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Wager Halleck, A.M., Major General, U.S.A.. + </title> + <style type="text/css"> +/*<![CDATA[ XML blockout */ +<!-- + P { margin-top: .75em; + text-align: justify; + margin-bottom: .75em; + } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { + text-align: center; /* all headings centered */ + } + HR { width: 33%; + margin-top: 1em; + margin-bottom: 1em; + } + BODY{margin-left: 10%; + margin-right: 10%; + } + .linenum {position: absolute; top: auto; left: 4%;} /* poetry number */ + .note {margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; margin-bottom: 1em;} /* footnote */ + .blkquot {margin-left: 4em; margin-right: 4em;} /* block indent */ + .pagenum {position: absolute; left: 92%; font-size: smaller; justify: right;} /* page numbers */ + .sidenote {width: 20%; margin-bottom: 1em; padding-left: 2em; font-size: smaller; float: right; clear: right;} + + .poem {margin-left:10%; margin-right:10%; text-align: left;} + .poem .stanza {margin: 1em 0em 1em 0em;} + .poem p {margin: 0; padding-left: 3em; text-indent: -3em;} + .poem p.i2 {margin-left: 2em;} + .poem p.i4 {margin-left: 4em;} + .poem .caesura {vertical-align: -200%;} + // --> + /* XML end ]]>*/ + </style> + </head> +<body> + + +<pre> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Elements of Military Art and Science +by Henry Wager Halleck + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Elements of Military Art and Science + Or, Course Of Instruction In Strategy, Fortification, + Tactics Of Battles, &C.; Embracing The Duties Of Staff, + Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, And Engineers; Adapted To + The Use Of Volunteers And Militia; Third Edition; With + Critical Notes On The Mexican And Crimean Wars. + +Author: Henry Wager Halleck + +Release Date: July 1, 2005 [EBook #16170] + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART *** + + + + +Produced by Graeme Mackreth and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. + + + + + + +</pre> + +<br><h2>ELEMENTS</h2> +<h2>OF</h2> +<h2>MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE:</h2> +<h2>OR,</h2> +<h2>COURSE OF INSTRUCTION +IN +STRATEGY, FORTIFICATION, TACTICS OF BATTLES, &c.</h2> +<br> + +<h3>EMBRACING THE DUTIES OF STAFF, INFANTRY, CAVALRY, ARTILLERY, AND +ENGINEERS.</h3><br> +<br> + +<h4>ADAPTED TO THE USE OF VOLUNTEERS AND MILITIA.</h4><br> +<br> + +<p>THIRD EDITION.</p> + +<p>WITH CRITICAL NOTES ON THE MEXICAN AND CRIMEAN WARS.</p> + +<h5>BY</h5> + +<h5>H. WAGER HALLECK, A.M., MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.A.</h5> + +<br> + +<p>NEW YORK:</p> + +<p>D. APPLETON & COMPANY,</p> + +<p>443 & 445 BROADWAY.</p> + +<p>LONDON: 16 LITTLE BRITAIN</p> + +<p>1862.</p> + +<p>Entered, according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, BY D. +APPLETON & COMPANY, In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the +United States for the Southern District of New York.</p><br><br><br> + + + + + + + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_I">I. INTRODUCTION.—Dr. Wayland's Arguments on the Justifiableness of War +briefly examined.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_II">II. STRATEGY.—General Divisions of the Art.—Rules for planning a +Campaign.—Analysis of the Military Operations of Napoleon.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_III">III. FORTIFICATIONS.—Their importance in the Defence of States proved +by numerous Historical Examples.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_IV">IV. LOGISTICS.—Subsistence.—Forage.—Marches.—Convoys.— +Castrametation.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_V">V. TACTICS.—The Twelve Orders of Battle, with Examples of +each.—Different Formations of Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and +Engineers on the Field of Battle, with the Modes of bringing Troops into +action.</a>/p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_VI">VI. MILITARY POLITY.—The Means of National Defence best suited to the +character and condition of a Country, with a brief Account of those +adopted by the several European Powers.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_VII">VII. DEFENCE OF OUR SEA-COAST.—Brief Description of our Maritime +Fortifications, with an Examination of the several Contests that have +taken place between Ships and Forts, including the Attack on San Juan +d'Ulloa, and on St. Jean d'Acre.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_VIII">VIII. OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.—Brief Description of the +Fortifications on the Frontier, and an analysis of our Northern +Campaigns.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_IX">IX. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Staff and Administrative Corps.—Their History, +Duties, Numbers, and Organization.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_X">X. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Infantry and Cavalry.—Their History, Duties, +Numbers, and Organization.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_XI">XI. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Artillery.—Its History and Organization, with a +Brief Notice of the different kinds of Ordnance, the Manufacture of +Projectiles, &c.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_XII">XII. ARMY ORGANIZATION.—Engineers.—Their History, Duties, and +Organization,—with a Brief Discussion, showing their importance as a +part of a modern Army Organization.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_XIII">XIII. PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Historical Notice of the progress of +this Art.—Description of the several parts of a Fortress, and the +various Methods of fortifying a Position.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_XIV">XIV. FIELD ENGINEERING.—Field Fortifications.—Military +Communications.—Military Bridges.—Sapping, Mining, and the Attack and +Defence of a Fortified Place.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#CHAPTER_XV">XV. MILITARY EDUCATION.—Military Schools of France, Prussia, Austria, +Russia, England, &c.—Washington's Reasons for establishing the West +Point Academy.—Rules of Appointment and Promotion in Foreign +Services.—Absurdity and Injustice of our own System.</a></p> + +<p><a href="#EXPLANATION_OF_PLATES">EXPLANATION OF PLATES 409</a></p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="PREFACE"></a><h2>PREFACE</h2> +<br> + +<p>The following pages were hastily thrown together in the form of +lectures, and delivered, during, the past winter, before the Lowell +Institute of Boston. They were written without the slightest intention +of ever publishing them; but several officers of militia, who heard them +delivered, or afterwards read them in manuscript, desire their +publication, on the ground of their being useful to a class of officers +now likely to be called into military service. It is with this view +alone that they are placed in the hands of the printer. No pretension is +made to originality in any part of the work; the sole object having been +to embody, in a small compass, well established military principles, and +to illustrate these by reference to the events of past history, and the +opinions and practice of the best generals.</p> + +<p>Small portions of two or three of the following chapters have already +appeared, in articles furnished by the author to the New York and +Democratic Reviews, and in a "Report on the Means of National Defence," +published by order of Congress.</p> + +<p>H.W.H.</p> + +<p>MAY, 1846.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="ELEMENTS_OF_MILITARY_ART_AND_SCIENCE"></a><h2>ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE.</h2> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_I"></a><h2>CHAPTER I.</h2> + +<p>INTRODUCTION.</p> +<br> + +<p>Our distance from the old world, and the favorable circumstances in +which we have been placed with respect to the other nations of the new +world, have made it so easy for our government to adhere to a pacific +policy, that, in the sixty-two years that have elapsed since the +acknowledgment of our national independence, we have enjoyed more than +fifty-eight of general peace; our Indian border wars have been too +limited and local in their character to seriously affect the other parts +of the country, or to disturb the general conditions of peace. This +fortunate state of things has done much to diffuse knowledge, promote +commerce, agriculture, and manufactures; in fine, to increase the +greatness of the nation and the happiness of the individual. Under these +circumstances our people have grown up with habits and dispositions +essentially pacific, and it is to be hoped that these feelings may not +soon be changed. But in all communities opinions sometimes run into +extremes; and there are not a few among us who, dazzled by the +beneficial results of a long peace, have adopted the opinion that war in +any case is not only useless, but actually immoral; nay, more, that to +engage in war is wicked in the highest degree, and even <i>brutish</i>.</p> + +<p>All modern ethical writers regard <i>unjust</i> war as not only immoral, but +as one of the greatest of crimes—murder on a large scale. Such are all +wars of mere ambition, engaged in for the purpose of extending regal +power or national sovereignty; wars of plunder, carried on from +mercenary motives; wars of propagandism, undertaken for the unrighteous +end of compelling men to adopt certain religious or political opinions, +whether from the alleged motives of "introducing a more orthodox +religion," or of "extending the area of freedom." Such wars are held in +just abhorrence by all moral and religious people: and this is believed +to be the settled conviction of the great mass of our own citizens.</p> + +<p>But in addition to that respectable denomination of Christians who deny +our right to use arms under any circumstances, there are many religious +enthusiasts in other communions who, from causes already noticed, have +adopted the same theory, and hold <i>all</i> wars, even those in +self-defence, as unlawful and immoral. This opinion has been, within the +last few years, pressed on the public with great zeal and eloquence, and +many able pens have been enlisted in its cause. One of the most popular, +and by some regarded one of the most able writers on moral science, has +adopted this view as the only one consonant with the principles of +Christian morality.</p> + +<p>It has been deemed proper, in commencing a course of lectures on war, to +make a few introductory remarks respecting this question of its +justifiableness. We know of no better way of doing this than to give on +the one side the objections to war as laid down in Dr. Wayland's Moral +Philosophy, and on the other side the arguments by which other ethical +writers have justified a resort to war. We do not select Dr. Wayland's +work for the purpose of criticizing so distinguished an author; but +because he is almost the only writer on ethics who advocates these +views, and because the main arguments against war are here given in +brief space, and in more moderate and temperate language than that used +by most of his followers. I shall give his arguments in his own +language.</p> + +<p>"I. All wars are contrary to the revealed will of God."</p> + +<p>It is said in reply, that if the Christian religion condemns all wars, +no matter how just the cause, or how necessary for self-defence, we must +expect to find in the Bible some direct prohibition of war, or at least +a prohibition fairly implied in other direct commandments. But the Bible +nowhere prohibits war: in the Old Testament we find war and even +conquest positively commanded, and although war was raging in the world +in the time of Christ and his apostles, still they said not a word of +its unlawfulness and immorality. Moreover, the fathers of the church +amply acknowledge the right of war, and directly assert, that when war +is justly declared, the Christian may engage in it either by stratagem +or open force. If it be of that highly wicked and immoral character +which some have recently attributed to it, most assuredly it would be +condemned in the Bible in terms the most positive and unequivocal.</p> + +<p>But it has been said that the use of the sword is either directly or +typically forbidden to the Christian, by such passages as "Thou shalt +not kill," (Deut. v. 17,) "I say unto you, that ye resist not evil: but +whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other +also," (Matt. v. 39,) &c. If these passages are to be taken as literal +commands, as fanatics and religious enthusiasts would have us believe, +not only is war unlawful, but also all our penal statutes, the +magistracy, and all the institutions of the state for the defence of +individual rights, the protection of the innocent, and the punishment of +the guilty. But if taken in conjunction with the whole Bible, we must +infer that they are hyperbolical expressions, used to impress strongly +on our minds the general principle of love and forgiveness, and that, so +far as possible, we over come evil with good. Can any sober-minded man +suppose, for a moment, that we are commanded to encourage the attacks of +the wicked, by literally turning the left cheek when assaulted on the +right, and thus induce the assailant to commit more wrong? Shall we +invite the thief and the robber to persevere in his depredations, by +literally giving him a cloak when he takes our coat; and the insolent +and the oppressor to proceed in his path of crime, by going two miles +with him if he bid us to go one?</p> + +<p>Again, if the command, "Thou shalt not kill," is to be taken literally, +it not only prohibits us from engaging in just war, and forbids the +taking of human life by the state, as a punishment for crime; it also +forbids, says Dr. Leiber, our taking the life of any animal, and even +extends to the vegetable kingdom,—for undoubtedly plants have life, and +are liable to violent death—to be <i>killed</i>. But Dr. Wayland concedes to +individuals the right to take vegetable and animal life, and to society +the right to punish murder by death. This passage undoubtedly means, +thou shalt not unjustly kill,—thou shalt do no murder; and so it is +rendered in our prayer-books. It cannot have reference to war, for on +almost the next page we find the Israelites commanded to go forth and +smite the heathen nations,—to cast them out of the land,—to utterly +destroy them,—to show them no mercy, &c. If these passages of the Bible +are to be taken literally, there is no book which contains so many +contradictions; but if taken in connection with the spirit of other +passages, we shall find that we are permitted to use force in preventing +or punishing crime, whether in nations or in individuals; but that we +should combine love with justice, and free our hearts from all evil +motives.</p> + +<p>II. All wars are unjustifiable, because "God commands us to love every +man, alien or citizen, Samaritan or Jew, as ourselves; and the act +neither of society nor of government can render it our duty to violate +this command."</p> + +<p>It is true that no act of society can make it our duty to violate any +command of God: but is the above command to be taken literally, and as +forbidding us to engage in just war? Is it not rather intended to +impress upon us, in a forcible manner, that mutual love is a great +virtue; that we should hate no one, not even a stranger nor an enemy, +but should treat all with justice, mercy, and loving-kindness? If the +meaning attempted to be given to this command in the above quotation be +the true one, it is antagonistical not only to just war, but to civil +justice, to patriotism, and to the social and domestic affections.</p> + +<p>But are we bound to love all human beings alike; that is, to the same +degree? Does the Bible, as a whole, inculcate such doctrine? On the +contrary, Christ himself had his <i>beloved</i> disciple,—one whom he loved +pre-eminently, and above all the others; though he loved the others none +the less on that account. We are bound to love our parents, our +brothers, our families first, and above all other human beings; but we +do not, for this reason, love others any the less. A man is not only +permitted to seek first the comfort and happiness of his own family, but +if he neglect to do so, he is worse than an infidel. We are bound to +protect our families against the attacks of others; and, if necessary +for the defence of their lives, we are permitted to take the life of the +assailant; nay more, we are bound to do so. But it does not follow that +we <i>hate</i> him whom we thus destroy. On the contrary, we may feel +compassion, and even love for him. The magistrate sentences the murderer +to suffer the penalty of the law; and the sheriff carries the sentence +into execution by taking, in due form, the life of the prisoner: +nevertheless, both the magistrate and the sheriff may have the kindest +feelings towards him whom they thus deprive of life.</p> + +<p>So it is in the external affairs of the state. Next to my kindred and my +neighbors do I love my countrymen. I love them more than I do +foreigners, because my interests, my feelings, my happiness, my ties of +friendship and affection, bind me to them more intimately than to the +foreigner. I sympathize with the oppressed Greek, and the enslaved +African, and willingly contribute to their relief, although their +sufferings affect me very remotely; but if my own countrymen become +oppressed and enslaved, nearer and dearer interests are affected, and +peculiar duties spring from the ties and affections which God has +formed. If my countrymen be oppressed, my neighbors and kindred will be +made unhappy and suffering; this I am bound to take all proper measures +in my power to prevent. If the assailant cannot be persuaded by argument +to desist from his wicked intentions, I unite with my fellow-citizens in +forcibly resisting his aggressions. In doing this I am actuated by no +feelings of hatred towards the hostile forces; I have in my heart no +malice, no spirit of revenge; I have no desire to harm individuals, +except so far as they are made the instruments of oppression. But as +instruments of evil, I am bound to destroy their power to do harm. I do +not shoot at my military enemy from hatred or revenge; I fight against +him because the paramount interests of my country cannot be secured +without destroying the instrument by which they are assailed. I am +prohibited from exercising any personal cruelty; and after the battle, +or as soon as the enemy is rendered harmless, he is to be treated with +kindness, and to be taken care of equally with the wounded friend. All +conduct to the contrary is regarded by civilized nations with +disapprobation.</p> + +<p>That war does not properly beget personal malignity but that, on the +contrary, the effects of mutual kindness and courtesy on the +battle-field, frequently have a beneficial influence in the political +events of after years, may be shown by innumerable examples in all +history. Soult and Wellington were opposing generals in numerous +battles; but when the former visited England in 1838, he was received by +Wellington and the whole British nation with the highest marks of +respect; and the mutual warmth of feeling between these two +distinguished men has contributed much to the continuance of friendly +relations between the two nations. And a few years ago, when we seemed +brought, by our civil authorities, almost to the brink of war by the +northeastern boundary difficulties, the pacific arrangements concluded, +through the intervention of General Scott, between the Governors of +Maine and New Brunswick, were mainly due to ancient friendships +contracted by officers of the contending armies during our last war with +Great Britain.</p> + +<p>III. "It is granted that it would be better for man in general, if wars +were abolished, and all means, both of offence and defence, abandoned. +Now, this seems to me to admit, that this is the law under which God has +created man. But this being admitted, the question seems to be at an +end; for God never places man under circumstances in which it is either +wise, or necessary, or innocent, to violate his laws. Is it for the +advantage of him who lives among a community of thieves, to steal; or +for one who lives among a community of liars, to lie?"</p> + +<p>The fallacy of the above argument is so evident that it is scarcely +necessary to point out its logical defects.</p> + +<p>My living among a community of thieves would not justify me in stealing, +and certainly it would be no reason why I should neglect the security of +my property. My living among murderers would not justify me in +committing murder, and on the other hand it would be no reason why I +should not fight in the defence of my family, if the arm of the law were +unable to protect them. That other nations carry on unjust wars is no +reason why we should do likewise, nor is it of itself any reason why we +should neglect the means of self-defence.</p> + +<p>It may seem, to us short-sighted mortals, better that we were placed in +a world where there were no wars, or murders, or thefts; but God has +seen fit to order it otherwise. Our duties and our relations to our +fellow-men are made to suit the world as it is, and not such a world as +we would make for ourselves.</p> + +<p>We live among thieves: we must therefore resort to force to protect our +property—that is, to locks, and bars, and bolts; we build walls thick +and high between the robber and our merchandise. And more: we enact laws +for his punishment, and employ civil officers to forcibly seize the +guilty and inflict that degree of punishment necessary for the +prevention of other thefts and robberies.</p> + +<p>We live among murderers: if neither the law nor the ordinary physical +protections suffice for the defence of our own lives and the lives of +our innocent friends, we forcibly resist the murderer, even to his +death, if need be. Moreover, to deter others from like crimes, we +inflict the punishment of death upon him who has already taken life.</p> + +<p>These relations of individuals and of society are laid down by all +ethical writers as in accordance with the strictest rules of Christian +morality. Even Dr. Wayland considers it not only the right, but the duty +of individuals and of society to resort to these means, and to enact +these laws for self-protection. Let us extend the same course of +reasoning to the relations of different societies.</p> + +<p>We live among nations who frequently wage unjust wars; who, disregarding +the rights of others, oppress and rob, and even murder their citizens, +in order to reach some unrighteous end. As individuals, we build fences +and walls for the protection of our grounds and our merchandise; so, as +a nation, we build ships and forts to protect our commerce, our harbors, +and our cities. But the walls of our houses and stores are useless, +unless made so strong and high that the robber cannot break through or +scale them without great effort and personal danger; so our national +ships and forts would be utterly useless for protection, unless fully +armed and equipped.</p> + +<p>Further: as individuals and as societies we employ civil officers for +the protection of our property and lives, and, when necessary, arm them +with the physical means of executing the laws, even though the +employment of these means should cost human life. The prevention and +punishment of crime causes much human suffering; nevertheless the good +of community requires that crime should be prevented and punished. So, +as a nation, we employ military officers to man our ships and forts, to +protect our property and our persons, and to repel and punish those who +seek to rob us of our life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness. National +aggressions are far more terrible in their results than individual +crime; so also the means of prevention and punishment are far more +stupendous, and the employment of these means causes a far greater +amount of human suffering. This may be a good reason for greater +<i>caution</i> in resorting to such means, but assuredly it is no argument +against the <i>moral right</i> to use them.</p> + +<p>IV. War is unjustifiable because unnecessary:</p> + +<p>"1st. The very fact that a nation relied solely upon the justice of its +measures, and the benevolence of its conduct, would do more than any +thing else to prevent the occurrence of injury. The moral sentiment of +every community would rise in opposition to injury inflicted upon the +just the kind, and the merciful."</p> + +<p>The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of +individuals. Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so +far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases +to be a virtue. If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, +and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished? Reason and +experience prove the contrary. Active benevolence and kindness should +always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit +it. The laws of God's universe are founded on justice as well as love. +"The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury +inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;" but this fact does +not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent +persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall +be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints +may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.</p> + +<p>"2d. But suppose the [national] injury to be done. I reply, the proper +appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, +but to the consciences of men. Let the wrong be set forth, but be set +forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the +consciences of men be aroused to justice."</p> + +<p>Argument, and "appeals to the consciences of men" should always be +resorted to in preference to "physical force;" but when they fail to +deter the wicked, force must be employed. I may reason with the robber +and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my +house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral +appeals, I employ physical force,—I call in the strong arm of the law +to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life +that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.</p> + +<p>"If," says Puffendorf, "some one treads the laws of peace under his +feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the +highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I +should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in +other words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own +preservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he +may act with impunity and with full liberty. On the contrary, since he +shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in +a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the +duties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which +menaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to +accuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity." <i>De +Jure Nat. et Gent</i>, lib. ii., ch. v., §1. This same course of +reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in +respect to war.</p> + +<p>"3d. But suppose this method fail. Why, then, let us suffer the evil."</p> + +<p>This principle, if applied to its full extent, would, we believe, be +subversive of all right, and soon place all power in the hands of the +most evil and wicked men in the community. Reason with the nation that +invades our soil, and tramples under foot our rights and liberties, and +should it not desist, why, then, suffer the evil! Reason with the +murderer, and if he do not desist, why, then, suffer him to murder our +wives and our children! Reason with the robber and the defaulter, and if +they will not listen, why, then, let them take our property! We cannot +appeal to the courts, for if their decisions be not respected, they +employ <i>force</i> to <i>compel</i> obedience to their mandates. But Dr. Wayland +considers the law of benevolence to forbid the use of force between men. +He forgets this, it is true, in speaking of our duties towards our +fellow-men of the same <i>society</i>, and even allows us to punish the +murderer with death; but towards the foreigner he requires a greater +forbearance and benevolence than towards our neighbor; for if another +nation send its armies to oppress, and rob, and murder us by the +thousand, we have no right to employ physical force either to prevent or +to punish them, though we may do so to prevent or punish a neighbor for +an individual act of the same character. The greater the scale of crime, +then, the less the necessity of resorting to physical force to prevent +it!</p> + +<p>"4th. But it may be asked, what is to prevent repeated and continued +aggression? I answer, first, not instruments of destruction, but the +moral principle which God has placed in the bosom of every man. I think +that obedience to the law of God, on the part of the injured, is the +surest preventive against the repetition of injury. I answer, secondly, +suppose that acting in obedience to the law of benevolence will not +prevent the repetition of injury, will acting on the principle of +retaliation prevent it?" Again; "I believe aggression from a foreign +nation to be the intimation from God that we are disobeying the law of +benevolence, and that this is his mode of teaching nations their duty, +in this respect, to each other. So that aggression seems to me in no +manner to call for retaliation and injury, but rather to call for +special kindness and good-will."</p> + +<p>This argument, if such it can be called, is equally applicable to +individual aggressions. We are bound to regard them as intimations of +our want of benevolence, and to reward the aggressors for the +intimations! Is it true, that in this world the wicked only are +oppressed, and that the good are always the prospered and happy? Even +suppose this true, and that I, as a sinful man, deserve God's anger, is +this any reason why I should not resist the assassin, and seek to bring +him to punishment? The whole of this argument of Dr. Wayland applies +with much greater force to municipal courts than to war.</p> + +<p>V. "Let us suppose a nation to abandon all means both of offence and of +defence, to lay aside all power of inflicting injury, and to rely for +self-preservation solely upon the justice of its own conduct, and the +moral effect which such a course of conduct would produce upon the +consciences of men. * * * * How would such a nation be protected from +external attack, and entire subjugation? I answer, by adopting the law +of benevolence, a nation would render such an event in the highest +degree improbable. The causes of national war are, most commonly, the +love of plunder and the love of glory. The first of these is rarely, if +ever, sufficient to stimulate men to the <i>ferocity necessary to war</i>, +unless when assisted by the second. And by adopting as the rule of our +conduct the law of benevolence, all motive arising from the second cause +is taken away. There is not a nation in Europe that could be led on to +war against a harmless, just, forgiving, and defenceless people."</p> + +<p>History teaches us that societies as well as individuals have been +attacked again and again notwithstanding that they either would not or +could not defend themselves. Did Mr. White, of Salem, escape his +murderers any the more for being harmless and defenceless? Did the +Quakers escape being attacked and hung by the ancient New Englanders any +the more because of their non-resisting principles? Have the Jews +escaped persecutions throughout Christendom any the more because of +their imbecility and non-resistance for some centuries past? Poland was +comparatively harmless and defenceless when the three great European +powers combined to attack and destroy the entire nation, dividing +between themselves the Polish territory, and enslaving or driving into +exile the Polish people.</p> + +<div class="poem"><div class="stanza"> +<p>"Oh, bloodiest picture in the book of time,</p> +<p>Sarmatia fell, unwept, without a crime!"</p> +</div></div> + +<p>We need not multiply examples under this head; all history is filled +with them.</p> + +<p>Let us to-morrow destroy our forts and ships of war, disband our army +and navy, and apply the lighted torch to our military munitions and to +our physical means of defence of every description; let it be proclaimed +to the world that we will rely solely upon the consciences of nations +for justice, and that we have no longer either the will or the ability +to defend ourselves against aggression. Think you that the African and +Asiatic pirates would refrain, any the more, from plundering our vessels +trading to China, because we had adopted "the law of benevolence?" Would +England be any the more likely to compromise her differences with us, or +be any the more disposed to refrain from impressing our seamen and from +searching our merchant-ships? Experience shows that an undefended state, +known to suffer every thing, soon becomes the prey of all others, and +history most abundantly proves the wisdom and justice of the words of +Washington—"IF WE DESIRE TO SECURE PEACE, IT MUST BE KNOWN THAT WE ARE +AT ALL TIMES READY FOR WAR."</p> + +<p>But let us bring this case still nearer home. Let it be known to-morrow +that the people of Boston or New York have adopted the strictly +non-resisting principle, and that hereafter they will rely solely on the +consciences of men for justice; let it be proclaimed throughout the +whole extent of our Union, and throughout the world, that you have +destroyed your jails and houses of correction, abolished your police and +executive law officers, that courts may decide justice but will be +allowed no force to compel respect to their decisions, that you will no +longer employ walls, and bars, and locks, to secure your property and +the virtue and lives of your children; but that you will trust solely +for protection to "the law of active benevolence." Think you that the +thieves, and robbers, and murderers of Philadelphia, and Baltimore, and +New Orleans, and the cities of the old world, will, on this account, +refrain from molesting the peace of New York and Boston, and that the +wicked and abandoned men now in these cities, will be the more likely to +turn from the evil of their ways?</p> + +<p>Assuredly, if this "law of active benevolence," as Dr. Wayland +denominates the rule of non-resistance, will prevent nations from +attacking the harmless and defenceless, it will be still more likely to +prevent individuals from the like aggressions; for the moral sense is +less active in communities than where the responsibility is individual +and direct.</p> + +<p>Throughout this argument Dr. Wayland assumes that all wars are wars of +aggression, waged for "plunder" or "glory," or through "hatred" or +"revenge," whereas such is far from being true. He indeed sometimes +speaks of war as being <i>generally</i> of this character; at others he +speaks of it as being <i>always</i> undertaken either from a spirit of +aggression or retaliation. Take either form of his argument, and the +veriest schoolboy would pronounce it unsound: viz.,</p> + +<p><i>All</i> wars are undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;</p> + +<p>Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws;—therefore,</p> + +<p><i>All</i> wars are immoral and unjustifiable.</p> + +<p>Or,</p> + +<p>Wars are <i>generally</i> undertaken either for aggression or retaliation;</p> + +<p>Aggression and retaliation are forbidden by God's laws—therefore,</p> + +<p><i>All</i> wars are immoral and unjustifiable.</p> + +<p>VI. "Let any man reflect upon the amount of pecuniary expenditure, and +the awful waste of human life, which the wars of the last hundred years +have occasioned, and then we will ask him whether it be not evident, +that the one-hundredth part of this expense and suffering, if employed +in the honest effort to render mankind wiser and better, would, long +before this time, have banished wars from the earth, and rendered the +civilized world like the garden of Eden? If this be true, it will follow +that the cultivation of a military spirit is injurious to a community, +inasmuch as it aggravates the source of the evil, the corrupt passions +of the human breast, by the very manner in which it attempts to correct +the evil itself."</p> + +<p>Much has been said to show that war begets immorality, and that the +cultivation of the military spirit has a corrupting influence on +community. And members of the clergy and of the bar have not +unfrequently so far forgotten, if not truth and fact, at least the +common courtesies and charities of life, as to attribute to the military +profession an unequal share of immorality and crime. We are declared not +only parasites on the body politic, but professed violators of God's +laws—men so degraded, though unconsciously, that "in the pursuit of +justice we renounce the human character and assume that of the beasts;" +it is said that "murder, robbery, rape, arson, theft, if only plaited +with the soldier's garb, go unwhipped of justice."<a name="FNanchor_1_1"></a><a href="#Footnote_1_1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> It has never been +the habit of the military to retort these charges upon the other +professions. We prefer to leave them unanswered. If demagogues on the +"stump," or in the legislative halls, or in their Fourth of-July +addresses, can find no fitter subjects "to point a moral or adorn a +tale," we must be content to bear their misrepresentations and abuse. </p> + +<a name="Footnote_1_1"></a><a href="#FNanchor_1_1">[1]</a><div class="note"><p> Sumner's Oration.</p></div> + +<p>Unjust wars, as well as unjust litigation, are immoral in their effects +and also in their cause. But just wars and just litigation are not +demoralizing. Suppose all wars and all courts of justice to be +abolished, and the wicked nations as well as individuals to be suffered +to commit injuries without opposition and without punishment; would not +immorality and unrighteousness increase rather than diminish? Few events +rouse and elevate the patriotism and public spirit of a nation so much +as a just and patriotic war. It raises the tone of public morality, and +destroys the sordid selfishness and degrading submissiveness which so +often result from a long-protracted peace. Such was the Dutch war of +independence against the Spaniards; such the German war against the +aggressions of Louis XIV., and the French war against the coalition of +1792. But without looking abroad for illustration, we find ample proof +in our own history. Can it be said that the wars of the American +Revolution and of 1812, were demoralizing in their effects? "Whence do +Americans," says Dr. Lieber, "habitually take their best and purest +examples of all that is connected with patriotism, public spirit, +devotedness to common good, purity of motive and action, if not from the +daring band of their patriots of the Revolution?"</p> + +<p>The principal actors in the military events of the Revolution and of +1812, held, while living, high political offices in the state, and the +moral tone which they derived from these wars may be judged of by the +character stamped on their administration of the government. These men +have passed away, and their places have, for some time, been filled by +men who take their moral tone from the relations of peace. To the true +believer in the efficacy of <i>non-resistance,</i> and in the demoralizing +influence of all wars, how striking the contrast between these +different periods in our political history! How infinitely inferior to +the rulers in later times were those, who, in the blindness of their +infatuation, appealed to physical force, rather than surrender their +life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness! Let us trace out this +contrast:—</p> + +<p>In the earlier ages of our republic, and under the rule of those whose +moral character had been corrupted by war, party spirit ran higher and +was less pure than at later periods in our history. The object of the +principal leaders of the great political parties was then to render the +opinions of the opposite party odious: now, their only object is to +sustain their own opinions by argument. Then, each party claimed to +itself an exclusive love of country, and stigmatized the other as aliens +and the natural enemies of the state: now, they both practise great +forbearance, love, and charity, towards political opponents. Then, men +obtained place through intrigue and corruption, and a universal scramble +for the loaves and fishes of office on the one side, and a universal +political proscription on the other, were regarded as the natural +results of an election: now, this disgusting strife for office has +ceased; men no longer seek place, but wait, like Cincinnatus, to be +called from their ploughs; and none are proscribed for opinion's sake. +Then, in electing men to office the most important social and +constitutional principles were forgotten or violated: now, we have the +august spectacle of a nation-choosing its rulers under the guidance of +strict moral principle. Then, the halls of congress were frequently +filled with demagogues, and tiplers, and the <i>small men</i> of community: +now, the ablest and best of the country are always sought for as +representatives. Then, the magnates of party were the mere timid, +temporizing slaves of expediency, looking, not to the justice and wisdom +of their measures, but to their probable popularity with then sneaking +train of followers: now, they rely for respect and support upon the +judgment of the honest and enlightened. Then, the rank and file of party +were mere political hirelings, who sold their manhood for place, who +reviled and glorified, and shouted huzzas and whispered calumnies, just +as they were bidden; they could fawn upon those who dispensed political +patronage with a cringing servility that would shame the courtiers of +Louis XIV., or the parasites and hirelings of Walpole: now, all +political partisans, deriving their moral tone from the piping times of +peace, are pure, disinterested patriots, who, like the Roman farmer, +take office with great reluctance, and resign it again as soon as the +state can spare their services. Then, prize-fighters, and blacklegs, and +gamblers, having formed themselves into political clubs, were courted by +men high in authority, and rewarded for their dirty and corrupting +partisan services by offices of trust and responsibility: now, no man +clothed with authority would dare to insult the moral sense of community +by receiving such characters in the national councils, or by bestowing +public offices upon these corrupt and loathsome dregs of society.</p> + +<p>Such, the advocates of non resistance would persuade us, are the +legitimate results in this country of war on the one hand and of a +long-protracted peace on the other. But there are men of less vivid +imaginations, and, perhaps, of visions less distorted by fanatical zeal, +who fail to perceive these results, and who even think they see the +reverse of all this. These men cannot perceive any thing in the lives of +Washington, Hamilton, and Knox, to show that they were the less virtuous +because they had borne arms in their country's service: they even fail +to perceive the injurious effects of the cultivation of a military +spirit on the military students of West Point, whose graduates, they +think, will compare favorably in moral character with the graduates of +Yale and Cambridge. Nay, more, some even go so far as to say that our +army, as a body, is no less moral than the corresponding classes in +civil life; that our common soldiers are as seldom guilty of riots, +thefts, robberies, and murders, as similarly educated men engaged in +other pursuits; that our military officers are not inferior in moral +character to our civil officers, and that, as a class, they will compare +favorably with any other class of professional men—with lawyers, for +example. In justification of these opinions—which may, perhaps, be +deemed singularly erroneous—they say, that in the many millions of +public money expended during the last forty years, by military officers, +for the army, for military defences, and for internal improvements, but +a single graduate of West Point has proved a defaulter, even to the +smallest sum, and that it is exceedingly rare to see an officer of the +army brought into court for violating the laws.</p> + +<p>But even suppose it true that armies necessarily diffuse immorality +through community, is it not equally true that habitual submission to +the injustice, plunder, and insult of foreign conquerors would tend +still more to degrade and demoralize any people?</p> + +<p>With regard to "pecuniary expenditures" required in military defence, +many absurd as well as false statements have been put forth. With +respect to our own country, the entire amounts expended, under the head +of war department, whether for Indian pensions, for the purchase of +Indian lands, the construction of government roads, the improvement of +rivers and harbors, the building of breakwaters and sea-walls, for the +preservation of property, the surveying of public lands, &c., &c.; in +fine, every expenditure made by officers of the army, under the war +department, is put down as "expenses for military defence." Similar +misstatements are made with respect to foreign countries: for example, +the new fortifications of Paris are said to have already cost from fifty +to seventy-five millions of dollars, and as much more is said to be +required to complete them. Indeed, we have seen the whole estimated cost +of those works stated at two hundred and forty millions of dollars, or +twelve hundred millions of francs! The facts are these: the works, when +done, will have cost about twenty-eight millions. We had the pleasure of +examining them not long since, in company with several of the engineer +officers employed on the works. They were then three-fourths done, and +had cost about twenty millions. We were assured by these officers that +the fortifications proper would be completed for somewhat less than the +original estimate of twenty-eight millions. Had we time to enter into +details, other examples of exaggeration and misrepresentation could be +given.</p> + +<p>But it is not to be denied that wars and the means of military defence +have cost vast amounts of money. So also have litigation and the means +deemed requisite for maintaining justice between individuals. It has +been estimated that we have in this country, at the present time, thirty +thousand lawyers, without including pettifoggers. Allowing each of these +to cost the country the average sum of one thousand dollars, and we have +the annual cost to the country, for lawyers, thirty millions of dollars. +Add to this the cost of legislative halls and legislators for making +laws; of court-houses, jails, police offices, judges of the different +courts, marshals, sheriffs justices of the peace, constables, clerks, +witnesses, &c., employed to apply and enforce the laws when made; the +personal loss of time of the different plaintiffs and defendants, the +individual anxiety and suffering produced by litigation; add all these +together, and I doubt not the result for a single year will somewhat +astonish these modern economists. But if all the expenditures of this +nature that have been made for the last fifty years, in this individual +"war of hate," be added together, we have no doubt a very fruitful text +might be obtained for preaching a crusade against law and lawyers! But +could any sane man be found to say that, on account of the cost of +maintaining them, all laws and lawyers are useless and should be +abolished?</p> + +<p>If, therefore, these vast sums of money are deemed necessary to secure +justice between individuals of the same nation, can we expect that the +means of international justice can be maintained without expenditures +commensurate with the object in view? If we cannot rely exclusively upon +the "law of active benevolence" for maintaining justice between brothers +of the same country, can we hope that, in the present state of the +world, strangers and foreigners will be more ready to comply with its +requisitions?</p> + +<p>The length of the preceding remarks admonishes us to greater brevity in +the further discussion of this subject.</p> + +<p>It is objected to war, that men being rational beings, should contend +with one another by argument, and not by force, as do the brutes.</p> + +<p>To this it is answered, that force properly begins only where argument +ends. If he who has wronged me cannot be persuaded to make restitution, +I apply to the court,—that is, to <i>legal</i> force,—to compel him to do +me justice. So nations ought to resort to <i>military force</i> only when all +other means fail to prevent aggression and injury.</p> + +<p>But war often fails to procure redress of grievances, or to prevent +repeated and continued aggression.</p> + +<p>So does a resort to civil force; but such a resort is none the less +proper and just on that account.</p> + +<p>But in war the innocent party is sometimes the sufferer, while the +guilty triumph.</p> + +<p>So it often is in civil life: God, for some wise purpose, sometimes +permits the wicked to triumph for a season.</p> + +<p>But in all wars one party must be in the wrong, and frequently the war +is unjust on both sides.</p> + +<p>So in suits at law, one party is necessarily wrong, and frequently both +resort to the civil tribunals in hopes of attaining unrighteous ends.</p> + +<p>But nations do not resort to tribunals, like individuals, to settle +their differences.</p> + +<p>For the reason that it is believed a tribunal of this character—a +congress of nations, as it has been called,—would be more productive +of evil than of good. By such an arrangement the old and powerful +European monarchies would acquire the authority to interfere in the +domestic affairs of the weaker powers. We see the effects of +establishing such a tribunal in the so-called Holy Alliance, whose +influence is regarded by the friends of liberty as little less dangerous +than the Holy Inquisition. Moreover, such a tribunal would not prevent +war, for military force would still be resorted to to enforce its +decisions. For these and other reasons, it is deemed better and safer to +rely on the present system of International Law. Under this system, and +in this country, a resort to the arbitrament of war is not the result of +impulse and passion,—a yielding to the mere "bestial propensities" of +our nature; it is a deliberate and solemn act of the legislative +power,—of the representatives of the national mind, convened as the +high council of the people. It is this power which must determine when +all just and honorable means have been resorted to to obtain national +justice, and when a resort to military force is requisite and proper. If +this decision be necessarily unchristian and barbarous, such, also, +should we expect to be the character of other laws passed by the same +body, and under the same circumstances. A declaration of war, in this +country, is a law of the land, made by a deliberative body, under the +high sanction of the constitution. It is true that such a law may be +unjust and wrong, but we can scarcely agree that it will necessarily be +so. The distinction between war, as thus duly declared, and +"international Lynch-law" is too evident to need comment.</p> + +<p>But it is said that the benefits of war are more than counterbalanced by +the evils it entails, and that, "most commonly, the very means by which +we repel a despotism from abroad, only establishes over us a military +despotism at home."</p> + +<p>Much has been said and written about <i>military</i> despotism; but we think +he who studies history thoroughly, will not fail to prefer a military +despotism to a despotism of mere politicians. The governments of +Alexander and Charlemagne were infinitely preferable to those of the +petty civil tyrants who preceded and followed them; and there is no one +so blinded by prejudice as to say that the reign of Napoleon was no +better than that of Robespierre, Danton, and the other "lawyers" who +preceded him, or of the Bourbons, for whom he was dethroned.</p> + +<p>"Cæsar," says a distinguished senator of our own country, "was +rightfully killed for conspiring against his country; but it was not he +that destroyed the liberties of Rome. That work was done by the +profligate politicians without him, and before his time; and his death +did not restore the republic. There were no more elections: rotten +politicians had destroyed them; and the nephew of Cæsar, as heir to his +uncle, succeeded to the empire on the principle of hereditary +succession."</p> + +<p>"And here History appears in her grand and instructive character, as +Philosophy teaching by example: and let us not be senseless to her +warning voice. Superficial readers believe it was the military men who +destroyed the Roman republic! No such thing! It was the politicians who +did it!--factious, corrupt, intriguing politicians—destroying public +virtue in their mad pursuit after office—destroying their rivals by +crime—deceiving and debauching the people for votes—and bringing +elections into contempt by the frauds and violence with which they were +conducted. From the time of the Gracchi there were no elections that +could bear the name. Confederate and rotten politicians bought and sold +the consulship. Intrigue and the dagger disposed of rivals. Fraud, +violence, bribes, terror, and the plunder of the public treasury +commanded votes. The people had no choice; and long before the time of +Cæsar, nothing remained of republican government but the name and the +abuse. Read Plutarch. In the 'Life of Cæsar,' and not three pages before +the crossing of the Rubicon, he paints the ruined state of the +elections,—shows that all elective government was gone,—that the +hereditary form had become a necessary relief from the contests of the +corrupt,—and that in choosing between Pompey and Cæsar, many preferred +Pompey, not because they thought him republican, but because they +thought he would make the milder king. Even arms were but a small part +of Cæsar's reliance, when he crossed the Rubicon. Gold, still more than +the sword, was his dependence; and he sent forward the accumulated +treasures of plundered Gaul, to be poured into the laps of rotten +politicians. There was no longer a popular government; and in taking all +power himself, he only took advantage of the state of things which +profligate politicians had produced. In this he was culpable, and paid +the forfeit with his life. But in contemplating his fate, let us never +forget that the politicians had undermined and destroyed the republic, +before he came to seize and to master it."</p> + +<p>We could point to numerous instances, where the benefits of war have +more than compensated for the evils which attended it; benefits not only +to the generations who engaged in it, but also to their descendants for +long ages. Had Rome adopted the non-resistance principle when Hannibal +was at her gates, we should now be in the night of African ignorance and +barbarism, instead of enjoying the benefits of Roman learning and Roman +civilization. Had France adopted this principle when the allied armies +invaded her territories in 1792, her fate had followed that of Poland. +Had our ancestors adopted this principle in 1776, what now had been, +think you, the character and condition of our country?</p> + +<p>Dr. Lieber's remarks on this point are peculiarly just and apposite. +"The continued efforts," says he, "requisite for a nation to protect +themselves against the ever-repeated attacks of a predatory foe, may be +infinitely greater than the evils entailed by a single and energetic +war, which forever secures peace from that side. Nor will it be denied, +I suppose, that Niebuhr is right when he observes, that the advantage to +Rome of having conquered Sicily, as to power and national vigor, was +undeniable. But even if it were not so, are there no other advantages to +be secured? No human mind is vast enough to comprehend in one glance, +nor is any human life long enough to follow out consecutively, all the +immeasurable blessings and the unspeakable good which have resolved to +mankind from the ever-memorable victories of little Greece over the +rolling masses of servile Asia, which were nigh sweeping over Europe +like the high tides of a swollen sea, carrying its choking sand over all +the germs of civilization, liberty, and taste, and nearly all that is +good and noble. Think what we should have been had Europe become an +Asiatic province, and the Eastern principles of power and stagnation +should have become deeply infused into her population, so that no +process ever after could have thrown it out again! Has no advantage +resulted from the Hebrews declining any longer to be ground in the dust, +and ultimately annihilated, at least mentally so, by stifling servitude, +and the wars which followed their resolution? The Netherlands war of +independence has had a penetrating and decided effect upon modern +history, and, in the eye of all who value the most substantial parts and +elementary ideas of modern and civil liberty, a highly advantageous one, +both directly and through Great Britain. Wars have frequently been, in +the hands of Providence, the means of disseminating civilization, if +carried on by a civilized people—as in the case of Alexander, whose +wars had a most decided effect upon the intercourse of men and extension +of civilization—or of rousing and reuniting people who had fallen into +lethargy, if attacked by less civilized and numerous hordes. Frequently +we find in history that the ruder and victorious tribe is made to +recover as it were civilization, already on the wane with a refined +nation. Paradoxical as it may seem at first glance, it is, nevertheless, +amply proved by history, that the closest contact and consequent +exchange of thought and produce and enlargement of knowledge, between +two otherwise severed nations, is frequently produced by war. War is a +struggle, a state of suffering; but as such, at times, only that +struggling process without which—in proportion to the good to be +obtained, or, as would be a better expression for many cases, to the +good that is to be borne—no great and essential good falls ever to the +share of man. Suffering, merely as suffering, is not an evil. Our +religion, philosophy, every day's experience, prove it. No maternal +rejoicing brightens up a mother's eve without the anxiety of labor."</p> + +<p>One word more, and we must leave this subject. It has been said by some +that the duties of patriotism are less binding upon us than upon our +ancestors; that, whatever may have been the practice in years that are +past the present generation can in no manner bear arms in their +country's cause, such a course being not only <i>dishonorable</i>, but in the +eye of the Christian, <i>wicked</i>, and even <i>infamous</i>! It is believed, +however, that such are not the general opinions and sentiments of the +religious people of this country. Our forefathers lighted the fires of +Religion and Patriotism at the same altar; it is believed that their +descendants have not allowed either to be extinguished, but that both +still burn, and will continue to burn, with a purer and brighter flame. +Our forefathers were not the less mindful of their duty to their God, +because they also faithfully served their country. If we are called upon +to excel them in works of charity, of benevolence, and of Christian +virtue, let it not be said of us that we have forgotten the virtue of +patriotism.<a name="FNanchor_2_2"></a><a href="#Footnote_2_2"><sup>[2]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_2_2"></a><a href="#FNanchor_2_2">[2]</a><div class="note"><p> For further discussion of this subject the reader is +referred to Lieber's Political Ethics, Part II., book vii. chap. 3; +Paley's Moral and Political Philosophy; Legare's Report of June 13, +1838, in the House of Representatives; Mackintosh's History of the +Revolution of 1688, chap. x.; Bynkershock; Vatel; Puffendorf; +Clausewitz; and most other writers on international law and the laws of +war. +</p><p> +Dr. Wayland's view of the question is advocated with much zeal by Dymond +in his Inquiry into the Accordancy of War with the Principles of +Christianity; Jay's Peace and War; Judd's Sermon on Peace and War; +Peabody's Address, &c.; Coue's Tract on What is the Use of the Navy? +Sumner's True Grandeur of Nations.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_II"></a><h2>CHAPTER II. </h2> + +<p>STRATEGY</p> +<br> + +<p>War has been defined, "A contest between nations and states carried on +by force." But this definition is by some considered defective, inasmuch +as it would exclude all civil wars.</p> + +<p>When war is commenced by attacking a nation in peace, it is called +<i>offensive</i>, and when undertaken to repel invasion, or the attacks of an +enemy, it is called <i>defensive</i>. A war may be essentially defensive even +where we begin it, if intended to prevent an attack or invasion which is +under preparation. Besides this general division of war, military +writers have made numerous others, such as—</p> + +<p><i>Wars of intervention</i>, in which one state interferes in favor of +another. This intervention may either have respect to the <i>internal</i> or +to the <i>external</i> affairs of a nation. The interference of Russia in the +affairs of Poland, of England in the government of India, Austria and +the allied powers in the affairs of France during the Revolution and +under the empire, are examples under the first head. The intervention of +the Elector Maurice of Saxony against Charles V., of King William +against Louis XIV., in 1688, of Russia and France in the seven years' +war, of Russia again between France and Austria, in 1805, and between +France and Prussia, in 1806, are examples under the second head. Most +liberal-publicists consider intervention in the internal affairs of +nations as indefensible; but the principle is supported by the advocates +of the old monarchies of Europe.</p> + +<p><i>Wars of insurrection</i> to gain or to regain liberty; as was the case +with the Americans in 1776, and the modern Greeks in 1821.</p> + +<p><i>Wars of independence</i> from foreign dictation and control as the wars of +Poland against Russia, of the Netherlands against Spain, of France +against the several coalitions of the allied powers, of the Spanish +Peninsula against France and of China and India against England. The +American war of 1812 partook largely of this character, and some +judicious historians have denominated it the war of Independence, as +distinguished from the war of the Revolution.</p> + +<p><i>Wars of opinion</i>, like those which the Vendeans have sustained in +support of the Bourbons, and those France has sustained against the +allies, as also those of propagandism, waged against the smaller +European states by the republican hordes of the French Revolution. To +this class also belong—</p> + +<p><i>Religious wars</i>, like those of Islamism, of the crusades, and of the +Reformation.</p> + +<p><i>Wars of conquest</i>, like those of the Romans in Gaul, of the English in +India, of the French in Egypt and Africa, and of the Russians in +Circassia.</p> + +<p><i>National wars</i>, in which the great body of the people of a state +engage, like those of the Swiss against Austria and the Duke of +Burgundy, of the Catalans in 1712, of the Americans against England, of +the Dutch against Phillip II., and of the Poles and Circassians against +Russia.</p> + +<p><i>Civil wars</i>, where one portion of the state fights against the other, +as the war of the Roses in England, of the league in France, of the +Guelphs and Ghibelines in Italy, and of the factions in Mexico and South +America.</p> + +<p>It is not the present intention to enter into any discussion of these +different kinds of war, but rather to consider the general subject, and +to discuss such general principles and rules as may be applicable to all +wars.</p> + +<p>War in its most extensive sense may be regarded both as a <i>science</i> and +an <i>art</i>. It is a science so far as it investigates general principles +and institutes an analysis of military operations; and an art when +considered with reference to the practical rules for conducting +campaigns, sieges, battles, &c. So is engineering a science so far as it +investigates the general principles of fortification, and also +artillery, in analyzing the principles of gunnery; but both are arts +when considered with reference to the practical rules for the +construction, attack, and defence of forts, or for the use of cannon.</p> + +<p>This distinction has not always been observed by writers on this +subject, and some have asserted that strategy is the <i>science</i>, and +tactics the <i>art</i> of war. This is evidently mistaking the general +distinction between science, which investigates principles, and art, +which forms practical rules.</p> + +<p>In popular language, however, it is usual to speak of <i>the military art</i> +when we refer to the general subject of war, and of <i>the military +sciences</i> when we wish to call attention more particularly to the +scientific principles upon which the art is founded. We shall here +consider the military art in this general sense, as including the entire +subject of war.</p> + +<p>As thus defined, the military art may be divided into four distinct +branches, viz.: 1st. <i>Strategy</i>; 2d. Fortification, or <i>Engineering</i>; +3d. <i>Logistics</i>; 4th. <i>Tactics</i>. Several general treatises on this art +add another branch, called <i>The Policy of War</i>, or the relations of war +with the affairs of state.</p> + +<p><i>Strategy</i> is defined to be the art of directing masses on decisive +points, or the hostile movements of armies beyond the range of each +other's cannon. <i>Engineering</i> embraces all dispositions made to enable +troops to resist a superior force the longest time possible; and also +the means resorted to by the opposing army to overcome these material +obstacles. <i>Logistics</i> embraces the practical details of moving and +supplying armies. <i>Tactics</i> is the art of bringing troops into action, +or of moving them in the presence of an enemy, that is, within his view, +and within the reach of his artillery. All these are most intimately +connected. A fault in tactics may occasion the loss of strategic lines; +the best combined manœuvres on the field of battle may lead to no +decisive results, when the position, or the direction of the operation +is not strategic; sometimes not only battles, but entire campaigns, are +lost through neglect of the engineer's art, or faults in his +dispositions; again, armies would be of little use without the requisite +means of locomotion and of subsistence.</p> + +<p>1. <i>Strategy</i> regards the theatre of war, rather than the field of +battle. It selects the important points in this theatre, and the lines +of communication by which they may be reached; it forms the plan and +arranges the general operations of a campaign; but it leaves it to the +engineers to overcome material obstacles and to erect new ones; it +leaves to logistics the means of supporting armies and of moving them on +the chosen lines; and to tactics, the particular dispositions for +battle, when the armies have reached the destined points. It is well to +keep in mind these distinctions, which may be rendered still more +obvious by a few illustrations. The point where several lines of +communications either intersect or meet, and the centre of an arc which +is occupied by the enemy, are strategic points; but tactics would reject +a position equally accessible on all sides, especially with its flanks +exposed to attack. Sempronius at Trebbia and Varro at Cannæ, so placed +their armies that the Carthagenians attacked them, at the same time, in +front, on the flanks, and in rear; the Roman consuls were defeated: but +the central strategic position of Napoleon at Rivoli was eminently +successful. At the battle of Austerlitz the allies had projected a +<i>strategic</i> movement to their left, in order to cut off Napoleon's right +from Vienna; Weyrother afterwards changed his plans, and executed a +corresponding <i>tactical</i> movement. By the former there had been some +chance of success, but the latter exposed him to inevitable destruction. +The little fort of Koenigsten, from its advantageous position, was more +useful to the French, in 1813, than the vast works of Dresden. The +little fort of Bard, with its handful of men, was near defeating the +operations of Napoleon in 1800, by holding in check his entire army; +whereas, on the other hand, the ill-advised lines of Ticino, in 1706, +caused an army of 78,000 French to be defeated by only 40,000 men under +Prince Eugene of Savoy.</p> + +<p>War, as has already been said, may be either offensive or defensive. If +the attacking army be directed against an entire state, it becomes a war +of <i>invasion</i>. If only a province, or a military position, or an army, +be attacked, it is simply regarded as taking the <i>initiative</i> in +offensive movements.</p> + +<p><i>Offensive</i> war is ordinarily most advantageous in its moral and +political influence. It is waged on a foreign soil, and therefore spares +the country of the attacking force; it augments its own resources at the +same time that it diminishes those of the enemy; it adds to the moral +courage of its own army, while it disheartens its opponents. A war of +invasion may, however, have also its disadvantages. Its lines of +operation may become too <i>deep</i>, which is always hazardous in an enemy's +country. All the natural and artificial obstacles, such as mountains, +rivers, defiles, fortifications, &c., are favorable for defence, but +difficult to be overcome by the invader. The local authorities and +inhabitants oppose, instead of facilitating his operations; and if +patriotism animate the defensive army to fight for the independence of +its threatened country, the war may become long and bloody. But if a +political diversion be made in favor of the invading force, and its +operations be attended with success, it strikes the enemy at the heart, +paralyzes all his military energies, and deprives him of his military +resources, thus promptly terminating the contest. Regarded simply as the +initiative of movements, the offensive is almost always the preferable +one, as it enables the general to choose his lines for moving and +concentrating his masses on the decisive point.</p> + +<p>The first and most important rule in offensive war is, to keep your +forces as much concentrated as possible. This will not only prevent +misfortune, but secure victory,—since, by its necessary operation, you +possess the power of throwing your whole force upon any exposed point of +your enemy's position.</p> + +<p>To this general rule some writers have laid down the following +exceptions:—</p> + +<p>1st. When the food and forage of the neighborhood in which you act have +been exhausted and destroyed, and your magazines are, from any cause, +unable to supply the deficiency, one of two things must be done; either +you must go to places where these articles abound, or you must draw from +them your supplies by <i>detachments</i>. The former is rarely compatible +with your plan, and necessarily retards its execution; and hence the +preference which is generally given to the latter.</p> + +<p>2d. When reinforcements are about to join you, and this can only be +effected by a march through a country actually occupied by hostile +corps, or liable to be so occupied, you must again waive the general +rule, and risk one party for the security of the other; or, (which may +be better,) make such movements with your main body as shall accomplish +your object.</p> + +<p>3d. When you have complete evidence of the actual, or probable +insurrection in your favor, of a town or province of your enemy, or of a +division of his army, you must support this inclination by strong +<i>detachments</i>, or by movements of your main body. Napoleon's operations +in Italy, in 1796-7, furnish examples of what is here meant.</p> + +<p>4th. When, by dispatching a <i>detachment</i>, you may be able to intercept a +convoy, or reinforcement, coming to the aid of your enemy.</p> + +<p>These are apparent rather than real exceptions to the rule of +concentration. This rule does not require that <i>all the army should +occupy the same position</i>. Far from it. Concentration requires the main +body to be in immediate and supporting reach: small detachments, for +temporary and important objects, like those mentioned, are perfectly +legitimate, and in accordance with correct principles. Napoleon's +position in Spain will serve as an illustration. A hand, placed on the +map of that country, will represent the position of the invading forces. +When opened, the fingers will represent the several detachments, thrown +out on important strategic lines, and which could readily be drawn in, +as in closing the hand, upon the principal and central mass, preparatory +to striking some important blow.</p> + +<p>"If, as we have seen, it be the first great rule for an army acting on +the offensive principle, to keep its forces <i>concentrated</i>, it is, no +doubt, the second, <i>to keep them fully employed.</i> Is it your intention +to seize a particular province of your enemy? to penetrate to his +capital? or to cut him off from his supplies? Whatever measure be +necessary to open your route to these objects must be <i>promptly</i> taken; +and if you mean to subsist yourself at his expense, your movements must +be more rapid than his. Give him time to <i>breathe</i>,—and above all, give +him time to <i>rest</i>, and your project is blasted; his forages will be +completed, and his magazines filled and secured. The roads of approach +will be obstructed, bridges destroyed, and strong points everywhere +taken and defended. You will, in fact, like Burgoyne, in 1777, reduce +yourself to the necessity of bleeding at every step, without equivalent +or use."</p> + +<p>"Such cannot be the fate of a commander who, knowing all the value of +acting on the offensive, shakes, by the vigor and address of his first +movements, the moral as well as physical force of his enemy,—who, +selecting his own time, and place, and mode of attack, confounds his +antagonist by enterprises equally hardy and unexpected,—and who at last +leaves to him only the alternative of resistance without hope, or of +flying without resistance."</p> + +<p>The British army, in the war of the American Revolution, must have been +most wretchedly ignorant of these leading maxims for conducting +offensive war. Instead of concentrating their forces on some decisive +point, and then destroying the main body of our army by repeated and +well-directed blows, they scattered their forces over an immense extent +of country, and became too weak to act with decision and effect on any +one point. On the other hand, this policy enabled us to call out and +discipline our scattered and ill-provided forces.</p> + +<p>The main object in <i>defensive</i> war is, to protect the menaced territory, +to retard the enemy's progress, to multiply obstacles in his way, to +guard the vital points of the country, and—at the favorable moment, +when the enemy becomes enfeebled by detachments, losses, privations, and +fatigue—to assume the offensive, and drive him from the country. This +combination of the defensive and offensive has many advantages. The +enemy, being forced to take the defensive in his turn, loses much of the +moral superiority due to successful offensive operations. There are +numerous instances of this kind of war, "the defensive-offensive," as it +is sometimes called, to be found in history. The last four campaigns of +Frederick the Great of Prussia, are examples which may serve as models. +Wellington played a similar part in the Spanish peninsula.</p> + +<p>To merely remain in a defensive attitude, yielding gradually to the +advances of the enemy, without any effort to regain such positions or +provinces as may have fallen into his power, or to inflict on him some +fatal and decisive blow on the first favorable opportunity; such a +system is always within the reach of ignorance, stupidity, and +cowardice; but such is far from being the true Fabian system of +defensive war.</p> + +<p>"Instead of finding security only in flight; instead of habitually +refusing to look the enemy in the face; instead of leaving his march +undisturbed; instead of abandoning, without contest, points strong by +nature or by art;—instead of all this, the true war of defence seeks +every occasion to meet the enemy, and loses none by which it can annoy +or defeat him; it is always awake; it is constantly in motion, and never +unprepared for either attack or defence. When not employed in efforts of +courage or address, it incessantly yields itself to those of labor and +science. In its front it breaks up roads or breaks down bridges; while +it erects or repairs those in its rear: it forms abbatis, raises +batteries, fortifies passes, or intrenches encampments; and to the +system of deprivation adds all the activity, stratagem, and boldness of +<i>la petite guerre</i>. Dividing itself into detachments, it multiplies its +own attacks and the alarms of the enemy. Collecting itself at a single +point, it obstructs his progress for days, and sometimes for weeks +together. Does it even abandon the avenues it is destined to defend? It +is but for the purpose of shielding them more securely, by the attack of +his hospitals, magazines, convoys, or reinforcements. In a word, by +adopting the maxim, that the <i>enemy must be made to pay for whatever he +gains</i>, it disputes with him every inch of ground, and if at last it +yields to him a victory, it is of that kind which calls forth only his +sighs."</p> + +<p>In discussing the subject of strategy, certain technical terms are +employed, such as <i>theatre of war; theatre of operations; base of +operations</i>, or the line from which operations start; <i>objective +points</i>, or points to which the operations are directed; <i>line of +operations</i>, or the line along which an army moves; <i>key points</i>, or +points which it is important for the defensive army to secure; <i>line of +defence,</i> or the line which it is important to defend at all hazards: +and in general, <i>strategic points, strategic lines, strategic positions, +&c.</i> As these terms are very generally used in military books, it may be +well to make ourselves thoroughly acquainted with their import. After +defining these terms and explaining their meaning and application, it is +deemed best to illustrate their use by reference to well-known and +striking historical examples.</p> + +<p><i>The theatre of a war</i> embraces not only the territory of the two +belligerent powers, but also that of their allies, and of such secondary +powers as, through fear or interest, may be drawn into the contest. With +maritime nations it also embraces the seas, and sometimes crosses to +another continent. Some of the wars between France and England embraced +the two hemispheres.</p> + +<p><i>The theatre of operations</i>, however, is of a more limited character, +and should not be confounded with the theatre of war. In general, it +includes only the territory which an army seeks, on the one hand, to +defend, and on the other, to invade. If two or more armies be directed +towards the same object, though by different lines, their combined +operations are included in the same theatre but if each acts +independently of the others, and seeks distinct and separate objects, +each must have its own independent theatre of operations.</p> + +<p>A war between France and Austria may embrace all Italy and Germany, but +the theatre of operations may be limited to only a portion of these +countries. Should the Oregon question lead to hostilities between the +United States and England, the theatre of war would embrace the greater +part of North America and the two oceans, but the theatre of operations +would probably be limited to Canada and our northern frontier, with +naval descents upon our maritime cities.</p> + +<p>The first point to be attended to in a plan of military operation is to +select a good <i>base</i>. Many circumstances influence this selection, such +as mountains, rivers, roads, forests, cities, fortifications, military +dépôts, means of subsistence, &c. If the frontier of a state contain +strong natural or artificial barriers, it may serve not only as a good +base for offensive operations, but also as an excellent line of defence +against invasion. A single frontier line may, however, be penetrated by +the enemy, and in that case a second or third base further in the +interior becomes indispensable for a good defence.</p> + +<p>A French army carrying on military operations against Germany would make +the Rhine its first base; but if driven from this it would form a second +base on the Meuse or Moselle, a third on the Seine, and a fourth on the +Loire; or, when driven from the first base, it would take others +perpendicular to the front of defence, either to the right, on Béfort +and Besançon, or to the left, on Mézières and Sedan. If acting +offensively against Prussia and Russia, the Rhine and the Main would +form the first base the Elbe and the Oder the second, the Vistula the +third, the Nieman the fourth, and the Dwina and the Dnieper the fifth.</p> + +<p>A French army operating against Spain would have the Pyrenees for its +first base; the line of the Ebro for a second, resting its wings on the +gulf of Gascony and the Mediterranean. If from this position it advance +its left, possessing itself of the kingdom of Valencia, the line of the +Sierra d'Estellas becomes its third base of operations against the +centre of Spain.</p> + +<p>A base may be parallel, oblique, or perpendicular to our line of +operations, or to the enemy's line of defence. Some prefer one plan and +some another; the best authorities, however, think the oblique or +perpendicular more advantageous than the parallel; but we are not often +at liberty to choose between these, for other considerations usually +determine the selection.</p> + +<p>In 1806, the French forces first moved perpendicular to their base on +the Main, but afterwards effected a change of front, and moved on a line +oblique or nearly parallel to this base. They had pursued the same plan +of operations in the Seven Years' War. The Russians, in 1812, based +perpendicularly on the Oka and the Kalouga, and extended their flank +march on Wiozma and Krasnoi; in 1813, the allies, based perpendicularly +on Bohemia, succeeded in paralyzing Napoleon's army on the Elbe.</p> + +<p>An American army moving by Lake Champlain, would be based perpendicular +on the great line of communication between Boston and Buffalo; if moving +from the New England states on Quebec and Montreal, the line of +operations would be oblique; and if moving from the Niagara frontier by +Lake Ontario and the St. Lawrence, the line would be nearly parallel +both to our base and to the enemy's line of defence—an operation, under +the circumstances, exceedingly objectionable.</p> + +<p>Any point in the theatre of operations which gives to the possessor an +advantage over his opponent, is regarded as <i>strategic</i>. Their +geographical position and political and military character, give them a +greater or less influence in directing the campaign. These points are +occupied by the defensive army, and attacked by the offensive; if on or +near the base, they become the <i>key</i> points for the former, and the +<i>objective</i> points for the latter.<a name="FNanchor_3_3"></a><a href="#Footnote_3_3"><sup>[3]</sup></a> There are also between these two a +greater or less number of strategic points, which have an important +though inferior influence upon the result of the war.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_3_3"></a><a href="#FNanchor_3_3">[3]</a><div class="note"><p> It may be well to remark that a strategic point is not +necessarily a geometrical point; an entire province, or a considerable +portion of a geographical frontier, is, in military language, sometimes +denominated a <i>point</i>. In the same way, strategic lines, instead of +being mathematical lines, are frequently many miles in width.</p></div> + +<p>The first object of the French in attacking Belgium, is to gain +possession of the Meuse, as this position would give them a decided +advantage in any ulterior operations. In attacking southern Germany, the +course of the Danube offers a series of points which exercise an +important influence on the war. For northern Germany, Leipsic and the +country bordering on the Saale and the Elbe, are objects often fiercely +contested by the French and other belligerent powers. In a war between +this country and England, Montreal and the points on the St. Lawrence +between Montreal and Quebec, would become objects of the highest +importance, and their possession would probably determine the result of +the war.</p> + +<p>The capital of a state, from its political importance as well as its +military influence, is almost always a decisive strategic point, and its +capture is therefore frequently the object of an entire campaign. The +possession of Genoa, Turin, Alexandria, Milan, &c., in 1796, both from +their political and military importance, had a decided influence upon +the results of the war in these several states. In the same way Venice, +Rome, and Naples, in 1797, Vienna, in the campaigns of 1805 and 1809, +Berlin, in 1806, Madrid, in 1808, and Paris, in 1814 and 1815. If +Hannibal had captured the capital immediately after the battle of +Cannæ;, he would thus have destroyed the Roman power. The taking of +Washington, in 1814, had little or no influence on the war, for the +place was then of no importance in itself, and was a mere nominal +capital. It, however, greatly influenced our reputation abroad, and +required many brilliant successes to wash the blot from our national +escutcheon.</p> + +<p><i>Lines of defence</i> in strategy are either permanent or temporary. The +great military frontiers of a state, especially when strengthened by +natural and artificial obstacles, such as chains of mountains, rivers, +lines of fortresses, &c., are regarded as permanent lines of defence. +The Alpine range between France and Piedmont, with its fortified passes; +the Rhine, the Oder, and the Elbe, with their strongly-fortified places; +the Pyrenees, with Bayonne at one extremity and Perpignon at the other; +the triple range of fortresses on the Belgian frontier—are all +permanent lines of defence. The St. Lawrence river is a permanent line +of defence for Canada; and the line of lake Champlain, the upper St. +Lawrence, and the lakes, for the United States.</p> + +<p>Temporary lines of defence are such as are taken up merely for the +campaign. Napoleon's position in Saxony, in 1813; the line of the allies +in Belgium, in 1815; the line of the Marne, in 1814, are examples of +temporary lines of defence.</p> + +<p>It will be seen from these remarks that lines of defence are not +necessarily bases of operation.</p> + +<p><i>Strategic positions</i> are such as are taken up during the operations of +a war, either by a <i>corps d'armée</i> or grand detachment, for the purpose +of checking or observing an opposing force; they are named thus to +distinguish them from tactical positions or fields of battle. The +positions of Napoleon at Rivoli, Verona, and Legnano, in 1796 and 1797, +to watch the Adige; his positions on the Passarge, in 1807, and in +Saxony and Silesia in front of his line of defence, in 1813; and +Massena's positions on the Albis, along the Limmat and the Aar, in 1799, +are examples under this head.</p> + +<p>Before proceeding further it may be well to illustrate the strategic +relations of lines and positions by the use of diagrams.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 1.</a>) The army at A covers the whole of the ground in rear of the +line DC perpendicular to the line AB, the position of the enemy being at +B.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 2.</a>) AJ being equal to BJ, A will still cover every thing in rear +of DC.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 3.</a>) If the army A is obliged to cover the point <i>a</i>, the army B +will cover all the space without the circle whose radius is <i>a</i>B; and of +course A continues to cover the point <i>a</i> so long as it remains within +this circle <i>a</i>B.</p> + +<p><i>A line of operations</i> embraces that portion of the theatre of war which +an army or <i>corps d'armée</i> passes over in attaining its object; <i>the +front of operations</i> is the front formed by the army as it advances on +this line.</p> + +<p>When an army acts as a single mass, without forming independent corps, +the line it follows is denominated a <i>simple line of operations</i>.</p> + +<p>If two or more corps act in an isolated manner, but against the same +opposing force, they are said to follow <i>double</i> or <i>multiple lines</i>.</p> + +<p>The lines by which Moreau and Jourdan entered Germany in 1796, were +double lines; but Napoleon's advance by Bamberg and Gera, in 1806, +although moving in seven distinct <i>corps d'armée,</i> formed but a single +line of operations.</p> + +<p><i>Interior lines of operations</i> are those followed by an army which +operates between the enemy's lines in such a way as to be able to +concentrate his forces on one of these lines before the other can be +brought to its assistance. For example, Napoleon's line of operations +in 1814, between the Marne and the Seine, where he manœuvred with so +much skill and success against the immensely superior forces of the +allies.</p> + +<p><i>Exterior lines</i> present the opposite results; they are those which an +army will form in moving on the extremities of the opposing masses. For +example, the lines of the Marne and the Seine, followed by the army of +Silesia and the grand Austro-Russian army, in the campaign of 1814. +Burgoyne's line of operations, in 1777, was double and exterior.</p> + +<p><i>Concentric lines</i> are such as start from distant points, and are +directed towards the same object, either in the rear or in advance of +their base.</p> + +<p>If a mass leaves a single point and separates into several distinct +corps, taking divergent directions, it is said to pursue <i>eccentric +lines</i>.</p> + +<p>Lines are said to be <i>deep</i>, when the end to be attained is very distant +from the base.</p> + +<p>The lines followed by a secondary or auxiliary force are denominated +<i>secondary lines</i>.</p> + +<p>The lines pursued by the army of the Sombre-et-Meuse in 1796, and by +Bagration in 1812, were <i>secondary lines</i>, as the former were merely +secondary to the army of the Rhine, and the latter to that of Barclay.</p> + +<p><i>Accidental lines</i> are those which result from a change in the primitive +plan of campaign, which give a new direction to the operations. These +are of rare occurrence, but they sometimes lead to important results.</p> + +<p>The direction given to a line of operations depends not only on the +geographical situation of the country, but also on the positions +occupied by the enemy. The general plan of campaign is frequently +determined on previous to beginning operations, but the choice of lines +and positions must ordinarily result from the ulterior events of the +war, and be made by the general as these events occur.</p> + +<p>As a general rule, <i>a line of operations should be directed upon the +centre</i>, or <i>one of the extremities of the enemy's line of defence</i>; +unless our forces be infinitely superior in number, it would be absurd +to act against the front and extremities at the same time.</p> + +<p>If the configuration of the theatre of operations be favorable to a +movement against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence, this +direction maybe best calculated to lead to important results. (<a href=images/451.gif>Fig.4.</a>)</p> + +<p>In 1800 the army of the Rhine was directed against the extreme left of +the line of the Black Forest; the army of reserve was directed by the +St. Bernard and Milan on the extreme right and rear of Melas's line of +defence: both operations were most eminently successful. (<a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 5.</a>)</p> + +<p>It may be well to remark that it is not enough merely to gain the +extremity and rear of the enemy, for in that case it may be possible for +him to throw himself on our communications and place us in the very +dilemma in which we had hoped to involve him. To avoid this danger it is +necessary to give such a direction to the line of operations that our +army shall preserve its communications and be able to reach its base.</p> + +<p>Thus, if Napoleon, in 1800, after crossing the Alps, had marched by +Turin on Alexandria and received battle at Marengo, without having first +secured Lombardy and the left of the Po, his own line of retreat would +have been completely cut off by Melas; whereas, by the direction which +he gave to his line of operations he had, in case of reverse, every +means for reaching either the Var or the Valois. (<a href=images/453.gif>Fig. 6.</a>) Again, in +1806, if he had marched directly from Gera to Leipsic, he would have +been cut off from his base on the Rhine; whereas, by turning from Gera +towards Weimar, he not only cut off the Prussians from the Elbe, but at +the same time secured to himself the roads of Saalfield, Schleitz, and +Hoff, thus rendering perfectly safe his communications in his rear. +(<a href=images/453.gif>Fig. 7.</a>)</p> + +<p>We have said that the configuration of the ground and the position of +the hostile forces may <i>sometimes</i> render it advisable to direct our +line of operations against the extremity of the enemy's line of defence; +but, <i>as a general rule</i> a central direction will lead to more important +results. This severs the enemy's means of resistance, and enables the +assailant to strike, with the mass of his force, upon the dissevered and +partially paralyzed members of the hostile body. (<a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 8.</a>)</p> + +<p>Such a plan of operations enabled Napoleon, in the Italian campaigns of +1796 and 1797, to pierce and destroy, with a small force, the large and +successive armies which Austria sent against him. In 1805 his operations +were both interior and central: in 1808 they were most eminently +central: in 1809, by the central operations in the vicinity of +Ratisbonne, he defeated the large and almost victorious army of the +Archduke Charles: in 1814, from his central position between the Marne +and Seine, with only seventy thousand men against a force of more than +two hundred thousand, he gained numerous victories, and barely failed of +complete success. Again in 1815, with an army of only one hundred and +twenty thousand men against an allied force of two hundred and twenty +thousand, by his central advance on Charleroi and Ligny, he gained a +most decided advantage over the enemy—an advantage lost by the +eccentric movement of Grouchy: and even in 1813, his central position at +Dresden would have secured him most decisive advantages, had not the +faults of his lieutenants lost these advantages in the disasters of Kulm +and the Katzbach.</p> + +<p>For the same frontier it is objectionable to form more than one army; +grand detachments and corps of observation may frequently be used with +advantage, but double or multiple lines of operation are far less +favorable than one simple line. It may however sometimes occur that the +position of the enemy's forces will be such as to make this operation +the preferable one. In that case, interior lines should always be +adopted, unless we have a vast superiority in number. Double exterior +lines, with corps several days' march asunder, must be fatal, if the +enemy, whether acting on single or double interior lines, take advantage +of his position to concentrate his masses successively against our +isolated forces. The Roman armies under the consuls Flaminius and +Servilius opposed Hannibal on exterior lines, the one by Florence and +Arrezzio, and the other by Modena and Ariminum. Hannibal turned the +position of Flaminius and attacked the Roman armies separately, gaining +a complete and decisive victory. Such also was the character of the +operations of the French in 1795, under Pichegru and Jourdan; they met +with a bloody and decisive defeat. Again in 1796, the French armies +under Jourdan and Moreau, pursued exterior lines; the Archduke Charles, +from his interior position, succeeded in defeating both the opposing +generals, and forcing them to retreat. If the two armies united had +pursued a single line, the republican flag had been carried in triumph +to Vienna.</p> + +<p><i>Converging</i> lines of operation are preferable, under most +circumstances, to diverging lines. Care should be taken, however, that +the point of meeting be such that it may not be taken as a strategic +position by the enemy, and our own forces be destroyed in detail, before +they can effect a junction. In 1797 the main body of the Austrians, +under Alvinzi, advanced against Napoleon, on three separate lines, +intending to concentrate at Rivoli, and then attack the French in mass; +but Napoleon took his strategic position at Rivoli, and overthrew the +enemy's corps as they successively appeared. In the same way the +Archduke Charles took an interior position, between Moreau and Jourdan, +in 1796, and prevented them from concentrating their forces on a single +point. Wurmser and Quasdanowich attempted to concentrate their forces on +the Mincio, by moving on the opposite shores of Lake Garda; but Napoleon +took an interior position and destroyed them. In 1815 Blucher and +Wellington, from their interior position, prevented the junction of +Napoleon and Grouchy.</p> + +<p><i>Diverging</i> lines may be employed with advantage against an enemy +immediately after a successful battle or strategic manœuvre; for by +this means we separate the enemy's forces, and disperse them; and if +occasion should require it, may again concentrate our forces by +converging lines. Such was the manœuvre of Frederick the Great, in +1757, which produced the battles of Rosbach and Leuthen; such also was +the manœuvre of Napoleon at Donawert in 1805, at Jena in 1806, and at +Ratisbon in 1809.</p> + +<p><i>Interior</i> lines of operations, when properly conducted, have almost +invariably led to success: indeed every instance of failure may be +clearly traced to great unskilfulness in their execution, or to other +extraneous circumstances of the campaign. There may, however, be cases +where it will be preferable to direct our forces on the enemy's flank; +the geographical character of the theatre of war, the position of other +collateral forces, &c., rendering such a direction necessary. But as a +general rule, interior and central lines, for an army of moderate +forces, will lead to decisive results.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's Italian campaigns in 1796 and 1797, the campaign of the +Archduke Charles in 1796, Napoleon's campaigns of 1805 and 1809 against +Austria, and of 1806 and 1807 against Prussia and Russia, of 1808 in +Spain, his manœuvres in 1814, between the battle of Brienne and that +of Paris, and his operations previous to the Battle of Ligny in 1815, +are all brilliant examples under this head.</p> + +<p>To change the line of operations, in the middle of a campaign, and +follow <i>accidental lines</i>, is always a delicate affair, and can only be +resorted to by a general of great skill, and with disciplined troops. In +such a case it may be attended with important results. It was one of +Napoleon's maxims, that "a line of operations, when once chosen, should +never be abandoned." This maxim, however, must sometimes be disregarded +by an army of undisciplined troops, in order to avoid entire +destruction; but the total abandonment of a line of operations is always +attended with great loss, and should be regarded as a mere choice of +evils. A regular army can always avoid this result, by changing the +direction of its line; thus frequently gaining superior advantages in +the new theatre of action. If the plan of this change be the result of a +good <i>coup d'oeil</i>, and it be skilfully executed, the rear of the +operating army will be secure from the enemy; and moreover, he will be +left in doubt respecting its weak points. But such is the uncertainty of +this manœuvre, that it is very rarely taken by the best troops, unless +actually forced upon them. If the army be of incongruous materials, +generally a change of direction will be less advantageous than to +entirely abandon the line, and save as many as possible of the troops +for some new plan of operations. (Maxim 20.) If, however, the +undisciplined army be sustained by fortifications, it can take up the +<i>accidental line of operations</i> in the same manner, and with the same +probability of success, as is done by a regular force.</p> + +<p>We have examples of accidental lines in the operations of the king of +Prussia, after the battle of Hohenkirchen, and of Washington, in +New-Jersey, after the action of Princeton. This is one of the finest in +military history. Napoleon had projected a change in his line of +operations, in case he lost the battle of Austerlitz; but victory +rendered its execution unnecessary. Again in 1814 he had planned an +entire change of operations; but the want of co-operation of the forces +under Mortier and Marmont forced him to abandon a plan which, if +properly executed, had probably defeated the allies. Jomini pronounced +it one of the most brilliant of his military career.</p> + +<p>Having explained the principal terms used in strategy, let us trace out +the successive operations of war in their usual strategic relations.</p> + +<p>We will suppose war to be declared, and the army to be just entering +upon a campaign. The political and military authorities of the state +determine upon the nature of the war, and select the theatre of its +enterprises. The chief selects certain points, on or near the borders of +the seat of war, where his troops are to be assembled, and his +<i>materiel</i> collected. These points, together, form his base of +operations. He now selects some point, within the theatre of the war, as +the first object of his enterprises, and chooses the line of operations +most advantageous for reaching this objective point. The temporary +positions taken on this line become strategic positions, and the line in +his rear, a line of defence. When he arrives in the vicinity of his +first object, and the enemy begins to oppose his enterprises, he must +force this enemy to retreat, either by an attack or by manœuvres. For +this purpose he temporarily adopts certain lines of manœuvre, which may +deviate from his general line of operations. The ulterior events of the +campaign may possibly cause him to make these new, or accidental lines, +his lines of operations. The approach of hostile forces may cause him to +detach secondary corps on secondary lines; or to divide his army, and +pursue double or multiple lines. The primitive object may also be +relinquished, and new ones proposed, with new lines and new plans of +operations. As he advances far from his primitive base, he forms new +dépôts and lines of magazines. He may encounter natural and artificial +obstacles. To cross large rivers in the face of an enemy is a hazardous +operation; and he requires all the art of the engineer in constructing +bridges, and securing a safe passage for his army. If a fortified place +is to be taken, he will detach a siege corps, and either continue his +march with the main army, or take a strategic position to cover this +siege. Thus Napoleon, in 1796, with an army of only 50,000 combatants, +could not venture to penetrate into Austria, with Mantua and its +garrison of 25,000 men in his rear, and an Austrian force of 40,000 +before him. But in 1806 the great superiority of his army enabled him to +detach forces to besiege the principal fortresses of Silesia, and still +to continue his operations with his principal forces. The chief of the +army may meet the enemy under circumstances such as to induce or compel +him to give battle. If he should be victorious, the enemy must be +pursued and harassed to the uttermost. If he should be defeated, he must +form the best plan, and provide the best means of retreat. If possible, +he must take shelter in some line of fortifications, and prepare to +resume the offensive. Lines of intrenchment and temporary works may +sometimes serve him as a sufficient protection. Finally, when the +unfavorable season compels him to suspend his operations, he will go +into winter cantonments, and prepare for a new campaign.</p> + +<p>Such are the ordinary operations of war: its relations to strategy must +be evident, even to the most superficial reader.</p> + +<p>Not unfrequently the results of a campaign depend more upon the +strategic operations of an army, than upon its victories gained in +actual combat. Tactics, or movements within the range of the enemy's +cannon, is therefore subordinate to the <i>choice of positions</i>: if the +field of battle be properly chosen, success will be decisive, and the +loss of the battle not disastrous; whereas, if selected without +reference to the principles of the science, the victory, if gained, +might be barren, and defeat, if suffered, totally fatal: thus +demonstrating the truth of Napoleon's maxim, that success is oftener due +to the genius of the general, and to the nature of the theatre of war, +than to the number and bravery of the soldiers. (Maxim 17, 18.)</p> + +<p>We have a striking illustration of this in the French army of the +Danube, which, from the left wing of General Kray, marched rapidly +through Switzerland to the right extremity of the Austrian line, "and by +this movement alone conquered all the country between the Rhine and +Danube without pulling a trigger."</p> + +<p>Again, in 1805, the army of Mack was completely paralyzed, and the main +body forced to surrender, at Ulm, without a single important battle. In +1806, the Prussians were essentially defeated even before the battle of +Jena. The operations about Heilesberg, in 1807, the advance upon Madrid, +in 1808, the manœuvres about Ratisbon, in 1809, the operations of the +French in 1814, and the first part of the campaign of 1815, against +vastly superior numbers, are all familiar proofs of the truth of the +maxim.</p> + +<p>Strategy may therefore be regarded as the most important, though least +understood, of all the branches of the military art.<a name="FNanchor_4_4"></a><a href="#Footnote_4_4"><sup>[4]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_4_4"></a><a href="#FNanchor_4_4">[4]</a><div class="note"><p> Strategy may be learned from didactic works or from general +military histories. There are very few good elementary works on this +branch of the military art. The general treatises of the Archduke +Charles, and of General Wagner, in German, (the former has been +translated into French,) are considered as the best. The discussions of +Jomini on this subject in his great work on the military art, are +exceedingly valuable; also the writings of Rocquancourt, Jacquinot de +Presle, and Gay de Vernon. The last of these has been translated into +English, but the translation is exceedingly inaccurate. The military +histories of Lloyd, Templehoff, Jomini, the Archduke Charles, Grimoard, +Gravert, Souchet, St. Cyr, Beauvais, Laverne, Stutterheim, Wagner, +Kausler, Gourgaud and Montholon, Foy, Mathieu Dumas, Ségur, Pelet, Koch, +Clausewitz, and Thiers, may be read with great advantage. Napier's +History of the Peninsular War is the only English History that is of any +value as a <i>military</i> work: it is a most excellent book. Alison's great +History of Europe is utterly worthless to the military man; the author +is ignorant of the first principles of the military art, and nearly +every page is filled with the grossest blunders. +</p><p> +We subjoin the titles of a few of the best works that treat of strategy, +either directly or in connection with military history. +</p><p> +<i>Principes de la Stratégie, &c.</i>, par le Prince Charles, traduit de +l'Allemand, 3 vols. in 8vo. This is a work of great merit. The technical +terms, however, are very loosely employed. +</p><p> +<i>Précis de l'Art de la Guerre</i>, par le Baron Jomini. His chapter on +strategy embodies the principles of this branch of the art. +</p><p> +<i>Grundsätze der Strategic</i>, Von Wagner. +</p><p> +<i>Cours Elémentaire d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire</i>, par Rocquancourt. +This work contains much valuable information connected with the history +of the art of war; but it is far too diffuse and ill-arranged for an +elementary book. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'Art et d'Histoire Militaire</i>, par Jacquinot de Presle. This +work is especially designed for cavalry officers, and the other branches +of military service are but very briefly discussed. +</p><p> +De Vernon's Treatise on the Science of War and Fortification contains +much valuable information; but, as an elementary book, it has the same +objections as that of Rocquancourt. +</p><p> +<i>History of the Seven Years' War</i>, by Lloyd and Templehoff. The military +writings of Lloyd and Templehoff are valuable as connected with the +history of strategy; but many of the principles laid down by these +writers are now regarded as erroneous. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires de Napoléon</i>. The Memoirs of Napoleon, as dictated by himself +to Gourgaud and Montholon, have been translated into English. It is +hardly necessary to remark that they contain all the general principles +of military art and science. No military man should fail to study them +thoroughly. The matter is so condensed, and important principles are +embodied in so few words, that they are not easily understood by the +ordinary reader, and probably will never be popular with the multitude. +</p><p> +<i>Essai général de Tactique</i>, par Guibert. A work very popular in its +day, but now far less valuable than the writings already mentioned. +</p><p> +<i>Ausführliche Beschreibung der Schlacht des Pirmasens</i>, von Gravert. +Regarded by military men as a valuable historical fragment. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur les Campagnes en Espagne</i>. Souchet. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires de Gouvion St. Cyr.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Statistique de la Guerre</i>, par Reveroni St. Cyr. +</p><p> +<i>Première Campagnes de la Revolution</i>, par Grimoard. +</p><p> +<i>Victoires et Conquêtes</i>. Beauvais. +</p><p> +<i>Campagnes de Suwarrow</i>. Laverne. +</p><p> +<i>Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule</i>. Foy. +</p><p> +<i>Précis des Evénements Militaires</i>. Mathieu Dumas. +</p><p> +<i>Histoire de Napoléon et de la Grande Armée en 1812</i>. Ségur +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1809</i>. Pelet. +</p><p> +<i>La Campagne de 1814</i>. Koch. +</p><p> +<i>Vom Kriege—Die Feldzügge, &c.</i> Clausewitz. +</p><p> +<i>La Révolution, le Consulat et l'Empire.</i> Thiers. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur la Guerre de 1812—sur la Campagne du Vice roi en Italie, +en 1813 et 1814; Histoire de la Guerre en Allemagne en 1814; Histoire +des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815, en France</i>. Vaudoncourt. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur l'Art Militaire, &c.</i> Carion-Nisas. +</p><p> +<i>Histoire de l'Expédition en Russie en 1812</i>. Chambray. +</p><p> +<i>War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France</i>. John Jones. +</p><p> +<i>Peninsular War</i>. Napier. +</p><p> +<i>Notices of the War of 1812</i>. Armstrong +</p><p> +All the above are works of merit; but none are more valuable to the +military man than the military histories of Jomini and Kausler, with +their splendid diagrams and maps.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_III"></a><h2>CHAPTER III.</h2> + +<p>FORTIFICATIONS.</p> + +<br> + +<p><i>Fortifications, or engineering</i>, may be considered with reference to +the defence of states and the grand operation of armies; or with +reference to the details of the construction, and attack, and defence of +forts, and the influence of field-works on the tactical manœuvres of +armies. It is proposed to speak here only of its general character, as a +branch of the military art, without entering into any professional +discussion of details.</p> + +<p>The connection of fortification and strategy may be considered under two +distinct heads: 1st, the choice of sites for constructing fortresses for +defence; 2d, their influence in offensive operations, and the +determination of the question whether they can be passed with safety, or +whether the attacking force will be under the necessity of besieging +them.</p> + +<p>The centre and extremities of <i>a base of operations</i> should always be +secured either by natural or artificial obstacles. This base is +generally chosen so that fortifications will be necessary for +strengthening only a part of the line. But if a frontier, like the side +of France towards Belgium, be destitute of natural obstacles, the +artificial means of defence must be proportionally increased. Great care +should be taken that permanent fortifications be made only on such +places as may favor military operations. If otherwise, the troops +detached from the active army for garrisoning them, will only tend to +weaken this force without any corresponding advantages. In this way, +fortifications may become actually injurious to defence. A number of the +European fortresses which were built before the subject of strategy was +properly understood, are now regarded as utterly useless, from their +ill-advised positions.</p> + +<p>Whether a fortress may be safely passed with merely blockading or +observing it, depends very much upon the nature of the war, and the +numbers and position of the defensive army. The allies, in 1814, +invading France with a million of soldiers, assisted by the political +diversion of factions and Bourbonists within the kingdom, and treason in +the frontier fortresses, and even in the ranks of Napoleon's army, could +conduct their military operations on a very different plan from that +which would be adopted by either Austria, Prussia, Russia, England, +Spain, Portugal, Holland, Italy, and the German powers, if singly waging +war with the French. Napoleon sometimes detached a corps to observe a +fortress which threatened his line of operations or of manœuvre; at +others, he delayed his advance till the place could be reduced.