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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthydemus, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Euthydemus
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Translator: Benjamin Jowett
+
+Posting Date: November 23, 2008 [EBook #1598]
+Release Date: January 1999
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EUTHYDEMUS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sue Asscher
+
+
+
+
+
+EUTHYDEMUS
+
+by Plato
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+The Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate
+jest, has also a very serious purpose. It may fairly claim to be
+the oldest treatise on logic; for that science originates in the
+misunderstandings which necessarily accompany the first efforts of
+speculation. Several of the fallacies which are satirized in it reappear
+in the Sophistici Elenchi of Aristotle and are retained at the end of
+our manuals of logic. But if the order of history were followed, they
+should be placed not at the end but at the beginning of them; for they
+belong to the age in which the human mind was first making the attempt
+to distinguish thought from sense, and to separate the universal from
+the particular or individual. How to put together words or ideas, how
+to escape ambiguities in the meaning of terms or in the structure of
+propositions, how to resist the fixed impression of an 'eternal being'
+or 'perpetual flux,' how to distinguish between words and things--these
+were problems not easy of solution in the infancy of philosophy. They
+presented the same kind of difficulty to the half-educated man which
+spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a child. It was long before
+the new world of ideas which had been sought after with such passionate
+yearning was set in order and made ready for use. To us the fallacies
+which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are trivial and obsolete
+because we are no longer liable to fall into the errors which are
+expressed by them. The intellectual world has become better assured to
+us, and we are less likely to be imposed upon by illusions of words.
+
+The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues
+of Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by
+examples in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro,
+Theaetetus, Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise
+illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a scheme of
+categories is found in the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction
+is taught, and the fallacy of arguing in a circle is exposed in the
+Republic; the nature of synthesis and analysis is graphically described
+in the Phaedrus; the nature of words is analysed in the Cratylus; the
+form of the syllogism is indicated in the genealogical trees of the
+Sophist and Statesman; a true doctrine of predication and an analysis of
+the sentence are given in the Sophist; the different meanings of one
+and being are worked out in the Parmenides. Here we have most of the
+important elements of logic, not yet systematized or reduced to an art
+or science, but scattered up and down as they would naturally occur in
+ordinary discourse. They are of little or no use or significance to
+us; but because we have grown out of the need of them we should not
+therefore despise them. They are still interesting and instructive for
+the light which they shed on the history of the human mind.
+
+There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new
+ones are constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which
+ancient logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not
+the analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the
+use of the Aristotelian logic any longer natural to us. We no longer put
+arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen; the simple use
+of language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the
+nature of the proposition, nor extract hidden truths from the copula,
+nor dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse
+the form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or
+imagine that any single science furnishes a principle of reasoning to
+all the rest. Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to
+be invented for our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some
+of our great physical philosophers, seem to be quite as good reasoners
+as those who have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the
+basis of usage and common sense; there is no need to reopen them. No
+science should raise problems or invent forms of thought which add
+nothing to knowledge and are of no use in assisting the acquisition of
+it. This seems to be the natural limit of logic and metaphysics; if they
+give us a more comprehensive or a more definite view of the different
+spheres of knowledge they are to be studied; if not, not. The better
+part of ancient logic appears hardly in our own day to have a separate
+existence; it is absorbed in two other sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed
+this ancient art be not also fading away into literary criticism; (2)
+the science of language, under which all questions relating to words and
+propositions and the combinations of them may properly be included.
+
+To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress
+and have no definite sphere, tends to interfere with the prosecution
+of living ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and
+to render men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of
+appreciating the nature of truth. Nor should we allow the living science
+to become confused with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term
+logic has two different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and
+we vainly try to bridge the gulf between them. Many perplexities are
+avoided by keeping them apart. There might certainly be a new science of
+logic; it would not however be built up out of the fragments of the
+old, but would be distinct from them--relative to the state of knowledge
+which exists at the present time, and based chiefly on the methods of
+Modern Inductive philosophy. Such a science might have two legitimate
+fields: first, the refutation and explanation of false philosophies
+still hovering in the air as they appear from the point of view of later
+experience or are comprehended in the history of the human mind, as in
+a larger horizon: secondly, it might furnish new forms of thought more
+adequate to the expression of all the diversities and oppositions
+of knowledge which have grown up in these latter days; it might also
+suggest new methods of enquiry derived from the comparison of the
+sciences. Few will deny that the introduction of the words 'subject' and
+'object' and the Hegelian reconciliation of opposites have been 'most
+gracious aids' to psychology, or that the methods of Bacon and Mill have
+shed a light far and wide on the realms of knowledge. These two
+great studies, the one destructive and corrective of error, the other
+conservative and constructive of truth, might be a first and second part
+of logic. Ancient logic would be the propaedeutic or gate of approach to
+logical science,--nothing more. But to pursue such speculations further,
+though not irrelevant, might lead us too far away from the argument of
+the dialogue.
+
+The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he
+approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader,
+the irony more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two
+Sophists, although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his
+writings. Even Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and
+becomes a friendly and interested auditor of the great discourse. But
+in the Euthydemus the mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of
+Socrates continues to the end...
+
+Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself
+taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus,
+are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled at
+Thurii, but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens
+as professors of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To
+this they have now added a new accomplishment--the art of Eristic, or
+fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach 'for a
+consideration.' But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and
+in the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look-out for
+teachers of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of
+the great Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of
+their instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although
+the greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary
+incredulity.
+
+A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two
+brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of
+his lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a
+performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and
+the Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias.
+'Cleinias,' says Euthydemus, 'who learn, the wise or the unwise?' 'The
+wise,' is the reply; given with blushing and hesitation. 'And yet when
+you learned you did not know and were not wise.' Then Dionysodorus takes
+up the ball: 'Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar-master;
+the wise or the foolish boys?' 'The wise.' 'Then, after all, the wise
+learn.' 'And do they learn,' said Euthydemus, 'what they know or what
+they do not know?' 'The latter.' 'And dictation is a dictation of
+letters?' 'Yes.' 'And you know letters?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn what
+you know.' 'But,' retorts Dionysodorus, 'is not learning acquiring
+knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you acquire that which you have not got
+already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn that which you do not know.'
