a third, and under what circumstances the inference cannot +be made. Our results can be set forth in a system of symbols. As in +mathematics, we may abstract from the particular things reasoned about, +and concern ourselves only with the forms of reasoning. This gives us +the theory of the _syllogism_; it is a part of logic in which the +mathematician is apt to feel very much at home. + +But this is by no means all of logic. Let us consider the following +points:-- + +(1) We are not concerned to know only what statements may be made on +the basis of certain other statements. We want to know what is true +and what is false. We must ask: Has a man the right to set up these +particular statements and to reason from them? That some men accept as +true premises which are repudiated by others is an undoubted fact. +Thus, it is maintained by certain philosophers that we may assume that +any view of the universe which is repellant to our nature cannot be +true. Shall we allow this to pass unchallenged? And in ethics, some +have held that it is under all circumstances wrong to lie; others have +denied this, and have held that in certain cases--for example, to save +life or to prevent great and unmerited suffering--lying is permissible. +Shall we interest ourselves only in the deductions that each man makes +from his assumed premises, and pay no attention to the truth of the +premises themselves? + +(2) Again. The vast mass of the reasonings that interest men are +expressed in the language that we all use and not in special symbols. +But language is a very imperfect instrument, and all sorts of +misunderstandings are possible to those who express their thoughts in +it. + +Few men know exactly how much is implied in what they are saying. If I +say: All men are mortal, and an angel is not a man; therefore, an angel +is not mortal; it is not at once apparent to every one in what respect +my argument is defective. He who argues: Feathers are light; light is +contrary to darkness; hence, feathers are contrary to darkness; is +convicted of error without difficulty. But arguments of the same kind, +and quite as bad, are to be found in learned works on matters less +familiar to us, and we often fail to detect the fallacy. + +Thus, Herbert Spencer argues, in effect, in the fourth and fifth +chapters of his "First Principles," as follows:-- + + We are conscious of the Unknowable, + The Unknowable lies behind the veil of phenomena, + Hence, we are conscious of what lies behind the veil of phenomena. + +It is only the critical reader who notices that the Unknowable in the +first line is the "raw material of consciousness," and the Unknowable +in the second is something not in consciousness at all. The two senses +of the word "light" are not more different from one another. Such +apparent arguments abound, and it often requires much acuteness to be +able to detect their fallacious character. + +When we take into consideration the two points indicated above, we see +that the logician is at every turn forced to reflect upon our knowledge +as men do not ordinarily reflect. He is led to ask: What is truth? He +cannot accept uncritically the assumptions which men make; and he must +endeavor to become very clearly conscious of the real meaning and the +whole meaning of statements expressed in words. Even in the simple +logic with which we usually begin our studies, we learn to scrutinize +statements in a reflective way; and when we go deeper, we are at once +in contact with philosophical problems. It is evidently our task to +attain to a clearer insight into the nature of our experience and the +meaning of proof than is attainable by the unreflective. + +Logic, then, is a reflective science, and it is not surprising that it +has held its place as one of the philosophical sciences. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +PSYCHOLOGY + +69. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.--I think I have said enough in Chapter +II (section 10) about what we mean when we speak of psychology as a +natural science and as an independent discipline. Certainly there are +many psychologists who would not care to be confused with the +philosophers, and there are some that regard philosophy with suspicion. + +Nevertheless, psychology is commonly regarded as belonging to the +philosophical group. That this is the case can scarcely be thought +surprising when we see how the psychologist himself speaks of the +relation of his science to philosophy. + +"I have kept," writes Professor James[1] in that delightful book which +has become the common property of us all, "close to the point of view +of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes +certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements +between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions +are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, +assumes as its data (1) _thoughts and feelings_, and (2) _a physical +world_ in time and space with which they coexist, and which (3) _they +know_. Of course, these data themselves are discussable; but the +discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and +falls outside the province of this book." + +This is an admirable statement of the scope of psychology as a natural +science, and also of the relations of metaphysics to the sciences. But +it would not be fair to Professor James to take this sentence alone, +and to assume that, in his opinion, it is easy to separate psychology +altogether from philosophy. "The reader," he tells us in the next +paragraph, "will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is +mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into queries which +only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope +successfully to deal with." And in the opening sentence of the preface +he informs us that some of his chapters are more "metaphysical" than is +suitable for students going over the subject for the first time. + +That the author is right in maintaining that it is not easy to draw a +clear line between philosophy and psychology, and to declare the latter +wholly independent, I think we must concede. An independent science +should be sure of the things with which it is dealing. Where these are +vague and indefinite, and are the subject of constant dispute, it +cannot march forward with assurance. One is rather forced to go back +and examine the data themselves. The beaten track of the special +science has not been satisfactorily constructed. + +We are forced to admit that the science of psychology has not yet +emerged from the state in which a critical examination of its +foundations is necessary, and that the construction of the beaten path +is still in progress. This I shall try to make clear by illustrations. + +The psychologist studies the mind, and his ultimate appeal must be to +introspection, to a direct observation of mental phenomena, and of +their relations to external things. Now, if the observation of mental +phenomena were a simple and an easy thing; if the mere fact that we are +conscious of sensations and ideas implied that we are _clearly_ +conscious of them and are in a position to describe them with accuracy, +psychology would be a much more satisfactory science than it is. + +But we are not thus conscious of our mental life. We can and do use +our mental states without being able to describe them accurately. In a +sense, we are conscious of what is there, but our consciousness is +rather dim and vague, and in our attempts to give an account of it we +are in no little danger of giving a false account. + +Thus, the psychologist assumes that we perceive both physical phenomena +and mental--the external world and the mind. He takes it for granted +that we perceive mental phenomena to be related to physical. He is +hardly in a position to make this assumption, and then to set it aside +as a thing he need not further consider. Does he not tell us, as a +result of his investigations, that we can know the external world only +as it is reflected in our sensations, and thus seem to shut the mind up +within the circle of mental phenomena merely, cutting off absolutely a +direct knowledge of what is extra-mental? If we can know only mental +phenomena, the representatives of things, at first hand, how can we +tell that they are representatives? and what becomes of the assumption +that we _perceive_ that mind is related to an external world? + +It may be said, this problem the psychologist may leave to the +metaphysician. Certainly, it is one of those problems that the +metaphysician discusses; it has been treated in Chapter IV. But my +contention is, that he who has given no thought to the matter may +easily fall into error as to the very nature of mental phenomena. + +For example, when we approach or recede from a physical object we have +a series of experiences which are recognized as sensational. When we +imagine a tree or a house we are also experiencing a mental phenomenon. +All these experiences _seem_ plainly to have extension in some sense of +the word. We appear to perceive plainly part out of part. In so far, +these mental things seem to resemble the physical things which we +contrast with what is mental. Shall we say that, because these things +are mental and not physical, their apparent extension is a delusion? +Shall we say that they really have no parts? Such considerations have +impelled psychologists of eminence to maintain, in flat contradiction +to what seems to be the unequivocal testimony of direct introspection, +that the total content of consciousness at any moment must be looked +upon as an indivisible, part-less unit. + +We cannot, then, depend merely on direct introspection. It is too +uncertain in its deliverances. If we would make clear to ourselves +what mental phenomena really are, and how they | differ from physical +phenomena, we must fall back upon the reflective analysis of our +experience which occupies the metaphysician (section 34). Until we +have done this, we are in great danger of error. We are actually +uncertain of our materials. + +Again. The psychologist speaks of the relation of mind and body. Some +psychologists incline to be parallelists, some are warm advocates of +interactionism. Now, any theory of the relation of mind to body must +depend on observation ultimately. If we had not direct experience of a +relation between the physical and the mental somewhere, no hypothesis +on the subject would ever have emerged. + +But our experiences are not perfectly clear and unequivocal to us. +Their significance does not seem to be easily grasped. To comprehend +it one is forced to that reflective examination of experience which is +characteristic of the philosopher (Chapter IX). + +Here it may again be said: Leave the matter to the meta-physician and +go on with your psychological work. I answer: The psychologist is not +in the same position as the botanist or the zoölogist. He is studying +mind in its relation to body. It cannot but be unsatisfactory to him +to leave that relation wholly vague; and, as a matter of fact, he +usually takes up with one theory or another. We have seen (section 36) +that he may easily adopt a theory that leads him to overlook the great +difference between physical phenomena and mental phenomena, and to +treat them as though they were the same. This one may do in spite of +all that introspection has to say about the gulf that separates them. + +Psychology is, then, very properly classed among the philosophical +sciences. The psychologist is not sufficiently sure of his materials +to be able to dispense with reflective thought, in many parts of his +field. Some day there may come to be a consensus of opinion touching +fundamental facts, and the science may become more independent. A +beaten track may be attained; but that has not yet been done. + +70. THE DOUBLE AFFILIATION OF PSYCHOLOGY.--In spite of what has been +said above, we must not forget that psychology is a _relatively_ +independent science. One may be a useful psychologist without knowing +much about philosophy. + +As in logic it is possible to write a text-book not greatly different +in spirit and method from text-books concerned with the sciences not +classed as philosophical, so it is possible to make a useful study of +mental phenomena without entering upon metaphysical analyses. In +science, as in common life, we can _use_ concepts without subjecting +them to careful analysis. + +Thus, our common experience reveals that mind and body are connected. +We may, for a specific purpose, leave the _nature_ of this connection +vague, and may pay careful attention to the physiological conditions of +mental phenomena, studying in detail the senses and the nervous system. +We may, further, endeavor to render our knowledge of mental phenomena +more full and accurate by experimentation. In doing this we may be +compelled to make use of elaborate apparatus. Of such mechanical aids +to investigation our psychological laboratories are full. + +It is to such work as this that we owe what is called the +"physiological" and the "experimental" psychology. One can carry on +such investigations without being a metaphysician. But one can +scarcely carry them on without having a good knowledge of certain +sciences not commonly supposed to be closely related to psychology at +all. Thus, one should be trained in chemistry and physics and +physiology, and should have a working knowledge of laboratory methods. +Moreover, it is desirable to have a sufficient knowledge of mathematics +to enable one to handle experimental data. + +The consideration of such facts as these sometimes leads men to raise +the question: Should psychology affiliate with philosophy or with the +physical sciences? The issue is an illegitimate one. Psychology is +one of the philosophical sciences, and cannot dispense with reflection; +but that is no reason why it should not acknowledge a close relation to +certain physical sciences as well. Parts of the field can be isolated, +and one may work as one works in the natural sciences generally; but if +one does nothing more, one's concepts remain unanalyzed, and, as we +have seen in the previous section, there is some danger of actual +misconception. + + +[1] "Psychology," Preface. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +ETHICS AND AESTHETICS + +71. COMMON SENSE ETHICS.--We may, if we choose, study the actions of +men merely with a view to ascertaining what they are and describing +them accurately. Something like this is done by the anthropologist, +who gives us an account of the manners and customs of the various races +of mankind; he tells us _what is_; he may not regard it as within his +province at all to inform us regarding _what ought to be_. + +But men do not merely act; they judge their actions in the light of +some norm or standard, and they distinguish between them as right and +wrong. The systematic study of actions as right and wrong yields us +the science of ethics. + +Like psychology, ethics is a special science. It is concerned with a +somewhat limited field of investigation, and is not to be confounded +with other sciences. It has a definite aim distinct from theirs. And, +also like psychology, ethics is classed as one of the philosophical +sciences, and its relation to philosophy is supposed to be closer than +that of such sciences as physics and mathematics. It is fair to ask +why this is so. Why cannot ethics proceed on the basis of certain +assumptions independently, and leave to some other discipline the whole +question of an inquiry into the nature and validity of those +assumptions? + +About half a century ago Dr. William Whewell, one of the most learned +of English scholars, wrote a work entitled "The Elements of Morality," +in which he attempted to treat the science of ethics as it is generally +admitted that one may treat the science of geometry. The book was +rather widely read a generation since, but we meet with few references +to it in our time. + +"Morality and the philosophy of morality," argues the author, "differ +in the same manner and in the same degree as geometry and the +philosophy of geometry. Of these two subjects, geometry consists of a +series of positive and definite propositions, deduced one from another, +in succession, by rigorous reasoning, and all resting upon certain +definitions and self-evident axioms. The philosophy of geometry is +quite a different subject; it includes such inquiries as these: Whence +is the cogency of geometrical proof? What is the evidence of the +axioms and definitions? What are the faculties by which we become +aware of their truth? and the like. The two kinds of speculation have +been pursued, for the most part, by two different classes of +persons,--the geometers and the metaphysicians; for it has been far +more the occupation of metaphysicians than of geometers to discuss such +questions as I have stated, the nature of geometrical proofs, +geometrical axioms, the geometrical faculty, and the like. And if we +construct a complete system of geometry, it will be almost exactly the +same, whatever be the views which we take on these metaphysical +questions." [1] + +Such a system Dr. Whewell wishes to construct in the field of ethics. +His aim is to give us a view of morality in which moral propositions +are "deduced from axioms, by successive steps of reasoning, so far as +to form a connected system of moral truth." Such a "sure and connected +knowledge of the duties of man" would, he thinks, be of the greatest +importance. + +In accordance with this purpose, Dr. Whewell assumes that humanity, +justice, truth, purity, order, earnestness, and moral purpose are +fundamental principles of human action; and he thinks that all who +admit as much as this will be able to go on with him in his development +of a system of moral rules to govern the life of man. + +It would hardly be worth while for me to speak at length of a way of +treating ethics so little likely to be urged upon the attention of the +reader who busies himself with the books which are appearing in our own +day, were it not that we have here an admirable illustration of the +attempt to teach ethics as though it were such a science as geometry. +The shortcomings of the method become very evident to one who reads the +work attentively. + +Thus, we are forced to ask ourselves, have we really a collection of +ultimate moral principles which are analogous to the axioms of +geometry? For example, to take but a single instance, Dr. Whewell +formulates the Principle of Truth as follows: "We must conform to the +universal understanding among men which the use of language +implies";[2] and he remarks later; "The rules: _Lie not_, Perform your +promise, are of universal validity; and the conceptions of _lie_ and of +_promise_ are so simple and distinct that, in general, the rules may be +directly and easily applied." [3] + +Now, we are struck by the fact that this affirmation of the universal +validity of the principle of truth is made in a chapter on "Cases of +Conscience," in a chapter concerned with what seem to be conflicts +between duties; and this chapter is followed by one which treats of +"Cases of Necessity," _i.e._ cases in which a man is to be regarded as +justified in violating common rules when there seems to be urgent +reason for so doing. We are told that the moralist cannot say: Lie +not, except in great emergencies; but must say: Lie not at all. But we +are also told that he must grant that there are cases of necessity in +which transgressions of moral rules are excusable; and this looks very +much as if he said: Go on and do the thing while I close my eyes. + +This hardly seems to give us a "sure and connected knowledge of the +duties of man" deduced from axiomatic principles. On what authority +shall we suspend for the time being this axiomatic principle or that? +Is there some deeper principle which lends to each of them its +authority, and which may, for cause, withdraw it? There is no hint of +such in the treatment of ethics which we are considering, and we seem +to have on our hands, not so much a science, as a collection of +practical rules, of the scope of which we are more or less in the dark. + +The interesting thing to notice is that this view of ethics is very +closely akin to that adapted unconsciously by the majority of the +persons we meet who have not interested themselves much in ethics as a +science. + +By the time that we have reached years of discretion we are all in +possession of a considerable number of moral maxims. We consider it +wrong to steal, to lie, to injure our neighbor. Such maxims lie in our +minds side by side, and we do not commonly think of criticising them. +But now and then we face a situation in which one maxim seems to urge +one course of action and another maxim a contrary one. Shall we tell +the truth and the whole truth, when so doing will bring grave +misfortune upon an innocent person? And now and then we are brought to +the realization that all men do not admit the validity of all our +maxims. Judgments differ as to what is right and what is wrong. Who +shall be the arbiter? Not infrequently a rough decision is arrived at +in the assumption that we have only to interrogate "conscience"--in the +assumption, in other words, that we carry a watch which can be counted +upon to give the correct time, even if the timepieces of our neighbors +are not to be depended upon. + +The common sense ethics cannot be regarded as very systematic and +consistent, or as very profound. It is a collection of working rules, +of practical maxims; and, although it is impossible to overestimate its +value as a guide to life, its deficiencies, when it is looked at +critically, become evident, I think, even to thoughtful persons who are +not scientific at all. + +Many writers on ethics have simply tried to turn this collection of +working rules into a science, somewhat as Dr. Whewell has done. This +is the peculiar weakness of those who have been called the +"intuitionalists"--though I must warn the reader against assuming that +this term has but the one meaning, and that all those to whom it has +been applied should be placed in the same class. Here it is used to +indicate those who maintain that we are directly aware of the validity +of certain moral principles, must accept them as ultimate, and need +only concern ourselves with the problem of their application. + +72. ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY.--When John Locke maintained that there are +no "innate practical principles," or innate moral maxims, he pointed in +evidence to the "enormities practiced without remorse" in different +ages and by different peoples. The list he draws up is a curious and +an interesting one.[4] + +In our day it has pretty generally come to be recognized by thoughtful +men that a man's judgments as to right and wrong reflect the phase of +civilization, or the lack of it, which he represents, and that their +significance cannot be understood when we consider them apart from +their historic setting. This means that no man's conscience is set up +as an ultimate standard, but that every man's conscience is regarded as +furnishing material which the science of ethics must take into account. + +May we, broadening the basis upon which we are to build, and studying +the manners, customs, and moral judgments of all sorts and conditions +of men, develop an empirical science of ethics which will be +independent of philosophy? + +It does not seem that we can do this. We are concerned with +psychological phenomena, and their nature and significance are by no +means beyond dispute. For example, there is the feeling of moral +obligation, of which ethics has so much to say. What is this feeling, +and what is its authority? Is it a thing to be explained? Can it +impel a man, let us say, a bigot, to do wrong? And what can we mean by +credit and discredit, by responsibility and free choice, and other +concepts of the sort? All this must remain very vague to one who has +not submitted his ethical concepts to reflective analysis of the sort +that we have a right to call philosophical. + +Furthermore, it does not seem possible to decide what a man should or +should not do, without taking into consideration the circumstances in +which he is placed. The same act may be regarded as benevolent or the +reverse according to its context. If we will but grant the validity of +the premises from which the medieval churchman reasoned, we may well +ask whether, in laying hands violently upon those who dared to form +independent judgments in matters of religion, he was not +conscientiously doing his best for his fellow-man. He tried by all +means to save some, and to what he regarded as a most dangerous malady +he applied a drastic remedy. By what standard shall we judge him? + +There can be no doubt that our doctrine of the whole duty of man must +be conditioned by our view of the nature of the world in which man +lives and of man's place in the world. Has ethics nothing to do with +religion? If we do not believe in God, and if we think that man's life +ends with the death of the body, it is quite possible that we shall set +for him an ethical standard which we should have to modify if we +adopted other beliefs. The relation of ethics to religion is a problem +that the student of ethics can scarcely set aside. It seems, then, +that the study of ethics necessarily carries us back to world problems +which cannot be approached except by the path of philosophical +reflection. We shall see in Chapter XX that the theistic problem +certainly belongs to this class. + +It is worthy of our consideration that the vast majority of writers on +ethics have felt strongly that their science runs out into metaphysics. +We can scarcely afford to treat their testimony lightly. Certainly it +is not possible for one who has no knowledge of philosophy to +understand the significance of the ethical systems which have appeared +in the past. The history of ethics may be looked upon as a part of the +history of philosophy. Only on the basis of some general view as to +nature and man have men decided what man ought to do. As we have seen +above, this appears sufficiently reasonable. + +73. AESTHETICS.--Of aesthetics, or the science of the beautiful, I +shall say little. There is somewhat the same reason for including it +among the philosophical sciences that there is for including ethics. + +Those who have paid little attention to science or to philosophy are +apt to dogmatize about what is and what is not beautiful just as they +dogmatize about what is and what is not right. They say +unhesitatingly; This object is beautiful, and that one is ugly. It is +as if they said: This one is round, and that one square. + +Often it quite escapes their attention that what they now regard as +beautiful struck them as unattractive a short time before; and will, +perhaps, when the ceaseless change of the fashions has driven it out of +vogue, seem strange and unattractive once more. Nor do they reflect +upon the fact that others, who seem to have as good a right to an +opinion as they, do not agree with them in their judgments; nor upon +the further fact that the standard of beauty is a thing that has varied +from age to age, differs widely in different countries, and presents +minor variations in different classes even in the same community. + +The dogmatic utterances of those who are keenly susceptible to the +aesthetic aspects of things but are not given to reflection stand in +striking contrast to the epitome of the popular wisdom expressed in the +skeptical adage that there is no disputing about tastes. + +We cannot interpret this adage broadly and take it literally, for then +we should have to admit that men's judgments as to the beautiful cannot +constitute the material of a science at all, and that there can be no +such thing as progress in the fine arts. The notion of progress +implies a standard, and an approximation to an ideal. Few would dare +to deny that there has been progress in such arts as painting and +music; and when one has admitted so much as this, one has virtually +admitted that a science of aesthetics is, at least, possible. + +The science studies the facts of the aesthetic life as ethics studies +the facts of the moral life. It can take no man's taste as furnishing +a standard: it must take every man's taste as a fact of significance. +It is driven to reflective analysis--to such questions as, what is +beauty? and what is meant by aesthetic progress? It deals with elusive +psychological facts the significance of which is not easily grasped. +It is a philosophical science, and is by no means in a position to +follow a beaten path, dispensing with a reflective analysis of its +materials. + + +[1] Preface. + +[2] section 269. + +[3] section 376. + +[4] "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book I, Chapter III. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +METAPHYSICS + +74. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?--The reader has probably already remarked that +in some of the preceding chapters the adjectives "metaphysical" and +"philosophical" have been used as if they were interchangeable, in +certain connections, at least. This is justified by common usage; and +in the present chapter I shall be expected by no one, I think, to prove +that metaphysics is a philosophical discipline. My task will rather be +to show how far the words "metaphysics" and "philosophy" have a +different meaning. + +In Chapters III to XI, I have given a general view of the problems +which present themselves to reflective thought, and I have indicated +that they are not problems which can conveniently be distributed among +the several special sciences. Is there an external world? What is it? +What are space and time? What is the mind? How are mind and body +related? How do we know that there are other minds than ours? etc. +These have been presented as _philosophical_ problems; and when we turn +back to the history of speculative thought we find that they are just +the problems with which the men whom we agree to call philosophers have +chiefly occupied themselves. + +But when we turn to our treatises on _metaphysics_, we also find that +these are the problems there discussed. Such treatises differ much +among themselves, and the problems are not presented in the same form +or in the same order; but one who can look beneath the surface will +find that the authors are busied with much the same thing--with some or +all of the problems above mentioned. + +How, then, does metaphysics differ from philosophy? The difference +becomes clear to us when we realize that the word philosophy has a +broader and looser signification, and that metaphysics is, so to speak, +the core, the citadel, of philosophy. + +We have seen (Chapter II) that the world and the mind, as they seem to +be presented in the experience of the plain man, do not stand forth +with such clearness and distinctness that he is able to answer +intelligently the questions we wish to ask him regarding their nature. +It is not merely that his information is limited; it is vague and +indefinite as well. And we have seen, too, that, however the special +sciences may increase and systematize his information, they do not +clear away such vagueness. The man still uses such concepts as "inner" +and "outer," "reality," "the mind," "space," and "time," with no very +definite notion of what they mean. + +Now, the attempt to clear away this vagueness by the systematic +analysis of such concepts--in other words, the attempt to make a +thorough analysis of our experience--is metaphysics. The metaphysician +strives to limit his task as well as he may, and to avoid unnecessary +excursions into the fields occupied by the special sciences, even those +which lie nearest to his own, such as psychology and ethics. There is +a sense in which he may be said to be working in the field of a special +science, though he is using as the material for his investigations +concepts which are employed in many sciences; but it is clear that his +discipline is not a special science in the same sense in which geometry +and physics are special sciences. + +Nevertheless, the special sciences stand, as we have already seen in +the case of several of them, very near to his own. If he broadens his +view, and deliberately determines to take a survey of the field of +human knowledge as illuminated by the analyses that he has made, he +becomes something more than a _metaphysician_; he becomes a +_philosopher_. + +This does not in the least mean that he becomes a storehouse of +miscellaneous information, and an authority on all the sciences. +Sometimes the philosophers have attempted to describe the world of +matter and of mind as though they possessed some mysterious power of +knowing things that absolved them from the duty of traveling the weary +road of observation and experiment that has ended in the sciences as we +have them. When they have done this, they have mistaken the +significance of their calling. A philosopher has no more right than +another man to create information out of nothing. + +But it is possible, even for one who is not acquainted with the whole +body of facts presented in a science, to take careful note of the +assumptions upon which that science rests, to analyze the concepts of +which it makes use, to mark the methods which it employs, and to gain a +fair idea of its scope and of its relation to other sciences. Such a +reflection upon our scientific knowledge is philosophical reflection, +and it may result in a classification of the sciences, and in a general +view of human knowledge as a whole. Such a view may be illuminating in +the extreme; it can only be harmful when its significance is +misunderstood. + +But, it may be argued, why may not the man of science do all this for +himself? Why should he leave it to the philosopher, who is presumably +less intimately acquainted with the sciences than he is? + +To this I answer: The work should, of course, be done by the man who +will do it best. All our subdivision of labor should be dictated by +convenience. But I add, that experience has shown that the workers in +the special sciences have not as a rule been very successful when they +have tried to philosophize. + +Science is an imperious mistress; she demands one's utmost efforts; and +when a man turns to philosophical reflection merely "by the way," and +in the scraps of time at his disposal after the day's work is done, his +philosophical work is apt to be rather superficial. Moreover, it does +not follow that, because a man is a good mathematician or chemist or +physicist, he is gifted with the power of reflective analysis. Then, +too, such men are apt to be imperfectly acquainted with what has been +done in the past; and those who are familiar with the history of +philosophy often have occasion to remark that what is laid before them, +in ignorance of the fact that it is neither new nor original, is a +doctrine which has already made its appearance in many forms and has +been discussed at prodigious length in the centuries gone by. + +In certain sciences it seems possible to ignore the past, to a great +extent, at least. What is worth keeping has been kept, and there is a +solid foundation on which to build for the future. But with reflective +thought it is not so. There is no accepted body of doctrine which we +have the right to regard as unassailable. We should take it as a safe +maxim that the reflections of men long dead _may_ be profounder and +more worthy of our study than those urged upon our attention by the men +of our day. + +And this leads me to make a remark upon the titles given to works on +metaphysics. It seems somewhat misleading to label them: "Outlines of +Metaphysics" or "Elements of Metaphysics." Such titles suggest that we +are dealing with a body of doctrine which has met with general +acceptance, and may be compared with that found in handbooks on the +special sciences. But we should realize that, when we are concerned +with the profounder investigations into the nature of our experience, +we tread upon uncertain ground and many differences of opinion obtain. +We should, if possible, avoid a false semblance of authority. + +75. EPISTEMOLOGY.--We hear a great deal at the present day of +Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge. I have not classed it as a +distinct philosophical science, for reasons which will appear below. + +We have seen in Chapter XVI that it is possible to treat of logic in a +simple way without growing very metaphysical; but we have also seen +that when we go deeply into questions touching the nature of evidence +and what is meant by truth and falsity, we are carried back to +philosophical reflection at once. + +We may, for convenience, group together these deeper questions +regarding the nature of knowledge and its scope, and call the subject +of our study "Epistemology." + +But it should be remarked, in the first place, that, when we work in +this field, we are exercising a reflective analysis of precisely the +type employed in making the metaphysical analyses contained in the +earlier chapters of this book. We are treating our experience as it is +not treated in common thought and in science. + +And it should be remarked, in the second place, that the investigation +of our knowledge inevitably runs together with an investigation into +the nature of things known, of the mind and the world. Suppose that I +give the titles of the chapters in Part III of Mr. Hobhouse's able work +on "The Theory of Knowledge." They are as follows: Validity; the +Validity of Knowledge; the Conception of External Reality; Substance; +the Conception of Self; Reality as a System; Knowledge and Reality; the +Grounds of Knowledge and Belief. + +Are not these topics metaphysical? Let us ask ourselves how it would +affect our views of the validity and of the limits of our knowledge, if +we were converted to the metaphysical doctrines of John Locke, or of +Bishop Berkeley, or of David Hume, or of Thomas Reid, or of Immanuel +Kant. + +We may, then, regard epistemology as a part of logic--the metaphysical +part--or as a part of metaphysics; it does not much matter which we +call it, since we mean the same thing. But its relation to metaphysics +is such that it does not seem worth while to call it a separate +discipline. + +Before leaving this subject there is one more point upon which I should +touch, if only to obviate a possible misunderstanding. + +We find in Professor Cornelius's clear little book, "An Introduction to +Philosophy" (Leipzig, 1903; it has unhappily not yet been translated +into English), that metaphysics is repudiated altogether, and +epistemology is set in its place. But this rejection of metaphysics +does not necessarily imply the denial of the value of such an analysis +of our experience as I have in this work called metaphysical. +Metaphysics is taken to mean, not an analysis of experience, but a +groping behind the veil of phenomena for some reality not given in +experience. In other words, what Professor Cornelius condemns is what +many of the rest of us also condemn under another name. What he calls +metaphysics, we call bad metaphysics; and what he calls epistemology, +we call metaphysics. The dispute is really a dispute touching the +proper name to apply to reflective analysis of a certain kind. + +As it is the fashion in certain quarters to abuse metaphysics, I set +the reader on his guard. Some kinds of metaphysics certainly ought to +be repudiated under whatever name they may be presented to us. + + + + +CHAPTER XX + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION + +76. RELIGION AND REFLECTION.--A man may be through and through ethical +in his thought and feeling, and yet know nothing of the science of +ethics. He may be possessed of the finest aesthetic taste, and yet may +know nothing of the science of aesthetics. It is one thing to be good, +and another to know clearly what goodness means; it is one thing to +love the beautiful, and another to know how to define it. + +Just so a man may be thoroughly religious, and may, nevertheless, have +reflected very little upon his religious belief and the foundations +upon which it rests. This does not mean that his belief is without +foundation. It may have a firm basis or it may not. But whatever the +case may be, he is not in a position to say much about it. He _feels_ +that he is right, but he cannot prove it. The man is, I think we must +admit, rather blind as to the full significance of his position, and he +is, in consequence, rather helpless. + +Such a man is menaced by certain dangers. We have seen in the chapter +on ethics that men are by no means at one in their judgments as to the +rightness or wrongness of given actions. And it requires a very little +reflection to teach us that men are not at one in their religious +notions. God and His nature, the relation of God to man, what the +religious life should be, these things are the subject of much dispute; +and some men hold opinions regarded by others as not merely erroneous +but highly pernicious in their influence. + +Shall a man simply assume that the opinions which he happens to hold +are correct, and that all who differ with him are in error? He has not +framed his opinions quite independently for himself. We are all +influenced by what we have inherited from the past, and what we inherit +may be partly erroneous, even if we be right in the main. Moreover, we +are all liable to prejudices, and he who has no means of distinguishing +such from sober truths may admit into his creed many errors. The +lesson of history is very instructive upon this point. The fact is +that a man's religious notions reflect the position which he occupies +in the development of civilization very much as do his ethical notions. + +Again. Even supposing that a man has enlightened notions and is living +a religious life that the most instructed must approve; if he has never +reflected, and has never tried to make clear to himself just what he +really does believe and upon what grounds he believes it, how will it +be with him when his position is attacked by another? Men are, as I +have said, not at one in these matters, and there are few or none of +the doctrines put forward as religions that have not been attacked +again and again. + +Now, those who depend only upon an instinctive feeling may be placed in +the very painful position of seeing no answer to the objections brought +against them. What is said may seem plausible; it may even seem true, +and is it right for a man to oppose what appears to be the truth? One +may be shocked and pained, and may feel that he who makes the assault +_cannot_ be right, and yet may be forced to admit that a relentless +logic, or what presents itself as such, has every appearance of +establishing the repellent truth that robs one of one's dearest +possession. The situation is an unendurable one; it is that of the man +who guards a treasure and recognizes that there is no lock on the door. + +Surely, if there is error mixed with truth in our religious beliefs, it +is desirable that we should have some way of distinguishing between the +truth and the error. And if our beliefs really have a foundation, it +is desirable that we should know what that foundation is, and should +not be at the mercy of every passer-by who takes the notion to throw a +stone at us. But these desirable ends, it seems clear, cannot be +attained without reflection. + +77. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.--The reflection that busies itself with +these things results in what is called the philosophy of religion. To +show that the name is an appropriate one and that we are concerned with +a philosophical discipline, I shall take up for a moment the idea of +God, which most men will admit has a very important place in our +conception of religion. + +Does God exist? We may feel very sure that He does, and yet be forced +to admit that the evidence of His existence is not so clear and +undeniable as to compel the assent of every one. We do not try to +prove the existence of the men we meet and who talk to us. No one +thinks of denying their existence; it is taken for granted. Even the +metaphysician, when he takes up and discusses the question whether we +can prove the existence of any mind beyond our own, does not seriously +doubt whether there are other minds or not. It is not so much what we +know, as how we know it, that interests him. + +But with the existence of God it is different. That men do not think +that an examination of the evidence can be dispensed with is evident +from the books that are written and lectures that are delivered year +after year. There seem to be honest differences of opinion, and we +feel compelled to offer men proofs--to show that belief is reasonable. + +How shall we determine whether this world in which we live is such a +world that we may take it as a revelation of God? And of what sort of +a Being are we speaking when we use the word "God"? The question is +not an idle one, for men's conceptions have differed widely. There is +the savage, with a conception that strikes the modern civilized man as +altogether inadequate; there is the thoughtful man of our day, who has +inherited the reflections of those who have lived in the ages gone by. + +And there is the philosopher, or, perhaps, I should rather say, there +are the philosophers. Have they not conceived of God as a group of +abstract notions, or as a something that may best be described as the +Unknowable, or as the Substance which is the identity of thought and +extension, or as the external world itself? All have not sinned in +this way, but some have, and they are not men whom we can ignore. + +If we turn from all such notions and, in harmony with the faith of the +great body of religious men in the ages past, some of whom were +philosophers but most of whom were not, cling close to the notion that +God is a mind or spirit, and must be conceived according to the +analogy, at least, of the human mind, the mind we most directly +know--if we do this, we are still confronted by problems to which the +thoughtful man cannot refuse attention. + +What do we mean by a mind? This is a question to which one can +scarcely give an intelligent answer unless one has exercised one's +faculty of philosophic reflection. And upon what sort of evidence does +one depend in establishing the existence of minds other than one's own? +This has been discussed at length in Chapter X, and the problem is +certainly a metaphysical one. And if we believe that the Divine Mind +is not subject to the limitations which confine the human, how shall we +conceive it? The question is an important one. Some of the +philosophers and theologians who have tried to free the Divine Mind +from such limitations have taken away every positive mark by which we +recognize a mind to be such, and have left us a naked "Absolute" which +is no better than a labeled vacuum. + +Moreover, we cannot refuse to consider the question of God's relation +to the world. This seems to lead back to the broader question: How are +we to conceive of any mind as related to the world? What is the +relation between mind and matter? If any subject of inquiry may +properly be called metaphysical, surely this may be. + +We see, then, that there is little wonder that the thoughtful +consideration of the facts and doctrines of religion has taken its +place among the philosophical sciences. Aesthetics has been called +applied psychology; and I think it is scarcely too much to say that we +are here concerned with applied metaphysics, with the attempt to obtain +a clear understanding of the significance of the facts of religion in +the light of those ultimate analyses which reveal to us the real nature +of the world of matter and of minds. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER SCIENCES + +78. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.--We have seen in +the preceding chapters that certain of the sciences can scarcely be +cultivated successfully in complete separation from philosophy. It has +also been indicated in various places that the relation of other +sciences to philosophy is not so close. + +Thus, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra, and geometry may be +successfully prosecuted by a man who has reflected little upon the +nature of numbers and who has never asked himself seriously what he +means by space. The assumptions which he is justified in making, and +the kind of operations which he has the right to perform, do not seem, +as a rule, to be in doubt. + +So it is also in the sciences of chemistry and physics. There is +nothing to prevent the chemist or the physicist from being a +philosopher, but he is not compelled to be one. He may push forward +the investigations proper to his profession regardless of the type of +philosophy which it pleases him to adopt. Whether he be a realist or +an idealist, a dualist or a monist, he should, as chemist or physicist, +treat the same sort of facts in the same sort of a way. His path +appears to be laid out for him, and he can do work the value of which +is undisputed by traveling quietly along it, and without stopping to +consider consciously what kind of a path it is. There are many who +work in this way, and they succeed in making important contributions to +human knowledge. + +Such sciences as these I call the non-philosophical sciences to +distinguish them from the group of sciences I have been discussing at +length. What marks them out is, that the facts with which the +investigator has to deal are known by him with sufficient clearness to +leave him usually in little doubt as to the use which he can make of +them. His knowledge is clear enough for the purpose in hand, and his +work is justified by its results. What is the relation of such +sciences as these to philosophy? + +79. THE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES AND METHODS.--It is one thing to +have the instinct of the investigator and to be able to feel one's way +along the road that leads to new knowledge of a given kind, and it is +another thing to have the reflective turn of mind that makes one +clearly conscious of just what one has been doing and how one has been +doing it. Men reasoned before there was a science of logic, and the +sciences made their appearance before what may be called the logic of +the sciences had its birth. + +"It may be truly asserted," writes Professor Jevons,[1] "that the rapid +progress of the physical sciences during the last three centuries has +not been accompanied by a corresponding advance in the theory of +reasoning. Physicists speak familiarly of Scientific Method, but they +could not readily describe what they mean by that expression. +Profoundly engaged in the study of particular classes of natural +phenomena, they are usually too much engrossed in the immense and ever +accumulating details of their special sciences to generalize upon the +methods of reasoning which they unconsciously employ. Yet few will +deny that these methods of reasoning ought to be studied, especially by +those who endeavor to introduce scientific order into less successful +and methodical branches of knowledge." + +Professor Jevons suggests that it is lack of time and attention that +prevents the scientific investigator from attaining to a clear +conception of what is meant by scientific method. This has something +to do with it, but I think we may also maintain that the work of the +investigator and that of the critic are somewhat different in kind, and +require somewhat different powers of mind. We find a parallel to this +elsewhere. Both in literature and in art men may be in the best sense +productive, and yet may be poor critics. We are often wofully +disappointed when we attend a lecture on poetry by a poet, or one on +painting by an artist. + +It may be said: If what is maintained above regarding the possibility +of prosecuting scientific researches without having recourse to +reflective thought is true, why should the man of science care whether +the principles and methods of the non-philosophical sciences are +investigated or are merely taken for granted? + +I answer: It should be observed that the statements made in the last +section were somewhat guarded. I have used the expressions "as a rule" +and "usually." I have spoken thus because one can work in the way +described, without danger of error, only where a beaten track has been +attained and is followed. In Chapter XVI it was pointed out that even +in the mathematical sciences one may be forced to reflect upon the +significance of one's symbols. As I write this, a pamphlet comes to +hand which is concerned to prove that "every cause is potentially +capable of producing several effects," and proves it by claiming that +the square root of four ([square root symbol]4) is a _cause_ which may +have as _effect_ either two (2) or minus two (-2). + +Is this mathematical reasoning? Are mathematical relations ever those +of cause and effect? And may one on the basis of such reasonings claim +that in nature the relation of cause and effect is not a fixed and +invariable one? + +Even where there is a beaten track, there is some danger that men may +wander from it. And on the confines of our knowledge there are fields +in which the accepted road is yet to be established. Science makes +constant use of hypotheses as an aid to investigation. What hypotheses +may one frame, and what are inadmissible? How important an +investigation of this question may be to the worker in certain branches +of science will be clear to one who will read with attention Professor +Poincaré's brilliant little work on "Science and Hypothesis." [2] + +There is no field in art, literature, or science in which the work of +the critic is wholly superfluous. "There are periods in the growth of +science," writes Professor Pearson in his deservedly popular work, "The +Grammar of Science," [3] "when it is well to turn our attention from +its imposing superstructure and to examine carefully its foundations. +The present book is primarily intended as a criticism of the +fundamental concepts of modern science, and as such finds its +justification in the motto placed upon its title-page." The motto in +question is a quotation from the French philosopher Cousin: "Criticism +is the life of science." + +We have seen in Chapter XVI that a work on logic may be a comparatively +simple thing. It may describe the ways in which men reason when they +reason correctly, and may not go deep into metaphysical questions. On +the other hand, it may be deeply metaphysical. + +When we approach the part of logic which deals with the principles and +methods of the sciences, this difference is forced upon our attention. +One may set forth the assumptions upon which a science rests, and may +describe the methods of investigation employed, without going much +below the plane of common thought. As a type of such works I may +mention the useful treatise by Professor Jevons cited earlier in this +chapter. + +On the other hand, our investigations may be more profound, and we may +scrutinize the very foundations upon which a science rests. Both the +other works referred to illustrate this method of procedure. + +For example, in "The Grammar of Science," we find our author +discussing, under the title "The Facts of Science," such problems as +the following: the Reality of Things; Sense-impressions and +Consciousness; the Nature of Thought; the External Universe; Sensations +as the Ultimate Source of the Materials of Knowledge; and the Futility +of "Things-in-themselves." The philosophical character of such +discussions does not need to be pointed out at length. + + +[1] "The Principles Of Science," London, 1874, Preface. + +[2] English translation, New York, 1905. + +[3] Second edition, London, 1900. + + + + +VI. ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + + +CHAPTER XXII + +THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + +80. THE QUESTION OF PRACTICAL UTILITY.--Why should men study +philosophy? The question is a natural one, for man is a rational +being, and when the worth of a thing is not at once evident to him, he +usually calls for proof of its worth. Our professional schools, with +the exception of schools of theology, usually pay little attention to +philosophical studies; but such studies occupy a strong position in our +colleges, and a vast number of persons not students in the technical +sense think it worth while to occupy themselves with them more or less. +Wherever liberal studies are prosecuted they have their place, and it +is an honored place. Is this as it should be? + +Before we ask whether any given study is of practical value, it is wise +to determine what the word "practical" shall be taken to mean. Shall +we say that we may call practical only such learning as can be turned +to direct account in earning money later? If we restrict the meaning +of the word in this way, we seem to strike a blow at liberal studies in +general. + +Thus, no one would think of maintaining that the study of mathematics +is not of practical value--sometimes and to some persons. The +physicist and the engineer need to know a good deal about mathematics. +But how is it with the merchant, the lawyer, the clergyman, the +physician? How much of their algebra, geometry, and trigonometry do +these remember after they have become absorbed in the practice of their +several callings, and how often do they find it necessary to use +anything beyond certain simple rules of arithmetic? + +Sometimes we are tempted to condemn the study of the classics as +unpractical, and to turn instead to the modern languages and to the +physical sciences. Now, it is, of course, a fair question to ask what +should and what should not be regarded as forming part of a liberal +education, and I shall make no effort to decide the question here. But +it should be borne well in mind that one cannot decide it by +determining what studies are practical in the sense of the word under +discussion. + +If we keep strictly to this sense, the modern languages are to the +majority of Americans of little more practical value than are the Latin +and Greek. We scarcely need them except when we travel abroad, and +when we do that we find that the concierge and the waiter use English +with surprising fluency. As for the sciences, those who expect to earn +a living through a knowledge of them, seek, as a rule, that knowledge +in a technical or professional school, and the rest of us can enjoy the +fruit of their labors without sharing them. It is a popular fallacy +that because certain studies have a practical value to the world at +large, they must necessarily have a practical value to every one, and +can be recommended to the individual on that account. It is worth +while to sit down quietly and ask oneself how many of the bits of +information acquired during the course of a liberal education are +directly used in the carrying on of a given business or in the practice +of a given profession. + +Nevertheless, we all believe that liberal education is a good thing for +the individual and for the race. One must not too much restrict the +meaning of the word "practical." A civilized state composed of men who +know nothing save what has a direct bearing upon their especial work in +life is an absurdity; it cannot exist. There must be a good deal of +general enlightenment and there must be a considerable number of +individuals who have enjoyed a high measure of enlightenment. + +This becomes clear if we consider the part played in the life of the +state by the humblest tradesman. If he is to be successful, he must be +able to read, write, and keep his accounts, and make, let us say, +shoes. But when we have said this, we have summed him up as a workman, +but not as a man, and he is also a man. He may marry, and make a good +or a bad husband, and a good or a bad father. He stands in relations +to his neighborhood, to the school, and to the church; and he is not +without his influence. He may be temperate or intemperate, frugal or +extravagant, law-abiding or the reverse. He has his share, and no +small share, in the government of his city and of his state. His +influence is indeed far-reaching, and that it may be an influence for +good, he is in need of all the intellectual and moral enlightenment +that we can give him. It is of the utmost practical utility to the +state that he should know a vast number of things which have no direct +bearing upon the making and mending of shoes. + +And if this is true in the case of the tradesman, it is scarcely +necessary to point out that the physician, the lawyer, the clergyman, +and the whole army of those whom we regard as the leaders of men and +the molders of public opinion have spheres of non-professional activity +of great importance to the state. They cannot be mere specialists if +they would. They must influence society for good or ill; and if they +are ignorant and unenlightened, their influence cannot be good. + +When we consider the life of man in a broad way, we see how essential +it is that many men should be brought to have a share in what has been +gained by the long travail of the centuries past. It will not do to +ask at every step whether they can put to direct professional use every +bit of information gained. Literature and science, sweetness and +light, beauty and truth, these are the heritage of the modern world; +and unless these permeate its very being, society must undergo +degeneration. It is this conviction that has led to the high +appreciation accorded by intelligent men to courses of liberal study, +and among such courses those which we have recognized as philosophical +must take their place. + +81. WHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ARE USEFUL.--But let us ask a little more +specifically what is to be gained by pursuing distinctively +philosophical studies. Why should those who go to college, or +intelligent persons who cannot go to college, care to interest +themselves in logic and ethics, psychology and metaphysics? Are not +these studies rather dry, in the first place, and rather profitless, in +the second? + +As to the first point, I should stoutly maintain that if they are dry, +it is somebody's fault. The most sensational of novels would be dry if +couched in the language which some philosophers have seen fit to use in +expressing their thoughts. He who defines "existence" as "the still +and simple precipitate of the oscillation between beginning to be and +ceasing to be" has done his best to alienate our affections from the +subject of his predilection. + +But it is not in the least necessary to talk in this way about matters +philosophical. He who is not a slave to tradition can use plain and +simple language. To be sure, there are some subjects, especially in +the field of metaphysics, into which the student cannot expect to see +very deeply at the outset of his studies. Men do not expect to +understand the more difficult problems of mathematics without making a +good deal of preparation; but, unhappily, they sometimes expect to have +the profoundest problems of metaphysics made luminous to them in one or +two popular lectures. + +Philosophical studies are not dry, when men are properly taught, and +are in a position to understand what is said. They deal with the most +fascinating of problems. It is only necessary to pierce through the +husk of words which conceals the thoughts of the philosopher, and we +shall find the kernel palatable, indeed. Nor are such studies +profitless, to take up our second point. Let us see what we may gain +from them. + +Let us begin with logic--the traditional logic commonly taught to +beginners. Is it worth while to study this? Surely it is. No one who +has not tried to introduce the average under-graduate to logic can +realize how blindly he uses his reasoning powers, how unconscious he is +of the full meaning of the sentences he employs, how easily he may be +entrapped by fallacious reasonings where he is not set on his guard by +some preposterous conclusion touching matters with which he is familiar. + +And he is not merely unconscious of the lapses in his processes of +reasoning, and of his imperfect comprehension of the significance of +his statements; he is unconscious also of the mass of inherited and +acquired prejudices, often quite indefensible, which he unquestioningly +employs as premises. + +He fairly represents the larger world beyond the walls of the college. +It is a world in which prejudices are assumed as premises, and loose +reasonings pass current and are unchallenged until they beget some +unpalatable conclusion. It is a world in which men take little pains +to think carefully and accurately unless they are dealing with +something touching which it is practically inconvenient to make a +mistake. + +He who studies logic in the proper way is not filling his mind with +useless facts; he is simply turning the light upon his own thinking +mind, and realizing more clearly what he has always done rather blindly +and blunderingly. He may completely forget the + + "Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris," + +and he may be quite unable to give an account of the moods and figures +of the syllogism; but he cannot lose the critical habit if he once has +acquired it, and he cannot but be on his guard against himself as well +as against others. + +There is a keen pleasure in gaining such insight. It gives a feeling +of freedom and power, and rids one of that horrid sense that, although +this or that bit of reasoning is certainly bad, it is impossible to +tell just what is the matter with it. And as for its practical +utility, if it is desirable to get rid of prejudice and confusion, and +to possess a clear and reasonable mind, then anything that makes for +this must be of value. + +Of the desirability that all who can afford the luxury of a liberal +education should do some serious reading in ethics, it seems hardly +necessary to speak. The deficiencies of the ethics of the unreflective +have already been touched upon in Chapter XVIII. + +But I cannot forbear dwelling upon it again. What thoughtful man is +not struck with the variety of ethical standards which obtain in the +same community? The clergyman who has a strong sense of responsibility +for the welfare of his flock is sometimes accused of not sufficiently +realizing the importance of a frank expression of the whole truth about +things; the man of science, whose duty it seems to be to peer into the +mysteries of the universe, and to tell what he sees or what he guesses, +is accused of an indifference to the effect which his utterances may +have upon the less enlightened who hear him speak; many criticise the +lawyer for a devotion to the interests of his client which is at times +in doubtful harmony with the interests of justice in the larger sense; +in the business world commercial integrity is exalted, and lapses from +the ethical code which do not assail this cardinal virtue are not +always regarded with equal seriousness. + +It is as though men elected to worship at the shrine of a particular +saint, and were inclined to overlook the claims of others. For all +this there is, of course, a reason; such things are never to be looked +upon as mere accident. But this does not mean that these more or less +conflicting standards are all to be accepted as satisfactory and as +ultimate. It is inevitable that those who study ethics seriously, who +really reflect upon ethical problems, should sometimes criticise the +judgments of their fellow-men rather unfavorably. + +Of such independent criticism many persons have a strong distrust. I +am reminded here of an eminent mathematician who maintained that the +study of ethics has a tendency to distort the student's judgments as to +what is right and what is wrong. He had observed that there is apt to +be some divergence of opinion between those who think seriously upon +morals and those who do not, and he gave the preference to the +unthinking majority. + +Now, there is undoubtedly danger that the independent thinker may be +betrayed into eccentricities of opinion which are unjustifiable and are +even dangerous. But it seems a strange doctrine that it is, on the +whole, safer not to think, but rather to drift on the stream of public +opinion. In other fields we are not inclined to believe that the +ignorant man, who has given no especial attention to a subject, is the +one likely to be right. Why should it be so in morals? + +That the youth who goes to college to seek a liberal education has a +need of ethical studies becomes very plain when we come to a +realization of the curious limitations of his ethical training as +picked up from his previous experience of the world. He has some very +definite notions as to right and wrong. He is as ready to maintain the +desirability of benevolence, justice, and veracity, as was Bishop +Butler, who wrote the famous "Analogy "; although, to be sure, he is +most inarticulate when called upon to explain what constitutes +benevolence, justice, or veracity. But the strangest thing is, that he +seems to place some of the most important decisions of his whole life +quite outside the realm of right and wrong. + +He may admit that a man should not undertake to be a clergyman, unless +he possesses certain qualifications of mind and character which +evidently qualify him for that profession. But he does not see why he +has not the right to become a wearisome professor or an incompetent +physician, if he chooses to enter upon such a career. Is a man not +free to take up what profession he pleases? He must take the risk, of +course; but if he fails, he fails. + +And when he is asked to consider from the point of view of ethics the +question of marriage and its responsibilities, he is at first inclined +to consider the whole subject as rather a matter for jest. Has a man +not the right to marry or remain single exactly as he pleases? And is +he not free to marry any one whom he can persuade to accept him? To be +sure, he should be a little careful about marrying quite out of his +class, and he should not be hopelessly careless about money matters. +Thus, a decision, which may affect his whole life as much as any other +that he can be called upon to make, which may practically make it or +mar it, is treated as though it were not a matter of grave concern, but +a private affair, entailing no serious consequences to any one and +calling for no reflection. + +I wish it could be said that the world outside of the college regarded +these matters in another light. But the student faithfully represents +the opinions current in the community from which he comes. And he +represents, unhappily, the teachings of the stage and of the world of +current fiction. The influence of these is too often on the side of +inconsiderate passion, which stirs our sympathy and which lends itself +to dramatic effect. With the writers of romance the ethical +philosophers have an ancient quarrel. + +It may be said: But the world gets along very well as it is, and +without brooding too much upon ethical problems. To this we may +answer: Does the world get along so very well, after all? Are there no +evils that foresight and some firmness of character might have +obviated? And when we concern ourselves with the educated classes, at +least, the weight of whose influence is enormous, is it too much to +maintain that they should do some reading and thinking in the field of +ethics? should strive to attain to clear vision and correct judgment on +the whole subject of man's duties? + +Just at the present time, when psychological studies have so great a +vogue, one scarcely feels compelled to make any sort of an apology for +them. It is assumed on all hands that it is desirable to study +psychology, and courses of lectures are multiplied in all quarters. + +Probably some of this interest has its root in the fallacy touched upon +earlier in this chapter. The science of psychology has revolutionized +educational theory. When those of us who have arrived at middle life +look back and survey the tedious and toilsome path along which we were +unwillingly driven in our schoolboy days, and then see how smooth and +pleasant it has been made since, we are impelled to honor all who have +contributed to this result. Moreover, it seems very clear that +teachers of all grades should have some acquaintance with the nature of +the minds that they are laboring to develop, and that they should not +be left to pick up their information for themselves--a task +sufficiently difficult to an unobservant person. + +These considerations furnish a sufficient ground for extolling the +science of psychology, and for insisting that studies in it should form +some part of the education of a teacher. But why should the rest of us +care for such studies? + +To this one may answer, in the first place, that nearly all of us have, +or ought to have, some responsibility for the education of children; +and, in the second, that we deal with the minds of others every day in +every walk in life, and it can certainly do no harm to have our +attention called to the way in which minds function. To be sure, some +men are by nature tactful, and instinctively conscious of how things +strike the minds of those about them. But even such persons may gain +helpful suggestions, and, at least, have the habit of attention to the +mental processes of others confirmed in them. How often we are +impressed at church, at the public lecture, and in private +conversations, with the fact that the speaker lives in blissful +unconsciousness of what can be understood by or can possibly interest +his hearers! For the confirmed bore, there is, perhaps, no cure; but +it seems as though something might be done for those who are afflicted +to a minor degree. + +And this brings me to another consideration, which is that a proper +study of psychology ought to be of service in revealing to a man his +own nature. It should show him what he is, and this is surely a first +step toward becoming something better. It is wonderful how blind men +may be with regard to what passes in their own minds and with regard to +their own peculiarities. When they learn to reflect, they come to a +clearer consciousness of themselves--it is as though a lamp were +lighted within them. One may, it is true, study psychology without +attaining to any of the good results suggested above; but, for that +matter, there is no study which may not be pursued in a profitless way, +if the teacher be sufficiently unskilled and the pupil sufficiently +thoughtless. + +82. METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.--Perhaps it will be said: +For such philosophical studies as the above a good defense may perhaps +be made, but can one defend in the same way the plunge into the +obscurities of metaphysics? In this field no two men seem to be wholly +agreed, and if they were, what would it signify? Whether we call +ourselves monists or dualists, idealists or realists, Lockians or +Kantians, must we not live and deal with the things about us in much +the same way? + +Those who have dipped into metaphysical studies deeply enough to see +what the problems discussed really are; who have been able to reach the +ideas concealed, too often, under a rather forbidding terminology; who +are not of the dogmatic turn of mind which insists upon unquestioned +authority and is repelled by the uncertainties which must confront +those who give themselves to reflective thought,--these will hardly +need to be persuaded that it is desirable to give some attention to the +question: What sort of a world, after all, is this world in which we +live? What is its meaning? + +To many men the impulse to peer into these things is over-powering, and +the pleasure of feeling their insight deepen is extremely keen. What +deters us in most instances is not the conviction that such +investigations are not, or should not be, interesting, but rather the +difficulty of the approach. It is not easy to follow the path which +leads from the world of common thought into the world of philosophical +reflection. One becomes bewildered and discouraged at the outset. +Sometimes, after listening to the directions of guides who disagree +among themselves, we are tempted to believe that there can be no +certain path to the goal which we have before us. + +But, whatever the difficulties and uncertainties of our task, a little +reflection must show that it is not one which has no significance for +human life. + +Men can, it is true, eat and sleep and go through the routine of the +day, without giving thought to science or religion or philosophy, but +few will defend such an existence. As a matter of fact, those who have +attained to some measure of intellectual and moral development do +assume, consciously or unconsciously, some rather definite attitude +toward life, and this is not independent of their conviction as to what +the world is and means. + +Metaphysical speculations run out into the philosophy of religion; and, +on the other hand, religious emotions and ideals have again and again +prompted men to metaphysical construction. A glance at history shows +that it is natural to man to embrace some attitude toward the system of +things, and to try to justify this by reasoning. Vigorous and +independent minds have given birth to theories, and these have been +adopted by others. The influence of such theories upon the evolution +of humanity has been enormous. + +Ideas have ruled and still rule the world, some of them very abstract +ideas. It does not follow that one is uninfluenced by them, when one +has no knowledge of their source or of their original setting. They +become part of the intellectual heritage of us all, and we sometimes +suppose that we are responsible for them ourselves. Has not the fact +that an idealistic or a materialistic type of thought has been current +at a particular time influenced the outlook on life of many who have +themselves devoted little attention to philosophy? It would be +interesting to know how many, to whom Spencer is but a name, have felt +the influence of the agnosticism of which he was the apostle. + +I say this without meaning to criticise here any of the types of +doctrine referred to. My thesis is only that philosophy and life go +hand in hand, and that the prying into the deeper mysteries of the +universe cannot be regarded as a matter of no practical moment. Its +importance ought to be admitted even by the man who has little hope +that he will himself be able to attain to a doctrine wholly +satisfactory and wholly unshakable. + +For, if the study of the problems of metaphysics does nothing else for +a given individual, it, at least, enables him to comprehend and +criticise intelligently the doctrines which are presented for his +acceptance by others. It is a painful thing to feel quite helpless in +the face of plausible reasonings which may threaten to rob us of our +most cherished hopes, or may tend to persuade us of the vanity of what +we have been accustomed to regard as of highest worth. If we are quite +unskilled in the examination of such doctrines, we may be captured by +the loosest of arguments--witness the influence of Spencer's argument +for the "Unknowable," in the "First Principles"; and if we are ignorant +of the history of speculative thought, we may be carried away by old +and exploded notions which pose as modern and impressive only because +they have been given a modern dress. + +We can, of course, refuse to listen to those who would talk with us. +But this savors of bigotry, and the world will certainly not grow +wiser, if men generally cultivate a blind adherence to the opinions in +which they happen to be brought up. A cautious conservatism is one +thing, and blind obstinacy is another. To the educated man (and it is +probable that others will have to depend on opinions taken at second +hand) a better way of avoiding error is open. + +Finally, it will not do to overlook the broadening influence of such +studies as we are discussing. How dogmatically men are in the habit of +expressing themselves upon those obscure and difficult problems which +deal with matters that lie on the confines of human knowledge! Such an +assumption of knowledge cannot but make us uncomprehending and +unsympathetic. + +There are many subjects upon which, if we hold an opinion at all, we +should hold it tentatively, waiting for more light, and retaining a +willingness to be enlightened. Many a bitter and fruitless quarrel +might be avoided, if more persons found it possible to maintain this +philosophical attitude of mind. Philosophy is, after all, reflection, +and the reflective man must realize that he is probably as liable to +error as are other men. He is not infallible, nor has the limit of +human knowledge been attained in his day and generation. He who +realizes this will not assume that his neighbor is always wrong, and he +will come to have that wide, conscientious tolerance, which is not +indifference, but which is at the farthest remove from the zeal of mere +bigotry. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII + +WHY WE SHOULD STUDY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY + +83. THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE SUBJECT.--When one reflects upon the +number of lecture courses given every year at our universities and +colleges on the history of philosophy, one is struck by the fact that +philosophy is not treated as are most other subjects with which the +student is brought into contact. + +If we study mathematics, or chemistry, or physics, or physiology, or +biology, the effort is made to lay before us in a convenient form the +latest results which have been attained in those sciences. Of their +history very little is said; and, indeed, as we have seen (section 6), +lectures on the history of the inductive sciences are apt to be +regarded as philosophical in their character and aims rather than as +merely scientific. + +The interest in the history of philosophy is certainly not a +diminishing one. Text-books covering the whole field or a part of it +are multiplied; extensive studies are made and published covering the +work of individual philosophers; innumerable historical discussions +make their appearance in the pages of current philosophical journals. +No student is regarded as fairly acquainted with philosophy who knows +nothing of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, Berkeley and +Hume, Kant and Hegel, and the rest. We should look upon him as having +a very restricted outlook if he had read only the works of the thinkers +of our own day; indeed, we should not expect him to have a proper +comprehension even of these, for their chapters must remain blind and +meaningless to one who has no knowledge of what preceded them and has +given birth to the doctrines there set forth. + +It is a fair question to ask: Why is philosophy so bound up with the +study of the past? Why may we not content ourselves with what has up +to the present been attained, and omit a survey of the road along which +our predecessors have traveled? + +84. THE ESPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES TO REFLECTIVE +THOUGHT.--In some of the preceding chapters dealing with the various +philosophical sciences, it has been indicated that, in the sciences we +do not regard as philosophical, men may work on the basis of certain +commonly accepted assumptions and employ methods which are generally +regarded as trustworthy within the given field. The value both of the +fundamental assumptions and of the methods of investigation appear to +be guaranteed by the results attained. There are not merely +observation and hypothesis; there is also verification, and where this +is lacking, men either abandon their position or reserve their judgment. + +Thus, a certain body of interrelated facts is built up, the +significance of which, in many fields at least, is apparent even to the +layman. Nor is it wholly beyond him to judge whether the results of +scientific investigations can be verified. An eclipse, calculated by +methods which he is quite unable to follow, may occur at the appointed +hour and confirm his respect for the astronomer. The efficacy of a +serum in the cure of diseases may convince him that work done in the +laboratory is not labor lost. + +It seems evident that the several sciences do really rise on stepping +stones of their dead selves, and that those selves of the past are +really dead and superseded. Who would now think of going back for his +science to Plato's "Timaeus," or would accept the description of the +physical world contained in the works of Aristotle? What chemist or +physicist need busy himself with the doctrine of atoms and their +clashings presented in the magnificent poem of Lucretius? Who can +forbear a smile--a sympathetic one--when he turns over the pages of +Augustine's "City of God," and sees what sort of a world this +remarkable man believed himself to inhabit? + +It is the historic and human interest that carries us back to these +things. We say: What ingenuity! what a happy guess! how well that was +reasoned in the light of what was actually known about the world in +those days! But we never forget that what compels our admiration does +so because it makes us realize that we stand in the presence of a great +mind, and not because it is a foundation-stone in the great edifice +which science has erected. + +But it is not so in philosophy. It is not possible to regard the +philosophical reflections of Plato and of Aristotle as superseded in +the same sense in which we may so regard their science. The reason for +this lies in the difference between scientific thought and reflective +thought. + +The two have been contrasted in Chapter II of this volume. It was +there pointed out that the sort of thinking demanded in the special +sciences is not so very different from that with which we are all +familiar in common life. Science is more accurate and systematic, it +has a broader outlook, and it is free from the imperfections which +vitiate the uncritical and fragmentary knowledge which experience of +the world yields the unscientific. But, after all, the world is much +the same sort of a world to the man of science and to his uncritical +neighbor. The latter can, as we have seen, understand what, in +general, the former is doing, and can appropriate many of his results. + +On the other hand, it often happens that the man who has not, with +pains and labor, learned to reflect, cannot even see that the +philosopher has a genuine problem before him. Thus, the plain man +accepts the fact that he has a mind and that it knows the world. That +both mental phenomena and physical phenomena should be carefully +observed and classified he may be ready to admit. But that the very +conceptions of mind and of what it means to know a world are vague and +indefinite in the extreme, and stand in need of careful analysis, he +does not realize. + +In other words, he sees that our knowledge needs to be extended and +rendered more accurate and reliable, but he does not see that, if we +are to think clearly and consciously, all our knowledge needs to be +gone over in a different way. In common life it is quite possible to +use in the attainment of practical ends knowledge which has not been +analyzed and of the full meaning of which we are ignorant. I hope it +has become evident in the course of this volume that something closely +analogous is true in the field of science. The man of science may +measure space and time, and may study the phenomena of the human mind, +without even attempting to answer all the questions which may be raised +as to what is meant, in the last analysis, by such concepts as space, +time, and the mind. + +That such concepts should be analyzed has, I hope, been made clear, if +only that erroneous and misleading notions as to these things should be +avoided. But when a man with a genius for metaphysical analysis +addresses himself to this task, he cannot simply hand the results +attained by his reflections over to his less reflective fellow-man. +His words are not understood; he seems to be dealing with shadows, with +unrealities; he has passed from the real world of common thought into +another world which appears to have little relation to the former. + +Nor can verification, indubitable proof, be demanded and furnished as +it can in many parts of the field cultivated by the special sciences. +We may judge science fairly well without ourselves being scientists, +but it is not possible to judge philosophy without being to some extent +a philosopher. + +In other words, the conclusions of reflective thought must be judged by +following the process and discovering its cogency or the reverse. +Thus, when the philosopher lays before us an argument to prove that we +must regard the only ultimate reality in the world as unknowable, and +must abandon our theistic convictions, how shall we make a decision as +to whether he is right or is wrong? May we expect that the day will +come when he will be justified or condemned as is the astronomer on the +day predicted for an eclipse? Neither the philosophy of Locke, nor +that of Descartes, nor that of Kant, can be vindicated as can a +prediction touching an eclipse of the sun. To judge these men, we must +learn to think with them, to survey the road by which they travel; and +this we cannot do until we have learned the art. + +Whether we like to admit it or not, we must admit, if we are +fair-minded and intelligent, that philosophy cannot speak with the same +authority as science, where science has been able to verify its +results. There are, of course, scientific hypotheses and speculations +which should be regarded as being quite as uncertain as anything +brought forward by the philosophers. But, admitting this, the fact +remains that there is a difference between the two fields as a whole, +and that the philosopher should learn not to speak with an assumption +of authority. No final philosophy has been attained, so palpably firm +in its foundation, and so admittedly trustworthy in its construction, +that we are justified in saying: Now we need never go back to the past +unless to gratify the historic interest. It is a weakness of young +men, and of older men of partisan temper, to feel very sure of matters +which, in the nature of things, must remain uncertain. + +Since these things are so, and since men possess the power of +reflection in very varying degree, it is not surprising that we find it +worth while to turn back and study the thoughts of those who have had a +genius for reflection, even though they lived at a time when modern +science was awaiting its birth. Some things cannot be known until +other things are known; often there must be a vast collection of +individual facts before the generalizations of science can come into +being. But many of the problems with which reflective thought is still +struggling have not been furthered in the least by information which +has been collected during the centuries which have elapsed since they +were attacked by the early Greek philosophers. + +Thus, we are still discussing the distinction between "appearance" and +"reality," and many and varied are the opinions at which philosophers +arrive. But Thales, who heads the list of the Greek philosophers, had +quite enough material, given in his own experience, to enable him to +solve this problem as well as any modern philosopher, had he been able +to use the material. He who is familiar with the history of philosophy +will recognize that, although one may smile at Augustine's accounts of +the races of men, and of the spontaneous generation of small animals, +no one has a right to despise his profound reflections upon the nature +of time and the problems which arise out of its character as past, +present, and future. + +The fact is that metaphysics does not lag behind because of our lack of +material to work with. The difficulties we have to face are nothing +else than the difficulties of reflective thought. Why can we not tell +clearly what we mean when we use the word "self," or speak of +"knowledge," or insist that we know an "external world"? Are we not +concerned with the most familiar of experiences? To be sure we +are--with experiences familiarly, but vaguely and unanalytically, known +and, hence, only half known. All these experiences the great men of +the past had as well as we; and if they had greater powers of +reflection, perhaps they saw more deeply into them than we do. At any +rate, we cannot afford to assume that they did not. + +One thing, however, I must not omit to mention. Although one man +cannot turn over bodily the results of his reflection to another, it by +no means follows that he cannot give the other a helping hand, or warn +him of dangers by himself stumbling into pitfalls, as the case may be. +We have an indefinite advantage over the solitary thinkers who opened +up the paths of reflection, for we have the benefit of their teaching. +And this brings me to a consideration which I must discuss in the next +section. + +85. THE VALUE OF DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW.--The man who has not read is +like the man who has not traveled--he is not an intelligent critic, for +he has nothing with which to compare what falls within the little +circle of his experiences. That the prevailing architecture of a town +is ugly can scarcely impress one who is acquainted with no other town. +If we live in a community in which men's manners are not good, and +their standard of living not the highest, our attention does not dwell +much upon the fact, unless some contrasted experience wakes within us a +clear consciousness of the difference. That to which we are accustomed +we accept uncritically and unreflectively. It is difficult for us to +see it somewhat as one might see it to whom it came as a new experience. + +Of course, there may be in the one town buildings of more and of less +architectural beauty; and there may be in the one community differences +of opinion that furnish intellectual stimulus and keep awake the +critical spirit. Still, there is such a thing as a prevalent type of +architecture, and there is such a thing as the spirit of the times. He +who is carried along by the spirit of the age may easily conclude that +what is, is right, because he hears few raise their voices in protest. + +To estimate justly the type of thought in which he has been brought up, +he must have something with which to compare it. He must stand at a +distance, and try to judge it as he would judge a type of doctrine +presented to him for the first rime. And in the accomplishment of this +task he can find no greater aid than the study of the history of +philosophy. + +It is at first something of a shock to a man to discover that +assumptions which he has been accustomed to make without question have +been frankly repudiated by men quite as clever as he, and, perhaps, +more critical. It opens the eyes to see that his standards of worth +have been weighed by others and have been found wanting. It may well +incline him to reexamine reasonings in which he has detected no flaw, +when he finds that acute minds have tried them before, and have +declared them faulty. + +Nor can it be without its influence upon his judgment of the +significance of a doctrine, when it becomes plain to him that this +significance can scarcely be fully comprehended until the history of +the doctrine is known. For example, he thinks of the mind as somehow +in the body, as interacting with it, as a substance, and as immaterial. +In the course of his reading it begins to dawn upon his consciousness +that he has not thought all this out for himself; he has taken these +notions from others, who in turn have had them from their predecessors. +He begins to realize that he is not resting upon evidence independently +found in his own experience, but has upon his hands a sheaf of opinions +which are the echoes of old philosophies, and whose rise and +development can be traced over the stretch of the centuries. Can he +help asking himself, when he sees this, whether the opinions in +question express the truth and the whole truth? Is he not forced to +take the critical attitude toward them? + +And when he views the succession of systems which pass in review before +him, noting how a truth may be dimly seen by one writer, denied by +another, taken up again and made clearer by a third, and so on, how can +he avoid the reflection that, as there was some error mixed with the +truth presented in earlier systems, so there probably is some error in +whatever may happen to be the form of doctrine generally received in +his own time? The evolution of humanity is not yet at an end; men +still struggle to see clearly, and fall short of the ideal; it must be +a good thing to be freed from the dogmatic assumption of finality +natural to the man of limited outlook. In studying the history of +philosophy sympathetically we are not merely calling to our aid critics +who possess the advantage of seeing things from a different point of +view, but we are reminding ourselves that we, too, are human and +fallible. + +86. PHILOSOPHY AS POETRY, AND PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE.--The recognition +of the truth that the problems of reflection do not admit of easy +solution and that verification can scarcely be expected as it can in +the fields of the special sciences, need not, even when it is brought +home to us, as it is apt to be, by the study of the history of +philosophy, lead us to believe that philosophies are like the fashions, +a something gotten up to suit the taste of the day, and to be dismissed +without regret as soon as that taste changes. + +Philosophy is sometimes compared with poetry. It is argued that each +age must have its own poetry, even though it be inferior to that which +it has inherited from the past. Just so, it is said, each age must +have its own philosophy, and the philosophy of an earlier age will not +satisfy its demands. The implication is that in dealing with +philosophy we are not concerned with what is true or untrue in itself +considered, but with what is satisfying to us or the reverse. + +Now, it would sound absurd to say that each age must have its own +geometry or its own physics. The fact that it has long been known that +the sum of the interior angles of a plane triangle is equal to two +right angles, does not warrant me in repudiating that truth; nor am I +justified in doing so, and in believing the opposite, merely because I +find the statement uninteresting or distasteful. When we are dealing +with such matters as these, we recognize that truth is truth, and that, +if we mistake it or refuse to recognize it, so much the worse for us. + +Is it otherwise in philosophy? Is it a perfectly proper thing that, in +one age, men should be idealists, and in another, materialists; in one, +theists, and in another, agnostics? Is the distinction between true +and false nothing else than the distinction between what is in harmony +with the spirit of the times and what is not? + +That it is natural that there should be such fluctuations of opinion, +we may freely admit. Many things influence a man to embrace a given +type of doctrine, and, as we have seen, verification is a difficult +problem. But have we here, any more than in other fields, the right to +assume that a doctrine was true at a given time merely because it +_seemed_ to men true at that time, or because they found it pleasing? +The history of science reveals that many things have long been believed +to be true, and, indeed, to be bound up with what were regarded as the +highest interests of man, and that these same things have later been +discovered to be false--not false merely for a later age, but false for +all time; as false when they were believed in as when they were +exploded and known to be exploded. No man of sense believes that the +Ptolemaic system was true for a while, and that then the Copernican +became true. We say that the former only _seemed_ true, and that the +enthusiasm of its adherents was a mistaken enthusiasm. + +It is well to remember that philosophies are brought forward because it +is believed or hoped that they are true. A fairy tale may be recited +and may be approved, although no one dreams of attaching faith to the +events narrated in it. But a philosophy attempts to give us some +account of the nature of the world in which we live. If the +philosopher frankly abandons the attempt to tell us what is true, and +with a Celtic generosity addresses himself to the task of saying what +will be agreeable to us, he loses his right to the title. It is not +enough that he stirs our emotions, and works up his unrealities into +something resembling a poem. It is not primarily his task to please, +as it is not the task of the serious worker in science to please those +whom he is called upon to instruct. Truth is truth, whether it be +scientific truth or philosophical truth. And error, no matter how +agreeable or how nicely adjusted to the temper of the times, is always +error. If it is error in a field in which the detection and exposure +of error is difficult, it is the more dangerous, and the more should we +be on our guard against it. + +We may, then, accept the lesson of the history of philosophy, to wit, +that we have no right to regard any given doctrine as final in such a +sense that it need no longer be held tentatively and as subject to +possible revision; but we need not, on that account, deny that +philosophy is, what it has in the past been believed to be, an earnest +search for truth. A philosophy that did not even profess to be this +would not be listened to at all. It would be regarded as too trivial +to merit serious attention. If we take the word "science" in the broad +sense to indicate a knowledge of the truth more exact and satisfactory +than that which obtains in common life, we may say that every +philosophy worthy of the name is, at least, an attempt at scientific +knowledge. Of course, this sense of the word "science" should not be +confused with that in which it has been used elsewhere in this volume. + +87. HOW TO READ THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--He who takes up the history +of philosophy for the first time is apt to be impressed with the fact +that he is reading something that might not inaptly be called the +history of human error. + +It begins with crude and, to the superficial spectator, seemingly +childish attempts in the field of physical science. There are clever +guesses at the nature of the physical world, but the boldest of +speculations are entered upon with no apparent recognition of the +difficulty of the task undertaken, and with no realization of the need +for caution. Somewhat later a different class of problems makes its +appearance--the problems which have to do with the mind and with the +nature of knowledge, reflective problems which scarcely seem to have +come fairly within the horizon of the earliest thinkers. + +These problems even the beginner may be willing to recognize as +philosophical; but he may conscientiously harbor a doubt as to the +desirability of spending time upon the solutions which are offered. +System rises after system, and confronts him with what appear to be new +questions and new answers. It seems as though each philosopher were +constructing a world for himself independently, and commanding him to +accept it, without first convincing him of his right to assume this +tone of authority and to set up for an oracle. In all this conflict of +opinions where shall we seek for truth? Why should we accept one man +as a teacher rather than another? Is not the lesson to be gathered +from the whole procession of systems best summed up in the dictum of +Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things"--each has his own truth, +and this need not be truth to another? + +This, I say, is a first impression and a natural one. I hasten to add: +this should not be the last impression of those who read with +thoughtful attention. + +One thing should be emphasized at the outset: nothing will so often +bear rereading as the history of philosophy. When we go over the +ground after we have obtained a first acquaintance with the teachings +of the different philosophers, we begin to realize that what we have in +our hands is, in a sense, a connected whole. We see that if Plato and +Aristotle had not lived, we could not have had the philosophy which +passed current in the Middle Ages and furnished a foundation for the +teachings of the Church. We realize that without this latter we could +not have had Descartes, and without Descartes we could not have had +Locke and Berkeley and Hume. And had not these lived, we should not +have had Kant and his successors. Other philosophies we should +undoubtedly have had, for the busy mind of man must produce something. +But whatever glimpses at the truth these men have vouchsafed us have +been guaranteed by the order of development in which they have stood. +They could not independently have written the books that have come down +to us. + +This should be evident from what has been said earlier in this chapter +and elsewhere in this book. Let us bear in mind that a philosopher +draws his material from two sources. First of all, he has the +experience of the mind and the world which is the common property of us +all. But it is, as we have seen, by no means easy to use this +material. It is vastly difficult to reflect. It is fatally easy to +misconceive what presents itself in our experience. With the most +earnest effort to describe what lies before us, we give a false +description, and we mislead ourselves and others. + +In the second place, the philosopher has the interpretations of +experience which he has inherited from his predecessors. The influence +of these is enormous. Each age has, to a large extent, its problems +already formulated or half formulated for it. Every man must have +ancestors, of some sort, if he is to appear upon this earthly stage at +all; and a wholly independent philosopher is as impossible a creature +as an ancestorless man. We have seen how Descartes (section 60) tried +to repudiate his debt to the past, and how little successful he was in +doing so. + +Now, we make a mistake if we overlook the genius of the individual +thinker. The history of speculative thought has many times taken a +turn which can only be accounted for by taking into consideration the +genius for reflective thought possessed by some great mind. In the +crucible of such an intellect, old truths take on a new aspect, +familiar facts acquire a new and a richer meaning. But we also make a +mistake if we fail to see in the writings of such a man one of the +stages which has been reached in the gradual evolution of human +thought, if we fail to realize that each philosophy is to a great +extent the product of the past. + +When one comes to understand these things, the history of philosophy no +longer presents itself as a mere agglomeration of arbitrary and +independent systems. And an attentive reading gives us a further key +to the interpretation of what seemed inexplicable. We find that there +may be distinct and different streams of thought, which, for a while, +run parallel without commingling their waters. For centuries the +Epicurean followed his own tradition, and walked in the footsteps of +his own master. The Stoic was of sterner stuff, and he chose to travel +another path. To this day there are adherents of the old church +philosophy, Neo-Scholastics, whose ways of thinking can only be +understood when we have some knowledge of Aristotle and of his +influence upon men during the Middle Ages. We ourselves may be +Kantians or Hegelians, and the man at our elbow may recognize as his +spiritual father Comte or Spencer. + +It does not follow that, because one system follows another in +chronological order, it is its lineal descendant. But some ancestor a +system always has, and if we have the requisite learning and ingenuity, +we need not find it impossible to explain why this thinker or that was +influenced to give his thought the peculiar turn that characterizes it. +Sometimes many influences have conspired to attain the result, and it +is no small pleasure to address oneself to the task of disentangling +the threads which enter into the fabric. + +Moreover, as we read thus with discrimination, we begin to see that the +great men of the past have not spoken without appearing to have +sufficient reason for their utterances in the light of the times in +which they lived. We may make it a rule that, when they seem to be +speaking arbitrarily, to be laying before us reasonings that are not +reasonings, dogmas for which no excuse seems to be offered, the fault +lies in our lack of comprehension. Until we can understand how a man, +living in a certain century, and breathing a certain moral and +intellectual atmosphere, could have said what he did, we should assume +that we have read his words, but not his real thought. For the latter +there is always a psychological, if not a logical, justification. + +And this brings me to the question of the language in which the +philosophers have expressed their thoughts. The more attentively one +reads the history of philosophy, the clearer it becomes that the number +of problems with which the philosophers have occupied themselves is not +overwhelmingly great. If each philosophy which confronts us seems to +us quite new and strange, it is because we have not arrived at the +stage at which it is possible for us to recognize old friends with new +faces. The same old problems, the problems which must ever present +themselves to reflective thought, recur again and again. The form is +more or less changed, and the answers which are given to them are not, +of course, always the same. Each age expresses itself in a somewhat +different way. But sometimes the solution proposed for a given problem +is almost the same in substance, even when the two thinkers we are +contrasting belong to centuries which lie far apart. In this case, +only our own inability to strip off the husk and reach the fruit itself +prevents us from seeing that we have before us nothing really new. + +Thus, if we read the history of philosophy with patience and with +discrimination, it grows luminous. We come to feel nearer to the men +of the past. We see that we may learn from their successes and from +their failures; and if we are capable of drawing a moral at all, we +apply the lesson to ourselves. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + +SOME PRACTICAL ADMONITIONS + +88. BE PREPARED TO ENTER UPON A NEW WAY OF LOOKING AT THINGS.--We have +seen that reflective thought tries to analyze experience and to attain +to a clear view of the elements that make it up--to realize vividly +what is the very texture of the known world, and what is the nature of +knowledge. It is possible to live to old age, as many do, without even +a suspicion that there may be such a knowledge as this, and +nevertheless to possess a large measure of rather vague but very +serviceable information about both minds and bodies. + +It is something of a shock to learn that a multitude of questions may +be asked touching the most familiar things in our experience, and that +our comprehension of those things may be so vague that we grope in vain +for an answer. Space, time, matter, minds, realities,--with these +things we have to do every day. Can it be that we do not know what +they are? Then we must be blind, indeed. How shall we set about +enlightening our ignorance? + +Not as we have enlightened our ignorance heretofore. We have added +fact to fact; but our task now is to gain a new light on all facts, to +see them from a different point of view; not so much to extend our +knowledge as to deepen it. + +It seems scarcely necessary to point out that our world, when looked at +for the first time in this new way, may seem to be a new and strange +world. The real things of our experience may appear to melt away, to +be dissolved by reflection into mere shadows and unrealities. Well do +I remember the consternation with which, when almost a schoolboy, I +first made my acquaintance with John Stuart Mill's doctrine that the +things about us are "permanent possibilities of sensation." To Mill, +of course, chairs and tables were still chairs and tables, but to me +they became ghosts, inhabitants of a phantom world, to find oneself in +which was a matter of the gravest concern. + +I suspect that this sense of the unreality of things comes often to +those who have entered upon the path of reflection, It may be a comfort +to such to realize that it is rather a thing to be expected. How can +one feel at home in a world which one has entered for the first time? +One cannot become a philosopher and remain exactly the man that one was +before. Men have tried to do it,--Thomas Reid is a notable instance +(section 50); but the result is that one simply does not become a +philosopher. It is not possible to gain a new and a deeper insight +into the nature of things, and yet to see things just as one saw them +before one attained to this. + +If, then, we are willing to study philosophy at all, we must be willing +to embrace new views of the world, if there seem to be good reasons for +so doing. And if at first we suffer from a sense of bewilderment, we +must have patience, and must wait to see whether time and practice may +not do something toward removing our distress. It may be that we have +only half understood what has been revealed to us. + +89. BE WILLING TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES WHICH AT FIRST STRIKE ONE AS +ABSURD.--It must be confessed that the philosophers have sometimes +brought forward doctrines which seem repellent to good sense, and +little in harmony with the experience of the world which we have all +our lives enjoyed. Shall we on this account turn our backs upon them +and refuse them an impartial hearing? + +Thus, the idealist maintains that there is no existence save psychical +existence; that the material things about us are really mental things. +One of the forms taken by this doctrine is that alluded to above, that +things are permanent possibilities of sensation. + +I think it can hardly be denied that this sounds out of harmony with +the common opinion of mankind. Men do not hesitate to distinguish +between minds and material things, nor do they believe that material +things exist only in minds. That dreams and hallucinations exist only +in minds they are very willing to admit; but they will not admit that +this is true of such things as real chairs and tables. And if we ask +them why they take such a position, they fall back upon what seems +given in experience. + +Now, as the reader of the earlier chapters has seen, I think that the +plain man is more nearly right in his opinion touching the existence of +a world of non-mental things than is the idealistic philosopher. The +latter has seen a truth and misconceived it, thus losing some truth +that he had before he began to reflect. The former has not seen the +truth which has impressed the idealist, and he has held on to that +vague recognition that there are two orders of things given in our +experience, the physical and the mental, which seems to us so +unmistakable a fact until we fall into the hands of the philosophers. + +But all this does not prove that we have a right simply to fall back +upon "common sense," and refuse to listen to the idealist. The +deliverances of unreflective common sense are vague in the extreme; and +though it may seem to assure us that there is a world of things +non-mental, its account of that world is confused and incoherent. He +who must depend on common sense alone can find no answer to the +idealists; he refuses to follow them, but he cannot refute them. He is +reduced to dogmatic denial. + +This is in itself an uncomfortable position. And when we add to this +the reflection that such a man loses the truth which the idealist +emphasizes, the truth that the external world of which we speak must +be, if we are to know it at all, a world revealed to our senses, a +world given in our experience, we see that he who stops his ears +remains in ignorance. The fact is that the man who has never weighed +the evidence that impresses the idealist is not able to see clearly +what is meant by that external world in which we all incline to put +such faith. We may say that he _feels_ a truth blindly, but does not +see it. + +Let us take another illustration. If there is one thing that we feel +to be as sure as the existence of the external world, it is that there +are other minds more or less resembling our own. The solipsist may try +to persuade us that the evidence for such minds is untrustworthy. We +may see no flaw in his argument, but he cannot convince us. May we +ignore him, and refuse to consider the matter at all? + +Surely not, if we wish to substitute clear thinking for vague and +indefinite opinion. We should listen with attention, strive to +understand all the reasonings laid before us, and then, if they seem to +lead to conclusions really not in harmony with our experience, go +carefully over the ground and try to discover the flaw in them. It is +only by doing something like this that we can come to see clearly what +is meant when we speak of two or more minds and the relation between +them. The solipsist can help us, and we should let him do it. + +We should, therefore, be willing to consider seriously all sorts of +doctrines which may at first strike us as unreasonable. I have chosen +two which I believe to contain error. But the man who approaches a +doctrine which impresses him as strange has no right to assume at the +outset that it contains error. We have seen again and again how easy +it is to misapprehend what is given in experience. The philosopher may +be in the right, and what he says may repel us because we have become +accustomed to certain erroneous notions, and they have come to seem +self-evident truths. + +90. DO NOT HAVE TOO MUCH RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY.--But if it is an error +to refuse to listen to the philosopher, it is surely no less an error +to accord him an authority above what he has a right to demand. Bear +in mind what was said in the last chapter about the difference between +the special sciences and philosophy. There is in the latter field no +body of doctrine that we may justly regard as authoritative. There are +"schools" of philosophy, and their adherents fall into the very human +error of feeling very sure that they and those who agree with them are +right; and the emphasis with which they speak is apt to mislead those +who are not well informed. I shall say a few words about the dangers +of the "school." + +If we look about us, we are impressed by the fact that there are +"schools" of philosophy, somewhat as there are religious sects and +political parties. An impressive teacher sets the mark of his +personality and of his preferences upon those who come under his +influence. They are not at an age to be very critical, and, indeed, +they have not as yet the requisite learning to enable them to be +critical. They keep the trend which has been given them early in life, +and, when they become teachers, they pass on the type of thought with +which they have been inoculated, and the circle widens. "Schools" may +arise, of course, in a different way. An epoch-making book may sweep +men off of their feet and make of them passionate adherents. But he +who has watched the development of the American universities during the +last twenty-five years must be impressed with the enormous influence +which certain teachers have had in giving a direction to the +philosophic thought of those who have come in contact with them. We +expect the pupils of a given master to have a given shade of opinion, +and very often we are not disappointed in our guess. + +It is entirely natural that this should be so. Those who betake +themselves to the study of philosophy are men like other men. They +have the same feelings, and the bending of the twig has the same +significance in their case that it has in that of others. It is no +small compliment to a teacher that he can thus spread his influence, +and leave his proxies even when he passes away. + +But, when we strive to "put off humanity" and to look at the whole +matter under the cold light of reason, we may well ask ourselves, +whether he who unconsciously accepts his philosophy, in whole or in +part, because it has been the philosophy of his teacher, is not doing +what is done by those persons whose politics and whose religion take +their color from such accidental circumstances as birth in a given +class or family traditions? + +I am far from saying that it is, in general, a bad thing for the world +that men should be influenced in this way by one another. I say only +that, when we look at the facts of the case, we must admit that even +our teachers of philosophy do not always become representatives of the +peculiar type of thought for which they stand, merely through a +deliberate choice from the wealth of material which the history of +speculative thought lays before them. They are influenced by others to +take what they do take, and the traces of this influence are apt to +remain with them through life. He who wishes to be entirely impartial +must be on his guard against such influences as these, and must +distrust prejudices for or against certain doctrines, when he finds +that he imbibed them at an uncritical age and has remained under their +influence ever since. Some do appear to be able to emancipate +themselves, and to outgrow what they first learned. + +It is, as I have said, natural that there should be a tendency to form +"schools" in philosophy. And there are certain things that make this +somewhat uncritical acceptance of a doctrine very attractive. + +In the first place, if we are willing to take a system of any sort as a +whole, it saves us a vast amount of trouble. We seem to have a +citadel, a point of vantage from which we can look out upon life and +interpret it. If the house we live in is not in all respects ideal, at +least it is a house, and we are not homeless. There is nothing more +intolerable to most men than the having of no opinions. They will +change one opinion for another, but they will rarely consent to do +without altogether. It is something to have an answer to offer to +those who persist in asking questions; and it is something to have some +sort of ground under one's feet, even if it be not very solid ground. + +Again. Man is a social creature, and he is greatly fortified in his +opinions by the consciousness that others share them with him. If we +become adherents of a "school," we have the agreeable consciousness +that we are not walking alone through the maze of speculations that +confronts those who reflect. There appears to be a traveled way in +which we may have some confidence. Are we not following the crowd, or, +at least, a goodly number of the pilgrims who are seeking the same goal +with ourselves? Under such circumstances we are not so often impelled +to inquire anxiously whether we are after all upon the right road. We +assume that we have made no mistake. + +Under such circumstances we are apt to forget that there are many such +roads, and that these have been traveled in ages past by troops very +much like our own, who also cherished the hope that they were upon the +one and only highway. In other words, we are apt to forget the lesson +of the history of philosophy. This is a serious mistake. + +And what intensifies our danger, if we belong to a school which happens +to be dominant and to have active representatives, is that we get very +little real criticism. The books that we write are usually criticised +by those who view our positions sympathetically, and who are more +inclined to praise than to blame. He who looks back upon the past is +struck with the fact that books which have been lauded to the skies in +one age have often been subjected to searching criticism and to a good +deal of condemnation in the next. Something very like this is to be +expected of books written in our own time. It is, however, a pity that +we should have to wait so long for impartial criticism. + +This leads me to say a word of the reviews which fill our philosophical +journals, and which we must read, for it is impossible to read all the +books that come out, and yet we wish to know something about them. + +To the novice it is something of a surprise to find that books by men +whom he knows to be eminent for their ingenuity and their learning are +condemned in very offhand fashion by quite young men, who as yet have +attained to little learning and to no eminence at all. One sometimes +is tempted to wonder that men admittedly remarkable should have +fathered such poor productions as we are given to understand them to +be, and should have offered them to a public that has a right to be +indignant. + +Now, there can be no doubt that, in philosophy, a cat has the right to +look at a king, and has also a right to point out his misdoings, if +such there be. But it seems just to indicate that, in this matter, +certain cautions should be observed. + +If a great man has been guilty of an error in reasoning, there is no +reason why it should not be pointed out by any one who is capable of +detecting it. The authority of the critic is a matter of no moment +where the evidence is given. In such a case, we take a suggestion and +we do the criticising for ourselves. But where the evidence is not +given, where the justice of the criticism is not proved, the case is +different. Here we must take into consideration the authority of the +critic, and, if we follow him at all, we must follow him blindly. Is +it safe to do this? + +It is never safe in philosophy, or, at any rate, it is safe so seldom +that the exceptions are not worth taking into account. Men write from +the standpoint of some school of opinion; and, until we know their +prepossessions, their statements that this is good, that is bad, the +third thing is profound, are of no significance whatever. We should +simply set them aside, and try to find out from our reviewer what is +contained in the book under criticism. + +One of the evils arising out of the bias I am discussing is, that books +and authors are praised or condemned indiscriminately because of their +point of view, and little discrimination is made between good books and +poor books. There is all the difference in the world between a work +which can be condemned only on the ground that it is realistic or +idealistic in its standpoint, and those feeble productions which are to +be condemned from every point of view. If we consistently carry out +the principle that we may condemn all those who are not of our party, +we must give short shrift to a majority of the great men of the past. + +So I say, beware of authority in philosophy, and, above all, beware of +that most insidious form of authority, the spirit of the "school." It +cannot but narrow our sympathies and restrict our outlook. + +91. REMEMBER THAT ORDINARY RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY.--What I am going to +say in this section is closely related to what has been said just +above. To the disinterested observer it may seem rather amusing that +one should think it worth while to try to show that we have not the +right to use a special set of weights and measures when we are dealing +with things philosophical. There was a time when men held that a given +doctrine could be philosophically false, and, at the same time, +theologically true; but surely the day of such twists and turnings is +past! + +I am by no means sure that it is past. With the lapse of time, old +doctrines take on new aspects, and come to be couched in a language +that suits the temper of the later age. Sometimes the doctrine is +veiled and rendered less startling, but remains essentially what it was +before, and may be criticised in much the same way. + +I suppose we may say that every one who is animated by the party spirit +discussed above, and who holds to a group of philosophical tenets with +a warmth of conviction out of proportion to the authority of the actual +evidence which may be claimed for them, is tacitly assuming that the +truth or falsity of philosophical dogmas is not wholly a matter of +evidence, but that the desires of the philosopher may also be taken +into account. + +This position is often taken unconsciously. Thus, when, instead of +proving to others that a given doctrine is false, we try to show them +that it is a dangerous doctrine, and leads to unpalatable consequences, +we assume that what seems distasteful cannot be true, and we count on +the fact that men incline to believe what they like to believe. + +May we give this position the dignity of a philosophical doctrine and +hold that, in the somewhat nebulous realm inhabited by the philosopher, +men are not bound by the same rules of evidence that obtain elsewhere? +That this is actually done, those who read much in the field of modern +philosophy are well aware. Several excellent writers have maintained +that we need not, even if there seems to be evidence for them, accept +views of the universe which do not satisfy "our whole nature." + +We should not confuse with this position the very different one which +maintains that we have a right to hold tentatively, and with a +willingness to abandon them should evidence against them be +forthcoming, views which we are not able completely to establish, but +which seem reasonable. One may do this with perfect sincerity, and +without holding that philosophical truth is in any way different from +scientific truth. But the other position goes beyond this; it assumes +that man must be satisfied, and that only that can be true which +satisfies him. + +I ask, is it not significant that such an assumption should be made +only in the realm of the unverifiable? No man dreams of maintaining +that the rise and fall of stocks will be such as to satisfy the whole +nature even of the elect, or that the future history of man on this +planet is a thing to be determined by some philosopher who decides for +us what would or would not be desirable. + +Surely all truths of election--those truths that we simply choose to +have true--are something much less august than that Truth of Evidence +which sometimes seems little to fall in with our desires, and in the +face of which we are humble listeners, not dictators. Before the +latter we are modest; we obey, lest we be confounded. And if, in the +philosophic realm, we believe that we may order Truth about, and make +her our slave, is it not because we have a secret consciousness that we +are not dealing with Truth at all, but with Opinion, and with Opinion +that has grown insolent because she cannot be drawn from her obscurity +and be shown to be what she is? + +Sometimes it is suddenly revealed to a man that he has been accepting +two orders of truth. I once walked and talked with a good scholar who +discoursed of high themes and defended warmly certain theses. I said +to him: If you could go into the house opposite, and discover +unmistakably whether you are in the right or in the wrong,--discover it +as unmistakably as you can discover whether there is or is not +furniture in the drawing-room,--would you go? He thought over the +matter for a while, and then answered frankly; No! I should not go; I +should stay out here and argue it out. + +92. AIM AT CLEARNESS AND SIMPLICITY.--There is no department of +investigation in which it is not desirable to cultivate clearness and +simplicity in thinking, speaking, and writing. But there are certain +reasons why we should be especially on our guard in philosophy against +the danger of employing a tongue "not understanded of the people." +There are dangerous pitfalls concealed under the use of technical words +and phrases. + +The value of technical expressions in the special sciences must be +conceded. They are supposed to be more exact and less ambiguous than +terms in ordinary use, and they mark an advance in our knowledge of the +subject. The distinctions which they indicate have been carefully +drawn, and appear to be of such authority that they should be generally +accepted. Sometimes, as, for example, in mathematics, a conventional +set of symbols may quite usurp the function of ordinary language, and +may enormously curtail the labor of setting forth the processes and +results of investigation. + +But we must never forget that we have not in philosophy an +authoritative body of truth which we have the right to impose upon all +who enter that field. A multitude of distinctions have been made and +are made; but the representatives of different schools of thought are +not at one touching the value and significance of these distinctions. +If we coin a word or a phrase to mark such, there is some danger that +we fall into the habit of using such words or phrases, as we use the +coins in our purse, without closely examining them, and with the ready +assumption that they must pass current everywhere. + +Thus, there is always a possibility that our technical expressions may +be nothing less than crystallized error. Against this we should surely +be on our guard. + +Again. When we translate the language of common life into the dialect +of the learned, there is danger that we may fall into the error of +supposing that we are adding to our knowledge, even though we are doing +nothing save to exchange one set of words for another. Thus, we all +know very well that one mind can communicate with another. One does +not have to be a scholar to be aware of this. If we choose to call +this "intersubjective intercourse," we have given the thing a sounding +name; but we know no more about it than we did before. The problem of +the relation between minds, and the way in which they are to be +conceived as influencing each other, remains just what it was. So, +also, we recognize the everyday fact that we know both ourselves and +what is not ourselves. Shall we call this knowledge of something not +ourselves "self-transcendence"? We may do so if we wish, but we ought +to realize that this bestowal of a title makes no whit clearer what is +meant by knowledge. + +Unhappily, men too often believe that, when they have come into the +possession of a new word or phrase, they have gained a new thought. +The danger is great in proportion to the breadth of the gulf which +separates the new dialect from the old language of common life in which +we are accustomed to estimate things. Many a philosopher would be +bereft, indeed, were he robbed of his vocabulary and compelled to +express his thoughts in ordinary speech. The theories which are +implicit in certain recurring expressions would be forced to come out +into the open, and stand criticism without disguise. + +But can one write philosophical books without using words which are not +in common use among the unphilosophic? I doubt it. Some such words it +seems impossible to avoid. However, it does seem possible to bear in +mind the dangers of a special philosophical terminology and to reduce +such words to a minimum. + +Finally, we may appeal to the humanity of the philosopher. The path to +reflection is a sufficiently difficult one as it is; why should he roll +rocks upon it and compel those who come after him to climb over them? +If truths are no truer for being expressed in a repellent form, why +should he trick them out in a fantastic garb? What we want is the +naked truth, and we lose time and patience in freeing our mummy from +the wrappings in which learned men have seen fit to encase it. + +93. DO NOT HASTILY ACCEPT A DOCTRINE.--This brings me to the last of +the maxims which I urge upon the attention of the reader. All that has +been said so far may be regarded as leading up to it. + +The difficulty that confronts us is this: On the one hand, we must +recognize the uncertainty that reigns in this field of investigation. +We must ever weigh probabilities and possibilities; we do not find +ourselves in the presence of indubitable truths which all competent +persons stand ready to admit. This seems to argue that we should learn +to suspend judgment, and should be most wary in our acceptance of one +philosophical doctrine and our rejection of another. + +On the other hand, philosophy is not a mere matter of intellectual +curiosity. It has an intimate connection with life. As a man thinks, +so is he, to a great extent, at least. How, then, can one afford to +remain critical and negative? To counsel this seems equivalent to +advising that one abandon the helm and consent to float at the mercy of +wind and tide. + +The difficulty is a very real one. It presents itself insistently to +those who have attained to that degree of intellectual development at +which one begins to ask oneself questions and to reflect upon the worth +and meaning of life. An unreflective adherence to tradition no longer +satisfies such persons. They wish to know why they should believe in +this or that doctrine, and why they should rule their lives in harmony +with this or that maxim. Shall we advise them to lay hold without +delay of a set of philosophical tenets, as we might advise a disabled +man to aid himself with any staff that happens to come to hand? Or +shall we urge them to close their eyes to the light, and to go back +again to the old unreflective life? + +Neither of these counsels seems satisfactory, for both assume tacitly +that it does not much matter what the _truth_ is, and that we can +afford to disregard it. + +Perhaps we may take a suggestion from that prudent man and acute +philosopher, Descartes. Discontented with the teachings of the schools +as they had been presented to him, he resolved to set out upon an +independent voyage of discovery, and to look for a philosophy of his +own. It seemed necessary to him to doubt, provisionally at least, all +that he had received from the past. But in what house should he live +while he was reconstructing his old habitation? Without principles of +some sort he could not live, and without reasonable principles he could +not live well. So he framed a set of provisional rules, which should +guide his life until he had new ground beneath his feet. + +When we examine these rules, we find that, on the whole, they are such +as the experience of mankind has found prudent and serviceable. In +other words, we discover that Descartes, until he was in a position to +see clearly for himself, was willing to be led by others. He was a +unit in the social order, and he recognized that truth. + +It does not seem out of place to recall this fact to the consciousness +of those who are entering upon the reflective life. Those who are +rather new to reflection upon philosophical matters are apt to seize +single truths, which are too often half-truths, and to deduce their +consequences remorselessly. They do not always realize the extreme +complexity of society, or see the full meaning of the relations in +which they stand to the state and to the church. Breadth of view can +only come with an increase of knowledge and with the exercise of +reflection. + +For this reason I advise patience, and a willingness to accept the +established order of things until one is very sure that one has +attained to some truth--some real truth, not a mere truth of +election--which may serve as the basis of a reconstruction. The first +glimpses of truth cannot be depended upon to furnish such a foundation. + +Thus, we may suspend judgment, and, nevertheless, be ready to act. But +is not this a mere compromise? Certainly. All life is a compromise; +and in the present instance it means only that we should keep our eyes +open to the light, whatever its source, and yet should nourish that +wholesome self-distrust that prevents a man from being an erratic and +revolutionary creature, unmindful of his own limitations. Prudent men +in all walks in life make this compromise, and the world is the better +for it. + + + + +NOTES + + +CHAPTER I, sections 1-5. If the student will take a good history of +philosophy, and look over the accounts of the different systems +referred to, he will see the justice of the position taken in the text, +namely, that philosophy was formerly synonymous with universal +knowledge. It is not necessary, of course, to read the whole history +of philosophy to attain this end. One may take such a text-book as +Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," and run over the summaries +contained in the large print. To see how the conception of what +constitutes universal knowledge changed in successive ages, compare +Thales, the Sophists, Aristotle, the Schoolmen, Bacon, and Descartes. +For the ancient philosophy one may consult Windelband's "History of the +Ancient Philosophy," a clear and entertaining little work (English +translation, N.Y., 1899). + +In Professor Paulsen's "Introduction to Philosophy" (English +translation, N.Y., 1895), there is an interesting introductory chapter +on "The Nature and Import of Philosophy" (pp. 1-41). The author pleads +for the old notion of philosophy as universal knowledge, though he does +not, of course, mean that the philosopher must be familiar with all the +details of all the sciences. + +Section 6. In justification of the meaning given to the word +"philosophy" in this section, I ask the reader to look over the list of +courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading +universities at home and abroad. There is a certain consensus of +opinion as to what properly comes under the title, even among those who +differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy. + + +CHAPTER II, sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World +in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of +Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904. + +One can be brought to a vivid realization of the fact that the sciences +proceed upon a basis of assumptions which they do not attempt to +analyze and justify, if one will take some elementary work on +arithmetic or geometry or psychology and examine the first few +chapters, bearing in mind what philosophical problems may be drawn from +the materials there treated. Section 11. The task of reflective +thought and its difficulties are treated in the chapter entitled "How +Things are Given in Consciousness" (Chapter III), in my "System of +Metaphysics." + + +CHAPTER III, sections 12-13. Read "The Inadequacy of the Psychological +Standpoint," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter II. I call especial +attention to the illustration of "the man in the cell" (pp. 18 ff.). +It would be a good thing to read these pages with the class, and to +impress upon the students the fact that those who have doubted or +denied the existence of the external material world have, if they have +fallen into error, fallen into a very natural error, and are not +without some excuse. + +Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System +of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is +examined at length, with quotations and references. + +It is interesting to notice that a doubt of the external world has +always rested upon some sort of a "telephone exchange" argument; +naturally, it could not pass by that name before the invention of the +telephone, but the reasoning is the same. It puts the world at one +remove, shutting the mind up to the circle of its ideas; and then it +doubts or denies the world, or, at least, holds that its existence must +be proved in some roundabout way. Compare Descartes, "Of the Existence +of Material Things," "Meditations," VI. + + +CHAPTER IV, sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by +the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of +Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between +the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed +in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind." +This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of +the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter. + +As it is possible that the reader may be puzzled by differences of +expression which obtain in the two books, a word of explanation is not +out of place. + +In the "Metaphysics," for example, it is said that sensations so +connect themselves together as to form what we call the system of +material things (p. 105). It is intimated in a footnote that this is a +provisional statement and the reader is referred to later chapters. +Now, in the present book (sections 16-17), it is taught that we may not +call material things groups of sensations. + +The apparent contradiction is due to the fact that, in this volume, the +full meaning of the word "sensation" is exhibited at the outset, and +sensations, as phenomena of the subjective order, are distinguished +from the phenomena of the objective order which constitute the external +world. In the earlier work the word "sensation" was for a while used +loosely to cover all our experiences that do not belong to the class +called imaginary, and the distinction between the subjective and +objective in this realm was drawn later (Chapter XXIII). + +I think the present arrangement is the better one, as it avoids from +the outset the suggestion that the real world is something +subjective--our sensations or ideas--and thus escapes the idealistic +flavor which almost inevitably attaches to the other treatment, until +the discussion is completed, at least. + + +CHAPTER V, sections 10-21. See Chapters VIII and IX, "System of +Metaphysics," "The Distinction between Appearance and Reality" and "The +Significance of the Distinction." + +Section 22. See Chapter XXVI, "The World as Unperceived, and the +'Unknowable,'" where Spencer's doctrine is examined at length, and +references are given. I think it is very important that the student +should realize that the "Unknowable" is a perfectly useless assumption +in philosophy, and can serve no purpose whatever. + + +CHAPTER VI, sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of +Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties +connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space." + +It would be an excellent thing for the student, after he has read the +above chapters, to take up Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and read +and analyze the argument of Antinomies I and II, with the Observations +appended. One can understand these arguments without being familiar +with the "Critique" as a whole; at any rate, the account of Kant's +philosophy contained in section 51 of this book will serve to explain +his use of certain terms, such as "the laws of our sensibility." + +Kant's reasonings are very curious and interesting in this part of his +book. It seems to be proved that the world must be endless in space +and without a beginning or end in time, and just as plausibly proved +that it cannot be either. It seems to be proved that finite spaces and +times are infinitely divisible, and at the same time that they cannot +be infinitely divisible. The situation is an amusing one, and rendered +not the less amusing by the seriousness with which the mutually +destructive arguments are taken. + +When the student meets such a tangle in the writings of any +philosopher, I ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that +is at fault--at least, let him not assume that it is. The fault +probably lies with a human reason. + +Section 26. See Chapter XII, "The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space," in my +"System of Metaphysics." The argument ought not to be difficult to one +who has mastered Chapter V of this volume. + + +CHAPTER VII, sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of +Metaphysics," "Of Time." + +With the chapters on Space and Time it would be well for the student to +read Chapter XIV, "The Real World in Space and Time," where it is made +clear why we have no hesitation in declaring space and time to be +infinite, although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of +knowledge to declare the material world infinite. + + +CHAPTER VIII, sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics," +Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self." + +Section 33. The suggestions, touching the attitude of the psychologist +toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James's +"Psychology" are very interesting and instructive. + + +CHAPTER IX, sections 35-36. For a strong argument in favor of +interactionism see James's "Psychology," Chapter V. I wish the student +would, in reading it, bear in mind what is said in my chapter on "The +Atomic Self," above referred to. The subject should be approached with +an open mind, and one should suspend judgment until both sides have +been heard from. + +Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and +that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded +their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland." +Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended +it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral +product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the +steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He +made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of +Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis." + +We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza. +It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in +the subject is largely due. The whole subject is discussed at length +in my "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XIX-XXI. The titles are: "The +Automaton Theory: Parallelism," "What is Parallelism?" and "The Man and +the Candlestick." Clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in +Professor Strong's recent brilliant work, "Why the Mind has a Body" +N.Y., 1903. + +Section 38. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXIV, "The Time and +Place of Sensations and Ideas." + + +CHAPTER X, sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII +and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of +Minds." + +Writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other +minds. + +(1) I have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference. +This is the position usually taken. + +(2) We have seen that Huxley and Clifford cast doubts upon the validity +of the inference, but, nevertheless, made it. Professor Strong, in the +work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, maintains that it +is not an inference, and that we do not directly perceive other minds, +but that we are assured of their existence just the same. He makes our +knowledge an "intuition" in the old-fashioned sense of the word, a +something to be accepted but not to be accounted for. + +(3) Writers who have been influenced more or less by the Neo-Kantian or +Neo-Hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct +evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the existence +of our own. I have never seen a systematic and detailed exposition of +this doctrine. It appears rather in the form of hints dropped in +passing. A number of such are to be found in Taylor's "Elements of +Metaphysics." + +Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its +origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the "System of Metaphysics," +"Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus." It is well worth while for +the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of +Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time. + + +CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The +World as Mechanism." + +Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, "The Place of Mind in Nature." + +Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its +difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter +XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense +of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the +common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The +Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe." + +Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the +opposition to Determinism is attributable to this confusion. + +Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, "Mechanism and Teleology." + + +CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in +point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of +Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our +Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of +some of his sections:-- + +Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation." + +Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper." + +Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be +called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us." + +Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the assumption that we +perceive external things directly,--an assumption into which he slips +unawares,--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly +what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has +not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion +is entitled: "Folly to expect demonstration in everything." + +Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers +would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's +"Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Three Dialogues between Hylas +and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation +of sentiment characterize them throughout. + +The "Principles" is a systematic treatise. If one has not time to read +it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the +first forty-one sections. For brief readings in class, to illustrate +Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38. + +The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology of the names +in the title suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins +his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute +skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism. + +For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human +Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part +IV, section 6. + +Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us +asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument +by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good +exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his +"Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of +Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20). + +Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see +Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, +N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of +philosophy by Ueberweg and Höffding (English translation of the latter, +London, 1900). Full bibliographies are to be found especially in +Ueberweg. + +It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair +of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason" +(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the +Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905). + + +CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could +regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him). +See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his +doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know +directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer +all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only +relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing." + +Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical +realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who +has not begun to reflect, in the first class. John Locke is a good +representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human +Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the +third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy." + +Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes +on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of +its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address, +"The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902). + +Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter XXXIV (entitled "Of +God"), "System of Metaphysics." + + +CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI, +"The Insufficiency of Materialism." + +Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body" +(N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It +is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of +Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the +considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists. + +Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance +historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its +meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The +Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality." +The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "God or Substance" +contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the +back of the first-mentioned volume. + +Professor Royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist; see +the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute," +or God, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite +minds are parts. + +Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his +"Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known +or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; +as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these +two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. +The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are +compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the +distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming +incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one." + + +CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced +in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweeping doubt; in II, his +doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of God is established; +in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find +a good deal of the "natural light" in the first part of his "Principles +of Philosophy." + +Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency +in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his +treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV, +section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are +not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class. + +Section 62. See the note to section 51. + +Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea +of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has +been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three +years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a +clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been +worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first +wrote it, merely supplementing it here. + +We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to +be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John +Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume +entitled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his +doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in +essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of +philosophical essays entitled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in +Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the +first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903). + +Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that +pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results. +It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. This method means: + +"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, +'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, +fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that +pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a +certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in +Lecture VI. + +The theory maintains that: "True ideas are those that we can +assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those +that we can not" (p. 201). This sounds as though Professor James +abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian mentioned in +section 64. + +But what do the words "verification" and "validation" pragmatically +mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of +the verified and validated idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with +reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they +instigate, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we +feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and +transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, +harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what +we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202). + +Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in +which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to +take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned. +That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch +becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note +his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does +take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The +doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121). + +Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made, +and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It +is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I +shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly +written. + +Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from +the above to merit another title. In the "Journal of Philosophy, +Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey +brings out the distinction between his own position and that of +Professor James. + +To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail. +Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the +"Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side, +Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and +Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben, +"Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July, +1908. + + +CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded +their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal +Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge" +(London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y., +1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898), +Preface. + +Professor Aikins writes: "Thus, in so far as logic tries to make us +reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way +in which their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple +metaphysics studied for a practical end." + +Professor Creighton says, "Although in treating the syllogistic logic I +have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation, I +have both here, and when dealing with the inductive methods, endeavored +to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way, and to +prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book." + +John Stuart Mill tried not to be metaphysical; but let the reader +examine, say, his third chapter, "Of the Things denoted by Names," or +look over Book VI, in his "System of Logic." + +Professor Sigwart's great work, "Logik" (Freiburg, 2d edition, Volume +I, 1889, Volume II, 1893), may almost be called a philosophy of logic. + + +CHAPTER XVII, section 69. Compare with Professor James's account of +the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin: "The +question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a +fierce warfare has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by +the adjustment of mutual claims. . . . The terms of the adjustment of +which I speak are briefly these: on the one hand, empirical +investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical +investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and +preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be +equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to +the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be +secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and +speculative. Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into +the metempirical." "Handbook of Psychology," Preface, pp. iii and iv. + + +CHAPTER XVIII, section 71. The teacher might very profitably take +extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality" +referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is +significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us +advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the +cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual +conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide +us. + +Section 72. Wundt, in his volume "The Facts of the Moral Life" (N.Y., +1897), tries to develop an empirical science of ethics independent of +metaphysics; see the Preface. + +Compare with this: Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory" (London, +1885), Preface; T. H. Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," Introduction; +Muirhead's "The Elements of Ethics" (N.Y., 1892); Mackenzie's "A Manual +of Ethics" (London, 1893); Jodl's "Gesduchte der Ethik" (Stuttgart, +1882), Preface. I give but a few references, but they will serve to +illustrate how close, in the opinion of ethical writers, is the +relation between ethics and philosophy. + + +CHAPTER XIX, section 74. The student who turns over the pages of +several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial +similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped +out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality), Rational +Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval +landmarks which have been left standing. I may as well warn the reader +that two men who discourse of Ontology may not be talking about the +same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the +different ways of conceiving the "One Substance"; and bear in mind also +what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word "reality." + +I have discarded the above titles in my "System of Metaphysics," +because I think it is better and less misleading to use plain and +unambiguous language. + +Section 75. See the note to Chapter XVI. + + +CHAPTER XX, sections 76-77. One can get an idea of the problems with +which the philosophy of religion has to deal by turning to my "System +of Metaphysics" and reading the two chapters entitled "Of God," at the +close of the book. It would be interesting to read and criticise in +class some of the theistic arguments that philosophers have brought +forward. Quotations and references are given in Chapter XXXIV. + + +CHAPTER XXI, sections 78-79. What is said of the science of logic, in +Chapter XVI, has, of course, a bearing upon these sections. I suggest +that the student examine a few chapters of "The Grammar of Science"; +the book is very readable. + + +CHAPTER XXII, sections 80-82. The reader will find in lectures I and +II in Sir William Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics" a discussion of +the utility of philosophy. It has a pleasant, old-fashioned flavor, +and contains some good thoughts. What is said in Chapters XVI-XXI of +the present volume has a good deal of bearing upon the subject. See +especially what is said in the chapters on logic, ethics, and the +philosophy of religion. + + +CHAPTER XXIII, sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and +thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the +comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of +Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the +Introduction. + +We have a good illustration of the fact that there may be parallel +streams of philosophic thought (section 87) when we turn to the Stoics +and the Epicureans. Zeno and Epicurus were contemporaries, but they +were men of very dissimilar character, and the schools they founded +differed widely in spirit. Zeno went back for his view of the physical +world to Heraclitus, and for his ethics to the Cynics. Epicurus +borrowed his fundamental thoughts from Democritus. + +On the other hand, philosophers may sometimes be regarded as links in +the one chain. Witness the series of German thinkers: Kant, Fichte, +Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer; or the series of British thinkers: +Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill. Herbert Spencer represents a confluence +of the streams. The spirit of his doctrine is predominantly British; +but he got his "Unknowable" from Kant, through Hamilton and Mansel. + +At any point in a given stream there may be a division. Thus, Kant was +awakened to his creative effort by Hume. But Mill is also the +successor of Hume, and more truly the successor, for he carries on the +traditional way of approaching philosophical problems, while Kant +rebels against it, and heads a new line. + + +CHAPTER XXIV, sections 88-93. I hardly think it is necessary for me to +comment upon this chapter. The recommendations amount to this: that a +man should be fair-minded and reasonable, free from partisanship, +cautious, and able to suspend judgment where the evidence is not clear; +also that where the light of reason does not seem to him to shine +brightly and to illumine his path as he could wish, he should be +influenced in his actions by the reflection that he has his place in +the social order, and must meet the obligations laid upon him by this +fact. When the pragmatist emphasizes the necessity of accepting ideals +and living by them, he is doing us a service. But we must see to it +that he does not lead us into making arbitrary decisions and feeling +that we are released from the duty of seeking for evidence. Read +together sections 64, 91, and 93. + + + + +INDEX + + + Absolute, The: Spencer's doctrine of, 70; + Bradley's, 191-192; + meanings of the word, 201; + reference, 312. + Activity and Passivity: meaning of, 159-161; + confused with cause and effect, 159-161; + activity of mind, 162-163. + Aesthetics: a philosophical discipline, 242-243. + Agnosticism: 202. + Aikins: 314. + Albert the Great: scope of his labors, 9. + Analytical Judgments: defined, 178. + Anaxagoras: his doctrine, 4; on the soul, 101. + Anaximander: his doctrine, 3. + Anaximenes: his doctrine, 3; on the soul, 101. + Appearances: doubt of their objectivity, 35; + realities and, 59 ff.; + apparent and real space, 80-87; + apparent and real time, 93-99; + apparent and real extension, 113; + measurement of apparent time, 128; + appearance and reality, Bradley's doctrine, 191-192. + Aristotle: reference to Thales, 3; + scope of his philosophy, 7; + authority in the Middle Ages, 9; + on the soul, 102-103. + Arithmetic: compared with logic, 225-226. + Atoms: nature of our knowledge of, 22-23; also, 65-67; + doctrine of Democritus, 194-195. + Augustine: on time as past, present, and future, 90 ff.; + on soul and body, 104; + as scientist and as philosopher, 278. + Authority: in philosophy, 291-296. + Automatism: the automaton theory, 129-130; + animal automatism, 141-142; + activity of mind and automatism, 162; + references, 308-309. + Automaton: see Automatism. + + Bacon, Francis: his conception of philosophy, 10. + Baldwin: on psychology and metaphysics, 314. + Berkeley: referred to, 56; + on appearance and reality, 61-63; + his idealism, 168-170; + his theism, 190-191; + references to his works, 310. + Body and Mind: see Mind and Body. + Bosanquet: his logic, 235. + Bradley: his "Absolute," 191-192; reference given, 311. + Breath: mind conceived to be, 101. + + Cassiodorus: on soul and body, 103-104. + Cause and Effect; meaning of words, 118-120; + relation of mental and material not causal, 121-126; + see also, 132; + cause and effect, activity and passivity, 159 ff. + Child: its knowledge of the world, 18-19. + Cicero: Pythagoras' use of word "philosopher," 2; on immortality, 32. + Clifford, W. K.: on infinite divisibility of space, 79-80; + on other minds, 135; + on mind-stuff, 144-146; + his panpsychism, 197-198; + his parallelism, 308-309; + references on mind-stuff, 309. + Common Sense: notions of mind and body, 106 ff.; + Reid's doctrine, 171-174; + common sense ethics, 236-240. + Common Thought: what it is, 18-20. + Concomitance: see Mind and Body. + Copernican System: 282. + Cornelius: on metaphysics, 249. + Creighton: 314. + Critical Empiricism: the doctrine, 218-219. + Critical Philosophy: outlined, 175-180; + criticised, 211-218; + references, 311. + Croesus: 1. + + Democritus: doctrine referred to, 4; + his place in the history of philosophy, 5; + on the soul, 101-102; + his materialism examined, 194-195. + Descartes: conception of philosophy, 10; + on mind and body, 105-106; also, 119; + on animal automatism, 141-142; + on the external world, 163-168; + on substance, 198; + his rationalism, 206-209; + the "natural light," 208; + his attempt at a critical philosophy, 214; + his rules of method, 214; + provisional rules of life, 301-302; + reference given, 306; + reference to his automatism, 308; + references to the "Meditations," 312. + Determinism: 155-159; references, 309-310. + Dewey, John: 312-314. + Dogmatism: Kant's use of term, 211-212. + Dualism: what, 193; + varieties of, 202-204; + the present volume dualistic, 204; + Hamilton's, 312. + + Eleatics: their doctrine, 4. + Empedocles: his doctrine, 4; a pluralist, 205. + Empiricism: the doctrine, 209-211; + Kant on, 212; + critical empiricism, 218-219. + Energy: conservation of, 151-154. + Epicureans: their view of philosophy, 7-8; their materialism, 102. + Epiphenomenon: the mind as, 162. + Epistemology: its place among the philosophical sciences, 247-249. + Ethics: and the mechanism of nature, 159-164; + common sense ethics, 236-240; + Whewell criticised, 238-240; + philosophy and, 240-242; + utility of, 265-267; + references, 315. + Evidence: in philosophy, 296-298. + Existence: of material things, 56-58; also, 165-192. + Experience: suggestions of the word, 58; + Hume's doctrine of what it yields, 170-171; + Descartes and Locke, 178; + Kant's view of, 179; + empiricism, 209-211; + critical empiricism, 218-219. + Experimental Psychology: its scope, 234-235. + Explanation: of relation of mind and body, 125-126. + External World: its existence, 32 ff.; + plain man's knowledge of, 32-36; + psychologist's attitude, 36-38; + the "telephone exchange," 38-44; + what the external world is, 45-58; + its existence discussed, 56-58; + a mechanism, 147-150; + knowledge of, theories, 165-180; + Descartes on, 207-208; + psychologist's attitude discussed, 230-234. + Falckenberg: 311, 316. + Fate: 158; literature on fatalism, 309-310. + Fichte: on philosophic method, 10; solipsistic utterances, 133. + Final Cause: what, 161. + "Form" and "Matter": the distinction between, 82-83; + space as "form," 82-84; + time as "form," 94; + Kant's doctrine of "forms," 179; + the same criticised, 216-217. + Free-will: and the order of nature, 154-159; + determinism and "free-will-ism," 155-159; + literature referred to, 309-310. + + God: revealed in the world, 163-164; + Berkeley on argument for, 190-191; + Spinoza on God or substance, 199; + Descartes' argument for, 208; + influence of belief on ethics, 241; + conceptions of, 252-253; + relation to the world, 253-254; + monistic conception of, 312; + references, 314. + Greek Philosophy: Pre-Socratic characterized, 2-5; + conception of philosophy from Sophists to Aristotle, 5-7; + the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics, 7-8. + Green, T. H.: 218, 315. + + Hamilton, Sir W.: on space, 76; + on the external world, 174; also, 182; + reference, 311; + his dualism, 312; + on utility of philosophy, 316. + Hegel: his conception of philosophy, 11; + an objective idealist, 190. + Heraclitus: his doctrine, 4; on the soul, 101. + Herodotus: 1-2. + History of Philosophy: much studied, 273-274; + its importance, 274-281; + how to read it, 281-287; + references, 316. + Hobhouse: on theory of knowledge, 248; reference, 312. + Höffding: his monism, 200-201; his history of philosophy, 311. + Howison: on pluralism, 205. + Humanism: 312-313. + Hume: his doctrine, 170-171; + use of word "impression," 177; + influence on Kant, 177-178. + Huxley: on other minds, 135, 138; on automatism, 308. + Hypothetical Realism: see Realism. + + Idealism: in Berkeley and Hume, 168-171; + general discussion of the varieties of, 187-192; + proper attitude toward, 289-291. + Ideas: distinguished from things, 33-36; + in psychology, 36-38; + Berkeley's use of the word, 168-170; + Hume's use of the word, 177. + Imagination: contrasted with sense, 45-49; + extension of imagined things, 113. + Immateriality: of mind, see Plotinus, and Mind. + Impression: Hume's use of word, 177. + Infinity: infinity and infinite divisibility of space, 73-80; + of time, 88-90; also, 95-97; + mathematics and, 226. + Inside: meaning of word, 55. + Interactionism: see Mind and Body. + Intuitionalists; defined, 240. + Ionian School: 3. + + James, W.: on pragmatism, 220-222 and 312-313; + on psychology and metaphysics, 230-231; + on interactionism, reference, 308; + on "free-will," 309-310. + Jevons: his logic, 224; on study of scientific method, 256. + Jodl: 315. + + Kant: on space, 75; + his critical philosophy, 175-180; + his philosophy criticised, 211-218; + references to, 307, 311. + Keynes: 314. + + Localisation: of sensations, what, 127. + Locke, John: on doubt of external world, 32; + on substance, 108; + on perception of external world, 166-168; + his empiricism, 209-210; + his attempt at a critical philosophy, 215-216; + on innate moral principles, 240; + reference to "Essay," 310; + his hypothetical realism, 311; + treatment of substance, references, 312. + Logic; the traditional, 224; + "modern" logic, 224-225; + Jevons and Bosanquet referred to, 224-225; + philosophy and, 225-229; + compared with arithmetic, 225-227; + deeper problems of, 227; + Spencer cited, 228; + utility of, 264-265; + references, 314. + Lucretius: his materialistic psychology, 102. + + Mach: 14. + Mackenzie: 315. + Malebranche: referred to, 142. + Martineau: 315. + Materialism: primitive man's notion of mind, 100-101; + materialism in the Greek philosophy, 101-102; + refutation of, 111-132; + general account of, 194-197. + Mathematics: nature of mathematical knowledge, 23-25; + arithmetic compared with logic, 225-226; + mathematical relations and cause and effect, 257; + mathematical methods, 256-257. + Matter: what is meant by material things, 51-58; + the material world a mechanism, 147-150. + "Matter" and "Form": see "Form" and "Matter." + McCosh: on mind and body, 120. + Mechanism: the material world a, 147-150; + objections to the doctrine, 148-150; + mind and mechanism, 151-154; + mechanism and morals, 159-164; + mechanism and teleology, reference, 310. + Metaphysician: on the mind, 111 ff. + Metaphysics: psychology and, 230-234; + distinguished from philosophy, 244-245; + uncertainty of, 247; + utility of, 269-272; + traditional divisions of, 315. + Method: scientific method, 256-259. + Middle Ages: view of philosophy in, 8-9. + Mill, J. S.: the argument for other minds, 136-138; + on permanent possibilities of sensation, 289; + his logic, 314. + Mind: the child's notion of, 100; + regarded as breath, 101; + suggestions of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew words for mind or + soul, 101; + materialistic views of, in Greek philosophy, 101-102; + Plato and Aristotle on nature of, 102-103; + doctrine of Plotinus, 103; + of Cassiodorus, 103; + of Augustine, 104; + of Descartes, 105-106; + modern common sense notions of mind, 106-110; + mind as substance, Locke quoted, 108-109; + psychologist's notion of, 110-111; + what the mind is, 111-114; + place of mind in nature, 151-154; + minds active, 162-163; + see also, Mind and Body, and Other Minds. + Mind and Body: is the mind in the body, 115-117; + plain man's notion of, 116; + interactionism, 117-121; + doctrine of Descartes and his successors, 119-120; + plain man as interactionist, 120; + McCosh quoted, 120-121; + objection to interactionism, 121; + parallelism, 121-126; + its foundation in experience, 123-124; + meaning of word "concomitance," 123-125; + time and place of mental phenomena, 126-129; + objections to parallelism, 129-132; + Clifford's parallelism criticised, 130; + mental phenomena and causality, 129; + double sense of word "concomitance," 131-132; + mind and the mechanism of the world, 151-154; + mechanism and morals, 159-164; + "concomitant phenomena" and attainment of ends, 162; + references given on other minds and mind-stuff, 309; + see also, Other Minds. + Mind-stuff: see Other Minds. + Minima Sensibilia: 87. + Modern Philosophy: conception of philosophy in, 9-12. + Monism: what, 193-194; + varieties of, 194-202; + narrower sense of word, 198-202. + Moral Distinctions: their foundation, 159-164. + Muirhead: 315. + + Naïve Realism: 181. + "Natural Light": term used by Descartes, 208. + Natural Realism: see Realism. + Nature: place of mind in, 151-154; + order of nature and "free-will," 154-159. + Neo-Platonism: referred to, 8; on the soul as immaterial, 103. + Nihilism: word used by Hamilton, 186. + Noumena: see Phenomena. + + Objective Idealism: 189-190; reference to Royce, 311. + Objective Order: contrasted with the subjective, 55. + Ontology: what, 315. + Orders of Experience: the subjective and the objective, 55; + see also, 114. + Other Minds: their existence, 133-136; + Fichte referred to, 133; + Richter quoted, 133; + Huxley and Clifford on proof of, 135; + the argument for, 136-140; + Mill quoted, 136-138; + Huxley criticised, 138-140; + what minds are there? 140-144; + Descartes quoted, 141-142; + Malebranche, 142; + the limits of psychic life, 142-144; + mind-stuff, 144-146; + proper attitude toward solipsism, 291. + Outside: meaning of word, 55. + + Panpsychism: the doctrine, 198; references given, 311. + Pantheism: 202. + Parallelism: see Mind and Body. + Paulsen: on nature of philosophy, 305. + Pearson: the "telephone exchange," 38 ff.; + on scientific principles and method, 258-259; + reference given, 306. + Peirce, C. S.: on pragmatism, 219-220. + Perception: see Representative Perception. + Phenomena and Noumena: Kant's distinction between, 176-180. + Philosophical Sciences: enumerated, 13; + why grouped together, 13-17; + examined in detail, 223-259. + Philosophy: meaning of word, and history of its use, 1 ff.; + what the word now covers, 12-17; + problems of, 32-164; + historical background of modern philosophy, 165-180; + types of, 181-222; + logic and, 225-229; + psychology and, 230-234; + ethics and, 240-242; + aesthetics and, 242-243; + metaphysics distinguished from, 244-245; + religion and, 250-254; + the non-philosophical sciences and, 255-259; + utility of, 263-272; + history of, 273-287; + verification in, 276-277; + as poetry and as science, 281-283; + how systems arise, 283-287; + practical admonitions, 288-303; + authority in, 291-296; + ordinary rules of evidence in, 296-298. + Physiological Psychology: what it is, 234. + Pineal Gland; as seat of the soul, 105. + Place: of mental phenomena, see Space. + Plain Man: his knowledge of the world, 19-20; also, 32-36; + his knowledge of space, 73; + on mind and body, 106-110; + his interactionism, 120. + Plants: psychic life in, 143. + Plato: use of word "philosopher," 2; + scope of his philosophy, 6-7; + on the soul, 102-103. + Plotinus: the soul as immaterial, 103. + Pluralism and Singularism: described, 204-205. + Poetry and Philosophy: 281-283. + Poincaré: referred to, 258. + Pragmatism: the doctrine, 219-222; + see also, 296-298, 300-303, and 312-314; + will to believe, references, 310, 312. + Present: meaning of "the present," 97-99. + Psychology: psychological knowledge characterized, 25-28; + attitude of psychologist toward external world, 36-38; + toward mind, 110-111; + philosophy and, 230-234; + double affiliation of, 234-235; + utility of, 268-269; + metaphysics and, 313; + "rational," 315. + Ptolemaic System; 282. + Pythagoras: the word "philosopher," 2. + Pythagoreans: their doctrine, 4. + + Qualities of Things: contrasted with sensations, 51-56. + + Rational Cosmology: 315. + Rationalism: the doctrine, 206-209. + Rational Psychology: 315. + Real: see Reality. + Realism: hypothetical realism, 168; + "natural" realism, 174; + general discussion of realism and its varieties, 181-187; + ambiguity of the word, 186-187. + Reality: contrasted with appearance, 35; + in psychology, 36-38; + the "telephone exchange" and, 38 ff.; + things and their appearances, 59-61; + real things, 61-63; + ultimate real things, 63-68; + the "Unknowable" as Reality, 68-72; + real space, 80-87; + real time, 93-99; + substance as reality, 111; + real and apparent extension, 113-114; + measurement of apparent time, 128; + Bradley's doctrine of reality, 191-192; + Clifford's panpsychism and reality, 197-198. + + Reflective Thought: its nature, 28-31. + Reid, Thomas: doctrine of "common sense," 171-174; + references, 310. + Religion: philosophy and, 250-254; + conceptions of God, 252-253; + God and the world, 253-254; see God. + Representative Perception: plain man's position, 32-36; + the psychologist, 36-38; + "telephone exchange" doctrine, 38-44; + the true distinction between sensations and things, 45-58; + the doctrine of, 165-168; + Descartes and Locke quoted, 165-168. + Richter, Jean Paul: on the solipsist, 133. + Royce: an objective idealist, 311; a monist, 312. + + Schelling: attitude toward natural philosophy, 10. + Schiller: on "Humanism," 312-313. + "Schools": in philosophy, 291-296. + Science: philosophy and the special sciences, 12-17; + the philosophical sciences, 13 ff.; + nature of scientific knowledge, 21-28; + compared with reflective thought, 29-31; + science and the world as mechanism, 148; + the conservation of energy, 151-154; + philosophical sciences examined in detail, 223-259; + science and metaphysical analysis, 246-247; + the non-philosophical sciences and philosophy, 255-259; + study of scientific principles, 256-259; + verification in science and in philosophy, 275-277; + philosophy as science, 281-283. + Scientific Knowledge: see Science. + Sensations: knowledge of things through, 33-44; + sense and imagination contrasted, 45-49; + are "things" groups of, 49-51; + distinction between things and, 51-56; + use of the word in this volume and in the + "System of Metaphysics," 306-307. + Sidgwick: on Kant, 311. + Sigwart: 314. + Singularism and Pluralism: described, 204-205. + Skeptics: their view of philosophy, 7-8; + their doubt of reality, 59; + Hume's skepticism, 171. + Socrates: use of words "philosopher" and "philosophy," 2; + attitude toward sophism, 6. + Solipsism: see Other Minds. + Solon: 1. + Sophists: characterized, 6. + Soul: see Mind. + Space: plain man's knowledge of, 73; + said to be necessary, infinite and infinitely divisible, 73-74; + discussion of it as necessary and as infinite, 74-77; + Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer quoted, 75-77; + as infinitely divisible, the moving point, 77-80; + Clifford quoted, 79-80; + real space and apparent, 80-87; + "matter" and "form," 82-84; + extension of imaginary things, 113; + place of mental phenomena, 115-117, also, 126-129. + Spencer, Herbert: his definition of philosophy, 11; + his work criticised, 11-12; + on the "Unknowable" as ultimate Reality, 69-70; + Spencer as "natural" realist, 174; + influenced by Kant's doctrine, 176; + his inconsistent doctrine of the external world, 183-184; + defective logic, 228; + influence of agnosticism, 271; + references given, 307, 311. + Spinoza: his _a priori_ method, 10; + on God or substance, 199; + his rationalism, 208; + his parallelism, 308; + references, 311-312. + Spiritualism: the doctrine, 197-198. + Stoics: their view of philosophy, 7-8; their materialism, 102. + Strong: on other minds, 209; references to, 309, 311. + Subjective Idealism: 187-188. + Subjective Order: contrasted with objective, 55. + Substance: meaning of word, 108; + Locke on, 108; + mind as substance, 111-112; + doctrine of the One Substance, 198-202. + Synthetic Judgments: defined, 179. + Systems of Philosophy: their relations to each other, 283-287. + + Taylor: on other minds, 309. + Teleology: what, 163; reference, 310. + "Telephone Exchange": doctrine of the external world + as "messages," 38-44. + Thales: his doctrine, 3. + Theism: see God. + Theory of Knowledge: see Epistemology. + Things: our knowledge of, 18-23; + contrast of ideas and, 33-36; + same contrast in psychology, 36-38; + sensations and things, 45 ff.; + existence of, 56-58; + contrasted with appearances, 59 ff.; + real things, 61 ff.; + the space of real things, 80-87. + Thomas Aquinas: scope of his labors, 9. + Time: as necessary, infinite, and infinitely divisible, 88-90; + problem of knowing past, present, and future, 90-93; + Augustine quoted, 90-91; + timeless self criticised, 92-93; + real time and apparent, 93-99; + real time as necessary, infinite, and infinitely divisible, 95-97; + consciousness of time, 97-99; + mental phenomena and time, 126-129. + Timeless Self: 92-93. + Touch: the real world revealed in experiences of, 61-63. + Truth: pragmatism and, 219-222 and 312-314; + Whewell on veracity, 238-239; + criterion of truth in philosophy, 296-298; + also, 300-303. + + Ueberweg: 305, 311. + Ultimate Reality: see Reality. + "Unknowable": as Reality, 68-72; see Spencer. + Utility: of liberal studies, 260-263; of philosophy, 363-272. + + Verification: in science and in philosophy, 275-277. + + Ward, James: on concepts of mechanics, 148. + "Weltweisheit": philosophy as, 12. + Whewell: his common sense ethics, 236-240; referred to, 315. + Will: see Free-will. + Will to Believe: see Pragmatism. + Windelband: 305. + Wolff, Christian: definition of philosophy, 10. + World: see External World. + Wundt: ethics referred to, 315. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY*** + + +******* This file should be named 16406-8.txt or 16406-8.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/6/4/0/16406 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + https://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + diff --git a/16406-8.zip b/16406-8.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef4350f --- /dev/null +++ b/16406-8.zip diff --git a/16406.txt b/16406.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f7a2748 --- /dev/null +++ b/16406.txt @@ -0,0 +1,12133 @@ +The Project Gutenberg eBook, An Introduction to Philosophy, by George +Stuart Fullerton + + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + + + + +Title: An Introduction to Philosophy + + +Author: George Stuart Fullerton + + + +Release Date: August 1, 2005 [eBook #16406] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-646-US (US-ASCII) + + +***START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY*** + + +E-text prepared by Al Haines + + + +AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY + +by + +GEORGE STUART FULLERTON + +Professor of Philosophy in Columbia University +New York + +New York +The MacMillan Company +London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd. + +1915 + +Norwood Press +J. S. Cushing Co.--Berwick & Smith Co. +Norwood, Mass., U.S.A. + + + + + + + +PREFACE + +As there cannot be said to be a beaten path in philosophy, and as +"Introductions" to the subject differ widely from one another, it is +proper that I should give an indication of the scope of the present +volume. + +It undertakes:-- + +1. To point out what the word "philosophy" is made to cover in our +universities and colleges at the present day, and to show why it is +given this meaning. + +2. To explain the nature of reflective or philosophical thinking, and +to show how it differs from common thought and from science. + +3. To give a general view of the main problems with which philosophers +have felt called upon to deal. + +4. To give an account of some of the more important types of +philosophical doctrine which have arisen out of the consideration of +such problems. + +5. To indicate the relation of philosophy to the so-called +philosophical sciences, and to the other sciences. + +6. To show, finally, that the study of philosophy is of value to us +all, and to give some practical admonitions on spirit and method. Had +these admonitions been impressed upon me at a time when I was in +especial need of guidance, I feel that they would have spared me no +little anxiety and confusion of mind. For this reason, I recommend +them to the attention of the reader. + +Such is the scope of my book. It aims to tell what philosophy is. It +is not its chief object to advocate a particular type of doctrine. At +the same time, as it is impossible to treat of the problems of +philosophy except from some point of view, it will be found that, in +Chapters III to XI, a doctrine is presented. It is the same as that +presented much more in detail, and with a greater wealth of reference, +in my "System of Metaphysics," which was published a short time ago. +In the Notes in the back of this volume, the reader will find +references to those parts of the larger work which treat of the +subjects more briefly discussed here. It will be helpful to the +teacher to keep the larger work on hand, and to use more or less of the +material there presented as his undergraduate classes discuss the +chapters of this one. Other references are also given in the Notes, +and it may be profitable to direct the attention of students to them. + +The present book has been made as clear and simple as possible, that no +unnecessary difficulties may be placed in the path of those who enter +upon the thorny road of philosophical reflection. The subjects treated +are deep enough to demand the serious attention of any one; and they +are subjects of fascinating interest. That they are treated simply and +clearly does not mean that they are treated superficially. Indeed, +when a doctrine is presented in outline and in a brief and simple +statement, its meaning may be more readily apparent than when it is +treated more exhaustively. For this reason, I especially recommend, +even to those who are well acquainted with philosophy, the account of +the external world contained in Chapter IV. + +For the doctrine I advocate I am inclined to ask especial consideration +on the ground that it is, on the whole, a justification of the attitude +taken by the plain man toward the world in which he finds himself. The +experience of the race is not a thing that we may treat lightly. + +Thus, it is maintained that there is a real external world presented in +our experience--not a world which we have a right to regard as the +sensations or ideas of any mind. It is maintained that we have +evidence that there are minds in certain relations to that world, and +that we can, within certain limits, determine these relations. It is +pointed out that the plain man's belief in the activity of his mind and +his notion of the significance of purposes and ends are not without +justification. It is indicated that theism is a reasonable doctrine, +and it is held that the human will is free in the only proper sense of +the word "freedom." Throughout it is taken for granted that the +philosopher has no private system of weights and measures, but must +reason as other men reason, and must prove his conclusions in the same +sober way. + +I have written in hopes that the book may be of use to undergraduate +students. They are often repelled by philosophy, and I cannot but +think that this is in part due to the dry and abstract form in which +philosophers have too often seen fit to express their thoughts. The +same thoughts can be set forth in plain language, and their +significance illustrated by a constant reference to experiences which +we all have--experiences which must serve as the foundation to every +theory of the mind and the world worthy of serious consideration. + +But there are many persons who cannot attend formal courses of +instruction, and who, nevertheless, are interested in philosophy. +These, also, I have had in mind; and I have tried to be so clear that +they could read the work with profit in the absence of a teacher. + +Lastly, I invite the more learned, if they have found my "System of +Metaphysics" difficult to understand in any part, to follow the simple +statement contained in the chapters above alluded to, and then to +return, if they will, to the more bulky volume. + + +GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. + +New York, 1906. + + + + +CONTENTS + + +PART I + +INTRODUCTORY + + +CHAPTER I + +THE MEANING OF THE WORD "PHILOSOPHY" IN THE PAST AND IN THE PRESENT + + 1. The Beginnings of Philosophy. + 2. The Greek Philosophy at its Height. + 3. Philosophy as a Guide to Life. + 4. Philosophy in the Middle Ages. + 5. The Modern Philosophy. + 6. What Philosophy means in our Time. + +CHAPTER II + +COMMON THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT + + 7. Common Thought. + 8. Scientific Knowledge. + 9. Mathematics. + 10. The Science of Psychology. + 11. Reflective Thought. + + +PART II + +PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE EXTERNAL WORLD + +CHAPTER III + +IS THERE AN EXTERNAL WORLD? + + 12. How the Plain Man thinks he knows the World. + 13. The Psychologist and the External World. + 14. The "Telephone Exchange." + +CHAPTER IV + +SENSATIONS AND "THINGS" + + 15. Sense and Imagination. + 16. May we call "Things" Groups of Sensations? + 17. The Distinction between Sensations and "Things." + 18. The Existence of Material Things. + +CHAPTER V + +APPEARANCES AND REALITIES + + 19. Things and their Appearances. + 20. Real Things. + 21. Ultimate Real Things. + 22. The Bugbear of the "Unknowable". + +CHAPTER VI + +OF SPACE + + 23. What we are supposed to know about It. + 24. Space as Necessary and Space as Infinite. + 25. Space as Infinitely Divisible. + 26. What is Real Space? + +CHAPTER VII + +OF TIME + + 27. Time as Necessary, Infinite, and Infinitely Divisible. + 28. The Problem of Past, Present, and Future. + 29. What is Real Time? + + +PART III + +PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE MIND + +CHAPTER VIII + +WHAT IS THE MIND? + + 30. Primitive Notions of Mind. + 31. The Mind as Immaterial. + 32. Modern Common Sense Notions of the Mind. + 33. The Psychologist and the Mind. + 34. The Metaphysician and the Mind. + +CHAPTER IX + +MIND AND BODY + + 35. Is the Mind in the Body? + 36. The Doctrine of the Interactionist. + 37. The Doctrine of the Parallelist. + 38. In what Sense Mental Phenomena have a Time and Place. + 39. Objections to Parallelism. + +CHAPTER X + +HOW WE KNOW THERE ARE OTHER MINDS + + 40. Is it Certain that we know It? + 41. The Argument for Other Minds. + 42. What Other Minds are there? + 43. The Doctrine of Mind-stuff. + +CHAPTER XI + +OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND + + 44. Is the Material World a Mechanism? + 45. The Place of Mind in Nature. + 46. The Order of Nature and "Free-will." + 47. The Physical World and the Moral World. + + +PART IV + +SOME TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY + +CHAPTER XII + +THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND + + 48. The Doctrine of Representative Perception. + 49. The Step to Idealism. + 50. The Revolt of "Common Sense." + 51. The Critical Philosophy. + +CHAPTER XIII + +REALISM AND IDEALISM + + 52. Realism. + 53. Idealism. + +CHAPTER XIV + +MONISM AND DUALISM + + 54. The Meaning of the Words. + 55. Materialism. + 56. Spiritualism. + 57. The Doctrine of the One Substance. + 58. Dualism. + 59. Singularism and Pluralism. + +CHAPTER XV + +RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM + + 60. Rationalism. + 61. Empiricism. + 62. Criticism. + 63. Critical Empiricism. + 64. Pragmatism. + + +PART V + +THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES + +CHAPTER XVI + +LOGIC + + 65. Introductory; the Philosophical Sciences. + 66. The Traditional Logic. + 67. The "Modern" Logic. + 68. Logic and Philosophy. + +CHAPTER XVII + +PSYCHOLOGY + + 69. Psychology and Philosophy. + 70. The Double Affiliation of Psychology. + +CHAPTER XVIII + +ETHICS AND AESTHETICS + + 71. Common Sense Ethics. + 72. Ethics and Philosophy. + 73. Aesthetics. + + +CHAPTER XIX + +METAPHYSICS + + 74. What is Metaphysics? + 75. Epistemology. + +CHAPTER XX + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION + + 76. Religion and Reflection. + 77. The Philosophy of Religion. + +CHAPTER XXI + +PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER SCIENCES + + 78. The Philosophical and the Non-philosophical Sciences. + 79. The study of Scientific Principles and Methods. + + +PART VI + +ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + +CHAPTER XXII + +THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + + 80. The Question of Practical Utility. + 81. Why Philosophical Studies are Useful. + 82. Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Religion. + +CHAPTER XXIII + +WHY WE SHOULD STUDY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY + + 83. The Prominence given to the Subject. + 84. The Especial Importance of Historical Studies to Reflective Thought. + 85. The Value of Different Points of View. + 86. Philosophy as Poetry and Philosophy as Science. + 87. How to read the History of Philosophy. + +CHAPTER XXIV + +SOME PRACTICAL ADMONITIONS + + 88. Be prepared to enter upon a New Way of Looking at Things. + 89. Be willing to consider Possibilities which at first strike one + as Absurd. + 90. Do not have too much Respect for Authority. + 91. Remember that Ordinary Rules of Evidence Apply. + 92. Aim at Clearness and Simplicity. + 93. Do not hastily accept a Doctrine. + + +NOTES + + + + +AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY + + +I. INTRODUCTORY + +CHAPTER I + +THE MEANING OF THE WORD "PHILOSOPHY" IN THE PAST AND IN THE PRESENT + +I must warn the reader at the outset that the title of this chapter +seems to promise a great deal more than he will find carried out in the +chapter itself. To tell all that philosophy has meant in the past, and +all that it means to various classes of men in the present, would be a +task of no small magnitude, and one quite beyond the scope of such a +volume as this. But it is not impossible to give within small compass +a brief indication, at least, of what the word once signified, to show +how its signification has undergone changes, and to point out to what +sort of a discipline or group of disciplines educated men are apt to +apply the word, notwithstanding their differences of opinion as to the +truth or falsity of this or that particular doctrine. Why certain +subjects of investigation have come to be grouped together and to be +regarded as falling within the province of the philosopher, rather than +certain other subjects, will, I hope, be made clear in the body of the +work. Only an indication can be given in this chapter. + +1. THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY.--The Greek historian Herodotus +(484-424 B.C.) appears to have been the first to use the verb "to +philosophize." He makes Croesus tell Solon how he has heard that he +"from a desire of knowledge has, philosophizing, journeyed through many +lands." The word "philosophizing" seems to indicate that Solon pursued +knowledge for its own sake, and was what we call an investigator. As +for the word "philosopher" (etymologically, a lover of wisdom), a +certain somewhat unreliable tradition traces it back to Pythagoras +(about 582-500 B.C.). As told by Cicero, the story is that, in a +conversation with Leon, the ruler of Phlius, in the Peloponnesus, he +described himself as a philosopher, and said that his business was an +investigation into the nature of things. + +At any rate, both the words "philosopher" and "philosophy" are freely +used in the writings of the disciples of Socrates (470-399 B.C.), and +it is possible that he was the first to make use of them. The seeming +modesty of the title philosopher--for etymologically it is a modest +one, though it has managed to gather a very different signification +with the lapse of time--the modesty of the title would naturally appeal +to a man who claimed so much ignorance, as Socrates; and Plato +represents him as distinguishing between the lover of wisdom and the +wise, on the ground that God alone may be called wise. From that date +to this the word "philosopher" has remained with us, and it has meant +many things to many men. But for centuries the philosopher has not +been simply the investigator, nor has he been simply the lover of +wisdom. + +An investigation into the origin of words, however interesting in +itself, can tell us little of the uses to which words are put after +they have come into being. If we turn from etymology to history, and +review the labors of the men whom the world has agreed to call +philosophers, we are struck by the fact that those who head the list +chronologically appear to have been occupied with crude physical +speculations, with attempts to guess what the world is made out of, +rather than with that somewhat vague something that we call philosophy +to-day. + +Students of the history of philosophy usually begin their studies with +the speculations of the Greek philosopher Thales (b. 624 B.C.). We are +told that he assumed water to be the universal principle out of which +all things are made, and that he maintained that "all things are full +of gods." We find that Anaximander, the next in the list, assumed as +the source out of which all things proceed and that to which they all +return "the infinite and indeterminate"; and that Anaximenes, who was +perhaps his pupil, took as his principle the all-embracing air. + +This trio constitutes the Ionian school of philosophy, the earliest of +the Greek schools; and one who reads for the first time the few vague +statements which seem to constitute the sum of their contributions to +human knowledge is impelled to wonder that so much has been made of the +men. + +This wonder disappears, however, when one realizes that the appearance +of these thinkers was really a momentous thing. For these men turned +their faces away from the poetical and mythologic way of accounting for +things, which had obtained up to their time, and set their faces toward +Science. Aristotle shows us how Thales may have been led to the +formulation of his main thesis by an observation of the phenomena of +nature. Anaximander saw in the world in which he lived the result of a +process of evolution. Anaximenes explains the coming into being of +fire, wind, clouds, water, and earth, as due to a condensation and +expansion of the universal principle, air. The boldness of their +speculations we may explain as due to a courage born of ignorance, but +the explanations they offer are scientific in spirit, at least. + +Moreover, these men do not stand alone. They are the advance guard of +an army whose latest representatives are the men who are enlightening +the world at the present day. The evolution of science--taking that +word in the broad sense to mean organized and systematized +knowledge--must be traced in the works of the Greek philosophers from +Thales down. Here we have the source and the rivulet to which we can +trace back the mighty stream which is flowing past our own doors. +Apparently insignificant in its beginnings, it must still for a while +seem insignificant to the man who follows with an unreflective eye the +course of the current. + +It would take me too far afield to give an account of the Greek schools +which immediately succeeded the Ionic: to tell of the Pythagoreans, who +held that all things were constituted by numbers; of the Eleatics, who +held that "only Being is," and denied the possibility of change, +thereby reducing the shifting panorama of the things about us to a mere +delusive world of appearances; of Heraclitus, who was so impressed by +the constant flux of things that he summed up his view of nature in the +words: "Everything flows"; of Empedocles, who found his explanation of +the world in the combination of the four elements, since become +traditional, earth, water, fire, and air; of Democritus, who developed +a materialistic atomism which reminds one strongly of the doctrine of +atoms as it has appeared in modern science; of Anaxagoras, who traced +the system of things to the setting in order of an infinite +multiplicity of different elements,--"seeds of things,"--which setting +in order was due to the activity of the finest of things, Mind. + +It is a delight to discover the illuminating thoughts which came to the +minds of these men; and, on the other hand, it is amusing to see how +recklessly they launched themselves on boundless seas when they were +unprovided with chart and compass. They were like brilliant children, +who know little of the dangers of the great world, but are ready to +undertake anything. These philosophers regarded all knowledge as their +province, and did not despair of governing so great a realm. They were +ready to explain the whole world and everything in it. Of course, this +can only mean that they had little conception of how much there is to +explain, and of what is meant by scientific explanation. + +It is characteristic of this series of philosophers that their +attention was directed very largely upon the external world. It was +natural that this should be so. Both in the history of the race and in +that of the individual, we find that the attention is seized first by +material things, and that it is long before a clear conception of the +mind and of its knowledge is arrived at. Observation precedes +reflection. When we come to think definitely about the mind, we are +all apt to make use of notions which we have derived from our +experience of external things. The very words we use to denote mental +operations are in many instances taken from this outer realm. We +"direct" the attention; we speak of "apprehension," of "conception," of +"intuition." Our knowledge is "clear" or "obscure"; an oration is +"brilliant"; an emotion is "sweet" or "bitter." What wonder that, as +we read over the fragments that have come down to us from the +Pre-Socratic philosophers, we should be struck by the fact that they +sometimes leave out altogether and sometimes touch lightly upon a +number of those things that we regard to-day as peculiarly within the +province of the philosopher. They busied themselves with the world as +they saw it, and certain things had hardly as yet come definitely +within their horizon. + +2. THE GREEK PHILOSOPHY AT ITS HEIGHT.