</p> + +<p>"An army," says Jomini, "may sometimes penetrate between places on an +open frontier, to attack the enemy's forces in the field, taking care at +the same time to <i>observe</i> these places; but no invading army can cross +a great river, like the Danube, the Rhine, or the Elbe, without reducing +at least one of the fortresses on that river, so as to secure a line of +retreat; but being in possession of such a place, it can continue the +offensive, while its <i>matériel de siège</i> successively reduces the other +places."</p> + +<p>In case the main army is obliged to remain and cover the besieging +corps, it should take some central position, where it can command all +the avenues of approach, and fall with vigor on the enemy, should he +attempt to raise the siege. Napoleon's operations before Mantua, in +1796, offer the finest model for imitation.</p> + +<p>The old system of intrenched camps and lines of contravallation is +unsuited to the spirit of modern warfare. In ancient times, and more +particularly in the middle ages, too much importance was attached to +tactical positions, and not enough to strategic points and lines. This +gave to fortifications a character that never properly belonged to them. +From the middle ages down to the period of the French Revolution, wars +were carried on mainly by the system of positions—one party confining +their operations to the security of certain important places, while the +other directed their whole attention to the siege and capture of these +places. But Carnot and Napoleon changed this system, at the same time +with the system of tactics, or rather, returned from it to the old and +true system of strategic operations. Some men, looking merely at the +fact that a <i>change</i> was made, but without examining the <i>character</i> of +that change, have rushed headlong to the conclusion that fortified +places are now utterly useless in war, military success depending +entirely upon a good system of marches.</p> + +<p>On this subject, General Jomini, the great military historian of the +wars of the French Revolution, remarks that "we should depend entirely +upon neither organized masses, nor upon material obstacles, whether +natural or artificial. To follow exclusively either of these systems +would be equally absurd. The true science of war consists in choosing a +just medium between the two extremes. The wars of Napoleon demonstrated +the great truth, that distance can protect no country from invasion, but +that a state, to be secure, must have a good system of fortresses, and a +good system of military reserves and military institutions."</p> + +<p>In all military operations <i>time</i> is of vast importance. If a single +division of an army can be retarded for a few hours only, it not +unfrequently decides the fate of the campaign. Had the approach of +Blucher been delayed for a few hours, Napoleon must have been victorious +at the battle of Waterloo. An equilibrium can seldom be sustained for +more than six or seven hours between forces on the field of battle; but +in this instance, the state of the ground rendered the movements so +slow as to prolong the battle for about twelve hours; thus enabling the +allies to effect a concentration in time to save Wellington.</p> + +<p>Many of Napoleon's brilliant victories resulted from merely bringing +troops to bear suddenly upon some decisive point. Rivoli in 1796-7, +Marengo in 1800, Ulm in 1805, Jena in 1806, Ratisbon in 1809, Brienne in +1814, and Ligny in 1815, are familiar examples. But this concentration +of forces, even with a regular army, cannot be calculated on by the +general with any degree of certainty, unless his communications are +perfectly secure. And this difficulty is very much increased where the +troops are new and undisciplined. When a country like ours is invaded, +large numbers of such troops must suddenly be called into the field. Not +knowing the designs of the invaders, much time will be lost in marches +and countermarches; and if there be no safe places of resort the +operations must be indecisive and insecure.</p> + +<p>To a defensive army fortifications are valuable as points of repose, +upon which the troops, if beaten, may fall back, and shelter their sick +and wounded, collect their scattered forces, repair their materials, and +draw together a new supply of stores and provisions; and as rallying +points, where new troops may be assembled with safety, and the army, in +a few days, be prepared to again meet the enemy in the open field. +Without these defences, undisciplined and inexperienced armies, when +once routed, can seldom be rallied again, except with great losses. But +when supported by forts, they can select their opportunity for fighting, +and offer or refuse battle according to the probability of success; and, +having a safe place of retreat, they are far less influenced by fear in +the actual conflict.</p> + +<p>The enemy, on the other hand, being compelled either to besiege or +<i>observe</i> these works, his army will be separated from its magazines, +its strength and efficiency diminished by detachments, and his whole +force exposed to the horrors of partisan warfare. It has therefore been +estimated by the best military writers, that an army supported by a +judicious system of fortifications, can repel a land force <i>six</i> times +as large as itself.</p> + +<p>Every government should prepare, in time of peace, its most prominent +and durable means of defence. By securing in a permanent manner its +important points, it will enable a small force to retain possession of +these places against a greatly superior army, for a considerable length +of time. This serves the same purpose as a battle gained; for, in the +beginning of a war of invasion, the economy of time is of the utmost +importance to the defensive party, enabling it to organize and prepare +the great military resources of the state.</p> + +<p>In all mountainous frontiers, or sides of states bordering on large +rivers, or chains of lakes, there will necessarily be but few points by +which an invader can penetrate into the interior of the country. Let us +suppose that, for a frontier of moderate extent, there are <i>five</i> +passes, or avenues through which the enemy may approach the interior. To +effectually defend these approaches against the invading army will +require, for each, an army of ten thousand men. Not being able to decide +positively on the plans of the enemy, all these communications must be +defended at the same time. This requires a defending army of fifty +thousand men. Let us now suppose each of these passes to be fortified in +such a way, that one thousand men will be able to hold the enemy in +check, and force him to resort to the operations of a siege; or, at +least, to retard his advance till an active army can be organized in the +interior, and prepared to meet him in the field. We here see that five +thousand men, by means of fortifications, can accomplish the same +defensive object as fifty thousand men without these artificial means of +security.</p> + +<p>But let us enter a little more into the details of frontier defences, +and examine the character of the several systems which have been +successively proposed or adopted. Frontiers are divided into four +distinct classes, according as the state may be open on one or more +sides, or bounded by mountains, large rivers and lakes, or by the sea.</p> + +<p>An open frontier is the most difficult of defence; and while there +exists a perfect uniformity among military men upon the vast importance +of fortifying such a frontier, there is an equal diversity of opinion +respecting the best manner of arranging these works. We shall here +mention three general systems of arranging forts for the defence of an +open country, each of which has been advocated at different times, and +afterwards received various modifications and additions. These three +systems comprise the main features of all others worthy of much +consideration. They are:—</p> +<br> + +<p>1st. The system of continuous lines, proposed by Montalembert.</p> + +<p>2d. A system of three lines of detached works, strongly recommended by +D'Arçon and others.</p> + +<p>3d. A system proposed by Vauban, and advocated by Rogniat, consisting of +lines of very strong works, placed at considerable distances from each +other and covering large <i>intrenched camps</i>.</p> +<br> + +<p>The first of these systems was proposed in 1790, and for a time +attracted considerable notice in France, but has long since been +discarded, as being utterly incompatible with the principles of the +military art. A writer, however, of some pretensions in this country, +recommends its adoption for the defence of Baltimore and the shores of +the Chesapeake. The same author would dispense entirely with our +present system of fortifications on the sea-coast, and substitute in +their place wooden Martello towers! This would be very much like +building 120 gun ships at Pittsburg and Memphis, for the defence of the +Ohio and the Mississippi rivers, and sending out duck-boats to meet the +enemy on the Atlantic!</p> + +<p>In the second system, the works on the extreme frontier are to be placed +about thirty or forty miles apart, and those of the second and third +lines respectively thirty or forty miles in rear of the first and second +lines, and opposite the intervals.</p> + +<p>In the third system, first recommended by Vauban and more recently by +Rogniat, the works are to be arranged in the same manner as in that of +D'Arçon, but the distance between them is to be from seventy to one +hundred miles, and each fort arranged for covering a large intrenched +camp.</p> + +<p>Either of these last two systems is well suited to the defence of an +open frontier. The former is applied to the side of France towards +Belgium, and the latter, with certain modifications, to the defence of +Western Germany. The first line of fortifications on the northern +frontier of France consists of Dunkirk, Lille, Valenciennes, Condé, +Quesnoy, Rocroi, Charlemont, Mézières, and Sedan; the second line, of +Calais, Andres, St. Omer, Béthune, Arras, Douai, Chambrai, Landrecies, +and Avesnes; the third line, of Boulogne, Montreuil, Hesdin, Abbeville, +Amiens, Bapaume, Peronne, Ham, and Laon.</p> + +<p>For mountainous frontiers it is deemed necessary to secure all the +important passes with small redoubts or military works, and to defend +with strong forts the grand interior strategic points on which these +communications are directed. For a frontier of moderate extent there may +be some six or eight gorges in the mountains by which an army might +penetrate; but it will always be found that these roads concentrate on +two or three points in the great valleys below. Take, for example, the +frontier of France towards Switzerland and Italy. The passes of the +mountains are secured by the little works of Fort L'Ecluse, Fort +Pierre-châtel, Fort Barraux, Briançon, Mont Dauphin, Colmars, Entrevaux, +and Antibes; while Besançon, Grenoble, and Toulon, form a second line; +and Lyons a grand central dépôt.</p> + +<p>Where a great river or chain of lakes forms the boundary of a state, the +system of defence will be much the same as that of an open land +frontier, the works of the first line being made to secure the great +bridges or ferries by which the enemy might effect a passage; those of +the second line, to cover the passes of the highlands that generally +approach more or less near the great watercourse; and those of the third +line, far enough in rear to protect the great internal communications of +the country. Let us take, for example, the side of France bordering on +the Rhine. Wissembourg and Lauterbourg, Fort Louis, Haguenau, +Strasbourg, Schelstadt, Neuf-Brisach, and Huneguen, cover the several +passages of the river; while Bitche, Phalsbourg, and Béfort form a +second line; Thionville, Metz, and Toul, a third line; and Verdun a +grand central dépôt.</p> + +<p>The following are the principal objects proposed to be accomplished by +fortifications on a sea-coast.</p> + +<p>1st. To close all important harbors to an enemy, and secure them to the +navy of the country.</p> + +<p>2d. To prevent the enemy from forming an establishment on our shores, +from which, by his naval superiority, he might destroy our commerce and +keep the whole frontier in continual alarm.</p> + +<p>3d. To cover our great cities against a maritime attack and bombardment.</p> + +<p>4th. To cover our ship-yards and great naval dépôts. </p> + +<p>5th. To prevent, as much as possible, the great avenues of interior +navigation from being blockaded by naval means at their entrance into +the ocean.</p> + +<p>6th. To give to our navy facilities for protecting our coast trade from +the enemy's ships of war, and our internal communications, which lie +near the coast, from maritime descents.</p> +<br> + +<p>Let us notice how France has attempted to accomplish this object. The +Mediterranean frontier has Fort Quarré, Fort St. Marguérite, St. Tropez, +Brigançon, the forts of Point Man, of l'Ertissac, and of Langoustier, +Toulon, St. Nicholas, Castle of If, Marseilles, Tour de Boue, +Aigues-Montes, Fort St. Louis, Fort Brescou, Narbonne, Château de +Salces, Perpignan, Collioure, Fort St. Elme, and Port Vendre. Toulon is +the great naval dépôt for this frontier, and Marseilles the great +commercial port. Both are well secured by strong fortifications. The +Atlantic frontier has Bayonne; the forts of Royan, Grave, Medoc, Paté, +&c., on the Gironde; Rochefort, with the forts of Chapus, Lapin, Aix, +Oleron, &c., to cover the roadstead; La Rochelle, with the forts of the +Isle of Ré; Sables, with the forts of St. Nicholas, and Des Moulines, +Isle Dieu, Belle Isle, Fort du Pilier, Mindin, Ville Martin; Quiberon, +with Fort Penthièvre; L'Orient, with its harbor defences; Fort Cigogne; +Brest, with its harbor defences; St. Malo, with Forts Cézembre, La +Canchée, L'Anse du Verger, and Des Rimains; Cherbourg, with its +defensive forts and batteries; Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and +Dunkirk. Cherbourg, Brest, and Rochefort, are great naval dépôts; and +Havre, Nantes, and Bordeaux, the principal commercial ports. Many of the +works above enumerated are small in extent and antiquated in their +construction, and some of them quite old and dilapidated nevertheless, +they have heretofore been found sufficient for the defence of the naval +dépôts and commercial seaports of France against the superior naval +forces of her neighbor.</p> + +<p>Omitting for the present all discussion of sea-coast defences, let us +examine more particularly the character and influence of fortifications +on land frontiers.</p> + +<p>All military writers agree that fortifications have heretofore exerted a +great, and frequently a decisive, influence on the operations of a war. +Those of France are frequently referred to as proofs of this influence. +But, while all are disposed to allow that these works contributed much +in former times to the defence of states, yet some have said that modern +improvements in the mode of attack have rendered forts far less valuable +than formerly.</p> + +<p>Such, however, is not the case. Improvements in the mode of attack have +not kept pace with the facilities of locomotion; and, although +fortifications do not now usually sustain a siege of as <i>many days</i> as +in former times, still, as compared with the relative lengths of +campaigns in ancient and modern wars, the <i>proportional</i> length of +sieges is now even <i>greater</i> than formerly. When the same is +accomplished in a campaign of seven weeks as was formerly done in a war +of seven years, it is not necessary that fortified places should hold +out a very long time. A place that can sustain a siege of a month is now +deemed sufficiently strong for ordinary campaigns; for by the end of +that time the defensive army will either be destroyed, or be able to +come to its succor. In either case a longer defence would not be +required.</p> + +<p>A reference to the most important sieges of the last century or two will +show that forts are, on an average, capable of sustaining a siege for +more than that length of time. Lille, in 1708, held the allies in check +for a whole year; and again, in 1792, compelled the Austrians to raise +the siege after an unsuccessful attack of fifteen days.</p> + +<p>Antwerp, in 1585, sustained a siege of fourteen months against greatly +superior forces; in 1814 Carnot defended the citadel of this place for +four months, and until an armistice had been concluded between the +contending parties; in 1832, it sustained, with a garrison of only 4,500 +men and 145 pieces of ordnance, a siege of twenty-five days, against a +force of 55,000 men and 223 cannon.</p> + +<p>Namur, near the end of the seventeenth century, sustained a siege of ten +weeks.</p> + +<p>Ismaïl, in 1790, sustained a siege of more than two months against the +Russians.</p> + +<p>Maestricht, in 1793, sustained a siege of nearly two weeks; and again, +in 1794, sustained a blockade and siege of nearly two months.</p> + +<p>Magdeburg, in the thirty years' war, resisted the army of Wallenstein +for seven months; and in 1813-14, although garrisoned by only 4,000 men, +it for a long time resisted the overwhelming forces of the allies.</p> + +<p>Dantzic, at the same time, sustained a siege against superior forces for +more than nine months.</p> + +<p>Landau, in 1793, sustained a siege of nine months.</p> + +<p>Valenciennes and Mayence, in 1793, each sustained a siege of about three +months.</p> + +<p>Charleroi, Fort Vauban, and L'Ecluse, in 1794, each sustained a siege of +about thirty days.</p> + +<p>Quesnoy, in 1794, sustained a siege of about three weeks.</p> + +<p>Rosas, in 1795, sustained a siege of some seventy days.</p> + +<p>Mantua, in 1796-7, protected from invasion, for eight months, the Tyrol +and the heart of the Austrian monarchy.</p> + +<p>Kehl and Huninguen, in 1796, sheltered Moreau for three months against +all the efforts of the Archduke Charles.</p> + +<p>St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, sustained a siege of sixty days of open +trench.</p> + +<p>Ulm, in 1800, held Moreau in check for more than a month.</p> + +<p>Genoa, in 1800, sustained a blockade of sixty and a siege of forty days.</p> + +<p>Saragossa in 1808 sustained a close siege of near two months; and in +1809 it was again besieged for two months.</p> + +<p>Rosas in 1808 sustained a siege of thirty days.</p> + +<p>Gerona in 1809 sustained a siege and blockade of seven months, nearly +four of them being of open trench.</p> + +<p>Mequinenza (a very small work) in 1810 sustained a siege of more than +two weeks.</p> + +<p>Astorga in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days; twenty-four being of +open trench.</p> + +<p>Lerida in 1810 sustained a siege of thirty days, two weeks being of open +trench.</p> + +<p>Ciudad Rodrigo in 1810 sustained a siege of two months.</p> + +<p>Almeida in 1810 sustained a siege of more than a month.</p> + +<p>Tortosa in 1810 sustained a siege of six months.</p> + +<p>Tarragona in 1811 sustained a siege of nearly two months.</p> + +<p>Badajos in 1811 sustained a siege of more than forty days open trench.</p> + +<p>Lerida in 1811 sustained a siege of two weeks open trench.</p> + +<p>Saguntum in 1811 sustained a siege of a month.</p> + +<p>Valencia in 1811-12 sustained a siege of two months</p> + +<p>Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 sustained a blockade of several months, and a +close siege of two weeks.</p> + +<p>Badajos in 1812 sustained twenty-one days of open trenches.</p> + +<p>Burgos in 1812 sustained thirty-three days of open trenches.</p> + +<p>St. Sebastian in 1813 sustained a siege and blockade of nearly three +months, with fifty-nine days of open trenches.</p> + +<p>Pampeluna in 1813 sustained a siege of more than four months.</p> + +<p>Monzon in 1813-14 also sustained a siege of more than four months.</p> + +<p>This list might be increased with numerous other examples, to show that +even poorly fortified towns are capable of defending themselves, on an +average, for more than a month. These examples, be it remembered, are +nearly all taken from a period of history since any material +improvements have been made in the art of attack. Since the time of +Vauban the improvements in attack have not kept pace with the increased +means of defence. Moreover, these examples are taken from the sieges of +towns defended mainly by old and antiquated works, and entirely +incapable of offering the same resistance as detached fortifications, +with all the modern improvements.</p> + +<p>The value of fortifications, as land defences, is sufficiently proved by +showing their general capability of resisting an invader, even for a +limited period; thus affording us time and opportunity to provide other +means of security. But it must not be inferred that forts besieged <i>en +règle</i> will necessarily fall after so many days. Such is far from being +the case. The besieged have usually great advantages over the besiegers; +and unless the latter are vastly superior in number, or the work is of a +very inferior character, or the garrison is destitute of the requisite +means and energy to resist an attack, they will not be taken.</p> + +<p>Mezieres was not taken in 1520; nor Marseilles in 1524; nor Peronne in +1536; nor Landrecies in 1543; nor Metz in 1552; nor Montauban in 1621; +nor Lerida in 1647; nor Maestricht in 1676; nor Vienna in 1529, and +again in 1683; nor Turin in 1706; nor Conde in 1744; nor Lille in 1792; +nor Landau in 1793; nor Ulm in 1800; nor Saragossa in 1808; nor Burgos +in 1812. This list might be extended almost indefinitely with the names +of places that could be reduced neither by force nor by starvation.</p> + +<p>But, as has already been noticed, some have asserted that fortifications +have become of little comparative importance, under the new system of +warfare introduced during the wars of the French Revolution. On this +subject let us consult the opinions of the best military judges of the +present century.</p> + +<p>Napoleon says of fortifications, "they are an excellent means of +retarding, fettering, enfeebling, and disquieting a conquering foe."</p> + +<p>"The possession of strategic points," says the Archduke Charles, "is +decisive in military operations; and the most efficacious means should, +therefore, be employed to defend points whose preservation is the +country's safeguard. This object is accomplished by fortifications, +inasmuch as they can resist, for a given time, with a small number of +troops, every effort of a much larger force; fortifications should, +therefore, be regarded as the basis of a good system of defence." "It +should be a maxim of state policy in every country, to fortify, in time +of peace, all such points, and to arrange them with great care, so that +they can be defended by a small number of troops. For the enemy, knowing +the difficulty of getting possession of these works, will look twice +before he involves himself in a war." "Establishments which can secure +strategic advantages are not the works of a moment; they require time +and labor. He who has the direction of the military forces of a state, +should, in time of peace, prepare for war." "The proper application or +neglect of these principles will decide the safety or the ruin of the +state." "Fortifications arrest the enemy in the pursuit of his object, +and direct his movements on less important points;—he must either force +these fortified lines, or else hazard enterprises upon lines which offer +only disadvantages. In fine, a country secured by a system of defences +truly strategic, has no cause to fear either the invasion or the yoke of +the enemy; for he can advance to the interior of the country only +through great trouble and ruinous efforts. Of course, lines of +fortifications thus arranged cannot shelter a state against all reverses; +but these reverses will not, in this case, be attended by total ruin; +for they cannot take from the state the means nor the time for +collecting new forces; nor can they ever reduce it to the cruel +alternative of submission or destruction."</p> + +<p>"Fortifications," says Jomini, "fulfil two objects of capital +importance,—1st. The protection of the frontiers; and 2d. Assisting the +operations of the army in the field." "Every part of the frontiers of a +state should be secured by one or two great places of refuge, secondary +places, and even small posts for facilitating the active operations of +the armies. Cities girt with walls and slight ditches may often be of +great utility in the interior of a country, as places of deposit, where +stores, magazines, hospitals, &c., may be sheltered from the incursions +of the enemy's light troops. These works are more especially valuable +where such stores, in order not to weaken the regular army by +detachments, are intrusted to the care of raw and militia forces." It is +not supposed that any system of fortifications can hermetically close a +frontier; "but, although they of themselves can rarely present an +absolute obstacle to the advance of the hostile army, yet it is +indisputable that they straiten its movements, change the direction of +its marches, and force it into detachments; while, on the contrary, they +afford all the opposite advantages to the defensive army; they protect +its marches, favor its debouches, cover its magazines, its flanks, and +its movements, and finally furnish it with a place of refuge in time of +need."</p> + +<p>These opinions were uttered, be it remembered, long since the period at +which modern military quacks date the downfall of fortifications as +inland defences, by men, too, who were not engineers, and consequently +had no professional predilections in favor of fortifications. The +Archduke Charles, as a general, knew no rival but Napoleon, and General +Jomini is universally regarded as the first military historian of the +age. The truth of their remarks on fortifications is most fully +confirmed by the military histories of Germany and France.</p> + +<p>For a long period previous to the Thirty Years' War, its strong castles +and fortified cities secured the German empire from attacks from abroad, +except on its extensive frontier, which was frequently assailed, but no +enemy was able to penetrate to the interior till a want of union among +its own princes opened its strongholds to the Swedish conqueror; nor +then, did the cautious Gustavus Adolphus venture far into its +territories till he had obtained possession of all the military works +that might endanger his retreat.</p> + +<p>Again, in the Seven Years' War, when the French neglected to secure +their foothold in Germany, by placing in a state of defence the +fortifications that fell into their power, the first defeat rendered +their ground untenable, and threw them from the Elbe back upon the Rhine +and the Mayne. They afterwards took the precaution to fortify their +positions, and to secure their magazines under shelter of strong places, +and, consequently, were enabled to maintain themselves in the hostile +country till the end of the war, notwithstanding the inefficiency of +their generals, the great reverses they sustained in the field, the +skill and perseverance of the enemy they were contending with, and the +weak and vacillating character of the cabinet that directed them.</p> + +<p>But this system of defence was not so carefully maintained in the latter +part of the eighteenth century, for at the beginning of the French +Revolution, says Jomini, "Germany had too few fortifications; they were +generally of a poor character, and improperly located." France, on the +contrary, was well fortified: and although without armies, and torn in +pieces by domestic factions, (we here use the language of the Archduke,) +"she sustained herself against all Europe; <i>and this was because her +government, since the reign of Louis XIII</i>., <i>had continually labored to +put her frontiers into a defensive condition agreeably to the principles +of strategy</i>; starting from such a system for a basis, she subdued every +country on the continent that was not thus fortified; and this reason +alone will explain how her generals sometimes succeeded in destroying an +army, and even an entire state, merely by a strategic success."</p> + +<p>This may be illustrated by reference to particular campaigns. In 1792, +when the Duke of Brunswick invaded France, she had no armies competent +to her defence. Their numbers upon paper were somewhat formidable, it is +true, but the license of the Revolution had so loosened the bonds of +discipline as to effect an almost complete disorganization. "It seemed, +at this period," says the historian, "as if the operations of the French +generals were dependent upon the absence of their enemies: the moment +they appeared, the operations were precipitately abandoned." But France +had on her eastern frontier a triple line of good fortresses, although +her miserable soldiery were incapable of properly defending them. The +several works of the first and second lines fell, one after another, +before the slow operations of a Prussian siege, and the Duke of +Brunswick was already advancing upon the third, when Dumourier, with +only twenty-five thousand men, threw himself into this line, and by a +well-conducted war of positions, placing his raw and unsteady forces +behind unassailable intrenchments, succeeded in repelling a disciplined +army nearly four times as numerous as his own. Had no other obstacle +than the French troops been interposed between Paris and the Prussians, +all agree that France must have fallen.</p> + +<p>In the campaign, of 1793, the French army in Flanders were beaten in +almost every engagement, and their forces reduced to less than one half +the number of the allies. The French general turned traitor to his +country, and the National Guards deserted their colors and returned to +France. The only hope of the Republicans, at this crisis, was Vauban's +line of Flemish fortresses. These alone saved France. The strongholds of +Lille, Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, Landrecies, &c., held the Austrians +in check till the French could raise new forces and reorganize their +army. "The important breathing-time which the sieges of these +fortresses," says an English historian, "afforded to the French, and the +immense advantage which they derived from the new levies which they +received, and fresh organization which they acquired during that +important period, is a signal proof of the vital importance of +fortresses in contributing to national defence. Napoleon has not +hesitated to ascribe to the three months thus gained the salvation of +France. It is to be constantly recollected that the Republican armies +were then totally unable to keep the field; that behind the frontier +fortresses there was neither a defensive position, nor a corps to +reinforce them; and that if driven from their vicinity, the capital was +taken and the war concluded."</p> + +<p>In the following year, 1794, when France had completed her vast +armaments, and, in her turn, had become the invading power, the enemy +had no fortified towns to check the progress of the Republican armies; +which, based on strong works of defence, in a few weeks overran +Flanders, and drove the allies beyond the Rhine.</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1796, when the army of Moreau had been forced into a +precipitate retreat by the admirable strategic operations of the +Archduke Charles, the French forces owed their safety to the +fortifications on the Rhine. These works arrested the enemy's pursuit +and obliged him to resort to the tedious operations of sieges; and the +reduction of the French advanced posts alone, Kehl and Huninguen, poorly +as they were defended, employed all the resources of the Austrian army, +and the skill of their engineers, from early in October till late in +February. Kehl was at first assaulted by a force <i>four</i> times as +numerous as the garrison; if the enemy had succeeded, he would have cut +off Moreau's retreat, and destroyed his army. Fortunately the place was +strong enough to resist all assaults; and Moreau, basing himself on the +fortresses of Alsace, his right covered by Huninguen, Neuf-Brisach, and +Béfort, and his left by the iron barrier of the Netherlands, effectually +checked the waves of Austrian success.</p> + +<p>Let us now turn to the campaigns of Napoleon. In his first campaign in +Italy, 1796, the general was directed "to seize the forts of Savona, +compel the senate to furnish him with pecuniary supplies, and to +surrender the keys of Gavi, a fortress perched on the rocky height +commanding the pass of the Bocchetta." Setting out from Savona, he +crossed the mountains at a weak point between the Alps and the +Apennines, and succeeded in piercing the enemy's line of defence. The +king of Sardinia, jealous of Austrian influence, had refused to permit +the Austrian army to garrison his line of fortifications. Napoleon, +profiting by his victorious attitude, the mutual jealousy of Austria +and Sardinia, and the intrigues of his diplomatists, soon gained +possession of these important works. "<i>These Sardinian fortresses</i>," he +wrote to the Directory, "<i>at once put the Republicans in possession of +the keys of the Peninsula</i>." Basing himself on Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, +Gavi, and Alessandria, with Tortosa as his dépôt of magazines, he +advanced against Lombardy. Now basing himself on the Adda and Po, with +the fortress of Pizzighettone as the dépôt of his magazines, he advanced +upon the line of the Adige. Pechiera became his next dépôt, and he now +had four fortresses in echelon between him and his first dépôt of +magazines; and, after the fall of Mantua, basing himself on the Po, he +advanced against the States of the Church, making Ferrara and then +Ancona, his places of dépôt.</p> + +<p>From the solid basis of the fortresses of Piedmont and Lombardy, "he was +enabled to turn his undivided attention to the destruction of the +Austrians, and thus commence, with some security, that great career of +conquest which he already meditated in the imperial dominions." In this +campaign of 1797, after scouring his base, he fortified Palma-Nuova, +Osapo, &c., repaired the old fortifications of Klagenfurth, and, as he +advanced, established, to use his own words, "a good <i>point d'appui</i> at +every five or six marches."</p> + +<p>Afterwards, when the Austrians had nearly wrested Italy from the weak +grasp of Napoleon's successors, the French saved their army in the +fortress of Genoa and behind the line of the Var, which had been +fortified with care in 1794-5. Numerous attempts were made to force this +line, the advanced post of Fort Montauban being several times assaulted +by numerous forces. But the Austrian columns recoiled from its murderous +fire of grape and musketry, which swept off great numbers at every +discharge. Again the assault was renewed with a vast superiority of +numbers, and again "the brave men who headed the column almost perished +at the foot of the intrenchment; and, after sustaining a heavy loss, +they were compelled to abandon the enterprise."</p> + +<p>While the forces on the Var thus stayed the waves of Austrian success, +Massena, in the fortifications of Genoa, sustained a blockade of sixty, +and a siege of forty days, against an army five times as large as his +own; and when forced to yield to the stern demands of famine, he almost +dictated to the enemy the terms of the treaty. These two defences held +in check the <i>élite</i> of the Austrian forces, while the French reserve +crossed the Alps, seized the important points of the country, and cut +off the Austrian line of retreat. "But even after the victory of +Marengo," says Napoleon, "I did not consider the whole of Italy +reconquered, until all the fortified places between me and the Mincio +should be occupied by my troops. I gave Melas permission to return to +Mantua, on condition of his surrendering all these fortresses."</p> + +<p>He now directed Chasseloup de Laubat and his engineers to repair and +remodel the fortifications of Verona, Legnano, Pechiera, Mantua, the +line of the Adda, Milan, Alessandria,<a name="FNanchor_5_5"></a><a href="#Footnote_5_5"><sup>[5]</sup></a> Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, and several +smaller works; thus forming a quadruple line of defence against Austrian +aggression in Italy. These works were of great service to the French in +1805, enabling Massena with fifty thousand men to hold in check the +Archduke Charles with more than ninety thousand, while Napoleon's grand +army, starting from the solid base of the Rhine, traversed Germany and +seized upon the capital of Austria.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_5_5"></a><a href="#FNanchor_5_5">[5]</a><div class="note"><p> More than twenty millions of money were appropriated for +this place alone.</p></div> + +<p>The neglect of the Prussians to place their country in a state of +military defence, previous to declaring war against Napoleon in 1806, +had a most disastrous influence upon the campaign. Napoleon, on the +other hand, occupied and secured all the important military positions +which he had captured in the preceding campaign. "The Prussians," said +he, "made no preparations for putting into a state of defence the +fortifications on their first line, not even those within a few marches +of our cantonments. While I was piling up bastion upon bastion at Kehl, +Cassel, and Wesel, they did not plant a single palisade at Magdeburg, +nor put in battery a single cannon at Spandau." The works on the three +great lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly +repaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in +check the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till the +newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could +re-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness. Profiting +by the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great +defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily +surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who +commanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established +in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, +Hameln, Nieubourg, &c. "Spandau," said he in the 19th Bulletin, "is an +inestimable acquisition. In our hands it could sustain two months of +operations. But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had +not even armed its batteries." The possession of these fortifications +inclined the scale at Eylau. All the historians of the war notice their +influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.</p> + +<p>These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of +Tilsit. The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they +effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the +flames of war. And again in 1813, these works might have produced a +decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of +Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from +profiting by the advantages of his position.</p> + +<p>The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular +campaigns has often been alluded to by historians. Those works which had +been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, +contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had +been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to +fetter and embarrass his operations. Some of these, like Saragossa, +Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and +defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by +compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did +much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.</p> + +<p>The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in +furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into +the enemy's territory, has already been noticed. If these fortresses of +France, after the disasters of 1812 and '13, failed to save the nation, +the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion +itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the French +defences. As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men, +under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, +impoverished by the fatal war in Russia,—torn in pieces by political +factions,—deserted by its sworn allies,—its fortresses basely betrayed +into the enemy's hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason +of generals with their entire armies. Its only hope was in the +fortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, +that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses +and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after +their entrance into Paris. But political considerations prevented the +operation.</p> + +<p>Again in 1815, Napoleon, even after the defeat of Waterloo, possessed +lines of defence sufficiently strong to resist all attempts at invasion. +But again the want of co-operation on the part of the government at +Paris, and the treason of his own generals, forced his second +abdication. If he had retained the command of the army, and the nation +had seconded his efforts, the allies would never have reached Paris. But +the new government presented the disgraceful spectacle of opening the +way for the enemies of their country. "France," said Napoleon, "will +eternally reproach the ministry with having forced her whole people to +pass under the Caudine-forks, by ordering the disbanding of an army that +had for twenty-five years been its country's glory, <i>and by giving up to +our astonished enemies our still invincible fortresses</i>."</p> + +<p>History fully supports Napoleon's opinion of the great danger of +penetrating far into a hostile country to attack the capital, even when +that capital is without fortifications. The fatal effects of such an +advance, without properly securing the means of retreat, is exemplified +by his own campaign of 1812, in Russia. If, after the fall of Smolensk, +he had fortified that place and Vitepsk, which by their position closed +the narrow passage comprised between the Dnieper and the Dwina, he might +in all probability, on the following spring, have been able to seize +upon Moscow and St. Petersburg. But leaving the hostile army of +Tschkokoff in his rear, he pushed on to Moscow, and when the +conflagration of that city cut off his hopes of winter quarters there, +and the premature rigor of the season destroyed the horses of his +artillery and provision-trains, retreat became impossible, and the awful +fate of his immense army was closed by scenes of horror to which there +is scarcely a parallel in history. This point might be still further +illustrated by the Russian campaign of Charles XII., in 1708-9, the +fatal advance of the French army on Lisbon, in the Peninsular war, and +other examples of the same character.</p> + +<p>Even single works sometimes effect the object of lines of +fortifications, and frustrate the operations of an entire army. Thus, +Lille suspended for a whole year the operations of Prince Eugene and +Marlborough; the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of +changing the fortunes of the war; Pavia, in 1525, lost France her +monarch, the flower of her nobility, and her Italian conquests; Metz, in +1552, arrested the entire power of Charles V., and saved France from +destruction; Prague, in 1757, brought the greatest warrior of his age to +the brink of ruin; St. Jean d'Acre, in 1799, stopped the successful +career of Napoleon; Burgos, in 1812, saved the beaten army of Portugal, +enabled them to collect their scattered forces, and regain the +ascendancy; Strasburg has often been, the bulwark of the French against +Germany, saving France from invasion, and perhaps subjugation.</p> + +<p>In nearly the language of Napoleon, (Memoirs, vol. IX.,) If Vienna had +been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the +fate of the war. Again, in 1809, if this capital had been fortified, it +would have enabled the Archduke Charles, after the disaster of Eckmuhl, +by a forced retreat on the left of the Danube, to form a junction with +the forces of General Hiller and the Archduke John.</p> + +<p>If Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the army routed at Jena would have +rallied there and been joined by the Russians. If Madrid had been +strongly fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of +Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-Sierra, would not have marched +towards that capital, leaving in rear of Salamanca and Valladolid, both +the English army of General Moore and the Spanish army of Romana. If +Moscow had been fortified in 1812, its conflagration would have been +avoided, for, with strong defensive works, and the army of Kutusoff +encamped on its ramparts, its capture would have been impossible.</p> + +<p>Had not Constantinople been well fortified, the empire of Constantine +must have terminated in the year 700, whereas the standard of the +Prophet was not planted there until 1440. This capital was therefore +indebted to its walls for eight hundred years of existence. During this +period it was besieged fifty-three times, but only one of these sieges +was successful. The French and Venetians took it, but not without a very +severe contest.</p> + +<p>Paris has often owed its safety to its walls. In 885 the Normans +besieged it for two years without effect. In 1358 the Dauphin besieged +it in vain. In 1359 Edward, king of England, encamped at Montrouge, +devastated the country to its walls, but recoiled from before it, and +retired to Chartres. In 1429 it repulsed the attack of Charles VII. In +1464 the Count of Charlerois surrounded the city, but was unsuccessful +in his attacks. In 1472 it repulsed the army of the Duke of Bourgone, +who had already ravaged its precincts. In 1536, when attacked by Charles +V., it again owed its safety to its walls. In 1588 and 1589 it repulsed +the armies of Henry III. and Henry IV. In 1636 and several succeeding +years the inhabitants of Paris owed their safety to its walls. If this +capital had been strongly fortified in 1814 and 1815, the allied armies +would not have dared to attempt its investment.</p> + +<p>But it is deemed unnecessary to further specify examples; the whole +history of modern warfare is one continued proof of the importance of +fortifications as a means of national defence, and as an auxiliary in +offensive military operations. Our illustrations have been mostly drawn +from European wars, but our own brief history, as will be shown +hereafter, is not without its proofs.</p> + +<p>The use and importance of field-fortifications, intrenched camps, &c., +as well as the class of military works called coast-defences, will be +discussed hereafter.<a name="FNanchor_6_6"></a><a href="#Footnote_6_6"><sup>[6]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_6_6"></a><a href="#FNanchor_6_6">[6]</a><div class="note"><p> The use of fortifications in the defence of states is +discussed by Ternay, Vauban, Cormontaigne, Napoleon, the Archduke +Charles, Jomini, Fallot, and, incidentally, by most of the military +historians of the wars of the French Revolution. The names of such +standard works as give the detailed arrangements of fortifications will +be mentioned hereafter.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_IV"></a><h2>CHAPTER IV.</h2> + +<p>LOGISTICS.</p> +<br> + +<p>III. We have defined <i>logistics</i> to be that branch of the military art +which embraces all the practical details of moving and supplying armies. +The term is derived from the title of a French general officer, +<i>(major-général des logis,)</i> who was formerly charged with directing the +marches, encampments, and lodging of the troops. It has been still +further extended by recent military writers, and many of them now regard +logistics as a distinct and important branch of the art.</p> + +<p>We shall here consider logistics as including the military duties +ordinarily attributed to the pay, subsistence, clothing, medical, +hospital, and transportation departments; in fine, of all the civil and +civico-military corps of the army. We shall therefore discuss under this +head, the preparation of all the necessary materials for fitting out +troops for a campaign and for putting them in motion; the regulating of +marches, convoys, the means of transport for provisions, hospitals, +munitions, and supplies of all kinds; the preparation and protection of +magazines; the laying out of camps and cantonments; in fine, every thing +connected with preparing, moving, and guarding the <i>impedimenta</i> of an +army.</p> + +<p>The officers connected with this branch of service must consult with the +engineers in every thing relating to the defence of their dépôts, +magazines, camps, cantonments, communications, and the passage of +rivers, and in all that relates to their connection with the attack and +defence of places: but in all that relates to strategy and tactics they +must receive instructions directly from the chief of the staff of the +army, who will have the general direction of every thing connected with +logistics. Before commencing the operations of the campaign, or +beginning the execution of the plans decided upon at head-quarters, +this officer should satisfy himself respecting the condition of the +various materials belonging to the different departments of the +army;—the horses and horse equipments, carriages, caissons, ponton and +artillery equipages, siege equipages, moveable hospitals, engineer and +artillery utensils, clothing, and munitions of all kinds; he must supply +whatever may be wanting, and provide means for the transportation of +every thing.</p> + +<p><i>Subsistence</i>.—The art of subsisting troops during active operations in +a hostile country, is one of the most difficult subjects connected with +war; and it is a question well worthy of study, both for the statesman +and the warrior, how Darius and Xerxes, Philip and Alexander, in ancient +times—and the Greek emperors and the barbarians—and, later still, the +crusaders of the middle ages, contrived to support the immense masses of +men which they led to war.</p> + +<p>Cæsar has said that war should be made to support war; and some modern +generals have acted upon this principle to the extreme of supporting +their armies entirely at the expense of the country passed over. Others +have adopted either in part or entirely the principle of regular +magazines.</p> + +<p>Louis XIV. and Frederick II. fought mostly on their own frontiers, and +followed the system of regular dépôts and supplies. But the +revolutionary armies of France made war without magazines, subsisting, +sometimes on the inhabitants, sometimes by requisitions levied on the +country passed over, and at others by pillage and marauding. Napoleon +found little difficulty in supporting an army of a hundred or a hundred +and twenty thousand men in Italy, Suabia, and on the rich borders of the +Rhine and the Danube; but in Spain, Poland, and Russia, the subject of +subsistence became one of extreme embarrassment.</p> + +<p>All dépôts of provisions and other supplies for an army are denominated +<i>magazines</i>; these are divided into <i>principal, secondary,</i> and +<i>provisional</i>. The first are usually on the base of operations; the +second, on the line of operations; and the last in the immediate +vicinity of the troops, and contain supplies for a few days only.</p> + +<p>The system of <i>magazines</i> is objected to by some, because it fetters the +movements of an army, and makes its military operations subordinate to +the means of supply. Moreover, as the movements of an army must be so +arranged as to cover these magazines, their establishment at given +points reveals to the enemy our plan of campaign.</p> + +<p>On the other hand, the system of <i>requisitions</i>, either for immediate +supplies or for secondary magazines, gives far greater velocity and +impetuosity to an active army; and if it be so regulated as to repress +pillage, and be levied with uniformity and moderation, it may be relied +on with safety in well-cultivated countries; but in more barren and less +populous districts, an army without magazines, especially in case of a +prolonged stay or a forced retreat, will be exposed to great suffering +and loss, if not to total destruction.</p> + +<p>Before commencing a campaign the general should make himself acquainted +with all the resources of the country to be passed over—determine the +amount of supplies which it may be necessary to take with him, and the +amount that can be obtained by requisitions; these requisitions being +levied in a uniform and legal manner, and through the existing local +authorities.</p> + +<p>In great wars of invasion it is sometimes impracticable, at least for a +time, to provide for the immense forces placed on foot, by any regular +system of magazines or of ordinary requisitions: in such cases their +subsistence is entirely intrusted to the troops themselves, who levy +contributions wherever they pass. The inevitable consequences of this +system are universal pillage and a total relaxation of discipline; the +loss of private property and the violation of individual rights, are +followed by the massacre of all straggling parties, and the ordinary +peaceful and non-combatant inhabitants are converted into bitter and +implacable enemies.</p> + +<p>In this connection the war in the Spanish peninsula is well worthy of +study. At the beginning of this war Napoleon had to choose between +methodical operations, with provisions carried in the train of his army, +or purchased of the inhabitants and regularly paid for; and irregular +warfare, with forced requisitions—war being made to support war. The +question was thoroughly discussed.</p> + +<p>On the one hand, by sacrificing three or four millions of francs from +the French treasury, he would have been able to support his troops +without requisitions, would have maintained good order and discipline in +his armies, and by the distribution of this money among a people poor +and interested, he would have made many partisans. He could then have +offered them, with a firm and just hand, the olive or the sword. But +then the drafts upon the French treasury, had the war been a protracted +one, would have been enormous for the support of an army of 200,000 men +in Spain. Moreover, the hostile and insurrectionary state of the local +authorities rendered regular and legal requisitions almost impossible; +and the want of navigable rivers, good roads, and suitable transport, +rendered problematical the possibility of moving a sufficient quantity +of stores in an insurrectionary country. Besides, no great detachments +could have been made to regulate the administration of the provinces, or +to pursue the insurgent corps into the fastnesses of the mountains. In +fine, by this system, he would have effected a military occupation of +Spain without its subjugation. </p> + +<p>On the other hand, by marching rapidly against all organized masses, +living from day to day upon the local resources of the country, as he +had done in Italy, sparing his reserves for the occupation and +pacification of the conquered provinces; this mode promised more prompt +and decisive results than the other. Napoleon, therefore, determined to +adopt it for his active masses, employing the system of magazines and +regular requisitions so far as practicable. In favorable parts of the +country, Soult and Souchet, with smaller armies, succeeded in obtaining +in this way regular supplies for a considerable length of time, but the +others lived mainly by forced requisitions levied as necessity required. +This sometimes gave place to great excesses, but these were principally +the faults of subordinate officers who tolerated them, rather than of +Napoleon, who punished such breaches of discipline, when they were known +to him, with great severity. He afterwards declared that, "had he +succeeded he would have indemnified the great mass of the Spanish people +for their losses, by the sale of the hoarded wealth of the clergy, which +would have rendered the church less powerful, and caused a more just +division of property; thus the evil of the war would have been forgotten +in the happy triumph of public and private interest over the interest of +an ambitious and exclusive clergy."</p> + +<p>The following maxims on subsistence have the sanction of the best +military writers:</p> + +<p>1st. Regular magazines should be formed, so far as practicable, for the +supplies of an army; the levying of requisitions being resorted to only +where the nature of the war, and the requisite rapidity of marches, +render these absolutely necessary to success.</p> + +<p>2d. Dépôts should be formed in places strengthened by nature or art, +defended by small corps, or garrisons, and situated in positions least +liable to attack.</p> + +<p>3d. All great dépôts should be placed on navigable rivers, canals, +railways, or practical roads, <i>communicating with the line of +operations</i>, so that they may be transported with ease and rapidity, as +the army advances on this line.</p> + +<p>4th. An army should never be without a supply for ten or fifteen days, +otherwise the best chances of war may be lost, and the army exposed to +great inconveniences. Templehoff says that the great Frederick, in the +campaign of 1757, always carried in the Prussian provision-train <i>bread</i> +for <i>six</i>, and <i>flour</i> for <i>nine days</i>, and was therefore never at a +loss for means to subsist his forces, in undertaking any sudden and +decisive operation. The Roman soldier usually carried with him +provisions for fifteen days. Napoleon says, "Experience has proved that +an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food +being carried by the men and baggage-horses and a supply for twenty days +by the train of wagons; so that at least four hundred and eighty wagons +would be required for an army of forty thousand men; two hundred and +forty being regularly organized, and two hundred and forty being +obtained by requisition. For this purpose there would be a battalion of +three companies for the military stores of each division, each company +having its establishment for forty wagons, twenty being furnished by the +commissariat, and twenty obtained by requisition. This gives for each +division one hundred and twenty wagons, and for each army, four hundred +and eighty. Each battalion for a provision-train should have two hundred +and ten men."</p> + +<p>5th. An army, while actually in motion, can find temporary resources, +unless in a sterile country, or one already ravaged by war, or at the +season of the year when the old crops are nearly exhausted and the new +ones not ready for harvest; but, even supposing the army may in this way +be partially or wholly supplied, while in motion, it nevertheless +frequently happens that it may remain for some days in position, (as the +French at Austerlitz and Ulm;) a supply of hard bread for some ten days +will therefore be important to subsist the army till a regular +commissariat can be established.</p> + +<p>6th. "Supplies of bread and biscuit," says Napoleon, "are no more +essential to modern armies than to the Romans; flour, rice, and pulse, +may be substituted in marches without the troops suffering any harm. It +is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great +attention to their magazines; it may be seen in Cæsar's Commentaries, +how much he was occupied with this care in his several campaigns. The +ancients knew how to avoid being slaves to any system of supplies, or to +being obliged to depend on the purveyors; but all the great captains +well understood the art of subsistence."</p> + +<p><i>Forage</i> is a military term applied to food of any kind for horses or +cattle,—as grass, hay, corn, oats, &c.; and also to the operation of +collecting such food. Forage is of two kinds, <i>green</i> and <i>dry</i>; the +former being collected directly from the meadows and harvest-fields, and +the latter from the barns and granaries of the farmers, or the +storehouses of the dealers.</p> + +<p>The animals connected with an army may be subsisted by regular +magazines, by forced requisitions, or by authorized <i>foraging</i> <a name="FNanchor_7_7"></a><a href="#Footnote_7_7"><sup>[7]</sup></a> As +has already been remarked, it is not always politic, or even possible, +to provide regular magazines for the entire supplies of an army during +the active operations of a campaign. On account of the great expense and +difficulty of transporting forage, the general of an army is more +frequently under the necessity of resorting to requisitions, or forced +contributions as they are called, and to foraging, for the subsistence +of his animals, than to provide food for his men. Nor are requisitions +and foragings for this object so objectionable as in the other case, +being far less likely to produce general want and distress among the +non-combatant inhabitants. </p> + +<a name="Footnote_7_7"></a><a href="#FNanchor_7_7">[7]</a><div class="note"><p> This term is sometimes, though improperly, applied to the +operation of forcibly collecting food for the troops.</p></div> + +<p>The commanding officer of troops should always use his best endeavors to +obtain his forage by purchase of the inhabitants, or by requisitions on +the local authorities; and even where these means are impracticable, the +foraging parties should be strictly directed to make their levies with +uniformity and due moderation. Accurate accounts should be kept of the +kinds and quantities of all produce and other property taken, so that it +may be regularly distributed and accounted for. Under no circumstances +should individuals be permitted to appropriate to themselves more than +their <i>pro rata</i> allowance. Foraging parties may sometimes attain their +object in a peaceful manner, by representing to the inhabitants the +nature of their instructions and the necessity of obtaining immediate +supplies. Even where no recompense is proposed, it may be well to offer +certificates to the effect that such articles have been taken for the +use of the army. These certificates, even when of no value in +themselves, frequently tend to appease excited passions and allay +insurrections. In defensive war, carried on in one's own country, it is +often necessary to seize upon private property and appropriate it to the +public service: in all such cases the certificates of the foraging +officers become proofs of individual claims against the government.</p> + +<p>No foraging party should ever be sent out till after the country has +been properly reconnoitred. A good military escort and vanguard should +always accompany and precede the foragers, for protection against the +enemy's light cavalry and an insurgent militia. Trustworthy troops must +be placed in the villages and hamlets of the country to be foraged, in +order to prevent the foragers from engaging in irregular and +unauthorized pillage. Officers of the staff and administrative corps +are sent with the party to see to the proper execution of the orders, +and to report any irregularities on the part of the troops. In case any +corps engage in unauthorized pillage, due restitution should be made to +the inhabitants, and the expense of such restitution deducted from the +pay and allowances of the corps by whom such excess is committed. A few +examples of this kind of justice will soon restore discipline to the +army, and pacify the inhabitants of the country occupied.</p> + +<p>Experience is the best guide in estimating the amount of hay or grain +that may be taken from a given field: the produce of an acre is, of +course, very different for different soils and climates. In distributing +the burdens to the several pack-horses and wagons employed in conveying +the forage to the army, it is important for the foraging officers to +know the relative weight and bulk of each article.</p> + +<table summary="Forage weights"> +<tr> +<td width="200">Ordinary pressed hay in this country will average about</td> +<td width="200"></td> +<td width="150">12lbs</td> +<td width="100">per cubic foot</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="200">Wheat</td> +<td width="200">weighs</td> +<td width="150">60lbs</td> +<td width="100">per bushel</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width ="200">Rye</td> +<td width="200"> weighs</td> +<td width="150">56lbs</td> +<td width="100">per bushel</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="200">Maize or Indian corn</td> +<td width="200">weighs</td> +<td width="150">56lbs</td> +<td width="100">per bushel</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="200">Barley</td> +<td width="200">weighs</td> +<td width="150">50lbs</td> +<td width="100">per bushel</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="200">Oats</td> +<td width="200">weighs</td> +<td width="150">35lbs</td> +<td width="100">per bushel</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="650">Meal, flour and ground feed of all kinds,are purchased by the pound.</td> +</tr> +</table> + +<br> + +<p>As it would be exceedingly dangerous to send forward the regular train +of the army for the conveyance of forage collected by these foraging +parties, the country wagons and pack-horses are usually pressed into +service for this purpose.</p> + +<p>Troops of horse are sometimes sent into the vicinity of meadows and +grain-fields for temporary subsistence: in such cases the horses and +cattle may be farmed in the neighborhood, and the grass and grain +issued in regular rations, immediately as taken from the field; but in +no case should the animals be turned out to pasture.</p> + +<p>In a country like ours, where large bodies of new and irregular forces +are to be suddenly called into the field in case of war, it is important +to establish very rigid rules in relation to forage and subsistence; +otherwise the operations of such troops must be attended with great +waste of public and private property, the want of means of subsistence, +the consequent pillage of the inhabitants, and a general relaxation of +discipline. Regular troops are far less liable to such excesses than +inexperienced and undisciplined forces.</p> + +<p><i>Marches</i>.—Marches are of two kinds: 1st. Route marches,—2d. Marches +within reach of the enemy. The former belong to the domain of strategy; +the latter to that of tactics; both, however, are connected with +logistics in every thing that concerns the means of their execution.</p> + +<p>When an army is moving on a line of operations, it should be in as many +columns as the facility of subsistence, celerity of movement, the nature +of the roads, &c., may require. Large columns cannot move with the same +rapidity as smaller ones, nor can they be so readily subsisted. But when +an army is within striking distance of the enemy, concentration becomes +more important than celerity, and the forces must be kept in mass, or at +least within supporting distances of each other. We find only two +instances in the Seven Years' War, in which Frederick attempted attacks +by several columns at considerable distances from each other; and in +both these instances (at Torgau and at Namiest, against Laudon, during +the siege of Olmutz) he was unsuccessful. His usual mode was to bring +his columns near together as he approached the enemy, and to form his +troops into line at the moment of attack. Such was his order of march at +Prague, Kollin, Rosbach, Leuthen, Zornsdorf, and Kunersdorf. The +following is one of Frederick's orders respecting marches, (October 2d, +1760.)</p> + +<p>"The army will, as usual, march in three columns by lines. The first +column will consist of the first line; the second, of the second line; +and the third, of the reserve. The wagons, and hospital wagons, of +regiments, will follow their corps. The batteries of heavy calibre will +follow the infantry brigades to which they are assigned. On passing +woods, the regiments of cavalry will march between two infantry corps."</p> + +<p>"Each column will have a vanguard of one light battalion and ten +squadrons of hussars or dragoons. They will be preceded by three wagons +carrying plank-bridges. The rear-guard is charged with taking up these +bridges after the army has defiled over them."</p> + +<p>"The parks will be divided among the columns, to avoid the embarrassment +resulting from a great many wagons being together in a body."</p> + +<p>"If any thing should happen to the second and third columns, the king +will be instantly apprized of it; he will be found at the head of the +first column. Should any thing occur to the rear-guard, the same will be +instantly communicated to Lieutenant-general Zeithen, who will be with +the rear-guard of the first column."</p> + +<p>"The officers will take care that the soldiers march with equal step, +and that they do not stray to the right or left, and thus uselessly +fatigue themselves and lose their distances."</p> + +<p>"When orders are given to form the line, the wagons will file out of the +columns to the left, and will march to be parked," &c.</p> + +<p>The position of the baggage, when near the enemy, will depend on the +nature of the march. If the march be to the front, it will be in rear of +the column; if the march be by the flank, and the enemy be on the outer +flank, the baggage will be on the inner one, most remote from danger; if +the march be in retreat, the baggage will be in advance of the army. In +either case it should be strongly guarded.</p> + +<p>It was in direct violation of this rule that General Hull, in the +campaign of 1812, on reaching the Miami of the Lake, (Maumee,) embarked +his baggage, stores, sick, convalescent, and "even the instructions of +his government and the returns of his army," on board the Cuyahoga +packet, and dispatched them for Detroit, while the army, with the same +destination, resumed its march by land. The result of thus sending his +baggage, stores, official papers, &c., <i>without a guard, and on the +flank nearest the enemy,</i> was just what might have been anticipated:—in +attempting to pass the British post of Malden the whole detachment was +attacked and captured, "by a subaltern and six men, in a small and open +boat."</p> + +<p>To prevent a surprise, detachments of light troops should be always +thrown out in front, on the flanks, and in rear of the column, +denominated from their position, <i>Advanced-Guard, Flankers,</i> and +<i>Rear-Guard.</i> These scan the country which is to be passed over by the +column, watch the enemy's motions, and give notice of his approach in +time to allow the main force to choose a suitable field of battle, and +to pass from the order of march to that of combat. The strength and +composition of these detachments depend upon the nature of the ground, +and the character and position of the enemy. In case of an attack they +retire slowly, and on joining the main body, take their assigned +position in the line of battle.</p> + +<p>In an open country the order of march presents but little difficulty; +but in a broken country, and especially in the vicinity of the enemy, a +march cannot be conducted with too many precautions. Before engaging in +a <i>defile</i> it should be thoroughly examined, and sufficient detachments +sent out to cover the main body from attack while effecting the +passage. A neglect of these precautions has sometimes led to the most +terrible disasters.</p> + +<p>In military operations very much depends upon the rapidity of marches. +The Roman infantry, in Scipio's campaigns in Africa, frequently marched +a distance of twenty miles in five hours, each soldier carrying from +fifty to eighty pounds of baggage. Septimius Severus, Gibbon states, +marched from Vienna to Rome, a distance of eight hundred miles, in forty +days. Cæsar marched from Rome to the Sierra-Morena, in Spain, a distance +of four hundred and fifty leagues, in twenty-three days!</p> + +<p>Napoleon excelled all modern generals in the celerity of his movements. +Others have made for a single day as extraordinary marches as the +French, but for general activity during a campaign they have no rivals +in modern history. A few examples of the rapidity of their movements may +not be without interest.</p> + +<p>In 1797 a part of Napoleon's army left Verona after having fought the +battle of St. Michaels, on the 13th of January, then marched all night +upon Rivoli, fought in the mountains on the 14th, returned to Mantua on +the 15th, and defeated the army of Provera on the morning of the +16th,—thus, in less than four days, having marched near fifty leagues, +fought three battles, and captured more than twenty thousand prisoners! +Well might he write to the Directory that his soldiers had surpassed the +much vaunted rapidity of Cæsar's legions.</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1800, Macdonald, wishing to prevent the escape of +Loudon, in a single day marched forty miles, crossing rivers, and +climbing mountains and glaciers.</p> + +<p>In 1805 the grand French army broke up their camp at Boulogne, in the +early part of September, and in two weeks reached their allotted posts +on the Rhine, averaging daily from twenty-five to thirty miles. </p> + +<p>During the same campaign the French infantry, pursuing the Archduke +Ferdinand in his retreat from Ulm, marched thirty miles a day in +dreadful weather, and over roads almost impassable for artillery.</p> + +<p>Again, in the campaign of 1806, the French infantry pursued the +Prussians at the rate of from twenty-five to thirty miles per day.</p> + +<p>In 1808 the advanced posts of Napoleon's army pursued Sir John Moore's +army at the rate of twenty-five miles a day, in the midst of winter. +Napoleon transported an army of fifty thousand men from Madrid to +Astorga with nearly the same rapidity, marching through deep snows, +across high mountains, and rivers swollen by the winter rains. The +activity, perseverance, and endurance of his troops, during these ten +days' march, are scarcely equalled in history.</p> + +<p>In 1812, the activity of the French forces under Clausel was truly +extraordinary. After almost unheard-of efforts at the battle of +Salamanca, he retreated forty miles in a little more than twelve hours!</p> + +<p>In 1814, Napoleon's army marched at the rate of ten leagues a day, +besides fighting a battle every twenty-four hours. Wishing to form a +junction with other troops, for the succor of Paris, he marched his army +the distance of seventy-five miles in thirty-six hours; the cavalry +marching night and day, and the infantry travelling <i>en poste</i>.</p> + +<p>On his return from Elba, in 1815, his guards marched fifty miles the +first day after landing; reached Grenoble through a rough and +mountainous country, a distance of two hundred miles, in six days, and +reached-Paris, a distance of six hundred miles, in less than twenty +days!</p> + +<p>The marches of the allied powers, during the wars of the French +Revolution, were much less rapid than those of the armies of Napoleon. +Nevertheless, for a single day the English and Spaniards have made some +of the most extraordinary marches on record.</p> + +<p>In 1809, on the day of the battle of Talavera, General Crawford, fearing +that Wellington was hard pressed, made a forced march with three +thousand men the distance of sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours!</p> + +<p>The Spanish regiment of Romana, in their march from Jutland to Spain, +marched the extraordinary distance of fifty miles in twenty-one hours.</p> + +<p>Cavalry, for a single day, will march a greater distance than infantry; +but for a campaign of several months the infantry will march over the +most ground. In the Russian campaign of Napoleon, his cavalry failed to +keep pace with the infantry in his forced march on Moskwa. But in the +short campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the cavalry of Murat displayed the +most wonderful activity, and effected more extraordinary results than +any mounted troops of modern ages.</p> + +<p>The English cavalry, however, have made one or two short marches with a +rapidity truly extraordinary.</p> + +<p>In 1803 Wellington's cavalry in India marched the distance of sixty +miles in thirty-two hours.</p> + +<p>But the march of the English cavalry under Lord Lake, before the battle +of Furruckabad, is, if we can trust the English accounts, still more +extraordinary than any thing recorded of the Romans or the French—it is +said that he marched <i>seventy miles in twenty-four hours!!!</i></p> + +<p>As a general rule, troops marching for many days in succession will move +at the rate of from fifteen to twenty miles per day. In forced marches, +or in pursuit of a flying enemy, they will average from twenty to +twenty-five miles per day. And for only two or three days in succession, +with favorable roads, thirty miles per day may be calculated on. Marches +beyond this are unusual, and, when they do occur, are the result of +extraordinary circumstances. </p> + +<p><i>Convoy</i>.—A convoy consists of provisions, military munitions, &c., +sent from one point to another, under the charge of a detachment of +troops, called an <i>escort</i>. When regular dépôts and magazines are +established, with proper relations to the line of operations, convoys +requiring particular escorts are seldom necessary, because the position +of the army will cover the space over which the magazines are to be +moved. But in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, or in a country whose +inhabitants are hostile or insurrectionary, precautions of this kind +should always be resorted to.</p> + +<p>The size and composition of the escort must depend upon the nature of +the country and the imminence of the danger. The ground to be passed +over should be previously reconnoitred, and the line of march be taken +up only after the most satisfactory reports. When once put in motion, +the convoy should be thoroughly hemmed in by flankers, to give warning +to the escort of the approach of the enemy. Small parties of cavalry are +detached on all sides, but particularly in advance. The main body of the +escort is concentrated on the most exposed point of the convoy while the +other sides are guarded by subdivisions. In case of an attack by a large +party, the baggage wagons may be formed into a kind of defensive +field-work, which, with one or two pieces of light artillery, can in +this way resist a pretty strong effort to destroy or carry away the +convoy.</p> + +<p>As a general rule, it is better to supply the wants of an army by small +successive convoys than by periodical and large ones. Even should some +of the former be captured their loss would not be materially felt; but a +large periodical convoy offers so great a temptation to the enterprise +of the enemy, and is so difficult to escort, that he will venture much +to destroy it, and its loss may frustrate our plans of a siege or of an +important military operation. If the Prussian army, when besieging +Olmutz, had observed this rule, the capture of a convoy would not have +forced them to raise the siege and to retreat.</p> + +<p>Napoleon estimates that an army of 100,000 men in position will require +the daily arrival of from four to five hundred wagon loads of +provisions.</p> + +<p>The difficulty of moving provisions, baggage, &c., in a retreat, is +always very great, and the very best generals have frequently failed on +this point. Indeed, the best concerted measures will sometimes fail, +amid the confusion and disorder consequent upon a retreat with an able +and active enemy in pursuit. In such a case, the loss of the +provision-trains in a sterile or unfriendly country may lead to the most +terrible disasters. We will allude to two examples of this kind: the +retreat of the English from Spain in 1809, and that of the French from +Russia in 1812.</p> + +<p>When Sir John Moore saw that a retreat had become necessary to save his +army from entire destruction, he directed all the baggage and stores to +be taken to the rear, and every possible arrangement to be made for +their preservation and for the regular supplies of the army. But the +want of discipline in his troops, and more especially the want of a +proper engineer organization to prepare the requisite means for +facilitating his own marches, and impeding the enemy's pursuit, +prevented his plans from being fully carried into execution. Much +suffering and great losses were consequently inflicted upon his troops; +a large portion of his baggage and military stores was captured, and +even the treasure of his army, amounting to some 200,000 dollars, was +abandoned through the ignorance and carelessness of the escorting +officer.</p> + +<p>In Napoleon's march into Russia, his plans had been so admirably +combined, that from Mentz to Moscow not a single estafette or convoy, it +is said, was carried off in this campaign; nor was there a day passed +without his receiving intelligence from France. When the retreat was +begun, (after the burning of Moscow,) he had six lines of magazines in +his rear; the 1st, at Smolensk, ten days' march from Moscow; those of +the 2d line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensk; those of +the 3d line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialystok; those of the 4th line at +Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the 5th +line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the 6th line at Stettin, +Custrin, and Glogau. When the army left Moscow it carried with it +provisions sufficient for twenty days, and an abundance of ammunition, +each piece of artillery being supplied with three hundred and fifty +rounds; but the premature cold weather destroyed thirty thousand horses +in less than three days, thus leaving the trains without the means of +transportation or suitable escorts for their protection: the horrible +sufferings of the returning army now surpassed all description.</p> + +<p>The officer selected to escort convoys should be a man of great +prudence, activity, and energy, for frequently very much depends upon +the safe and timely arrival of the provisions and military stores which +he may have in charge.</p> + +<p><i>Castrametation</i>.—Castrametation is, strictly speaking, the art of +laying out and disposing to advantage the several parts of the camp of +an army. The term is sometimes more extensively used to include all the +means for lodging and sheltering the soldiers during a campaign, and all +the arrangements for cooking, &c., either in the field or in winter +quarters. A camp, whether composed of tents or barracks, or merely +places assigned for bivouacking, must be divided and arranged in such a +way that the several divisions shall be disposed as they are intended to +be drawn up in order of battle; so that, on any sudden alarm, the troops +can pass from it promptly, and form their line of battle without +confusion. Suitable places must also be assigned for cooking, for +baggage, and for provisions, military stores, and ammunitions.</p> + +<p>The extent of the color front of a camp depends much on the character of +the ground and the means of defence, but as a general rule, it should +never exceed the position which the army would occupy in the line of +battle. The different arms should be encamped in the same order as that +of battle; this order of course depending on the nature of the +battle-ground. A <i>corps d'armée</i> is composed of battalions of infantry, +squadrons of cavalry, batteries of artillery, and companies of engineer +troops, and the art of encampments consists in arranging each of these +elements so as to satisfy the prescribed conditions.</p> + +<p>The choice of ground for a camp must be governed, 1st, by the general +rules respecting military positions, and, 2d, by other rules peculiar to +themselves, for they may be variously arranged in a manner more or less +suitable on the same position.</p> + +<p>That the ground be suitable for defence, is the first and highest +consideration.</p> + +<p>It should also be commodious and dry: moist ground in the vicinity of +swamps and stagnant waters, would endanger the health of the army: for +the same reason it should not be subject to overflow or to become marshy +by heavy rains, and the melting of snow.</p> + +<p>The proximity of good roads, canals, or navigable streams, is important +for furnishing the soldiers with all the necessaries of life.</p> + +<p>The proximity of woods is also desirable for furnishing firewood, +materials for huts, for repairs of military equipments, for works of +defence, &c.</p> + +<p>Good water within a convenient distance, is also an essential element in +the choice of ground for a camp; without this the soldiers' health is +soon undermined. The proximity of running streams is also important for +the purposes of washing and bathing, and for carrying off the filth of +the camp.</p> + +<p>The camp should not be so placed as to be enfiladed or commanded by any +point within long cannon range; if bordering on a river or smaller +stream, there should be space enough between them to form in order of +battle; the communications in rear should offer the means of retreating +in case of necessity, but should not afford facilities to the enemy to +make his attack on that side.</p> + +<p>If the camp is to be occupied for a considerable length of time, as for +<i>cantonments</i> or <i>winter-quarters</i>, the greater must be the care in +selecting its position and in the arrangement for the health and comfort +of the soldiers. In the latter case, (of winter-quarters,) the +engineer's art should always be called in play to form intrenchments, +lines of abattis, inundations, &c., to render the position as difficult +of access to the enemy as possible.</p> + +<p>A <i>bivouac</i> is the most simple kind of camp. It consists merely of lines +of fires, and huts for the officers and soldiers. These huts may be made +of straw, of wood obtained from the forest, or by dismantling houses and +other buildings in the vicinity of the camp, and stripping them of their +timbers, doors, floors, &c. Troops may be kept in bivouac for a few +days, when in the vicinity of the enemy, but the exposure of the soldier +in ordinary bivouacs, especially in the rainy seasons or in a rigorous +climate, is exceedingly destructive of human life, and moreover leads to +much distress to the inhabitants of the country occupied, in the +destruction of their dwellings and the most common necessaries of life. +If the position is to be occupied for any length of time, the huts +should be arranged like tents, according to a regular system, and made +comfortable for the troops. Such should always be the system adopted in +camps of practice or manœuvre, in cantonments, winter-quarters, or in +intrenched positions. </p> + +<p>We have adopted in our service the system of encamping in tents. These +may do very well under the ordinary circumstances; but in the active +operations of a campaign they are exceedingly objectionable, as greatly +encumbering the baggage-trains. It would seem preferable to resort to +bivouacs for the temporary camp of a single night, and to construct a +regular system of huts where a position is to be occupied for any length +of time. This may be regarded as a general rule, but in certain +countries and climates, the tent becomes almost indispensable.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's views on this subject are certainly interesting, if not +decisive of the question: "Tents," says he, "are not wholesome. It is +better for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet +towards the fire; he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards +or a little straw. The ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried +in the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary for the superior +officers, who have occasion to read and consult maps, and who ought to +be ordered never to sleep in a house—a fatal abuse, which has given +rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followed +the example of the French as to discard their tents; and if they be +still used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical, +sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree, +against the heat of the sun, and any sorry shelter whatever, against the +rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the tents for each +battalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in +carrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the enemies' +spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your +numbers, and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs +every day, and every instant in the day. An army ranged in two or three +lines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, +which the enemy may mistake for the vapor of the atmosphere. It is +impossible to count the number of fires; it is easy, however, to count +the number of tents, and to trace out the position that they occupy."</p> + +<p>The guarding of camps is a very important matter, and requires much +attention.</p> + +<p>The <i>camp-guard</i> consists of one or two rows of sentinels placed around +the camp, and relieved at regular intervals. The number of rows of +sentinels, and the distance between each man, will depend upon the +character of the ground and the degree of danger apprehended.</p> + +<p>Detachments of infantry and cavalry, denominated picquets, are also +thrown out in front and on the flanks, which, in connection with the +camp-guards, serve to keep good order and discipline in and around the +camp, to prevent desertions, intercept reconnoitering parties, and to +give timely notice of the enemy's approach.</p> + +<p>Still larger detachments, denominated <i>grand-guards</i>, are posted in the +surrounding villages, farm-houses, or small field-works, which they +occupy as outposts, and from which they can watch the movements of the +enemy, and prevent any attempts to surprise the camp. They detach +patrols, videttes, and sentries, to furnish timely notice of danger. +They should never be so far from the camp as to be beyond succor in case +of sudden attack. Outposts, when too far advanced, are sometimes +destroyed without being able to give notice of the enemy's approach.</p> + +<p>In encamping troops in winter-quarters, it is sometimes necessary to +scatter them over a considerable extent of ground, in order to +facilitate their subsistence. In such a case, the arrangement of guards +requires the utmost care. A chain of advanced posts should be placed +several miles' distance from the line of camp; these posts should be +supported by other and larger detachments in their rear, and +concentrated on fewer points; and the whole country around should be +continually reconnoitered by patrols of cavalry.</p> + +<p>The manner in which Napoleon quartered and wintered his army on the +Passarge, in 1806-7, furnishes a useful lesson to military men, both in +the matters of encampment and subsistence. An immense army of men were +here quartered and subsisted, in a most rigorous climate, with a not +over fertile soil, in the midst of hostile nations, and in the very face +of a most powerful enemy.</p> + +<p>A Roman army invariably encamped in the same order, its troops being +always drawn up in the same battle array. A Roman staff-officer who +marked out an encampment, performed nothing more than a mechanical +operation; he had no occasion for much genius or experience. The form of +the camps was a square. In later times, they sometimes, in imitation of +the Greeks, made them circular, or adapted them to the ground. The camp +was always surrounded with a ditch and rampart, and divided into two +parts by a broad street, and into subdivisions by cross-streets and +alleys. Each tent was calculated to hold ten privates and a petty +officer.</p> + +<p>In the middle ages, the form of the camp did not differ very essentially +from that of the Romans, the variation consisting principally in the +interior arrangements, these arrangements being made to correspond to +the existing mode of forming a line of battle. The details of this +system may be found in the military work of Machiavelli.</p> + +<p>The art of fixing a camp in modern times is the same as taking up a line +of battle on the same position. Of all the projectile machines must be +in play and favorably placed. The position must neither be commanded, +out-fronted, nor surrounded; but on the contrary ought, as far as +possible, to command and out-front the enemy's position. But even in the +same position there are numerous modes of arranging an encampment, or of +forming a line of battle, and to select the best of these modes +requires great experience, <i>coup d'oeil</i>, and genius. In relation to +this point Napoleon makes the following remarks:—</p> + +<p>"Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to +form as many as it has corps or divisions? At what distance ought the +vanguard and the flankers to be encamped? What frontage and what depth +ought to be given to the camp? Where should the cavalry, the artillery, +and the carriages be distributed? Should the army be ranged in battle +array, in several lines? And if it should, what space should there be +between those lines? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the +infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? As every piece has +sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should +all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the +engagement, or should half of it be kept in reserve?"</p> + +<p>"The solution of these questions depends on the following +circumstances:—1st. On the number of troops, and the numbers of +infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed. 2d. On +the relation subsisting between the two armies. 3d. On the quality of +the troops. 4th. On the end in view. 5th. On the nature of the field. +And 6th. On the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of +the general who commands them. Nothing absolute either can or ought to +be prescribed on this head. In modern warfare there is no natural order +of battle."</p> + +<p>"The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult +in modern armies, than it was in those of the ancients. It is also +certain that his influence is more efficacious in deciding battles. In +the ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of eighty or a +hundred toises from the enemy, was in no danger; and yet he was +conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to +advantage all the movements of his forces. In modern armies, a +general-in-chief, though removed four or five hundred toises, finds +himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very +much exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the +enemy escape him. In every engagement he is occasionally obliged to +approach within reach of small-arms. The effect of modern arms is much +influenced by the situation in which they are placed. A battery of guns, +with a great range and a commanding position that takes the enemy +obliquely, may be decisive of a victory. Modern fields of battle are +much more extended than those of the ancients, whence it becomes +necessary to study operations on a large scale. A much greater degree of +experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a +modern army than was necessary for an ancient one."</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>Figure 9</a> represents a camp (on favorable ground) of a grand-division of +an army, composed of two brigades or twelve battalions of infantry, +twelve squadrons of cavalry, five batteries of artillery, and three +companies of engineers.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Figure 10</a> represents the details of a camp of a battalion of infantry +composed of eight companies.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Figure 11</a> is the camp of a squadron of cavalry.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Figure 12</a> is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two +companies of foot engineers.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Figure 13</a> is the camp of two batteries of mounted artillery, or two +companies of mounted sappers and pontoniers.</p> + +<p>On undulating or broken ground the arrangement and order of the general +camp, as well as the details of the encampment of each arm, would admit +of much variation.<a name="FNanchor_8_8"></a><a href="#Footnote_8_8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> </p> + +<a name="Footnote_8_8"></a><a href="#FNanchor_8_8">[8]</a><div class="note"><p> There are many valuable remarks on the various subjects +comprised under the head of logistics, in the works of Jomini, Grimoard, +Thiebault, Boutourlin, Guibert, Laroche Amyon, Bousmard, Ternay, +Vauchelle, Odier, Audouin, Bardin, Chemevrieres, Daznan, Ballyet, +Dremaux, Dupre d'Aulnay, Morin, and in the published regulations and +orders of the English army.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_V"></a><h2>CHAPTER V.</h2> + +<p>TACTICS.</p> +<br> + +<p>IV. Tactics.—We have defined tactics to be the art of bringing troops +into action, or of moving them in the presence of the enemy;—that is, +within his view, and within the reach of his artillery. This branch of +the military art has usually been divided into two parts: 1st. Grand +Tactics, or the tactics of battles; and 2d. Elementary Tactics, or +tactics of instruction.<a name="FNanchor_9_9"></a><a href="#Footnote_9_9"><sup>[9]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_9_9"></a><a href="#FNanchor_9_9">[9]</a><div class="note"><p> "It does not come within the view of this work to say any +thing of the merely mechanical part of the art; because it must be taken +for granted, that every man who accepts the command of an army knows at +least the alphabet of his trade. If he does not, (unless his enemy be as +ignorant as himself,) defeat and infamy await him. Without understanding +perfectly what are called <i>the evolutions</i>, how is it possible that a +general can give to his own army that order of battle which shall be +most provident and skilful in each particular case in which he may be +placed? How know which of these evolutions the enemy employs against +him? and, of course, how decide on a counter-movement which may be +necessary to secure victory or avoid defeat? The man who shall take the +command of an army without perfectly understanding this elementary +branch, is no less presumptuous than he who should pretend to teach +Greek without knowing even his letters. If we have such generals, let +them, for their own sakes, if not for their country's, put themselves +immediately to school."</p></div> + +<p>A <i>battle</i> is a general action between armies. If only a small portion +of the forces are engaged it is usually denominated a <i>combat</i>, an +<i>affair</i>, an <i>action</i>, a <i>skirmish</i>, &c., according to the character of +the conflict. The art of combining and conducting battles of all +descriptions has been designated by the name of Grand Tactics.</p> + +<p>Battles may be arranged into three classes; 1st. <i>Defensive</i> battles, or +those given in a chosen position by an army waiting the attack of the +enemy. 2d. <i>Offensive</i> battles, or those made by an army which attacks +the enemy in position. 3d. The <i>mixed</i> or <i>unforeseen</i> battles, given by +two armies meeting while on the march.</p> + +<p>I. When an army awaits the attack, it takes its position and forms its +line of battle according to the nature of the ground and the supposed +character and strength of the enemy's forces. Such is usually the case +when an army wishes to cover a siege, protect a capital, guard dépôts of +provisions and military stores, or some important strategic point. The +general relations of positions with strategy and engineering have +already been considered; we will now discuss merely their relations to +battles.</p> + +<p>The first condition to be satisfied by a tactical position is, that its +debouches shall be more favorable for falling on the enemy when he has +approached to the desired point, than those which the enemy can have for +attacking our line of battle. 2d. The artillery should have its full +effect upon all the avenues of approach. 3d. We should have good ground +for manœuvring our own troops unseen, if possible, by the enemy. 4th. +We should have a full view of the enemy's manœuvres as he advances to +the attack. 5th. We should have the flanks of our line well protected by +natural or artificial obstacles. 6th. We should have some means of +effecting a retreat without exposing our army to destruction.</p> + +<p>It is very seldom that all these conditions can be satisfied at the same +time; and sometimes the very means of satisfying one, may be in direct +violation of another. A river, a forest, or a mountain, which secures a +flank of a line of battle, may become an obstacle to a retreat, should +the defensive forces be thrown back upon that wing. Again, the position +may be difficult of attack in front or on the wings, and at the same +time unfavorable for retreat. Such was Wellington's position at +Waterloo. The park of Hougomont, the hamlet of Haye Sainte, and the +marshy rivulet of Papelotte, were serious obstacles against the +attacking force; but the marshy forest of Soignies in rear, with but a +single road, cut off all hope of retreat.</p> + +<p>II. According to the strategic relations of the contending forces in a +campaign, will it be determined whether we are to await the enemy, or to +seek him out and attack him wherever he may be found. We may sometimes +be obliged to make the attack at all hazards, for the purpose of +preventing the junction of two corps, or to cut off forces that may be +separated from the main body by a river, &c. As a general rule the +attacking force has a moral superiority over the defensive, but this +advantage is frequently more than counterbalanced by other conditions.</p> + +<p>The main thing in an <i>offensive</i> battle is to seize upon the decisive +point of the field. This point is determined by the configuration of the +ground, the position of the contending forces, the strategic object of +the battle; or, by a combination of these. For example, when one wing of +the enemy rests on a height that commands the remainder of his line, +this would seem the decisive point to be attacked, for its occupation +would secure the greatest advantages; but this point may be so very +difficult of access, or be so related to the strategic object as to +render its attack out of the question. Thus it was at the battle of +Bautzen: the left of the allies rested on the mountains of Bohemia, +which were difficult of attack, but favorable for defence; moreover, +their only line of retreat was on the right, which thus became the point +of attack for the French, although the topographical and tactical key of +the field was on the left.</p> + +<p>III. It frequently happens in modern warfare that battles result from +the meeting of armies in motion, both parties acting on the offensive. +Indeed, an army that is occupying a defensive position may, on the +approach of the enemy, advance to meet him while on the march. Battles +of this kind may partake of the mixed character of offensive and +defensive actions, or they may be of the nature of a surprise to both +armies. To this class belong the battles of Rosbach, Eylau, Lutzen, +Luzzara, Abensberg, &c.</p> + +<p>Surprises were much more common in ancient than in modern times, for the +noise of musketry and the roar of artillery, belonging to the posts or +wings assailed, will prevent any general surprise of an army. Moreover, +the division into separate masses, or <i>corps d'armée,</i> will necessarily +confine the surprise to a part, at most, of the forces employed. +Nevertheless, in the change given to military terms, a surprise may now +mean only an unexpected combination of manœuvres for an attack, rather +than an actual falling upon troops unguarded or asleep. In this sense +Marengo, Lutzen, Eylau, &c. are numbered with surprises. Benningsen's +attack on Murat at Zarantin in 1812 was a true surprise, resulting from +the gross negligence and carelessness of the king of Naples.</p> + +<p>An <i>order of battle</i> is the particular disposition given to the troops +for a determined manœuvre on the field of battle. A <i>line of battle</i> is +the general name applied to troops drawn up in their usual order of +exercise, without any determined manœuvre; it may apply to defensive +positions, or to offensive operations, where no definitive object has +been decided on. Military writers lay down twelve orders of battle, +viz.: 1st. The simple parallel order; 2d. The parallel order with a +crotchet; 3d. The parallel order reinforced on one or both wings; 4th. +The parallel order reinforced on the centre; 5th. The simple oblique +order; 6th. The oblique order reinforced on the assailing wing; 7th. The +perpendicular order on one or both wings; 8th. The concave order; 9th. +The convex order; 10th. The order by echelon on one or both wings; 11th. +The order by echelon on the centre; 12th. The combined orders of attack +on the centre and one wing at the same time.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/453.gif>Figure 14.</a>)<a name="FNanchor_10_10"></a><a href="#Footnote_10_10"><sup>[10]</sup></a> The simple parallel order is the worst possible +disposition for a battle, for the two parties here fight with equal +chances, and the combat must continue till accident, superior numbers, +or mere physical strength decides the day; skill can have little or no +influence in such a contest.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_10_10"></a><a href="#FNanchor_10_10">[10]</a><div class="note"><p> In the plans, B is the army in position, and A the +attacking force arranged according to the different orders of battle. To +simplify the drawings, a single line represents the position of an army, +whereas, in practice, troops are usually drawn up in three lines. Each +figure represents a grand division of twelve battalions.</p></div> + +<p>(<a href=images/453.gif>Figure 15.</a>) The parallel order with a crotchet on the flank, is +sometimes used in a defensive position, and also in the offensive with +the crotchet thrown forward. Malplaquet, Nordlingen, Prague, and Kolin, +are examples of this order. Wellington, at Waterloo, formed the parallel +order with the retired crotchet on the right flank.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/455.gif>Figure 16.</a>) A line of battle parallel to the enemy's, if strongly +reinforced on one point, is according to correct principles, and may in +certain cases secure the victory; but it has many inconveniences. The +weak part of the line being too near the enemy, may, notwithstanding its +efforts to the contrary, become engaged, and run the risk of a defeat, +and thereby counterbalance the advantages gained by the strong point. +Moreover, the reinforced part of the line will not be able to profit by +its success by taking the enemy's line in flank and rear, without +endangering its connection with the rest of the line.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/455.gif>Figure 17</a>) represents the parallel order reinforced on the centre. The +same remarks are applicable to this as to the preceding.</p> + +<p>These two orders were frequently used by the ancients: as at the battle +of Zama, for example; and sometimes by modern generals. Turenne employed +one of them at Ensheim. </p> + +<p>(<a href=images/455.gif>Figure 18</a>) is the simple oblique order.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/455.gif>Figure 19</a>) is the oblique order, with the attacking wing reinforced. +This last is better suited for an inferior army in attacking a superior, +for it enables it to carry the mass of its force on a single point of +the enemy's line, while the weak wing is not only out of reach of +immediate attack, but also holds the remainder of the enemy's line in +check by acting as a reserve ready to be concentrated on the favorable +point as occasion may require.</p> + +<p>The most distinguished examples under this order are the battles of +Leuctra and Mantinea, under the celebrated Epaminondas; Leuthen, under +Frederick; the Pyramids, Marengo, and Jena, under Napoleon.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/455.gif>Figure 20.</a>) An army may be perpendicular upon a flank at the beginning +of a battle, as was the army of Frederick at Rosbach, and the Russian +army at Kunersdorff; but this order must soon change to the oblique. An +attack upon both wings can only be made when the attacking force is +vastly superior. At Eylau, Napoleon made a perpendicular attack on one +wing at the same time that he sought to pierce the enemy's centre.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/455.gif>Figure 21.</a>) The concave order may be used with advantage in certain +cases, and in particular localities. Hannibal employed it at the battle +of Cannæ, the English at Crecy and Agincourt, and the Austrians at +Essling, in 1809.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/457.gif>Figure 22.</a>) The convex order is sometimes formed to cover a defile, to +attack a concave line, or to oppose an attack before or after the +passage of a river. The Romans formed this order at the battle of +Cosilinum; the French at Ramilies in 1706, at Fleurus in 1794, at +Essling in 1809, and at the second and third days of Leipsic in 1813, +and at Brienne in 1814.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/457.gif>Figure 23.</a>) The order by echelon on one wing may be frequently +employed with advantage; but if the echelon be made on both wings, there +is the same objection to its use as to the perpendicular order on both +wings. At Dresden, Napoleon attacked both wings at the same time; this +is the only instance in his whole history of a similar attack, and this +was owing to peculiar circumstances in the ground and in the position of +his troops.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/457.gif>Figure 24.</a>) The echelon order on the centre alone may be employed with +success against an army formed in a thin or too extended line of battle, +for it would be pretty certain to penetrate and break the line.</p> + +<p>The echelon order possesses in general very great advantages. The +several corps composing the army may manœuvre separately, and +consequently with greater ease. Each echelon covers the flank of that +which precedes it; and all may be combined towards a single object, and +extended with the necessary <i>ensemble</i>. At the battle of the Pyramids, +Napoleon formed the oblique order in echelon by squares. Portions of his +forces were arranged in echelon in some of his other battles.</p> + +<p>(<a href=images/457.gif>Figure 25.</a>) The combined order in columns on the centre and one +extremity at the same time, is better suited than either of the +preceding for attacking a strong contiguous line. Napoleon employed this +order at Wagram, Ligny, Bautzen, Borodino, and Waterloo.</p> + +<p>It is impossible to lay down, as a general rule, which of these orders +of battle should be employed, or that either should be exclusively +followed throughout the whole battle. The question must be decided by +the general himself on the ground, where all the circumstances may be +duly weighed. An order well suited to one position might be the worst +possible in another. Tactics is in this respect the very reverse of +strategy—the latter being subject to more rigid and invariable rules.</p> + +<p>But whatever the plan adopted by the attacking force, it should seek to +dislodge the enemy, either by piercing or turning his line. If it can +conceal its real intentions, and deceive him respecting the true point +of attack, success will be more certain and decisive. A turning +manœuvre may frequently be employed with advantage at the same time +with the main attack on the line. The operations of Davoust at Wagram, +and Richepanse at Hohenlinden, are good examples under this head. The +manœuvre is, however, a difficult one, and unless executed with skill, +may lead to disasters like the turning manœuvres of the Austrians at +Rivoli and Austerlitz, and of the French under Jourdan at Stackach, and +under Marmont at Salamanca.</p> + +<p>We will now discuss the particular manner of arranging the troops on the +line of battle, or the manner of employing each arm, without entering, +however, much into the detailed tactics of formation and instruction.</p> + +<p>We shall begin with <i>infantry</i>, as the most important arm on the +battle-field.</p> + +<p>There are four different ways of forming infantry for battle: 1st, as +tirailleurs, or light troops; 2d, in deployed lines; 3d, in lines of +battalions, ployed on the central division of each battalion, or formed +in squares; 4th, in deep masses.</p> + +<p>These different modes of formation are reduced to four separate systems: +1st, the thin formation of two deployed lines; 2d, a line of battalions +in columns of attack on the centre, or in squares by battalions; 3d, a +combination of these two, or the first line deployed, and the second in +columns of attack; and 4th, the deep formation of heavy columns of +several battalions. The tirailleurs are merely accessories to the main +forces, and are employed to fill up intervals, to protect the march of +the columns, to annoy the enemy, and to manœuvre on the flanks.</p> + +<p>1st. Formerly the line of battle for infantry was very generally that +of two deployed lines of troops, as shown in <a href=images/459.gif>Fig. 26.</a> But reason and +experience have demonstrated that infantry in this thin or light order, +can only move very slowly; that in attempting rapid movements it breaks +and exhibits great and dangerous undulations, and would be easily +pierced through by troops of a deeper order. Hence it is that the light +formation is only proper when the infantry is to make use of its fire, +and to remain almost stationary.</p> + +<p>2d. If the formation of a line of battalions in columns of attack be +employed, the depth and mobility will depend upon the organization or +habitual formation of this arm.</p> + +<p>In our service a battalion is supposed to be composed of ten companies, +each formed in three ranks. The two flank companies are designed for +tirailleurs. This would give a column of four divisions, and +consequently twelve files deep; and as only two of these files could +employ their fire, there would be much too large a portion of +non-combatants exposed to the enemy's artillery. In practice, however, +we employ the two-rank formation, which, if the flank companies be +detached, would give a column of attack eight files in depth, which is +not objectionable. If however, the flank companies should be present in +the battalion, the depth of the column would still be ten files.