+
+Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these
+repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the
+process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are
+not serious; there are jests at the mysteries which precede the
+enthronement, and he is being initiated into the mysteries of the
+sophistical ritual. This is all a sort of horse-play, which is now
+ended. The exhortation to virtue will follow, and Socrates himself (if
+the wise men will not laugh at him) is desirous of showing the way in
+which such an exhortation should be carried on, according to his
+own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias. The result of the
+investigation may be summed up as follows:--
+
+All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as
+wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues
+and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is
+omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good
+fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not
+the wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the possession
+of goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them which
+can only be given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good nor
+evil--knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and folly
+the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can
+wisdom be taught? 'Yes,' says Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the
+youth delights Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of
+discussing one of his great puzzles. 'Since wisdom is the only good,
+he must become a philosopher, or lover of wisdom.' 'That I will,' says
+Cleinias.
+
+After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction,
+the two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of
+quite another sort.
+
+'You want Cleinias to be wise?' 'Yes.' 'And he is not wise yet?' 'No.'
+'Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is?--not
+to be--that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!'
+
+Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement,
+thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners.
+But he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as
+a storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and
+Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only
+contradicting them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as
+contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe
+one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?'
+Ctesippus is unable to reply.
+
+Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would
+like to be informed by the great master of the art, 'What is the meaning
+of this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood?
+Then what are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain
+that Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but
+is 'non-plussed' at what they are saying now. 'What does the word
+"non-plussed" mean?' Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are
+lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus
+again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews
+the conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the
+variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in the Odyssey,
+hopes to restore them to their natural form.
+
+He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a
+philosopher. And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and
+knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used. What
+knowledge is there which has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is
+required in any particular art; nor again the art of the composer of
+speeches, who knows how to write them, but cannot speak them, although
+he too must be admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals.
+Neither is the knowledge which we are seeking the knowledge of the
+general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the
+huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of
+quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The two enquirers,
+Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness,
+vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last they fix
+upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the
+kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil:
+and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us
+wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only
+in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to
+the question, 'good in what?' At length in despair Cleinias and Socrates
+turn to the 'Dioscuri' and request their aid.
+
+Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot
+know and not know, he cannot know some things and not know others, and
+therefore he knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men
+know all things. 'Do they know shoemaking, etc?' 'Yes.' The sceptical
+Ctesippus would like to have some evidence of this extraordinary
+statement: he will believe if Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth
+Dionysodorus has, and if Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of
+information about Euthydemus. Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges
+in a little raillery at the expense of the brothers. But he restrains
+himself, remembering that if the men who are to be his teachers think
+him stupid they will take no pains with him. Another fallacy is
+produced which turns on the absoluteness of the verb 'to know.' And here
+Dionysodorus is caught 'napping,' and is induced by Socrates to confess
+that 'he does not know the good to be unjust.' Socrates appeals to his
+brother Euthydemus; at the same time he acknowledges that he cannot,
+like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and even Heracles, on the approach
+of a second monster, called upon his nephew Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus
+rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of Heracles than of Socrates.
+For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a brother, and a father is
+a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of men only, but of dogs
+and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the consequences which
+follow: 'Much good has your father got out of the wisdom of his
+puppies.'
+
+'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is
+a good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much
+of them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too much
+gold.' And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your
+belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?' Ctesippus,
+imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not the Scythians reckon
+those to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the
+inside of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts Euthydemus, 'what has the quality
+of vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What has the quality
+of vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.' 'Then our garments
+have the quality of vision.' A similar play of words follows, which is
+successfully retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias,
+who is rebuked by Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful
+things.
+
+'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the
+same or not the same as absolute beauty?' Socrates replies that they are
+not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And
+are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more
+amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows
+the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are
+invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and
+laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:--
+
+First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus
+to public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such
+arguments than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he
+remarks upon their impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as
+well as those of other people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which
+makes them give away their secret to all the world: they should be more
+reserved, and let no one be present at this exhibition who does not pay
+them a handsome fee; or better still they might practise on one another
+only. He concludes with a respectful request that they will receive him
+and Cleinias among their disciples.
+
+Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise
+severely this wisdom,--not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing
+such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious
+critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates
+understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half
+politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves
+and a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals.
+They are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his
+friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine
+themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both
+of politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the principles of
+combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good things
+which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them
+taken separately.
+
+Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is
+growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to
+him the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings.
+Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions
+are few, and recommends that 'he and his house' should continue to serve
+philosophy, and not mind about its professors.
+
+...
+
+There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying
+out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies
+like the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of
+the human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms
+which have rooted themselves in language--as troublesome elements
+of thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same
+absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached
+to the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in
+the first and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of
+reflection, in the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic.
+
+It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus.
+The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they
+were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier
+Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to
+perplex human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably
+received more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously
+maintained them. They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to
+wonder how any one could ever have been deceived by them; but we must
+remember also that there was a time when the human mind was only with
+great difficulty disentangled from such fallacies.
+
+To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a
+mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during
+more than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the
+conception of rest, and therefore the very word 'this' (Theaet.) from
+language; in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved
+to be contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative
+change was a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to
+abstract notions, were not understood; in which there was no analysis of
+grammar, and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention;
+in which contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every
+predicate was affirmed to be true of every subject, and on the other,
+it was held that no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing
+was, or was known, or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried
+on with religious earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in
+which the catchwords of philosophy are completely detached from their
+context. (Compare Theaet.) To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato
+in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the modern world, is the natural
+enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times also there is no fallacy
+so gross, no trick of language so transparent, no abstraction so barren
+and unmeaning, no form of thought so contradictory to experience, which
+has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a
+certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view only. The
+peculiarity of the fallacies of our own age is that we live within them,
+and are therefore generally unconscious of them.
+
+Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De
+Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with equal command of their true
+nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we
+are only struck with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:'
+gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge.