--The next succeeding period sees +certain classes of questions emerge into prominence which had attracted +comparatively little attention from the men of an earlier day. +Democritus of Abdera, to whom reference has been made above, belongs +chronologically to this latter period, but his way of thinking makes us +class him with the earlier philosophers. It was characteristic of +these latter that they assumed rather naively that man can look upon +the world and can know it, and can by thinking about it succeed in +giving a reasonable account of it. That there may be a difference +between the world as it really is and the world as it appears to man, +and that it may be impossible for man to attain to a knowledge of the +absolute truth of things, does not seem to have occurred to them. + +The fifth century before Christ was, in Greece, a time of intense +intellectual ferment. One is reminded, in reading of it, of the +splendid years of the Renaissance in Italy, of the awakening of the +human mind to a vigorous life which cast off the bonds of tradition and +insisted upon the right of free and unfettered development. Athens was +the center of this intellectual activity. + +In this century arose the Sophists, public teachers who busied +themselves with all departments of human knowledge, but seemed to lay +no little emphasis upon certain questions that touched very nearly the +life of man. Can man attain to truth at all--to a truth that is more +than a mere truth to him, a seeming truth? Whence do the laws derive +their authority? Is there such a thing as justice, as right? It was +with such questions as these that the Sophists occupied themselves, and +such questions as these have held the attention of mankind ever since. +When they make their appearance in the life of a people or of an +individual man, it means that there has been a rebirth, a birth into +the life of reflection. + +When Socrates, that greatest of teachers, felt called upon to refute +the arguments of these men, he met them, so to speak, on their own +ground, recognizing that the subjects of which they discoursed were, +indeed, matter for scientific investigation. His attitude seemed to +many conservative persons in his day a dangerous one; he was regarded +as an innovator; he taught men to think and to raise questions where, +before, the traditions of the fathers had seemed a sufficient guide to +men's actions. + +And, indeed, he could not do otherwise. Men had learned to reflect, +and there had come into existence at least the beginnings of what we +now sometimes rather loosely call the mental and moral sciences. In +the works of Socrates' disciple Plato (428-347 B.C.) and in those of +Plato's disciple Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), abundant justice is done to +these fields of human activity. These two, the greatest among the +Greek philosophers, differ from each other in many things, but it is +worthy of remark that they both seem to regard the whole sphere of +human knowledge as their province. + +Plato is much more interested in the moral sciences than in the +physical, but he, nevertheless, feels called upon to give an account of +how the world was made and out of what sort of elements. He evidently +does not take his own account very seriously, and recognizes that he is +on uncertain ground. But he does not consider the matter beyond his +jurisdiction. + +As for Aristotle, that wonderful man seems to have found it possible to +represent worthily every science known to his time, and to have marked +out several new fields for his successors to cultivate. His philosophy +covers physics, cosmology, zooelogy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, +psychology, politics and economics, rhetoric and poetics. + +Thus we see that the task of the philosopher was much the same at the +period of the highest development of the Greek philosophy that it had +been earlier. He was supposed to give an account of the system of +things. But the notion of what it means to give an account of the +system of things had necessarily undergone some change. The +philosopher had to be something more than a natural philosopher. + +3. PHILOSOPHY AS A GUIDE TO LIFE.--At the close of the fourth century +before Christ there arose the schools of the Stoics, the Epicureans, +and the Skeptics. In them we seem to find a somewhat new conception of +philosophy--philosophy appears as chiefly a guide to life. The Stoic +emphasizes the necessity of living "according to nature," and dwells +upon the character of the wise man; the Epicurean furnishes certain +selfish maxims for getting through life as pleasantly as possible; the +Skeptic counsels apathy, an indifference to all things,--blessed is he +who expects nothing, for he shall not be disappointed. + +And yet, when we examine more closely these systems, we find a +conception of philosophy not really so very different from that which +had obtained before. We do not find, it is true, that disinterested +passion for the attainment of truth which is the glory of science. Man +seems quite too much concerned with the problem of his own happiness or +unhappiness; he has grown morbid. Nevertheless, the practical maxims +which obtain in each of these systems are based upon a certain view of +the system of things as a whole. + +The Stoic tells us of what the world consists; what was the beginning +and what will be the end of things; what is the relation of the system +of things to God. He develops a physics and a logic as well as a +system of ethics. The Epicurean informs us that the world originated +in a rain of atoms through space; he examines into the foundations of +human knowledge; and he proceeds to make himself comfortable in a world +from which he has removed those disturbing elements, the gods. The +Skeptic decides that there is no such thing as truth, before he +enunciates the dogma that it is not worth while to worry about +anything. The philosophy of each school includes a view of the system +of things as a whole. The philosopher still regarded the universe of +knowledge as his province. + +4. PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE AGES.--I cannot do more than mention +Neo-Platonism, that half Greek and half Oriental system of doctrine +which arose in the third century after Christ, the first system of +importance after the schools mentioned above. But I must not pass it +by without pointing out that the Neo-Platonic philosopher undertook to +give an account of the origin, development, and end of the whole system +of things. + +In the Middle Ages there gradually grew up rather a sharp distinction +between those things that can be known through the unaided reason and +those things that can only be known through a supernatural revelation. +The term "philosophy" came to be synonymous with knowledge attained by +the natural light of reason. This seems to imply some sort of a +limitation to the task of the philosopher. Philosophy is not +synonymous with all knowledge. + +But we must not forget to take note of the fact that philosophy, even +with this limitation, constitutes a pretty wide field. It covers both +the physical and the moral sciences. Nor should we omit to notice that +the scholastic philosopher was at the same time a theologian. Albert +the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas, the famous scholastics of the +thirteenth century, had to write a "_Summa Theologiae_," or system of +theology, as well as to treat of the other departments of human +knowledge. + +Why were these men not overwhelmed with the task set them by the +tradition of their time? It was because the task was not, after all, +so great as a modern man might conceive it to be. Gil Blas, in Le +Sage's famous romance, finds it possible to become a skilled physician +in the twinkling of an eye, when Dr. Sangrado has imparted to him the +secret that the remedy for all diseases is to be found in bleeding the +patient and in making him drink copiously of hot water. When little is +known about things, it does not seem impossible for one man to learn +that little. During the Middle Ages and the centuries preceding, the +physical sciences had a long sleep. Men were much more concerned in +the thirteenth century to find out what Aristotle had said than they +were to address questions to nature. The special sciences, as we now +know them, had not been called into existence. + +5. THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY.--The submission of men's minds to the +authority of Aristotle and of the church gradually gave way. A revival +of learning set in. Men turned first of all to a more independent +choice of authorities, and then rose to the conception of a philosophy +independent of authority, of a science based upon an observation of +nature, of a science at first hand. The special sciences came into +being. + +But the old tradition of philosophy as universal knowledge remained. +If we pass over the men of the transition period and turn our attention +to Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and Rene Descartes (1596-1650), the two +who are commonly regarded as heading the list of the modern +philosophers, we find both of them assigning to the philosopher an +almost unlimited field. + +Bacon holds that philosophy has for its objects God, man, and nature, +and he regards it as within his province to treat of "_philosophia +prima_" (a sort of metaphysics, though he does not call it by this +name), of logic, of physics and astronomy, of anthropology, in which he +includes psychology, of ethics, and of politics. In short, he attempts +to map out the whole field of human knowledge, and to tell those who +work in this corner of it or in that how they should set about their +task. + +As for Descartes, he writes of the trustworthiness of human knowledge, +of the existence of God, of the existence of an external world, of the +human soul and its nature, of mathematics, physics, cosmology, +physiology, and, in short, of nearly everything discussed by the men of +his day. No man can accuse this extraordinary Frenchman of a lack of +appreciation of the special sciences which were growing up. No one in +his time had a better right to be called a scientist in the modern +sense of the term. But it was not enough for him to be a mere +mathematician, or even a worker in the physical sciences generally. He +must be all that has been mentioned above. + +The conception of philosophy as of a something that embraces all +departments of human knowledge has not wholly passed away even in our +day. I shall not dwell upon Spinoza (1632-1677), who believed it +possible to deduce a world _a priori_ with mathematical precision; upon +Christian Wolff (1679-1754), who defined philosophy as the knowledge of +the causes of what is or comes into being; upon Fichte (1762-1814), who +believed that the philosopher, by mere thinking, could lay down the +laws of all possible future experience; upon Schelling (1775-1854), +who, without knowing anything worth mentioning about natural science, +had the courage to develop a system of natural philosophy, and to +condemn such investigators as Boyle and Newton; upon Hegel (1770-1831), +who undertakes to construct the whole system of reality out of +concepts, and who, with his immediate predecessors, brought philosophy +for a while into more or less disrepute with men of a scientific turn +of mind. I shall come down quite to our own times, and consider a man +whose conception of philosophy has had and still has a good deal of +influence, especially with the general public--with those to whom +philosophy is a thing to be taken up in moments of leisure, and cannot +be the serious pursuit of a life. + +"Knowledge of the lowest kind," says Herbert Spencer, "is _un-unified_ +knowledge; Science is _partially-unified_ knowledge; Philosophy is +_completely-unified_ knowledge." [1] Science, he argues, means merely +the family of the Sciences--stands for nothing more than the sum of +knowledge formed of their contributions. Philosophy is the fusion of +these contributions into a whole; it is knowledge of the greatest +generality. In harmony with this notion Spencer produced a system of +philosophy which includes the following: A volume entitled "First +Principles," which undertakes to show what man can and what man cannot +know; a treatise on the principles of biology; another on the +principles of psychology; still another on the principles of sociology; +and finally one on the principles of morality. To complete the scheme +it would have been necessary to give an account of inorganic nature +before going on to the phenomena of life, but our philosopher found the +task too great and left this out. + +Now, Spencer was a man of genius, and one finds in his works many +illuminating thoughts. But it is worthy of remark that those who +praise his work in this or in that field are almost always men who have +themselves worked in some other field and have an imperfect +acquaintance with the particular field that they happen to be praising. +The metaphysician finds the reasonings of the "First Principles" rather +loose and inconclusive; the biologist pays little heed to the +"Principles of Biology"; the sociologist finds Spencer not particularly +accurate or careful in the field of his predilection. He has tried to +be a professor of all the sciences, and it is too late in the world's +history for him or for any man to cope with such a task. In the days +of Plato a man might have hoped to accomplish it. + +6. WHAT PHILOSOPHY MEANS IN OUR TIME.--It savors of temerity to write +down such a title as that which heads the present section. There are +men living to-day to whom philosophy means little else than the +doctrine of Kant, or of Hegel, or of the brothers Caird, or of Herbert +Spencer, or even of St. Thomas Aquinas, for we must not forget that +many of the seminaries of learning in Europe and some in America still +hold to the mediaeval church philosophy. + +But let me gather up in a few words the purport of what has been said +above. Philosophy once meant the whole body of scientific knowledge. +Afterward it came to mean the whole body of knowledge which could be +attained by the mere light of human reason, unaided by revelation. The +several special sciences sprang up, and a multitude of men have for a +long time past devoted themselves to definite limited fields of +investigation with little attention to what has been done in other +fields. Nevertheless, there has persisted the notion of a discipline +which somehow concerns itself with the whole system of things, rather +than with any limited division of that broad field. It is a notion not +peculiar to the disciples of Spencer. There are many to whom +philosophy is a "_Weltweisheit_," a world-wisdom. Shall we say that +this is the meaning of the word philosophy now? And if we do, how +shall we draw a line between philosophy and the body of the special +sciences? + +Perhaps the most just way to get a preliminary idea of what philosophy +means to the men of our time is to turn away for the time being from +the definition of any one man or group of men, and to ask ourselves +what a professor of philosophy in an American or European university is +actually supposed to teach. + +It is quite clear that he is not supposed to be an Aristotle. He does +not represent all the sciences, and no one expects him to lecture on +mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, zooelogy, botany, economics, +politics, and various other disciplines. There was a time when he +might have been expected to teach all that men could know, but that +time is long past. + +Nevertheless, there is quite a group of sciences which are regarded as +belonging especially to his province; and although a man may devote a +large part of his attention to some one portion of the field, he would +certainly be thought remiss if he wholly neglected the rest. This +group of sciences includes logic, psychology, ethics and aesthetics, +metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I have not included +epistemology or the "theory of knowledge" as a separate discipline, for +reasons which will appear later (Chapter XIX); and I have included the +history of philosophy, because, whether we care to call this a special +science or not, it constitutes a very important part of the work of the +teacher of philosophy in our day. + +Of this group of subjects the student who goes to the university to +study philosophy is supposed to know something before he leaves its +walls, whatever else he may or may not know. + +It should be remarked, again, that there is commonly supposed to be a +peculiarly close relation between philosophy and religion. Certainly, +if any one about a university undertakes to give a course of lectures +on theism, it is much more apt to be the professor of philosophy than +the professor of mathematics or of chemistry. The man who has written +an "Introduction to Philosophy," a "Psychology," a "Logic," and an +"Outlines of Metaphysics" is very apt to regard it as his duty to add +to the list a "Philosophy of Religion." The students in the +theological seminaries of Europe and America are usually encouraged, if +not compelled, to attend courses in philosophy. + +Finally, it appears to be definitely accepted that even the disciplines +that we never think of classing among the philosophical sciences are +not wholly cut off from a connection with philosophy. When we are +occupied, not with adding to the stock of knowledge embraced within the +sphere of any special science, but with an examination of the methods +of the science, with, so to speak, a criticism of the foundations upon +which the science rests, our work is generally recognized as +philosophical. It strikes no one as odd in our day that there should +be established a "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific +Methods," but we should think it strange if some one announced the +intention to publish a "Journal of Philosophy and Comparative Anatomy." +It is not without its significance that, when Mach, who had been +professor of physics at Prague, was called (in 1895) to the University +of Vienna to lecture on the history and theory of the inductive +sciences, he was made, not professor of physics, but professor of +philosophy. + +The case, then, stands thus: a certain group of disciplines is regarded +as falling peculiarly within the province of the professor of +philosophy, and the sciences which constitute it are frequently called +the philosophical sciences; moreover, it is regarded as quite proper +that the teacher of philosophy should concern himself with the problems +of religion, and should pry into the methods and fundamental +assumptions of special sciences in all of which it is impossible that +he should be an adept. The question naturally arises: Why has his task +come to be circumscribed as it is? Why should he teach just these +things and no others? + +To this question certain persons are at once ready to give an answer. +There was a time, they argue, when it seemed possible for one man to +embrace the whole field of human knowledge. But human knowledge grew; +the special sciences were born; each concerned itself with a definite +class of facts and developed its own methods. It became possible and +necessary for a man to be, not a scientist at large, but a chemist, a +physicist, a biologist, an economist. But in certain portions of the +great field men have met with peculiar difficulties; here it cannot be +said that we have sciences, but rather that we have attempts at +science. The philosopher is the man to whom is committed what is left +when we have taken away what has been definitely established or is +undergoing investigation according to approved scientific methods. He +is Lord of the Uncleared Ground, and may wander through it in his +compassless, irresponsible way, never feeling that he is lost, for he +has never had any definite bearings to lose. + +Those who argue in this way support their case by pointing to the lack +of a general consensus of opinion which obtains in many parts of the +field which the philosopher regards as his own; and also by pointing +out that, even within this field, there is a growing tendency on the +part of certain sciences to separate themselves from philosophy and +become independent. Thus the psychologist and the logician are +sometimes very anxious to have it understood that they belong among the +scientists and not among the philosophers. + +Now, this answer to the question that we have raised undoubtedly +contains some truth. As we have seen from the sketch contained in the +preceding pages, the word philosophy was once a synonym for the whole +sum of the sciences or what stood for such; gradually the several +sciences have become independent and the field of the philosopher has +been circumscribed. We must admit, moreover, that there is to be found +in a number of the special sciences a body of accepted facts which is +without its analogue in philosophy. In much of his work the +philosopher certainly seems to be walking upon more uncertain ground +than his neighbors; and if he is unaware of that fact, it must be +either because he has not a very nice sense of what constitutes +scientific evidence, or because he is carried away by his enthusiasm +for some particular form of doctrine. + +Nevertheless, it is just to maintain that the answer we are discussing +is not a satisfactory one. For one thing, we find in it no indication +of the reason why the particular group of disciplines with which the +philosopher occupies himself has been left to him, when so many +sciences have announced their independence. Why have not these, also, +separated off and set up for themselves? Is it more difficult to work +in these fields than in others? and, if so, what reason can be assigned +for the fact? + +Take psychology as an instance. How does it happen that the physicist +calmly develops his doctrine without finding it necessary to make his +bow to philosophy at all, while the psychologist is at pains to explain +that his book is to treat psychology as "a natural science," and will +avoid metaphysics as much as possible? For centuries men have been +interested in the phenomena of the human mind. Can anything be more +open to observation than what passes in a man's own consciousness? +Why, then, should the science of psychology lag behind? and why these +endless disputes as to whether it can really be treated as a "natural +science" at all? + +Again. May we assume that, because certain disciplines have taken a +position of relative independence, therefore all the rest of the field +will surely come to be divided up in the same way, and that there will +be many special sciences, but no such thing as philosophy? It is hasty +to assume this on no better evidence than that which has so far been +presented. Before making up one's mind upon this point, one should +take a careful look at the problems with which the philosopher occupies +himself. + +A complete answer to the questions raised above can only be given in +the course of the book, where the main problems of philosophy are +discussed, and the several philosophical sciences are taken up and +examined. But I may say, in anticipation, as much as this:-- + +(1) Philosophy is reflective knowledge. What is meant by reflective +knowledge will be explained at length in the next chapter. + +(2) The sciences which are grouped together as philosophical are those +in which we are forced back upon the problems of reflective thought, +and cannot simply put them aside. + +(3) The peculiar difficulties of reflective thought may account for the +fact that these sciences are, more than others, a field in which we may +expect to find disputes and differences of opinion. + +(4) We need not be afraid that the whole field of human knowledge will +come to be so divided up into special sciences that philosophy will +disappear. The problems with which the philosopher occupies himself +are real problems, which present themselves unavoidably to the +thoughtful mind, and it is not convenient to divide these up among the +several sciences. This will become clearer as we proceed. + + +[1] "First Principles," Part II, section 37. + + + + +CHAPTER II + +COMMON THOUGHT, SCIENCE, AND REFLECTIVE THOUGHT + +7. COMMON THOUGHT.--Those who have given little attention to the study +of the human mind are apt to suppose that, when the infant opens its +eyes upon the new world of objects surrounding its small body, it sees +things much as they do themselves. They are ready to admit that it +does not know much _about_ things, but it strikes them as absurd for +any one to go so far as to say that it does not see things--the things +out there in space before its eyes. + +Nevertheless, the psychologist tells us that it requires quite a course +of education to enable us to see things--not to have vague and +unmeaning sensations, but to see things, things that are known to be +touchable as well as seeable, things that are recognized as having size +and shape and position in space. And he aims a still severer blow at +our respect for the infant when he goes on to inform us that the little +creature is as ignorant of itself as it is of things; that in its small +world of as yet unorganized experiences there is no self that is +distinguished from other things; that it may cry vociferously without +knowing who is uncomfortable, and may stop its noise without knowing +who has been taken up into the nurse's arms and has experienced an +agreeable change. + +This chaotic little world of the dawning life is not our world, the +world of common thought, the world in which we all live and move in +maturer years; nor can we go back to it on the wings of memory. We +seem to ourselves to have always lived in a world of things,--things in +time and space, material things. Among these things there is one of +peculiar interest, and which we have not placed upon a par with the +rest, our own body, which sees, tastes, touches, other things. We +cannot remember a time when we did not know that with this body are +somehow bound up many experiences which interest us acutely; for +example, experiences of pleasure and pain. Moreover, we seem always to +have known that certain of the bodies which surround our own rather +resemble our own, and are in important particulars to be distinguished +from the general mass of bodies. + +Thus, we seem always to have been living in a world of _things_ and to +have recognized in that world the existence of ourselves and of other +people. When we now think of "ourselves" and of "other people," we +think of each of the objects referred to as possessing a _mind_. May +we say that, as far back as we can remember, we have thought of +ourselves and of other persons as possessing minds? + +Hardly. The young child does not seem to distinguish between mind and +body, and, in the vague and fragmentary pictures which come back to us +from our early life, certainly this distinction does not stand out. +The child may be the completest of egoists, it may be absorbed in +itself and all that directly concerns this particular self, and yet it +may make no conscious distinction between a bodily self and a mental, +between mind and body. It does not explicitly recognize its world as a +world that contains minds as well as bodies. + +But, however it may be with the child in the earlier stages of its +development, we must all admit that the mature man does consciously +recognize that the world in which he finds himself is a world that +contains minds as well as bodies. It never occurs to him to doubt that +there are bodies, and it never occurs to him to doubt that there are +minds. + +Does he not perceive that he has a body and a mind? Has he not +abundant evidence that his mind is intimately related to his body? +When he shuts his eyes, he no longer sees, and when he stops his ears, +he no longer hears; when his body is bruised, he feels pain; when he +wills to raise his hand, his body carries out the mental decree. Other +men act very much as he does; they walk and they talk, they laugh and +they cry, they work and they play, just as he does. In short, they act +precisely as though they had minds like his own. What more natural +than to assume that, as he himself gives expression, by the actions of +his body, to the thoughts and emotions in his mind, so his neighbor +does the same? + +We must not allow ourselves to underrate the plain man's knowledge +either of bodies or of minds. It seems, when one reflects upon it, a +sufficiently wonderful thing that a few fragmentary sensations should +automatically receive an interpretation which conjures up before the +mind a world of real things; that, for example, the little patch of +color sensation which I experience when I turn my eyes toward the +window should seem to introduce me at once to a world of material +objects lying in space, clearly defined in magnitude, distance, and +direction; that an experience no more complex should be the key which +should unlock for me the secret storehouse of another mind, and lay +before me a wealth of thoughts and emotions not my own. From the poor, +bare, meaningless world of the dawning intelligence to the world of +common thought, a world in which real things with their manifold +properties, things material and things mental, bear their part, is +indeed a long step. + +And we should never forget that he who would go farther, he who would +strive to gain a better knowledge of matter and of mind by the aid of +science and of philosophical reflection, must begin his labors on this +foundation which is common to us all. How else can he begin than by +accepting and more critically examining the world as it seems revealed +in the experience of the race? + +8. SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.--Still, the knowledge of the world which we +have been discussing is rather indefinite, inaccurate, and +unsystematic. It is a sufficient guide for common life, but its +deficiencies may be made apparent. He who wishes to know matter and +mind better cannot afford to neglect the sciences. + +Now, it is important to observe that although, when the plain man grows +scientific, great changes take place in his knowledge of things, yet +his way of looking at the mind and the world remains in general much +what it was before. To prevent this statement from being +misunderstood, I must explain it at some length. + +Let us suppose that the man in question takes up the study of botany. +Need he do anything very different from what is done more imperfectly +by every intelligent man who interests himself in plants? There in the +real material world before him are the same plants that he observed +somewhat carelessly before. He must collect his information more +systematically and must arrange it more critically, but his task is not +so much to do something different as it is to do the same thing much +better. + +The same is evidently true of various other sciences, such as geology, +zooelogy, physiology, sociology. Some men have much accurate +information regarding rocks, animals, the functions of the bodily +organs, the development of a given form of society, and other things of +the sort, and other men have but little; and yet it is usually not +difficult for the man who knows much to make the man who knows little +understand, at least, what he is talking about. He is busying himself +with _things_--the same things that interest the plain man, and of +which the plain man knows something. He has collected information +touching their properties, their changes, their relationships; but to +him, as to his less scientific neighbor, they are the same things they +always were,--things that he has known from the days of childhood. + +Perhaps it will be admitted that this is true of such sciences as those +above indicated, but doubted whether it is true of all the sciences, +even of all the sciences which are directly concerned with _things_ of +_some_ sort. For example, to the plain man the world of material +things consists of things that can be seen and touched. Many of these +seem to fill space continuously. They may be divided, but the parts +into which they may be divided are conceived as fragments of the +things, and as of the same general nature as the wholes of which they +are parts. Yet the chemist and the physicist tell us that these same +extended things are not really continuous, as they seem to us to be, +but consist of swarms of imperceptible atoms, in rapid motion, at +considerable distances from one another in space, and grouped in +various ways. + +What has now become of the world of realities to which the plain man +pinned his faith? It has come to be looked upon as a world of +appearances, of phenomena, of manifestations, under which the real +things, themselves imperceptible, make their presence evident to our +senses. Is this new, real world the world of things in which the plain +man finds himself, and in which he has felt so much at home? + +A closer scrutiny reveals that the world of atoms and molecules into +which the man of science resolves the system of material things is not, +after all, so very different in kind from the world to which the plain +man is accustomed. He can understand without difficulty the language +in which it is described to him, and he can readily see how a man may +be led to assume its existence. + +The atom is not, it is true, directly perceivable by sense, but it is +conceived as though it and its motions were thus perceivable. The +plain man has long known that things consist of parts which remain, +under some circumstances, invisible. When he approaches an object from +a distance, he sees parts which he could not see before; and what +appears to the naked eye a mere speck without perceptible parts is +found under the microscope to be an insect with its full complement of +members. Moreover, he has often observed that objects which appear +continuous when seen from a distance are evidently far from continuous +when seen close at hand. As we walk toward a tree we can see the +indefinite mass of color break up into discontinuous patches; a fabric, +which presents the appearance of an unbroken surface when viewed in +certain ways may be seen to be riddled with holes when held between the +eye and the light. There is no man who has not some acquaintance with +the distinction between appearance and reality, and who does not make +use of the distinction in common life. + +Nor can it seem a surprising fact that different combinations of atoms +should exhibit different properties. Have we not always known that +things in combination are apt to have different properties from the +same things taken separately? He who does not know so much as this is +not fit even to be a cook. + +No, the imperceptible world of atoms and molecules is not by any means +totally different from the world of things in which the plain man +lives. These little objects and groups of objects are discussed very +much as we discuss the larger objects and groups of objects to which we +are accustomed. We are still concerned with _things_ which exist in +space and move about in space; and even if these things are small and +are not very familiarly known, no intellectual revolution is demanded +to enable a man to understand the words of the scientist who is talking +about them, and to understand as well the sort of reasonings upon which +the doctrine is based. + +9. MATHEMATICS.--Let us now turn to take a glance at the mathematical +sciences. Of course, these have to do with things sooner or later, for +our mathematical reasonings would be absolutely useless to us if they +could not be applied to the world of things; but in mathematical +reasonings we abstract from things for the time being, confident that +we can come back to them when we want to do so, and can make use of the +results obtained in our operations. + +Now, every civilized man who is not mentally deficient can perform the +fundamental operations of arithmetic. He can add and subtract, +multiply and divide. In other words, he can use _numbers_. The man +who has become an accomplished mathematician can use numbers much +better; but if we are capable of following intelligently the intricate +series of operations that he carries out on the paper before us, and +can see the significance of the system of signs which he uses as an +aid, we shall realize that he is only doing in more complicated ways +what we have been accustomed to do almost from our childhood. + +If we are interested, not so much in performing the operations, as in +inquiring into what really takes place in a mind when several units are +grasped together and made into a new unit,--for example, when twelve +units are thought as one dozen,--the mathematician has a right to say: +I leave all that to the psychologist or to the metaphysician; every one +knows in a general way what is meant by a unit, and knows that units +can be added and subtracted, grouped and separated; I only undertake to +show how one may avoid error in doing these things. + +It is with geometry as it is with arithmetic. No man is wholly +ignorant of points, lines, surfaces, and solids. We are all aware that +a short line is not a point, a narrow surface is not a line, and a thin +solid is not a mere surface. A door so thin as to have only one side +would be repudiated by every man of sense as a monstrosity. When the +geometrician defines for us the point, the line, the surface, and the +solid, and when he sets before us an array of axioms, or self-evident +truths, we follow him with confidence because he seems to be telling us +things that we can directly see to be reasonable; indeed, to be telling +us things that we have always known. + +The truth is that the geometrician does not introduce us to a new world +at all. He merely gives us a fuller and a more exact account than was +before within our reach of the space relations which obtain in the +world of external objects, a world we already know pretty well. + +Suppose that we say to him: You have spent many years in dividing up +space and in scrutinizing the relations that are to be discovered in +that realm; now tell us, what is space? Is it real? Is it a thing, or +a quality of a thing, or merely a relation between things? And how can +any man think space, when the ideas through which he must think it are +supposed to be themselves non-extended? The space itself is not +supposed to be in the mind; how can a collection of non-extended ideas +give any inkling of what is meant by extension? + +Would any teacher of mathematics dream of discussing these questions +with his class before proceeding to the proof of his propositions? It +is generally admitted that, if such questions are to be answered at +all, it is not with the aid of geometrical reasonings that they will be +answered. + +10. THE SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.--Now let us come back to a science which +has to do directly with things. We have seen that the plain man has +some knowledge of minds as well as of material things. Every one +admits that the psychologist knows minds better. May we say that his +knowledge of minds differs from that of the plain man about as the +knowledge of plants possessed by the botanist differs from that of all +intelligent persons who have cared to notice them? Or is it a +knowledge of a quite different kind? + +Those who are familiar with the development of the sciences within +recent years have had occasion to remark the fact that psychology has +been coming more and more to take its place as an independent science. +Formerly it was regarded as part of the duty of the philosopher to +treat of the mind and its knowledge; but the psychologist who pretends +to be no more than a psychologist is a product of recent times. This +tendency toward specialization is a natural thing, and is quite in line +with what has taken place in other fields of investigation. + +When any science becomes an independent discipline, it is recognized +that it is a more or less limited field in which work of a certain kind +is done in a certain way. Other fields and other kinds of work are to +some extent ignored. But it is quite to be expected that there should +be some dispute, especially at first, as to what does or does not +properly fall within the limits of a given science. Where these limits +shall be placed is, after all, a matter of convenience; and sometimes +it is not well to be too strict in marking off one field from another. +It is well to watch the actual development of a science, and to note +the direction instinctively taken by investigators in that particular +field. + +If we compare the psychology of a generation or so ago with that of the +present day, we cannot but be struck with the fact that there is an +increasing tendency to treat psychology as a _natural science_. By +this is not meant, of course, that there is no difference between +psychology and the sciences that concern themselves with the world of +material things--psychology has to do primarily with minds and not with +bodies. But it is meant that, as the other sciences improve upon the +knowledge of the plain man without wholly recasting it, as they accept +the world in which he finds himself and merely attempt to give us a +better account of it, so the psychologist may accept the world of +matter and of minds recognized by common thought, and may devote +himself to the study of minds, without attempting to solve a class of +problems discussed by the metaphysician. For example, he may refuse to +discuss the question whether the mind can really know that there is an +external world with which it stands in relation, and from which it +receives messages along the avenues of the senses. He may claim that +it is no more his business to treat of this than it is the business of +the mathematician to treat of the ultimate nature of space. + +Thus the psychologist assumes without question the existence of an +external real world, a world of matter and motion. He finds in this +world certain organized bodies that present phenomena which he regards +as indicative of the presence of minds. He accepts it as a fact that +each mind knows its own states directly, and knows everything else by +inference from those states, receiving messages from the outer world +along one set of nerves and reacting along another set. He conceives +of minds as wholly dependent upon messages thus conveyed to them from +without. He tells us how a mind, by the aid of such messages, +gradually builds up for itself the notion of the external world and of +the other minds which are connected with bodies to be found in that +world. + +We may fairly say that all this is merely a development of and an +improvement upon the plain man's knowledge of minds and of bodies. +There is no normal man who does not know that his mind is more +intimately related to his body than it is to other bodies. We all +distinguish between our ideas of things and the external things they +represent, and we believe that our knowledge of things comes to us +through the avenues of the senses. Must we not open our eyes to see, +and unstop our ears to hear? We all know that we do not perceive other +minds directly, but must infer their contents from what takes place in +the bodies to which they are referred--from words and actions. +Moreover, we know that a knowledge of the outer world and of other +minds is built up gradually, and we never think of an infant as knowing +what a man knows, much as we are inclined to overrate the minds of +infants. + +The fact that the plain man and the psychologist do not greatly differ +in their point of view must impress every one who is charged with the +task of introducing students to the study of psychology and philosophy. +It is rather an easy thing to make them follow the reasonings of the +psychologist, so long as he avoids metaphysical reflections. The +assumptions which he makes seem to them not unreasonable; and, as for +his methods of investigation, there is no one of them which they have +not already employed themselves in a more or less blundering way. They +have had recourse to _introspection_, _i.e._ they have noticed the +phenomena of their own minds; they have made use of the _objective +method_, i.e. they have observed the signs of mind exhibited by other +persons and by the brutes; they have sometimes _experimented_--this is +done by the schoolgirl who tries to find out how best to tease her +roommate, and by the boy who covers and uncovers his ears in church to +make the preacher sing a tune. + +It may not be easy to make men good psychologists, but it is certainly +not difficult to make them understand what the psychologist is doing +and to make them realize the value of his work. He, like the workers +in the other natural sciences, takes for granted the world of the plain +man, the world of material things in space and time and of minds +related to those material things. But when it is a question of +introducing the student to the reflections of the philosophers the case +is very different. We seem to be enticing him into a new and a strange +world, and he is apt to be filled with suspicion and distrust. The +most familiar things take on an unfamiliar aspect, and questions are +raised which it strikes the unreflective man as highly absurd even to +propose. Of this world of reflective thought I shall say just a word +in what follows. + +11. REFLECTIVE THOUGHT.--If we ask our neighbor to meet us somewhere at +a given hour, he has no difficulty in understanding what we have +requested him to do. If he wishes to do so, he can be on the spot at +the proper moment. He may never have asked himself in his whole life +what he means by space and by time. He may be quite ignorant that +thoughtful men have disputed concerning the nature of these for +centuries past. + +And a man may go through the world avoiding disaster year after year by +distinguishing with some success between what is real and what is not +real, and yet he may be quite unable to tell us what, in general, it +means for a thing to be real. Some things are real and some are not; +as a rule he seems to be able to discover the difference; of his method +of procedure he has never tried to give an account to himself. + +That he has a mind he cannot doubt, and he has some idea of the +difference between it and certain other minds; but even the most ardent +champion of the plain man must admit that he has the most hazy of +notions touching the nature of his mind. He seems to be more doubtful +concerning the nature of the mind and its knowledge than he is +concerning the nature of external things. Certainly he appears to be +more willing to admit his ignorance in this realm. + +And yet the man can hold his own in the world of real things. He can +distinguish between this thing and that, this place and that, this time +and that. He can think out a plan and carry it into execution; he can +guess at the contents of other minds and allow this knowledge to find +its place in his plan. + +All of which proves that our knowledge is not necessarily useless +because it is rather dim and vague. It is one thing to use a mental +state; it is another to have a clear comprehension of just what it is +and of what elements it may be made up. The plain man does much of his +thinking as we all tie our shoes and button our buttons. It would be +difficult for us to describe these operations, but we may perform them +very easily nevertheless. When we say that we _know_ how to tie our +shoes, we only mean that we can tie them. + +Now, enough has been said in the preceding sections to make clear that +the vagueness which characterizes many notions which constantly recur +in common thought is not wholly dispelled by the study of the several +sciences. The man of science, like the plain man, may be able to use +very well for certain purposes concepts which he is not able to analyze +satisfactorily. For example, he speaks of space and time, cause and +effect, substance and qualities, matter and mind, reality and +unreality. He certainly is in a position to add to our knowledge of +the things covered by these terms. But we should never overlook the +fact that the new knowledge which he gives us is a knowledge of the +same kind as that which we had before. He measures for us spaces and +times; he does not tell us what space and time are. He points out the +causes of a multitude of occurrences; he does not tell us what we mean +whenever we use the word "cause." He informs us what we should accept +as real and what we should repudiate as unreal; he does not try to show +us what it is to be real and what it is to be unreal. + +In other words, the man of science _extends_ our knowledge and makes it +more accurate; he does not _analyze_ certain fundamental conceptions, +which we all use, but of which we can usually give a very poor account. + +On the other hand, it is the task of _reflective thought_, not in the +first instance, to extend the limits of our knowledge of the world of +matter and of minds, but rather _to make us more clearly conscious of +what that knowledge really is_. Philosophical reflection takes up and +tries to analyze complex thoughts that men use daily without caring to +analyze them, indeed, without even realizing that they may be subjected +to analysis. + +It is to be expected that it should impress many of those who are +introduced to it for the first time as rather a fantastic creation of +problems that do not present themselves naturally to the healthy mind. +There is no thoughtful man who does not reflect sometimes and about +some things; but there are few who feel impelled to go over the whole +edifice of their knowledge and examine it with a critical eye from its +turrets to its foundations. In a sense, we may say that philosophical +thought is not natural, for he who is examining the assumptions upon +which all our ordinary thought about the world rests is no longer in +the world of the plain man. He is treating things as men do not +commonly treat them, and it is perhaps natural that it should appear to +some that, in the solvent which he uses, the real world in which we all +rejoice should seem to dissolve and disappear. + +I have said that it is not the task of reflective thought, _in the +first instance_, to extend the limits of our knowledge of the world of +matter and of minds. This is true. But this does not mean that, as a +result of a careful reflective analysis, some errors which may creep +into the thought both of the plain man and of the scientist may not be +exploded; nor does it mean that some new extensions of our knowledge +may not be suggested. + +In the chapters to follow I shall take up and examine some of the +problems of reflective thought. And I shall consider first those +problems that present themselves to those who try to subject to a +careful scrutiny our knowledge of the external world. It is well to +begin with this, for, even in our common experience, it seems to be +revealed that the knowledge of material things is a something less +vague and indefinite than the knowledge of minds. + + + + +II. PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE EXTERNAL WORLD + + +CHAPTER III + +IS THERE AN EXTERNAL WORLD? + +12. HOW THE PLAIN MAN THINKS HE KNOWS THE WORLD.--As schoolboys we +enjoyed Cicero's joke at the expense of the "minute philosophers." +They denied the immortality of the soul; he affirmed it; and he +congratulated himself upon the fact that, if they were right, they +would not survive to discover it and to triumph over him. + +At the close of the seventeenth century the philosopher John Locke was +guilty of a joke of somewhat the same kind. "I think," said he, +"nobody can, in earnest, be so skeptical as to be uncertain of the +existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that +can doubt so far (whatever he may have with his own thoughts) will +never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say +anything contrary to his own opinion." + +Now, in this chapter and in certain chapters to follow, I am going to +take up and turn over, so that we may get a good look at them, some of +the problems that have presented themselves to those who have reflected +upon the world and the mind as they seem given in our experience. I +shall begin by asking whether it is not possible to doubt that there is +an external world at all. + +The question cannot best be answered by a jest. It may, of course, be +absurd to maintain that there is no external world; but surely he, too, +is in an absurd position who maintains dogmatically that there is one, +and is yet quite unable to find any flaw in the reasonings of the man +who seems to be able to show that this belief has no solid foundation. +And we must not forget that the men who have thought it worth while to +raise just such questions as this, during the last twenty centuries, +have been among the most brilliant intellects of the race. We must not +assume too hastily that they have occupied themselves with mere +trivialities. + +Since, therefore, so many thoughtful men have found it worth while to +ask themselves seriously whether there is an external world, or, at +least, how we can know that there is an external world, it is not +unreasonable to expect that, by looking for it, we may find in our +common experience or in science some difficulty sufficient to suggest +the doubt which at first strikes the average man as preposterous. In +what can such a doubt take its rise? Let us see. + +I think it is scarcely too much to say that the plain man believes that +he _does not_ directly perceive an external world, and that he, at the +same time, believes that he _does_ directly perceive one. It is quite +possible to believe contradictory things, when one's thought of them is +somewhat vague, and when one does not consciously bring them together. + +As to the first-mentioned belief. Does not the plain man distinguish +between his ideas of things and the things themselves? Does he not +believe that his ideas come to him through the avenues of the senses? +Is he not aware of the fact that, when a sense is disordered, the thing +as he perceives it is not like the thing "as it is"? A blind man does +not see things when they are there; a color-blind man sees them as +others do not see them; a man suffering under certain abnormal +conditions of the nervous system sees things when they are not there at +all, _i.e._ he has hallucinations. The thing itself, as it seems, is +not in the man's mind; it is the idea that is in the man's mind, and +that represents the thing. Sometimes it appears to give a true account +of it; sometimes it seems to give a garbled account; sometimes it is a +false representative throughout--there is no reality behind it. It is, +then, the _idea_ that is immediately known, and not the _thing_; the +thing is merely _inferred_ to exist. + +I do not mean to say that the plain man is conscious of drawing this +conclusion. I only maintain that it seems a natural conclusion to draw +from the facts which he recognizes, and that sometimes he seems to draw +the conclusion half-consciously. + +On the other hand, we must all admit that when the plain man is not +thinking about the distinction between ideas and things, but is looking +at some material object before him, is touching it with his fingers and +turning it about to get a good look at it, it never occurs to him that +he is not directly conscious of the thing itself. + +He seems to himself to perceive the thing immediately; to perceive it +_as_ it is and _where_ it is; to perceive it as a really extended +thing, out there in space before his body. He does not think of +himself as occupied with mere images, representations of the object. +He may be willing to admit that his mind is in his head, but he cannot +think that what he sees is in his head. Is not the object _there_? +does he not _see_ and _feel_ it? Why doubt such evidence as this? He +who tells him that the external world does not exist seems to be +denying what is immediately given in his experience. + +The man who looks at things in this way assumes, of course, that the +external object is known directly, and is not a something merely +inferred to exist from the presence of a representative image. May one +embrace this belief and abandon the other one? If we elect to do this, +we appear to be in difficulties at once. All the considerations which +made us distinguish so carefully between our ideas of things and the +things themselves crowd in upon us. Can it be that we know things +independently of the avenues of the senses? Would a man with different +senses know things just as we do? How can any man suffer from an +hallucination, if things are not inferred from images, but are known +independently? + +The difficulties encountered appear sufficiently serious even if we +keep to that knowledge of things which seems to be given in common +experience. But even the plain man has heard of atoms and molecules; +and if he accepts the extension of knowledge offered him by the man of +science, he must admit that, whatever this apparently immediately +perceived external thing may be, it cannot be the external thing that +science assures him is out there in space beyond his body, and which +must be a very different sort of thing from the thing he seems to +perceive. The thing he perceives must, then, be _appearance_; and +where can that appearance be if not in his own mind? + +The man who has made no study of philosophy at all does not usually +think these things out; but surely there are interrogation marks +written up all over his experience, and he misses them only because he +does not see clearly. By judiciously asking questions one may often +lead him either to affirm or to deny that he has an immediate knowledge +of the external world, pretty much as one pleases. If he affirms it, +his position does not seem to be a wholly satisfactory one, as we have +seen; and if he denies it, he makes the existence of the external world +wholly a matter of inference from the presence of ideas in the mind, +and he must stand ready to justify this inference. + +To many men it has seemed that the inference is not an easy one to +justify. One may say: We could have no ideas of things, no sensations, +if real things did not exist and make an impression upon our senses. +But to this it may be answered: How is that statement to be proved? Is +it to be proved by observing that, when things are present and affect +the senses, there come into being ideas which represent the things? +Evidently such a proof as this is out of the question, for, if it is +true that we know external things only by inference and never +immediately, then we can never prove by observation that ideas and +things are thus connected. And if it is not to be proved by +observation, how shall it be proved? Shall we just assume it +dogmatically and pass on to something else? Surely there is enough in +the experience of the plain man to justify him in raising the question +whether he can certainly know that there is an external world. + +13. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE EXTERNAL WORLD.--We have seen just above +that the doubt regarding the existence of the world seems to have its +root in the familiar distinction between ideas and things, appearances +and the realities which they are supposed to represent. The +psychologist has much to say about ideas; and if sharpening and making +clear this distinction has anything to do with stirring up doubts, it +is natural to suppose that they should become more insistent when one +has exchanged the ignorance of everyday life for the knowledge of the +psychologist. + +Now, when the psychologist asks how a given mind comes to have a +knowledge of any external thing, he finds his answer in the messages +which have been brought to the mind by means of the bodily senses. He +describes the sense-organs and the nervous connections between these +and the brain, and tells us that when certain nervous impulses have +traveled, let us say, from the eye or the ear to the brain, one has +sensations of sight or sound. + +He describes for us in detail how, out of such sensations and the +memories of such sensations, we frame mental images of external things. +Between the mental image and the thing that it represents he +distinguishes sharply, and he informs us that the mind knows no more +about the external thing than is contained in such images. That a +thing is present can be known only by the fact that a message from the +thing is sent along the nerves, and what the thing is must be +determined from the character of the message. Given the image in the +absence of the thing,--that is to say, an hallucination,--the mind will +naturally suppose that the thing is present. This false supposition +cannot be corrected by a direct inspection of the thing, for such a +direct inspection of things is out of the question. The only way in +which the mind concerned can discover that the thing is absent is by +referring to its other experiences. This image is compared with other +images and is discovered to be in some way abnormal. We decide that it +is a false representative and has no corresponding reality behind it. + +This doctrine taken as it stands seems to cut the mind off from the +external world very completely; and the most curious thing about it is +that it seems to be built up on the assumption that it is not really +true. How can one know certainly that there is a world of material +things, including human bodies with their sense-organs and nerves, if +no mind has ever been able to inspect directly anything of the sort? +How can we tell that a sensation arises when a nervous impulse has been +carried along a sensory nerve and has reached the brain, if every mind +is shut up to the charmed circle of its own ideas? The anatomist and +the physiologist give us very detailed accounts of the sense-organs and +of the brain; the physiologist even undertakes to measure the speed +with which the impulse passes along a nerve; the psychologist accepts +and uses the results of their labors. But can all this be done in the +absence of any first-hand knowledge of the things of which one is +talking? Remember that, if the psychologist is right, any external +object, eye, ear, nerve, or brain, which we can perceive directly, is a +mental complex, a something in the mind and not external at all. How +shall we prove that there are objects, ears, eyes, nerves, and +brains,--in short, all the requisite mechanism for the calling into +existence of sensations,--in an outer world which is not immediately +perceived but is only inferred to exist? + +I do not wish to be regarded as impugning the right of the psychologist +to make the assumptions which he does, and to work as he does. He has +a right to assume, with the plain man, that there is an external world +and that we know it. But a very little reflection must make it +manifest that he seems, at least, to be guilty of an inconsistency, and +that he who wishes to think clearly should strive to see just where the +trouble lies. + +So much, at least, is evident: the man who is inclined to doubt whether +there is, after all, any real external world, appears to find in the +psychologist's distinction between ideas and things something like an +excuse for his doubt. To get to the bottom of the matter and to +dissipate his doubt one has to go rather deeply into metaphysics. I +merely wish to show just here that the doubt is not a gratuitous one, +but is really suggested to the thoughtful mind by a reflection upon our +experience of things. And, as we are all apt to think that the man of +science is less given to busying himself with useless subtleties than +is the philosopher, I shall, before closing this chapter, present some +paragraphs upon the subject from the pen of a professor of mathematics +and mechanics. + +14. THE "TELEPHONE EXCHANGE."--"We are accustomed to talk," writes +Professor Karl Pearson,[1] "of the 'external world,' of the 'reality' +outside us. We speak of individual objects having an existence +independent of our own. The store of past sense-impressions, our +thoughts and memories, although most probably they have beside their +psychical element a close correspondence with some physical change or +impress in the brain, are yet spoken of as _inside_ ourselves. On the +other hand, although if a sensory nerve be divided anywhere short of +the brain, we lose the corresponding class of sense impression, we yet +speak of many sense-impressions, such as form and texture, as existing +outside ourselves. How close then can we actually get to this supposed +world outside ourselves? Just as near but no nearer than the brain +terminals of the sensory nerves. We are like the clerk in the central +telephone exchange who cannot get nearer to his customers than his end +of the telephone wires. We are indeed worse off than the clerk, for to +carry out the analogy properly we must suppose him _never to have been +outside the telephone exchange, never to have seen a customer or any +one like a customer--in short, never, except through the telephone +wire, to have come in contact with the outside universe_. Of that +'real' universe outside himself he would be able to form no direct +impression; the real universe for him would be the aggregate of his +constructs from the messages which were caused by the telephone wires +in his office. About those messages and the ideas raised in his mind +by them he might reason and draw his inferences; and his conclusions +would be correct--for what? For the world of telephonic messages, for +the type of messages that go through the telephone. Something definite +and valuable he might know with regard to the spheres of action and of +thought of his telephonic subscribers, but outside those spheres he +could have no experience. Pent up in his office he could never have +seen or touched even a telephonic subscriber _in himself_. Very much +in the position of such a telephone clerk is the conscious _ego_ of +each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves. +Not a step nearer than those terminals can the _ego_ get to the 'outer +world,' and what in and for themselves are the subscribers to its nerve +exchange it has no means of ascertaining. Messages in the form of +sense-impressions come flowing in from that 'outside world,' and these +we analyze, classify, store up, and reason about. But of the nature of +'things-in-themselves,' of what may exist at the other end of our +system of telephone wires, we know nothing at all. + +"But the reader, perhaps, remarks, 'I not only see an object, but I can +_touch_ it. I can trace the nerve from the tip of my finger to the +brain. I am not like the telephone clerk, I can follow my network of +wires to their terminals and find what is at the other end of them.' +Can you, reader? Think for a moment whether your _ego_ has for one +moment got away from his brain exchange. The sense-impression that you +call touch was just as much as sight felt only at the brain end of a +sensory nerve. What has told you also of the nerve from the tip of +your finger to your brain? Why, sense-impressions also, messages +conveyed along optic or tactile sensory nerves. In truth, all you have +been doing is to employ one subscriber to your telephone exchange to +tell you about the wire that goes to a second, but you are just as far +as ever from tracing out for yourself the telephone wires to the +individual subscriber and ascertaining what his nature is in and for +himself. The immediate sense-impression is just as far removed from +what you term the 'outside world' as the store of impresses. If our +telephone clerk had recorded by aid of a phonograph certain of the +messages from the outside world on past occasions, then if any +telephonic message on its receipt set several phonographs repeating +past messages, we have an image analogous to what goes on in the brain. +Both telephone and phonograph are equally removed from what the clerk +might call the 'real outside world,' but they enable him through their +sounds to construct a universe; he projects those sounds, which are +really inside his office, outside his office, and speaks of them as the +external universe. This outside world is constructed by him from the +contents of the inside sounds, which differ as widely from +things-in-themselves as language, the symbol, must always differ from +the thing it symbolizes. For our telephone clerk sounds would be the +real world, and yet we can see how conditioned and limited it would be +by the range of his particular telephone subscribers and by the +contents of their messages. + +"So it is with our brain; the sounds from telephone and phonograph +correspond to immediate and stored sense-impressions. These +sense-impressions we project as it were outwards and term the real +world outside ourselves. But the things-in-themselves which the +sense-impressions symbolize, the 'reality,' as the metaphysicians wish +to call it, at the other end of the nerve, remains unknown and is +unknowable. Reality of the external world lies for science and for us +in combinations of form and color and touch--sense-impressions as +widely divergent from the thing 'at the other end of the nerve' as the +sound of the telephone from the subscriber at the other end of the +wire. We are cribbed and confined in this world of sense-impressions +like the exchange clerk in his world of sounds, and not a step beyond +can we get. As his world is conditioned and limited by his particular +network of wires, so ours is conditioned by our nervous system, by our +organs of sense. Their peculiarities determine what is the nature of +the outside world which we construct. It is the similarity in the +organs of sense and in the perceptive faculty of all normal human +beings which makes the outside world the same, or _practically_ the +same, for them all. To return to the old analogy, it is as if two +telephone exchanges had very nearly identical groups of subscribers. +In this case a wire between the two exchanges would soon convince the +imprisoned clerks that they had something in common and peculiar to +themselves. That conviction corresponds in our comparison to the +recognition of other consciousness." + +I suggest that this extract be read over carefully, not once but +several times, and that the reader try to make quite clear to himself +the position of the clerk in the telephone exchange, _i.e._ the +position of the mind in the body, as depicted by Professor Pearson, +before recourse is had to the criticisms of any one else. One cannot +find anywhere better material for critical philosophical reflection. + +As has been seen, our author accepts without question, the +psychological doctrine that the mind is shut up within the circle of +the messages that are conducted to it along the sensory nerves, and +that it cannot directly perceive anything truly external. He carries +his doctrine out to the bitter end in the conclusion that, since we +have never had experience of anything beyond sense-impressions, and +have no ground for an inference to anything beyond, we must recognize +that the only external world of which we know anything is an external +world built up out of sense-impressions. It is, thus, in the mind, and +is not external at all; it is only "projected outwards," _thought of_ +as though it were beyond us. Shall we leave the inconsistent position +of the plain man and of the psychologist and take our refuge in this +world of projected mental constructs? + +Before the reader makes up his mind to do this, I beg him to consider +the following:-- + +(1) If the only external world of which we have a right to speak at all +is a construct in the mind or _ego_, we may certainly affirm that the +world is in the _ego_, but does it sound sensible to say that the _ego_ +is somewhere in the world? + +(2) If all external things are really inside the mind, and are only +"projected" outwards, of course our own bodies, sense-organs, nerves, +and brains, are really inside and are merely projected outwards. Now, +do the sense-impressions of which everything is to be constructed "come +flowing in" along these nerves that are really inside? + +(3) Can we say, when a nerve lies entirely within the mind or _ego_, +that this same mind or _ego_ is nearer to one end of the nerve than it +is to the other? How shall we picture to ourselves "the conscious +_ego_ of each one of us seated at the brain terminals of the sensory +nerves"? How can the _ego_ place the whole of itself at the end of a +nerve which it has constructed within itself? And why is it more +difficult for it to get to one end of a nerve like this than it is to +get to the other? + +(4) Why should the thing "at the other end of the nerve" remain unknown +and unknowable? Since the nerve is entirely in the mind, is purely a +mental construct, can anything whatever be at the end of it without +being in the mind? And if the thing in question is not in the mind, +how are we going to prove that it is any nearer to one end of a nerve +which is inside the mind than it is to the other? If it may really be +said to be at the end of the nerve, why may we not know it quite as +well as we do the end of the nerve, or any other mental construct? + +It must be clear to the careful reader of Professor Pearson's +paragraphs, that he does not confine himself strictly to the world of +mere "projections," to an outer world which is really _inner_. If he +did this, the distinction between inner and outer would disappear. Let +us consider for a moment the imprisoned clerk. He is in a telephone +exchange, about him are wires and subscribers. He gets only sounds and +must build up his whole universe of things out of sounds. Now we are +supposing him to be in a telephone exchange, to be receiving messages, +to be building up a world out of these messages. Do we for a moment +think of him as building up, out of the messages which came along the +wires, those identical wires which carried the messages and the +subscribers which sent them? Never! we distinguish between the +exchange, with its wires and subscribers, and the messages received and +worked up into a world. In picturing to ourselves the telephone +exchange, we are doing what the plain man and the psychologist do when +they distinguish between mind and body,--they never suppose that the +messages which come through the senses are identical with the senses +through which they come. + +But suppose we maintain that there is no such thing as a telephone +exchange, with its wires and subscribers, which is not to be found +within some clerk. Suppose the real external world is something +_inner_ and only "projected" without, mistakenly supposed by the +unthinking to be without. Suppose it is nonsense to speak of a wire +which is not in the mind of a clerk. May we under such circumstances +describe any clerk as _in a telephone exchange_? as _receiving +messages_? as _no nearer_ to his subscribers than his end of the wire? +May we say that sense-impressions _come flowing in_ to him? The whole +figure of the telephone exchange becomes an absurdity when we have once +placed the exchange within the clerk. Nor can we think of two clerks +as connected by a wire, when it is affirmed that every wire must +"really" be in some clerk. + +The truth is, that, in the extracts which I have given above and in +many other passages in the same volume, the real external world, the +world which does not exist in the mind but _without_ it, is much +discredited, and is yet not actually discarded. The ego is placed at +the brain terminals of the sensory nerves, and it receives messages +which _flow in_; _i.e._ the clerk is actually placed in an exchange. +That the existence of the exchange is afterward denied in so many words +does not mean that it has not played and does not continue to play an +important part in the thought of the author. + +It is interesting to see how a man of science, whose reflections compel +him to deny the existence of the external world that we all seem to +perceive and that we somehow recognize as distinct from anything in our +minds, is _nevertheless compelled to admit the existence of this world +at every turn_. + +But if we do admit it, what shall we make of it? Shall we deny the +truth of what the psychologist has to tell us about a knowledge of +things only through the sensations to which they give rise? We cannot, +surely, do that. Shall we affirm that we know the external world +directly, and at the same time that we do not know it directly, but +only indirectly, and through the images which arise in our minds? That +seems inconsistent. Certainly there is material for reflection here. + +Nevertheless the more we reflect on that material, the more evident +does it become that the plain man cannot be wrong in believing in the +external world which seems revealed in his experiences. We find that +all attempts to discredit it rest upon the implicit assumption of its +existence, and fall to the ground when that existence is honestly +denied. So our problem changes its form. We no longer ask: Is there +an external world? but rather: _What_ is the external world, and how +does it differ from the world of mere ideas? + + +[1] "The Grammar of Science," 2d Ed., London, 1900, pp. 60-63. + + + + +CHAPTER IV + +SENSATIONS AND "THINGS" + +15. SENSE AND IMAGINATION.--Every one distinguishes between things +perceived and things only imagined. With open eyes I see the desk +before me; with eyes closed, I can imagine it. I lay my hand on it and +feel it; I can, without laying my hand on it, imagine that I feel it. +I raise my eyes, and see the pictures on the wall opposite me; I can +sit here and call before my mind the image of the door by which the +house is entered. + +What is the difference between sense and imagination? It must be a +difference of which we are all somehow conscious, for we unhesitatingly +distinguish between the things we perceive and the things we merely +imagine. + +It is well to remember at the outset that the two classes of +experiences are not wholly different. The blue color that I imagine +seems blue. It does not lose this quality because it is only +imaginary. The horse that I imagine seems to have four legs, like a +horse perceived. As I call it before my mind, it seems as large as the +real horse. Neither the color, nor the size, nor the distribution of +parts, nor any other attribute of the sort appears to be different in +the imaginary object from what it is in the object as given in +sensation. + +The two experiences are, nevertheless, not the same; and every one +knows that they are not the same. One difference that roughly marks +out the two classes of experiences from one another is that, as a rule, +our sense-experiences are more vivid than are the images that exist in +the imagination. + +I say, as a rule, for we cannot always remark this difference. +Sensations may be very clear and unmistakable, but they may also be +very faint and indefinite. When a man lays his hand firmly on my +shoulder, I may be in little doubt whether I feel a sensation or do +not; but when he touches my back very lightly, I may easily be in +doubt, and may ask myself in perplexity whether I have really been +touched or whether I have merely imagined it. As a vessel recedes and +becomes a mere speck upon the horizon, I may well wonder, before I feel +sure that it is really quite out of sight, whether I still see the dim +little point, or whether I merely imagine that I see it. + +On the other hand, things merely imagined may sometimes be very vivid +and insistent. To some persons, what exists in the imagination is dim +and indefinite in the extreme. Others imagine things vividly, and can +describe what is present only to the imagination almost as though it +were something seen. Finally, we know that an image may become so +vivid and insistent as to be mistaken for an external thing. That is +to say, there are such things as hallucinations. + +The criterion of vividness will not, therefore, always serve to +distinguish between what is given in the sense and what is only +imagined. And, indeed, it becomes evident, upon reflection, that we do +not actually make it our ultimate test. We may be quite willing to +admit that faint sensations may come to be confused with what is +imagined, with "ideas," but we always regard such a confusion as +somebody's error. We are not ready to admit that things perceived +faintly are things imagined, or that vivid "ideas" are things perceived +by sense. + +Let us come back to the illustrations with which we started. How do I +know that I perceive the desk before me; and how do I know that, +sitting here, I imagine, and do not see, the front door of the house? + +My criterion is this: when I have the experience I call "seeing my +desk," the bit of experience which presents itself as my desk is in a +certain setting. That is to say, the desk seen must be in a certain +relation to my body, and this body, as I know it, also consists of +experiences. Thus, if I am to know that I see the desk, I must realize +that my eyes are open, that the object is in front of me and not behind +me, etc. + +The desk as seen varies with the relation to the body in certain ways +that we regard as natural and explicable. When I am near it, the +visual experience is not just what it is when I recede from it. But +how can I know that I am near the desk or far from it? What do these +expressions mean? Their full meaning will become clearer in the next +chapter, but here I may say that nearness and remoteness must be +measured for me in experiences of some sort, or I would never know +anything as near to or far from my body. + +Thus, all our sensory experiences are experiences that fall into a +certain system or order. It is a system which we all recognize +implicitly, for we all reject as merely imaginary those experiences +which lack this setting. If my eyes are shut--I am speaking now of the +eyes as experienced, as felt or perceived, as given in sensation--I +never say; "I see my desk," no matter how vivid the image of the +object. Those who believe in "second sight" sometimes talk of seeing +things not in this setting, but the very name they give to the supposed +experience indicates that there is something abnormal about it. No one +thinks it remarkable that I see the desk before which I perceive myself +to be sitting with open eyes. Every one would think it strange if I +could see and describe the table in the next room, now shut away from +me. When a man thinks he hears his name pronounced, and, turning his +head, seeks in vain for the speaker, he sets his experience down as a +hallucination. He says, I did not really hear that; I merely imagined +it. + +May one not, with open eyes, have a hallucination of vision, just as +one may seem to hear one's name pronounced when no one is by? +Certainly. But in each case the experience may be proved to be a +hallucination, nevertheless. It may be recognized that the sensory +setting is incomplete, though it may not, at first, seem so. Thus the +unreal object which seems to be seen may be found to be a thing that +cannot be touched. Or, when one has attained to a relatively complete +knowledge of the system of experiences recognized as sensory, one may +make use of roundabout methods of ascertaining that the experience in +question does not really have the right setting. Thus, the ghost which +is seen by the terrified peasant at midnight, but which cannot be +photographed, we may unhesitatingly set down as something imagined and +not really seen. + +All our sensations are, therefore, experiences which take their place +in a certain setting. This is our ultimate criterion. We need not +take the word of the philosopher for it. We need only reflect, and ask +ourselves how we know that, in a given case, we are seeing or hearing +or touching something, and are not merely imagining it. In every case, +we shall find that we come back to the same test. In common life, we +apply the test instinctively, and with little realization of what we +are doing. + +And if we turn to the psychologist, whose business it is to be more +exact and scientific, we find that he gives us only a refinement of +this same criterion. It is important to him to distinguish between +what is given in sensation and what is furnished by memory or +imagination, and he tells us that sensation is the result of a message +conducted along a sensory nerve to the brain. + +Here we see emphasized the relation to the body which has been +mentioned above. If we ask the psychologist how he knows that the body +he is talking about is a real body, and not merely an imagined one, he +has to fall back upon the test which is common to us all. A real hand +is one which we see with the eyes open, and which we touch with the +other hand. If our experiences of our own body had not the setting +which marks all sensory experiences, we could never say: I _perceive_ +that my body is near the desk. When we call our body real, as +contrasted with things imaginary, we recognize that this group of +experiences belongs to the class described; it is given in sensation, +and is not merely thought of. + +It will be observed that, in distinguishing between sensations and +things imaginary, we never go beyond the circle of our experiences. We +do not reach out to a something _beyond_ or _behind_ experiences, and +say: When such a reality is present, we may affirm that we have a +sensation, and when it is not, we may call the experience imaginary. +If there were such a reality as this, it would do us little good, for +since it is not supposed to be perceived directly, we should have to +depend upon the sensations to prove the presence of the reality, and +could not turn to the reality and ask it whether we were or were not +experiencing a sensation. The distinction between sensations and what +is imaginary is an _observed_ distinction. It can be _proved_ that +some experiences are sensory and that some are not. This means that, +in drawing the distinction, we remain within the circle of our +experiences. + +There has been much unnecessary mystification touching this supposed +reality behind experiences. In the next chapter we shall see in what +senses the word "reality" may properly be used, and in what sense it +may not. There is a danger in using it loosely and vaguely. + +16. MAY WE CALL "THINGS" GROUPS OF SENSATIONS?--Now, the external world +seems to the plain man to be directly given in his sense experiences. +He is willing to admit that the table in the next room, of which he is +merely thinking, is known at one remove, so to speak. But this desk +here before him: is it not known directly? Not the mental image, the +mere representative, but the desk itself, a something that is physical +and not mental? + +And the psychologist, whatever his theory of the relation between the +mind and the world, seems to support him, at least, in so far as to +maintain that in sensation the external world is known as directly as +it is possible for the external world to be known, and that one can get +no more of it than is presented in sensation. If a sense is lacking, +an aspect of the world as given is also lacking; if a sense is +defective, as in the color-blind, the defect is reflected in the world +upon which one gazes. + +Such considerations, especially when taken together with what has been +said at the close of the last section about the futility of looking for +a reality behind our sensations, may easily suggest rather a startling +possibility. May it not be, if we really are shut up to the circle of +our experiences, that the physical things, which we have been +accustomed to look upon as non-mental, are nothing more than complexes +of sensations? Granted that there seems to be presented in our +experience a material world as well as a mind, may it not be that this +material world is a mental thing of a certain kind--a mental thing +contrasted with other mental things, such as imaginary things? + +This question has always been answered in the affirmative by the +idealists, who claim that all existence must be regarded as psychical +existence. Their doctrine we shall consider later (sections 49 and +53). It will be noticed that we seem to be back again with Professor +Pearson in the last chapter. + +To this question I make the following answer: In the first place, I +remark that even the plain man distinguishes somehow between his +sensations and external things. He thinks that he has reason to +believe that things do not cease to exist when he no longer has +sensations. Moreover, he believes that things do not always appear to +his senses as they really are. If we tell him that his sensations +_are_ the things, it shocks his common sense. He answers: Do you mean +to tell me that complexes of sensation can be on a shelf or in a +drawer? can be cut with a knife or broken with the hands? He feels +that there must be some real distinction between sensations and the +things without him. + +Now, the notions of the plain man on such matters as these are not very +clear, and what he says about sensations and things is not always +edifying. But it is clear that he feels strongly that the man who +would identify them is obliterating a distinction to which his +experience testifies unequivocally. We must not hastily disregard his +protest. He is sometimes right in his feeling that things are not +identical, even when he cannot prove it. + +In the second place, I remark that, in this instance, the plain man is +in the right, and can be shown to be in the right. "Things" are not +groups of sensations. The distinction between them will be explained +in the next section. + +17. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SENSATIONS AND "THINGS"--Suppose that I +stand in my study and look at the fire in the grate. I am experiencing +sensations, and am not busied merely with an imaginary fire. But may +my whole experience of the fire be summed up as an experience of +sensations and their changes? Let us see. + +If I shut my eyes, the fire disappears. Does any one suppose that the +fire has been annihilated? No. We say, I no longer see it, but +nothing has happened to the fire. + +Again, I may keep my eyes open, and simply turn my head. The fire +disappears once more. Does any one suppose that my turning my head has +done anything to the fire? We say unhesitatingly, my sensations have +changed, but the fire has remained as it was. + +Still, again, I may withdraw from the fire. Its heat seems to be +diminished. Has the fire really grown less hot? And if I could +withdraw to a sufficient distance, I know that the fire would appear to +me smaller and less bright. Could I get far enough away to make it +seem the faintest speck in the field of vision, would I be tempted to +claim that the fire shrunk and grew faint merely because I walked away +from it? Surely not. + +Now, suppose that I stand on the same spot and look at the fire without +turning my head. The stick at which I am gazing catches the flame, +blazes up, turns red, and finally falls together, a little mass of gray +ashes. Shall I describe this by saying that my sensations have +changed, or may I say that the fire itself has changed? The plain man +and the philosopher alike use the latter expression in such a case as +this. + +Let us take another illustration. I walk towards the distant house on +the plain before me. What I see as my goal seems to grow larger and +brighter. It does not occur to me to maintain that the house changes +as I advance. But, at a given instant, changes of a different sort +make their appearance. Smoke arises, and flames burst from the roof. +Now I have no hesitation in saying that changes are taking place in the +house. It would seem foolish to describe the occurrence as a mere +change in my sensations. Before it was my sensations that changed; now +it is the house itself. + +We are drawing this distinction between changes in our sensations and +changes in things at every hour in the day. I cannot move without +making things appear and disappear. If I wag my head, the furniture +seems to dance, and I regard it as a mere seeming. I count on the +clock's going when I no longer look upon its face. It would be absurd +to hold that the distinction is a mere blunder, and has no foundation +in our experience. The role it plays is too important for that. If we +obliterate it, the real world of material things which seems to be +revealed in our experience melts into a chaos of fantastic experiences +whose appearances and disappearances seem to be subject to no law. + +And it is worthy of remark that it is not merely in common life that +the distinction is drawn. Every man of science must give heed to it. +The psychologist does, it is true, pay much attention to sensations; +but even he distinguishes between the sensations which he is studying +and the material things to which he relates them, such as brains and +sense-organs. And those who cultivate the physical sciences strive, +when they give an account of things and their behavior, to lay before +us a history of changes analogous to the burning of the stick and of +the house, excluding mere changes in sensations. + +There is no physicist or botanist or zooelogist who has not our common +experience that things as perceived by us--our experiences of +things--appear or disappear or change their character when we open or +shut our eyes or move about. But nothing of all this appears in their +books. What they are concerned with is things and their changes, and +they do not consider such matters as these as falling within their +province. If a botanist could not distinguish between the changes +which take place in a plant, and the changes which take place in his +sensations as he is occupied in studying the plant, but should tell us +that the plant grows smaller as one recedes from it, we should set him +down as weak-minded. + +That the distinction is everywhere drawn, and that we must not +obliterate it, is very evident. But we are in the presence of what has +seemed to many men a grave difficulty. Are not things presented in our +experience only as we have sensations? what is it to perceive a thing? +is it not to have sensations? how, then, _can_ we distinguish between +sensations and things? We certainly do so all the time, in spite of +the protest of the philosopher; but many of us do so with a haunting +sense that our behavior can scarcely be justified by the reason. + +Our difficulty, however, springs out of an error of our own. Grasping +imperfectly the full significance of the word "sensation," we extend +its use beyond what is legitimate, and we call by that name experiences +which are not sensations at all. Thus the external world comes to seem +to us to be not really a something contrasted with the mental, but a +part of the mental world. We accord to it the attributes of the +latter, and rob it of those distinguishing attributes which belong to +it by right. When we have done this, we may feel impelled to say, as +did Professor Pearson, that things are not really "outside" of us, as +they seem to be, but are merely "projected" outside--thought of as if +they were "outside." All this I must explain at length. + +Let us come back to the first of the illustrations given above, the +case of the fire in my study. As I stand and look at it, what shall I +call the red glow which I observe? Shall I call it a _quality of a +thing_, or shall I call it a _sensation_? + +To this I answer: _I may call it either the one or the other, according +to its setting among other experiences_. + +We have seen (section 15) that sensations and things merely imaginary +are distinguished from one another by their setting. With open eyes we +see things; with our eyes closed we can imagine them: we see what is +before us; we imagine what lies behind our backs. If we confine our +attention to the bit of experience itself, we have no means of +determining whether it is sensory or imaginary. Only its setting can +decide that point. Here, we have come to another distinction of much +the same sort. That red glow, that bit of experience, taken by itself +and abstracted from all other experiences, cannot be called either a +sensation or the quality of a thing. Only its context can give us the +right to call it the one or the other. + +This ought to become clear when we reflect upon the illustration of the +fire. We have seen that one whole series of changes has been +unhesitatingly described as a series of changes in my sensations. Why +was this? Because it was observed to depend upon changes in the +relations of my body, my senses (a certain group of experiences), to +the bit of experience I call the fire. Another series was described as +a series of changes in the fire. Why? Because, the relation to my +senses remaining unchanged, changes still took place, and had to be +accounted for in other ways. + +It is a matter of common knowledge that they can be accounted for in +other ways. This is not a discovery of the philosopher. He can only +invite us to think over the matter and see what the unlearned and the +learned are doing at every moment. Sometimes they are noticing that +experiences change as they turn their heads or walk toward or away from +objects; sometimes they abstract from this, and consider the series of +changes that take place independently of this. + +That bit of experience, that red glow, is not related only to my body. +Such experiences are related also to each other; they stand in a vast +independent system of relations, which, as we have seen, the man of +science can study without troubling himself to consider sensations at +all. This system is the external world--the external world as known or +as knowable, the only external world that it means anything for us to +talk about. As having its place in this system, a bit of experience is +not a sensation, but is a quality or aspect of a thing. + +Sensations, then, to be sensations, must be bits of experience +considered in their relation to some organ of sense. They should never +be confused with qualities of things, which are experiences in a +different setting. It is as unpardonable to confound the two as it is +to confound sensations with things imaginary. + +We may not, therefore, say that "things" are groups of sensations. We +may, if we please, describe them as complexes of qualities. And we may +not say that the "things" we perceive are really "inside" of us and are +merely "projected outside." + +What can "inside" and "outside" mean? Only this. We recognize in our +experience two distinct orders, the _objective order_, the system of +phenomena which constitutes the material world, and the _subjective +order_, the order of things mental, to which belong sensations and +"ideas." That is "outside" which belongs to the objective order. The +word has no other meaning when used in this connection. That is +"inside" which belongs to the subjective order, and is contrasted with +the former. + +If we deny that there is an objective order, an external world, and say +that everything is "inside," we lose our distinction, and even the word +"inside" becomes meaningless. It indicates no contrast. When men fall +into the error of talking in this way, what they do is to _keep_ the +external world and gain the distinction, and at the same time to _deny_ +the existence of the world which has furnished it. In other words, +they put the clerk into a telephone exchange, and then tell us that the +exchange does not really exist. He is inside--of what? He is inside +of nothing. Then, can he really be inside? + +We see, thus, that the plain man and the man of science are quite right +in accepting the external world. The objective order is known as +directly as is the subjective order. Both are orders of experiences; +they are open to observation, and we have, in general, little +difficulty in distinguishing between them, as the illustrations given +above amply prove. + +18. THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL THINGS.