</p> + +<p>In the French service, each battalion is composed of four divisions, +formed in either two or three ranks. The two-rank formation is the one +habitually employed. If all the companies be present, and the formation +in three ranks, the depth of column will be twelve files; if in two +ranks the depth will be eight, files. If the flank companies be +detached, the depth of column will be, for three ranks nine files, and +for two ranks six files. (Figs. 27 and 28.)</p> + +<p>In the Russian service each, battalion has four divisions of three ranks +each. But the third rank is employed as tirailleurs, which gives a depth +of column of eight files. The employment of the third rank for +tirailleurs is deemed objectionable on account of the difficulty of +rallying them on the column. For this reason, the best authorities +prefer detaching an entire division of two companies.</p> + +<p>The formation of squares is exceedingly effective in an open country, +and against an enemy who is superior in cavalry. Formerly very large +squares were employed, but they are now formed either by regiment or by +battalion. The former are deemed best for the defensive, and the latter +for offensive movements. The manner of arranging these is shown in +<a href=images/459.gif>Figure 29.</a></p> + +<p>3d. The mixed system, or the combination of the two preceding, has +sometimes been employed with success. Napoleon used this formation at +Tagliamento, and the Russians at Eylau. Each regiment was composed of +three battalions, the first being deployed in line, and the other two +formed in columns of attack by division in rear of the two extremities, +as shown in <a href=images/459.gif>Fig. 30.</a> It may in some cases be better to place the second +and third battalions in line with the first, and on the two extremities +of this battalion, in order to prolong the line of fire. The centre of +the line of each regiment would be less strong, however, than when the +two battalions by column are placed in rear of the other which is +deployed. This mixed system of formation has many advocates, and in +certain situations may be employed with great advantage.</p> + +<p>4th. The deep order of heavy columns of several battalions is +objectionable as an habitual formation for battle, inasmuch as it +exposes large masses of men to the ravages of artillery, and diminishes +the mobility and impulsion of an attack without adding greatly to its +force. Macdonald led a column of this kind at the battle of Wagram with +complete success, although he experienced enormous losses. But Ney's +heavy columns of attack at Waterloo failed of success, and suffered +terribly from the concentric fire of the enemy's batteries. </p> + +<p>Whenever deep columns are employed, Jomini recommends that the +grand-division of twelve battalions should have one battalion on each +flank, (<a href=images/459.gif>Fig. 31,</a>) marching by files, in order to protect its flanks from +the enemy's attacks. Without this defence a column of twelve battalions +deep becomes an inert mass, greatly exposed to be thrown into disorder +or broken, as was the column of Fontenoy, and the Macedonian phalanx by +Paulus Emillus. A grand-division is sometimes arranged in two columns by +brigade, as is represented in <a href=images/459.gif>Figure 32.</a> These are less heavy than a +single column of grand-division by battalion, but are subject to nearly +the same objections.</p> + +<p>All offensive operations on the field of battle require <i>mobility, +solidity</i>, and <i>impulsion</i>; while, on the other hand, all defensive +operations should combine <i>solidity</i> with <i>the greatest possible amount +of fire</i>.</p> + +<p>Troops in motion can make but little use of their fire-arms, whatever +may be their formation. If in very large masses, they move slower and +are more exposed; but the moral effect of these large moveable columns +is such, that they frequently carry positions without ever employing +their fire. The French columns usually succeeded against the Austrian +and Prussian infantry, but the English infantry could not so easily be +driven from their ground; hey also employed their fire to greater +advantage, as was shown at Talavera, Busaco, Fuente de Honore, Albuera +and Waterloo. The smaller columns and the mixed formation were always +most successful against such troops.</p> + +<p>From these remarks we must conclude—1st. That the very thin as well as +the very deep formation is objectionable under ordinary circumstances, +and can seldom be employed with safety.</p> + +<p>2d. That the attack by battalions in columns by division is the best for +carrying a position; the column should, however, be diminished in depth +as much as possible, in order both to increase its own fire and to +diminish its exposure to the fire of the enemy; moreover, it should be +well covered by tirailleurs and supported by cavalry.</p> + +<p>3d. That the mixed formation of the first line deployed and the second +in columns of battalion by division is the best for defence.</p> + +<p>4th. That either of the last two may be employed in the offensive or +defensive, according to the nature of the ground, the character of the +general, and the character and position of the troops. Squares are +always good against cavalry.</p> + +<p>Troops should be habituated to all these formations, and accustomed to +pass rapidly from one to another in the daytime or at night. None, +however, but disciplined troops can do this: hence the great superiority +of regulars on the field of battle, where skilful manœuvres frequently +effect more than the most undaunted courage.</p> + +<p>The arm next in importance on the battle-field is <i>cavalry</i>. The +principal merit of this arm consists in its <i>velocity</i> and <i>mobility</i>. +Cavalry has little solidity, and cannot of itself defend any position +against infantry; but in connection with the other arms, it is +indispensable for beginning a battle, for completing a victory, and for +reaping its full advantage by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe.</p> + +<p>There are four different modes of forming cavalry, the same as for +infantry: 1st in deployed lines; 2d, a line of regiments in column of +attack on the centre; 3d, the mixed formation; and 4th, the deep +formation of several columns.</p> + +<p>1st. The thin formation was deemed objectionable for infantry, on +account of its liability to be penetrated by cavalry. The same objection +does not hold so forcibly with respect to this latter arm; but full +lines are deemed less advantageous than lines deployed checker-wise or +in echelon. In either case the distance between the lines should be +sufficient to prevent the second line from coming in contact with the +first, in case the latter receives a slight check. This distance need +not be so great in lines deployed checker-wise, as when they are full, +or in echelon.</p> + +<p>2d. The second system of formation, that is, a line of columns of attack +on the central division for infantry, is by battalion, but for cavalry, +by regiment. If the regiment is composed of eight squadrons, the column +will contain four lines, two squadrons forming a division; but if +composed of only six squadrons, the column will contain only three +lines, and consequently will be six files in depth. In either case the +distance between the lines should be that of a demi-squadron, when the +troops are drawn up in battle array; but when charging, the divisions +may close to a less distance.</p> + +<p>3d. In forming a grand division of two brigades, by the third or mixed +system, two regiments may be deployed in the first line, and three +formed in columns of attack in rear of the flanks and centre, as is +shown in <a href=images/459.gif>Fig. 33,</a> the sixth being held in reserve. This formation is +deemed a good one.</p> + +<p>4th. The fourth system, of deep columns of cavalry, is entirely unsuited +for the charge, and this formation can only be employed for troops drawn +up in reserve.</p> + +<p>The flanks of lines or columns of cavalry are always much exposed, and +squadrons should therefore be formed in echelon on the right and left, +and a little in rear of the main body, in order to protect the flanks +from the attacks of the enemy's horse. Irregular cavalry is usually +employed for this purpose.</p> + +<p>In the formation of a grand division in line of battle, care should be +taken not to give too great an extent to the command of the generals of +brigade. If the formation be in two lines, neither brigade should form +an entire line, but each should form a wing of the division, two +regiments of the same brigade being placed in rear of each other. This +rule is an important one, and should never be neglected.</p> + +<p>It may also be laid down as a maxim, in the formation of cavalry on the +battle-field, that the first line after the charge, even if most +successful, may require reforming in rear of the second line, and that +this last should be prepared to act in the front line after the first +onset. The success of the battle frequently depends upon the charge of +the final reserve of cavalry on the flanks of lines already engaged.</p> + +<p>It is on account of this frequent manœuvring of the cavalry on the +battle-field, its reforming for repeated charges, that great bodies +deployed in full lines are principally objected to. They cannot be +handled with the facility and rapidity of columns of regiments by +divisions. The attack of Nansouty's cavalry, formed in this way, on the +Prussian cavalry, deployed in advance of Chateau-Thierry, in 1814, is a +good proof of this.</p> + +<p>Cavalry may be brought to a charge—1st, in columns; 2d, in line; and +3d, in route, or at random, <i>(à la déban-dade.)</i> These may also be +varied by charging either at a trot or a gallop. All these modes have +been employed with success. In a regular charge in line the lance offers +great advantages; in the mêlée the sabre is the best weapon; hence some +military writers have proposed arming the front rank with lances, and +the second with sabres, The pistol and the carabine are useless in the +charge, but may sometimes be employed with advantage against convoys, +outposts, and light cavalry; to fire the carabine with any effect, the +troop must be at a halt. In all charges in line, especially against +cavalry, the fast trot is deemed preferable to the gallop, on account of +the difficulty of keeping up the alignment when the speed is increased. +Lances are utterly useless in a mêée, and in employing troops armed in +this way, it is of the greatest importance to keep them in order and in +line. In charging with the sabre against artillery the gallop may +sometimes be employed, for velocity here may be more important than +force.</p> + +<p>We will now consider the formation and use of <i>artillery</i> on the field +of battle. It may be laid down as a fundamental principle, that the fire +of artillery should be directed on that part of the enemy's line which +we design to pierce; for this fire will not only weaken this point, but +will also aid the attack of the cavalry and infantry when the principal +efforts are directed towards the intended point.</p> + +<p>In the defence, the artillery is usually distributed throughout the +whole line, on ground favorable for its fire; but the reserve should be +so placed that it can easily be brought to bear on the point where the +enemy will be most likely to direct his principal attack.</p> + +<p>Artillery placed on a plain, or with ground slightly inclined in front, +and using the point-blank or ricochet fire, is the most effective; very +high points are unfavorable If possible, the concentric fire should be +employed against the enemy's columns of attack. The position of the +English artillery on the field of Waterloo, and the use of the +concentric fire, furnishes one of the best examples for the disposition +of this arm to be found in modern military history.</p> + +<p>The proper use of artillery on the battle-field is against the enemy's +infantry and cavalry, consequently only a small part of it should be +employed to respond to the fire of the enemy's batteries; not more than +one third at most can be spared for this object.</p> + +<p>If possible, batteries should be established so as to take the enemy's +line in flank, either by an oblique or enfilading fire. A direct fire +against columns of attack, with a few light pieces thrown out to take it +in flank at the same time, will always be advantageous. A direct and +flank fire was employed with success by Kleist against the column of Ney +at the battle of Bautzen; the French marshal was forced to change his +direction.</p> + +<p>Batteries should always be well secured on the flanks, and constantly +sustained by infantry or cavalry. If attacked by cavalry, the artillery +should keep up its fire as long as possible, first with ball, and then +with grape when the enemy arrives within a suitable distance. The same +rule will apply to attacks of infantry, except that the fire of solid +shot at a great distance is much less effective than against mounted +troops.</p> + +<p>The <i>engineer troops</i> are employed on the field of battle principally by +detachments, acting as auxiliaries to the other arms. Each regiment of +infantry should have a detachment of sappers armed with axes to act as +pioneers, for the removal of obstacles that may impede its advance. +These sappers are of the utmost importance, for without them an entire +column might be checked and thrown into confusion by impediments which a +few sappers with their axes would remove in a very short time. +Detachments of engineer troops must also act in concert with the cavalry +and artillery for the same purpose as above. In establishing the +batteries of artillery, in opening roads for their manœuvres, and in +arranging material obstacles for their defence, the axes, picks, and +shovels of the sappers are of infinite value. Field-works, bridges, and +bridge-defences, frequently have a decisive influence upon the result of +a battle, but as these are usually arranged previous to the action, they +will be discussed in another place. In the attack and defence of these +field-works, the engineer troops play a distinguished part. The +consideration of this part of the subject, though perhaps properly +belonging to the tactics of battles, will also be postponed to another +occasion.</p> + +<p>We will now discuss the employment of the combined arms on the field of +battle.</p> + +<p>Before the French Revolution, all the infantry, formed by regiments and +brigades, was united in a single body and drawn up in two lines. The +cavalry was placed on the two flanks, and the artillery distributed +along the entire line. In moving by wings, they formed four columns, two +of cavalry and two of infantry: in moving by a flank, they formed only +two very long columns; the cavalry, however, sometimes formed a third +and separate column in flank movements, but this disposition was rarely +made.</p> + +<p>The French Revolution introduced the system of grand divisions composed +of the four arms combined; each division moved separately and +independently of the other. In the wars of the Empire, Napoleon united +two or more of these divisions into a <i>corps d'armée,</i> which formed a +wing, the centre, or reserve of his grand army. In addition to these +divisions and <i>corps d'armée,</i> he had large reserves of cavalry and +artillery, which were employed as distinct and separate arms.</p> + +<p>If the forces be sufficiently numerous to fight by <i>corps d'armée,</i> each +corps should have its own reserve, independent of the general reserve of +the army. Again, if the forces be so small as to act by grand divisions +only, each division should then have <i>its</i> separate reserve.</p> + +<p>An army, whether composed of separate corps or of grand divisions, +usually forms, on the field of battle, a centre, two wings, and a +reserve. Each corps or division acts by itself, with its infantry, +cavalry, artillery, and engineer troops. The reserve of cavalry may be +formed in rear of the centre or one of the wings. In small forces of +fifty or sixty thousand men, the cavalry may act with advantage on the +wings, in the manner of the ancients. If the reserve of this arm be +large enough to form three separate bodies, it may <i>itself</i> very +properly be formed into a centre and wings. If it be formed into two +columns only, they may be placed in rear of the openings between the +centre and the wings of the main force. The reserve of artillery is +employed either to reinforce the centre or a wing, and in the defensive +is frequently distributed throughout the whole line of battle. In +offensive operations, it may be well to concentrate as much fire as +possible on the intended point of attack. The mounted artillery either +acts in concert with the cavalry, of is used to reinforce that arm; the +light-foot acts with the infantry, and the batteries of heavy calibre +are distributed along the line, or concentrated on some important point +where their fire may be most effectual. They reach the enemy's forces at +a distance, and arrest the impulsion of his attack. They may also be +employed to draw the fire of his artillery; but their movements are too +slow and difficult for a reserve.</p> + +<p>The order of succession in which the different arms are engaged in a +battle, depends upon the nature of the ground and other accidental +circumstances, and cannot be determined by any fixed rules. The +following, however, is most frequently employed, and in ordinary cases +may be deemed good.</p> + +<p>The attack is first opened by a cannonade; light troops are sent forward +to annoy the enemy, and, if possible, to pick off his artillerists. The +main body then advances in two lines: the first displays itself in line +as it arrives nearly within the range of grape-shot; the second line +remains in columns of attack formed of battalions by division, at a +distance from the first sufficient to be beyond the reach of the enemy's +musketry, but near enough to support the first line, or to cover it, if +driven back. The artillery, in the mean time, concentrates its fire on +some weak point to open a way for the reserve, which rushes into the +opening and takes the enemy in flank and rear. The cavalry charges at +the opportune moment on the flank of the enemy's columns or penetrates +an opening in his line, and cutting to pieces his staggered troops, +forces them into retreat, and completes the victory. During this time +the whole line of the enemy should be kept occupied, so as to prevent +fresh troops from being concentrated on the threatened point.</p> + +<p>The following maxims on battles may be studied with advantage:—1st. +<i>General battles</i> are not to be fought but under the occurrence of one +of the following circumstances: when you are, from any cause, decidedly +superior to the enemy; when he is on the point of receiving +reinforcements, which will materially effect your relative strength; +when, if not beaten or checked, he will deprive you of supplies or +reinforcements, necessary to the continuance or success of your +operations; and, generally, when the advantage of winning the battle +will be greater than the disadvantage of losing it.</p> + +<p>2d. Whatever may be your reason for risking a general battle, you ought +to regard as indispensable preliminaries,—a thorough knowledge of the +ground on which you are to act; an ample supply of ammunition; the most +perfect order in your fire-arms; hospital dépôts regularly established, +with surgeons, nurses, dressings, &c., sufficient for the accommodation +of the wounded; points of rendezvous established and known to the +commanders of corps; and an entire possession of the passes in your own +rear.</p> + +<p>3d. The battle being fought and <i>won</i>, the victory must be followed up +with as much alacrity and vigor, as though nothing had been gained,—a +maxim very difficult of observance, (from the momentary disobedience +which pervades all troops flushed with conquest,) but with which an +able general will never dispense. No one knew better the use of this +maxim than Napoleon, and no one was a more strict and habitual observer +of it.</p> + +<p>4th. The battle being fought and <i>lost</i>, it is your first duty to do +away the <i>moral</i> effect of defeat,—the want of that self-respect and +self-confidence, which are its immediate followers, and which, so long +as they last, are the most powerful auxiliaries of your enemy. It is +scarcely necessary to remark that, to effect this object,—to reinspire +a beaten army with hope, and to reassure it of victory,—we must not +turn our backs on an enemy, without sometimes presenting to him our +front also;—we must not confide our safety to mere flight, but adopt +such measures as shall convince him that though wounded and overpowered, +we are neither disabled nor dismayed; and that we still possess enough +both of strength and spirit to punish his faults, should he commit any. +Do you operate in a covered or mountainous country?—avail yourself of +its ridges and woods; for by doing so you will best evade the pressure +of his cavalry. Have you defiles or villages to pass?—seize the heads +of these, defend them obstinately, and make a show of fighting another +battle. In a word, let no error of your enemy, nor any favorable +incident of the ground, escape your notice or your use. It is by these +means that your enemy is checked, and your troops inspirited; and it was +by these that Frederick balanced his surprise at Hohenkirchen, and the +defeat of his plans before Olmutz. The movement of our own Washington, +after losing the battle of Brandywine, was of this character. He hastily +recrossed the Schuylkill with the professed intention of seeking the +enemy and renewing the combat, which was <i>apparently</i> prevented only by +a heavy and incessant fall of rain. A rumor was now raised that the +enemy, while refusing his left wing, was rapidly advancing upon his +right, to intercept our passage of the river, and thus gain possession +of Philadelphia. This report justified a retreat, which drew from the +General repeated assurances, that in quitting his present position and +giving to his march a retrograde direction, it was not his object to +avoid, but to follow and to fight the enemy. This movement, though no +battle ensued, had the effect of restoring the confidence as well of the +people as of the army.<a name="FNanchor_11_11"></a><a href="#Footnote_11_11"><sup>[11]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_11_11"></a><a href="#FNanchor_11_11">[11]</a><div class="note"><p> There are innumerable works in almost every language on +elementary tactics; very few persons, however, care to read any thing +further than the manuals used in our own service. Our system of +infantry, cavalry, and artillery tactics is generally taken from the +French; and also the course of engineer instruction, so far as matured, +for sappers, miners, and pontoniers, is based on the French manuals for +the varied duties of this arm. +</p><p> +On Grand Tactics, or Tactics of Battles, the military and historical +writings of General Jomini abound in most valuable instructions. +Napoleon's memoirs, and the writings of Rocquancourt, Hoyer, Decker, +Okouneff, Roguiat, Jocquinot-de-Presle, Guibert, Duhesme, Gassendi, +Warnery, Baron Bohan, Lindneau, Maiseroy, Miller, and Ternay, are +considered as being among the best authorities.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_VI"></a><h2>CHAPTER VI.</h2> + +<p>MILITARY POLITY AND THE MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.</p> +<br> + +<p><i>Military Polity</i>.—In deciding upon a resort to arms, statesmen are +guided by certain general rules which have been tacitly adopted in the +intercourse of nations: so also both statesmen and generals are bound by +rules similarly adopted for the conduct of hostile forces while actually +engaged in military operations.</p> + +<p>In all differences between nations, each state has a right to decide for +itself upon the nature of its means of redress for injuries received. +Previous to declaring open and public war, it may resort to some other +forcible means of redress, short of actual war. These are:—</p> + +<p>1st. Laying an embargo upon the property of the offending nation.</p> + +<p>2d. Taking forcible possession of the territory or property in dispute.</p> + +<p>3d. Resorting to some direct measure of retaliation.</p> + +<p>4th. Making reprisals upon the persons and things of the offending +nation.</p> + +<p>It is not the present purpose to discuss these several means of redress, +nor even to enter into any examination of the rights and laws of public +war, when actually declared; it is intended to consider here merely such +military combinations as are resorted to by the state in preparation for +defence, or in carrying on the actual operations of a war.</p> + +<p>In commencing hostilities against any other power, we must evidently +take into consideration all the political and physical circumstances of +the people with whom we are to contend: we must regard their general +character for courage and love of country; their attachment to their +government and political institutions; the character of their rulers and +their generals; the numbers, organization, and discipline of their +armies; and particularly the relations between the civil and military +authorities in the state, for if the latter be made entirely +subordinate, we may very safely calculate on erroneous combinations. We +must also regard their passive means of resistance, such as their system +of fortifications, their military materials and munitions, their +statistics of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, and especially +the geographical position and physical features of their country. No +government can neglect, with impunity, these considerations in its +preparations for war, or in its manner of conducting military +operations.</p> + +<p>Napoleon's system of carrying on war against the weak, effeminate, and +disorganized Italians required many modifications when directed against +the great military power of Russia. Moreover, the combinations of Eylau +and Friedland were inapplicable to the contest with the maddened +guerrillas of Minos, animated by the combined passions of hatred, +patriotism, and religious enthusiasm.</p> + +<p>Military power may be regarded either as absolute or relative: the +absolute force of a state depending on the number of its inhabitants and +the extent of its revenues; the relative force, on its geographical and +political position, the character of its people, and the nature of its +government. Its military preparations should evidently be in proportion +to its resources. Wealth constitutes both the apprehension and the +incentive to invasion. Where two or more states have equal means of war, +with incentives very unequal, an equilibrium cannot exist; for danger +and temptation are no longer opposed to each other. The preparation of +states may, therefore, be equal without being equivalent, and the +smaller of the two may be most liable to be drawn into a war without the +means of sustaining it.</p> + +<p>The numerical relation between the entire population of a state, and the +armed forces which it can maintain, must evidently vary with the wealth +and pursuits of the people. Adam Smith thinks that a country purely +agricultural may, at certain seasons, furnish for war one-fifth, or even +in case of necessity one-fourth, of its entire population. A commercial +or manufacturing country would be unable to furnish any thing like so +numerous a military force. On this account small agricultural states are +sometimes able to bring into the field much larger armies than their +more powerful neighbors. During the Seven Years' War, Frederick +supported an army equal to one-twentieth of the entire Prussian +population, and at the close of this memorable contest one-sixth of the +males capable of bearing arms had actually perished on the field of +battle.</p> + +<p>But the number of troops that may be brought into the field in times of +great emergency is, of course, much greater than can be supported during +a long war, or as a part of a permanent military establishment. +Montesquieu estimates that modern nations are capable of supporting, +without endangering their power, a permanent military force of about +one-hundredth part of their population. This ratio differs but little +from that of the present military establishments of the great European +powers.</p> + +<p>Great Britain, with a population of about twenty-five millions, and a +general budget of $250,000,000, supports a military and naval force of +about 150,000 effective and 100,000 non-effective men, 250,000 in all, +at an annual expense of from seventy to eighty millions of dollars.</p> + +<p>Russia, with a population of about seventy millions, supports an active +army of 632,000 men, with an immense reserve, at an expense of about +$65,000,000, out of a general budget of $90,000,000; that is, the +expense of her military establishment is to her whole budget as 7 to 10.</p> + +<p>Austria, with a population of thirty-five millions, has an organized +peace establishment of 370,000, (about 250,000 in active service,) and +a reserve of 260,000, at an expense of $36,000,000, out of a general +budget of $100,000,000.</p> + +<p>Prussia, with a population of about fifteen millions, has from 100,000 +to 120,000 men in arms, with a reserve of 200,000, at an annual expense +of more than $18,000,000, out of a general budget of about $38,000,000.</p> + +<p>France, with a population of near thirty-five millions, supports a +permanent establishment of about 350,000 men, at an expense of seventy +or eighty millions of dollars, out of a total budget of $280,000,000. +France has long supported a permanent military force of from +one-hundredth to one hundred-and-tenth of her population, at an expense +of from one-fourth to one-fifth of her whole budget. The following +table, copied from the "Spectateur Militaire," shows the state of the +army at six different periods between 1788 and 1842. It omits, of +course, the extraordinary levies of the wars of the Revolution and of +the Empire.</p> + +<p><i>Table</i>.</p> +<table border="1" width="700" summary="French Defence Expenditure"> +<tr> +<td width="20">Dates. +</td> +<td width="30">Population. +</td> +<td width ="100"> Budget of State. +</td> +<td width="100"> Budget of Army. +</td> +<td width="100"> Army, Peace Establisment. Men +</td> +<td width="100"> Army, War establishment. Men +</td> +<td width="250"> Remarks +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="20"> 1788 +</td> +<td width="30"> 24,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> livres 500,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> livres 100,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 180,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 300,000 +</td> +<td width="250"> +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="20"> 1814 +</td> +<td width="30"> 28,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> francs 800,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> francs 180,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 255,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 340,000 +</td> +<td width="250"> Ordinance of 1814 +</td> +</tr> +<tr><td width="20"> 1823 +</td> +<td width="30"> 31,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 900,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 200,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 280,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 390,000 +</td> +<td width="250"> Report of Minister of War +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="20"> 1830 +</td> +<td width="30"> 32,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 1,000,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 220,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 312,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 500,000 +</td> +<td width="250"> Report of Minister of War +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="20"> 1840 +</td> +<td width="30"> 34,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 1,170,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 242,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 312,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> not shown +</td> +<td width="250"> Budget of 1840. +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="20"> 1842 +</td> +<td width="30"> 35,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 1,200,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 285,000,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 370,000 +</td> +<td width="100"> 520,000 +</td> +<td width="250"> Estimated expences of 1842 +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<br> + +<p>From these data we see that the great European powers at the present day +maintain, in time of peace, military establishments equal to about +one-hundredth part of their entire population.</p> + +<p>The geographical position of a country also greatly influences the +degree and character of its military preparation. It may be bordered on +one or more sides by mountains and other obstacles calculated to +diminish the probability of invasion; or the whole frontier may be wide +open to an attack: the interior may be of such a nature as to furnish +security to its own army, and yet be fatal to the enemy should he occupy +it; or it may furnish him advantages far superior to his own country. It +may be an island in the sea, and consequently exposed only to maritime +descents—events of rare occurrence in modern times.</p> + +<p>Again, a nation may be placed between others who are interested in its +security, their mutual jealousy preventing the molestation of the weaker +neighbor. On the other hand, its political institutions may be such as +to compel the others to unite in attacking it in order to secure +themselves. The republics of Switzerland could remain unmolested in the +midst of powerful monarchies; but revolutionary France brought upon +herself the armies of all Europe.</p> + +<p>Climate has also some influence upon military character, but this +influence is far less than that of education and discipline. Northern +nations are said to be naturally more phlegmatic and sluggish than those +of warmer climates; and yet the armies of Gustavus Adolphus, Charles +XII., and Suwarrow, have shown themselves sufficiently active and +impetuous, while the Greeks, Romans, and Spaniards, in the times of +their glory, were patient, disciplined, and indefatigable, +notwithstanding the reputed fickleness of ardent temperaments.</p> + +<p>For any nation to postpone the making of military preparations till such +time as they are actually required in defence, is to waste the public +money, and endanger the public safety. The closing of an avenue of +approach, the security of a single road or river, or even the strategic +movement of a small body of troops, often effects, in the beginning, +what afterwards cannot be accomplished by large fortifications, and the +most formidable armies. Had a small army in 1812, with a well-fortified +dépôt on Lake Champlain, penetrated into Canada, and cut off all +reinforcements and supplies by way of Quebec, that country would +inevitably have fallen into our possession. In the winter of 1806-7, +Napoleon crossed the Vistula, and advanced even to the walls of +Königsberg, with the Austrians in his rear, and the whole power of +Russia before him. If Austria had pushed forward one hundred thousand +men from Bohemia, on the Oder, she would, in all probability, says the +best of military judges, Jomini, have struck a fatal blow to the +operations of Napoleon, and his army must have been exceedingly +fortunate even to regain the Rhine. But Austria preferred remaining +neutral till she could increase her army to four hundred thousand men. +She then took the offensive, and was beaten; whereas, with one hundred +thousand men brought into action at the favorable moment, she might, +most probably, have decided the fate of Europe.</p> + +<p>"Defensive war," says Napoleon, "does not preclude attack, any more +than offensive war is exclusive of defence," for frequently the best way +to counteract the enemy's operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at +the very outset of the war, to invade and cripple him. But this can +never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with the munitions of +war, and unsupported by fortifications. Such invasions must necessarily +fail. Experience in the wars of the French revolution has demonstrated +this; and even our own short history is not without its proof. In 1812, +the conquest of Canada was determined on some time before the +declaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or +apparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to +this declaration, for the Canadian peninsula. With a disciplined army of +the same numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed against +the vital point of the British possessions at a time when the whole +military force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men, how +different had been the result!</p> + +<p>While, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate +to its resources, position, and character, they can in no case be +dispensed with. No matter how extensive or important the temporary means +that may be developed as necessity requires, there must be some force +kept in a constant state of efficiency, in order to impart life and +stability to the system. The one can never properly replace the other; +for while the former constitutes the basis, the latter must form the +main body of the military edifice, which, by its strength and +durability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if the +architecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in its +fall.</p> + +<p>The permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations, +are—</p> + +<p>1st. An army; 2d. A navy; 3d. Fortifications.</p> + +<p>The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, to +regard their <i>personnel</i>; but looking upon them as institutions or +organizations, they present all the characteristics of durability. They +are sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes; by the +hot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may +become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of popular delusion may +overthrow and apparently sweep them away. But they will immediately +spring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the +organization of political institutions.</p> + +<p>Its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation's +wants; but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support +so as to degrade their character or endanger their organization. "A +government," says one of the best historians of the age, "which neglects +its army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes +of posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its +country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory."</p> + +<p>One of our own distinguished cabinet ministers remarks, that the history +of our relations with the Indian tribes from the beginning to the +present hour, is one continued proof of the necessity of maintaining an +efficient military force in time of peace, and that the treatment we +received for a long series of years from European powers, was a most +humiliating illustration of the folly of attempting to dispense with +these means of defence.</p> + +<p>"Twice," says he, "we were compelled to maintain, by open war, our +quarrel with the principal aggressors. After many years of forbearance +and negotiation, our claims in other cases were at length amicably +settled; but in one of the most noted of these cases, it was not without +much delay and imminent hazard of war that the execution of the treaty +was finally enforced. No one acquainted with these portions of our +history, can hesitate to ascribe much of the wantonness and duration of +the wrongs we endured, to a knowledge on the part of our assailants of +the scantiness and inefficiency of our military and naval force."</p> + +<p>"If," said Mr. Calhoun, "disregarding the sound dictates of reason and +experience, we, in peace, neglect our military establishment, we must, +with a powerful and skilful enemy, be exposed to the most distressing +calamities."</p> + +<p>These remarks were made in opposition to the reduction of our military +establishment, in 1821, below the standard of thirteen thousand. +Nevertheless, the force was reduced to about six or seven thousand; and +we were soon made to feel the consequences. It is stated, in a report of +high authority, that if there had been two regiments available near St. +Louis, in 1832, the war with Black Hawk would have been easily avoided; +and that it cannot be doubted that the scenes of devastation and savage +warfare which overspread the Floridas for nearly seven years would also +have been avoided, and some thirty millions have been saved the country, +if two regiments had been available at the beginning of that +conflict.<a name="FNanchor_12_12"></a><a href="#Footnote_12_12"><sup>[12]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_12_12"></a><a href="#FNanchor_12_12">[12]</a><div class="note"><p> We may now add to these remarks, that if our government +had occupied the country between the Nueces and the Rio Grande with a +well-organized army of twelve thousand men, war with Mexico might have +been avoided; but to push forward upon Matamoras a small force of only +two thousand, in the very face of a large Mexican army was holding out +to them the strongest inducements to attack us. The temporary economy of +a few thousands in reducing our military establishment to a mere handful +of men, again results in a necessary expenditure of many millions of +dollars and a large sacrifice of human life.</p></div> + +<p>We must, in this country, if we heed either the dictates of reason or +experience, maintain in time of peace a skeleton military and naval +force, capable of being greatly expanded, in the event of danger, by +the addition of new troops.</p> + +<p>Much energy and enterprise will always be imparted to an army or navy by +the addition of new forces. The strength thus acquired is sometimes in +even a far greater ratio than the increase of numbers. But it must be +remembered that these new elements are, of themselves, far inferior to +the old ones in discipline, steady courage, and perseverance. No general +can rely on the accuracy of their movements in the operations of a +campaign, and they are exceedingly apt to fail him at the critical +moment on the field of battle. The same holds true with respect to +sailors inexperienced in the discipline and duties of a man-of-war. +There is this difference, however: an army usually obtains its recruits +from men totally unacquainted with military life, while a navy, in case +of sudden increase, is mainly supplied from the merchant marine with +professional sailors, who, though unacquainted with the use of +artillery, &c., on ship-board, are familiar with all the other duties of +sea life, and not unused to discipline. Moreover, raw seamen and +marines, from being under the immediate eye of their officers in time of +action, and without the possibility of escape, fight much better than +troops of the same character on land. If years are requisite to make a +good sailor, surely an equal length of time is necessary to perfect the +soldier; and no less skill, practice, and professional study are +required for the proper direction of armies than for the management of +fleets.</p> + +<p>But some have said that even these skeletons of military and naval +forces are entirely superfluous, and that a brave and patriotic people +will make as good a defence against invasion as the most disciplined and +experienced. Such views are frequently urged in the halls of congress, +and some have even attempted to confirm them by historical examples.</p> + +<p>There are instances, it is true, where disorganized and frantic masses, +animated by patriotic enthusiasm, have gained the most brilliant +victories. Here, however, extraordinary circumstances supplied the place +of order, and produced an equilibrium between forces that otherwise +would have been very unequal; but in almost every instance of this kind, +the loss of the undisciplined army has been unnecessarily great, human +life being substituted for skill and order. But victory, even with such +a drawback, cannot often attend the banners of newly raised and +disorderly forces. If the captain and crew of a steamship knew nothing +of navigation, and had never been at sea, and the engineer was totally +unacquainted with his profession, could we expect the ship to cross the +Atlantic in safety, and reach her destined port? Would we trust our +lives and the honor of our country to their care? Would we not say to +them, "First make yourselves acquainted with the principles of your +profession, the use of the compass, and the means of determining whether +you direct your course upon a ledge of rocks or into a safe harbor?" War +is not, as some seem to suppose, a mere game of chance. Its principles +constitute one of the most intricate of modern sciences; and the general +who understands the art of rightly applying its rules, and possesses the +means of carrying out its precepts, may be morally certain of success.</p> + +<p>History furnishes abundant proofs of the impolicy of relying upon +undisciplined forces in the open field. Almost every page of Napier's +classic History of the Peninsular War contains striking examples of the +useless waste of human life and property by the Spanish militia; while, +with one quarter as many regulars, at a small fractional part of the +actual expense, the French might have been expelled at the outset, or +have been driven, at any time afterwards, from the Peninsula.</p> + +<p>At the beginning of the French Revolution the regular army was +abolished, and the citizen-soldiery, who were established on the 14th of +July, 1789, relied on exclusively for the national defence. "But these +three millions of national guards," says Jomini, "though good supporters +of the decrees of the assembly, were nevertheless useless for +reinforcing the army beyond the frontiers, and utterly incapable of +defending their own firesides." Yet no one can question their individual +bravery and patriotism; for, when reorganized, disciplined, and properly +directed, they put to flight the best troops in Europe. At the first +outbreak of this revolution, the privileged classes of other countries, +upholding crumbling institutions and rotten dynasties, rushed forth +against the maddened hordes of French democracy. The popular power, +springing upward by its own elasticity when the weight of political +oppression was removed, soon became too wild and reckless to establish +itself on any sure basis, or even to provide for its own protection. If +the attacks of the enervated enemies of France were weak, so also were +her own efforts feeble to resist these attacks. The republican armies +repelled the ill-planned and ill-conducted invasion by the Duke of +Brunswick; but it was by the substitution of human life for preparation, +system, and skill; enthusiasm supplied the place of discipline; robbery +produced military stores; and the dead bodies of her citizens formed +<i>épaulements</i> against the enemy. Yet this was but the strength of +weakness; the aimless struggle of a broken and disjointed government; +and the new revolutionary power was fast sinking away before the +combined opposition of Europe, when the great genius of Napoleon, with a +strong arm and iron rule, seizing upon the scattered fragments, and +binding them together into one consolidated mass, made France +victorious, and seated himself on the throne of empire.</p> + +<p>No people in the world ever exhibited a more general and enthusiastic +patriotism than the Americans during the war of our own Revolution. And +yet our army received, even at that time, but little support from +irregular and militia forces in the open field. Washington's opinions on +this subject furnish so striking a contrast to the congressional +speeches of modern political demagogues, who, with boastful swaggers, +would fain persuade us that we require no organization or discipline to +meet the veteran troops of Europe in the open field, and who would hurry +us, without preparation, into war with the strongest military powers of +the world—so striking is the contrast between the assertions of these +men and the letters and reports of Washington, that it may be well for +the cool and dispassionate lover of truth to occasionally refresh his +memory by reference to the writings of Washington. The following brief +extracts are from his letters to the President of Congress, December, +1776:</p> + +<p>"The saving in the article of clothing, provisions, and a thousand other +things, by having nothing to do with the militia, unless in cases of +extraordinary exigency, and such as could not be expected in the common +course of events, would amply support a large army, which, well +officered, would be daily improving, instead of continuing a +destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. In my opinion, if any +dependence is placed on the militia another year, Congress will be +deceived. When danger is a little removed from them they will not turn +out at all. When it comes home to them, the well-affected, instead of +flying to arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in removing +their families and effects; while the disaffected are concerting +measures to make their submission, and spread terror and dismay all +around, to induce others to follow their example. Daily experience and +abundant proofs warrant this information. Short enlistments, and a +mistaken dependence upon our militia, have been the origin of all our +misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our debt. The militia come +in, you cannot tell how; go, you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot +tell where; consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you +at last, at a critical moment."</p> + +<p>These remarks of Washington will not be found too severe if we remember +the conduct of our militia in the open field at Princeton, Savannah +River, Camden, Guilford Court-House, &c., in the war of the Revolution; +the great cost of the war of 1812 as compared with its military results; +the refusal of the New England militia to march beyond the lines of +their own states, and of the New-York militia to cross the Niagara and +secure a victory already won; or the disgraceful flight of the Southern +militia from the field of Bladensburg.</p> + +<p>But there is another side to this picture. If our militia have +frequently failed to maintain their ground <i>when drawn up in the open +field</i>, we can point with pride to their brave and successful defence of +Charleston, Mobile, New Orleans, Fort McHenry, Stonington, Niagara, +Plattsburg, in proof of what may be accomplished by militia in +connection with fortifications.</p> + +<p>These examples from our history must fully demonstrate the great value +of a militia when properly employed as a defence against invasion, and +ought to silence the sneers of those who would abolish this arm of +defence as utterly useless. In the open field militia cannot in general +be manœuvred to advantage; whereas, in the defence of fortified places +their superior intelligence and activity not unfrequently render them +even more valuable than regulars. And in reading the severe strictures +of Washington, Greene, Morgan, and others, upon our militia, it must be +remembered that they were at that time entirely destitute of important +works of defence; and the experience of all other nations, as well as +our own, has abundantly shown that a newly-raised force cannot cope, <i>in +the open field</i>, with one subordinate and disciplined. Here <i>science</i> +must determine the contest. Habits of strict obedience, and of +simultaneous and united action, are indispensable to carry out what the +higher principles of the military profession require. New and +undisciplined forces are often confounded at the evolutions, and +strategic and tactical combinations of a regular army, and lose all +confidence in their leaders and in themselves. But, when placed behind a +breastwork, they even overrate their security. They can then coolly look +upon the approaching columns, and, unmoved by glittering armor and +bristling bayonets, will exert all their skill in the use of their +weapons. The superior accuracy of aim which the American has obtained by +practice from his early youth, has enabled our militia to gain, under +the protection of military works, victories as brilliant as the most +veteran troops. The moral courage necessary to await an attack behind a +parapet, is at least equal to that exerted in the open field, where +<i>movements</i> generally determine the victory. To watch the approach of an +enemy, to see him move up and display his massive columns, his long +array of military equipments, his fascines and scaling-ladders, his +instruments of attack, and the professional skill with which he wields +them, to hear the thunder of his batteries, spreading death all around, +and to repel, hand to hand, those tremendous assaults, which stand out +in all their horrible relief upon the canvass of modern warfare, +requires a heart at least as brave as the professional warrior exhibits +in the pitched battle.</p> + +<p>But we must not forget that to call this force into the open field,—to +take the mechanic from his shop, the merchant from his counter, the +farmer from his plough,—will necessarily be attended with an immense +sacrifice of human life. The lives lost on the battle-field are not the +only ones; militia, being unaccustomed to exposure, and unable to supply +their own wants with certainty and regularity, contract diseases which +occasion in every campaign a most frightful mortality.</p> + +<p>There is also a vast difference in the cost of supporting regulars and +militia forces. The cost of a regular army of twenty thousand men for a +campaign of six months, in this country, has been estimated, from data +in the War-office, at a hundred and fifty dollars per man; while the +cost of a militia force, under the same circumstances, making allowance +for the difference in the expenses from sickness, waste of +camp-furniture, equipments, &c., will be two hundred and fifty dollars +per man. But in short campaigns, and in irregular warfare, like the +expedition against Black Hawk and his Indians in the Northwest, and +during the hostilities in Florida, "the expenses of the militia," says +Mr. Secretary Spencer, in a report to congress in 1842, "invariably +exceed those of regulars by <i>at least three hundred per cent</i>." It is +further stated that "<i>fifty-five thousand militia</i> were called into +service during the Black Hawk and Florida wars, and that <i>thirty +millions of dollars have been expended in these conflicts</i>!" When it is +remembered that during these border wars our whole regular army did not +exceed twelve or thirteen thousand men, it will not be difficult to +perceive why our military establishment was so enormously expensive. +Large sums were paid to sedentary militia who never rendered the +slightest service. Again, during our late war with Great Britain, of +less than three years' duration, <i>two hundred and eighty thousand +muskets were lost,</i>—the average cost of which is stated at twelve +dollars,—making an aggregate loss, in muskets alone, <i>of three millions +and three hundred and sixty thousand dollars</i>, during a service of about +two years and a half;—resulting mainly from that neglect and waste of +public property which almost invariably attends the movements of +newly-raised and inexperienced forces. Facts like these should awaken us +to the necessity of reorganizing and disciplining our militia. General +Knox, when Secretary of War, General Harrison while in the senate, and +Mr. Poinsett in 1841, each furnished plans for effecting this purpose, +but the whole subject has been passed by with neglect.</p> + +<p>Permanent fortifications differ in many of their features from either of +the two preceding elements of national defence. They are passive in +their nature, yet possess all the conservative properties of an army or +navy, and through these two contribute largely to the active operations +of a campaign. When once constructed they require but very little +expenditure for their support. In time of peace they withdraw no +valuable citizens from the useful occupations of life. Of themselves +they can never exert an influence corrupting to public morals, or +dangerous to public liberty; but as the means of preserving peace, and +as obstacles to an invader, their influence and power are immense. While +contributing to the economical support of a peace establishment, by +furnishing drill-grounds, parades, quarters, &c.; and to its efficiency +still more, by affording facilities both to the regulars and militia for +that species of artillery practice so necessary in the defence of water +frontiers; they also serve as safe dépôts of arms and the immense +quantity of materials and military munitions so indispensable in modern +warfare. These munitions usually require much time, skill, and expense +in their construction, and it is of vast importance that they should be +preserved with the utmost care.</p> + +<p>Maritime arsenals and dépôts of naval and military stores on the +sea-coast are more particularly exposed to capture and destruction. Here +an enemy can approach by stealth, striking some sudden and fatal blow +before any effectual resistance can be organized. But in addition to +the security afforded by harbor fortifications to public property of the +highest military value, they also serve to protect the merchant +shipping, and the vast amount of private wealth which a commercial +people always collect at these points. They furnish safe retreats, and +the means of repair for public vessels injured in battle, or by storms, +and to merchantmen a refuge from the dangers of sea, or the threats of +hostile fleets. Moreover, they greatly facilitate our naval attacks upon +the enemy's shipping; and if he attempt a descent, their well-directed +fire will repel his squadrons from our harbors, and force his troops to +land at some distant and unfavorable position.</p> + +<p>The three means of permanent defence which have been mentioned, are, of +course, intended to accomplish the same general object; but each has its +distinct and proper sphere of action, and neither can be regarded as +antagonistical to the others. Any undue increase of one, at the expense +of the other two, must necessarily be followed by a corresponding +diminution of national strength. We must not infer, however, that all +must be maintained upon the same footing. The position of the country +and the character of the people must determine this.</p> + +<p>England, from her insular position and the extent of her commerce, must +maintain a large navy; a large army is also necessary for the defence of +her own coasts and the protection of her colonial possessions. Her +men-of-war secure a safe passage for her merchant-vessels, and transport +her troops in safety through all seas, and thus contribute much to the +acquisition and security of colonial territory. The military forces of +the British empire amount to about one hundred and fifty thousand men, +and the naval forces to about seven hundred vessels of war,[13] carrying +in all some fifteen thousand guns and forty thousand men. France has +less commerce, and but few colonial possessions. She has a great extent +of sea-coast, but her fortifications secure it from maritime descents; +her only accessible points are on the land frontiers. Her army and +navy, therefore, constitute <i>her</i> principal means of defence. Her army +numbers some three hundred and fifty thousand men, and her navy about +three hundred and fifty vessels,[13] carrying about nine thousand guns +and thirty thousand men. Russia, Austria, Prussia, Sweden, and other +continental powers, have but little commerce to be protected, while +their extensive frontiers are greatly exposed to land attacks: their +fortifications and armies, therefore, constitute their principal means +of defence. But for the protection of their own seas from the inroads of +their powerful maritime neighbor, Russia and Austria support naval +establishments of a limited extent. Russia has, in all, some one hundred +and eighty vessels of war, and Austria not quite half that number.<a name="FNanchor_13_13"></a><a href="#Footnote_13_13"><sup>[13]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_13_13"></a><a href="#FNanchor_13_13">[13]</a><div class="note"><p> These numbers include <i>all</i> vessels of war, whether in +commission, building, or in ordinary.</p></div> + +<p>The United States possess no colonies; but they have a sea-coast of more +than three thousand miles, with numerous bays, estuaries, and navigable +rivers, which expose our most populous cities to maritime attacks. The +northern land frontier is two thousand miles in extent, and in the west +our territory borders upon the British and Mexican possessions for many +thousand miles more. Within these limits there are numerous tribes of +Indians, who require the watchful care of armed forces to keep them at +peace among themselves as well as with us. Our authorized military +establishment amounts to 7,590 men, and our naval establishment consists +of seventy-seven vessels of all classes, carrying 2,345 guns, and 8,724 +men.<a name="FNanchor_14_14"></a><a href="#Footnote_14_14"><sup>[14]</sup></a> This is certainly a very small military and naval force for the +defence of so extended and populous a country, especially one whose +political institutions and rapidly-increasing power expose it to the +distrust and jealousy of most other nations.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_14_14"></a><a href="#FNanchor_14_14">[14]</a><div class="note"><p> Since these pages were put in the hands of the printer, +the above numbers have been nearly doubled, this increase having been +made with special reference to the present war with Mexico.</p></div> + +<p>The fortifications for the defence of our sea-coast and land frontiers +will be discussed hereafter.<a name="FNanchor_15_15"></a><a href="#Footnote_15_15"><sup>[15]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_15_15"></a><a href="#FNanchor_15_15">[15]</a><div class="note"><p> Jomini's work on the Military Art contains many valuable +remarks on this subject of Military Polity: also the writings of +Clausewitz, Dupin, Lloyd, Chambray, Tranchant de Laverne, and Rudtorfer. +Several of these questions are also discussed in Rocquancourt, +Carion-Nisas, De Vernon, and other writers on military history. The +several European Annuaires Militaires, or Army Registers, and the French +and German military periodicals, contain much valuable matter connected +with military statistics.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_VII"></a><h2>CHAPTER VII.</h2> + +<p>SEA-COAST DEFENCES.</p> +<br> + +<p>The principal attacks which we have had to sustain, either as colonies +or states, from civilized foes, have come from Canada. As colonies we +were continually encountering difficulties and dangers from the French +possessions. In the war of the Revolution, it being one of national +emancipation, the military operations were more general throughout the +several states; but in the war of 1812 the attacks were confined to the +northern frontier and a few exposed points along the coast. In these two +contests with Great Britain, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, +Washington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, being within +reach of the British naval power, and offering the dazzling attraction +of rich booty, have each been subjected to powerful assaults.</p> + +<p>Similar attacks will undoubtedly be made in any future war with England. +An attempt at permanent lodgment would be based either on Canada or a +servile insurrection in the southern states. The former project, in a +military point of view, offers the greatest advantages, but most +probably the latter would also be resorted to for effecting a diversion, +if nothing more. But for inflicting upon us a sudden and severe injury +by the destruction of large amounts of public and private property, our +seaport towns offer inducements not likely to be disregarded. This mode +of warfare, barbarous though it be, will certainly attend a conflict +with any great maritime power. How can we best prepare in time of peace +to repel these attacks?</p> + +<p>Immediately after the war of 1812 a joint commission of our most +distinguished military and naval officers was formed, to devise a system +of defensive works, to be erected in time of peace for the security of +the most important and the most exposed points on our sea-coast. It may +be well here to point out, in very general terms, the positions and +character of these works, mentioning only such as have been completed, +or are now in course of construction, and such as are intended to be +built as soon as Congress shall grant the requisite funds. There are +other works projected for some future period, but as they do not belong +to the class required for immediate, use, they will not be referred to.</p> + +<p>MAINE.</p> + +<p>Beginning at the northeastern extremity of our coast, we have, for +Eastport and Wiscasset, projected works estimated to carry about fifty +guns. Nothing has yet been done to these works.</p> + +<p>Next Portland, with works carrying about forty or fifty guns, and Fort +Penobscot and batteries, carrying about one hundred and fifty guns. +These are only partly built.</p> + +<p>NEW HAMPSHIRE.</p> + +<p>Defences of Portsmouth and the vicinity, about two hundred guns. These +works are also only partly built.</p> + +<p>MASSACHUSETTS.</p> + +<p>Projected works east of Boston, carrying about sixty guns. These are not +yet commenced.</p> + +<p>Works for defence of Boston Harbor carry about five hundred guns. These +are nearly three-quarters completed. Those of New Bedford harbor carry +fifty guns: not yet begun.</p> + +<p>RHODE ISLAND.</p> + +<p>Newport harbor,—works carry about five hundred guns, nearly completed.</p> + +<p>CONNECTICUT.</p> + +<p>New London harbor, New Haven, and the Connecticut river. The first of +these nearly completed; the two latter not yet begun.</p> + +<p>NEW YORK.</p> + +<p>The works projected for the defence of New York harbor are estimated to +carry about one thousand guns. These works are not yet one-half +constructed.</p> + +<p>PENNSYLVANIA.</p> + +<p>The works projected for the defence of the Delaware Bay and Philadelphia +will carry about one hundred and fifty guns. They are not one-quarter +built.</p> + +<p>MARYLAND AND VIRGINIA.</p> + +<p>Baltimore and Annapolis—these works will carry some two hundred and +fifty guns. The works for the Chesapeake Bay will carry about six +hundred guns; and those for the Potomac river about eighty guns. These +are more than one-half completed.</p> + +<p>NORTH CAROLINA.</p> + +<p>The works at Beaufort and Smithville carry about one hundred and fifty +guns. They are essentially completed.</p> + +<p>SOUTH CAROLINA.</p> + +<p>The works for the defence of Charleston carry some two hundred guns. +They are one-half constructed.</p> + +<p>GEORGIA.</p> + +<p>The defences of Savannah carry about two hundred guns and are nearly +three-quarters finished.</p> + +<p>FLORIDA.</p> + +<p>The works projected for the defence of St. Augustine, Key West, +Tortugas, and Pensacola will carry some eight or nine hundred guns. +Those at St. Augustine and Pensacola are essentially completed, but +those at Key West and Tortugas are barely begun.</p> + +<p>ALABAMA.</p> + +<p>The works for the defence of Mobile will carry about one hundred and +sixty guns. These are nearly constructed.</p> + +<p>LOUISIANA.</p> + +<p>The works for the defence of New Orleans will carry some two hundred and +fifty or three hundred guns; they are nearly completed.</p> + +<p>The works north of the Chesapeake cost about three thousand dollars per +gun; those south of that point about six thousand dollars per gun. This +difference in cost is due in part to the character of the soil on which +the fortifications are built, and in part to the high prices paid in the +south for materials and workmanship.</p> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> + +<p>Having pointed out the character and condition of our system of +sea-coast defences, let us briefly examine how far these works may be +relied on as a means of security against a maritime descent.</p> + +<p>To come to a proper conclusion on this subject, let us first examine the +three or four great maritime descents attempted by the English during +the wars of the French Revolution; a period at which the great naval +superiority of England over other nations, gave her the title of +<i>mistress of the seas</i>. Let us notice what have been the results of the +several attempts made by this power at maritime invasions, and the means +by which such attacks have been repelled.</p> + +<p>In 1795, a maritime expedition was fitted out against Quiberon, at an +expense of eight millions of dollars. This port of the French coast had +then a naval defence of near thirty sail, carrying about sixteen +hundred guns. Lord Bridport attacked it with fourteen sail of the line, +five frigates, and some smaller vessels, about fifteen hundred guns in +all, captured a portion of the fleet, and forced the remainder to take +shelter under the guns of the fortifications of L'Orient. The French +naval defence being destroyed, the British now entered Quiberon without +opposition. This bay is said by Brenton, in his British Naval History, +to be "the finest on the coast of France, or perhaps in the world, for +landing an army." Besides these natural advantages in favor of the +English, the inhabitants of the surrounding country were in open +insurrection, ready to receive the invaders with open arms. A body of +ten thousand troops were landed, and clothing, arms, &c., furnished to +as many more royalist troops; but the combined forces failed in their +attack upon St. Barbe, and General Hoche, from his intrenchments, with +seven thousand men, held in check a body of eighteen thousand, penned +up, without defences, in the narrow peninsula. Reinforced by a new +debarkation, the allies again attempted to advance, but were soon +defeated, and ultimately almost entirely destroyed.</p> + +<p>In 1799, the English and Russians made a descent upon Holland with +fourteen ships of the line and ten frigates, carrying about eleven +hundred guns and a great number of transports, with an army of +thirty-six thousand men. The Dutch naval defences consisted of eight +ships of the line, three fifty-four gun ships, eight forty-eight gun +ships and eight smaller frigates, carrying in all about twelve hundred +guns; but this force contributed little or nothing to the defence, and +was soon forced to hoist the hostile flag. The defensive army was at +first only twelve thousand, but the Republicans afterwards increased it +to twenty-two thousand, and finally to twenty-eight thousand men. But +notwithstanding this immense naval and military superiority, and the +co-operation of the Orange party in assisting the landing of their +troops, the allies failed to get possession of a single strong place; +and after a loss of six thousand men, were compelled to capitulate. +"Such," says Alison, "was the disastrous issue of the greatest +expedition which had yet sailed from the British harbors during the +war."</p> + +<p>In 1801, Nelson, with three ships of the line, two frigates, and +thirty-five smaller vessels, made a desperate attack upon the harbor of +Boulogne, but was repulsed with severe loss.</p> + +<p>Passing over some unimportant attacks, we come to the descent upon the +Scheldt, or as it is commonly called, the Walcheren expedition, in 1809. +This expedition, though a failure, has often been referred to as proving +the expediency of maritime descents. The following is a brief narrative +of this expedition:—</p> + +<p>Napoleon had projected vast fortifications, dock-yards, and naval +arsenals at Flushing and Antwerp for the protection of a maritime force +in the Scheldt. But no sooner was the execution of this project begun, +than the English fitted out an expedition to seize upon the defences of +the Scheldt, and capture or destroy the naval force. Flushing, at the +mouth of the river, was but ill-secured, and Antwerp, some sixty or +seventy miles further up the river, was entirely defenceless; the +rampart was unarmed with cannon, dilapidated, and tottering, and its +garrison consisted of only about two hundred invalids and recruits. +Napoleon's regular army was employed on the Danube and in the Peninsula. +The British attacking force consisted of thirty-seven ships of the line, +twenty-three frigates, thirty-three sloops of war, twenty-eight gun, +mortar, and bomb vessels, thirty-six smaller vessels, eighty-two +gunboats, innumerable transports, with over forty thousand troops, and +an immense artillery train; making in all, says the English historian, +"an hundred thousand combatants." A landing was made upon the island of +Walcheren, and siege laid to Flushing, which place was not reduced till +eighteen days after the landing; the attack upon the water was made by +seven or eight ships of the line, and a large flotilla of bomb vessels, +but produced no effect. The channel at the mouth of the river was too +broad to be defended by the works of Flushing, and the main portion of +the fleet passed out of reach of the guns, and ascended the Scheldt part +way up to Antwerp. But in the mean time, the fortifications of that +place had been repaired, and, after a fruitless operation of a whole +month in the river, the English were gradually forced to retreat to +Walcheren, and finally to evacuate their entire conquest.</p> + +<p>The cost of the expedition was immense, both in treasure and in life. It +was certainly very poorly managed. But we cannot help noticing the +superior value of fortifications as a defence against such descents. +They did much to retard the operations of the enemy till a defensive +army could be raised. The works of Flushing were never intended to close +up the Scheldt, and of course could not intercept the passage of +shipping; but they were not reduced by the English naval force, as has +sometimes been alleged. Col. Mitchel, of the English service, says that +the fleet "kept up so tremendous a fire upon the batteries, that the +French officers who had been present at Austerlitz and Jena declared +that the cannonade in these battles had been a mere <i>jeu d'enfans</i> in +comparison. Yet what was the effect produced on the defences of the +place by this fire, so formidable, to judge by the sound alone? The +writer can answer the question with some accuracy, for he went along the +entire sea-line the very day after the capitulation, and found no part +of the parapet injured so as to be of the slightest consequence, and +only one solitary gun dismounted, evidently by the bursting of a shell, +and which could not, of course, have been thrown from the line of +battle ships, but must have been thrown from the land batteries."<a name="FNanchor_16_16"></a><a href="#Footnote_16_16"><sup>[16]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_16_16"></a><a href="#FNanchor_16_16">[16]</a><div class="note"><p> The batteries constructed in the siege of this place were +armed with fifty-two heavy guns and mortars.</p></div> + +<p>But it may be said that although great naval descents on a hostile coast +are almost always unsuccessful, nevertheless a direct naval attack upon +a single fortified position will be attended with more favorable +results; and that our seaport towns, however fortified, will be exposed +to bombardment and destruction by the enemy's fleets. In other words, +that in a direct contest between ships and forts the former will have at +least an equal chance of success.</p> + +<p>Let us suppose a fair trial of this relative strength. The fort is to be +properly constructed and in good repair; its guns in a position to be +used with effect; its garrison skilful and efficient; its commander +capable and brave. The ship is of the very best character, and in +perfect order; the crew disciplined and courageous; its commander +skilful and adroit; the wind, and tide, and sea—all as could be +desired.<a name="FNanchor_17_17"></a><a href="#Footnote_17_17"><sup>[17]</sup></a> The numbers of the garrison and crew are to be no more than +requisite, with no unnecessary exposure of human life to swell the lists +of the slain. The issue of this contest, unless attended with +extraordinary and easily distinguishable circumstances, would be a fair +test of their relative strength.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_17_17"></a><a href="#FNanchor_17_17">[17]</a><div class="note"><p> These conditions for a battery are easily satisfied, but +for the ship, are partly dependent on the elements, and seldom to be +wholly attained.</p></div> + +<p>What result should we anticipate from the nature of the contending +forces? The ship, under the circumstances we have supposed, can choose +her point of attack, selecting the one she may deem the most vulnerable; +but she herself is everywhere vulnerable; her men and guns are much +concentrated, and consequently much exposed. But in the fort the guns +and men are more distributed, a fort with an interior area of several +acres not having a garrison as large as the crew of a seventy-four-gun +ship. All parts of the vessel are liable to injury; while the fort +offers but a small mark,—the opening of the embrasures, a small part of +the carriage, and now and then a head or arm raised above the +parapet,—the ratio of exposed surfaces being not less than <i>twenty to +one</i>. In the vessel the guns are fired from an oscillating deck, and the +balls go at random; in the fort the guns are fired from an immoveable +platform, and the balls reach their object with unerring aim. There is +always more or less motion in the water, so that the ship's guns, though +accurately pointed at one moment, at the next will be thrown entirely +away from the object, even when the motion is too slight to be otherwise +noticed; whereas in the battery the guns will be fired just as they are +pointed; and the motion of the vessel will merely vary to the extent of +a few inches the spot in which the shot is received. In the fort the men +and guns are behind impenetrable walls of stone and earth; in the vessel +they are behind frail bulwarks, whose splinters are equally destructive +with the shot. The fort is incombustible; while the ship may readily be +set on fire by incendiary projectiles. The ship has many points exposed +that may be called vital points. By losing her rudder, or portions of +her rigging, or of her spars, she may become unmanageable, and unable to +use her strength; she may receive shots under water, and be liable to +sink; she may receive hot shot, and be set on fire: these damages are in +addition to those of having her guns dismounted and her people killed by +shots that pierce her sides and scatter splinters from her timbers; +while the risks of the battery are confined to those mentioned +above—namely, the risk that the gun, the carriage, or the men may be +struck.</p> + +<p>The opinions of military writers, and the facts of history, fully +accord with these deductions of theory. Some few individuals mistaking, +or misstating, the facts of a few recent trials, assert that modern +improvements in the naval service have so far outstripped the progress +in the art of land defence, that a floating force is now abundantly able +to cope, upon equal terms, with a land battery. Ignorant and superficial +persons, hearing merely that certain forts had recently yielded to a +naval force, and taking no trouble to learn the real facts of the case, +have paraded them before the public as proofs positive of a new era in +military science. This conclusion, however groundless and absurd, has +received credit merely from its novelty. Let us examine the several +trials of strength which have taken place between ships and forts within +the last fifty years, and see what have been the results.</p> + +<p>In 1792 a considerable French squadron attacked Cagliari, whose +fortifications were at that time so dilapidated and weak, as scarcely to +deserve the name of defences. Nevertheless, the French fleet, after a +bombardment of three days, was most signally defeated and obliged to +retire.</p> + +<p>In 1794 two British ships, "the Fortitude of seventy-four, and the Juno +frigate of thirty-two guns," attacked a small town in the bay of +Martello, Corsica, which was armed with one gun in barbette, and a +garrison of thirty men. After a bombardment of two and a half hours, +these ships were forced to haul off with considerable damage and loss of +life. The little tower had received no injury, and its garrison were +unharmed. Here were <i>one hundred and six guns</i> afloat against <i>one</i> on +shore; and yet the latter was successful.</p> + +<p>In 1797 Nelson attacked the little inefficient batteries of Santa Crux, +in Teneriffe, with eight vessels carrying four hundred guns. But +notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, skill, and bravery, he +was repelled with the loss of two hundred and fifty men, while the +garrison received little or no damage. A single ball from the land +battery, striking the side of one of his vessels, instantly sunk her +with near a hundred seamen and marines!</p> + +<p>In 1798, a French flotilla of fifty-two brigs and gunboats, manned with +near seven thousand men, attacked a little English redoubt on the island +of Marcou, which was armed with two thirty-two-pounders, two +six-pounders, four four-pounders, and two carronades, and garrisoned +with two hundred and fifty men. Notwithstanding this great disparity of +numbers, the little redoubt sunk seven of the enemy's brigs and +gunboats, captured another, and forced the remainder to retreat with +great loss; while the garrison had but one man killed and three wounded.</p> + +<p>In 1801, the French, with three frigates and six thousand men, attacked +the poorly-constructed works of Porto Ferrairo, whose defensive force +was a motley garrison of fifteen hundred Corsicans, Tuscans, and +English. Here the attacking force was <i>four</i> times as great as that of +the garrison; nevertheless they were unsuccessful after several +bombardments and a siege of five months.</p> + +<p>In July of the same year, 1801, Admiral Saumarez, with an English fleet +of six ships of the line and two smaller vessels, carrying in all five +hundred and two guns, attacked the Spanish and French defences of +Algesiras. Supposing the floating forces of the contending parties to be +equal, gun for gun, (which is certainly a very fair estimate for the +attacking force, considering the circumstances of the case,) we have a +French land-battery of only twelve guns opposed by an English floating +force of one hundred and ninety-six guns. Notwithstanding this +inequality of nearly <i>seventeen</i> to <i>one</i>, the little battery compelled +the superior naval force to retreat with great loss.</p> + +<p>Shortly after this, the French and Spanish fleets attacked the same +English squadron with a force of nearly <i>three</i> to <i>one</i>, but met with a +most signal defeat; whereas with a land-battery of only <i>one</i> to +<i>seventeen</i>, the same party had been victorious. What proof can be more +decisive of the superiority of guns on shore over those afloat!</p> + +<p>In 1803 the English garrison of Diamond Rock, near Port Royal Bay, with +only one hundred men and some fifteen guns, repelled a French squadron +of two seventy-four-gun ships, a frigate, and a brig, assisted by a land +attack of two hundred troops. There was not a single man killed or +wounded in the redoubt, while the French lost fifty men! The place was +afterwards reduced by famine.</p> + +<p>In 1806 a French battery on Cape Licosa, of only two guns and a garrison +of twenty-five men, resisted the attacks of a British eighty-gun ship +and two frigates. The carriage of one of the land-guns failed on the +second shot, so that, in fact, only <i>one</i> of them was available during +the action. Here was <i>a single piece of ordnance</i> and a garrison of +<i>twenty-five men,</i> opposed to a naval force of <i>over one hundred and +fifty guns</i> and about <i>thirteen hundred men.</i> And what effects were +produced by this strange combat? The attacking force lost <i>thirty-seven</i> +men killed and wounded, the eighty-gun ship was much disabled, while the +fort and garrison escaped entirely unharmed! What could not be effected +by force was afterwards obtained by negotiation.</p> + +<p>In 1808 a French land-battery of only <i>three</i> guns, near Fort Trinidad, +drove off an English seventy-four-gun ship, and a bomb-vessel.</p> + +<p>In 1813 Leghorn, whose defences were of a very mediocre character, and +whose garrison at that time was exceedingly weak, was attacked by an +English squadron of six ships, carrying over three hundred guns, and a +land force of one thousand troops. The whole attempt was a perfect +failure.</p> + +<p>"In 1814, when the English advanced against Antwerp," says Colonel +Mitchell, an English historian, "Fort Frederick, a small work of only +two guns, was established in a bend of the Polder Dyke, at some distance +below Lillo. The armament was a long eighteen-pounder and a five and a +half inch howitzer. From this post the French determined to dislodge the +English, and an eighty-gun ship dropped down with the tide and anchored +near the Flanders shore, about six hundred yards from the British +battery. By her position she was secured from the fire of the +eighteen-pounder, and exposed to that of the howitzer only. As soon as +every thing was made tight her broadside was opened; and if noise and +smoke were alone sufficient to ensure success in war, as so many of the +moderns seem to think, the result of this strange contest would not have +been long doubtful, for the thunder of the French artillery actually +made the earth to shake again; but though the earth shook, the single +British howitzer was neither dismounted nor silenced; and though the +artillery-men could not, perfectly exposed as they were, stand to their +gun while the iron hail was striking thick and fast around, yet no +sooner did the enemy's fire slacken for a moment than they sprang to +their post, ready to return at least one shot for eighty. This +extraordinary combat lasted from seven o'clock in the morning till near +twelve at noon, when the French ship, having had forty-one men killed +and wounded, her commander being in the list of the latter, and having +besides sustained serious damage in her hull and rigging, returned to +Antwerp without effecting any thing whatever. The howitzer was not +dismounted, the fort was not injured,—there being in fact nothing to +injure,—and the British had only one man killed and two wounded." </p> + +<p>It is unnecessary to further specify examples from the wars of the +French Revolution; the whole history of these wars is one continued +proof of the superiority of fortifications as a maritime frontier +defence. The sea-coast of France is almost within stone's throw<a name="FNanchor_18_18"></a><a href="#Footnote_18_18"><sup>[18]</sup></a> of +the principal British naval dépôts; here were large towns and harbors, +filled with the rich commerce of the world, offering the dazzling +attraction of rich booty. The French navy was at this time utterly +incompetent to their defence; while England supported a maritime force +at an annual expense of near <i>ninety millions of dollars.</i> Her largest +fleets were continually cruising within sight of these seaports, and not +unfrequently attempting to cut out their shipping. "At this period," +says one of her naval historians, "the naval force of Britain, so +multiplied and so expert from long practice, had acquired an intimate +knowledge of their (the French) harbors, their bays and creeks; her +officers knew the depth of water, and the resistance likely to be met +with in every situation." On the other hand, these harbors and towns +were frequently stripped of their garrisons by the necessities of +distant wars, being left with no other defence than their fortifications +and militia. And yet, notwithstanding all this, they escaped unharmed +during the entire contest. They were frequently attacked, and in some +instances the most desperate efforts were made to effect a permanent +lodgment; but in no case was the success at all commensurate with the +expense of life and treasure sacrificed, and no permanent hold was made +on either the maritime frontiers of France or her allies. This certainly +was owing to no inferiority of skill and bravery on the part of the +British navy, as the battles of Aboukir and Trafalgar, and the almost +total annihilation of the French marine, have but too plainly proven. +Why then did these places, escape? We know of no other reason, than that +<i>they were fortified</i>; and that the French knew how to defend their +fortifications. The British maritime expeditions to Quiberon, Holland, +Boulogne, the Scheldt, Constantinople, Buenos Ayres, &c., sufficiently +prove the ill-success, and the waste of life and treasure with which +they must always be attended. But when her naval power was applied to +the destruction of the enemy's marine, and in transporting her land +forces to solid bases of operations on the soil of her allies, in +Portugal and Belgium, the fall of Napoleon crowned the glory of their +achievements.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_18_18"></a><a href="#FNanchor_18_18">[18]</a><div class="note"><p> Only eighteen and a half miles across the Channel at the +narrowest place.</p></div> + +<p>Let us now examine the several British naval attacks on our own forts, +in the wars of the Revolution and of 1812.</p> + +<p>In 1776 Sir Peter Parker, with a British fleet of nine vessels, carrying +about two hundred and seventy<a name="FNanchor_19_19"></a><a href="#Footnote_19_19"><sup>[19]</sup></a> guns, attacked Fort Moultrie, in +Charleston harbor, which was then armed with only twenty-six guns, and +garrisoned by only three hundred and seventy-five regulars and a few +militia. In this contest the British were entirely defeated, and lost, +in killed and wounded, two hundred and five men, while their whole two +hundred and seventy guns killed and wounded only thirty-two men in the +fort. Of this trial of strength, which was certainly a fair one, Cooper +in his Naval History, says:—"It goes fully to prove the important +military position that ships cannot withstand forts, when the latter are +properly armed, constructed, and garrisoned. General Moultrie says only +thirty rounds from the battery were fired, and was of opinion that the +want of powder alone prevented the Americans from destroying the +men-of-war."</p> + +<a name="Footnote_19_19"></a><a href="#FNanchor_19_19">[19]</a><div class="note"><p> These vessels <i>rated</i> two hundred and fifty-four guns, but +the number actually carried is stated to have been two hundred and +seventy.</p></div> + +<p>In 1814 a British fleet of four vessels, carrying ninety-two guns, +attacked Fort Boyer, a small redoubt, located on a point of land +commanding the passage from the Gulf into the bay of Mobile. This +redoubt was garrisoned by only one hundred and twenty combatants, +officers included; and its armament was but twenty small pieces of +cannon, some of which were almost entirely useless, and most of them +poorly mounted "in batteries hastily thrown up, and leaving the gunners +uncovered from the knee upward," while the enemy's land force, acting in +concert with the ships, consisted of twenty artillerists with a battery +of two guns, and seven hundred and thirty marines, Indians, and negroes. +His ships carried five hundred and ninety men in all. This immense +disparity of numbers and strength did not allow to the British military +and naval commanders the slightest apprehension "that four British +ships, carrying ninety-two guns, and a land force somewhat exceeding +seven hundred combatants, could fail in reducing a small work mounting +only twenty short carronades, and defended by a little more than a +hundred men, unprovided alike with furnaces for heating shot, or +casements to cover themselves from rockets and shells." Nevertheless, +the enemy was completely repulsed; one of his largest ships was entirely +destroyed, and 85 men were killed and wounded on board the other; while +our loss was only eight or nine. Here a naval force of <i>five</i> to <i>one</i> +was repelled by the land-battery.</p> + +<p>Again, in 1814, a barbette battery of one four-pounder and two +eighteen-pounder guns at Stonington, repelled a British fleet of one +hundred and thirty-four guns. During the engagement the Americans +exhausted their ammunition, and spiked their eighteen-pounders, and only +one of them was afterwards used. Two of the enemy's ships, carrying one +hundred and twelve guns, were engaged during the whole time of attack, +and during much of this time bombarded the town from a position beyond +reach of the land-battery. They were entirely too far off for the +four-pounder gun to be of any use. Supposing the two eighteen-pounders +to have been employed during the whole action, and also all the guns of +the fleet, <i>one</i> eighteen-pounder on land must have been more than +equivalent to <i>sixty-seven</i> guns afloat, for the ships were so much +injured as to render it necessary for them to withdraw. The British loss +was twenty killed, and more than fifty wounded. Ours was only two killed +and six wounded.<a name="FNanchor_20_20"></a><a href="#Footnote_20_20"><sup>[20]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_20_20"></a><a href="#FNanchor_20_20">[20]</a><div class="note"><p> Perkins says two killed and six wounded. Holmes says six +wounded, but makes no mention of any killed.</p></div> + +<p>The fleet sent to the attack of Baltimore, in 1814, consisted of forty +sail, the largest of which were ships of the line, carrying an army of +over six thousand combatants. The troops were landed at North Point, +while sixteen of the bomb-vessels and frigates approached within reach +of Fort McHenry, and commenced a bombardment which lasted twenty-five +hours. During this attack, the enemy threw "fifteen hundred shells, four +hundred of which exploded within the walls of the fort, but without +making any impression on either the strength of the work or the +garrison," and the British were compelled to retire with much loss.</p> + +<p>In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of the +Mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high +as Fort St. Philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only +twenty guns in all. A heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with +but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no +impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their +former position at the mouth of the river.</p> + +<p>There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy's +vessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been +alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a +proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks. +Even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception +be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side? We +allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the British +fleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful +and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the +archives of the nation. Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient +work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a +small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been +completed. The portion constructed was never, until very recently, +properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack +could not possibly have held out a long time. But no defence whatever +was made. Capt. Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one +hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders "to ascend the river as +high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a +bombardment," approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, +which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter +deserted the works, and rapidly retreated. The commanding officer was +immediately dismissed for his cowardice. An English naval officer, who +was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, +says: "We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step. The +position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, +and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind +and many other chances were in their favor," &c. The fleet ascended the +river to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were +preparing at White House and Indian Head to cut off its retreat, it +retired, in much haste, but not without injury.</p> + +<p>Some have also pretended to find in modern European history a few +examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned +to ships and forts. Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated +examples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have +repelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four +or five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a +somewhat doubtful victory over forts. But a careful and critical +examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are +no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over +guns afloat.</p> + +<p>The only instances where it has ever been pretended by writers of any +note, that ships have gained advantage, are those of the attack on +Copenhagen in 1801; the passage of the Dardanelles, in 1807; the attack +on Algiers, in 1816; the attack on San Juan d'Ulloa, in 1838; and the +attack on St. Jean d'Acre, in 1840.</p> + +<p>Let us examine these examples a little in detail:—</p> + +<p><i>Copenhagen</i>.—The British fleet sent to attack Copenhagen, in 1801, +consisted of fifty-two sail, eighteen of them being line-of-battle +ships, four frigates, &c. They sailed from Yarmouth roads on the 12th of +March, passed the Sound on the 30th, and attacked and defeated the +Danish line on the 2d of April.</p> + +<p>The Sound between Cronenberg and the Swedish coast is about two and a +half miles wide, (vide <a href=images/461.gif>Fig. 34.</a>) The batteries of Cronenberg and +Elsinore were lined with one hundred pieces of cannon and mortars; but +the Swedish battery had been much neglected, and then mounted only six +guns. Nevertheless, the British admiral, to avoid the damage his +squadron would have to sustain in the passage of this wide channel, +defended by a force scarcely superior to a single one of his ships, +preferred to attempt the difficult passage of the Belt; but after a few +of his light vessels, acting as scouts, had run on rocks, he returned to +the Sound.</p> + +<p>He then tried to negotiate a peaceful passage, threatening, however, a +declaration of war if his vessels should be fired upon. It must be +remembered that at this time England was at peace with both Denmark and +Sweden, and that no just cause of war existed. Hence, the admiral +inferred that the commanders of these batteries would be loath to +involve their countries in a war with so formidable a power as England, +by commencing hostilities, when only a free passage was asked. The +Danish commander replied, that he should not permit a fleet to pass his +post, whose object and destination were unknown to him. He fired upon +them, as he was bound to do by long-existing commercial regulations, and +not as an act of hostility against the English. The Swedes, on the +contrary, remained neutral, and allowed the British vessels to lie near +by for several days without firing upon them. Seeing this friendly +disposition of the Swedes, the fleet neared their coast, and passed out +of the reach of the Danish batteries, which opened a fire of balls and +shells; but all of them fell more than two hundred yards short of the +fleet, which escaped without the loss of a single man.</p> + +<p>The Swedes excused their treachery by the plea that it would have been +impossible to construct batteries at that season, and that, even had it +been possible, Denmark would not have consented to their doing so, for +fear that Sweden would renew her old claim to one half of the rich +duties levied by Denmark on all ships passing the strait. There may have +been some grounds for the last excuse; but the true reason for their +conduct was the fear of getting involved in a war with England. Napoleon +says that, even at that season, a few days would have been sufficient +for placing a hundred guns in battery, and that Sweden had much more +time than was requisite. And with a hundred guns on each side of the +channel, served with skill and energy, the fleet must necessarily have +sustained so much damage as to render it unfit to attack Copenhagen. </p> + +<p>On this passage, we remark:—</p> + +<p>1st. The whole number of guns and mortars in the forts of the Sound +amounted to only one hundred and six, while the fleet carried over +seventeen hundred guns; and yet, with this immense superiority of more +than <i>sixteen</i> to <i>one</i>, the British admiral preferred the dangerous +passage of the Belt to encountering the fire of these land-batteries.</p> + +<p>2d. By negotiations, and threatening the vengeance of England, he +persuaded the small Swedish battery to remain silent and allow the fleet +to pass near that shore, out of reach of Cronenberg and Elsinore.</p> + +<p>3d. It is the opinion of Napoleon and the best English writers, that if +the Swedish battery had been put in order, and acted in concert with the +Danish works, they might have so damaged the fleet as to render it +incapable of any serious attempt on Copenhagen.</p> + +<p>We now proceed to consider the circumstances attending the attack and +defence of Copenhagen itself. The only side of the town exposed to the +attack of heavy shipping is the northern, where there lies a shoal +extending out a considerable distance, leaving only a very narrow +approach to the heart of the city, (<a href=images/461.gif>Fig. 35</a>) On the most advanced part +of this shoal are the Crown-batteries, carrying in all eighty-eight +guns.<a name="FNanchor_21_21"></a><a href="#Footnote_21_21"><sup>[21]</sup></a> The entrance into the Baltic between Copenhagen and Salthorn, +is divided into two channels by a bank, called the Middle Ground, which +is situated directly opposite Copenhagen. To defend the entrance on the +left of the Crown-batteries, they placed near the mouth of the channel +four ships of the line, one frigate, and two sloops, carrying in all +three hundred and fifty-eight guns. To secure the port and city from +bombardment from the King's Channel, (that between the Middle Ground and +town,) a line of floating defences were moored near the edge of the +shoal, and manned principally by volunteers. This line consisted of old +hulls of vessels, block-ships, prames, rafts, &c., carrying in all six +hundred and twenty-eight guns—a force strong enough to prevent the +approach of bomb-vessels and gunboats, (the purpose for which it was +intended,) but utterly incapable of contending with first-rate ships of +war; but these the Danes thought would be deterred from approaching by +the difficulties of navigation. These difficulties were certainly very +great; and Nelson said, beforehand, that "the wind which might carry him +in would most probably not bring out a crippled ship." Had the Danes +supposed it possible for Nelson to approach with his large vessels, the +line of floating defences would have been formed nearer Copenhagen, the +right supported by batteries raised on the isle of Amack. "In that +case," says Napoleon, "it is probable that Nelson would have failed in +his attack; for it would have been impossible for him to pass between +the line and shore thus lined with cannon." As it was, the line was too +extended for strength, and its right too far advanced to receive +assistance from the battery of Amack. A part of the fleet remained as a +reserve, under Admiral Parker, while the others, under Nelson, advanced +to the King's Channel. This attacking force consisted of eight ships of +the line and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying in all eleven hundred +guns, (without including those in the six gun-brigs, whose armament is +not given.) One of the seventy-four-gun ships could not be brought into +action, and two others grounded; but, Lord Nelson says, "although not in +the situation assigned them, yet they were so placed as to be of great +service." This force was concentrated upon <i>a part</i> of the Danish line +of floating defences, the whole of which was not only inferior to it by +three hundred and eighty-two guns, but so situated as to be beyond the +reach of succor, and without a chance of escape. The result was what +might have been expected. Every vessel of the right and centre of this +outer Danish line was taken or destroyed, except one or two small ones, +which cut and run under protection of the fortifications. The left of +the line, being supported by the Crown-battery, remained unbroken. A +division of frigates, in hopes of providing an adequate substitute for +the ships intended to attack the batteries, ventured to engage them, but +"it suffered considerable loss, and, in spite of all its efforts, was +obliged to relinquish this enterprise, and sheer off."</p> + +<a name="Footnote_21_21"></a><a href="#FNanchor_21_21">[21]</a><div class="note"><p> Some writers say only sixty-eight or seventy; but the +English writers generally say eighty-eight. A few, (apparently to +increase the brilliancy of the victory,) make this number still +greater.</p></div> + +<p>The Danish vessels lying in the entrance of the channel which leads to +the city, were not attacked, and took no material part in the contest. +They are to be reckoned in the defence on the same grounds that the +British ships of the reserve should be included in the attacking force. +Nor was any use made of the guns on shore, for the enemy did not advance +far enough to be within their range.</p> + +<p>The Crown-battery was <i>behind</i> the Danish line, and mainly masked by it. +A part only of its guns could be used in support of the left of this +line, and in repelling the direct attacks of the frigates, which it did +most effectually. But we now come to a new feature in this battle. As +the Danish line of floating defences fell into the hands of the English, +the range of the Crown-battery enlarged, and its power was felt. Nelson +saw the danger to which his fleet was exposed, and, being at last +convinced of the prudence of the admiral's signal for retreat, "made up +his mind to weigh anchor and retire from the engagement." To retreat, +however, from his present position, was exceedingly difficult and +dangerous. He therefore determined to endeavor to effect an armistice, +and dispatched the following letter to the prince-regent:</p> + +<p>"Lord Nelson has directions to spare Denmark when no longer resisting; +but if the firing is continued on the part of Denmark, Lord Nelson must +be obliged to set on fire all the floating batteries he has taken, +without the power to save the brave Danes who have defended them."</p> + +<p>This produced an armistice, and hostilities had hardly ceased, when +three of the English ships, including that in which Nelson himself was, +struck upon the bank. "They were in the jaws of destruction, and would +never have escaped if the batteries had continued their fire. They +therefore owed their safety to this armistice." A convention was soon +signed, by which every thing was left <i>in statu quo</i>, and the fleet of +Admiral Parker allowed to proceed into the Baltic. Edward Baines, the +able English historian of the wars of the French Revolution, in speaking +of Nelson's request for an armistice, says: "This letter, which +exhibited a happy union of policy and courage, was written at a moment +when Lord Nelson perceived that, in consequence of the unfavorable state +of the wind, the admiral was not likely to get up to aid the enterprise; +that <i>the principal batteries</i> of the enemy, and the ships at the mouth +of the harbor, <i>were yet untouched;</i> that two of his own division had +grounded, and others were likely to share the same fate." Campbell says +these batteries and ships "<i>were still unconquered.</i> Two of his +[Nelson's] own vessels were grounded and exposed to a heavy fire; +others, if the battle continued, might be exposed to a similar fate, +while he found it would be scarcely practicable to bring off the prizes +under the fire of the batteries."</p> + +<p>With respect to the fortifications of the town, a chronicler of the +times says they were of no service while the action lasted. "They began +to fire when the enemy took possession of the abandoned ships, but it +was at the same time the parley appeared." The Danish commander, +speaking of the general contest between the two lines, says: "The +Crown-battery did not come at all into action." An English writer says +distinctly: "The works (fortifications) of Copenhagen were absolutely +untouched at the close of the action." Colonel Mitchel, the English +historian, says: "Lord Nelson never fired a shot at the town or +fortifications of Copenhagen; he destroyed a line of block-ships, +prames, and floating batteries that defended the sea approach to the +town; and the Crown Prince, seeing his capital exposed, was willing to +finish by armistice a war, the object of which was neither very popular +nor well understood. What the result of the action between Copenhagen +and the British fleet might ultimately have been, is therefore +altogether uncertain. THE BOMBARDMENT OF COPENHAGEN BY NELSON, as it is +generally styled, is therefore, like most other oracular phrases of the +day, a mere combination of words, without the slightest meaning."</p> + +<p>The British lost in killed and wounded nine hundred and forty-three men; +and the loss of the Danes, according to their own account, which is +confirmed by the French, was but very little higher. The English, +however, say it amounted to sixteen or eighteen hundred; but let the +loss be what it may, it was almost exclusively confined to the floating +defences, and can in no way determine the relative accuracy of aim of +the guns ashore and guns afloat.</p> + +<p>The facts and testimony we have adduced, prove incontestably—</p> + +<p>1st. That of the fleet of fifty-two sail and seventeen hundred guns sent +by the English to the attack upon Copenhagen, two ships carrying one +hundred and forty-eight guns were grounded or wrecked; seven ships of +the line, and thirty-six smaller vessels, carrying over one thousand +guns, were actually brought into the action; while the remainder were +held as a reserve to act upon the first favorable opportunity. </p> + +<p>2d. That the Danish line of floating defences, consisting mostly of +hulls, sloops, rafts, &c., carried only six hundred and twenty-eight +guns of all descriptions; that the fixed batteries supporting this line +did not carry over eighty or ninety guns at most; and that both these +land and floating batteries were mostly manned and the guns served by +<i>volunteers</i>.</p> + +<p>3d. That the fixed batteries in the system of defence were either so +completely masked, or so far distant, as to be useless during the +contest between the fleet and floating force.</p> + +<p>4th. That the few guns of these batteries which were rendered available +by the position of the floating defences, repelled, with little or no +loss to themselves, and some injury to the enemy, a vastly superior +force of frigates which attacked them.</p> + +<p>5th. That the line of floating defences was conquered and mostly +destroyed, while the fixed batteries were uninjured.</p> + +<p>6th. That the fortifications of the city and of Amack island were not +attacked, and had no part in the contest.</p> + +<p>7th. That, as soon as the Crown-batteries were unmasked and began to +act, Nelson prepared to retreat, but, on account of the difficulty of +doing so, he opened a parley, threatening, with a cruelty unworthy of +the most barbarous ages, that, <i>unless the batteries ceased their fire +upon his ships, he would burn all the floating defences with the Danish +prisoners in his possession;</i> and that this armistice was concluded just +in time to save his own ships from destruction.</p> + +<p>8th. That, consequently, the battle of Copenhagen cannot be regarded as +a contest between ships and forts, or a triumph of ships over forts: +that, so far as the guns on shore were engaged, they showed a vast +superiority over those afloat—a superiority known and confessed by the +English themselves.</p> + +<p><i>Constantinople</i>.—The channel of the Dardanelles is about twelve +leagues long, three miles wide at its entrance, and about three-quarters +of a mile at its narrowest point. Its principal defences are the outer +and inner castles of Europe and Asia, and the castles of Sestos and +Abydos. Constantinople stands about one hundred miles from its entrance +into the Sea of Marmora, and at nearly the opposite extremity of this +sea. The defences of the channel had been allowed to go to decay; but +few guns were mounted, and the forts were but partially garrisoned. In +Constantinople not a gun was mounted, and no preparations for defence +were made; indeed, previous to the approach of the fleet, the Turks had +not determined whether to side with the English or the French, and even +then the French ambassador had the greatest difficulty in persuading +them to resist the demands of Duckforth.