+Here, as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers
+who put words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who
+deny predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to whom ideas
+and objects of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual
+oscillation and transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly
+taught through these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language,
+which allows the same words to be used in different meanings, or with
+different degrees of meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative
+nature of all phenomena. Plato is aware that his own doctrine of
+ideas, as well as the Eleatic Being and Not-being, alike admit of being
+regarded as verbal fallacies. The sophism advanced in the Meno, 'that
+you cannot enquire either into what you know or do not know,' is
+lightly touched upon at the commencement of the Dialogue; the thesis of
+Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it seems to be
+true, is satirized. In contrast with these fallacies is maintained the
+Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by knowledge. The grammatical
+puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes probably contain allusions
+to tricks of language which may have been practised by the disciples
+of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had more point, if we were
+acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is directed.
+Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; but we have lost the
+clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether, as in the Cratylus,
+Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun with his satire.
+
+The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects
+with the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to
+the subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly
+irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages
+the youth, instead of 'knocking him down,' after the manner of the
+two Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion--for while
+Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they
+are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to
+teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the
+Republic; as the conception of the kingly art is more fully developed in
+the Politicus, and the caricature of rhetoric in the Gorgias.
+
+The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is
+Socrates once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in
+years, Crito, the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches,
+his fellow demesman (Apol.), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once
+or twice interrupts with a remark after the manner of the interlocutor
+in the Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes
+a playful allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth
+Cleinias, the grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis,
+Charmides, Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths
+Socrates draws his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in
+a kindly and sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates
+has not improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (compare
+Phaedrus). The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as
+long dead, (Greek), and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year
+404 B.C., suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus
+could not have been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue
+could not have been composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus,
+who is the lover of Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the
+Lysis, and seems there too to deserve the character which is here given
+him, of a somewhat uproarious young man. But the chief study of all
+is the picture of the two brothers, who are unapproachable in their
+effrontery, equally careless of what they say to others and of what is
+said to them, and never at a loss. They are 'Arcades ambo et cantare
+pares et respondere parati.' Some superior degree of wit or subtlety is
+attributed to Euthydemus, who sees the trap in which Socrates catches
+Dionysodorus.
+
+The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as
+inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar
+criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the
+variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the
+abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play,
+just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same
+time he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons
+who are as alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and
+Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been
+apt to have a bad name both in ancient and modern times. The persons
+whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this
+class. They occupy a border-ground between philosophy and politics; they
+keep out of the dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy
+as a means of serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them
+as making two good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by
+perverting the objects of both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be
+types of the class. Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life,
+they are disposed to censure the interest which Socrates takes in the
+exhibition of the two brothers. They do not understand, any more than
+Crito, that he is pursuing his vocation of detecting the follies of
+mankind, which he finds 'not unpleasant.' (Compare Apol.)
+
+Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The
+concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his
+two sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give
+up philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a
+preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that 'Virtue
+cannot be taught because there are no teachers.'
+
+The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1)
+the similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and
+Lysis;--the relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of
+humorous antagonism, not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of
+embittered hatred; and the places and persons have a considerable family
+likeness; (2) the Euthydemus belongs to the Socratic period in which
+Socrates is represented as willing to learn, but unable to teach; and
+in the spirit of Xenophon's Memorabilia, philosophy is defined as 'the
+knowledge which will make us happy;' (3) we seem to have passed the
+stage arrived at in the Protagoras, for Socrates is no longer discussing
+whether virtue can be taught--from this question he is relieved by the
+ingenuous declaration of the youth Cleinias; and (4) not yet to have
+reached the point at which he asserts 'that there are no teachers.' Such
+grounds are precarious, as arguments from style and plan are apt to
+be (Greek). But no arguments equally strong can be urged in favour of
+assigning to the Euthydemus any other position in the series.
+
+
+
+
+EUTHYDEMUS
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue.
+Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus.
+
+SCENE: The Lyceum.
+
+
+CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking
+yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could
+not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads,
+and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were
+talking: who was he?
+
+SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean?
+
+CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand
+side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has
+wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but
+he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks
+younger than he is.
+
+SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left
+hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the
+conversation.
+
+CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new
+importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they,
+and what is their line of wisdom?
+
+SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this
+part of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were
+driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in
+these regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they
+are wonderful--consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was
+before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian
+brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes,
+besides being perfect in the use of their bodies, are invincible in
+every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armour, and
+will teach the art to any one who pays them; and also they are most
+skilful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to
+speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts.
+And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last
+carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the
+only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now
+no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in
+the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or
+false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for
+they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one.
+
+CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear
+that.
+
+SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the
+consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I
+covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before,
+they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may
+bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of
+Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the
+boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him
+grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience
+similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to
+receive me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men
+to accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus,
+and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your
+sons as a bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake
+of them willing to receive us.
+
+CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish
+that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know
+beforehand what we are going to learn.
+
+SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I
+did not attend--I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will
+endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone
+in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to
+depart; when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so
+I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and
+Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to
+be their disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had
+not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who,
+as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of
+lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but
+also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as
+I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of
+me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him,
+at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at
+us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and
+sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest
+anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time;
+and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and
+Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a large way of
+wisdom, for they know all about war,--all that a good general ought
+to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of
+fighting in armour: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how
+to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured.
+
+They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they
+looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus
+said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously;
+to us they are secondary occupations.
+
+Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary,
+what must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble
+study is?
+
+The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal
+occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than
+any man.
+
+My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was
+saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting
+in armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you
+professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the
+other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings,
+and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you
+quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so
+vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me.
+
+You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact.
+
+Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king
+is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you
+intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do?
+
+That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only
+to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn.
+
+But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want
+to learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and
+Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers
+of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was
+sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned
+forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who
+was between us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love,
+and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to
+us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of
+Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the
+persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all
+eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice
+vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then
+I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do
+myself and the company the favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble
+in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing,--can you make a
+good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn
+of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines
+that virtue is a thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are
+not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of
+the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are
+the men from whom he will best learn it?