--One difficulty seems to remain +and to call for a solution. We all believe that material things exist +when we no longer perceive them. We believe that they existed before +they came within the field of our observation. + +In these positions the man of science supports us. The astronomer has +no hesitation in saying that the comet, which has sailed away through +space, exists, and will return. The geologist describes for us the +world as it was in past ages, when no eye was opened upon it. + +But has it not been stated above that the material world is an order of +_experiences_? and can there be such a thing as an experience that is +not _experienced_ by somebody? In other words, can the world exist, +except as it is _perceived to exist_? + +This seeming difficulty has occasioned much trouble to philosophers in +the past. Bishop Berkeley (1684-1753) said, "To exist is to be +perceived." There are those who agree with him at the present day. + +Their difficulty would have disappeared had they examined with +sufficient care the meaning of the word "exist." We have no right to +pass over the actual uses of such words, and to give them a meaning of +our own. If one thing seems as certain as any other, it is that +material things exist when we do not perceive them. On what ground may +the philosopher combat the universal opinion, the dictum of common +sense and of science? When we look into his reasonings, we find that +he is influenced by the error discussed at length in the last +section--he has confused the phenomena of the two orders of experience. + +I have said that, when we concern ourselves with the objective order, +we abstract or should abstract, from the relations which things bear to +our senses. We account for phenomena by referring to other phenomena +which we have reason to accept as their physical conditions or causes. +We do not consider that a physical cause is effective only while we +perceive it. When we come back to this notion of our perceiving a +thing or not perceiving it, we have left the objective order and passed +over to the subjective. We have left the consideration of "things" and +have turned to sensations. + +There is no reason why we should do this. The physical order is an +independent order, as we have seen. The man of science, when he is +endeavoring to discover whether some thing or quality of a thing really +existed at some time in the past, is not in the least concerned to +establish the fact that some one saw it. No one ever saw the primitive +fire-mist from which, as we are told, the world came into being. But +the scientist cares little for that. He is concerned only to prove +that the phenomena he is investigating really have a place in the +objective order. If he decides that they have, he is satisfied; he has +proved something to exist. _To belong to the objective order is to +exist as a physical thing or quality_. + +When the plain man and the man of science maintain that a physical +thing exists, they use the word in precisely the same sense. The +meaning they give to it is the proper meaning of the word. It is +justified by immemorial usage, and it marks a real distinction. Shall +we allow the philosopher to tell us that we must not use it in this +sense, but must say that only sensations and ideas exist? Surely not. +This would mean that we permit him to obliterate for us the distinction +between the external world and what is mental. + +But is it right to use the word "experience" to indicate the phenomena +which have a place in the objective order? Can an experience be +anything but mental? + +There can be no doubt that the suggestions of the word are +unfortunate--it has what we may call a subjective flavor. It suggests +that, after all, the things we perceive are sensations or percepts, and +must, to exist at all, exist in a mind. As we have seen, this is an +error, and an error which we all avoid in actual practice. We do not +take sensations for things, and we recognize clearly enough that it is +one thing for a material object to exist and another for it to be +perceived. + +Why, then, use the word "experience"? Simply because we have no better +word. We must use it, and not be misled by the associations which +cling to it. The word has this great advantage: it brings out clearly +the fact that all our knowledge of the external world rests ultimately +upon those phenomena which, when we consider them in relation to our +senses, we recognize as sensations. We cannot start out from mere +imaginings to discover what the world was like in the ages past. + +It is this truth that is recognized by the plain man, when he maintains +that, in the last resort, we can know things only in so far as we see, +touch, hear, taste, and smell them; and by the psychologist, when he +tells us that, in sensation, the external world is revealed as directly +as it is possible that it could be revealed. But it is a travesty on +this truth to say that we do not know things, but know only our +sensations of sight, touch, taste, hearing, and the like.[1] + + +[1] See the note on this chapter at the close of the volume. + + + + +CHAPTER V + +APPEARANCES AND REALITIES + +19. THINGS AND THEIR APPEARANCES.--We have seen in the last chapter +that there is an external world and that it is given in our experience. +There is an objective order, and we are all capable of distinguishing +between it and the subjective. He who says that we perceive only +sensations and ideas flies in the face of the common experience of +mankind. + +But we are not yet through with the subject. We all make a distinction +between things as they _appear_ and things as they _really are_. + +If we ask the plain man, What is the real external world? the first +answer that seems to present itself to his mind is this: Whatever we +can see, hear, touch, taste, or smell may be regarded as belonging to +the real world. What we merely imagine does not belong to it. + +That this answer is not a very satisfactory one occurred to men's minds +very early in the history of reflective thought. The ancient skeptic +said to himself: The colors of objects vary according to the light, and +according to the position and distance of the objects; can we say that +any object has a real color of its own? A staff stuck into water looks +bent, but feels straight to the touch; why believe the testimony of one +sense rather than that of another? + +Such questionings led to far-reaching consequences. They resulted in a +forlorn distrust of the testimony of the senses, and to a doubt as to +our ability to know anything as it really is. + +Now, the distinction between appearances and realities exists for us as +well as for the ancient skeptic, and without being tempted to make such +extravagant statements as that there is no such thing as truth, and +that every appearance is as real as any other, we may admit that it is +not very easy to see the full significance of the distinction, although +we are referring to it constantly. + +For example, we look from our window and see, as we say, a tree at a +distance. What we are conscious of is a small bluish patch of color. +Now, a small bluish patch of color is not, strictly speaking, a tree; +but for us it represents the tree. Suppose that we walk toward the +tree. Do we continue to see what we saw before? Of course, we say +that we continue to see the same tree; but it is plain that what we +immediately perceive, what is given in consciousness, does not remain +the same as we move. Our blue patch of color grows larger and larger; +it ceases to be blue and faint; at the last it has been replaced by an +expanse of vivid green, and we see the tree just before us. + +During our whole walk we have been seeing the tree. This appears to +mean that we have been having a whole series of visual experiences, no +two of which were just alike, and each of which was taken as a +representative of the tree. Which of these representatives is most +like the tree? Is the tree _really_ a faint blue, or is it _really_ a +vivid green? Or is it of some intermediate color? + +Probably most persons will be inclined to maintain that the tree only +seems blue at a distance, but that it really is green, as it appears +when one is close to it. In a sense, the statement is just; yet some +of those who make it would be puzzled to tell by what right they pick +out of the whole series of experiences, each of which represents the +tree as seen from some particular position, one individual experience, +which they claim not only represents the tree as seen from a given +point but also represents it as it is. Does this particular experience +bear some peculiar earmark which tells us that it is like the real tree +while the others are unlike it? + +20. REAL THINGS.--And what is this _real tree_ that we are supposed to +see as it is when we are close to it? + +About two hundred years ago the philosopher Berkeley pointed out that +the distinction commonly made between things as they look, the +apparent, and things as they are, the real, is at bottom the +distinction between things as presented to the sense of sight and +things as presented to the sense of touch. The acute analysis which he +made has held its own ever since. + +We have seen that, in walking towards the tree, we have a long series +of visual experiences, each of which differs more or less from all of +the others. Nevertheless, from the beginning of our progress to the +end, we say that we are looking at the same tree. The images change +color and grow larger. We do not say that the tree changes color and +grows larger. Why do we speak as we do? It is because, all along the +line, we mean by the real tree, not what is given to the sense of +sight, but something for which this stands as a sign. This something +must be given in our experience somewhere, we must be able to perceive +it under some circumstances or other, or it would never occur to us to +recognize the visual experiences as _signs_, and we should never say +that in being conscious of them in succession we are looking at the +same tree. They are certainly not the same with each other; how can we +know that they all stand for the same thing, unless we have had +experience of a connection of the whole series with one thing? + +This thing for which so many different visual experiences may serve as +signs is the thing revealed in experiences of touch. When we ask: In +what direction is the tree? How far away is the tree? How big is the +tree? we are always referring to the tree revealed in touch. It is +nonsense to say that _what we see_ is far away, if by what we see we +mean the visual experience itself. As soon as we move we lose that +visual experience and get another, and to recover the one we lost we +must go back where we were before. When we say we see a tree at a +distance, we must mean, then, that we know from certain visual +experiences which we have that by moving a certain distance we will be +able to touch a tree. And what does it mean to move a certain +distance? In the last analysis it means to us to have a certain +quantity of movement sensations. + +Thus the real world of things, for which experiences of sight serve as +signs, is a world revealed in experiences of touch and movement, and +when we speak of real positions, distances, and magnitudes, we are +always referring to this world. But this is a world revealed in our +experience, and it does not seem a hopeless task to discover what may +properly be called real and what should be described as merely +apparent, when both the real and the apparent are open to our +inspection. + +Can we not find in this analysis a satisfactory explanation of the +plain man's claim that under certain circumstances he sees the tree as +it is and under others he does not? What he is really asserting is +that one visual experience gives him better information regarding the +real thing, the touch thing, than does another. + +But what shall we say of his claim that the tree is really green, and +only looks blue under certain circumstances? Is it not just as true +that the tree only looks green under certain circumstances? Is color +any part of the touch thing? Is it ever more than a sign of the touch +thing? How can one color be more real than another? + +Now, we may hold to Berkeley's analysis and maintain that, in general, +the real world, as contrasted with the apparent, means to us the world +that is revealed in experiences of touch and movement; and yet we may +admit that the word "real" is sometimes used in rather different senses. + +It does not seem absurd for a woman to Say: This piece of silk really +is yellow; it only looks white under this light. We all admit that a +white house may look pink under the rays of the setting sun, and we +never call it a pink house. We have seen that it is not unnatural to +say: That tree is really green; it is only its distance that makes it +look blue. + +When one reflects upon these uses of the word "real," one recognizes +the fact that, among all the experiences in which things are revealed +to us, certain experiences impress us as being more prominent or +important or serviceable than certain others, and they come to be +called _real_. Things are not commonly seen by artificial light; the +sun is not always setting; the tree looks green when it is seen most +satisfactorily. In each case, the real color of the thing is the color +that it has under circumstances that strike us as normal or as +important. We cannot say that we always regard as most real that +aspect under which we most commonly perceive things, for if a more +unusual experience is more serviceable and really gives us more +information about the thing, we give the preference to that. Thus we +look with the naked eye at a moving speck on the table before us, and +we are unable to distinguish its parts. We place a microscope over the +speck and perceive an insect with all its members. The second +experience is the more unusual one, but would not every one say: Now we +perceive the thing _as it is_? + +21. ULTIMATE REAL THINGS.--Let us turn away from the senses of the word +"real," which recognize one color or taste or odor as more real than +another, and come back to the real world of things presented in +sensations of touch. All other classes of sensations may be regarded +as related to this as the series of visual experiences above mentioned +was related to the one tree which was spoken of as revealed in them +all, the touch tree of which they gave information. + +Can we say that this world is always to be regarded as reality and +never as appearance? We have already seen (section 8) that science +does not regard as anything more than appearance the real things which +seem to be directly presented in our experience. + +This pen that I hold in my hand seems, as I pass my fingers over it, to +be continuously extended. It does not appear to present an alternation +of filled spaces and empty spaces. I am told that it is composed of +molecules in rapid motion and at considerable distances from one +another. I am further told that each molecule is composed of atoms, +and is, in its turn, not a continuous thing, but, so to speak, a group +of little things. + +If I accept this doctrine, as it seems I must, am I not forced to +conclude that the reality which is given in my experience, the reality +with which I have contrasted appearances and to which I have referred +them, is, after all, itself only an appearance? The touch things which +I have hitherto regarded as the real things that make up the external +world, the touch things for which all my visual experiences have served +as signs, are, then, not themselves real external things, but only the +appearances under which real external things, themselves imperceptible, +manifest themselves to me. + +It seems, then, that I do not directly perceive any real thing, or, at +least, anything that can be regarded as more than an appearance. What, +then, is the external world? What are things really like? Can we give +any true account of them, or are we forced to say with the skeptics +that we only know how things seem to us, and must abandon the attempt +to tell what they are really like? + +Now, before one sets out to answer a question it is well to find out +whether it is a sensible question to ask and a sensible question to try +to answer. He who asks: Where is the middle of an infinite line? When +did all time begin? Where is space as a whole? does not deserve a +serious answer to his questions. And it is well to remember that he +who asks: What is the external world like? must keep his question a +significant one, if he is to retain his right to look for an answer at +all. He has manifestly no right to ask us: How does the external world +look when no one is looking? How do things feel when no one feels +them? How shall I think of things, not as I think of them, but as they +are? + +If we are to give an account of the external world at all, it must +evidently be _an account_ of the external world; _i.e._ it must be +given in terms of our experience of things. The only legitimate +problem is to give a true account instead of a false one, to +distinguish between what only appears and is not real and what both +appears and is real. + +Bearing this in mind, let us come back to the plain man's experience of +the world. He certainly seems to himself to perceive a real world of +things, and he constantly distinguishes, in a way very serviceable to +himself, between the merely apparent and the real. There is, of +course, a sense in which every experience is real; it is, at least, an +experience; but when he contrasts real and apparent he means something +more than this. Experiences are not relegated to this class or to that +merely at random, but the final decision is the outcome of a long +experience of the differences which characterize different individual +experiences and is an expression of the relations which are observed to +hold between them. Certain experiences are accepted as signs, and +certain others come to take the more dignified position of thing +signified; the mind rests in them and regards them as the real. + +We have seen above that the world of real things in which the plain man +finds himself is a world of objects revealed in experiences of touch. +When he asks regarding anything: How far away is it? How big is it? +In what direction is it? it is always the touch thing that interests +him. What is given to the other senses is only a sign of this. + +We have also seen (section 8) that the world of atoms and molecules of +which the man of science tells us is nothing more than a further +development of the world of the plain man. The real things with which +science concerns itself are, after all, only minute touch things, +conceived just as are the things with which the plain man is familiar. +They exist in space and move about in space, as the things about us are +perceived to exist in space and move about in space. They have size +and position, and are separated by distances. We do not _perceive_ +them, it is true; but we _conceive_ them after the analogy of the +things that we do perceive, and it is not inconceivable that, if our +senses were vastly more acute, we might perceive them directly. + +Now, when we conclude that the things directly perceptible to the sense +of touch are to be regarded as appearances, as signs of the presence of +these minuter things, do we draw such a conclusion arbitrarily? By no +means. The distinction between appearance and reality is drawn here +just as it is drawn in the world of our common everyday experiences. +The great majority of the touch things about us we are not actually +touching at any given moment. We only _see_ the things, _i.e._ we have +certain _signs_ of their presence. None the less we believe that the +things exist all the time. And in the same way the man of science does +not doubt the existence of the real things of which he speaks; he +perceives their _signs_. That certain experiences are to be taken as +signs of such realities he has established by innumerable observations +and careful deductions from those observations. To see the full force +of his reasonings one must read some work setting forth the history of +the atomic theory. + +If, then, we ask the question: What is the real external world? it is +clear that we cannot answer it satisfactorily without taking into +consideration the somewhat shifting senses of the word "real." What is +the real external world to the plain man? It is the world of touch +things, of objects upon which he can lay his hands. What is the real +external world to the man of science? It is the world of atoms and +molecules, of minuter touch things that he cannot actually touch, but +which he conceives as though he could touch them. + +It should be observed that the man of science has no right to deny the +real world which is revealed in the experience of the plain man. In +all his dealings with the things which interest him in common life, he +refers to this world just as the plain man does. He sees a tree and +walks towards it, and distinguishes between its real and its apparent +color, its real and its apparent size. He talks about seeing things as +they are, or not seeing things as they are. These distinctions in his +experience of things remain even after he has come to believe in atoms +and molecules. + +Thus, the touch object, the tree as he feels it under his hand, may +come to be regarded as the sign of the presence of those entities that +science seems, at present, to regard as ultimate. Does this prevent it +from being the object which has stood as the interpreter of all those +diverse visual sensations that we have called different views of the +tree? They are still the appearances, and it, relatively to them, is +the reality. Now we find that it, in its turn, can be used as a sign +of something else, can be regarded as an appearance of a reality more +ultimate. It is clear, then, that the same thing may be regarded both +as appearance and as reality--appearance as contrasted with one thing, +and reality as contrasted with another. + +But suppose one says: _I do not want to know what the real external +world is to this man or to that man; I want to know what the real +external world is_. What shall we say to such a demand? + +There is a sense in which such a demand is not purely meaningless, +though it may not be a very sensible demand to make. We have seen that +an increase of knowledge about things compels a man to pass from the +real things of common life to the real things of science, and to look +upon the former as appearance. Now, a man may arbitrarily decide that +he will use the word "reality" to indicate only that which can never in +its turn be regarded as appearance, a reality which must remain an +ultimate reality; and he may insist upon our telling him about that. +How a man not a soothsayer can tell when he has come to ultimate +reality, it is not easy to see. + +Suppose, however, that we could give any one such information. We +should then be telling him about things _as they are_, it is true, but +his knowledge of things would not be different in _kind_ from what it +was before. The only difference between such a knowledge of things and +a knowledge of things not known to be ultimate would be that, in the +former case, it would be recognized that no further extension of +knowledge was possible. The distinction between appearance and reality +would remain just what it was in the experience of the plain man. + +22. THE BUGBEAR OF THE "UNKNOWABLE."--It is very important to recognize +that we must not go on talking about appearance and reality, as if our +words really meant something, when we have quite turned our backs upon +our experience of appearances and the realities which they represent. + +That appearances and realities are connected we know very well, for we +perceive them to be connected. What we see, we can touch. And we not +only know that appearances and realities are connected, but we know +with much detail what appearances are to be taken as signs of what +realities. The visual experience which I call the house as seen from a +distance I never think of taking for a representative of the hat which +I hold in my hand. This visual experience I refer to its own +appropriate touch thing, and not to another. If what _looks like_ a +beefsteak could _really be_ a fork or a mountain or a kitten +indifferently,--but I must not even finish the sentence, for the words +"look like" and "could really be" lose all significance when we loosen +the bond between appearances and the realities to which they are +properly referred. + +Each appearance, then, must be referred to some particular real thing +and not to any other. This is true of the appearances which we +recognize as such in common life, and it is equally true of the +appearances recognized as such in science. The pen which I feel +between my fingers I may regard as appearance and refer to a swarm of +moving atoms. But it would be silly for me to refer it to atoms "in +general." The reality to which I refer the appearance in question is a +particular group of atoms existing at a particular point in space. The +chemist never supposes that the atoms within the walls of his test-tube +are identical with those in the vial on the shelf. Neither in common +life nor in science would the distinction between appearances and real +things be of the smallest service were it not possible to distinguish +between this appearance and that, and this reality and that, and to +refer each appearance to its appropriate reality. Indeed, it is +inconceivable that, under such circumstances, the distinction should +have been drawn at all. + +These points ought to be strongly insisted upon, for we find certain +philosophic writers falling constantly into a very curious abuse of the +distinction and making much capital of it. It is argued that what we +see, what we touch, what we conceive as a result of scientific +observation and reflection--all is, in the last analysis, material +which is given us in sensation. The various senses furnish us with +different classes of sensations; we work these up into certain +complexes. But sensations are only the impressions which something +outside of us makes upon us. Hence, although we seem to ourselves to +know the external world as it is, our knowledge can never extend beyond +the impressions made upon us. Thus, we are absolutely shut up to +_appearances_, and can know nothing about the _reality_ to which they +must be referred. + +Touching this matter Herbert Spencer writes[1] as follows: "When we are +taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, +cannot be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions +produced on us, we are yet, by the relativity of thought, compelled to +think of these in relation to a cause--the notion of a real existence +which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved +that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is +inconsistent with itself,--that matter, however conceived by us, cannot +be matter as it actually is,--our conception, though transfigured, is +not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far +as possible from those special forms under which it was before +represented in thought." + +This means, in plain language, that we must regard everything we know +and can know as appearance and must refer it to an unknown reality. +Sometimes Mr. Spencer calls this reality the Unknowable, sometimes he +calls it the Absolute, and sometimes he allows it to pass by a variety +of other names, such as Power, Cause, etc. He wishes us to think of it +as "lying behind appearances" or as "underlying appearances." + +Probably it has already been remarked that this Unknowable has brought +us around again to that amusing "telephone exchange" discussed in the +third chapter. But if the reader feels within himself the least +weakness for the Unknowable, I beg him to consider carefully, before he +pins his faith to it, the following:-- + +(1) If we do perceive external bodies, our own bodies and others, then +it is conceivable that we may have evidence from observation to the +effect that other bodies affecting our bodies may give rise to +sensations. In this case we cannot say that we know nothing but +sensations; we know real bodies as well as sensations, and we may refer +the sensations to the real bodies. + +(2) If we do not perceive that we have bodies, and that our bodies are +acted upon by others, we have no evidence that what we call our +sensations are due to messages which come from "external things" and +are conducted along the nerves. It is then, absurd to talk of such +"external things" as though they existed, and to call them the reality +to which sensations, as appearances, must be referred, + +(3) In other words, if there is perceived to be a telephone exchange +with its wires and subscribers, we may refer the messages received to +the subscribers, and call this, if we choose, a reference of appearance +to reality. + +But if there is perceived no telephone exchange, and if it is concluded +that any wires or subscribers of which it means anything to speak must +be composed of what we have heretofore called "messages," then it is +palpably absurd to refer the "messages" as a whole to subscribers not +supposed to be composed of "messages"; and it is a blunder to go on +calling the things that we know "messages," as though we had evidence +that they came from, and must be referred to, something beyond +themselves. + +We must recognize that, with the general demolition of the exchange, we +lose not only known subscribers, but the very notion of a subscriber. +It will not do to try to save from this wreck some "unknowable" +subscriber, and still pin our faith to him. + +(4) We have seen that the relation of appearance to reality is that of +certain experiences to certain other experiences. When we take the +liberty of calling the Unknowable a _reality_, we blunder in our use of +the word. The Unknowable cannot be an experience either actual, +possible, or conceived as possible, and it cannot possibly hold the +relation to any of our experiences that a real thing of any kind holds +to the appearances that stand as its signs. + +(5) Finally, no man has ever made an assumption more perfectly useless +and purposeless than the assumption of the Unknowable. We have seen +that the distinction between appearance and reality is a serviceable +one, and it has been pointed out that it would be of no service +whatever if it were not possible to refer particular appearances to +their own appropriate realities. The realities to which we actually +refer appearances serve to explain them. Thus, when I ask: Why do I +perceive that tree now as faint and blue and now as vivid and green? +the answer to the question is found in the notion of distance and +position in space; it is found, in other words, in a reference to the +real world of touch things, for which visual experiences serve as +signs. Under certain circumstances, the mountain _ought_ to be robed +in its azure hue, and, under certain circumstances, it _ought not_. +The circumstances in each case are open to investigation. + +Now, let us substitute for the real world of touch things, which +furnishes the explanation of given visual experiences, that philosophic +fiction, that pseudo-real nonentity, the Unknowable. Now I perceive a +tree as faint and blue, now as bright and green; will a reference to +the Unknowable explain why the experiences differed? Was the +Unknowable in the one instance farther off in an unknowable space, and +in the other nearer? This, even if it means anything, must remain +unknowable. And when the chemist puts together a volume of chlorine +gas and a volume of hydrogen gas to get two volumes of hydrochloric +acid gas, shall we explain the change which has taken place by a +reference to the Unknowable, or shall we turn to the doctrine of atoms +and their combinations? + +The fact is that no man in his senses tries to account for any +individual fact by turning for an explanation to the Unknowable. It is +a life-preserver by which some set great store, but which no man dreams +of using when he really falls into the water. + +If, then, we have any reason to believe that there is a real external +world at all, we have reason to believe that we know what it is. That +some know it imperfectly, that others know it better, and that we may +hope that some day it will be known still more perfectly, is surely no +good reason for concluding that we do not know it at all. + + +[1] "First Principles," Part I, Chapter IV, section 26. + + + + +CHAPTER VI + +OF SPACE + +23. WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO KNOW ABOUT IT.--The plain man may admit +that he is not ready to hazard a definition of space, but he is +certainly not willing to admit that he is wholly ignorant of space and +of its attributes. He knows that it is something in which material +objects have position and in which they move about; he knows that it +has not merely length, like a line, nor length and breadth, like a +surface, but has the three dimensions of length, breadth, and depth; he +knows that, except in the one circumstance of its position, every part +of space is exactly like every other part, and that, although objects +may move about in space, it is incredible that the spaces themselves +should be shifted about. + +Those who are familiar with the literature of the subject know that it +has long been customary to make regarding space certain other +statements to which the plain man does not usually make serious +objection when he is introduced to them. Thus it is said:-- + +(1) The idea of space is _necessary_. We can think of objects in space +as annihilated, but we cannot conceive space to be annihilated. We can +clear space of things, but we cannot clear away space itself, even in +thought. + +(2) Space must be _infinite_. We cannot conceive that we should come +to the end of space. + +(3) Every space, however small, is _infinitely divisible_. That is to +say, even the most minute space must be composed of spaces. We cannot, +even theoretically, split a solid into mere surfaces, a surface into +mere lines, or a line into mere points. + +Against such statements the plain man is not impelled to rise in +rebellion, for he can see that there seems to be some ground for making +them. He can conceive of any particular material object as +annihilated, and of the place which it occupied as standing empty; but +he cannot go on and conceive of the annihilation of this bit of empty +space. Its annihilation would not leave a gap, for a gap means a bit +of empty space; nor could it bring the surrounding spaces into +juxtaposition, for one cannot shift spaces, and, in any case, a +shifting that is not a shifting through space is an absurdity. + +Again, he cannot conceive of any journey that would bring him to the +end of space. There is no more reason for stopping at one point than +at another; why not go on? What could end space? + +As to the infinite divisibility of space, have we not, in addition to +the seeming reasonableness of the doctrine, the testimony of all the +mathematicians? Does any one of them ever dream of a line so short +that it cannot be divided into two shorter lines, or of an angle so +small that it cannot be bisected? + +24. SPACE AS NECESSARY AND SPACE AS INFINITE.--That these statements +about space contain truth one should not be in haste to deny. It seems +silly to say that space can be annihilated, or that one can travel +"over the mountains of the moon" in the hope of reaching the end of it. +And certainly no prudent man wishes to quarrel with that coldly +rational creature the mathematician. + +But it is well worth while to examine the statements carefully and to +see whether there is not some danger that they may be understood in +such a way as to lead to error. Let us begin with the doctrine that +space is necessary and cannot be "thought away." + +As we have seen above, it is manifestly impossible to annihilate in +thought a certain portion of space and leave the other portions intact. +There are many things in the same case. We cannot annihilate in +thought one side of a door and leave the other side; we cannot rob a +man of the outside of his hat and leave him the inside. But we can +conceive of a whole door as annihilated, and of a man as losing a whole +hat. May we or may we not conceive of space as a whole as nonexistent? + +I do not say, be it observed, can we conceive of something as attacking +and annihilating space? Whatever space may be, we none of us think of +it as a something that may be threatened and demolished. I only say, +may we not think of a system of things--not a world such as ours, of +course, but still a system of things of some sort--in which space +relations have no part? May we not conceive such to be possible? + +It should be remarked that space relations are by no means the only +ones in which we think of things as existing. We attribute to them +time relations as well. Now, when we think of occurrences as related +to each other in time, we do, in so far as we concentrate our attention +upon these relations, turn our attention away from space and +contemplate another aspect of the system of things. Space is not such +a necessity of thought that we must keep thinking of space when we have +turned our attention to something else. And is it, indeed, +inconceivable that there should be a system of things (not extended +things in space, of course), characterized by time relations and +perhaps other relations, but not by space relations? + +It goes without saying that we cannot go on thinking of space and at +the same time not think of space. Those who keep insisting upon space +as a necessity of thought seem to set us such a task as this, and to +found their conclusion upon our failure to accomplish it. "We can +never represent to ourselves the nonexistence of space," says the +German philosopher Kant (1724-1804), "although we can easily conceive +that there are no objects in space." + +It would, perhaps, be fairer to translate the first half of this +sentence as follows: "We can never picture to ourselves the +nonexistence of space." Kant says we cannot make of it a +_Vorstellung_, a representation. This we may freely admit, for what +does one try to do when one makes the effort to imagine the +nonexistence of space? Does not one first clear space of objects, and +then try to clear space of space in much the same way? We try to +"think space away," _i.e. to remove it from the place where it was and +yet keep that place_. + +What does it mean to imagine or represent to oneself the nonexistence +of material objects? Is it not to represent to oneself the objects as +no longer in space, _i.e._ to imagine the space as empty, as cleared of +the objects? It means something in this case to speak of a +_Vorstellung_, or representation. We can call before our minds the +empty space. But if we are to think of space as nonexistent, what +shall we call before our minds? Our procedure must not be analogous to +what it was before; we must not try to picture to our minds _the +absence of space_, as though that were in itself a something that could +be pictured; we must turn our attention to other relations, such as +time relations, and ask whether it is not conceivable that such should +be the only relations obtaining within a given system. + +Those who insist upon the fact that we cannot but conceive space as +infinite employ a very similar argument to prove their point. They set +us a self-contradictory task, and regard our failure to accomplish it +as proof of their position. Thus, Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856) +argues: "We are altogether unable to conceive space as bounded--as +finite; that is, as a whole beyond which there is no further space." +And Herbert Spencer echoes approvingly: "We find ourselves totally +unable to imagine bounds beyond which there is no space." + +Now, whatever one may be inclined to think about the infinity of space, +it is clear that this argument is an absurd one. Let me write it out +more at length: "We are altogether unable to conceive space as +bounded--as finite; that is, as a whole _in the space_ beyond which +there is no further space." "We find ourselves totally unable to +imagine bounds, _in the space_ beyond which there is no further space." +The words which I have added were already present implicitly. What can +the word "beyond" mean if it does not signify space beyond? What Sir +William and Mr. Spencer have asked us to do is to imagine a limited +space with a _beyond_ and yet _no beyond_. + +There is undoubtedly some reason why men are so ready to affirm that +space is infinite, even while they admit that they do not know that the +world of material things is infinite. To this we shall come back again +later. But if one wishes to affirm it, it is better to do so without +giving a reason than it is to present such arguments as the above. + +25. SPACE AS INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--For more than two thousand years +men have been aware that certain very grave difficulties seem to attach +to the idea of motion, when we once admit that space is infinitely +divisible. To maintain that we can divide any portion of space up into +ultimate elements which are not themselves spaces, and which have no +extension, seems repugnant to the idea we all have of space. And if we +refuse to admit this possibility there seems to be nothing left to us +but to hold that every space, however small, may theoretically be +divided up into smaller spaces, and that there is no limit whatever to +the possible subdivision of spaces. Nevertheless, if we take this most +natural position, we appear to find ourselves plunged into the most +hopeless of labyrinths, every turn of which brings us face to face with +a flat self-contradiction. + +To bring the difficulties referred to clearly before our minds, let us +suppose a point to move uniformly over a line an inch long, and to +accomplish its journey in a second. At first glance, there appears to +be nothing abnormal about this proceeding. But if we admit that this +line is infinitely divisible, and reflect upon this property of the +line, the ground seems to sink from beneath our feet at once. + +For it is possible to argue that, under the conditions given, the point +must move over one half of the line in half a second; over one half of +the remainder, or one fourth of the line, in one fourth of a second; +over one eighth of the line, in one eighth of a second, etc. Thus the +portions of line moved over successively by the point may be +represented by the descending series: + +1/2, 1/4, 1/8, 1/16, . . . [Greek omicron symbol] + +Now, it is quite true that the motion of the point can be described in +a number of different ways; but the important thing to remark here is +that, if the motion really is uniform, and if the line really is +infinitely divisible, this series must, as satisfactorily as any other, +describe the motion of the point. And it would be absurd to maintain +that _a part_ of the series can describe the whole motion. We cannot +say, for example, that, when the point has moved over one half, one +fourth, and one eighth of the line, it has completed its motion. If +even a single member of the series is left out, the whole line has not +been passed over; and this is equally true whether the omitted member +represent a large bit of line or a small one. + +The whole series, then, represents the whole line, as definite parts of +the series represent definite parts of the line. The line can only be +completed when the series is completed. But when and how can this +series be completed? In general, a series is completed when we reach +the final term, but here there appears to be no final term. We cannot +make zero the final term, for it does not belong to the series at all. +It does not obey the law of the series, for it is not one half as large +as the term preceding it--what space is so small that dividing it by 2 +gives us [omicron]? On the other hand, some term just before zero +cannot be the final term; for if it really represents a little bit of +the line, however small, it must, by hypothesis, be made up of lesser +bits, and a smaller term must be conceivable. There can, then, be no +last term to the series; _i.e._ what the point is doing at the very +last is absolutely indescribable; it is inconceivable that there should +be a _very last_. + +It was pointed out many centuries ago that it is equally inconceivable +that there should be a _very first_. How can a point even begin to +move along an infinitely divisible line? Must it not before it can +move over any distance, however short, first move over half that +distance? And before it can move over that half, must it not move over +the half of that? Can it find something to move over that has no +halves? And if not, how shall it even start to move? To move at all, +it must begin somewhere; it cannot begin with what has no halves, for +then it is not moving over any part of the line, as all parts have +halves; and it cannot begin with what has halves, for that is not the +beginning. _What does the point do first?_ that is the question. +Those who tell us about points and lines usually leave us to call upon +gentle echo for an answer. + +The perplexities of this moving point seem to grow worse and worse the +longer one reflects upon them. They do not harass it merely at the +beginning and at the end of its journey. This is admirably brought out +by Professor W. K. Clifford (1845-1879), an excellent mathematician, +who never had the faintest intention of denying the possibility of +motion, and who did not desire to magnify the perplexities in the path +of a moving point. He writes:-- + +"When a point moves along a line, we know that between any two +positions of it there is an infinite number . . . of intermediate +positions. That is because the motion is continuous. Each of those +positions is where the point was at some instant or other. Between the +two end positions on the line, the point where the motion began and the +point where it stopped, there is no point of the line which does not +belong to that series. We have thus an infinite series of successive +positions of a continuously moving point, and in that series are +included all the points of a certain piece of line-room." [1] + +Thus, we are told that, when a point moves along a line, between any +two positions of it there is an infinite number of intermediate +positions. Clifford does not play with the word "infinite"; he takes +it seriously and tells us that it means without any end: "_Infinite_; +it is a dreadful word, I know, until you find out that you are familiar +with the thing which it expresses. In this place it means that between +any two positions there is some intermediate position; between that and +either of the others, again, there is some other intermediate; and so +on _without any end_. Infinite means without any end." + +But really, if the case is as stated, the point in question must be at +a desperate pass. I beg the reader to consider the following, and ask +himself whether he would like to change places with it:-- + +(1) If the series of positions is really endless, the point must +complete one by one the members of an endless series, and reach a +nonexistent final term, for a really endless series cannot have a final +term. + +(2) The series of positions is supposed to be "an infinite series of +successive positions." The moving point must take them one after +another. But how can it? _Between any two positions of the point +there is an infinite number of intermediate positions_. That is to +say, no two of these successive positions must be regarded as _next to_ +each other; every position is separated from every other by an infinite +number of intermediate ones. How, then, shall the point move? It +cannot possibly move from one position to the next, for there is no +next. Shall it move first to some position that is not the next? Or +shall it in despair refuse to move at all? + +Evidently there is either something wrong with this doctrine of the +infinite divisibility of space, or there is something wrong with our +understanding of it, if such absurdities as these refuse to be cleared +away. Let us see where the trouble lies. + +26. WHAT IS REAL SPACE?--It is plain that men are willing to make a +number of statements about space, the ground for making which is not at +once apparent. It is a bold man who will undertake to say that the +universe of matter is infinite in extent. We feel that we have the +right to ask him how he knows that it is. But most men are ready +enough to affirm that space is and must be infinite. How do they know +that it is? They certainly do not directly perceive all space, and +such arguments as the one offered by Hamilton and Spencer are easily +seen to be poor proofs. + +Men are equally ready to affirm that space is infinitely divisible. +Has any man ever looked upon a line and perceived directly that it has +an infinite number of parts? Did any one ever succeed in dividing a +space up infinitely? When we try to make clear to ourselves how a +point moves along an infinitely divisible line, do we not seem to land +in sheer absurdities? On what sort of evidence does a man base his +statements regarding space? They are certainly very bold statements. + +A careful reflection reveals the fact that men do not speak as they do +about space for no reason at all. When they are properly understood, +their statements can be seen to be justified, and it can be seen also +that the difficulties which we have been considering can be avoided. +The subject is a deep one, and it can scarcely be discussed +exhaustively in an introductory volume of this sort, but one can, at +least, indicate the direction in which it seems most reasonable to look +for an answer to the questions which have been raised. How do we come +to a knowledge of space, and what do we mean by space? This is the +problem to solve; and if we can solve this, we have the key which will +unlock many doors. + +Now, we saw in the last chapter that we have reason to believe that we +know what the real external world is. It is a world of things which we +perceive, or can perceive, or, not arbitrarily but as a result of +careful observation and deductions therefrom, conceive as though we did +perceive it--a world, say, of atoms and molecules. It is not an +Unknowable behind or beyond everything that we perceive, or can +perceive, or conceive in the manner stated. + +And the space with which we are concerned is real space, the space in +which real things exist and move about, the real things which we can +directly know or of which we can definitely know something. In some +sense it must be given in our experience, if the things which are in +it, and are known to be in it, are given in our experience. How must +we think of this real space? + +Suppose we look at a tree at a distance. We are conscious of a certain +complex of color. We can distinguish the kind of color; in this case, +we call it blue. But the quality of the color is not the only thing +that we can distinguish in the experience. In two experiences of color +the quality may be the same, and yet the experiences may be different +from each other. In the one case we may have more of the same +color--we may, so to speak, be conscious of a larger patch; but even if +there is not actually more of it, there may be such a difference that +we can know from the visual experience alone that the touch object +before us is, in the one case, of the one shape, and, in the other +case, of another. Thus we may distinguish between the _stuff_ given in +our experience and the _arrangement_ of that stuff. This is the +distinction which philosophers have marked as that between "matter" and +"form." It is, of course, understood that both of these words, so +used, have a special sense not to be confounded with their usual one. + +This distinction between "matter" and "form" obtains in all our +experiences. I have spoken just above of the shape of the touch object +for which our visual experiences stand as signs. What do we mean by +its shape? To the plain man real things are the touch things of which +he has experience, and these touch things are very clearly +distinguishable from one another in shape, in size, in position, nor +are the different parts| of the things to be confounded with each +other. Suppose that, as we pass our hand over a table, all the +sensations of touch and movement which we experience fused into an +undistinguishable mass. Would we have any notion of size or shape? It +is because our experiences of touch and movement do not fuse, but +remain distinguishable from each other, and we are conscious of them as +_arranged_, as constituting a system, that we can distinguish between +this part of a thing and that, this thing and that. + +This arrangement, this order, of what is revealed by touch and +movement, we may call the "form" of the touch world. Leaving out of +consideration, for the present, time relations, we may say that the +"form" of the touch world is the whole system of actual and possible +relations of arrangement between the elements which make it up. It is +because there is such a system of relations that we can speak of things +as of this shape or of that, as great or small, as near or far, as here +or there. + +Now, I ask, is there any reason to believe that, when the plain man +speaks of _space_, the word means to him anything more than this system +of actual and possible relations of arrangement among the touch things +that constitute his real world? He may talk sometimes as though space +were some kind of a _thing_, but he does not really think of it as a +thing. + +This is evident from the mere fact that he is so ready to make about it +affirmations that he would not venture to make about things. It does +not strike him as inconceivable that a given material object should be +annihilated; it does strike him as inconceivable that a portion of +space should be blotted out of existence. Why this difference? Is it +not explained when we recognize that space is but a name for all the +actual and possible relations of arrangement in which things in the +touch world may stand? We cannot drop out some of these relations and +yet keep _space_, _i.e._ the system of relations which we had before. +That this is what space means, the plain man may not recognize +explicitly, but he certainly seems to recognize it implicitly in what +he says about space. Men are rarely inclined to admit that space is a +_thing_ of any kind, nor are they much more inclined to regard it as a +quality of a thing. Of what could it be the quality? + +And if space really were a thing of any sort, would it not be the +height of presumption for a man, in the absence of any direct evidence +from observation, to say how much there is of it--to declare it +infinite? Men do not hesitate to say that space must be infinite. But +when we realize that we do not mean by space merely the actual +relations which exist between the touch things that make up the world, +but also the _possible_ relations, _i.e._ that we mean the whole _plan_ +of the world system, we can see that it is not unreasonable to speak of +space as infinite. + +The material universe may, for aught we know, be limited in extent. +The actual space relations in which things stand to each other may not +be limitless. But these actual space relations taken alone do not +constitute space. Men have often asked themselves whether they should +conceive of the universe as limited and surrounded by void space. It +is not nonsense to speak of such a state of things. It would, indeed, +appear to be nonsense to say that, if the universe is limited, it does +not lie in void space. What can we mean by void space but the system +of possible relations in which things, if they exist, must stand? To +say that, beyond a certain point, no further relations are possible, +seems absurd. + +Hence, when a man has come to understand what we have a right to mean +by space, it does not imply a boundless conceit on his part to hazard +the statement that space is infinite. When he has said this, he has +said very little. What shall we say to the statement that space is +infinitely divisible? + +To understand the significance of this statement we must come back to +the distinction between appearances and the real things for which they +stand as signs, the distinction discussed at length in the last chapter. + +When I see a tree from a distance, the visual experience which I have +is, as we have seen, not an indivisible unit, but is a complex +experience; it has parts, and these parts are related to each other; in +other words, it has both "matter" and "form." It is, however, one +thing to say that this experience has parts, and it is another to say +that it has an infinite number of parts. No man is conscious of +perceiving an infinite number of parts in the patch of color which +represents to him a tree at a distance; to say that it is constituted +of such strikes us in our moments of sober reflection as a monstrous +statement. + +Now, this visual experience is to us the sign of the reality, the real +tree; it is not taken as the tree itself. When we speak of the size, +the shape, the number of parts, of the tree, we do not have in mind the +size, the shape, the number of parts, of just this experience. We pass +from the sign to the thing signified, and we may lay our hand upon this +thing, thus gaining a direct experience of the size and shape of the +touch object. + +We must recognize, however, that just as no man is conscious of an +infinite number of parts in what he sees, so no man is conscious of an +infinite number of parts in what he touches. He who tells me that, +when I pass my finger along my paper cutter, _what I perceive_ has an +infinite number of parts, tells me what seems palpably untrue. When an +object is very small, I can see it, and I cannot see that it is +composed of parts; similarly, when an object is very small, I can feel +it with my finger, but I cannot distinguish its parts by the sense of +touch. There seem to be limits beyond which I cannot go in either case. + +Nevertheless, men often speak of thousandths of an inch, or of +millionths of an inch, or of distances even shorter. Have such +fractions of the magnitudes that we do know and can perceive any real +existence? The touch world of real things as it is revealed in our +experience does not appear to be divisible into such; it does not +appear to be divisible even so far, and much less does it appear to be +infinitely divisible. + +But have we not seen that the touch world given in our experience must +be taken by the thoughtful man as itself the sign or appearance of a +reality more ultimate? The speck which appears to the naked eye to +have no parts is seen under the microscope to have parts; that is to +say, an experience apparently not extended has become the sign of +something that is seen to have part out of part. We have as yet +invented no instrument that will make directly perceptible to the +finger tip an atom of hydrogen or of oxygen, but the man of science +conceives of these little things as though they could be perceived. +They and the space in which they move--the system of actual and +possible relations between them--seem to be related to the world +revealed in touch very much as the space revealed in the field of the +microscope is related to the space of the speck looked at with the +naked eye. + +Thus, when the thoughtful man speaks of _real space_, he cannot mean by +the word only the actual and possible relations of arrangement among +the things and the parts of things directly revealed to his sense of +touch. He may speak of real things too small to be thus perceived, and +of their motion as through spaces too small to be perceptible at all. +What limit shall he set to the possible subdivision of _real_ things? +Unless he can find an ultimate reality which cannot in its turn become +the appearance or sign of a further reality, it seems absurd to speak +of a limit at all. + +We may, then, say that real space is infinitely divisible. By this +statement we should mean that certain experiences may be represented by +others, and that we may carry on our division in the case of the +latter, when a further subdivision of the former seems out of the +question. But it should not mean that any single experience furnished +us by any sense, or anything that we can represent in the imagination, +is composed of an infinite number of parts. + +When we realize this, do we not free ourselves from the difficulties +which seemed to make the motion of a point over a line an impossible +absurdity? The line as revealed in a single experience either of sight +or of touch is not composed of an infinite number of parts. It is +composed of points seen or touched--least experiences of sight or +touch, _minima sensibilia_. These are next to each other, and the +point, in moving, takes them one by one. + +But such a single experience is not what we call a line. It is but one +experience of a line. Though the experience is not infinitely +divisible, the line may be. This only means that the visual or tactual +point of the single experience may stand for, may represent, what is +not a mere point but has parts, and is, hence, divisible. Who can set +a limit to such possible substitutions? in other words, who can set a +limit to the divisibility of a _real line_? + +It is only when we confuse the single experience with the real line +that we fall into absurdities. What the mathematician tells us about +real points and real lines has no bearing on the constitution of the +single experience and its parts. Thus, when he tells us that between +any two points on a line there are an infinite number of other points, +he only means that we may expand the line indefinitely by the system of +substitutions described above. We do this for ourselves within limits +every time that we approach from a distance a line drawn on a +blackboard. The mathematician has generalized our experience for us, +and that is all he has done. We should try to get at his real meaning, +and not quote him as supporting an absurdity. + + +[1] "Seeing and Thinking," p. 149. + + + + +CHAPTER VII + +OF TIME + +27. TIME AS NECESSARY, INFINITE, AND INFINITELY DIVISIBLE.--Of course, we +all know something about time; we know it as past, present, and future; +we know it as divisible into parts, all of which are successive; we know +that whatever happens must happen in time. Those who have thought a good +deal about the matter are apt to tell us that time is a necessity of +thought, we cannot but think it; that time is and must be infinite; and +that it is infinitely divisible. + +These are the same statements that were made regarding space, and, as +they have to be criticised in just the same way, it is not necessary to +dwell upon them at great length. However, we must not pass them over +altogether. + +As to the statement that time is a _necessary_ idea, we may freely admit +that we cannot in thought _annihilate_ time, or _think it away_. It does +not seem to mean anything to attempt such a task. Whatever time may be, +it does not appear to be a something of such a nature that we can +demolish it or clear it away from something else. But is it necessarily +absurd to speak of a system of things--not, of course, a system of things +in which there is change, succession, an earlier and a later, but still a +system of things of some sort--in which there obtain no time relations? +The problem is, to be sure, one of theoretical interest merely, for such +a system of things is not the world we know. + +And as for the infinity of time, may we not ask on what ground any one +ventures to assert that time is infinite? No man can say that infinite +time is directly given in his experience. If one does not directly +perceive it to be infinite, must one not seek for some proof of the fact? +The only proof which appears to be offered us is contained in the +statement that we cannot conceive of a time before which there was no +time, nor of a time after which there will be no time; a proof which is +no proof, for written out at length it reads as follows: we cannot +conceive of a time _in the time_ before which there was no time, nor of a +time _in the time_ after which there will be no time. As well say: We +cannot conceive of a number the number before which was no number, nor of +a number the number after which will be no number. Whatever may be said +for the conclusion arrived at, the argument is a very poor one. + +When we turn to the consideration of time as infinitely divisible, we +seem to find ourselves confronted with the same difficulties which +presented themselves when we thought of space as infinitely divisible. +Certainly no man was immediately conscious of an infinite number of parts +in the minute which just slipped by. Shall he assert that it did, +nevertheless, contain an infinite number of parts? Then how did it +succeed in passing? how did it even _begin_ to pass away? It is +infinitely divisible, that is, there is no end to the number of parts +into which it may be divided; those parts and parts of parts are all +successive, no two can pass at once, they must all do it in a certain +order, one after the other. + +Thus, something must pass _first_. What can it be? If that something +has parts, is divisible, the whole of it cannot pass first. It must +itself pass bit by bit, as must the whole minute; and if it is infinitely +divisible we have precisely the problem that we had at the outset. +Whatever passes first cannot, then, have parts. + +Let us assume that it has no parts, and bid it Godspeed! Has the minute +begun? Our minute is, by hypothesis, infinitely divisible; it is +composed of parts, and those parts of other parts, and so on without end. +We cannot by subdivision come to any part which is itself not composed of +smaller parts. The partless thing that passed, then, is no part of the +minute. That is all still waiting at the gate, and no member of its +troop can prove that it has a right to lead the rest. In the same outer +darkness is waiting the point on the line that misbehaved itself in the +last chapter. + +28. THE PROBLEM OF PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE.--It seems bad enough to +have on our hands a minute which must pass away in successive bits, and +to discover that no bit of it can possibly pass first. But if we follow +with approval the reflections of certain thinkers, we may find ourselves +at such a pass that we would be glad to be able to prove that we may have +on our hands a minute of any sort. Men sometimes are so bold as to +maintain that they know time to be infinite; would it not be well for +them to prove first that they can know time at all? + +The trouble is this; as was pointed out long ago by Saint Augustine +(354-430) in his famous "Confessions," [1] the parts of time are +successive, and of the three divisions, past, present, and future, only +one can be regarded as existing: "Those two times, past and future, how +can they be, when the past is not now, and the future is not yet?" The +present is, it seems, the only existent; how long is the present? + +"Even a single hour passes in fleeting moments; as much of it as has +taken flight is past, what remains is future. If we can comprehend any +time that is divisible into no parts at all, or perhaps into the minutest +parts of moments, this alone let us call present; yet this speeds so +hurriedly from the future to the past that it does not endure even for a +little space. If it has duration, it is divided into a past and a +future; but the present has no duration. + +"Where, then, is the time that we may call long? Is it future? We do +not say of the future: it _is_ long; for as yet there exists nothing to +be long. We say: it _will be_ long. But when? If while yet future it +will not be long, for nothing will yet exist to be long. And if it will +be long, when, from a future as yet nonexistent, it has become a present, +and has begun to be, that it may be something that is long, then present +time cries out in the words of the preceding paragraph that it cannot be +long." + +Augustine's way of presenting the difficulty is a quaint one, but the +problem is as real at the beginning of the twentieth century as it was at +the beginning of the fifth. Past time does not exist now, future time +does not exist yet, and present time, it seems, has no duration. Can a +man be said to be conscious of time as past, present, and future? Who +can be conscious of the nonexistent? And the existent is not _time_, it +has no duration, there is no before and after in a mere limiting point. + +Augustine's way out of the difficulty is the suggestion that, although we +cannot, strictly speaking, measure time, we can measure _memory_ and +_expectation_. Before he begins to repeat a psalm, his expectation +extends over the whole of it. After a little a part of it must be +referred to expectation and a part of it to memory. Finally, the whole +psalm is "extended along" the memory. We can measure this, at least. + +But how is the psalm in question "extended along" the memory or the +expectation? Are the parts of it successive, or do they thus exist +simultaneously? If everything in the memory image exists at once, if all +belongs to the punctual present, to the mere point that divides past from +future, how can a man get from it a consciousness of time, of a something +whose parts cannot exist together but must follow each other? + +Augustine appears to overlook the fact that on his own hypothesis, the +present, the only existent, the only thing a man can be conscious of, is +an indivisible instant. In such there can be no change; the man who is +shut up to such cannot be aware that the past is growing and the future +diminishing. Any such change as this implies at least two instants, an +earlier and a later. He who has never experienced a change of any sort, +who has never been conscious of the relation of earlier and later, of +succession, cannot think of the varied content of memory as of _that +which has been present_. It cannot mean to him what memory certainly +means to us; he cannot be conscious of a past, a present, and a future. +To extract the notion of time, of past, present, and future, from an +experience which contains no element of succession, from an indivisible +instant, is as hopeless a task as to extract a line from a mathematical +point. + +It appears, then, that, if we are to be conscious of time at all, if we +are to have the least conception of it, we must have some direct +experience of change. We cannot really be shut up to that punctual +present, that mere point or limit between past and future, that the +present has been described as being. But does this not imply that we can +be directly conscious of what is not present, that we can _now_ perceive +what does _not now_ exist? How is this possible? + +It is not easy for one whose reading has been somewhat limited in any +given field to see the full significance of the problems which present +themselves in that field. Those who read much in the history of modern +philosophy will see that this ancient difficulty touching our +consciousness of time has given rise to some exceedingly curious +speculations, and some strange conclusions touching the nature of the +mind. + +Thus, it has been argued that, since the experience of each moment is +something quite distinct from the experience of the next, a something +that passes away to give place to its successor, we cannot explain the +consciousness of time, of a whole in which successive moments are +recognized as having their appropriate place, unless we assume a +something that knows each moment and knits it, so to speak, to its +successor. This something is the self or consciousness, which is +independent of time, and does not exist in time, as do the various +experiences that fill the successive moments. It is assumed to be +_timelessly_ present _at all times_, and thus to connect the nonexistent +past with the existent present. + +I do not ask the reader to try to make clear to himself how anything can +be timelessly present at all times, for I do not believe that the words +can be made to represent any clear thought whatever. Nor do I ask him to +try to conceive how this timeless something can join past and present. I +merely wish to point out that these modern speculations, which still +influence the minds of many distinguished men, have their origin in a +difficulty which suggested itself early in the history of reflective +thought, and are by no means to be regarded as a gratuitous and useless +exercise of the ingenuity. They are serious attempts to solve a real +problem, though they may be unsuccessful ones, and they are worthy of +attention even from those who incline to a different solution. + +29. WHAT IS REAL TIME?--From the thin air of such speculations as we have +been discussing let us come back to the world of the plain man, the world +in which we all habitually live. It is from this that we must start out +upon all our journeys, and it is good to come back to it from time to +time to make sure of our bearings. + +We have seen (Chapter V) that we distinguish between the real and the +apparent, and that we recognize as the real world the objects revealed to +the sense of touch. These objects stand to each other in certain +relations of arrangement; that is to say, they exist in space. And just +as we may distinguish between the object as it appears and the object as +it is, so we may distinguish between apparent space and real space, +_i.e._ between the relations of arrangement, actual and possible, which +obtain among the parts of the object as it appears, and those which +obtain among the parts of the object as it really is. + +But our experience does not present us only with objects in space +relations; it presents us with a succession of changes in those objects. +And if we will reason about those changes as we have reasoned about space +relations, many of our difficulties regarding the nature of time may, as +it seems, be made to disappear. + +Thus we may recognize that we are directly conscious of duration, of +succession, and may yet hold that this crude and immediate experience of +duration is not what we mean by real time. Every one distinguishes +between apparent time and real time now and then. We all know that a +sermon may _seem _long and not _be_ long; that the ten years that we live +over in a dream are not ten real years; that the swallowing of certain +drugs may be followed by the illusion of the lapse of vast spaces of +time, when really very little time has elapsed. What is this _real_ time? + +It is nothing else than the order of the changes which take place or may +take place in real things. In the last chapter I spoke of space as the +"form" of the real world; it would be better to call it _a_ "form" of the +real world, and to give the same name also to time. + +It is very clear that, when we inquire concerning the real time of any +occurrence, or ask how long a series of such lasted, we always look for +our answer to something that has happened in the external world. The +passage of a star over the meridian, the position of the sun above the +horizon, the arc which the moon has described since our last observation, +the movement of the hands of a clock, the amount of sand which has fallen +in the hourglass, these things and such as these are the indicators of +real time. There may be indicators of a different sort; we may decide +that it is noon because we are hungry, or midnight because we are tired; +we may argue that the preacher must have spoken more than an hour because +he quite wore out the patience of the congregation. These are more or +less uncertain signs of the lapse of time, but they cannot be regarded as +experiences of the passing of time either apparent or real. + +Thus, we see that real space and real time are the _plan_ of the world +system. They are not _things_ of any sort, and they should not be +mistaken for things. They are not known independently of things, though, +when we have once had an experience of things and their changes, we can +by abstraction from the things themselves fix our attention upon their +arrangement and upon the order of their changes. We can divide and +subdivide spaces and times without much reference to the things. But we +should never forget that it would never have occurred to us to do this, +indeed, that the whole procedure would be absolutely meaningless to us, +were not a real world revealed in our experience as it is. + +He who has attained to this insight into the nature of time is in a +position to offer what seem to be satisfactory solutions to the problems +which have been brought forward above. + +(1) He can see, thus, why it is absurd to speak of any portion of time as +becoming nonexistent. Time is nothing else than an order, a great system +of relations. One cannot drop out certain of these and leave the rest +unchanged, for the latter imply the former. Day-after-to-morrow would +not be day-after-to-morrow, if to-morrow did not lie between it and +to-day. To speak of dropping out to-morrow and leaving it the time it +was conceived to be is mere nonsense. + +(2) He can see why it does not indicate a measureless conceit for a man +to be willing to say that time is infinite. One who says this need not +be supposed to be acquainted with the whole past and future history of +the real world, of which time is an aspect. We constantly abstract from +things, and consider only the order of their changes, and in this order +itself there is no reason why one should set a limit at some point; +indeed, to set such a limit seems a gratuitous absurdity. He who says +that time is infinite does not say much; he is not affirming the +existence of some sort of a thing; he is merely affirming a theoretical +possibility, and is it not a theoretical possibility that there may be an +endless succession of real changes in a real world? + +(3) It is evident, furthermore, that, when one has grasped firmly the +significance of the distinction between apparent time and real time, one +may with a clear conscience speak of time as infinitely divisible. Of +course, the time directly given in any single experience, the minute or +the second of which we are conscious as it passes, cannot be regarded as +composed of an infinite number of parts. We are not directly conscious +of these subdivisions, and it is a monstrous assumption to maintain that +they must be present in the minute or second as perceived. + +But no such single experience of duration constitutes what we mean by +real time. We have seen that real time is the time occupied by the +changes in real things, and the question is, How far can one go in the +subdivision of this time? + +Now, the touch thing which usually is for us in common life the real +thing is not the real thing for science; it is the appearance under which +the real world of atoms and molecules reveals itself. The atom is not +directly perceivable, and we may assign to its motions a space so small +that no one could possibly perceive it as space, as a something with part +out of part, a something with a here and a there. But, as has been +before pointed out (section 26), this does not prevent us from believing +the atom and the space in which it moves to be real, and we can +_represent_ them to ourselves as we can the things and the spaces with +which we have to do in common life. + +It is with time just as it is with space. We can perceive an inch to +have parts; we cannot perceive a thousandth of an inch to have parts, if +we can perceive it at all; but we can represent it to ourselves as +extended, that is, we can let an experience which is extended stand for +it, and can dwell upon the parts of that. We can perceive a second to +have duration; we cannot perceive a thousandth of a second to have +duration; but we can conceive it as having duration, _i.e._ we can let +some experience of duration stand for it and serve as its representative. + +It is, then, reasonable to speak of the space covered by the vibration of +an atom, and it is equally reasonable to speak of the time taken up by +its vibration. It is not necessary to believe that the duration that we +actually experience as a second must itself be capable of being divided +up into the number of parts indicated by the denominator of the fraction +that we use in indicating such a time, and that each of these parts must +be perceived as duration. + +There is, then, a sense in which we may affirm that time is infinitely +divisible. But we must remember that apparent time--the time presented +in any single experience of duration--is never infinitely divisible; and +that real time, in any save a relative sense of the word, is not a single +experience of duration at all. It is a recognition of the fact that +experiences of duration may be substituted for each other without +assignable limit. + +(4) But what shall we say to the last problem--to the question how we can +be conscious of time at all, when the parts of time are all successive? +How can we even have a consciousness of "crude" time, of apparent time, +of duration in any sense of the word, when duration must be made up of +moments no two of which can exist together and no one of which alone can +constitute time? The past is not now, the future is not yet, the present +is a mere point, as we are told, and cannot have parts. If we are +conscious of time as past, present, and future, must we not be conscious +of a series as a series when every member of it save one is nonexistent? +Can a man be conscious of the nonexistent? + +The difficulty does seem a serious one, and yet I venture to affirm that, +if we examine it carefully, we shall see that it is a difficulty of our +own devising. The argument quietly makes an assumption--and makes it +gratuitously--with which any consciousness of duration is incompatible, +and then asks us how there can be such a thing as a consciousness of +duration. + +The assumption is that _we can be conscious only of the existent_, and +this, written out a little more at length, reads as follows: _we can be +conscious only of the now existent_, or, in other words _of the present_. +Of course, this determines from the outset that we cannot be conscious of +the past and the future, of duration. + +The past and the future are, to be sure, nonexistent from the point of +view of the present; but it should be remarked as well that the present +is nonexistent from the point of view of the past or the future. If we +are talking of time at all we are talking of that no two parts of which +are simultaneous; it would be absurd to speak of a past that existed +simultaneously with the present, just as it would be absurd to speak of a +present existing simultaneously with the past. But we should not deny to +past, present, and future, respectively, their appropriate existence; nor +is it by any means self-evident that there cannot be a consciousness of +past, present, and future as such. + +We fall in with the assumption, it seems, because we know very well that +we are not directly conscious of a remote past and a remote future. We +represent these to ourselves by means of some proxy--we have present +memories of times long past and present anticipations of what will be in +the time to come. Moreover, we use the word "present" very loosely; we +say the present year, the present day, the present hour, the present +minute, or the present second. When we use the word thus loosely, there +seems no reason for believing that there should be such a thing as a +direct consciousness that extends beyond the present. It appears +reasonable to say: No one can be conscious save of the present. + +It should be remembered, however, that the generous present of common +discourse is by no means identical with the ideal point between past and +future dealt with in the argument under discussion. We all say: I now +see that the cloud is moving; I now see that the snow is falling. But +there can be no moving, no falling, no change, in the timeless "now" with +which we have been concerned. Is there any evidence whatever that we are +shut up, for all our immediate knowledge, to such a "now"? There is none +whatever. + +The fact is that this timeless "now" is a product of reflective thought +and not a something of which we are directly conscious. It is an ideal +point in the real time of which this chapter has treated, the time that +is in a certain sense infinitely divisible. It is first cousin to the +ideal mathematical point, the mere limit between two lines, a something +not perceptible to any sense. We have a tendency to carry over to it +what we recognize to be true of the very different present of common +discourse, a present which we distinguish from past and future in a +somewhat loose way, but a present in which there certainly is the +consciousness of change, of duration. And when we do this, we dig for +ourselves a pit into which we proceed to fall. + +We may, then, conclude that we are directly conscious of more than the +present, in the sense in which Augustine used the word. We are conscious +of _time_, of "crude" time, and from this we can pass to a knowledge of +real time, and can determine its parts with precision. + + +[1] Book XI, Chapters 14 and 15. + + + + +III. PROBLEMS TOUCHING THE MIND + + +CHAPTER VIII + +WHAT IS THE MIND? + +30. PRIMITIVE NOTIONS OF MIND.--The soul or mind, that something to +which we refer sensations and ideas of all sorts, is an object that men +do not seem to know very clearly and definitely, though they feel so +sure of its existence that they regard it as the height of folly to +call it in question. That he has a mind, no man doubts; what his mind +is, he may be quite unable to say. + +We have seen (section 7) that children, when quite young, can hardly be +said to recognize that they have minds at all. This does not mean that +what is mental is not given in their experience. They know that they +must open their eyes to see things, and must lay their hands upon them +to feel them; they have had pains and pleasures, memories and fancies. +In short, they have within their reach all the materials needed in +framing a conception of the mind, and in drawing clearly the +distinction between their minds and external things. Nevertheless, +they are incapable of using these materials; their attention is +engrossed with what is physical,--with their own bodies and the bodies +of others, with the things that they can eat, with the toys with which +they can play, and the like. It is only later that there emerges even +a tolerably clear conception of a self or mind different from the +physical and contrasted with it. + +Primitive man is almost as material in his thinking as is the young +child. Of this we have traces in many of the words which have come to +be applied to the mind. Our word "spirit" is from the Latin +_spiritus_, originally a breeze. The Latin word for the soul, the word +used by the great philosophers all through the Middle Ages, _anima_ +(Greek, anemos), has the same significance. In the Greek New +Testament, the word used for spirit (pneuma) carries a similar +suggestion. When we are told in the Book of Genesis that "man became a +living soul," we may read the word literally "a breath." + +What more natural than that the man who is just awakening to a +consciousness of that elusive entity the mind should confuse it with +that breath which is the most striking outward and visible sign that +distinguishes a living man from a dead one? + +That those who first tried to give some scientific account of the soul +or mind conceived it as a material thing, and that it was sufficiently +common to identify it with the breath, we know from direct evidence. A +glance at the Greek philosophy, to which we owe so much that is of +value in our intellectual life, is sufficient to disclose how difficult +it was for thinking men to attain to a higher conception. + +Thus, Anaximenes of Miletus, who lived in the sixth century before +Christ, says that "our soul, which is air, rules us." A little later, +Heraclitus, a man much admired for the depth of his reflections, +maintains that the soul is a fiery vapor, evidently identifying it with +the warm breath of the living creature. In the fifth century, B.C., +Anaxagoras, who accounts for the ordering of the elements into a system +of things by referring to the activity of Mind or Reason, calls mind +"the finest of things," and it seems clear that he did not conceive of +it as very different in nature from the other elements which enter into +the constitution of the world. + +Democritus of Abdera (between 460 and 360 B.C.), that great +investigator of nature and brilliant writer, developed a materialistic +doctrine that admits the existence of nothing save atoms and empty +space. He conceived the soul to consist of fine, smooth, round atoms, +which are also atoms of fire. These atoms are distributed through the +whole body, but function differently in different places--in the brain +they give us thought, in the heart, anger, and in the liver, desire. +Life lasts just so long as we breathe in and breathe out such atoms. + +The doctrine of Democritus was taken up by Epicurus, who founded his +school three hundred years before Christ--a school which lived and +prospered for a very long time. Those who are interested in seeing how +a materialistic psychology can be carried out in detail by an ingenious +mind should read the curious account of the mind presented in his great +poem, "On Nature," by the Roman poet Lucretius, an ardent Epicurean, +who wrote in the first century B.C. + +The school which we commonly think of contrasting with the Epicurean, +and one which was founded at about the same time, is that of the +Stoics. Certainly the Stoics differed in many things from the +Epicureans; their view of the world, and of the life of man, was a much +nobler one; but they were uncompromising materialists, nevertheless, +and identified the soul with the warm breath that animates man. + +31. THE MIND AS IMMATERIAL.--It is scarcely too much to say that the +Greek philosophy as a whole impresses the modern mind as representing +the thought of a people to whom it was not unnatural to think of the +mind as being a breath, a fire, a collection of atoms, a something +material. To be sure, we cannot accuse those twin stars that must ever +remain the glory of literature and science, Plato and Aristotle, of +being materialists. Plato (427-347, B.C.) distributes, it is true, the +three-fold soul, which he allows man, in various parts of the human +body, in a way that at least suggests the Democritean distribution of +mind-atoms. The lowest soul is confined beneath the diaphragm; the one +next in rank has its seat in the chest; and the highest, the rational +soul, is enthroned in the head. However, he has said quite enough +about this last to indicate clearly that he conceived it to be free +from all taint of materiality. + +As for Aristotle (384-322, B.C.), who also distinguished between the +lower psychical functions and the higher, we find him sometimes +speaking of soul and body in such a way as to lead men to ask +themselves whether he is really speaking of two things at all; but when +he specifically treats of the _nous_ or reason, he insists upon its +complete detachment from everything material. Man's reason is not +subjected to the fate of the lower psychical functions, which, as the +"form" of the body, perish with the body; it enters from without, and +it endures after the body has passed away. It is interesting to note, +however, an occasional lapse even in Aristotle. When he comes to speak +of the relation to the world of the Divine Mind, the First Cause of +Motion, which he conceives as pure Reason, he represents it as +_touching_ the world, although it remains itself _untouched_. We seem +to find here just a flavor--an inconsistent one--of the material. + +Such reflections as those of Plato and Aristotle bore fruit in later +ages. When we come down to Plotinus the Neo-Platonist (204-269, A.D.), +we have left the conception of the soul as a warm breath, or as +composed of fine round atoms, far behind. It has become curiously +abstract and incomprehensible. It is described as an immaterial +substance This substance is, in a sense, in the body, or, at least, it +is present to the body. But it is not in the body as material things +are in this place or in that. _It is as a whole in the whole body, and +it is as a whole in every part of the body_. Thus the soul may be +regarded as divisible, since it is distributed throughout the body; but +it must also be regarded as indivisible, since it is wholly in every +part. + +Let the man to whom such sentences as these mean anything rejoice in +the meaning that he is able to read into them! If he can go as far as +Plotinus, perhaps he can go as far as Cassiodorus (477-570, A.D.), and +maintain that the soul is not merely as a whole in every part of the +body, but is wholly in each of its own parts. + +Upon reading such statements one's first impulse is to exclaim: How is +it possible that men of sense should be led to speak in this +irresponsible way? and when they do speak thus, is it conceivable that +other men should seriously occupy themselves with what they say? + +But if one has the historic sense, and knows something of the setting +in which such doctrines come to the birth, one cannot regard it as +remarkable that men of sense should urge them. No one coins them +independently out of his own brain; little by little men are impelled +along the path that leads to such conclusions. Plotinus was a careful +student of the philosophers that preceded him. He saw that mind must +be distinguished from matter, and he saw that what is given a location +in space, in the usual sense of the words, is treated like a material +thing. On the other hand, he had the common experience that we all +have of a relation between mind and body. How do justice to this +relation, and yet not materialize mind? + +What he tried to do is clear, and it seems equally clear that he had +good reason for trying to do it. But it appears to us now that what he +actually did was to make of the mind or soul a something very like an +inconsistent bit of matter, that is somehow in space, and yet not +exactly in space, a something that can be in two places at once, a +logical monstrosity. That his doctrine did not meet with instant +rejection was due to the fact, already alluded to, that our experience +of the mind is something rather dim and elusive. It is not easy for a +man to say what it is, and, hence, it is not easy for a man to say what +it is not. + +The doctrine of Plotinus passed over to Saint Augustine, and from him +it passed to the philosophers of the Middle Ages. How extremely +difficult it has been for the world to get away from it at all, is made +clearly evident in the writings of that remarkable man Descartes. + +Descartes wrote in the seventeenth century. The long sleep of the +Middle Ages was past, and the several sciences had sprung into a +vigorous and independent life. It was not enough for Descartes to +describe the relation of mind and body in the loose terms that had +prevailed up to his time. He had made a careful study of anatomy, and +he realized that the brain is a central organ to which messages are +carried by the nerves from all parts of the body. He knew that an +injury to the nerve might prevent the receipt of a message, _i.e._ he +knew that a conscious sensation did not come into being until something +happened in the brain. + +Nor was he content merely to refer the mind to the brain in a general +way. He found the "little pineal gland" in the midst of the brain to +be in what he regarded as an admirable position to serve as the seat of +the soul. To this convenient little central office he relegated it; +and he describes in a way that may to-day well provoke a smile the +movements that the soul imparts to the pineal gland, making it incline +itself in this direction and in that, and making it push the "animal +spirits," the fluid contained in the cavities of the brain, towards +various "pores." + +Thus he writes:[1] "Let us, then, conceive of the soul as having her +chief seat in the little gland that is in the middle of the brain, +whence she radiates to all the rest of the body by means of the +spirits, the nerves, and even the blood, which, participating in the +impressions of the spirits, can carry them through the arteries to all +the members." And again: "Thus, when the soul wills to call anything +to remembrance, this volition brings it about that the gland, inclining +itself successively in different directions, pushes the spirits towards +divers parts of the brain, until they find the part which has the +traces that the object which one wishes to recollect has left there." + +We must admit that Descartes' scientific studies led him to make this +mind that sits in the little pineal gland something very material. It +is spoken of as though it pushed the gland about; it is affected by the +motions of the gland, as though it were a bit of matter. It seems to +be a less inconsistent thing than the "all in the whole body" soul of +Plotinus; but it appears to have purchased its comprehensibility at the +expense of its immateriality. + +Shall we say that Descartes frankly repudiated the doctrine that had +obtained for so many centuries? We cannot say that; he still held to +it. But how could he? The reader has perhaps remarked above that he +speaks of the soul as having her _chief_ seat in the pineal gland. It +seems odd that he should do so, but he still held, even after he had +come to his definite conclusions as to the soul's seat, to the ancient +doctrine that the soul is united to all the parts of the body +"conjointly." He could not wholly repudiate a venerable tradition. + +We have seen, thus, that men first conceived of the mind as material +and later came to rebel against such a conception. But we have seen, +also, that the attempt to conceive it as immaterial was not wholly +successful. It resulted in a something that we may describe as +inconsistently material rather than as not material at all. + +32. MODERN COMMON SENSE NOTIONS OF THE MIND.--Under this heading I mean +to sum up the opinions as to the nature of the mind usually held by the +intelligent persons about us to-day who make no claim to be regarded as +philosophers. Is it not true that a great many of them believe:-- + +(1) That the mind is in the body? + +(2) That it acts and reacts with matter? + +(3) That it is a substance with attributes? + +(4) That it is nonextended and immaterial? + +I must remark at the outset that this collection of opinions is by no +means something gathered by the plain man from his own experience. +These opinions are the echoes of old philosophies. They are a heritage +from the past, and have become the common property of all intelligent +persons who are even moderately well-educated. Their sources have been +indicated in the preceding sections; but most persons who cherish them +have no idea of their origin. + +Men are apt to suppose that these opinions seem reasonable to them +merely for the reason that they find in their own experience evidence +of their truth. But this is not so. + +Have we not seen above how long it took men to discover that they must +not think of the mind as being a breath, or a flame, or a collection of +material atoms? The men who erred in this way were abler than most of +us can pretend to be, and they gave much thought to the matter. And +when at last it came to be realized that mind must not thus be +conceived as material, those who endeavored to conceive it as something +else gave, after their best efforts, a very queer account of it indeed. + +Is it in the face of such facts reasonable to suppose that our friends +and acquaintances, who strike us as having reflective powers in nowise +remarkable, have independently arrived at the conception that the mind +is a nonextended and immaterial substance? Surely they have not +thought all this out for themselves. They have taken up and +appropriated unconsciously notions which were in the air, so to speak. +They have inherited their doctrines, not created them. It is well to +remember this, for it may make us the more willing to take up and +examine impartially what we have uncritically turned into articles of +belief. + +The first two articles, namely, that the mind is in the body and that +it acts upon, and is acted upon by, material things, I shall discuss at +length in the next chapter. Here I pause only to point out that the +plain man does not put the mind into the body quite unequivocally. I +think it would surprise him to be told that a line might be drawn +through two heads in such a way as to transfix two minds. And I +remark, further, that he has no clear idea of what it means for mind to +act upon body or body to act upon mind. How does an immaterial thing +set a material thing in motion? Can it touch it? Can it push it? +Then what does it do? + +But let us pass on to the last two articles of faith mentioned above. + +We all draw the distinction between _substance_ and its _attributes_ or +_qualities_. The distinction was remarked and discussed many centuries +ago, and much has been written upon it. I take up the ruler on my +desk; it is recognized at once as a bit of wood. How? It has such and +such qualities. My paper-knife is of silver. How do I know it? It +has certain other qualities. I speak of my mind. How do I know that I +have a mind? I have sensations and ideas. If I experienced no mental +phenomena of any sort, evidence of the existence of a mind would be +lacking. + +Now, whether I am concerned with the ruler, with the paper-knife, or +with the mind, have I direct evidence of the existence of anything more +than the whole group of qualities? Do I ever perceive the substance? + +In the older philosophy, the substance (_substantia_) was conceived to +be a something not directly perceived, but only inferred to exist--a +something underlying the qualities of things and, as it were, holding +them together. It was believed in by philosophers who were quite ready +to admit that they could not tell anything about it. For example, John +Locke (1632-1704), the English philosopher, holds to it stoutly, and +yet describes it as a mere "we know not what," whose function it is to +hold together the bundles of qualities that constitute the things we +know. + +In the modern philosophy men still distinguish between substance and +qualities. It is a useful distinction, and we could scarcely get on +without it. But an increasing number of thoughtful persons repudiate +the old notion of substance altogether. + +We may, they say, understand by the word "substance" the whole group of +qualities _as a group_--not merely the qualities that are revealed at a +given time, but all those that we have reason to believe a fuller +knowledge would reveal. In short, we may understand by it just what is +left when the "we know not what" of the Lockian has been discarded. + +This notion of substance we may call the more modern one; yet we can +hardly say that it is the notion of the plain man. He does not make +very clear to himself just what is in his thought, but I think we do +him no injustice in maintaining that he is something of a Lockian, even +if he has never heard of Locke. The Lockian substance is, as the +reader has seen, a sort of "unknowable." + +And now for the doctrine that the mind is nonextended and immaterial. +With these affirmations we may heartily agree; but we must admit that +the plain man enunciates them without having a very definite idea of +what the mind is. + +He regards as in his mind all his sensations and ideas, all his +perceptions and mental images of things. Now, suppose I close my eyes +and picture to myself a barber's pole. Where is the image? We say, in +the mind. Is it extended? We feel impelled to answer, No. But it +certainly _seems_ to be extended; the white and the red upon it appear +undeniably side by side. May I assert that this mental image has no +extension whatever? Must I deny to it _parts_, or assert that its +parts are not side by side? + +It seems odd to maintain that a something as devoid of parts as is a +mathematical point should yet appear to have parts and to be extended. +On the other hand, if we allow the image to be extended, how can we +refer it to a nonextended mind? + +To such questions as these, I do not think that the plain man has an +answer. That they can be answered, I shall try to show in the last +section of this chapter. But one cannot answer them until one has +attained to rather a clear conception of what is meant by the mind. + +And until one has attained to such a conception, the statement that the +mind is immaterial must remain rather vague and indefinite. As we saw +above, even the Plotinic soul was inconsistently material rather than +immaterial. It was not excluded from space; it was referred to space +in an absurd way. The mind as common sense conceives it, is the +successor of this Plotinic soul, and seems to keep a flavor of what is +material after all. This will come out in the next chapter, where we +shall discuss mind and body. + +33. THE PSYCHOLOGIST AND THE MIND.--When we ask how the psychologist +conceives of the mind, we must not forget that psychologists are many +and that they differ more or less from each other in their opinions. +When we say "the psychologist" believes this or that, we mean usually +no more than that the opinion referred to is prevalent among men of +that class, or that it is the opinion of those whom we regard as its +more enlightened members. + +Taking the words in this somewhat loose sense, I shall ask what the +psychologist's opinion is touching the four points set forth in the +preceding section. How far does he agree with the plain man? + +(1) There can be no doubt that he refers the mind to the body in some +way, although he may shake his head over the use of the word "in." + +(2) As to whether the mind acts and reacts with matter, in any sense of +the words analogous to that in which they are commonly used, there is a +division in the camp. Some affirm such interaction; some deny it. The +matter will be discussed in the next chapter. + +(3) The psychologist--the more modern one--inclines to repudiate any +substance or substratum of the sort accepted in the Middle Ages and +believed in by many men now. To him the mind is the whole complex of +mental phenomena in their interrelations. In other words, the mind is +not an unknown and indescribable something that is merely inferred; it +is something revealed in consciousness and open to observation. + +(4) The psychologist is certainly not inclined to regard the mind or +any idea belonging to it as material or as extended. But he does +recognize implicitly, if not explicitly, that ideas are composite. To +him, as to the plain man, the image held in the memory or imagination +_seems_ to be extended, and he can distinguish its parts. He does not +do much towards clearing away the difficulty alluded to at the close of +the last section. It remains for the metaphysician to do what he can +with it, and to him we must turn if we wish light upon this obscure +subject. + +34. THE METAPHYSICIAN AND THE MIND.