diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | .gitattributes | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1598-h.zip | bin | 0 -> 50983 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1598-h/1598-h.htm | 3761 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1598.txt | 3034 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | 1598.zip | bin | 0 -> 48425 bytes | |||
| -rw-r--r-- | LICENSE.txt | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | README.md | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/uthyd10.txt | 2857 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | old/uthyd10.zip | bin | 0 -> 46319 bytes |
9 files changed, 9668 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1598-h.zip b/1598-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf6fac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/1598-h.zip diff --git a/1598-h/1598-h.htm b/1598-h/1598-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..12eb4b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/1598-h/1598-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3761 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Euthydemus, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthydemus, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Euthydemus + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Release Date: November 23, 2008 [EBook #1598] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EUTHYDEMUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + EUTHYDEMUS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + by Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> EUTHYDEMUS </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + The Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate jest, + has also a very serious purpose. It may fairly claim to be the oldest + treatise on logic; for that science originates in the misunderstandings + which necessarily accompany the first efforts of speculation. Several of + the fallacies which are satirized in it reappear in the Sophistici Elenchi + of Aristotle and are retained at the end of our manuals of logic. But if + the order of history were followed, they should be placed not at the end + but at the beginning of them; for they belong to the age in which the + human mind was first making the attempt to distinguish thought from sense, + and to separate the universal from the particular or individual. How to + put together words or ideas, how to escape ambiguities in the meaning of + terms or in the structure of propositions, how to resist the fixed + impression of an 'eternal being' or 'perpetual flux,' how to distinguish + between words and things—these were problems not easy of solution in + the infancy of philosophy. They presented the same kind of difficulty to + the half-educated man which spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a + child. It was long before the new world of ideas which had been sought + after with such passionate yearning was set in order and made ready for + use. To us the fallacies which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are + trivial and obsolete because we are no longer liable to fall into the + errors which are expressed by them. The intellectual world has become + better assured to us, and we are less likely to be imposed upon by + illusions of words. + </p> + <p> + The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues of + Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by examples + in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus, + Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise illustrated by + examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a scheme of categories is found in + the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction is taught, and the + fallacy of arguing in a circle is exposed in the Republic; the nature of + synthesis and analysis is graphically described in the Phaedrus; the + nature of words is analysed in the Cratylus; the form of the syllogism is + indicated in the genealogical trees of the Sophist and Statesman; a true + doctrine of predication and an analysis of the sentence are given in the + Sophist; the different meanings of one and being are worked out in the + Parmenides. Here we have most of the important elements of logic, not yet + systematized or reduced to an art or science, but scattered up and down as + they would naturally occur in ordinary discourse. They are of little or no + use or significance to us; but because we have grown out of the need of + them we should not therefore despise them. They are still interesting and + instructive for the light which they shed on the history of the human + mind. + </p> + <p> + There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new ones + are constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which ancient + logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not the + analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the use of + the Aristotelian logic any longer natural to us. We no longer put + arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen; the simple use + of language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the + nature of the proposition, nor extract hidden truths from the copula, nor + dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse the + form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or imagine + that any single science furnishes a principle of reasoning to all the + rest. Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to be invented + for our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some of our great + physical philosophers, seem to be quite as good reasoners as those who + have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the basis of usage + and common sense; there is no need to reopen them. No science should raise + problems or invent forms of thought which add nothing to knowledge and are + of no use in assisting the acquisition of it. This seems to be the natural + limit of logic and metaphysics; if they give us a more comprehensive or a + more definite view of the different spheres of knowledge they are to be + studied; if not, not. The better part of ancient logic appears hardly in + our own day to have a separate existence; it is absorbed in two other + sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed this ancient art be not also fading away + into literary criticism; (2) the science of language, under which all + questions relating to words and propositions and the combinations of them + may properly be included. + </p> + <p> + To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress + and have no definite sphere, tends to interfere with the prosecution of + living ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and to render + men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of appreciating + the nature of truth. Nor should we allow the living science to become + confused with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term logic has two + different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and we vainly try to + bridge the gulf between them. Many perplexities are avoided by keeping + them apart. There might certainly be a new science of logic; it would not + however be built up out of the fragments of the old, but would be distinct + from them—relative to the state of knowledge which exists at the + present time, and based chiefly on the methods of Modern Inductive + philosophy. Such a science might have two legitimate fields: first, the + refutation and explanation of false philosophies still hovering in the air + as they appear from the point of view of later experience or are + comprehended in the history of the human mind, as in a larger horizon: + secondly, it might furnish new forms of thought more adequate to the + expression of all the diversities and oppositions of knowledge which have + grown up in these latter days; it might also suggest new methods of + enquiry derived from the comparison of the sciences. Few will deny that + the introduction of the words 'subject' and 'object' and the Hegelian + reconciliation of opposites have been 'most gracious aids' to psychology, + or that the methods of Bacon and Mill have shed a light far and wide on + the realms of knowledge. These two great studies, the one destructive and + corrective of error, the other conservative and constructive of truth, + might be a first and second part of logic. Ancient logic would be the + propaedeutic or gate of approach to logical science,—nothing more. + But to pursue such speculations further, though not irrelevant, might lead + us too far away from the argument of the dialogue. + </p> + <p> + The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he + approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, the irony + more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists, + although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even + Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and becomes a friendly + and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the Euthydemus the + mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of Socrates continues to the + end... + </p> + <p> + Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself + taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, + are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled at + Thurii, but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens + as professors of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To this + they have now added a new accomplishment—the art of Eristic, or + fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach 'for a + consideration.' But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and in + the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look-out for teachers + of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great + Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of their + instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although the + greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary + incredulity. + </p> + <p> + A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two + brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of his + lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a + performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the + Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. 'Cleinias,' + says Euthydemus, 'who learn, the wise or the unwise?' 'The wise,' is the + reply; given with blushing and hesitation. 'And yet when you learned you + did not know and were not wise.' Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: 'Who + are they who learn dictation of the grammar-master; the wise or the + foolish boys?' 'The wise.' 'Then, after all, the wise learn.' 'And do they + learn,' said Euthydemus, 'what they know or what they do not know?' 'The + latter.' 'And dictation is a dictation of letters?' 'Yes.' 'And you know + letters?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn what you know.' 'But,' retorts + Dionysodorus, 'is not learning acquiring knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you + acquire that which you have not got already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn that + which you do not know.' + </p> + <p> + Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these + repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the + process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are not serious; + there are jests at the mysteries which precede the enthronement, and he is + being initiated into the mysteries of the sophistical ritual. This is all + a sort of horse-play, which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will + follow, and Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is + desirous of showing the way in which such an exhortation should be carried + on, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias. + The result of the investigation may be summed up as follows:— + </p> + <p> + All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as + wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues + and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is + omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good + fortune when we have wisdom already:—in every art and business are + not the wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the + possession of goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them + which can only be given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good + nor evil—knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and + folly the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can + wisdom be taught? 'Yes,' says Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the youth + delights Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of + discussing one of his great puzzles. 'Since wisdom is the only good, he + must become a philosopher, or lover of wisdom.' 'That I will,' says + Cleinias. + </p> + <p> + After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction, the + two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of quite + another sort. + </p> + <p> + 'You want Cleinias to be wise?' 'Yes.' 