+
+Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both.
+
+And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now
+living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the
+study of virtue?
+
+Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are.
+
+Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the
+exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he
+ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will
+confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is
+I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good.
+His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the
+old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young,
+and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and
+turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit,
+therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial
+of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no
+objection.
+
+These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus,
+in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can
+be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer
+questions.
+
+He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come
+and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at
+home in answering.
+
+What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the
+task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets,
+I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the
+Muses. Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O
+Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant?
+
+The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity
+looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said:
+Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think;
+for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their
+questions.
+
+Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch
+my ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be
+refuted, Socrates.
+
+While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I
+had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and
+he answered that those who learned were the wise.
+
+Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are
+there not?
+
+The boy assented.
+
+And they are the teachers of those who learn--the grammar-master and the
+lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners?
+
+Yes.
+
+And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you
+were learning?
+
+No, he said.
+
+And were you wise then?
+
+No, indeed, he said.
+
+But if you were not wise you were unlearned?
+
+Certainly.
+
+You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were
+learning?
+
+The youth nodded assent.
+
+Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine.
+
+At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a
+chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then,
+before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly
+took him in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master
+dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who
+learned the dictation?
+
+The wise, replied Cleinias.
+
+Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your
+last answer to Euthydemus was wrong.
+
+Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their
+wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were
+silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere
+with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking
+another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of
+an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or
+what they do not know?
+
+Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of
+the same sort.
+
+Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good!
+
+Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied--inevitable.
+
+I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your
+disciples.
+
+Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn
+what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the
+same as before.
+
+Do you not know letters?
+
+He assented.
+
+All letters?
+
+Yes.
+
+But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters?
+
+To this also he assented.
+
+Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know?
+
+This again was admitted by him.
+
+Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he
+only who does not know letters learns?
+
+Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn.
+
+Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters?
+
+He admitted that.
+
+Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer.
+
+The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the
+argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the
+youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now,
+is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns?
+
+Cleinias assented.
+
+And knowing is having knowledge at the time?
+
+He agreed.
+
+And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time?
+
+He admitted that.
+
+And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing?
+
+Those who have not.
+
+And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number
+of those who have not?
+
+He nodded assent.
+
+Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of
+those who have?
+
+He agreed.
+
+Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who
+know.
+
+Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew
+that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a
+respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You
+must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of
+speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers
+are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of
+the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement,
+which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know,
+accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and
+dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then
+that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual,
+which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use
+of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know,
+wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and
+is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of
+which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the
+knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done
+or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter
+is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word
+'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you,
+that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who
+know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the
+second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know
+or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and
+therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing
+with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he
+would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men,
+tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He
+would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is
+about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his
+friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has
+hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to
+follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose,
+and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give
+me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted
+to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus,
+I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you
+explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of
+virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the
+nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and
+if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh
+at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager
+to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to
+refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question
+to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one
+of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought
+not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who
+does not desire happiness?
+
+There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not.
+
+Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be
+happy?--that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many
+good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the
+first, for there can be no doubt of the answer.
+
+He assented.
+
+And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us
+this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth
+is a good.
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts?
+
+He agreed.
+
+Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's
+own land, are goods?
+
+He assented.
+
+And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance,
+justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we
+shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as
+goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you
+say?
+
+They are goods, said Cleinias.
+
+Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for
+wisdom--among the goods or not?
+
+Among the goods.
+
+And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods.
+
+I do not think that we have, said Cleinias.
+
+Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the
+greatest of them all.
+
+What is that? he asked.
+
+Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to
+be the greatest of goods.
+
+True, he said.
+
+On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you
+and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers.
+
+Why do you say so?
+
+Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but
+repeating ourselves.
+
+What do you mean?
+
+I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward
+good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same
+thing twice over.
+
+He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is
+good-fortune; even a child may know that.
+
+The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said
+to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate
+and successful in performing on the flute?
+
+He assented.
+
+And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters?
+
+Certainly.
+
+Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole
+than wise pilots?
+
+None, certainly.
+
+And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take
+the risk--in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one?
+
+With a wise one.
+
+And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a
+dangerous illness--a wise physician, or an ignorant one?
+
+A wise one.
+
+You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to
+act with an ignorant one?
+
+He assented.
+
+Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever
+err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would
+be wisdom no longer.
+
+We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general
+conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then
+recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I
+said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if
+many good things were present with us?
+
+He assented.
+
+And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they
+profited us not, or if they profited us?
+
+If they profited us, he said.
+
+And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For
+example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal
+of drink and did not drink, should we be profited?
+
+Certainly not, he said.
+
+Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work,
+and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For
+example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools
+and plenty of wood, if he never worked?
+
+Certainly not, he said.
+
+And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now
+speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed
+them?
+
+No indeed, Socrates.
+
+Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good
+things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely
+having them?
+
+True.
+
+Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of
+good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness?
+
+Yes, in my opinion.
+
+And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly?
+
+He must use them rightly.
+
+That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse
+than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a
+good nor an evil. You admit that?
+
+He assented.
+
+Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right
+use simply the knowledge of the carpenter?
+
+Nothing else, he said.
+
+And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives
+the right way of making them?
+
+He agreed.
+
+And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first--wealth and
+health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right
+use of them, and regulates our practice about them?
+
+He assented.
+
+Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that
+which gives a man not only good-fortune but success?
+
+He again assented.
+
+And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he
+have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having
+and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom?
+Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer
+mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes?
+and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And who would do least--a poor man or a rich man?
+
+A poor man.
+
+A weak man or a strong man?
+
+A weak man.
+
+A noble man or a mean man?
+
+A mean man.
+
+And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man?
+
+Yes.
+
+And an indolent man less than an active man?
+
+He assented.
+
+And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of
+seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones?
+
+All this was mutually allowed by us.
+
+Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the
+goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in
+themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether
+they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance
+of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as
+they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them;
+and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater
+goods: but in themselves they are nothing?
+
+That, he replied, is obvious.
+
+What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the
+result--that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only
+good, and ignorance the only evil?