--I have reserved for the next +chapter the first two points mentioned as belonging to the plain man's +doctrine of the mind. In what sense the mind may be said to be in the +body, and how it may be conceived to be related to the body, are topics +that deserve to be treated by themselves in a chapter on "Mind and +Body." Here I shall consider what the metaphysician has to say about +the mind as substance, and about the mind as nonextended and immaterial. + +It has been said that the Lockian substance is really an "unknowable." +No one pretends to have experience of it; it is revealed to no sense; +it is, indeed, a name for a mere nothing, for when we abstract from a +thing, in thought, every single quality, we find that there is left to +us nothing whatever. + +We cannot say that the substance, in this sense of the word, is the +_reality_ of which the qualities are _appearances_. In Chapter V we +saw just what we may legitimately mean by realities and appearances, +and it was made clear that an unknowable of any sort cannot possibly be +the reality to which this or that appearance is referred. Appearances +and realities are experiences which are observed to be related in +certain ways. That which is not open to observation at all, that of +which we have, and can have, no experience, we have no reason to call +the reality of anything. We have, in truth, no reason to talk about it +at all, for we know nothing whatever about it; and when we do talk +about it, it is because we are laboring under a delusion. + +This is equally true whether we are concerned with the substance of +material things or with the substance of minds. An "unknowable" is an +"unknowable" in any case, and we may simply discard it. We lose +nothing by so doing, for one cannot lose what one has never had, and +what, by hypothesis, one can never have. The loss of a mere word +should occasion us no regret. + +Now, we have seen that we do not lose the world of real material things +in rejecting the "Unknowable" (Chapter V). The things are complexes of +qualities, of physical phenomena; and the more we know about these, the +more do we know about real things. + +But we have also seen (Chapter IV) that physical phenomena are not the +only phenomena of which we have experience. We are conscious of mental +phenomena as well, of the phenomena of the subjective order, of +sensations and ideas. Why not admit that these _constitute_ the mind, +as physical phenomena constitute the things which belong to the +external world? + +He who says this says no more than that the mind is known and is +knowable. It is what it is perceived to be; and the more we know of +mental phenomena, the more do we know of the mind. Shall we call the +mind as thus known a _substance_? That depends on the significance +which we give to this word. It is better, perhaps, to avoid it, for it +is fatally easy to slip into the old use of the word, and then to say, +as men have said, that we do not know the mind as it is, but only as it +appears to us to be--that we do not know the reality, but only its +appearances. + +And if we keep clearly before us the view of the mind which I am +advocating, we shall find an easy way out of the difficulties that seem +to confront us when we consider it as nonextended and immaterial. + +Certain complexes of mental phenomena--for example, the barber's pole +above alluded to--certainly appear to be extended. Are they really +extended? If I imagine a tree a hundred feet high, is it really a +hundred feet high? Has it any real size at all? + +Our problem melts away when we realize what we mean by this "real +size." In Chapter V, I have distinguished between apparent space and +real space. Real space is, as was pointed out, the "plan" of the real +physical world. To occupy any portion of real space, a thing must be a +real external thing; that is, the experiences constituting it must +belong to the objective order, they must not be of the class called +mental. We all recognize this, in a way. We know that a real material +foot rule cannot be applied to an imaginary tree. We say, How big did +the tree seen in a dream _seem_; we do not say, How big was it +_really_? If we did ask such a question, we should be puzzled to know +where to look for an answer. + +And this for a very good reason. He who asks: How big was that +imaginary tree really? asks, in effect: How much real space did the +unreal tree fill? The question is a foolish one. It assumes that +phenomena not in the objective order are in the objective order. As +well ask how a color smells or how a sound looks. When we are dealing +with the material we are not dealing with the mental, and we must never +forget this. + +The tree imagined or seen in a dream seems extended. Its extension is +_apparent_ extension, and this apparent extension has no place in the +external world whatever. But we must not confound this apparent +extension with a real mathematical point, and call the tree nonextended +in this sense. If we do this we are still in the old error--we have +not gotten away from real space, but have substituted position in that +space for extension in that space. Nothing mental can have even a +position in real space. To do that it would have to be a real thing in +the sense indicated. + +Let us, then, agree with the plain man in affirming that the mind is +nonextended, but let us avoid misconception. The mind is constituted +of experiences of the subjective order. None of these are in +space--real space. But some of them have apparent extension, and we +must not overlook all that this implies. + +Now for the mind as immaterial. We need not delay long over this +point. If we mean by the mind the phenomena of the subjective order, +and by what is material the phenomena of the objective order, surely we +may and must say that the mind is immaterial. The two classes of +phenomena separate themselves out at once. + + +[1] "The Passions," Articles 34 and 42. + + + + +CHAPTER IX + +MIND AND BODY + +35. IS THE MIND IN THE BODY?--There was a time, as we have seen in the +last chapter (section 30), when it did not seem at all out of the way +to think of the mind as in the body, and very literally in the body. +He who believes the mind to be a breath, or a something composed of +material atoms, can conceive it as being in the body as unequivocally +as chairs can be in a room. Breath can be inhaled and exhaled; atoms +can be in the head, or in the chest, or the heart, or anywhere else in +the animal economy. There is nothing dubious about this sense of the +preposition "in." + +But we have also seen (section 31) that, as soon as men began to +realize that the mind is not material, the question of its presence in +the body became a serious problem. If I say that a chair is in a room, +I say what is comprehensible to every one. It is assumed that it is in +a particular place in the room and is not in some other place. If, +however, I say that the chair is, as a whole, in every part of the room +at once, I seem to talk nonsense. This is what Plotinus and those who +came after him said about the mind. Are their statements any the less +nonsensical because they are talking about minds? When one speaks +about things mental, one must not take leave of good sense and utter +unmeaning phrases. + +If minds are enough like material things to be in anything, they must +be in things in some intelligible sense of the word. It will not do to +say: I use the word "in," but I do not really mean _in_. If the +meaning has disappeared, why continue to use the word? It can only +lead to mystification. + +Descartes seemed to come back to something like an intelligible meaning +when he put the mind in the pineal gland in the brain. Yet, as we have +seen, he clung to the old conception. He could not go back to the +frank materialization of mind. + +And the plain man to-day labors under the same difficulty. He puts the +mind in the body, in the brain, but he does not put it there frankly +and unequivocally. It is in the brain and yet not exactly in the +brain. Let us see if this is not the case. + +If we ask him: Does the man who wags his head move his mind about? does +he who mounts a step raise his mind some inches? does he who sits down +on a chair lower his mind? I think we shall find that he hesitates in +his answers. And if we go on to say: Could a line be so drawn as to +pass through your image of me and my image of you, and to measure their +distance from one another? I think he will say, No. He does not +regard minds and their ideas as existing in space in this fashion. + +Furthermore, it would not strike the plain man as absurd if we said to +him: Were our senses far more acute than they are, it is conceivable +that we should be able to perceive every atom in a given human body, +and all its motions. But would he be willing to admit that an increase +in the sharpness of sense would reveal to us directly the mind +connected with such a body? It is not, then, in the body as the atoms +are. It cannot be seen or touched under any conceivable circumstances. +What can it mean, hence, to say that it is _there_? Evidently, the +word is used in a peculiar sense, and the plain man cannot help us to a +clear understanding of it. + +His position becomes intelligible to us when we realize that he has +inherited the doctrine that the mind is immaterial, and that he +struggles, at the same time, with the tendency so natural to man to +conceive it after the analogy of things material. He thinks of it as +in the body, and, nevertheless, tries to dematerialize this "in." His +thought is sufficiently vague, and is inconsistent, as might be +expected. + +If we will bear in mind what was said in the closing section of the +last chapter, we can help him over his difficulty. That mind and body +are related there can be no doubt. But should we use the word "in" to +express this relation? + +The body is a certain group of phenomena in the objective order; that +is, it is a part of the external world. The mind consists of +experiences in the subjective order. We have seen that no mental +phenomenon can occupy space--real space, the space of the external +world--and that it cannot even have a position in space (section 34). +As mental, it is excluded from the objective order altogether. The +mind is not, then, strictly speaking, _in_ the body, although it is +related to it. It remains, of course, to ask ourselves how we ought to +conceive the relation. This we shall do later in the present chapter. + +But, it may be said, it would sound odd to deny that the mind is in the +body. Does not every one use the expression? What can we substitute +for it? I answer: If it is convenient to use the expression let us +continue to do so. Men must talk so as to be understood. But let us +not perpetuate error, and, as occasion demands it, let us make clear to +ourselves and to others what we have a right to understand by this _in_ +when we use it. + +36. THE DOCTRINE OF THE INTERACTIONIST.--There is no man who does not +know that his mind is related to his body as it is not to other +material things. We open our eyes, and we see things; we stretch out +our hand, and we feel them; our body receives a blow, and we feel pain; +we wish to move, and the muscles are set in motion. + +These things are matters of common experience. We all perceive, in +other words, that there is an interaction, in some sense of the term, +between mind and body. + +But it is important to realize that one may be quite well aware of all +such facts, and yet may have very vague notions of what one means by +body and by mind, and may have no definite theory at all of the sort of +relation that obtains between them. The philosopher tries to attain to +a clearer conception of these things. His task, be it remembered, is +to analyze and explain, not to deny, the experiences which are the +common property of mankind. + +In the present day the two theories of the relation of mind and body +that divide the field between them and stand opposed to each other are +_interactionism_ and _parallelism_. I have used the word "interaction" +a little above in a loose sense to indicate our common experience of +the fact that we become conscious of certain changes brought about in +our body, and that our purposes realize themselves in action. But +every one who accepts this fact is not necessarily an interactionist. +The latter is a man who holds a certain more or less definite theory as +to what is implied by the fact. Let us take a look at his doctrine. + +Physical things interact. A billiard ball in motion strikes one which +has been at rest; the former loses its motion, the latter begins to +roll away. We explain the occurrence by a reference to the laws of +mechanics; that is to say, we point out that it is merely an instance +of the uniform behavior of matter in motion under such and such +circumstances. We distinguish between the state of things at one +instant and the state of things at the next, and we call the former +_cause_ and the latter _effect_. + +It should be observed that both cause and effect here belong to the one +order, the objective order. They have their place in the external +world. Both the balls are material things; their motion, and the space +in which they move, are aspects of the external world. + +If the balls did not exist in the same space, if the motion of the one +could not be towards or away from the other, if contact were +impossible, we would manifestly have no interaction _in the sense of +the word employed above_. As it is, the interaction of physical things +is something that we can describe with a good deal of definiteness. +Things interact in that they stand in certain physical relations, and +undergo changes of relations according to certain laws. + +Now, to one who conceives the mind in a grossly material way, the +relation of mind and body can scarcely seem to be a peculiar problem, +different from the problem of the relation of one physical thing to +another. If my mind consists of atoms disseminated through my body, +its presence in the body appears as unequivocal as the presence of a +dinner in a man who has just risen from the table. Nor can the +interaction of mind and matter present any unusual difficulties, for +mind is matter. Atoms may be conceived to approach each other, to +clash, to rearrange themselves. Interaction of mind and body is +nothing else than an interaction of bodies. One is not forced to give +a new meaning to the word. + +When, however, one begins to think of the mind as immaterial, the case +is very different. How shall we conceive an immaterial thing to be +related to a material one? + +Descartes placed the mind in the pineal gland, and in so far he seemed +to make its relation to the gland similar to that between two material +things. When he tells us that the soul brings it about that the gland +bends in different directions, we incline to view the occurrence as +very natural--is not the soul in the gland? + +But, on the other hand, Descartes also taught that the essence of mind +is _thought_ and the essence of body is _extension_. He made the two +natures so different from each other that men began to ask themselves +how the two things could interact at all. The mind wills, said one +philosopher, but that volition does not set matter in motion; when the +mind wills, God brings about the appropriate change in material things. +The mind perceives things, said another, but that is not because they +affect it directly; it sees things in God. Ideas and things, said a +third, constitute two independent series; no idea can cause a change in +things, and no thing can cause a change in ideas. + +The interactionist is a man who refuses to take any such turn as these +philosophers. His doctrine is much nearer to that of Descartes than it +is to any of theirs. He uses the one word "interaction" to describe +the relation between material things and also the relation between mind +and body, nor does he dwell upon the difference between the two. He +insists that mind and matter stand in the one causal nexus; that a +change in the outside world may be the _cause_ of a perception coming +into being in a mind, and that a volition may be the _cause_ of changes +in matter. + +What shall we call the plain man? I think we may call him an +interactionist in embryo. The stick in his hand knocks an apple off of +the tree; his hand seems to him to be set in motion because he wills +it. The relation between his volition and the motion of his hand +appears to him to be of much the same sort as that between the motion +of the stick and the fall of the apple. In each case he thinks he has +to do with the relation of cause and effect. + +The opponent of the interactionist insists, however, that the plain man +is satisfied with this view of the matter only because he has not +completely stripped off the tendency to conceive the mind as a material +thing. And he accuses the interactionist of having fallen a prey to +the same weakness. + +Certainly, it is not difficult to show that the interactionists write +as though the mind were material, and could be somewhere in space. The +late Dr. McCosh fairly represents the thought of many, and he was +capable of expressing himself as follows;[1] "It may be difficult to +ascertain the exact point or surface at which the mind and body come +together and influence each other, in particular, how far into the body +(Descartes without proof thought it to be in the pineal gland), but it +is certain, that when they do meet mind knows body as having its +essential properties of extension and resisting energy." + +How can an immaterial thing be located at some point or surface within +the body? How can a material thing and an immaterial thing "come +together" at a point or surface? And if they cannot come together, +what have we in mind when we say they interact? + +The parallelist, for it is he who opposes interactionism, insists that +we must not forget that mental phenomena do not belong to the same +order as physical phenomena. He points out that, when we make the word +"interaction" cover the relations of mental phenomena to physical +phenomena as well as the relations of the latter to each other, we are +assimilating heedlessly facts of two different kinds and are +obliterating an important distinction. He makes the same objection to +calling the relations between mental phenomena and physical phenomena +_causal_. If the relation of a volition to the movement of the arm is +not the same as that of a physical cause to its physical effect, why, +he argues, do you disguise the difference by calling them by the same +name? + +37. THE DOCTRINE OF THE PARALLELIST.--Thus, the parallelist is a man +who is so impressed by the gulf between physical facts and mental facts +that he refuses to regard them as parts of the one order of causes and +effects. You cannot, he claims, make a single chain out of links so +diverse. + +Some part of a human body receives a blow; a message is carried along a +sensory nerve and reaches the brain; from the brain a message is sent +out along a motor nerve to a group of muscles; the muscles contract, +and a limb is set in motion. The immediate effects of the blow, the +ingoing message, the changes in the brain, the outgoing message, the +contraction of the muscles--all these are physical facts. One and all +may be described as motions in matter. + +But the man who received the blow becomes conscious that he was struck, +and both interactionist and parallelist regard him as becoming +conscious of it when the incoming message reaches some part of the +brain. What shall be done with this consciousness? The interactionist +insists that it must be regarded as a link in the physical chain of +causes and effects--he breaks the chain to insert it. The parallelist +maintains that it is inconceivable that such an insertion should be +made. He regards the physical series as complete in itself, and he +places the consciousness, as it were, on a _parallel_ line. + +It must not be supposed that he takes this figure literally. It is his +effort to avoid materializing the mind that forces him to hold the +position which he does. To put the mind in the brain is to make of it +a material thing; to make it parallel to the brain, in the literal +sense of the word, would be just as bad. All that we may understand +him to mean is that mental phenomena and physical, although they are +related, cannot be built into the one series of causes and effects. He +is apt to speak of them as _concomitant_. + +We must not forget that neither parallelist nor interactionist ever +dreams of repudiating our common experiences of the relations of mental +phenomena and physical. Neither one will, if he is a man of sense, +abandon the usual ways of describing such experiences. Whatever his +theory, he will still say: I am suffering because I struck my hand +against that table; I sat down because I chose to do so. His doctrine +is not supposed to deny the truth contained in such statements; it is +supposed only to give a fuller understanding of it. Hence, we cannot +condemn either doctrine simply by an uncritical appeal to such +statements and to the experiences they represent. We must look much +deeper. + +Now, what can the parallelist mean by _referring_ sensations and ideas +to the brain and yet denying that they are _in_ the brain? What is +this reference? + +Let us come back to the experiences of the physical and the mental as +they present themselves to the plain man. They have been discussed at +length in Chapter IV. It was there pointed out that every one +distinguishes without difficulty between sensations and things, and +that every one recognizes explicitly or implicitly that a sensation is +an experience referred in a certain way to the body. + +When the eyes are open, we _see_; when the ears are open, we _hear_; +when the hand is laid on things, we _feel_. How do we know that we are +experiencing sensations? The setting tells us that. The experience in +question is given together with an experience of the body. This is +_concomitance of the mental and the physical_ as it appears in the +experience of us all; and from such experiences as these the +philosopher who speaks of the concomitance of physical and mental +phenomena must draw the whole meaning of the word. + +Let us here sharpen a little the distinction between sensations and +things. Standing at some distance from the tree, I see an apple fall +to the ground. Were I only half as far away, my experience would not +be exactly the same--I should have somewhat different sensations. As +we have seen (section 17), the apparent sizes of things vary as we +move, and this means that the quantity of sensation, when I observe the +apple from a nearer point, is greater. The man of science tells me +that the image which the object looked at projects upon the retina of +the eye grows larger as we approach objects. The thing, then, may +remain unchanged; our sensations will vary according to the impression +which is made upon our body. + +Again. When I have learned something of physics, I am ready to admit +that, although light travels with almost inconceivable rapidity, still, +its journey through space does take time. Hence the impression made +upon my eye by the falling apple is not simultaneous with the fall +itself; and if I stand far away it is made a little later than when I +am near. In the case in point the difference is so slight as to pass +unnoticed, but there are cases in which it seems apparent even to the +unlearned that sensations arise later than the occurrences of which we +take them to be the report. + +Thus, I stand on a hill and watch a laborer striking with his sledge +upon the distant railway. I hear the sound of the blow while I see his +tool raised above his head. I account for this by saying that it has +taken some time for the sound-waves to reach my ear, and I regard my +sensation as arising only when this has been accomplished. + +But this conclusion is not judged sufficiently accurate by the man of +science. The investigations of the physiologist and the psychologist +have revealed that the brain holds a peculiar place in the economy of +the body. If the nerve which connects the sense organ with the brain +be severed, the sensation does not arise. Injuries to the brain affect +the mental life as injuries to other parts of the body do not. Hence, +it is concluded that, to get the real time of the emergence of a +sensation, we must not inquire merely when an impression was made upon +the organ of sense, but must determine when the message sent along the +nerve has reached some part of the brain. The resulting brain change +is regarded as the true concomitant of the sensation. If there is a +brain change of a certain kind, there is the corresponding sensation. +It need hardly be said that no one knows as yet much about the brain +motions which are supposed to be concomitants of sensations, although a +good deal is said about them. + +It is very important to remark that in all this no new meaning has been +given to the word "concomitance." The plain man remarks that +sensations and their changes must be referred to the body. With the +body disposed in a certain way, he has sensations of a certain kind; +with changes in the body, the sensations change. He does not perceive +the sensations to be in the body. As I recede from a house I have a +whole series of visual experiences differing from each other and ending +in a faint speck which bears little resemblance to the experience with +which I started. I have had, as we say, a series of sensations, or +groups of such. Did any single group, did the experience which I had +at any single moment, seem to me to be _in my body_? Surely not. Its +relation to my body is other than that. + +And when the man of science, instead of referring sensations vaguely to +the body, refers them to the brain, the reference is of precisely the +same nature. From our common experience of the relation of the +physical and the mental he starts out. He has no other ground on which +to stand. He can only mark the reference with greater exactitude. + +I have been speaking of the relation of sensations to the brain. It is +scarcely necessary for me to show that all other mental phenomena must +be referred to the brain as well, and that the reference must be of the +same nature. The considerations which lead us to refer ideas to the +brain are set forth in our physiologies and psychologies. The effects +of cerebral disease, injuries to the brain, etc., are too well known to +need mention; and it is palpably as absurd to put ideas in the brain as +it is to put sensations there. + +Now, the parallelist, if he be a wise man, will not attempt to +_explain_ the reference of mental phenomena to the brain--to _explain_ +the relation between mind and matter. The relation appears to be +unique. Certainly it is not identical with the relation between two +material things. We explain things, in the common acceptation of the +word, when we show that a case under consideration is an +exemplification of some general law--when we show, in other words, that +it does not stand alone. But this does stand alone, and is admitted to +stand alone. We admit as much when we say that the mind is immaterial, +and yet hold that it is related to the body. We cannot, then, ask for +an _explanation_ of the relation. + +But this does not mean that the reference of mental phenomena to the +body is a meaningless expression. We can point to those experiences of +concomitance that we all have, distinguish them carefully from +relations of another kind, and say: This is what the word means, +whether it be used by the plain man or by the man of science. + +I have said above: "If there is a brain change of a certain kind, there +is the corresponding sensation." Perhaps the reader will feel inclined +to say here: If you can say as much as this, why can you not go a +little farther and call the brain change the _cause_ of the sensation? + +But he who speaks thus, forgets what has been said above about the +uniqueness of the relation. In the objective order of our experiences, +in the external world, we can distinguish between antecedents and +consequents, between causes and their effects. The causes and their +effects belong to the one order, they stand in the same series. The +relation of the physical to the mental is, as we have seen, a different +relation. Hence, the parallelist seems justified in objecting to the +assimilation of the two. He prefers the word "concomitance," just +because it marks the difference. He does not mean to indicate that the +relation is any the less uniform or dependable when he denies that it +is causal. + +38. IN WHAT SENSE MENTAL PHENOMENA HAVE A TIME AND PLACE.--We have seen +in Chapters VI and VII what space and time--real space and time--are. +They are the plan of the real external world and its changes; they are +aspects of the objective order of experience. + +To this order no mental phenomenon can belong. It cannot, as we have +seen (section 35), occupy any portion of space or even have a location +in space. It is equally true that no series of mental changes can +occupy any portion of time, real time, or even fill a single moment in +the stream of time. There are many persons to whom this latter +statement will seem difficult of acceptance; but the relation of mental +phenomena to space and to time is of the same sort, and we can consider +the two together. + +Psychologists speak unhesitatingly of the localization of sensations in +the brain, and they talk as readily of the moment at which a sensation +arises and of the duration of the sensation. What can they mean by +such expressions? + +We have seen that sensations are not in the brain, and their +localization means only the determination of their concomitant physical +phenomena, of the corresponding brain-change. And it ought to be clear +even from what has been said above that, in determining the moment at +which a sensation arises, we are determining only the time of the +concomitant brain process. Why do we say that a sensation arises later +than the moment at which an impression is made upon the organ of sense +and earlier than the resulting movement of some group of muscles? +Because the change in the brain, to which we refer the sensation, +occurs later than the one and earlier than the other. This has a place +in real time, it belongs to that series of world changes whose +succession constitutes real time. If we ask _when_ anything happened, +we always refer to this series of changes. We try to determine its +place in the world order. + +Thus, we ask: When was Julius Caesar born? We are given a year and a +day. How is the time which has elapsed since measured? By changes in +the physical world, by revolutions of the earth about the sun. We ask: +When did he conceive the plan of writing his Commentaries? If we get +an answer at all, it must be an answer of the same kind--some point in +the series of physical changes which occur in real time must be +indicated. Where else should we look for an answer? In point of fact, +we never do look elsewhere. + +Again. We have distinguished between apparent space and real space +(section 34). We have seen that, when we deny that a mental image can +occupy any portion of space, we need not think of it as losing its +parts and shrivelling to a point. We may still attribute to it +apparent space; may affirm that it seems extended. Let us mark the +same distinction when we consider time. The psychologist speaks of the +duration of a sensation. Has it real duration? It is not in time at +all, and, of course, it cannot, strictly speaking, occupy a portion of +time. But we can try to measure the duration of the physical +concomitant, and call this the real duration of the sensation. + +We all distinguish between the real time of mental phenomena, in the +sense indicated just above, and the apparent time. We know very well +that the one may give us no true measure of the other. A sermon +_seems_ long; was it _really_ long? There is only one way of measuring +its real length. We must refer to the clock, to the sun, to some +change in the physical world. We _seem_ to live years in a dream; was +the dream _really_ a long one? The real length can only be determined, +if at all, by a physical reference. Those apparent years of the dream +have no place in the real time which is measured by the clock. We do +not have to cut it and insert them somewhere. They belong to a +different order, and cannot be inserted any more than the thought of a +patch can be inserted in a rent in a real coat. + +We see, thus, when we reflect upon the matter, that mental phenomena +cannot, strictly speaking, be said to have a time and place. He who +attributes these to them materializes them. But their physical +concomitants have a time and place, and mental phenomena can be +ordered by a reference to these. They can be assigned a time and +place of existing in a special sense of the words not to be confounded +with the sense in which we use them when we speak of the time and place +of material things. This makes it possible to relate every mental +phenomenon to the world system in a definite way, and to distinguish it +clearly from every other, however similar. + +We need not, when we come to understand this, change our usual modes of +speech. We may still say: The pain I had two years ago is like the +pain I have to-day; my sensation came into being at such a moment; my +regret lasted two days. We speak that we may be understood; and such +phrases express a truth, even if they are rather loose and inaccurate. +But we must not be deceived by such phrases, and assume that they mean +what they have no right to mean. + +39. OBJECTIONS TO PARALLELISM.--What objections can be brought against +parallelism? It is sometimes objected by the interactionist that it +abandons the plain man's notion of the mind as a substance with its +attributes, and makes of it a mere collection of mental phenomena. It +must be admitted that the parallelist usually holds a view which +differs rather widely from that of the unlearned. + +But even supposing this objection well taken, it can no longer be +regarded as an objection specifically to the doctrine of parallelism, +for the view of the mind in question is becoming increasingly popular, +and it is now held by influential interactionists as well as by +parallelists. One may believe that the mind consists of ideas, and may +still hold that ideas can cause motions in matter. + +There is, however, another objection that predisposes many thoughtful +persons to reject parallelism uncompromisingly. It is this. If we +admit that the chain of physical causes and effects, from a blow given +to the body to the resulting muscular movements made in self-defense, +is an unbroken one, what part can we assign to the mind in the whole +transaction? Has it _done_ anything? Is it not reduced to the +position of a passive spectator? Must we not regard man as "a physical +automaton with parallel psychical states"? + +Such an account of man cannot fail to strike one as repugnant; and yet +it is the parallelist himself whom we must thank for introducing us to +it. The account is not a caricature from the pen of an opponent. "An +automaton," writes Professor Clifford,[2] "is a thing that goes by +itself when it is wound up, and we go by ourselves when we have had +food. Excepting the fact that other men are conscious, there is no +reason why we should not regard the human body as merely an exceedingly +complicated machine which is wound up by putting food into the mouth. +But it is not _merely_ a machine, because consciousness goes with it. +The mind, then, is to be regarded as a stream of feelings which runs +parallel to, and simultaneous with, a certain part of the action of the +body, that is to say, that particular part of the action of the brain +in which the cerebrum and the sensory tracts are excited." + +The saving statement that the body is not _merely_ a machine, because +consciousness goes with it, does not impress one as being sufficient to +redeem the illustration. Who wants to be an automaton with an +accompanying consciousness? Who cares to regard his mind as an +"epiphenomenon"--a thing that exists, but whose existence or +nonexistence makes no difference to the course of affairs? + +The plain man's objection to such an account of himself seems to be +abundantly justified. As I have said earlier in this chapter, neither +interactionist nor parallelist has the intention of repudiating the +experience of world and mind common to us all. We surely have evidence +enough to prove that minds count for something. No house was ever +built, no book was ever written, by a creature without a mind; and the +better the house or book, the better the mind. _That_ there is a fixed +and absolutely dependable relation between the planning mind and the +thing accomplished, no man of any school has the right to deny. The +only legitimate question is: _What is the nature_ of the relation? Is +it _causal_, or should it be conceived to be _something else_? + +The whole matter will be more fully discussed in Chapter XI. This +chapter I shall close with a brief summary of the points which the +reader will do well to bear in mind when he occupies himself with +parallelism. + +(1) Parallelism is a protest against the interactionist's tendency to +materialize the mind. + +(2) The name is a figurative expression, and must not be taken +literally. The true relation between mental phenomena and physical is +given in certain common experiences that have been indicated, and it is +a unique relation. + +(3) It is a fixed and absolutely dependable relation. It is impossible +that there should be a particular mental fact without its corresponding +physical fact; and it is impossible that this physical fact should +occur without its corresponding mental fact. + +(4) The parallelist objects to calling this relation _causal_, because +this obscures the distinction between it and the relation between facts +both of which are physical. He prefers the word "concomitance." + +(5) Such objections to parallelism as that cited above assume that the +concomitance of which the parallelist speaks is analogous to physical +concomitance. The chemist puts together a volume of hydrogen gas and a +volume of chlorine gas, and the result is two volumes of hydrochloric +acid gas. We regard it as essential to the result that there should be +the two gases and that they should be brought together. But the fact +that the chemist has red hair we rightly look upon as a concomitant +phenomenon of no importance. The result would be the same if he had +black hair or were bald. But this is not the concomitance that +interests the parallelist. The two sorts of concomitance are alike +only in the one point. Some phenomenon is regarded as excluded from +the series of causes and effects under discussion. On the other hand, +the difference between the two is all-important; in the one case, the +concomitant phenomenon is an accidental circumstance that might just as +well be absent; in the other, it is nothing of the sort; it _cannot_ be +absent--the mental fact _must_ exist if the brain-change in question +exists. + +It is quite possible that, on reading this list of points, one may be +inclined to make two protests. + +First: Is a parallelism so carefully guarded as this properly called +_parallelism_ at all? To this I answer: The name matters little. I +have used it because I have no better term. Certainly, it is not the +parallelism which is sometimes brought forward, and which peeps out +from the citation from Clifford. It is nothing more than an insistence +upon the truth that we should not treat the mind as though it were a +material thing. If any one wishes to take the doctrine and discard the +name, I have no objection. As so guarded, the doctrine is, I think, +true. + +Second: If it is desirable to avoid the word "cause," in speaking of +the relation of the mental and the physical, on the ground that +otherwise we give the word a double sense, why is it not desirable to +avoid the word "concomitance"? Have we not seen that the word is +ambiguous? I admit the inconsistency and plead in excuse only that I +have chosen the lesser of two evils. It is fatally easy to slip into +the error of thinking of the mind as though it were material and had a +place in the physical world. In using the word "concomitance" I enter +a protest against this. But I have, of course, no right to use it +without showing just what kind of concomitance I mean. + + +[1] "First and Fundamental Truths," Book I, Part II, Chapter II. New +York, 1889. + +[2] "Lectures and Essays," Vol. II, p. 57. London, 1879. + + + + +CHAPTER X + +HOW WE KNOW THERE ARE OTHER MINDS + +40. IS IT CERTAIN THAT WE KNOW IT?--I suppose there is no man in his +sober senses who seriously believes that no other mind than his own +exists. There is, to be sure, an imaginary being more or less +discussed by those interested in philosophy, a creature called the +Solipsist, who is credited with this doctrine. But men do not become +solipsists, though they certainly say things now and then that other +men think logically lead to some such unnatural view of things; and +more rarely they say things that sound as if the speaker, in some +moods, at least, might actually harbor such a view. + +Thus the philosopher Fichte (1762-1814) talks in certain of his +writings as though he believed himself to be the universe, and his +words cause Jean Paul Richter, the inimitable, to break out in his +characteristic way: "The very worst of it all is the lazy, aimless, +aristocratic, insular life that a god must lead; he has no one to go +with. If I am not to sit still for all time and eternity, if I let +myself down as well as I can and make myself finite, that I may have +something in the way of society, still I have, like petty princes, only +my own creatures to echo my words. . . . Every being, even the highest +Being, wishes something to love and to honor. But the Fichtean +doctrine that I am my own body-maker leaves me with nothing +whatever--with not so much as the beggar's dog or the prisoner's +spider. . . . Truly I wish that there were men, and that I were one of +them. . . . If there exists, as I very much fear, no one but myself, +unlucky dog that I am, then there is no one at such a pass as I." + +Just how much Fichte's words meant to the man who wrote them may be a +matter for dispute. Certainly no one has shown a greater moral +earnestness or a greater regard for his fellowmen than this +philosopher, and we must not hastily accuse any one of being a +solipsist. But that to certain men, and, indeed, to many men, there +have come thoughts that have seemed to point in this direction--that +not a few have had doubts as to their ability to _prove_ the existence +of other minds--this we must admit. + +It appears somewhat easier for a man to have doubts upon this subject +when he has fallen into the idealistic error of regarding the material +world, which seems to be revealed to him, as nothing else than his +"ideas" or "sensations" or "impressions." If we will draw the whole +"telephone exchange" into the clerk, there seems little reason for not +including all the subscribers as well. If other men's bodies are my +sensations, may not other men's minds be my imaginings? But doubts may +be felt also by those who are willing to admit a real external world. +How do we know that our inference to the existence of other minds is a +justifiable inference? Can there be such a thing as _verification_ in +this field? + +For we must remember that no man is directly conscious of any mind +except his own. Men cannot exhibit their minds to their neighbors as +they exhibit their wigs. However close may seem to us to be our +intercourse with those about us, do we ever attain to anything more +than our ideas of the contents of their minds? We do not experience +these contents; we picture them, we represent them by certain proxies. +To be sure, we believe that the originals exist, but can we be quite +sure of it? Can there be a _proof_ of this right to make the leap from +one consciousness to another? We seem to assume that we can make it, +and then we make it again and again; but suppose, after all, that there +were nothing there. Could we ever find out our error? And in a field +where it is impossible to prove error, must it not be equally +impossible to prove truth? + +The doubt has seemed by no means a gratuitous one to certain very +sensible practical men. "It is wholly impossible," writes Professor +Huxley,[1] "absolutely to prove the presence or absence of +consciousness in anything but one's own brain, though by analogy, we +are justified in assuming its existence in other men." "The existence +of my conception of you in my consciousness," says Clifford,[2] +"carries with it a belief in the existence of you outside of my +consciousness. . . . How this inference is justified, how +consciousness can testify to the existence of anything outside of +itself, I do not pretend to say: I need not untie a knot which the +world has cut for me long ago. It may very well be that I myself am +the only existence, but it is simply ridiculous to suppose that anybody +else is. The position of absolute idealism may, therefore, be left out +of count, although each individual may be unable to justify his dissent +from it." + +These are writers belonging to our own modern age, and they are men of +science. Both of them deny that the existence of other minds is a +thing that can be _proved_; but the one tells us that we are "justified +in assuming" their existence, and the other informs us that, although +"it may very well be" that no other mind exists, we may leave that +possibility out of count. + +Neither position seems a sensible one. Are we justified in assuming +what cannot be proved? or is the argument "from analogy" really a proof +of some sort? Is it right to close our eyes to what "may very well +be," just because we choose to do so? The fact is that both of these +writers had the conviction, shared by us all, that there are other +minds, and that we know something about them; and yet neither of them +could see that the conviction rested upon an unshakable foundation. + +Now, I have no desire to awake in the mind of any one a doubt of the +existence of other minds. But I think we must all admit that the man +who recognizes that such minds are not directly perceived, and who +harbors doubts as to the nature of the inference which leads to their +assumption, may, perhaps, be able to say that _he feels certain_ that +there are other minds; but must we not at the same time admit that he +is scarcely in a position to say: _it is certain_ that there are other +minds? The question will keep coming back again: May there not, after +all, be a legitimate doubt on the subject? + +To set this question at rest there seems to be only one way, and that +is this: to ascertain the nature of the inference which is made, and to +see clearly what can be meant by _proof_ when one is concerned with +such matters as these. If it turns out that we have proof, in the only +sense of the word in which it is reasonable to ask for proof, our doubt +falls away of itself. + +41. THE ARGUMENT FOR OTHER MINDS.--I have said early in this volume +(section 7) that the plain man perceives that other men act very much +as he does, and that he attributes to them minds more or less like his +own. He reasons from like to like--other bodies present phenomena +which, in the case of his own body, he perceives to be indicative of +mind, and he accepts them as indicative of mind there also. The +psychologist makes constant use of this inference; indeed, he could not +develop his science without it. + +John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), whom it is always a pleasure to read +because he is so clear and straightforward, presents this argument in +the following form:[3]-- + +"By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to +believe, that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking +and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and +thoughts, or, in other words, possess Minds? The most strenuous +Intuitionist does not include this among the things that I know by +direct intuition. I conclude it from certain things, which my +experience of my own states of feeling proves to me to be marks of it. +These marks are of two kinds, antecedent and subsequent; the previous +conditions requisite for feeling, and the effects or consequences of +it. I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, +first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be +the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they +exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know +by experience to be caused by feelings. I am conscious in myself of a +series of facts connected by a uniform sequence, of which the beginning +is modifications of my body, the middle is feelings, the end is outward +demeanor. In the case of other human beings I have the evidence of my +senses for the first and last links of the series, but not for the +intermediate link. I find, however, that the sequence between the +first and last is as regular and constant in those other cases as it is +in mine. In my own case I know that the first link produces the last +through the intermediate link, and could not produce it without. +Experience, therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an +intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in +myself, or a different one. I must either believe them to be alive, or +to be automatons; and by believing them to be alive, that is, by +supposing the link to be of the same nature as in the case of which I +have experience, and which is in all respects similar, I bring other +human beings, as phenomena, under the same generalizations which I know +by experience to be the true theory of my own existence. And in doing +so I conform to the legitimate rules of experimental inquiry. The +process is exactly parallel to that by which Newton proved that the +force which keeps the planets in their orbits is identical with that by +which an apple falls to the ground. It was not incumbent on Newton to +prove the impossibility of its being any other force; he was thought to +have made out his point when he had simply shown that no other force +need be supposed. We know the existence of other beings by +generalization from the knowledge of our own; the generalization merely +postulates that what experience shows to be a mark of the existence of +something within the sphere of our consciousness, may be concluded to +be a mark of the same thing beyond that sphere." + +Now, the plain man accepts the argument from analogy, here insisted +upon, every day of his life. He is continually forming an opinion as +to the contents of other minds on a basis of the bodily manifestations +presented to his view. The process of inference is so natural and +instinctive that we are tempted to say that it hardly deserves to be +called an inference. Certainly the man is not conscious of distinct +steps in the process; he perceives certain phenomena, and they are at +once illuminated by their interpretation. He reads other men as we +read a book--the signs on the paper are scarcely attended to, our whole +thought is absorbed in that for which they stand. As I have said +above, the psychologist accepts the argument, and founds his +conclusions upon it. + +Upon what ground can one urge that this inference to other minds is a +doubtful one? It is made universally. We have seen that even those +who have theoretic objections against it, do not hesitate to draw it, +as a matter of fact. It appears unnatural in the extreme to reject it. +What can induce men to regard it with suspicion? + +I think the answer to this question is rather clearly suggested in the +sentence already quoted from Professor Huxley: "It is wholly +impossible absolutely to prove the presence or absence of consciousness +in anything but one's own brain, though, by analogy, we are justified +in assuming its existence in other men." + +Here Professor Huxley admits that we have something like a proof, for +he regards the inference as _justified_. But he does not think that we +have _absolute proof_--the best that we can attain to appears to be a +degree of probability falling short of the certainty which we should +like to have. + +Now, it should be remarked that the discredit cast upon the argument +for other minds has its source in the fact that it does not satisfy a +certain assumed standard. What is that standard? It is the standard +of proof which we may look for and do look for where we are concerned +to establish the existence of material things with the highest degree +of certainty. + +There are all sorts of indirect ways of proving the existence of +material things. We may read about them in a newspaper, and regard +them as highly doubtful; we may have the word of a man whom, on the +whole, we regard as veracious; we may infer their existence, because we +perceive that certain other things exist, and are to be accounted for. +Under certain circumstances, however, we may have proof of a different +kind: we may see and touch the things themselves. Material things are +open to direct inspection. Such a direct inspection constitutes +_absolute proof_, so far as material things are concerned. + +But we have no right to set this up as our standard of absolute proof, +when we are talking about other minds. In this field it is not proof +at all. Anything that can be directly inspected is not another mind. +We cannot cast a doubt upon the existence of colors by pointing to the +fact that we cannot smell them. If they could be smelt, they would not +be colors. We must in each case seek a proof of the appropriate kind. + +What have we a right to regard as absolute proof of the existence of +another mind? Only this: the analogy upon which we depend in making +our inference must be a very close one. As we shall see in the next +section, the analogy is sometimes very remote, and we draw the +inference with much hesitation, or, perhaps, refuse to draw it at all. +It is not, however, the _kind of inference_ that makes the trouble; it +is the lack of detailed information that may serve as a basis for +inference. Our inference to other minds is unsatisfactory only in so +far as we are ignorant of our own minds and bodies and of other bodies. +Were our knowledge in these fields complete, we should know without +fail the signs of mind, and should know whether an inference were or +were not justified. + +And _justified_ here means proved--proved in the only sense in which we +have a right to ask for proof. No single fact is known that can +discredit such a proof. Our doubt is, then, gratuitous and can be +dismissed. We may claim that we have _verification_ of the existence +of other minds. Such verification, however, must consist in showing +that, in any given instance, the signs of mind really are present. It +cannot consist in presenting minds for inspection as though they were +material things. + +One more matter remains to be touched upon in this section. It has +doubtless been observed that Mill, in the extract given above, seems to +place "feelings," in other words, mental phenomena, between one set of +bodily motions and another. He makes them the middle link in a chain +whose first and third links are material. The parallelist cannot treat +mind in this way. He claims that to make mental phenomena effects or +causes of bodily motions is to make them material. + +Must, then, the parallelist abandon the argument for other minds? Not +at all. The force of the argument lies in interpreting the phenomena +presented by other bodies as one knows by experience the phenomena of +one's own body must be interpreted. He who concludes that the relation +between his own mind and his own body can best be described as a +"parallelism," must judge that other men's minds are related to their +bodies in the same way. He must treat his neighbor as he treats +himself. The argument from analogy remains the same. + +42. WHAT OTHER MINDS ARE THERE?--That other men have minds nobody +really doubts, as we have seen above. They resemble us so closely, +their actions are so analogous to our own, that, although we sometimes +give ourselves a good deal of trouble to ascertain what sort of minds +they have, we never think of asking ourselves whether they have minds. + +Nor does it ever occur to the man who owns a dog, or who drives a +horse, to ask himself whether the creature has a mind. He may complain +that it has not much of a mind, or he may marvel at its +intelligence--his attitude will depend upon the expectations which he +has been led to form. But regard the animal as he would regard a +bicycle or an automobile, he will not. The brute is not precisely like +us, but its actions bear an unmistakable analogy to our own; pleasure +and pain, hope and fear, desire and aversion, are so plainly to be read +into them that we feel that a man must be "high gravel blind" not to +see their significance. + +Nevertheless, it has been possible for man, under the prepossession of +a mistaken philosophical theory, to assume the whole brute creation to +be without consciousness. When Descartes had learned something of the +mechanism of the human body, and had placed the human soul--_hospes +comesque corporis_--in the little pineal gland in the midst of the +brain, the conception in his mind was not unlike that which we have +when we picture to ourselves a locomotive engine with an engineer in +its cab. The man gives intelligent direction; but, under some +circumstances, the machine can do a good deal in the absence of the +man; if it is started, it can run of itself, and to do this, it must go +through a series of complicated motions. + +Descartes knew that many of the actions performed by the human body are +not the result of conscious choice, and that some of them are in direct +contravention of the will's commands. The eye protects itself by +dropping its lid, when the hand is brought suddenly before it; the foot +jerks away from the heated object which it has accidentally touched. +The body was seen to be a mechanism relatively independent of the mind, +and one rather complete in itself. Joined with a soul, the circle of +its functions was conceived to be widened; but even without the +assistance of the soul, it was thought that it could keep itself busy, +and could do many things that the unreflective might be inclined to +attribute to the efficiency of the mind. + +The bodies of the brutes Descartes regarded as mechanisms of the same +general nature as the human body. He was unwilling to allow a soul to +any creature below man, so nothing seemed left to him save to maintain +that the brutes are machines without consciousness, and that their +apparently purposive actions are to be classed with such human +movements as the sudden closing of the eye when it is threatened with +the hand. The melancholy results of this doctrine made themselves +evident among his followers. Even the mild and pious Malebranche could +be brutal to a dog which fawned upon him, under the mistaken notion +that it did not really hurt a dog to kick it. + +All this reasoning men have long ago set aside. For one thing, it has +come to be recognized that there may be consciousness, perhaps rather +dim, blind, and fugitive, but still consciousness, which does not get +itself recognized as do our clearly conscious purposes and volitions. +Many of the actions of man which Descartes was inclined to regard as +unaccompanied by consciousness may not, in fact, be really unconscious. +And, in the second place, it has come to be realized that we have no +right to class all the actions of the brutes with those reflex actions +in man which we are accustomed to regard as automatic. + +The belief in animal automatism has passed away, it is to be hoped, +never to return. That lower animals have minds we must believe. But +what sort of minds have they? + +It is hard enough to gain an accurate notion of what is going on in a +human mind. Men resemble each other more or less closely, but no two +are precisely alike, and no two have had exactly the same training. I +may misunderstand even the man who lives in the same house with me and +is nearly related to me. Does he really suffer and enjoy as acutely as +he seems to? or must his words and actions be accepted with a discount? +The greater the difference between us, the more danger that I shall +misjudge him. It is to be expected that men should misunderstand +women; that men and women should misunderstand children; that those who +differ in social station, in education, in traditions and habits of +life, should be in danger of reading each other as one reads a book in +a tongue imperfectly mastered. When these differences are very great, +the task is an extremely difficult one. What are the emotions, if he +has any, of the Chinaman in the laundry near by? His face seems as +difficult of interpretation as are the hieroglyphics that he has pasted +up on his window. + +When we come to the brutes, the case is distinctly worse. We think +that we can attain to some notion of the minds to be attributed to such +animals as the ape, the dog, the cat, the horse, and it is not nonsense +to speak of an animal psychology. But who will undertake to tell us +anything definite of the mind of a fly, a grasshopper, a snail, or a +cuttlefish? That they have minds, or something like minds, we must +believe; what their minds are like, a prudent man scarcely even +attempts to say. In our distribution of minds may we stop short of +even the very lowest animal organisms? It seems arbitrary to do so. + +More than that; some thoughtful men have been led by the analogy +between plant life and animal life to believe that something more or +less remotely like the consciousness which we attribute to animals must +be attributed also to plants. Upon this belief I shall not dwell, for +here we are evidently at the limit of our knowledge, and are making the +vaguest of guesses. No one pretends that we have even the beginnings +of a plant psychology. At the same time, we must admit that organisms +of all sorts do bear some analogy to each other, even if it be a remote +one; and we must admit also that we cannot _prove_ plants to be wholly +devoid of a rudimentary consciousness of some sort. + +As we begin with man and descend the scale of beings, we seem, in the +upper part of the series, to be in no doubt that minds exist. Our only +question is as to the precise contents of those minds. Further down we +begin to ask ourselves whether anything like mind is revealed at all. +That this should be so is to be expected. Our argument for other minds +is the argument from analogy, and as we move down the scale our analogy +grows more and more remote until it seems to fade out altogether. He +who harbors doubts as to whether the plants enjoy some sort of psychic +life, may well find those doubts intensified when he turns to study the +crystal; and when he contemplates inorganic matter he should admit that +the thread of his argument has become so attenuated that he cannot find +it at all. + +43. THE DOCTRINE OF MIND-STUFF.--Nevertheless, there have been those +who have attributed something like consciousness even to inorganic +matter. If the doctrine of evolution be true, argues Professor +Clifford,[4] "we shall have along the line of the human pedigree a +series of imperceptible steps connecting inorganic matter with +ourselves. To the later members of that series we must undoubtedly +ascribe consciousness, although it must, of course, have been simpler +than our own. But where are we to stop? In the case of organisms of a +certain complexity, consciousness is inferred. As we go back along the +line, the complexity of the organism and of its nerve-action insensibly +diminishes; and for the first part of our course we see reason to think +that the complexity of consciousness insensibly diminishes also. But +if we make a jump, say to the tunicate mollusks, we see no reason there +to infer the existence of consciousness at all. Yet not only is it +impossible to point out a place where any sudden break takes place, but +it is contrary to all the natural training of our minds to suppose a +breach of continuity so great." + +We must not, says Clifford, admit any breach of continuity. We must +assume that consciousness is a complex of elementary feelings, "or +rather of those remoter elements which cannot even be felt, but of +which the simplest feeling is built up." We must assume that such +elementary facts go along with the action of every organism, however +simple; but we must assume also that it is only when the organism has +reached a certain complexity of nervous structure that the complex of +psychic facts reaches the degree of complication that we call +Consciousness. + +So much for the assumption of something like mind in the mollusk, where +Clifford cannot find direct evidence of mind. But the argument does +not stop here: "As the line of ascent is unbroken, and must end at last +in inorganic matter, we have no choice but to admit that every motion +of matter is simultaneous with some . . . fact or event which might be +part of a consciousness." + +Of the universal distribution of the elementary constituents of mind +Clifford writes as follows: "That element of which, as we have seen, +even the simplest feeling is a complex, I shall call _Mind-stuff_. A +moving molecule of inorganic matter does not possess mind or +consciousness; but it possesses a small piece of mind-stuff. When +molecules are so combined together as to form the film on the under +side of a jellyfish, the elements of mind-stuff which go along with +them are so combined as to form the faint beginnings of Sentience. +When the molecules are so combined as to form the brain and nervous +system of a vertebrate, the corresponding elements of mind-stuff are so +combined as to form some kind of consciousness; that is to say, changes +in the complex which take place at the same time get so linked together +that the repetition of one implies the repetition of the other. When +matter takes the complex form of a living human brain, the +corresponding mind-stuff takes the form of a human consciousness, +having intelligence and volition." + +This is the famous mind-stuff doctrine. It is not a scientific +doctrine, for it rests on wholly unproved assumptions. It is a play of +the speculative fancy, and has its source in the author's strong desire +to fit mental phenomena into some general evolutionary scheme. As he +is a parallelist, and cannot make of physical phenomena and of mental +one single series of causes and effects, he must attain his end by +making the mental series complete and independent in itself. To do +this, he is forced to make several very startling assumptions:-- + +(1) We have seen that there is evidence that there is consciousness +somewhere--it is revealed by certain bodies. Clifford assumes +consciousness, or rather its raw material, _mind-stuff_, to be +everywhere. For this assumption we have not a whit of evidence. + +(2) To make of the stuff thus attained a satisfactory evolutionary +series, he is compelled to assume that mental phenomena are related to +each other much as physical phenomena are related to each other. This +notion he had from Spinoza, who held that, just as all that takes place +in the physical world must be accounted for by a reference to physical +causes, so all happenings in the world of ideas must be accounted for +by a reference to mental causes, _i.e._ to ideas. For this assumption +there is no more evidence than for the former. + +(3) Finally, to bring the mental phenomena we are familiar with, +sensations of color, sound, touch, taste, etc., into this evolutionary +scheme, he is forced to assume that all such mental phenomena are made +up of elements which do not belong to these classes at all, of +something that "cannot even be felt." For this assumption there is as +little evidence as there is for the other two. + +The fact is that the _mind-stuff_ doctrine is a castle in the air. It +is too fanciful and arbitrary to take seriously. It is much better to +come back to a more sober view of things, and to hold that there is +evidence that other minds exist, but no evidence that every material +thing is animated. If we cannot fit this into our evolutionary scheme, +perhaps it is well to reexamine our evolutionary scheme, and to see +whether some misconception may not attach to that. + + +[1] "Collected Essays," Vol. I, p. 219, New York, 1902. + +[2] "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves," in "Lectures and Essays," +Vol. II. + +[3] "Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy," Chapter XII. + +[4] "On the Nature of Things-in-Themselves." + + + + +CHAPTER XI + +OTHER PROBLEMS OF WORLD AND MIND + +44. IS THE MATERIAL WORLD A MECHANISM?--So far we have concerned +ourselves with certain leading problems touching the external world and +the mind,--problems which seem to present themselves unavoidably to those +who enter upon the path of reflection. And we have seen, I hope, that +there is much truth, as well as some misconception, contained in the +rather vague opinions of the plain man. + +But the problems that we have taken up by no means exhaust the series of +those that present themselves to one who thinks with patience and +persistency. When we have decided that men are not mistaken in believing +that an external world is presented in their experience; when we have +corrected our first crude notions of what this world is, and have cleared +away some confusions from our conceptions of space and time; when we have +attained to a reasonably clear view of the nature of the mind, and of the +nature of its connection with the body; when we have escaped from a +tumble into the absurd doctrine that no mind exists save our own, and +have turned our backs upon the rash speculations of the adherents of +"mind-stuff"; there still remain many points upon which we should like to +have definite information. + +In the present chapter I shall take up and turn over a few of these, but +it must not be supposed that one can get more than a glimpse of them +within such narrow limits. First of all we will raise the question +whether it is permissible to regard the material world, which we accept, +as through and through a mechanism. + +There can be little doubt that there is a tendency on the part of men of +science at the present day so to regard it. It should, of course, be +frankly admitted that no one is in a position to prove that, from the +cosmic mist, in which we grope for the beginnings of our universe, to the +organized whole in which vegetable and animal bodies have their place, +there is an unbroken series of changes all of which are explicable by a +reference to mechanical laws. Chemistry, physics, and biology are still +separate and distinct realms, and it is at present impossible to find for +them a common basis in mechanics. The belief of the man of science must, +hence, be regarded as a faith; the doctrine of the mechanism of nature is +a working hypothesis, and it is unscientific to assume that it is +anything more. + +There can be no objection to a frank admission that we are not here +walking in the light of established knowledge. But it does seem to savor +of dogmatism for a man to insist that no increase in our knowledge can +ever reveal that the physical world is an orderly system throughout, and +that all the changes in material things are explicable in terms of the +one unified science. Earnest objections have, however, been made to the +tendency to regard nature as a mechanism. To one of the most curious of +them we have been treated lately by Dr. Ward in his book on "Naturalism +and Agnosticism." + +It is there ingeniously argued that, when we examine with care the +fundamental concepts of the science of mechanics, we find them to be +self-contradictory and absurd. It follows that we are not justified in +turning to them for an explanation of the order of nature. + +The defense of the concepts of mechanics we may safely leave to the man +of science; remembering, of course, that, when a science is in the +making, it is to be expected that the concepts of which it makes use +should undergo revision from time to time. But there is one general +consideration that it is not well to leave out of view when we are +contemplating such an assault upon the notion of the world as mechanism +as is made by Dr. Ward. It is this. + +Such attacks upon the conception of mechanism are not purely destructive +in their aim. The man who makes them wishes to destroy one view of the +system of things in order that he may set up another. If the changes in +the system of material things cannot be accounted for mechanically, it is +argued, we are compelled to turn for our explanation to the action and +interaction of minds. This seems to give mind a very important place in +the universe, and is believed to make for a view of things that +guarantees the satisfaction of the highest hopes and aspirations of man. + +That a recognition of the mechanical order of nature is incompatible with +such a view of things as is just above indicated, I should be the last to +admit. The notion that it is so is, I believe, a dangerous error. It is +an error that tends to put a man out of sympathy with the efforts of +science to discover that the world is an orderly whole, and tempts him to +rejoice in the contemplation of human ignorance. + +But the error is rather a common one; and see to what injustice it may +lead one. It is concluded that the conception of _matter_ is an obscure +one; that we do not know clearly what we mean when we speak of the _mass_ +of a body; that there are disputes as to proper significance to be given +to the words _cause_ and _effect_; that the _laws of motion_, as they are +at present formulated, do not seem to account satisfactorily for the +behavior of all material particles. From this it is inferred that we +must give up the attempt to explain mechanically the order of physical +things. + +Now, suppose that it were considered a dangerous and heterodox doctrine, +that the changes in the system of things are due to the activities of +minds. Would not those who now love to point out the shortcomings of the +science of mechanics discover a fine field for their destructive +criticism? Are there no disputes as to the ultimate nature of mind? Are +men agreed touching the relations of mind and matter? What science even +attempts to tell us how a mind, by an act of volition, sets material +particles in motion or changes the direction of their motion? How does +one mind act upon another, and what does it mean for one mind to act upon +another? + +If the science of mechanics is not in all respects as complete a science +as it is desirable that it should be, surely we must admit that when we +turn to the field of mind we are not dealing with what is clear and free +from difficulties. Only a strong emotional bias can lead a man to dwell +with emphasis upon the difficulties to be met with in the one field, and +to pass lightly over those with which one meets in the other. + +One may, however, refuse to admit that the order of nature is throughout +mechanical, without taking any such unreasonable position as this. One +may hold that many of the changes in material things do not _appear_ to +be mechanical, and that it is too much of an assumption to maintain that +they are such, even as an article of faith. Thus, when we pass from the +world of the inorganic to that of organic life, we seem to make an +immense step. No one has even begun to show us that the changes that +take place in vegetable and animal organisms are all mechanical changes. +How can we dare to assume that they are? + +With one who reasons thus we may certainly feel a sympathy. The most +ardent advocate of mechanism must admit that his doctrine is a working +hypothesis, and not _proved_ to be true. Its acceptance would, however, +be a genuine convenience from the point of view of science, for it does +introduce, at least provisionally, a certain order into a vast number of +facts, and gives a direction to investigation. Perhaps the wisest thing +to do is, not to combat the doctrine, but to accept it tentatively and to +examine carefully what conclusions it may seem to carry with it--how it +may affect our outlook upon the world as a whole. + +45. THE PLACE OF MIND IN NATURE.--One of the very first questions which +we think of asking when we contemplate the possibility that the physical +world is throughout a mechanical system is this: How can we conceive +minds to be related to such a system? That minds, and many minds, do +exist, it is not reasonable to doubt. What shall we do with them? + +One must not misunderstand the mechanical view of things. When we use +the word "machine," we call before our minds certain gross and relatively +simple mechanisms constructed by man. Between such and a flower, a +butterfly, and a human body, the difference is enormous. He who elects +to bring the latter under the title of mechanism cannot mean that he +discerns no difference between them and a steam engine or a printing +press. He can only mean that he believes he might, could he attain to a +glimpse into their infinite complexity, find an explanation of the +physical changes which take place in them, by a reference to certain +general laws which describe the behavior of material particles everywhere. + +And the man who, having extended his notion of mechanism, is inclined to +overlook the fact that animals and men have minds, that thought and +feeling, plan and purpose, have their place in the world, may justly be +accused of a headlong and heedless enthusiasm. Whatever may be our +opinion on the subject of the mechanism of nature, we have no right to +minimize the significance of thought and feeling and will. Between that +which has no mind and that which has a mind there is a difference which +cannot be obliterated by bringing both under the concept of mechanism. +It is a difference which furnishes the material for the sciences of +psychology and ethics, and gives rise to a whole world of distinctions +which find no place in the realm of the merely physical. + +There are, then, minds as well as bodies; what place shall we assign to +these minds in the system of nature? + +Several centuries ago it occurred to the man of science that the material +world should be regarded as a system in which there is constant +transformation, but in which nothing is created. This way of looking at +things expressed itself formerly in the statement that, through all the +changes that take place in the world, the quantity of matter and motion +remains the same. To-day the same idea is better expressed in the +doctrine of the eternity of mass and the conservation of energy. In +plain language, this doctrine teaches that every change in every part of +the physical world, every motion in matter, must be preceded by physical +conditions which may be regarded as the equivalent of the change in +question. + +But this makes the physical world a closed system, a something complete +in itself. Where is there room in such a system for minds? + +It does indeed seem hard to find in such a system a place for minds, if +one conceives of minds as does the interactionist. We have seen (section +36) that the interactionist makes the mind act upon matter very much as +one particle of matter is supposed to act upon another. Between the +physical and the mental he assumes that there are _causal_ relations; +_i.e._ physical changes must be referred to mental causes sometimes, and +mental changes to physical. This means that he finds a place for mental +facts by inserting them as links in the one chain of causes and effects +with physical facts. If he is not allowed to break the chain and insert +them, he does not know what to do with them. + +The parallelist has not the same difficulty to face. He who holds that +mental phenomena must not be built into the one series of causes and +effects with physical phenomena may freely admit that physical phenomena +form a closed series, an orderly system of their own, and he may yet find +a place in the world for minds. He refuses to regard them as a part of +the world-mechanism, but he _relates_ them to physical things, conceiving +them as _parallel to_ the physical in the sense described (sections +37-39). He insists that, even if we hold that there are gaps in the +physical order of causes and effects, we cannot conceive these gaps to be +filled by mental phenomena, simply because they are mental phenomena. +They belong to an order of their own. Hence, the assumption that the +physical series is unbroken does not seem to him to crowd mental +phenomena out of their place in the world at all. They must, in any +case, occupy the place that is appropriate to them (section 38). + +It will be noticed that this doctrine that the chain of physical causes +and effects is nowhere broken, and that mental phenomena are related to +it as the parallelist conceives them to be, makes the world-system a very +orderly one. Every phenomenon has its place in it, and can be accounted +for, whether it be physical or mental. To some, the thought that the +world is such an orderly thing is in the highest degree repugnant. They +object that, in such a world, there is no room for _free-will_; and they +object, further, that there is no room for the _activity of minds_. Both +of these objections I shall consider in this chapter. + +But first, I must say a few words about a type of doctrine lately +insisted upon,[1] which bears some resemblance to interactionism as we +usually meet with it, and, nevertheless, tries to hold on to the doctrine +of the conservation of energy. It is this:-- + +The concept of energy is stretched in such a way as to make it cover +mental phenomena as well as physical. It is claimed that mental +phenomena and physical phenomena are alike "manifestations of energy," +and that the coming into being of a consciousness is a mere +"transformation," a something to be accounted for by the disappearance +from the physical world of a certain equivalent--perhaps of some motion. +It will be noticed that this is one rather subtle way of obliterating the +distinction between mental phenomena and physical. In so far it +resembles the interactionist's doctrine. + +In criticism of it we may say that he who accepts it has wandered away +from a rather widely recognized scientific hypothesis, and has +substituted for it a very doubtful speculation for which there seems to +be no whit of evidence. It is, moreover, a speculation repugnant to the +scientific mind, when its significance is grasped. Shall we assume +without evidence that, when a man wakes in the morning and enjoys a +mental life suspended or diminished during the night, his thoughts and +feelings have come into being at the expense of his body? Shall we +assume that the mass of his body has been slightly diminished, or that +motions have disappeared in a way that cannot be accounted for by a +reference to the laws of matter in motion? This seems an extraordinary +assumption, and one little in harmony with the doctrine of the eternity +of mass and the conservation of energy as commonly understood. We need +not take it seriously so long as it is quite unsupported by evidence. + +46. THE ORDER OF NATURE AND "FREE-WILL."--In a world as orderly as, in +the previous section, this world is conceived to be, is there any room +for freedom? What if the man of science is right in suspecting that the +series of physical causes and effects is nowhere broken? Must we then +conclude that we are never free? + +To many persons it has seemed that we are forced to draw this conclusion, +and it is not surprising that they view the doctrine with dismay. They +argue: Mental phenomena are made parallel with physical, and the order of +physical phenomena seems to be determined throughout, for nothing can +happen in the world of matter unless there is some adequate cause of its +happening. If, then, I choose to raise my finger, that movement must be +admitted to have physical causes, and those causes other causes, and so +on without end. If such a movement must always have its place in a +causal series of this kind, how can it be regarded as a free movement? +It is determined, and not free. + +Now, it is far from a pleasant thing to watch the man of science busily +at work trying to prove that the physical world is an orderly system, and +all the while to feel in one's heart that the success of his efforts +condemns one to slavery. It can hardly fail to make one's attitude +towards science that of alarm and antagonism. From this I shall try to +free the reader by showing that our freedom is not in the least danger, +and that we may look on unconcerned. + +When we approach that venerable dispute touching the freedom of the will, +which has inspired men to such endless discussions, and upon which they +have written with such warmth and even acrimony, the very first thing to +do is to discover what we have a right to mean when we call a man _free_. +As long as the meaning of the word is in doubt, the very subject of the +dispute is in doubt. When may we, then, properly call a man free? What +is the normal application of the term? + +I raise my finger. Every man of sense must admit that, under normal +conditions, I can raise my finger or keep it down, _as I please_. There +is no ground for a difference of opinion so far. But there is a further +point upon which men differ. One holds that my "pleasing" and the +brain-change that corresponds to it have their place in the world-order; +that is, he maintains that every volition can be _accounted for_. +Another holds that, under precisely the same circumstances, one may +"please" or not "please"; which means that the "pleasing" cannot be +wholly accounted for by anything that has preceded. The first man is a +_determinist_, and the second a "_free-willist_." I beg the reader to +observe that the word "free-willist" is in quotation marks, and not to +suppose that it means simply a believer in the freedom of the will. + +When in common life we speak of a man as free, what do we understand by +the word? Usually we mean that he is free from external compulsion. If +my finger is held by another, I am not free to raise it. But I may be +free in this sense, and yet one may demur to the statement that I am a +free man. If a pistol be held to my head with the remark, "Hands up!" my +finger will mount very quickly, and the bystanders will maintain that I +had no choice. + +We speak in somewhat the same way of men under the influence of +intoxicants, of men crazed by some passion and unable to take into +consideration the consequences of their acts, and of men bound by the +spell of hypnotic suggestion. Indeed, whenever a man is in such a +condition that he is glaringly incapable of leading a normal human life +and of being influenced by the motives that commonly move men, we are +inclined to say that he is not free. + +But does it ever occur to us to maintain that, in general, the possession +of a character and the capacity of being influenced by considerations +make it impossible for a man to be free? Surely not. If I am a prudent +man, I will invest my money in good securities. Is it sensible to say +that I cannot have been free in refusing a twenty per cent investment, +_because I am by nature prudent_? Am I a slave _because I eat when I am +hungry_, and can I partake of a meal freely, only when there is no reason +why I should eat at all? + +He who calls me free only when my acts do violence to my nature or cannot +be justified by a reference to anything whatever has strange notions of +freedom. Patriots, poets, moralists, have had much to say of freedom; +men have lived for it, and have died for it; men love it as they love +their own souls. Is the object of all this adoration the metaphysical +absurdity indicated above? + +To insist that a man is free only in so far as his actions are +unaccountable is to do violence to the meaning of a word in very common +use, and to mislead men by perverting it to strange and unwholesome uses. +Yet this is done by the "free-willist." He keeps insisting that man is +free, and then goes on to maintain that he cannot be free unless he is +"free." He does not, unfortunately, supply the quotation marks, and he +profits by the natural mistake in identity. As he defines freedom it +becomes "freedom," which is a very different thing. + +What is this "freedom"? It is not freedom from external constraint. It +is not freedom from overpowering passion. It is freedom from all the +motives, good as well as bad, that we can conceive of as influencing man, +and freedom also from oneself. + +It is well to get this quite clear. The "free-willist" maintains that, +_in so far as a man is "free,"_ his actions cannot be accounted for by a +reference to the order of causes at all--not by a reference to his +character, hereditary or acquired; not by a reference to his +surroundings. "Free" actions, in so far as they are "free," have, so to +speak, sprung into being out of the void. What follows from such a +doctrine? Listen:-- + +(1) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," I am not the author of +what appear to be my acts; who can be the cause of causeless actions? + +(2) It follows that no amount of effort on my part can prevent the +appearance of "free" acts of the most deplorable kind. If one can +condition their appearance or non-appearance, they are not "free" acts. + +(3) It follows that there is no reason to believe that there will be any +congruity between my character and my "free" acts. I may be a saint by +nature, and "freely" act like a scoundrel. + +(4) It follows that I can deserve no credit for "free" acts. I am not +their author. + +(5) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," it is useless to praise +me, to blame me, to punish me, to endeavor to persuade me. I must be +given over to unaccountable sainthood or to a reprobate mind, as it +happens to happen. I am quite beyond the pale of society, for my +neighbor cannot influence my "free" acts any more than I can. + +(6) It follows that, in so far as I am "free," I am in something very +like a state of slavery; and yet, curiously enough, it is a slavery +without a master. In the old stories of Fate, men were represented as +puppets in the hand of a power outside themselves. Here I am a puppet in +no hand; but I am a puppet just the same, for I am the passive spectator +of what appear to be my acts. I do not do the things I seem to do. They +are done for me or in me--or, rather, they are not done, but just happen. + +Such "freedom" is a wretched thing to offer to a man who longs for +freedom; for the freedom to act out his own impulses, to guide his life +according to his own ideals. It is a mere travesty on freedom, a fiction +of the philosophers, which inspires respect only so long as one has not +pierced the disguise of its respectable name. True freedom is not a +thing to be sought in a disorderly and chaotic world, in a world in which +actions are inexplicable and character does not count. Let us rinse our +minds free of misleading verbal associations, and let us realize that a +"free-will" neighbor would certainly not be to us an object of respect. +He would be as offensive an object to have in our vicinity as a +"free-will" gun or a "free-will" pocketknife. He would not be a rational +creature. + +Our only concern need be for freedom, and this is in no danger in an +orderly world. We all recognize this truth, in a way. We hold that a +man of good character freely chooses the good, and a man of evil +character freely chooses evil. Is not this a recognition of the fact +that the choice is a thing to be accounted for, and is, nevertheless, a +free choice? + +I have been considering above the world as it is conceived to be by the +parallelist, but, to the reader who may not incline towards parallelism, +I wish to point out that these reasonings touching the freedom of the +will concern the interactionist just as closely. They have no necessary +connection with parallelism. The interactionist, as well as the +parallelist, may be a determinist, a believer in freedom, or he may be a +"free-willist." + +He regards mental phenomena and physical phenomena as links in the one +chain of causes and effects. Shall he hold that certain mental links are +"free-will" links, that they are wholly unaccountable? If he does, all +that has been said above about the "free-willist" applies to him. He +believes in a disorderly world, and he should accept the consequences of +his doctrine. + +47. THE PHYSICAL WORLD AND THE MORAL WORLD.--I have said a little way +back that, when we think of bodies as having minds, we are introduced to +a world of distinctions which have no place in the realm of the merely +physical. One of the objections made to the orderly world of the +parallelist was that in it there is no room for the activity of minds. +Before we pass judgment on this matter, we should try to get some clear +notion of what we may mean by the word "activity." The science of ethics +must go by the board, if we cannot think of men as _doing_ anything, as +acting rightly or acting wrongly. + +Let us conceive a billiard ball in motion to come into collision with one +at rest. We commonly speak of the first ball as active, and of the +second as the passive subject upon which it exercises its activity. Are +we justified in thus speaking? + +In one sense, of course, we are. As I have several times had occasion to +remark, we are, in common life, justified in using words rather loosely, +provided that it is convenient to do so, and that it does not give rise +to misunderstandings. + +But, in a stricter sense, we are not justified in thus speaking, for in +doing so we are carrying over into the sphere of the merely physical a +distinction which does not properly belong there, but has its place in +another realm. The student of mechanics tells us that the second ball +has affected the first quite as much as the first has affected the +second. We cannot simply regard the first as cause and the second as +effect, nor may we regard the motion of the first as cause and the +subsequent motion of the second as its effect alone. _The whole +situation at the one instant_--both balls, their relative positions and +their motion and rest--must be taken as the cause of _the whole situation +at the next instant_, and in this whole situation the condition of the +second ball has its place as well as that of the first. + +If, then, we insist that to have causal efficiency is the same thing as +to be active, we should also admit that the second ball was active, and +quite as active as the first. It has certainly had as much to do with +the total result. But it offends us to speak of it in this way. We +prefer to say that the first was active and the second was acted upon. +What is the source of this distinction? + +Its original source is to be found in the judgments we pass upon +conscious beings, bodies with minds; and it could never have been drawn +if men had not taken into consideration the relations of minds to the +changes in the physical world. As carried over to inanimate things it is +a transferred distinction; and its transference to this field is not +strictly justifiable, as has been indicated above. + +I must make this clear by an illustration. I hurry along a street +towards the university, because the hour for my lecture is approaching. +I am struck down by a falling tile. In my advance up the street I am +regarded as active; in my fall to the ground I am regarded as passive. + +Now, looking at both occurrences from the purely physical point of view, +we have nothing before us but a series of changes in the space relations +of certain masses of matter; and in all those changes both my body and +its environment are concerned. As I advance, my body cannot be regarded +as the sole cause of the changes which are taking place. My progress +would be impossible without the aid of the ground upon which I tread. +Nor can I accuse the tile of being the sole cause of my demolition. Had +I not been what I was and where I was, the tile would have fallen in +vain. I must be regarded as a concurrent cause of my own disaster, and +my unhappy state is attributable to me as truly as it is to the tile. + +Why, then, am I in the one case regarded as active and in the other as +passive? In each case I am a cause of the result. How does it happen +that, in the first instance, I seem to most men to be _the_ cause, and in +the second to be not a cause at all? The rapidity of my motion in the +first instance cannot account for this judgment. He who rides in the +police van and he who is thrown from the car of a balloon may move with +great rapidity and yet be regarded as passive. + +Men speak as they do because they are not content to point out the +physical antecedents of this and that occurrence and stop with that. +They recognize that, between my advance up the street and my fall to the +ground there is one very important difference. In the first case what is +happening _may be referred to an idea in my mind_. Were the idea not +there, I should not do what I am doing. In the second case, what has +happened _cannot be referred to an idea in my mind_. + +Here we have come to the recognition that there are such things as +_purposes_ and _ends_; that an idea and some change in the external world +may be related as _plan_ and _accomplishment_. In other words, we have +been brought face to face with what has been given the somewhat +misleading name of _final cause_. In so far as that in the bringing +about of which I have had a share is my _end_, I am _active_; in so far +as it is not my end, but comes upon me as something not planned, I am +_passive_. The enormous importance of the distinction may readily be +seen; it is only in so far as I am a creature who can have purposes, that +_desire_ and _will_, _foresight_ and _prudence_, _right_ and _wrong_, can +have a significance for me. + +I have dwelt upon the meaning of the words "activity" and "passivity," +and have been at pains to distinguish them from cause and effect, because +the two pairs of terms have often been confounded with each other, and +this confusion has given rise to a peculiarly unfortunate error. It is +this error that lies at the foundation of the objection referred to at +the beginning of this section. + +We have seen that certain men of science are inclined to look upon the +physical world as a great system, all the changes in which may be +accounted for by an appeal to physical causes. And we have seen that the +parallelist regards ideas, not as links in this chain, but as parallel +with physical changes. + +It is argued by some that, if this is a true view of things, we must +embrace the conclusion that _the mind cannot be active at all_, that it +can _accomplish nothing_. We must look upon the mind as an +"epiphenomenon," a useless decoration; and must regard man as "a physical +automaton with parallel psychical states." + +Such abuse of one's fellow-man seems unchristian, and it is wholly +uncalled for on any hypothesis. Our first answer to it is that it seems +to be sufficiently refuted by the experiences of common life. We have +abundant evidence that men's minds do count for something. I conclude +that I want a coat, and I order one of my tailor; he believes that I will +pay for it, he wants the money, and he makes the coat; his man desires to +earn his wages and he delivers it. If I had not wanted the coat, if the +tailor had not wanted my money, if the man had not wanted to earn his +wages, the end would not have been attained. No philosopher has the +right to deny these facts. + +Ah! but, it may be answered, these three "wants" are not supposed to be +the _causes_ of the motions in matter which result in my appearing +well-dressed on Sunday. They are only _concomitant phenomena_. + +To this I reply: What of that? We must not forget what is meant by such +concomitance (section 39). We are dealing with a fixed and necessary +relation, not with an accidental one. If these "wants" had been lacking, +there would have been no coat. So my second answer to the objector is, +that, on the hypothesis of the parallelist, the relations between mental +phenomena and physical phenomena are just as dependable as that relation +between physical phenomena which we call that of cause and effect. +Moreover, since activity and causality are not the same thing, there is +no ground for asserting that the mind cannot be active, merely because it +is not material and, hence, cannot be, strictly speaking, a cause of +motions in matter. + +The plain man is entirely in the right in thinking that minds are active. +The truth is that _nothing can be active except as it has a mind_. The +relation of purpose and end is the one we have in view when we speak of +the activity of minds. + +It is, thus, highly unjust to a man to tell him that he is "a physical +automaton with parallel psychical states," and that he is wound up by +putting food into his mouth. He who hears this may be excused if he +feels it his duty to emit steam, walk with a jerk, and repudiate all +responsibility for his actions. Creatures that think, form plans, and +_act_, are not what we call automata. It is an abuse of language to call +them such, and it misleads us into looking upon them as we have no right +to look upon them. If men really were automata in the proper sense of +the word, we could not look upon them as wise or unwise, good or bad; in +short, the whole world of moral distinctions would vanish. + +Perhaps, in spite of all that has been said in this and in the preceding +section, some will feel a certain repugnance to being assigned a place in +a world as orderly as our world is in this chapter conceived to be--a +world in which every phenomenon, whether physical or mental, has its +definite place, and all are subject to law. But I suppose our content or +discontent will not be independent of our conception of what sort of a +world we conceive ourselves to be inhabiting. + +If we conclude that we are in a world in which God is revealed, if the +orderliness of it is but another name for Divine Providence, we can +scarcely feel the same as we would if we discovered in the world nothing +of the Divine. I have in the last few pages been discussing the doctrine +of purposes and ends, teleology, but I have said nothing of the +significance of that doctrine for Theism. The reader can easily see that +it lies at the very foundation of our belief in God. The only arguments +for theism that have had much weight with mankind have been those which +have maintained there are revealed in the world generally evidences of a +plan and purpose at least analogous to what we discover when we +scrutinize the actions of our fellow-man. Such arguments are not at the +mercy of either interactionist or parallelist. On either hypothesis they +stand unshaken. + +With this brief survey of some of the most interesting problems that +confront the philosopher, I must content myself here. Now let us turn +and see how some of the fundamental problems treated in previous chapters +have been approached by men belonging to certain well-recognized schools +of thought. + +And since it is peculiarly true in philosophy that, to understand the +present, one must know something of the past, we shall begin by taking a +look at the historical background of the types of philosophical doctrine +to which reference is constantly made in the books and journals of the +day. + + +[1] Ostwald, "Vorlesungen ueber Naturphilosophie," s. 396. Leipzig, 1902. + + + + +IV. SOME TYPES OF PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY + + +CHAPTER XII + +THEIR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND + +48. THE DOCTRINE OF REPRESENTATIVE PERCEPTION.