</p> + +<p>The British fleet consisted of six sail of the line, two frigates, two +sloops, and several bomb-vessels, carrying eight hundred and eighteen +guns, (besides those in the bomb-ships.) Admiral Duckforth sailed +through the Dardanelles on the 19th of February, 1807, with little or no +opposition. This being a Turkish festival day, the soldiers of the +scanty garrison were enjoying the festivities of the occasion, and none +were left to serve the few guns of the forts which had been prepared for +defence. But while the admiral was waiting on the Sea of Marmora for the +result of negotiations, or for a favorable wind to make the attack upon +Constantinople, the fortifications of this city were put in order, and +the Turks actively employed, under French engineers and artillery +officers, in repairing the defences of the Straits. Campbell, in his +Naval History, says:—"Admiral Duckforth now fully perceived the +critical situation in which he was placed. He might, indeed, succeed, +should the weather become favorable, in bombarding Constantinople; <i>but +unless the bombardment should prove completely successful in forcing +the Turks to pacific terms, the injury he might do to the city would not +compensate for the damage which his fleet must necessarily sustain. With +this damaged and crippled fleet, he must repass the Dardanelles, now +rendered infinitely stronger than they were when he came through them</i>."</p> + +<p>Under these circumstances the admiral determined to retreat; and on the +3d of April escaped through the Dardanelles, steering midway of the +channel, with a favorable and strong current. "This escape, however," +says Baines, "was only from destruction, but by no means from serious +loss and injury. * * * * In what instance in the whole course of our +naval warfare, have ships received equal damage in so short a time as in +this extraordinary enterprise?" In detailing the extent of this damage, +we will take the ships in the order they descended. The first had her +wheel carried away, and her hull much damaged, but escaped with the loss +of only three men. A stone shot penetrated the second, between the poop +and quarter deck, badly injured the mizzen-mast, carried away the wheel, +and did other serious damage, killing and wounding twenty men. Two shot +struck the third, carrying away her shrouds and injuring her masts; loss +in killed and wounded, thirty. The fourth had her mainmast destroyed, +with a loss of sixteen. The fifth had a large shot, six feet eight +inches in circumference, enter her lower deck; loss fifty-five. The +sixth, not injured. The seventh, a good deal damaged, with a loss of +seventeen. The eighth had no loss. The ninth was so much injured that, +"had there been a necessity for hauling the wind on the opposite tack, +she must have gone down:" her loss was eight. The tenth lost twelve. The +eleventh was much injured, with a loss of eight—making a total loss in +repassing the Dardanelles, of one hundred and sixty-seven; and in the +whole expedition two hundred and eighty-one, exclusive of two hundred +and fifty men who perished in the burning of the Ajax.</p> + +<p>Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a +favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned +forts of the Dardanelles. Duckforth himself says, that "had he remained +before Constantinople much longer—till the forts had been completely +put in order—no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable +sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence." Scarcely had +the fleet cleared the Straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced with +eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, +the English did not venture to renew the contest. They had effected a +most fortunate escape. General Jomini says that if the defence had been +conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition +would have cost the English their whole squadron.</p> + +<p>Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were +uninjured. The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in +all probability not even striking their objects—"the rapid change of +position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the +certainty of aim." The state of the batteries when the fleet first +passed, is thus described in James's Naval History: "Some of them were +dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned." And +Alison says: "They had been allowed to fall into disrepair. The castles +of Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the +dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their +ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as +remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the +rapidity and precision of an English broadside."</p> + +<p>Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did +not hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected +to accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is +forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve <i>Turkish line-of-battle +-ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their +sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within +the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or +nothing against the invaders.</i> It is scarcely ever mentioned, being +regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number +of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly +have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which +were as ancient as the reign of Amurath!</p> + +<p><i>Algiers.</i>—The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816, +is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other +official and authentic English papers.</p> + +<p>The attack was made by the combined fleets, consisting of five sail of +the line, eighteen or twenty frigates and smaller vessels, besides five +bomb-vessels and several rocket-boats, carrying in all about one +thousand guns. The armament of some of the smaller vessels is not given, +but the guns of those whose armaments are known, amount to over nine +hundred. The harbor and defences of Algiers had been previously surveyed +by Captain Warde, royal navy, under Lord Exmouth's direction; and the +number of the combined fleet was arranged according to the information +given in this survey—just so many ships, and no more, being taken, as +could be employed to advantage against the city, without being +needlessly exposed. Moreover, the men and officers had been selected and +exercised with reference to this particular attack.</p> + +<p>From the survey of Captain Warde, and the accompanying map, it appears +that the armament of all the fortifications of Algiers and the vicinity, +counting the water fronts and the parts that could flank the shore, was +only two hundred and eighty-four guns of various sizes and descriptions, +including mortars. But not near all of these could act upon the fleet as +it lay. Other English accounts state the number of guns actually opposed +to the fleet at from two hundred and twenty to two hundred and thirty. +Some of these were in small and distant batteries, whereas nearly all +the fleet was concentrated on the mole-head works. (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 36.</a>) Supposing +only one broadside of the ships to have been engaged, the ratio of the +forces, as expressed by the number of guns, must have been about as 5 to +2. This is a favorable supposition for the ships; for we know that +several of them, from their position and a change of anchorage, brought +both broadsides to bear; moreover, at no one time could <i>all</i> the guns +of the water fronts of the batteries bear on the attacking ships. The +Algerine shipping in the harbor was considerable, including several +vessels of war, but no use was made of them in defence, and nearly all +were burnt. The attacking ships commanded some of the batteries, and +almost immediately dismounted their guns. The walls of the casemated +works were so thin as to be very soon battered down. Most of the +Algerine guns were badly mounted, and many of them were useless after +the first fire. They had no furnaces for heating shot, and, as "they +loaded their guns with loose powder, put in with a ladle," they could +not possibly have used hot shot, even had they constructed furnaces. The +ships approached the forts, and many of them anchored in their intended +position, without a shot being fired from the batteries. The action +commenced at a quarter before three, and did not entirely cease till +half-past eleven. The ships then took advantage of the land breeze, and, +by warping and towing off, were able to get under sail and come to +anchor beyond reach of the land-batteries. Negotiations were again +opened, and the Dey surrendered the Christian slaves and yielded to the +terms of the treaty.</p> + +<p>During the contest, the fleet "fired nearly one hundred and eighteen +tons of powder, and fifty thousand shot, (weighing more than five +hundred tons of iron,) besides nine hundred and sixty thirteen and +ten-inch shells, (thrown by the bomb-vessels,) and the shells and +rockets from the flotilla." The vessels were considerably crippled, and +their loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and +eighty-three. The land batteries were much injured, and a large part of +their guns dismounted. Their loss is not known; the English confess they +could obtain no account of it, but suppose it to have been very great. +This seems more than probable; for, besides those actually employed in +the defence, large numbers of people crowded into the forts to witness +the contest. So great was this curiosity, that, when the action +commenced, the parapets were covered with the multitude gazing at the +manœuvres of the ships. To avoid so unnecessary and indiscriminate a +slaughter, Lord Exmouth (showing a humanity that does him great credit) +motioned with his hand to the ignorant wretches to retire to some place +of safety. This loss of life in the batteries, the burning of the +buildings within the town and about the mole, the entire destruction of +their fleet and merchant vessels anchored within the mole and in the +harbor, had a depressing effect upon the inhabitants, and probably did +more than the injuries received by the batteries in securing an +honorable conclusion to the treaty. We know very well that these +batteries, though much injured, <i>were not silenced</i> when Lord Exmouth +took advantage of the land breeze and sailed beyond their reach. The +ships retired—1st, because they had become much injured, and their +ammunition nearly exhausted; 2d, in order to escape from a position so +hazardous in case of a storm; and 3d, to get beyond the reach of the +Algerine batteries. Lord Exmouth himself gives these as his reasons for +the retreat, and says, "the land wind saved me many a gallant fellow." +And Vice-admiral Von de Capellan, in his report of the battle, gives the +same opinion: "<i>in this retreat</i>" says he, "which, from want of wind and +the damage suffered in the rigging, was very slow, <i>the ships had still +to suffer much from the new-opened and redoubled fire of the enemy's +batteries</i>; at last, the land breeze springing up," &c. An English +officer, who took part in this affair, says: "It was well for us that +the land wind came off, or we should never have got out; and God knows +what would have been our fate, had we remained all night."</p> + +<p>The motives of the retreat cannot, therefore, be doubted. Had the Arabs +set themselves zealously at work, during the night, to prepare for a new +contest, by remounting their guns, and placing others behind the ruins +of those batteries which had fallen,—in other words, had the works now +been placed in hands as skilful and experienced as the English, the +contest would have been far from ended. But (to use the words of the +Board of Defence) Lord Exmouth relied on the effects produced on the +people by his dreadful cannonade; and the result proves that he was +right. His anxiety to clear the vessels from the contest shows that +there was a power still unconquered, which he thought it better to leave +to be restrained by the suffering population of the city, than to keep +in a state of exasperation and activity by his presence. What was this +power but an unsubdued energy in the batteries?</p> + +<p>The true solution of the question is, then, not so much the amount of +injury done on the one side or the other—particularly as there was on +one side a city to suffer as well as the batteries—as the relative +efficiency of the parties when the battle closed. All political +agitation and popular clamor aside, what would have been the result had +the fight been continued, or even had Lord Exmouth renewed it next +morning? These are questions that can be answered only on conjecture; +but the manner the battle ended certainly leaves room for many doubts +whether, had the subsequent demands of Lord Exmouth been rejected, he +had it in his power to enforce them by his ships; whether, indeed, if he +had renewed the fight, he would not have been signally defeated. On the +whole, we do not think that this battle, although it stands pre-eminent +as an example of naval success over batteries, presents an argument to +shake the confidence which fortifications, well situated, well planned, +and well fought, deserve, as the defences of a seaboard.</p> + +<p>We cannot help regarding these conclusions as just, when we reflect upon +all the circumstances of the case. The high character, skill, and +bravery of the attacking force; their immense superiority in number of +guns, with no surplus human life to be exposed; the antiquated and +ill-managed works of defence, the entire want of skill of the Algerine +artillerists, and the neglect of the ordinary means of preparation; the +severe execution which these ill-served guns did upon the enemy's +ships,—an execution far more dreadful than that effected by the French +or Dutch fleets in their best-contested naval battles with the ships of +the same foe,—from these facts, we must think that those who are so +ready to draw from this case conclusions unfavorable to the use of +land-batteries as a means of defence against shipping, know but little +of the nature of the contest.</p> + +<p>An English historian of some note, in speaking of this attack, +says:—"It is but little to the purpose, unless to prove what may be +accomplished by fleets against towns exactly so circumstanced, placed, +and governed. Algiers is situated on an amphitheatre of hills, sloping +down towards the sea, and presenting therefore the fairest mark to the +fire of hostile ships. But where is the capital exactly so situated that +we are ever likely to attack? And as to the destruction of a few +second-rate towns, even when practicable, it is a mean, unworthy species +of warfare, by which nothing was ever gained. The severe loss sustained +before Algiers must also be taken into account, because it was inflicted +by mere Algerine artillery, and was much inferior to what may be +expected from a contest maintained against batteries manned with +soldiers instructed by officers of skill and science, not only in +working the guns, but in the endless duty of detail necessary for +keeping the whole of an artillery material in a proper state of +formidable efficiency."</p> + +<p><i>San Juan d'Ulloa.</i>—The following facts, relative to the attack on San +Juan d'Ulloa by the French, in 1838, are drawn principally from the +report of a French engineer officer who was one of the expedition.</p> + +<p>The French fleet consisted of four ships, carrying one hundred and +eighty-eight guns, two armed steamboats, and two bomb-ketches with four +large mortars. The whole number of guns, of whatever description, found +in the fort was one hundred and eighty-seven; a large portion of these, +however, were for land defence. (<a href=images/463.gif>Fig. 37.</a>)</p> + +<p>When the French vessels were towed into the position selected for the +attack, "it was lucky for us," says the French officer in his report, +"that the Mexicans did not disturb this operation, which lasted nearly +two hours, and that they permitted us to commence the fire." "We were +exposed to the fire of one twenty-four-pounder, five sixteen-pounders, +seven twelve-pounders, one eight-pounder, and five eighteen-pounder +carronades—<i>in all nineteen pieces only</i>." If these be converted into +equivalent twenty-four-pounders, in proportion to the weight of the +balls, the whole nineteen guns will be <i>less than twelve twenty-four +pounders</i>. This estimate is much too great, for it allows three +eight-pounders to be equal to one twenty-four-pounder, and each of the +eighteen-pounder carronades to be three quarters the power of a long +twenty-four-pounder; whereas, at the distance at which the parties were +engaged, these small pieces were nearly harmless. Two of the powder +magazines, from not being bomb-proof, were blown up during the +engagement, by which three of the nineteen guns on the water front of +the castle were dismounted; thus reducing the land force to <i>an +equivalent of ten twenty-four-pounders</i>. The other sixteen guns were +still effective when abandoned by the Mexicans. The cannonade and +bombardment continued about six hours, eight thousand two hundred and +fifty shot and shells being fired at the fort by the French. The +principal injury received by the work was from the explosion of the +powder magazine. But very few guns were dismounted by the fire of the +French ships, and only three of these on the water front. The details of +the condition of the ships and fort are given in the report of the +French officer,<a name="FNanchor_22_22"></a><a href="#Footnote_22_22"><sup>[22]</sup></a> but it is unnecessary to repeat them here.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_22_22"></a><a href="#FNanchor_22_22">[22]</a><div class="note"><p> Vide also House Doc. No. 206, twenty-sixth Congress, first +session</p></div> + +<p>In general terms, it appears from the above-mentioned report, that the +number of guns actually brought into action by the floating force, +(counting only one broadside of the ship,) amounted to <i>ninety-four +guns, besides four heavy sea-mortars</i>; that the whole number so employed +in the fort was only <i>nineteen, including the smallest calibres</i>; that +these guns were generally so small and inefficient, that their balls +would not enter the sides of the ordinary attacking frigates; the +principal injury sustained by the castle was produced by the explosion +of powder magazines injudiciously placed and improperly secured; that +the castle, though built of poor materials, was but slightly injured by +the French fire; that the Mexicans proved themselves ignorant of the +ordinary means of defence, and abandoned their works when only a few of +their guns had been dismounted; that notwithstanding all the +circumstances in favor of the French, their killed and wounded, in +proportion to the guns acting against them, was upwards of <i>four times</i> +as great as the loss of the English at the battle of Trafalgar!</p> + +<p><i>St. Jean d'Acre</i>.—The narratives of the day contained most exaggerated +accounts of the English attack on St. Jean d'Acre; now, however, the +principal facts connected with this attack are fully authenticated. For +the amount of the fleet we quote from the British official papers, and +for that of the fort, from the pamphlet of Lieutenant-colonel +Matuszewiez. These statements are mainly confirmed by the narratives, +more recently published, of several English and French eye-witnesses.</p> + +<p>The fortifications were built of poor materials, antiquated in their +plans, and much decayed. Their entire armament amounted to only two +hundred guns, some of which were merely field-pieces. The water fronts +were armed with one hundred cannon and sixteen mortars, those of the +smaller calibre included. (<a href=images/463.gif>Fig. 38.</a>) When approached by the British +fleet, the works were undergoing repairs, and, says Commodore Napier, +"were fast getting into a state of preparation against attack."</p> + +<p>The British fleet consisted of eight ships of the line, carrying six +hundred and forty-six guns; six frigates, carrying two hundred and +thirty-six guns; four steamers, carrying eighteen guns; and two or three +other vessels, whose force is not given. "Only a few guns," says Napier, +"defended the approach from the northward," and most of the ships came +in from that direction. The western front was armed with about forty +cannon; but opposed to this were six ships and two steamers, carrying +about five hundred guns. Their fire was tremendous during the +engagement, but <i>no breach was made</i> in the walls. The south front was +armed in part by heavy artillery and in part by field-pieces. This front +was attacked by six ships and two steamers, carrying over two hundred +guns. The eastern front was armed only with light artillery; against +this was concentrated the remainder of the fleet, carrying about two +hundred and forty guns. The guns of the works were so poorly mounted, +that but few could be used at all; and these, on account of the +construction of the fort, could not reach the ships, though anchored +close by the walls. "Only five of their guns," says Napier, "placed in a +flanking battery, were well served, and never missed; but they were +pointed too high, and damaged our spars and rigging only." The stone was +of so poor a quality, says the narrative of Colonel Matuszewiez, that +the walls fired upon presented on the exterior a shattered appearance, +but they were nowhere seriously injured. In the words of Napier, "<i>they +were not breached, and a determined enemy might have remained secure +under the breastworks, or in the numerous casemates, without suffering +much loss</i>." The accidental explosion of a magazine within the fort, +containing six thousand casks of powder, laid in ruins a space of sixty +thousand square yards, opened a large breach in the walls of the +fortifications, partially destroyed the prisons, and killed and wounded +a thousand men of the garrison. This frightful disaster, says the French +account, hastened the triumph of the fleet. The prisoners and +malefactors, thus released from confinement, rushed upon the garrison at +the same time with the mountaineers, who had besieged the place on the +land side. The uselessness of the artillery, the breaches of the fort, +the attacks of the English, all combined to force the retreat of the +garrison, "in the midst of scenes of blood and atrocious murders."</p> + +<p>We will close this account with the following extract of a speech of the +Duke of Wellington, in the House of Lords, Feb. 4, 1841: "He had had," +he said, "a little experience in services of this nature; and he thought +it his duty to warn their lordships, on this occasion, that they must +not always expect that ships, however well commanded, or however gallant +their seamen might be, were capable of commonly engaging successfully +with stone walls. He had no recollection, in all his experience, except +the recent instance on the coast of Syria, of any fort being taken by +ships, excepting two or three years ago, when the fort of San Juan +d'Ulloa was captured by the French fleet. This was, he thought, the +single instance that he recollected, though he believed that something +of the sort had occurred at the siege of Havana, in 1763. The present +achievement he considered one of the greatest of modern times. This was +his opinion, and he gave the highest credit to those who had performed +such a service. It was, altogether, a most skilful proceeding. He was +greatly surprised at the small number of men that was lost on board the +fleet; and, on inquiring how it happened, he discovered that it was +because the vessels were moored within one-third of the ordinary +distance. The guns of the fortress were intended to strike objects at a +greater distance; and the consequence was, that the shot went over the +ships that were anchored at one-third the usual distance. By that means, +they sustained not more than one-tenth of the loss which they would +otherwise have experienced. Not less than five hundred pieces of +ordnance were directed against the walls, and the precision with which +the fire was kept up, the position of the vessels, and, lastly, the +blowing up of the large magazine—all aided in achieving this great +victory in so short a time. He had thought it right to say thus much, +because he wished to warn the public against supposing that such deeds +as this could be effected every day. He would repeat that this was a +singular instance, in the achievement of which undoubtedly great skill +was manifested, but which was also connected with peculiar +circumstances, which they could not hope always to occur. It must not +therefore be expected, as a matter of course, that all such attempts +must necessarily succeed."</p> + +<p>Having completed our examination of the ability of land batteries to +cope, gun for gun, with a naval force, let us consider, for a few +moments, the objection which is sometimes made to the use of +fortifications for the defence of the sea-coast, viz.: <i>that our +maritime cities and arsenals can be better and more economically secured +by a home squadron</i>.</p> + +<p>We have already alluded to the impossibility of substituting one means +of defence for another. The efficiency of the bayonet can in no way +enable us to dispense with artillery, nor the value of engineer troops +in the passage of rivers, and the attack and defence of forts, render +cavalry the less necessary in other operations of a campaign. To the +navy alone must we look for the defence of our shipping upon the high +seas; but it cannot replace fortifications in the protection of our +harbors, bays, rivers, arsenals, and commercial towns.</p> + +<p>Let us take a case in point. For the defence of New York city, it is +deemed highly important that the East River should be closed to the +approach of a hostile fleet at least fifteen or twenty miles from the +city, so that an army landed there would have to cross the Westchester +creek, the Bronx, Harlem river, and the defiles of Harlem +heights—obstacles of great importance in a judicious defence. Throg's +Neck is the position selected for this purpose; cannon placed there not +only command the channel, but, from the windings of the river, sweep it +for a great distance above and below. No other position, even <i>in</i> the +channel itself, possesses equal advantages. Hence, if we had only naval +means of defence, it would be best, were such a thing possible, to place +the floating defences themselves on this point. Leaving entirely out of +consideration the question of relative <i>power, position</i> alone would +give the superior efficiency to the fort. But there are other +considerations no less important than that of position. Fort Schuyler +can be garrisoned and defended in part by the same militia force which +will be employed to prevent the march of the enemy's army on the city. +On the other hand, the crews of the floating defences must be seamen; +they will consequently be of less value in the subsequent land +operations. Moreover, forts, situated as this is, can be so planned as +to bring to bear upon any part of the channel a greater number of guns +than can be presented by any hostile squadron against the corresponding +portion of the fort. This result can be obtained with little difficulty +in narrow channels, as is done in most of the other works for the +defence of New York, the works for Boston, Newport, Philadelphia, +Baltimore, Charleston, Savannah, New Orleans, &c., and an approximation +to it is not incompatible with the defence of the broader estuaries, +like the Chesapeake.</p> + +<p>But we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets +to our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force +exclusively. Let us leave out of consideration the security of all our +other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance +of having at command the means of attacking the enemy's coast, in the +absence of his fleet. We take the single case of the attack being made +on New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there. Now, if +this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may +be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us—for an +attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best +materials. But here the consequences of victory are very unequal: the +enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our +squadron and the objects it is intended to defend. If we suppose our own +naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor +would in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the +harbor. But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must +be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively +upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy's +fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping +him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the +loss of our harbor.</p> + +<p>These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single +harbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the +Delaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New +Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and +therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy +will direct his assaults. If he come to one of these in the absence of +our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole +force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both +fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin. Could our fleet be so arranged as +to meet these enterprises?</p> + +<p>"As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack +out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can +indicate the spot? And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to +be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the +advancing foe? Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in +front of it, shall we sweep its whole length—a distance scarcely less +than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to +ours? Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or +shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy? Shall we cover the southern +cities, or give them up also? We must unquestionably do one of two +things—either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our +cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances +of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question."</p> + +<p>"On the practicability of covering a small extent of coast by cruising +in front of it—or, in other words, the possibility of anticipating an +enemy's operations, discovering the object of movements of which we get +no glimpse and hear no tidings, and seeing the impress of his footsteps +on the surface of the ocean—it may be well to consult experience."</p> + +<p>The naval power of Spain under Philip II. was almost unlimited. With the +treasures of India and America at his command, the fitting out of a +fleet of one hundred and fifty or two hundred sail, to invade another +country, was no very gigantic operation. Nevertheless, this naval force +was of but little avail as a coast defence. Its efficiency for this +purpose was well tested in 1596. England and Holland attacked Cadiz with +a combined fleet of one hundred and seventy ships, which entered the Bay +of Cadiz without, on its approach to their coast, being once seen by the +Spanish navy. This same squadron, on its return to England, passed along +a great portion of the Spanish coast without ever meeting with the +slightest opposition from the innumerable Spanish floating defences.</p> + +<p>In 1744, a French fleet of twenty ships, and a land force of twenty-two +thousand men, sailed from Brest to the English coast, without meeting +with any opposition from the superior British fleet which had been sent +out, under Sir John Norris, on purpose to intercept them. The landing of +the troops was prevented by a storm, which drove the fleet back upon the +coast of France to seek shelter.</p> + +<p>In 1755, a French fleet of twenty-five sail of the line, and many +smaller vessels, sailed from Brest for America. Nine of these soon +afterwards returned to France, and the others proceeded to the gulf of +St. Lawrence. An English fleet of seventeen sail of the line and some +frigates had been sent out to intercept them; but the two fleets passed +each other in a thick fog, and all the French vessels except two reached +Quebec in safety.</p> + +<p>In 1759, a French fleet, blockaded in the port of Dunkirk by a British +force under Commodore Bogs, seizing upon a favorable opportunity, +escaped from the enemy, attacked the coast of Scotland, made a descent +upon Carrickfergus, and cruised about till February, 1760, without +meeting a single British vessel, although sixty-one ships of the line +were then stationed upon the coasts of England and France, and several +of these were actually in pursuit.</p> + +<p>In 1796, when the French attempted to throw the army of Hoche into +Ireland, the most strenuous efforts were made by the British navy to +intercept the French fleet in its passage. The Channel fleet, of near +thirty sail of the line, under Lord Bridport, was stationed at Spithead; +Sir Roger Curtis, with a smaller force, was cruising to the westward; +Vice-admiral Colpoys was stationed off Brest, with thirteen sail of the +line; and Sir Edward Pellew (afterwards Lord Exmouth) watched the +harbor, with a small squadron of frigates. Notwithstanding this triple +floating bulwark, as it was called—one fleet on the enemy's coast, a +second in the Downs, and a third close on their own shores—the French +fleet of forty-four vessels, carrying a land force of twenty-five +thousand men, reached Bantry Bay in safety! This fleet was eight days on +the passage, and three more in landing the troops; and most of the +vessels might have returned to Brest in safety, had it not been for +disasters by storms, for only <i>one</i> of their whole number was +intercepted by the vast naval force which England had assembled for that +express object. "The result of this expedition," says Alison, "was +pregnant with important instructions to the rulers of both countries. +To the French, as demonstrating the extraordinary risks which attend a +maritime expedition, in comparison with a land campaign; the small +number of forces which can be embarked on board even a great fleet; and +the unforeseen disasters which frequently, on that element, defeat the +best concerted enterprises. To the English, as showing that <i>the empire +of the seas does not always afford security against invasion;</i> that, in +the face of superior maritime forces, her possessions were for sixteen +days at the mercy of the enemy; and that neither the skill of her +sailors nor the valor of her armies, but the fury of the elements, saved +them from danger in the most vulnerable part of their dominions. While +these considerations are fitted to abate the confidence in invasion, +they are calculated, at the same time, to weaken an overweening +confidence in naval superiority, and to demonstrate that <i>the only base +upon which certain reliance can be placed</i>, even by an insular power, +<i>is a well-disciplined army and the patriotism of its own subjects</i>."</p> + +<p>Subsequent events still further demonstrated the truth of these remarks. +In the following year, a French squadron of two frigates and two sloops, +passed the British fleets with perfect impunity, destroyed the shipping +in the port of Ilfracombe, and safely landed their troops on the coast +of Wales. Again, in 1798, the immense British naval force failed to +prevent the landing of General Humbert's army in the bay of Killala; +and, in the latter part of the same year, a French squadron of nine +vessels and three thousand men escaped Sir J.B. Warren's squadron, and +safely reached the coast of Ireland. As a further illustration, we quote +from the report of the Board of National Defence in 1839.</p> + +<p>The Toulon fleet, in 1798, consisting of about twenty sail of the line +and twenty smaller vessels of war, and numerous transports, making in +all, three hundred sail and forty thousand troops, slipped out of port +and sailed to Malta. "It was followed by Nelson, who, thinking correctly +that they were bound for Egypt, shaped his course direct for Alexandria. +The French, steering towards Candia, took the more circuitous passage; +so that Nelson arrived at Alexandria before them, and, not finding them +there, returned, by way of Caramania and Candia, to Sicily, missing his +adversary in both passages. Sailing again for Alexandria, he found the +French fleet at anchor in Aboukir bay, and, attacking them there, +achieved the memorable victory of the Nile. When we consider the +narrowness of the sea; the numerous vessels in the French fleet; the +actual crossing of the two fleets on a certain night; and that Nelson, +notwithstanding, could see nothing of the enemy himself, and hear +nothing of them from merchant vessels, we may judge of the probability +of waylaying our adversary on the broad Atlantic."</p> + +<p>"The escape of another Toulon fleet in 1805; the long search for them in +the Mediterranean by the same able officer; the pursuit in the West +Indies; their evasion of him among the islands; the return to Europe; +his vain efforts subsequently, along the coast of Portugal, in the bay +of Biscay, and off the English channel; and the meeting at last at +Trafalgar, brought about only because the combined fleets, trusting to +the superiority that the accession of several reinforcements had given, +were willing to try the issue of a battle—these are instances, of the +many that might be cited, to show how small is the probability of +encountering upon the ocean an enemy who desires to avoid a meeting, and +how little the most untiring zeal, the most restless activity, the most +exalted professional skill and judgment, can do to lessen the adverse +chances. For more than a year Nelson most closely watched his enemy, who +seems to have got out of port as soon as he was prepared to do so, and +without attracting the notice of any of the blockading squadron. When +out, Nelson, perfectly in the dark as to the course Villeneuve had +taken, sought for him in vain on the coast of Egypt. Scattered by +tempests, the French fleet again took refuge in Toulon; whence it again +put to sea, when refitted and ready, joining the Spanish fleet at Cadiz."</p> + +<p>"On the courage, skill, vigilance, and judgment, acceded on all hands to +belong in a pre-eminent degree to the naval profession in this country, +this system of defence relies to accomplish, against a string of +chances, objects of importance so great that not a doubt or misgiving as +to the result is admissible. It demands of the navy to do perfectly, and +without fail, that which, to do at all, seems impossible. The navy is +required to know the secret purposes of the enemy, in spite of distance, +and the broken intercourse of a state of war, even before these purposes +are known to the leader who is to execute them; nay, more, before the +purpose itself is formed. On an element where man is but the sport of +storms, the navy is required to lie in wait for the foe at the exact +spot and moment, in spite of weather and seasons; to see him in spite of +fogs and darkness."</p> + +<p>"Finally, after all the devices and reliances of the system are +satisfactorily accomplished, and all the difficulties subdued, it +submits to the issue of a single battle, on equal terms, the fate of the +war, having no hope or reserve beyond."</p> + +<p>"The proper duty of our navy is, not coast or river defence; it has a +more glorious sphere—that of the <i>offensive</i>. In our last war, instead +of lying in harbor, and contenting themselves with keeping a few more of +the enemy's vessels in watch over them than their own number—instead of +leaving the enemy's commerce in undisturbed enjoyment of the sea, and +our commerce without countenance or aid, they scattered themselves over +the wide surface of the ocean, penetrated to the most remote seas, +everywhere acting with the most brilliant success against the enemy's +navigation. And we believe, moreover, that in the amount of the enemy's +property thus destroyed, of American property protected or recovered, +and in the number of hostile ships kept in pursuit of our scattered +vessels, ships evaded if superior, and beaten if equal—they rendered +benefits a thousand-fold greater, to say nothing of the glory they +acquired for the nation, and the character they imparted to it, than any +that would have resulted from a state of passiveness within the harbors. +Confident that this is the true policy as regards the employment of the +navy proper, we doubt not that it will in the future be acted on, as it +has been in the past; and that the results, as regards both honor and +advantage, will be expanded commensurately with its own enlargement. In +order, however, that the navy may always assume and maintain that active +and energetic deportment, in offensive operations, which is at the same +time so consistent with its functions, and so consonant with its spirit, +we have shown that it must not be occupied with mere coast defence."</p> + +<p>A few remarks on the relative cost of ships and forts, and the economy +of their support, and we will close this discussion. We do not regard +this question, however, as a matter of any great importance, for it can +seldom be decisive in the choice of these two means of defence. No +matter what their relative cost may be, the one cannot often be +substituted for the other. There are some few cases, however, where this +might be taken into consideration, and would be decisive. Let us +endeavor to illustrate our meaning. For the defence of New York city, +the Narrows and East River must be secured by forts; ships cannot, in +this case, be substituted. But let us suppose that the <i>outer</i> harbor of +New York furnishes no favorable place for the debarkation of troops, or +that the place of debarkation is so far distant that the troops cannot +reach the city before the defensive forces can be prepared to repel +them. This outer harbor would be of great importance to the enemy as a +shelter from storms, and as a place of debarkation or of rendezvous +preparatory to a forcible passage of the Narrows; while to us its +possession would not be absolutely essential, though very important. +Strong fortifications on Sandy Hook, and one of the shoals, might +probably be so constructed as to furnish a pretty sure barrier to the +entrance of this outer harbor; on the other hand, a naval force +stationed within the inner harbor, and acting under the protection of +forts at the Narrows, might also furnish a good, though perhaps less +certain protection for this outer roadstead. Here, then, we might well +consider the question of relative cost and economy of support of the +proposed fortifications, and of a home squadron large enough to effect +the same object, and to be kept continually <i>at home</i> for that special +purpose. If we were to allow it to go to sea for the protection of our +commerce, its character and efficiency as a <i>harbor</i> defence would be +lost. We can therefore regard it only as a local force—fixed within the +limits of the defence of this particular place—and our estimates must +be made accordingly.</p> + +<p>The average durability of ships of war in the British navy, has been +variously stated at seven and eight years in time of war, and from ten +to twelve and fourteen years in time of peace. Mr. Perring, in his +"Brief Inquiry," published in 1812, estimates the average durability at +about eight years. His calculations seem based upon authentic +information. A distinguished English writer has more recently arrived at +the same result, from estimates based upon the returns of the Board of +Admiralty during the period of the wars of the French Revolution. The +data in our own possession are less complete; the appropriations for +<i>building</i> and <i>repairing</i> having been so expended as to render it +impossible to draw any accurate line of distinction. But, in the returns +now before us, there are generally separate and distinct amounts of the +<i>timbers</i> used for these two purposes; and consequently, so far as this +(the main item of expense) is concerned, we may form pretty accurate +comparisons.</p> + +<p>According to Edge, (pp. 20, 21,) the average cost of timber, for hulls, +masts, and yards, in <i>building</i> an English 74 gun ship, is £61,382. Let +us now compare this cost of timber for <i>building</i>, with that of the same +item for <i>repairs</i>, for the following fifteen ships, between 1800 and +1820. The list would have been still further enlarged, but the returns +for other ships during some portion of the above period are imperfect:</p> + +<table border="1" summary="Cost of Ship repairs"> +<tr><td width="300"> Name of Ship</td> +<td width="40"> No. of guns +</td> +<td width="60"> When built +</td> +<td width="200"> Repaired from +</td> +<td width="100"> Cost. +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300">Vengeance +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1800 to 1807 +</td> +<td width="100"> £84,720 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Ildefonso +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1807 to 1808 +</td> +<td width="100"> 85,195 +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Scipio +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1807 to 1809 +</td> +<td width= "100"> 60,785 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Tremendous +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width= "200"> 1807 to 1810 +</td> +<td width="100"> 135,397 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Elephant +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1808 to 1811 +</td> +<td width="100"> 67,007 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Spencer +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> 1800 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1809 to 1813 +</td> +<td width="100"> 124,186 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Romulus +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1810 to 1812 +</td> +<td width="100"> 73,141 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Albion +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width= "60"> 1802 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1810 to 1813 +</td> +<td width="100"> 102,295 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Donegal +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1812 to 1815 +</td> +<td width="100"> 101,367 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Implacable +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1813 to 1815 +</td> +<td width="100"> 59,865 +</td> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Illustrious +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> 1803 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1813 to 1816 +</td> +<td width="100"> 74,184 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Northumberland +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1814 to 1815 +</td> +<td width="100"> 59,795 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Kent +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1814 to 1818 +</td> +<td width="100"> 88,357 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Sultan +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> 1807 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1816 to 1818 +</td> +<td width="100"> 61,518 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="300"> Sterling Castle +</td> +<td width="40"> 74 +</td> +<td width="60"> +</td> +<td width="200"> 1816 to 1818 +</td> +<td width="100"> 65,280 +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<br> + +<p>This table, although incomplete, gives for the above fifteen ships, +during a period of less than twenty years, the cost of <i>timber alone</i> +used in their repair, an average of about $400,000 each. More timber +than this was used, in all probability, upon the same vessels, and paid +for out of the funds appropriated "for such as may be ordered in course +of the year to be repaired." But the amount specifically appropriated +for timber for these fifteen ships, would, in every twelve or fifteen +years, equal the entire <i>first cost</i> of the same items. If we add to +this amount, the cost of labor required in the application of timber to +the operations of repair, and take into consideration the expense of +other materials and labor, and the decayed condition of many of the +ships at the end of this period, we should not be surprised to find the +whole sum <i>expended</i> under these heads to equal the first cost, even +within the minimum estimate of seven years. The whole cost of timber +used for hulls, masts, and yards, in building between 1800 and 1820, was +£18,727,551; in repairs and "ordinary wear and tear," £17,449,780; +making an annual average of $4,560,158 for building timber, and +$4,273,371 for that used in repairs. A large portion of the vessels +<i>built</i> were intended to replace others which had been lost, or were so +decayed as to be broken up.</p> + +<p>But it may be well to add here, the actual supplies voted for the +sea-service, and for wear and tear, and the extraordinary expenses in +building and repairing of ships from 1800 to 1815.</p> + +<table border="1" summary="Cost of Ship Maintenance"> +<tr> +<td width="100"> Year. +</td> +<td width="200"> For the wear and tear of ships. +</td> +<td width="200"> Extra Expences for building, repairing etc. +</td> +<td width="200"> For entire sea service. +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1800 +</td> +<td width="200"> £4,350,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> £772,140 +</td> +<td width="200"> £13,619,079 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1801 +</td> +<td width="200"> 5,850,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 933,900 +</td> +<td width="200"> 16,577,037 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1802 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,684,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 773,500 +</td> +<td width="200"> 11,833,571 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1803 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,120,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 901,140 +</td> +<td width="200"> 10,211,378 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1804 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,900,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 948,520 +</td> +<td width="200"> 12,350,606 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1805 +</td> +<td width="200"> 4,680,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1,553,690 +</td> +<td width="200"> 15,035,630 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1806 +</td> +<td width="200"> 4,680,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1,980,830 +</td> +<td width="200"> 18,864,341 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1807 +</td> +<td width="200"> 5,070,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,134,903 +</td> +<td width="200"> 17,400,337 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1808 +</td> +<td width="200"> 5,070,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,351,188 +</td> +<td width="200"> 18,087,544 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1809 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,295,500 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,296,030 +</td> +<td width="200"> 19,578,467 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1810 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,295,500 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1,841,107 +</td> +<td width="200"> 18,975,120 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1811 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,675,750 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,046,200 +</td> +<td width="200"> 19,822,000 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1812 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,675,750 +</td> +<td width="200"> 1,696,621 +</td> +<td width="200"> 19,305,759 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1813 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,549,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,822,031 +</td> +<td width="200"> 20,096,709 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1814 +</td> +<td width="200"> 3,268,000 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,086,274 +</td> +<td width="200"> 19,312,070 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="100"> 1815 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,386,500 +</td> +<td width="200"> 2,116,710 +</td> +<td width="200"> 19,032,700 +</td> +</tr> +</table> +<br> + +<p>It appears from this table that the appropriations for the service, +during the first fifteen years of the present century, amounted to a +little less than <i>ninety millions</i> of dollars per annum; and for the +wear and tear of ships, and "the extraordinary expenses in building and +repairing ships, &c.," the annual appropriations amounted to near +<i>thirty millions</i>.</p> + +<p>Our own naval returns are also so imperfect that it is impossible to +form any very accurate estimate of the relative cost of construction and +repairs of our men-of-war. The following table, compiled from a report +of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1841, (Senate Doc. No. 223, 26th +Congress,) will afford data for an approximate calculation:—</p> +<br> +<table border="1" summary="Cost of USN Ships"> +<tr> +<td width="150"> Name of Ship +</td> +<td width="70"> No. of guns +</td> +<td width="150">Total cost of building, exclusive of armaments, stores, etc. +</td> +<td width="80">When completed. +</td> +<td width="150">Cost of repairs, exclusive of ordnance, etc. +</td> +<td width="150">Repaired between +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150">Delaware +</td> +<td width=70> 74 +</td> +<td width="150"> $543,368.00 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1820 +</td> +<td width="150"> $354,132.56 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1827 and 1838 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> N. Carolina +</td> +<td width="70"> 74 +</td> +<td width="150"> 431,852.00 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1825 +</td> +<td width="150"> 317,628.92 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1824 and 1836 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> Constitution +</td> +<td width="70"> 44 +</td> +<td width="150"> 302,718.84 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1797 +</td> +<td width="150"> 266,878.34 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1833 and 1839 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> United States +</td> +<td width="70"> 44 +</td> +<td width="150"> 299,336.56 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1797 +</td> +<td width="150"> 571,972.77 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1821 and 1841 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> Brandywine +</td> +<td width="70"> 44 +</td> +<td width="150"> [23]299,218.12 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1825 +</td> +<td width="150"> [23]377,665.95 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1826 and 1838 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> Potomac +</td> +<td width="70"> 44 +</td> +<td width="150"> [23]231,013.02 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1822 +</td> +<td width="150"> <a name="FNanchor_23_23"></a><a href="#Footnote_23_23"><sup>[23]</sup></a> 82,597.03 +</td> +<td width="150">1829 and 1835 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td Width="150"> Concord +</td> +<td width="70"> 20 +</td> +<td width="150"> 115,325.80 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1828 +</td> +<td width="150"> 72,796.22 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1832 and 1840 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> Falmouth +</td> +<td width="70"> 20 +</td> +<td width="150"> 94,093.27 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1827 +</td> +<td width="150"> 130,015.43 +</td> +<td width="150"> 1828 and 1837 +</td> +</tr> +<tr> +<td width="150"> John Adams +</td> +<td width="70"> 20 +</td> +<td width="150"> 110,670.69 +</td> +<td width="80"> 1829</td> +<td width="150"> 119,641.93</td> +<td width="150"> 1834 and 1837</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150">Boston</td> +<td width="70"> 20</td> +<td width="150"> 91,973.19</td> +<td width="80"> 1825</td> +<td width="150"> 189,264.37</td> +<td width="150"> 1826 and 1840</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> St. Louis</td> +<td width="70"> 20</td> +<td width="150"> 102,461.95</td> +<td width="80"> 1828</td> +<td width="150"> 135,458.75</td> +<td width="150"> 1834 and 1839</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Vincennes</td> +<td width="70"> 20</td> +<td width="150"> 111,512.79</td> +<td width="80"> 1826</td> +<td width="150"> 178,094.81</td> +<td width="150"> 1830 and 1838</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Vandalia</td> +<td width="70"> 20</td> +<td width="150"> 90,977.88</td> +<td width="80"> 1828</td> +<td width="150"> 59,181.34</td> +<td width="150"> 1832 and 1834</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Lexington</td> +<td width="70"> 20?</td> +<td width="150"> 114,622.35</td> +<td width="80"> 1826</td> +<td width="150"> 83,386.52</td> +<td width="150"> 1827 and 1837</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Warren</td> +<td width="70"> 20?</td> +<td width="150"> 99,410.01</td> +<td width="80"> 1826</td> +<td width="150"> 152,596.03</td> +<td width="150"> 1830 and 1838</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Fairfield</td> +<td width="70"> 20</td> +<td width="150"> 100,490.35</td> +<td width="80"> 1826</td> +<td width="150"> 65,918.26</td> +<td width="150"> 1831 and 1837</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Natches<a name="FNanchor_24_24"></a><a href="#Footnote_24_24"><sup>[24]</sup></a></td> +<td width="70"> 20?</td> +<td width="150"> 106,232.19</td> +<td width="80"> 1827</td> +<td width="150"> 129,969.80</td> +<td width="150"> 1829 and 1836</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Boxer</td> +<td width="70"> 10</td> +<td width="150"> 30,697.88</td> +<td width="80"> 1831</td> +<td width="150"> 28,780.48</td> +<td width="150">1834 and 1840</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Enterprise</td> +<td width="70"> 10</td> +<td width="150"> 27,938.63</td> +<td width="80"> 1831</td> +<td width="150"> 20,716.59</td> +<td width="150"> 1834 and 1840</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Grampus</td> +<td width="70">10</td> +<td width="150"> 23,627.42</td> +<td width="80"> 1821</td> +<td width="150"> 96,086.36</td> +<td width="150">1825 and 1840</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150">Dolphin</td> +<td width="70">10</td> +<td width="150"> 38,522.62</td> +<td width="80"> 1836</td> +<td width="150"> 15,013.35</td> +<td width="150"> 1839 and 1840</td></tr> +<tr><td width="150"> Shark</td> +<td width="70">10</td> +<td width="150"> 23,627.42</td> +<td width="80"> 1821</td> +<td width="150">93,395.84</td> +<td width="150"> 1824 and 1839</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<a name="Footnote_23_23"></a><a href="#FNanchor_23_23">[23]</a><div class="note"><p> Returns incomplete.</p></div> + +<a name="Footnote_24_24"></a><a href="#FNanchor_24_24">[24]</a><div class="note"><p> Broken up in 1840.</p></div> + +<p>It appears from the above table, that the cost of constructing ships of +the line is about $6,600 per gun; of frigates, $6,500 per gun; of +smaller vessels of war, a little less than $5,000 per gun: making an +average cost of vessels of war to be <i>more than six thousand dollars per +gun.</i> And the expense of repairs for these vessels is <i>more than seven +per cent. per annum</i> on their first cost.</p> + +<p>We have as yet had but little experience in the use of war-steamers. The +Fulton, four guns, built in 1838-'39, cost three hundred and +thirty-three thousand seven hundred and seventy dollars and +seventy-seven cents; the Mississippi and Missouri, ten guns each, built +in 1841, cost about six hundred thousand dollars a piece; making an +average cost for war-steamers of <i>over sixty thousand dollars per gun.</i> +The cost of repairs of steam ships will be much greater than those for +vessels of war; but we have not yet had sufficient experience to +determine the exact amount. It has been estimated, however, by competent +judges, that when kept, the expense of repairs will at least equal +twelve per cent. of the first cost. The expense of keeping them in +commission is enormously great. "Their engines," says the Secretary of +the Navy, in his annual report in 1842, "consume so much fuel as to add +enormously to their expenses; and the necessity that they should return +to port, after short intervals of time, for fresh supplies, renders it +impossible to send them on any distant service. They cannot be relied on +as cruisers, and are altogether too expensive for service in time of +peace. I have therefore determined to take them out of commission, and +substitute for them other and less expensive vessels."</p> + +<p>The average cost of permanent fortifications is but <i>little more than +three thousand dollars per gun</i>. And it must be obvious, from the nature +of the materials of which they are constructed, that the expense of +their support must be inconsiderable. It is true that for some years +past a large item of annual expenditure for fortifications has been +under the head of "repairs;" but much of this sum is for alterations and +enlargements of temporary and inefficient works, erected anterior to the +war of 1812. Some of it, however, has been for actual repairs of decayed +or injured portions of the forts; these injuries resulting from the +nature of the climate, the foundations, the use of poor materials and +poor workmanship, and from neglect and abandonment. But if we include +the risk of abandonment at times, it is estimated, upon data drawn from +past experience, that <i>one-third of one per cent. per annum</i>, of the +first cost, will keep in perfect repair any of our forts that have been +constructed since the last war.</p> + +<p>But it is unnecessary to further discuss this question We repeat what +has already been said, no matter what may be the relative cost of ships +and forts, the one, as a general thing, cannot be substituted for the +other. Each has its own sphere of action, and each will contribute, in +its own way, to the national defence; and any undue increase of one, at +the expense of the other, will be attended by a corresponding diminution +of national power.<a name="FNanchor_25_25"></a><a href="#Footnote_25_25"><sup>[25]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_25_25"></a><a href="#FNanchor_25_25">[25]</a><div class="note"><p> For further information concerning our system of sea-coast +defences, the reader is referred to House Doc. 206, twenty-sixth +Congress, second session; Senate Doc. 85, twenty-eighth Congress, second +session; and to the annual reports of the Chief Engineer.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_VIII"></a><h2>CHAPTER VIII.</h2> + +<p>OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.</p> +<br> + +<p>In discussing engineering as a branch of the military art, we spoke of +the use of fortifications on land frontiers, and their influence on the +strategic operations of a campaign. A brief notice was also given of the +different systems that have been proposed for arranging these defensive +works. Let us now apply this discussion to our northern frontier.</p> + +<p>The principle laid down by Napoleon and Jomini, "that fortifications +should always be constructed on important strategic points," is +undoubtedly the correct one: but how to determine these points is a +question that will often perplex the patience and try the skill of the +engineer; yet determine them he must, or his fortifications will be +worse than useless; for a fort improperly located, like a cannon with +its fire reversed on its own artillerists, will be sure to effect the +destruction of the very forces it was designed to protect.</p> + +<p>The selection of positions for fortifications on our northern frontier +must have reference to three distinct classes of objects, viz.: the +security, <i>first</i>, of the large frontier towns, where much public and +private property is exposed to sudden dashing expeditions of the foe, +made either on land or by water; <i>second</i>, of lake harbors, important as +places of refuge and security to our own ships, or to the enemy's fleets +while engaged in landing troops or furnishing supplies to an invading +army; <i>third</i>, of all strategic points on the probable lines of +offensive or defensive operations. These objects are distinct in their +nature, and would seem to require separate and distinct means for their +accomplishment; nevertheless, it will generally be found that positions +selected with reference to one of these objects equally fulfil the +others, so intimately are they all connected. To determine the strategic +points of a probable line of military operations is therefore the main +thing to be attended to in locating fortifications. That such points of +maximum importance are actually marked out by the peaceful or hostile +intercourse of nations cannot be doubted.</p> + +<p>The <i>relative</i> importance of cities and towns is less varied by the +fluctuations of commerce on a land frontier than on the sea-coast. The +ever-changing system of "internal improvements," by furnishing new +highways and thoroughfares for the transportation of the products of +manufacturers and agriculture, either continually varies the relative +standing of the seaports already opened, or opens new ones for the +exportation of these products, and the importation of foreign articles +received in exchange. But these "internal improvements" are seldom +carried so far as to connect together two separate and distinct +countries, and consequently the principal places on the dividing line +usually retain their relative importance, no matter how often they may +have declined during times of hostility, or again flourished with the +increased commercial intercourse which results from peace. The principal +European places of traffic near the frontiers have remained the same for +ages, and in all probability ages hence the great frontier marts will be +nearly the same as at present. This stability of rank among border towns +is not confined to commercial influence; the same holds true with +respect to that established by intercourse of a hostile character. +Military history teaches us that lines of hostile operations, and the +fields upon which the principal battles between any two countries have +been fought, are nearly the same, no matter how remote the periods of +comparison. These points and lines, so important in commerce as well as +in war, result from the natural features of the ground, and we ought +therefore to expect that they would be as little liable to sudden +changes as the character of the earth itself.</p> + +<p>From these remarks it will readily be perceived that there are three +distinct methods of determining the strategic points between this +country and Canada: 1st, by an examination of the topography of the two +countries; 2d, by tracing out the main channels of commercial +intercourse; 3d, by reviewing the lines of their military operations. +The last method is the least liable to error, and perhaps is the most +easily understood, inasmuch as it is sometimes difficult to point out +the precise degree of connection between prospective military lines and +the channels of commerce, or to show why these two have a fixed relation +to the physical features of the country. In the present instance, +moreover, this method furnishes ample data for the formation of our +decision, inasmuch as the campaigns between this country and Canada have +been neither few in number nor unimportant in their character and +results.</p> + +<p>In tracing out the main features of the early wars upon our northern +frontier, it must be borne in mind that nearly the same portion of +country which is now possessed by the English, was then occupied by the +French, and that the English possessions in North America included the +present Middle and Northern States. At the period of the American +revolution the French and English had completely changed ground, the +armies of the former operating in the "States," while the English were +in possession of Canada.</p> + +<p>The first expedition to be noticed against that portion of the country, +was conducted by Samuel Argall, who sailed from Virginia in 1613, with a +fleet of eleven vessels, attacked the French on the Penobscot, and +afterwards the St. Croix.</p> + +<p>In 1654, Sedgwick, at the head of a small New England army, attacked the +French on the Penobscot, and overrun all Arcadia.</p> + +<p>In 1666, during the contest between Charles II. and Louis XIV., it was +proposed to march the New England troops across the country by the +Kennebec or Penobscot, and attack Quebec; but the terrors and +difficulties of crossing "over rocky mountains and howling deserts" were +such as to deter them from undertaking the campaign.</p> + +<p>In 1689, Count Frontenac, governor of Canada, made a descent into New +York to assist the French fleet in reducing that province. His line of +march was by the river Sorrel and Lake Champlain. An attack upon +Montreal by the Iroquois soon forced him to return; but in the following +January a party of French and Indians left Montreal in the depth of a +Canadian winter, and after wading for two and twenty days, with +provisions on their backs, through snows and swamps and across a wide +wilderness, reached the unguarded village of Schenectady. Here a +midnight war-whoop was raised, and the inhabitants either massacred or +driven half-clad through the snow to seek protection in the neighboring +towns.</p> + +<p>In 1690, a congress of the colonies, called to provide means for the +general defence, assembled at New York, and resolved to carry war into +Canada: an army was to attack Montreal by way of Lake Champlain, and a +fleet to attempt Quebec by the St. Lawrence. The former advanced as far +as the lake, when the quarrels of the commanding officers defeated the +objects of the expedition. The Massachusetts fleet of thirty-four +vessels, (the largest carrying forty-four guns each,) and two thousand +men, failed to reduce Quebec, though the defences of that place were +then of the slightest character, and armed with only twenty-three guns.</p> + +<p>In 1704, and again in 1707, Port Royal was attacked by costly +expeditions fitted out by the eastern colonies; and again, in 1709, a +land force of fifteen hundred men advanced against Montreal by Lake +Champlain; but nothing of importance was effected by either expedition.</p> + +<p>In 1711, Lord Bolingbroke planned the conquest of Canada. The land +forces, numbering five thousand men in all, were separated into two +distinct armies, the one sent against Detroit, and the other against +Montreal by Lake Champlain; while a fleet of fifteen ships of war, forty +transports, and six store-ships, carrying a land force of six thousand +five hundred men, was to attack Quebec. The maritime expedition failed +to reach its destination, and after losing a part of the fleet and more +than a thousand men in the St. Lawrence, this part of the project was +abandoned. Nor was any thing important accomplished by either division +of the land forces.</p> + +<p>The same plan of campaign was followed in 1712. An army of four thousand +men marched against Montreal by Lake Champlain, but on hearing of the +failure of the naval expedition and of the concentration of the French +forces on the river Sorel, they retired towards Albany.</p> + +<p>The next expedition of any importance was the naval one of 1745 against +Louisburg. For the attack of this place the colonies raised about four +thousand men, and one hundred small vessels and transports, carrying +between one hundred and sixty and two hundred guns. They were afterwards +joined by ten other vessels carrying near five hundred guns. This +attacking force now, according to some of the English writers, consisted +of six thousand provincials, and eight hundred seamen, and a combined +naval force of near seven hundred guns. The troops landed, and laid +siege to the town. The garrison of the fortifications of Louisburg +consisted of six hundred regulars and one thousand Breton militia, or, +according to some writers, of only twelve hundred men in all. The +armament of these works was one hundred and one cannon, seventy-six +swivels, and six mortars. Auxiliary to the main works were an +island-battery of thirty twenty-two-pounders, and a battery on the main +land armed with thirty large cannon. Frequent attempts were made to +storm the place, but the most persevering efforts were of no avail, many +of the New Englanders being killed and wounded, and their boats +destroyed, while the garrison remained unharmed. At length, after a +siege of forty-nine days, want of provisions and the general +dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, caused the garrison to surrender. +When the New Englanders saw the strength of the works, and the slight +impression which their efforts had produced, they were not only elated +but greatly astonished at their success. It should be noticed, that in +the above attack the number of guns in the fleet was almost <i>three</i> +times as great as that of all the forts combined; and yet the <i>naval</i> +part of the attack was unsuccessful. The besieging army was more than +<i>four</i> times as great as all the garrisons combined; and yet the place +held out forty-nine days, and at last was surrendered through the want +of provisions and the disaffection of the citizens. This place was soon +afterwards restored to the French.</p> + +<p>We see that, thus far in these wars, the English were vastly superior in +strength and numbers, yet the result of the several campaigns was +decidedly in favor of the French, who not only retained their +possessions in the North, but extended their jurisdiction to the mouth +of the Mississippi, and laid claim to the whole country west of the +Alleghany mountains. This success must be attributed, not to any +superiority of the Canadians in bravery, but to the higher military +character of their governors, <i>and more especially to their +fortifications</i>, which were constructed in situations most judiciously +selected, to influence the Indians and facilitate incursions into the +English colonies. The French pursued interior and central lines, while +the English followed exterior and divergent lines. The disparity of +numbers was always very great. At the beginning of the eighteenth +century, the whole population of the colonies amounted to upwards of one +million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana did not exceed +fifty-two thousand. But the French possessions, though situated at the +extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless +wilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, +strong enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought +against them. This fort-building propensity of the French became a +matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 1710 the legislature of +New York especially protested against it in an address to the crown. +While the military art was stationary in England, France had produced +her four great engineers—Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cormontaigne; and +nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more +strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the Canadian +colony, when assailed by such vastly superior British forces. Still +further accessions were now made to these English forces by large +reinforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians received +little or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the war +till 1760, forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expensive +process of reducing all their fortifications. This will be shown in the +following outline of the several campaigns.</p> + +<p>Very early in 1755, a considerable body of men was sent from Great +Britain to reinforce their troops in this country. These troops were +again separated into four distinct armies. The <i>first</i>, consisting of +near two thousand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but was +met and totally defeated by one-half that number of French and Indians. +The <i>second</i> division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack Fort +Niagara by way of Oswego, but returned without success. The <i>third</i>, of +three thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau's army of +twelve hundred regulars and six hundred Canadians and Indians, in the +open field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works at +Ticonderoga and Crown Point. The <i>fourth</i>, consisting of three thousand +three hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of Nova +Scotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result. It +was commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a +vast superiority of force; <i>but this superiority was again more than +counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the English, and by the +fortifications which the French had erected, in such positions as to +give them a decided advantage in their military operations.</i> Washington +early recommended the same system of defence for the English on the +Ohio; and, after Braddock's defeat, advised "the erection of small +fortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means +the country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it +will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the +rout again."</p> + +<p>But this advice of Washington was unheeded, and the campaign of 1756 was +based upon the same erroneous principles as the preceding one. The +<i>first</i> division, of three thousand men, was to operate against Fort Du +Quesne; the <i>second</i>, of six thousand men, against Niagara; the <i>third</i>, +of ten thousand men, against Crown Point; and a <i>fourth</i>, of two +thousand men, was to ascend the Kennebec river, destroy the settlements +on the Chaudiere, and, by alarming the country about Quebec, produce a +diversion in favor of the third division, which was regarded as the main +army, and was directed along the principal line of operations. The +entire French forces at this time consisted of only three thousand +regulars and a body of Canadian militia. Nevertheless, the English, with +forces nearly <i>six times</i> as numerous, closed the campaign without +gaining a single advantage.</p> + +<p>We here see that the French, with very inferior forces, still continued +successful in every campaign, uniformly gaining advantage over their +enemy, and gaining ground upon his colonies. By the possession of Forts +William Henry, Ticonderoga, and Crown Point, they completely commanded +Lake George and Lake Champlain, which afforded the shortest and easiest +line of communication between the British colonies and Canada. By means +of their forts at Montreal, Frontenac, Detroit, &c., they had entire +dominion of the lakes connecting the St. Lawrence with the Mississippi, +and Canada with Louisiana; moreover, by means of Fort Du Quesne and a +line of auxiliary works, their ascendency over the Indians on the Ohio +was well secured. But experience had at length taught the English +wherein lay the great strength of their opponents, and a powerful effort +was now to be made to displace the French from their fortresses, or at +least to counterbalance these works by a vast and overwhelming +superiority of troops.</p> + +<p>In 1757, a British fleet of fifteen ships of the line, eighteen +frigates, and many smaller vessels, and a land force of twelve thousand +effective men, were sent to attempt the reduction of the fortifications +of Louisburg; but they failed to effect their object.</p> + +<p>In 1758 the forces sent against this place consisted of twenty ships of +the line and eighteen frigates, with an army of fourteen thousand men. +The harbor was defended by only five ships of the line, one fifty-gun +ship, and five frigates, three of which were sunk across the mouth of +the basin. The fortifications of the town had been much neglected, and +in general had fallen into ruins. The garrison consisted of only two +thousand five hundred regulars, and six hundred militia. Notwithstanding +that the number of guns of the British fleet exceeded both the armaments +of the French ships and of all the forts, these British ships did not +risk an attack, but merely acted as transports and as a blockading +squadron. Even the French naval defence, and the outer works commanding +the harbor, were reduced by the temporary land-batteries which Wolfe +erected; and the main work, although besieged by an inequality of forces +of nearly <i>five</i> to <i>one</i>, held out for two months, and even then +surrendered through the fears and petitions of the non-combatant +inhabitants, and not because it had received any material injury from +the besiegers. The defence, however, had been continued long enough to +prevent, for that campaign, any further operations against Canada. The +whole number of the English land forces in this campaign was computed at +fifty thousand men, of which more than forty thousand were in the field. +The <i>first</i> division, of nine thousand men, was directed against Fort Du +Quesne, whose garrison did not exceed as many hundred. The <i>second</i> +division, of sixteen thousand effective troops, proceeded against +Ticonderoga and Crown Point; while a detachment of three thousand men +captured Fort Frontenac, then garrisoned by only one hundred and ten +men. The whole force of the French amounted to only five thousand; the +English attempted to drive them from their works by storm, but were +repulsed with a loss of near two thousand men, while their opponents +were scarcely injured. The <i>third</i> division acted, as has just been +stated, in concert with the naval force against Louisburg.</p> + +<p>In 1759, the <i>western</i> division of the English army, consisting of a +strong body of Indians, and five thousand troops, wasted the whole +season in reducing Fort Niagara, which was garrisoned by only six +hundred men. The <i>central</i> column of thirteen thousand men was +sufficiently successful to enable it to winter at Crown Point. The +<i>eastern</i> division of eight thousand men under Wolfe ascended the St. +Lawrence with a fleet of twenty-two ships, thirteen frigates, and +fourteen sloops, and smaller vessels, carrying one thousand nine hundred +and ninety guns, and five thousand five hundred and ninety seamen. The +naval defence of Quebec consisted of eight frigates, carrying two +hundred and ten guns; the land forces numbered about nine thousand, and +the fortifications were armed with ninety-four guns and five mortars, +only a part of which could be brought to bear upon the anchorage ground. +Several attempts were made by the combined forces to carry these works, +but they proved equally unsuccessful. Although the English fleet carried +<i>twenty times</i> as many guns as the forts, their inability to reduce +these works was acknowledged. The siege had continued for two months, +and still the fortifications were uninjured. General Wolfe himself +distinctly stated, that, in any further attempt to carry the place, the +"guns of the shipping could not be of much use;" and the chief engineer +of the expedition gave it as his opinion, that "the ships would receive +great damage from the shot and bombs of the upper batteries, without +making the least impression upon them." Under these circumstances it was +finally determined to endeavor to decoy Montcalm from his works, and +make him risk a battle in the open field. In an evil hour, the French +consented to forego the advantages of their fortifications, and the +contest was finally decided on the plains of Abraham, with forces nearly +equal in number. Both Wolfe and Montcalm fell in this battle, but the +former on the field of victory; and five days afterwards the inhabitants +of Quebec, weakened and dispirited by their losses, surrendered the +town, although its fortifications were still unharmed.</p> + +<p>The French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the +enemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the +advance of the English till France could send troops to their relief; +but no such relief came, and when the campaign of 1760 opened, the +little French army was concentrated at Montreal. As the English +divisions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain, and the third +by Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine opportunity for the +strategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but the +garrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction, and +therefore awaited the enemy within their works. Montreal, being but +slightly fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the French +empire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense.</p> + +<p>At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was so obviously +important to get possession of the military works commanding the line of +Lake Champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously +fitted out by Massachusetts and Connecticut. The garrisons of these +works were taken by surprise. This conquest, says Botta, the able and +elegant historian of the Revolution, "was no doubt of high importance, +but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the +whole war, if these fortresses, <i>which are the bulwarks of the +colonies</i>, had been defended in times following, with the same prudence +and valor with which they had been acquired."</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand seven hundred and +eighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at Albany, +crossed the lake and approached the fortress of St. John's about the 1st +of September. The work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred +regulars, and some two hundred militia. This was the only obstacle to +prevent the advance of our army into the very heart of Canada; to leave +it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat. Allen had +already made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had been +destroyed, and he himself made prisoner. The reduction of this place was +therefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d +of November, and after a long and tedious siege. This delay decided the +fate of the campaign; for, although Montreal fell immediately +afterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our +troops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing, +now demanded their discharge. The eastern division, of one thousand men +under Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and Chaudiere, +through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrived +opposite Quebec on the 9th of November. The place was at this time +almost without defence, and, had Arnold possessed a suitable pontoon +equipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise. But by the time +that the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction +could be effected between the two American armies, Quebec was prepared +to sustain their attack. The result of that attack is too well known to +require a repetition here.</p> + +<p>Early the next season it was deemed necessary to withdraw the American +army from Canada. This retreat of undisciplined troops, in the presence +of vastly superior numbers of the enemy, would have been extremely +hazardous had it not been effected on a line of forts which were held by +our own troops. As it was we sustained no considerable loss.</p> + +<p>Carleton pursued on rapidly, to co-operate with General Howe, who was +now lying at New York with over one hundred ships and about thirty-five +thousand troops; but he received a decided check from the guns of +Ticonderoga, and retired again to Canada.</p> + +<p>By the British plan of campaign in 1777, the entire force of their +northern army was to concentrate at Albany. One division of fifteen +hundred men, including Indians, advanced by Oswego, Wood Creek, and the +Mohawk; but Fort Stanwix, with a garrison of only six hundred men, +arrested their progress and forced them to return. Another, leaving New +York, ascended the Hudson as far as Esopus; but its progress was so much +retarded by the small forts and water-batteries along that river, that +it would have been too late to assist Burgoyne, even if it could +possibly have reached Albany. The principal division of the enemy's +army, numbering about nine thousand men, advanced by the Champlain +route. Little or no preparations were made to arrest its progress. The +works of Ticonderoga were so out of repair as to be indefensible on the +flanks. Its garrison consisted of only fifteen hundred continental +troops, and about as many militia, over whom the general had no control. +Their supply of provisions was exhausted, and only one man in ten of the +militia had bayonets to their guns. Under these circumstances it was +deemed best to withdraw the garrison six days after the investment. +Burgoyne now advanced rapidly, but with so little precaution as to leave +his communications in rear entirely unprotected. Being repulsed by the +American forces collected at Saratoga, his line of supplies cut off by +our detached forts, his provisions exhausted, his troops dispirited, and +his Indian allies having deserted him, retreat became impossible, and +his whole army was forced to capitulate. This campaign closed the +military operations on our northern frontier during the war of the +Revolution.</p> + +<p>We now come to the war of 1812. In the beginning of this war the number +of British regulars in the Canadas did not exceed three thousand men, +who were scattered along a frontier of more than nine hundred miles in +extent. In the whole of Upper Canada there were but seven hundred and +twenty men, and at Montreal, Three Rivers, and on the whole line of the +Sorel the whole defensive force amounted to only thirteen hundred and +thirty men, and the garrison of Quebec was so small, that no detachment +could be made without great inconvenience and danger. The fortifications +of Isle aux Noix, then emphatically the key of central Canada, was +without a garrison during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Under +these circumstances an American force of fifteen hundred or two thousand +men marching rapidly from Albany, might readily have broken the enemy's +line of defence, and cut off all Upper Canada from supplies and +reinforcements from England by way of Quebec. Let us see what course was +pursued.</p> + +<p>On the 1st of June an army of two thousand men was collected at Dayton, +in Ohio, placed under the command of an imbecile old officer of the +Revolution, and directed by Detroit against the Canadian Peninsula. The +dilatory march, absurd movements, and traitorous surrender of Hull's +army to a British force of three hundred regulars and four hundred +militia, are but too well known. Another American army of about ten +thousand men was afterwards raised in the west; the main division of +this army under Harrison marched by three separate routes to invade +Canada by way of Malden; but they failed to reach their destination, and +wintered behind the river Portage. The Eastern army was collected at +Albany in the early part of the summer and placed under the command of +General Dearborn, another old officer of the Revolution. Instead of +pushing this force rapidly forward upon the strategic line of Lake +Champlain, the general was directed to divide it into three parts, and +to send one division against the Niagara frontier, a <i>second</i> against +Kingston, and a <i>third</i> against Montreal. These orders were dispatched +from Washington the 26th of June, nearly a month after Hull had begun +his march from Dayton. Dearborn's army, on the first of September, +consisted of six thousand five hundred regulars and seven thousand +militia—thirteen thousand five hundred in all: six thousand three +hundred for the Niagara frontier, two thousand two hundred at Sacketts +Harbor, and five thousand for Lake Champlain. Even with this absurd plan +of campaign and faulty division of the forces, we might have succeeded +if the general had acted with energy, so exceedingly weak were the +Canadian means of defence; but instead of taking advantage of his +superiority in numbers and the favorable circumstances of the time, he +entered into an armistice with the British general, and his whole army +of thirteen thousand five hundred men lay inactive till the 13th of +October, when the absurd project of crossing the Niagara at Lewiston +failed, because the New-York militia had <i>constitutional scruples</i> +against crossing a river so long as the enemy were on the other side. +The Lake Champlain column, consisting of three thousand regulars and two +thousand militia, a considerable portion of which had been collected as +early as the first of August, had in four months advanced as far as La +Cole river, a distance of about two hundred miles from Albany. The +unimportant action at this place terminated the campaign, and the army +of the North returned to winter-quarters.</p> + +<p>All the early part of the campaign of 1813, on the northern frontier, +was spent in a war of detachments, in which our troops captured Fort +George and York, and repelled the predatory excursions of the enemy. In +these operations our troops exhibited much courage and energy, and the +young officers who led them, no little skill and military talent. But +nothing could have been more absurd than for a general, with superior +forces in the vicinity of an enemy, to act only by detachments at a time +when his opponents were daily increasing in number. This useless war of +outposts and detachments was continued till July, when General Dearborn +was recalled, and General Wilkinson, another old officer of the +Revolution, put in his place. It was now determined to make a push for +Montreal, with the combined forces of the Northern army. Wilkinson, with +8,000 men, descended the St. Lawrence, but did not reach Prescott till +the 6th of November, thus affording to the English plenty of leisure to +prepare for his reception. Hampton, another old officer of the +Revolution, ascended Lake Champlain with another column of 4,000 men, +but refused to form any co-operation with Wilkinson, and after the +unimportant combat of Chrystler's Field, the whole army again retired +to winter-quarters.</p> + +<p>In the mean time the army of the West, under Harrison, who was assisted +by the military skill and science of McCrea and Wood, and the bravery of +Croghan and Johnson, held in check the British and Indians; and the +battle of the Thames and the victory of Lake Erie formed a brilliant +termination to the campaign in that quarter. Had such victories been +gained on the Montreal or eastern portion of the frontier, they would +have led to the most important results.</p> + +<p>The plan of operations for the campaign of 1814 was of the same diverse +and discordant character as before. But the command of the troops had +now fallen into the hands of young and energetic officers, and Brown, +assisted by such men as Wood, McCrea, Scott, Ripley, Miller, soon gained +the victories of Fort Erie, Chippewa, and Lundy's Lane; while McComb and +McDonough drove back the enemy from the line of Lake Champlain. With +these operations terminated the Northern campaign of 1814, the last +which has been conducted on that frontier.</p> + +<p>Let us now turn to the system of works projected for the defence of this +line.</p> + +<p>The first works are at the Falls of St. Mary, on the western extremity +of the line.</p> + +<p>The second works are at Mackinaw.</p> + +<p>The third works are at the foot of Lake Huron.</p> + +<p>The fourth works are near Detroit.</p> + +<p>The fifth works are near Buffalo.</p> + +<p>The sixth works are at the mouth of the Niagara river.</p> + +<p>The seventh works are at Oswego.</p> + +<p>The eighth works are at Sacketts Harbor.</p> + +<p>The ninth works are below Ogdensburg.</p> + +<p>The tenth works are at Rouse's Point.</p> + +<p>The eleventh works are near the head-waters of the Kennebec or the +Penobscot.</p> + +<p>The twelfth works are at Calais, on the St. Croix.</p> + +<p>All these works are small, and simple in their character, well +calculated to assist the operations of armed forces in the field, but +incapable of resisting a protracted siege. They are entirely different +in their character from those on the coast, the latter being intended +principally for the use of our citizen-soldiery, in the defence of our +seaport towns, while the former are intended merely as auxiliaries to +the operations of more disciplined troops.</p> + +<p>This system of defence for our Northern frontier has been much commented +on by men professing some knowledge of the military art, and various +opinions have been advanced respecting its merits. Some have thought +that more and larger works should be placed on the western extremity of +this line; others attach by far the greatest importance to the central +or Montreal portion of the frontier; while others, again, attach a +higher value to the eastern extremity of the line.</p> + +<p>These last would have us concentrate our main forces on the head-waters +of the Kennebec and the Penobscot, and then advance upon Quebec, a +distance of some 250 miles, along the isolated carriage-road, through +the valley of the Chaudiere. Here is only a single road, but little +travelled, and penetrating a wide and almost uninhabited wilderness. +General Jomini says emphatically, that <i>a line of operations should +always offer two or three roads for the movement of an army in the +sphere of its enterprises</i>,—an insuperable objection to the Kennebec +route, except as a diversion to the main attack. But there are still +stronger objections to this route, than its want of feasibility for the +transportation of the main army; for even should that army succeed in +reaching Quebec in safety, the expedition would be entirely without +military results, unless that fortress could be immediately reduced,—a +contingency which would be extremely doubtful under the most favorable +circumstances; and even should we be ever so fortunate in our +operations, the siege of such a place would occupy a considerable length +of time. It would be throwing our forces along the most difficult line +of operations, against the strongest point in the enemy's line of +defence, and making the success of the whole plan depend upon the +contingency of a reduction, in a few days, of one of the strongest +fortresses in the world. What principle in military science would +justify such a plan of campaign? We are fully aware of the great +advantages to be derived from the reduction of Quebec; and we are also +aware of the great difficulties to be encountered in any attempt to +accomplish that object. It may, and probably will ere long, be made to +surrender to our arms; but it would be utter folly to base our military +operations on the contingency of a short and successful siege. By +advancing upon Montreal by the Lake Champlain route, we could cut off +the Canadian forces in the West from all reinforcements; and then, as +circumstances might direct, could besiege Quebec, or attack the enemy in +the field, or perhaps, manœuvring as the French did at the siege of +Mantua, accomplish both objects at the same time.</p> + +<p>We have seen that it was one of Napoleon's maxims that <i>an army should +choose the shortest and most direct line of operations, which should +either pierce the enemy's line of defence, or cut off his communications +with his base</i>. It is the opinion of men of the best military talent in +our army that the Lake Champlain line satisfies all these conditions at +the same time;—that it is the most direct, most feasible, and most +decisive line which can be pursued in case of operations against Canada; +and that it is indispensable to success in war that this line be well +fortified in time of peace. All agree that the St. Lawrence above +Quebec constitutes the <i>key</i> point of the enemy's defence, and the +<i>objective</i> point towards which all our operations should be directed. +To reach this point, all our Boards of Engineers have deemed it best to +collect our troops at Albany and advance by Lake Champlain, a distance +of only two hundred miles. Besides the advantages of a good water +communication the whole distance for the transportation of military +stores, there are several roads on each side, all concentrating on this +line within our own territory. It has already been shown by the brief +sketch of our northern wars, that this line has been the field of strife +and blood for <i>fifteen campaigns</i>. Nature has marked it out as our +shortest and easiest line of intercourse with Canada, both in peace and +war. Military diversions will always be made on the eastern and western +extremities of this frontier, and important secondary or auxiliary +operations be carried on by the eastern and western routes; but until we +overthrow the whole system of military science as established by the +Romans, revived by Frederick and practised and improved by Napoleon, the +<i>central and interior line</i>, under all ordinary circumstances, will +furnish the greatest probabilities of success.</p> + +<p>If the line of Lake Champlain is, as we have endeavored to show, the +most important line in the north; its security by fortifications is a +matter of the greatest interest. The works recommended by the Board, +consist of a single fort, costing $600,000, at Rouse's Point, on the +extreme frontier, and unfortified dépôts at Plattsburg and Albany. But +is this sufficient to accomplish the object? If the hostile army should +pass the extreme frontier barrier, what is to retard his advance,—what +defensive works are to protect the débouché of the Northern canal, or +even to save the great central dépôt? We know of no foreign engineer who +has recommended less than <i>three</i> lines of fortifications for the +security of a land frontier; and Napoleon, the Archduke Charles, and +General Jomini, agree in recommending at least this number of lines. +There may be circumstances that render it unnecessary to resort to a +three-fold defence throughout the whole extent of our northern frontier; +but upon our main line of communication with Canada,—a line of maximum +importance both to us and to the enemy, we know of no reason for +violating the positive rules of the art,—rules which have been +established for ages; and sanctioned by the best engineers and greatest +generals of modern times.</p> + +<p>Ticonderoga has more than once stayed the waves of northern invasion; +and we know of no change in the art of war, or in the condition of the +country, that renders less important than formerly the advantages of an +intermediate point of support between Albany and the Canadian lines. +Indeed it would seem that the connection of the Hudson with the lake by +the northern canal had even increased the value of such a point.</p> + +<p>It would seem, moreover, that the great value of a central dépôt near +Albany would warrant a resort to the best means of security which can be +afforded by defensive works. Here we already have one of our largest +arsenals of construction; here are to be located magazines for the +collection and deposit, in time of peace, of gunpowder; here, in time of +war, is to be formed the grand military dépôt for our whole northern +armies; and here is the point of junction of the lines of communication +of our northern and eastern states, and the great central rallying point +where troops are to be collected for the defence of our northern +frontier, or for offensive operations against Canada. Such a place +should never be exposed to the <i>coup-de-main</i> of an enemy. The chance +operations of a defensive army are never sufficient for the security of +so important a position. We do not here pretend to say what its defences +should be. Perhaps strong <i>têtes-de-pont</i> on the Mohawk and Hudson +rivers, and detached works on the several lines of communication, may +accomplish the desired object; perhaps more central and compact works +may be found necessary. But we insist on the importance of securing this +position by <i>some</i> efficient means. The remarks of Napoleon, (which have +already been given,) on the advantages to be derived from fortifying +such a central place, where the military wealth of a nation can be +secured, are strikingly applicable to this case.</p> + +<p>But let us look for a moment at what is called the <i>western</i> plan of +defence for our northern frontier.</p> + +<p>Certain writers and orators of the western states, in their plans of +military defence, would have the principal fortifications of the +northern frontier established on Lake Erie, the Detroit river, the St. +Clair, and Lake Huron; and the money proposed for the other frontier and +coast works, expended in establishing military and naval dépôts at +Memphis and Pittsburg, and in the construction of a ship-canal from the +lower Illinois to Lake Michigan,—for the purpose of obtaining the naval +control of the northern lakes.</p> + +<p>It is said that British military and steam naval forces will ascend the +St. Lawrence to Lake Ontario; that to counteract these operations we +must build an opposition steam-navy at Pittsburg and Memphis, and +collect out troops on the Ohio and Mississippi, ascend the Mississippi +and Illinois, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and the Georgian Bay, cross +over to the Ottawa by French river and Lake Nipissing, or Moon river and +the Muskago, then descend the Ottawa river to Montreal. But as there +might be some difficulty in conveying their war-steamers over some +twelve or fifteen portages between the Georgian Bay and the Ottawa, and +as the upper waters of that river are not navigable by such craft, it +has, by some of the military writers before alluded to, been deemed +preferable to descend Lake Huron, St. Clair river and lake, run the +gauntlet past the British forts on the Detroit, descend Lake Erie and +the Niagara<a name="FNanchor_26_26"></a><a href="#Footnote_26_26"><sup>[26]</sup></a> into Lake Ontario, so as to meet the English as they +come steaming up the St. Lawrence!</p> + +<a name="Footnote_26_26"></a><a href="#FNanchor_26_26">[26]</a><div class="note"><p> How they are to pass the Falls was not determined either +by Harry Bluff or the Memphis Convention.</p></div> + +<p>It is agreed upon all sides that the British must first collect their +forces at Quebec, and then pass along the line of the St. Lawrence and +Lake Ontario to reach the Niagara and Detroit frontiers. Our boards of +engineers have deemed it best to collect troops on the Champlain line, +and, by penetrating between Montreal and Quebec, separate the enemy's +forces and cut off all the remainder of Canada from supplies and +reinforcements from England. But it has been discovered by certain +western men that to cut the <i>trunk</i> of a tree is not the proper method +of felling it: we must climb to the <i>top</i> and pinch the buds, or, at +most, cut off a few of the smaller limbs. To blow up a house, we should +not place the mine under the foundation, but attach it to one of the +shingles of the roof! We have already shown that troops collected at +Albany may reach the great strategic point on the St. Lawrence by an +easy and direct route of <i>two hundred miles</i>; but forces collected at +Pittsburg and Memphis must pass over a difficult and unfrequented route +of <i>two thousand miles</i>.</p> + +<p>Our merchant marine on the lakes secures to us a naval superiority in +that quarter at the beginning of a war; and our facilities for +ship-building are there equal if not superior to any possessed by the +enemy. The only way, therefore, in which our ascendency on the lakes can +be lost, is by the introduction of steam craft from the Atlantic. The +canals and locks constructed for this object will pass vessels of small +dimensions and drawing not over eight and a half feet water.</p> + +<p>How are we to prevent the introduction of these Atlantic steamers into +our lakes? Shall we, at the first opening of hostilities, march with +armed forces upon the enemy's line of artificial communication and blow +up the locks of their ship-canals, thus meeting the enemy's marine at +the very threshold of its introduction into the interior seas; or shall +we build opposition steam-navies at Pittsburg and Memphis, some two +thousand miles distant, and then expend some forty or fifty millions<a name="FNanchor_27_27"></a><a href="#Footnote_27_27"><sup>[27]</sup></a> +in opening an artificial channel to enable them to reach Lake Ontario, +after its borders have been laid waste by the hostile forces? Very few +disinterested judges would hesitate in forming their opinion on this +question.<a name="FNanchor_28_28"></a><a href="#Footnote_28_28"><sup>[28]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_27_27"></a><a href="#FNanchor_27_27">[27]</a><div class="note"><p> The construction of the Illinois ship-canal, for vessels +of eight and a half feet draught, is estimated at fifteen millions; to +give the same draught to the Mississippi and lower Illinois, would +require at least ten millions more; a ship canal of the corresponding +draught around Niagara Falls, will cost, say, ten millions; the navy +yard at Memphis, with docks, storehouses, &c., will cost about two +millions, and steamers sent thence to the lakes will cost about fifty +thousand dollars per gun. On the other hand, the military defences which +it is deemed necessary to erect in time of peace for the security of the +Champlain frontier, will cost only about two thousand dollars per gun; +the whole expenditure not exceeding, at most, two millions of dollars! +</p><p> +It is not to be denied that a water communication between the +Mississippi and the northern lakes will have great commercial +advantages, and that, in case of a protracted war, auxiliary troops and +military stores may be drawn from the valley of the Mississippi to +assist the North and East in preventing any great accessions to the +British military forces in the Canadas. We speak only of the policy of +expending vast sums of money on this <i>military</i> (?) <i>project</i>, to the +neglect of matters of more immediate and pressing want. We have nothing +to say of its character as a <i>commercial project</i>, or of the ultimate +military advantages that might accrue from such a work. We speak only of +the present condition and wants of the country, and not of what that +condition and those wants may be generations hence!</p></div> + +<a name="Footnote_28_28"></a><a href="#FNanchor_28_28">[28]</a><div class="note"><p> There are no books devoted exclusively to the subjects +embraced in this chapter; but the reader will find many remarks on the +northern frontier defences in the histories of the war of 1812, in +congressional reports, (vide House Doc. 206, XXVIth Congress, 2d +session; and Senate Doc., No. 85, XXVIIIth Congress, 2d session,) and in +numerous pamphlets and essays that have appeared from the press within +the last few years.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_IX"></a><h2>CHAPTER IX.</h2> + +<p>ARMY ORGANIZATION—STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE CORPS.</p> +<br> + +<p>By the law of the 12th of December, 1790, on the organization of the +public force of France, the Army was defined, "A standing force drawn +from the public force, and designed to act against external enemies." +[<i>Une force habituelle extraite de la force publique, et destinée +essentiellement à agir contre les ennemis du dehors</i>.]</p> + +<p>In time of peace, the whole organized military force of the State is +intended when we speak of <i>the army</i>; but in time of war this force is +broken up into two or more fractions, each of which is called an <i>army</i>. +These armies are usually named from the particular duty which may be +assigned to them—as, <i>army of invasion, army of occupation, army of +observation, army of reserve, &c.</i>; or from the country or direction in +which they operate—as, <i>army of the North, of the South, of Mexico, of +Canada, of the Rhine, &c.</i>; or from the general who commands it—as, the +<i>army of Soult, army of Wellington, army of Blücher, &c.</i></p> + +<p>All modern armies are organized on the same basis. They are made up of a +Staff and Administrative departments, and four distinct arms—Infantry, +Cavalry, Artillery, and Engineers; each having distinct duties, but all +combining to form one and the same military body. In the actual +operations of a campaign, these forces are formed into <i>corps d'armée</i>, +each <i>corps d'armée</i> being composed of two or more <i>grand-divisions</i>; +each grand-division, of two or more <i>brigades</i>; and each brigade, of +several <i>companies, squadrons</i>, or <i>batteries</i>.</p> + +<p>In speaking of an army in the field, it is sometimes supposed to be +divided into two classes of men—the <i>Staff</i> and <i>the line</i>. We here +include in the first class—</p> + +<p>All officers, of whatever arm, above the rank of colonel;</p> + +<p>All officers of the staff corps of whatever grade, and</p> + +<p>All officers attached to the staff as aides, &c.;</p> + +<p>All officers of the administrative departments;</p> + +<p>All officers of artillery and engineer staffs;</p> + +<p>The corps of geographical or topographical engineers, and</p> + +<p>The guards.</p> + +<p>In the second class are included all troops, of whatever arm, which +belong to the active army, in infantry, cavalry, artillery, and +engineers. All troops on detached service, such as recruiting, guarding +posts and dépôts, escorting convoys, &c., as well as all sedentary +corps, garrisons of fortified places, &c., are not regarded in this +classification as composing any part of the <i>line</i> of the army.</p> + +<p><i>Troops of the line</i> is a term applied only to such troops as form the +principal line on the battle-field, viz:—The heavy infantry and heavy +cavalry. These are technically called <i>infantry of the line</i>, and +<i>cavalry of the line</i>. In this sense of the term, light infantry, light +cavalry or dragoons, artillery, and engineers, are not classed as troops +of the <i>line</i>. But this distinction is now pretty much fallen into +disuse, and the division of an army into Staff and Administrative +departments, and four arms of service—Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, and +Engineers—is now regarded as the most convenient, from being precise +and definite in its meaning.