+
+He assented.
+
+Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire
+happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and
+a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and
+good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,--the inference
+is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as
+he can?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more
+than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether
+citizen or stranger--the eager desire and prayer to them that they would
+impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any
+one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any
+man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree?
+I said.
+
+Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right.
+
+Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not
+come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be
+considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me--
+
+But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said.
+
+Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am
+also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome
+investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as
+you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man
+happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to
+love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her?
+
+Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best.
+
+I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and
+Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of
+the sort of exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that
+one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic
+style: or at least take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to
+show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is
+one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what
+that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young
+man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart.
+
+Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted
+to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start
+in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and
+virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes
+were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might
+shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man,
+Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully
+persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue.
+
+Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want
+this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest?
+
+I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting
+when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them
+jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided
+in saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said:
+
+Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words.
+
+I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words.
+
+Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise?
+
+Undoubtedly.
+
+And he is not wise as yet?
+
+At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is.
+
+You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant?
+
+That we do.
+
+You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is?
+
+I was thrown into consternation at this.
+
+Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to
+be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty
+lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or
+to perish!
+
+When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and
+said: Stranger of Thurii--if politeness would allow me I should say,
+A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and
+the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to
+perish?
+
+Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to
+tell a lie?
+
+Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to say anything else.
+
+And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not?
+
+You tell the thing of which you speak.
+
+And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other?
+
+Yes, said Ctesippus.
+
+And that is a distinct thing apart from other things?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And he who says that thing says that which is?
+
+Yes.
+
+And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore
+Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no
+lie.
+
+Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is
+not.
+
+Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not?
+
+True.
+
+And that which is not is nowhere?
+
+Nowhere.
+
+And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to
+Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere?
+
+I think not, said Ctesippus.
+
+Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing?
+
+Nay, he said, they do something.
+
+And doing is making?
+
+Yes.
+
+And speaking is doing and making?
+
+He agreed.
+
+Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would
+be doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do
+what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is
+false; but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what
+is.
+
+Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain
+way and manner, and not as they really are.
+
+Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one
+speaks of things as they are?
+
+Yes, he said--all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons.
+
+And are not good things good, and evil things evil?
+
+He assented.
+
+And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they
+are?
+
+Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give
+you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak
+evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil.
+
+And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and
+warm things of the warm?
+
+To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid
+and cold dialectician.
+
+You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive!
+
+Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving
+you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor
+to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all
+men, to perish.
+
+I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made
+a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the
+strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them
+about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to
+destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad
+and foolish ones--whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether
+they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and
+destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into
+a good one--if they know this (and they do know this--at any rate
+they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered
+art)--let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him
+wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust
+yourselves with them, then fiat experimentum in corpore senis; I will be
+the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to
+Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill
+me, boil me, if he will only make me good.
+
+Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the
+strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well
+skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that
+of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here
+is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not
+angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking
+improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O
+illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things.
+
+Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing.
+
+Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do
+you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not?
+
+You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one
+contradicting any one else.
+
+Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting
+Dionysodorus.
+
+Are you prepared to make that good?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+Well, have not all things words expressive of them?
+
+Yes.
+
+Of their existence or of their non-existence?
+
+Of their existence.
+
+Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man
+could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not.
+
+And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all
+the same for that.
+
+But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us
+are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same
+thing?
+
+He assented.
+
+Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of
+us says a word about the thing at all?
+
+He granted that proposition also.
+
+But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say
+something and you say nothing--is there any contradiction? How can he
+who speaks contradict him who speaks not?
+
+Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you
+mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear,
+this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples
+of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be
+quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that
+I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that
+there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true
+or say nothing. Is not that your position?
+
+He assented.
+
+But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely?
+
+No, he cannot, he said.
+
+Then there is no such thing as false opinion?
+
+No, he said.
+
+Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for
+is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And that is impossible?
+
+Impossible, he replied.
+
+Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously
+maintain no man to be ignorant?
+
+Refute me, he said.
+
+But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is
+impossible?
+
+Very true, said Euthydemus.
+
+Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how
+can I tell you to do that which is not?
+
+O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties
+and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand
+them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question:
+if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no
+such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is
+acting--that is what you mean?
+
+Yes, he replied.
+
+And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such
+thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of
+goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying
+that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing
+to learn?
+
+And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you
+bring up now what I said at first--and if I had said anything last year,
+I suppose that you would bring that up too--but are non-plussed at the
+words which I have just uttered?
+
+Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise
+men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'nonplussed,' which
+you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean
+that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other
+sense.
+
+No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer.
+
+What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said.
+
+Answer, said he.
+
+And is that fair?
+
+Yes, quite fair, he said.
+
+Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise
+man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows
+when to answer and when not to answer--and now you will not open your
+mouth at all, because you know that you ought not.
+
+You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit
+that I am wise, answer as I tell you.
+
+I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question.
+
+Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless?
+
+They are alive.
+
+And do you know of any word which is alive?
+
+I cannot say that I do.
+
+Then why did you ask me what sense my words had?
+
+Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was
+right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say,
+wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all
+your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then
+again you are wrong in saying that there is no error,--and this remark
+was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however,
+Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is
+not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic,
+which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another
+and not falling yourself, now any more than of old.
+
+Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you
+call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to
+talking nonsense.
+
+Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe
+Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I
+said before to Cleinias--that you do not understand the ways of these
+philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian
+wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their
+enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until
+they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest
+their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech
+them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the
+form in which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will
+go on therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I
+may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me
+deeply serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias,
+I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that
+philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion?
+
+Yes, he replied.
+
+And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute
+truth--A knowledge which will do us good?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of
+the places where most gold was hidden in the earth?
+
+Perhaps we should, he said.
+
+But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the
+better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there
+is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into
+gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how
+to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said.
+
+I quite remember, he said.
+
+Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine,
+or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use
+it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right?
+
+He agreed.
+
+And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal,
+without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality,
+neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy
+of the previous instances?
+
+To all this he agreed.
+
+Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses
+as well as makes?