--We have seen in Chapter +II that it seems to the plain man abundantly evident that he really is +surrounded by material things and that he directly perceives such +things. This has always been the opinion of the plain man and it seems +probable that it always will be. It is only when he begins to reflect +upon things and upon his knowledge of them that it occurs to him to +call it in question. + +Very early in the history of speculative thought it occurred to men, +however, to ask how it is that we know things, and whether we are sure +we do know them. The problems of reflection started into life, and +various solutions were suggested. To tell over the whole list would +take us far afield, and we need not, for the purpose we have in view, +go back farther than Descartes, with whom philosophy took a relatively +new start, and may be said to have become, in spirit and method, at +least, modern. + +I have said (section 31) that Descartes (1596-1650) was fairly well +acquainted with the functioning of the nervous system, and has much to +say of the messages which pass along the nerves to the brain. The same +sort of reasoning that leads the modern psychologist to maintain that +we know only so much of the external world as is reflected in our +sensations led him to maintain that the mind is directly aware of the +ideas through which an external world is represented, but can know the +world itself only indirectly and through these ideas. + +Descartes was put to sore straits to prove the existence of an external +world, when he had once thus placed it at one remove from us. If we +accept his doctrine, we seem to be shut up within the circle of our +ideas, and can find no door that will lead us to a world outside. The +question will keep coming back: How do we _know_ that, corresponding to +our ideas, there are material things, if we have never perceived, in +any single instance, a material thing? And the doubt here suggested +may be reinforced by the reflection that the very expression "a +material thing" ought to be meaningless to a man who, having never had +experience of one, is compelled to represent it by the aid of something +so different from it as ideas are supposed to be. Can material things +really be to such a creature anything more than some complex of ideas? + +The difficulties presented by any philosophical doctrine are not always +evident at once. Descartes made no scruple of accepting the existence +of an external world, and his example has been followed by a very large +number of those who agree with his initial assumption that the mind +knows immediately only its own ideas. + +Preeminent among such we must regard John Locke, the English +philosopher (1632-1704), whose classic work, "An Essay concerning Human +Understanding," should not be wholly unknown to any one who pretends to +an interest in the English literature. + +Admirably does Locke represent the position of what very many have +regarded as the prudent and sensible man,--the man who recognizes that +ideas are not external things, and that things must be known through +ideas, and yet holds on to the existence of a material world which we +assuredly know. + +He recognizes, it is true, that some one may find a possible opening +for the expression of a doubt, but he regards the doubt as gratuitous; +"I think nobody can, in earnest, be so skeptical as to be uncertain of +the existence of those things which he sees and feels." As we have +seen (section 12), he meets the doubt with a jest. + +Nevertheless, those who read with attention Locke's admirably clear +pages must notice that he does not succeed in really setting to rest +the doubt that has suggested itself. It becomes clear that Locke felt +so sure of the existence of the external world because he now and then +slipped into the inconsistent doctrine that he perceived it +immediately, and not merely through his ideas. Are those things "which +he sees and feels" _external_ things? Does he see and feel them +directly, or must he infer from his ideas that he sees and feels them? +If the latter, why may one not still doubt? Evidently the appeal is to +a direct experience of material things, and Locke has forgotten that he +must be a Lockian. + +"I have often remarked, in many instances," writes Descartes, "that +there is a great difference between an object and its idea." How could +the man possibly have remarked this, when he had never in his life +perceived the object corresponding to any idea, but had been altogether +shut up to ideas? "Thus I see, whilst I write this," says Locke,[1] "I +can change the appearance of the paper, and by designing the letters +tell beforehand what new idea it shall exhibit the very next moment, by +barely drawing my pen over it, which will neither appear (let me fancy +as much as I will), if my hand stands still, or though I move my pen, +if my eyes be shut; nor, when those characters are once made on the +paper, can I choose afterward but see them as they are; that is, have +the ideas of such letters as I have made. Whence it is manifest, that +they are not barely the sport and play of my own imagination, when I +find that the characters that were made at the pleasure of my own +thought do not obey them; nor yet cease to be, whenever I shall fancy +it; but continue to affect the senses constantly and regularly, +according to the figures I made them." + +Locke is as bad as Descartes. Evidently he regards himself as able to +turn to the external world and perceive the relation that things hold +to ideas. Such an inconsistency may escape the writer who has been +guilty of it, but it is not likely to escape the notice of all those +who come after him. Some one is sure to draw the consequences of a +doctrine more rigorously, and to come to conclusions, it may be, very +unpalatable to the man who propounded the doctrine in the first +instance. + +The type of doctrine represented by Descartes and Locke is that of +_Representative Perception_. It holds that we know real external +things only through their mental representatives. It has also been +called _Hypothetical Realism_, because it accepts the existence of a +real world, but bases our knowledge of it upon an inference from our +sensations or ideas. + +49. THE STEP TO IDEALISM.--The admirable clearness with which Locke +writes makes it the easier for his reader to detect the untenability of +his position. He uses simple language, and he never takes refuge in +vague and ambiguous phrases. When he tells us that the mind is wholly +shut up to its ideas, and then later assumes that it is not shut up to +its ideas, but can perceive external things, we see plainly that there +must be a blunder somewhere. + +George Berkeley (1684-1753), Bishop of Cloyne, followed out more +rigorously the consequences to be deduced from the assumption that all +our direct knowledge is of ideas; and in a youthful work of the highest +genius entitled "The Principles of Human Knowledge," he maintained that +there is no material world at all. + +When we examine with care the objects of sense, the "things" which +present themselves to us, he argues, we find that they resolve +themselves into sensations, or "ideas of sense." What can we mean by +the word "apple," if we do not mean the group of experiences in which +alone an apple is presented to us? The word is nothing else than a +name for this group as a group. Take away the color, the hardness, the +odor, the taste; what have we left? And color, hardness, odor, taste, +and anything else that may be referred to any object as a quality, can +exist, he claims, only in a perceiving mind; for such things are +nothing else than sensations, and how can there be an unperceived +sensation? + +The things which we perceive, then, he calls complexes of ideas. Have +we any reason to believe that these ideas, which exist in the mind, are +to be accepted as representatives of things of a different kind, which +are not mental at all? Not a shadow of a reason, says Berkeley; there +is simply no basis for inference at all, and we cannot even make clear +what it is that we are setting out to infer under the name of matter. +We need not, therefore, grieve over the loss of the material world, for +we have suffered no loss; one cannot lose what one has never had. + +Thus, the objects of human knowledge, the only things of which it means +anything to speak, are: (1) Ideas of Sense; (2) Ideas of Memory and +Imagination; (3) The Passions and Operations of the Mind; and (4) The +Self that perceives all These. + +From Locke's position to that of Berkeley was a bold step, and it was +much criticised, as well it might be. It was felt then, as it has been +felt by many down to our own time, that, when we discard an external +world distinct from our ideas, and admit only the world revealed in our +ideas, we really do lose. + +It is legitimate to criticise Berkeley, but it is not legitimate to +misunderstand him; and yet the history of his doctrine may almost be +called a chronicle of misconceptions. It has been assumed that he drew +no distinction between real things and imaginary things, that he made +the world no better than a dream, etc. Arbuthnot, Swift, and a host of +the greater and lesser lights in literature, from his time to ours, +have made merry over the supposed unrealities in the midst of which the +Berkeleian must live. + +But it should be remembered that Berkeley tried hard to do full justice +to the world of things in which we actually find ourselves; not a +hypothetical, inferred, unperceived world, but the world of the things +we actually perceive. He distinguished carefully between what is real +and what is merely imaginary, though he called both "ideas"; and he +recognized something like a system of nature. And, by the argument +from analogy which we have already examined (section 41), he inferred +the existence of other finite minds and of a Divine Mind. + +But just as John Locke had not completely thought out the consequences +which might be deduced from his own doctrines, so Berkeley left, in his +turn, an opening for a successor. It was possible for that acutest of +analysts, David Hume (1711-1776), to treat him somewhat as he had +treated Locke. + +Among the objects of human knowledge Berkeley had included the _self_ +that perceives things. He never succeeded in making at all clear what +he meant by this object; but he regarded it as a substance, and +believed it to be a cause of changes in ideas, and quite different in +its nature from all the ideas attributed to it. But Hume maintained +that when he tried to get a good look at this self, to catch it, so to +speak, and to hold it up to inspection, he could not find anything +whatever save perceptions, memories, and other things of that kind. +The self is, he said, "but a bundle or collection of different +perceptions which succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and +are in a perpetual flux and movement." + +As for the objects of sense, our own bodies, the chairs upon which we +sit, the tables at which we write, and all the rest--these, argues +Hume, we are impelled by nature to think of as existing continuously, +but we have no evidence whatever to prove that they do thus exist. Are +not the objects of sense, after all, only sensations or impressions? +Do we not experience these sensations or impressions interruptedly? +Who sees or feels a table continuously day after day? If the table is +but a name for the experiences in question, if we have no right to +infer material things behind and distinct from such experiences, are we +not forced to conclude that the existence of the things that we see and +feel is an interrupted one? + +Hume certainly succeeded in raising more questions than he succeeded in +answering. We are compelled to admire the wonderful clearness and +simplicity of his style, and the acuteness of his intellect, in every +chapter. But we cannot help feeling that he does injustice to the +world in which we live, even when we cannot quite see what is wrong. +Does it not seem certain to science and to common sense that there is +an order of nature in some sense independent of our perceptions, so +that objects may be assumed to exist whether we do or do not perceive +them? + +When we read Hume we have a sense that we are robbed of our real +external world; and his account of the mind makes us feel as a badly +tied sheaf of wheat may be conceived to feel--in danger of falling +apart at any moment. Berkeley we unhesitatingly call an _Idealist_, +but whether we shall apply the name to Hume depends upon the extension +we are willing to give to it. His world is a world of what we may +broadly call _ideas_; but the tendencies of his philosophy have led +some to call it a _Skepticism_. + +50. THE REVOLT OF "COMMON SENSE."--Hume's reasonings were too important +to be ignored, and his conclusions too unpalatable to satisfy those who +came after him. It seemed necessary to seek a way of escape out of +this world of mere ideas, which appeared to be so unsatisfactory a +world. One of the most famous of such attempts was that made by the +Scotchman Thomas Reid (1710-1796). + +At one time Reid regarded himself as the disciple of Berkeley, but the +consequences which Hume deduced from the principles laid down by the +former led Reid to feel that he must build upon some wholly different +foundation. He came to the conclusion that the line of philosophers +from Descartes to Hume had made one capital error in assuming "that +nothing is perceived but what is in the mind that perceives it." + +Once admit, says Reid, that the mind perceives nothing save ideas, and +we must also admit that it is impossible to prove the existence either +of an external world or of a mind different from "a bundle of +perceptions." Hence, Reid maintains that we perceive--not infer, but +perceive--_things_ external to the mind. He writes:[2]-- + +"Let a man press his hand against the table--_he feels it hard_. But +what is the meaning of this? The meaning undoubtedly is, that he hath +a certain feeling of touch, from which he concludes, without any +reasoning, or comparing ideas, that there is something external really +existing, whose parts stick so firmly together that they cannot be +displaced without considerable force. + +"There is here a feeling, and a conclusion drawn from it, or some way +suggested by it. In order to compare these, we must view them +separately, and then consider by what tie they are connected, and +wherein they resemble one another. The hardness of the table is the +conclusion, the feeling is the medium by which we are led to that +conclusion. Let a man attend distinctly to this medium, and to the +conclusion, and he will perceive them to be as unlike as any two things +in nature. The one is a sensation of the mind, which can have no +existence but in a sentient being; nor can it exist one moment longer +than it is felt; the other is in the table, and we conclude, without +any difficulty, that it was in the table before it was felt, and +continues after the feeling is over. The one implies no kind of +extension, nor parts, nor cohesion; the other implies all these. Both, +indeed, admit of degrees, and the feeling, beyond a certain degree, is +a species of pain; but adamantine hardness does not imply the least +pain. + +"And as the feeling hath no similitude to hardness, so neither can our +reason perceive the least tie or connection between them; nor will the +logician ever be able to show a reason why we should conclude hardness +from this feeling, rather than softness, or any other quality +whatsoever. But, in reality, all mankind are led by their constitution +to conclude hardness from this feeling." + +It is well worth while to read this extract several times, and to ask +oneself what Reid meant to say, and what he actually said. He is +objecting, be it remembered, to the doctrine that the mind perceives +immediately only its own ideas or sensations and must infer all else. +His contention is that we _perceive_ external things. + +Does he say this? He says that we have feelings of touch _from which +we conclude_ that there is something external; that there is a feeling, +"_and a conclusion drawn from it, or some way suggested by it_;" that +"the hardness of the table is the _conclusion_, and the feeling is the +_medium_ by which we are _led to the conclusion_." + +Could Descartes or Locke have more plainly supported the doctrine of +representative perception? How could Reid imagine he was combatting +that doctrine when he wrote thus? The point in which he differs from +them is this: he maintains that we draw the conclusion in question +without any reasoning, and, indeed, in the absence of any conceivable +reason why we should draw it. We do it instinctively; we are led by +the constitution of our nature. + +In effect Reid says to us: When you lay your hand on the table, you +have a sensation, it is true, but you also know the table is hard. How +do you know it? I cannot tell you; you simply know it, and cannot help +knowing it; and that is the end of the matter. + +Reid's doctrine was not without its effect upon other philosophers. +Among them we must place Sir William Hamilton (1788-1856), whose +writings had no little influence upon British philosophy in the last +half of the last century. + +Hamilton complained that Reid did not succeed in being a very good +_Natural Realist_, and that he slipped unconsciously into the position +he was concerned to condemn. Sir William tried to eliminate this +error, but the careful reader of his works will find to his amusement +that this learned author gets his feet upon the same slippery descent. +And much the same thing may be said of the doctrine of Herbert Spencer +(1820-1903), who claims that, when we have a sensation, we know +directly that there is an external thing, and then manages to sublimate +that external thing into an Unknowable, which we not only do not know +directly, but even do not know at all. + +All of these men were anxious to avoid what they regarded as the perils +of Idealism, and yet they seem quite unable to retain a foothold upon +the position which they consider the safer one. + +Reid called his doctrine the philosophy of "Common Sense," and he +thought he was coming back from the subtleties of the metaphysicians to +the standpoint of the plain man. That he should fall into difficulties +and inconsistencies is by no means surprising. As we have seen +(section 12), the thought of the plain man is far from clear. He +certainly believes that we perceive an external world of things, and +the inconsistent way in which Descartes and Locke appeal from ideas to +the things themselves does not strike him as unnatural. Why should not +a man test his ideas by turning to things and comparing the former with +the latter? On the other hand, he knows that to perceive things we +must have sense organs and sensations, and he cannot quarrel with the +psychologists for saying that we know things only in so far as they are +revealed to us through our sensations. How does he reconcile these two +positions? He does not reconcile them. He accepts them as they stand. + +Reid and various other philosophers have tried to come back to "Common +Sense" and to stay there. Now, it is a good position to come back to +for the purpose of starting out again. The experience of the plain +man, the truths which he recognizes as truths, these are not things to +be despised. Many a man whose mind has been, as Berkeley expresses it, +"debauched by learning," has gotten away from them to his detriment, +and has said very unreasonable things. But "Common Sense" cannot be +the ultimate refuge of the philosopher; it can only serve him as +material for investigation. The scholar whose thought is as vague and +inconsistent as that of the plain man has little profit in the fact +that the apparatus of his learning has made it possible for him to be +ponderously and unintelligibly vague and inconsistent. + +Hence, we may have the utmost sympathy with Reid's protest against the +doctrine of representative perception, and we may, nevertheless, +complain that he has done little to explain how it is that we directly +know external things and yet cannot be said to know things except in so +far as we have sensations or ideas. + +51. THE CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY.--The German philosopher, Immanuel Kant +(1724-1804), was moved, by the skeptical conclusions to which Hume's +philosophy seemed to lead, to seek a way of escape, somewhat as Reid +was. But he did not take refuge in "Common Sense"; he developed an +ingenious doctrine which has had an enormous influence in the +philosophical world, and has given rise to a Kantian literature of such +proportions that no man can hope to read all of it, even if he devotes +his life to it. In Germany and out of it, it has for a hundred years +and more simply rained books, pamphlets, and articles on Kant and his +philosophy, some of them good, many of them far from clear and far from +original. Hundreds of German university students have taken Kant as +the subject of the dissertation by which they hoped to win the degree +of Doctor of Philosophy;--I was lately offered two hundred and +seventy-four such dissertations in one bunch;--and no student is +supposed to have even a moderate knowledge of philosophy who has not an +acquaintance with that famous work, the "Critique of Pure Reason." + +It is to be expected from the outset that, where so many have found so +much to say, there should reign abundant differences of opinion. There +are differences of opinion touching the interpretation of Kant, and +touching the criticisms which may be made upon, and the development +which should be given to, his doctrine. It is, of course, impossible +to go into all these things here; and I shall do no more than indicate, +in untechnical language and in briefest outline, what he offers us in +place of the philosophy of Hume. + +Kant did not try to refute, as did Reid, the doctrine, urged by +Descartes and by his successors, that all those things which the mind +directly perceives are to be regarded as complexes of ideas. On the +contrary, he accepted it, and he has made the words "phenomenon" and +"noumenon" household words in philosophy. + +The world which seems to be spread out before us in space and time is, +he tells us, a world of things _as they are revealed to our senses and +our intelligence_; it is a world of manifestations, of phenomena. What +things-in-themselves are like we have no means of knowing; we know only +things as they appear to us. We may, to be sure, talk of a something +distinct from phenomena, a something not revealed to the senses, but +thought of, a _noumenon_; but we should not forget that this is a +negative conception; there is nothing in our experience that can give +it a filling, for our experience is only of phenomena. The reader will +find an unmistakable echo of this doctrine in Herbert Spencer's +doctrine of the "Unknowable" and its "manifestations." + +Now, Berkeley had called all the things we immediately perceive +_ideas_. As we have seen, he distinguished between "ideas of sense" +and "ideas of memory and imagination." Hume preferred to give to these +two classes different names--he called the first _impressions_ and the +second _ideas_. + +The associations of the word "impression" are not to be mistaken. +Locke had taught that between ideas in the memory and genuine +sensations there is the difference that the latter are due to the +"brisk acting" of objects without us. Objects impress us, and we have +sensations or impressions. To be sure, Hume, after employing the word +"impression," goes on to argue that we have no evidence that there are +external objects, which cause impressions. But he retains the word +"impression," nevertheless, and his use of it perceptibly colors his +thought. + +In Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena we have the lineal +descendant of the old distinction between the circle of our ideas and +the something outside of them that causes them and of which they are +supposed to give information. Hume said we have no reason to believe +such a thing exists, but are impelled by our nature to believe in it. +Kant is not so much concerned to prove the nonexistence of noumena, +things-in-themselves, as he is to prove that the very conception is an +empty one. His reasonings seem to result in the conclusion that we can +make no intelligible statement about things so cut off from our +experience as noumena are supposed to be; and one would imagine that he +would have felt impelled to go on to the frank declaration that we have +no reason to believe in noumena at all, and had better throw away +altogether so meaningless and useless a notion. But he was a +conservative creature, and he did not go quite so far. + +So far there is little choice between Kant and Hume. Certainly the +former does not appear to have rehabilitated the external world which +had suffered from the assaults of his predecessors. What important +difference is there between his doctrine and that of the man whose +skeptical tendencies he wished to combat? + +The difference is this: Descartes and Locke had accounted for our +knowledge of things by maintaining that things act upon us, and make an +impression or sensation--that their action, so to speak, begets ideas. +This is a very ancient doctrine as well as a very modern one; it is the +doctrine that most men find reasonable even before they devote +themselves to the study of philosophy. The totality of such +impressions received from the external world, they are accustomed to +regard as our _experience_ of external things; and they are inclined to +think that any knowledge of external things not founded upon experience +can hardly deserve the name of knowledge. + +Now, Hume, when he cast doubt upon the existence of external things, +did not, as I have said above, divest himself of the suggestions of the +word "impression." He insists strenuously that all our knowledge is +founded upon experience; and he holds that no experience can give us +knowledge that is necessary and universal. We know things as they are +revealed to us in our experience; but who can guarantee that we may not +have new experiences of a quite different kind, and which flatly +contradict the notions which we have so far attained of what is +possible and impossible, true and untrue. + +It is here that Kant takes issue with Hume. A survey of our knowledge +makes clear, he thinks, that we are in the possession of a great deal +of information that is not of the unsatisfactory kind that, according +to Hume, all our knowledge of things must be. There, for example, are +all the truths of mathematics. When we enunciate a truth regarding the +relations of the lines and angles of a triangle, we are not merely +unfolding in the predicate of our proposition what was implicitly +contained in the subject. There are propositions that do no more than +this; they are _analytical_, _i.e._ they merely analyze the subject. +Thus, when we say: Man is a rational animal, we may merely be defining +the word "man"--unpacking it, so to speak. But a _synthetic_ judgment +is one in which the predicate is not contained in the subject; it adds +to one's information. The mathematical truths are of this character. +So also is the truth that everything that happens must have a cause. + +Do we connect things with one another in this way merely because we +have had _experience_ that they are thus connected? Is it because they +are _given_ to us connected in this way? That cannot be the case, Kant +argues, for what is taken up as mere experienced act cannot be known as +universally and necessarily true. We perceive that these things _must_ +be so connected. How shall we explain this necessity? + +We can only explain it, said Kant, in this way: We must assume that +what is given us from without is merely the raw material of sensation, +the _matter_ of our experience; and that the ordering of this matter, +the arranging it into a world of phenomena, the furnishing of _form_, +is the work of the mind. Thus, we must think of space, time, +causality, and of all other relations which obtain between the elements +of our experience, as due to the nature of the mind. It perceives the +world of phenomena that it does, because it _constructs_ that world. +Its knowledge of things is stable and dependable because it cannot know +any phenomenon which does not conform to its laws. The water poured +into a cup must take the shape of the cup; and the raw materials poured +into a mind must take the form of an orderly world, spread out in space +and time. + +Kant thought that with this turn he had placed human knowledge upon a +satisfactory basis, and had, at the same time, indicated the +limitations of human knowledge. If the world we perceive is a world +which we make; if the forms of thought furnished by the mind have no +other function than the ordering of the materials furnished by sense; +then what can we say of that which may be beyond phenomena? What of +_noumena_? + +It seems clear that, on Kant's principles, we ought not to be able to +say anything whatever of _noumena_. To say that such may exist appears +absurd. All conceivable connection between them and existing things as +we know them is cut off. We cannot think of a noumenon as a +_substance_, for the notions of substance and quality have been +declared to be only a scheme for the ordering of phenomena. Nor can we +think of one as a cause of the sensations that we unite into a world, +for just the same reason. We are shut up logically to the world of +phenomena, and that world of phenomena is, after all, the successor of +the world of ideas advocated by Berkeley. + +This is not the place to discuss at length the value of Kant's +contribution to philosophy.[3] There is something terrifying in the +prodigious length at which it seems possible for men to discuss it. +Kant called his doctrine "Criticism," because it undertook to establish +the nature and limits of our knowledge. By some he has been hailed as +a great enlightener, and by others he has been accused of being as +dogmatic in his assumptions as those whom he disapproved. + +But one thing he certainly has accomplished. He has made the words +"phenomena" and "noumena" familiar to us all, and he has induced a vast +number of men to accept it as established fact that it is not worth +while to try to extend our knowledge beyond phenomena. One sees his +influence in the writings of men who differ most widely from one +another. + + +[1] "Essay," Book IV, Chapter XI, section 7. + +[2] "An Inquiry into the Human Mind," Chapter V, section 5. + +[3] The reader will find a criticism of the Critical Philosophy in +Chapter XV. + + + + +CHAPTER XIII + +REALISM AND IDEALISM + +52. REALISM.--The plain man is a realist. That is to say, he believes +in a world which is not to be identified with his own ideas or those of +any other mind. At the same time, as we have seen (section 12), the +distinction between the mind and the world is by no means clear to him. +It is not difficult, by judicious questioning, to set his feet upon the +slippery descent that shoots a man into idealism. + +The vague realism of the plain man may be called _Naive_ or +_Unreflective Realism_. It has been called by some _Natural Realism_, +but the latter term is an unfortunate one. It is, of course, natural +for the unreflective man to be unreflective, but, on the other hand, it +is also natural for the reflective man to be reflective. Besides, in +dubbing any doctrine "natural," we are apt to assume that doctrines +contrasted with it may properly be called "unnatural" or "artificial." +It is an ancient rhetorical device, to obtain sympathy for a cause in +which one may happen to be interested by giving it a taking name; but +it is a device frowned upon by logic and by good sense. + +One kind of realism is, then, naive realism. It is the position from +which we all set out, when we begin to reflect upon the system of +things. It is the position to which some try to come back, when their +reflections appear to be leading them into strange or unwelcome paths. + +We have seen how Thomas Reid (section 50) recoiled from the conclusions +to which the reasonings of the philosophers had brought him, and tried +to return to the position of the plain man. The attempt was a failure, +and was necessarily a failure, for Reid tried to come back to the +position of the plain man _and still be a philosopher_. He tried to +live in a cloud and, nevertheless, to see clearly--a task not easy to +accomplish. + +It should be remarked, however, that he tried, at least, to insist that +we know the external world _directly_. We may divide realists into two +broad classes, those who hold to this view, and those who maintain that +we know it only indirectly and through our ideas. + +The plain man belongs, of course, to the first class, if it is just to +speak of a man who says inconsistent things as being wholly in any one +class. Certainly he is willing to assert that the ground upon which he +stands and the staff in his hand are perceived by him directly. + +But we are compelled to recognize that there are subdivisions in this +first class of realists. Reid tried to place himself beside the plain +man and failed to do so. Hamilton (section 50) tried also, and he is +not to be classed precisely either with the plain man or with Reid. He +informs us that the object as it appears to us is a composite something +to the building up of which the knowing mind contributes its share, the +medium through which the object is perceived its share, and the object +in itself its share. He suggests, by way of illustration, that the +external object may contribute one third. This seems to make, at +least, _something_ external directly known. But, on the other hand, he +maintains that the mind knows immediately only what is in immediate +contact with the bodily organ--with the eyes, with the hands, etc.; and +he believes it knows this immediately because it is actually present in +all parts of the body. And, further, in distinguishing as he does +between existence "as it is in itself" and existence "as it is revealed +to us," and in shutting us up to the latter, he seems to rob us even of +the modicum of externality that he has granted us. + +I have already mentioned Herbert Spencer (section 50) as a man not +without sympathy for the attempt to rehabilitate the external world. +He is very severe with the "insanities" of idealism. He is not willing +even to take the first step toward it. + +He writes:[1] "The postulate with which metaphysical reasoning sets out +is that we are primarily conscious only of our sensations--that we +certainly know we have these, and that if there be anything beyond +these serving as cause for them, it can be known only by inference from +them. + +"I shall give much surprise to the metaphysical reader if I call in +question this postulate; and the surprise will rise into astonishment +if I distinctly deny it. Yet I must do this. Limiting the proposition +to those epiperipheral feelings produced in us by external objects (for +these are alone in question), I see no alternative but to affirm that +the thing primarily known is not that a sensation has been experienced, +but that there exists an outer object." + +According to this, the outer object is not known through an inference; +it is known directly. But do not be in haste to class Spencer with the +plain man, or with Reid. Listen to a citation once before made +(section 22), but worth repeating in this connection: "When we are +taught that a piece of matter, regarded by us as existing externally, +cannot be really known, but that we can know only certain impressions +produced on us, we are yet, by the relativity of thought, compelled to +think of these in relation to a cause--the notion of a real existence +which generated these impressions becomes nascent. If it be proved +that every notion of a real existence which we can frame is +inconsistent with itself,--that matter, however conceived by us, cannot +be matter as it actually is,--our conception, though transfigured, is +not destroyed: there remains the sense of reality, dissociated as far +as possible from those special forms under which it was before +represented in thought." + +It is interesting to place the two extracts side by side. In the one, +we are told that we do not know external objects by an inference from +our sensations; in the other we are taught that the piece of matter +which we regard as existing externally cannot be really known; that we +can know only certain impressions produced on us, and must refer them +to a cause; that this cause cannot be what we think it. It is +difficult for the man who reads such statements not to forget that +Spencer regarded himself as a realist who held to a direct knowledge of +something external. + +There are, as it is evident, many sorts of realists that may be +gathered into the first class mentioned above--men who, however +inconsistent they may be, try, at least, to maintain that our knowledge +of the external world is a direct one. And it is equally true that +there are various sorts of realists that may be put into the second +class. + +These men have been called _Hypothetical Realists_. In the last +chapter it was pointed out that Descartes and Locke belong to this +class. Both of these men believed in an external world, but believed +that its existence is a thing to be inferred. + +Now, when a man has persuaded himself that the mind can know directly +only its own ideas, and must infer the world which they are supposed to +represent, he may conceive of that external world in three different +ways. + +(1) He may believe that what corresponds to his idea of a material +object, for example, an apple, is in very many respects like the idea +in his mind. Thus, he may believe that the odor, taste, color, +hardness, etc., that he perceives directly, or as ideas, have +corresponding to them real external odor, taste, color, hardness, etc. +It is not easy for a man to hold to this position, for a very little +reflection seems to make it untenable; but it is theoretically possible +for one to take it, and probably many persons have inclined to the view +when they have first been tempted to believe that the mind perceives +directly only its ideas. + +(2) He may believe that such things as colors, tastes, and odors cannot +be qualities of external bodies at all, but are only effects, produced +upon our minds by something very different in kind. We seem to +perceive bodies, he may argue, to be colored, to have taste, and to be +odorous; but what we thus perceive is not the external thing; the +external thing that produces these appearances cannot be regarded as +having anything more than "solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, +and number." Thus did Locke reason. To him the external world as it +really exists, is, so to speak, a paler copy of the external world as +we seem to perceive it. It is a world with fewer qualities, but, +still, a world with qualities of some kind. + +(3) But one may go farther than this. One may say: How can I know that +even the extension, number, and motion of the things which I directly +perceive have corresponding to them extension, number, and motion, in +an outer world? If what is not colored can cause me to perceive color, +why may not that which is not extended cause me to perceive extension? +And, moved by such reflections, one may maintain that there exists +outside of us that which we can only characterize as an Unknown Cause, +a Reality which we cannot more nearly define. + +This last position resembles very closely one side of Spencer's +doctrine--that represented in the last of the two citations, as the +reader can easily see. It is the position of the follower of Immanuel +Kant who has not yet repudiated the noumenon or thing-in-itself +discussed in the last chapter (section 51). + +I am not concerned to defend any one of the varieties of Direct or of +Hypothetical Realism portrayed above. But I wish to point out that +they all have some sort of claim to the title _Realism_, and to remind +the reader that, when we call a man a realist, we do not do very much +in the way of defining his position. I may add that the account of the +external world contained in Chapter IV is a sort of realism also. + +If this last variety, which I advocate, _must_ be classified, let it be +placed in the first broad class, for it teaches that we know the +external world directly. But I sincerely hope that it will not be +judged wholly by the company it keeps, and that no one will assign to +it either virtues or defects to which it can lay no just claim. + +Before leaving the subject of realism it is right that I should utter a +note of warning touching one very common source of error. It is +fatally easy for men to be misled by the names which are applied to +things. Sir William Hamilton invented for a certain type of +metaphysical doctrine the offensive epithet "nihilism." It is a type +which appeals to many inoffensive and pious men at the present day, +some of whom prefer to call themselves idealists. Many have been +induced to become "free-willists" because the name has suggested to +them a proper regard for that freedom which is justly dear to all men. +We can scarcely approach with an open mind an account of ideas and +sensations which we hear described as "sensationalism," or worse yet, +as "sensualism." When a given type of philosophy is set down as +"dogmatism," we involuntarily feel a prejudice against it. + +He who reads as reflectively as he should will soon find out that +philosophers "call names" much as other men do, and that one should +always be on one's guard. "Every form of phenomenalism," asseverated a +learned and energetic old gentleman, who for many years occupied a +chair in one of our leading institutions of learning, "necessarily +leads to atheism." He inspired a considerable number of students with +such a horror for "phenomenalism" that they never took pains to find +out what it was. + +I mention these things in this connection, because I suspect that not a +few in our own day are unduly influenced by the associations which +cling to the words "realism" and "idealism." Realism in literature, as +many persons understand it, means the degradation of literature to the +portrayal of what is coarse and degrading, in a coarse and offensive +way. Realism in painting often means the laborious representation upon +canvas of things from which we would gladly avert our eyes if we met +them in real life. With the word "idealism," on the other hand, we are +apt to connect the possession of ideals, a regard for what is best and +noblest in life and literature. + +The reader must have seen that realism in the philosophic sense of the +word has nothing whatever to do with realism in the senses just +mentioned. The word is given a special meaning, and it is a weakness +to allow associations drawn from other senses of the word to color our +judgment when we use it. + +And it should be carefully held in view that the word "idealism" is +given a special sense when it is used to indicate a type of doctrine +contrasted with the doctrine of the realist. Some forms of +philosophical idealism have undoubtedly been inspiring; but some have +been, and are, far from inspiring. They should not be allowed to +posture as saints merely because they are cloaked with an ambiguous +name. + +53. IDEALISM.--Idealism we may broadly define as the doctrine that all +existence is mental existence. So far from regarding the external +world as beyond and independent of mind, it maintains that it can have +its being only in consciousness. + +We have seen (section 49) how men were led to take the step to +idealism. It is not a step which the plain man is impelled to take +without preparation. To say that the real world of things in which we +perceive ourselves to live and move is a something that exists only in +the mind strikes him as little better than insane. He who becomes an +idealist usually does so, I think, after weighing the arguments +presented by the hypothetical realist, and finding that they seem to +carry one farther than the latter appears to recognize. + +The type of idealism represented by Berkeley has been called +_Subjective Idealism_. Ordinarily our use of the words "subjective" +and "objective" is to call attention to the distinction between what +belongs to the mind and what belongs to the external order of things. +My sensations are subjective, they are referred to my mind, and it is +assumed that they can have no existence except in my mind; the +qualities of things are regarded as objective, that is, it is commonly +believed that they exist independently of my perception of them. + +Of course, when a man becomes an idealist, he cannot keep just this +distinction. The question may, then, fairly be raised: How can he be a +_subjective idealist_? Has not the word "subjective" lost its +significance? + +To this one has to answer: It has, and it has not. The man who, with +strict consistency, makes the desk at which he sits as much his "idea" +as is the pain in his finger or his memory of yesterday, cannot keep +hold of the distinction of subjective and objective. But men are not +always as consistent as this. Remember the illustration of the +"telephone exchange" (section 14). The mind is represented as situated +at the brain terminals of the sensory nerves; and then brain, nerves, +and all else are turned into ideas in this mind, which are merely +"projected outwards." + +Now, in placing the mind at a definite location in the world, and +contrasting it with the world, we retain the distinction between +subjective and objective--what is in the mind can be distinguished from +what is beyond it. On the other hand, in making the whole system of +external things a complex of ideas in the mind, we become idealists, +and repudiate realism. The position is an inconsistent one, of course, +but it is possible for men to take it, for men have taken it often +enough. + +The idealism of Professor Pearson (section 14) is more palpably +subjective than that of Berkeley, for the latter never puts the mind in +a "telephone exchange." Nevertheless, he names the objects of sense, +which other men call material things, "ideas," and he evidently +assimilates them to what we commonly call ideas and contrast with +things. Moreover, he holds them in some of the contempt which men +reserve for "mere ideas," for he believes that idolaters might be +induced to give over worshiping the heavenly bodies could they be +persuaded that these are nothing more than their own ideas. + +With the various forms of subjective idealism it is usual to contrast +the doctrine of _Objective Idealism_. This does not maintain that the +world which I perceive is my "idea"; it maintains that the world is +"idea." + +It is rather a nice question, and one which no man should decide +without a careful examination of the whole matter, whether we have any +right to retain the word "idea" when we have rubbed out the distinction +which is usually drawn between ideas and external things. If we +maintain that all men are always necessarily selfish, we stretch the +meaning of the word quite beyond what is customary, and selfishness +becomes a thing we have no reason to disapprove, since it characterizes +saint and sinner alike. Similarly, if we decide to name "idea," not +only what the plain man and the realist admit to have a right to that +name, but also the great system which these men call an external +material world, it seems right to ask; Why use the word "idea" at all? +What does it serve to indicate? Not a distinction, surely, for the +word seems to be applicable to all things without distinction. + +Such considerations as these lead me to object to the expression +"objective idealism": if the doctrine is really _objective_, _i.e._ if +it recognizes a system of things different and distinct from what men +commonly call ideas, it scarcely seems to have a right to the title +_idealism_; and if it is really _idealism_, and does not rob the word +idea of all significance, it can scarcely be _objective_ in any proper +sense of the word. + +Manifestly, there is need of a very careful analysis of the meaning of +the word "idea," and of the proper significance of the terms +"subjective" and "objective," if error is to be avoided and language +used soberly and accurately. Those who are not in sympathy with the +doctrine of the objective idealists think that in such careful analysis +and accurate statement they are rather conspicuously lacking. + +We think of Hegel (1770-1831) as the typical objective idealist. It is +not easy to give an accurate account of his doctrine, for he is far +from a clear writer, and he has made it possible for his many admirers +to understand him in many ways. But he seems to have accepted the +system of things that most men call the real external world, and to +have regarded it as the Divine Reason in its self-development. And +most of those whom we would to-day be inclined to gather together under +the title of objective idealists appear to have been much influenced, +directly or indirectly, by his philosophy. There are, however, great +differences of opinion among them, and no man should be made +responsible for the opinions of the class as a class. + +I have said a few pages back that some forms of idealism are inspiring, +and that some are not. + +Bishop Berkeley called the objects of sense ideas. He regarded all +ideas as inactive, and thought that all changes in ideas--and this +includes all the changes that take place in nature--must be referred to +the activity of minds. Some of those changes he could refer to finite +minds, his own and others. Most of them he could not, and he felt +impelled to refer them to a Divine Mind. Hence, the world became to +him a constant revelation of God; and he uses the word "God" in no +equivocal sense. It does not signify to him the system of things as a +whole, or an Unknowable, or anything of the sort. It signifies a +spirit akin to his own, but without its limitations. He writes:[2]-- + +"A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense, as not being an +idea; when, therefore, we see the color, size, figure, and motions of a +man, we perceive only certain sensations or ideas excited in our own +minds; and these being exhibited to our view in sundry distinct +collections serve to mark out unto us the existence of finite and +created spirits like ourselves. Hence, it is plain we do not see a +man,--if by _man_ is meant that which lives, moves, perceives, and +thinks as we do,--but only such a certain collection of ideas as +directs us to think there is a distinct principle of thought and +motion, like to ourselves, accompanying and represented by it. And +after the same manner we see God; all the difference is that, whereas +some one finite and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a particular +human mind, whithersoever we direct our view, we do at all times and in +all places perceive manifest tokens of the Divinity--everything we see, +hear, feel, or any wise perceive by sense, being a sign or effect of +the power of God; as is our perception of those very motions which are +produced by men." + +With Berkeley's view of the world as a constant revelation of God, many +men will sympathize who have little liking for his idealism as +idealism. They may criticise in detail his arguments to prove the +nonexistence of a genuinely external world, but they will be ready to +admit that his doctrine is an inspiring one in the view that it takes +of the world and of man. + +With this I wish to contrast the doctrine of another idealist, Mr. +Bradley, whose work, "Appearance and Reality," has been much discussed +in the last few years, in order that the reader may see how widely +different forms of idealism may differ from each other, and how absurd +it is to praise or blame a man's philosophy merely on the ground that +it is idealistic. + +Mr. Bradley holds that those aspects of our experience which we are +accustomed to regard as real--qualities of things, the relations +between things, the things themselves, space, time, motion, causation, +activity, the self--turn out when carefully examined to be +self-contradictory and absurd. They are not real; they are +unrealities, mere appearances. + +But these appearances exist, and, hence, must belong to reality. This +reality must be sentient, for "there is no being or fact outside of +that which is commonly called psychical existence." + +Now, what is this reality with which appearances--the whole world of +things which seem to be given in our experience--are contrasted? Mr. +Bradley calls it the Absolute, and indicates that it is what other men +recognize as the Deity. How shall we conceive it? + +We are told that we are to conceive it as consisting of the contents of +finite minds, or "centers of experience," subjected to "an +all-pervasive transfusion with a reblending of all material." In the +Absolute, finite things are "transmuted" and lose "their individual +natures." + +What does this mean in plain language? It means that there are many +finite minds of a higher and of a lower order, "centers of experience," +and that the contents of these are unreal appearances. There is not a +God or Absolute outside of and distinct from these, but rather one that +in some sense _is their reality_. This mass of unrealities transfused +and transmuted so that no one of them retains its individual nature is +the Absolute. That is to say, time must become indistinguishable from +space, space from motion, motion from the self, the self from the +qualities of things, etc., before they are fit to become constituents +of the Absolute and to be regarded as real. + +As the reader has seen, this Absolute has nothing in common with the +God in which Berkeley believed, and in which the plain man usually +believes. It is the night in which all cats are gray, and there +appears to be no reason why any one should harbor toward it the least +sentiment of awe or veneration. + +Whether such reasonings as Mr. Bradley's should be accepted as valid or +should not, must be decided after a careful examination into the +foundations upon which they rest and the consistency with which +inferences are drawn from premises. I do not wish to prejudge the +matter. But it is worth while to set forth the conclusions at which he +arrives, that it may be clearly realized that the associations which +often hang about the word "idealism" should be carefully stripped away +when we are forming our estimate of this or that philosophical doctrine. + + +[1] "Principles of Psychology," Part VII, Chapter VI, section 404. + +[2] "Principles," section 148. + + + + +CHAPTER XIV + +MONISM AND DUALISM + +54. THE MEANING OF THE WORDS.--In common life men distinguish between +minds and material things, thus dividing the things, which taken +together make up the world as we know it, into two broad classes. They +think of minds as being very different from material objects, and of +the latter as being very different from minds. It does not occur to +them to find in the one class room for the other, nor does it occur to +them to think of both classes as "manifestations" or "aspects" of some +one "underlying reality." In other words, the plain man to-day is a +_Dualist_. + +In the last chapter (section 52) I have called him a Naive Realist; and +here I shall call him a _Naive Dualist_, for a man may regard mind and +matter as quite distinct kinds of things, without trying to elevate his +opinion, through reflection, into a philosophical doctrine. The +reflective man may stand by the opinion of the plain man, merely trying +to make less vague and indefinite the notions of matter and of mind. +He then becomes a _Philosophical Dualist_. There are several varieties +of this doctrine, and I shall consider them a little later (section 58). + +But it is possible for one to be less profoundly impressed by the +differences which characterize matter and mind. One may feel inclined +to refer mental phenomena to matter, and to deny them the prominence +accorded them by the dualist. On the other hand, one may be led by +one's reflections to resolve material objects into mere ideas, and to +claim that they can have no existence except in a mind. Finally, it is +possible to hold that both minds and material things, as we know them, +are only manifestations, phenomena, and that they must be referred to +an ulterior "reality" or "substance." One may claim that they are +"aspects" of the one reality, which is neither matter nor mind. + +These doctrines are different forms of _Monism_. In whatever else they +differ from one another, they agree in maintaining that the universe +does not contain two kinds of things fundamentally different. Out of +the duality of things as it seems to be revealed to the plain man they +try to make some kind of a unity. + +35. MATERIALISM.--The first of the forms of monism above mentioned is +_Materialism_. It is not a doctrine to which the first impulse of the +plain man leads him at the present time. Even those who have done no +reading in philosophy have inherited many of their ways of looking at +things from the thinkers who lived in the ages past, and whose opinions +have become the common property of civilized men. For more than two +thousand years the world and the mind have been discussed, and it is +impossible for any of us to escape from the influence of those +discussions and to look at things with the primitive simplicity of the +wholly untutored. + +But it was not always so. There was a time when men who were not +savages, but possessed great intellectual vigor and much cultivation, +found it easy and natural to be materialists. This I have spoken of +before (section 30), but it will repay us to take up again a little +more at length the clearest of the ancient forms of materialism, that +of the Atomists, and to see what may be said for and against it. + +Democritus of Abdera taught that nothing exists except atoms and empty +space. The atoms, he maintained, differ from one another in size, +shape, and position. In other respects they are alike. They have +always been in motion. Perhaps he conceived of that motion as +originally a fall through space, but there seems to be uncertainty upon +this point. However, the atoms in motion collide with one another, and +these collisions result in mechanical combinations from which spring +into being world-systems. + +According to this doctrine, nothing comes from nothing, and nothing can +become nonexistent. All the changes which have ever taken place in the +world are only changes in the position of material particles--they are +regroupings of atoms. We cannot directly perceive them to be such, for +our senses are too dull to make such fine observations, but our reason +tells us that such is the case. + +Where, in such a world as this, is there room for mind, and what can we +mean by mind? Democritus finds a place for mind by conceiving it to +consist of fine, smooth, round atoms, which are the same as the atoms +which constitute fire. These are distributed through the whole body, +and lie among the other atoms which compose it. They are inhaled with +and exhaled into the outer air. While they are in the body their +functions are different according as they are located in this organ or +in that. In the brain they give rise to thought, in the heart to +anger, and in the liver to desire. + +I suppose no one would care, at the present time, to become a +Democritean. The "Reason," which tells us that the mind consists of +fine, round atoms, appears to have nothing but its bare word to offer +us. But, apart from this, a peculiar difficulty seems to face us; even +supposing there are atoms of fire in the brain, the heart, and the +liver, what are the _thought_, _anger_, and _desire_, of which mention +is made? + +Shall we conceive of these last as atoms, as void space, or as the +motion of atoms? There really seems to be no place in the world for +them, and _these are the mind so far as the mind appears to be +revealed_--they are _mental phenomena_. It does not seem that they are +to be identified with anything that the Atomistic doctrine admits as +existing. They are simply overlooked. + +Is the modern materialism more satisfactory? About half a century ago +there was in the scientific world something like a revival of +materialistic thinking. It did not occur to any one to maintain that +the mind consists of fine atoms disseminated through the body, but +statements almost as crude were made. It was said, for example, that +the brain secretes thought as the liver secretes bile. + +It seems a gratuitous labor to criticise such statements as these in +detail. There are no glands the secretions of which are not as +unequivocally material as are the glands themselves. This means that +such secretions can be captured and analyzed; the chemical elements of +which they are composed can be enumerated. They are open to inspection +in precisely the same way as are the glands which secrete them. + +Does it seem reasonable to maintain that thoughts and feelings are +related to brains in this way? Does the chemist ever dream of +collecting them in a test tube, and of drawing up for us a list of +their constituent elements? When the brain is active, there are, to be +sure, certain material products which pass into the blood and are +finally eliminated from the body; but among these products no one would +be more surprised than the materialist to discover pains and pleasures, +memories and anticipations, desires and volitions. This talk of +thought as a "secretion" we can afford to set aside. + +Nor need we take much more seriously the seemingly more sober statement +that thought is a "function" of the brain. There is, of course, a +sense in which we all admit the statement; minds are not disembodied, +and we have reason to believe that mind and brain are most intimately +related. But the word "function" is used in a very broad and loose +sense when it serves to indicate this relation; and one may employ it +in this way without being a materialist at all. In a stricter sense of +the word, the brain has no functions that may not be conceived as +mechanical changes,--as the motion of atoms in space,--and to identify +mental phenomena with these is inexcusable. It is not theoretically +inconceivable that, with finer senses, we might directly perceive the +motions of the atoms in another man's brain; it is inconceivable that +we should thus directly perceive his melancholy or his joy; they belong +to another world. + +56. SPIRITUALISM.--The name _Spiritualism_ is sometimes given to the +doctrine that there is no existence which we may not properly call mind +or spirit. It errs in the one direction as materialism errs in the +other. + +One must not confound with this doctrine that very different one, +Spiritism, which teaches that a certain favored class of persons called +mediums may bring back the spirits of the departed and enable us to +hold communication with them. Such beliefs have always existed among +the common people, but they have rarely interested philosophers. I +shall have nothing to say of them in this book. + +There have been various kinds of spiritualists. The name may be +applied to the idealists, from Berkeley down to those of our day; at +some of the varieties of their doctrine we have taken a glance +(sections 49, 53). To these we need not recur; but there is one type +of spiritualistic doctrine which is much discussed at the present day +and which appears to appeal strongly to a number of scientific men. We +must consider it for a moment. + +We have examined Professor Clifford's doctrine of Mind-stuff (section +43). Clifford maintained that all the material things we perceive are +our perceptions--they are in our consciousness, and are not properly +external at all. But, believing, as he did, that all nature is +animated, he held that every material thing, every perception, may be +taken as a revelation of something not in our consciousness, of a mind +or, at least, of a certain amount of mind-stuff. How shall we conceive +the relation between what is in our mind and the something +corresponding to it not in our mind? + +We must, says Clifford, regard the latter as the _reality_ of which the +former is the _appearance_ or _manifestation_. "What I perceive as +your brain is really in itself your consciousness, is You; but then +that which I call your brain, the material fact, is merely my +perception." + +This doctrine is _Panpsychism_, in the form in which it is usually +brought to our attention. It holds that the only real existences are +minds, and that physical phenomena must be regarded as the +manifestations under which these real existences make us aware of their +presence. The term panpsychism may, it is true, be used in a somewhat +different sense. It may be employed merely to indicate the doctrine +that all nature is animated, and without implying a theory as to the +relation between bodies perceived and the minds supposed to accompany +them. + +What shall we say to panpsychism of the type represented by Clifford? +It is, I think, sufficiently answered in the earlier chapters of this +volume:-- + +(1) If I call material facts my perceptions, I do an injustice to the +distinction between the physical and the mental (Chapter IV). + +(2) If I say that all nature is animated, I extend illegitimately the +argument for other minds (Chapter X). + +(3) If I say that mind is the reality of which the brain is the +appearance, I misconceive what is meant by the distinction between +appearance and reality (Chapter V). + +57. THE DOCTRINE OF THE ONE SUBSTANCE.--In the seventeenth century +Descartes maintained that, although mind and matter may justly be +regarded as two substances, yet it should be recognized that they are +not really independent substances in the strictest sense of the word, +but that there is only one substance, in this sense, and mind and +matter are, as it were, its attributes. + +His thought was that by attribute we mean that which is not +independent, but must be referred to something else; by substance, we +mean that which exists independently and is not referred to any other +thing. It seemed to follow that there could be only one substance. + +Spinoza modified Descartes' doctrine in that he refused to regard mind +and matter as substances at all. He made them unequivocally attributes +of the one and only substance, which he called God. + +The thought which influenced Spinoza had impressed many minds before +his time, and it has influenced many since. One need not follow him in +naming the unitary something to which mind and matter are referred +substance. One may call it Being, or Reality, or the Unknowable, or +Energy, or the Absolute, or, perhaps, still something else. The +doctrine has taken many forms, but he who reads with discrimination +will see that the various forms have much in common. + +They agree in maintaining that matter and mind, as they are revealed in +our experience, are not to be regarded as, in the last analysis, two +distinct kinds of thing. They are, rather, modes or manifestations of +one and the same thing, and this is not to be confounded with either. + +Those who incline to this doctrine take issue with the materialist, who +assimilates mental phenomena to physical; and they oppose the idealist, +who assimilates physical phenomena to mental, and calls material things +"ideas." We have no right, they argue, to call that of which ideas and +things are manifestations either mind or matter. It is to be +distinguished from both. + +To this doctrine the title of _Monism_ is often appropriated. In this +chapter I have used the term in a broader sense, for both the +materialist and the spiritualist maintain that there is in the universe +but one kind of thing. Nevertheless, when we hear a man called a +monist without qualification, we may, perhaps, be justified in +assuming, in the absence of further information, that he holds to some +one of the forms of doctrine indicated above. There may be no logical +justification for thus narrowing the use of the term, but logical +justification goes for little in such matters. + +Various considerations have moved men to become monists in this sense +of the word. Some have been influenced by the assumption--one which +men felt impelled to make early in the history of speculative +thought--that the whole universe must be the expression of some unitary +principle. A rather different argument is well illustrated in the +writings of Professor Hoeffding, a learned and acute writer of our own +time. It has influenced so many that it is worth while to delay upon +it. + +Professor Hoeffding holds that mental phenomena and physical phenomena +must be regarded as parallel (see Chapter IX), and that we must not +conceive of ideas and material things as interacting. He writes:[1]-- + +"If it is contrary to the doctrine of the persistence of physical +energy to suppose a transition from the one province to the other, and +if, nevertheless, the two provinces exist in our experience as +distinct, then the two sets of phenomena must be unfolded +simultaneously, each according to its laws, so that for every +phenomenon in the world of consciousness there is a corresponding +phenomenon in the world of matter, and conversely (so far as there is +reason to suppose that conscious life is correlated with material +phenomena). The parallels already drawn point directly to such a +relation; it would be an amazing accident, if, while the characteristic +marks repeated themselves in this way, there were not at the foundation +an inner connection. Both the _parallelism_ and the _proportionality_ +between the activity of consciousness and cerebral activity point to an +_identity_ at bottom. The difference which remains in spite of the +points of agreement compels us to suppose that one and the same +principle has found its expression in a double form. We have no right +to take mind and body for two beings or substances in reciprocal +interaction. We are, on the contrary, impelled to conceive the +material interaction between the elements composing the brain and +nervous system _as an outer form of the inner ideal unity of +consciousness_. What we in our inner experience become conscious of as +thought, feeling, and resolution, is thus represented in the material +world by certain material processes of the brain, which as such are +subject to the law of the persistence of energy, although this law +cannot be applied to the relation between cerebral and conscious +processes. It is as though the same thing were said in two languages." + +Some monists are in the habit of speaking of the one Being to which +they refer phenomena of all sorts as the "Absolute." The word is a +vague one, and means very different things in different philosophies. +It has been somewhat broadly defined as "the ultimate principle of +explanation of the universe." He who turns to one principle of +explanation will conceive the Absolute in one way, and he who turns to +another will, naturally, understand something else by the word. + +Thus, the idealist may conceive of the Absolute as an all-inclusive +Mind, of which finite minds are parts. To Spencer, it is the +Unknowable, a something behind the veil of phenomena. Sometimes it +means to a writer much the same thing that the word God means to other +men; sometimes it has a significance at the farthest remove from this +(section 53). Indeed, the word is so vague and ambiguous, and has +proved itself the mother of so many confusions, that it would seem a +desirable thing to drop it out of philosophy altogether, and to +substitute for it some less ambiguous expression. + +It seems clear from the preceding pages, that, before one either +accepts or rejects monism, one should very carefully determine just +what one means by the word, and should scrutinize the considerations +which may be urged in favor of the particular doctrine in question. +There are all sorts of monism, and men embrace them for all sorts of +reasons. Let me beg the reader to bear in mind;-- + +(1) The monist may be a materialist; he may be an idealist; he may be +neither. In the last case, he may, with Spinoza, call the one +Substance God; that is, he may be a Pantheist. On the other hand, he +may, with Spencer, call it the Unknowable, and be an Agnostic. Other +shades of opinion are open to him, if he cares to choose them. + +(2) It does not seem wise to assent hastily to such statements as; "The +universe is the manifestation of one unitary Being"; or: "Mind and +matter are the expression of one and the same principle." We find +revealed in our experience mental phenomena and physical phenomena. In +what sense they are one, or whether they are one in any sense,--this is +something to be determined by an examination of the phenomena and of +the relations in which we find them. It may turn out that the universe +is one only in the sense that all phenomena belong to the one orderly +system. If we find that this is the case, we may still, if we choose, +call our doctrine monism, but we should carefully distinguish such a +monism from those represented by Hoeffding and Spencer and many others. +There seems little reason to use the word, when the doctrine has been +so far modified. + +58. DUALISM.--The plain man finds himself in a world of physical things +and of minds, and it seems to him that his experience directly +testifies to the existence of both. This means that the things of +which he has experience appear to belong to two distinct classes. + +It does not mean, of course, that he has only two kinds of experiences. +The phenomena which are revealed to us are indefinitely varied; all +physical phenomena are not just alike, and all mental phenomena are not +just alike. + +Nevertheless, amid all the bewildering variety that forces itself upon +our attention, there stands out one broad distinction, that of the +physical and the mental. It is a distinction that the man who has done +no reading in the philosophers is scarcely tempted to obliterate; to +him the world consists of two kinds of things widely different from +each other; minds are not material things and material things are not +minds. We are justified in regarding this as the opinion of the plain +man even when we recognize that, in his endeavor to make clear to +himself what he means by minds, he sometimes speaks as though he were +talking about something material or semi-material. + +Now, the materialist allows these two classes to run together; so does +the idealist. The one says that everything is matter; the other, that +everything is mind. It would be foolish to maintain that nothing can +be said for either doctrine, for men of ability have embraced each. +But one may at least say that both seem to be refuted by our common +experience of the world, an experience which, so far as it is permitted +to testify at all, lifts up its voice in favor of _Dualism_. + +Dualism is sometimes defined as the doctrine that there are in the +world two kinds of substances, matter and mind, which are different in +kind and should be kept distinct. There are dualists who prefer to +avoid the use of the word substance, and to say that the world of our +experiences consists of physical phenomena and of mental phenomena, and +that these two classes of facts should be kept separate. + +The dualist may maintain that we have a direct knowledge of matter and +of mind, and he may content himself with such a statement, doing little +to make clear what we mean by matter and by mind. In this case, his +position is little different from that of the plain man who does not +attempt to philosophize. Thomas Reid (section 50) belongs to this +class. + +On the other hand, the dualist may attempt to make clear, through +philosophical reflection, what we mean by the matter and mind which +experience seems to give us. He may conclude:-- + +(1) That he must hold, as did Sir William Hamilton, that we perceive +directly only physical and mental phenomena, but are justified in +inferring that, since the phenomena are different, there must be two +kinds of underlying substances to which the phenomena are referred. +Thus, he may distinguish between the two substances and their +manifestations, as some monists distinguish between the one substance +and its manifestations. + +(2) Or he may conclude that it is futile to search for substances or +realities of any sort _behind_ phenomena, arguing that such realities +are never revealed in experience, and that no sound reason for their +assumption can be adduced. In this case, he may try to make plain what +mind and matter are, by simply analyzing our experiences of mind and +matter and coming to a clearer comprehension of their nature. + +As the reader has probably remarked, the philosophy presented in the +earlier chapters of this book (Chapters III to XI) is _dualistic_ as +well as _realistic_. That is to say, it refuses to rub out the +distinction between physical phenomena and mental phenomena, either by +dissolving the material world into ideas; by calling ideas secretions +or functions of the brain; or by declaring them one in a fictitious +entity behind the veil and not supposed to be exactly identical with +either. And as it teaches that the only reality that it means anything +to talk about must be found in experience, it is a dualism of the type +described in the paragraph which immediately precedes. + +Such a philosophy does not seem to do violence to the common experience +of minds and of physical things shared by us all, whether we are +philosophers or are not. It only tries to make clear what we all know +dimly and vaguely. This is, I think, a point in its favor. However, +men of great ability and of much learning have inclined to doctrines +very different; and we have no right to make up our minds on such a +subject as this without trying to give them an attentive and an +impartial hearing. + +59. SINGULARISM AND PLURALISM.--There are those who apply to the +various forms of monism the title _Singularism_, and who contrast with +this _Pluralism_, a word which is meant to cover the various doctrines +which maintain that there is more than one ultimate principle or being +in the universe. + +It is argued that we should have some word under which we may bring +such a doctrine, for example, as that of the Greek philosopher +Empedocles (born about 490 B.C.). This thinker made earth, water, +fire, and air the four material principles or "roots" of things. He +was not a monist, and we can certainly not call him a dualist. + +Again. The term pluralism has been used to indicate the doctrine that +individual finite minds are not parts or manifestations of one +all-embracing Mind,--of God or the Absolute,--but are relatively +independent beings. This doctrine has been urged in our own time, with +eloquence and feeling, by Professor Howison.[2] Here we have a +pluralism which is idealistic, for it admits in the universe but one +_kind_ of thing, minds; and yet refuses to call itself monistic. It +will readily be seen that in this paragraph and in the one preceding +the word is used in different senses. + +I have added the above sentences to this chapter that the reader may +have an explanation of the meaning of a word sometimes met with. But +the title of the chapter is "Monism and Dualism," and it is of this +contrast that it is especially important to grasp the significance. + + +[1] "Outlines of Psychology," pp. 64-65, English translation, 1891. + +[2] "The Limits of Evolution, and Other Essays," revised edition. New +York, 1905. + + + + +CHAPTER XV + +RATIONALISM, EMPIRICISM, CRITICISM, AND CRITICAL EMPIRICISM + +60. RATIONALISM.--As the content of a philosophical doctrine must be +determined by the _initial assumptions_ which a philosopher makes and +by the _method_ which he adopts in his reasonings, it is well to +examine with some care certain broad differences in this respect which +characterize different philosophers, and which help to explain how it +is that the results of their reflections are so startlingly different. + +I shall first speak of _Rationalism_, which I may somewhat loosely +define as the doctrine that the reason can attain truths independently +of observation--can go beyond experienced fact and the deductions which +experience seems to justify us in making from experienced fact. The +definition cannot mean much to us until it is interpreted by a concrete +example, and I shall turn to such. It must, however, be borne in mind +that the word "rationalism" is meant to cover a great variety of +opinions, and we have said comparatively little about him when we have +called a man a rationalist in philosophy. Men may agree in believing +that the reason can go beyond experienced fact, and yet may differ +regarding the particular truths which may be thus attained. + +Now, when Descartes found himself discontented with the philosophy that +he and others had inherited from the Middle Ages, and undertook a +reconstruction, he found it necessary to throw over a vast amount of +what had passed as truth, if only with a view to building up again upon +a firmer foundation. It appeared to him that much was uncritically +accepted as true in philosophy and in the sciences which a little +reflection revealed to be either false or highly doubtful. +Accordingly, he decided to clear the ground by a sweeping doubt, and to +begin his task quite independently. + +In accordance with this principle, he rejected the testimony of the +senses touching the existence of a world of external things. Do not +the senses sometimes deceive us? And, since men seem to be liable to +error in their reasonings, even in a field so secure as that of +mathematical demonstration, he resolved further to repudiate all the +reasonings he had heretofore accepted. He would not even assume +himself to be in his right mind and awake; might he not be the victim +of a diseased fancy, or a man deluded by dreams? + +Could anything whatever escape this all-devouring doubt? One truth +seemed unshakable: his own existence, at least, emerged from this sea +of uncertainties. I may be deceived in thinking that there is an +external world, and that I am awake and really perceive things; but I +surely cannot be deceived unless I exist. _Cogito, ergo sum_--I think, +hence I exist; this truth Descartes accepted as the first principle of +the new and sounder philosophy which he sought. + +As we read farther in Descartes we discover that he takes back again a +great many of those things that he had at the outset rejected as +uncertain. Thus, he accepts an external world of material things. How +does he establish its existence? He cannot do it as the empiricist +does it, by a reference to experienced fact, for he does not believe +that the external world is directly given in our experience. He thinks +we are directly conscious only of our _ideas_ of it, and must somehow +prove that it exists over against our ideas. + +By his principles, Descartes is compelled to fall back upon a curious +roundabout argument to prove that there is a world. He must first +prove that God exists, and then argue that God would not deceive us +into thinking that it exists when it does not. + +Now, when we come to examine Descartes' reasonings in detail we find +what appear to us some very uncritical assumptions. Thus, he proves +the existence of God by the following argument:-- + +I exist, and I find in me the idea of God; of this idea I cannot be the +author, for it represents something much greater than I, and its cause +must be as great as the reality it represents. In other words, nothing +less than God can be the cause of the idea of God which I find in me, +and, hence, I may infer that God exists. + +Where did Descartes get this notion that every idea must have a cause +which contains as much external reality as the idea does represented +reality? How does he prove his assumption? He simply appeals to what +he calls "the natural light," which is for him a source of all sorts of +information which cannot be derived from experience. This "natural +light" furnishes him with a vast number of "eternal truths", these he +has not brought under the sickle of his sweeping doubt, and these help +him to build up again the world he has overthrown, beginning with the +one indubitable fact discussed above. + +To the men of a later time many of Descartes' eternal truths are simply +inherited philosophical prejudices, the results of the reflections of +earlier thinkers, and in sad need of revision. I shall not criticise +them in detail. The important point for us to notice is that we have +here a type of philosophy which depends upon truths revealed by the +reason, independently of experience, to carry one beyond the sphere of +experience. + +I again remind the reader that there are all sorts of rationalists, in +the philosophical sense of the word. Some trust the power of the +unaided reason without reserve. Thus Spinoza, the pantheist, made the +magnificent but misguided attempt to deduce the whole system of things +physical and things mental from what he called the attributes of God, +Extension and Thought. + +On the other hand, one may be a good deal of an empiricist, and yet +something of a rationalist, too. Thus Professor Strong, in his recent +brilliant book, "Why the Mind has a Body," maintains that we know +intuitively that other minds than our own exist; know it without +gathering our information from experience, and without having to +establish the fact in any way. This seems, at least, akin to the +doctrine of the "natural light," and yet no one can say that Professor +Strong does not, in general, believe in a philosophy of observation and +experiment. + +61. EMPIRICISM.--I suppose every one who has done some reading in the +history of philosophy will, if his mother tongue be English, think of +the name of John Locke when empiricism is mentioned. + +Locke, in his "Essay concerning Human Understanding," undertakes "to +inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, +together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." +His sober and cautious work, which was first published in 1690, was +peculiarly English in character; and the spirit which it exemplifies +animates also Locke's famous successors, George Berkeley (1684-1753), +David Hume (1711-1776), and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). Although +Locke was a realist, Berkeley an idealist, Hume a skeptic, and Mill +what has been called a sensationalist; yet all were empiricists of a +sort, and emphasized the necessity of founding our knowledge upon +experience. + +Now, Locke was familiar with the writings of Descartes, whose work he +admired, but whose rationalism offended him. The first book of the +"Essay" is devoted to the proof that there are in the mind of man no +"innate ideas" and no "innate principles." That is to say, Locke tries +to show that one must not seek, in the "natural light" to which +Descartes turned, a distinct and independent source of information, + +"Let us, then," he continues, "suppose the mind to be, as we say, white +paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be +furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and +boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless +variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To +this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge +is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our +observation, employed either about external sensible objects, or about +the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by +ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the +materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from +whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring." [1] + +Thus, all we know and all we ever shall know of the world of matter and +of minds must rest ultimately upon observation,--observation of +external things and of our own mind. We must clip the erratic wing of +a "reason" which seeks to soar beyond such knowledge; which leaves the +solid earth, and hangs suspended in the void. + +"But hold," exclaims the critical reader; "have we not seen that Locke, +as well as Descartes (section 48), claims to know what he cannot prove +by direct observation or even by a legitimate inference from what has +been directly observed? Does he not maintain that the mind has an +immediate knowledge or experience only of its own ideas? How can he +prove that there are material extended things outside causing these +ideas? And if he cannot prove it by an appeal to experience, to direct +observation, is he not, in accepting the existence of the external +world at all, just as truly as Descartes, a rationalist?" + +The objection is well taken. On his own principles, Locke had no right +to believe in an external world. He has stolen his world, so to speak; +he has taken it by violence. Nevertheless, as I pointed out in the +section above referred to, Locke is not a rationalist of _malice +prepense_. He _tries_ to be an empiricist. He believes in the +external world because he thinks it is directly revealed to the +senses--he inconsistently refers to experience as evidence of its +existence. + +It has often been claimed by those who do not sympathize with +empiricism that the empiricists make assumptions much as others do, but +have not the grace to admit it. I think we must frankly confess that a +man may try hard to be an empiricist and may not be wholly successful. +Moreover, reflection forces us to the conclusion that when we have +defined empiricism as a doctrine which rests throughout upon an appeal +to "experience" we have not said anything very definite. + +What is _experience_? What may we accept as directly revealed fact? +The answer to such questions is far from an easy one to give. It is a +harder matter to discuss intelligently than any one can at all realize +until he has spent some years in following the efforts of the +philosophers to determine what is "revealed fact." We are supposed to +have experience of our own minds, of space, of time, of matter. What +are these things as revealed in our experience? We have seen in the +earlier chapters of this book that one cannot answer such questions +off-hand. + +62. CRITICISM.--I have in another chapter (section 51) given a brief +account of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. He called his doctrine +"Criticism," and he distinguished it from "Dogmatism" and "Empiricism." + +Every philosophy that transcends experience, without first critically +examining our faculty of knowledge and determining its right to spread +its wings in this way, Kant calls "dogmatism." The word seems rather +an offensive one, in its usual signification, at least; and it is as +well not to use it. As Kant used the word, Descartes was a dogmatist; +but let us rather call him a rationalist. He certainly had no +intention of proceeding uncritically, as we shall see a little later. +If we call him a dogmatist we seem to condemn him in advance, by +applying to him an abusive epithet. + +Empiricism, according to Kant, confines human knowledge to experience, +and thus avoids the errors which beset the dogmatist. But then, as +Hume seemed to have shown, empiricism must run out into skepticism. If +all our knowledge has its foundations in experience, how can we expect +to find in our possession any universal or necessary truths? May not a +later experience contradict an earlier? How can we be sure that what +has been will be? Can we _know_ that there is anything fixed and +certain in our world? + +Skepticism seemed a forlorn doctrine, and, casting about for a way of +escape from it, Kant hit upon the expedient which I have described. So +long as we maintain that our knowledge has no other source than the +experiences which the world imprints upon us, so to speak, from +without, we are without the power of prediction, for new experiences +may annihilate any generalizations we have founded upon those already +vouchsafed us; but if we assume that the world upon which we gaze, the +world of phenomena, is made what it is by the mind that perceives it, +are we not in a different position? + +Suppose, for example, we take the statement that there must be an +adequate cause of all the changes that take place in the world. Can a +mere experience of what has been in the past guarantee that this law +will hold good in the future? But, when we realize that the world of +which we are speaking is nothing more than a world of phenomena, of +experiences, and realize further that this whole world is constructed +by the mind out of the raw materials furnished by the senses, may we +not have a greater confidence in our law? If it is the nature of the +mind to connect the phenomena presented to it with one another as cause +and effect, may we not maintain that no phenomenon can possibly make +its appearance that defies the law in question? How could it appear +except under the conditions laid upon all phenomena? If it is our +nature to think the world as an orderly one, and if we can know no +world save the one we construct ourselves, the orderliness of all the +things we can know seems to be guaranteed to us. + +It will be noticed that Kant's doctrine has a negative side. He limits +our knowledge to phenomena, to experiences, and he is himself, in so +far, an empiricist. But in that he finds in experience an order, an +arrangement of things, not derived from experience in the usual sense +of the word, he is not an empiricist. He has paid his own doctrine the +compliment of calling it "criticism," as I have said. + +Now, I beg the reader to be here, as elsewhere, on his guard against +the associations which attach to words. In calling Kant's doctrine +"the critical philosophy," we are in some danger of uncritically +assuming and leading others to believe uncritically that it is free +from such defects as may be expected to attach to "dogmatism" and to +empiricism. Such a position should not be taken until one has made a +most careful examination of each of the three types of doctrine, of the +assumptions which it makes, and of the rigor with which it draws +inferences upon the basis of such assumptions. That we may be the +better able to withstand "undue influence," I call attention to the +following points:-- + +(1) We must bear in mind that the attempt to make a critical +examination into the foundations of our knowledge, and to determine its +scope, is by no means a new thing. Among the Greeks, Plato, Aristotle, +the Stoics, the Epicureans, and the Skeptics, all attacked the problem. +It did not, of course, present itself to these men in the precise form +in which it presented itself to Kant, but each and all were concerned +to find an answer to the question: Can we know anything with certainty; +and, if so, what? They may have failed to be thoroughly critical, but +they certainly made the attempt. + +I shall omit mention of the long series of others, who, since that +time, have carried on the tradition, and shall speak only of Descartes +and Locke, whom I have above brought forward as representatives of the +two types of doctrine that Kant contrasts with his own. + +To see how strenuously Descartes endeavored to subject his knowledge to +a critical scrutiny and to avoid unjustifiable assumptions of any sort, +one has only to read that charming little work of genius, the +"Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason." + +In his youth Descartes was, as he informs us, an eager student; but, +when he had finished the whole course of education usually prescribed, +he found himself so full of doubts and errors that he did not feel that +he had advanced in learning at all. Yet he had been well tutored, and +was considered as bright in mind as others. He was led to judge his +neighbor by himself, and to conclude that there existed no such certain +science as he had been taught to suppose. + +Having ripened with years and experience, Descartes set about the task +of which I have spoken above, the task of sweeping away the whole body +of his opinions and of attempting a general and systematic +reconstruction. So important a work should be, he thought, approached +with circumspection; hence, he formulated certain Rules of Method. + +"The first," he writes, "was never to accept anything for true which I +did not clearly know to be such; that is, carefully to avoid haste and +prejudice, and to include nothing more in my judgments than what was +presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all reason +for doubt." + +Such was our philosopher's design, and such the spirit in which he set +about it. We have seen the result above. It is as if Descartes had +decided that a certain room full of people did not appear to be free +from suspicious characters, and had cleared out every one, afterwards +posting himself at the door to readmit only those who proved themselves +worthy. When we examine those who succeeded in passing muster, we +discover he has favored all his old friends. He simply _cannot_ doubt +them; are they not vouched for by the "natural light"? Nevertheless, +we must not forget that Descartes sifted his congregation with much +travail of spirit. He did try to be critical. + +As for John Locke, he reveals in the "Epistle to the Reader," which +stands as a preface to the "Essay," the critical spirit in which his +work was taken up. "Were it fit to trouble thee," he writes, "with the +history of this Essay, I should tell thee, that five or six friends +meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from +this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that +rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without +coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it +came into my thoughts, that we took a wrong course; and that before we +set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to +examine our own abilities, and to see what objects our understandings +were, or were not, fitted to deal with." + +This problem, proposed by himself to his little circle of friends, +Locke attacked with earnestness, and as a result he brought out many +years later the work which has since become so famous. The book is +literally a critique of the reason, although a very different critique +from that worked out by Kant. + +"If, by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding," says Locke, +"I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things +they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose +it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more +cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop +when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a +quiet ignorance of those things which upon examination are found to be +beyond the reach of our capacities." [2] + +To the difficulties of the task our author is fully alive: "The +understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all +other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains +to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But whatever be +the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry, whatever it be +that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves, sure I am that all the +light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can +make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but +bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search, of +other things." [3] + +(2) Thus, many men have attempted to produce a critical philosophy, and +in much the same sense as that in which Kant uses the words. Those who +have come after them have decided that they were not sufficiently +critical, that they have made unjustifiable assumptions. When we come +to read Kant, we will, if we have read the history of philosophy with +profit, not forget to ask ourselves if he has not sinned in the same +way. + +For example, we will ask;-- + +(a) Was Kant right in maintaining that we find in experience synthetic +judgments (section 51) that are not founded upon experience, but yield +such information as is beyond the reach of the empiricist? There are +those who think that the judgments to which he alludes in evidence of +his contention--the mathematical, for instance--are not of this +character. + +(b) Was he justified in assuming that all the ordering of our world is +due to the activity of mind, and that merely the raw material is +"given" us through the senses? There are many who demur against such a +statement, and hold that it is, if not in all senses untrue, at least +highly misleading, since it seems to argue that there is no really +external world at all. Moreover, they claim that the doctrine is +neither self-evident nor susceptible of proper proof. + +(c) Was Kant justified in assuming that, even if we attribute the +"form" or arrangement of the world we know to the native activity of +the mind, the necessity and universality of our knowledge is assured? +Let us grant that the proposition, whatever happens must have an +adequate cause, is a "form of thought." What guarantee have we that +the "forms of thought" must ever remain changeless? If it is an +assumption for the empiricist to declare that what has been true in the +past will be true in the future, that earlier experiences of the world +will not be contradicted by later; what is it for the Kantian to +maintain that the order which he finds in his experience will +necessarily and always be the order of all future experiences? +Transferring an assumption to the field of mind does not make it less +of an assumption. + +Thus, it does not seem unreasonable to charge Kant with being a good +deal of a rationalist. He tried to confine our knowledge to the field +of experience, it is true; but he made a number of assumptions as to +the nature of experience which certainly do not shine by their own +light, and which many thoughtful persons regard as incapable of +justification. + +Kant's famous successors in the German philosophy, Fichte (1762-1814), +Schelling (1775-1854), Hegel (1770-1831), and Schopenhauer (1788-1860), +all received their impulse from the "critical philosophy," and yet each +developed his doctrine in a relatively independent way. + +I cannot here take the space to characterize the systems of these men; +I may merely remark that all of them contrast strongly in doctrine and +method with the British philosophers mentioned in the last section, +Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Mill. They are _un-empirical_, if one may +use such a word; and, to one accustomed to reading the English +philosophy, they seem ever ready to spread their wings and hazard the +boldest of flights without a proper realization of the thinness of the +atmosphere in which they must support themselves. + +However, no matter what may be one's opinion of the actual results +attained by these German philosophers, one must frankly admit that no +one who wishes to understand clearly the development of speculative +thought can afford to dispense with a careful reading of them. Much +even of the English philosophy of our own day must remain obscure to +those who have not looked into their pages. Thus, the thought of Kant +and Hegel molded the thought of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) and of +the brothers Caird; and their influence has made itself widely felt +both in England and in America. One cannot criticise intelligently +books written from their standpoint, unless one knows how the authors +came by their doctrine and out of what it has been developed. + +63. CRITICAL EMPIRICISM.