</p> + +<p>The <i>general staff</i> of an army includes all general officers of the +army, and such officers of lower grades as are attached to this general +duty, instead of serving with troops, or on special administrative duty. +The general officers are—1st, the <i>generalissimo</i>, or commander-in +-chief; 2d, <i>generals</i>, or marshals, as they are called in +France, or field-marshals and generals of infantry and cavalry, as they +are called in England and the northern states of Europe; 3d, +<i>lieutenant-generals</i>; 4th, <i>generals of division</i>, or major-generals, +as they are called in England; 5th, <i>generals of brigade</i>, or +brigadier-generals, as they are sometimes called;—colonels, majors, +captains, lieutenants, ensigns, and cornets or cadets, are also either +attached to the staff, or form a part of the <i>staff corps</i>. The titles +of "adjutant-general," and of "inspector-general," are given to staff +officers selected for these special services, either in the general +staff or in the several <i>corps d'armée</i>. No special rank is attached to +these offices themselves, and the grade of those who hold them is fixed +by some special rule, or by their general rank in the army.</p> + +<p>In the war of the Revolution, Washington held the rank of General, and +in 1798 the rank of Lieutenant-general. In the war of 1812, the highest +grade held by any of our officers was that of General of Division, or +Major-general, as it was called. The highest grade in our army at the +present time is called Major-general—a title that properly belongs, not +to the general of an army, but to the chief of staff. Hamilton had this +title when chief of Washington's staff; Berthier and Soult when chief of +Napoleon's staff, the former till the close of the campaign of 1814, and +the latter in the Waterloo campaign. General Jomini first greatly +distinguished himself as chief of Ney's staff, and afterwards on the +staff of the Emperor of Russia. Other generals have owed much of their +success to the chiefs of their staff:—Pichegru to Regnier, Moreau to +Dessoles, Kutusof to Toll, Barclay to Diebitsch, and Blücher to +Sharnharst and Gneisenau.</p> + +<p>The <i>generalissimo</i> or commander-in-chief of an army is the person +designated by the law of the land to take charge of the organized +military forces of the state. In this country the President, through his +Secretary of War, exercises this general command. In England, Wellington +acts in the capacity of commander-in-chief of all the British military +forces. In France, the Minister of War, under the king, has this general +direction. In other European services, some prince of the blood, or +distinguished general, exercises the functions of generalissimo.</p> + +<p>An active army in the field should be commanded by a <i>general</i>, or, as +is done in some European countries, by a marshal. These may be regarded +as of assimilated rank.</p> + +<p>A <i>corps d'armée</i> should, be commanded by a <i>Lieutenant-general</i>. This +rule is almost universal in Europe. The number of marshals in France +under Napoleon was so great, that officers of this grade were often +assigned to <i>corps d'armée</i>.</p> + +<p>A grand division of an army should be commanded by a <i>General of +Division</i>. In England, the assimilated grade is that of major-general, +and in France at the present time, the younger lieutenant-generals, or +the <i>maréchaux-de-camp</i>, command divisions.</p> + +<p>A brigade should be commanded by a <i>Brigadier-general</i>. At the present +time in the French service, <i>maréchaux-de-camp</i> act as commanders of +brigades.</p> + +<p>The several <i>corps d'armée</i> are designated by numbers, 1st, 2d, 3d, &c., +and in the same way the several divisions in each <i>corps d'armée</i>, and +the several brigades in each division.</p> + +<p>When the number of troops are placed on a war footing, each <i>corps +d'armée</i> ordinarily contains from twenty to thirty thousand men.</p> + +<p>The command of these several <i>corps d'armée</i>, divisions, and brigades, +is taken by the officers of the corresponding grades according to +seniority of rank, and without reference to arms, unless otherwise +directed by the generalissimo, who should always have the power to +designate officers for special commands.</p> + +<p>The <i>chief of staff</i> of an army is usually selected from the grade next +below that of the general commanding, and receives the title, for the +time being, which is used to designate this special rank. In some +European armies, and formerly in our own service, this officer was +called major-general. In France, if the generalissimo commands in +person, a marshal is made chief of staff with the temporary title of +<i>major-général</i>; but if a marshal commands the army, a lieutenant +-general or <i>maréchal-de-camp</i> becomes chief of staff with the +title of <i>aide-major-général</i>. The chiefs of staff of <i>corps d'armée</i> +and of divisions, are selected in precisely the same way.</p> + +<p>The position assigned by the commanding general for the residence of his +staff, is denominated the <i>General Head-Quarter of the army</i>; that of a +<i>corps d'armée</i> staff, the <i>Head-Quarters of</i> [1st or 2d, &c.] <i>corps +d'armée</i>; that of a division, the <i>Head-Quarters of</i> [1st or 2d, &c.] +<i>division</i>, [1st or 2d, &c.] <i>corps d'armée</i>.</p> + +<p>The petty staffs of regiments, squadrons, &c., consisting of an +adjutant, sergeant-major, &c., are especially organized by the +commandants of the regiments, &c., and have no connection whatever with +the general staff of an army. Of course, then, they are not embraced in +the present discussion.</p> + +<p>The subordinate officers of the staff of an army, in time of war, are +charged with important and responsible duties connected with the +execution of the orders of their respective chiefs. But in time of +peace, they are too apt to degenerate into fourth-rate clerks of the +Adjutant-general's department, and mere military dandies, employing +their time in discussing the most unimportant and really contemptible +points of military etiquette, or criticising the letters and dispatches +of superior officers, to see whether the wording of the report or the +folding of the letter exactly corresponds to the particular regulation +applicable to the case. Such was the character given to the first staff +of Wellington, and a similar class of men composed the staff of the army +of Italy when it was abolished by Napoleon and a new one formed in its +place. There are also some officers of this stamp in our own service, +but they are regarded by the army with universal contempt. The staff of +our army requires a new and different organization, and should be +considerably enlarged.</p> + +<p>The following is the composition of a regularly organized general staff +in the French service, for an army of forty or fifty thousand men +divided into two <i>corps d'armée</i> and a reserve.</p> + +<p>1st. The marshal (or general) commanding-in-chief; and one colonel or +lieutenant-colonel, one major, three captains and three subalterns, as +aides-de-camp. </p> + +<p>2d. A lieutenant-general as chief-of-staff, with the title of +<i>major-general</i>, assisted by one colonel or lieutenant-colonel, three +majors, five captains, and one subaltern, as aides-de-camp.</p> + +<p>3d. Three lieutenant-generals, commanding the <i>corps d'armée</i> and +reserve. Each of these will be assisted by aides in the same way as the +<i>major-general</i>, and each will also have his regularly-organized staff +of <i>corps d'armée</i>, with a general of division or general of brigade as +chief.</p> + +<p>4th. Six or nine generals commanding divisions, each having his own +distinct and separately organized staff. In the French army, the staff +of an officer commanding a division is composed of one colonel, two +majors, three captains, and six subalterns.</p> + +<p>5th. Twelve or more generals of brigade, each having one captain, and +one subaltern for aides.</p> + +<p>6th. There is also attached to the staff of the general-in-chief of the +army, the commandants of artillery and engineers, with several +subordinates, inspector-generals, and the ranking officers of each of +the administrative departments, with their assistants.</p> + +<p>The generals select their aides and assistants from the staff corps, or +from either of the four arms of service.</p> + +<p>The troops of these arms may be distributed as follows:</p> + +<br> +<table summary="Troop Distribution"> +<tr><td width="600">52 battalions of infantry,</td> +<td width="100"> 35,000 men.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="600"> 42 squadrons of horse</td> +<td width="100"> 6,500</td></tr> +<tr><td width="600">13 batteries of artillery, (4 mounted and 9 foot,)</td> +<td width="100"> 2,500</td></tr> +<tr><td width="600">5 companies of sappers, 2 of pontoniers,<a name="FNanchor_29_29"></a><a href="#Footnote_29_29"><sup>[29]</sup></a> and 1 of artificers</td> +<td width="100"><u> 1,500</u></td></tr> +<tr><td></td><td width="100">45,500</td></tr></table> +<br> + + +<a name="Footnote_29_29"></a><a href="#FNanchor_29_29">[29]</a><div class="note"><p> One bridge-equipage is required for each <i>corps d'armée</i>.</p></div> + +<p>If we add to these the staff, and the several officers and employés of +the administrative departments, we have an army of nearly fifty thousand +men.</p> + +<p>This, it will be remembered, is the organization of an army in the +field; in the entire military organization of a state, the number of +staff officers will be still higher.</p> + +<p>In 1788, France, with a military organization for about three hundred +and twenty thousand men, had eighteen marshals, two hundred and +twenty-five lieutenant-generals, five hundred and thirty-eight +<i>maréchaux-de-camp</i>, and four hundred and eighty-three brigadiers. A +similar organization of the general staff was maintained by Napoleon. At +present the general staff of the French army consists of nine marshals, +(twelve in time of war;) eighty lieutenant-generals in active service, +fifty-two in reserve, and sixty two <i>en retraite</i>—one hundred and +ninety-four in all; one hundred and sixty <i>maréchaux-de-camp</i> in active +service, eighty-six in reserve, and one hundred and ninety <i>en +retraite</i>—four hundred and thirty-six in all. The officers of the +staff-corps are: thirty colonels, thirty lieutenant-colonels, one +hundred majors, three hundred captains, and one hundred lieutenants. +Those of other European armies are organized on the same basis.</p> + +<p>It will be seen from these remarks that the organization of our own +general staff is exceedingly defective, and entirely unsuited to the +object for which it is created. We have two brigadier-generals for the +command of two brigades, and one general of division, with the title of +major-general, who acts in the fourfold capacity of general commanding +the army, lieutenant-general, general of division, and chief of staff of +the army. But as it is impossible with this number to maintain a proper +organization, the President (with the advice and consent of the Senate) +has, from time to time, increased this number to three major-generals, +and nine brigadier-generals, and numerous officers of staff with lower +grades. Nearly all these officers are detached from their several +regiments and corps, thus injuring the efficiency of regiments and +companies; and we have in our service, by this absurd mode of supplying +the defects of our system of organization by brevet rank, the anomaly +of <i>officers being generals, and at the same time not generals; of +holding certain ranks and grades, and yet not holding these ranks and +grades!</i> Let Congress do away this absurd and ridiculous system, and +establish a proper and efficient organization of the general staff, and +restore the grades of general and lieutenant-general. In the war of +1812, instead of resorting to a proper organization when an increase of +the general staff was required, we merely multiplied the number of +major-generals and generals of brigade by direct appointment, or by +conferring brevet rank. It is now conceded that there never was a more +inefficient general staff than that with which our army was cursed +during the war; and the claims of brevet rank have ever since been a +source of endless turmoils and dissatisfaction, driving from the army +many of its noblest ornaments.</p> + +<p>In the event of another war, it is to be hoped that Congress will not +again resort to the ruinous system of 1812. Possibly it may by some be +objected to the creation of generals, lieutenant-generals, &c., that it +increases the expense of the army and the number of its officers. This +need not be. The number, pay, &c., may remain the same, or nearly the +same, as at present. But by increasing the grades you avoid in a +considerable measure the difficulties of seniority claims and brevet +rank—the principal curses of our present system. If we merely increase +the number of each existing grade, giving a part of these rank above +their name and office, we merely multiply evils. But we will leave this +subject for the present, and recur to the general discussion of staff +duties.</p> + +<p>The following remarks of Jomini on the importance of the staff of an +army are worthy of attention. "A good staff," says he, "is, more than +all, indispensable to the constitution of an army; for it must be +regarded as the nursery where the commanding general can raise his +principal supports—as a body of officers whose intelligence can aid +his own. When harmony is wanting between the genius that commands, and +the talents of those who apply his conceptions, success cannot be sure; +for the most skilful combinations are destroyed by faults in execution. +Moreover, a good staff has the advantage of being more durable than the +genius of any single man; it not only remedies many evils, but it may +safely be affirmed that it constitutes for the army the best of all +safeguards. The petty interests of coteries, narrow views, and misplaced +egotism, oppose this last position: nevertheless, every military man of +reflection, and every enlightened statesman, will regard its truth as +beyond all dispute; for a well-appointed staff is to an army what a +skilful minister is to a monarchy—it seconds the views of the chief, +even though it be in condition to direct all things of itself; it +prevents the commission of faults, even though the commanding general be +wanting in experience, by furnishing him good councils. How many +mediocre men of both ancient and modern times, have been rendered +illustrious by achievements which were mainly due to their associates! +Reynier was the chief cause of the victories of Pichegru, in 1794; and +Dessoles, in like manner, contributed to the glory of Moreau. Is not +General Toll associated with the successes of Kutusof? Diebitsch with +those of Barclay and Witgenstein? Gneisenau and Muffling with those of +Blücher? Numerous other instances might be cited in support of these +assertions."</p> + +<p>"A well-established staff does not always result from a good system of +education for the young aspirants; for a man may be a good mathematician +and a fine scholar, without being a good warrior. The staff should +always possess sufficient consideration and prerogative to be sought for +by the officers of the several arms, and to draw together, in this way, +men who are already known by their aptitude for war. Engineer and +artillery officers will no longer oppose the staff, if they reflect that +it will open to them a more extensive field for immediate distinction, +and that it will eventually be made up exclusively of the officers of +those two corps who may be placed at the disposal of the commanding +general, and who are the most capable of directing the operations of +war."</p> + +<p>"At the beginning of the wars of the Revolution," says this able +historian elsewhere, "in the French army the general staff, which is +essential for directing the operations of war, had neither instruction +nor experience." The several adjutant-generals attached to the army of +Italy were so utterly incompetent, that Napoleon became prejudiced +against the existing staff-corps, and virtually destroyed it, drawing +his staff-officers from the other corps of the army. In his earlier +wars, a large portion of staff duties were assigned to the engineers; +but in his later campaigns the officers of this corps were particularly +required for the sieges carried on in Germany and Spain, and +considerable difficulty was encountered in finding suitable officers for +staff duty. Some of the defects of the first French staff-corps were +remedied in the latter part of Napoleon's career, and in 1818 it was +reorganized by Marshal Saint-Cyr, and a special school established for +its instruction.</p> + +<p>Some European nations have established regular staff-corps, from which +the vacancies in the general staff are filled; others draw all their +staff-officers from the corps of the army. A combination of the two +systems is preferred by the best judges. Jomini recommends a regular +staff-corps, with special schools for its instruction; but thinks that +its officers should be drawn, at least in part, from the other corps of +the army: the officers of engineers and artillery he deems, from their +instruction, to be peculiarly qualified for staff duty. The policy of +holding double rank at the same time in the staff and in the corps of +the army, as is done in our service, is pronounced by all competent +judges as ruinous to an army, destroying at the same time the character +of the staff and injuring the efficiency of the line.</p> + +<p>The following remarks on the character and duties of general-officers of +an army, made at the beginning of the war of 1812, are from the pen of +one of the ablest military writers this country has yet produced:—</p> + +<p>"Generals have been divided into three classes,—<i>Theorists</i>, who by +study and reflection have made themselves acquainted with all the rules +or maxims of the art they profess; <i>Martinets</i>, who have confined their +attention merely to the mechanical part of the trade; and <i>Practical +men</i>, who have no other or better guide than their own experience, in +either branch of it. This last description is in all services, excepting +our own, the most numerous, but with us gives place to a fourth class, +viz., men destitute alike of <i>theory</i> and of <i>experience</i>."</p> +<br> + +<p>"Self-respect is one thing, and presumption another. Without the former, +no man ever became a good officer; under the influence of the latter, +generals have committed great faults. The former is the necessary result +of knowledge; the latter of ignorance. A man acquainted with his duty +can rarely be placed in circumstances new, surprising, or embarrassing; +a man ignorant of his duty will always find himself constrained to +<i>guess</i>, and not knowing how to be right by <i>system</i>, will often be +wrong by <i>chance</i>."</p> + +<p>"These remarks are neither made nor offered as applying exclusively to +the science of war. They apply to all other sciences; but in these, +errors are comparatively harmless. A naturalist may amuse himself and +the public with false and fanciful theories of the earth; and a +metaphysician may reason very badly on the relations and forms of matter +and spirit, without any ill effect but to make themselves ridiculous. +Their blunders but make us merry; they neither pick pockets, nor break +legs, nor destroy lives; while those of a general bring after them evils +the most compounded and mischievous,—the slaughter of an army—the +devastation of a state—the ruin of an empire!"</p> + +<p>"In proportion as ignorance may be calamitous, the reasons for acquiring +instruction are multiplied and strengthened. Are you an <i>honest</i> man? +You will spare neither labor nor sacrifice to gain a competent knowledge +of your duty. Are you a man of <i>honor</i>? You will be careful to avoid +self-reproach. Does your bosom glow with the holy fervor of +<i>patriotism</i>? You will so accomplish yourself as to avoid bringing down +upon your country either insult or injury."</p> + +<p>"Nor are the more selfish impulses without a similar tendency. Has +<i>hunger</i> made you a soldier? Will you not take care of your bread! Is +<i>vanity</i> your principle of action? Will you not guard those mighty +blessings, your epaulets and feathers! Are you impelled by a love of +<i>glory</i> or a love of <i>power</i>? And can you forget that these coy +mistresses are only to be won by intelligence and good conduct?"</p> + +<p>"But the <i>means</i> of instruction, say you, where are they to be found? +Our standing army is but a bad and ill-organized militia, and our +militia not better than a mob. Nor have the defects in these been +supplied by Lycées, Prytanées, and Polytechnic schools. The morbid +patriotism of some, and the false economy of others, have nearly +obliterated every thing like military knowledge among us."</p> + +<p>"This, reader, is but one motive the more for reinstating it. Thanks to +the noble art of printing! you still have <i>books</i> which, if <i>studied</i>, +will teach the art of war."</p> + +<p>"<i>Books</i>! And what are they but the dreams of pedants? They may make a +Mack, but have they ever made a Xenophon, a Cæsar, a Saxe, a Frederick, +or a Bonaparte? Who would not laugh to hear the cobbler of Athens +lecturing Hannibal on the art of war?"</p> + +<p>"True; but as you are not Hannibal, listen to the cobbler. Xenophon, +Cæsar, Saxe, Frederick, and Napoleon, have all thought well of books, +and have even composed them. Nor is this extraordinary, since they are +but the depositories of maxims which genius has suggested, and +experience confirmed; since they both enlighten and shorten the road of +the traveller, and render the labor and genius of past ages tributary to +our own. <i>These</i> teach most emphatically, that the secret of successful +war is not to be found in mere <i>legs</i> and <i>arms</i>, but in the <i>head</i> that +shall direct them. If this be either ungifted by nature, or uninstructed +by study and reflection, the best plans of manœuvre and campaign avail +nothing. The two last centuries have presented many revolutions in +military character, all of which have turned on this principle. It would +be useless to enumerate these. We shall quote only the greatest and the +last—<i>The troops of Frederick!</i> How illustrious under him! How +contemptible under his successors! Yet his system was there; his double +lines of march at full distance; his oblique order of battle; his simple +lines of manœuvre in the presence of an enemy; his wise conformation of +an <i>état-major;</i>—all, in short, that distinguished his practice from +that of ordinary men, survived him; but the head that truly comprehended +and knew how to apply these, died with Frederick. What an admonition +does this fact present for self-instruction,—for unwearied +diligence,—for study and reflection! Nor should the force of this be +lessened by the consideration that, after all, unless nature should +have done her part of the work,—unless to a soul not to be shaken by +any changes of fortune—cool, collected, and strenuous—she adds a head +fertile in expedients, prompt in its decisions, and sound in its +judgments, no man can ever merit the title of a <i>general</i>."</p> + +<p>The celebrated Marshal Saxe has made the following remarks on the +necessary qualifications to form a good general. The most indispensable +one, according to his idea, is valor, without which all the rest will +prove nugatory. The next is a sound understanding with some genius: for +he must not only be courageous, but be extremely fertile in expedients. +The third is health and a robust constitution.</p> + +<p>"His mind must be capable of prompt and vigorous resources; he must have +an aptitude, and a talent at discovering the designs of others, without +betraying the slightest trace of his own intentions; he must be, +<i>seemingly</i>, communicative, in order to encourage others to unbosom, but +remain tenaciously reserved in matters that concern his own army; he +must, in a word, possess activity with judgment, be able to make a +proper choice of his officers, and never deviate from the strictest line +of military justice. Old soldiers must not be rendered wretched and +unhappy by unwarrantable promotions, nor must extraordinary talents be +kept back to the detriment of the service on account of mere rules and +regulations. Great abilities will justify exceptions; but ignorance and +inactivity will not make up for years spent in the profession."</p> + +<p>"In his deportment he must be affable, and always superior to +peevishness or ill-humor; he must not know, or at least seem not to +know, what a spirit of resentment is; and when he is under the necessity +of inflicting military chastisement, he must see the guilty punished +without compromise or foolish humanity; and if the delinquent be from +among the number of his most intimate friends, he must be doubly severe +towards the unfortunate man. For it is better, in instances of +correction, that one individual should be treated with rigor (by orders +of the person over whom he may be supposed to hold some influence) than +that an idea should go forth in the army of public justice being +sacrificed to private sentiments."</p> + +<p>"A modern general should always have before him the example of Manlius; +he must divest himself of personal sensations, and not only be convinced +himself, but convince others, that he is the organ of military justice, +and that what he does is irrevocably prescribed. With these +qualifications, and by this line of conduct, he will secure the +affections of his followers, instill into their minds all the impulses +of deference and respect; he will be feared, and consequently obeyed."</p> + +<p>"The resources of a general's mind are as various as the occasions for +the exercise of them are multiplied and checkered: he must be perfectly +master of the art of knowing how to support an army in all circumstances +and situations; how to apply its strength, or be sparing of its energy +and confidence; how to post all its different component parts, so as not +to be forced to give or receive battle in opposition to settled plans. +When once engaged, he must have presence of mind enough to grasp all the +relative points of disposition and arrangement, to seize favorable +moments for impression, and to be thoroughly conversant in the infinite +vicissitudes that occur during the heat of a battle; on a ready +possession of which its ultimate success depends. These requisites are +unquestionably manifold, and grow out of the diversity of situations and +the chance medley of events that produce their necessity."</p> + +<p>"A general to be in perfect possession of them, must on the day of +battle be divested of every thought, and be inaccessible to every +feeling, but what immediately regards the business of the day; he must +reconnoitre with the promptitude of a skilful geographer, whose eye +collects instantaneously all the relative portions of locality, and +feels his ground as it were by instinct; and in the disposition of his +troops he must discover a perfect knowledge of his profession, and make +all his arrangements with accuracy and dispatch. His order of battle +must be simple and unconfused, and the execution of his plan be as quick +as if it merely consisted in uttering some few words of command; as, +<i>the first line will attack! the second will support it! or, such a +battalion will advance and support the line.</i>"</p> + +<p>"The general officers who act under such a general must be ignorant of +their business indeed, if, upon the receipt of these orders, they should +be deficient in the immediate means of answering them, by a prompt and +ready co-operation. So that the general has only to issue out directions +according to the growth of circumstances, and to rest satisfied that +every division will act in conformity to his intentions; but if, on the +contrary, he should so far forget his situation as to become a +drill-sergeant in the heat of action, he must find himself in the case +of the fly in the fable, which perched upon a wheel, and foolishly +imagined that the motion of the carriage was influenced by its +situation. A general, therefore, ought on the day of battle to be +thoroughly master of himself, and to have both his mind and his eye +riveted to the immediate scene of action. He will by these means be +enabled to see every thing; his judgment will be unembarrassed, and he +will instantly discover all the vulnerable points of the enemy. The +instant a favorable opening offers, by which the contest may be decided, +it becomes his duty to head the nearest body of troops, and, without any +regard to personal safety, to advance against the enemy's line. [By a +ready conception of this sort, joined to a great courage, General +Dessaix determined the issue of the battle of Marengo.] It is, however, +impossible for any man to lay down rules, or to specify with accuracy +all the different ways by which a victory may be obtained. Every thing +depends upon a variety of situations, casualties of events, and +intermediate occurrences, which no human foresight can positively +ascertain, but which may be converted to good purposes by a quick eye, a +ready conception, and prompt execution."</p> + +<p>"Prince Eugene was singularly gifted with these qualifications, +particularly with that sublime possession of the mind, which constitutes +the essence of a military character."</p> + +<p>"Many commanders-in-chief have been so limited in their ideas of +warfare, that when events have brought the contest to issue, and two +rival armies have been drawn out for action, their whole attention has +devolved upon a straight alignment, an equality of step, or a regular +distance in intervals of columns. They have considered it sufficient to +give answers to questions proposed by their aides-de-camp, to send +orders in various directions, and to gallop themselves from one quarter +to another, without steadily adhering to the fluctuations of the day, or +calmly watching for an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. They +endeavor, in fact, to do every thing, and thereby do nothing. They +appear like men whose presence of mind deserts them the instant they are +taken out of the beaten track, or reduced to supply unexpected calls by +uncommon exertions; and from whence, continues the same sensible writer, +do these contradictions arise? from an ignorance of those high +qualifications without which the mere routine of duty, methodical +arrangement, and studied discipline must fall to the ground, and defeat +themselves. Many officers spend their whole lives in putting a few +regiments through a regular set of manœuvres; and having done so, they +vainly imagine that all the science of a real military man consists in +that acquirement. When, in process of time, the command of a large army +falls to their lot, they are manifestly lost in the magnitude of the +undertaking, and, from not knowing how to act as they ought, they remain +satisfied with doing what they have partially learned."</p> + +<p>"Military knowledge, as far as it regards a general or +commander-in-chief, may be divided into two parts, one comprehending +mere discipline and settled systems for putting a certain number of +rules into practice; and the other originating a sublimity of conception +that method may assist, but cannot give."</p> + +<p>"If a man be born with faculties that are naturally adapted to the +situation of a general, and if his talents do not fit the extraordinary +casualties of war, he will never rise beyond mediocrity."</p> + +<p>"It is, in fact, in war as it is in painting, or in music. Perfection in +either art grows out of innate talent, but it never can be acquired +without them. Study and perseverance may correct ideas, but no +application, no assiduity will give the life and energy of action; these +are the works of nature."</p> + +<p>"It has been my fate (observes the Marshal) to see several very +excellent colonels become indifferent generals. I have known others, who +have distinguished themselves at sieges, and in the different evolutions +of an army, lose their presence of mind and appear ignorant of their +profession, the instant they were taken from that particular line, and +be incapable of commanding a few squadrons of horse. Should a man of +this cast be put at the head of an army, he will confine himself to mere +dispositions and manœuvres; to them he will look for safety; and if +once thwarted, his defeat will be inevitable, because his mind is not +capable of other resources."</p> + +<p>"In order to obviate, in the best possible manner, the innumerable +disasters which must arise from the uncertainty of war, and the greater +uncertainty of the means that are adopted to carry it on, some general +rules ought to be laid down, not only for the government of the troops, +but for the instruction of those who have the command of them. The +principles to be observed are: that when the line or the columns +advance, their distances should be scrupulously observed; that whenever +a body of troops is ordered to charge, every proportion of the line +should rush forward with intrepidity and vigor; that if openings are +made in the first line, it becomes the duty of the second instantly to +fill up the chasms."</p> + +<p>"These instructions issue from the dictates of plain nature, and do not +require the least elucidation in writing They constitute the A, B, C of +soldiers. Nothing can be more simple, or more intelligible; so much so, +that it would be ridiculous in a general to sacrifice essential objects +in order to attend to such minutiæ. His functions in the day of battle +are confined to those occupations of the mind, by which he is enabled to +watch the countenance of the enemy; to observe his movements, and to see +with an eagle's or a king of Prussia's eye, all the relative directions +that his opponents take. It must be his business to create alarms and +suspicions among the enemy's line in one quarter, while his real +intention is to act against another; to puzzle and disconcert him in his +plans; to take advantage of the manifold openings which his feints have +produced, and when the contest is brought to issue, to be capable of +plunging with effect upon the weakest part, and carrying the sword of +death where its blow is certain of being mortal. But to accomplish these +important and indispensable points, his judgment must be clear, his mind +collected, his heart firm, and his eyes incapable of being diverted, +even for a moment, by the trifling occurrences of the day."</p> + +<p>The <i>administrative service</i> of an army is usually divided into several +distinct departments, as—</p> + +<br> +<table summary="Administrative Services"><tr> +<td width="400"> Pay department.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">Subsistence department</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">Clothing department</td</tr> +<tr><td width="400">Medical department</td> +<td width="150"> These in our service are united.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">Hospital Department</td> +<td width="150"> ditto</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">Barracks</td> +<td width="150">These in our service are combined in one called the quartermaster's department</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">Fuel</td> +<tr><td width="400">Transportation</td> +<tr><td width="400">Recruiting</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">Military Justice, or Court Martial department.</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<p>It was intended to enter into the history, organization, and use of each +of these civico-military departments of an army; but our limits are such +as to preclude any thing like so detailed a discussion as would be +necessary for a proper understanding of the subject. We therefore pass +from the staff directly to the <i>line</i> or rather the four principal arms +of an army organization.<a name="FNanchor_30_30"></a><a href="#Footnote_30_30"><sup>[30]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_30_30"></a><a href="#FNanchor_30_30">[30]</a><div class="note"><p> Of works that treat directly of staff organization and +duties, those of Grimoard, Thiébault, Boutourlin, Labaume, are esteemed +among the best. The writings of Jomini, Napoleon, Rocquancourt, +Vauchelle, Odier, Scharnhorst, also contain much valuable information on +this subject. The following list of books may be referred to for further +information on the subjects alluded to in this chapter: +</p><p> +<i>Aide-Mémoire des officiers généraux et supérieurs et des capitaines.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Précis de l'art de la guerre.</i> Jomini. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires de Napoléon.</i> Montholon et Gourgaud. +</p><p> +<i>Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires.</i> Rocquancourt. +</p><p> +<i>Cours élémentaire d'administration militaire.</i> Vauchelle. +</p><p> +<i>Droite élémentaire d'art militaire, &c.</i> Gay de Vernon. +</p><p> +<i>Annuaire militaire historique, &c.</i> Sicard. +</p><p> +<i>Cours abrégé d'administration militaire.</i> Bernier. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'administration militaire, &c.</i> Odier. +</p><p> +<i>De l'administration de l'armée d'Espagne.</i> Odier. +</p><p> +<i>De l'organization de la force armée en France.</i> Carion-Nisas. +</p><p> +<i>Elémens de l'art militaire, &c.</i> Cugnot. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur la guerre.</i> Feuquiéres. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'art militaire et d'histoire.</i> Jacquinot de Presle. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'art militaire.</i> Fallot. +</p><p> +<i>Théorie de l'officier supérieur.</i> Léorier. +</p><p> +<i>Histoire de l'administration de la guerre.</i> Audouin. +</p><p> +<i>Instructions diverses a l'usage de l'école d'application du corps royal +d'état-major.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Handbuch für offiziere, &c.</i> Scharnhorst. +</p><p> +Having omitted all discussion of the several departments of the +administrative service of an army organization, it is not deemed +necessary to give the names of books of reference on the subjects of +pay, courts-martial, medicinal and hospital departments, &c., &c.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_X"></a><h2>CHAPTER X</h2> + +<p>ARMY ORGANIZATION.<a name="FNanchor_31_31"></a><a href="#Footnote_31_31"><sup>[31]</sup></a>—INFANTRY AND CAVALRY</p> +<br> + +<p><i>Infantry</i>.—Infantry constitutes, in active service, by far the most +numerous portion of an army; in time of peace its duties are simple, +and, in most countries, of little comparative importance; but in our +country the continually recurring difficulties on the Indian frontiers, +render this arm peculiarly necessary and important, even in time of +general peace. From the nature of infantry service—no peculiar +technical knowledge (we speak of the privates and officers of the lower +grades) being so absolutely indispensable as in the other arms—the +soldier may in a short time be trained and instructed in his duties. For +this reason the ratio of infantry in a peace establishment is ordinarily +much less than in active service, this arm being always capable of great +expansion when occasion requires.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_31_31"></a><a href="#FNanchor_31_31">[31]</a><div class="note"><p> In discussing our own organization, it may be well to +compare it with the armies of some of the principal nations of Europe. +Our limits will not allow us to go very much into details, nor to make a +comparison with more than a single European power. We shall select +France, inasmuch as her army organization has served as a model for the +rest of Europe, and is still, in some respects, superior to most +others.</p></div> + +<p>In the early periods of society, and in countries where horses abounded, +men have usually preferred fighting on horseback; but civilization and a +more thorough acquaintance with war has always increased the importance +of infantry.</p> + +<p>The Hebrews, and also the Egyptians, employed this arm almost +exclusively. The Asiatics generally employed both infantry and cavalry, +but with the Greeks the <i>infantry</i> was the favorite arm. Even their +kings and generals usually fought on foot. The Romans conquered the +world mainly with their infantry. This arm was also considered of the +greatest importance by the ancient Germans and Gauls; but the migration +of the Huns and other Mongolic tribes mounted on small and fleet horses, +and the acquaintance formed by the Franks of northern Spain with the +Moors, who were mounted on beautiful horses from Arabia and the plateau +of Asia, introduced a taste for cavalry in western Europe. This taste +was still further cultivated under the feudal system, for the knights +preferred fighting on horseback to serving on foot. During the crusades +the infantry fell into disrepute. But the invention of gunpowder changed +the whole system of warfare, and restored to infantry its former +importance. </p> + +<p>"The Romans," says Napoleon in his Memoirs, "had two infantries; the +first, lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second, +heavily armed, bore a short sword. After the invention of powder two +species of infantry were still continued: the arquebusiers, who were +lightly armed, and intended to observe and harass the enemy; and the +pikemen, who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry. During the +hundred and fifty years which have elapsed since Vauban banished lances +and pikes from all the infantry of Europe, substituting for them the +firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly armed...... +There has been since that time, properly speaking, only one kind of +infantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it was +by way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion being +composed of nine companies, one picked company did not appear +sufficient. If the Emperor Napoleon created companies of voltigeurs +armed like dragoons, it was to substitute them for those companies of +chasseurs. He composed them of men under five feet in height, in order +to bring into use that class of the conscription which measured from +four feet ten inches to five feet; and having been until that time +exempt, made the burden of conscription fall more heavily on the other +classes. This arrangement served to reward a great number of old +soldiers, who, being under five feet in height, could not enter into the +companies of grenadiers, who on account of their bravery, deserved to +enter into a picked company: it was a powerful incentive to emulation to +bring the giants and pigmies into competition. Had there been men of +different colors in the armies of the emperor, he would have composed +companies of blacks and companies of whites: in a country where there +were cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might be made of companies of +cyclops, and others of hunchbacks."</p> + +<p>"In 1789, the French army as composed of regiments of the line and +battalions of chasseurs; the chasseurs of the Cevennes, the Vivarais, +the Alps, of Corsica, and the Pyrenees, who at the Revolution formed +half brigades of light infantry; but the object was not to have two +different sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructed +alike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited by +the men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of the +garde-chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers +of the Alps and Pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the North, +they were always detached, in preference, for climbing heights or +scouring a forest; when these men were placed in line, in a battle, they +served very well as a battalion of the line, because they had received +the same instructions, and were armed and disciplined in the same +manner. Every power occasionally raises, in war-time, irregular corps, +under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of foreign +deserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction; +but that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. There is and can be +but one. If the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it is +not light-armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed +soldiers, or battalions armed with swords; for all the infantry of +Europe serve at times as light troops."</p> + +<p>Most European nations, for reasons probably similar to those of +Napoleon, keep up this nominal division of <i>infantry of the line</i> and +<i>light infantry</i>; but both are usually armed and equipped alike, and +both receive the same organization and instruction. The light infantry +are usually made up from the class of men, or district of country, which +furnishes the greatest number of riflemen and sharpshooters. In France, +the light infantry is best supplied by the hunters of the Ardennes, the +Vosges, and the Jura districts; in Austria, by the Croates and Tyrolese; +in Prussia, by the "försters," or woodsmen; and in Russia, by the +Cossacks. Our own western hunters, with proper discipline, make the best +tirailleurs in the world.</p> + +<p>Light infantry is usually employed to protect the flanks of the main +army, to secure outposts, to reconnoitre the ground, secure avenues of +approach, deceive the enemy by demonstrations, and secure the repose of +the other troops by patrolling parties. They usually begin a battle, and +afterwards take their places in the line, either on the flanks, or in +the intervals between the larger bodies. The battle of Jena furnishes a +good example of the use of French light infantry; and at the battle of +Waterloo, the Prussian tirailleurs were exceedingly effective in +clearing the ground for the advance of Blücher's heavy columns. The +attack of Floh-hug by Augereau, of Vierzehn Heilegen by Suchet, of +Iserstaedt by Desjardins, are models well worthy of study.</p> + +<p>The infantry of the line acts in masses, and, on the field of battle, +constitutes the principal fighting force. Its formations and the manner +of engaging it have already been discussed under the head of tactics.</p> + +<p>The importance of infantry is due, in considerable part, to the fact +that it can be used everywhere—in mountains or on plains, in woody or +open countries, in cities or in fields, on rivers or at sea, in the +redoubt or in the attack of the breach; the infantry depends only on +itself, whereas the other arms must depend in a considerable degree on +the efficiency of their materials and the will and strength of brute +force; and when the snows of Russia or the deserts of Egypt deprive +their animals of the means of sustenance, they become perfectly useless.</p> + +<p>Foot-soldiers, in olden times, were armed with a spear and sometimes +with a sword, arrows, lance, and sling. At present they are armed with +a gun and bayonet, and sometimes with a sword. In some European +services, a few of the foot-soldiers are armed with a pike. Some of the +light troops used as sharpshooters carry the rifle, but this weapon is +useless for the great body of infantry. The short-sword is more useful +as an instrument for cutting branches, wood, &c., than for actual +fighting. The infantry have no defensive covering, or at least very +little. The helmet or cap serves to protect the head, and the shoulders +are somewhat defended by epaulets. It has often been proposed in modern +times to restore the ancient defensive armor of the foot-soldier; but +this would be worse than useless against fire-arms, and moreover would +destroy the efficiency of these troops by impeding their movements. The +strength of this arm depends greatly upon its discipline; for if calm +and firm, a mass of infantry in column or in square is almost +impenetrable.</p> + +<p>The bayonet was introduced by Vauban in the wars of Louis XIV., and +after the years 1703 and '4, the pike was totally suppressed in the +French army. This measure was warmly opposed by Marshal Montesquieu, and +the question was discussed by him and Marshal Vauban with an ability and +learning worthy of these great men. The arguments of Vauban were deemed +most conclusive, and his project was adopted by the king.</p> + +<p>This question has been agitated by military writers in more recent +times, Puységur advocating the musket, and Folard and Lloyd contending +in favor of restoring the pike. Even in our own service, so late as the +war of 1812, a distinguished general of the army strongly urged the use +of the pike, and the fifteenth (and perhaps another regiment) was armed +and equipped in part as <i>pikemen</i>; but experience soon proved the +absurdity of the project.</p> + +<p>Napoleon calls the infantry the <i>arm of battles</i> and the <i>sinews of the +army</i>. But if it be acknowledged, that, next to the talent of the +general-in-chief, the infantry is the first instrument of victory, it +must also be confessed that it finds a powerful support in the cavalry, +artillery, and engineers, and that without these it would often be +compromised, and could gain but a half success.</p> + +<p>The French infantry is divided into one hundred regiments of three +battalions each, a battalion being composed of seven companies. There +are also several other battalions of chasseurs, zuaves, &c., being +organized especially for service in Africa, and composed in part of +native troops.</p> + +<p>In our own army we have eight regiments of infantry, each regiment +forming a single battalion of ten companies. The flank companies are +intended for light infantry.</p> + +<p>In all properly organized armies the infantry constitutes from +three-fourths to four-fifths of the entire active force in the field, +and from two-thirds to three-fourths, say about seven-tenths of the +entire military establishment. In time of peace this proportion may be +slightly diminished.</p> + +<p><i>Cavalry.</i>—The use of cavalry is probably nearly as old as war itself. +The Egyptians had cavalry before the time of Moses, and the Israelites +often encountered cavalry in their wars with their neighbors, though +they made no use of this arm themselves until the time of Solomon.</p> + +<p>The Greeks borrowed their cavalry from the Asiatics, and especially from +the Persians, who, according to Xenophon, held this arm in great +consideration. After the battle of Platea, it was agreed by assembled +Greece that each power should furnish one horseman to every ten +foot-soldiers. In Sparta the poorest were selected for this arm, and the +cavalry marched to combat without any previous training. At Athens the +cavalry service was more popular, and they formed a well-organized corps +of twelve hundred horsemen. At Thebes also this arm had consideration in +the time of Epaminondas. But the cavalry of Thessaly was the most +renowned, and both Philip and Alexander drew their mounted troops from +that country.</p> + +<p>The Romans had made but little progress in this arm when they +encountered the Thessalians, who fought in the army of Pyrrhus. They +then increased their cavalry, but it was not numerous till after their +wars with the Carthaginians. Scipio organized and disciplined the Roman +cavalry like that of the Numidians. This arm was supplied from the ranks +of the richest citizens, and afterwards formed an order intermediary +between the Senate and the people, under the name of <i>knights</i>.</p> + +<p>At a later period, the cavalry of the Gauls was particularly good. The +Franks were without cavalry when they made their first irruption into +Gaul. Under the reign of Childeric I. we see for the first time the +"cavaliers francs" figure as a part of the national forces. At the +battle of Tours the cavalry and infantry were in the proportion of one +to five, and under Pepin and Charlemagne their numbers were nearly +equal. Under Charles the Bald armies were composed entirely of cavalry, +and during the middle ages the knights disdained the foot service, and +fought only on horseback.</p> + +<p>After the introduction of artillery, cavalry was still employed, though +to little advantage. Gustavus Adolphus was the first to perceive the +real importance of this arm in modern warfare, and he used it with great +success. But it was left for Seidlitz to perfect it under the direction +of Frederick the Great.</p> + +<p>Marshal Saxe very justly remarked, that cavalry is the "<i>arme du +moment,</i>" for in almost every battle there are moments when a decisive +charge of cavalry will gain the victory, but if not made at the instant +it may be too late. The efficiency of cavalry depends upon the moral +impression which it makes on the enemy, and is greater in proportion to +the size of the mass, and the rapidity of its motion. This last quality +enables a commander to avail himself immediately of a decisive moment, +when the enemy exposes a weak point, or when disorder appears in his +ranks. But this requires a bold and active spirit, which shrinks not +from responsibility, and is able to avail itself with quickness and +decision of every opportunity. If it be remembered that it is essential +that this <i>coup d'oeil</i>, so rare and so difficult to acquire, be +accompanied by a courage and vigor of execution which nothing can shake, +we shall not be astonished that history furnishes so few good cavalry +generals, and that this arm so seldom does such execution as it did +under Frederick and Napoleon, with Seidlitz and Murat as commanders.</p> + +<p>The soldier gains great <i>velocity</i> by the use of the horse in war; but +in other respects he is the loser. The great expense and care required +of the cavalier to support his horse; the difficulty experienced in +surmounting ordinary obstacles, and in using his fire-arms to advantage, +are all prejudicial to success.</p> + +<p>The unequal size of the horse, and the great diversity in his strength +and breed, have rendered it necessary to divide this arm into <i>light</i> +and <i>heavy</i> cavalry, and a mixed class called <i>dragoons</i>. The heavy +cavalry is commonly used in masses where <i>force</i> is mainly requisite; +the lighter troops are used singly and in small detachments, where +rapidity of movement is most desired.</p> + +<p>The <i>heavy</i> cavalry are divided into carabiniers, cuirassiers, and +sometimes lancers. The two latter are frequently united, the cuirassiers +being armed with the lance. These troops are seldom used for scouts, +vanguards, and convoys; but are frequently employed to sustain the light +cavalry. Their main duty is "<i>to appear on the field of battle and make +the decisive charges</i>."</p> + +<p>The <i>light</i> cavalry is composed of chasseurs, or troopers, hussars, and +lancers. The latter, when composed of large men and mounted on heavy +horses, are attached to the heavy cavalry.</p> + +<p>The <i>dragoons</i> were formerly a mixed body of horse and foot, but it +being found impossible to unite these two distinct arms in one, and the +attempt having destroyed the usefulness of the body to act in either +capacity, the term was applied to a mixed kind of cavalry between the +heavy and the light horse. In more recent wars they have also been +instructed as infantry and employed as foot-soldiers, till horses could +be found in the enemy's country with which to mount them. But we believe +there is no instance in more modern wars in which they have been +employed at the same time in both capacities.</p> + +<p>This term is, very improperly, applied to all our cavalry; and some of +the congressional wiseacres have recently experimented on one of our +so-called regiments of <i>dragoons</i>, by dismounting it one year, selling +its horses at auction, and changing its arms and equipments, and again, +the next year, purchasing new horses, arms, and equipments for +remounting it; and all this for <i>economy!</i></p> + +<p>The Roman cavalry at first wore a round shield and helmet, the rest of +their body being nearly uncovered. Their arms were a sword and long thin +javelin, or lance, with an iron head. They afterwards reduced the shield +to a much smaller size, and made square, and their lance was greatly +increased in size and length, and armed at both ends. In other respects +they were armed in the same way as infantry. The use of the lance and +the shield at the same time, of course rendered both nearly worthless. +The Roman cavalry was superior to that of their enemies, except, +perhaps, the light cavalry of the Parthians.</p> + +<p>The heavy armor which was sometimes worn by the ancients, like the <i>gens +d'armes</i> of the middle ages, rendered them greatly inferior to infantry +in a close engagement. Tigranes, king of Armenia, brought an army of one +hundred and fifty thousand horse into the field, against the Roman +general Lucullus, who had only about six thousand horse and fifteen +thousand foot. But the Armenian cavalry, called <i>cataphratti</i> were so +overburdened with armor, that when they fell from their horses they +could scarcely move or make any use of their arms. They were routed by a +mere handful of Roman infantry.</p> + +<p>The modern cavalry is much lighter, and, by dispensing with armor, +shields, &c., it can move with much greater rapidity. A modern cavalry +horse carries a weight of from two hundred and fifty to three hundred +pounds, viz.:</p> + +<table summary="Cavalry Weights"> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="100">Heavy Cavalry</td> +<td width="100">Light Cavalry</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">The rider</td> +<td width="100"> 160</td> +<td width="100"> 140 lbs.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">His arms and equipments</td> +<td width="100">55</td> +<td width="100"> 40</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">His horse equipments</td> +<td width="100"> 60</td> +<td width="100"> 45</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Two days' rations of provisions and grain</td> +<td width="100"><u>25</u></td> +<td width="100"><u>25</u></td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="100">300</td> +<td width="100">250</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<p>The horse moves per minute—</p> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">At a walk, from 110 yards to 120</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">At a trot, 220 240</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">At a gallop, 330 360</span><br> +<br> + +<p>But on a march over the ordinary average of good and bad roads, cavalry +will walk about one hundred yards per minute, and at an easy trot, two +hundred.</p> + +<p>An ordinary day's march for cavalry is about thirty miles, but on a +forced march this arm can march fifty miles within the twenty-four +hours. A single horseman, or a small detachment, can easily exceed this +distance.</p> + +<p>"Light cavalry," says Napoleon, in his Memoirs, "ought to reconnoitre +and watch the motions of the enemy, considerably in advance of the army; +it is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and +protected especially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation +have always existed between the infantry and cavalry: light cavalry is +indispensable to the vanguard, the rearguard, and the wings of the army; +it, therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow the +movements of any particular corps of infantry. It would be more natural +to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependence +upon the infantry, with which it has no connection; but it should be +independent of both."</p> + +<p>"If the light cavalry is to form vanguards, it must be organized into +squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manœuvring; for +that is all vanguards and rearguards do: they pursue or retreat by +platoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, or +change their position with rapidity for the purpose of outfronting a +whole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a vanguard, of inferior +numbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delays +the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the +infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions, +and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations. The art of a +general of the vanguard, or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a +defeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to +spend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics point out +the methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary +for cavalry than for infantry, and in the vanguard, or the rear-guard, +than in any other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we saw in +1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the light troops of Maria +Theresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent +organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine that +such troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons +of Latour, or to the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideas +of things; but neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever +formed the vanguards of the Austrian and Russian armies; because to +speak of a vanguard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops which +manœuvre. The Russians considered a regiment of Cossacks who had been +trained worth three regiments untrained. Every thing about these troops +is despicable, except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, +powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable; he is born +on horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is in the field, what the +Bedouin is in the desert, or the Barbet in the Alps; he never enters a +house, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset, +that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly +have observed him."</p> + +<p>"Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because they were better +armed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pairs of +pistols, a <i>tromblon</i>, a carbine, a helmet with a visor, a coat of mail, +several horses, and several men on foot to attend them. But a hundred +French did not fear a hundred Mamelukes; three hundred were more than a +match for an equal number; and one thousand would beat fifteen hundred: +so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Murat, +Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to the +Mamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of +outfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the +right and left; the Mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the +wings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them; +they were always broken."</p> + +<p>"The duty of a vanguard, or a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing +or retiring, but in manœuvring. It should be composed of a good light +cavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by +excellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the +troops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, +should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each according +to his station. An undisciplined troop would only embarrass the +advanced guard."</p> + +<p>"It is admitted that for facility in manœuvring, the squadron should +consist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons +should have a superior officer."</p> + +<p>"It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses: +dragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed +with straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the +heavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-muskets, with +bayonets: should have the <i>shakot</i> of the infantry, pantaloons covering +the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough +to be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry of +all descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know how +to manœuvre on foot. Three thousand light cavalry, or three thousand +cuirassiers, should not suffer themselves to be stopped by a thousand +infantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry; and +three thousand dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack two thousand +infantry, should the latter, favored by their position, attempt to stop +them.</p> + +<p>"Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, attached great importance +to dragoons, and used them successfully. The dragoons gained great glory +in Italy, in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the campaigns +of 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprung up against them. The +divisions of dragoons had been mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be +embarked without horses for the expedition of England, in order to serve +on foot until they should be mounted in that country. General Baraguay +d'Hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equipped +with gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number of +recruits, whom he exercised in infantry manœuvres alone. These were no +longer cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of 1806 on foot, +until after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on horses taken +from the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. +These combined circumstances injured the dragoons; but in 1813 and 1814 +their divisions acquired honor in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoons +are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the vanguard, the +rear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for +van and rearguards: they should never be employed in this service but +when it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war."</p> + +<p>Napoleon further recommends that light cavalry be divided into two +kinds, chasseurs or troopers, and light horse; and the heavy to be +composed of dragoons and cuirassiers; the troopers to be mounted on +horses of 4 ft 6 in.; light cavalry on horses of 4 ft. 7 or 8 in.; +dragoons on horses of 4 ft. 9 in.; and cuirassiers on horses of 4 ft. 10 +or 11 in.; which employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops.</p> + +<p>All cavalry must receive the same instruction; and all should be +capable, in case of need, of performing any of the duties of mounted +troops. The shock is the principal effect produced by this arm; +therefore, the greater the velocity the greater must be this effect, +provided the troops can be kept in mass. But it is found, by experience, +that it is impossible to preserve them in line when put to the height of +their speed. The best authorities therefore prefer, as we have said +elsewhere, the charge at the trot, or at any rate the gallop should not +be taken up till within a very short distance of the enemy. The charge +of a compact mass at a trot is much greater than that of a wavering one +at a gallop.</p> + +<p>On the field of battle the cavalry of the line is considered as the arm +of the shock, to break through any corps that may be in opposition; but +it is unable of itself to resist a shock, and therefore should on no +account wait to receive the charge of another body of mounted troops. It +was on this account that Frederick directed his cavalry officers, under +the severest penalties, never to receive a charge, but always to meet +the attacking force half way. This is the only mode of preventing +defeat.</p> + +<p>A good infantry can always sustain itself against the charges of +cavalry. At the battle of Auerstedt, in 1806, Davoust ordered the +divisions of Gudin to form squares to resist the Prussian cavalry, +which, by means of a fog, had gained a most advantageous position. +Blücher led his cavalry in repeated and impetuous charges, but all was +in vain; the French infantry presented a front of iron. At the combat of +Krasnoi, in 1812, the cavalry of Grouchy, Nansonty, and Bordesoult, +attacked and overthrew the dragoons of Clarkof, but the Russian infantry +under Neveroffskoi sustained itself against the repeated charges of +vastly superior numbers of these French horse. At the battle of Molwitz, +the grenadiers sustained the charges of the enemy's cavalry, although +the cavalry of the great Frederick had already been completely +overthrown.</p> + +<p>But when the infantry is engaged with the infantry of the enemy, the +charges of cavalry are generally successful, and sometimes decide the +fate of the battle, as was the case at Rosbach, Zornsdorf, Wurtsburg, +Marengo, Eylau, Borodino, &c.</p> + +<p>Cavalry may also be very efficacious against infantry in wet weather, +when the rain or snow renders it impossible for the foot soldiers to use +their fire-arms to advantage, as was the case with the corps of +Augereau, at Eylau, and with the Austrian left, at the battle of +Dresden. Again, if the infantry be previously weakened, or thrown into +disorder by the fire of batteries. The charge of the Russian cavalry at +Hohenfriedberg, in 1745, is a remarkable example of this kind.</p> + +<p>Cavalry should always be immediately sustained in its efforts either by +infantry or other bodies of horse; for as soon as the charge is made, +the strength of this arm is for a time exhausted, and, if immediately +attacked, defeat becomes inevitable. The charge of the cavalry of Ney on +Prince Hohenlohe at the battle of Jena, and of the French horse on Gossa +at Leipsic, are fine examples of the successful charges of cavalry when +properly sustained. Kunnersdorf and Waterloo are examples of the +disastrous consequences of leaving such charges without support.</p> + +<p>The choice of the field of battle is sometimes such as to render cavalry +almost useless. Such was the case at the battle of Cassano, between the +Duke of Vendome and the Prince Eugene. The field was so cut up by the +Adda and the canals of Rittorto and Pendina, that Prince Eugene could +make no use of his horse. If, when master of the bridge of Rittorto, he +had been able to charge the French with a body of cavalry, there had +been no doubt of his complete success.</p> + +<p>After a battle, and in the pursuit of a flying enemy, cavalry is +invaluable. If Napoleon had possessed a suitable number of mounted +troops, with an able commander, at the battles of Lutzen and Ligny, the +results of these victories had been decisive; whereas they were really +without consequence. On the other hand, the Prussian army in 1806, after +the battle of Jena, and Napoleon's army in 1815 at Waterloo, were +completely cut to pieces by the skilful use of cavalry in the pursuit of +a defeated and dispirited foe.</p> + +<p>The want of good cavalry was severely felt in the war of the American +Revolution. Had Washington possessed a few good squadrons of horse, his +surprise and defeat in the lines of Brooklyn, and the consequent loss of +New York, had never taken place. The efficient employment of a few good +squadrons of cavalry might readily have prevented the defeat at +Bladensburg, and the loss of the capitol, in 1814.</p> + +<p>In a well-organized army, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to +one-sixth of the infantry, according to the nature of the war.<a name="FNanchor_32_32"></a><a href="#Footnote_32_32"><sup>[32]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_32_32"></a><a href="#FNanchor_32_32">[32]</a><div class="note"><p> To gain a competent knowledge of the duties connected with +the two arms of service mentioned in this chapter, the officer should +make himself thoroughly acquainted with Scott's System of Infantry +Tactics, for the United States' Infantry, or at least with Major +Cooper's abridged edition of Infantry Tactics, and with the system of +Cavalry Tactics, adopted in our army; also with the directions for the +use of these two arms in a campaign, and their employment on the +battle-field, given in the writings of Jomini, Decker, Okouneff, +Rocquancourt, and Jacquinot de Presle.</p></div> + +<p>The following books may be referred to for further information +respecting the history, organization, use, and instruction of infantry +and cavalry:—</p> + +<p><i>Essai général de tactique.</i> Guibert.</p> + +<p><i>Considérations générales sur l'infanterie française,</i> par un général en +rétraite. A work of merit.</p> + +<p><i>De l'infanterie,</i> par l'auteur de l'histoire de l'expédition de Russie.</p> + +<p><i>Histoire de la guerre de la peninsule.</i> Foy. This work contains many +interesting and valuable remarks on the French and English systems of +tactics, and particularly on the tactics of Infantry.</p> + +<p><i>Cours d'art et d'histoire militaires.</i> Jacquinot de Presle.</p> + +<p><i>Art de la guerre.</i> Rogniat.</p> + +<p><i>Instruction destinée aux troupes légères,</i> &c., redigée sur une +instruction de Frederick II. à ses officiers.</p> + +<p><i>English Infantry Regulations.</i></p> + +<p><i>Ordonnance</i> (French) <i>pour l'exercice et les manœuvres de +l'infanterie,</i> par le commission de manœuvres.</p> + +<p><i>Aide-mémoires des officiers généraux et supérieurs, et des capitaines.</i></p> + +<p><i>Essai sur l'histoire générale de l'art militaire.</i> Carion-Nisas.</p> + +<p><i>Histoire de la milice française.</i> Daniel.</p> + +<p><i>Cours élémentaire d'art et d'histoire militaires.</i> Rocquancourt.</p> + +<p><i>Traité élémentaire d'art militaire,</i> &c. Gay de Vernon.</p> + +<p><i>Introduction à l'étude de l'art de la guerre.</i> La Roche-Amyou.</p> + +<p><i>Tactique des trois armes.</i> Decker.</p> + +<p><i>Examen raisonné des trois armes,</i> &c. Okouneff.</p> + +<p>The last two are works of great merit. The writings of Okouneff, +however, are very diffuse.</p> + +<p><i>Instruction pour le service de l'infanterie légère.</i> Guyard.</p> + +<p><i>Instruction de l'infanterie,</i> &c. Schauenbourg.</p> + +<p><i>Traité de tactique.</i> Ternay et Koch.</p> + +<p><i>Mécanism des manœuvres de guerre de l'infanterie polonaise.</i> +Vroniecki.</p> + +<p><i>Traité sur l'infanterie légère.</i> Beurmann.</p> + +<p><i>English Cavalry Regulations.</i></p> + +<p><i>Ordonnance</i> (French) <i>sur l'exercice et les évolutions de la +cavalerie.</i></p> + +<p><i>Les troupes à cheval de France,</i> &c. De Bourge.</p> + +<p><i>Avant-postes de cavalerie légère.</i> Brack. The author served with +distinction under Lassale, Colbert, Maison, Pujol, and Excelmans.</p> + +<p><i>Réflexions sur l'emploi de la cavalerie,</i> &c. Caraman.</p> + +<p><i>Observations sur l'ordonnance, &c., de la cavalerie.</i> Dejean.</p> + +<p><i>Tactique de la cavalerie.</i> Itier.</p> + +<p><i>Eléments de tactique pour la cavalerie,</i> par Mottin de la Balme. A work +of rare merit.</p> + +<p><i>De l'emploi de la cavalerie à la guerre.</i> Schauenbourg.</p> + +<p><i>Rémarques sur la cavalerie.</i> Warnery. This work has long enjoyed a high +reputation among the cavalry officers of the European services. The +Paris edition is enriched with notes by a French general officer.</p> + +<p><i>Nachrichten und Betrachtungen über die Thaten und Schicksale der +Reiterei,</i> &c. This work discusses the operations of cavalry in the +campaigns of Frederick the Great and of Napoleon, down to the battle of +Lutzen in 1813.</p> + +<p><i>Examen du livret provisoire,</i> &c. Marbot.</p> + +<p><i>Le Spectateur Militaire,</i> contains many essays by cavalry officers on +the various questions connected with the organization and use of this +arm.</p> + +<p><i>Die Gefechtslehre der beiden verbundenen Waffen-Kavallerie und +reitenden Artillerie.</i> Decker.</p> + +<p><i>Manuel de l'officier.</i> Ruhle de Lilienstern.</p> + +<p><i>Aide-mémoire, à l'usage des officiers de cavalerie.</i></p> + +<p><i>Journal de l'infanterie et de la cavalerie.</i></p> + +<p><i>Traité de tactique pour les officiers d'infanterie et de cavalerie.</i></p> + +<p><i>Histoire des exploits et des vicissitudes de la cavalerie prussienne.</i> +Coutz.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_XI"></a><h2>CHAPTER XI.</h2> + +<p>ARMY ORGANIZATION.—ARTILLERY.</p> +<br> + +<p><i>Artillery</i>.—Previous to the invention of gunpowder in the thirteenth +century, the machines of war were divided between two classes of +military men, the engineers (<i>engignours</i>, as they were called in the +middle ages) and the artillery, (<i>artilliers</i>, as they were formerly +called,) the latter being particularly charged with the management of +the lighter and more portable projectile machines, such as the balistas +and arco-balistas, which were used for throwing different kinds of +arrows—<i>flêches, viretons, carreaux, matras</i>, &c., while the former +managed the battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c. And, indeed, for a +long time after the discovery of gunpowder, this distinction was kept +up, and the artillery retained all the more ordinary projectile +machines, while the engineers constructed and managed the more ponderous +weapons of attack and defence. But the new artillery was gradually +introduced, without, however, immediately displacing the old, and there +were for a time, if we may be allowed the expression, <i>two</i> artilleries, +the one employing the old projectile machines, and the other those of +the new invention. The latter were called <i>canoniers</i>, to distinguish +them from the former, who still retained the name of <i>artilliers</i>.</p> + +<p>The first cannon were invented in the early part of the fourteenth +century, or, perhaps, among the Arabs as early as the middle of the +thirteenth century, but they were not much known in Europe till about +1350. Cannon are said to have been employed by the Moors as early as +1249, and by the French in 1338. The English used artillery at the +battle of Crecy in 1346. Both cannon and the ancient projectile machines +were employed at the siege of Aiguillon in 1339, at Zara in 1345, at +Rennes in 1357, and at Naples in 1380. At this last siege the ancient +balista was employed to throw into the castle of Naples barrels of +infectious matter and mutilated limbs of prisoners of war. We read of +the same thing being done in Spain at a later period.</p> + +<p>Cannon in France were at first called <i>bombards</i> and <i>couleuverines</i>, +but were afterwards named from certain figures marked on them, such as +<i>serpentines, basilisks, scorpions,</i>&c. In the infancy of the art they +were made small, weighing only from twenty to fifty pounds, and were +mounted on small moveable carriages. This species of fire-arms became +quite numerous about the beginning of the fifteenth century. They were +followed by heavier pieces, used in the attack and defence of towns. +This siege artillery continued to be increased in dimensions till, +towards the latter part of the fifteenth century, they reached such an +enormous size as to be almost useless as a military machine. Louis XI. +had an immense piece constructed at Tours, in 1770, which, it was said, +carried a ball from the Bastille to Charenton, (about six miles!) Its +caliber was that of five hundred pounds. It was intended for experiment, +and burst on the second discharge. The famous culverin of Bolduc was +said to carry a ball from that city to Bommel. The culverin of Nancy, +made in 1598, was more than twenty-three feet in length. There is now an +ancient cannon in the arsenal at Metz of about this length, which +carries a ball of one hundred and forty pounds. Cannon balls were found +at Paris as late as 1712, weighing near two hundred pounds, and from +twelve to sixteen inches in diameter. At the siege of Constantinople in +1453, there was a famous metallic bombard which threw stone balls of an +incredible size; at the siege of Bourges in 1412, a cannon was used +which, it was said, threw stone balls "of the size of mill-stones." The +Gantois, under Arteville, made a bombard fifty feet in length, whose +report was heard at a distance of ten leagues!</p> + +<p>The first cannon were made of wood, and covered with sheet-iron, or +embraced by iron rings: longitudinal bars of iron were afterwards +substituted for the wooden form. Towards the end of the fourteenth +century, brass, tin, copper, wrought and cast iron, were successively +used for this purpose. The bores of the pieces were first made in a +conical shape, and it was not until a much later period that the +cylindrical form was introduced.</p> + +<p>In the wars between the Spaniards and Moors in the latter part of the +fifteenth century, very great use was made of artillery in sieges and +battles. Ferdinand the Catholic had at this time, probably, a larger +artillery train than any other European power. The Spanish cannon, +generally very large, were composed of iron bars about two inches in +breadth, held together by bolts and rings of the same metal. The pieces +were firmly attached to their carriages, and incapable of either +horizontal or vertical movement. The balls thrown by them were usually +of marble, though sometimes of iron. Many of the pieces used at the +siege of Baza, in 1486, are still to be seen in that city, and also the +cannon balls then in use. Some of the latter are fourteen inches in +diameter, and weigh one hundred and seventy-five pounds. The length of +the cannon was about twelve feet. These dimensions are a proof of a +slight improvement in this branch of military science, which was, +nevertheless, still in its infancy. The awkwardness of artillery at this +period may be judged of by its slowness of fire. At the siege of +Zeteuel, in 1407, five "bombards," as the heavy pieces of ordnance were +then called, were able to discharge only forty shot in the course of a +day; and it is noticed as a remarkable circumstance at the siege of +Albahar, that two batteries discharged one hundred and forty balls in +the course of the twenty-four hours!</p> + +<p>In the Italian wars between France and Spain, in the beginning of the +sixteenth century, the difficulty of moving the heavy cannon then in use +was so great that only a very small number of pieces were brought upon +the battle-field. At the battle of Cerignola, in 1503, the number of +cannon in the French army was only thirteen. Indeed, during the greater +part of this century, four or five pieces were considered sufficient for +an ordinary army in the field, and many agreed to the doctrine of +Machiavelli, that the only legitimate use of artillery was in the attack +and defence of places. But in the wars of Henry IV. of France, this arm +of service was again increased, and the troops which this king destined +against the house of Austria had an artillery train of fifty pieces. +Great improvements were also made about this period in the manufacture +of powder, and all kinds of fire-arms. Sully gave greater development +to this arm of service, improving its materials, and increasing its +efficiency. Then, as at most other periods, the French were in advance +of most other nations in artillery.</p> + +<p>It was near the close of the sixteenth or the beginning of the +seventeenth century, that the heavy and ill-shaped artillery began to +give place to more wieldy and useful pieces. A certain M. de Linar +demonstrated, in the latter part of the sixteenth century, that cannon +twelve feet in length would give a greater range than those seventeen +feet in length, the calibre being the same; but some years elapsed +before advantage was taken of this discovery. In 1624, Gustavus Adolphus +caused experiments to be made to verify this point, and, on being +convinced of its truth, caused his batteries to be furnished with +shorter and lighter pieces. This great king introduced, about the same +time, a new and lighter kind of artillery, made of sheet iron and +leather. Each piece had its chamber formed of thin metal and embraced by +strong iron rings; over these was placed a form of hardened leather, +which was again encircled with rings and held compactly together. These +pieces were mounted on light carriages, so that two men could easily +manœuvre them. It was said that they would fire from eight to ten +rounds without requiring repairs. Gustavus made use of them in all his +military operations from 1628 to the time of his death. They did him +excellent service on numerous occasions; being so very light they could +be easily transported, and, on the field of battle, their movements +could be made to conform to the movements of his troops.</p> + +<p>As cannon and small arms were gradually introduced into general use, +various inventions and improvements were proposed and introduced from +time to time. Cannon were constructed with two or more barrels; some +were arranged for being loaded in the breech, and others at the mouth of +the piece; two pieces were sometimes connected by horizontal timbers, +which revolved about a vertical axis, so that the recoil of one piece +would bring the other into battery; and various other arrangements of +this description, which have recently been revived and some of them +patented as new inventions. The small arms employed at this period were +much the same as those used at the present day, except the matchlock, +which afterwards gave place to flint-locks. Arms of this description +were sometimes made to be loaded at the breach, and guns with two, +three, and even as many as eight barrels, were at one time in fashion. +In the <i>Musée de l'Artillerie</i> at Paris may be found many arms of this +kind, which have been reproduced in this country and England as new +inventions. In this Museum are two ancient pieces, invented near the end +of the sixteenth or the beginning of the seventeenth century, which very +nearly correspond with <i>Colt's patent</i>, with the single exception of the +lock!<a name="FNanchor_33_33"></a><a href="#Footnote_33_33"><sup>[33]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_33_33"></a><a href="#FNanchor_33_33">[33]</a><div class="note"><p> It is not to be inferred that the modern <i>improvements</i> +(as they are called) are copied from the more ancient <i>inventions</i>. Two +men of different ages, or even of the same age, sometimes fall upon the +same identical discovery, without either's borrowing from the other.</p></div> + +<p>The <i>materiel</i> of artillery employed in modern warfare is divided into +two general classes: 1st. <i>Siege Artillery</i>, or such as is employed in +the attack and defence of places. 2d. <i>Field Artillery</i>, or such as is +used in battle, or in the field-operations of an army.</p> + +<p>1. <i>Siege Artillery</i> is composed of <i>mortars, large howitzers, Paixhan +guns</i> or <i>Columbiads</i>,<a name="FNanchor_34_34"></a><a href="#Footnote_34_34"><sup>[34]</sup></a> and <i>all cannon</i> of <i>a large calibre.</i> In our +service this class of ordnance includes the twelve, eighteen, +twenty-four, thirty-two, and forty-two-pounder guns, the eight, ten, and +thirteen-inch mortars, the sixteen-inch stone mortar, the +twenty-four-pounder coehorn mortar, the twenty-four-pounder carronade, +and the eight, ten, and twelve-inch howitzers.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_34_34"></a><a href="#FNanchor_34_34">[34]</a><div class="note"><p> These pieces were first invented by Colonel Bomford, of +the U.S. army, and used in the war of 1812. The dimensions of these guns +were first taken to Europe by a young French officer, and thus fell into +the hands of General Paixhan, who immediately introduced them into the +French service. They were by this means first made known to the rest of +Europe, and received the name of the person who introduced them into the +European services, rather than that of the original inventor. All these +facts are so fully susceptible of proof, that Europeans now acknowledge +themselves indebted to us for the invention; even General Paixhan gives +up all claim to originality in his gun, and limits himself to certain +improvements which he introduced. The original gun, which was invented +by Colonel Bomford, and whose dimensions were carried to General Paixhan +in France, is now lying at the ordnance dépôt, in New York harbor.</p></div> + +<p>All these, except the smaller mortars, are made of cast iron. This +substance is less tenacious than wrought iron or bronze, and the cannon +made of it are, on this account, much heavier than of the other +materials; but for the naval service, and the attack and defence of +fortifications, the weight required to secure the necessary strength is +not very objectionable. Wrought iron and bronze are much more expensive +and less durable. Moreover, the difficulty of forging wrought iron in +masses of sufficient size has been such as to prevent its being brought +into general use for artillery. Numerous attempts have been made, at +different periods, to construct large guns of this material, but none +have yet been successful. Improvements which are now making in the +manufacture of wrought iron, may render this the preferable material for +the smaller pieces of artillery; but the best informed military men deem +it objectionable for the heavier cannon, both on account of its cost and +the imperfection of its manufacture. Even should the latter objection be +removed, its cost must prevent its general application to the +construction of siege artillery. Charlatans in military science, both in +this country and in Europe, bring this subject up every fifteen or +twenty years as a new <i>invention</i>, and flaming notices of the +<i>improvement</i>, and predictions of the revolution it is to effect in the +art of war, are circulated in the newspapers to "gull" a credulous +public; and after some fifty or one hundred thousand dollars have been +squandered on some court-favorite, the whole matter ends in the +explosion of the "<i>improvement</i>," and probably the destruction of the +"<i>inventor</i>," and perhaps also of his spectators. Let us be distinctly +understood on this subject. There may be <i>inventions</i> and <i>improvements</i> +in the manufacture of wrought iron, but there is nothing <i>new</i> in its +<i>application</i> to the construction of cannon, for it has been used for +this purpose as long ago as the first invention of the art.</p> + +<p>2. <i>Field Artillery</i> is composed of the smaller guns and howitzers. In +our service this class of cannon includes the six and twelve-pounder +guns, and the twelve and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. All these are +now made of bronze. This material is more expensive than cast-iron, but +its superior tenacity renders it more useful where great weight is +objectionable. Improvements in the manufacture of cast iron may render +it safe to employ this metal in the construction of field-pieces. It is +also possible the wrought iron may be forged in masses large enough, and +the cost be so reduced as to bring it into use for field-pieces. It is +here important to combine strength with lightness, and additional +expense may very properly be incurred to secure this important object.</p> + +<p>The <i>projectiles</i> now in use are solid shot, shells, strap-shot, case or +canister-shot, grape-shot, light and fire-balls, carcasses, grenades, +and rockets.</p> + +<p><i>Solid shot</i> are now almost invariably made of cast iron,<a name="FNanchor_35_35"></a><a href="#Footnote_35_35"><sup>[35]</sup></a> formed in +moulds of sand or iron. This projectile is used under almost every +circumstance, whether in the battle-field or in the attack and defence +of places, and is the only one that is effectual against the stone walls +of forts. <i>Hot shot</i> are used against shipping and wooden structures of +every description. Red-hot balls were first employed by the king of +Poland, in 1575, but, on account of the difficulty of heating them with +rapidity, and the danger of loading the piece with them, this kind of +projectile was not in general use till a much later period. It was at +first supposed that the expansion of the metal would be so great, when +heated to a red or white heat, as to prevent the ball from entering the +piece; it is found, however, that the windage is still sufficient for +loading with facility. These red-hot balls are principally used to fire +wooden buildings, ships, and other combustible matter. They are +therefore much used as a projectile for coast defence, and all +fortifications on the seaboard should be provided with furnaces and +grates, arranged so as to heat them with facility and rapidity.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_35_35"></a><a href="#FNanchor_35_35">[35]</a><div class="note"><p> In Mexico, where iron is scarce, copper is used for shot +and shells; but it is a poor substitute.</p></div> + +<p>There are several kinds of <i>hollow-shot</i> and <i>shells</i>, called <i>bombs, +howitzes, grenades</i>, &c. They are made of cast iron, and usually in a +spherical shape, the cavity being concentric with the exterior surface. +The cavity was formerly made eccentric with the exterior, under the +belief that the heavier side would always strike first. The rotary +motion of the shell during its flight rendered this precaution of no +use. Fire is communicated to the combustible matter within the shell by +means of a fuse, which is so regulated that the explosion shall take +place at the desired moment. Hollow-shot are used with advantage to +destroy ordinary buildings, ships, earthwork, and thin walls of masonry; +they, however, are of little avail in breaking the massive walls of +well-constructed forts. Howitzes and grenades are particularly effective +against cavalry and columns of infantry, and are much employed on the +battle-field; they are also much used in the attack and defence of +places.</p> + +<p>We find that as early as 1486 the Spaniards made use of a projectile +similar to the modern bomb. "They threw from their engines large +globular masses, composed of certain inflammable ingredients mixed with +gunpowder, which, scattering long trains of light," says an eye-witness, +"in their passage through the air, filled the beholders with dismay, and +descending on the roofs of edifices, frequently occasioned extensive +conflagration." In the siege of Constantinople by Mahomet II., shells +were used, and also mortars of enormous size. In 1572 Valturus proposed +to throw, with a kind of mortar, "globes of copper filled with powder." +In 1588, an artificer of Venloo burned Wachtendeck by throwing bombs +into the place. A similar attempt had just been made at Berg-op-Zoom. +The use of this projectile became quite common in France under Louis +XIII. Howitzes were not much used till the seventeenth century. They are +of German origin, and the howitzer first bore the name of <i>hausmitz</i>.</p> + +<p>The <i>strap-shot</i> consists of a round ball attached to a <i>sabot</i> of the +same calibre, by means of two strips of tin passing over the shot at +right angles, and fastened to a third, which is soldered around the +sabot. One end of the sabot is arranged for attaching it to the +cartridge, the other being hollowed out to receive the shot. The +supposed advantages of this arrangement are, 1st, a diminution of the +windage; 2d, the gun may be loaded with greater rapidity; and, 3d, the +cartridge is transported with greater safety.</p> + +<p>The <i>case</i> or <i>canister-shot</i> is prepared by filling a tin canister with +grape-shot or musket-balls, and attaching it to the cartridge by means +of a sabot. There being two sizes of grape-shot, and one of +musket-balls, we have three kinds of canister-shot calculated to reach +at different distances. The three sizes of shot are frequently mixed in +the same canister. This projectile is particularly effective against +lines of infantry and cavalry, when the distance is short.</p> + +<p>The <i>grape-shot</i> is composed of small balls arranged round an upright +pin attached to a plate of wood or iron. The concave cast-iron plate is +preferable, as it increases the range of the shot. The balls are covered +with canvass, and thoroughly confined by a quilting of strong twine. +This shot is used for the same purposes as the canister.</p> + +<p><i>Light</i> and <i>fire-balls</i> are formed of an oval case of sacking, filled +with combustible matter, and attached to a culot of cast-iron. The whole +is covered with a net of spun-yarn. Light-balls are used to light up our +own works, and are not armed; fire-balls being employed to light up the +works or approaches of an enemy, it is necessary to arm them with +pistol-barrels, in order to prevent, any one from extinguishing them. +When made of very combustible materials, and used for setting fire to +wooden structures, they are denominated <i>incendiary balls</i>.</p> + +<p><i>Carcasses</i> are employed for the same purpose as incendiary balls; they +are of two kinds: 1st, the <i>shell-carcass</i>; and, 2d, the <i>ribbed-carcass</i>. +The first is composed of a spherical shell, cast with five fuse-holes, one +being at the top, and the other four in a plane perpendicular to this and +at right angles with each other; the shell is filled with matter highly +combustible. The second is formed of iron ribs connected by iron straps, +and attached at the ends to culots of the same material, the whole being +filled with combustible composition. This is more expensive than the shell +carcass, and cannot be fired with as great accuracy; it is now seldom used. +Carcasses may be armed in the same manner as fire-balls.</p> + +<p><i>Smoke</i> and <i>suffocating balls</i> are used to drive an enemy from +galleries and mines. They are thrown by hand.</p> + +<p>The <i>personnel</i> of the French artillery was for a long time retained, +together with the engineers, under the general direction of the "Grand +Master of Cross-bows." In 1420 the master-general of artillery was made +independent of the grand-master of cross-bows; but previous to the reign +of Louis XIV., the artillery troops had no organization as a separate +corps. In 1668 six companies of <i>canoniers</i> were created, and soon after +two companies of <i>bombardiers</i>. In 1693 the first regiment of fusiliers +was changed into a <i>royal regiment of artillery</i>, and both the canoniers +and bombardiers were eventually incorporated with it. The staff of +artillery, towards the close of this reign, was composed of one +grand-master, sixty lieutenants, sixty commissaries, and eighty +<i>officiers-pointeurs</i>. In 1721 the artillery was divided into five +battalions and stationed at Metz, Strasbourg, Grenoble, Perpignan, and +La Fère, where they established schools of theory and practice. In 1756 +the artillery was organized into seven regiments, each regiment having +its own separate school. This organization continued without any +remarkable change till the Revolution.</p> + +<p>During the earlier campaigns of the French Revolution it is impossible +to trace out the changes that took place in army organization, every +thing was then so irregular and confused, the troops of different arms +being frequently united together. In the campaign of 1792 there were +some six or seven regiments of foot artillery, and ten companies of +horse. This arm was greatly increased during the subsequent campaigns, +and its organization was completely remodelled by Napoleon on his +elevation to the head of the government. The <i>personnel</i> of the +artillery was then composed of a general staff, nine regiments of foot +and six of horse. In 1815 it was reduced to eight regiments of foot and +four of horse.</p> + +<p>The <i>personnel</i> of artillery in modern army organization is divided into +four classes: the <i>staff, guards, artificers,</i> and <i>troops</i>.</p> + +<p>I. The <i>Staff</i>, or <i>Ordnance</i>, as it is called in our service, is +charged with the construction of all the materials of artillery, and the +collection of powder and military stores. As the lives of persons using +these materials, and, in a considerable degree, the success of war, +depend upon the nature and quality of the stores thus manufactured and +collected, it is obvious that the members of this branch of the +artillery service should possess high and peculiar qualifications. In +the French army the artillery staff is composed of two hundred and +eighty-three officers of different grades: also twenty-four officers of +the general staff are attached to this service. In our army the +<i>ordnance</i> is composed of twenty-eight officers of different grades.</p> + +<p>II. <i>Artillery-guards.</i>—These in our service are divided into two +classes: 1st. <i>Military Store-keepers.</i> 2d. <i>Ordnance Sergeants.</i> Both +are alike charged with the care and preservation of the artillery +property and stores at the several garrisons, arsenals, and magazines. +In our army we have fifty-eight of these guards, viz: fifteen +commissioned military store-keepers, and forty-three ordnance sergeants. +We seldom have more than this number of permanent posts; each one can +therefore be supplied with an artillery guard for the care of the +artillery stores. In the French service there are three hundred and +fifteen of these artillery guards; they are divided into three classes.</p> + +<p>III. <i>Artificers.</i>—This class of men are employed in the construction +and repairs of military materials. In most of our arsenals and armories +it is thought to be best to employ unenlisted workmen, by the piece or +contract. Nevertheless a limited number of enlisted men of this +description are found to be both useful and necessary. We have three +hundred and thirty of these in our army, viz: two hundred and fifty +enlisted "ordnance men," and eighty "artificers" attached to the +regiments. In the French army they have for the service of the arsenals +and establishments, one hundred and forty-nine "ouvriers," and twelve +"artificers;" there are also three hundred and sixty "ouvriers" and +seventeen "armuriers" attached to the corps of artillery, making in all +five hundred and thirty-eight.</p> + +<p>IV. <i>Artillery Troops.</i>—Artillery, as an arm of service, is divided in +the same manner as its <i>materiel</i>; the <i>field</i>-artillery being intended +for field service, and the garrison or <i>siege</i>-artillery, for the attack +and defence of places. The troops of the artillery corps of a modern +army usually do duty either in the field, or in sieges, or garrison, as +occasion may require. When employed in the service of a campaign, +artillery is usually divided into two classes: 1st. <i>Foot</i> Artillery; +and 2d. <i>Horse</i> Artillery.</p> + +<p>In the early history of artillery, as has already been shown, but few +pieces were ever brought upon the battle-field. Charles VIII. crossed +the Alps with a pretty large train; but a part of these were hand-guns, +and but very few of the larger pieces were ever brought into battle; +indeed, it was then thought that this arm would be of little use except +in sieges. At the battle of Gravelines the army of Philip II. had only +seventeen pieces of artillery; and at the battle of Ivry the French had +only four pieces of cannon, and two culverins: the army of the League +had also only four pieces. At the battle of Moncontour the opposing +armies had but eight pieces each.</p> + +<p>Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden not only improved the character of +artillery, but also gave to it great development as an arm of service. +At the battle of Bréetenfield he had one hundred pieces of artillery, +great and small, and at the camp of Nuremberg he numbered about three +hundred. This king also made a more skilful use of his cannon by uniting +them more in mass than had been done by his predecessors; his system was +nevertheless very imperfect. In the disposition of this arm on the field +of battle, a vast improvement was made by Condé, Turenne, and Prince +Eugene of Savoy. Frederick the Great also made great use of this arm, +and was the first to introduce horse artillery. This mode of using +field-pieces has peculiar properties which in many circumstances render +it an invaluable arm. The promptness and rapidity of its movements +enable it to act with other troops without embarrassing them. The French +soon introduced into their army the improvements made by the king of +Prussia, and in 1763 the celebrated Gribeauval appeared. He improved the +form of the cannon and greatly diminished the weight of field artillery, +giving it an organization which has been but slightly changed since his +time.</p> + +<p>The successive improvements in artillery have for a long time +constituted a prominent feature in war. The power of this arm to throw +projectiles to a great distance, and to overturn and destroy opposing +obstacles, renders it a necessary arm on the battle-field, and a strong +barrier and safeguard of states. It is an essential element in all army +organization.</p> + +<p>In our army we have four regiments of artillery, forming the basis of +forty batteries. In the French service there are fourteen regiments, +forming the basis of two hundred and six field batteries.</p> + +<p>The term <i>battery</i>, when applied to artillery as an arm of service, +refers to a permanent organization of a certain number of cannon, with +the men and other accessaries required to serve them. This is the unit +of force in this arm. The regimental organization is a mere nominal +arrangement, for in actual service artillery acts by batteries, and +never by regiments. Its strength is therefore invariably estimated by +the number of its batteries.</p> + +<p>A battery is ordinarily composed of six pieces, two of them being +howitzers. The lighter batteries would, in our service, be formed of +six-pounder guns and twelve-pounder howitzers; and the heavier of +twelve-pounder guns and twenty-four-pounder howitzers. These heavy +batteries would usually form the reserve. Each piece being attended by +its caisson, this formation would give twelve carriages to each battery, +six for the guns and six for the caissons. The extra caissons form a +part of the reserve, and move with the train. In some foreign services a +battery is composed of eight pieces with their caissons.</p> + +<p>This arm admits of three formations—<i>in column, in battle</i>, and <i>in +battery</i>. In column it ordinarily moves by sections of two pieces, each +piece being followed or preceded by its caisson. Columns of +half-batteries are sometimes formed, and also columns of single pieces; +but the latter ought never to be employed except in cases of necessity +in passing a narrow defile, and at a distance from the enemy.</p> + +<p>In order of battle, the pieces are drawn up in line, their caissons +forming a second line, at the distance of a few paces.</p> + +<p>When in order of battery, the pieces are formed in the same way as for +battle, except that the guns are directed towards the enemy and prepared +for firing.</p> + +<p>The movements and manœuvres of foot artillery correspond with those of +infantry, and of mounted artillery with those of cavalry, a battery +being regarded as a battalion or squadron, of which the pieces form the +platoons. Mounted batteries can seldom move with greater rapidity than +the trot, except in cases of emergency, and even then the gallop can be +kept up only for a very short time; but this is of no great importance, +as the batteries never accompany cavalry in the charge.</p> + +<p>The French and German writers discuss artillery as employed in battle, +under two distinct heads—1st, as an arm of preparation, and 2d, as an +arm of succor.</p> + +<p>I. As an arm of preparation it serves, 1st, to protect the deploying of +the other troops; 2d, to disorganize the enemy's masses, and to +facilitate the action of infantry and cavalry, by weakening the intended +points of attack; 3d, to force an enemy to evacuate a position by +overthrowing obstacles with which he has covered himself; 4th, to keep +up the action till the other troops can be prepared to strike the +decisive blow.</p> + +<p>The force of this arm depends upon the rapidity and accuracy of its +fire; rash valor is therefore far less desirable in artillery than +skill, patience, and cool courage. Artillery always acts at a distance, +and in mass; single pieces are seldom employed, except to cover +reconnoitring parties, or to sustain the light infantry in a skirmish. +Mounted batteries sometimes approach within two or three hundred yards +of the enemy's infantry; but this is only done with a strong support of +other troops, and to prepare the way for a charge of cavalry. The +batteries do not accompany the charge, but they should always follow up +and complete the success; mounted batteries are particularly useful in +pursuit. If Murat, in 1812, had accompanied his attacks upon +Neveroffskoi's retreating columns of sixty thousand infantry by two or +three batteries of mounted artillery, the whole column must have been +captured or destroyed.</p> + +<p>Artillery, on the field of battle, is very liable to allow its fire to +be drawn, and its projectiles wasted, while the enemy is at too great a +distance to be reached. It is a very common thing in a battle, to employ +two or three pieces of heavy calibre at the beginning of the fight, in +order to provoke the opposing batteries to open their fire before the +proper time. The waste of material is not the only loss attending this +error; the troops are fatigued and disheartened, while the courage and +confidence of their opponents are always revived by a weak and +inaccurate fire. To avoid such an error the commanding officer of a +battery of artillery should be perfectly familiar with the effective +ranges of his pieces, and accustomed to form a correct estimate of +distances. For this purpose the eye should be frequently practised in +time of peace in estimating the ranges for different calibres.</p> + +<table summary="Artillery Ranges"> +<tr><td width="400">The effective range of a 12-pounder field-piece +is about</td> +<td width="100"> 1000 yds.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">The effective range of a 6-pounder field piece</td> +<td width="100"> 800</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">The effective range of a 24-pounder howitzer</td> +<td width="100">600 yds.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">The effective range of a 12-pounder howitzer</td> +<td width="100">500 yds.</td></tr> +<tr><td width="400">The effective range of grape and case shot is from</td> +<td width="100"> 500 to 600 yds.</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<p>Even at these distances the aim is usually so inaccurate that a large +portion of the projectiles are lost. In the attack on Spires, a whole +column of artillery expended its fire while at a distance of 900 yards +from the enemy, who, of course, received little or no injury. In firing +from fortifications, the aim is far more accurate, and the artillery may +therefore be employed to advantage as soon as the enemy comes within the +longest range.</p> + +<p>II. As an arm of succor, the artillery serves, 1st, to give impulsive +force to the attacking columns; 2d, to assist in arresting, or at least +in retarding, the offensive movements of an enemy; 3d, to protect the +avenues of approach, and to defend obstacles that cover a position; and, +4th, to cover a retrograde movement.</p> + +<p>Mounted artillery is, like cavalry, much the most effective in attack; +but batteries of foot are better calculated for defence. The cannoniers +are so armed as to be capable of defending their pieces to the last +extremity; they therefore cannot be easily captured by opposing columns +of infantry. "As to pretending to rush upon the guns," says Napoleon, +"and carry them by the bayonet, or to pick off the gunners by musketry, +these are chimerical ideas. Such things do sometimes happen; but have we +not examples of still more extraordinary captures by a <i>coup de main?</i> +As a general rule, there is no infantry, however intrepid it may be, +that can, without artillery, march with impunity the distance of five or +six hundred toises, against two well-placed batteries (16 pieces) of +cannon, served by good gunners; before they could pass over two-thirds +of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed. * * * * A +good infantry forms, no doubt, the sinews of an army; but if it were +required to fight for a long time against a very superior artillery, its +good quality would be exhausted, and its efficiency destroyed. In the +first campaigns of the wars of the Revolution, what France had in the +greatest perfection was artillery; we know not a single instance in +which twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were +ever carried by the bayonet. In the affair at Valmy, at the battles of +Jemmapes, Nordlingen, and Fleurus, the French had an artillery superior +to that of the enemy, although they had often only two guns to one +thousand men; but that was because their armies were very numerous. It +may happen that a general, more skilful in manœuvring, more expert than +his adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain successes +during a part of a campaign, although his artillery may be far inferior +to that of his opponent; but on the critical day of a general +engagement, his inferiority in point of metal will be severely felt."</p> + +<p>History furnishes us numerous examples of the use of artillery in +protecting avenues of approach:—such as the defile of Köesen at the +battle of Auerstedt; the avenues between the redoubts of Pultowa, &c., +&c.</p> + +<p>When an army is forced to retreat, it covers its rear by that portion of +its cavalry and mounted artillery which has suffered least during the +battle. By placing the squadrons of horse and the light batteries in +echelon, the retiring column may be well protected. The artillery, by +using the prolonge, may also continue its retreat while in battery and +firing. It was in this way that at the battle of Albuera, in 1811, the +French artillery on the left wing held in check the right and centre of +the Anglo-Spaniards till the army effected its retreat; the artillery +then retired in echelons, by batteries and fractions of batteries, under +the protection of the cavalry.</p> + +<p>We have already discussed, under the general head of tactics, the +position and use of artillery on the battle-field a few additional +remarks must suffice.