+
+True, he said.
+
+And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that
+sort--far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the
+art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they
+are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre
+differ widely from one another. Am I not right?
+
+He agreed.
+
+And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only
+another of the same sort?
+
+He assented.
+
+But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making
+speeches--would that be the art which would make us happy?
+
+I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias.
+
+And why should you say so? I asked.
+
+I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do
+not know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers
+of lyres do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of
+themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches
+which the others make for them; and this proves that the art of making
+speeches is not the same as the art of using them.
+
+Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art
+of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I
+did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be
+discovered in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I
+meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias,
+and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a
+part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior
+to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes
+and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of
+their's acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the
+charming and pacifying of them. Do you agree with me?
+
+Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right.
+
+Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have
+recourse?
+
+I do not see my way, he said.
+
+But I think that I do, I replied.
+
+And what is your notion? asked Cleinias.
+
+I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which
+the possession is most likely to make a man happy.
+
+I do not think so, he said.
+
+Why not? I said.
+
+The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind.
+
+What of that? I said.
+
+Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing;
+and when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but
+they hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and
+calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make
+their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in
+them)--they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey,
+hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if
+they have any sense in them.
+
+Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true?
+
+Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp
+hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know
+how to use them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to
+the keeper of them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us
+blessed, and which is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art
+of the general is not the one, and some other must be found.
+
+CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this?
+
+SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito?
+
+CRITO: Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs
+neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor.
+
+SOCRATES: Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real
+answerer.
+
+CRITO: Ctesippus! nonsense.
+
+SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not
+spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito,
+that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard
+them I am certain.
+
+CRITO: Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I
+should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further,
+and did you find the art which you were seeking?
+
+SOCRATES: Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we
+were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art,
+which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole
+story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that
+gave and caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when
+we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having
+still to seek as much as ever.
+
+CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the
+political.
+
+CRITO: Well, and what came of that?
+
+SOCRATES: To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art
+of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only
+one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the
+very art which we were seeking--the art which is the source of good
+government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as
+alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing
+all things, and utilizing them.
+
+CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what
+followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was
+asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything
+for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the
+same?
+
+CRITO: Yes, I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine
+were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and
+I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say--it
+produces health?
+
+CRITO: I should.
+
+SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have
+supreme authority over the subject arts--what does that do? Does it not
+supply us with the fruits of the earth?
+
+CRITO: Yes.
+
+SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme
+power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer?
+
+CRITO: Indeed I am not, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this
+is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful.
+
+CRITO: Certainly.
+
+SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good?
+
+CRITO: Certainly, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that
+knowledge of some kind is the only good.
+
+CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying.
+
+SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for
+example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in
+themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart
+knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good,
+and make us happy.
+
+CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according
+to your report of the conversation.
+
+SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good?
+
+CRITO: Why not, Socrates?
+
+SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the
+arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them?
+
+CRITO: I think not, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with
+it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor
+evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can
+it be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is
+the knowledge by which we are to make other men good?
+
+CRITO: By all means.
+
+SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat
+that they will make others good, and that these others will make others
+again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have
+put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old,
+old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther,
+from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness.
+
+CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great
+perplexity.
+
+SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck,
+I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the
+strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument;
+they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and
+show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us
+to pass the rest of our lives in happiness.
+
+CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following
+effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this
+knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you
+already have it?
+
+What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this?
+
+Indeed I am.
+
+Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a
+knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to
+learn.
+
+Then tell me, he said, do you know anything?
+
+Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance.
+
+That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is,
+and at the same time is not what it is?
+
+Certainly not.
+
+And did you not say that you knew something?
+
+I did.
+
+If you know, you are knowing.
+
+Certainly, of the knowledge which I have.
+
+That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know
+all things?
+
+Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not
+know.
+
+And if you do not know, you are not knowing.
+
+Yes, friend, of that which I do not know.
+
+Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing;
+and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to
+the same things.
+
+A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you
+explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do
+you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and
+therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be
+knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then
+I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking--May I assume this to
+be your ingenious notion?
+
+Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said.
+
+Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I
+am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot
+complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not
+know others?
+
+Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus.
+
+What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing?
+
+Nay, he replied, we do know something.
+
+Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything?
+
+Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us.
+
+O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing!
+And do all other men know all things or nothing?
+
+Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know
+others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing.
+
+Then what is the inference? I said.
+
+They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing.
+
+O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest;
+hardly have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know
+all things, including carpentering and leather-cutting?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And do you know stitching?
+
+Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too.
+
+And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand?
+
+Certainly; did you think we should say No to that?
+
+By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give
+me some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly.
+
+What proof shall I give you? he said.
+
+Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall
+tell how many teeth you have.
+
+Will you not take our word that we know all things?
+
+Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing,
+and then we shall know that you are speak the truth; if you tell us
+the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will
+believe the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them,
+and they refused, and they would only say in answer to each of his
+questions, that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to
+throw off all restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he
+would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild
+boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did.
+At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked
+Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance.
+
+Certainly, he replied.
+
+And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he
+got to such a height of skill as that?
+
+He can do anything, he said.
+
+And did you always know this?
+
+Always, he said.
+
+When you were children, and at your birth?
+
+They both said that they did.
+
+This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous,
+Socrates.
+
+Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to
+be wise men.
+
+But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar
+marvels.
+
+Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be
+self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never
+knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known
+all things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me.
+
+Answer then, he said.
+
+Ask, I said, and I will answer.
+
+Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing?
+
+Something, I said.
+
+And do you know with what you know, or with something else?
+
+With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul?
+
+Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked
+one?
+
+Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you
+bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer
+nevertheless, and not to ask again.
+
+Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said.
+
+Yes, I replied.
+
+Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning.
+
+Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is
+understood and answered by me in another, will that please you--if I
+answer what is not to the point?
+
+That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as
+I imagine.
+
+I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said.
+
+You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning,
+because you will be prating, and are an ancient.
+
+Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions,
+when he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered
+that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then
+he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was
+intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better
+let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse
+to take me. So I said: You are a far better dialectician than myself,
+Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession of the art, and therefore
+do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer.