--We have seen that the trouble with the +rationalists seemed to be that they made an appeal to "eternal truths," +which those who followed them could not admit to be eternal truths at +all. They proceeded on a basis of assumptions the validity of which +was at once called in question. + +Locke, the empiricist, repudiated all this, and then also made +assumptions which others could not, and cannot, approve. Kant did +something of much the same sort; we cannot regard his "criticism" as +wholly critical. + +How can we avoid such errors? How walk cautiously, and go around the +pit into which, as it seems to us, others have fallen? I may as well +tell the reader frankly that he sets his hope too high if he expects to +avoid all error and to work out for himself a philosophy in all +respects unassailable. The difficulties of reflective thought are very +great, and we should carry with us a consciousness of that fact and a +willingness to revise our most cherished conclusions. + +Our initial difficulty seems to be that we must begin by assuming +_something_, if only as material upon which to work. We must begin our +philosophizing _somewhere_. Where shall we begin? May we not fall +into error at the very outset? + +The doctrine set forth in the earlier chapters of this volume maintains +that we must accept as our material the revelation of the mind and the +world which seems to be made in our common experience, and which is +extended and systematized in the sciences. But it insists that we must +regard such an acceptance as merely provisional, must subject our +concepts to a careful criticism, and must always be on our guard +against hasty assumptions. + +It emphasizes the value of the light which historical study casts upon +the real meaning of the concepts which we all use and must use, but +which have so often proved to be stones of stumbling in the path of +those who have employed them. Its watchword is analysis, always +analysis; and a settled distrust of what have so often passed as +"self-evident" truths. It regards it as its task to analyze +experience, while maintaining that only the satisfactory carrying out +of such an analysis can reveal what experience really is, and clear our +notions of it from misinterpretations. + +No such attempt to give an account of experience can be regarded as +fundamentally new in its method. Every philosopher, in his own way, +criticises experience, and seeks its interpretation. But one may, +warned by the example of one's predecessors, lay emphasis upon the +danger of half-analyses and hasty assumptions, and counsel the +observance of sobriety and caution. + +For convenience, I have called the doctrine _Critical Empiricism_. I +warn the reader against the seductive title, and advise him not to +allow it to influence him unduly in his judgment of the doctrine. + +64. PRAGMATISM.--It seems right that I should, before closing this +chapter, say a few words about Pragmatism, which has been so much +discussed in the last few years. + +In 1878 Mr. Charles S. Peirce wrote an article for the _Popular Science +Monthly_ in which he proposed as a maxim for the attainment of +clearness of apprehension the following: "Consider what effects, which +might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of +our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the +whole of our conception of the object." + +This thought has been taken up by others and given a development which +Mr. Peirce regards with some suspicion. He refers[4] especially to the +development it has received at the hands of Professor William James, in +his two essays, "The Will to Believe" and "Philosophical Conceptions +and Practical Results." [5] Professor James is often regarded as +foremost among the pragmatists. + +I shall not attempt to define pragmatism, for I do not believe that the +doctrine has yet attained to that definiteness of formulation which +warrants a definition. We seem to have to do not so much with a +clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been +worked out in detail, as with a tendency which makes itself apparent in +the works of various writers under somewhat different forms. + +I may roughly describe it as the tendency to take that to be _true_ +which is _useful_ or _serviceable_. It is well illustrated in the two +essays to which reference is made above. + +Thus, Professor James dwells upon the unsatisfactoriness and +uncertainty of philosophical and scientific knowledge: "Objective +evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but +where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found?" + +Now, among those things regarding which it appears impossible to attain +to intellectual certitude, there are matters of great practical moment, +and which affect deeply the conduct of life; for example, the doctrines +of religion. Here a merely skeptical attitude seems intolerable. + +In such cases, argues Professor James, "we have the right to believe at +our own risk any hypothesis that is live enough to tempt our will." + +It is important to notice that there is no question here of a logical +right. We are concerned with matters regarding which, according to +Professor James, we cannot look for intellectual evidence. It is +assumed that we believe simply because we choose to believe--we believe +arbitrarily. + +It is further important to notice that what is a "live" hypothesis to +one man need not tempt the will of another man at all. As our author +points out, a Turk would naturally will to believe one thing and a +Christian would will to believe another. Each would will to believe +what struck him as a satisfactory thing to believe. + +What shall we say to this doctrine? I think we must say that it is +clearly not a philosophical _method of attaining to truth_. Hence, it +has not properly a place in this chapter among the attempts which have +been made to attain to the truth of things. + +It is, in fact, not concerned with truths, but with assumptions, and +with assumptions which are supposed to be made on the basis of no +evidence. It is concerned with "seemings." + +The distinction is a very important one. Our Turk cannot, by willing +to believe it, make his hypothesis true; but he can make it _seem_ +true. Why should he wish to make it seem true whether it is true or +not? Why should he strive to attain to a feeling of subjective +certainty, not by logically resolving his doubts, but by ignoring them? + +The answer is given us by our author. He who lives in the midst of +doubts, and refuses to cut his knot with the sword of belief, misses +the good of life. This is a practical problem, and one of no small +moment. In the last section of this book I have tried to indicate what +it is wise for a man to do when he is confronted by doubts which he +cannot resolve. + +Into the general question whether even a false belief may not, under +some circumstances, be more serviceable than no belief at all, I shall +not enter. The point I wish to emphasize is that there is all the +difference in the world between _producing a belief_ and _proving a +truth_. + +We are compelled to accept it as a fact that men, under the influence +of feeling, can believe in the absence of evidence, or, for that +matter, can believe in spite of evidence. But a truth cannot be +established in the absence of evidence or in the face of adverse +evidence. And there is a very wide field in which it is made very +clear to us that beliefs adopted in the absence of evidence are in +danger of being false beliefs. + +The pragmatist would join with the rest of us in condemning the Turk or +the Christian who would simply will to believe in the rise or the fall +of stocks, and would refuse to consult the state of the market. Some +hypotheses are, in the ordinary course of events, put to the test of +verification. We are then made painfully aware that beliefs and truths +are quite distinct things, and may not be in harmony. + +Now, the pragmatist does not apply his principle to this field. He +confines it to what may not inaptly be called the field of the +unverifiable. The Turk, who wills to believe in the hypothesis that +appeals to him as a pious Turk, is in no such danger of a rude +awakening as is the man who wills to believe that stocks will go up or +down. But mark what this means: it means that _he is not in danger of +finding out what the truth really is_. It does not mean that he is in +possession of the truth. + +So I say, the doctrine which we are discussing is not a method of +attaining to truth. What it really attempts to do is to point out to +us how it is prudent for us to act when we cannot discover what the +truth is.[6] + + +[1] "An Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book II, Chapter I, +section 2. + +[2] Book I, Chapter I, section 4. + +[3] Book I, Chapter I, section 1. + +[4] "Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology," article "Pragmatism." + +[5] Published in 1897 and 1898. + +[6] For references to later developments of pragmatism, see the note on +page 312. + + + + +V. THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES + + +CHAPTER XVI + +LOGIC + +65. INTRODUCTORY: THE PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.--I have said in the first +chapter of this book (section 6) that there is quite a group of +sciences that are regarded as belonging peculiarly to the province of +the teacher of philosophy to-day. Having, in the chapters preceding, +given some account of the nature of reflective thought, of the problems +touching the world and the mind which present themselves to those who +reflect, and of some types of philosophical theory which have their +origin in such reflection, I turn to a brief consideration of the +philosophical sciences. + +Among these I included logic, psychology, ethics, and aesthetics, +metaphysics, and the history of philosophy. I did not include +epistemology or "the theory of knowledge" as a separate discipline, and +my reasons for this will appear in Chapter XIX. I remarked that, to +complete the list, we should have to add the philosophy of religion and +an investigation into the principles and methods of the sciences +generally. + +Why, it was asked, should this group of disciplines be regarded as the +field of the philosopher, when others are excluded? The answer to this +question which finds the explanation of the fact to lie in a mere +historical accident was declared unsatisfactory, and it was maintained +that the philosophical sciences are those in which we find ourselves +carried back to the problems of reflective thought. + +With a view to showing the truth of this opinion, I shall take up one +by one the philosophical sciences. Of the history of philosophy I +shall not speak in this part of the work, but shall treat of it in +Chapter XXIII. + +66. THE TRADITIONAL LOGIC.--Most of us begin our acquaintance with +logic in the study of some such elementary manual as Jevons' "Lessons +in Logic." + +In such books we are shown how terms represent things and classes of +things or their attributes, and how we unite them into propositions or +statements. It is indicated at length what statements may be made on a +basis of certain other statements and what may not; and emphasis is +laid upon the dangers which arise out of a misunderstanding of the +language in which we are forced to express our thoughts. Finally, +there are described for us the experimental methods by which the +workers in the sciences have attained to the general information about +the world which has become our heritage. + +Such books are useful. It is surely no small profit for a student to +gain the habit of scrutinizing the steps by which he has come into the +possession of a certain bit of information, and to have a quick eye for +loose and inconsistent reasonings. + +But it is worthy of remark that one may study such a book as this and +yet remain pretty consistently on what may be called the plane of the +common understanding. One seems to make the assumptions made in all +the special sciences, _e.g._ the assumption that there is a world of +real things and that we can know them and reason about them. We are +not introduced to such problems as: What _is_ truth? and Is _any_ +knowledge valid? Nor does it seem at once apparent that the man who is +studying logic in this way is busying himself with a philosophical +discipline. + +67. THE "MODERN LOGIC."--It is very puzzling for the student to turn +from such a text-book as the one above mentioned to certain others +which profess to be occupied with the same science, and which, yet, +appear to treat of quite different things. + +Thus, in Dr. Bosanquet's little work on "The Essentials of Logic," the +reader is at once plunged into such questions as the nature of +knowledge, and what is meant by the real world. We seem to be dealing +with metaphysics, and not with logic, as we have learned to understand +the term. How is it that the logician comes to regard these things as +within his province? + +A multitude of writers at the present day are treating logic in this +way, and in some great prominence is given to problems which the +philosopher recognizes as indisputably his own. The term "modern +logic" is often employed to denote a logic of this type; one which does +not, after the fashion of the natural sciences generally, proceed on +the basis of certain assumptions, and leave deeper questions to some +other discipline, but tries to get to the bottom of things for itself. +The tendency to run into metaphysics is peculiarly marked in those +writers who have been influenced by the work of the philosopher Hegel. + +I shall not here ask why those who belong to one school are more +inclined to be metaphysical than are those who belong to another, but +shall approach the broader question why the logicians generally are +inclined to be more metaphysical than those who work in certain other +special sciences, such as mathematics, for example. Of the general +tendency there can be no question. The only problem is: Why does this +tendency exist? + +68. LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY.--Let us contrast the science of arithmetic +with logic; and let us notice, regarding it, the following points:-- + +It is, like logic, a _general_ science, in that the things treated of +in many sciences may be numbered. It considers only a certain aspect +of the things. + +Now, that things may be counted, added together, subtracted, etc., is +guaranteed by the experience of the plain man; and the methods of +determining the numerical relations of things are gradually developed +before his eyes, beginning with operations of great simplicity. +Moreover, verification is possible, and within certain limits +verification by direct inspection. + +To this we may add, that there has gradually been built up a fine +system of unambiguous symbols, and it is possible for a man to know +just what he is dealing with. + +Thus, a certain beaten path has been attained, and a man may travel +this very well without having forced on his attention the problems of +reflective thought. The knowledge of numbers with which he starts is +sufficient equipment with which to undertake the journey. That one is +on the right road is proved by the results one obtains. As a rule, +disputes can be settled by well-tried mathematical methods. + +There is, then, a common agreement as to initial assumptions and +methods of work, and useful results are attained which seem to justify +both. Here we have the normal characteristics of a special science. + +We must not forget, however, that, even in the mathematical sciences, +before a beaten path was attained, disputes as to the significance of +numbers and the cogency of proofs were sufficiently common. And we +must bear in mind that even to-day, where the beaten path does not seem +wholly satisfactory, men seem to be driven to reflect upon the +significance of their assumptions and the nature of their method. + +Thus, we find it not unnatural that a man should be led to ask; What is +a minus quantity really? Can anything be less than nothing? or that he +should raise the questions: Can one rightly speak of an infinite +number? Can one infinite number be greater than another, and, if so, +what can greater mean? What are infinitesimals? and what can be meant +by different orders of infinitesimals? + +He who has interested himself in such questions as these has betaken +himself to philosophical reflection. They are not answered by +employing mathematical methods. + +Let us now turn to logic. And let us notice, to begin with, that it is +broader in its application than the mathematical sciences. It is +concerned to discover what constitutes _evidence_ in every field of +investigation. + +There is, it is true, a part of logic that may be developed somewhat +after the fashion of mathematics. Thus, we may examine the two +statements: All men are mortal, and Caesar is a man; and we may see +clearly that, given the truth of these, we must admit that Caesar is +mortal. We may make a list of possible inferences of this kind, and +point out under what circumstances the truth of two statements implies +the truth of a third, and under what circumstances the inference cannot +be made. Our results can be set forth in a system of symbols. As in +mathematics, we may abstract from the particular things reasoned about, +and concern ourselves only with the forms of reasoning. This gives us +the theory of the _syllogism_; it is a part of logic in which the +mathematician is apt to feel very much at home. + +But this is by no means all of logic. Let us consider the following +points:-- + +(1) We are not concerned to know only what statements may be made on +the basis of certain other statements. We want to know what is true +and what is false. We must ask: Has a man the right to set up these +particular statements and to reason from them? That some men accept as +true premises which are repudiated by others is an undoubted fact. +Thus, it is maintained by certain philosophers that we may assume that +any view of the universe which is repellant to our nature cannot be +true. Shall we allow this to pass unchallenged? And in ethics, some +have held that it is under all circumstances wrong to lie; others have +denied this, and have held that in certain cases--for example, to save +life or to prevent great and unmerited suffering--lying is permissible. +Shall we interest ourselves only in the deductions that each man makes +from his assumed premises, and pay no attention to the truth of the +premises themselves? + +(2) Again. The vast mass of the reasonings that interest men are +expressed in the language that we all use and not in special symbols. +But language is a very imperfect instrument, and all sorts of +misunderstandings are possible to those who express their thoughts in +it. + +Few men know exactly how much is implied in what they are saying. If I +say: All men are mortal, and an angel is not a man; therefore, an angel +is not mortal; it is not at once apparent to every one in what respect +my argument is defective. He who argues: Feathers are light; light is +contrary to darkness; hence, feathers are contrary to darkness; is +convicted of error without difficulty. But arguments of the same kind, +and quite as bad, are to be found in learned works on matters less +familiar to us, and we often fail to detect the fallacy. + +Thus, Herbert Spencer argues, in effect, in the fourth and fifth +chapters of his "First Principles," as follows:-- + + We are conscious of the Unknowable, + The Unknowable lies behind the veil of phenomena, + Hence, we are conscious of what lies behind the veil of phenomena. + +It is only the critical reader who notices that the Unknowable in the +first line is the "raw material of consciousness," and the Unknowable +in the second is something not in consciousness at all. The two senses +of the word "light" are not more different from one another. Such +apparent arguments abound, and it often requires much acuteness to be +able to detect their fallacious character. + +When we take into consideration the two points indicated above, we see +that the logician is at every turn forced to reflect upon our knowledge +as men do not ordinarily reflect. He is led to ask: What is truth? He +cannot accept uncritically the assumptions which men make; and he must +endeavor to become very clearly conscious of the real meaning and the +whole meaning of statements expressed in words. Even in the simple +logic with which we usually begin our studies, we learn to scrutinize +statements in a reflective way; and when we go deeper, we are at once +in contact with philosophical problems. It is evidently our task to +attain to a clearer insight into the nature of our experience and the +meaning of proof than is attainable by the unreflective. + +Logic, then, is a reflective science, and it is not surprising that it +has held its place as one of the philosophical sciences. + + + + +CHAPTER XVII + +PSYCHOLOGY + +69. PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.--I think I have said enough in Chapter +II (section 10) about what we mean when we speak of psychology as a +natural science and as an independent discipline. Certainly there are +many psychologists who would not care to be confused with the +philosophers, and there are some that regard philosophy with suspicion. + +Nevertheless, psychology is commonly regarded as belonging to the +philosophical group. That this is the case can scarcely be thought +surprising when we see how the psychologist himself speaks of the +relation of his science to philosophy. + +"I have kept," writes Professor James[1] in that delightful book which +has become the common property of us all, "close to the point of view +of natural science throughout the book. Every natural science assumes +certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the elements +between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from which its own deductions +are carried on. Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, +assumes as its data (1) _thoughts and feelings_, and (2) _a physical +world_ in time and space with which they coexist, and which (3) _they +know_. Of course, these data themselves are discussable; but the +discussion of them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and +falls outside the province of this book." + +This is an admirable statement of the scope of psychology as a natural +science, and also of the relations of metaphysics to the sciences. But +it would not be fair to Professor James to take this sentence alone, +and to assume that, in his opinion, it is easy to separate psychology +altogether from philosophy. "The reader," he tells us in the next +paragraph, "will in vain seek for any closed system in the book. It is +mainly a mass of descriptive details, running out into queries which +only a metaphysics alive to the weight of her task can hope +successfully to deal with." And in the opening sentence of the preface +he informs us that some of his chapters are more "metaphysical" than is +suitable for students going over the subject for the first time. + +That the author is right in maintaining that it is not easy to draw a +clear line between philosophy and psychology, and to declare the latter +wholly independent, I think we must concede. An independent science +should be sure of the things with which it is dealing. Where these are +vague and indefinite, and are the subject of constant dispute, it +cannot march forward with assurance. One is rather forced to go back +and examine the data themselves. The beaten track of the special +science has not been satisfactorily constructed. + +We are forced to admit that the science of psychology has not yet +emerged from the state in which a critical examination of its +foundations is necessary, and that the construction of the beaten path +is still in progress. This I shall try to make clear by illustrations. + +The psychologist studies the mind, and his ultimate appeal must be to +introspection, to a direct observation of mental phenomena, and of +their relations to external things. Now, if the observation of mental +phenomena were a simple and an easy thing; if the mere fact that we are +conscious of sensations and ideas implied that we are _clearly_ +conscious of them and are in a position to describe them with accuracy, +psychology would be a much more satisfactory science than it is. + +But we are not thus conscious of our mental life. We can and do use +our mental states without being able to describe them accurately. In a +sense, we are conscious of what is there, but our consciousness is +rather dim and vague, and in our attempts to give an account of it we +are in no little danger of giving a false account. + +Thus, the psychologist assumes that we perceive both physical phenomena +and mental--the external world and the mind. He takes it for granted +that we perceive mental phenomena to be related to physical. He is +hardly in a position to make this assumption, and then to set it aside +as a thing he need not further consider. Does he not tell us, as a +result of his investigations, that we can know the external world only +as it is reflected in our sensations, and thus seem to shut the mind up +within the circle of mental phenomena merely, cutting off absolutely a +direct knowledge of what is extra-mental? If we can know only mental +phenomena, the representatives of things, at first hand, how can we +tell that they are representatives? and what becomes of the assumption +that we _perceive_ that mind is related to an external world? + +It may be said, this problem the psychologist may leave to the +metaphysician. Certainly, it is one of those problems that the +metaphysician discusses; it has been treated in Chapter IV. But my +contention is, that he who has given no thought to the matter may +easily fall into error as to the very nature of mental phenomena. + +For example, when we approach or recede from a physical object we have +a series of experiences which are recognized as sensational. When we +imagine a tree or a house we are also experiencing a mental phenomenon. +All these experiences _seem_ plainly to have extension in some sense of +the word. We appear to perceive plainly part out of part. In so far, +these mental things seem to resemble the physical things which we +contrast with what is mental. Shall we say that, because these things +are mental and not physical, their apparent extension is a delusion? +Shall we say that they really have no parts? Such considerations have +impelled psychologists of eminence to maintain, in flat contradiction +to what seems to be the unequivocal testimony of direct introspection, +that the total content of consciousness at any moment must be looked +upon as an indivisible, part-less unit. + +We cannot, then, depend merely on direct introspection. It is too +uncertain in its deliverances. If we would make clear to ourselves +what mental phenomena really are, and how they | differ from physical +phenomena, we must fall back upon the reflective analysis of our +experience which occupies the metaphysician (section 34). Until we +have done this, we are in great danger of error. We are actually +uncertain of our materials. + +Again. The psychologist speaks of the relation of mind and body. Some +psychologists incline to be parallelists, some are warm advocates of +interactionism. Now, any theory of the relation of mind to body must +depend on observation ultimately. If we had not direct experience of a +relation between the physical and the mental somewhere, no hypothesis +on the subject would ever have emerged. + +But our experiences are not perfectly clear and unequivocal to us. +Their significance does not seem to be easily grasped. To comprehend +it one is forced to that reflective examination of experience which is +characteristic of the philosopher (Chapter IX). + +Here it may again be said: Leave the matter to the meta-physician and +go on with your psychological work. I answer: The psychologist is not +in the same position as the botanist or the zooelogist. He is studying +mind in its relation to body. It cannot but be unsatisfactory to him +to leave that relation wholly vague; and, as a matter of fact, he +usually takes up with one theory or another. We have seen (section 36) +that he may easily adopt a theory that leads him to overlook the great +difference between physical phenomena and mental phenomena, and to +treat them as though they were the same. This one may do in spite of +all that introspection has to say about the gulf that separates them. + +Psychology is, then, very properly classed among the philosophical +sciences. The psychologist is not sufficiently sure of his materials +to be able to dispense with reflective thought, in many parts of his +field. Some day there may come to be a consensus of opinion touching +fundamental facts, and the science may become more independent. A +beaten track may be attained; but that has not yet been done. + +70. THE DOUBLE AFFILIATION OF PSYCHOLOGY.--In spite of what has been +said above, we must not forget that psychology is a _relatively_ +independent science. One may be a useful psychologist without knowing +much about philosophy. + +As in logic it is possible to write a text-book not greatly different +in spirit and method from text-books concerned with the sciences not +classed as philosophical, so it is possible to make a useful study of +mental phenomena without entering upon metaphysical analyses. In +science, as in common life, we can _use_ concepts without subjecting +them to careful analysis. + +Thus, our common experience reveals that mind and body are connected. +We may, for a specific purpose, leave the _nature_ of this connection +vague, and may pay careful attention to the physiological conditions of +mental phenomena, studying in detail the senses and the nervous system. +We may, further, endeavor to render our knowledge of mental phenomena +more full and accurate by experimentation. In doing this we may be +compelled to make use of elaborate apparatus. Of such mechanical aids +to investigation our psychological laboratories are full. + +It is to such work as this that we owe what is called the +"physiological" and the "experimental" psychology. One can carry on +such investigations without being a metaphysician. But one can +scarcely carry them on without having a good knowledge of certain +sciences not commonly supposed to be closely related to psychology at +all. Thus, one should be trained in chemistry and physics and +physiology, and should have a working knowledge of laboratory methods. +Moreover, it is desirable to have a sufficient knowledge of mathematics +to enable one to handle experimental data. + +The consideration of such facts as these sometimes leads men to raise +the question: Should psychology affiliate with philosophy or with the +physical sciences? The issue is an illegitimate one. Psychology is +one of the philosophical sciences, and cannot dispense with reflection; +but that is no reason why it should not acknowledge a close relation to +certain physical sciences as well. Parts of the field can be isolated, +and one may work as one works in the natural sciences generally; but if +one does nothing more, one's concepts remain unanalyzed, and, as we +have seen in the previous section, there is some danger of actual +misconception. + + +[1] "Psychology," Preface. + + + + +CHAPTER XVIII + +ETHICS AND AESTHETICS + +71. COMMON SENSE ETHICS.--We may, if we choose, study the actions of +men merely with a view to ascertaining what they are and describing +them accurately. Something like this is done by the anthropologist, +who gives us an account of the manners and customs of the various races +of mankind; he tells us _what is_; he may not regard it as within his +province at all to inform us regarding _what ought to be_. + +But men do not merely act; they judge their actions in the light of +some norm or standard, and they distinguish between them as right and +wrong. The systematic study of actions as right and wrong yields us +the science of ethics. + +Like psychology, ethics is a special science. It is concerned with a +somewhat limited field of investigation, and is not to be confounded +with other sciences. It has a definite aim distinct from theirs. And, +also like psychology, ethics is classed as one of the philosophical +sciences, and its relation to philosophy is supposed to be closer than +that of such sciences as physics and mathematics. It is fair to ask +why this is so. Why cannot ethics proceed on the basis of certain +assumptions independently, and leave to some other discipline the whole +question of an inquiry into the nature and validity of those +assumptions? + +About half a century ago Dr. William Whewell, one of the most learned +of English scholars, wrote a work entitled "The Elements of Morality," +in which he attempted to treat the science of ethics as it is generally +admitted that one may treat the science of geometry. The book was +rather widely read a generation since, but we meet with few references +to it in our time. + +"Morality and the philosophy of morality," argues the author, "differ +in the same manner and in the same degree as geometry and the +philosophy of geometry. Of these two subjects, geometry consists of a +series of positive and definite propositions, deduced one from another, +in succession, by rigorous reasoning, and all resting upon certain +definitions and self-evident axioms. The philosophy of geometry is +quite a different subject; it includes such inquiries as these: Whence +is the cogency of geometrical proof? What is the evidence of the +axioms and definitions? What are the faculties by which we become +aware of their truth? and the like. The two kinds of speculation have +been pursued, for the most part, by two different classes of +persons,--the geometers and the metaphysicians; for it has been far +more the occupation of metaphysicians than of geometers to discuss such +questions as I have stated, the nature of geometrical proofs, +geometrical axioms, the geometrical faculty, and the like. And if we +construct a complete system of geometry, it will be almost exactly the +same, whatever be the views which we take on these metaphysical +questions." [1] + +Such a system Dr. Whewell wishes to construct in the field of ethics. +His aim is to give us a view of morality in which moral propositions +are "deduced from axioms, by successive steps of reasoning, so far as +to form a connected system of moral truth." Such a "sure and connected +knowledge of the duties of man" would, he thinks, be of the greatest +importance. + +In accordance with this purpose, Dr. Whewell assumes that humanity, +justice, truth, purity, order, earnestness, and moral purpose are +fundamental principles of human action; and he thinks that all who +admit as much as this will be able to go on with him in his development +of a system of moral rules to govern the life of man. + +It would hardly be worth while for me to speak at length of a way of +treating ethics so little likely to be urged upon the attention of the +reader who busies himself with the books which are appearing in our own +day, were it not that we have here an admirable illustration of the +attempt to teach ethics as though it were such a science as geometry. +The shortcomings of the method become very evident to one who reads the +work attentively. + +Thus, we are forced to ask ourselves, have we really a collection of +ultimate moral principles which are analogous to the axioms of +geometry? For example, to take but a single instance, Dr. Whewell +formulates the Principle of Truth as follows: "We must conform to the +universal understanding among men which the use of language +implies";[2] and he remarks later; "The rules: _Lie not_, Perform your +promise, are of universal validity; and the conceptions of _lie_ and of +_promise_ are so simple and distinct that, in general, the rules may be +directly and easily applied." [3] + +Now, we are struck by the fact that this affirmation of the universal +validity of the principle of truth is made in a chapter on "Cases of +Conscience," in a chapter concerned with what seem to be conflicts +between duties; and this chapter is followed by one which treats of +"Cases of Necessity," _i.e._ cases in which a man is to be regarded as +justified in violating common rules when there seems to be urgent +reason for so doing. We are told that the moralist cannot say: Lie +not, except in great emergencies; but must say: Lie not at all. But we +are also told that he must grant that there are cases of necessity in +which transgressions of moral rules are excusable; and this looks very +much as if he said: Go on and do the thing while I close my eyes. + +This hardly seems to give us a "sure and connected knowledge of the +duties of man" deduced from axiomatic principles. On what authority +shall we suspend for the time being this axiomatic principle or that? +Is there some deeper principle which lends to each of them its +authority, and which may, for cause, withdraw it? There is no hint of +such in the treatment of ethics which we are considering, and we seem +to have on our hands, not so much a science, as a collection of +practical rules, of the scope of which we are more or less in the dark. + +The interesting thing to notice is that this view of ethics is very +closely akin to that adapted unconsciously by the majority of the +persons we meet who have not interested themselves much in ethics as a +science. + +By the time that we have reached years of discretion we are all in +possession of a considerable number of moral maxims. We consider it +wrong to steal, to lie, to injure our neighbor. Such maxims lie in our +minds side by side, and we do not commonly think of criticising them. +But now and then we face a situation in which one maxim seems to urge +one course of action and another maxim a contrary one. Shall we tell +the truth and the whole truth, when so doing will bring grave +misfortune upon an innocent person? And now and then we are brought to +the realization that all men do not admit the validity of all our +maxims. Judgments differ as to what is right and what is wrong. Who +shall be the arbiter? Not infrequently a rough decision is arrived at +in the assumption that we have only to interrogate "conscience"--in the +assumption, in other words, that we carry a watch which can be counted +upon to give the correct time, even if the timepieces of our neighbors +are not to be depended upon. + +The common sense ethics cannot be regarded as very systematic and +consistent, or as very profound. It is a collection of working rules, +of practical maxims; and, although it is impossible to overestimate its +value as a guide to life, its deficiencies, when it is looked at +critically, become evident, I think, even to thoughtful persons who are +not scientific at all. + +Many writers on ethics have simply tried to turn this collection of +working rules into a science, somewhat as Dr. Whewell has done. This +is the peculiar weakness of those who have been called the +"intuitionalists"--though I must warn the reader against assuming that +this term has but the one meaning, and that all those to whom it has +been applied should be placed in the same class. Here it is used to +indicate those who maintain that we are directly aware of the validity +of certain moral principles, must accept them as ultimate, and need +only concern ourselves with the problem of their application. + +72. ETHICS AND PHILOSOPHY.--When John Locke maintained that there are +no "innate practical principles," or innate moral maxims, he pointed in +evidence to the "enormities practiced without remorse" in different +ages and by different peoples. The list he draws up is a curious and +an interesting one.[4] + +In our day it has pretty generally come to be recognized by thoughtful +men that a man's judgments as to right and wrong reflect the phase of +civilization, or the lack of it, which he represents, and that their +significance cannot be understood when we consider them apart from +their historic setting. This means that no man's conscience is set up +as an ultimate standard, but that every man's conscience is regarded as +furnishing material which the science of ethics must take into account. + +May we, broadening the basis upon which we are to build, and studying +the manners, customs, and moral judgments of all sorts and conditions +of men, develop an empirical science of ethics which will be +independent of philosophy? + +It does not seem that we can do this. We are concerned with +psychological phenomena, and their nature and significance are by no +means beyond dispute. For example, there is the feeling of moral +obligation, of which ethics has so much to say. What is this feeling, +and what is its authority? Is it a thing to be explained? Can it +impel a man, let us say, a bigot, to do wrong? And what can we mean by +credit and discredit, by responsibility and free choice, and other +concepts of the sort? All this must remain very vague to one who has +not submitted his ethical concepts to reflective analysis of the sort +that we have a right to call philosophical. + +Furthermore, it does not seem possible to decide what a man should or +should not do, without taking into consideration the circumstances in +which he is placed. The same act may be regarded as benevolent or the +reverse according to its context. If we will but grant the validity of +the premises from which the medieval churchman reasoned, we may well +ask whether, in laying hands violently upon those who dared to form +independent judgments in matters of religion, he was not +conscientiously doing his best for his fellow-man. He tried by all +means to save some, and to what he regarded as a most dangerous malady +he applied a drastic remedy. By what standard shall we judge him? + +There can be no doubt that our doctrine of the whole duty of man must +be conditioned by our view of the nature of the world in which man +lives and of man's place in the world. Has ethics nothing to do with +religion? If we do not believe in God, and if we think that man's life +ends with the death of the body, it is quite possible that we shall set +for him an ethical standard which we should have to modify if we +adopted other beliefs. The relation of ethics to religion is a problem +that the student of ethics can scarcely set aside. It seems, then, +that the study of ethics necessarily carries us back to world problems +which cannot be approached except by the path of philosophical +reflection. We shall see in Chapter XX that the theistic problem +certainly belongs to this class. + +It is worthy of our consideration that the vast majority of writers on +ethics have felt strongly that their science runs out into metaphysics. +We can scarcely afford to treat their testimony lightly. Certainly it +is not possible for one who has no knowledge of philosophy to +understand the significance of the ethical systems which have appeared +in the past. The history of ethics may be looked upon as a part of the +history of philosophy. Only on the basis of some general view as to +nature and man have men decided what man ought to do. As we have seen +above, this appears sufficiently reasonable. + +73. AESTHETICS.--Of aesthetics, or the science of the beautiful, I +shall say little. There is somewhat the same reason for including it +among the philosophical sciences that there is for including ethics. + +Those who have paid little attention to science or to philosophy are +apt to dogmatize about what is and what is not beautiful just as they +dogmatize about what is and what is not right. They say +unhesitatingly; This object is beautiful, and that one is ugly. It is +as if they said: This one is round, and that one square. + +Often it quite escapes their attention that what they now regard as +beautiful struck them as unattractive a short time before; and will, +perhaps, when the ceaseless change of the fashions has driven it out of +vogue, seem strange and unattractive once more. Nor do they reflect +upon the fact that others, who seem to have as good a right to an +opinion as they, do not agree with them in their judgments; nor upon +the further fact that the standard of beauty is a thing that has varied +from age to age, differs widely in different countries, and presents +minor variations in different classes even in the same community. + +The dogmatic utterances of those who are keenly susceptible to the +aesthetic aspects of things but are not given to reflection stand in +striking contrast to the epitome of the popular wisdom expressed in the +skeptical adage that there is no disputing about tastes. + +We cannot interpret this adage broadly and take it literally, for then +we should have to admit that men's judgments as to the beautiful cannot +constitute the material of a science at all, and that there can be no +such thing as progress in the fine arts. The notion of progress +implies a standard, and an approximation to an ideal. Few would dare +to deny that there has been progress in such arts as painting and +music; and when one has admitted so much as this, one has virtually +admitted that a science of aesthetics is, at least, possible. + +The science studies the facts of the aesthetic life as ethics studies +the facts of the moral life. It can take no man's taste as furnishing +a standard: it must take every man's taste as a fact of significance. +It is driven to reflective analysis--to such questions as, what is +beauty? and what is meant by aesthetic progress? It deals with elusive +psychological facts the significance of which is not easily grasped. +It is a philosophical science, and is by no means in a position to +follow a beaten path, dispensing with a reflective analysis of its +materials. + + +[1] Preface. + +[2] section 269. + +[3] section 376. + +[4] "Essay concerning Human Understanding," Book I, Chapter III. + + + + +CHAPTER XIX + +METAPHYSICS + +74. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?--The reader has probably already remarked that +in some of the preceding chapters the adjectives "metaphysical" and +"philosophical" have been used as if they were interchangeable, in +certain connections, at least. This is justified by common usage; and +in the present chapter I shall be expected by no one, I think, to prove +that metaphysics is a philosophical discipline. My task will rather be +to show how far the words "metaphysics" and "philosophy" have a +different meaning. + +In Chapters III to XI, I have given a general view of the problems +which present themselves to reflective thought, and I have indicated +that they are not problems which can conveniently be distributed among +the several special sciences. Is there an external world? What is it? +What are space and time? What is the mind? How are mind and body +related? How do we know that there are other minds than ours? etc. +These have been presented as _philosophical_ problems; and when we turn +back to the history of speculative thought we find that they are just +the problems with which the men whom we agree to call philosophers have +chiefly occupied themselves. + +But when we turn to our treatises on _metaphysics_, we also find that +these are the problems there discussed. Such treatises differ much +among themselves, and the problems are not presented in the same form +or in the same order; but one who can look beneath the surface will +find that the authors are busied with much the same thing--with some or +all of the problems above mentioned. + +How, then, does metaphysics differ from philosophy? The difference +becomes clear to us when we realize that the word philosophy has a +broader and looser signification, and that metaphysics is, so to speak, +the core, the citadel, of philosophy. + +We have seen (Chapter II) that the world and the mind, as they seem to +be presented in the experience of the plain man, do not stand forth +with such clearness and distinctness that he is able to answer +intelligently the questions we wish to ask him regarding their nature. +It is not merely that his information is limited; it is vague and +indefinite as well. And we have seen, too, that, however the special +sciences may increase and systematize his information, they do not +clear away such vagueness. The man still uses such concepts as "inner" +and "outer," "reality," "the mind," "space," and "time," with no very +definite notion of what they mean. + +Now, the attempt to clear away this vagueness by the systematic +analysis of such concepts--in other words, the attempt to make a +thorough analysis of our experience--is metaphysics. The metaphysician +strives to limit his task as well as he may, and to avoid unnecessary +excursions into the fields occupied by the special sciences, even those +which lie nearest to his own, such as psychology and ethics. There is +a sense in which he may be said to be working in the field of a special +science, though he is using as the material for his investigations +concepts which are employed in many sciences; but it is clear that his +discipline is not a special science in the same sense in which geometry +and physics are special sciences. + +Nevertheless, the special sciences stand, as we have already seen in +the case of several of them, very near to his own. If he broadens his +view, and deliberately determines to take a survey of the field of +human knowledge as illuminated by the analyses that he has made, he +becomes something more than a _metaphysician_; he becomes a +_philosopher_. + +This does not in the least mean that he becomes a storehouse of +miscellaneous information, and an authority on all the sciences. +Sometimes the philosophers have attempted to describe the world of +matter and of mind as though they possessed some mysterious power of +knowing things that absolved them from the duty of traveling the weary +road of observation and experiment that has ended in the sciences as we +have them. When they have done this, they have mistaken the +significance of their calling. A philosopher has no more right than +another man to create information out of nothing. + +But it is possible, even for one who is not acquainted with the whole +body of facts presented in a science, to take careful note of the +assumptions upon which that science rests, to analyze the concepts of +which it makes use, to mark the methods which it employs, and to gain a +fair idea of its scope and of its relation to other sciences. Such a +reflection upon our scientific knowledge is philosophical reflection, +and it may result in a classification of the sciences, and in a general +view of human knowledge as a whole. Such a view may be illuminating in +the extreme; it can only be harmful when its significance is +misunderstood. + +But, it may be argued, why may not the man of science do all this for +himself? Why should he leave it to the philosopher, who is presumably +less intimately acquainted with the sciences than he is? + +To this I answer: The work should, of course, be done by the man who +will do it best. All our subdivision of labor should be dictated by +convenience. But I add, that experience has shown that the workers in +the special sciences have not as a rule been very successful when they +have tried to philosophize. + +Science is an imperious mistress; she demands one's utmost efforts; and +when a man turns to philosophical reflection merely "by the way," and +in the scraps of time at his disposal after the day's work is done, his +philosophical work is apt to be rather superficial. Moreover, it does +not follow that, because a man is a good mathematician or chemist or +physicist, he is gifted with the power of reflective analysis. Then, +too, such men are apt to be imperfectly acquainted with what has been +done in the past; and those who are familiar with the history of +philosophy often have occasion to remark that what is laid before them, +in ignorance of the fact that it is neither new nor original, is a +doctrine which has already made its appearance in many forms and has +been discussed at prodigious length in the centuries gone by. + +In certain sciences it seems possible to ignore the past, to a great +extent, at least. What is worth keeping has been kept, and there is a +solid foundation on which to build for the future. But with reflective +thought it is not so. There is no accepted body of doctrine which we +have the right to regard as unassailable. We should take it as a safe +maxim that the reflections of men long dead _may_ be profounder and +more worthy of our study than those urged upon our attention by the men +of our day. + +And this leads me to make a remark upon the titles given to works on +metaphysics. It seems somewhat misleading to label them: "Outlines of +Metaphysics" or "Elements of Metaphysics." Such titles suggest that we +are dealing with a body of doctrine which has met with general +acceptance, and may be compared with that found in handbooks on the +special sciences. But we should realize that, when we are concerned +with the profounder investigations into the nature of our experience, +we tread upon uncertain ground and many differences of opinion obtain. +We should, if possible, avoid a false semblance of authority. + +75. EPISTEMOLOGY.--We hear a great deal at the present day of +Epistemology, or the Theory of Knowledge. I have not classed it as a +distinct philosophical science, for reasons which will appear below. + +We have seen in Chapter XVI that it is possible to treat of logic in a +simple way without growing very metaphysical; but we have also seen +that when we go deeply into questions touching the nature of evidence +and what is meant by truth and falsity, we are carried back to +philosophical reflection at once. + +We may, for convenience, group together these deeper questions +regarding the nature of knowledge and its scope, and call the subject +of our study "Epistemology." + +But it should be remarked, in the first place, that, when we work in +this field, we are exercising a reflective analysis of precisely the +type employed in making the metaphysical analyses contained in the +earlier chapters of this book. We are treating our experience as it is +not treated in common thought and in science. + +And it should be remarked, in the second place, that the investigation +of our knowledge inevitably runs together with an investigation into +the nature of things known, of the mind and the world. Suppose that I +give the titles of the chapters in Part III of Mr. Hobhouse's able work +on "The Theory of Knowledge." They are as follows: Validity; the +Validity of Knowledge; the Conception of External Reality; Substance; +the Conception of Self; Reality as a System; Knowledge and Reality; the +Grounds of Knowledge and Belief. + +Are not these topics metaphysical? Let us ask ourselves how it would +affect our views of the validity and of the limits of our knowledge, if +we were converted to the metaphysical doctrines of John Locke, or of +Bishop Berkeley, or of David Hume, or of Thomas Reid, or of Immanuel +Kant. + +We may, then, regard epistemology as a part of logic--the metaphysical +part--or as a part of metaphysics; it does not much matter which we +call it, since we mean the same thing. But its relation to metaphysics +is such that it does not seem worth while to call it a separate +discipline. + +Before leaving this subject there is one more point upon which I should +touch, if only to obviate a possible misunderstanding. + +We find in Professor Cornelius's clear little book, "An Introduction to +Philosophy" (Leipzig, 1903; it has unhappily not yet been translated +into English), that metaphysics is repudiated altogether, and +epistemology is set in its place. But this rejection of metaphysics +does not necessarily imply the denial of the value of such an analysis +of our experience as I have in this work called metaphysical. +Metaphysics is taken to mean, not an analysis of experience, but a +groping behind the veil of phenomena for some reality not given in +experience. In other words, what Professor Cornelius condemns is what +many of the rest of us also condemn under another name. What he calls +metaphysics, we call bad metaphysics; and what he calls epistemology, +we call metaphysics. The dispute is really a dispute touching the +proper name to apply to reflective analysis of a certain kind. + +As it is the fashion in certain quarters to abuse metaphysics, I set +the reader on his guard. Some kinds of metaphysics certainly ought to +be repudiated under whatever name they may be presented to us. + + + + +CHAPTER XX + +THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION + +76. RELIGION AND REFLECTION.--A man may be through and through ethical +in his thought and feeling, and yet know nothing of the science of +ethics. He may be possessed of the finest aesthetic taste, and yet may +know nothing of the science of aesthetics. It is one thing to be good, +and another to know clearly what goodness means; it is one thing to +love the beautiful, and another to know how to define it. + +Just so a man may be thoroughly religious, and may, nevertheless, have +reflected very little upon his religious belief and the foundations +upon which it rests. This does not mean that his belief is without +foundation. It may have a firm basis or it may not. But whatever the +case may be, he is not in a position to say much about it. He _feels_ +that he is right, but he cannot prove it. The man is, I think we must +admit, rather blind as to the full significance of his position, and he +is, in consequence, rather helpless. + +Such a man is menaced by certain dangers. We have seen in the chapter +on ethics that men are by no means at one in their judgments as to the +rightness or wrongness of given actions. And it requires a very little +reflection to teach us that men are not at one in their religious +notions. God and His nature, the relation of God to man, what the +religious life should be, these things are the subject of much dispute; +and some men hold opinions regarded by others as not merely erroneous +but highly pernicious in their influence. + +Shall a man simply assume that the opinions which he happens to hold +are correct, and that all who differ with him are in error? He has not +framed his opinions quite independently for himself. We are all +influenced by what we have inherited from the past, and what we inherit +may be partly erroneous, even if we be right in the main. Moreover, we +are all liable to prejudices, and he who has no means of distinguishing +such from sober truths may admit into his creed many errors. The +lesson of history is very instructive upon this point. The fact is +that a man's religious notions reflect the position which he occupies +in the development of civilization very much as do his ethical notions. + +Again. Even supposing that a man has enlightened notions and is living +a religious life that the most instructed must approve; if he has never +reflected, and has never tried to make clear to himself just what he +really does believe and upon what grounds he believes it, how will it +be with him when his position is attacked by another? Men are, as I +have said, not at one in these matters, and there are few or none of +the doctrines put forward as religions that have not been attacked +again and again. + +Now, those who depend only upon an instinctive feeling may be placed in +the very painful position of seeing no answer to the objections brought +against them. What is said may seem plausible; it may even seem true, +and is it right for a man to oppose what appears to be the truth? One +may be shocked and pained, and may feel that he who makes the assault +_cannot_ be right, and yet may be forced to admit that a relentless +logic, or what presents itself as such, has every appearance of +establishing the repellent truth that robs one of one's dearest +possession. The situation is an unendurable one; it is that of the man +who guards a treasure and recognizes that there is no lock on the door. + +Surely, if there is error mixed with truth in our religious beliefs, it +is desirable that we should have some way of distinguishing between the +truth and the error. And if our beliefs really have a foundation, it +is desirable that we should know what that foundation is, and should +not be at the mercy of every passer-by who takes the notion to throw a +stone at us. But these desirable ends, it seems clear, cannot be +attained without reflection. + +77. THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.--The reflection that busies itself with +these things results in what is called the philosophy of religion. To +show that the name is an appropriate one and that we are concerned with +a philosophical discipline, I shall take up for a moment the idea of +God, which most men will admit has a very important place in our +conception of religion. + +Does God exist? We may feel very sure that He does, and yet be forced +to admit that the evidence of His existence is not so clear and +undeniable as to compel the assent of every one. We do not try to +prove the existence of the men we meet and who talk to us. No one +thinks of denying their existence; it is taken for granted. Even the +metaphysician, when he takes up and discusses the question whether we +can prove the existence of any mind beyond our own, does not seriously +doubt whether there are other minds or not. It is not so much what we +know, as how we know it, that interests him. + +But with the existence of God it is different. That men do not think +that an examination of the evidence can be dispensed with is evident +from the books that are written and lectures that are delivered year +after year. There seem to be honest differences of opinion, and we +feel compelled to offer men proofs--to show that belief is reasonable. + +How shall we determine whether this world in which we live is such a +world that we may take it as a revelation of God? And of what sort of +a Being are we speaking when we use the word "God"? The question is +not an idle one, for men's conceptions have differed widely. There is +the savage, with a conception that strikes the modern civilized man as +altogether inadequate; there is the thoughtful man of our day, who has +inherited the reflections of those who have lived in the ages gone by. + +And there is the philosopher, or, perhaps, I should rather say, there +are the philosophers. Have they not conceived of God as a group of +abstract notions, or as a something that may best be described as the +Unknowable, or as the Substance which is the identity of thought and +extension, or as the external world itself? All have not sinned in +this way, but some have, and they are not men whom we can ignore. + +If we turn from all such notions and, in harmony with the faith of the +great body of religious men in the ages past, some of whom were +philosophers but most of whom were not, cling close to the notion that +God is a mind or spirit, and must be conceived according to the +analogy, at least, of the human mind, the mind we most directly +know--if we do this, we are still confronted by problems to which the +thoughtful man cannot refuse attention. + +What do we mean by a mind? This is a question to which one can +scarcely give an intelligent answer unless one has exercised one's +faculty of philosophic reflection. And upon what sort of evidence does +one depend in establishing the existence of minds other than one's own? +This has been discussed at length in Chapter X, and the problem is +certainly a metaphysical one. And if we believe that the Divine Mind +is not subject to the limitations which confine the human, how shall we +conceive it? The question is an important one. Some of the +philosophers and theologians who have tried to free the Divine Mind +from such limitations have taken away every positive mark by which we +recognize a mind to be such, and have left us a naked "Absolute" which +is no better than a labeled vacuum. + +Moreover, we cannot refuse to consider the question of God's relation +to the world. This seems to lead back to the broader question: How are +we to conceive of any mind as related to the world? What is the +relation between mind and matter? If any subject of inquiry may +properly be called metaphysical, surely this may be. + +We see, then, that there is little wonder that the thoughtful +consideration of the facts and doctrines of religion has taken its +place among the philosophical sciences. Aesthetics has been called +applied psychology; and I think it is scarcely too much to say that we +are here concerned with applied metaphysics, with the attempt to obtain +a clear understanding of the significance of the facts of religion in +the light of those ultimate analyses which reveal to us the real nature +of the world of matter and of minds. + + + + +CHAPTER XXI + +PHILOSOPHY AND THE OTHER SCIENCES + +78. THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND NON-PHILOSOPHICAL SCIENCES.--We have seen in +the preceding chapters that certain of the sciences can scarcely be +cultivated successfully in complete separation from philosophy. It has +also been indicated in various places that the relation of other +sciences to philosophy is not so close. + +Thus, the sciences of arithmetic, algebra, and geometry may be +successfully prosecuted by a man who has reflected little upon the +nature of numbers and who has never asked himself seriously what he +means by space. The assumptions which he is justified in making, and +the kind of operations which he has the right to perform, do not seem, +as a rule, to be in doubt. + +So it is also in the sciences of chemistry and physics. There is +nothing to prevent the chemist or the physicist from being a +philosopher, but he is not compelled to be one. He may push forward +the investigations proper to his profession regardless of the type of +philosophy which it pleases him to adopt. Whether he be a realist or +an idealist, a dualist or a monist, he should, as chemist or physicist, +treat the same sort of facts in the same sort of a way. His path +appears to be laid out for him, and he can do work the value of which +is undisputed by traveling quietly along it, and without stopping to +consider consciously what kind of a path it is. There are many who +work in this way, and they succeed in making important contributions to +human knowledge. + +Such sciences as these I call the non-philosophical sciences to +distinguish them from the group of sciences I have been discussing at +length. What marks them out is, that the facts with which the +investigator has to deal are known by him with sufficient clearness to +leave him usually in little doubt as to the use which he can make of +them. His knowledge is clear enough for the purpose in hand, and his +work is justified by its results. What is the relation of such +sciences as these to philosophy? + +79. THE STUDY OF SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES AND METHODS.--It is one thing to +have the instinct of the investigator and to be able to feel one's way +along the road that leads to new knowledge of a given kind, and it is +another thing to have the reflective turn of mind that makes one +clearly conscious of just what one has been doing and how one has been +doing it. Men reasoned before there was a science of logic, and the +sciences made their appearance before what may be called the logic of +the sciences had its birth. + +"It may be truly asserted," writes Professor Jevons,[1] "that the rapid +progress of the physical sciences during the last three centuries has +not been accompanied by a corresponding advance in the theory of +reasoning. Physicists speak familiarly of Scientific Method, but they +could not readily describe what they mean by that expression. +Profoundly engaged in the study of particular classes of natural +phenomena, they are usually too much engrossed in the immense and ever +accumulating details of their special sciences to generalize upon the +methods of reasoning which they unconsciously employ. Yet few will +deny that these methods of reasoning ought to be studied, especially by +those who endeavor to introduce scientific order into less successful +and methodical branches of knowledge." + +Professor Jevons suggests that it is lack of time and attention that +prevents the scientific investigator from attaining to a clear +conception of what is meant by scientific method. This has something +to do with it, but I think we may also maintain that the work of the +investigator and that of the critic are somewhat different in kind, and +require somewhat different powers of mind. We find a parallel to this +elsewhere. Both in literature and in art men may be in the best sense +productive, and yet may be poor critics. We are often wofully +disappointed when we attend a lecture on poetry by a poet, or one on +painting by an artist. + +It may be said: If what is maintained above regarding the possibility +of prosecuting scientific researches without having recourse to +reflective thought is true, why should the man of science care whether +the principles and methods of the non-philosophical sciences are +investigated or are merely taken for granted? + +I answer: It should be observed that the statements made in the last +section were somewhat guarded. I have used the expressions "as a rule" +and "usually." I have spoken thus because one can work in the way +described, without danger of error, only where a beaten track has been +attained and is followed. In Chapter XVI it was pointed out that even +in the mathematical sciences one may be forced to reflect upon the +significance of one's symbols. As I write this, a pamphlet comes to +hand which is concerned to prove that "every cause is potentially +capable of producing several effects," and proves it by claiming that +the square root of four ([square root symbol]4) is a _cause_ which may +have as _effect_ either two (2) or minus two (-2). + +Is this mathematical reasoning? Are mathematical relations ever those +of cause and effect? And may one on the basis of such reasonings claim +that in nature the relation of cause and effect is not a fixed and +invariable one? + +Even where there is a beaten track, there is some danger that men may +wander from it. And on the confines of our knowledge there are fields +in which the accepted road is yet to be established. Science makes +constant use of hypotheses as an aid to investigation. What hypotheses +may one frame, and what are inadmissible? How important an +investigation of this question may be to the worker in certain branches +of science will be clear to one who will read with attention Professor +Poincare's brilliant little work on "Science and Hypothesis." [2] + +There is no field in art, literature, or science in which the work of +the critic is wholly superfluous. "There are periods in the growth of +science," writes Professor Pearson in his deservedly popular work, "The +Grammar of Science," [3] "when it is well to turn our attention from +its imposing superstructure and to examine carefully its foundations. +The present book is primarily intended as a criticism of the +fundamental concepts of modern science, and as such finds its +justification in the motto placed upon its title-page." The motto in +question is a quotation from the French philosopher Cousin: "Criticism +is the life of science." + +We have seen in Chapter XVI that a work on logic may be a comparatively +simple thing. It may describe the ways in which men reason when they +reason correctly, and may not go deep into metaphysical questions. On +the other hand, it may be deeply metaphysical. + +When we approach the part of logic which deals with the principles and +methods of the sciences, this difference is forced upon our attention. +One may set forth the assumptions upon which a science rests, and may +describe the methods of investigation employed, without going much +below the plane of common thought. As a type of such works I may +mention the useful treatise by Professor Jevons cited earlier in this +chapter. + +On the other hand, our investigations may be more profound, and we may +scrutinize the very foundations upon which a science rests. Both the +other works referred to illustrate this method of procedure. + +For example, in "The Grammar of Science," we find our author +discussing, under the title "The Facts of Science," such problems as +the following: the Reality of Things; Sense-impressions and +Consciousness; the Nature of Thought; the External Universe; Sensations +as the Ultimate Source of the Materials of Knowledge; and the Futility +of "Things-in-themselves." The philosophical character of such +discussions does not need to be pointed out at length. + + +[1] "The Principles Of Science," London, 1874, Preface. + +[2] English translation, New York, 1905. + +[3] Second edition, London, 1900. + + + + +VI. ON THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + + +CHAPTER XXII + +THE VALUE OF THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY + +80. THE QUESTION OF PRACTICAL UTILITY.--Why should men study +philosophy? The question is a natural one, for man is a rational +being, and when the worth of a thing is not at once evident to him, he +usually calls for proof of its worth. Our professional schools, with +the exception of schools of theology, usually pay little attention to +philosophical studies; but such studies occupy a strong position in our +colleges, and a vast number of persons not students in the technical +sense think it worth while to occupy themselves with them more or less. +Wherever liberal studies are prosecuted they have their place, and it +is an honored place. Is this as it should be? + +Before we ask whether any given study is of practical value, it is wise +to determine what the word "practical" shall be taken to mean. Shall +we say that we may call practical only such learning as can be turned +to direct account in earning money later? If we restrict the meaning +of the word in this way, we seem to strike a blow at liberal studies in +general. + +Thus, no one would think of maintaining that the study of mathematics +is not of practical value--sometimes and to some persons. The +physicist and the engineer need to know a good deal about mathematics. +But how is it with the merchant, the lawyer, the clergyman, the +physician? How much of their algebra, geometry, and trigonometry do +these remember after they have become absorbed in the practice of their +several callings, and how often do they find it necessary to use +anything beyond certain simple rules of arithmetic? + +Sometimes we are tempted to condemn the study of the classics as +unpractical, and to turn instead to the modern languages and to the +physical sciences. Now, it is, of course, a fair question to ask what +should and what should not be regarded as forming part of a liberal +education, and I shall make no effort to decide the question here. But +it should be borne well in mind that one cannot decide it by +determining what studies are practical in the sense of the word under +discussion. + +If we keep strictly to this sense, the modern languages are to the +majority of Americans of little more practical value than are the Latin +and Greek. We scarcely need them except when we travel abroad, and +when we do that we find that the concierge and the waiter use English +with surprising fluency. As for the sciences, those who expect to earn +a living through a knowledge of them, seek, as a rule, that knowledge +in a technical or professional school, and the rest of us can enjoy the +fruit of their labors without sharing them. It is a popular fallacy +that because certain studies have a practical value to the world at +large, they must necessarily have a practical value to every one, and +can be recommended to the individual on that account. It is worth +while to sit down quietly and ask oneself how many of the bits of +information acquired during the course of a liberal education are +directly used in the carrying on of a given business or in the practice +of a given profession. + +Nevertheless, we all believe that liberal education is a good thing for +the individual and for the race. One must not too much restrict the +meaning of the word "practical." A civilized state composed of men who +know nothing save what has a direct bearing upon their especial work in +life is an absurdity; it cannot exist. There must be a good deal of +general enlightenment and there must be a considerable number of +individuals who have enjoyed a high measure of enlightenment. + +This becomes clear if we consider the part played in the life of the +state by the humblest tradesman. If he is to be successful, he must be +able to read, write, and keep his accounts, and make, let us say, +shoes. But when we have said this, we have summed him up as a workman, +but not as a man, and he is also a man. He may marry, and make a good +or a bad husband, and a good or a bad father. He stands in relations +to his neighborhood, to the school, and to the church; and he is not +without his influence. He may be temperate or intemperate, frugal or +extravagant, law-abiding or the reverse. He has his share, and no +small share, in the government of his city and of his state. His +influence is indeed far-reaching, and that it may be an influence for +good, he is in need of all the intellectual and moral enlightenment +that we can give him. It is of the utmost practical utility to the +state that he should know a vast number of things which have no direct +bearing upon the making and mending of shoes. + +And if this is true in the case of the tradesman, it is scarcely +necessary to point out that the physician, the lawyer, the clergyman, +and the whole army of those whom we regard as the leaders of men and +the molders of public opinion have spheres of non-professional activity +of great importance to the state. They cannot be mere specialists if +they would. They must influence society for good or ill; and if they +are ignorant and unenlightened, their influence cannot be good. + +When we consider the life of man in a broad way, we see how essential +it is that many men should be brought to have a share in what has been +gained by the long travail of the centuries past. It will not do to +ask at every step whether they can put to direct professional use every +bit of information gained. Literature and science, sweetness and +light, beauty and truth, these are the heritage of the modern world; +and unless these permeate its very being, society must undergo +degeneration. It is this conviction that has led to the high +appreciation accorded by intelligent men to courses of liberal study, +and among such courses those which we have recognized as philosophical +must take their place. + +81. WHY PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES ARE USEFUL.--But let us ask a little more +specifically what is to be gained by pursuing distinctively +philosophical studies. Why should those who go to college, or +intelligent persons who cannot go to college, care to interest +themselves in logic and ethics, psychology and metaphysics? Are not +these studies rather dry, in the first place, and rather profitless, in +the second? + +As to the first point, I should stoutly maintain that if they are dry, +it is somebody's fault. The most sensational of novels would be dry if +couched in the language which some philosophers have seen fit to use in +expressing their thoughts. He who defines "existence" as "the still +and simple precipitate of the oscillation between beginning to be and +ceasing to be" has done his best to alienate our affections from the +subject of his predilection. + +But it is not in the least necessary to talk in this way about matters +philosophical. He who is not a slave to tradition can use plain and +simple language. To be sure, there are some subjects, especially in +the field of metaphysics, into which the student cannot expect to see +very deeply at the outset of his studies. Men do not expect to +understand the more difficult problems of mathematics without making a +good deal of preparation; but, unhappily, they sometimes expect to have +the profoundest problems of metaphysics made luminous to them in one or +two popular lectures. + +Philosophical studies are not dry, when men are properly taught, and +are in a position to understand what is said. They deal with the most +fascinating of problems. It is only necessary to pierce through the +husk of words which conceals the thoughts of the philosopher, and we +shall find the kernel palatable, indeed. Nor are such studies +profitless, to take up our second point. Let us see what we may gain +from them. + +Let us begin with logic--the traditional logic commonly taught to +beginners. Is it worth while to study this? Surely it is. No one who +has not tried to introduce the average under-graduate to logic can +realize how blindly he uses his reasoning powers, how unconscious he is +of the full meaning of the sentences he employs, how easily he may be +entrapped by fallacious reasonings where he is not set on his guard by +some preposterous conclusion touching matters with which he is familiar. + +And he is not merely unconscious of the lapses in his processes of +reasoning, and of his imperfect comprehension of the significance of +his statements; he is unconscious also of the mass of inherited and +acquired prejudices, often quite indefensible, which he unquestioningly +employs as premises. + +He fairly represents the larger world beyond the walls of the college. +It is a world in which prejudices are assumed as premises, and loose +reasonings pass current and are unchallenged until they beget some +unpalatable conclusion. It is a world in which men take little pains +to think carefully and accurately unless they are dealing with +something touching which it is practically inconvenient to make a +mistake. + +He who studies logic in the proper way is not filling his mind with +useless facts; he is simply turning the light upon his own thinking +mind, and realizing more clearly what he has always done rather blindly +and blunderingly. He may completely forget the + + "Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris," + +and he may be quite unable to give an account of the moods and figures +of the syllogism; but he cannot lose the critical habit if he once has +acquired it, and he cannot but be on his guard against himself as well +as against others. + +There is a keen pleasure in gaining such insight. It gives a feeling +of freedom and power, and rids one of that horrid sense that, although +this or that bit of reasoning is certainly bad, it is impossible to +tell just what is the matter with it. And as for its practical +utility, if it is desirable to get rid of prejudice and confusion, and +to possess a clear and reasonable mind, then anything that makes for +this must be of value. + +Of the desirability that all who can afford the luxury of a liberal +education should do some serious reading in ethics, it seems hardly +necessary to speak. The deficiencies of the ethics of the unreflective +have already been touched upon in Chapter XVIII. + +But I cannot forbear dwelling upon it again. What thoughtful man is +not struck with the variety of ethical standards which obtain in the +same community? The clergyman who has a strong sense of responsibility +for the welfare of his flock is sometimes accused of not sufficiently +realizing the importance of a frank expression of the whole truth about +things; the man of science, whose duty it seems to be to peer into the +mysteries of the universe, and to tell what he sees or what he guesses, +is accused of an indifference to the effect which his utterances may +have upon the less enlightened who hear him speak; many criticise the +lawyer for a devotion to the interests of his client which is at times +in doubtful harmony with the interests of justice in the larger sense; +in the business world commercial integrity is exalted, and lapses from +the ethical code which do not assail this cardinal virtue are not +always regarded with equal seriousness. + +It is as though men elected to worship at the shrine of a particular +saint, and were inclined to overlook the claims of others. For all +this there is, of course, a reason; such things are never to be looked +upon as mere accident. But this does not mean that these more or less +conflicting standards are all to be accepted as satisfactory and as +ultimate. It is inevitable that those who study ethics seriously, who +really reflect upon ethical problems, should sometimes criticise the +judgments of their fellow-men rather unfavorably. + +Of such independent criticism many persons have a strong distrust. I +am reminded here of an eminent mathematician who maintained that the +study of ethics has a tendency to distort the student's judgments as to +what is right and what is wrong. He had observed that there is apt to +be some divergence of opinion between those who think seriously upon +morals and those who do not, and he gave the preference to the +unthinking majority. + +Now, there is undoubtedly danger that the independent thinker may be +betrayed into eccentricities of opinion which are unjustifiable and are +even dangerous. But it seems a strange doctrine that it is, on the +whole, safer not to think, but rather to drift on the stream of public +opinion. In other fields we are not inclined to believe that the +ignorant man, who has given no especial attention to a subject, is the +one likely to be right. Why should it be so in morals? + +That the youth who goes to college to seek a liberal education has a +need of ethical studies becomes very plain when we come to a +realization of the curious limitations of his ethical training as +picked up from his previous experience of the world. He has some very +definite notions as to right and wrong. He is as ready to maintain the +desirability of benevolence, justice, and veracity, as was Bishop +Butler, who wrote the famous "Analogy "; although, to be sure, he is +most inarticulate when called upon to explain what constitutes +benevolence, justice, or veracity. But the strangest thing is, that he +seems to place some of the most important decisions of his whole life +quite outside the realm of right and wrong. + +He may admit that a man should not undertake to be a clergyman, unless +he possesses certain qualifications of mind and character which +evidently qualify him for that profession. But he does not see why he +has not the right to become a wearisome professor or an incompetent +physician, if he chooses to enter upon such a career. Is a man not +free to take up what profession he pleases? He must take the risk, of +course; but if he fails, he fails. + +And when he is asked to consider from the point of view of ethics the +question of marriage and its responsibilities, he is at first inclined +to consider the whole subject as rather a matter for jest. Has a man +not the right to marry or remain single exactly as he pleases? And is +he not free to marry any one whom he can persuade to accept him? To be +sure, he should be a little careful about marrying quite out of his +class, and he should not be hopelessly careless about money matters. +Thus, a decision, which may affect his whole life as much as any other +that he can be called upon to make, which may practically make it or +mar it, is treated as though it were not a matter of grave concern, but +a private affair, entailing no serious consequences to any one and +calling for no reflection. + +I wish it could be said that the world outside of the college regarded +these matters in another light. But the student faithfully represents +the opinions current in the community from which he comes. And he +represents, unhappily, the teachings of the stage and of the world of +current fiction. The influence of these is too often on the side of +inconsiderate passion, which stirs our sympathy and which lends itself +to dramatic effect. With the writers of romance the ethical +philosophers have an ancient quarrel. + +It may be said: But the world gets along very well as it is, and +without brooding too much upon ethical problems. To this we may +answer: Does the world get along so very well, after all? Are there no +evils that foresight and some firmness of character might have +obviated? And when we concern ourselves with the educated classes, at +least, the weight of whose influence is enormous, is it too much to +maintain that they should do some reading and thinking in the field of +ethics? should strive to attain to clear vision and correct judgment on +the whole subject of man's duties? + +Just at the present time, when psychological studies have so great a +vogue, one scarcely feels compelled to make any sort of an apology for +them. It is assumed on all hands that it is desirable to study +psychology, and courses of lectures are multiplied in all quarters. + +Probably some of this interest has its root in the fallacy touched upon +earlier in this chapter. The science of psychology has revolutionized +educational theory. When those of us who have arrived at middle life +look back and survey the tedious and toilsome path along which we were +unwillingly driven in our schoolboy days, and then see how smooth and +pleasant it has been made since, we are impelled to honor all who have +contributed to this result. Moreover, it seems very clear that +teachers of all grades should have some acquaintance with the nature of +the minds that they are laboring to develop, and that they should not +be left to pick up their information for themselves--a task +sufficiently difficult to an unobservant person. + +These considerations furnish a sufficient ground for extolling the +science of psychology, and for insisting that studies in it should form +some part of the education of a teacher. But why should the rest of us +care for such studies? + +To this one may answer, in the first place, that nearly all of us have, +or ought to have, some responsibility for the education of children; +and, in the second, that we deal with the minds of others every day in +every walk in life, and it can certainly do no harm to have our +attention called to the way in which minds function. To be sure, some +men are by nature tactful, and instinctively conscious of how things +strike the minds of those about them. But even such persons may gain +helpful suggestions, and, at least, have the habit of attention to the +mental processes of others confirmed in them. How often we are +impressed at church, at the public lecture, and in private +conversations, with the fact that the speaker lives in blissful +unconsciousness of what can be understood by or can possibly interest +his hearers! For the confirmed bore, there is, perhaps, no cure; but +it seems as though something might be done for those who are afflicted +to a minor degree. + +And this brings me to another consideration, which is that a proper +study of psychology ought to be of service in revealing to a man his +own nature. It should show him what he is, and this is surely a first +step toward becoming something better. It is wonderful how blind men +may be with regard to what passes in their own minds and with regard to +their own peculiarities. When they learn to reflect, they come to a +clearer consciousness of themselves--it is as though a lamp were +lighted within them. One may, it is true, study psychology without +attaining to any of the good results suggested above; but, for that +matter, there is no study which may not be pursued in a profitless way, +if the teacher be sufficiently unskilled and the pupil sufficiently +thoughtless. + +82. METAPHYSICS AND PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION.--Perhaps it will be said: +For such philosophical studies as the above a good defense may perhaps +be made, but can one defend in the same way the plunge into the +obscurities of metaphysics? In this field no two men seem to be wholly +agreed, and if they were, what would it signify? Whether we call +ourselves monists or dualists, idealists or realists, Lockians or +Kantians, must we not live and deal with the things about us in much +the same way? + +Those who have dipped into metaphysical studies deeply enough to see +what the problems discussed really are; who have been able to reach the +ideas concealed, too often, under a rather forbidding terminology; who +are not of the dogmatic turn of mind which insists upon unquestioned +authority and is repelled by the uncertainties which must confront +those who give themselves to reflective thought,--these will hardly +need to be persuaded that it is desirable to give some attention to the +question: What sort of a world, after all, is this world in which we +live? What is its meaning? + +To many men the impulse to peer into these things is over-powering, and +the pleasure of feeling their insight deepen is extremely keen. What +deters us in most instances is not the conviction that such +investigations are not, or should not be, interesting, but rather the +difficulty of the approach. It is not easy to follow the path which +leads from the world of common thought into the world of philosophical +reflection. One becomes bewildered and discouraged at the outset. +Sometimes, after listening to the directions of guides who disagree +among themselves, we are tempted to believe that there can be no +certain path to the goal which we have before us. + +But, whatever the difficulties and uncertainties of our task, a little +reflection must show that it is not one which has no significance for +human life. + +Men can, it is true, eat and sleep and go through the routine of the +day, without giving thought to science or religion or philosophy, but +few will defend such an existence. As a matter of fact, those who have +attained to some measure of intellectual and moral development do +assume, consciously or unconsciously, some rather definite attitude +toward life, and this is not independent of their conviction as to what +the world is and means. + +Metaphysical speculations run out into the philosophy of religion; and, +on the other hand, religious emotions and ideals have again and again +prompted men to metaphysical construction. A glance at history shows +that it is natural to man to embrace some attitude toward the system of +things, and to try to justify this by reasoning. Vigorous and +independent minds have given birth to theories, and these have been +adopted by others. The influence of such theories upon the evolution +of humanity has been enormous. + +Ideas have ruled and still rule the world, some of them very abstract +ideas. It does not follow that one is uninfluenced by them, when one +has no knowledge of their source or of their original setting. They +become part of the intellectual heritage of us all, and we sometimes +suppose that we are responsible for them ourselves. Has not the fact +that an idealistic or a materialistic type of thought has been current +at a particular time influenced the outlook on life of many who have +themselves devoted little attention to philosophy? It would be +interesting to know how many, to whom Spencer is but a name, have felt +the influence of the agnosticism of which he was the apostle. + +I say this without meaning to criticise here any of the types of +doctrine referred to. My thesis is only that philosophy and life go +hand in hand, and that the prying into the deeper mysteries of the +universe cannot be regarded as a matter of no practical moment. Its +importance ought to be admitted even by the man who has little hope +that he will himself be able to attain to a doctrine wholly +satisfactory and wholly unshakable. + +For, if the study of the problems of metaphysics does nothing else for +a given individual, it, at least, enables him to comprehend and +criticise intelligently the doctrines which are presented for his +acceptance by others. It is a painful thing to feel quite helpless in +the face of plausible reasonings which may threaten to rob us of our +most cherished hopes, or may tend to persuade us of the vanity of what +we have been accustomed to regard as of highest worth. If we are quite +unskilled in the examination of such doctrines, we may be captured by +the loosest of arguments--witness the influence of Spencer's argument +for the "Unknowable," in the "First Principles"; and if we are ignorant +of the history of speculative thought, we may be carried away by old +and exploded notions which pose as modern and impressive only because +they have been given a modern dress. + +We can, of course, refuse to listen to those who would talk with us. +But this savors of bigotry, and the world will certainly not grow +wiser, if men generally cultivate a blind adherence to the opinions in +which they happen to be brought up. A cautious conservatism is one +thing, and blind obstinacy is another. To the educated man (and it is +probable that others will have to depend on opinions taken at second +hand) a better way of avoiding error is open. + +Finally, it will not do to overlook the broadening influence of such +studies as we are discussing. How dogmatically men are in the habit of +expressing themselves upon those obscure and difficult problems which +deal with matters that lie on the confines of human knowledge! Such an +assumption of knowledge cannot but make us uncomprehending and +unsympathetic. + +There are many subjects upon which, if we hold an opinion at all, we +should hold it tentatively, waiting for more light, and retaining a +willingness to be enlightened. Many a bitter and fruitless quarrel +might be avoided, if more persons found it possible to maintain this +philosophical attitude of mind. Philosophy is, after all, reflection, +and the reflective man must realize that he is probably as liable to +error as are other men. He is not infallible, nor has the limit of +human knowledge been attained in his day and generation. He who +realizes this will not assume that his neighbor is always wrong, and he +will come to have that wide, conscientious tolerance, which is not +indifference, but which is at the farthest remove from the zeal of mere +bigotry. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIII + +WHY WE SHOULD STUDY THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY + +83. THE PROMINENCE GIVEN TO THE SUBJECT.--When one reflects upon the +number of lecture courses given every year at our universities and +colleges on the history of philosophy, one is struck by the fact that +philosophy is not treated as are most other subjects with which the +student is brought into contact. + +If we study mathematics, or chemistry, or physics, or physiology, or +biology, the effort is made to lay before us in a convenient form the +latest results which have been attained in those sciences. Of their +history very little is said; and, indeed, as we have seen (section 6), +lectures on the history of the inductive sciences are apt to be +regarded as philosophical in their character and aims rather than as +merely scientific. + +The interest in the history of philosophy is certainly not a +diminishing one. Text-books covering the whole field or a part of it +are multiplied; extensive studies are made and published covering the +work of individual philosophers; innumerable historical discussions +make their appearance in the pages of current philosophical journals. +No student is regarded as fairly acquainted with philosophy who knows +nothing of Plato and Aristotle, Descartes and Spinoza, Berkeley and +Hume, Kant and Hegel, and the rest. We should look upon him as having +a very restricted outlook if he had read only the works of the thinkers +of our own day; indeed, we should not expect him to have a proper +comprehension even of these, for their chapters must remain blind and +meaningless to one who has no knowledge of what preceded them and has +given birth to the doctrines there set forth. + +It is a fair question to ask: Why is philosophy so bound up with the +study of the past? Why may we not content ourselves with what has up +to the present been attained, and omit a survey of the road along which +our predecessors have traveled? + +84. THE ESPECIAL IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL STUDIES TO REFLECTIVE +THOUGHT.