</p> + +<p>As a general rule, batteries should be placed in positions from which +they can employ their fire to advantage, and also be free to move in any +direction that the progress of the battle may require. Advantage should +always be taken of natural or artificial obstacles, such as hedges, +clumps of trees, logs, mounds of earth, &c., to cover and conceal the +guns till the moment they open their fire. Elevated positions are, +contrary to the common opinion, generally unfavorable, for artillery +cannot fire to advantage at any considerable angle of depression. The +slopes in front should be of considerable length, otherwise the balls +would do very little execution upon that portion of the column of attack +which occupied the valley. The ground should also be smooth, for if +rough the balls will either bury themselves in the earth, or ricochet at +a high angle of deflection, thus destroying a considerable part of the +effect of the fire. The counterforts or spurs of hills are favorable for +artillery, as they enable it to see, with an enfilading fire, the slopes +of the principal range. Batteries should seldom be placed so as to fire +over other troops, for they will not only be intimidated by this fire, +but also exposed to the opposing fire of the enemy's artillery. A large +number of pieces should never be crowded into the same place, but an +interval should be left between the guns of forty or fifty feet, +according to the locality. The most favorable position for this arm in +ordinary ground, is in the intervals between the regiments or brigades +of the line, and far enough in advance of this line not to draw upon the +other troops the fire of the enemy's artillery. The flanks of the line +are also favorable for the action of this arm.</p> + +<p>Sometimes artillery has been employed to form a part of the line of +battle; but such instances are exceptions, and can never be comprised in +general rules. Whenever this disposition has been made, it has resulted +from the defective character of the other arms, or from some peculiar +circumstance in the battle which enabled a bold and skilful commander to +deviate from the ordinary rules of tactics. Such was the case with +Napoleon at Wagram. In Saxony, in 1813, he was several times obliged to +substitute his artillery to supply the want of other arms.</p> + +<p>In the defence and attack of field-works, and in the passage of rivers, +artillery plays an important and indispensable part; but it here becomes +an auxiliary to the dispositions of the engineers, or at least acts in +concert with that arm.</p> + +<p>The troops of artillery, in all well-regulated army organizations, +should equal about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the +infantry.<a name="FNanchor_36_36"></a><a href="#Footnote_36_36"><sup>[36]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_36_36"></a><a href="#FNanchor_36_36">[36]</a><div class="note"><p> To qualify himself for the duties connected with his arm +of service, the artillery officer must make himself thoroughly +acquainted with—. +</p><p> +<i>The Instruction for United States Field Artillery, horse and foot; +</i></p><p> +<i>Capt. Anderson's Instruction for Garrison Artillery;</i> +</p><p><i> +Kinsley's Notes on Pyrotechny;</i> +</p><p><i> +Knowlton's Notes on Gunpowder</i>,&c.; and +</p><p> +The writings of Thiroux and Piobert on theoretical and practical +instruction, and the writings of Jomini, Decker, and Okotmeff, on the +use of this arm on the field of battle. +</p><p> +The following list of books of reference may be of use to those who wish +to make themselves perfectly familiar with all the branches of +artillery. +</p><p> +<i>Histoire général de l'artillerie</i>. Brunet. +</p><p> +<i>L'artillerie à cheval dans les combats de cavalerie</i>. Par un officier +de l'artillerie Prussienne. +</p><p> +<i>Considérations et experiences sur le tir des obus à bulles</i>. Bormann. +<i>Essai sur les obusiers</i>. Dusaert. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie</i>. Le Bourg. +</p><p> +<i>Traité sur l'artillerie</i>, (traduit de l'Allemand.) Rouvroy. +</p><p> +<i>Bombardier Français</i>. Bélidor. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires d'artillerie</i>. St. Rémy. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur l'usage de l'artillerie dans la guerre de campagne et celle +de siége</i>. Dupuget. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur les nouveaux systèmes d'artillerie</i>. St. Aubin. +</p><p> +<i>Treatise on Artillery</i>. Müller. +</p><p> +<i>Artificial Fire-Works</i>. Jones. +</p><p> +<i>Table de tir les canons et obusiers</i>. Lombard. +</p><p> +<i>On Gunpowder</i>. Antoni. +</p><p> +<i>Recherches sur l'artillerie en général</i>. Texier de Norbec. +</p><p> +<i>Déscription de l'art de fabriquer les canons</i>. Monge. +</p><p> +<i>Procédés de la fabrication des armes blanches</i>. Vandermonde. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel de l'artilleur</i>. Durtubie. +</p><p> +<i>Traité du mouvement des projectiles</i>. Lombard. +</p><p> +<i>Treatise on Artillery</i>. Scheel. (Translated from the German.) +</p><p> +<i>Traité pratique des feux d'artifice</i>. Morel. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel du canonnier marin</i>. Cornibert. +</p><p> +<i>New Principles of Gunnery</i>. Robins. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur la fabrication des armes portatives</i>. Cotty. +</p><p> +<i>Recherches sur la poudre</i>. Cossigny. +</p><p> +<i>Supplement</i>. Cossigny. +</p><p> +<i>Fabrication de la poudre</i>. Renaud. +</p><p> +<i>American Artillerist's Companion</i>. Toussard. +</p><p> +<i>Tables des portées des canons et canonades de la marine</i>. Cornilwert. +</p><p> +<i>Traité d'artifices de guerre</i>. Bigot. +</p><p> +<i>Traité élémentaire de la fabrication des bouches à feu</i>. Dartein. +</p><p> +<i>Traité de l'art de fabriquer la poudre à canon</i>. Bottée et Riffault. +</p><p> +<i>L'art du salpétrier</i>. Bottée et Riffault. +</p><p> +<i>Dictionary of Artillery</i>. Hoyer. (German.) +</p><p> +<i>New Experiments on Gunnery</i>. Hutton—(Hutton's Tracts.) +</p><p> +<i>Des bois propres au service des Arsenaux</i>. Herbin de Halles. +</p><p> +<i>Instruction sur le service de l'artillerie</i>. Hulot. +</p><p> +<i>Manœuvres de force</i>. Bigot. +</p><p> +<i>Balistique</i>. Obenheim. +</p><p> +<i>Treatise on Artillery</i>. German. Scharnhorst. (Translated into French, +1840.) +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur l'art de pointer</i>. Poumet. +</p><p> +<i>Réflexions sur la fabrication des bouches à feu</i>. Lamartillière. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoire sur la planchette du canonnier</i>. Obenheim. +</p><p> +<i>Aide-Mémoire</i>. Gassendi. +</p><p> +<i>Observations on the use of Artillery at the sieges of Badajos, St. +Sebastian, etc.</i>. +</p><p> +<i>Treatise on Artillery</i>. Lallemand. +</p><p> +<i>Elémens de pyrotechnie</i>. Ruggieri. +</p><p> +<i>Nouvelle force maritime</i>. Paixhans. +</p><p> +<i>Dictionnaire d'artillerie</i>. Cotty. +</p><p> +<i>Recherches balistiques</i>. Coste. +</p><p> +<i>Poudres fulminantes</i>. Vergnaud. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel de la métallurgie du fer</i>. Culman. +</p><p> +<i>Pyrotechnic militaire,</i> (traduit de l'Allemand, par R. de Peretsdorff.) +</p><p> +<i>Journal des Sciences Militaires</i>. +</p><p> +<i>Pyrotechny</i>. Cutbush. +</p><p> +<i>Traité élémentaire d'artillerie</i>. Decker. +</p><p> +<i>Fusées de guerre</i>. Montgery. +</p><p> +<i>Documens sur la matière à canons</i>. Hervé. +</p><p> +<i>Observations sur le nouveau système d'artillerie</i>. Allix. +</p><p> +<i>Système d'artillerie de campagne</i>. Allix. +</p><p> +<i>Pocket Gunner</i>. Adye. +</p><p> +<i>On the Rocket System</i>. Congreve. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur l'art des fontes</i>. Serres. +</p><p> +<i>Receuil de Mémoires sur la poudre à canon</i>. Proust. +</p><p> +<i>Mémorial de l'artilleur marin</i>. Michel. +</p><p> +<i>Observations sur le nouveau système de l'artillerie</i>. Poumet. +</p><p> +<i>Mémorial d'artillerie</i>. +</p><p> +<i>British Gunner</i>. Spearman. +</p><p> +<i>Régles de pointage à bord des vaisseaux</i>. Montgery. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel du maître de forges</i>. Landrin. +</p><p> +<i>Naval Gunnery</i>. Douglass. +</p><p> +<i>Métallurgie du fer</i> (traduit de l'Allemand, par Culman.) Karsten. +</p><p> +<i>Aide-Mémoire à l'usage des officers d'artillerie</i>. (Strasbourg.) +</p><p> +<i>Traité de l'organisation et de la tactique de l'artillerie,</i> (traduit +de l'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Grewenitz. +</p><p> +<i>Supplement au dictionnaire d'artillerie</i>. Cotty. +</p><p> +<i>Memoir on Gunpowder</i>. Braddock. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel de l'armurier</i>. Paulin-Desormeaux. +</p><p> +<i>Journal des armes spéciales</i>. +</p><p> +<i>Cours sur le service des officiers dans les fonderies</i>. Serres. +</p><p> +<i>Expériences sur la fabrication et la durée des bouches à feu en fer et +bronze,</i> (traduit de l'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Meyer. +</p><p> +<i>Applications du fer aux constructions de l'artillerie</i>. Thierry. +</p><p> +<i>Aide-Mémoire d'art militaire</i>. Lebas. +</p><p> +<i>Mémorial à l'usage de l'armée Belge</i>. +</p><p> +<i>Instructions and Regulations for the service and management of heavy +ordnance in the British service</i>. +</p><p> +<i>Experiences sur les principes du tir,</i> faites à Metz, en 1834. +</p><p> +<i>Traité d'artillerie théorique et pratique</i>. Piobert. +</p><p> +<i>Aide-Mémoire à l'usage des officiers d'artillerie,</i> (avec approbation +du comité d'artillerie.) +</p><p> +<i>Manuel d'artillerie à l'usage des officiers de la République +Helvétique.</i> Bonaparte, (Napoleon Louis.) +</p><p> +<i>Expériences comparatives entre des bouches à feu en fonte de fer, +d'origine Franzaise, Anglaise et Suédoise,</i> faites à Gavres, en 1836. +</p><p> +<i>Expériences faites à Brest en</i> 1831, <i>sur les canons.</i> Paixhans. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur l'organisation de l'artillerie.</i> Le Bourg. +</p><p> +<i>Expériences sur des projectiles creux,</i> faites en 1829, '30, '31. +</p><p> +<i>Instruction pratique sur l'emploi des projectiles,</i> (traduit de +l'Allemand par Peretsdorff.) Decker. +</p><p> +<i>Effects of heavy ordnance as applied to ships of war.</i> Simmons. +</p><p> +<i>Expériences sur les poudres de guerre,</i> faites à Esquerdes, en 1832, +'33, '34, and '35. Maguin. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'artillerie à l'usage des sous-officiers.</i> De Crépy. +</p><p> +<i>Instruction théorique et pratique d'artillerie,</i> à l'usage des élèves +de St. Cyr. Thiroux. +</p><p> +<i>Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les forges.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Manuel historique de la technologie des armes à feu,</i> (traduit de +l'Allemand par M. Rieffel.) Meyer. +</p><p> +<i>Formules rélatives aux effets du tir sur affût.</i> Poisson. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel de l'artificer.</i> Vergnaud. +</p><p> +<i>Etat actuel de l'artillerie de campagne de toutes les puissances de +l'Europe,</i> (traduit par Mazé; Ire partie, Artillerie Anglaise.) Jacobi. +(Six other parts have been published in German, containing descriptions +of the French, Belgian, Hessian, Wirtemburg, Nassau, and Swedish +systems.) +</p><p> +<i>Introduction à l'étude de l'artillerie.</i> Madelaine. +</p><p> +<i>Cours sur le service des officiers d'artillerie dans les fonderies. +Description de la fabrication des bouches ù feu à la fonderie royale de +Liège.</i> Huguenin. +</p><p> +<i>Poudre ù canon.</i> Timmerhans. +</p><p> +<i>Procédés de fabrication dans les forges,</i> (extrait du cours sur le +service des officiers dans les forges.) +</p><p> +<i>Renseignements sur le matériel de l'artillerie navale de la Grande +Bretagne.</i> Zeni et des Hays. +</p><p> +<i>Théorie des affûts et des voitures de l'artillerie.</i> Migout et Bergery +</p><p> +<i>Artillerist's Manual.</i> Griffith. +</p><p> +<i>Handbuch für die K.K. Oesterreichische Artillerie Offiziere,</i> (manual +for the Austrian artillery officers.) +</p><p> +<i>Sammlung von Steindruckzeichnungen der Preussischen Artillerie,</i> <i>mit +Erläuterungen</i>, (collection of plates of the Prussian artillery, with +explanatory text.) +</p><p> +<i>Histoire des fusées de guerre.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Ordnance Manual</i>, for the use of the officers of the United States +Army. +</p><p> +<i>Experiments on Gunpowder</i>. Capt. Mordecai. +</p><p> +<i>Pyrotechny</i>, for the use of the Cadets at the United States Military +Academy. Kinsley. +</p><p> +<i>Notes on Gunpowder, Percussion Powder, Cannon, and Projectiles</i>. Lt. +Knowlton.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_XII"></a><h2>CHAPTER XII.</h2> + +<p>ARMY ORGANIZATION—ENGINEERS.</p> + +<br> + +<p><i>Engineers</i>.—The term <i>engineer</i> is derived from the unclassical Latin +word <i>ingenium</i>, which was applied both to a <i>machine</i> and the <i>mind</i> or +<i>skill</i> of the person who devised or constructed it.</p> + +<p>It was Philip Augustus, say the French writers, who first introduced +engineers (<i>engigneurs</i>, or <i>engignours</i>, as they were called) into +France, and restored the art of sieges. The engineers of that age were +seldom charged with the construction of works of military defence, but, +like Archimedes at Syracuse, and Longinus at Palmyra, they directed +their attention principally to devising implements of war and the most +effective manner of using them. Engines of war were at that time divided +between the <i>engigneurs</i> and the <i>artilliers</i>; the former being charged +with the heavier machines, and the latter with the smaller weapons used +for throwing projectiles. After the invention of gunpowder, the old +battering-rams, cranes, helipoles, &c., disappeared, and with them the +<i>engigneurs</i>, or masters of engines. The new inventions were united with +the few old projectile machines that remained in the artillery, and the +engineers were for a time left almost without employment. The revival of +the art of fortification was very slow, and the modern system scarcely +began to be developed till near the sixteenth century.</p> + +<p>We must omit for the present giving even an outline of the history of +military engineering, and pass to the troops of this arm, as +constituting an essential element of an army organization. The subject +of fortification, and the history of its various changes, will be +examined in the next chapter.</p> + +<p>The engineers, in modern army organization, constitute the fourth arm of +service, as, compared with artillery, their relative numbers are about +as two to three. They are divided in the same manner as the artillery, +viz.:—1st, the staff; 2d, guards, or fort-keepers; 3d, artificers; and +4th, the troops.</p> + +<p>I. The officers constituting the staff of this corps are charged in time +of peace with planning, constructing, and repairing all fortifications +and other defensive works; the construction and preparation of all +military materials, and stores connected with this arm; and (in our +service) with the disbursements of money connected with these +operations: in time of war they are charged with the attack and defence +of military works, the laying out and construction of field defences, +redoubts, intrenchments, roads, &c.; in the attack they form a part of +the vanguard, to remove obstructions; and in retreat they form a part +of the rear-guard, to erect obstacles, destroy roads, bridges, &c., so +as to retard an enemy's pursuit.</p> + +<p>From the important character of these duties as connected with the means +essential to a national defence, and the vast amount of money expended +in these operations, it is evident that a high order of acquirements +should be deemed necessary to qualify one to perform the duties of a +military engineer. This officer requires a knowledge of chemistry, to +guide his choice of materials for mortars, cements, and mastics; of +mineralogy and geology, for selecting stone; of botany, for timber and +the means of preventing its decay; of mathematics, in laying out his +work and calculating the thickness and stability of his walls, +embankments, &c.; of mechanical philosophy, in constructing his +machinery; of military engineering, in his plans of fortifications; and +of all the higher branches of military science, in selecting positions +for these works, such that they shall have the proper relations to the +means of national defence, and to the grand operations of armies in the +field. The avenues to appointment to this corps are guarded, in most +European armies, with special care, to prevent the influence of money, +politics, or family connections; and in our own army it is now specified +by law of Congress, that the vacancies shall be filled only from the +most distinguished graduates of the military academy. Formerly our +service suffered most severely from the employment of incompetent +persons, introduced through political influence from civil life, and +foreign charlatans, the refuse of European armies. Many of our earlier +military works (as will be mentioned hereafter) were modelled upon +systems for a long time discarded by the profession in Europe, and even +some of those which have been constructed within the last thirty years +are made of such wretched materials and workmanship, that they are +already crumbling into ruins. While the existing laws and regulations +seem well calculated to prevent the recurrence of similar abuses and +errors, it nevertheless can be shown that the organization of this arm +of our service requires modifications and extensions to give it the +requisite degree of efficiency, and to economize the public +expenditures.</p> + +<p>The wars of Louis XIV. first led to a regular military organization, and +a regular system of defence. In these wars the engineers received great +development, and have ever since occupied a prominent position as parts +of an army organization. We therefore find in all the great sieges and +battles of this era a large and continually increasing number of +engineers and engineer troops, this force being gradually augmented as +the true principles of war became better understood, and as the wants of +the service required. Even in the earliest of these battles we find the +engineers taking a prominent and distinguished part. In the war of 1688, +twenty-four engineers were killed and wounded at the siege of +Philipsbourg, eighteen at Namur, eight at Huy, ten at Charleroi, eight +at Ath, thirty at Barcelona, &c. Such losses were good proofs of the +usefulness of these officers, and before this war was closed, their +number was increased to six hundred; and in 1706 the army contained +eight brigades of engineers and four companies of miners.</p> + +<p>The engineer corps being partially disbanded in the early part of the +French Revolution, great difficulty was experienced in reorganizing it +and in finding competent men to supply the places of those who had been +driven into exile or sacrificed during the reign of terror. Energy and +activity, combined with republican zeal, could supply the place of skill +in the other arms, but the science of the engineer could not be acquired +in a day.</p> + +<p>In 1799, the staff of the engineer corps consisted of four hundred and +forty-nine officers, without including the general officers, commanding +departments, or those connected with the engineer troops. The same +organization was continued in 1804. The engineer staff of the French +army now numbers four hundred and thirty-two officers. We have in our +service forty-three engineer officers, for staff duty, who are now +engaged in the construction and repairs of some sixty or seventy +fortifications, and other works of a civil and military character.</p> + +<p>II. <i>Engineer Guards</i>, or <i>Fort-Keepers</i>, are a class of men charged +with the general care of forts, and all public property deposited in the +several engineer dépôts and garrisons, and in the public works during +their construction.</p> + +<p>There are five hundred and fifty of these "<i>gardes du Genie</i>" in the +French army, who rank next the sub-lieutenants of engineers, and are +assimilated with the sub-lieutenants of infantry in the hospitals, +marches, &c. <i>In our service we have no engineer guards or +fort-keepers.</i></p> + +<p>This defect in our organization has been the cause of serious +inconvenience, and the consequent waste of public property. The expense +of hiring civil agents for this purpose has more than trebled the cost +of supporting a suitable number of non-commissioned guards to maintain +the good order and efficiency of our forts, in the absence of engineer +officers, and to preserve and keep in repair the military implements and +stores connected with this department of the army. It has already been +shown that we have fifty-eight of these guards for the artillery +service, and it really seems somewhat singular that the engineers, with +a much greater amount of public property in their charge, are allowed no +assistants of this kind.</p> + +<p>III. <i>Engineer artificers</i> are a class of men employed in the practical +operations of constructing forts and other military defences, and in +making and repairing all the implements used by the engineer troops in +the operations of sapping and mining, in crossing rivers, in +constructing field-defences, and in the attack and defence of +field-works.</p> + +<p>As very few new fortifications are now required in France, the services +of engineer artificers are less necessary and important than in our +service, where large sums of money are annually expended upon military +defences, There are, however, in the French army a corps of engineer +artificers, consisting of eight officers and a cadre of fifty-four +non-commissioned officers, with a variable number of privates, organized +into two companies. <i>But in our army we have no regular engineer +artificers!</i> In our artillery service we have three hundred and thirty +enlisted artillery artificers. If these are useful and necessary to the +artillery service, which no one doubts, for still stronger reasons would +it be advantageous to the public service to employ at least an equal +number of enlisted engineer artificers on our fortifications; for the +annual expenditure of public money is here much greater than in the +corresponding branch of the artillery service.</p> + +<p>IV. <i>Engineer troops</i> are divided into three classes—1st, <i>sappers and +pioneers</i>; 2d, <i>miners</i>; and 3d, <i>pontoniers</i>.</p> + +<p>In the French army of 1799, there were four battalions of sappers, +consisting of 120 officers and 7,092 men. In 1804, Napoleon organized +five battalions of these troops, consisting of 165 officers and 8,865 +men. Even this number was found insufficient in his campaigns in Germany +and Spain, and he was obliged to organize an additional number of +sappers from the Italian and French auxiliaries. The pioneers were then +partly attached to other branches of the service. There is, at present, +in the French army a considerable number of sappers or pioneers detached +for the service of the infantry regiments, three companies of +<i>sapeurs-conducteurs</i>, and forty-two companies of <i>sapeurs</i>. In the +French army of 1799, there were six companies of miners, consisting of +24 officers and 576 men. In 1804, Napoleon increased these troops to +nine companies, containing 36 officers and 864 men. The present French +peace establishment contains six companies of miners, organized much the +same as under Napoleon. In the French army of 1799 there were two +regiments of pontoniers, of 38 officers and 960 men. But this number was +found too small in the remaining campaigns, and the deficiency was +temporarily supplied by organizing sailors for these duties. In the +present French army organization, there are eleven companies of +pontoniers, forming a regiment of sixty-three officers.</p> + +<p><i>We have in our service no sappers, miners, or pontoniers</i>, and, in case +of war, would be found without the means of executing any military +works, or performing any military operation which would require engineer +troops.</p> + +<p>In the preliminary stages of army organization under Louis XIV., +infantry troops were detailed as sappers, and instructed in these duties +by the engineers. This irregularity of service soon caused difficulties +and losses, and the evils springing from it were so great, that Vauban +urged the propriety of a separate organization. In 1670 he officially +recommended to the king to establish a regiment of twelve hundred +sappers and <i>ouvriers</i>, and in a subsequent report on the value of these +troops, used the following language: "They would be useful in peace as +well as in war, and would be the means of saving much in all +fortifications where they should be employed. In fact, I have not the +least doubt that they would save annually to the king much more than +their pay. I assert all I have said on this subject with as much +confidence as if I had seen the result; and I can, with the same +certainty, add, that this small troop will be the means of saving large +numbers of good engineers and brave officers and soldiers, from the +stern necessity to which we are reduced of exposing, almost always, the +laborers and those who support them; which necessity would not arise +had we at command a sufficient number of this kind of workmen well +instructed. To such a degree have I felt the necessity of sappers, at +every siege at which I have been present, that I have always had reason +to repent of not having more urgently solicited the creation of this +company."</p> + +<p>Such are the views of the greatest of military engineers, a man who +fought one hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and +built or repaired three hundred fortifications. His anticipations of the +usefulness of engineer troops were fully realized, and they have ever +since received the most careful attention, and now form, as has just +been shown, one of the most important and efficient arms in the French +service. The fortifications constructed by the engineers, as organized +by Vauban, have ever since constituted one of the principal elements of +the French military power.</p> + +<p>In the wars of Napoleon there are innumerable instances in illustration +of the delays and disasters attending the operations of armies not +supplied with engineer troops; and, on the other hand, the advantages +resulting from their services when properly organized and instructed. We +have already pointed out the influence which the fortifications in the +hands of the French exerted on the results of these wars, and the fatal +consequences to the Allies of neglecting these works of national +defence. Every student of military history will immediately call to mind +the influence of Savona, Coni, Mondovi, Ceva, Govi, Alessandria, +Tortona, Pizzighitone, Peschiera, Mantua, Palma-Nuova, Osopo, +Klagenfurth, &c., in the campaigns of 1796-7; of Genoa, Port Bard, the +fortifications of the Var, Ulm, Ingoldstadt, &c., in 1800; of Milan, +Turin, Mantua, Roco d'Aufo, Genoa, Alessandria, &c., in 1805; the +importance of Kehl, Cassel, Wesel, &c., to the French in 1806, and the +fatal consequences to the Prussians in that campaign, of their total +and culpable neglect of their own fortifications.</p> + +<p>All military historians speak of the influence of fortifications in the +Peninsular campaigns: those which had been given up to Napoleon previous +to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of +his arms, while those which were retained by Spain and her allies, +contributed in an equal degree to hamper and embarrass his operations. +Some of these, like Saragossa and Tarragona, with their broken walls and +defective armaments, kept the enemy in check some sixty days each, and +did much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.</p> + +<p>Temporary or field-fortifications also had an important influence here. +The lines of Torres-Vedras, the field-works of Ronda, the intrenched +camps of the Pyrenees, Bayonne, Toulouse, &c., are examples under this +head. In fact, field-works played a most important part in all of +Napoleon's wars. We might mention the redoubt of Montenotte, the +intrenchments at Milesimo, the batteries of Lobau, the field-defences of +Hougomont, La Haye-Sainte, and Papelotte at Waterloo, and numerous other +cases equally striking. Just before the battle of Waterloo, Wellington +employed some eighteen thousand peasants and two thousand horses, under +the direction of British officers of engineers. In speaking of these +defences, Colonel Pasley says: "It may be easily conceived that to have +directed such a great body of workmen to proper advantage, by means of a +few officers of engineers, would have been impossible, but for the +system adopted of subdividing the various works among the +non-commissioned officers and privates of the engineer troops, each of +whom was made responsible for laying out the details of his own portion, +and for the direction of a party of from twenty to one hundred men, or +even more, according to circumstances."</p> + +<p>But to return to the Peninsular war. These campaigns exhibit in strong +colors the advantages derived, on the one side, from a well-organized +engineer corps, and the losses, delays, and defects suffered on the +other, until the defects of the organization were remedied. Napoleon +entered Spain with a well-appointed army, and soon, through strategy and +well-directed force, gained possession of the important fortresses of +the Peninsula; seizing in this way the strategic routes and important +geographical points, he was enabled to retain possession of the country +for eight years, in spite of the numerous forces arrayed against him, +the absence of himself and his best generals in Germany, and the great +inefficiency of Joseph and of many of his generals. These fortifications +were old, and of strength inferior to modern works of defence, but it +required years and the expenditure of millions in blood and treasure to +expel from the country those who had possession of them.</p> + +<p>For the first five years of this war the English struggled with a most +imperfect army organization.<a name="FNanchor_37_37"></a><a href="#Footnote_37_37"><sup>[37]</sup></a> When "the first serious siege," says +Napier, was undertaken by the British army, "to the discredit of the +English government, no army was ever so ill provided with the means of +prosecuting such an enterprise. The engineer officers were exceedingly +zealous; and many of them were well versed in the theory of their +business. But the ablest trembled when reflecting on their utter +destitution of all that belonged to real service. Without a corps of +sappers and miners, without a single private who knew how to carry on an +approach under fire, they were compelled to attack fortresses defended +by the most warlike, practised, and scientific troops of the age."</p> + +<a name="Footnote_37_37"></a><a href="#FNanchor_37_37">[37]</a><div class="note"><p> In a letter dated February 11th, 1812, Wellington wrote +to the Secretary of State as follows:—"I would beg leave to suggest to +your lordship the expediency of adding to the engineer establishment a +corps of sappers and miners. It is inconceivable with what disadvantages +we undertake any thing like a siege for want of assistance of this +description. There is no French <i>corps d'armée</i> which has not a +battalion of sappers and a company of miners; but we are obliged to +depend for assistance of this description upon the regiments of the +line; and although the men are brave and willing, they want the +knowledge and training which are necessary. Many casualties among them +consequently occur, and much valuable time is lost at the most critical +period of the siege."</p></div> + +<p>"The best officers and finest soldiers were obliged to sacrifice +themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and +incapacity of a government, always ready to plunge the nation into war, +without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. The +sieges carried on by the British in Spain were a succession of +butcheries; because the commonest materials, and the means necessary to +their art, were denied the engineers." Colonel J.T. Jones writes in +nearly the same terms of the early sieges in the Peninsula, and with +respect to the siege of Badajos, adds in express terms, that "a body of +sappers and miners, and the necessary fascines and gabions, would have +rendered the reduction of the work certain."<a name="FNanchor_38_38"></a><a href="#Footnote_38_38"><sup>[38]</sup></a> Soon after this siege a +body of engineer troops arrived from England, but their number was +insufficient, and Wellington, having learned by sad experience the +importance of engineer troops, ordered a body of two hundred volunteers +to be detached from the line, "and daily instructed in the practice of +sapping, making and laying fascines and gabions, and the construction of +batteries, &c." The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, which immediately followed +this organization, was conducted with greater skill and success than any +other till nearly the close of the war; and all military writers have +attributed this result to the greater efficiency of the engineer force +engaged in the siege. This arm was now gradually increased, and the last +year of the war the engineer force with the English army in the field +consisted of seventy-seven officers, seven assistant-engineers and +surveyors, four surgeons and assistants, one thousand six hundred and +forty-six sappers, miners, artificers, &c., one thousand three hundred +and forty horses and one hundred and sixty carriages.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_38_38"></a><a href="#FNanchor_38_38">[38]</a><div class="note"><p> Colonel Pasley states that only <i>one and a half yards of +excavation</i>, per man, was executed <i>in a whole night</i>, by the untrained +troops in the Peninsular war; whereas an instructed sapper can easily +accomplish this <i>in twenty minutes</i>, and that it has been done by one of +his most skilful sappers, at Chatham, <i>in seven minutes!</i></p></div> + +<p>During all this time the French furnished their armies in Spain with +well-organized engineer forces. We have endeavored to form a comparison +of the number of French engineers and artillerists employed on these +peninsular sieges. But from the loose manner in which these details are +usually given by historians, it is almost impossible to distinguish +between the two. Both are not unfrequently given under the same head, +and when a distinction is apparently kept up, only the engineer <i>staff</i> +is mentioned under the head of engineers—the sappers, miners, +artificers, the train, &c., all being put down as artillery. In the +following table we have endeavored to arrange them as is done in our own +army. The trains of both arms are left out, for frequently that of one +arm performed the duties of the other. Moreover, in our service a +portion of these duties of engineer and artillery trains is performed by +the quartermaster's department. For those who wish to know the exact +organization of the French engineer train, we give it as it existed in +1811, viz.:—seven troops, each troop consisting of three officers, one +hundred and forty-one non-commissioned officers and privates, two +hundred and fifty horses, and fifty wagons, conveying five thousand two +hundred and seventy intrenching tools, one thousand seven hundred +cutting tools, one thousand eight hundred and two artificers' tools, two +hundred and fifty-three miners' tools, and eight thousand three hundred +and eighteen kilogrammes' weight of machinery and stores, each article +being made to a particular pattern. The pioneers in Spain acted +sometimes with one arm and sometimes with the other, and we have +assigned them accordingly in the table. The pontoniers, however, in our +service are included with the engineers; we have therefore put them, in +our table, in the same column with the engineers.</p> + +<table border="1" summary="Siege, Engineers"> +<tr><td width="300" rowspan="2">Name of Siege.</td> +<td width="100" colspan="2">Engineer staff, sappers, miners, pontoniers and pioneers.</td> +<td width="100" colspan="2">Artillery staff, horse and foot artillery, ouvriers and pioneers</td> +<td width="100" rowspan="2">Total of engineers, sappers, miners, pontoniers and pioneers </td> +<td width="100" rowspan="2">Total of artillery staff, horse and foot artillery, ouvriers and pioneers</td></tr> +<tr><td width="100">Officers</td> +<td width="100">Men</td> +<td width="100">Officer</td> +<td width="100">Men</td> +<tr><td width="300">Saragossa</td> +<td width="100">86</td> +<td width="100">1180</td> +<td width="100">90</td> +<td width="100">1276</td> +<td width="100">1275</td> +<td width="100">1360</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Rosas</td> +<td width="100">21</td> +<td width="100">211</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">232</td> +<td width="100">461</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Girona</td> +<td width="100">54</td> +<td width="100">603</td> +<td width="100">62</td> +<td width="100">1299</td> +<td width="100">637</td> +<td width="100">1361</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Astorga</td> +<td width="100">7</td> +<td width="100">91</td> +<td width="100">17</td> +<td width="100">427</td> +<td width="100">98</td> +<td width="100">444</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Lerida</td> +<td width="100">15</td> +<td width="100">316</td> +<td width="100">11</td> +<td width="100">208</td> +<td width="100">331</td> +<td width="100">219</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Meguinenza</td> +<td width="100">34</td> +<td width="100">278</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">312</td> +<td width="100">136</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">1st. Cuidad Rodrigo</td> +<td width="100">34</td> +<td width="100">441</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">475</td> +<td width="100">1019</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Almeida</td> +<td width="100">34</td> +<td width="100">489</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">523</td> +<td width="100">1019</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Tortosa</td> +<td width="100">43</td> +<td width="100">429</td> +<td width="100">32</td> +<td width="100">381</td> +<td width="100">472</td> +<td width="100">413</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Tarragona</td> +<td width="100">50</td> +<td width="100">681</td> +<td width="100">46</td> +<td width="100">701</td> +<td width="100">731</td> +<td width="100">747</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Olivensa</td> +<td width="100">10</td> +<td width="100">106</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">116</td> +<td width="100">186</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">1st. Badajos</td> +<td width="100">25</td> +<td width="100">707</td> +<td width="100">41</td> +<td width="100">699</td> +<td width="100">732</td> +<td width="100">740</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Tarifa</td> +<td width="100">12</td> +<td width="100">235</td> +<td width="100">17</td> +<td width="100">148</td> +<td width="100">247</td> +<td width="100">165</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Peniscola</td> +<td width="100">13</td> +<td width="100">138</td> +<td width="100">9</td> +<td width="100">183</td> +<td width="100">151</td> +<td width="100">192</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">2nd. Cuidad Rodrigo</td> +<td width="100">3</td> +<td width="100">12</td> +<td width="100">8</td> +<td width="100">160</td> +<td width="100">15</td> +<td width="100">168</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">2nd. Badajos</td> +<td width="100">9</td> +<td width="100">256</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">-</td> +<td width="100">265</td> +<td width="100">268</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Burgos</td> +<td width="100">4</td> +<td width="100">124</td> +<td width="100">3</td> +<td width="100">126</td> +<td width="100">128</td> +<td width="100">129</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Castio Udiales</td> +<td width="100">5</td> +<td width="100">68</td> +<td width="100">8</td> +<td width="100">197</td> +<td width="100">73</td> +<td width="100">205</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">St Sebastian</td> +<td width="100">13</td> +<td width="100">248</td> +<td width="100">7</td> +<td width="100">166</td> +<td width="100">261</td> +<td width="100">173</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<p>From this table it appears that the ratio of the two arms at these +sieges, making the comparison on the basis of our own organization, is +about the same as for the present French army in Algeria, or a little +more than five of engineers to six of artillery.</p> + +<p>Thus far we have spoken of the field-operations of engineer troops in +connection with fortifications, alluding only incidentally to the use of +military bridges and the passage of rivers. In the early wars of the +French Revolution the want of pontoniers was severely felt, and from the +deficiency of this branch of service, the operations of the French +generals were on several occasions very much restricted. The evil was +afterwards remedied in a great degree by the introduction of several +battalions of ponioniers in the regular army organization. On many +occasions, during his wars, did Napoleon feel and acknowledge the +importance of these troops; but on none, perhaps, was this importance +more clearly shown than in the passage of the Beresina during his +retreat from Moscow with the wreck of his army. The Russians had cut the +bridge of Borisow and taken position in great strength on the right bank +of the river, both at this point and below; the French, wearied with +long and difficult marches, destitute of artillery, provisions, and +military stores, with a wide and deep river in front, and a powerful +enemy on their flank and rear, benumbed by the rigors of a merciless +climate, and dispirited by defeat—every thing seemed to promise their +total destruction. "General Eblé," says an English general officer, in +his remarks on this retreat, "who, from the beginning of the campaign, +had made all the arrangements for the equipment and construction of +military bridges, was specially charged with the important duty of +providing for the passage of this river; and he discharged that duty +with a degree of forecast and ability to which certainly Napoleon owed +his escape and the wreck of his army its safety. General Eblé had begun +to prepare, at Smolensko, for the difficulties which he foresaw in this +operation. He formed, with every care, a train sufficient for the +transport of all the tools and stores that might be required; and, +further to provide against casualties and accidents, every man belonging +to the companies of pontoniers was obliged to carry from Smolensko a +tool or implement of some kind, and a proportion of nails: and fortunate +was it for the army that he did so; for such was the difficulty in +getting through the carriages containing stores, that only two +forge-wagons and six caissons of tools and nails could be preserved. To +these the general added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of +carriages that were abandoned on the march. Much was sacrificed to bring +off these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as +Segur observes, that exertion '<i>sauva l'armée</i>.'"</p> + +<p>But it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most +likely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting +from the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its +importance and the advantages to be derived from its possession. A few +examples of this nature, drawn from military history, may be +instructive. We need not go back to the disastrous passage of the +Vistula by Charles XII., the failure of Marlborough to pass the Dyle, +and Eugene to cross the Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessful +attempts of Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The wars +following the French Revolution are sufficiently replete with useful +instruction on this subject.<a name="FNanchor_39_39"></a><a href="#Footnote_39_39"><sup>[39]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_39_39"></a><a href="#FNanchor_39_39">[39]</a><div class="note"><p> Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one +example, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was +deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of +Baden in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrown +across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory +gained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for +want of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a <i>single</i> bridge, the +passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently +interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder +ensued, and the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only a +small part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the +battle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the whole +operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy +this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers saved it. We here +remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important victory; 2d, +from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in +great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince of +Baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, this +single bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces; +4th, the skill of the little corps of French pontoniers saved the +bridge, and of consequence, the army.</p></div> + +<p>In 1794 so great was the disorder in the direction of affairs, that the +boats of the bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of for +commercial purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, "the +conquerors of Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a +time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means +of crossing a river." A few boats were procured from the Wahal and the +Meuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the Moselle; but "these +operations consumed precious time, and <i>four months</i> thus passed away in +preparations." Even after other things were all ready, the army was +obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges; +during this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with +very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage.</p> + +<p>In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the French +collected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the +Rhine at Neuweid and Kehl without loss or delay. The latter of these +passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and +certainly does credit to the general who directed it. But Moreau's +bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign, +his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing +a new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all +private boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of +collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as +entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite +bank of the river. The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of +no further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the +open day, and in face of the enemy. Undertaken under such circumstances, +"the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very +doubtful;" and had it failed, "Moreau's army would have been ruined for +the campaign."</p> + +<p>Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly how +important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers. +"I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow +the enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and +deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. We had no +means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves +with the means of embarkation found at Placentia and its environs. +Lannes, chief of brigade, crossed in the first boats, with the advanced +guard. The Austrians had only ten squadrons on the other side, and these +were easily overcome. The passage was now continued without +interruption, but very slowly. <i>If I had had a good ponton-equipage, the +fate of the enemy's army had been sealed; but the necessity of passing +the river by successive embarkations saved it."</i></p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1799, the Archduke attempted to pass the Aar, and +attacked the French on the opposite side, but for want of suitable +equipage his operation was delayed till the enemy had collected +sufficient forces to intercept the passage; he was now obliged to enter +into a stipulation for a suspension of hostilities, and to withdraw his +bridges.</p> + +<p>The operations of the French in the campaign of 1800, led to the most +glorious results, but their execution was attended with the greatest +difficulties. The passage of the Alps was greatly facilitated by the +ability of the chief engineer, Marescot, and the skill of the troops +under his command; and the facility of passing rivers afforded Napoleon +by his pontoniers, had an important influence upon the success of the +campaign. "The army of the reserve had many companies of pontoniers and +sappers; the pontons of course could not be taken across the St. +Bernard, but the pontoniers soon found materials on the Po and Tesin for +constructing bridge equipages." Moreau's army in the same year profited +well by his pontoniers, in the passages of the Inn, the Salza, the +Traun, the Alza, &c., and in the pursuit of the Austrian army—a pursuit +that has but a single parallel example in modern history.</p> + +<p>The facility with which Napoleon crossed rivers, made forced marches, +constructed redoubts, fortified dépôts, and grasped the great strategic +points of the enemy in the campaign of 1805, resulted from the skilful +organization of his army, and the efficiency given to the forces +employed in these important operations. The engineer staff of the French +army at this period, consisted of four hundred and forty-nine officers, +and there were four battalions of sappers, of one hundred and twenty +officers and seven thousand and ninety-two men; six companies of miners, +of twenty-four officers and five hundred and seventy-six men; and two +regiments of pontoniers, of thirty-eight officers and nine hundred and +sixty men. On the contrary, the enemy's neglect of these things is one +of the most striking of the many faults of the war, and his ill-directed +efforts to destroy the great wooden bridge across the Danube, and the +successful operations of the French sappers in securing it, formed one +of the principal turning points in the campaign.</p> + +<p>The same organization enabled the French to perform their wonderfully +rapid and decisive movements in the Prussian campaign of 1806, and the +northern operations of 1807.</p> + +<p>In 1809, Napoleon's army crossed, with the most wonderful rapidity, the +Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and other rivers emptying into the Danube, +and reached Vienna before the wonder-stricken Austrians could prepare +for its defence. It was then necessary for the French to effect a +passage of the Danube, which was much swollen by recent rains and the +melting snow of the mountains. Considering the depth and width of the +river, the positions of the enemy, and his preparations to oppose a +passage, with the disastrous consequences that would result to the +French from any failure in its execution; taking all these things into +consideration, Jomini pronounced it "one of the most hazardous and +difficult of all the operations of War." Here the fate of the army +depended, apparently, upon the skill and efficiency of the engineers and +pontoniers, and nobly did they discharge the trust reposed in them. When +the pontons failed, tressel-bridges were substituted, and even +fifty-four enormous boats were put in requisition. So skilfully were +these operations conducted, that Napoleon's immense army crossed over in +safety, directly in the face of a superior enemy, and the same day +fought the memorable battle of Esling. Forced to retire before numbers +vastly superior to his own, Napoleon concentrated his forces on the +island of Lobau, and intrenched his position. Surrounded by the broad +and deep channel of the Danube, and watched by numerous and skilful +enemies, it required the most constant activity and the greatest good +fortune to effect a passage. Here the skill and efficiency of the +engineers shone conspicuously; a number of bridges were thrown across +the river in the face of the Austrians, and against obstacles almost +insurmountable; the whole French army passed in safety, and soon put the +finishing stroke to that brilliant campaign. So high an estimate did +Napoleon attach to the construction of these bridges, that, when the +passage was completed, he offered to place Bertrand, the constructing +engineer, though of comparatively low rank, at the head of the French +<i>corps du genie</i>.</p> + +<p>On many occasions during the retreat in 1812-13, from the Beresina to +the left of the Rhine, across the Niemen, the Vistula, the Oder, the +Elbe, and the numerous other rivers which divide that immense country, +the French derived vast advantages from the experience and skill of +their engineers and pontoniers, several times whole corps escaping +through their means from the grasp of their pursuers. When, however, the +disasters of this retreat had absorbed most of the material of the army, +and had sadly thinned the ranks of men of skill and experience, they +sustained many severe, and, in other circumstances, unnecessary losses. +Of this character we may mention the passage of the Elster by the bridge +of Lindnau, where, through the ignorance and carelessness of those +charged with the mines, and through the want of suitable bridge +arrangements, thousands of brave men were buried in the muddy waters of +this small river. So sensibly did Napoleon feel this want of bridge +equipages, in the winter of 1813-14, that he addressed to his minister +of war, on this subject, the following remarkable words: "If I had had +pontons, I should have already annihilated the army of Schwartzenberg, +and closed the war; I should have taken from him eight or ten thousand +wagons, and his entire army in detail; but for want of the proper means +I could not pass the Seine." Again, on the 2d of March he wrote: "If I +had had a bridge equipage this morning, Blücher's army had been lost." +Whoever will examine the details of the operations of this campaign, +will be convinced of the full force of these remarks.</p> + +<p>In Spain in 1808, Sir John Moore, in order to assist the native forces, +had penetrated so near the army of Napoleon, that retreat became +exceedingly difficult, and he was several times on the point of being +lost. The English army was at this time very deficient in engineer +troops, and Moore suffered much for want of miners to destroy bridges, +and pontoniers to construct new ones. In order to cover his retreat and +impede the advance of the French, the commander-in-chief, says Napier, +"directed several bridges to be destroyed, but the engineers [for want +of miners and miner's tools] failed of success in every attempt."</p> + +<p>In Soult's retreat, in 1809, he crossed the Duero at Oporto, and +destroyed the bridges so as to cut off the pursuit of Wellington. But +while Soult, deceived by treachery in his own corps, neglected to guard +the river with proper vigilance, Wellington collected boats at different +points, crossed over his army, surprised the French, and, had it not +been for the singular delay and indecision of General Murray, would most +certainly have forced the entire army to capitulate; as it was, his +operation produced a decided influence on the campaign, and effected the +safety of Beresford's corps. Soult destroyed his artillery and baggage, +and hastily retreated through the mountain passes; but his army was +again arrested at the river Cavado, and placed on the very brink of +destruction, when the brave and skilful Dulong succeeded in effecting a +passage at the Ponte Nova; the same daring officer opened, on the same +day, a way for the further escape of the French across the Misarella by +the Saltador.</p> + +<p>In the pursuit of Massena, in 1810, it was important to the English to +cross the Guadiana, and attack the French before Badajos could be put in +a state of defence. Beresford was directed by Wellington to pass this +river at Jerumina, where the Portuguese had promised to furnish pontons; +but they neglected to fulfil their engagement, and the army had to wait +till Capt. Squire, an able and efficient officer of engineers, could +construct other means for effecting a passage. Every thing was done +that genius could devise and industry execute; nevertheless, the +operations of the army were greatly delayed—"<i>a delay,</i>" says the +historian, "<i>that may be considered as the principal cause of those long +and bloody operations which afterwards detained Lord Wellington more +than a year on the frontiers of Portugal.</i>"</p> + +<p>We might prolong these remarks by discussing the passages of the Ceira +and Alva, and their influence on the pursuit of Massena; Wellington's +passage of the Tagus, and his retreat from Burgos in 1812; the passage +of the Adour and Garonne in 1814; and the failure of the mines to blow +up the bridges of Saltador, Alcantara, &c.; but a sufficient number of +examples, it is believed, has already been adduced to show the advantage +of maintaining a properly organized and instructed body of sappers, +miners, and pontoniers, and the fatal results attending the want of such +troops, as a component part of an army organization.</p> + +<p>It has already been remarked that the infantry of an army must always +form the basis of the apportionment; and by the general rule laid down +by military writers, the cavalry should be from one-fourth to one-sixth +of the infantry, according to the character of the war; the artillery +about two-thirds of the cavalry, or one-seventh of the infantry; and the +engineers from one-half to three-fourths of the artillery,—say about +two-thirds. The staff and administrative corps must vary according to +the nature of the organization, and the character of the theatre of war. +The former ought to be from two to five in a thousand, and the latter +from twenty-five to seventy-five,<a name="FNanchor_40_40"></a><a href="#Footnote_40_40"><sup>[40]</sup></a> as a general rule. These ratios +would give for a good army organization;</p> + +<table summary="Staff and Administration numbers"> +<tr><td width="300">Staff</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 5</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Administrative service—pay, medical, commissary, quarter-master, etc.</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 65</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Infantry</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 650</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Cavalry</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 130</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Artillery</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 90</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Engineers</td> +<td width="50" align="right">60</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="50" align="right">========</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Total</td> +<td width="50" align="right">1,000</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<p>In a broken country, and against savage and undisciplined foes, like the +Indians in this country, the natives opposed to the English in India, to +the French in Algeria, or to the Russians in Circassia, the cavalry, +artillery, and engineers would be diminished, and the infantry and +administrative corps proportionably increased; the former because light +troops are always preferable against an undisciplined foe, and the +latter because of the difficulty of moving and procuring supplies in new +and uncultivated countries. The French forces in Algeria, in 1844, +amounted to about sixty thousand men, in the following proportion:—</p> +<br> +<table summary="Troop ratios"> +<tr><td width="300"> Staff</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 4.7</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Administrative,etc.</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 112.3</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Infantry</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 687.3</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Cavalry,</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 86.6</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Artillery</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 61.2</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Engineers</td> +<td width="50" align="right">47.9</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="80">==========</td> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="80" align="right">1000 men.</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<a name="Footnote_40_40"></a><a href="#FNanchor_40_40">[40]</a><div class="note"><p> This supposes the teamsters, wagon-masters, +hospital-servants, &c., to be enlisted men, and not persons hired for +the occasion as is done in our army.</p></div> + +<p>In small peace establishments the relative proportion of infantry and +cavalry should be much less than when prepared for the field, because +troops for these two arms can be much more readily formed in case of +emergency, than for those which require more scientific information, and +technical skill and instruction. The staff and engineers are evidently +the most difficult to be formed in case of war, and next to these the +artillery and administrative corps.</p> + +<p>In this country we can maintain, in time of peace, only the framework of +an army, looking to our citizen soldiery to form, in case of need, the +great mass of our military force. This is the starting point in our +military system, and the basis of our army organization. Let us see +whether this principle is carried out in practice.</p> + +<p>For every thousand men in our present organization<a name="FNanchor_41_41"></a><a href="#Footnote_41_41"><sup>[41]</sup></a> we have,</p> +<br> +<table summary="Troop Ratios"> +<tr><td width="300">For the staff</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 2</td></tr> +<tr><td width=300> Administrative</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 20<a name="FNanchor_42_42"></a><a href="#Footnote_42_42"><sup>[42]</sup></a></td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Infantry</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 513</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Cavalry</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 150</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"> Artillery</td> +<td width="50" align="right"> 310</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300">Engineers</td> +<td width="50" align="right">5</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="100" align="right">=======</td></tr> +<tr><td width="300"></td> +<td width="100" align="right">1000 men</td></tr></table> +<br> + +<a name="Footnote_41_41"></a><a href="#FNanchor_41_41">[41]</a><div class="note"><p> These numbers are the real rather than the <i>nominal</i> +proportions, many of our officers being called <i>staff</i>, who properly +belong to one of the other classes.</p></div> + +<a name="Footnote_42_42"></a><a href="#FNanchor_42_42">[42]</a><div class="note"><p> Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by +unenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies. Where such +is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no +higher than is represented above.</p></div> + +<p>We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as +numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our +engineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a +war establishment. To this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry +in our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as the +latter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery. +But for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be +proportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is +actually the case. </p> + +<p>Experience in the first campaigns of the American Revolution strongly +impressed on the mind of Washington the absolute necessity of forming a +regular and systematic army organization. But so difficult was it to +obtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his +engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make +drafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularly +instructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by the +officers of this corps. An order, in his own handwriting, giving the +details of this temporary arrangement, is dated March 30th, 1779. Until +men are enlisted for the purpose, companies of sappers and miners shall +be formed by drafts from the line. "The duties of the companies of +sappers and miners," he continues, "shall be under the direction of the +engineers, to construct field-works of every kind, and all works +necessary for the attack or defence of places, as circumstances may +require. On a march in the vicinity of an enemy, a detachment of the +companies of sappers and miners shall be stationed at the head of the +column, directly after the vanguard, for the purpose of opening and +mending the roads, and removing obstructions," &c. &c.</p> + +<p>The great difficulties encountered by Washington in instructing his +inexperienced forces in the more difficult branches of the art, made him +the more earnest, in after years, to impress on us how important it was +for us <i>In peace to prepare for war.</i> The preparation here meant is not +the keeping up, in time of peace, of a large standing army, ever ready +to take the field; but rather the formation of a small body, educated +and practised in all the scientific and difficult parts of the +profession; a body which shall serve as the <i>cadre</i> or framework of a +large army, capable of imparting to the new and inexperienced soldiers +of the republic that skill and efficiency which has been acquired by +practice. How far have we accomplished this object, and what will be the +probable operations in case of another contest with a European power? +New and inexperienced troops will be called into the field to oppose a +veteran and disciplined army. From these troops we shall expect all the +bravery and energy resulting from ardent patriotism and an enthusiastic +love of liberty. But we cannot here expect much discipline, military +skill, or knowledge of the several branches of the military art. The +peaceful habits of our citizens tend but little to the cultivation of +the military character. How, then, are we to oppose the hostile force? +Must human blood be substituted for skill and preparation, and dead +bodies of our citizens serve as epaulements against the inroads of the +enemy? To some extent, we fear it must be the case; but not entirely so, +for government has not altogether neglected to make preparation for such +an event. Fortifications have been planned or erected on the most +important and exposed positions; military materials and munitions have +been collected in the public arsenals; a military school has been +organized to instruct in the military sciences; there are regularly kept +up small bodies of infantry and cavalry, weak in numbers, but capable of +soon making good soldiers of a population so well versed as ours is in +the use of the musket and the horse; an artillery force, proportionally +much larger, is also regularly maintained, with a sufficient number of +men and officers to organize and make good artillery-men of citizens +already partially acquainted with the use of the cannon. But an +acquaintance with infantry, cavalry, and artillery duties is not the +only practical knowledge requisite in war. In the practical operations +of an army in the field, rivers are to be crossed, bridges suddenly +erected and suddenly destroyed, field-works constructed and defended, +batteries captured and destroyed; fortifications are to be put in order +and defended, or to be besieged and recaptured; trenches must be opened, +mines sprung, batteries established, breaches made and stormed; +trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, gabions, fascines, and numerous other +military implements and machinery are to be constructed. Have our +citizens a knowledge of these things, or have we provided in our +military establishment for a body of men instructed and practised in +this branch of the military art, and capable of imparting to an army the +necessary efficiency for this service? Unfortunately this question must +be answered in the negative; and it is greatly to be feared that the +future historian will have to say of us, as Napier has said of the +English:—"<i>The best officers and soldiers were obliged to sacrifice +themselves in a lamentable manner, to compensate for the negligence and +incapacity of a government always ready to plunge the nation into a war, +without the slightest care of what was necessary to obtain success. +Their sieges were a succession of butcheries; because the commonest +materials, and the means necessary to their art, were denied the +engineers</i>."<a name="FNanchor_43_43"></a><a href="#Footnote_43_43"><sup>[43]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_43_43"></a><a href="#FNanchor_43_43">[43]</a><div class="note"><p> The subjects discussed in this chapter are also treated by +most authors on Military Organization and Military History, and by the +several writers on Military Engineering. Allent, Vauban, Cormontaigne, +Rocquancourt, Pasley, Douglas, Jones, Belmas, Napier, Gay de Vernon, may +be referred to with advantage. Pasley, Douglas, Jones, and Napier, speak +in the strongest terms of the importance of engineer troops in the +active operations of a war, and of the absolute necessity of organizing +this force in time of peace. A list of books of reference on Military +Engineering will be given at the close of the following chapters. +</p><p> +While these pages are passing through the press, Congress has authorized +the President to raise <i>one company</i> of engineer troops! This number is +altogether too small to be of any use in time of war.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_XIII"></a><h2>CHAPTER XIII. </h2> + +<p>PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.</p> +<br> + +<p><i>Fortification</i> is defined,—the art of disposing the ground in such a +manner as to enable a small number of troops to resist a larger army the +longest time possible. If the work be placed in a position of much +importance, and its materials be of a durable character, it is called +permanent; if otherwise, it receives the appellation of <i>field</i>, or +<i>temporary</i>. Field-works are properly confined to operations of a single +campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be occupied +only for a short period. Generally these works are of earth, thrown up +by the troops in a single day. They are intimately connected with a +system of permanent fortifications, but from the facility of their +construction, no provision need be made for them before the actual +breaking out of war. Indeed, they could not well be built before +hostilities commenced, as their locality in each case must be determined +by the position of the hostile forces.</p> + +<p>Having already described the general influence of permanent +fortifications as a means of national defence, we shall here speak +merely of the principles of their construction. It is not proposed to +enter into any technical discussion of matters that especially belong +to the instruction of the engineer, but merely to give the nomenclature +and use of the more important parts of a military work; in a word, such +general information as should belong to officers of every grade and +corps of an army.</p> + +<p>The first species of fortification among the ancients was of course very +simple, consisting merely of an earthen mound, or palisades. A wall was +afterwards used, and a ditch was then added to the wall. It was found +that a straight wall could be easily breached by the enemy's +battering-rams; to remedy this evil, towers were built at short +intervals from each other, forming a broken line of salient and +re-entering parts. These towers or salient points gradually assumed a +shape approximating to the modern bastion.</p> + +<p>After the invention of gunpowder and the application of cannon to the +attack and defence of places, it became necessary to arrange earthen +ramparts behind the thin walls of the ancient works, for the reception +of the new artillery. Moreover these walls were soon found inadequate to +resist the missiles of the besiegers, and it became necessary to replace +them by parapets of earth. In order to cover the retaining walls of +these parapets from the besieging batteries, it was also found to be +necessary to lower these walls as much as possible, and to raise the +counterscarps. The traces or plans of the works, however, received no +material change till about the close of the fifteenth century.</p> + +<p>It is not known who first changed the ancient towers into bastions. Some +attribute it to an Italian, and with considerable show of reason, for a +bastion was built at Turin as early as 1461. Achmet Pacha, it is said, +fortified Otranto in this way, in 1480, but whether the system was +previously known among the Turks cannot be determined. Others attribute +the invention to Ziska, the celebrated leader of the Hussites. It is +most probable that the transition from the tower to the bastion was a +very gradual one, and that the change was perfected in several countries +at about the same time.</p> + +<p>Fortifications, like other arts and sciences, greatly flourished in +Italy under the Medicis, and that country furnished Europe with its most +skilful engineers. Catharine of Medicis introduced into France many of +her countrymen, distinguished in this profession; among these may be +named Bellamat, Bephano, Costritio, Relogio, Vorganno, the two Marini, +Campi, and Hieronimo, who built several important places and directed +the sieges of others. These able foreigners were rivalled by some +distinguished French engineers, who laid the foundation of the "<i>corps +du Genie</i>" which has since become a school of military instruction for +the world. Among the early French engineers may be distinguished +Lafontaine De Serré, Feuquières, and St. Remy. Pedro Navarro had been +appointed a member of this corps, but his attention was more specially +directed to mining, and we do not learn that he distinguished himself in +the construction of any fortification.</p> + +<p>In Germany, in the beginning of the sixteenth century, Albert Durer +distinguished himself as a writer on fortification; his book is +remarkable as containing the germs of many of the improvements which +were made by those who followed him. This is the more to be wondered at +as he was not a professed engineer. After him followed Spekel, a native +of Strasburg, who died in 1589. His writings are valuable as showing the +state of the art at that time, and the changes which he himself +introduced. He was an engineer of much practical knowledge and +experience, having assisted at the sieges of Malta, Golletta, Vienna, +Jula, Nicosia, Famagusta, &c.</p> + +<p>The first French engineer who wrote on fortification was Errard de +Bar-le-Duc, who published near the close of the sixteenth century. As an +engineer, he was rivalled by Chatillon, a man of distinguished merit. +Errard fortified Amiens, built a part of the castle of Sedan, and a +portion of the defences of Calais. Under the reign of Louis XIII., +Desnoyers, Deville, Pagan, and Fabre were greatly distinguished. Deville +published in 1628. He was a man of much learning and experience; but he +is said to have adopted, both in his theory and practice, the principles +of the Italian school, with most of its errors. Pagan began his military +career while young, and became <i>maréchal de champ</i> at the age of 38, +when, having the misfortune to become blind, he was compelled to +relinquish his brilliant hopes. He was the ablest engineer of his age, +and was also greatly distinguished in other branches of science. In his +plans he inclined to the Dutch rather than the Italian school of +fortification. He published in 1645.</p> + +<p>At the close of the sixteenth century, the Dutch had been forced to +resort to military defences to protect themselves against the +aggressions of the Spaniards. As the Dutch were inferior in other +military means, fortification became one of the vital resources of the +country. Their works, however, thrown up in much haste, were in many +respects defective, although well adapted to the exigencies of the time. +Freytag, their principal engineer, wrote in 1630. Some of his +improvements were introduced into France by Pagan. He was preceded by +Marolois, (a cotemporary of Pagan,) who published in 1613.</p> + +<p>In Germany, Rimpler, a Saxon, wrote on fortification in 1671. He was a +man of great experience, having served at the sieges of Candia, +Phillipsburg, Bonn, Riga, Bremen, Dansburg, Bommeln, &c. He fell at the +siege of Vienna in 1683. His writings are said to contain the groundwork +of Montalembert's system.</p> + +<p>In Italy, after the time of Tartaglia, Marchi, Campi, &c., we find no +great improvement in this art. Several Italians, however, distinguished +themselves as engineers under the Spaniards. The fortifications of +Badajos are a good example of the state of the art in Italy and Spain a +that epoch. The citadel of Antwerp, built by two Italian engineers, +Pacciotti and Cerbelloni, in 1568, has become celebrated for the siege +it sustained in 1832.</p> + +<p>The age of Louis XIV. effected a great revolution in the art of +fortification, and carried it to such a degree of perfection, that it +has since received but slight improvement. The years 1633 and 1634 are +interesting dates in the history of this art, as having given birth +respectively to Vauban and Coehorn. The former was chief engineer of +France under Louis XIV., and the latter held a corresponding position +under the Dutch republic. Coehorn's ideas upon fortification are +conceived with an especial view to the marshy soil of his own country, +and, although well suited to the object in view, are consequently of +less general application than those of his more distinguished +cotemporary and rival. The best specimens of his mode of construction +that exist at the present day, are the fortresses of Manheim, +Bergen-op-Zoom, Nimiguen, and Breda.</p> + +<p>Coehorn was followed in Holland by Landsberg, an able and practical +engineer, who to much reading added extensive experience, having himself +served at sixteen sieges. His system was in many respects peculiar, both +in trace and relief; it dispensed with the glacis, and all revertments +of masonry. His plans could be applied only to marshy soils. The first +edition of his work was published in 1685.</p> + +<p>But the career of Vauban forms the most marked and prominent era in the +history of fortification; it constitutes the connecting link between the +rude sketches of the earlier engineers, and the well-established form +which the art has since assumed. In his earlier works we find many of +the errors of his predecessors; but a gradual change seems to have been +wrought in his mind by reflection and experience, and these faults were +soon remedied and a new and distinct system developed. Vauban has left +no treatise upon his favorite art, and his ideas upon fortification have +been deduced from his constructions, and from detached memoirs left +among his papers. The nature of his labors, and the extent of his +activity and industry, may be imagined from the fact that he fought one +hundred and forty battles, conducted fifty-eight sieges, and built or +repaired three hundred fortifications. His memoirs, found among his +manuscript papers, on various military and political subjects, are +numerous, and highly praised even at the present day. But his beautiful +and numerous constructions, both of a civil and military character, are +real monuments to his genius. The best illustrations of his principles +of fortification occur at Lille, Strasbourg, Landau, Givet, and +Neuf-Brisack. His writings on mines, and the attack and defence of +places, are, by the profession, regarded as classic. His improvements in +the existing method of attack gave great superiority to the arms of his +countrymen, and even enabled him to besiege and capture his rival +Coehorn, in his own works. He died in 1707, and was soon succeeded by +Cormontaigne.</p> + +<p>The latter did not attempt the introduction of any new system, but +limited himself to improving and perfecting the plans of his illustrious +predecessors. His improvements, however, were both extensive and +judicious, and are sufficient to entitle him to the place he holds as +one of the ablest military engineers the world has ever produced. His +works on the subject of fortification, besides being elegantly written, +contain the most valuable information of any works we have. His most +admired constructions are to be found at Metz, Thionville, and Bitche. +The beautiful crown works of Billecroix, at Metz, are perfect models of +their kind. Cormontaigne died in 1750.</p> + +<p>Cotemporary with him were Sturin and Glasser. The former deviated but +slightly from the systems of his predecessors, but the latter invented +several ingenious improvements which gave him great reputation.</p> + +<p>Next follows Rosard, a Bavarian engineer; and Frederick Augustus, king +of Poland, who devoted himself particularly to this art. The former +casemated only the flanks of his works, but the latter introduced +casemate fire more extensively than any one who had preceded him.</p> + +<p>In France, Belidor and De Filey published about the middle of the last +century. They were both able engineers but their systems were inferior +to that of Cormontaigne.</p> + +<p>In 1767 De la Chiche introduced a system of fortification in many +respects original. He raised his covered-ways so as to conceal all his +masonry, and casemated a great portion of his <i>enceinte</i>. For exterior +defence, he employed direct fire from his barbettes, and curvated fire +from his casemates; the direct fire of the latter secured his ditches.</p> + +<p>Next to De la Chiche follows Montalembert, who published in 1776. He was +a man of much experience and considerable originality, but of no great +ability as an engineer. Most of his ideas were derived from De la Chiche +and the German school of Rimpler. His plans have generally been rejected +by his own countrymen, but they still have advocates among the Germans.</p> + +<p>General Virgin, a distinguished Swedish engineer, wrote in 1781. His +idea of strongly fortifying the smaller towns to the comparative neglect +of the larger cities, constitutes one of the principal novelties in his +system.</p> + +<p>In 1794, Reveroni devised a system in which the casemates of +Montalembert were employed, but his guns were so arranged as to be +employed in barbette while the besiegers were at a distance, and +afterwards to be used for casemated fire. The casemate gun-carriage, +which formed a part of his invention, was ingenious, but never much +employed in practice.</p> + +<p>Bousmard, a French emigrant, published in 1790. He adopted the general +trace of Vauban, but introduced modifications in the details essentially +different from those of Cormontaigne. Some of these modifications are +very valuable improvements, while others are of a more doubtful +character. Bousmard is, on the whole, a very able writer, and his works +should be found in the library of every military engineer.</p> + +<p>Carnot's celebrated treatise was published in 1810. He was evidently a +man of genius, and during his career at the head of the War Department +of France, numerous and very important improvements were made in the +several branches of the military art, and especially in strategy. His +work on fortification exhibits much originality and genius, but it is +doubtful whether it has very much contributed to the improvement of this +art. His ideas have been very severely, and rather unfairly criticised +by the English, and particularly by Sir Howard Douglas.</p> + +<p>Chasseloup de Laubat early distinguished himself as an engineer of much +capacity and talent. He followed Napoleon in nearly all his campaigns, +and conducted many of his sieges. He remodelled the fortifications of +Northern Italy and of the Lower Rhine. He published in 1811. The +improvements which he introduced are numerous and valuable, and he +probably contributed more to advance his art, and to restore the +equilibrium between attack and defence, than any other engineer since +Cormontaigne. After the fall of Napoleon and the partition of his +empire, the allies mutilated or destroyed the constructions of +Chasseloup, so that, it is believed, no perfect specimen of his system +remains.</p> + +<p>The cotemporaries of Chasseloup were mostly engaged in active field +service and sieges, and few had either leisure or opportunity to devote +themselves to improvements in permanent fortification.</p> + +<p>Choumara published in 1827. His system contains much originality, and +his writings give proof of talent and genius. He has very evidently more +originality than judgment, and it is hardly probable that his system +will ever be generally adopted in practice.</p> + +<p>The Metz system, as arranged by Noizet, as a theoretical study, is +undoubtedly the very best that is now known. It, however, requires great +modifications to suit it to different localities. For a horizontal site, +it is probably the most perfect system ever devised. It is based on the +system of Vauban as improved by Cormontaigne, and contains several of +the modifications suggested by modern engineers. It is applied in a +modified form to the new fortifications of Paris.</p> + +<p>Baron Rohault de Fleury has introduced many modifications of the +ordinary French system in his new defences of Lyons. We have seen no +written account of these works, but from a hasty examination in 1844, +they struck us as being too complicated and expensive.</p> + +<p>The new fortifications of Western Germany are modifications of Rempler's +system, as improved by De la Chiche and Montalembert. It is said that +General Aster, the directing engineer, has also introduced some of the +leading principles of Chasseloup and Carnot. </p> + +<p>The English engineers have satisfied themselves with following in the +track of their continental neighbors, and can offer no claims to +originality.</p> + +<p>Of the system of fortification now followed in our service we must +decline expressing any opinion; the time has not yet arrived for +subjecting it to a severe and judicious criticism. But of the system +pursued previous to 1820, we may say, without much fear of +contradiction, that a worse one could scarcely have been devised. +Instead of men of talent and attainments in military science, most of +our engineers were then either foreigners, or civilians who owed their +commissions to mere political influence. The qualifications of the +former were probably limited to their recollection of some casual visit +to two or three of the old European fortresses; and the latter probably +derived all their military science from some old military book, which, +having become useless in Europe, had found its way into this country, +and which they had read without understanding, and probably without even +looking at its date. The result was what might have been anticipated—a +total waste of the public money. We might illustrate this by numerous +examples. A single one, however, must suffice. About the period of the +last war, eight new forts were constructed for the defence of New York +harbor, at an expense of some two millions of dollars. Six of these were +<i>circular</i>, and the other two were <i>star forts</i>—systems which had been +discarded in Europe for nearly two thousand years! Three of these works +are now entirely abandoned, two others are useless, and large sums of +money have recently been expended on the other three in an attempt to +remedy their faults, and render them susceptible of a good defence. +Moreover, a number of the works which were constructed by our engineers +before that corps was made to feel the influence of the scientific +education introduced through the medium of the Military Academy—we say, +a considerable number of our fortifications, constructed by engineers +who owed their appointment to political influence, are not only wrong +in their plans, but have been made of such wretched materials and +workmanship that they are already crumbling into ruins.</p> + +<p>A fortification, in its most simple form, consists of a mound of earth, +termed, the <i>rampart</i>, which encloses the space fortified; a <i>parapet</i>, +surmounting the rampart and covering the men and guns from the enemy's +projectiles; a <i>scarp wall,</i> which sustains the pressure of the earth of +the rampart and parapet, and presents an insurmountable obstacle to an +assault by storm; a wide and deep <i>ditch</i>, which prevents the enemy from +approaching near the body of the place; a <i>counterscarp wall</i>, which +sustains the earth on the exterior of the ditch; a <i>covered way</i>, which +occupies the space between the counterscarp and a mound of earth called +a <i>glacis</i>, thrown up a few yards in front of the ditch for the purpose +of covering the scarp of the main work.</p> + +<p>The work by which the space fortified is immediately enveloped, is +called the <i>enceinte</i>, or <i>body of the place</i>. Other works are usually +added to the enceinte to strengthen the weak points of the +fortification, or to lengthen the siege by forcing the enemy to gain +possession of them before he can breach the body of the place: these are +termed <i>outworks</i>, when enveloped by the covered way, and <i>advanced +works</i>, when placed exterior to the covered way, but in some way +connected with the main work; but if entirely beyond the glacis, and not +within supporting distance of the fortress, they are called <i>detached +works</i>.</p> + +<p>In a bastioned front the principal outwork is the <i>demi-lune</i>, which is +placed in front of the curtain; it serves to cover the main entrance to +the work, and to place the adjacent bastions in strong re-enterings.</p> + +<p>The <i>tenaille</i> is a small low work placed in the ditch, to cover the +scarp wall of the curtain and flanks from the fire of the besieger's +batteries erected along the crest of the glacis.</p> + +<p>The <i>places of arms</i>, are points where troops are assembled in order to +act on the exterior of the work. The <i>re-entering places of arms</i>, are +small redans arranged at the points of junction of the covered ways of +the bastion and demi-lune. The <i>salient places of arms</i> are the parts of +the covered way in front of the salients of the bastion and demi-lune.</p> + +<p>Small permanent works, termed <i>redoubts</i>, are placed within the +demi-lune and re-entering places of arms for strengthening those works. +Works of this character constructed within the bastion are termed +<i>interior retrenchments;</i> when sufficiently elevated to command the +exterior ground, they are called <i>cavaliers.</i></p> + +<p><i>Caponniers</i> are works constructed to cover the passage of the ditch +from the tenaille to the gorge of the demi-lune, and also from the +demi-lune to the covered way, by which communication may be maintained +between the enceinte and outworks.</p> + +<p><i>Posterns</i> are underground communications made through the body of the +place or some of the outworks.</p> + +<p><i>Sortie-passages</i> are narrow openings made through the crest of the +glacis, which usually rise in the form of a ramp from the covered way, +by means of which communication may be kept up with the exterior. These +passages are so arranged that they cannot be swept by the fire of the +enemy. The other communications above ground are called <i>ramps, stairs,</i> +&c.</p> + +<p><i>Traverses</i> are small works erected on the covered way to intercept the +fire of the besieger's batteries.</p> + +<p><i>Scarp</i> and <i>counterscarp</i> galleries are sometimes constructed for the +defence of the ditch. They are arranged with loop-holes, through which +the troops of the garrison fire on the besiegers when they have entered +the ditch, without being themselves exposed to the batteries of the +enemy.</p> + +<p>In sea-coast defences, and sometimes in a land front for the defence of +the ditch, embrasures are made in the scarp wall for the fire of +artillery; the whole being protected from shells by a bomb-proof +covering over head: this arrangement is termed a <i>casemate</i>.</p> + +<p>Sometimes double ramparts and parapets are formed, so that the interior +one shall fire over the more advanced; the latter in this case is called +<i>a faussebraie</i>.</p> + +<p>If the inner work be separated from the other it is called a +<i>retrenchment</i><a name="FNanchor_44_44"></a><a href="#Footnote_44_44"><sup>[44]</sup></a> and if in addition it has a commanding fire, it is +termed, as was just remarked, a <i>cavalier</i>.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_44_44"></a><a href="#FNanchor_44_44">[44]</a><div class="note"><p> The term <i>retrenchment</i> implies an interior work, which is +constructed within or in rear of another, for the purpose of +strengthening it; the term <i>intrenchment</i>, on the contrary, implies an +independent work, constructed in the open field, without reference to +any other adjoining work.</p></div> + +<p>The <i>capital</i> of a bastion is a line bisecting its salient angle. All +the works comprehended between the capitals of two adjacent bastions is +termed a <i>front</i>: it is taken as the unit in permanent fortification.</p> + +<p><a href=images/465.gif>Fig. 39</a> represents the ground plan of a modern bastioned front, of a +regular and simple form, on a horizontal site.</p> + +<br> +<p>A, A, A—Is the enceinte, or body +of the place.</p> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>B</i>—The bastions.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>C</i>—The main ditch.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>D</i>—The covered ways.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>E</i>—The re-entering places of arms.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>F</i>—The salient places of arms.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>G</i>—The demi-lune.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>H</i>—The demi-lune ditch.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>J</i>—The demi-lune redoubt.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>L</i>—The ditch of the demi-lune</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 6.5em;">redoubt.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>M</i>—The redoubt of the re-entering</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 6.5em;">places of arms.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>N</i>—The ditches of the redoubts.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>O</i>—The tenaille.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>P</i>—The double caponier.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>a</i>—The traverses.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>b</i>—The sortie-passages.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>c</i>—Stairs.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;"><i>d</i>—Cut in the demi-lune to flank</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 7em;">the redoubt of the re-entering</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 7em;">place of arms.</span><br> +<br> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 40</a> represents a section through the line <i>mn'</i> of the preceding +figure.</p> + +<br> +<p>A—Is the rampart.</p> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>B</i>—The parapet.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>C</i>—The ditch.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>D</i>—The scarp wall.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>E</i>—The counterscarp wall.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>F</i>—The glacis.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>G</i>—The covered way.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>H</i>—The terre-plain.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>J</i>—The parade.</span><br> +<br> + +<p>Sometimes half embrasures are cut in the earthen parapet of a fort, so +as to sink the gun below the crest, and thus more effectually cover the +men from the enemy's fire.</p> + +<p>But guns in embrasure have a far less extended field of fire than when +mounted in barbette; moreover, the embrasures present openings through +which an enemy may penetrate in an assault. Owing to these objections, +they are employed only for the protection of particular points; that is, +where it is important to cover the artillerists from the enemy's fire, +or where the guns are to be used merely to protect a ditch, or to +enfilade a road, &c. The bottom of the embrasure is called the <i>sole</i>, +the sides are called <i>cheeks</i>, and the mass of earth between two +embrasures, the <i>merlon</i>. Embrasures may be made either direct or +oblique, according as the fire is required to be perpendicular or +oblique to the parapet.</p> + +<p>A <i>coverport</i> is a small outwork of any convenient form, erected +immediately in front of a gateway, to screen it from the enemy's fire.</p> + +<p>A <i>counterguard</i> is a more extensive work, constructed in front of a +part of the fortress itself, or of some other outwork of greater +importance, which it is intended to cover. These are sometimes called +<i>coverfaces</i>, from their situation and object; but the former term is +most commonly used.</p> + +<p>Sometimes outworks, called <i>tenaillons</i>, consisting of one long and one +short face, are placed on each side of the demi-lune of a front of +fortification, for the purpose of prolonging the siege. (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 41.</a>)</p> + +<p>Small, or <i>demi</i>-tenaillons, are frequently so arranged as to cover only +one-half of the demi-lune, and then a <i>bonnet</i> constructed in front of +the salient of the demi-lune. (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig.42.</a>) In this case the bonnet is +flanked by the short faces of the demi-tenaillons; these short faces are +themselves flanked by the demi-lune, while the bastions flank the long +faces.</p> + +<p>A <i>horn-work</i> consists of a front of fortification, and two wings +resting on the faces of bastions of a front of the fortress. It +sometimes has also a demi-lune or bonnet, as in the case of +demi-tenaillons. (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 43.</a>)</p> + +<p>A <i>crown-work</i> consists of two fronts of fortification, and two wings. +(<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 44.</a>) It is sometimes made <i>double</i>, and even <i>triple</i>.</p> + +<p>These works are also employed as advanced works, and placed entirely in +front of the glacis. They have generally been added to a fortress for +the purpose of occupying some important piece of ground not included +within the limits of the main work. They may be constructed with covered +ways, and sometimes it may be found advantageous to secure them by +retrenchments.</p> + +<p>A <i>detached work</i> may be made in any form deemed best suited to the +site. Being but remotely connected with the fortress, the latter will +exercise but slight influence on the character of its plan or +construction. They are usually of limited extent and slight relief, +partaking much of the nature of field-works.<a name="FNanchor_45_45"></a><a href="#Footnote_45_45"><sup>[45]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_45_45"></a><a href="#FNanchor_45_45">[45]</a><div class="note"><p> The general principles of permanent fortification may be +best learned from the writings of Cormontaigne, St. Paul de Noizet, and +Laurillard-Fallot. A list of valuable books of reference on the several +branches of military engineering will be given at the close of the next +chapter.</p></div> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_XIV"></a><h2>CHAPTER XIV.</h2> + +<p>FIELD-ENGINEERING.</p> +<br> + +<p><i>Field-Engineering</i> includes the making of military reconnaissances, +temporary fortifications, and military roads; the planning and +construction of military bridges; the attack and defence of military +works;—in fine, all the various duties of engineer troops, either in +the operations of a campaign, or in the dispositions on the +battle-field.</p> + +<p><i>Military reconnaissance.</i>—By this term is meant an examination of a +portion of the theatre of war, to ascertain its military character and +resources. If the examination be made of a large district of country, +and for an entire campaign, the reconnaissance is <i>general</i>; if made for +collecting detailed information respecting a proposed line of march, the +passage of a river, the position of an enemy, &c., it is termed +<i>special</i>.</p> + +<p>In making a general reconnaissance, great care should be taken to +collect accurate information respecting the general topography of the +country; the character of the mountains, forests, and water-courses; the +nature of the roads, canals, and railways; the quality of the soil, and +the amount of provisions and forage it produces; the population and +character of the cities, towns, and villages, the commercial and +manufacturing resources of every part of the country, and the means of +transportation to be found in each district. The plan of military +operations will be based on the information thus obtained, and any +serious error in the reconnaissance may involve the results of the +campaign, and even the fate of the war.</p> + +<p>In a special reconnaissance, not only accurate but minute information +will be required: the character of the roads must be given in detail; +the nature of the water-courses, their depth and velocity; the position +and character of bridges, and fords;—in fine, a full description of all +obstacles to be encountered, and the means that can be made available +for overcoming these obstacles.</p> + +<p>A reconnoitring officer may usually derive much valuable information +from the published maps and descriptions of the country to be examined; +additional matters of detail may be obtained from woodsmen, hunters, and +fishermen; and also from the innkeepers and local authorities of the +district. But the officer should always verify this information, so far +as practical, by personal examination. In making a reconnaissance in the +vicinity of an enemy, he must be supported by a strong escort of mounted +troops, and in all his operations the greatest precaution will be +requisite to ensure success.</p> + +<p>Some simple instrument, such as a pocket sextant, or compass, will be +sufficient to enable the reconnoitring officer to measure, with +considerable accuracy, the height of mountains, the width of streams, +&c., and an ordinary scale and dividers will enable him to make a +suitable military sketch.</p> + +<p><i>Temporary Fortification.</i>—It has been stated in the preceding chapter +that temporary fortifications are properly confined to the operations of +a single campaign, and are used to strengthen positions which are to be +occupied only for a short period; and that they are usually made of +earth, thrown up by the troops in a single day. Temporary +fortifications, as a part of field-engineering, may therefore be +regarded rather as an <i>arm</i> than an <i>art</i>. The principles of their +construction are derived, of course, from the theory of permanent +fortification, but in applying these principles to practice in the +field, much greater latitude is allowed than in the exact scientific +arrangement of permanent works.</p> + +<p>The purpose of field-works (or intrenchments, as they are commonly +called) is to arrest, or at least to impede, the march of the attacking +foe; to shelter the defensive troops from the missive weapons of the +assailants, and to detain them in a position where they will be exposed +to the fire of the defensive force. The numerical and positive strength +of the assailed may be much less than that of the assailant, and yet an +equilibrium exist; the material obstacles compensating for the +difference in numbers. Intrenchments, though inert masses, must +therefore be regarded as most valuable and important accessaries in the +defence of a position.</p> + +<p>Intrenchments consist either of <i>lines</i> of works made to cover extended +positions, or of <i>detached</i> works designed simply to defend the ground +they occupy. The former generally present a front against the enemy in +but one direction, while the latter are usually closed on all their +sides.</p> + +<p>The following figures have been employed for the plan of simple +intrenchments, viz.: the polygon, redan, lunette, mitre, star-fort, and +bastion.</p> + +<p><i>Square</i> or <i>polygonal redoubts</i> are the most common forms given to +field-works, on account of the ease of their construction. But they have +many defects. There is a sector without fire in front of each salient, +and the ditches are without protection. The latter objection also holds +good against all circular works.</p> + +<p>The <i>redan</i> (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 45</a>) is frequently used to cover a point in rear, as a +bridge, a ford, or a defile. When used alone, its gorge should be closed +by palisades. Its ditches are unprotected.</p> + +<p>The <i>lunette</i> (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 46</a>) has nearly the same defects as the redan.</p> + +<p>The <i>mitre</i>, or <i>priest-cap,</i> (<a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 47,</a>) may be employed with advantage +when a cross-fire is required on the capital of the work. The +<i>star-fort</i> has all the defects, without the merit of simplicity, which +belong to the polygonal redoubt.</p> + +<p>The <i>bastion-fort</i> (<a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 48</a>) more fully satisfies the conditions of a +good defence than any other plan; but it is less simple and easy of +execution. It is usually composed of four or five fronts, but it may be +applied to a polygon of any number of sides.</p> + +<p>For the details of the construction of these several works, we must +refer to the special treatises on field-fortification.</p> + +<p>Lines of intrenchments may be made either continuous or with intervals. +In adopting either plan, the engineer should avail himself of all the +natural obstacles presented by the position, so as to diminish the labor +of erecting artificial means of defence.</p> + +<p>The simplest arrangement for a continuous intrenchment is the +<i>cremaillière</i> or indented line. When applied to an irregular site, or +used to connect together distant and detached works, the indented line +may be regarded as a good disposition. Mitres and redans, connected by +straight curtains, are sometimes employed, as also a combination of +large and small redans, forming alternate salient and re-entering +angles. A continuous line of bastions is preferable to any other +arrangement, when there is plenty of time for their construction.</p> + +<p>Lines with intervals are frequently formed of alternate lunettes and +square redoubts. Other detached works may be employed in the same way. +This manner of intrenching a position has several advantages, with +disciplined troops. The first shock of the assailant is sustained by the +detached works, and when he attempts to penetrate in the intervals, his +flanks become exposed to a deadly cross fire. These intervals also allow +the assailed to act on the offensive, by charging the enemy at the +opportune moment. But with raw and militia forces it will be safer to +resort to continuous lines. If cavalry form any part of the defensive +force, it will be absolutely necessary to leave intervals through which +these troops may charge.</p> + +<p>A vertical section of all intrenchments is of the same general form; the +dimensions will, of course, vary with the nature of the soil, and the +time and means employed in their construction. The minimum dimensions +that can be used with any considerable advantage are given in <a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 49.</a></p> + +<p>In laying out field-works advantage should be taken of all available +artificial obstacles, such as hedges, walls, houses, outbuildings, &c. A +thickset hedge may be rendered defensible by throwing up against it a +slight parapet of earth. Stone fences may be employed in the same way. +Walls of masonry may be pierced with loop-holes and arranged for one or +two tiers of fire. The walls of houses are pierced in the same manner, +and a projecting wooden structure, termed a <i>machicoulis gallery</i>, is +sometimes made from the floor of the second story, to enable the +assailed to fire down upon their opponents. This arrangement is +frequently employed to advantage in wooden blockhouses against a savage +foe; but it is of little avail when exposed to the fire of artillery. +Some have proposed galleries of this description in permanent works of +masonry, but the project is too obviously absurd to merit discussion.</p> + +<p>In addition to the parapet of an intrenchment, a good engineer will +always find time and means for constructing other artificial obstacles, +such as trous-de-loup, abattis, palisades, stockades, fraises, +chevaux-de-frise, crows'-feet, mines, &c.</p> + +<p><i>Trous-de-loup</i> are pits dug in the earth in the form of an inverted +truncated cone, some six feet in diameter, and about the same number of +feet in depth. They are usually placed a few yards in front of the +ditch, and concealed by some slight covering.</p> + +<p><i>Abattis</i> are tops and large limbs of trees arranged along the glacis of +a work; the ends of the branches are lopped off and sharpened.</p> + +<p><i>Palisades</i> are stakes some eight or ten feet long, with one end +fastened in the ground and the other made sharp. They are placed in +juxtaposition and connected together by horizontal riband-pieces. This +arrangement is frequently placed at the foot of the counterscarp. When +the timbers are large and the work is intended as a part of a primary +defence, it is called a <i>stockade</i>; when the stakes are placed at the +foot of the scarp, either horizontally or inclined, they receive the +name of <i>fraises</i>.</p> + +<p>A <i>cheval-de-frise</i> consists of a horizontal piece of timber armed with +wooden or iron lances, which project some eight or ten feet. It is much +employed against cavalry, and on rocky soils serves as a substitute for +palisades.</p> + +<p><i>Crows'-feet</i> are small wooden or iron forms filled with sharp spikes. +They are thrown, with their points upward, on ground which is to be +passed over by cavalry.</p> + +<p><i>Mines</i> are sometimes used in connection with intrenchments, but more +commonly in the attack and defence of permanent works. They will be +noticed further on.</p> + +<p>Field-works which are to be occupied for a considerable length of time +will usually have their steeper slopes revetted, and be arranged with +scarp and counterscarp, galleries, traverses, blindages, &c. Such works +hold an intermediary rank between temporary and permanent fortification.</p> + +<p>As examples of the importance of field fortifications and of the manner +of organizing them, the reader is referred to the celebrated battle of +Fontenoy, in 1745, where the carefully-arranged intrenchments of Marshal +Saxe enabled the French to repel, with immense destruction, the attacks +of greatly superior numbers; to the battle of Fleurus, in 1690, where +the Prince of Waldeck exposed himself to a most disastrous defeat "by +neglecting the resources of fortification and other indispensable +precautions;" to the battle of Malplaquet, in 1709, where Marshal +Villars, by neglecting to occupy and intrench the farm that closed the +passage between the woods of Sars and Lanière, exposed himself to a +disastrous defeat; to the operations of 1792, where General Custine, by +neglecting to intrench the heights that covered Bingen, as the engineers +had recommended, exposed himself to those terrible disasters which +forced him to a precipitate retreat; to the works of Wervike, which, by +a vigorous resistance on the 10th of September, 1793, saved the Dutch +army from total destruction; to the intrenched camp of Ulm, in 1800, +which for six weeks held in check the victorious army of Moreau; to the +intrenched lines of Torres Vedras, in 1810, which saved from destruction +the English army of Wellington; to the field-defences of Hougomont, +which contributed so much to the victory of Waterloo, &c.</p> + +<p><i>Military communications.</i>—The movements of armies are always much +embarrassed by forests, marshes, and water-courses, and nothing +contributes more to the dispatch of military operations than the means +of opening practical and easy communication through these various +obstacles.</p> + +<p>It is not necessary here to enter into any detailed discussion of the +manner of constructing military communications through forests or +marshes. In a new country like ours, where almost every one has had some +experience in road-making, no very great technical knowledge is required +for the construction of temporary works of this character; but much +professional skill and experience will be requisite for the engineers +who make the preliminary reconnaissances, and fix the location of these +roads.</p> + +<p>Water-courses may be crossed by means of fords, on the ice, or by +ferries and bridges. When temporary bridges or ferries are constructed +by the army in the field, they are classed under the general head of +<i>military bridges</i>, or more properly, <i>pontoniering</i>.</p> + +<p>Where the depth of the stream is not great, the current slight, and the +bottom smooth and hard, the passage may be effected by <i>fording</i>. If the +bottom be of mud, or large stones, the passage will be difficult and +dangerous, even where the depth and current are favorable. Under +favorable circumstances infantry can ford a stream where the depth is +not greater than four feet; cavalry to a depth of four or five feet; but +artillery, and engineer trains, cannot go to a depth of more than two +and a half feet, without greatly exposing their ammunition and military +stores The fords should be accurately staked out before the passage is +attempted, and ropes ought to be stretched across the stream, or cavalry +and small boats stationed below, to prevent the loss of life.