+
+Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with
+something, or with nothing.
+
+Yes, I said; I know with my soul.
+
+The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, he
+said, with what you know, but whether you know with something.
+
+Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope
+that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always
+know what I know with something.
+
+And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one
+thing, and sometimes another thing?
+
+Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this.
+
+Will you not cease adding to your answers?
+
+My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble.
+
+You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know
+with this?
+
+Always; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know.'
+
+You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things
+with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all
+things with this?
+
+All that I know, I replied, I know with this.
+
+There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous.
+
+Well, then, I said, I will take away the words 'that I know.'
+
+Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask:
+Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things?
+
+Quite impossible.
+
+And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that
+you know all things.
+
+I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words
+'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things.
+
+And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that
+which you know, whether you make the addition of 'when you know them'
+or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known
+all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth,
+and when you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the
+heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them;
+and I swear that you shall always continue to know all things, if I am
+of the mind to make you.
+
+But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said,
+if you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your
+power to make good your words unless you have the help of your brother
+Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although
+in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am
+told so by men of your prodigious wisdom--how can I say that I know such
+things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or
+not?
+
+Certainly, you know that.
+
+What do I know?
+
+That the good are not unjust.
+
+Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is,
+where did I learn that the good are unjust?
+
+Nowhere, said Dionysodorus.
+
+Then, I said, I do not know this.
+
+You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will
+be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not
+knowing at the same time.
+
+Dionysodorus blushed.
+
+I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not
+your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake?
+
+What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus?
+
+Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent
+Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a
+lesson you might at least allow me to learn.
+
+You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to
+answer.
+
+No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori
+I must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not
+fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot
+up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw
+a second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared
+to have newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from
+the left, opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing
+troublesome he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably
+succoured him; but if my Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles (the
+statuary), were to come, he would only make a bad business worse.
+
+And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said
+Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of
+Heracles any more than he is yours?
+
+I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you
+will insist on asking--that I pretty well know--out of envy, in order to
+prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus.
+
+Then answer me, he said.
+
+Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at
+all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother
+Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the
+brother of Heracles.
+
+And is Patrocles, he said, your brother?
+
+Yes, I said, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my
+father.
+
+Then he is and is not your brother.
+
+Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his
+father, and mine was Sophroniscus.
+
+And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also?
+
+Yes, I said; the former was my father, and the latter his.
+
+Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father.
+
+He is not my father, I said.
+
+But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone?
+
+I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid
+that you may prove me to be one.
+
+Are you not other than a stone?
+
+I am.
+
+And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than
+gold, you are not gold?
+
+Very true.
+
+And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father?
+
+I suppose that he is not a father, I replied.
+
+For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a
+father, then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father;
+and you, Socrates, are without a father.
+
+Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in
+the same case, for he is other than my father?
+
+Assuredly not, said Euthydemus.
+
+Then he is the same?
+
+He is the same.
+
+I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father,
+Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men?
+
+Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a
+father and not a father?
+
+Certainly, I did so imagine, said Ctesippus.
+
+And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man?
+
+They are not 'in pari materia,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had
+better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the
+father of all.
+
+But he is, he replied.
+
+What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other
+animals?
+
+Of all, he said.
+
+And your mother, too, is the mother of all?
+
+Yes, our mother too.
+
+Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then?
+
+Yes; and yours, he said.
+
+And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers?
+
+And yours too.
+
+And your papa is a dog?
+
+And so is yours, he said.
+
+If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract
+the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog.
+
+Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus.
+
+And he has puppies?
+
+Yes, and they are very like himself.
+
+And the dog is the father of them?
+
+Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come
+together.
+
+And is he not yours?
+
+To be sure he is.
+
+Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the
+puppies are your brothers.
+
+Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly
+interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat
+this dog?
+
+Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat
+you instead of him.
+
+Then you beat your father, he said.
+
+I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could
+he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has
+this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom
+of yours.
+
+But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good.
+
+And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said.
+
+Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it
+good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it;
+or to go to war armed rather than unarmed.
+
+Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your
+charming puzzles.
+
+That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit
+medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be
+good for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a
+cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him?
+
+Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks
+is as big as the statue of Delphi.
+
+And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as
+many spears and shields as possible?
+
+Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought
+to have one shield only, and one spear?
+
+I do.
+
+And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you
+and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known
+better...Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to
+the previous answer of Ctesippus and said:--
+
+Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing?
+
+Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better.
+
+And to have money everywhere and always is a good?
+
+Certainly, a great good, he said.
+
+And you admit gold to be a good?
+
+Certainly, he replied.
+
+And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much
+as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who
+has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a
+stater of gold in either eye?
+
+Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have
+gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that
+is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and
+father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their
+own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in
+their hands.
+
+And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of
+vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus.
+
+That which has the quality of vision clearly.
+
+And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. [Note:
+the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek),
+'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker
+or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English.]
+Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):--
+
+'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:--
+
+'I hope that you the enemy may slay.
+
+'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known
+is here affirmed to know.
+
+'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar
+sees.
+
+'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a
+stone you are.
+
+'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the
+speaker are the subject of speech.
+
+'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is
+when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations;
+the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the
+ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves
+unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are
+perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that
+the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are
+the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.'
+
+Yes, I do.
+
+Then do you see our garments?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then our garments have the quality of vision.
+
+They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus.
+
+What can they see?
+
+Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not
+see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught
+napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak
+and say nothing--you are doing so.
+
+And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus.
+
+Impossible, said Ctesippus.
+
+Or a speaking of the silent?
+
+That is still more impossible, he said.
+
+But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the
+silent?
+
+Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise
+and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely
+mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when
+speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because
+Cleinias was present).
+
+When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all
+things?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are
+silent.
+
+What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent?
+
+Certainly not, said Euthydemus.
+
+Then, my good friend, do they all speak?
+
+Yes; those which speak.
+
+Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things
+are silent or speak?
+
+Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that
+you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer.
+
+Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he
+said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is
+over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus
+ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must
+have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like
+theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn
+and beautiful things?