--In some of the preceding chapters dealing with the various +philosophical sciences, it has been indicated that, in the sciences we +do not regard as philosophical, men may work on the basis of certain +commonly accepted assumptions and employ methods which are generally +regarded as trustworthy within the given field. The value both of the +fundamental assumptions and of the methods of investigation appear to +be guaranteed by the results attained. There are not merely +observation and hypothesis; there is also verification, and where this +is lacking, men either abandon their position or reserve their judgment. + +Thus, a certain body of interrelated facts is built up, the +significance of which, in many fields at least, is apparent even to the +layman. Nor is it wholly beyond him to judge whether the results of +scientific investigations can be verified. An eclipse, calculated by +methods which he is quite unable to follow, may occur at the appointed +hour and confirm his respect for the astronomer. The efficacy of a +serum in the cure of diseases may convince him that work done in the +laboratory is not labor lost. + +It seems evident that the several sciences do really rise on stepping +stones of their dead selves, and that those selves of the past are +really dead and superseded. Who would now think of going back for his +science to Plato's "Timaeus," or would accept the description of the +physical world contained in the works of Aristotle? What chemist or +physicist need busy himself with the doctrine of atoms and their +clashings presented in the magnificent poem of Lucretius? Who can +forbear a smile--a sympathetic one--when he turns over the pages of +Augustine's "City of God," and sees what sort of a world this +remarkable man believed himself to inhabit? + +It is the historic and human interest that carries us back to these +things. We say: What ingenuity! what a happy guess! how well that was +reasoned in the light of what was actually known about the world in +those days! But we never forget that what compels our admiration does +so because it makes us realize that we stand in the presence of a great +mind, and not because it is a foundation-stone in the great edifice +which science has erected. + +But it is not so in philosophy. It is not possible to regard the +philosophical reflections of Plato and of Aristotle as superseded in +the same sense in which we may so regard their science. The reason for +this lies in the difference between scientific thought and reflective +thought. + +The two have been contrasted in Chapter II of this volume. It was +there pointed out that the sort of thinking demanded in the special +sciences is not so very different from that with which we are all +familiar in common life. Science is more accurate and systematic, it +has a broader outlook, and it is free from the imperfections which +vitiate the uncritical and fragmentary knowledge which experience of +the world yields the unscientific. But, after all, the world is much +the same sort of a world to the man of science and to his uncritical +neighbor. The latter can, as we have seen, understand what, in +general, the former is doing, and can appropriate many of his results. + +On the other hand, it often happens that the man who has not, with +pains and labor, learned to reflect, cannot even see that the +philosopher has a genuine problem before him. Thus, the plain man +accepts the fact that he has a mind and that it knows the world. That +both mental phenomena and physical phenomena should be carefully +observed and classified he may be ready to admit. But that the very +conceptions of mind and of what it means to know a world are vague and +indefinite in the extreme, and stand in need of careful analysis, he +does not realize. + +In other words, he sees that our knowledge needs to be extended and +rendered more accurate and reliable, but he does not see that, if we +are to think clearly and consciously, all our knowledge needs to be +gone over in a different way. In common life it is quite possible to +use in the attainment of practical ends knowledge which has not been +analyzed and of the full meaning of which we are ignorant. I hope it +has become evident in the course of this volume that something closely +analogous is true in the field of science. The man of science may +measure space and time, and may study the phenomena of the human mind, +without even attempting to answer all the questions which may be raised +as to what is meant, in the last analysis, by such concepts as space, +time, and the mind. + +That such concepts should be analyzed has, I hope, been made clear, if +only that erroneous and misleading notions as to these things should be +avoided. But when a man with a genius for metaphysical analysis +addresses himself to this task, he cannot simply hand the results +attained by his reflections over to his less reflective fellow-man. +His words are not understood; he seems to be dealing with shadows, with +unrealities; he has passed from the real world of common thought into +another world which appears to have little relation to the former. + +Nor can verification, indubitable proof, be demanded and furnished as +it can in many parts of the field cultivated by the special sciences. +We may judge science fairly well without ourselves being scientists, +but it is not possible to judge philosophy without being to some extent +a philosopher. + +In other words, the conclusions of reflective thought must be judged by +following the process and discovering its cogency or the reverse. +Thus, when the philosopher lays before us an argument to prove that we +must regard the only ultimate reality in the world as unknowable, and +must abandon our theistic convictions, how shall we make a decision as +to whether he is right or is wrong? May we expect that the day will +come when he will be justified or condemned as is the astronomer on the +day predicted for an eclipse? Neither the philosophy of Locke, nor +that of Descartes, nor that of Kant, can be vindicated as can a +prediction touching an eclipse of the sun. To judge these men, we must +learn to think with them, to survey the road by which they travel; and +this we cannot do until we have learned the art. + +Whether we like to admit it or not, we must admit, if we are +fair-minded and intelligent, that philosophy cannot speak with the same +authority as science, where science has been able to verify its +results. There are, of course, scientific hypotheses and speculations +which should be regarded as being quite as uncertain as anything +brought forward by the philosophers. But, admitting this, the fact +remains that there is a difference between the two fields as a whole, +and that the philosopher should learn not to speak with an assumption +of authority. No final philosophy has been attained, so palpably firm +in its foundation, and so admittedly trustworthy in its construction, +that we are justified in saying: Now we need never go back to the past +unless to gratify the historic interest. It is a weakness of young +men, and of older men of partisan temper, to feel very sure of matters +which, in the nature of things, must remain uncertain. + +Since these things are so, and since men possess the power of +reflection in very varying degree, it is not surprising that we find it +worth while to turn back and study the thoughts of those who have had a +genius for reflection, even though they lived at a time when modern +science was awaiting its birth. Some things cannot be known until +other things are known; often there must be a vast collection of +individual facts before the generalizations of science can come into +being. But many of the problems with which reflective thought is still +struggling have not been furthered in the least by information which +has been collected during the centuries which have elapsed since they +were attacked by the early Greek philosophers. + +Thus, we are still discussing the distinction between "appearance" and +"reality," and many and varied are the opinions at which philosophers +arrive. But Thales, who heads the list of the Greek philosophers, had +quite enough material, given in his own experience, to enable him to +solve this problem as well as any modern philosopher, had he been able +to use the material. He who is familiar with the history of philosophy +will recognize that, although one may smile at Augustine's accounts of +the races of men, and of the spontaneous generation of small animals, +no one has a right to despise his profound reflections upon the nature +of time and the problems which arise out of its character as past, +present, and future. + +The fact is that metaphysics does not lag behind because of our lack of +material to work with. The difficulties we have to face are nothing +else than the difficulties of reflective thought. Why can we not tell +clearly what we mean when we use the word "self," or speak of +"knowledge," or insist that we know an "external world"? Are we not +concerned with the most familiar of experiences? To be sure we +are--with experiences familiarly, but vaguely and unanalytically, known +and, hence, only half known. All these experiences the great men of +the past had as well as we; and if they had greater powers of +reflection, perhaps they saw more deeply into them than we do. At any +rate, we cannot afford to assume that they did not. + +One thing, however, I must not omit to mention. Although one man +cannot turn over bodily the results of his reflection to another, it by +no means follows that he cannot give the other a helping hand, or warn +him of dangers by himself stumbling into pitfalls, as the case may be. +We have an indefinite advantage over the solitary thinkers who opened +up the paths of reflection, for we have the benefit of their teaching. +And this brings me to a consideration which I must discuss in the next +section. + +85. THE VALUE OF DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW.--The man who has not read is +like the man who has not traveled--he is not an intelligent critic, for +he has nothing with which to compare what falls within the little +circle of his experiences. That the prevailing architecture of a town +is ugly can scarcely impress one who is acquainted with no other town. +If we live in a community in which men's manners are not good, and +their standard of living not the highest, our attention does not dwell +much upon the fact, unless some contrasted experience wakes within us a +clear consciousness of the difference. That to which we are accustomed +we accept uncritically and unreflectively. It is difficult for us to +see it somewhat as one might see it to whom it came as a new experience. + +Of course, there may be in the one town buildings of more and of less +architectural beauty; and there may be in the one community differences +of opinion that furnish intellectual stimulus and keep awake the +critical spirit. Still, there is such a thing as a prevalent type of +architecture, and there is such a thing as the spirit of the times. He +who is carried along by the spirit of the age may easily conclude that +what is, is right, because he hears few raise their voices in protest. + +To estimate justly the type of thought in which he has been brought up, +he must have something with which to compare it. He must stand at a +distance, and try to judge it as he would judge a type of doctrine +presented to him for the first rime. And in the accomplishment of this +task he can find no greater aid than the study of the history of +philosophy. + +It is at first something of a shock to a man to discover that +assumptions which he has been accustomed to make without question have +been frankly repudiated by men quite as clever as he, and, perhaps, +more critical. It opens the eyes to see that his standards of worth +have been weighed by others and have been found wanting. It may well +incline him to reexamine reasonings in which he has detected no flaw, +when he finds that acute minds have tried them before, and have +declared them faulty. + +Nor can it be without its influence upon his judgment of the +significance of a doctrine, when it becomes plain to him that this +significance can scarcely be fully comprehended until the history of +the doctrine is known. For example, he thinks of the mind as somehow +in the body, as interacting with it, as a substance, and as immaterial. +In the course of his reading it begins to dawn upon his consciousness +that he has not thought all this out for himself; he has taken these +notions from others, who in turn have had them from their predecessors. +He begins to realize that he is not resting upon evidence independently +found in his own experience, but has upon his hands a sheaf of opinions +which are the echoes of old philosophies, and whose rise and +development can be traced over the stretch of the centuries. Can he +help asking himself, when he sees this, whether the opinions in +question express the truth and the whole truth? Is he not forced to +take the critical attitude toward them? + +And when he views the succession of systems which pass in review before +him, noting how a truth may be dimly seen by one writer, denied by +another, taken up again and made clearer by a third, and so on, how can +he avoid the reflection that, as there was some error mixed with the +truth presented in earlier systems, so there probably is some error in +whatever may happen to be the form of doctrine generally received in +his own time? The evolution of humanity is not yet at an end; men +still struggle to see clearly, and fall short of the ideal; it must be +a good thing to be freed from the dogmatic assumption of finality +natural to the man of limited outlook. In studying the history of +philosophy sympathetically we are not merely calling to our aid critics +who possess the advantage of seeing things from a different point of +view, but we are reminding ourselves that we, too, are human and +fallible. + +86. PHILOSOPHY AS POETRY, AND PHILOSOPHY AS SCIENCE.--The recognition +of the truth that the problems of reflection do not admit of easy +solution and that verification can scarcely be expected as it can in +the fields of the special sciences, need not, even when it is brought +home to us, as it is apt to be, by the study of the history of +philosophy, lead us to believe that philosophies are like the fashions, +a something gotten up to suit the taste of the day, and to be dismissed +without regret as soon as that taste changes. + +Philosophy is sometimes compared with poetry. It is argued that each +age must have its own poetry, even though it be inferior to that which +it has inherited from the past. Just so, it is said, each age must +have its own philosophy, and the philosophy of an earlier age will not +satisfy its demands. The implication is that in dealing with +philosophy we are not concerned with what is true or untrue in itself +considered, but with what is satisfying to us or the reverse. + +Now, it would sound absurd to say that each age must have its own +geometry or its own physics. The fact that it has long been known that +the sum of the interior angles of a plane triangle is equal to two +right angles, does not warrant me in repudiating that truth; nor am I +justified in doing so, and in believing the opposite, merely because I +find the statement uninteresting or distasteful. When we are dealing +with such matters as these, we recognize that truth is truth, and that, +if we mistake it or refuse to recognize it, so much the worse for us. + +Is it otherwise in philosophy? Is it a perfectly proper thing that, in +one age, men should be idealists, and in another, materialists; in one, +theists, and in another, agnostics? Is the distinction between true +and false nothing else than the distinction between what is in harmony +with the spirit of the times and what is not? + +That it is natural that there should be such fluctuations of opinion, +we may freely admit. Many things influence a man to embrace a given +type of doctrine, and, as we have seen, verification is a difficult +problem. But have we here, any more than in other fields, the right to +assume that a doctrine was true at a given time merely because it +_seemed_ to men true at that time, or because they found it pleasing? +The history of science reveals that many things have long been believed +to be true, and, indeed, to be bound up with what were regarded as the +highest interests of man, and that these same things have later been +discovered to be false--not false merely for a later age, but false for +all time; as false when they were believed in as when they were +exploded and known to be exploded. No man of sense believes that the +Ptolemaic system was true for a while, and that then the Copernican +became true. We say that the former only _seemed_ true, and that the +enthusiasm of its adherents was a mistaken enthusiasm. + +It is well to remember that philosophies are brought forward because it +is believed or hoped that they are true. A fairy tale may be recited +and may be approved, although no one dreams of attaching faith to the +events narrated in it. But a philosophy attempts to give us some +account of the nature of the world in which we live. If the +philosopher frankly abandons the attempt to tell us what is true, and +with a Celtic generosity addresses himself to the task of saying what +will be agreeable to us, he loses his right to the title. It is not +enough that he stirs our emotions, and works up his unrealities into +something resembling a poem. It is not primarily his task to please, +as it is not the task of the serious worker in science to please those +whom he is called upon to instruct. Truth is truth, whether it be +scientific truth or philosophical truth. And error, no matter how +agreeable or how nicely adjusted to the temper of the times, is always +error. If it is error in a field in which the detection and exposure +of error is difficult, it is the more dangerous, and the more should we +be on our guard against it. + +We may, then, accept the lesson of the history of philosophy, to wit, +that we have no right to regard any given doctrine as final in such a +sense that it need no longer be held tentatively and as subject to +possible revision; but we need not, on that account, deny that +philosophy is, what it has in the past been believed to be, an earnest +search for truth. A philosophy that did not even profess to be this +would not be listened to at all. It would be regarded as too trivial +to merit serious attention. If we take the word "science" in the broad +sense to indicate a knowledge of the truth more exact and satisfactory +than that which obtains in common life, we may say that every +philosophy worthy of the name is, at least, an attempt at scientific +knowledge. Of course, this sense of the word "science" should not be +confused with that in which it has been used elsewhere in this volume. + +87. HOW TO READ THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.--He who takes up the history +of philosophy for the first time is apt to be impressed with the fact +that he is reading something that might not inaptly be called the +history of human error. + +It begins with crude and, to the superficial spectator, seemingly +childish attempts in the field of physical science. There are clever +guesses at the nature of the physical world, but the boldest of +speculations are entered upon with no apparent recognition of the +difficulty of the task undertaken, and with no realization of the need +for caution. Somewhat later a different class of problems makes its +appearance--the problems which have to do with the mind and with the +nature of knowledge, reflective problems which scarcely seem to have +come fairly within the horizon of the earliest thinkers. + +These problems even the beginner may be willing to recognize as +philosophical; but he may conscientiously harbor a doubt as to the +desirability of spending time upon the solutions which are offered. +System rises after system, and confronts him with what appear to be new +questions and new answers. It seems as though each philosopher were +constructing a world for himself independently, and commanding him to +accept it, without first convincing him of his right to assume this +tone of authority and to set up for an oracle. In all this conflict of +opinions where shall we seek for truth? Why should we accept one man +as a teacher rather than another? Is not the lesson to be gathered +from the whole procession of systems best summed up in the dictum of +Protagoras: "Man is the measure of all things"--each has his own truth, +and this need not be truth to another? + +This, I say, is a first impression and a natural one. I hasten to add: +this should not be the last impression of those who read with +thoughtful attention. + +One thing should be emphasized at the outset: nothing will so often +bear rereading as the history of philosophy. When we go over the +ground after we have obtained a first acquaintance with the teachings +of the different philosophers, we begin to realize that what we have in +our hands is, in a sense, a connected whole. We see that if Plato and +Aristotle had not lived, we could not have had the philosophy which +passed current in the Middle Ages and furnished a foundation for the +teachings of the Church. We realize that without this latter we could +not have had Descartes, and without Descartes we could not have had +Locke and Berkeley and Hume. And had not these lived, we should not +have had Kant and his successors. Other philosophies we should +undoubtedly have had, for the busy mind of man must produce something. +But whatever glimpses at the truth these men have vouchsafed us have +been guaranteed by the order of development in which they have stood. +They could not independently have written the books that have come down +to us. + +This should be evident from what has been said earlier in this chapter +and elsewhere in this book. Let us bear in mind that a philosopher +draws his material from two sources. First of all, he has the +experience of the mind and the world which is the common property of us +all. But it is, as we have seen, by no means easy to use this +material. It is vastly difficult to reflect. It is fatally easy to +misconceive what presents itself in our experience. With the most +earnest effort to describe what lies before us, we give a false +description, and we mislead ourselves and others. + +In the second place, the philosopher has the interpretations of +experience which he has inherited from his predecessors. The influence +of these is enormous. Each age has, to a large extent, its problems +already formulated or half formulated for it. Every man must have +ancestors, of some sort, if he is to appear upon this earthly stage at +all; and a wholly independent philosopher is as impossible a creature +as an ancestorless man. We have seen how Descartes (section 60) tried +to repudiate his debt to the past, and how little successful he was in +doing so. + +Now, we make a mistake if we overlook the genius of the individual +thinker. The history of speculative thought has many times taken a +turn which can only be accounted for by taking into consideration the +genius for reflective thought possessed by some great mind. In the +crucible of such an intellect, old truths take on a new aspect, +familiar facts acquire a new and a richer meaning. But we also make a +mistake if we fail to see in the writings of such a man one of the +stages which has been reached in the gradual evolution of human +thought, if we fail to realize that each philosophy is to a great +extent the product of the past. + +When one comes to understand these things, the history of philosophy no +longer presents itself as a mere agglomeration of arbitrary and +independent systems. And an attentive reading gives us a further key +to the interpretation of what seemed inexplicable. We find that there +may be distinct and different streams of thought, which, for a while, +run parallel without commingling their waters. For centuries the +Epicurean followed his own tradition, and walked in the footsteps of +his own master. The Stoic was of sterner stuff, and he chose to travel +another path. To this day there are adherents of the old church +philosophy, Neo-Scholastics, whose ways of thinking can only be +understood when we have some knowledge of Aristotle and of his +influence upon men during the Middle Ages. We ourselves may be +Kantians or Hegelians, and the man at our elbow may recognize as his +spiritual father Comte or Spencer. + +It does not follow that, because one system follows another in +chronological order, it is its lineal descendant. But some ancestor a +system always has, and if we have the requisite learning and ingenuity, +we need not find it impossible to explain why this thinker or that was +influenced to give his thought the peculiar turn that characterizes it. +Sometimes many influences have conspired to attain the result, and it +is no small pleasure to address oneself to the task of disentangling +the threads which enter into the fabric. + +Moreover, as we read thus with discrimination, we begin to see that the +great men of the past have not spoken without appearing to have +sufficient reason for their utterances in the light of the times in +which they lived. We may make it a rule that, when they seem to be +speaking arbitrarily, to be laying before us reasonings that are not +reasonings, dogmas for which no excuse seems to be offered, the fault +lies in our lack of comprehension. Until we can understand how a man, +living in a certain century, and breathing a certain moral and +intellectual atmosphere, could have said what he did, we should assume +that we have read his words, but not his real thought. For the latter +there is always a psychological, if not a logical, justification. + +And this brings me to the question of the language in which the +philosophers have expressed their thoughts. The more attentively one +reads the history of philosophy, the clearer it becomes that the number +of problems with which the philosophers have occupied themselves is not +overwhelmingly great. If each philosophy which confronts us seems to +us quite new and strange, it is because we have not arrived at the +stage at which it is possible for us to recognize old friends with new +faces. The same old problems, the problems which must ever present +themselves to reflective thought, recur again and again. The form is +more or less changed, and the answers which are given to them are not, +of course, always the same. Each age expresses itself in a somewhat +different way. But sometimes the solution proposed for a given problem +is almost the same in substance, even when the two thinkers we are +contrasting belong to centuries which lie far apart. In this case, +only our own inability to strip off the husk and reach the fruit itself +prevents us from seeing that we have before us nothing really new. + +Thus, if we read the history of philosophy with patience and with +discrimination, it grows luminous. We come to feel nearer to the men +of the past. We see that we may learn from their successes and from +their failures; and if we are capable of drawing a moral at all, we +apply the lesson to ourselves. + + + + +CHAPTER XXIV + +SOME PRACTICAL ADMONITIONS + +88. BE PREPARED TO ENTER UPON A NEW WAY OF LOOKING AT THINGS.--We have +seen that reflective thought tries to analyze experience and to attain +to a clear view of the elements that make it up--to realize vividly +what is the very texture of the known world, and what is the nature of +knowledge. It is possible to live to old age, as many do, without even +a suspicion that there may be such a knowledge as this, and +nevertheless to possess a large measure of rather vague but very +serviceable information about both minds and bodies. + +It is something of a shock to learn that a multitude of questions may +be asked touching the most familiar things in our experience, and that +our comprehension of those things may be so vague that we grope in vain +for an answer. Space, time, matter, minds, realities,--with these +things we have to do every day. Can it be that we do not know what +they are? Then we must be blind, indeed. How shall we set about +enlightening our ignorance? + +Not as we have enlightened our ignorance heretofore. We have added +fact to fact; but our task now is to gain a new light on all facts, to +see them from a different point of view; not so much to extend our +knowledge as to deepen it. + +It seems scarcely necessary to point out that our world, when looked at +for the first time in this new way, may seem to be a new and strange +world. The real things of our experience may appear to melt away, to +be dissolved by reflection into mere shadows and unrealities. Well do +I remember the consternation with which, when almost a schoolboy, I +first made my acquaintance with John Stuart Mill's doctrine that the +things about us are "permanent possibilities of sensation." To Mill, +of course, chairs and tables were still chairs and tables, but to me +they became ghosts, inhabitants of a phantom world, to find oneself in +which was a matter of the gravest concern. + +I suspect that this sense of the unreality of things comes often to +those who have entered upon the path of reflection, It may be a comfort +to such to realize that it is rather a thing to be expected. How can +one feel at home in a world which one has entered for the first time? +One cannot become a philosopher and remain exactly the man that one was +before. Men have tried to do it,--Thomas Reid is a notable instance +(section 50); but the result is that one simply does not become a +philosopher. It is not possible to gain a new and a deeper insight +into the nature of things, and yet to see things just as one saw them +before one attained to this. + +If, then, we are willing to study philosophy at all, we must be willing +to embrace new views of the world, if there seem to be good reasons for +so doing. And if at first we suffer from a sense of bewilderment, we +must have patience, and must wait to see whether time and practice may +not do something toward removing our distress. It may be that we have +only half understood what has been revealed to us. + +89. BE WILLING TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES WHICH AT FIRST STRIKE ONE AS +ABSURD.--It must be confessed that the philosophers have sometimes +brought forward doctrines which seem repellent to good sense, and +little in harmony with the experience of the world which we have all +our lives enjoyed. Shall we on this account turn our backs upon them +and refuse them an impartial hearing? + +Thus, the idealist maintains that there is no existence save psychical +existence; that the material things about us are really mental things. +One of the forms taken by this doctrine is that alluded to above, that +things are permanent possibilities of sensation. + +I think it can hardly be denied that this sounds out of harmony with +the common opinion of mankind. Men do not hesitate to distinguish +between minds and material things, nor do they believe that material +things exist only in minds. That dreams and hallucinations exist only +in minds they are very willing to admit; but they will not admit that +this is true of such things as real chairs and tables. And if we ask +them why they take such a position, they fall back upon what seems +given in experience. + +Now, as the reader of the earlier chapters has seen, I think that the +plain man is more nearly right in his opinion touching the existence of +a world of non-mental things than is the idealistic philosopher. The +latter has seen a truth and misconceived it, thus losing some truth +that he had before he began to reflect. The former has not seen the +truth which has impressed the idealist, and he has held on to that +vague recognition that there are two orders of things given in our +experience, the physical and the mental, which seems to us so +unmistakable a fact until we fall into the hands of the philosophers. + +But all this does not prove that we have a right simply to fall back +upon "common sense," and refuse to listen to the idealist. The +deliverances of unreflective common sense are vague in the extreme; and +though it may seem to assure us that there is a world of things +non-mental, its account of that world is confused and incoherent. He +who must depend on common sense alone can find no answer to the +idealists; he refuses to follow them, but he cannot refute them. He is +reduced to dogmatic denial. + +This is in itself an uncomfortable position. And when we add to this +the reflection that such a man loses the truth which the idealist +emphasizes, the truth that the external world of which we speak must +be, if we are to know it at all, a world revealed to our senses, a +world given in our experience, we see that he who stops his ears +remains in ignorance. The fact is that the man who has never weighed +the evidence that impresses the idealist is not able to see clearly +what is meant by that external world in which we all incline to put +such faith. We may say that he _feels_ a truth blindly, but does not +see it. + +Let us take another illustration. If there is one thing that we feel +to be as sure as the existence of the external world, it is that there +are other minds more or less resembling our own. The solipsist may try +to persuade us that the evidence for such minds is untrustworthy. We +may see no flaw in his argument, but he cannot convince us. May we +ignore him, and refuse to consider the matter at all? + +Surely not, if we wish to substitute clear thinking for vague and +indefinite opinion. We should listen with attention, strive to +understand all the reasonings laid before us, and then, if they seem to +lead to conclusions really not in harmony with our experience, go +carefully over the ground and try to discover the flaw in them. It is +only by doing something like this that we can come to see clearly what +is meant when we speak of two or more minds and the relation between +them. The solipsist can help us, and we should let him do it. + +We should, therefore, be willing to consider seriously all sorts of +doctrines which may at first strike us as unreasonable. I have chosen +two which I believe to contain error. But the man who approaches a +doctrine which impresses him as strange has no right to assume at the +outset that it contains error. We have seen again and again how easy +it is to misapprehend what is given in experience. The philosopher may +be in the right, and what he says may repel us because we have become +accustomed to certain erroneous notions, and they have come to seem +self-evident truths. + +90. DO NOT HAVE TOO MUCH RESPECT FOR AUTHORITY.--But if it is an error +to refuse to listen to the philosopher, it is surely no less an error +to accord him an authority above what he has a right to demand. Bear +in mind what was said in the last chapter about the difference between +the special sciences and philosophy. There is in the latter field no +body of doctrine that we may justly regard as authoritative. There are +"schools" of philosophy, and their adherents fall into the very human +error of feeling very sure that they and those who agree with them are +right; and the emphasis with which they speak is apt to mislead those +who are not well informed. I shall say a few words about the dangers +of the "school." + +If we look about us, we are impressed by the fact that there are +"schools" of philosophy, somewhat as there are religious sects and +political parties. An impressive teacher sets the mark of his +personality and of his preferences upon those who come under his +influence. They are not at an age to be very critical, and, indeed, +they have not as yet the requisite learning to enable them to be +critical. They keep the trend which has been given them early in life, +and, when they become teachers, they pass on the type of thought with +which they have been inoculated, and the circle widens. "Schools" may +arise, of course, in a different way. An epoch-making book may sweep +men off of their feet and make of them passionate adherents. But he +who has watched the development of the American universities during the +last twenty-five years must be impressed with the enormous influence +which certain teachers have had in giving a direction to the +philosophic thought of those who have come in contact with them. We +expect the pupils of a given master to have a given shade of opinion, +and very often we are not disappointed in our guess. + +It is entirely natural that this should be so. Those who betake +themselves to the study of philosophy are men like other men. They +have the same feelings, and the bending of the twig has the same +significance in their case that it has in that of others. It is no +small compliment to a teacher that he can thus spread his influence, +and leave his proxies even when he passes away. + +But, when we strive to "put off humanity" and to look at the whole +matter under the cold light of reason, we may well ask ourselves, +whether he who unconsciously accepts his philosophy, in whole or in +part, because it has been the philosophy of his teacher, is not doing +what is done by those persons whose politics and whose religion take +their color from such accidental circumstances as birth in a given +class or family traditions? + +I am far from saying that it is, in general, a bad thing for the world +that men should be influenced in this way by one another. I say only +that, when we look at the facts of the case, we must admit that even +our teachers of philosophy do not always become representatives of the +peculiar type of thought for which they stand, merely through a +deliberate choice from the wealth of material which the history of +speculative thought lays before them. They are influenced by others to +take what they do take, and the traces of this influence are apt to +remain with them through life. He who wishes to be entirely impartial +must be on his guard against such influences as these, and must +distrust prejudices for or against certain doctrines, when he finds +that he imbibed them at an uncritical age and has remained under their +influence ever since. Some do appear to be able to emancipate +themselves, and to outgrow what they first learned. + +It is, as I have said, natural that there should be a tendency to form +"schools" in philosophy. And there are certain things that make this +somewhat uncritical acceptance of a doctrine very attractive. + +In the first place, if we are willing to take a system of any sort as a +whole, it saves us a vast amount of trouble. We seem to have a +citadel, a point of vantage from which we can look out upon life and +interpret it. If the house we live in is not in all respects ideal, at +least it is a house, and we are not homeless. There is nothing more +intolerable to most men than the having of no opinions. They will +change one opinion for another, but they will rarely consent to do +without altogether. It is something to have an answer to offer to +those who persist in asking questions; and it is something to have some +sort of ground under one's feet, even if it be not very solid ground. + +Again. Man is a social creature, and he is greatly fortified in his +opinions by the consciousness that others share them with him. If we +become adherents of a "school," we have the agreeable consciousness +that we are not walking alone through the maze of speculations that +confronts those who reflect. There appears to be a traveled way in +which we may have some confidence. Are we not following the crowd, or, +at least, a goodly number of the pilgrims who are seeking the same goal +with ourselves? Under such circumstances we are not so often impelled +to inquire anxiously whether we are after all upon the right road. We +assume that we have made no mistake. + +Under such circumstances we are apt to forget that there are many such +roads, and that these have been traveled in ages past by troops very +much like our own, who also cherished the hope that they were upon the +one and only highway. In other words, we are apt to forget the lesson +of the history of philosophy. This is a serious mistake. + +And what intensifies our danger, if we belong to a school which happens +to be dominant and to have active representatives, is that we get very +little real criticism. The books that we write are usually criticised +by those who view our positions sympathetically, and who are more +inclined to praise than to blame. He who looks back upon the past is +struck with the fact that books which have been lauded to the skies in +one age have often been subjected to searching criticism and to a good +deal of condemnation in the next. Something very like this is to be +expected of books written in our own time. It is, however, a pity that +we should have to wait so long for impartial criticism. + +This leads me to say a word of the reviews which fill our philosophical +journals, and which we must read, for it is impossible to read all the +books that come out, and yet we wish to know something about them. + +To the novice it is something of a surprise to find that books by men +whom he knows to be eminent for their ingenuity and their learning are +condemned in very offhand fashion by quite young men, who as yet have +attained to little learning and to no eminence at all. One sometimes +is tempted to wonder that men admittedly remarkable should have +fathered such poor productions as we are given to understand them to +be, and should have offered them to a public that has a right to be +indignant. + +Now, there can be no doubt that, in philosophy, a cat has the right to +look at a king, and has also a right to point out his misdoings, if +such there be. But it seems just to indicate that, in this matter, +certain cautions should be observed. + +If a great man has been guilty of an error in reasoning, there is no +reason why it should not be pointed out by any one who is capable of +detecting it. The authority of the critic is a matter of no moment +where the evidence is given. In such a case, we take a suggestion and +we do the criticising for ourselves. But where the evidence is not +given, where the justice of the criticism is not proved, the case is +different. Here we must take into consideration the authority of the +critic, and, if we follow him at all, we must follow him blindly. Is +it safe to do this? + +It is never safe in philosophy, or, at any rate, it is safe so seldom +that the exceptions are not worth taking into account. Men write from +the standpoint of some school of opinion; and, until we know their +prepossessions, their statements that this is good, that is bad, the +third thing is profound, are of no significance whatever. We should +simply set them aside, and try to find out from our reviewer what is +contained in the book under criticism. + +One of the evils arising out of the bias I am discussing is, that books +and authors are praised or condemned indiscriminately because of their +point of view, and little discrimination is made between good books and +poor books. There is all the difference in the world between a work +which can be condemned only on the ground that it is realistic or +idealistic in its standpoint, and those feeble productions which are to +be condemned from every point of view. If we consistently carry out +the principle that we may condemn all those who are not of our party, +we must give short shrift to a majority of the great men of the past. + +So I say, beware of authority in philosophy, and, above all, beware of +that most insidious form of authority, the spirit of the "school." It +cannot but narrow our sympathies and restrict our outlook. + +91. REMEMBER THAT ORDINARY RULES OF EVIDENCE APPLY.--What I am going to +say in this section is closely related to what has been said just +above. To the disinterested observer it may seem rather amusing that +one should think it worth while to try to show that we have not the +right to use a special set of weights and measures when we are dealing +with things philosophical. There was a time when men held that a given +doctrine could be philosophically false, and, at the same time, +theologically true; but surely the day of such twists and turnings is +past! + +I am by no means sure that it is past. With the lapse of time, old +doctrines take on new aspects, and come to be couched in a language +that suits the temper of the later age. Sometimes the doctrine is +veiled and rendered less startling, but remains essentially what it was +before, and may be criticised in much the same way. + +I suppose we may say that every one who is animated by the party spirit +discussed above, and who holds to a group of philosophical tenets with +a warmth of conviction out of proportion to the authority of the actual +evidence which may be claimed for them, is tacitly assuming that the +truth or falsity of philosophical dogmas is not wholly a matter of +evidence, but that the desires of the philosopher may also be taken +into account. + +This position is often taken unconsciously. Thus, when, instead of +proving to others that a given doctrine is false, we try to show them +that it is a dangerous doctrine, and leads to unpalatable consequences, +we assume that what seems distasteful cannot be true, and we count on +the fact that men incline to believe what they like to believe. + +May we give this position the dignity of a philosophical doctrine and +hold that, in the somewhat nebulous realm inhabited by the philosopher, +men are not bound by the same rules of evidence that obtain elsewhere? +That this is actually done, those who read much in the field of modern +philosophy are well aware. Several excellent writers have maintained +that we need not, even if there seems to be evidence for them, accept +views of the universe which do not satisfy "our whole nature." + +We should not confuse with this position the very different one which +maintains that we have a right to hold tentatively, and with a +willingness to abandon them should evidence against them be +forthcoming, views which we are not able completely to establish, but +which seem reasonable. One may do this with perfect sincerity, and +without holding that philosophical truth is in any way different from +scientific truth. But the other position goes beyond this; it assumes +that man must be satisfied, and that only that can be true which +satisfies him. + +I ask, is it not significant that such an assumption should be made +only in the realm of the unverifiable? No man dreams of maintaining +that the rise and fall of stocks will be such as to satisfy the whole +nature even of the elect, or that the future history of man on this +planet is a thing to be determined by some philosopher who decides for +us what would or would not be desirable. + +Surely all truths of election--those truths that we simply choose to +have true--are something much less august than that Truth of Evidence +which sometimes seems little to fall in with our desires, and in the +face of which we are humble listeners, not dictators. Before the +latter we are modest; we obey, lest we be confounded. And if, in the +philosophic realm, we believe that we may order Truth about, and make +her our slave, is it not because we have a secret consciousness that we +are not dealing with Truth at all, but with Opinion, and with Opinion +that has grown insolent because she cannot be drawn from her obscurity +and be shown to be what she is? + +Sometimes it is suddenly revealed to a man that he has been accepting +two orders of truth. I once walked and talked with a good scholar who +discoursed of high themes and defended warmly certain theses. I said +to him: If you could go into the house opposite, and discover +unmistakably whether you are in the right or in the wrong,--discover it +as unmistakably as you can discover whether there is or is not +furniture in the drawing-room,--would you go? He thought over the +matter for a while, and then answered frankly; No! I should not go; I +should stay out here and argue it out. + +92. AIM AT CLEARNESS AND SIMPLICITY.--There is no department of +investigation in which it is not desirable to cultivate clearness and +simplicity in thinking, speaking, and writing. But there are certain +reasons why we should be especially on our guard in philosophy against +the danger of employing a tongue "not understanded of the people." +There are dangerous pitfalls concealed under the use of technical words +and phrases. + +The value of technical expressions in the special sciences must be +conceded. They are supposed to be more exact and less ambiguous than +terms in ordinary use, and they mark an advance in our knowledge of the +subject. The distinctions which they indicate have been carefully +drawn, and appear to be of such authority that they should be generally +accepted. Sometimes, as, for example, in mathematics, a conventional +set of symbols may quite usurp the function of ordinary language, and +may enormously curtail the labor of setting forth the processes and +results of investigation. + +But we must never forget that we have not in philosophy an +authoritative body of truth which we have the right to impose upon all +who enter that field. A multitude of distinctions have been made and +are made; but the representatives of different schools of thought are +not at one touching the value and significance of these distinctions. +If we coin a word or a phrase to mark such, there is some danger that +we fall into the habit of using such words or phrases, as we use the +coins in our purse, without closely examining them, and with the ready +assumption that they must pass current everywhere. + +Thus, there is always a possibility that our technical expressions may +be nothing less than crystallized error. Against this we should surely +be on our guard. + +Again. When we translate the language of common life into the dialect +of the learned, there is danger that we may fall into the error of +supposing that we are adding to our knowledge, even though we are doing +nothing save to exchange one set of words for another. Thus, we all +know very well that one mind can communicate with another. One does +not have to be a scholar to be aware of this. If we choose to call +this "intersubjective intercourse," we have given the thing a sounding +name; but we know no more about it than we did before. The problem of +the relation between minds, and the way in which they are to be +conceived as influencing each other, remains just what it was. So, +also, we recognize the everyday fact that we know both ourselves and +what is not ourselves. Shall we call this knowledge of something not +ourselves "self-transcendence"? We may do so if we wish, but we ought +to realize that this bestowal of a title makes no whit clearer what is +meant by knowledge. + +Unhappily, men too often believe that, when they have come into the +possession of a new word or phrase, they have gained a new thought. +The danger is great in proportion to the breadth of the gulf which +separates the new dialect from the old language of common life in which +we are accustomed to estimate things. Many a philosopher would be +bereft, indeed, were he robbed of his vocabulary and compelled to +express his thoughts in ordinary speech. The theories which are +implicit in certain recurring expressions would be forced to come out +into the open, and stand criticism without disguise. + +But can one write philosophical books without using words which are not +in common use among the unphilosophic? I doubt it. Some such words it +seems impossible to avoid. However, it does seem possible to bear in +mind the dangers of a special philosophical terminology and to reduce +such words to a minimum. + +Finally, we may appeal to the humanity of the philosopher. The path to +reflection is a sufficiently difficult one as it is; why should he roll +rocks upon it and compel those who come after him to climb over them? +If truths are no truer for being expressed in a repellent form, why +should he trick them out in a fantastic garb? What we want is the +naked truth, and we lose time and patience in freeing our mummy from +the wrappings in which learned men have seen fit to encase it. + +93. DO NOT HASTILY ACCEPT A DOCTRINE.--This brings me to the last of +the maxims which I urge upon the attention of the reader. All that has +been said so far may be regarded as leading up to it. + +The difficulty that confronts us is this: On the one hand, we must +recognize the uncertainty that reigns in this field of investigation. +We must ever weigh probabilities and possibilities; we do not find +ourselves in the presence of indubitable truths which all competent +persons stand ready to admit. This seems to argue that we should learn +to suspend judgment, and should be most wary in our acceptance of one +philosophical doctrine and our rejection of another. + +On the other hand, philosophy is not a mere matter of intellectual +curiosity. It has an intimate connection with life. As a man thinks, +so is he, to a great extent, at least. How, then, can one afford to +remain critical and negative? To counsel this seems equivalent to +advising that one abandon the helm and consent to float at the mercy of +wind and tide. + +The difficulty is a very real one. It presents itself insistently to +those who have attained to that degree of intellectual development at +which one begins to ask oneself questions and to reflect upon the worth +and meaning of life. An unreflective adherence to tradition no longer +satisfies such persons. They wish to know why they should believe in +this or that doctrine, and why they should rule their lives in harmony +with this or that maxim. Shall we advise them to lay hold without +delay of a set of philosophical tenets, as we might advise a disabled +man to aid himself with any staff that happens to come to hand? Or +shall we urge them to close their eyes to the light, and to go back +again to the old unreflective life? + +Neither of these counsels seems satisfactory, for both assume tacitly +that it does not much matter what the _truth_ is, and that we can +afford to disregard it. + +Perhaps we may take a suggestion from that prudent man and acute +philosopher, Descartes. Discontented with the teachings of the schools +as they had been presented to him, he resolved to set out upon an +independent voyage of discovery, and to look for a philosophy of his +own. It seemed necessary to him to doubt, provisionally at least, all +that he had received from the past. But in what house should he live +while he was reconstructing his old habitation? Without principles of +some sort he could not live, and without reasonable principles he could +not live well. So he framed a set of provisional rules, which should +guide his life until he had new ground beneath his feet. + +When we examine these rules, we find that, on the whole, they are such +as the experience of mankind has found prudent and serviceable. In +other words, we discover that Descartes, until he was in a position to +see clearly for himself, was willing to be led by others. He was a +unit in the social order, and he recognized that truth. + +It does not seem out of place to recall this fact to the consciousness +of those who are entering upon the reflective life. Those who are +rather new to reflection upon philosophical matters are apt to seize +single truths, which are too often half-truths, and to deduce their +consequences remorselessly. They do not always realize the extreme +complexity of society, or see the full meaning of the relations in +which they stand to the state and to the church. Breadth of view can +only come with an increase of knowledge and with the exercise of +reflection. + +For this reason I advise patience, and a willingness to accept the +established order of things until one is very sure that one has +attained to some truth--some real truth, not a mere truth of +election--which may serve as the basis of a reconstruction. The first +glimpses of truth cannot be depended upon to furnish such a foundation. + +Thus, we may suspend judgment, and, nevertheless, be ready to act. But +is not this a mere compromise? Certainly. All life is a compromise; +and in the present instance it means only that we should keep our eyes +open to the light, whatever its source, and yet should nourish that +wholesome self-distrust that prevents a man from being an erratic and +revolutionary creature, unmindful of his own limitations. Prudent men +in all walks in life make this compromise, and the world is the better +for it. + + + + +NOTES + + +CHAPTER I, sections 1-5. If the student will take a good history of +philosophy, and look over the accounts of the different systems +referred to, he will see the justice of the position taken in the text, +namely, that philosophy was formerly synonymous with universal +knowledge. It is not necessary, of course, to read the whole history +of philosophy to attain this end. One may take such a text-book as +Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy," and run over the summaries +contained in the large print. To see how the conception of what +constitutes universal knowledge changed in successive ages, compare +Thales, the Sophists, Aristotle, the Schoolmen, Bacon, and Descartes. +For the ancient philosophy one may consult Windelband's "History of the +Ancient Philosophy," a clear and entertaining little work (English +translation, N.Y., 1899). + +In Professor Paulsen's "Introduction to Philosophy" (English +translation, N.Y., 1895), there is an interesting introductory chapter +on "The Nature and Import of Philosophy" (pp. 1-41). The author pleads +for the old notion of philosophy as universal knowledge, though he does +not, of course, mean that the philosopher must be familiar with all the +details of all the sciences. + +Section 6. In justification of the meaning given to the word +"philosophy" in this section, I ask the reader to look over the list of +courses in philosophy advertised in the catalogues of our leading +universities at home and abroad. There is a certain consensus of +opinion as to what properly comes under the title, even among those who +differ widely as to what is the proper definition of philosophy. + + +CHAPTER II, sections 7-10. Read the chapter on "The Mind and the World +in Common Thought and in Science" (Chapter I) in my "System of +Metaphysics," N.Y., 1904. + +One can be brought to a vivid realization of the fact that the sciences +proceed upon a basis of assumptions which they do not attempt to +analyze and justify, if one will take some elementary work on +arithmetic or geometry or psychology and examine the first few +chapters, bearing in mind what philosophical problems may be drawn from +the materials there treated. Section 11. The task of reflective +thought and its difficulties are treated in the chapter entitled "How +Things are Given in Consciousness" (Chapter III), in my "System of +Metaphysics." + + +CHAPTER III, sections 12-13. Read "The Inadequacy of the Psychological +Standpoint," "System of Metaphysics," Chapter II. I call especial +attention to the illustration of "the man in the cell" (pp. 18 ff.). +It would be a good thing to read these pages with the class, and to +impress upon the students the fact that those who have doubted or +denied the existence of the external material world have, if they have +fallen into error, fallen into a very natural error, and are not +without some excuse. + +Section 14. See "The Metaphysics of the Telephone Exchange," "System +of Metaphysics," Chapter XXII, where Professor Pearson's doctrine is +examined at length, with quotations and references. + +It is interesting to notice that a doubt of the external world has +always rested upon some sort of a "telephone exchange" argument; +naturally, it could not pass by that name before the invention of the +telephone, but the reasoning is the same. It puts the world at one +remove, shutting the mind up to the circle of its ideas; and then it +doubts or denies the world, or, at least, holds that its existence must +be proved in some roundabout way. Compare Descartes, "Of the Existence +of Material Things," "Meditations," VI. + + +CHAPTER IV, sections 15-18. See Chapters VI and VII, "What we mean by +the External World," and "Sensations and 'Things,'" in my "System of +Metaphysics." In that work the discussion of the distinction between +the objective order of experience and the subjective order is completed +in Chapter XXIII, "The Distinction between the World and the Mind." +This was done that the subjective order might be treated in the part of +the book which discusses the mind and its relation to matter. + +As it is possible that the reader may be puzzled by differences of +expression which obtain in the two books, a word of explanation is not +out of place. + +In the "Metaphysics," for example, it is said that sensations so +connect themselves together as to form what we call the system of +material things (p. 105). It is intimated in a footnote that this is a +provisional statement and the reader is referred to later chapters. +Now, in the present book (sections 16-17), it is taught that we may not +call material things groups of sensations. + +The apparent contradiction is due to the fact that, in this volume, the +full meaning of the word "sensation" is exhibited at the outset, and +sensations, as phenomena of the subjective order, are distinguished +from the phenomena of the objective order which constitute the external +world. In the earlier work the word "sensation" was for a while used +loosely to cover all our experiences that do not belong to the class +called imaginary, and the distinction between the subjective and +objective in this realm was drawn later (Chapter XXIII). + +I think the present arrangement is the better one, as it avoids from +the outset the suggestion that the real world is something +subjective--our sensations or ideas--and thus escapes the idealistic +flavor which almost inevitably attaches to the other treatment, until +the discussion is completed, at least. + + +CHAPTER V, sections 10-21. See Chapters VIII and IX, "System of +Metaphysics," "The Distinction between Appearance and Reality" and "The +Significance of the Distinction." + +Section 22. See Chapter XXVI, "The World as Unperceived, and the +'Unknowable,'" where Spencer's doctrine is examined at length, and +references are given. I think it is very important that the student +should realize that the "Unknowable" is a perfectly useless assumption +in philosophy, and can serve no purpose whatever. + + +CHAPTER VI, sections 23-25. See Chapters X and XI, "System of +Metaphysics," "The Kantian Doctrine of Space" and "Difficulties +connected with the Kantian Doctrine of Space." + +It would be an excellent thing for the student, after he has read the +above chapters, to take up Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," and read +and analyze the argument of Antinomies I and II, with the Observations +appended. One can understand these arguments without being familiar +with the "Critique" as a whole; at any rate, the account of Kant's +philosophy contained in section 51 of this book will serve to explain +his use of certain terms, such as "the laws of our sensibility." + +Kant's reasonings are very curious and interesting in this part of his +book. It seems to be proved that the world must be endless in space +and without a beginning or end in time, and just as plausibly proved +that it cannot be either. It seems to be proved that finite spaces and +times are infinitely divisible, and at the same time that they cannot +be infinitely divisible. The situation is an amusing one, and rendered +not the less amusing by the seriousness with which the mutually +destructive arguments are taken. + +When the student meets such a tangle in the writings of any +philosopher, I ask him to believe that it is not the human reason that +is at fault--at least, let him not assume that it is. The fault +probably lies with a human reason. + +Section 26. See Chapter XII, "The Berkeleian Doctrine of Space," in my +"System of Metaphysics." The argument ought not to be difficult to one +who has mastered Chapter V of this volume. + + +CHAPTER VII, sections 27-29. Compare Chapter XIII, "System of +Metaphysics," "Of Time." + +With the chapters on Space and Time it would be well for the student to +read Chapter XIV, "The Real World in Space and Time," where it is made +clear why we have no hesitation in declaring space and time to be +infinite, although we recognize that it seems to be an assumption of +knowledge to declare the material world infinite. + + +CHAPTER VIII, sections 30-32. Read, in the "System of Metaphysics," +Chapters V and XVII, "The Self or Knower" and "The Atomic Self." + +Section 33. The suggestions, touching the attitude of the psychologist +toward the mind, contained in the preface to Professor William James's +"Psychology" are very interesting and instructive. + + +CHAPTER IX, sections 35-36. For a strong argument in favor of +interactionism see James's "Psychology," Chapter V. I wish the student +would, in reading it, bear in mind what is said in my chapter on "The +Atomic Self," above referred to. The subject should be approached with +an open mind, and one should suspend judgment until both sides have +been heard from. + +Section 37. Descartes held that the lower animals are automata and +that their actions are not indicative of consciousness; he regarded +their bodies as machines lacking the soul in the "little pineal gland." +Professor Huxley revived the doctrine of animal automatism and extended +it so as to include man. He regarded consciousness as a "collateral +product" of the working of the body, related to it somewhat as is the +steam-whistle of a locomotive engine to the working of the machine. He +made it an effect, but not a cause, of motions. See "System of +Metaphysics," Chapter XVIII, "The Automaton Theory: its Genesis." + +We owe the doctrine of parallelism, in its original form, to Spinoza. +It was elaborated by W. K. Clifford, and to him the modern interest in +the subject is largely due. The whole subject is discussed at length +in my "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XIX-XXI. The titles are: "The +Automaton Theory: Parallelism," "What is Parallelism?" and "The Man and +the Candlestick." Clifford's doctrine is presented in a new form in +Professor Strong's recent brilliant work, "Why the Mind has a Body" +N.Y., 1903. + +Section 38. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XXIV, "The Time and +Place of Sensations and Ideas." + + +CHAPTER X, sections 40-42. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapters XXVII +and XXVIII, "The Existence of Other Minds," and "The Distribution of +Minds." + +Writers seem to be divided into three camps on this question of other +minds. + +(1) I have treated our knowledge of other minds as due to an inference. +This is the position usually taken. + +(2) We have seen that Huxley and Clifford cast doubts upon the validity +of the inference, but, nevertheless, made it. Professor Strong, in the +work mentioned in the notes to the previous chapter, maintains that it +is not an inference, and that we do not directly perceive other minds, +but that we are assured of their existence just the same. He makes our +knowledge an "intuition" in the old-fashioned sense of the word, a +something to be accepted but not to be accounted for. + +(3) Writers who have been influenced more or less by the Neo-Kantian or +Neo-Hegelian doctrine are apt to speak as though we had the same direct +evidence of the existence of other minds that we have of the existence +of our own. I have never seen a systematic and detailed exposition of +this doctrine. It appears rather in the form of hints dropped in +passing. A number of such are to be found in Taylor's "Elements of +Metaphysics." + +Section 43. The "Mind-stuff" doctrine is examined at length and its +origin discussed in Chapter XXXI of the "System of Metaphysics," +"Mental Phenomena and the Causal Nexus." It is well worth while for +the student to read the whole of Clifford's essay "On the Nature of +Things-in-themselves," even if he is pressed for time. + + +CHAPTER XI, section 44. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XV, "The +World as Mechanism." + +Section 45. See Chapter XXXI, "The Place of Mind in Nature." + +Section 46. For a definition of Fatalism, and a description of its +difference from the scientific doctrine of Determinism, see Chapter +XXXIII, "Fatalism, 'Freewill' and Determinism." For a vigorous defense +of "Freewill" (which is not, in my opinion, free will at all, in the +common acceptation of the word) see Professor James's Essay on "The +Dilemma of the Determinist," in his volume, "The Will to Believe." + +Fatalism and Determinism are constantly confused, and much of the +opposition to Determinism is attributable to this confusion. + +Section 47. See Chapter XXXII, "Mechanism and Teleology." + + +CHAPTER XII, section 48. The notes to Chapter III (see above) are in +point here. It is well worth the student's while to read the whole of +Chapter XI, Book IV, of Locke's "Essay." It is entitled "Of our +Knowledge of the Existence of Other Things." Notice the headings of +some of his sections:-- + +Section 1. "It is to be had only by sensation." + +Section 2. "Instance whiteness of this paper." + +Section 3. "This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be +called 'Knowledge,' and proves the existence of things without us." + +Locke's argument proceeds, as we have seen, on the assumption that we +perceive external things directly,--an assumption into which he slips +unawares,--and yet he cannot allow that we really do perceive directly +what is external. This makes him uncomfortably conscious that he has +not absolute proof, after all. The section that closes the discussion +is entitled: "Folly to expect demonstration in everything." + +Section 49. I wish that I could believe that every one of my readers +would sometime give himself the pleasure of reading through Berkeley's +"Principles of Human Knowledge" and his "Three Dialogues between Hylas +and Philonous." Clearness of thought, beauty of style, and elevation +of sentiment characterize them throughout. + +The "Principles" is a systematic treatise. If one has not time to read +it all, one can get a good idea of the doctrine by running through the +first forty-one sections. For brief readings in class, to illustrate +Berkeley's reasoning, one may take sections 1-3, 14, 18-20, and 38. + +The "Dialogues" is a more popular work. As the etymology of the names +in the title suggests, we have in it a dispute between a man who pins +his faith to matter and an idealist. The aim of the book is to confute +skeptics and atheists from the standpoint of idealism. + +For Hume's treatment of the external world, see his "Treatise of Human +Nature," Part IV, section 2. For his treatment of the mind, see Part +IV, section 6. + +Section 50. Reid repeats himself a great deal, for he gives us +asseveration rather than proof. One can get the gist of his argument +by reading carefully a few of his sections. It would be a good +exercise to read in class, if time permitted, the two sections of his +"Inquiry" entitled "Of Extension" (Chapter V, section 5), and "Of +Perception in General" (Chapter VI, section 20). + +Section 51. For an account of the critical Philosophy, see +Falckenberg's "History of Modern Philosophy" (English translation, +N.Y., 1893). Compare with this the accounts in the histories of +philosophy by Ueberweg and Hoeffding (English translation of the latter, +London, 1900). Full bibliographies are to be found especially in +Ueberweg. + +It is well to look at the philosophy of Kant through more than one pair +of eyes. Thus, if one reads Morris's "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason" +(Chicago, 1882), one should read also Sidgwick's "Lectures on the +Philosophy of Kant" (N.Y., 1905). + + +CHAPTER XIII, section 52. It is difficult to see how Hamilton could +regard himself as a "natural" realist (the word is employed by him). +See his "Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII, where he develops his +doctrine. He seems to teach, in spite of himself, that we can know +directly only the impressions that things make on us, and must infer +all else: "Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is, thus, only +relative; of existence, absolutely and in itself, we know nothing." + +Whom may we regard as representing the three kinds of "hypothetical +realism" described in the text? Perhaps we may put the plain man, who +has not begun to reflect, in the first class. John Locke is a good +representative of the second; see the "Essay concerning Human +Understanding," Book II, Chapter VIII. Herbert Spencer belonged to the +third while he wrote Chapter V of his "First Principles of Philosophy." + +Section 53. I have said enough of the Berkeleian idealism in the notes +on Chapter XII. As a good illustration of objective idealism in one of +its forms I may take the doctrine of Professor Royce; see his address, +"The Conception of God" (N.Y., 1902). + +Mr. Bradley's doctrine is criticised in Chapter XXXIV (entitled "Of +God"), "System of Metaphysics." + + +CHAPTER XIV, section 55. See "System of Metaphysics," Chapter XVI, +"The Insufficiency of Materialism." + +Section 56. Professor Strong's volume, "Why the Mind has a Body" +(N.Y., 1903), advocates a panpsychism much like that of Clifford. It +is very clearly written, and with Clifford's essay on "The Nature of +Things-in-themselves," ought to give one a good idea of the +considerations that impel some able men to become panpsychists. + +Section 57. The pantheistic monism of Spinoza is of such importance +historically that it is desirable to obtain a clear notion of its +meaning. I have discussed this at length in two earlier works: "The +Philosophy of Spinoza" (N.Y., 1894) and "On Spinozistic Immortality." +The student is referred to the account of Spinoza's "God or Substance" +contained in these. See, especially, the "Introductory Note" in the +back of the first-mentioned volume. + +Professor Royce is a good illustration of the idealistic monist; see +the volume referred to in the note above (section 53). His "Absolute," +or God, is conceived to be an all-inclusive mind of which our finite +minds are parts. + +Section 58. Sir William Hamilton's dualism is developed in his +"Lectures on Metaphysics," VIII. He writes: "Mind and matter, as known +or knowable, are only two different series of phenomena or qualities; +as unknown and unknowable, they are the two substances in which these +two different series of phenomena or qualities are supposed to inhere. +The existence of an unknown substance is only an inference we are +compelled to make, from the existence of known phenomena; and the +distinction of two substances is only inferred from the seeming +incompatibility of the two series of phenomena to coinhere in one." + + +CHAPTER XV, section 60. The reader will find Descartes's path traced +in the "Meditations." In I, we have his sweeping doubt; in II, his +doctrine as to the mind; in III, the existence of God is established; +in VI, he gets around to the existence of the external world. We find +a good deal of the "natural light" in the first part of his "Principles +of Philosophy." + +Section 61. We have an excellent illustration of Locke's inconsistency +in violating his own principles and going beyond experience, in his +treatment of "Substance." Read, in his "Essay," Book I, Chapter IV, +section 18, and Book II, Chapter XXIII, section 4. These sections are +not long, and might well be read and analyzed in class. + +Section 62. See the note to section 51. + +Section 64. I write this note (in 1908) to give the reader some idea +of later developments of the doctrine called pragmatism. There has +been a vast amount printed upon the subject in the last two or three +years, but I am not able to say even yet that we have to do with "a +clear-cut doctrine, the limits and consequences of which have been +worked out in detail." Hence, I prefer to leave section 64 as I first +wrote it, merely supplementing it here. + +We may fairly consider the three leaders of the pragmatic movement to +be Professor William James, Dr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Professor John +Dewey. The first has developed his doctrine at length in his volume +entitled "Pragmatism" (London, 1907); the second, who calls his +doctrine "Humanism," but declares himself a pragmatist, and in +essential agreement with Professor James, has published two volumes of +philosophical essays entitled "Humanism" (London, 1903) and "Studies in +Humanism" (London, 1907); the third has developed his position in the +first four chapters of the "Studies in Logical Theory" (Chicago, 1903). + +Professor James, in his "Pragmatism" (Lecture II), says that +pragmatism, at the outset, at least, stands for no particular results. +It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method. This method means: + +"The attitude of looking away from first things, principles, +'categories,' supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, +fruits, consequences, facts." He remarks further, however, that +pragmatism has come to be used also in a wider sense, as signifying a +certain theory of truth (pp. 54-55). This theory is brought forward in +Lecture VI. + +The theory maintains that: "True ideas are those that we can +assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify. False ideas are those +that we can not" (p. 201). This sounds as though Professor James +abandoned his doctrine touching the Turk and the Christian mentioned in +section 64. + +But what do the words "verification" and "validation" pragmatically +mean? We are told that they signify certain practical consequences of +the verified and validated idea. Our ideas may be said to "agree" with +reality when they lead us, through acts and other ideas which they +instigate, up to or towards other parts of experience with which we +feel that the original ideas remain in agreement. "The connections and +transitions come to us from point to point as being progressive, +harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable leading is what +we mean by an idea's verification" (p. 202). + +Thus, we do not seem to be concerned with verification in the sense in +which the word has usually been employed heretofore. The tendency to +take as true what is useful or serviceable has not been abandoned. +That Professor James does not really leave his Turk in the lurch +becomes clear to any one who will read his book attentively and note +his reasons for taking the various pragmatic attitudes which he does +take. See, for example, his pragmatic argument for "free-will." The +doctrine is simply assumed as a doctrine of "relief" (pp. 110-121). + +Briefly stated, Dr. Schiller's doctrine is that truths are man-made, +and that it is right for man to consult his desires in making them. It +is in substantial harmony with the pragmatism of Professor James, and I +shall not dwell upon it. Dr. Schiller's essays are very entertainingly +written. + +Professor Dewey's pragmatism seems to me sufficiently different from +the above to merit another title. In the "Journal of Philosophy, +Psychology, and Scientific Methods," Volume IV, No. 4, Professor Dewey +brings out the distinction between his own position and that of +Professor James. + +To the periodical literature on pragmatism I cannot refer in detail. +Professor James defends his position against misconceptions in the +"Philosophical Review," Volume XVII, No. 1. See, on the other side, +Professor Perry, in the "Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and +Scientific Methods," Volume IV, pp. 365 and 421; Professor Hibben, +"Philosophical Review," XVII, 4; and Dr. Carus, "The Monist," July, +1908. + + +CHAPTER XVI, sections 65-68. To see how the logicians have regarded +their science and its relation to philosophy, see; Keynes's "Formal +Logic" (London, 1894), Introduction; Hobhouse's "Theory of Knowledge" +(London, 1896), Introduction; Aikins's "The Principles of Logic" (N.Y., +1902), Introduction; and Creighton's "Introductory Logic" (N.Y., 1898), +Preface. + +Professor Aikins writes: "Thus, in so far as logic tries to make us +reason correctly by giving us correct conceptions of things and the way +in which their relations involve each other, it is a kind of simple +metaphysics studied for a practical end." + +Professor Creighton says, "Although in treating the syllogistic logic I +have followed to a large extent the ordinary mode of presentation, I +have both here, and when dealing with the inductive methods, endeavored +to interpret the traditional doctrines in a philosophical way, and to +prepare for the theoretical discussions of the third part of the book." + +John Stuart Mill tried not to be metaphysical; but let the reader +examine, say, his third chapter, "Of the Things denoted by Names," or +look over Book VI, in his "System of Logic." + +Professor Sigwart's great work, "Logik" (Freiburg, 2d edition, Volume +I, 1889, Volume II, 1893), may almost be called a philosophy of logic. + + +CHAPTER XVII, section 69. Compare with Professor James's account of +the scope of psychology the following from Professor Baldwin: "The +question of the relation of psychology to metaphysics, over which a +fierce warfare has been waged in recent years, is now fairly settled by +the adjustment of mutual claims. . . . The terms of the adjustment of +which I speak are briefly these: on the one hand, empirical +investigation must precede rational interpretation, and this empirical +investigation must be absolutely unhampered by fetters of dogmatism and +preconception; on the other hand, rational interpretation must be +equally free in its own province, since progress from the individual to +the general, from the detached fact to its universal meaning, can be +secured only by the judicious use of hypotheses, both metaphysical and +speculative. Starting from the empirical we run out at every step into +the metempirical." "Handbook of Psychology," Preface, pp. iii and iv. + + +CHAPTER XVIII, section 71. The teacher might very profitably take +extracts from the two chapters of Whewell's "Elements of Morality" +referred to in the text, and read them with the class. It is +significant of the weakness of Whewell's position that he can give us +advice as long as we do not need it, but, when we come to the +cross-roads, he is compelled to leave the matter to the individual +conscience, and gives us no hint of a general principle that may guide +us. + +Section 72. Wundt, in his volume "The Facts of the Moral Life" (N.Y., +1897), tries to develop an empirical science of ethics independent of +metaphysics; see the Preface. + +Compare with this: Martineau's "Types of Ethical Theory" (London, +1885), Preface; T. H. Green's "Prolegomena to Ethics," Introduction; +Muirhead's "The Elements of Ethics" (N.Y., 1892); Mackenzie's "A Manual +of Ethics" (London, 1893); Jodl's "Gesduchte der Ethik" (Stuttgart, +1882), Preface. I give but a few references, but they will serve to +illustrate how close, in the opinion of ethical writers, is the +relation between ethics and philosophy. + + +CHAPTER XIX, section 74. The student who turns over the pages of +several works on metaphysics may be misled by a certain superficial +similarity that is apt to obtain among them. One sees the field mapped +out into Ontology (the science of Being or Reality), Rational +Cosmology, and Rational Psychology. These titles are mediaeval +landmarks which have been left standing. I may as well warn the reader +that two men who discourse of Ontology may not be talking about the +same thing at all. Bear in mind what was said in section 57 of the +different ways of conceiving the "One Substance"; and bear in mind also +what was said in Chapter V of the proper meaning of the word "reality." + +I have discarded the above titles in my "System of Metaphysics," +because I think it is better and less misleading to use plain and +unambiguous language. + +Section 75. See the note to Chapter XVI. + + +CHAPTER XX, sections 76-77. One can get an idea of the problems with +which the philosophy of religion has to deal by turning to my "System +of Metaphysics" and reading the two chapters entitled "Of God," at the +close of the book. It would be interesting to read and criticise in +class some of the theistic arguments that philosophers have brought +forward. Quotations and references are given in Chapter XXXIV. + + +CHAPTER XXI, sections 78-79. What is said of the science of logic, in +Chapter XVI, has, of course, a bearing upon these sections. I suggest +that the student examine a few chapters of "The Grammar of Science"; +the book is very readable. + + +CHAPTER XXII, sections 80-82. The reader will find in lectures I and +II in Sir William Hamilton's "Lectures on Metaphysics" a discussion of +the utility of philosophy. It has a pleasant, old-fashioned flavor, +and contains some good thoughts. What is said in Chapters XVI-XXI of +the present volume has a good deal of bearing upon the subject. See +especially what is said in the chapters on logic, ethics, and the +philosophy of religion. + + +CHAPTER XXIII, sections 83-87. There is a rather brief but good and +thoughtful discussion of the importance of historical study to the +comprehension of philosophical doctrines in Falckenberg's "History of +Modern Philosophy" (English translation, N.Y., 1893); see the +Introduction. + +We have a good illustration of the fact that there may be parallel +streams of philosophic thought (section 87) when we turn to the Stoics +and the Epicureans. Zeno and Epicurus were contemporaries, but they +were men of very dissimilar character, and the schools they founded +differed widely in spirit. Zeno went back for his view of the physical +world to Heraclitus, and for his ethics to the Cynics. Epicurus +borrowed his fundamental thoughts from Democritus. + +On the other hand, philosophers may sometimes be regarded as links in +the one chain. Witness the series of German thinkers: Kant, Fichte, +Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer; or the series of British thinkers: +Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill. Herbert Spencer represents a confluence +of the streams. The spirit of his doctrine is predominantly British; +but he got his "Unknowable" from Kant, through Hamilton and Mansel. + +At any point in a given stream there may be a division. Thus, Kant was +awakened to his creative effort by Hume. But Mill is also the +successor of Hume, and more truly the successor, for he carries on the +traditional way of approaching philosophical problems, while Kant +rebels against it, and heads a new line. + + +CHAPTER XXIV, sections 88-93. I hardly think it is necessary for me to +comment upon this chapter. The recommendations amount to this: that a +man should be fair-minded and reasonable, free from partisanship, +cautious, and able to suspend judgment where the evidence is not clear; +also that where the light of reason does not seem to him to shine +brightly and to illumine his path as he could wish, he should be +influenced in his actions by the reflection that he has his place in +the social order, and must meet the obligations laid upon him by this +fact. When the pragmatist emphasizes the necessity of accepting ideals +and living by them, he is doing us a service. But we must see to it +that he does not lead us into making arbitrary decisions and feeling +that we are released from the duty of seeking for evidence. Read +together sections 64, 91, and 93. + + + + +INDEX + + + Absolute, The: Spencer's doctrine of, 70; + Bradley's, 191-192; + meanings of the word, 201; + reference, 312. + Activity and Passivity: meaning of, 159-161; + confused with cause and effect, 159-161; + activity of mind, 162-163. + Aesthetics: a philosophical discipline, 242-243. + Agnosticism: 202. + Aikins: 314. + Albert the Great: scope of his labors, 9. + Analytical Judgments: defined, 178. + Anaxagoras: his doctrine, 4; on the soul, 101. + Anaximander: his doctrine, 3. + Anaximenes: his doctrine, 3; on the soul, 101. + Appearances: doubt of their objectivity, 35; + realities and, 59 ff.; + apparent and real space, 80-87; + apparent and real time, 93-99; + apparent and real extension, 113; + measurement of apparent time, 128; + appearance and reality, Bradley's doctrine, 191-192. + Aristotle: reference to Thales, 3; + scope of his philosophy, 7; + authority in the Middle Ages, 9; + on the soul, 102-103. + Arithmetic: compared with logic, 225-226. + Atoms: nature of our knowledge of, 22-23; also, 65-67; + doctrine of Democritus, 194-195. + Augustine: on time as past, present, and future, 90 ff.; + on soul and body, 104; + as scientist and as philosopher, 278. + Authority: in philosophy, 291-296. + Automatism: the automaton theory, 129-130; + animal automatism, 141-142; + activity of mind and automatism, 162; + references, 308-309. + Automaton: see Automatism. + + Bacon, Francis: his conception of philosophy, 10. + Baldwin: on psychology and metaphysics, 314. + Berkeley: referred to, 56; + on appearance and reality, 61-63; + his idealism, 168-170; + his theism, 190-191; + references to his works, 310. + Body and Mind: see Mind and Body. + Bosanquet: his logic, 235. + Bradley: his "Absolute," 191-192; reference given, 311. + Breath: mind conceived to be, 101. + + Cassiodorus: on soul and body, 103-104. + Cause and Effect; meaning of words, 118-120; + relation of mental and material not causal, 121-126; + see also, 132; + cause and effect, activity and passivity, 159 ff. + Child: its knowledge of the world, 18-19. + Cicero: Pythagoras' use of word "philosopher," 2; on immortality, 32. + Clifford, W. K.: on infinite divisibility of space, 79-80; + on other minds, 135; + on mind-stuff, 144-146; + his panpsychism, 197-198; + his parallelism, 308-309; + references on mind-stuff, 309. + Common Sense: notions of mind and body, 106 ff.; + Reid's doctrine, 171-174; + common sense ethics, 236-240. + Common Thought: what it is, 18-20. + Concomitance: see Mind and Body. + Copernican System: 282. + Cornelius: on metaphysics, 249. + Creighton: 314. + Critical Empiricism: the doctrine, 218-219. + Critical Philosophy: outlined, 175-180; + criticised, 211-218; + references, 311. + Croesus: 1. + + Democritus: doctrine referred to, 4; + his place in the history of philosophy, 5; + on the soul, 101-102; + his materialism examined, 194-195. + Descartes: conception of philosophy, 10; + on mind and body, 105-106; also, 119; + on animal automatism, 141-142; + on the external world, 163-168; + on substance, 198; + his rationalism, 206-209; + the "natural light," 208; + his attempt at a critical philosophy, 214; + his rules of method, 214; + provisional rules of life, 301-302; + reference given, 306; + reference to his automatism, 308; + references to the "Meditations," 312. + Determinism: 155-159; references, 309-310. + Dewey, John: 312-314. + Dogmatism: Kant's use of term, 211-212. + Dualism: what, 193; + varieties of, 202-204; + the present volume dualistic, 204; + Hamilton's, 312. + + Eleatics: their doctrine, 4. + Empedocles: his doctrine, 4; a pluralist, 205. + Empiricism: the doctrine, 209-211; + Kant on, 212; + critical empiricism, 218-219. + Energy: conservation of, 151-154. + Epicureans: their view of philosophy, 7-8; their materialism, 102. + Epiphenomenon: the mind as, 162. + Epistemology: its place among the philosophical sciences, 247-249. + Ethics: and the mechanism of nature, 159-164; + common sense ethics, 236-240; + Whewell criticised, 238-240; + philosophy and, 240-242; + utility of, 265-267; + references, 315. + Evidence: in philosophy, 296-298. + Existence: of material things, 56-58; also, 165-192. + Experience: suggestions of the word, 58; + Hume's doctrine of what it yields, 170-171; + Descartes and Locke, 178; + Kant's view of, 179; + empiricism, 209-211; + critical empiricism, 218-219. + Experimental Psychology: its scope, 234-235. + Explanation: of relation of mind and body, 125-126. + External World: its existence, 32 ff.; + plain man's knowledge of, 32-36; + psychologist's attitude, 36-38; + the "telephone exchange," 38-44; + what the external world is, 45-58; + its existence discussed, 56-58; + a mechanism, 147-150; + knowledge of, theories, 165-180; + Descartes on, 207-208; + psychologist's attitude discussed, 230-234. + Falckenberg: 311, 316. + Fate: 158; literature on fatalism, 309-310. + Fichte: on philosophic method, 10; solipsistic utterances, 133. + Final Cause: what, 161. + "Form" and "Matter": the distinction between, 82-83; + space as "form," 82-84; + time as "form," 94; + Kant's doctrine of "forms," 179; + the same criticised, 216-217. + Free-will: and the order of nature, 154-159; + determinism and "free-will-ism," 155-159; + literature referred to, 309-310. + + God: revealed in the world, 163-164; + Berkeley on argument for, 190-191; + Spinoza on God or substance, 199; + Descartes' argument for, 208; + influence of belief on ethics, 241; + conceptions of, 252-253; + relation to the world, 253-254; + monistic conception of, 312; + references, 314. + Greek Philosophy: Pre-Socratic characterized, 2-5; + conception of philosophy from Sophists to Aristotle, 5-7; + the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics, 7-8. + Green, T. H.: 218, 315. + + Hamilton, Sir W.: on space, 76; + on the external world, 174; also, 182; + reference, 311; + his dualism, 312; + on utility of philosophy, 316. + Hegel: his conception of philosophy, 11; + an objective idealist, 190. + Heraclitus: his doctrine, 4; on the soul, 101. + Herodotus: 1-2. + History of Philosophy: much studied, 273-274; + its importance, 274-281; + how to read it, 281-287; + references, 316. + Hobhouse: on theory of knowledge, 248; reference, 312. + Hoeffding: his monism, 200-201; his history of philosophy, 311. + Howison: on pluralism, 205. + Humanism: 312-313. + Hume: his doctrine, 170-171; + use of word "impression," 177; + influence on Kant, 177-178. + Huxley: on other minds, 135, 138; on automatism, 308. + Hypothetical Realism: see Realism. + + Idealism: in Berkeley and Hume, 168-171; + general discussion of the varieties of, 187-192; + proper attitude toward, 289-291. + Ideas: distinguished from things, 33-36; + in psychology, 36-38; + Berkeley's use of the word, 168-170; + Hume's use of the word, 177. + Imagination: contrasted with sense, 45-49; + extension of imagined things, 113. + Immateriality: of mind, see Plotinus, and Mind. + Impression: Hume's use of word, 177. + Infinity: infinity and infinite divisibility of space, 73-80; + of time, 88-90; also, 95-97; + mathematics and, 226. + Inside: meaning of word, 55. + Interactionism: see Mind and Body. + Intuitionalists; defined, 240. + Ionian School: 3. + + James, W.: on pragmatism, 220-222 and 312-313; + on psychology and metaphysics, 230-231; + on interactionism, reference, 308; + on "free-will," 309-310. + Jevons: his logic, 224; on study of scientific method, 256. + Jodl: 315. + + Kant: on space, 75; + his critical philosophy, 175-180; + his philosophy criticised, 211-218; + references to, 307, 311. + Keynes: 314. + + Localisation: of sensations, what, 127. + Locke, John: on doubt of external world, 32; + on substance, 108; + on perception of external world, 166-168; + his empiricism, 209-210; + his attempt at a critical philosophy, 215-216; + on innate moral principles, 240; + reference to "Essay," 310; + his hypothetical realism, 311; + treatment of substance, references, 312. + Logic; the traditional, 224; + "modern" logic, 224-225; + Jevons and Bosanquet referred to, 224-225; + philosophy and, 225-229; + compared with arithmetic, 225-227; + deeper problems of, 227; + Spencer cited, 228; + utility of, 264-265; + references, 314. + Lucretius: his materialistic psychology, 102. + + Mach: 14. + Mackenzie: 315. + Malebranche: referred to, 142. + Martineau: 315. + Materialism: primitive man's notion of mind, 100-101; + materialism in the Greek philosophy, 101-102; + refutation of, 111-132; + general account of, 194-197. + Mathematics: nature of mathematical knowledge, 23-25; + arithmetic compared with logic, 225-226; + mathematical relations and cause and effect, 257; + mathematical methods, 256-257. + Matter: what is meant by material things, 51-58; + the material world a mechanism, 147-150. + "Matter" and "Form": see "Form" and "Matter." + McCosh: on mind and body, 120. + Mechanism: the material world a, 147-150; + objections to the doctrine, 148-150; + mind and mechanism, 151-154; + mechanism and morals, 159-164; + mechanism and teleology, reference, 310. + Metaphysician: on the mind, 111 ff. + Metaphysics: psychology and, 230-234; + distinguished from philosophy, 244-245; + uncertainty of, 247; + utility of, 269-272; + traditional divisions of, 315. + Method: scientific method, 256-259. + Middle Ages: view of philosophy in, 8-9. + Mill, J. S.: the argument for other minds, 136-138; + on permanent possibilities of sensation, 289; + his logic, 314. + Mind: the child's notion of, 100; + regarded as breath, 101; + suggestions of Latin, Greek, and Hebrew words for mind or + soul, 101; + materialistic views of, in Greek philosophy, 101-102; + Plato and Aristotle on nature of, 102-103; + doctrine of Plotinus, 103; + of Cassiodorus, 103; + of Augustine, 104; + of Descartes, 105-106; + modern common sense notions of mind, 106-110; + mind as substance, Locke quoted, 108-109; + psychologist's notion of, 110-111; + what the mind is, 111-114; + place of mind in nature, 151-154; + minds active, 162-163; + see also, Mind and Body, and Other Minds. + Mind and Body: is the mind in the body, 115-117; + plain man's notion of, 116; + interactionism, 117-121; + doctrine of Descartes and his successors, 119-120; + plain man as interactionist, 120; + McCosh quoted, 120-121; + objection to interactionism, 121; + parallelism, 121-126; + its foundation in experience, 123-124; + meaning of word "concomitance," 123-125; + time and place of mental phenomena, 126-129; + objections to parallelism, 129-132; + Clifford's parallelism criticised, 130; + mental phenomena and causality, 129; + double sense of word "concomitance," 131-132; + mind and the mechanism of the world, 151-154; + mechanism and morals, 159-164; + "concomitant phenomena" and attainment of ends, 162; + references given on other minds and mind-stuff, 309; + see also, Other Minds. + Mind-stuff: see Other Minds. + Minima Sensibilia: 87. + Modern Philosophy: conception of philosophy in, 9-12. + Monism: what, 193-194; + varieties of, 194-202; + narrower sense of word, 198-202. + Moral Distinctions: their foundation, 159-164. + Muirhead: 315. + + Naive Realism: 181. + "Natural Light": term used by Descartes, 208. + Natural Realism: see Realism. + Nature: place of mind in, 151-154; + order of nature and "free-will," 154-159. + Neo-Platonism: referred to, 8; on the soul as immaterial, 103. + Nihilism: word used by Hamilton, 186. + Noumena: see Phenomena. + + Objective Idealism: 189-190; reference to Royce, 311. + Objective Order: contrasted with the subjective, 55. + Ontology: what, 315. + Orders of Experience: the subjective and the objective, 55; + see also, 114. + Other Minds: their existence, 133-136; + Fichte referred to, 133; + Richter quoted, 133; + Huxley and Clifford on proof of, 135; + the argument for, 136-140; + Mill quoted, 136-138; + Huxley criticised, 138-140; + what minds are there? 140-144; + Descartes quoted, 141-142; + Malebranche, 142; + the limits of psychic life, 142-144; + mind-stuff, 144-146; + proper attitude toward solipsism, 291. + Outside: meaning of word, 55. + + Panpsychism: the doctrine, 198; references given, 311. + Pantheism: 202. + Parallelism: see Mind and Body. + Paulsen: on nature of philosophy, 305. + Pearson: the "telephone exchange," 38 ff.; + on scientific principles and method, 258-259; + reference given, 306. + Peirce, C. S.: on pragmatism, 219-220. + Perception: see Representative Perception. + Phenomena and Noumena: Kant's distinction between, 176-180. + Philosophical Sciences: enumerated, 13; + why grouped together, 13-17; + examined in detail, 223-259. + Philosophy: meaning of word, and history of its use, 1 ff.; + what the word now covers, 12-17; + problems of, 32-164; + historical background of modern philosophy, 165-180; + types of, 181-222; + logic and, 225-229; + psychology and, 230-234; + ethics and, 240-242; + aesthetics and, 242-243; + metaphysics distinguished from, 244-245; + religion and, 250-254; + the non-philosophical sciences and, 255-259; + utility of, 263-272; + history of, 273-287; + verification in, 276-277; + as poetry and as science, 281-283; + how systems arise, 283-287; + practical admonitions, 288-303; + authority in, 291-296; + ordinary rules of evidence in, 296-298. + Physiological Psychology: what it is, 234. + Pineal Gland; as seat of the soul, 105. + Place: of mental phenomena, see Space. + Plain Man: his knowledge of the world, 19-20; also, 32-36; + his knowledge of space, 73; + on mind and body, 106-110; + his interactionism, 120. + Plants: psychic life in, 143. + Plato: use of word "philosopher," 2; + scope of his philosophy, 6-7; + on the soul, 102-103. + Plotinus: the soul as immaterial, 103. + Pluralism and Singularism: described, 204-205. + Poetry and Philosophy: 281-283. + Poincare: referred to, 258. + Pragmatism: the doctrine, 219-222; + see also, 296-298, 300-303, and 312-314; + will to believe, references, 310, 312. + Present: meaning of "the present," 97-99. + Psychology: psychological knowledge characterized, 25-28; + attitude of psychologist toward external world, 36-38; + toward mind, 110-111; + philosophy and, 230-234; + double affiliation of, 234-235; + utility of, 268-269; + metaphysics and, 313; + "rational," 315. + Ptolemaic System; 282. + Pythagoras: the word "philosopher," 2. + Pythagoreans: their doctrine, 4. + + Qualities of Things: contrasted with sensations, 51-56. + + Rational Cosmology: 315. + Rationalism: the doctrine, 206-209. + Rational Psychology: 315. + Real: see Reality. + Realism: hypothetical realism, 168; + "natural" realism, 174; + general discussion of realism and its varieties, 181-187; + ambiguity of the word, 186-187. + Reality: contrasted with appearance, 35; + in psychology, 36-38; + the "telephone exchange" and, 38 ff.; + things and their appearances, 59-61; + real things, 61-63; + ultimate real things, 63-68; + the "Unknowable" as Reality, 68-72; + real space, 80-87; + real time, 93-99; + substance as reality, 111; + real and apparent extension, 113-114; + measurement of apparent time, 128; + Bradley's doctrine of reality, 191-192; + Clifford's panpsychism and reality, 197-198. + + Reflective Thought: its nature, 28-31. + Reid, Thomas: doctrine of "common sense," 171-174; + references, 310. + Religion: philosophy and, 250-254; + conceptions of God, 252-253; + God and the world, 253-254; see God. + Representative Perception: plain man's position, 32-36; + the psychologist, 36-38; + "telephone exchange" doctrine, 38-44; + the true distinction between sensations and things, 45-58; + the doctrine of, 165-168; + Descartes and Locke quoted, 165-168. + Richter, Jean Paul: on the solipsist, 133. + Royce: an objective idealist, 311; a monist, 312. + + Schelling: attitude toward natural philosophy, 10. + Schiller: on "Humanism," 312-313. + "Schools": in philosophy, 291-296. + Science: philosophy and the special sciences, 12-17; + the philosophical sciences, 13 ff.; + nature of scientific knowledge, 21-28; + compared with reflective thought, 29-31; + science and the world as mechanism, 148; + the conservation of energy, 151-154; + philosophical sciences examined in detail, 223-259; + science and metaphysical analysis, 246-247; + the non-philosophical sciences and philosophy, 255-259; + study of scientific principles, 256-259; + verification in science and in philosophy, 275-277; + philosophy as science, 281-283. + Scientific Knowledge: see Science. + Sensations: knowledge of things through, 33-44; + sense and imagination contrasted, 45-49; + are "things" groups of, 49-51; + distinction between things and, 51-56; + use of the word in this volume and in the + "System of Metaphysics," 306-307. + Sidgwick: on Kant, 311. + Sigwart: 314. + Singularism and Pluralism: described, 204-205. + Skeptics: their view of philosophy, 7-8; + their doubt of reality, 59; + Hume's skepticism, 171. + Socrates: use of words "philosopher" and "philosophy," 2; + attitude toward sophism, 6. + Solipsism: see Other Minds. + Solon: 1. + Sophists: characterized, 6. + Soul: see Mind. + Space: plain man's knowledge of, 73; + said to be necessary, infinite and infinitely divisible, 73-74; + discussion of it as necessary and as infinite, 74-77; + Kant, Hamilton, and Spencer quoted, 75-77; + as infinitely divisible, the moving point, 77-80; + Clifford quoted, 79-80; + real space and apparent, 80-87; + "matter" and "form," 82-84; + extension of imaginary things, 113; + place of mental phenomena, 115-117, also, 126-129. + Spencer, Herbert: his definition of philosophy, 11; + his work criticised, 11-12; + on the "Unknowable" as ultimate Reality, 69-70; + Spencer as "natural" realist, 174; + influenced by Kant's doctrine, 176; + his inconsistent doctrine of the external world, 183-184; + defective logic, 228; + influence of agnosticism, 271; + references given, 307, 311. + Spinoza: his _a priori_ method, 10; + on God or substance, 199; + his rationalism, 208; + his parallelism, 308; + references, 311-312. + Spiritualism: the doctrine, 197-198. + Stoics: their view of philosophy, 7-8; their materialism, 102. + Strong: on other minds, 209; references to, 309, 311. + Subjective Idealism: 187-188. + Subjective Order: contrasted with objective, 55. + Substance: meaning of word, 108; + Locke on, 108; + mind as substance, 111-112; + doctrine of the One Substance, 198-202. + Synthetic Judgments: defined, 179. + Systems of Philosophy: their relations to each other, 283-287. + + Taylor: on other minds, 309. + Teleology: what, 163; reference, 310. + "Telephone Exchange": doctrine of the external world + as "messages," 38-44. + Thales: his doctrine, 3. + Theism: see God. + Theory of Knowledge: see Epistemology. + Things: our knowledge of, 18-23; + contrast of ideas and, 33-36; + same contrast in psychology, 36-38; + sensations and things, 45 ff.; + existence of, 56-58; + contrasted with appearances, 59 ff.; + real things, 61 ff.; + the space of real things, 80-87. + Thomas Aquinas: scope of his labors, 9. + Time: as necessary, infinite, and infinitely divisible, 88-90; + problem of knowing past, present, and future, 90-93; + Augustine quoted, 90-91; + timeless self criticised, 92-93; + real time and apparent, 93-99; + real time as necessary, infinite, and infinitely divisible, 95-97; + consciousness of time, 97-99; + mental phenomena and time, 126-129. + Timeless Self: 92-93. + Touch: the real world revealed in experiences of, 61-63. + Truth: pragmatism and, 219-222 and 312-314; + Whewell on veracity, 238-239; + criterion of truth in philosophy, 296-298; + also, 300-303. + + Ueberweg: 305, 311. + Ultimate Reality: see Reality. + "Unknowable": as Reality, 68-72; see Spencer. + Utility: of liberal studies, 260-263; of philosophy, 363-272. + + Verification: in science and in philosophy, 275-277. + + Ward, James: on concepts of mechanics, 148. + "Weltweisheit": philosophy as, 12. + Whewell: his common sense ethics, 236-240; referred to, 315. + Will: see Free-will. + Will to Believe: see Pragmatism. + Windelband: 305. + Wolff, Christian: definition of philosophy, 10. + World: see External World. + Wundt: ethics referred to, 315. + + + +***END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY*** + + +******* This file should be named 16406.txt or 16406.zip ******* + + +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: +https://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/6/4/0/16406 + + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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