</p> + +<p>Ice may be crossed by infantry, in small detachments. Its strength may +be increased by covering it with boards, or straw, so as to distribute +the weight over a greater surface. By sprinkling water over the straw, +and allowing it to freeze, the mass may be made still more compact. But +large bodies of cavalry, and heavy artillery, cannot venture on the ice +unless it be of great thickness and strength. An army can never trust, +for any length of time, to either fords or ice; if it did a freshet or a +thaw would place it in a most critical state. Military bridges will, +therefore, become its only safe reliance for keeping open its +communications.</p> + +<p>Military bridges are made with trestles, rafts, boats, and other +floating bodies. Rope bridges are also sometimes resorted to by troops +for passing rivers.</p> + +<p><i>Trestle bridges</i> are principally used for crossing small streams not +more than seven or eight feet in depth: they also serve to connect +floating bridges with the shore, in shallow water. The form of the +trestle is much the same as that of an ordinary <i>carpenter's horse,</i> +i.e., a horizontal beam supported by four inclined legs. These trestles +are placed in the stream, from twelve to twenty feet apart, and +connected by string-pieces, (or <i>balks</i> as they are termed in technical +language,) which are covered over with plank. The action of the current +against the bridge may be counteracted by anchors and cables, or by +means of boxes or baskets attached to the legs of the trestles, and +filled with stones. A more substantial form may be given to the bridge +by substituting for the trestles, piles, or the ordinary framed supports +so much used in the newer parts of our country.</p> + +<p>For examples of the use of bridges of this description we would refer to +Cæsar's celebrated bridge across the Rhine; the passage of the Scheldt +in 1588 by the Spaniards; the passage of the Lech in 1631 by Gustavus +Adolphus; the passage of the Danube in 1740 by Marshal Saxe; the great +bridge across the Var during Napoleon's Italian campaigns; the passage +of the Lech in 1800 by Lecourbe; the bridges across the Piava, the +Isonso, &c., in the subsequent operations of the army in Italy; the +celebrated passage of the Danube at the island of Lobau in 1809; the +passage of the Agueda in 1811 by the English; the passages of the Dwina, +the Moscowa, the Dneiper, the Beresina, &c., in the campaign of 1812; +the repairing of the bridge near Dresden, and the passage of the Elbe in +1813, &c.</p> + +<p><i>Rafts</i> formed of timbers, casks, barrels, &c., are frequently used as +military bridges. They may be made to bear almost any weight, and will +answer for the passage of rivers of any depth and width, provided the +current be not rapid.</p> + +<p>Where the bridge is to be supported by rafts made of solid timbers, +these timbers should be first placed in the water, to ascertain their +natural position of stability, and then the larger ends cut away on the +under side, so as to present the least possible resistance to the action +of the current. They are afterwards lashed together by strong rope or +withe lashing, or fastened by cross-pieces let into the timbers, and +held firm by bolts, or wooden pins. These rafts are kept in place by +anchors and cables placed up and down stream. The roadway is formed in +nearly the same manner as for a bridge supported on trestles. Empty +casks, and other floating bodies, may be substituted in place of logs in +the construction of rafts.</p> + +<p>For examples of the use of rafts in the construction of military +bridges, we would refer to the passage of the Seine in 1465 by Count +Charolais; the passage of the Meuse in 1579, by Alexander Farnése; the +passage of the Vistula in 1704, the Borysthenese in 1709, and the Sound +in 1718, by Charles XII.; the passage of the Adige in 1796; the passage +of the Po in 1807; and the subsequent military operations in the Spanish +Peninsula.</p> + +<p>Military bridges are frequently made of <i>boats</i>, and the ordinary +river-craft found in the vicinity of the intended passage. Flat-bottomed +boats are the most suitable for this purpose, but if these cannot be +obtained, keel boats will serve as a substitute. When these water-craft +are of very unequal sizes, (as is frequently the case,) two smaller +ones may be lashed together to form a single support; they can be +brought to the same level by means of stone ballast. The gunwales must +be suitably arranged for supporting the balks, or else frameworks should +be erected for this purpose from the centre of the boat. The arrangement +of the roadway, anchors, &c., is the same as before.</p> + +<p>A <i>bridge-equipage</i> made to follow an army in its movements in the +field, is generally composed of light skiffs or batteaux, and the +necessary timbers, planks, anchors, &c., for forming the roadway, and +keeping the bridge in its position. All these articles are constructed +especially for this purpose. All the wood-work should be of tough and +well-seasoned timber, so as to impose no unnecessary weight on the wagon +trains. The bateaux should also be made of strong and light materials. +For convenience in transportation, these boats are sometimes made with +hinges so as to fold up. The ribs are usually of oak, and the sides and +bottom of pine. Instead of plank, a covering of tin, copper, +India-rubber, &c., has sometimes been substituted. Floating supports of +this character are often made in compartments, so as to prevent their +sinking when injured by the enemy's projectiles. Indian-rubber pontons +may be folded up into a small space, and their slight weight renders +them convenient for transportation.</p> + +<p>On navigable streams a part of the bridge resting on one or two bateaux +should be so arranged that it can be shipped out of its place, forming a +<i>draw</i> for the passage of river-craft. Indeed, it would be well, even +where the river is not navigable, to form a draw for the passage of +trees, and other floating bodies, sent down by the enemy against the +bridge.</p> + +<p>An ordinary bridge-equipage of bateaux, or light pontons, for crossing a +river of from three to four hundred yards in width, and of moderate +current, will require a train of from sixty to eighty wagons.<a name="FNanchor_46_46"></a><a href="#Footnote_46_46"><sup>[46]</sup></a> Under +favorable circumstances, and with a well-instructed corps of pontoniers, +the bridge may be thrown across the river, and prepared for the passage +of an army in a few hours at most.<a name="FNanchor_47_47"></a><a href="#Footnote_47_47"><sup>[47]</sup></a> After the troops have passed +over, the bridge may be taken up, and replaced on the wagons in from a +quarter to half an hour.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_46_46"></a><a href="#FNanchor_46_46">[46]</a><div class="note"><p> The number of wagons in a ponton train will be greatly +diminished if it be found that Indian-rubber boats may be used as +supports for the bridge. The engineer department of our army are making +experiments to determine this point.</p></div> + +<a name="Footnote_47_47"></a><a href="#FNanchor_47_47">[47]</a><div class="note"><p> In 1746, three bridges of bateaux were thrown across the +Po, near Placentia, each fifteen hundred feet in length, and entirely +completed in eight hours. In 1757, two bridges of bateaux were thrown +across the Rhine, at Wesel, in half an hour; again, in the same year, a +third bridge was thrown across this river near Dusseldorf, in six hours. +In 1841, Col. Birago, of the Austrian army, arrived on the bank of the +Weisgerben arm of the Danube, with his bridge-equipage, at a round trot, +and immediately began the construction of his bridge, without any +previous preparation or examination. In less than three-quarters of an +hour the bridge was completed, and three loaded four-horse wagons passed +over on a trot, followed by a column of infantry.</p></div> + +<p>The following examples will serve to illustrate the use of different +kinds of boat-bridges in military operations:—the passage of the Rhine, +in 1702, by Villars; the passage of the Dnieper and the Bog, in 1739, by +the Russians; the passage of the Danube, in 1740, by Marshal Saxe; the +passage of the Rhine, near Cologne, in 1758, by the Prince of Clermont; +the passage of the Rhine, in 1795, by Jourdan; the passage of the Rhine, +at Kehl, in 1796, by Moreau; and again the same year, at Weissenthurn, +and at Neuwied, by Jourdan; the bridges across the Rhine, at the sieges +of Kehl and Huninguen, in 1797; the passage of the Limmat, in 1799, by +Massena; the passages of the Mincio, the Adige, the Brenta, the Piava, +&c., in 1800; the passages of these rivers again in 1805; the passages +of the Narew, in 1807, by the Russians; the several passages of the +Danube, in 1809, by the French and Austrian armies; the passages of the +Tagus and Douro, in 1810, by the English; the passages of the Niemen, +the Dwina, the Moskwa, and the Beresina, in 1812, by the French; and of +the great rivers of Germany and France, in 1813 and 1814.</p> + +<p>A floating body, propelled from one bank to the other by the current of +the stream, is termed a <i>flying-bridge.</i> The usual mode of establishing +a ferry of this kind, is to attach the head of the boat by means of a +cable and anchor to some point near the middle of the stream. By +steering obliquely to the current, the boat may be made to cross and +recross at the same point. A single passage may be made in the same way, +by the action of the current without the cable and anchor, but the boat +in this case will be carried some distance down the stream. Rowboats are +employed for crossing over infantry by successive debarkations; but this +process is too slow for the passage of a large force; it may very well +be resorted to as auxiliary to other means.</p> + +<p>Steam craft are so common at the present day on all navigable streams, +that an army in the field will frequently be able to avail itself of +this means of passing the larger rivers. But, in a hostile country, or +in one already passed over by the enemy, it will not be safe to rely +with confidence upon obtaining craft of this character. A well-organized +army will always carry in its train the means of effecting a certain and +speedy passage of all water-courses that may intercept its line of +march.</p> + +<p>Flying-bridges or rowboats were employed in the passage of the Dwina, in +1701, by the Swedes; the passage of the Po, in 1701, by Prince Eugene; +the passage of the Rhine, at Huninguen, in 1704; Jourdan's passage of +the Rhine in 1795; Moreau's passage in 1796; the sieges of Kehl and +Huninguen in 1797; Massena's passage of the Limmat, and Soult's passage +of the Linth, in 1799; the passage of the Rhine, at Lucisteig in 1800; +the passage of the Po, by the French, just before the battle of Marengo; +and others in Italy, Germany, and Spain, in the subsequent campaigns of +Napoleon.</p> + +<p>Military bridges have sometimes been formed of ropes, cables stretched +across the stream, and firmly attached at each end to trees, or posts +let into the earth. If the shore is of rock, rings with staples let into +the stone form the best means for securing the ends of the main ropes. +Plank are laid on these cables to form the roadway. The ropes forming +the "side-rail" of the bridge are passed over trestles at each shore, +and then fastened as before. Short vertical ropes attach the main +supports to these side ropes, in order that they may sustain a part of +the weight passing over the bridge. Constructions of this character are +fully described in Douglas's Essay on Military Bridges. For example, see +the passage of the Po, near Casal, in 1515, by the Swiss; the bridge +thrown over the Clain by Admiral Coligni, at the siege of Poitiers, in +1569; the operations of the Prince of Orange against Ghent and Bruges, +in 1631; the passage of the Tagus, at Alcantara, in 1810, by the +English; the bridge constructed across the Zezere, by the French, in +1810; the bridge thrown across the Scarpe, near Douai, in 1820; the +experiments made at Fêre in 1823, &c.</p> + +<p>The passage of a river in the presence of an enemy, whether acting +offensively or in retreat, is an operation of great delicacy and danger. +In either case the army is called upon to show the coolest and most +determined courage, for its success will depend on its maintaining the +strictest discipline and good order.</p> + +<p>In the case of a retreat the bridge should be covered by field +intrenchments, called a <i>tête de pont</i>, and defended by a strong guard. +If the river be of moderate width, the enemy may be kept at a distance +by heavy batteries on the opposite shore. As soon as the passage is +effected by the main body, the bridge, if permanent, will be blown up, +or otherwise destroyed by the miners, and if floating, will be swung +round to the other shore. The rear-guard will pass over in rowboats, or +the end pontons detached for that purpose. An army retreating in the +face of an enemy should never rely upon one single bridge, no matter +what may be its character: for the slightest accident happening to it +might expose the whole army to inevitable destruction.</p> + +<p>The passage of a river by main force, against an enterprising and active +enemy on the opposite shore, is always an operation of the greatest +difficulty, and not unfrequently accompanied with the most bloody +results.</p> + +<p>The most effectual method of accomplishing this object is by stratagem. +Demonstrations are made at several points at the same time: bodies of +troops are thrown across, after nightfall, in rowboats or by +flying-bridges, to get possession of the opposite bank. The vanguard of +light cavalry may cross by swimming. The pontoniers should have their +bridge equipage in readiness near the intended point of passage, so that +it can be thrown across with the greatest possible rapidity, while the +advanced guards are still able to keep the enemy at a distance. Under +favorable circumstances the pontoniers will have the bridge in readiness +for the passage of the army before the enemy can collect his troops upon +the threatened point.</p> + +<p>Cannon-balls and hollow shot are the most effectual means for destroying +an enemy's bridge when our batteries can be planted within reach. When +this cannot be done, we must resort to fire-boats, floating rafts, &c., +to accomplish our object. Operations of this kind carried on in the +night, are most likely to succeed. </p> + +<p>To protect bridges from the action of these floating bodies, stockades, +or floating chevaux-de-frise are constructed across the stream at some +distance above the bridge; strong cables, or chains stretched directly +across the river, or with an angle up stream, may be used in place of +stockades, or in conjunction with them. Guards should be stationed above +the bridge, with boats, ropes, grapnels, &c., for the purpose of +arresting all floating bodies and drawing thorn ashore, or directing +them safely through the <i>draw</i> in the bridge arrangement.</p> + +<p>The troops especially charged with the construction and management of +the various kinds of military bridges, are denominated <i>pontoniers</i>. The +duties of these troops are arduous and important, and, in a country like +ours, intersected by numerous water-courses, the success of a campaign +will often depend upon their skill and efficiency.</p> + +<p><i>Sapping</i>.—This is a general term applied to the operations of forming +trenches, along which troops may approach a work without being exposed +to the fire of the besieged.</p> + +<p>In addition to the ordinary sapping-tools, such as shovels, picks, +gabion-forks, &c., used in constructing trenches, there will also be +required a considerable amount of sapping materials, such as gabions, +fascines, sap-fagots, sandbags, &c.</p> + +<p>The <i>gabion</i> is a cylindrical basket of twigs, about two feet in +diameter, and some three feet in length, and without a bottom. It is +made by driving into the ground, in a circular form, a number of small +pickets about an inch in diameter, and of the length required for the +gabion. Twigs are wattled between the pickets like ordinary basket-work, +and fastened at the ends by withs or packthread. Gabions are used in +forming saps, batteries, blindages, powder-magazines, and in revetting +the steep slopes of field-works. </p> + +<p>The <i>fascine</i> is a bundle of twigs closely bound up, from nine to twelve +inches in diameter, and from ten to fifteen or twenty feet in length. +The largest are sometimes called <i>saucissons</i>. In making a fascine, +straight twigs about the thickness of a man's finger are laid side by +side, and firmly compressed together by a strong rope or chain attached +to the extremities of two levers. While held in this position the twigs +are firmly bound together by withs or cords. Fascines are used in +constructing trenches, batteries, &c., and for filling up wet ditches.</p> + +<p>The <i>sap-fagot</i> is a strong fascine about ten inches in diameter and two +feet in length, with a picket inserted through the middle. It is used in +the double sap in connection with gabions.</p> + +<p><i>Sand-bags</i> are usually made of coarse canvass. When filled with earth +they are some six or eight inches in diameter, and from eighteen inches +to two feet in length. From their perishable nature, they are used only +when other materials cannot be procured, and where it is important to +place the troops speedily under cover from the enemy's fire.</p> + +<p>Bales of wool, cotton, hay, straw, &c., may be employed in sapping for +the same purposes as the above materials, when they can be procured in +sufficient quantity. Pork and flour barrels, which are usually in +abundance in a camp, are frequently filled with sand and used for +forming magazines, blindages, &c., in field-works.</p> + +<p>A trench constructed in ordinary soil beyond the range of the enemy's +grape, is called a <i>simple sap</i>, or ordinary trench. The earth is thrown +up on the side towards the place besieged, so as to form a kind of +parapet to cover the men in the trench. The labor is here executed under +the supervision of engineer soldiers, by working parties detached from +the other arms. <a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 50</a> represents a vertical section of a simple sap. </p> + +<p>When within range of the enemy's grape, the <i>flying sap</i> is resorted to +in order to place the workmen speedily under cover. In this operation, +gabions are placed in juxtaposition on the side towards the besieged +work, and filled with all possible speed by the workmen. Three rows of +fascines are usually placed on the top of the gabions to increase the +height. The most difficult part of the flying sap is executed by +engineer troops, and the trench is completed by the ordinary working +parties. <a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 51</a> represents a section of this sap.</p> + +<p>The <i>full-sap</i> is employed when the works of the besiegers are within +range of musketry, or when the grape fire of the besieged is so deadly +that the flying sap can no longer be used. This is a difficult +operation, and unless executed with great care and by well-instructed +engineer troops, the construction of the trench will be attended with an +immense loss of life. The work must be executed under cover of a +<i>sap-roller,</i> which is a cylindrical mass of fascines, wool, or cotton, +some two feet in diameter. On very smooth ground a ball-proof shelter on +wheels might be used as a substitute. The sap-roller being placed along +the line of the trench so as to cover the sapper in front, who is armed +with a musket-proof headpiece and cuirass, this sapper commences the sap +by placing a gabion on the line of the proposed trench and fills it with +earth, working on his hands and knees. Having filled the first gabion, +he pushes forward the sap-roller and places a second one next the first, +stopping the open joint between the two with a stop-fagot. The second +gabion being filled in the same manner as the first, others are +successively established. When the first sapper has advanced a few feet, +he is followed by a second, also in defensive armor, who increases the +excavation and embankment; this sapper is then followed in the same way +by a third and a fourth, after which the trench will be sufficiently +advanced to be turned over to the ordinary workmen. The sap-fagots may +be removed when the embankment becomes thick enough to resist grape. +<a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 52</a> represents a plan and section of a full-sap.</p> + +<p>When the direction of the trench is such that the men are exposed on +both sides, it will be necessary to throw up an embankment both to the +right and left. This operation is called the <i>double sap,</i> and is +executed by two parties of sappers, working side by side. In this sap it +will be necessary to frequently change the direction of the trench, or +to throw up traverses, in order to cover the men at a distance from the +sap-roller. Wing-traverses, on the side of the trench which is least +exposed, some times serve the same purpose as a double sap.</p> + +<p><i>Mines</i>.—By <i>mining</i>, as a military term, we understand the operations +resorted to for the demolition, with powder, of a military structure of +any description. The term <i>mine</i> is applied both to the excavation +charged with powder for the purpose of producing an explosion, and to +the communications which lead to this excavation.</p> + +<p>The place in which the charge of powder is lodged is called the +<i>chamber</i>, the communication by which this place is reached the +<i>gallery</i>, and the excavation made by the explosion is termed the +<i>crater</i>.</p> + +<p>The form of the crater caused by an explosion in ordinary soils is +assumed to be a truncated cone, the diameter, <i>c d</i>, (<a href=images/471.gif>Fig. 53,</a>) of the +lower circle being one-half the diameter, <i>a b</i>, of the upper circle. +This form has never been ascertained to be exactly correct, but the +theoretical results deduced from a mathematical discussion of this +figure have been fully verified in practice. The radius, <i>p b</i>, of the +upper circle is termed the <i>crater radius</i>; the line <i>o p</i>, drawn from +the centre of the charge perpendicular to the surface where the +explosion takes place, is termed the <i>line of least resistance</i>; the +line <i>o b</i>, drawn from the centre of the powder to any point in the +circumference of the upper circle, is termed the <i>radius of explosion</i>.</p> + +<p>When the crater radius is equal to the line of least resistance, the +mine is termed <i>common</i>; when this radius is greater than the line of +least resistance, the mine is termed <i>overcharged</i>; and when the radius +is less, <i>undercharged</i>. A mine of small dimensions, formed by sinking a +shaft in the ground, is termed a <i>fougasse</i>. The term <i>camouflet</i> is +applied to a mine used to suffocate the enemy's miner, without producing +an explosion. Small mines made in rock or masonry, merely for the +purpose of excavation, without any considerable external explosion, are +called <i>blasts</i>.</p> + +<p>From experiments made on common mines, whose line of least resistance +did not exceed fifteen feet, it has been ascertained that the tenacity +of the earth is completely destroyed around the crater to a distance +equal to the crater radius, and that empty galleries would be broken in +at once and a half that distance. It has also been proved by experiment, +that the crater radius in overcharged mines may be increased to six +times the line of least resistance, but not much beyond this; that +within this limit the diameter of the crater increases nearly in the +ratio of the square roots of the charge; and that empty galleries may be +destroyed by overcharged mines at the distance of four times the line of +least resistance.</p> + +<p>By means of the deductions of physico-mathematical theory, and the +results of experiments, rules have been determined by which the miner +can calculate, with much accuracy, the charge necessary to produce a +required result in any given soil.</p> + +<p>In the earlier stages of the history of this art, mines were only used +to open breaches and demolish masses of masonry; but in later times they +have been employed as important elements in the attack and defence of +places. </p> + +<p>An isolated wall, only two or three feet thick, may readily be +demolished by exploding one or two casks of powder placed in contact +with its base. If the wall be five or six feet thick, the charges should +be placed under the foundation. For walls of still greater thickness it +will be best to open a gallery to the centre of the wall, a foot or two +above its base, and place the powder in chambers thus excavated. +Revetment walls may be overturned by placing the charges at the back of +the wall, about one-third or one-quarter of the way up from the base. If +placed too near the base, a breach will be made in the wall without +overturning it.</p> + +<p>To demolish a bridge of masonry the powder should be lodged in chambers +excavated in the centre of the piers. When there is not time for +excavating these chambers in the piers, a trench may be cut over the key +of the arch, in which the powder is placed and exploded; or, the casks +of powder may be suspended immediately under the arch, with the same +results. Where a saving of powder is of consequence, small chambers may +be excavated in the haunches of the arch, and the mine carefully +<i>tamped</i> before firing it.</p> + +<p>Bridges of wood may be destroyed by suspending casks of powder under the +principal timbers, or attaching them to the supports.</p> + +<p>Palisading, gates, doors, &c., may be destroyed in the same way, by +suspending casks or bags of powder against their sides; or still more +effectually, by burying the charges just beneath their base.</p> + +<p>To demolish a tower, magazine, or house, of masonry, place charges of +powder under the piers and principal walls of the building. In wooden +structures the powder should be placed under, or attached to the +principal supports. Where time is wanting to effect these arrangements, +a building may be blown down by placing a large mass of powder in the +interior. The powder may be economized, in this case, by putting it in a +strong case, which should be connected with the walls of the building on +all sides by wooden props.</p> + +<p>Special treatises on military mining contain full instructions for +regulating the size and position of the charge for the various cases +that may be met with in the practical operations of field-engineering.</p> + +<p>As applied to the attack and defence of a fortified place, mines are +divided into two general classes—<i>offensive</i> and <i>defensive</i> mines. The +former are employed by the besiegers to overthrow the scarps and +counterscarps of the place, to demolish barriers, palisades, walls, and +other temporary means of defence, and to destroy the mines of the +besieged. The latter are employed by the opposite party to blow up the +besiegers' works of attack, and to defend the passage of ditches against +an assault. Small mines called <i>fougasses</i> may be employed for the last +named object. The <i>shell-fougasse</i> is composed of a wooden box filled +with one or more tiers of shells, and buried just below the surface of +the earth. Sometimes a quantity of powder is placed under the shells, so +as to project them into the air previous to their explosion. The <i>stone +fougasse</i> is formed by making a funnel-shaped excavation, some five or +six feet deep, and placing at the bottom a charge of powder enclosed in +a box, and covered with a strong wooden shield; several cubic yards of +pebbles, broken stone, or brickbats, are placed against the shield, and +earth well rammed round, to prevent the explosion from taking place in +the wrong direction. These mines are fired by means of powder hose, or +by wires connected with a galvanic battery.</p> + +<p>The defensive mines employed to blow up the besiegers' works, are +generally common mines with the lines of least resistance seldom greater +than fifteen feet. All the main galleries and principal branches of +mines for a permanent fortification are constructed at the same time +with the other portions of the work, leaving only the secondary +branches, chambers, &c., to be made during the siege. For the general +arrangement of these galleries, and the precautions necessary for their +protection from the operations of the besiegers, reference must be made +to treatises specially devoted to the discussion of this subject.</p> + +<p>Mines can seldom be employed with advantage in works of slight relief, +and liable to an assault. But if judiciously arranged in the plan of +their construction, and well managed during the operations of the siege, +they contribute very materially to the length of the defence.</p> + +<p><i>Attack and defence</i>.—This subject admits of two natural divisions: +1st, of intrenchments, and 2d, of permanent works.</p> + +<p>I. Intrenchments maybe attacked either by <i>surprise</i>, or by <i>open +force</i>. In either case the operations should be based on exact +information of the strength of the works and the number and character of +the garrison—information that can be obtained from spies, deserters, +and prisoners, and confirmed by examinations or reconnaissances made by +officers of engineers. By these means a pretty accurate knowledge may be +obtained of the natural features of the ground exterior to the works; +their weak and strong points; and their interior arrangements for +defence.</p> + +<p>In an attack by surprise, the troops should consist of a storming party +and a reserve of picked men. The attacking column is preceded by a +company of sappers armed with axes, shovels, picks, crowbars, &c.; bags +of powder are also used for blowing down gates, palisades, &c. All the +operations must be carried on with the utmost dispatch. The time most +favorable for a surprise is an hour or two before day, as at this moment +the sentinels are generally less vigilant, and the garrison in a +profound sleep; moreover, the subsequent operations, after the first +surprise, will be facilitated by the approach of day. Under certain +circumstances, it may be advisable to make false attacks at the same +time with the true one, in order to distract the attention of the +garrison from the true point of danger. But false attacks have, in +general, the objection of dividing the forces of the assailants as well +as of the assailed. In all attacks by surprise, secrecy is the soul of +the enterprise.</p> + +<p>In an open assault, if artillery be employed, the troops should be drawn +up in a sheltered position, until the fire of the works is silenced, and +breaches effected in the parapet. But if the bayonet alone be resorted +to, the troops are immediately brought forward at the beginning of the +assault. The attack is begun by a storming party of picked men: they are +preceded, as before, by a body of sappers, provided with necessary means +for removing obstacles, and followed by a second detachment of +engineers, who will widen the passages, and render them more accessible +to the main body of troops who now advance to the assistance of the +storming party. If the assailants should be arrested at the counterscarp +by obstacles which must be removed before any farther progress can be +made, the infantry troops of the detachment display and open a fire upon +the assailed, in order to divert their fire from the sappers. A few +pieces of light artillery, on the flanks of the column, may sometimes be +employed for this purpose with great advantage.</p> + +<p>The storming party should always be provided with scaling-ladders, +planks, fascines, &c., for crossing the ditch, and mounting the scarp. +If the counterscarp be revetted with masonry, the troops must either +descend by ladders, or fill up the ditch with fascines, bales of straw, +bundles of wool, &c.: if not revetted, a passage for the troops into the +ditch will soon be formed by the shovels of the sappers. When the ditch +is gained, shelter is sought in a dead angle till the means are prepared +for mounting the scarp, and storming the work. If the scarp be of earth +only, the sappers will soon prepare a passage for the escalade; but if +revetted with masonry, the walls must be breached with hollow shot, or +scaled by means of ladders.</p> + +<p>In the defence, the strictest vigilance should be at all times exerted +to guard against a surprise: sentinels are posted on all the most +commanding points of the work; all the avenues of approach are most +thoroughly guarded; and patroles are constantly scouring the ground in +all directions. At night all these precautions are redoubled. Light and +fire-balls are thrown out in front of the work to light up the ground, +and discover the movements and approach of the enemy. Each man should +have his particular post assigned to him, and be thoroughly instructed +in the duties he will have to perform. All auxiliary arrangements, such +as palisades, abattis, &c., should be defended with the utmost +obstinacy; the longer the enemy is held in check by these obstacles, the +longer will he be exposed to the grape and musketry of the main work. +When he assaults the parapet, he will be opposed by the bayonet in front +and a well-aimed fire in flank. While in the ditch, or as he mounts the +scarp, hollow projectiles, incendiary preparations, stones, logs, &c., +will be rolled down upon his head. But when the assaulting column has +gained the top of the scarp, the bayonet forms the most effective means +of resistance.</p> + +<p>The measures resorted to in the attack and defence of the larger class +of field-works, will necessarily partake much of the nature of the +operations employed in the attack and defence of permanent +fortifications.</p> + +<p>II. The attack and defence of a fortress may be carried on either by a +regular siege, or by irregular operations and an assault. The latter +plan has sometimes been adopted when the works of the place were weak +and improperly defended; where the time and means were wanting for +conducting a regular siege; or where the assailants were ignorant of the +means proper to be resorted to for the reduction of the fortress. Such +operations, however, are usually attended by an immense sacrifice of +human life, and the general who neglects to employ all the resources of +the engineer's art in carrying on a siege, is justly chargeable with the +lives of his men. In the siege of Cambrai, Louis XIV., on the +solicitation of Du Metz, but contrary to the advice of Vauban, ordered +the demi-lune to be taken by assault, instead of waiting for the result +of a regular siege. The assault was made, but it was unsuccessful, and +the French sustained great losses. The king now directed Vauban to take +the demi-lune by regular approaches, which was done in a very short +time, and with a loss of <i>only five men!</i> Again, at the siege of Ypres, +the generals advised an assault before the breaches were ready. "You +will gain a day by the assault," said Vauban, "but you will lose a +thousand men." The king directed the regular works to be continued, and +the next day the place was taken with but little loss to the besiegers.</p> + +<p>But a work may be of such a character as to render it unnecessary to +resort to all the works of attack which would be required for the +reduction of a regular bastioned fort, on a horizontal site. For +example: the nature of the ground may be such as to enable the troops to +approach to the foot of the glacis, without erecting any works whatever; +of course, all the works up to the third parallel may in this case be +dispensed with without any violation of the rules of a siege. Again, the +point of attack may be such that the other parts of the place will not +flank the works of approach; here a single line of <i>boyaux</i> and short +parallels may be all-sufficient.</p> + +<p>But for the purpose of discussion, we will here suppose the place +besieged to be a regular bastioned work on a horizontal site, (<a href=images/473.gif>Fig.54.</a>)</p> + +<p>The operations of the siege may be divided into three distinct periods.</p> + +<p>1st. The preliminary operations of the attack and defence previous to +the opening of the trenches.</p> + +<p>2d. The operations of the two parties from the opening of the trenches +to the establishment of the third parallel.</p> + +<p>3d. From the completion of the third parallel to the reduction of the +place.</p> + +<p><i>First period.</i> The object of the <i>investment of the place</i> is to cut +off all communication between the work and the exterior, thus preventing +it from receiving succors, provisions, and military munitions, and also +to facilitate a close reconnoissance of the place by the engineers, who +should always accompany the investing corps, and pursue their labors +under its protection. This corps should be composed chiefly of light +troops—cavalry, light infantry, horse artillery, "brigades of engineers +and mounted sappers,"—who march in advance of the besieging army, and, +by a sudden movement, surround the work, seize upon all the avenues of +approach, and carry off every thing without the work that can be of +service either to the garrison or to the besiegers. To effect this +object, the enterprise must be conducted with secrecy and dispatch.</p> + +<p>The investing corps is now distributed around the work in the most +favorable positions for cutting off all access to it, and also to +prevent any communication with the exterior by detachments from the +garrison, and even single individuals are sent out to give intelligence +to a succoring army or to reconnoitre the operations of the besieging +corps. These posts and sentinels, called the <i>daily cordon</i>, are placed +some mile or mile and a half from the work, and beyond the reach of the +guns. But in the night-time these posts are insufficient to accomplish +their object, and consequently as soon as it is dark the troops move up +as close to the work as possible without being exposed to the fire of +musketry. This arrangement constitutes the <i>nightly cordon</i>.</p> + +<p>By the time the main army arrives the reconnoissance will be +sufficiently complete to enable the chief engineer to lay before the +general the outline of his plan of attack, so as to establish the +position of his dépôts and camp. These will be placed some two miles +from the work, according to the nature of the ground. As they occupy a +considerable extent of ground around the work, it will generally be +necessary to form intrenchments strong enough to prevent succors of +troops, provisions, &c., from being thrown into the place, and also to +restrain the excursions of the garrison. The works thrown up between the +camp and besieged place are termed the <i>line of countervallation</i>, and +those on the exterior side of the camp form the <i>line of +circumvallation</i>. These lines are generally about six hundred yards +apart. It is not unusual in modern warfare to dispense with lines of +circumvallation, (except a few detached works for covering the parks of +the engineers and artillery,) and to hold the succoring army in check by +means of an opposing force, called the <i>army of observation</i>.</p> + +<p>The measures of defence resorted to by the garrison will, of course, be +subordinate, in some degree, to those of attack. As soon as any danger +of an investment is apprehended, the commanding general should collect +into the place all the necessary provisions, forage, military munitions, +&c., to be found in the surrounding country; all useless persons should +be expelled from the garrison; a supply of timber for the works of the +engineers and artillery, fascines, gabions, palisades, &c., prepared; +all ground within cannon range around the work levelled; hedges and +trees cut down; holes filled up; temporary buildings demolished or +burnt; and all obstacles capable of covering an enemy and interrupting +the fire of the work, removed.</p> + +<p>During this period the engineer troops and working parties detached from +the other arms will be most actively employed. As soon as the investing +corps makes its appearance, bodies of light troops are thrown out to cut +off reconnoitring parties, and, if possible, to draw the enemy into +ambush. To facilitate these exterior operations, and to prevent a +surprise, several guns of long range are placed on the salients of the +bastions and demi-lunes, and others, loaded with grape, in the +embrasures of the flanks, so as to sweep the ditches. About one-third of +the garrison may be employed in exterior operations, and the other +two-thirds in arranging the means of defence in the interior.</p> + +<p><i>Second period.</i>—As soon as the engineers have completed their +reconnaissances and determined on the front of attack, and all the other +preparations are made, the general will direct the opening of the +trenches. The ground being previously marked out, battalions of light +troops, termed <i>guards of the trenches</i>, as soon as it is dark, are +placed about thirty yards in front of the first parallel, (A. <a href=images/473.gif>Fig. 54,</a>) +with smaller sections, and sentinels about the same distance further in +advance. These guards lie down, or otherwise conceal themselves from the +fire of the work. The engineer troops and detachments of workmen being +first marched to the dépôts and supplied with all the necessary tools +for carrying on the work, now commence their labors under the protection +of these guards. By daybreak the construction of the first parallel, and +the trenches connecting it with the dépôts, will be sufficiently +advanced to cover the men from the fire of the place; the guards will +therefore be withdrawn, and the workmen continue their labors during the +day to give the trenches the proper size and form. </p> + +<p>The <i>parallels</i> are the long lines of trench which envelop the besieged +work, and serve both as covered ways for the circulation of the +besiegers, and as means of defence against sorties from the garrison; +they are therefore arranged with banquettes for musketry fire. The +boyaux are trenches run in a zigzag direction along the capitals of the +front of attack, and are intended exclusively for the circulation of the +troops; they have no banquettes. The first parallel is about six hundred +yards from the place, and consequently beyond the reach of grape. It is +constructed by the <i>simple sap</i>. After the first night, the guards, +instead of advancing in front of the work, are placed in the trenches.</p> + +<p>The second parallel (B) is made some three hundred or three hundred and +fifty yards from the place, and being much exposed to grape, the +<i>flying-sap</i> is employed in its construction. Batteries (H) are +established between the first and second parallels to silence the fire +of the demi-lunes of the collateral bastions, and others (I) near the +second parallel, to enfilade the faces of the front of attack. These are +armed in part with mortars and in part with heavy siege-pieces.</p> + +<p>The works are now gradually pushed forward to the third parallel, (C), +which is constructed about sixty yards from the salients of the place. +As the operations of the besiegers are here greatly exposed to musketry +fire, the trenches are constructed by the <i>full-sap</i>. The third +parallel, having to contain the guards of the trenches, and being of +less development than the two preceding, is made much wider. The second +parallel now contains the reserve, and the first parallel becomes the +dépôt of materials. <i>Demi-parallels</i> (G) are frequently established +between the second and third, to be occupied by detachments of guards.</p> + +<p>The operations of defence during this period are so directed as to +harass the workmen in the trenches and retard the advance of the works +of attack. Garrison pieces of long range and large howitzers are brought +forward on the salients of the bastions and demi-lunes of attack, so as +to fire in ricochet along the capitals on which the boyaux must be +pushed: light and fire-balls are thrown out as soon as it becomes dark, +to light up the ground occupied by the besiegers, thus exposing them to +the fire of the work and to the attacks of the sortie parties. These +parties are composed of light troops who charge the guards and compel +the workmen to abandon their sapping tools and stand upon the defence. +They are most effective when the besiegers commence the second parallel, +as the guards in the first parallel are not so immediately at hand to +protect the workmen. When the sortie detachment has driven these workmen +from the trenches, instead of pursuing them into the first parallel, it +will display itself in battle order to cover the engineer troops, (who +should always accompany the detachment in this enterprise,) while they +fill up the trenches and destroy the implements of the besiegers. When +the guards of the trenches appear in force, the detachment will retire +in such a way, if possible, as to draw the enemy within range of the +grape and musketry of the collateral works. These sorties, if +successful, may be frequently repeated, for they tend very much to +prolong the siege. The best time for making them is an hour or two +before day, when the workmen and guards are fatigued with the labors of +the night. While the besiegers are establishing their enfilading +batteries, a strong fire of solid shot and shells will be concentrated +on the points selected for their construction. The garrison will also +labor during this period to put the work into a complete state of +defence: constructing all necessary palisadings, traverses, blindages, +barriers; and strengthening, if necessary, the covering of the +magazines.</p> + +<p><i>Third period.</i>—After the completion of the third parallel, the +crowning of the covered way may be effected by storm, by regular +approaches, or (if the work is secured by defensive mines) by a +subterranean warfare.</p> + +<p>In the first case stone mortar-batteries are established in front of the +third parallel, which, on a given signal, will open their fire in +concert with all the enfilading and mortar batteries. When this fire has +produced its effect in clearing the outworks, picked troops will sally +forth and carry the covered way with the bayonet, sheltering themselves +behind the traverses until the sappers throw up a trench some four or +five yards from the crest of the glacis, high enough to protect the +troops from the fire of the besieged. It may afterwards be connected +with the third parallel by boyaux.</p> + +<p>When the covered way is to be crowned by regular approaches, a <i>double +sap</i> is pushed forward from the third parallel to within thirty yards of +the salient of the covered way; the trench is then extended some fifteen +or twenty yards to the right or left, and the earth thrown up high +enough to enable the besiegers to obtain a plunging fire into the +covered way, and thus prevent the enemy from occupying it. This mound of +earth is termed a <i>trench cavalier</i>, (O). Boyaux are now pushed forward +to the crowning of the covered way and the establishing of breach +batteries, (J). Descents are then constructed into the ditches, and as +soon as these batteries have made a breach into the walls of the +bastions and outworks, the boyaux are pushed across the ditches and +lodgments effected in the breaches. The demi-lune is first carried; next +the demi-lune redoubt and bastion; and lastly, the interior +retrenchments and citadel. In some cases the breaches are carried by +assault, but the same objection is applicable here as in the storming of +the covered way; <i>time is gained, but at an immense expense of human +life.</i></p> + +<p>If the place is defended by mines it will be necessary for the +besiegers to counteract the effects of these works by resorting to the +slow and tedious operations of a subterranean warfare. In this case a +fourth trench is formed in front of the third parallel; shafts are sunk +in this, about six yards apart, for establishing overcharged mines; as +soon as the galleries of the besieged are destroyed by the explosion of +these mines, the covered way is attacked by storm; other mines are +established on the <i>terre-plain</i> of the covered way to destroy the +entrance to the galleries, and thus deprive the besieged of the use of +their entire system of mines.</p> + +<p>The measures of defence during this period must embrace every thing +calculated to retard the works of the besiegers. This may be most +effectually accomplished by maintaining a constant fire of grape and +musketry on the heads of the sap, and throwing grenades, shells, &c., +into the trenches, to harass and destroy the workmen. As the musketry +fire of the besiegers now becomes very destructive to the artillerists +at the guns, strong musket-proof blinds are arranged to mask the mouths +of the embrasures when the guns are not in battery, and also sloping +blindages to cover the men when serving at the pieces. The possession of +the outworks should be disputed inch by inch, and when the besiegers +have reached the ditch of the body of the place, sorties, and every +species of projectile, should be employed to drive off the sappers, and +to retard the construction of their works. In fine, all the resources of +the engineer's art should be put in requisition for the defence of the +breach, and the final assault should be vigorously resisted by the +bayonet, and by a well-sustained fire from all the collateral works.</p> + +<p>With respect to the relative strength of the opposing forces it may be +well to remark, that if the fortress is properly constructed the +garrison will be able to resist a besieging army <i>six times</i> as numerous +as itself. Such is the estimate of the best engineers.<a name="FNanchor_48_48"></a><a href="#Footnote_48_48"><sup>[48]</sup></a></p> + +<a name="Footnote_48_48"></a><a href="#FNanchor_48_48">[48]</a><p> A good knowledge of the several subjects discussed in this +chapter may be derived from the writings of Vauban, Cormontaigne, and +Noizet de St. Paul, on the attack and defence of places and field +fortification ; the several <i>manuels</i> used in the French service on +sapping, mining, and pontoniering; Col. Pasley's experiments on the +operations of a siege, sapping, mining, &c.; Douglas's work on military +bridges; Macauley's work on field fortification; and Professor Mahan's +<i>Treatise on Field Fortification.</i> This last is undoubtedly the very +best work that has ever been written on field fortification, and every +officer going into the field should supply himself with a copy. +</p><p> +The following are recommended as books of reference on subjects +discussed in the three preceding chapters. +</p><p> +<i>Mémorial pour la fortification permanente et passagère.</i> Cormontaigne. +</p><p> +<i>Défense des places.</i> Cormontaigne. +</p><p> +<i>Attaque des places.</i> Cormontaigne. +</p><p> +<i>Attaque des places.</i> Vauban. +</p><p> +<i>Traité des mines.</i> Vauban. +</p><p> +<i>Mémorial pour la castrametation et la fortification passagère.</i> +Lafitte-Clavé. +</p><p> +<i>Exercice sur les fortifications.</i> Davigneau. +</p><p> +<i>Mémorial de l'officier du genie.</i> A periodical of rare merit, +containing most valuable military and scientific matter. It is conducted +by officers of the French corps of engineers. It has already reached its +fourteenth number, each number forming a volume. +</p><p> +<i>Traité complet de fortification.</i> Noizet de St. Paul. +</p><p> +<i>Traité d'art militaire et de la fortification.</i> Gay de Vernon. +</p><p> +<i>Art de la guerre.</i> Rogniat. +</p><p> +<i>Essai général de fortification, &c.</i> Bousmard. +</p><p> +<i>Aide-mémoire portatif à l'usage des officiers du génie.</i> Laisné. A very +valuable and useful book. +</p><p> +<i>Aide-mémoire de l'ingénieur militaire.</i> Grivet. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'art militaire.</i> Laurillard Fallot. +</p><p> +<i>Cours de fortification, &c.</i> Lavart. +</p><p> +<i>Le livre de la guerre.</i> Perrot. +</p><p> +<i>Journaux des siéges dans la péninsule.</i> Belmas. +</p><p> +<i>Journal of Sieges in Spain.</i> John Jones. +</p><p> +Both of the above are works of great value. +</p><p> +<i>Cours d'art militaire et de fortification militaire.</i> François. +</p><p> +<i>Architettura militare.</i> Marchi. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur la fortification.</i> Baltard. +</p><p> +<i>La fortification.</i> Bar-le-Duc. +</p><p> +<i>Elémens de fortification.</i> Bellaire. +</p><p> +<i>La science des ingénieurs.</i> Bélidor. +</p><p> +<i>L'art universel des fortifications.</i> Bitainvieu. +</p><p> +<i>Nouvelle manière de fortifier les places.</i> Blondel. +</p><p> +<i>Les sept siéges de Lille.</i> Brun Lavaine. +</p><p> +<i>Défense des places fortes.</i> Carnot. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoire sur la fortification.</i> Carnot. +</p><p> +<i>Défense de Saragosse.</i> Cavallero. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires sur la fortification.</i> Choumara. +</p><p> +<i>Nouvelle fortification.</i> Coehorn. +</p><p> +<i>Théorie de la fortification.</i> Cugnot. +</p><p> +<i>Des fortifications,</i> &c. &c. Darçon. +</p><p> +<i>Rélation de la défense de Dantzik.</i> D'Artois. +</p><p> +<i>Les fortifications.</i> Deville. +</p><p> +<i>Péribologie.</i> Dilich. +</p><p> +<i>De la fortification permanente.</i> Dufour. A work of merit. +</p><p> +<i>Essai sur la défense des états par les fortifications.</i> Duviviet. +</p><p> +<i>Attaque et défense des places du camp de St. Omer.</i> +</p><p> +<i>L'école de la fortification.</i> Fallois. +</p><p> +<i>Introduction à la fortification.</i> De Fer. +</p><p> +<i>Précis de la défense de Valenciennes.</i> Ferrand. +</p><p> +<i>Traité théorique,</i> &c. Foissac-Latour. +</p><p> +<i>Examen detaillé,</i> &c. Foissac-Latour. +</p><p> +<i>Les ouvrages militaires de Fosse.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Instruction sur la fortification,</i> &c. Gaillard. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoires pour l'attaque et défense d'une place.</i> Goulon. +</p><p> +<i>Siége of Peschiera.</i> Henin. +</p><p> +<i>Journal du siége de Philisbourg.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Précis du siége de Dantzick.</i> Kirgener. +</p><p> +<i>Deuxième défense de Badajos.</i> Lamare. +</p><p> +<i>Fortification, et l'attaque et défense des places.</i> Lebloud. +</p><p> +<i>Œuvres de Lefebvre.</i> +</p><p> +<i>L'architecture des forteresses.</i> Mandar. +</p><p> +<i>Traité sur l'art des siéges.</i> Mazeroy. +</p><p> +<i>La sûreté des états par le moyen des forteresses.</i> Maigret. +</p><p> +<i>Défense d'Ancone.</i> Mangourit. +</p><p> +<i>Fortification.</i> Marolois. +</p><p> +<i>Siege de Turin.</i> Mengin. +</p><p> +<i>Recherches sur l'art défensif,</i> &c. Michaloz. +</p><p> +<i>La fortification de campagne,</i> &c. Miller. +</p><p> +<i>L'art défensif,</i> &c. Montalembert. +</p><p> +<i>Journaux des siéges de Flandre.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Relations des siéges en Europe,</i> &c. Musset-Fathay. A very valuable and +interesting work. +</p><p> +<i>Relation du siége de Metz.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Relation du siége d'Anvers.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Les siéges de Jaffa et de St. Jean d'Acre.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Les siéges de Saragosse et de Tortose.</i> Rogniat. +</p><p> +<i>Siége de Dantzick.</i> Sainte-Susanne. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoire sur la fortification permanente.—</i>Séa. +</p><p> +<i>Le siége de Constantine.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Elémens de fortification.</i> Trincano. +</p><p> +<i>Des places fortes.</i> Valazé. +</p><p> +<i>Essay on Military Bridges.</i>Douglas. A valuable work. +</p><p> +<i>Guide du pontonier.</i> Drieu. +</p><p> +<i>Mémoire sur la guerre souterraine.</i> Contèle. +</p><p> +<i>Traité des mines.</i> Etienne. +</p><p> +<i>Traité de l'art du mineur.</i> Geuss. +</p><p> +<i>Traité de fortification souterraine.</i> Gillot. +</p><p> +<i>Traité pratique et théorique des mines.</i> Lebrun. +</p><p> +<i>Nouveau traité des mines,</i> &c. Prudhomme. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel du sapeur.</i> Used in the French service. +</p><p> +<i>Manuel du mineur.</i> " "" +</p><p> +<i>Manuel du pontonier.</i> " "" +</p><p> +<i>Essay on Field Fortifications.</i> Pleydell. +</p><p> +<i>Elements of Field Fortifications.</i> Lochee. +</p><p> +<i>Rélation du siége de Grave et Mayence.</i> +</p><p> +<i>Siéges de Génes.</i> Thiébault. +</p><p> +<i>Traité de fortification souterraine.</i> Mouze. +</p><p> +<i>Militairische Mittheilungen.</i> Xilander. +</p><p> +<i>Die Befestigung der Statten.</i> Hauser. +</p><p> +<i>Abhandlung über die Befestigungskunst,</i>&c. Hauser +</p><p> +<i>Versuch über die Verschanzungskunst.</i> Muller. +</p><p> +<i>Course of Elementary Fortification. </i>Pasley. This is a work of much +detail—useful, no doubt, to an uneducated engineer soldier, but to an +officer at all acquainted with his profession, it must seem ridiculously +minute. +</p><p> +To the above list might be added a long list of books on that branch of +the engineer's art called <i>constructions</i>; but as this part of the +profession is, in some degree, common both to the civil and military +engineer, it is not deemed necessary to include works of this character +in a list of books strictly military.</p> + +<br> + +<hr style="width:65%;"> +<a name="CHAPTER_XV"></a><h2>CHAPTER XV</h2> + +<p>MILITARY EDUCATION APPOINTMENT AND PROMOTION.</p> +<br> + +<p>With the Romans, six years' instruction was required to make a soldier; +and so great importance did these ancient conquerors of the world attach +to military education and discipline, that the very name of their army +was derived from the verb <i>to practise.</i></p> + +<p>Modern nations, learning from experience that military success depends +more upon skill and discipline than upon numbers, have generally adopted +the same rule as the Romans; and nearly all of the European powers have +established military schools for the education of their officers and the +instruction of their soldiers.</p> + +<p>France, which has long taken the lead in military science, has six +military schools for the instruction of officers, containing in all more +than one thousand pupils, and numerous division and regimental schools +for the sub-officers and soldiers.</p> + +<p>Prussia maintains some twelve general schools for military education, +which contain about three thousand pupils, and also numerous division, +brigade, garrison, and company schools for practical instruction. </p> + +<p>Austria has some fifty military schools, which contain in all about four +thousand pupils.</p> + +<p>Russia has thirty-five engineer and artillery technical schools, with +about two thousand pupils; twenty-five military schools for the +noblesse, containing eight thousand seven hundred pupils; <i>corps +d'armee</i>schools, with several thousand pupils; regimental schools, with +eleven thousand pupils; and brigade-schools, with upwards of one hundred +and fifty-six thousand scholars;—making in all about two hundred +thousand pupils in her military schools!</p> + +<p>England has five military schools of instruction for officers, number of +pupils not known; a military orphan school, with about twelve thousand +pupils; and numerous dépôt and regimental schools of practice.</p> + +<p>The smaller European powers—Belgium, Sardinia, Naples, Spain, Portugal, +Denmark, Sweden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, Baden, have each several military +schools, with a large number of pupils.</p> + +<p>It is seen from these statistics, that the European powers are not so +negligent in educating their officers, and in instructing and +disciplining their soldiers, as some in this country would have us +believe.</p> + +<p>Washington, Hamilton, Knox, Pickering, and others, learning, by their +own experience in the war of the American revolution, the great +necessity of military education, urged upon our government, as early as +1783, the importance of establishing a military academy in this country, +but the subject continued to be postponed from year to year till 1802. +In 1794, the subaltern grade of <i>cadet</i> was created by an act of +Congress, the officers of this grade being attached to their regiments, +and "furnished at the public expense with the necessary books, +instruments, and apparatus" for their instruction. But this plan of +educating young officers at their posts was found impracticable, and in +his last annual message, Dec. 7th, 1796, Washington urged again, in +strong language, the establishment of a military academy, where a +regular course of military instruction could be given. "Whatever +argument," said he, "may be drawn from particular examples, +superficially viewed, a thorough examination of the subject will evince +that the art of war is both comprehensive and complicated; that it +demands much previous study; and that the possession of it in its most +improved and perfect state is always of great moment to the security of +a nation."</p> + +<p>The subject was however postponed from time to time, till March, 1802, +when a bill was passed establishing the <i>Military Academy</i>. It was at +first on a small scale, and its course of instruction meager and +deficient. It gradually became enlarged, but lingered along, with no +great improvement, till 1817, when Capt. Patridge was dismissed from the +superintendency, and Col. Thayer put in charge. From this period we date +the commencement of the success and reputation which the Military +Academy has since enjoyed.</p> + +<p>This institution, as now organized, consists of one cadet from each +congressional district, and a few at large, making an average of two +hundred and thirty-seven. The course of instruction is four years, after +which time the cadet is sent to his regiment or corps, with higher rank +if there are vacancies, but if there are no vacancies, he goes as a +cadet, with the brevet rank of the next higher grade.</p> + +<p>The examination for admission to the institution is a very limited one, +being confined to the elementary branches of an English education.</p> + +<p>The annual course at the academy is divided into two distinct periods, +the first extending from June till September, and the second from +September to the following June. During the first period, the cadets +leave their barracks and encamp in tents, and are made subject to the +police and discipline of an army in time of war. In addition to the +thorough and severe course of practical exercises and drills in the +different arms during these three summer months of each year, they are +made to perform the same tours of guard-duty, night and day, as is +required of the common soldier in time of actual war. This continues +till the first of September of each year, when the cadets return to +their barracks, and for the remaining nine months devote themselves to +the prescribed course of scientific and military studies, intermixed +with military exercises and practical operations in the laboratory and +on the field.</p> + +<p>To test the progress of the cadets in their studies, there are held +semi-annual public examinations. These examinations are strict and +severe, and all who fail to come up to the fixed standard are obliged to +withdraw from the institution, to allow some one else from the same +district to make the trial.</p> + +<p>During their course of studies the cadets, as warrant-officers of the +army, draw pay barely sufficient to defray their necessary expenses. The +allowance to each is twenty-six dollars per month, but none of this is +paid to the cadet, but is applied to the purchase of books, fuel, +lights, clothing, board, &c.</p> + +<p>This institution furnishes each year to the army about forty subaltern +officers, thoroughly instructed in all the theoretical and practical +duties of their profession. After completing this course, the cadet is +usually promoted from the grade of warrant-officer to that of a +commissioned officer, and is immediately put on duty with his regiment +or corps.</p> + +<p>This system of appointment to the army has produced the most +satisfactory results, and has received the commendation of our best +military men, and the approbation of all our presidents and most able +statesmen. Nevertheless, it has occasionally met with strong opposition; +this opposition springing in part from a want of proper information +respecting the character and working of the system, and in part from the +combined efforts of those who from negligence or incapacity have failed +to pass their examinations for promotion, and of those who, from a +conscious want of qualifications or merit, feel assured that they cannot +obtain commissions in the army so long as this system of merit, as fixed +by examination, shall exist. Hence the effort to destroy the Military +Academy and to throw the army entirely open to <i>political</i> appointment.</p> + +<p>Several legislative bodies, acting under these combined influences, have +passed resolutions, giving various objections to the Military Academy, +and recommending that it be abolished. The objections made by the +legislatures of Tennessee, Ohio, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Maine, +are mostly founded on false information, and may be readily answered by +reference to the official records of the War-office. But it is not the +present object to enter into a general discussion of the charges against +that institution, except so far as they are connected with the +importance of military education, and the rules of military appointment +and promotion.</p> + +<p>It has been alleged by many of the opponents of the West Point Academy, +that military instruction is of little or no advantage to a +general;—that in the wars of Napoleon, and in the American Revolution, +and the American war of 1812, armies were generally led to victory by +men without a military education, and unacquainted with military +science;—and that in the event of another war in this country, we must +seek our generals in the ranks of civil life, rather than among the +graduates of our Military Academy.</p> + +<p>The objection here made to military education will hold with equal +force against education in any other profession. We sometimes find men +who have become eminent in the pulpit and at the bar, or in medicine and +the sciences, without ever having enjoyed the advantages of an education +in academic or collegiate halls, and perhaps even without that +preliminary instruction usually deemed necessary for professional +pursuits. Shall we therefore abolish all our colleges, theological +seminaries, schools of law and medicine, our academies and primary +schools, and seek for our professional men among the uneducated and the +ignorant? If professional ignorance be a recommendation in our generals, +why not also in our lawyers and our surgeons? If we deem professional +instruction requisite for the care of our individual property and +health, shall we require less for guarding the honor and safety of our +country, the reputation of our arms, and the lives of thousands of our +citizens?</p> + +<p>But in reality, were not these men to whom we have alluded eminent in +their several professions <i>in spite of,</i> rather than <i>by means of</i> their +want of a professional education? And have not such men, feeling the +disadvantages under which they were forced to labor, been almost without +exception the advocates of education in others?</p> + +<p>But is it true that most of the generals of distinction in the more +recent wars were men destitute of military education,—men who rose from +the ranks to the pinnacle of military glory, through the combined +influence of ignorance of military science and contempt for military +instruction? Let us glance at the lives of the most distinguished of the +generals of the French Revolution, for these are the men to whom +reference is continually made to prove that the Military Academy is an +unnecessary and useless institution, the best generals being invariably +found in the ranks of an army, and <i>not</i> in the ranks of military +schools. Facts may serve to convince, where reasoning is of no avail.</p> + +<p>Napoleon himself was a pupil of the military schools of Brienne and +Paris, and had all the advantages of the best military and scientific +instruction given in France.</p> + +<p>Dessaix was a pupil of the military school of Effiat, with all the +advantages which wealth and nobility could procure. Davoust was a pupil +of the military school of Auxerre, and a fellow-pupil with Napoleon in +the military school of Paris. Kleber was educated at the military school +of Bavaria. Eugene Beauharnais was a pupil of St. Germain-en-Loye, and +had for his military instructor the great captain of the age. His whole +life was devoted to the military art. Berthier and Marmont were both +sons of officers, and, being early intended for the army, they received +military educations. Lecourbe had also the advantages of a military +education before entering the army. Pichegru and Duroc were pupils of +the military school of Brienne. Drouet was a pupil of the artillery +school. Foy was first educated in the college of Soissons, and +afterwards in the military schools of La Fère and Chalons. Carnot, +called the "Organizer of French victory," received a good early +education, and was also a pupil of the engineer school of Mézières.</p> + +<p>Several of the distinguished French generals at first received good +scientific and literary educations in the colleges of France, and then +acquired their military instruction in the subordinate grades of the +army; and by this means, before their promotion to responsible offices, +acquired a thorough practical instruction, founded on a basis of a +thorough preliminary education. Such was Suchet, a pupil of the college +of Lisle-Barbe; Lannes, a pupil of the college of Lectoure; and Mortier, +who was most carefully educated at Cambrai; Lefebvré and Murat were both +educated for the church, though the latter profited but little by his +instruction; Moreau and Joubert were educated for the bar; Massena was +not a college graduate, but he received a good preliminary education, +and for several years before he entered the army as an officer, he had +enjoyed all the advantages afforded by leisure and affluent +circumstances; Ney, though poor, received a good preliminary education, +and entered a notary's office to study a profession. Hoche was destitute +of the advantages of early education, but, anxious to supply this +deficiency, he early distinguished himself by his efforts to procure +books, and by his extraordinary devotion to military studies. By several +years devoted in this way to professional studies and the practical +duties of a subordinate grade in the army, Hoche acquired a military +knowledge which early distinguished him among the generals of the French +Revolution. Soult and Gouvion-Saint-Cyr, being of parents in limited +circumstances, had not the advantages of extensive education, but close +and diligent application, an ardent ambition, and strong and powerful +intellect, combined with long years of service in the practical +operations of the field, at length enabled these men to overcome all +obstacles, and force their way to the higher walks of their professions. +But both knew from experience the advantages of military instruction, +and the importance of professional education in the army, and they have +consequently both been the warmest friends and strongest advocates of +the military schools of France.</p> + +<p>The Polytechnic School was established too late to furnish officers for +any of the earlier wars of Napoleon; but in his last campaigns he began +to reap the advantages of an institution which had been under his +fostering care, and Bertrand, Dode, Duponthon, Haxo, Rogniat, Fleury, +Valazé, Gourgaud, Chamberry, and a host of other distinguished young +generals, fully justified the praises which the emperor lavished on his +"<i>poulet aux œufs d'or"</i>—the hen that laid him golden eggs!</p> + +<p>In our own revolutionary war, Generals Washington, Hamilton, Gates, +Schuyler, Knox, Alexander, (Lord Stirling,) the two Clintons, the Lees, +and others, were men of fine education, and a part of them of high +literary and scientific attainments; Washington, Gates, Charles Lee, the +Clintons, and some others, had considerable military experience even +before the war: nevertheless, so destitute was the army, generally, of +military science, that the government was under the necessity of seeking +it in foreigners—in the La Fayettes, the Kosciuskos, the Steubens, the +De Kalbs, the Pulaskis, the Duportails—who were immediately promoted to +the highest ranks in our army. In fact the officers of our scientific +corps were then nearly all foreigners.</p> + +<p>But, say the opponents of the Academy, military knowledge and education +are not the only requisites for military success; youthful enterprise +and efficiency are far more important than a mere acquaintance with +military science and the military art: long service in garrison, +combined with the indolent habits acquired by officers of a +peace-establishment, so deadens the enterprise of the older officers of +the army, that it must inevitably result, in case of war, that military +energy and efficiency will be derived from the ranks of civil life.</p> + +<p>We are not disposed to question the importance of youthful energy in the +commander of an army, and we readily admit that while seeking to secure +to our service a due degree of military knowledge, we should also be +very careful not to destroy its influence by loading it down with the +dead weights of effete seniority. But we do question the wisdom of the +means proposed for supplying our army with this desired efficiency. +Minds stored with vast funds of professional knowledge, and the rich +lore of past history; judgments ripened by long study and experience; +with passions extinguished, or at least softened by the mellowing +influence of age—these may be best suited for judges and statesmen, for +here there is time for deliberation, for the slow and mature judgment of +years. But for a general in the field, other qualities are also +required. Not only is military knowledge requisite for <i>directing</i> the +blow, but he must also have the military energy necessary for <i>striking</i> +that blow, and the military activity necessary for parrying the attacks +of the enemy. A rapid <i>coup d'oeil</i> prompt decision, active movements, +are as indispensable as sound judgment; for the general must <i>see</i>, and +<i>decide</i>, and <i>act</i>, all in the same instant. Accordingly we find that +most great generals of ancient and modern times have gained their +laurels while still young.</p> + +<p>Philip of Macedon ascended the throne at the age of twenty-two, and soon +distinguished himself in his wars with the neighboring states. At the +age of forty-five he had conquered all Greece. He died at forty-seven.</p> + +<p>Alexander the Great had defeated the celebrated Theban band at the +battle of Cheronea, and gained a military reputation at the age of +eighteen. He ascended the throne of his father Philip before twenty, and +at twenty-five had reached the zenith of his military glory, having +already conquered the world. He died before the age of thirty-two.</p> + +<p>Julius Cæsar commanded the fleet sent to blockade Mitylene, where he +greatly distinguished himself before the age of twenty-two. He soon +after held the important offices of tribune, quæstor, and edile. He had +completed his first war in Spain, and was made consul at Rome before the +age of forty. He twice crossed the Rhine, and conquered all Gaul, and +had twice passed over to Britain, before the age of forty-five; at +fifty-two he had won the field of Pharsalia, and attained the supreme +power. He died in the fifty-sixth year of his age, the victor of five +hundred battles, and the conqueror of a thousand cities. </p> + +<p>Hannibal joined the Carthaginian army in Spain at twenty-two, and was +made commander-in-chief at twenty-six. Victorious in Spain and France, +he crossed the Alps and won the battle of Cannæ before the age of +thirty-one.</p> + +<p>Scipio Africanus, (the elder,) at the age of sixteen distinguished +himself at the battle of Ticinus; at twenty was made edile, and soon +after pro-consul in Spain; at twenty-nine he won the great battle of +Zama, and closed his military career. Scipio Africanus (the younger) +also distinguished himself in early life; at the age of thirty six he +had conquered the Carthaginian armies and completed the destruction of +Carthage.</p> + +<p>Gengis-Khan succeeded to the domain of his father at the age of +thirteen, and almost immediately raised an army of thirty thousand men, +with which he defeated a numerous force of rebels, who had thought to +take advantage of his extreme youth to withdraw from his dominion. He +soon acquired a military reputation by numerous conquests, and before +the age of forty had made himself emperor of Mogul.</p> + +<p>Charlemagne was crowned king at twenty-six, conquered Aquitania at +twenty-eight, made himself master of France and the greater part of +Germany at twenty-nine, placed on his brows the iron crown of Italy at +thirty-two, and conquered Spain at thirty-six.</p> + +<p>Gonsalvo de Cordova, the "great captain," entered the army at fifteen, +and before the age of seventeen had acquired a brilliant military +reputation, and was knighted by the king himself on the field of battle; +at forty-one he was promoted over the heads of older veterans and made +commander-in-chief of the army in Italy.</p> + +<p>Henry IV. of France was placed at the head of the Huguenot army at the +age of sixteen, at nineteen he became king of Navarre; at forty he had +overthrown all his enemies, placed himself on the throne of France, and +become the founder of a new dynasty.</p> + +<p>Montecuculi, at the age of thirty-one, with two thousand horse, attacked +ten thousand Swedes and captured all their baggage and artillery; at +thirty-two he gained the victory of Triebel, at forty-nine defeated the +Swedes and saved Denmark, and at fifty-three defeated the Turks at the +great battle of St. Gothard. In his campaigns against the French at a +later age, he made it his chief merit, "not that he conquered, but that +he was not conquered."</p> + +<p>Saxe entered the army at the early age of twelve, and soon obtained the +command of a regiment of horse; at twenty-four he became +<i>maréchal-de-camp</i>, at forty-four marshal of France, and at forty-nine +gained the celebrated victory of Fontenoy. He died at the age of +fifty-four.</p> + +<p>Vauban entered the army of Condé as a cadet at the age of seventeen, at +twenty was made a lieutenant, at twenty-four he commanded two companies, +at forty-one was a brigadier, at forty-three a <i>maréchal-de-camp</i>, and +at forty-five commissaire-général of all the fortifications of France. +At the age of twenty-five he had himself conducted several sieges, and +had assisted at many others.</p> + +<p>Turenne entered the army before the age of fourteen; he served one year +as a volunteer, four years as a captain, four years as a colonel, three +years as a major-general, five years as a lieutenant-general, and became +a marshal of France at thirty-two. He had won all his military +reputation by the age of forty.</p> + +<p>Prince Maurice commanded an army at the age of sixteen, and acquired his +military reputation in very early life. He died at fifty-eight.</p> + +<p>The great Condé immortalized his name at the battle of Rocroi, in which, +at the age of twenty-two, he defeated the Spaniards. He had won all his +great military fame before the age of twenty-five.</p> + +<p>Prince Eugene of Savoy was a colonel at twenty-one, a +lieutenant-field-marshal at twenty-four, and soon after, a +general-field-marshal. He gained the battle of Zenta at thirty-four, and +of Blenheim at forty-one. At the opening of the war of 1733, he again +appeared at the head of the army at the advanced age of sixty-nine, but +having lost the vigor and fire of youth, he effected nothing of +importance.</p> + +<p>Peter the Great of Russia was proclaimed czar at ten years of age; at +twenty he organized a large army and built several ships; at twenty-four +he fought the Turks and captured Asoph; at twenty-eight he made war with +Sweden; at thirty he entered Moscow in triumph after the victory of +Embach, and the capture of Noteburg and Marienburg; at thirty-one he +began the city of St. Petersburg; at thirty-nine he was defeated by the +Turks and forced to ransom himself and army. His latter years were +mostly devoted to civil and maritime affairs. He died at the age of +fifty-five.</p> + +<p>Charles the XII. of Sweden ascended the throne at the age of fifteen, +completed his first successful campaign against Denmark at eighteen, +overthrew eighty thousand Russians at Narva before nineteen, conquered +Poland and Saxony at twenty-four, and died at thirty-six.</p> + +<p>Frederick the Great of Prussia ascended the throne at twenty-eight, and +almost immediately entered on that career of military glory which has +immortalized his name. He established his reputation in the first +Silesian war, which he terminated at the age of thirty. The second +Silesian war was terminated at thirty-three; and at forty-three, with a +population of five millions, he successfully opposed a league of more +than one hundred millions of people.</p> + +<p>Prince Henry of Prussia served his first campaign as colonel of a +regiment at sixteen; at the age of thirty-one he decided the victory of +Prague, and the same year was promoted to the command of a separate +army. The military reputation he acquired in the Seven Years' War was +second only to that of Frederick.</p> + +<p>Cortes had effected the conquest of Mexico, and completed his military +career, at the age of thirty-six.</p> + +<p>Sandoval, the most eminent of his great captains, died at the age of +thirty-one. He had earned his great renown, and closed his military +achievements, before the age of twenty-five.</p> + +<p>Pizarro completed the conquest of Peru at thirty-five, and died about +forty.</p> + +<p>Lord Clive began his military career at twenty-two, and had reached the +zenith of his military fame at thirty-five; he was raised to the peerage +at thirty-six, and died at fifty.</p> + +<p>Hastings began his military service at about twenty-five, and became +governor of Bengal at forty.</p> + +<p>Napoleon was made a lieutenant at seventeen, a captain at twenty, +<i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, +and commander-in-chief of the army of Italy at twenty-six. All his most +distinguished generals were, like him, young men, and they seconded him +in his several campaigns with all the energy and activity of youthful +valor and enthusiasm.</p> + +<p>Dessaix entered the army at fifteen; at the opening of the war he +quickly passed through the lower grades, and became a general of brigade +before the age of twenty-five, and a general of division at twenty-six; +he died before the age of thirty-two, with a reputation second only to +that of Napoleon.</p> + +<p>Kleber did not enter the army till later in life, but he quickly passed +through the subordinate grades, and was made a general of brigade at +thirty-eight, a general of division at forty, and general-in-chief of +an army at forty-one: he died at forty-six. On his death, and in +Napoleon's absence, Ménau, aged and inefficient, succeeded by right of +seniority to the command of the army of Egypt. Its utter ruin was the +almost immediate consequence.</p> + +<p>Massena first entered the army at seventeen, but soon married a rich +wife, and retired to civil life. He returned to the army at the opening +of the revolution, and in two years, before the age of thirty-five, was +promoted to the rank of general of division. He immediately acquired +that high reputation which he sustained through a long career of +military glory.</p> + +<p>Soult became a sub-lieutenant at twenty-two, a captain at twenty-four; +the following year he passed through the several grades of +<i>chef-de-bataillon</i>, colonel, and general of brigade, and became general +of division at twenty-nine.</p> + +<p>Davoust was a sub-lieutenant at seventeen, a general of brigade at +twenty-three, and general of division at twenty-five.</p> + +<p>Eugene Beauharnais entered the army at a very early age. He became +<i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at nineteen, colonel at twenty-one, general of +brigade at twenty-three, and Viceroy of Italy at twenty-five. He soon +proved himself one of Napoleon's ablest generals. At twenty-eight he +commanded the army of Italy, and at thirty-one gained great glory in the +Russian campaign, at the head of the fourth <i>corps d'armée.</i></p> + +<p>Gouvion-Saint-Cyr enured the army at the beginning of the Revolution, +and passing rapidly through the lower grades, became a general of +brigade at twenty-nine, and a general of division at thirty.</p> + +<p>Suchet became a <i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at twenty, general of brigade at +twenty-five, major-general of Brune's army at twenty-seven, and general +of division and of a <i>corps d'armée</i> at twenty-eight.</p> + +<p>Oudinot became a captain at twenty-three, <i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at +twenty-four, general of brigade at twenty-five, and general of division +at twenty-eight.</p> + +<p>Ney was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-six, +general of brigade at twenty-seven, and general of division at +twenty-nine.</p> + +<p>Lannes was a colonel at twenty-seven, general of brigade at +twenty-eight, and very soon after general of division.</p> + +<p>Joubert became adjutant-general at twenty-five, general of brigade at +twenty-six, general of division at twenty-eight, and general-in-chief of +the army of Italy at twenty-nine. He died at thirty.</p> + +<p>Victor was a <i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at twenty-seven, general of brigade at +twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty-two.</p> + +<p>Murat was a lieutenant at twenty, and passing rapidly through the lower +grades, he became a general of brigade at twenty-five, and a general of +division at twenty-seven.</p> + +<p>Mortier was a captain at twenty-three, adjutant-general at twenty-five, +general of brigade at thirty, and general of division at thirty-one.</p> + +<p>Macdonald was a colonel at twenty-seven, a general of brigade at +twenty-seven, and a general of division at thirty.</p> + +<p>Marmont was a captain at twenty-one, <i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at twenty-two, +general of brigade at twenty-four, inspector general at twenty-seven, +and general-in-chief of an army at thirty-two.</p> + +<p>Bernadotte was a colonel at twenty-eight, general of brigade at +twenty-nine, and general of division at thirty.</p> + +<p>Lefebvre was made a captain at the organization of the army in 1793; he +became a general of brigade at thirty-eight, and general of division at +thirty-nine.</p> + +<p>Bessières entered the army at twenty-six, became a colonel at thirty, +general of brigade at thirty-two, and general of division at +thirty-four. He died at forty-seven.</p> + +<p>Duroc was a captain at twenty-three, <i>chef-de-bataillon</i> at twenty-six, +colonel and <i>chef-de-brigade</i> at twenty-seven, and general of division +at thirty. He died at forty-one.</p> + +<p>This list might be still further extended with the same results, but +names enough have been given to show that the generals who assisted +Napoleon in his immortal campaigns were all, with scarcely an exception, +<i>young men</i>, still burning with the fires of youthful ardor and +enthusiasm. The grade of marshal was not created till after Napoleon +became emperor. On ascending the throne of the empire, he nominated to +this rank eighteen of the most distinguished generals of France. Some of +these were generals of the earlier wars of the Revolution, and had never +served under him. Others were younger men, several being only +thirty-four, thirty-five, and thirty-six years of age. The mean age of +all was forty-four. He afterwards made seven more marshals, whose mean +age was forty-three. These appointments, however, were regarded as +rewards for <i>past</i> services, rather than as a grade from which service +was expected, for several of the older marshals were never called into +the field after their promotion.</p> + +<p>Having noticed the ages of the principal generals who commanded in the +armies of Napoleon, let us look for a moment at those who opposed him. +In the campaign of 1796 the enemy's forces were directed by Beaulieu, +then nearly eighty years of age; Wurmser, also an octogenarian, and +Alvinzi, then over seventy: these had all three distinguished themselves +in earlier life, but had now lost that youthful energy and activity so +essential for a military commander.</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1800 the general-in-chief of the Austrian forces was +Melas, an old general, who had served some fifty years in the army; he +had distinguished himself so long ago as the Seven Years' War, but he +had now become timid and inefficient, age having destroyed his energy. </p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1805 the French were opposed by Kutusof, then sixty, +and Mack, then fifty-three; the plan of operations was drawn up by still +more aged generals of the Aulic council.</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1806 the French were opposed by the Duke of +Brunswick, then seventy-one, Hohenlohe, then sixty, and Mollendorf, +Kleist, and Massenbach, old generals, who had served under the great +Frederick,—men, says Jomini, "exhumed from the Seven Years' +War,"—"whose faculties were frozen by age,"—"who had been buried for +the last ten years in a lethargic sleep."</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1807 the French were opposed by Kamenski, then eighty +years of age, Benningsen, then sixty, and Buxhowden, then fifty-six. The +Allies now began to profit by their experience, and in 1809 the Austrian +army was led by the young, active, skilful, and energetic Archduke +Charles; and this campaign, although the commander-in-chief was somewhat +fettered by the foolish projects of the old generals of the Aulic +council, and thwarted by the disobedience of his brother, was +nevertheless the most glorious in the Austrian annals of the wars of the +Revolution.</p> + +<p>At the opening of the campaign of 1812 the Emperor Alexander, young, +(only thirty-five,) active, intelligent, and ambitious, had remodelled +his army, and infused into it his own energy and enthusiastic love of +glory. He was himself at its head, and directed its operations. Kutusof +was for a short time the nominal commander-in-chief, and exhibited an +activity unusual at his age, but he was surrounded by younger +generals—Barclay-de-Tolley, and Miloradowich, then forty-nine, +Wintzengerode, then forty-three, Schouvalof, then thirty-five, and the +Archduke Constantine, then thirty-three,—generals who, at the heads of +their corps, and under the young emperor and his able staff of young +officers, in the two succeeding campaigns, rolled back the waves of +French conquest, and finally overthrew the French empire. Wellington, +who led the English in these campaigns, was of the same age as Napoleon, +and had been educated at the same time with him in the military schools +of France. The Austrians were led by Schwartzenburg, then only about +thirty, and the Prussians by Yorck, Bulow, and Blücher. The last of +these was then well advanced in life, but all his movements being +directed by younger men,—Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,—his operations +partook of the energy of his able chiefs of staff.</p> + +<p>In the campaign of 1815, Napoleon was opposed by the combinations of +Wellington and Gneisenau, both younger men than most of his own +generals, who, it is well known, exhibited, in this campaign, less than +in former ones, the ardent energy and restless activity which had +characterized their younger days. Never were Napoleon's, plans better +conceived, never did his troops fight with greater bravery; but the +dilatory movements of his generals enabled his active enemies to parry +the blow intended for their destruction.</p> + +<p>In the American war of 1812, we pursued the same course as Austria, +Prussia, and Russia, in their earlier contests with Napoleon, <i>i.e.</i>, to +supply our armies with generals, we dug up the Beaulieus, the Wurmsers, +the Alvinzis, the Melases, the Macks, the Brunswicks, and the Kamenskis +of our revolutionary war; but after we had suffered sufficiently from +the Hulls, the Armstrongs, the Winchesters, the Dearborns, the +Wilkinsons, the Hamptons, and other veterans of the Revolution, we also +changed our policy, and permitted younger men—the Jacksons, the +Harrisons, the Browns, the McReas, the Scotts,<a name="FNanchor_49_49"></a><a href="#Footnote_49_49"><sup>[49]</sup></a> the Ripleys, the +Woods, the McCombs, the Wools, and the Millers—to lead our forces to +victory and to glory. In the event of another war, with any nation +capable of opposing to us any thing like a powerful resistance, shall we +again exhume the veterans of former days, and again place at the head of +our armies respectable and aged inefficiency; or shall we seek out +youthful enterprise and activity combined with military science and +instruction? The results of the war, the honor of the country, the glory +of our arms, depend, in a great measure, upon the answer that will be +given to this question.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_49_49"></a><a href="#FNanchor_49_49">[49]</a><div class="note"><p> Scott had acquired his military reputation, and attained +the rank of major-general at twenty-eight.</p></div> + +<p>But it may be asked, how are we to secure this combination of military +instruction and military energy; how are we to fill the higher grades of +our army with young and active men possessing due military instruction +and talent? The question is not a difficult one, and our government can +easily attain the desired object, if it will only set at work honestly, +disregarding all party prejudices and the mercenary and selfish +interests of its own members and advisers. Other governments have +pointed out to us the way. It is this: let <i>merit</i> be the main test for +all appointments and promotions in the army. Let one or more of the +subordinate grades be thrown open to the youth of the whole country, +without distinction as to birth, or wealth, or politics; let them be +kept on probation in this subordinate grade, and be thoroughly +instructed in all that relates to the military profession; after strict +examination let them be promoted to the vacancies in the higher grades +as rapidly as they shall show themselves qualified for the duties of +those grades, merit and services being here as elsewhere the only tests.</p> + +<p>The first part of this rule is already accomplished by the Military +Academy. One young man is selected from each congressional district, on +an average, once in about two years, the selection being made by the +representative of the district; these young men are made warrant +officers in the army, and sent to a military post for instruction; +frequent and strict examinations are instituted to determine their +capacity and fitness for military service; after a probation of a +certain length of time, the <i>best</i> are selected for commission in the +army, relative rank and appointments to corps being made strictly with +reference to merit; birth, wealth, influence of political friends—all +extraneous circumstances being excluded from consideration. What can be +more truly and thoroughly democratic than this? What scheme can be +better devised to supply our army with good officers, and to exclude +from the military establishment the corrupting influence of party +politics, and to prevent commissions in the army from being given to +"the sons of wealthy and influential men, to the almost total exclusion +of the sons of the poor and less influential men, regardless alike of +qualifications and of merit?"</p> + +<p>Unfortunately for the army and for the country this system ends here, +and all further advancement is made by mere seniority, or by executive +favoritism, the claims of merit having but little or no further +influence. Indeed, executive patronage is not infrequently permitted to +encroach even upon these salutary rules of appointment, and to place +relatives and political friends into the higher ranks of commissioned +officers directly from civil life, "regardless alike of qualifications +and of merit," while numbers "of sons of the poor and less influential +men," who have served a probation of four or five years in military +studies and exercises, and have proved themselves, in some thirty +examinations made by competent boards of military officers, to be most +eminently qualified for commissions, are passed by in utter neglect! Our +army is much more open to this kind of favoritism and political +partiality, than that of almost any of the governments of Europe, which +we have been accustomed to regard as aristocratic and wholly unfriendly +to real merit.</p> + +<p>In the Prussian service, in time of peace, the government can appoint no +one, even to the subordinate grade of ensign, till he has followed the +courses of instruction of the division or brigade-school of his arm, and +has passed a satisfactory examination. And, "no ensign can be promoted +to a higher grade till after his promotion has been agreed to by the +superior board or commission of examiners at Berlin, and his name has +been placed on the list of those whose knowledge and acquirements +(<i>connaissances</i>) render them qualified (<i>aptes</i>) for the responsible +duties of their profession. The nomination to the grade of +second-lieutenant is not, even after all these conditions are fulfilled, +left to the choice of the government. When a vacancy occurs in this +grade, the subaltern officers present to the commandant of the regiment +a list of three ensigns who have completed their course of study; the +commandant, after taking the advice of the superior officers of the +regiment, nominates the most meritorious of these three to the king, who +makes the appointment." The government can appoint to the engineers and +artillery only those who have been instructed as <i>élèves</i> in the Berlin +school of cadets and the school of artillery and engineers, and these +appointments must be made in the order in which the pupils have passed +their final examination. In these corps the lieutenants and second +captains can be promoted to a higher grade only after they have passed a +satisfactory examination. No political influence, nor even royal +partiality, can interfere with this rule.</p> + +<p>Even in the arbitrary monarchies of Austria and Russia it is deemed +necessary to subject all military appointments and promotions, in the +peace establishments, to certain fixed rules. In the Austrian army all +sub-lieutenants must be taken from the military schools, or the +specially-instructed corps of cadets and imperial guards; from this +grade to that of captain all promotions are made by the commandants of +regiments and corps on the advice of the other superior officers. Above +the grade of captain all nominations for promotion are made to the +emperor by the Aulic Council, in the order of seniority of rank, except +the claims of superior merit interfere. "In the Russian army," says +Haillot, "no one, not even a prince of the imperial family, can reach +the grade of officer till he has satisfactorily passed his several +examinations, or finished the severe novitiate to which the cadets in +the corps are subjected." Promotion below the grade of colonel is made +partly by seniority, and partly by merit; above that grade, by selection +alone.</p> + +<p>In the British service, rank in the line of the army is obtained by +purchase, and the higher grades are in this way filled with young men of +energy and enterprise; but this efficiency is gained by injustice to the +poor man, who is without the means of purchasing rank. In some respects +it is preferable to our ruinous system of exclusive seniority and +executive favoritism, but far more objectionable than that based on +merit. Wellington has recently said that the system of exclusive +seniority would soon utterly destroy the efficiency of the army, by +preventing young men from reaching the higher grades. "At first," says +an officer of some distinction in the British navy, in speaking of +promotions in that arm of service, "it certainly looks very hard to see +old stagers grumbling away their existence in disappointed hopes; yet +there can be little doubt that the navy, and, of course, the country at +large, are essentially better served by the present system of employing +active, young, and cheerful-minded officers, than they ever could be by +any imaginable system by seniority. It must not be forgotten, indeed, +that at a certain stage of the profession, the arrangement by which +officers are promoted in turn is already made the rule, and has long +been so: but, by a wise regulation, it does not come into operation +before the rank of post-captain be attained. Antecedent to this point, +there must occur ample opportunities of weeding out those persons, who, +if the rule of mere seniority were adopted, would exceedingly embarrass +the navy list." We fully agree with this writer respecting the evils of +a system of exclusive seniority, but not respecting the best means of +remedying these evils. In England, where the wealthy and aristocratic +classes govern the state, they may very well prefer a system of military +appointment and promotion based exclusively on wealth and political +influence; but in this country we are taught to consider <i>merit</i> as a +claim much higher than wealth, or rank, or privilege.</p> + +<p>The various changes in the rules of appointment and promotion in the +French service, and the various results of these changes, both on the +character of the army and the welfare of the state, are so instructive +that we regret that our limits will not allow us to enter into a full +discussion of them. We can give only a very brief outline.</p> + +<p>Previous to the Revolution, military appointment and promotion were +wholly subject to the rules of nobility, certain grades in the army +belonging of right to certain grades of the <i>noblesse</i>; merit and +service being excluded from consideration. But the constituent assembly +changed this order of things, and established the rule that +three-fourths of the sub-lieutenants be appointed by selection, <i>after a +concours</i>, and the other quarter be appointed from the sub-officers, +alternately by seniority and selection, without <i>concours</i>; the captains +and lieutenants by seniority; the colonels and lieutenant-colonels +two-thirds by seniority and one-third by selection; <i>maréchaux-de-camp</i> +and lieutenant-generals one-half by seniority and one-half by selection. +In 1793 the grades were still further opened to selection, and in the +turbulent times that followed, a part of them were even thrown open to +election by the soldiers. But in 1795 the combined system of merit and +seniority, with certain improvements, was restored. In 1796 and the wars +that followed, <i>merit</i> was the only qualification required, and +Bonaparte, Moreau, and other young generals were actually placed in +command of their seniors in rank. Military talent and military services, +not rank, were the recognised claims for promotion, the <i>baptism of +blood</i>, as it was called, having equalized all grades. Bonaparte, in +leaving Egypt, paid no attention to seniority of rank, but gave the +command to Kleber, who was then only a general of brigade, while Menou +was a general of division. Everybody knows that on the death of Kleber, +General Menou succeeded in the command; and that Egypt, saved by the +<i>selection</i> of Kleber, was lost by the <i>seniority</i> of Menou.</p> + +<p>Napoleon formed rules for promotion, both for peace and war, based on +merit. His peace regulations were much the same as the system of 1795; +his field regulations, however, from the circumstances of the times, +were almost the only ones used. The following extract from the +<i>Reglement de Campagne</i>of 1809, (title XX.,) gives the spirit of this +system:—"The next day after an action the generals of brigade will +present to the generals of division the names of all such as have +distinguished themselves in a particular manner; the generals of +division will immediately report these to the commander-in-chief, and +also the names of the generals and superior officers whose conduct has +contributed most to secure success, so that the general-in-chief may +immediately inform his majesty."</p> + +<p>On the restoration of the Bourbons there were also restored many of the +ancient privileges and claims of rank by the officers of the <i>maison +militaire du roi,</i> and court favoritism was substituted for merit and +service. But the revolution of 1830 produced a different order of +things. "The laws now regulate military promotion; the king can appoint +or promote only in conformity to legal prescriptions; and even in the +exercise of this prerogative, he is wise enough to restrain himself by +certain fixed rules, which protect him from intrigues, and from the +obsessions of persons of influence, and of party politicians." Would +that the same could always be said of the executive of this country in +making appointments and promotions in the army.</p> + +<p>The existing laws and regulations of the French service differ slightly +for different corps, but the general rule is as follows: No one can be +appointed to the grade of officer in the army who has not graduated at +one of the military schools, or has not served at least two years as a +sub-officer in a <i>corps d'armée</i>. In time of peace, no one can be +promoted to the rank of lieutenant, captain, or major, (<i>chef-d'escadron</i> +and <i>chef-de-bataillon</i>,) till he has served two years in the next +lower grade; no one can be made lieutenant-colonel till he has served four +years, nor be made colonel till he has served three years, in the next +lower grade; no one can be made <i>maréchal-de-camp</i>, lieutenant-general, +or marshal of France, till he has served two years in the next lower +grade. These numbers are all diminished one half in time of war. For the +grades of first-lieutenant and captain, two-thirds of the promotions are +by seniority, and one-third by selection; for the <i>chef-de-bataillon</i> +and <i>chef-d'escadron</i>, one-half by seniority and one-half by selection; +for all the other grades by selection only. In time of war, one-half of the +promotions to the grades of first-lieutenant and captain are filled by +selection, and all the promotions to other grades in this way. For +promotion by selection, a list of the authorized candidates for each +grade is made out every year by inspectors, and boards of examiners +appointed <i>ad hoc</i>, and the name, qualifications, and particular claim +are given of each officer admitted to the <i>concours</i>. The +recommendations of these inspectors and examiners are almost invariably +followed by the government in its selections. This combined system of +seniority and merit secures a gradual promotion to all, and at the same +time enables officers of great talents and acquirements to attain the +higher grades while still young and efficient. Merit need not, +therefore, always linger in the subaltern grades, and be held +subordinate to ignorance and stupidity, merely because they happen to be +endowed with the privileges of seniority. Moreover, government is +precluded from thrusting its own favorites into the higher grades, and +placing them over the heads of abler and better men.</p> + +<p>If such a system of appointment were introduced into our army, and fixed +by legal enactments, and no one were allowed to receive a commission +till he had either distinguished himself in the field, or had passed an +examination before a board of competent officers, we are confident that +better selections would be made in the appointments from civil life than +have been within the last ten years by the present system of political +influence. It would scarcely be possible to make worse selections.<a name="FNanchor_50_50"></a><a href="#Footnote_50_50"><sup>[50]</sup></a> +And if the combined system of seniority and examination were pursued in +promoting the subalterns already in service, it certainly would produce +less injustice, and give greater efficiency to the army, than the +present one of exclusive seniority and brevet rank, obtained through +intrigue and political influence, or high military appointments bestowed +as a reward for dirty and corrupt party services. As a military maxim, +<i>secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude +favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent +officers, totally independent of party politics</i>. Such a system has been +for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has +produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged +inefficiency have been <i>overslaughed</i>, and will soon entirely disappear +from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, +talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill. Is it +less important to have competent military officers to command where the +lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country +depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent +surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?</p> + +<a name="Footnote_50_50"></a><a href="#FNanchor_50_50">[50]</a><div class="note"><p> To show the working of this system of political +appointments, we would call attention to a single fact. On the formation +of an additional regiment of dragoons in 1836, <i>thirty</i> of its officers +were appointed from civil life, and only <i>four</i> from the graduates of +the Military Academy. Of those appointed to that regiment from civil +life, <i>twenty-two</i> have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the +latter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only <i>eight</i> of the +whole <i>thirty</i> political appointments are now left, their places having +been mainly supplied by graduates of the Military Academy. +</p><p> +In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course +will our government pursue? Will it again pass by the meritorious young +officers of our army,—graduates of the Military Academy,—who have +spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying +themselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over +their heads civilians of less education and inferior character—men +totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the +base hirelings of party,—those who screech the loudest in favor of +party measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party +ends?—and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and +post-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast +patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual +morality, and destroying the national character? Should any +administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and +honor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped +that the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its +scabbard.</p></div> + +<p>We wish to call particular attention to this subject. It deserves +attention at all times, but at the present moment it more especially +demands a close and candid consideration. The higher grades of our peace +establishment are now filled with men so far advanced in life that, in +case of an increase of the army, many of them must undoubtedly be +either passed over, or put on a retired list. Sooner or later some +change of this kind will undoubtedly be made. It is demanded by the good +of service, even in time of peace; and in time of war, it will be +absolutely necessary to the success of our arms.<a name="FNanchor_51_51"></a><a href="#Footnote_51_51"><sup>[51]</sup></a> But the great +danger is that the change may be made for the worse—that all the +appointments and promotions to the higher grades will be made through +political influence, thus converting the army and navy into political +engines. Let proper measures be taken to prevent so dangerous a result; +let executive patronage in the army be limited by wholesome laws, like +those in France and Prussia; and let military merit and services, as +determined by boards of competent military officers, be the only +recognised claims to appointment and promotion, thus giving to the poor +and meritorious at least an equal chance with the man of wealth and the +base hireling of party. In actual service the system of exclusive +seniority cannot exist; it would deaden and paralyze all our energies. +Taking advantage of this, politicians will drive us to the opposite +extreme, unless the executive authority be limited by wholesome laws, +based on the just principles of <i>merit</i> and <i>service</i>.</p> + +<a name="Footnote_51_51"></a><a href="#FNanchor_51_51">[51]</a><div class="note"><p> Even at the present moment, in ordering troops to Texas, +where immediate and active service is anticipated, it is found necessary +to break up regiments and send only the young and efficient officers +into the field, leaving most of the higher officers behind with mere +nominal commands. Very many of the officers now in Texas are acting in +capacities far above their nominal grades, but without receiving the +rank, pay, and emoluments due to their services.