+
+Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing?
+
+Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many.
+
+Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful?
+
+Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I
+thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I
+said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have
+beauty present with each of them.
+
+And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you
+Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you?
+
+God forbid, I replied.
+
+But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another,
+will one thing be another?
+
+Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their
+skill, on which my heart was set.
+
+Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the
+non-existent.
+
+What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable
+and the base base?
+
+That, he said, is as I please.
+
+And do you please?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for
+surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child
+will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that
+you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you
+and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department,
+and to do the dialectician's business excellently well.
+
+What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first
+place, whose business is hammering?
+
+The smith's.
+
+And whose the making of pots?
+
+The potter's.
+
+And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast?
+
+The cook, I said.
+
+And if a man does his business he does rightly?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted
+that?
+
+Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me.
+
+Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do
+his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the
+potter, he would do their business.
+
+Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have
+such wisdom of my own?
+
+And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has
+become your own?
+
+Certainly, I said, if you will allow me.
+
+What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own?
+
+Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and
+Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom.
+
+Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have
+in your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire,
+for example, an ox or a sheep--would you not think that which you could
+sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own,
+and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think
+not to be in your own power?
+
+Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the
+questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such
+things only are mine.
+
+Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings?
+
+Yes, I said.
+
+You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have
+the power to do all these things which I was just naming?
+
+I agree.
+
+Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation
+of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral
+Zeus? Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a
+net, who gives a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No,
+Dionysodorus, I have not.
+
+What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian
+at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of
+gentility.
+
+Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you
+please; in the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and
+ancestral, and all that other Athenians have.
+
+And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus?
+
+That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether
+colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who
+is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of
+the phratry, and an Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of
+ancestral Zeus is unknown to us.
+
+No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus,
+and Athene.
+
+Certainly, I said.
+
+And they are your gods, he said.
+
+Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors.
+
+At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that?
+
+I did, I said; what is going to happen to me?
+
+And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have
+life are animals; and have not these gods life?
+
+They have life, I said.
+
+Then are they not animals?
+
+They are animals, I said.
+
+And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give
+away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased?
+
+I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape.
+
+Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours,
+can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as
+you would with other animals?
+
+At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus
+came to the rescue.
+
+Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he.
+
+Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus.
+
+Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more
+of them; the pair are invincible.
+
+Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and
+their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings
+the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only
+had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted
+with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming
+to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that
+I made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like
+of their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and
+admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you
+to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much,
+indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there
+is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of
+any opinion--whether of the many, or of the grave and reverend
+seigniors--you regard only those who are like yourselves. And I do
+verily believe that there are few who are like you, and who would
+approve of such arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of
+their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the
+refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further
+express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all
+differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other;
+the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not
+excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and
+thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to
+be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so
+admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted
+to any one. I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time.
+Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same
+time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments;
+there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy
+an opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if
+the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be
+an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome
+fee;--you should be careful of this;--and if you are wise, you will also
+bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For
+only what is rare is valuable; and 'water,' which, as Pindar says, is
+the 'best of all things,' is also the cheapest. And now I have only to
+request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils.
+
+Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed
+between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me,
+since they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them
+money; no age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat
+one thing which they said, for your especial benefit,--that the learning
+of their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making.
+
+CRITO: Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I
+fear that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other
+sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such
+arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear
+ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear
+what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions--he was a
+professor of legal oratory--who came away from you while I was walking
+up and down. 'Crito,' said he to me, 'are you giving no attention to
+these wise men?' 'No, indeed,' I said to him; 'I could not get within
+hearing of them--there was such a crowd.' 'You would have heard
+something worth hearing if you had.' 'What was that?' I said. 'You would
+have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing.'
+'And what did you think of them?' I said. 'What did I think of them?' he
+said:--'theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from
+men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing.' That
+was the expression which he used. 'Surely,' I said, 'philosophy is a
+charming thing.' 'Charming!' he said; 'what simplicity! philosophy is
+nought; and I think that if you had been present you would have been
+ashamed of your friend--his conduct was so very strange in placing
+himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon
+every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the
+most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the
+study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous.'
+Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from
+others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of
+holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess that, in my
+opinion, he was in the right.
+
+SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say?
+First of all let me know;--What manner of man was he who came up to you
+and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the
+courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which
+they do battle?
+
+CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever
+been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a
+clever man, and composes wonderful speeches.
+
+SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class,
+whom I was on the point of mentioning--one of those whom Prodicus
+describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and
+statesmen--they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that
+they are generally esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the
+philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if
+they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will
+dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves
+really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and
+his friends, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion
+which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural; for they
+have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political
+wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have
+just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way of all risks and
+conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom.
+
+CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something
+specious in that notion of theirs.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot
+be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or
+things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate
+in both of them--if one of these two things is good and the other evil,
+are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in
+a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they
+fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of
+their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do
+not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either.
+Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to
+different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between
+them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either;
+or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one
+and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are both
+evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they
+will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but
+the truth is, that these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall
+short of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are
+really third, although they would like to stand first. There is no need,
+however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs--which may be forgiven;
+for every man ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works
+out anything which is at all like wisdom: at the same time we shall do
+well to see them as they really are.
+
+CRITO: I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant
+difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is
+no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child; but the other,
+Critobulus, is getting on, and needs some one who will improve him.
+I cannot help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there is a sort
+of madness in many of our anxieties about our children:--in the first
+place, about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them,
+and then about heaping up money for them--and yet taking no care about
+their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who
+pretend to educate others, I am amazed. To me, if I am to confess the
+truth, they all seem to be such outrageous beings: so that I do not know
+how I can advise the youth to study philosophy.
+
+SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the
+inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few
+and beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and
+money-making and the art of the general, noble arts?
+
+CRITO: Certainly they are, in my judgment.
+
+SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many
+are ridiculous performers?
+
+CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true.
+
+SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself
+and refuse to allow them to your son?
+
+CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates.
+
+SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the
+teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy
+herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to
+turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I
+believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house,
+as the saying is, and be of good cheer.
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthydemus, by Plato
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