</p></div> + +<p>But the importance of maintaining in our military organization a +suitable system of military instruction is not confined to the +exigencies of our actual condition. It mainly rests upon the absolute +necessity of having in the country a body of men who shall devote +themselves to the cultivation of military science, so as to be able to +compete with the military science of the transatlantic powers. It is not +to be expected that our citizen soldiery, however intelligent, +patriotic, and brave they may be, can make any very great progress in +military studies. They have neither the time nor opportunities for such +pursuits, and if they can acquire a practical acquaintance with +elementary tactics—the mere alphabet of the military art—it is as much +as can reasonably be expected of them. As a general rule, the militia +are individually more capable and intelligent than the men who compose a +regular army. But they must of necessity be inferior in practical +professional knowledge.</p> + +<p>Technical education is necessary in every pursuit of life. It is +possible that the lawyer may succeed in some particular cases without a +knowledge of law, but he will probably have few clients if he remain +ignorant of the laws and precedents that govern the courts. The +unlearned chemist may succeed in performing some single experiment, but +his progress will be slow and uncertain if he neglect to make himself +familiar with the experiments and discoveries of his predecessors.</p> + +<p>Learning, when applied to agriculture, raises it from a mere mechanical +drudgery to the dignity of a science. By analyzing the composition of +the soil we cultivate, we learn its capacity for improvement, and gain +the power to stimulate the earth to the most bountiful production. How +different the results attending the labors of the intelligent +agriculturist, guided by the lamp of learning, from those of the +ignorant drudge who follows the barren formula of traditional precepts! +As applied to manufactures and the mechanical arts, learning develops +new powers of labor, and new facilities for subsistence and enjoyment. +Personal comforts of every kind are greatly increased, and placed within +the reach of the humbler classes; while at the same time the "appliances +of art are made to minister to the demands of elegant taste, and a +higher moral culture." As applied to commerce, it not only greatly +increases the facilities for the more general diffusion of civilization +and knowledge, but is also vastly influential in harmonizing the +conflicting interests of nations.</p> + +<p>Nor is learning less humanizing and pacific in its influence when +applied to the military art. "During the dark ages which followed the +wreck of the Roman power, the military science by which that power had +been reared, was lost with other branches of learning. When learning +revived, the military art revived with it, and contributed not a little +to the restoration of the empire of mind over that of brute force. Then, +too, every great discovery in the art of war has a life-saving and +peace-promoting influence. The effects of the invention of gunpowder are +a familiar proof of this remark; and the same principle applies to the +discoveries of modern times. By perfecting ourselves in military +science, paradoxical as it may seem, we are therefore assisting in the +diffusion of peace, and hastening on the approach of that period when +swords shall be beaten into ploughshares and spears into pruning-hooks."</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="APPENDIX"></a><h2><b>APPENDIX.</b></h2> + +<hr style="width: 45%;"> + +<p>Since the first edition of this work was published, two important wars +have been commenced and terminated—that between the United States and +the Republic of Mexico, and that between Russia and the Western Powers +of Europe—and another is now being waged between France and Austria, +upon the old battle fields of Northern Italy. In issuing a new edition +of these Elements of Military Art and Science, it is deemed proper to +refer to these wars, and to apply the principles here discussed to the +military operations carried on in Mexico and in the Crimea. It is +proposed to do this in the form of Notes to the several Chapters. The +war in Italy being still undetermined, and the details of the several +battles which have already been fought being but imperfectly known, it +is obviously improper to attempt to criticize their strategic character +or tactical arrangement.</p> + +<p>H.W.H.</p> + +<p>NEW YORK, <i>July</i>, 1859.</p> + +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER II.—STRATEGY.</p> + +<p>In the invasion of Mexico, the United States formed four separate +armies, moving on <i>four distinct lines of operation:</i> 1st. The "Army of +the West," under General Kearny, moving from St. Louis on New Mexico and +California; 2d. The "Army of the Centre," under General Wool, moving +from San Antonio de Bexar on Chihuahua; 3d. The "Army of Occupation," on +the Rio Grande, under General Taylor, moving from Corpus Christi on +Matamoras, Monterey, and Saltillo; and 4th. The "Main Army," under +General Scott, moving from Vera Cruz on the capital of Mexico.</p> + +<p>The Army of the West, under General Kearny, moved upon a separate and +distinct line of operations, having no strategic relations to the other +three; its objects were the conquest and occupation of New Mexico and +Upper California. The first was readily accomplished; but the general +then detached so large a force to operate on Chihuahua after the +diversion of Wool's column, that his expedition to California must have +utterly failed without the assistance of the naval forces in the +Pacific.</p> + +<p>The lines of Taylor and Wool were evidently ill chosen, being so distant +as to afford the enemy an opportunity to take a central position between +them. Fortunately Wool proceeded no further than Monclova, and then +turned off to occupy Parras, thus coming under the immediate command of +General Taylor. The latter fought the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de +la Palma, and sustained the siege of Fort Brown; then crossing the Rio +Grande at Matamoras, he captured Monterey, and, forming a junction with +Wool, defeated the army of Santa Anna at Buena Vista. This battle ended +the campaign, which, however brilliantly conducted, was entirely without +strategic results.</p> + +<p>Scott landed his army near the Island of Sacrificios without opposition, +and immediately invested Vera Cruz, which surrendered after a short +siege and bombardment. Having thus secured his base, he immediately +advanced to the city of Puebla, meeting and defeating the army of Santa +Anna at Cerro Gordo. Remaining some time at Puebla to reinforce his +army, he advanced into the valley of Mexico, and after the brilliant +victories of Contreras, Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, +captured the city and terminated the war.</p> + +<p>With respect to the double line of operations of Taylor and Scott it may +be sufficient to remark, that Santa Anna, from his central position, +fought, with the same troops, the battles of Buena Vista and Cerro +Gordo. It should also be remarked, that the line of operations of the +army of the Rio Grande was not approved by either Scott or Taylor, nor, +it is believed, by any other officer of our army. Scott's line of +operations, however, was truly strategic, and in turning the Mexican +flank by Lake Chalco and the Pedregal, he exhibited the skill of a great +general.</p> + +<p>The war in the Crimea, from the limited extent of the theatre of +operations, afforded but little opportunity for the display of strategic +skill on either side. Nevertheless, the movements of both parties, prior +to the investment and siege of Sebastopol, are fair subjects for +military criticism with respect to the plans of operation.</p> + +<p>When the allies landed their troops at the Old Fort, three plans were +open for the consideration of the Russian general: 1st. To destroy or +close the harbors of Balaklava, Kamiesch, Kazatch and Strelitzka, and, +garrisoning Sebastopol with a strong force, to occupy with the rest of +his army the strong plateau south of the city, and thus force the allies +to besiege the strong works on the north. 2d. Having closed the harbors +on the south, and secured Sebastopol from being carried by the assault +of any detachment of the allies, to operate on their left flank, +annoying and harassing them with his Cossacks, and thus delay them many +days in the difficult and precarious position which they would have +occupied. 3d. To advance with his whole force and offer them battle at +the Alma. The last and least advantageous of these plans was adopted, +and as the garrison of Sebastopol, during the battle, consisted of only +four battalions and the sailors of the fleet, it might, considering the +weakness of its works, have been easily carried by a detachment of the +allied forces.</p> + +<p>For the allies at the Alma two plans presented themselves: 1st. To turn +the Russian left, cut him off from Sebastopol, and occupy that city in +force. 2d. To turn the Russian right, and, throwing him back upon +Sebastopol, cut him off from all external succor. Neither plan was fully +carried out. The column of General Bosquet turned the Russian left and +decided his retreat; but no strategic advantage was taken of the +victory. The battle was fought on the 20th of September, and by noon of +the 26th the allies had only advanced to the Balbeck, a distance of a +little more than ten miles in six days! On the 27th they regained their +communication with the fleet at Balaklava, without attempting to occupy +Sebastopol, and having exposed themselves to destruction by an +ill-conducted flank march. Fortunately for the allies, the Russians +failed to avail themselves of the advantages which the enemy had thus +gratuitously afforded. The fleet having entered the open harbor of +Balaklava, the allies now commenced the labor of landing and moving up +their siege material and of opening their trenches, while the Russians +prepared their fortifications on the south of Sebastopol for resisting +the operations of that gigantic siege which stands without a parallel in +history.</p> + +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER III.—FORTIFICATIONS.</p> + +<p>In the war between the United States and Mexico, the latter had no +fortifications on her land frontiers, and, with the single exception of +Vera Cruz, her harbors were entirely destitute of defensive works. The +Americans, therefore, had no obstacles of this kind to overcome on three +of their lines of operation; and, when Scott had reduced Vera Cruz, his +line of march was open to the capital. Moreover, nearly every seaport on +the Gulf and Pacific coast fell into our hands without a blow. Had the +landing of Scott been properly opposed, and Vera Cruz been strongly +fortified and well defended, it would have been taken only after a long +and difficult siege. Moreover, had the invading army encountered strong +and well-defended fortifications on the line of march to Mexico, the war +would, necessarily, have been prolonged, and possibly with a different +result.</p> + +<p>The Russian fortifications in the Baltic prevented the allies from +attempting any serious operations in that quarter, and those in the +Black Sea confined the war to a single point of the Heracleidan +Chersonese. Had Russia relied exclusively upon her fleet to prevent a +maritime descent, and left Sebastopol entirely undefended by +fortifications, how different had been the result of the Crimean war.</p> + +<p>This subject will be alluded to again in the Notes on Sea-coast +Defences, and Permanent Fortifications.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER IV.—LOGISTICS.</p> + +<p>The war in Mexico exhibited, in a striking manner, our superiority over +the enemy in this branch of the military art. No army was better +supplied than ours in all matters of subsistence, clothing, medical and +hospital stores, and in means of transportation. Two points, however, +are worthy of remark in this connection: 1st. The great waste of +material, which resulted from the employment of raw troops under short +enlistments, and commanded by officers appointed from civil life, who +were without experience and destitute of military instruction; and, 2d. +The immense expense of transportation, which was due in part to the +above cause and in part to the employment, in the administrative +departments, of civilians who were utterly ignorant of the rules and +routine of military service. This war was conducted on the system of +magazines and provisions carried in the train of the army, or purchased +of the inhabitants and regularly paid for, forced requisitions being +seldom resorted to, and then in very moderate quantities. The wisdom of +this plan was proved by the general good order and discipline of our +troops, and the general good-will of the non-combatant inhabitants of +the country which was passed over or occupied by the army.</p> + +<p>The war in the Crimea proved most conclusively the vast superiority of +the French administrative system over that of the English—of the +military over a civil organization of the administrative corps of an +army. The French troops before Sebastopol were regularly, cheaply, and +abundantly supplied with every requisite of provisions, clothing, +munitions, medical stores, military utensils, and hospital and camp +equipages; while the English army, notwithstanding an immense +expenditure of money, was often paralyzed in its operations by the want +of proper military material, and not unfrequently was destitute of even +the necessaries of life. </p> + +<p>Instead of profiting by this lesson, the recent tendency of our own +government has been (especially in supplying the army in Utah) to +imitate the sad example of the English, and to convert the supplying of +our armies into a system of political patronage to be used for party +purposes. If fully carried out, it must necessarily result in the ruin +of the army, the robbery of the treasury, and the utter corruption of +the government.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER V.—TACTICS.</p> + +<p>The war in Mexico, from the small number of troops engaged, and the +peculiar character of the ground in most cases, afforded but few +opportunities for the display of that skill in the tactics of battle +which has so often determined the victory upon the great fields of +Europe. Nevertheless, the history of that war is not without useful +lessons in the use which may be made of the several arms in the attack +and defence of positions. The limit assigned to these Notes will admit +of only a few brief remarks upon these battles.</p> + +<p>The affairs of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma properly constitute only +a single battle. In the first, which was virtually a cannonade, the +lines were nearly parallel, and Arista's change of front to an oblique +position during the engagement, was followed by a corresponding movement +on the part of General Taylor. Being made sensible of the superiority of +the American artillery, the Mexican general fell back upon the Ravine of +Resaca de la Palma, drawing up his troops in a concave line to suit the +physical character of the ground. The Americans attacked the whole line +with skirmishers, and with dragoons supported by light artillery, and +the charge of a heavy column of infantry decided the victory. General +Taylor's operations at Monterey partook more of the nature of an attack +upon an intrenched position than of a regular battle upon the field. No +doubt Worth's movement to the right had an important influence in +deciding the contest, but the separation of his column from the main +body, by a distance of some five miles, was, to say the least, a most +hazardous operation. The Mexicans, however, took no advantage of the +opening to operate between the separate masses into which the American +army was divided. The loss which the Mexicans inflicted upon us resulted +more from the strength of their position than from any skilful use of +their defensive works. In the battle of Buena Vista, the efforts of +Santa Anna were principally directed to turning the American left. If he +had concentrated his masses more upon the centre at the plateau, the +success gained in the early part of the contest would probably have been +decisive. The American right at La Angostura was made almost +inaccessible by the deep ravines in its front, and the skilful use made +of the artillery from this point enabled General Taylor to gain the +victory, even after his left had been completely turned, and a portion +of the volunteers had actually fled from the field.</p> + +<p>The manner in which Scott handled his troops in the various battles on +his line of march from Vera Cruz to the capital, proved him to be one of +the best generals of the age. At Cerro Gordo he so completely turned +Santa Anna's left as to cut off his line of retreat, and nearly +destroyed his army, the general himself barely escaping capture. The +turning of Valencia's position by the village of San Geronimo, at the +battle of Contreras, and the charge by Riley's columns of infantry, were +movements well planned and admirably executed, as were also the rapid +pursuit of Santa Anna to Churubusco, and the flank and rear attacks by +the brigades of Pierce and Shields. The victory of Molino del Rey was +mostly won with the musket, without very material assistance from heavy +artillery, and was one of the most brilliant but dearly bought +achievements of the war. The assault upon Chapultepec was preceded by a +long and heavy cannonade, which produced a decided moral effect upon the +enemy and greatly facilitated the assault.</p> + +<p>With respect to the battles of the Crimean war, only that of the Alma is +subject to the tactical criticism of ordinary battles; those of +Balaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya, were of the nature of sorties +made to prevent an assault of the unfinished works of defence, and to +prolong the operations of the siege. They must therefore be judged as +such, and not according to the ordinary rules applicable to contests in +the open field. At the battle of the Alma the Russians were attacked in +position, the two lines of battle being nearly parallel. According to +the original plan of attack, the Turks and Bosquet's division was to +turn the Russian left, while the main attack was made upon the centre. +But, on account of the division of command in the allied army, there was +no concert of action. The heavy column of Bosquet probably decided the +victory, although the battle was general throughout the whole line. The +English army advanced in columns of brigades at deploying distances, its +right connected with the French, and its left protected by a line of +skirmishers, of cavalry and horse artillery. With respect to the +formation and use of troops in the other battles, it may be remarked +that the charge of the English light cavalry at Balaklava was apparently +without necessity or object, and led to its inevitable destruction. In +the battle of Inkerman the Russians directed their main attack upon the +English right and centre, with false attacks upon the French left and +towards Balaklava. But these false attacks, as is usual in such cases, +were not conducted with sufficient energy and decision, and Bosquet was +thus enabled to perceive the real intentions of the enemy upon the +English portion of the line and move to its assistance. Moreover, the +main body of the Russians moved in too heavy and unwieldy masses, which +exposed them to terrible losses, and rendered impossible a rapid and +effective deployment of their numerical force. The same criticism is +applicable to their formation at the battle of the Tehernaya.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER VI.—MEANS OF NATIONAL DEFENCE.</p> + +<p>On the invasion of Mexico by the United States, the former republic had +a large army of tolerably good troops, though badly officered, still +worse equipped, and almost destitute of proper military stores; but she +was entirely wanting in two important elements of national +defence—fortifications and a navy. Her weakness was shown by the rapid +and easy conquest of almost the entire country.</p> + +<p>We have already remarked that the fortifications of Russia confined the +theatre of war to a single point of the Crimea, and limited the military +operations of the allies to the prolonged and only partially successful +siege of Sebastopol.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER VII.—SEA-COAST DEFENCES.</p> + +<p>Allusion has already been made to the weakness of Mexico, resulting from +her want of sea-coast defences, as shown by the war between that +republic and the United States. This would have been still more manifest +had she possessed any thing like a commercial marine, exposed to capture +by our naval forces. As it was, the Mexican war afforded not a single +contest between ships and forts, no opposition being made to the +occupation of Mexican ports by our naval force. The only coast defence, +the castle of San Juan d'Ulica was not attacked, but after the +bombardment and capture of Vera Cruz, it surrendered without a blow.</p> + +<p>The Crimean war, on the contrary, exhibited in a most marked degree the +importance of a well-fortified sea-coast. Notwithstanding the immense +force of the combined fleets of England and France, no naval attack was +made upon either Cronstadt or Sebastopol, and the large naval force of +Russia proved utterly useless as a defence against a maritime descent. +There was, indeed, a simulachre of a "naval cannonade" on the latter +place on the 17th of October, 1854, intended as a diversion of the +attention and strength of the garrison from the land side, where the +real struggle for predominance was going on between the besieged and the +besiegers. The inutility of this attempt was so manifest that no +serious naval attack was undertaken, notwithstanding that the allies +were ready to bring to bear upon the antiquated and ill-armed Russian +works the most powerful naval armaments the world had ever seen.</p> + +<p>The results of this "simulachre of a naval cannonade," as it has been +called, is worthy of note. The details are taken from Major Barnard's +able pamphlet on "The Dangers and Defences of New York," and Commander +Dahlgren's interesting and valuable work on "Shells and Shell Guns."</p> + +<p>"The allied fleet consisted of 14 French, 10 British, and 2 Turkish +ships-of-the-line (some few of which had auxiliary steam power), and a +number of side-wheel steamers to tow these; and carried in all about +2,500 guns. It was opposed by about 280 guns from the works. The fleet +kept itself (in general) at a respectable distance (from 1500 to 2000 +yards); too far to inflict any material injury with its armament +(32-pounders, with a moderate proportion of 8-inch shell-guns) upon the +works;—too far to receive much from the inefficient armament of the +Russian works."</p> + +<p>"The only exception to this remark applies to the detached English +squadron under Sir Edmund Lyons, consisting of the <i>Agamemnon</i>, +<i>Sanspareil</i>, <i>London</i>, <i>Arethusa</i>, and <i>Albion</i>, the +first-named of which vessels took a position at 750 or 800 yards from Fort +Constantine, while the others stretched along at about the same distance +from Fort Constantine, the 'Wasp Tower,' and 'Telegraph Battery.' Dahlgren +describes the result as follows:—"</p> + +<p>"The <i>Agamemnon</i> was very seriously maltreated, though not to such an +extent as to impair her power of battery or engine. She was on fire +several times; was struck by 240 shot or shells; and, singular to say, +only lost 29, while her second, just by, lost 70 men. The <i>Albion</i> +suffered still more, and in an hour was towed out crippled, and on fire +in more than one place, with a loss of 81 men. The crews of the <i>London</i> +and <i>Arethusa</i>, fared rather better, but the ships nearly as ill; and +they too remained in station but a little time after the <i>Albion</i>. The +<i>Queen</i> was driven off soon after she got into her new position, in +great danger; and the <i>Rodney</i> had the bare satisfaction of getting +aground and afloat after experiencing some damage."</p> + +<p>"The value of the small works on the cape and bluffs, was clearly +defined in these results; being above the dense cloud of smoke that +enveloped the ships and the lower forts, their aim was not embarrassed, +while the seamen labored under the difficulty of firing, with an +inconvenient elevation, at objects that they saw but seldom, and then +but dimly and briefly. As a consequence, three line-of-battle ships and +a frigate were driven off very shortly and in great peril, and a fourth +badly cut up; while the <i>Agamemnon</i> lay opposed to one of the heaviest +sea-forts with two tiers of casemates, and at the end of five-hours came +off with comparatively little loss."</p> + +<p>"Whatever superiority of effect the batteries on the heights may have +had (and we have so few details about these works that we can draw no +sure conclusion from this mere naked statement of damages received by +the vessels), it evidently was not for want of being <i>hit</i> often enough +(smoke or no smoke), that the <i>Agamemnon</i> escaped with so little injury. +She 'was struck by 240 shot and shells;' and it is only due to the +inefficiency of the projectiles by which she was struck, that she was +not destroyed."</p> + +<p>"With respect to the damages received by Fort Constantine, Dahlgren +says:—"</p> + +<p>"' The distance of the <i>Agamemnon</i> and <i>Sanspareil</i> from Fort +Constantine (17th October, 1854), was assumed to be about 800 yards; +Lord Raglan states it to have been rather less. These two ships could +bring to bear about 87 guns, and the firing from them probably lasted +some four hours. There can be no doubt that it inflicted much damage, +for the Russian Commander-in-chief-admits it in his official report; but +not sufficient to impair the strength of the masonry, and far short of +effecting a breach in it."</p> + +<p>"'At Bomarsund, the results were rather different:—Three 32-pounders of +42 cwt. (guns of inferior weight), were landed from a ship's spar deck, +and placed in battery at 950 yards from the North Tower—the masonry of +good quality and 6-1/2 feet thick. In eight hours, the wall between two +embrasures was cut through from top to bottom, offering a practicable +breach, to effect which 487 shot and 45 shells were fired, being at the +rate of one round from the battery in rather less than a minute; or, +from each gun, one in 2-3/4 minutes. The Tower surrendered."</p> + +<p>"'It seems almost incredible that three pieces should be able to +accomplish fully that which eighty-seven pieces utterly failed to do, +the distances from the object being alike—particularly when it is +considered that many of the latter were of greater calibre, and most of +them employed much heavier charges where the calibres were similar. The +guns of the ship, if fired at the same rate as those of the battery, +which was not unusually rapid (one round in two and three-fourth +minutes), would have discharged some seven thousand seven hundred shot +and shells in the course of the four hours, supposing no interruption; a +number which, if properly applied, would appear, from the results of +three guns, to have been sufficient to breach the wall of the fort in +fourteen places; whereas they did not effect a single breach, which is +abundant proof of the lack of accuracy. They must either have been +dispersed over the surface of the fort, or else missed it altogether, +and this could have been due only to a want of the precision which was +attained by the battery. The constantly preferred complaint of motion in +the ships was not to be urged, because on the day of cannonading +Sebastopol, there was scarcely a breath of wind, and the ships were too +large to be easily moved by the swell, unless very considerable. That +the fort did no greater damage to the ships than it received from them, +proves no more than that its fire was quite as illy directed, and the +calibres too low. It is said that the <i>Agamemnon</i> was struck in the hull +by two hundred and forty shot and shells, which must have been but a +small portion of what was fired, though sufficient to be decisive, if, +as already observed, the calibre had been heavier.'"</p> + +<p>Here, then, a number of projectiles thrown from the ships, which were +sufficient, had they been thrown from a land battery, according to the +result at Bomarsund, to produce fourteen practicable breaches, failed +not only to produce a single breach, but even "to impair the strength of +the masonry."</p> + +<p>The reason of this is obvious. That degree of precision of fire by which +a breach is effected by a land battery is utterly unattainable from a +floating structure, for the motion of the water, even in the calmest +days, is quite sufficient to prevent accuracy of aim at an object at a +distance, as in this case, of seven and eight hundred yards.</p> + +<p>With respect to the action of the shot and shells upon the <i>Agamemnon</i>, +it is to be remarked that we have as yet had no fair trial of the power +of the fire of modern shell-guns of large calibre from land batteries +against ships of war. The Russians had some of them in their fleet, and +at Sinope, with their shell-guns, they blew up two Turkish frigates <i>in +fifteen minutes. </i> It does not appear that in the Crimean war they had +yet provided their fortifications with the modern armaments, for where +shells were thrown from their sea-coast batteries, they were in every +instance of inferior calibre.</p> + +<p>With respect to the naval attack upon Kinburn, which has been referred +to as showing the importance of floating batteries as an auxiliary to +ships in reducing harbor defences, we have no official reports of the +Russians from which to derive accurate information of the strength of +the works attacked. Dahlgren, drawing his information from the official +accounts of the "English and French admirals," describes the works and +their location is follows:—</p> + +<p>"The Boug and the Dnieper issue into a large basin, formed partly by +the projection of the main shore, partly by a long narrow strip of +Sand-beach, which continues from it and takes a north-westerly direction +until it passes the promontory of Otchakov, where it terminates, and +from which it is separated by the channel, whereby the waters of the +estuary empty into the Black Sea."</p> + +<p>"The distance between the spit or extremity of this tongue and the +Point of Otchakov, or the main shore opposite, is about two miles; but +the water is too shoal to admit of the passage of large vessels of war, +except in the narrow channel that runs nearest to the spit and its +northern shore. Here, therefore, are placed the works designed to +command the entrance. They are three in number. Near the extreme point +of the spit is a covered battery built of logs, which are filled in and +overlaid with sand,—pierced for eighteen guns, but mounting only ten."</p> + +<p>"Advancing further along the beach is a circular redoubt, connected +with the spit battery by a covered way. This work, built of stone, and +riveted with turf, is open, and said to be the most substantial of the +three; it has eleven cannon, and within is a furnace for heating shot."</p> + +<p>"Further on, and where the beach has widened considerably, is Fort +Kinburn, a square bastioned work, extending to the sea on the south, and +to the waters of the estuary on the north. It is casemated in part, +though but few of these embrasures were armed,—its chief force being in +the pieces <i>en barbette, </i>and some nine or ten mortars. The masonry, +though solid, is represented by an eye-witness not to be bomb-proof, and +so dilapidated by age that the mortar was falling out from the +interstices, leaving the stone to disintegrate. The interior space was +occupied by ranges of wooden buildings, slightly constructed and +plastered over."</p> + +<p>"This fort is said to be armed with sixty pieces. The English admiral +states, that all three of the works mounted eighty-one guns and mortars. +The calibres are not given officially, but stated in private letters to +be 18-pounders and 32-pounders.'"</p> + +<p>"The above description will quite justify the further remark as to +these works:—"</p> + +<p>"They were inferior in every respect, and manifestly incapable of +withstanding any serious operation by sea or land. The main fort was +particularly weak in design, and dilapidated; all of them were +indifferently armed and garrisoned.'"</p> + +<p>"So much for the works. As to the character of the armament brought to +the assault, the same authority says:—</p> + +<p>"The allied force was admirably adapted to the operation, embracing +every description of vessel, from the largest to the smallest, and all +propelled by steam. There were screw-liners, and like vessels of +inferior class, side-wheel steamers, screw gunboats, floating-batteries, +mortar-vessels, etc., each armed in what was considered the most +approved manner. And this truly formidable naval force carried +<i>besides</i> some thousand troops' on board, all designed to attack these +dilapidated' works of Kinburn."</p> + +<p>"Without going into the particulars, we simply give Dahlgren's account +of the affair:—"</p> + +<p>"The French floating-batteries (<i>Devastation, Lave</i>, and <i>Tonnante</i>) +steamed in to make their first essay, anchoring some six or seven +hundred yards off the S.E. bastion of Fort Kinburn, and at 9.20 opened +fire, supported by the mortar-vessels, of which six were English, by the +gunboats, five French and six English, and by the steamer <i>Odin</i>, 16."</p> + +<p>"The heavy metal of the floating-batteries (said to be twelve +50-pounders on the broadside of each) soon told on the walls of the +fort; and the vertical fire was so good that the French admiral +attributed to it, in great part, the speedy surrender of the place. The +gunboats also made good ricochet practice, which was noticed to be +severe on the barbette batteries."</p> + +<p>"The Russian gunners, in nowise daunted by this varied fire, plied +their guns rapidly in return, directing their attention chiefly to the +floating-batteries, which were nearest."</p> + +<p>"Exactly at noon, the admirals steamed in with the <i>Royal Albert </i> 121, +<i>Algiers</i>, 91, <i>Agamemnon</i>, 90, and <i>Princess Royal</i>, 90, with the four +French liners in close order, taking position in line, ranging N.W. and +S.E., about one mile from the fort, in twenty-eight feet water."</p> + +<p>"At the same time, a squadron of steam-frigates, under Rear-Admirals +Stewart and Pellion, dashed in through the passage to the basin, opening +fire on the spit and central batteries in passing, and anchoring well +inside of Fort Nicholaiev and Otchakov. The attack seaward was completed +by the <i>Acre</i>, 100, <i>Curaçoa</i>, 30, <i>Tribune</i>, 30, and <i>Sphynx</i>, 6, +opening on the central battery; while the <i>Hannibal</i>, 91, <i>Dauntless</i>, +24, and <i>Terrible</i>, 21, assailed that on the spit. To this storm of shot +and shells, the Russians could not reply long. In the spit battery, the +sand falling through between the logs, displaced by shot and shells, +choked the embrasures, and blocked up the guns. In the fort, the light +wooden buildings were in flames at an early hour; then the walls began +to crumble before the balls which came from every quarter, front, flank, +and rear; and as the guns were disabled successively, the return became +feeble, until few were in condition to be fired, the central redoubt +alone discharging single guns at long intervals. The Russian commander, +however, made no sign of surrender; but the admirals, seeing that his +fire had ceased, and further defence was unavailing, hoisted the white +flag at 1.35 P.M., upon which the works were given up on honorable +terms."</p> + +<p>"The garrison consisted of about fourteen hundred men; their loss is +differently stated,—the French admiral says eighty wounded,—another, +forty-three killed and one hundred and fourteen wounded."</p> + +<p>"The English suffered the least, having but two men wounded; besides +two killed and two wounded in the <i>Arrow</i>, by the bursting of her two +68-pounder Lancaster guns."</p> + +<p>"The superiority of the allied vessels in number and calibre of +ordnance was very decided; they must have had at least six hundred and +fifty pieces in play, chiefly 32-pounders, and 8-inch shell guns, with a +fair proportion of 68-pounders and mortars, besides the 50-pounders of +the French floating batteries. To which the Russians could only reply +with eighty-one cannon and mortars, and no guns of heavier calibre than +32-pounders, while many were lower. The great disparity in offensive +power was not compensated to the works by the advantage of commanding +position, the Russian fort and redoubt being upon nearly the same level +with the ships' batteries, and also very deficient in proper strength. +On the other hand, the depth of water did not allow the liners to +approach nearer than one mile; and thus their fire was by no means so +intense as it would have been at shorter range."</p> + +<p>"This was the sole occasion in which the floating batteries had an +opportunity of proving their endurance; which was the question of most +importance, as no one could doubt the effect of long 50-pounders, or +68-pounders, when brought within a few hundred yards of masonry, and +able to retain the steadiness indispensable to a breaching fire."</p> + +<p>"No siege operation had ever embraced batteries of such power, for +though the English had employed long 68-pounders at Sebastopol, yet the +distance from the objects exceeded a thousand yards; and the +concentration of fire, so far as any opinion can be formed from the +published statements, was far inferior to that of the thirty-six +50-pounders, in the broadsides of the three batteries anchored in close +order."</p> + +<p>"They were hulled repeatedly by shot; one of them (the <i>Devastation</i>), +it is said, sixty-seven times, without any other effect on the stout +iron plates than to dint them, at the most, one and a half +inches,—still, there were ten men killed and wounded in this battery by +shot and shell which entered the ports,—and the majority of damage to +the French personnel (twenty-seven men) occurred in the three +floating-batteries."</p> + +<p>Major Barnard, in commenting upon this affair, says that it "proves +nothing, unless it be, that dilapidated, and ill-designed, and +ill-constructed works, armed with inferior calibres, cannot contend +against such an overwhelming array of force as was here displayed. * * * +The Fort of Kinburn surrendered, <i>not because</i> it was breached—not +because the defenders were so far diminished by their losses as to be +unable to protract the contest,—but simply because the guns and +gunners, exposed in all possible ways, were put hors-du-combat, and the +calibres (of the guns in Kinburn) were incapable of doing any great +damage to the vessels, at the distance they were stationed."</p> +<br> + +<p>The guns in the low <i>open</i> batteries were exposed to a ricochet and +vertical fire, to which latter the French admiral attributed, in good +part, the surrender of the place. The buildings behind the batteries, +built of wood, "slightly constructed and plastered over," were set on +fire, and the heat and smoke must have rendered the service of the guns +almost impracticable. Nevertheless, out of a garrison of 1,400, only 157 +were killed and wounded—a very small loss under all the circumstances. +If the works had been well-constructed casemates, covering the men from +the ricochet and vertical fires and the sharpshooters of the troops who +invested the land fronts, the loss of the garrison would have been still +less; and if they had been armed with heavier projectiles, much greater +damage would have been inflicted upon the attacking force.</p> + +<p>With respect to the use of floating-batteries in this case, Commander +Dahlgren very judiciously remarks:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The use that can be made of floating-batteries, as auxiliaries in</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attacking shore-works, must depend on further confirmation of their</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">asserted invulnerability. It may be that the performance at Kinburn</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">answered the expectation of the French emperor as regards offensive</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">power, for that is a mere question of the battering capacity of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">heaviest calibres, which is undoubted; but the main issue, which </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">concerns their endurance, cannot be settled by the impact of 32-pounder</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">shot, fired at 600 and 700 yards. Far heavier projectiles will in future</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">be found on all seaboard fortifications; and the ingenuity of the </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">artillerist may also be exerted more successfully than at Kinburn.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Still, it is not to be doubted that the floating-battery is a formidable</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">element in assailing forts, even if its endurance falls short of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">absolute invulnerability; and the defence will do well to provide </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">against its employment."</span><br> + +<p>The works at Bomarsund were taken by means of <i>land-batteries</i>, which +breached the exposed walls of the towers and main works. An auxiliary +fire was opened upon the water front by the fleet, but it produced very +little effect. But after the work had been reduced, an experimental +firing was made by the <i>Edinburgh</i>, armed with the largest and most +powerful guns in the British navy.</p> + +<p>In speaking of the effects of the siege batteries upon the walls of +Bomarsund, and the experimental fire of the <i>Edinburgh</i>, Sir Howard +Douglas remarks:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"This successful operation (of the land batteries) is very generally,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">but erroneously, stated to have been effected by the fire of the ships,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and it is even strongly held up as a proof of what ships can do, and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">ought to attempt elsewhere."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"But the results of the experimental firing at the remnant of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fort, which, unless the previous firing of the ships during the attack</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was absolutely harmless, must have been somewhat damaged, and moreover</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">shaken by the blowing-up of the contiguous portions, do not warrant</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">this conclusion, even should the attacking ships be permitted, like</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the <i>Edinburgh</i>, to take up, quietly and coolly, positions within 500</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">yards, and then deliberately commence and continue their firing, without</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">being fired at! The firing of the <i>Edinburgh</i>, at 1,060 yards, was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">unsatisfactory. 390 shot and shells were fired, from the largest and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">most powerful guns in the British navy (viz., from the Lancaster gun</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of 95 cwt., with an elongated shell of 100 lbs.;—from 68-pounders of 95</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">cwt., and 32-pounders of 56 cwt., solid shot guns;—from 10-inch shell</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">guns of 84 cwt., with hollow shot of 84 lbs.;—from 8-inch shell guns of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">65 and 60 cwt., with hollow shot of 56 lbs.), and did but little injury </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to the work. At 480 yards, 250 shot, shells, and hollow shot were fired.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">A small breach was formed in the facing of the outer wall, of extremely</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">bad masonry, and considerable damage done to the embrasures and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">other portions of the wall; but no decisive result was obtained—no</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">practicable breach formed, by which the work might be assaulted,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">taken, and effectually destroyed, although 640 shot and shells (40,000</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">lbs. of metal) were fired into the place, first at 1,060, and then at</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">480 yards."</span><br> + +<p>Surely, this "naval attack," taken in connection with the true facts of +the capture of Kinburn, the abortive attempt of the British fleet in the +Pacific upon the Russian works of Petropauloski, is not calculated to +affect the well established opinion of the ability of forts to resist +maritime attacks.</p> + +<p>Few are now disposed to dispute the general superiority of guns ashore +over guns afloat; but some think that works of masonry are incapable of +resisting the heavy and continuous fire which may now be brought against +it by fleets and floating-batteries, and would therefore extend the area +of the works and rely mainly upon earthen parapets, with guns in +barbette. This conclusion they form from the results of the maritime +attack on Kinburn, and of the land-batteries on Bomarsund.</p> + +<p>Major Barnard, in his valuable work on "The Dangers and Defences of New +York," draws a very different conclusion from these attacks, and +contends that they abundantly prove the capability of well-constructed +stone masonry to resist the fire of ships and floating-batteries, if the +latter are opposed by proper armaments in the forts; moreover, that they +proved the superiority of casemated forts over low open batteries, with +guns in barbette, in covering the garrison from the effects of a +vertical and ricochet fire. Unquestionably the masonry at Bomarsund was +poorly constructed; nevertheless, the fire of the shipping produced very +little effect upon it. It is also equally certain that Kinburn Was +taken, not by a breaching fire, but mainly by the effects of vertical +and ricochet fires.</p> + +<p>With respect to our own system of sea-coast defences, it may be +remarked, that, since this chapter was written, the works mentioned +therein as having been commenced, have been gradually advanced towards +completion, and that the acquisition of Texas and California, and the +settlement of Oregon and Washington Territory, by greatly extending our +line of maritime defence, have rendered necessary the fortification of +other points. It should also be noted that while the value and necessity +of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of +the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that +the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of +modern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it +necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports +of New York and San Francisco—one the <i>key point</i> of the Atlantic, and +the other of the Pacific coast. Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards +of Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted <i>too +many</i> points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our +great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast +defence. However this may have been <i>at the time the system was +adopted</i>, there can be no question that the relative strength of the +works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond +to <i>the present</i> relative importance of the places to be defended, and +the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing +the means of maritime attack. On this subject we quote from the work of +Major Barnard:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">system was planned, and our country has so increased in population,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">impression by an invasion of our territory,—our great maritime places</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the present day."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">these nations to wage war against the United States."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">would flow from such means. The war consisted exclusively in attacks</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">upon maritime places—great seaports—seats of commercial and naval</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">power. Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">prosperity of a nation—by the large populations and immense amount</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">results may be produced. Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">named became, indeed, the true seats of war."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">turned the issue of the war. Had it not been so decided <i>there</i>, Cronstadt</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">would have been the next field of combat,—for which, indeed, the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">allies had made the most enormous preparations."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Is it not <i>certain</i> that in future all war of maritime powers against</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the United States, will take a similar course? All territorial invasion</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">being out of the question, it is against our <i>great</i> seaports and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">strategic points of coast defence—such as New York, New Orleans, and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">San Francisco—pre-eminently New York,—that an enemy will concentrate</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">his efforts. Against these he will prepare such immense armaments,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">—against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall <i>insure</i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">success."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The mere defense of the city against <i>ordinary fleets</i>, is no longer</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the question; but <i>through the defensive works to be here erected, the</i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the </i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science </i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can </i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>bring against them</i>; in short, in fortifying New York, we are really</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">contests is to be decided."</span><br> + +<p>A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground +that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and +floating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area, +will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer +land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege.</p> + +<p>It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, +as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more +exposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners +to be picked off by sharpshooters. Moreover, they give but a very +limited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor. +On the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works, +when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually +resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries. The +results of recent wars, and of the West Point experiments by General +Totten, would seem to prove them abundantly capable of doing this. +Against such proofs the mere <i>ad captandum</i> assertion of their +incapacity can have but little weight—certainly not enough to justify +the abandonment of a system approved by the best military authorities +of this country and Europe, and sanctioned by long experience.</p> + +<p>Major Barnard, in speaking of the capacity of masonry casemated forts to +resist the fire of a hostile armament, and of the propriety of +abandoning them for earthen batteries in our system of Coast Defences, +uses the following forcible language:—"When we bear in mind that the +hostile 'floating batteries,' of whatever description, will themselves +be exposed to the most formidable projectiles that can be thrown from +shore batteries,—that when they choose to come to 'close quarters,' to +attempt to breach, <i>their</i> 'embrasures' present openings through which +deluges of grape, canister, and musket balls can be poured upon the +gunners; and consider what experience has so far shown, and reason has +taught us, with regard to the casemate,—we need not be under +apprehension that our casemated works will be battered down; nor doubt +that they will, as they did in Russia, answer the important purposes for +which they were designed."</p> + +<p>"It only remains to show the <i>necessity</i> of such works. It, in general, +costs much less to place a gun behind an earthen parapet, than to build +a masonry structure covered with bomb-proof arches, in which to mount +it. All authorities agree that an open barbette battery (Grivel's very +forcible admission has been quoted), on a low site, and to which vessels +can approach within 300 or 400 yards, is utterly inadmissible. It may +safely be said, that in nine cases out of ten, the sites which furnish +the efficient raking and cross fires upon the channels, are exactly of +this character; and indeed it very often happens that there are <i>no +others</i>."</p> + +<p>"When such sites <i>are</i> found, it rarely happens that they afford room +for sufficient number of guns in open batteries. Hence the necessity of +putting them tier above tier, which involves, of course, the casemated +structure. Such works, furnishing from their lower tier a low, raking +fire, and (if of several tiers) a plunging fire from their barbettes, +offer as favorable emplacements for guns as can be contrived, and afford +to their gunners a degree of security quite as great as <i>can</i> be given +to men thus engaged."</p> + +<p>"On subjects which have a mere speculative importance, there is no +danger in giving rein to speculation; but on those of such real and +intense practical importance as the security against hostile aggression +of the great city and port of New York, it is not admissible to set +aside the experience of the past, or the opinions of the best minds who +have devoted themselves to such subjects. A means of defence, sanctioned +by its being confided in to protect the great ports of Europe—which +<i>has</i> protected the great ports of Russia against the most formidable +naval armament that ever floated on the ocean, has a claim upon our +confidence which mere criticism cannot diminish; and a claim to be +adhered to in place of all new 'systems,' until time and trial shall +have <i>necessitated</i> (not merely justified) the change."</p> + +<p>"If, then, we refer to the practice of other nations, to find what has +been judged necessary for the defence of important ports,—to +experience, to find how such defensive systems have stood the test of +actual trial,—we may draw useful conclusions with regard to what is now +required to defend New York. We shall find at <i>Sebastopol</i>—a narrow +harbor, which owed its importance to its being the great naval dépôt of +Russia on the Black Sea—an array of 700 guns, about 500 of which were +placed in five 'masonry-casemated' works (several of them of great +size), and the remainder in open batteries. These defensive works +fulfilled their object, and sustained the attack of the allied fleet, on +the 17th of October, 1854, without sensible damage."</p> + +<p>"The facility with which seaports are attacked by fleets—the enormous +preparations required—the great risks encountered in landing a +besieging army on the coast of a formidable enemy (while, for protection +against the <i>former</i> species of attack, costly works are necessary, and +against the latter, field works and men can, in emergency, afford +protection), naturally caused the Russians to make these water defences +their <i>first</i> object. Yet, though almost unprotected on the land side, +Sebastopol resisted, for a whole year, an attack on that quarter; and +illustrated how, with plenty of men and material, an energetic and +effectual <i>land defence</i> may be improvised, where the <i>sea defence</i> is +provided for, as thoroughly as it was at that place."</p> + +<p>"Let Cronstadt be another example. Great as was the importance of its +defence to Russia, it was not greater,—it was by no means <i>as great</i>, +as that of New York to our own country. This port, and military and +naval dépôt, was defended (in its main approach) by upwards of 600 guns, +500 of which were mounted in five 'masonry-casemated' works; the +remainder in an open barbette battery, which enfiladed the main channel. +This number is formidable in itself; yet the same number mounted in New +York harbor would not afford anything like such a formidable defence as +was found at Cronstadt, owing to its great area, and long line of +approach, compared with the latter."</p> + +<p>"<i>These works fulfilled their object.</i> They protected the great port and +dépôt of Cronstadt and the capital of the empire from invasion. For two +successive years did the mighty armaments of France and England +threaten; but they were overawed by the frowning array of 'casemated +castles' which presented itself, and declined the contest." </p> + +<p>"Let us turn our eyes now to the great naval dépôt of France. After the +almost incredible expenditure lavished here, in creating a harbor facing +the shores of her great rival, England, and an equally profuse +expenditure in providing all that constitutes a great naval dépôt, we +may suppose that the best means, without regard to cost, which the +science of man could devise, would be employed here to make this great +seat of naval power secure against the formidable means of attack +possessed by the great maritime power most likely to be the assailant. +The means there employed are (so far as regards mere <i>harbor</i> defence) +precisely the same (viz., casemated works in several tiers, combined +with open batteries where the locations are favorable); and the +application of means is the same as we have found so successful in +Russia,—the same which constitute the system of harbor defence of New +York."</p> + +<p>Captain McClelland, in his official report to the War Department, on the +siege of Sebastopol, uses language equally strong and pertinent:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The permanent defences of Sebastopol against an attack by water,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">although inferior in material and the details of construction to our own</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">most recent works, proved fully equal to the purpose for which they</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">were intended. Indeed, the occurrences on the Pacific, the Baltic, and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the Black Sea, all seem to establish beyond controversy, the soundness</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the view so long entertained by all intelligent military men, that</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">well constructed fortifications must always prove more than a match for</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the strongest fleet."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"It is deemed that a calm consideration of the events so hastily and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">imperfectly narrated in the preceding pages must lead all unprejudiced</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">persons among our countrymen to a firm conviction on two vital points:"</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"1st. That our system of permanent coast defences is a wise and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">proper one, which ought to be completed and armed with the least</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">possible delay."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"2d. That mere individual courage cannot suffice to overcome the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">forces that would be brought against us, were we involved in an European</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">war, but that it must be rendered manageable by discipline, and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">directed by that consummate and mechanical skill which can only be</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">acquired by a course of education, instituted for the special purpose,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and by long habit."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"In the day of sailing-vessels the successful siege of Sebastopol</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">would have been impossible. It is evident that the Russians did not</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">appreciate the advantages afforded by steamers, and were unprepared</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to sustain a siege."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"This same power of steam would enable European nations to disembark</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">upon our shores even a larger force than that which finally encamped</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">around Sebastopol. To resist such an attack, should it ever be</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">made, our cities and harbors must be fortified, and those fortifications</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">must be provided with guns, ammunition, and instructed artillerists.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">To repel the advance of such an army into the interior, it is not enough</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to trust to the number of brave but undisciplined men that we can</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">bring to bear against it. An invading army of 15,000 or 20,000 men</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could easily be crushed by the unremitting attacks of superior numbers;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">but when it comes to the case of more than 100,000 disciplined</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">veterans, the very multitude brought to bear against them works its</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">own destruction; because, if without discipline and instruction, they</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">cannot be handled, and are in their own way. We cannot afford a Moscow</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">campaign."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Our regular army never can, and, perhaps, never ought to be, large</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">enough to provide for all the contingencies that may arise, but it</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">should be as large as its ordinary avocations in the defence of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">frontier will justify; the number of officers and non-commissioned</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">officers should be unusually large, to provide for a sudden increase; </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and the greatest possible care should be bestowed upon the instruction </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the special arms of the artillery and engineer troops. The militia</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and volunteer system should be placed upon some tangible and effective </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">basis; instructors furnished them from the regular army, and all </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">possible means taken to spread sound military information among them. </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">In the vicinity of our sea-coast fortifications, it would be well to</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">provide a sufficient number of volunteer companies with the means of </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">instruction in heavy artillery, detailing officers of the regular </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">artillery for instructors."</span><br> + +<p>On this subject of instructing our volunteers and militia in the use of +sea-coast batteries, we add the following quotation from Major Barnard's +pamphlet:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"One of the main causes of inefficiency in coast batteries, which</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">has given color to the idea that they may be passed, or even <i>attacked</i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">with impunity, I conceive to be the want of <i>skill</i> and <i>care</i> in the use of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the guns. The result is a prodigious smoke, and a prodigious throwing</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">away of balls, and very little damage done. This has been, however,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">by no means a <i>peculiarity</i> of coast defences. The same system of random</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">firing has hitherto prevailed, both in the use of small arms in land</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and of heavy ordnance in sea battles; nor has it occurred apparently to</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">even the greatest masters of the art of war, to ask why, for one man</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">wounded, or for one effective shot in a vessel's hull, so many thousands</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of shot should be thrown uselessly into the air."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"But this question is <i>now</i> asked, both in the use of the soldier's</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">rifled musket, and in the management of ships' guns, as well as of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">artillery of all kinds."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"It is at last discovered that it is of more importance to teach the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">soldier to direct his piece with accuracy of aim, than to perform</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">certain motions on parade with the precision of an automaton. The same </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">idea is now infused into all the departments of military and naval</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">science, and is a <i>necessary</i> result of the recent great </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">improvements in the construction of arms. In short, the truth has at</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">last become apparent that the old-fashioned system of random firing,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">though perhaps like the 'charge of the six hundred' at Balaklava, 'bien</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">magnifique, <i>n'est pas la guerre</i>.'"</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"It is of the utmost importance that we should apply this principle</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to the management of our sea-coast batteries, and give it a practical</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">effect. The <i>volunteers</i> of our cities will constitute <i>mainly</i>, in time of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">war, the gunners of our forts and manipulators of our sea-coast guns.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">In time of war, they will probably be exercised in these duties. But it</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is most desirable that we should have at <i>all times</i> a body of gunners,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">practised in these exercises. The result would be, not only to give to</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">our <i>citizens</i>, as well as citizen-soldiers, confidence in the defences</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">provided for their security, but it would disseminate military</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">knowledge, and an intelligent idea of the bearing and objects of the </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">different defensive works. To carry out this idea, it would be</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">desirable that there should be at each considerable seaport town, a </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sufficient garrison of <i>artillery</i> troops to aid in the instruction </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the volunteers. In the present condition of the army <i>this</i> cannot</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">be hoped; but perhaps it might, at least, be found practicable to detail</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">an artillery officer or two for the purpose."</span><br> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.—OUR NORTHERN FRONTIER DEFENCES.</p> + +<p>The author has seen nothing since this chapter was written to induce him +to change the views therein expressed with respect to the superior +strategic importance of the line of Lake Champlain, both as a line of +military operations, and as a line of defence. The mutual commercial +interests of the United States and the Canadas render a war between the +two countries less probable than formerly; nevertheless, such an event +is by no means impossible, and common prudence should induce us to +prepare in the best possible manner for such a contingency.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTERS IX., X., XI. AND XII.—ARMY ORGANIZATION.</p> + +<p>Since these chapters were written, several important changes have been +made in our army organization. The rank of Lieutenant-General (at +least, by brevet) has been revived, the staff, administrative corps, +infantry and cavalry have been increased, and a company of engineer +troops organized. But this company is mainly employed at West Point for +instruction of the cadets in the several branches of military +engineering, and thus serves to supply a deficiency long felt in the +system of education at the Military Academy. The want, however, of +troops of this arm for the construction, care, and preservation of our +permanent fortifications, and for the general duties of field +engineering, still remains to be supplied. Of all the arms of military +organization, this one most requires instruction in time of peace; it +cannot be supplied at the moment a war is declared.</p> + +<p>In speaking of our present army organization, as compared with those of +the different European powers which he was sent to examine and report +upon, Captain McClelland says:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Our force of artillery is large in proportion to the other arms of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">service, while the number of our engineer troops is ridiculously and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">shamefully small; it is, therefore, more than probable that in any</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">future siege it will be easy for the artillery to construct their own </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">batteries, while the engineers will be sufficiently burdened by the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">construction of the other works of attack; we have now, at last, the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">germ of an artillery school of practice; I would then suggest, for the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">consideration of the Secretary, the propriety of causing the artillery</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to construct their own batteries. The position and armament of siege</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">batteries should be determined by consultation between the engineers and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the artillery, the former having the preponderating voice, in order to</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">secure the necessary harmony and connection between all parts of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">works of attack. This change," he says, "will require to be introduced</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">into the artillery manual and course of instruction everything in</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">relation to the preparation of the fascines, gabions, platforms, and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">magazines, the dimensions of batteries, manner of arranging, working</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">parties, etc."</span><br> + +<p>With regard to the suggestion of Captain McClellan, it is sufficient to +remark, that it seeks to remedy one evil by introducing another equally +as great and equally as objectionable. The defect in our present army +organization is that one of its arms is too small for the duties which, +from the very nature of military service, naturally and properly belong +to it; and it surely is no remedy for this defect to permanently +transfer a part of these duties to another arm. As well might it be +said, if our artillery force were "ridiculously and shamefully small" in +proportion to the infantry and cavalry, that the field batteries should +be permanently transferred to those arms, and that light artillery +tactics should be comprised in our infantry and cavalry manuals.</p> + +<p>There are certain duties which the military experience of ages has shown +to properly and almost necessarily belong to each particular arm of an +army organization, and every attempt to make one branch perform the +appropriate duties of another has invariably destroyed its efficiency +for either service. Suppose our medical corps were "ridiculously and +shamefully small" in proportion to our pay department, shall our +paymasters perform the duties of surgery, and be instructed in the use +of the scalpel and amputating instruments! This is, perhaps, an extreme +case, but it serves to illustrate the principle.</p> + +<p>The defect referred to by Captain McClelland, and which has so often +been pointed out by our best military men, cannot be obviated by any +transfer or assignment, whether temporary or permanent, of the +appropriate duties of one corps to another. Indeed, such a measure would +only tend to make this defect permanent, and to convert a temporary into +a lasting evil. It can readily be remedied by legislative action, but in +no other way. The executive action suggested would be deprecated by all. +Moreover, the evil is now so obvious and so generally admitted, that +there can be little doubt that Congress will soon perceive the +importance of applying the only proper and effective remedy.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER XIII.—PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.</p> + +<p>Although the general principles of the plan and arrangement of a +permanent fortification, as established by the great masters of this +branch of military science, remain the same; nevertheless, the vast +improvements which have, within the last few years, been made in +projectiles, require some changes in the details of defensive works of +this character. These changes consist mainly in an increased thickness +of stone and earthen parapets and of the covering of magazines, in the +arrangement of embrasures, and in protecting the garrison from an +enemy's sharpshooters. The introduction of heavier siege guns, and of +heavier ordnance on ships of war, and especially on those propelled by +steam, require much larger ordnance in forts designed for the defence of +harbors. In the Russian war, Sweaborg was made to suffer from a distant +bombardment which left her fortifications intact. These modifications in +the arrangements and armaments of forts are absolutely necessary in +order to restore the relative power of defence against the improvements +made in the means of attack. They can very easily be introduced without +changing the form or general character of the works, and they are really +so very essential that, without them, a fort constructed 25 or 30 years +ago, and well suited to the then existing state of the military art, +will be likely to offer no very considerable resistance to modern siege +batteries or well organized maritime attacks.</p> + +<p>Some have gone much further in their estimate of the effect produced by +the increased size and force of military projectiles, and boldly assert +that masonry works of strong relief can no longer be used, and that the +increased range of small arms requires an entire change of the bastioned +front, with lines more extended.</p> + +<p>With respect to the effect of the increased range of small arms, it is +very natural that a superficial observer should adopt the opinion that +this improvement must be followed by an extension of the lines of a +defensive military work; but a close study of the subject will probably +lead to a different conclusion. Such at least is the opinion of the +ablest military engineers of Europe. The lines of the bastioned front +now generally in use, were really too long for a good defence with the +arms in use at the time it was adopted; and, in theory, the "rampart +gun" was to be relied upon for the defence of certain exposed points. +But this weapon is no longer in use; its place, however, is better +supplied by the increased range of the musket and rifle. The latter +weapon is almost invaluable for defending the approaches to a permanent +work.</p> + +<p>With respect to the breaching of stone masonry by siege batteries, it +has long been an established principle that all masonry exposed to the +fire of land batteries should be masked by earthen works. The neglect of +this rule caused the fall of Bomarsund. Those who so readily draw, from +the results of that siege, the inference that the present mode of +fortifying land fronts must be abandoned, exhibit their ignorance of +military engineering. The facts do not justify their conclusions.</p> + +<p>With respect to sea fronts, which can be reached only by guns afloat, +the case is very different. They are usually casemates of masonry, not +masked by earthen works. Whether the increased efficiency of projectiles +thrown by ships and floating batteries now require a resort to this mode +of protecting masonry on the water fronts of fortifications, is a +question well worthy of discussion. This subject has already been +alluded to in the Note on Sea-coast Defences, and it is there shown that +no facts have yet been developed which require or authorize any change +in our present system.</p> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER XIV.—FIELD ENGINEERING.</p> + +<p>As Mexico had no permanent fortifications to be besieged, the war in +that country afforded very little practice in that branch of engineering +which is connected with the attack and defence of permanent works, +particularly sapping and mining. The only operation resembling a siege +was the investment and bombardment of Vera Cruz, and it is worthy of +remark that if General Scott had stormed that place, weak as it was, he +must have lost a large number of his men, while from his trenches and +batteries he reduced it with scarcely the sacrifice of a single life.</p> + +<p>Nor did either party in this war make much use of field works in the +attack and defence of positions. Nevertheless, no one can read the +history of the war without appreciating the important influence which +Fort Brown had upon General Taylor's defence of the left bank of the Rio +Grande. Again if we compare our loss in other Mexican battles with that +which the Americans sustained in their attacks upon Monterey, +Churubusco, Molino del Key, and Chapultepec,—places partially secured +by field works—we shall be still more convinced of the value of +temporary fortifications for the defence of military positions, although +it was manifest that the Mexicans neither knew how to construct nor how +to defend them.</p> + +<p>Nor was there much practice in this war in the use of military bridges, +for, with the exception of the Rio Grande, our armies had no important +rivers to cross. We must not, however, omit to note the important fact +that General Taylor was unable to take advantage of the victories of +Palo Alto and Resacade La Palma to pursue and destroy the army of +Arista, <i>because</i> he had no pontoon equipage to enable him to follow +them across the Rio Grande. It should also be remarked that even a very +small bridge equipage would have been of very great use in crossing +other streams and ravines during the operations of this war. One of our +cavalry officers writes:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"On our march from Matamaras to Victoria and Tampico, in 1846</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and 1847, we had infinite difficulty in bridging boggy streams (there</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">being no suitable timber), and in crossing ravines with vertical banks;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">a few ways of the Birago trestles would have saved us many days and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">a vast amount of labor. In the operations in the valley of Mexico, our</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">movements, checked as they so often were by impassable wet ditches</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and sometimes by dry ravines, would have been rendered so much more</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">free and rapid by the use of the Birago trestles, that our successes</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">could have been gained at far less cost, and probably with more rapidity</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">than they were."</span><br> + +<p>With regard to military reconnaissance, the splendid achievements of Lee +and others connected with the operations of General Scott, proved the +value and importance of this particular branch of field engineering.</p> + +<p>But field engineering, as a branch or arm of the military service, +received its greatest development and most brilliant application in the +Crimean war, particularly in the siege of Sebastopol, and the measures +resorted to by General Todtleben to defend that place against the attack +of superior forces.</p> + +<p>A brief sketch of these defensive works may be of interest to the +reader:—</p> + +<p>When the allies reached Balaklava, Sebastopol was defended on the south +side only by a loop-holed wall about four feet and a half thick, and +from eighteen to twenty feet high, and a semicircular redoubt with two +stories of loop-holes, and five guns in barbette. These works would have +afforded some protection against a <i>coup-de-main</i> by infantry and +cavalry, but could have offered no very considerable obstacle to a +combined attack of these arms with artillery.</p> + +<p>The Russian engineer commenced his operations for strengthening this +position by occupying the most important points in his line of defence +with detached field works of sufficient relief to resist an assault, and +generally closed at the gorge. These works were afterwards connected by +re-entering lines of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the +ravines and to flank the advanced works. The old wall was strengthened +with earth, and rifle-pits for sharpshooters were constructed at a +considerable distance in front.</p> + +<p>The most important points of the main line of defence were: 1st. The +Flag-staff Bastion. 2d. The Central Bastion. 3d. The Malakoff. 4th. The +Redan. 5th. The little Redan. The command of the first was about fifteen +feet, its ditch thirty feet wide and from twelve to fifteen feet deep. A +portion of the scarp was provided with palisades some ten feet high. The +construction of the Central Bastion was similar to that of the +Flag-staff, but weaker in profile. The relief of the other works was +still less. The command of the Malakoff was about fourteen feet, its +ditch eighteen feet wide and twelve feet deep. The thickness of parapet +in these works was generally about eighteen feet, and the bombproofs +were covered with timber eighteen inches thick and six feet of earth. +The loop-holed walls connecting these works were covered by a rampart +and parapet, or entirely replaced by a simple parapet. Many of the +embrasures were revetted with the common boiler iron ships' water-tanks +filled with earth. The same material was sometimes used for traverses. +Rope mantelets were used to protect the artillerists at the pieces from +rifle balls and small grape. Great attention was given to the +construction of bombproofs to cover the men from vertical firing. These +were sometimes under the rampart and the second line of defence (where +there was one), often under special traverses, or entirely under ground, +and occasionally excavated in the solid rock. Some had fireplaces and +chimneys, and were well ventilated. Interior slopes were revetted with +gabions, crowned by fascines and sand bags. Gabions were also employed +to repair the damage caused by the enemy's artillery. Abattis, military +pits, caltrops and spikes, stuck through planks, and explosive machines +were employed in front of different parts of the defences. Mines were +resorted to in front of the Flag-staff Bastion to retard the French +approaches. They were made in rocky soil with craters from twelve to +fifteen feet deep. The Russian counter-approaches generally consisted of +flêches, united by a simple trench.</p> + +<p>Captain McClelland, one of our officers sent to the Crimea, from whose +valuable Report most of the foregoing details are gathered, adds the +following remarks upon these works of defence:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of the defences</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of Sebastopol, it will appear how little foundation there was for</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the generally-received accounts of the stupendous dimensions of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">works, and of new systems of fortifications brought into play. The</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">plain truth is, that these defences were simple temporary fortifications</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a single new</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">principle of engineering was developed. It is true, that there were</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">several novel minor details, such as the rope mantelets, the use of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">iron tanks, etc., but the whole merit consisted in the admirable</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted that the plans</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the various works were perfect. On the contrary, there is no</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">impropriety in believing that if Todtleben were called upon to do</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the same work over again, he would probably introduce better close</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">flanking arrangements."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract from the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors and their results will</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">be handed down in history as the most triumphant and enduring monument</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the value of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be forgotten that the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">inert masses which he raised would have been useless without the skilful</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">artillery and heroic infantry who defended them. Much stronger places</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">than Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. There can be</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">no danger in expressing the conviction that the siege of Sebastopol</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">called forth the most magnificent defence of fortifications that has</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">ever yet occurred." </span><br> + +<p>We will now pass to the works of attack. When the allies decided that +the works of Sebastopol could not be carried by a simple cannonade and +assault, but must be reduced by a regular siege, the first thing to be +considered was to secure the forces covering the siege works from +lateral sorties and the efforts of a relieving army. The field works +planned for this purpose were not of any great strength, and many of +them "were only undertaken when a narrow escape from some imminent +danger had demonstrated their necessity." The French line of defence +consisted of eight pentagonal redoubts, connected by an infantry +parapet. The English seemed to attach but little importance to field +works for the defence of their position; the terrible slaughter at +Inkerman was the natural consequence of this neglect.</p> + +<p>In describing the engineering operations of the allies at this siege. +Captain McClelland says:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"In regard to the detailed execution of the French attacks, little or</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">nothing novel is to be observed. Even when coolly examining the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">direction of their trenches, after the close of the siege, it was very</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">rare that a faulty direction could be detected; they always afforded</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">excellent cover, and were well defiladed; in some cases the excavation</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the double direct sap was carried to the depth of six and a half feet</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">in the solid rock! The execution of many of the saps and batteries was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">worthy of a school of practice. In the parallels, bombproofs were</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">provided as temporary hospitals, offices for the generals on duty, etc.</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">They did not use the sapper armor. The use of the sap-roller was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">often attempted, but it could be employed only during the latter part of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the attack upon the Malakoff, when the fire of the Russian artillery was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">nearly extinguished by the mortars; before that, as soon as a sap-roller</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">was placed in position—some thirty guns would be brought to bear</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">upon it, the result being its immediate destruction. It may justly be</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">their system of sapping. The technical skill and patient courage</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">corps of engineers."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">perfected with so much care at Chatham. Whenever the ground was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases. They</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">they ought to have been before giving the assault. In too many</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">cases the expression '<i>tâtonnement</i> of the French would seem</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to convey the best idea of their operations. Their batteries, however,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">were very well constructed. The magazines, platforms, etc., were</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 2em;">usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of. They</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">generally the flying-sap were employed."</span><br> + +<p>It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French +approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the +counterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached +within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.</p> + +<p>This description of the operations of the English at the siege of +Sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges +in the Spanish Peninsula. It certainly is very strange that a great +nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, +have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer +officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and +difficult duties of that arm. What excuse can ever be offered for +substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a +siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and +is always so necessary an element of a good military organization!</p> + +<p>While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense +importance of field-works against land attacks, some would conclude from +the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large +development are better suited for the defence of a large city than +permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will +necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men +and military stores. We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this +point, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journal +of the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.</p> + +<p>Captain McClelland says:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"This would seem to be the proper place to notice a popular fallacy,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">which, for a time at least, gained extensive credence. It was, that the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">siege of Sebastopol proved the superiority of temporary (earthen)</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fortifications over those of a permanent nature. It is easy to show that</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">it proved nothing of the kind; but that it only proved that temporary</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">works in the hands of a brave and skillful garrison are susceptible of a</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">longer defence than was generally supposed. They were attacked as</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">field works never were before, and were defended as field works never</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">had been defended. The main difference between properly constructed</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">permanent fortifications (intended to resist a siege) and temporary</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">works, is that the latter seldom present an insuperable obstacle against</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">assault, while the former always do. In addition, permanent works</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">have a better command over the adjacent country, and are more carefully</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">and perfectly planned. The masonry walls, which render an assault</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">impossible, cannot be seen from the distance, and can be destroyed</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">only by establishing batteries on the crest of the glacis, or the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">edge of the ditch; the earthen parapet alone being visible beyond that</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">point, they may, until the besiegers arrive there, be regarded in the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">same light as field works, with the difference that the garrison are not</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">harassed by the necessity of being constantly prepared to repel an</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">assault."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Now, in the siege of Sebastopol, the trenches of the besiegers</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">never reached the edge of the ditch; so that, had the fortification been</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">a permanent one, the most difficult, slow, and dangerous part of the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">siege remained to be undertaken, viz., the crowning of the covered</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">way, the establishment of the breach batteries, the descent and passage</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the ditch, and the assault of the breach; in other words, at the </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">moment when the weakness of the temporary works became apparent and</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">fatal, the true strength of the permanent defences would have commenced</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">coming into play."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Assuming the progress of the attack to have been as rapid as it was</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">under existing circumstances, the besiegers, on the 8th of September,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">would not yet have been in a condition to crown the covered way, the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">siege would certainly have extended into the winter; and it may even</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">be doubted whether the place would eventually have fallen, until the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">allies were in sufficient force to invest the north as well as the </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">southside."</span><br> + +<p>General Neil remarks:—</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Struck by the length of the siege of Sebastopol, certain foreign</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">officers have expressed the opinion that masonry-revetted scarps are not</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of incontestable utility in fortified places."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Sebastopol, a vast retrenched camp, defended by field fortifications</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of strong profile, derived its principal strength from an armament</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">such as could only exist in an extensive maritime arsenal, and from a</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">large army which always preserved its free communications with the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">interior of Russia."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"If the enceinte had been provided with good revetted scarps;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">if it had been necessary to breach these, and subsequently have been</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">compelled to penetrate through difficult passages, in rear of which the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">heads of our columns would have met an army, Sebastopol would have</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">been an impregnable fortress."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"When we compare, in effect, the works of attack at Sebastopol</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">with those of an ordinary siege, we will see that on the 8th of </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">September, 1855, the day of the last assault, we had only executed, </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">after the greatest effort, the besieging works which precede the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">crowning of the covered way; we had not then, as yet, entered upon that</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">period of the works of a siege which is the most difficult and the most</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">murderous; and there was no occasion to engage ourselves in them, since</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the ditches and parapets of the enceinte were not insurmountable, as the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">sequel has proved."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The difficulty consisted in conquering the Russian army upon a</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">position prepared long beforehand for its defence, quite as much as in</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">surmounting the material obstacle of the fortification."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Our places of arms being established at thirty metres from the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">besieged works, we were able to choose our own time for action, and to</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">throw ourselves unexpectedly upon the enemy when the fire of our </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">artillery had forced him to shelter himself, up to the last minute, </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">behind his numerous blindages; to have gone further would have been</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">inviting the initiative in the attack on the part of the Russian army."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"The absence of scarp walls, which would have secured the place</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">from escalade, did not exercise a less influence upon the defence;</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">for the besieged were compelled to keep permanently at the gorges</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of the works, strong reserves, in readiness to repulse the assault,</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">which they saw themselves menaced with from the commencement of</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">the siege."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Finally, it can be remarked, that these reserves, which were decimated</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">night and day by the concentric fire of our batteries, were able</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to issue out from the enceinte through wide debouches, without having</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">to pass through the narrow defiles which are formed by the drawbridges</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">of revetted places; they were, then, a permanent threat for the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">besiegers, who were exposed to seeing their trenches unexpectedly</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">invaded by the greater part of the Russian army."</span><br> +<br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Neither side, consequently, was in a position analogous to that</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">which is presented in the siege of a fortified place, protected from </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">insult by good masonry scarps.'" (Note to page 443.)</span><br> + +<p>And again, page 423, the same authority remarks:</p> + +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">"Now, it (the Russian army) is no longer able to escape from the</span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">concentric fires of our batteries; for, <i>not being protected by masonry</i></span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;"><i>scarps</i>, it is obliged constantly to keep united strong reserves, in </span><br> +<span style="margin-left: 1.5em;">order to repulse the assault with which it is at every instant menaced"</span><br> +<br> + +<p>NOTE TO CHAPTER XV.—MILITARY EDUCATION, &C.</p> + +<p>With regard to the subjects discussed in this chapter it will, perhaps, +be sufficient to remark that the Mexican war incontestably proved the +value of the West Point Military Academy; for the superior efficiency of +properly-educated officers over those who had been appointed from civil +life without any knowledge of the profession they were called upon to +practice, fully satisfied the country of the importance of that +institution, and even silenced the clamors of the few who refused to be +convinced.</p> + +<p>The recent abortive attempt to give efficiency to our navy by means of a +retired list, has, it is feared, destroyed for a time all hopes of +introducing this very necessary measure into our military service; +although it is very certain that without this we can never have our +system of promotion placed upon an effective and satisfactory basis, +which shall give efficiency to the army by rewarding merit, while it +prevents injustice by closing the avenues of political favoritism.</p> + +<p>The Mexican war also most abundantly proved that our objections to the +system of military appointment were well founded, and it is hoped that +the more recent abuses of that system will call public attention to the +necessity of a change; for if military office continue to be conferred +for partisan services, it will soon destroy the integrity as well as the +efficiency of our army.</p> + + + +<hr style="width: 65%;"> +<a name="EXPLANATION_OF_PLATES"></a><h2>EXPLANATION OF PLATES</h2> + +<p><a href=images/451.gif>Figs. 1, 2, 3.</a>—Used to illustrate the strategic relations of the armies +A and B.</p> + +<p><a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 4.</a>—Line of operations directed against the extremity of the +enemy's line of defence, as was done by Napoleon in the Marengo +campaign.</p> + +<p><a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 5.</a>—Napoleon's plan of campaign in 1800, for the army of the Rhine, +and the army of reserve.</p> + +<p><a href=images/453.gif>Fig. 6</a> shows the plan adopted by Napoleon in the campaign of 1800, to +preserve his communications.</p> + +<p><a href=images/453.gif>Fig. 7</a> illustrates the same thing in the campaign of 1806.</p> + +<p><a href=images/451.gif>Fig. 8.</a>—Interior and central line of operations.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>Fig. 9</a> represents a camp of a grand division of an army. The distance +from the front row of tents to the line of camp-guards should be from +350 to 400 feet; thence to the line of posts, from 150 to 200 feet; +thence to the line of sentinels, from 100 to 200 feet. In many cases, +the line of posts between the camp-guards and sentinels may be dispensed +with. The distance between battalions will be from 50 to 100 feet; and +the same between squadrons and batteries.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Fig. 10.</a>—Details of encampment for a battalion of infantry. The width +of company streets will depend upon the strength of a company, and will +be so arranged that the front of the camp shall not exceed the length of +the battalion, when drawn up in line of battle. This width will be from +50 to 100 feet. The distance between the tents of each row will be 2 or +3 feet; the distance between the tents of one company and those of +another, from 4 to 6 feet.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Fig. 11</a> is the camp of a squadron of cavalry. A single company encamping +alone, would be arranged in the same way as an entire squadron. The +horses are picketed in two lines parallel to the tents, and at a +distance from them of about 12 feet. The forage is placed between the +tents. A squadron of two companies will occupy a front of about 180 +feet. The fires, or company kitchens, should be 50 or 60 feet in rear of +the non-commissioned officers' tents.</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Fig 12</a> is the camp of two batteries of foot artillery, or two companies +of foot engineers.</p> + +<p>[The plan of encampment for artillery, as given in the "Instruction of +U.S. Field Artillery, horse and foot," may be employed where a single +battery encamps by itself, or where only the skeleton of companies is +maintained; but it will be found exceedingly inconvenient, where a full +battery, with a large train, encamps on the same line with other troops. +The plan we have given is that which is employed in most European +services.]</p> + +<p><a href=images/467.gif>Fig. 13.</a>—In this plan for mounted artillery and engineers, the fires +are so arranged as to expose the ammunition as little as possible to the +sparks from the kitchens.</p> + +<p><a href=images/453.gif>Fig. 14.</a>—Simple parallel order of battle.</p> + +<p><a href=images/453.gif>15.</a>—Parallel order, with a crochet on the flank.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>16.</a>—Parallel order, reinforced on a wing.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>17.</a>—Parallel order, reinforced on the centre.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>18.</a>—Simple oblique order.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>19.</a>—Oblique order, reinforced on the assailing wing.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>20.</a>—Perpendicular order.</p> + +<p><a href=images/455.gif>21.</a>—Concave order.</p> + +<p><a href=images/457.gif>22.</a>—Convex order.</p> + +<p><a href=images/457.gif>23.</a>—Order by echelon on a wing. </p> + +<p><a href=images/457.gif>24.</a>—Order by echelon on the centre.</p> + +<p><a href=images/457.gif>25.</a>—Combined order of attack.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>26.</a>—Formation of infantry by two deployed lines.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>27, 28.</a>--- Arrangements corresponding to depth of column.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>29.</a>—Formation by squares.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>30.</a>—Mixed formation of three battalions.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>31.</a>—Deep formation of heavy columns.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>32.</a>—Formation in columns by brigade.</p> + +<p><a href=images/459.gif>33.</a>—Formation of two brigades of cavalry, by the mixed system.</p> + +<p><a href=images/461.gif>34.</a>—Passage of the Sound by the British fleet, in 1807.</p> + +<p><a href=images/461.gif>35.</a>—Attack on Copenhagen.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>36.</a>—Attack on Algiers.</p> + +<p><a href=images/463.gif>37.</a>—Attack on San Juan d'Ulloa.</p> + +<p><a href=images/463.gif>38.</a>—Attack on St. Jean d'Acre.</p> + +<p><a href=images/465.gif>39.</a>—Plan of a regular bastioned front of a fortification.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>40.</a>—Section of do. do.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>41.</a>—Tenaillons.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>Fig. 42.</a>—Demi-tenaillons, with a bonnet.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>43.</a>—A horn-work.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>44.</a>—A crown-work.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>45.</a>—A redan.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>46.</a>—A lunette.</p> + +<p><a href=images/469.gif>47.</a>—A mitre or priest-cap.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>48.</a>—A bastioned fort.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>49.</a>—Vertical section of a field intrenchment.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>50.</a>—Simple sap.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>51.</a>—Flying sap.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>52.</a>—Full sap.</p> + +<p><a href=images/471.gif>53.</a>—Crater of a military mine.</p> + +<p><a href=images/473.gif> 54.</a>—Plan of the attack of a regular bastioned work.</p> + + +<img src="images/451.gif" alt="Figs.1,2,3,4,5,8"> +<img src="images/453.gif" alt="Figs.6,7,14,15"> +<img src="images/455.gif" alt="Figs.9,16,17,18,19,20,21"> +<img src="images/457.gif" alt="Figs.22,23,24,25,41"> +<img src="images/459.gif" alt="Figs.26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33"> +<img src="images/461.gif" alt="Figs.34,35"> +<img src="images/463.gif" alt="Figs.37,38"> +<img src="images/465.gif" alt="Figs.39"> +<img src="images/467.gif" alt="Figs.10,12,13"> +<img src="images/469.gif" alt="Figs.36,41,42,43,44,45,46,47"> +<img src="images/471.gif" alt="Figs.40,48,49,50,51,52,53"> +<img src="images/473.gif" alt="Figs.54"> + + + + + + + + + + + +<pre> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Elements of Military Art and Science +by Henry Wager Halleck + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK ELEMENTS OF MILITARY ART *** + +***** This file should be named 16170-h.htm or 16170-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + https://www.gutenberg.org/1/6/1/7/16170/ + +Produced by Graeme Mackreth and the Online Distributed +Proofreading Team at https://www.pgdp.net. + + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public 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