'And he is not wise yet?' 'No.' + 'Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is?—not + to be—that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all + be!' + </p> + <p> + Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement, + thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners. But + he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a storm + seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus + then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only + contradicting them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as + contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one + thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?' Ctesippus + is unable to reply. + </p> + <p> + Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like + to be informed by the great master of the art, 'What is the meaning of + this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then + what are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain that + Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but is + 'non-plussed' at what they are saying now. 'What does the word + "non-plussed" mean?' Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are + lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus + again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews the + conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the + variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in the Odyssey, + hopes to restore them to their natural form. + </p> + <p> + He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a philosopher. + And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a + kind which is profitable and may be used. What knowledge is there which + has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular + art; nor again the art of the composer of speeches, who knows how to write + them, but cannot speak them, although he too must be admitted to be a kind + of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge which we are + seeking the knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey + to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails + to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The + two enquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in + a wilderness, vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At + last they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of + knowledge. But the kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither + good nor evil: and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does + it make us wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, + but only in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer + to the question, 'good in what?' At length in despair Cleinias and + Socrates turn to the 'Dioscuri' and request their aid. + </p> + <p> + Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot know and + not know, he cannot know some things and not know others, and therefore he + knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men know all things. + 'Do they know shoemaking, etc?' 'Yes.' The sceptical Ctesippus would like + to have some evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if + Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth Dionysodorus has, and if + Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about Euthydemus. + Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the + expense of the brothers. But he restrains himself, remembering that if the + men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains + with him. Another fallacy is produced which turns on the absoluteness of + the verb 'to know.' And here Dionysodorus is caught 'napping,' and is + induced by Socrates to confess that 'he does not know the good to be + unjust.' Socrates appeals to his brother Euthydemus; at the same time he + acknowledges that he cannot, like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and + even Heracles, on the approach of a second monster, called upon his nephew + Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of + Heracles than of Socrates. For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a + brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of + men only, but of dogs and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the + consequences which follow: 'Much good has your father got out of the + wisdom of his puppies.' + </p> + <p> + 'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is a + good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much of + them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too much + gold.' And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your + belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?' Ctesippus, + imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not the Scythians reckon those + to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the inside + of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts Euthydemus, 'what has the quality of + vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What has the quality of + vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.' 'Then our garments have the + quality of vision.' A similar play of words follows, which is successfully + retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by + Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful things. + </p> + <p> + 'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the + same or not the same as absolute beauty?' Socrates replies that they are + not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And are + you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more + amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows + the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are + invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and + laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:— + </p> + <p> + First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to + public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such arguments + than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon their + impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other + people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which makes them give away + their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no + one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them a handsome fee; or + better still they might practise on one another only. He concludes with a + respectful request that they will receive him and Cleinias among their + disciples. + </p> + <p> + Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise + severely this wisdom,—not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing + such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious + critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates + understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half + politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves and + a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They + are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his + friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine + themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of + politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the principles of + combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good things + which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them + taken separately. + </p> + <p> + Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is + growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him + the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings. + Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are + few, and recommends that 'he and his house' should continue to serve + philosophy, and not mind about its professors. + </p> + <p> + ... + </p> + <p> + There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying + out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies like + the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the + human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which + have rooted themselves in language—as troublesome elements of + thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same + absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached to + the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in the first + and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of reflection, in + the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic. + </p> + <p> + It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus. + The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they + were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier + Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex + human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably received + more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained them. + They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one + could ever have been deceived by them; but we must remember also that + there was a time when the human mind was only with great difficulty + disentangled from such fallacies. + </p> + <p> + To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a + mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during more + than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the conception + of rest, and therefore the very word 'this' (Theaet.) from language; in + which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved to be + contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative change was + a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to abstract + notions, were not understood; in which there was no analysis of grammar, + and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention; in which + contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every predicate was + affirmed to be true of every subject, and on the other, it was held that + no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing was, or was known, + or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious + earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in which the catchwords of + philosophy are completely detached from their context. (Compare Theaet.) + To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope + and Swift in the modern world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget + that in modern times also there is no fallacy so gross, no trick of + language so transparent, no abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form + of thought so contradictory to experience, which has not been found to + satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a certain stage, or when + regarded from a certain point of view only. The peculiarity of the + fallacies of our own age is that we live within them, and are therefore + generally unconscious of them. + </p> + <p> + Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De + Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with equal command of their true + nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are + only struck with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:' + gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. Here, + as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put + words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny + predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to whom ideas and objects + of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual oscillation + and transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through + these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same + words to be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of + meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. + Plato is aware that his own doctrine of ideas, as well as the Eleatic + Being and Not-being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies. + The sophism advanced in the Meno, 'that you cannot enquire either into + what you know or do not know,' is lightly touched upon at the commencement + of the Dialogue; the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him + to whom it seems to be true, is satirized. In contrast with these + fallacies is maintained the Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by + knowledge. The grammatical puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes + probably contain allusions to tricks of language which may have been + practised by the disciples of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had + more point, if we were acquainted with the writings against which Plato's + humour is directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; + but we have lost the clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether, + as in the Cratylus, Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun + with his satire. + </p> + <p> + The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects with + the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to the + subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly + irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the + youth, instead of 'knocking him down,' after the manner of the two + Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion—for while + Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they + are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to + teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the + Republic; as the conception of the kingly art is more fully developed in + the Politicus, and the caricature of rhetoric in the Gorgias. + </p> + <p> + The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is Socrates + once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in years, Crito, + the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches, his fellow + demesman (Apol.), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once or twice + interrupts with a remark after the manner of the interlocutor in the + Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful + allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the + grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, Charmides, + Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths Socrates draws + his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in a kindly and + sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates has not + improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (compare Phaedrus). + The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead, + (Greek), and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year 404 B.C., + suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus could not have + been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue could not have + been composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus, who is the lover of + Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the Lysis, and seems there + too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat + uproarious young man. But the chief study of all is the picture of the two + brothers, who are unapproachable in their effrontery, equally careless of + what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss. + They are 'Arcades ambo et cantare pares et respondere parati.' Some + superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed to Euthydemus, who sees + the trap in which Socrates catches Dionysodorus. + </p> + <p> + The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as + inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar + criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the + variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the + abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play, + just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time + he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as + alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The + Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad + name both in ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in + the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this class. They occupy a + border-ground between philosophy and politics; they keep out of the + dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy as a means of + serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them as making two + good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by perverting the + objects of both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be types of the class. + Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life, they are disposed to + censure the interest which Socrates takes in the exhibition of the two + brothers. They do not understand, any more than Crito, that he is pursuing + his vocation of detecting the follies of mankind, which he finds 'not + unpleasant.' (Compare Apol.) + </p> + <p> + Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The + concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his two + sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up + philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a + preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that 'Virtue + cannot be taught because there are no teachers.' + </p> + <p> + The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1) the + similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and Lysis;—the + relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of humorous antagonism, + not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of embittered hatred; and the + places and persons have a considerable family likeness; (2) the Euthydemus + belongs to the Socratic period in which Socrates is represented as willing + to learn, but unable to teach; and in the spirit of Xenophon's + Memorabilia, philosophy is defined as 'the knowledge which will make us + happy;' (3) we seem to have passed the stage arrived at in the Protagoras, + for Socrates is no longer discussing whether virtue can be taught—from + this question he is relieved by the ingenuous declaration of the youth + Cleinias; and (4) not yet to have reached the point at which he asserts + 'that there are no teachers.' Such grounds are precarious, as arguments + from style and plan are apt to be (Greek). But no arguments equally strong + can be urged in favour of assigning to the Euthydemus any other position + in the series. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + EUTHYDEMUS + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue. + Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + SCENE: The Lyceum. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday + at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get + within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made + out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who + was he? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand + side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has + wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he + is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks + younger than he is. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand + there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the + conversation. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new + importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, + and what is their line of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part + of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out + of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in these regions. As + to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful—consummate! + I never knew what the true pancratiast was before; they are simply made up + of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight with their + bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in the use of + their bodies, are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they are + capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art to any one who pays + them; and also they are most skilful in legal warfare; they will plead + themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will + have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their + wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the + very end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been + hitherto neglected by them; and now no one dares even to stand up against + them: such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any + proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing + myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart + their skill to any one. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear + that. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the + consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I + covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, + they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring + the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of + Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the + boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him + grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience + similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive + me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to + accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus, and I + hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your sons as a + bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake of them + willing to receive us. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that + you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know + beforehand what we are going to learn. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did + not attend—I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will + endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in + the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart; + when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat down + again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus + came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their + disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had not taken + more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say, + is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom + was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the + wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting + alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you + describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first + stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I + particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the + youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted + the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time; and then I said to + Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, + wise not in a small but in a large way of wisdom, for they know all about + war,—all that a good general ought to know about the array and + command of an army, and the whole art of fighting in armour: and they know + about law too, and can teach a man how to use the weapons of the courts + when he is injured. + </p> + <p> + They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they looked + at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those, + Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us they are + secondary occupations. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what + must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study + is? + </p> + <p> + The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation; + and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man. + </p> + <p> + My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was + saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in + armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you + professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the + other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, + and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you + quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so + vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me. + </p> + <p> + You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact. + </p> + <p> + Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is + in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend + to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do? + </p> + <p> + That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to + exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn. + </p> + <p> + But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to + learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and + Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of + Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting + at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in + talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between + us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because + he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us: and all the + other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and + Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I + showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn: to + which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and + bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and + Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the + favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole + exhibition; but tell me one thing,—can you make a good man of him + only who is already convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him + also who is not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a + thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of + it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of the latter temper of + mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he + will best learn it? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both. + </p> + <p> + And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now + living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study + of virtue? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are. + </p> + <p> + Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the + exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he + ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will + confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is I + and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His + name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old + Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and + we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn + his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, + therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of + the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no + objection. + </p> + <p> + These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in + a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can be no + objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions. + </p> + <p> + He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come and + ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in + answering. + </p> + <p> + What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the + task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought + to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now + Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, + are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? + </p> + <p> + The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity + looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Take + courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my + belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions. + </p> + <p> + Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch my + ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be refuted, + Socrates. + </p> + <p> + While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had + no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he + answered that those who learned were the wise. + </p> + <p> + Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are + there not? + </p> + <p> + The boy assented. + </p> + <p> + And they are the teachers of those who learn—the grammar-master and + the lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the + learners? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you + were learning? + </p> + <p> + No, he said. + </p> + <p> + And were you wise then? + </p> + <p> + No, indeed, he said. + </p> + <p> + But if you were not wise you were unlearned? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were + learning? + </p> + <p> + The youth nodded assent. + </p> + <p> + Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine. + </p> + <p> + At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus + at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the + youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in + hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master dictated + anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the + dictation? + </p> + <p> + The wise, replied Cleinias. + </p> + <p> + Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your + last answer to Euthydemus was wrong. + </p> + <p> + Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their + wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were + silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere + with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another + similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert + dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they + do not know? + </p> + <p> + Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of the + same sort. + </p> + <p> + Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good! + </p> + <p> + Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied—inevitable. + </p> + <p> + I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your + disciples. + </p> + <p> + Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn + what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the + same as before. + </p> + <p> + Do you not know letters? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + All letters? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters? + </p> + <p> + To this also he assented. + </p> + <p> + Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know? + </p> + <p> + This again was admitted by him. + </p> + <p> + Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only + who does not know letters learns? + </p> + <p> + Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn. + </p> + <p> + Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters? + </p> + <p> + He admitted that. + </p> + <p> + Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer. + </p> + <p> + The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the + argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth. + Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not + learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? + </p> + <p> + Cleinias assented. + </p> + <p> + And knowing is having knowledge at the time? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time? + </p> + <p> + He admitted that. + </p> + <p> + And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing? + </p> + <p> + Those who have not. + </p> + <p> + And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of + those who have not? + </p> + <p> + He nodded assent. + </p> + <p> + Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of + those who have? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who + know. + </p> + <p> + Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that + he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite + lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You must not be + surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I + say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with + you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in + the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have + ever been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and + sport; and now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next + proceed to initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first + part of the sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with + initiation into the correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, + perceiving that you did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word + 'to learn' has two meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring + knowledge of some matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and + also, when you have the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, + whether something done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired + knowledge; the latter is generally called 'knowing' rather than + 'learning,' but the word 'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as + they explained to you, that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of + men, of those who know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar + trick in the second question, when they asked you whether men learn what + they know or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not + serious, and therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are + only playing with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that + ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play + with men, tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of + words. He would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when + he is about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of + his friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that + has hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to + follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, + and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give + me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted to + have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think + that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you explaining to the + young man how he is to apply himself to the study of virtue and wisdom? + And I will first show you what I conceive to be the nature of the task, + and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and if I do this in a very + inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture + to improvise before you because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must + therefore ask you and your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O + son of Axiochus, let me put a question to you: Do not all men desire + happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions + which I am afraid to ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible + man: for what human being is there who does not desire happiness? + </p> + <p> + There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not. + </p> + <p> + Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be + happy?—that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have + many good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than + the first, for there can be no doubt of the answer. + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us + this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth is + a good. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's + own land, are goods? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, + justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we + shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as + goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you + say? + </p> + <p> + They are goods, said Cleinias. + </p> + <p> + Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for + wisdom—among the goods or not? + </p> + <p> + Among the goods. + </p> + <p> + And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods. + </p> + <p> + I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. + </p> + <p> + Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the + greatest of them all. + </p> + <p> + What is that? he asked. + </p> + <p> + Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to + be the greatest of goods. + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and + I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers. + </p> + <p> + Why do you say so? + </p> + <p> + Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating + ourselves. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? + </p> + <p> + I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward + good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same + thing twice over. + </p> + <p> + He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is + good-fortune; even a child may know that. + </p> + <p> + The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to + him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and + successful in performing on the flute? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole + than wise pilots? + </p> + <p> + None, certainly. + </p> + <p> + And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the + risk—in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one? + </p> + <p> + With a wise one. + </p> + <p> + And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a + dangerous illness—a wise physician, or an ignorant one? + </p> + <p> + A wise one. + </p> + <p> + You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to + act with an ignorant one? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever + err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be + wisdom no longer. + </p> + <p> + We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, + that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind + the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the + admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were + present with us? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they + profited us not, or if they profited us? + </p> + <p> + If they profited us, he said. + </p> + <p> + And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For + example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal + of drink and did not drink, should we be profited? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, he said. + </p> + <p> + Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, + and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For + example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and + plenty of wood, if he never worked? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, he said. + </p> + <p> + And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now + speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed + them? + </p> + <p> + No indeed, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, + but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good + things, is that sufficient to confer happiness? + </p> + <p> + Yes, in my opinion. + </p> + <p> + And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly? + </p> + <p> + He must use them rightly. + </p> + <p> + That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than + the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor + an evil. You admit that? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use + simply the knowledge of the carpenter? + </p> + <p> + Nothing else, he said. + </p> + <p> + And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives + the right way of making them? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first—wealth and + health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use + of them, and regulates our practice about them? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which + gives a man not only good-fortune but success? + </p> + <p> + He again assented. + </p> + <p> + And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he + have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and + doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the + matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if + he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had + fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And who would do least—a poor man or a rich man? + </p> + <p> + A poor man. + </p> + <p> + A weak man or a strong man? + </p> + <p> + A weak man. + </p> + <p> + A noble man or a mean man? + </p> + <p> + A mean man. + </p> + <p> + And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And an indolent man less than an active man? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of + seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? + </p> + <p> + All this was mutually allowed by us. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods + of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, + but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are + not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they + are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to + minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the + guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves + they are nothing? + </p> + <p> + That, he replied, is obvious. + </p> + <p> + What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result—that + other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and + ignorance the only evil? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire + happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a + right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and + good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,—the + inference is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as + wise as he can? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than + money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether + citizen or stranger—the eager desire and prayer to them that they + would impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is + any one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to + any man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you + agree? I said. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to + man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered, + and is not yet agreed upon by you and me— + </p> + <p> + But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said. + </p> + <p> + Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also + grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation + as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that + wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and + fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, + and you individually will try to love her? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best. + </p> + <p> + I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus + and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of + exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that one of you will + set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or at least + take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to show the youth + whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of + knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, + as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and + wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart. + </p> + <p> + Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to + see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in + their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and + virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes + were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might + shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, + Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully + persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue. + </p> + <p> + Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this + young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest? + </p> + <p> + I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting + when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them + jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in + saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said: + </p> + <p> + Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words. + </p> + <p> + I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words. + </p> + <p> + Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise? + </p> + <p> + Undoubtedly. + </p> + <p> + And he is not wise as yet? + </p> + <p> + At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is. + </p> + <p> + You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant? + </p> + <p> + That we do. + </p> + <p> + You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is? + </p> + <p> + I was thrown into consternation at this. + </p> + <p> + Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to + be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty + lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or to + perish! + </p> + <p> + When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and + said: Stranger of Thurii—if politeness would allow me I should say, + A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and the + others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish? + </p> + <p> + Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to + tell a lie? + </p> + <p> + Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to say anything else. + </p> + <p> + And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not? + </p> + <p> + You tell the thing of which you speak. + </p> + <p> + And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other? + </p> + <p> + Yes, said Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + And that is a distinct thing apart from other things? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And he who says that thing says that which is? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, + if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not. + </p> + <p> + Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + And that which is not is nowhere? + </p> + <p> + Nowhere. + </p> + <p> + And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to + Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere? + </p> + <p> + I think not, said Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing? + </p> + <p> + Nay, he said, they do something. + </p> + <p> + And doing is making? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And speaking is doing and making? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be + doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what + is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; + but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way + and manner, and not as they really are. + </p> + <p> + Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks + of things as they are? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said—all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons. + </p> + <p> + And are not good things good, and evil things evil? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they + are? + </p> + <p> + Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give + you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak + evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil. + </p> + <p> + And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm + things of the warm? + </p> + <p> + To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid + and cold dialectician. + </p> + <p> + You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive! + </p> + <p> + Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving + you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor + to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all + men, to perish. + </p> + <p> + I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a + joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the + strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them + about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to + destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and + foolish ones—whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether + they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and + destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into a + good one—if they know this (and they do know this—at any rate + they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered art)—let + them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him wise, and all + of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust yourselves with + them, then fiat experimentum in corpore senis; I will be the Carian on + whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to Dionysodorus; + he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill me, boil me, if + he will only make me good. + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the + strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well + skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that + of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here + is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not + angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking + improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O + illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things. + </p> + <p> + Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing. + </p> + <p> + Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do you, + Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not? + </p> + <p> + You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one + contradicting any one else. + </p> + <p> + Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting + Dionysodorus. + </p> + <p> + Are you prepared to make that good? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + Well, have not all things words expressive of them? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Of their existence or of their non-existence? + </p> + <p> + Of their existence. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man + could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not. + </p> + <p> + And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all + the same for that. + </p> + <p> + But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are + describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of + us says a word about the thing at all? + </p> + <p> + He granted that proposition also. + </p> + <p> + But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say + something and you say nothing—is there any contradiction? How can he + who speaks contradict him who speaks not? + </p> + <p> + Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you + mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this + thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of + Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite + wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most + likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no + such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say + nothing. Is not that your position? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely? + </p> + <p> + No, he cannot, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then there is no such thing as false opinion? + </p> + <p> + No, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is + not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And that is impossible? + </p> + <p> + Impossible, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously + maintain no man to be ignorant? + </p> + <p> + Refute me, he said. + </p> + <p> + But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is + impossible? + </p> + <p> + Very true, said Euthydemus. + </p> + <p> + Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how + can I tell you to do that which is not? + </p> + <p> + O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and + excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, + and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if + there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such + thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting—that + is what you mean? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing + as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do + you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could + teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn? + </p> + <p> + And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you + bring up now what I said at first—and if I had said anything last + year, I suppose that you would bring that up too—but are non-plussed + at the words which I have just uttered? + </p> + <p> + Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise + men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'nonplussed,' which + you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I + cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense. + </p> + <p> + No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer. + </p> + <p> + What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said. + </p> + <p> + Answer, said he. + </p> + <p> + And is that fair? + </p> + <p> + Yes, quite fair, he said. + </p> + <p> + Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise + man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows + when to answer and when not to answer—and now you will not open your + mouth at all, because you know that you ought not. + </p> + <p> + You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit + that I am wise, answer as I tell you. + </p> + <p> + I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question. + </p> + <p> + Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless? + </p> + <p> + They are alive. + </p> + <p> + And do you know of any word which is alive? + </p> + <p> + I cannot say that I do. + </p> + <p> + Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? + </p> + <p> + Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was + right after all in saying that words have a sense;—what do you say, + wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your + wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you + are wrong in saying that there is no error,—and this remark was made + by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus + and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very + likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is + really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not + falling yourself, now any more than of old. + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call + yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking + nonsense. + </p> + <p> + Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe + Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said + before to Cleinias—that you do not understand the ways of these + philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian + wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their + enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they + show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their + full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to + shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in + which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on + therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch + their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply + serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, + shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that + philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute + truth—A knowledge which will do us good? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the + places where most gold was hidden in the earth? + </p> + <p> + Perhaps we should, he said. + </p> + <p> + But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better + off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there is in + the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the + knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the + gold? Do you not remember? I said. + </p> + <p> + I quite remember, he said. + </p> + <p> + Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or + of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use it + when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without + giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would + there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous + instances? + </p> + <p> + To all this he agreed. + </p> + <p> + Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as + well as makes? + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort—far + otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which + uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided: + for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely + from one another. Am I not right? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only + another of the same sort? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches—would + that be the art which would make us happy? + </p> + <p> + I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias. + </p> + <p> + And why should you say so? I asked. + </p> + <p> + I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not + know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers of lyres + do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves + unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the + others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is + not the same as the art of using them. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art + of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did + think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered + in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, + always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art + is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great + art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the + art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and + scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of their's acts upon + dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying + of them. Do you agree with me? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right. + </p> + <p> + Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse? + </p> + <p> + I do not see my way, he said. + </p> + <p> + But I think that I do, I replied. + </p> + <p> + And what is your notion? asked Cleinias. + </p> + <p> + I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which + the possession is most likely to make a man happy. + </p> + <p> + I do not think so, he said. + </p> + <p> + Why not? I said. + </p> + <p> + The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind. + </p> + <p> + What of that? I said. + </p> + <p> + Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and + when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but they + hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and + calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make + their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in + them)—they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their + prey, hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, + if they have any sense in them. + </p> + <p> + Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands + over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use + them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of + them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which + is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not + the one, and some other must be found. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs + neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real + answerer. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Ctesippus! nonsense. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not + spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, + that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard them + I am certain. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I + should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and + did you find the art which you were seeking? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were + like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which + was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? + At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and + caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we + were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as + much as ever. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the + political. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Well, and what came of that? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art + of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only one + which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art + which we were seeking—the art which is the source of good + government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as + alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing + all things, and utilizing them. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what + followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was + asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for + us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Yes, I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine + were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I + were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say—it + produces health? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: I should. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have + supreme authority over the subject arts—what does that do? Does it + not supply us with the fruits of the earth? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Yes. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme + power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Indeed I am not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this is + the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Certainly. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Certainly, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge + of some kind is the only good. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for + example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in + themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart + knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and + make us happy. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to + your report of the conversation. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Why not, Socrates? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the + arts,—carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: I think not, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? + For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, and + gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and + what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge + by which we are to make other men good? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: By all means. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that + they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, + without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put + aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old + song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the + knowledge of the art or science of happiness. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great + perplexity. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I + lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers + to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our + Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in + sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the + rest of our lives in happiness. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following + effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this + knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you + already have it? + </p> + <p> + What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this? + </p> + <p> + Indeed I am. + </p> + <p> + Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a + knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to + learn. + </p> + <p> + Then tell me, he said, do you know anything? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance. + </p> + <p> + That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, + and at the same time is not what it is? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not. + </p> + <p> + And did you not say that you knew something? + </p> + <p> + I did. + </p> + <p> + If you know, you are knowing. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, of the knowledge which I have. + </p> + <p> + That makes no difference;—and must you not, if you are knowing, know + all things? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not + know. + </p> + <p> + And if you do not know, you are not knowing. + </p> + <p> + Yes, friend, of that which I do not know. + </p> + <p> + Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; + and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to + the same things. + </p> + <p> + A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you + explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you + mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore, + since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not + knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the + knowledge for which we are seeking—May I assume this to be your + ingenious notion? + </p> + <p> + Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said. + </p> + <p> + Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am + only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot + complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not + know others? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing? + </p> + <p> + Nay, he replied, we do know something. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? + </p> + <p> + Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us. + </p> + <p> + O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And + do all other men know all things or nothing? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know others, + and be at the same time knowing and not knowing. + </p> + <p> + Then what is the inference? I said. + </p> + <p> + They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing. + </p> + <p> + O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest; hardly + have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things, + including carpentering and leather-cutting? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And do you know stitching? + </p> + <p> + Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too. + </p> + <p> + And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand? + </p> + <p> + Certainly; did you think we should say No to that? + </p> + <p> + By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me + some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly. + </p> + <p> + What proof shall I give you? he said. + </p> + <p> + Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell + how many teeth you have. + </p> + <p> + Will you not take our word that we know all things? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing, + and then we shall know that you are speak the truth; if you tell us the + number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe + the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they + refused, and they would only say in answer to each of his questions, that + they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all + restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he would ask them if + they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild boars, came rushing on + his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was + carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus + could dance. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he + got to such a height of skill as that? + </p> + <p> + He can do anything, he said. + </p> + <p> + And did you always know this? + </p> + <p> + Always, he said. + </p> + <p> + When you were children, and at your birth? + </p> + <p> + They both said that they did. + </p> + <p> + This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, + Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be + wise men. + </p> + <p> + But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar + marvels. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be + self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew + before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all + things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me. + </p> + <p> + Answer then, he said. + </p> + <p> + Ask, I said, and I will answer. + </p> + <p> + Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing? + </p> + <p> + Something, I said. + </p> + <p> + And do you know with what you know, or with something else? + </p> + <p> + With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul? + </p> + <p> + Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked + one? + </p> + <p> + Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; + when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer + nevertheless, and not to ask again. + </p> + <p> + Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I replied. + </p> + <p> + Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood + and answered by me in another, will that please you—if I answer what + is not to the point? + </p> + <p> + That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I + imagine. + </p> + <p> + I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said. + </p> + <p> + You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, + because you will be prating, and are an ancient. + </p> + <p> + Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when + he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered that + Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected + me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to + Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better let him have his way, + as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said: You + are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never + made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say; ask your + questions once more, and I will answer. + </p> + <p> + Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with + something, or with nothing. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said; I know with my soul. + </p> + <p> + The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, he + said, with what you know, but whether you know with something. + </p> + <p> + Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope + that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know + what I know with something. + </p> + <p> + And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one + thing, and sometimes another thing? + </p> + <p> + Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this. + </p> + <p> + Will you not cease adding to your answers? + </p> + <p> + My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble. + </p> + <p> + You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know + with this? + </p> + <p> + Always; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know.' + </p> + <p> + You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things + with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things + with this? + </p> + <p> + All that I know, I replied, I know with this. + </p> + <p> + There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous. + </p> + <p> + Well, then, I said, I will take away the words 'that I know.' + </p> + <p> + Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would + you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things? + </p> + <p> + Quite impossible. + </p> + <p> + And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that + you know all things. + </p> + <p> + I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words + 'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things. + </p> + <p> + And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which + you know, whether you make the addition of 'when you know them' or not? + for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all + things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when + you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and + earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; and I swear + that you shall always continue to know all things, if I am of the mind to + make you. + </p> + <p> + But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if + you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to + make good your words unless you have the help of your brother + Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although + in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am + told so by men of your prodigious wisdom—how can I say that I know + such things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that + or not? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, you know that. + </p> + <p> + What do I know? + </p> + <p> + That the good are not unjust. + </p> + <p> + Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, + where did I learn that the good are unjust? + </p> + <p> + Nowhere, said Dionysodorus. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, I do not know this. + </p> + <p> + You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will be + proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing + at the same time. + </p> + <p> + Dionysodorus blushed. + </p> + <p> + I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not + your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake? + </p> + <p> + What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus? + </p> + <p> + Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent + Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a + lesson you might at least allow me to learn. + </p> + <p> + You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to answer. + </p> + <p> + No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori I + must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not + fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot + up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a + second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have + newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, + opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing troublesome he + called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably succoured him; but if my + Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles (the statuary), were to come, he would + only make a bad business worse. + </p> + <p> + And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said + Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles + any more than he is yours? + </p> + <p> + I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will + insist on asking—that I pretty well know—out of envy, in order + to prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus. + </p> + <p> + Then answer me, he said. + </p> + <p> + Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, + but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles, + but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of + Heracles. + </p> + <p> + And is Patrocles, he said, your brother? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my + father. + </p> + <p> + Then he is and is not your brother. + </p> + <p> + Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his + father, and mine was Sophroniscus. + </p> + <p> + And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said; the former was my father, and the latter his. + </p> + <p> + Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father. + </p> + <p> + He is not my father, I said. + </p> + <p> + But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone? + </p> + <p> + I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid + that you may prove me to be one. + </p> + <p> + Are you not other than a stone? + </p> + <p> + I am. + </p> + <p> + And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than + gold, you are not gold? + </p> + <p> + Very true. + </p> + <p> + And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father? + </p> + <p> + I suppose that he is not a father, I replied. + </p> + <p> + For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father, + then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you, + Socrates, are without a father. + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in + the same case, for he is other than my father? + </p> + <p> + Assuredly not, said Euthydemus. + </p> + <p> + Then he is the same? + </p> + <p> + He is the same. + </p> + <p> + I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, + Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men? + </p> + <p> + Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a + father and not a father? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, I did so imagine, said Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man? + </p> + <p> + They are not 'in pari materia,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had + better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the + father of all. + </p> + <p> + But he is, he replied. + </p> + <p> + What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals? + </p> + <p> + Of all, he said. + </p> + <p> + And your mother, too, is the mother of all? + </p> + <p> + Yes, our mother too. + </p> + <p> + Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then? + </p> + <p> + Yes; and yours, he said. + </p> + <p> + And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers? + </p> + <p> + And yours too. + </p> + <p> + And your papa is a dog? + </p> + <p> + And so is yours, he said. + </p> + <p> + If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract + the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog. + </p> + <p> + Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + And he has puppies? + </p> + <p> + Yes, and they are very like himself. + </p> + <p> + And the dog is the father of them? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come + together. + </p> + <p> + And is he not yours? + </p> + <p> + To be sure he is. + </p> + <p> + Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the + puppies are your brothers. + </p> + <p> + Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly + interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat + this dog? + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat + you instead of him. + </p> + <p> + Then you beat your father, he said. + </p> + <p> + I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he + have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this + father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of + yours. + </p> + <p> + But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good. + </p> + <p> + And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said. + </p> + <p> + Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it + good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or + to go to war armed rather than unarmed. + </p> + <p> + Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your + charming puzzles. + </p> + <p> + That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit + medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good + for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a + cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him? + </p> + <p> + Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks is + as big as the statue of Delphi. + </p> + <p> + And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as + many spears and shields as possible? + </p> + <p> + Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to + have one shield only, and one spear? + </p> + <p> + I do. + </p> + <p> + And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you + and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known + better...Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to the + previous answer of Ctesippus and said:— + </p> + <p> + Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing? + </p> + <p> + Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better. + </p> + <p> + And to have money everywhere and always is a good? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, a great good, he said. + </p> + <p> + And you admit gold to be a good? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much + as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who + has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a + stater of gold in either eye? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have + gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is + only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and + father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own + skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their + hands. + </p> + <p> + And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, + or that which has not? said Euthydemus. + </p> + <p> + That which has the quality of vision clearly. + </p> + <p> + And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. [Note: the + ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek), 'the + speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the + subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English.] Compare + Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):— + </p> + <p> + 'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:— + </p> + <p> + 'I hope that you the enemy may slay. + </p> + <p> + 'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known + is here affirmed to know. + </p> + <p> + 'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar + sees. + </p> + <p> + 'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a + stone you are. + </p> + <p> + 'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the + speaker are the subject of speech. + </p> + <p> + 'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is + when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; + the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the + ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves + unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps + separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the + letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the + modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.' + </p> + <p> + Yes, I do. + </p> + <p> + Then do you see our garments? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then our garments have the quality of vision. + </p> + <p> + They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + What can they see? + </p> + <p> + Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; + and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping + when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and say + nothing—you are doing so. + </p> + <p> + And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus. + </p> + <p> + Impossible, said Ctesippus. + </p> + <p> + Or a speaking of the silent? + </p> + <p> + That is still more impossible, he said. + </p> + <p> + But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the + silent? + </p> + <p> + Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise + and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely + mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking + (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was + present). + </p> + <p> + When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all + things? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are + silent. + </p> + <p> + What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, said Euthydemus. + </p> + <p> + Then, my good friend, do they all speak? + </p> + <p> + Yes; those which speak. + </p> + <p> + Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things + are silent or speak? + </p> + <p> + Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that + you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer. + </p> + <p> + Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said, + That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over + with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times + as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked + up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our + time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful + things? + </p> + <p> + Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many. + </p> + <p> + Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful? + </p> + <p> + Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I + thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I + said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have + beauty present with each of them. + </p> + <p> + And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you + Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? + </p> + <p> + God forbid, I replied. + </p> + <p> + But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will + one thing be another? + </p> + <p> + Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their + skill, on which my heart was set. + </p> + <p> + Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the + non-existent. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable + and the base base? + </p> + <p> + That, he said, is as I please. + </p> + <p> + And do you please? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for + surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will + hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you + must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and + your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to + do the dialectician's business excellently well. + </p> + <p> + What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first + place, whose business is hammering? + </p> + <p> + The smith's. + </p> + <p> + And whose the making of pots? + </p> + <p> + The potter's. + </p> + <p> + And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast? + </p> + <p> + The cook, I said. + </p> + <p> + And if a man does his business he does rightly? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted + that? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me. + </p> + <p> + Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do + his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the + potter, he would do their business. + </p> + <p> + Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have + such wisdom of my own? + </p> + <p> + And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has + become your own? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, I said, if you will allow me. + </p> + <p> + What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and + Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom. + </p> + <p> + Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in + your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, for + example, an ox or a sheep—would you not think that which you could + sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own, + and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not + to be in your own power? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the + questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such + things only are mine. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said. + </p> + <p> + You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the + power to do all these things which I was just naming? + </p> + <p> + I agree. + </p> + <p> + Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of + something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? + Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who + gives a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No, Dionysodorus, I + have not. + </p> + <p> + What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian at + all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of + gentility. + </p> + <p> + Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in + the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and + all that other Athenians have. + </p> + <p> + And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus? + </p> + <p> + That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists + or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of + Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene + guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us. + </p> + <p> + No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, + and Athene. + </p> + <p> + Certainly, I said. + </p> + <p> + And they are your gods, he said. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors. + </p> + <p> + At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that? + </p> + <p> + I did, I said; what is going to happen to me? + </p> + <p> + And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have + life are animals; and have not these gods life? + </p> + <p> + They have life, I said. + </p> + <p> + Then are they not animals? + </p> + <p> + They are animals, I said. + </p> + <p> + And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away + or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased? + </p> + <p> + I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape. + </p> + <p> + Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, + can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as you + would with other animals? + </p> + <p> + At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came + to the rescue. + </p> + <p> + Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he. + </p> + <p> + Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus. + </p> + <p> + Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of + them; the pair are invincible. + </p> + <p> + Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and + their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings + the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only had + cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with + delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to + sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I + made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of + their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and + admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to + acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, + to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing + that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion—whether + of the many, or of the grave and reverend seigniors—you regard only + those who are like yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few + who are like you, and who would approve of such arguments; the majority of + mankind are so ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of + employing them in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. + I must further express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial + of all differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any + other; the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, + not excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; + and thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be + more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so + admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted + to any one. I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. + Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same + time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there + is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an + opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if the + discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be an + audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee;—you + should be careful of this;—and if you are wise, you will also bid + your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For only what + is rare is valuable; and 'water,' which, as Pindar says, is the 'best of + all things,' is also the cheapest. And now I have only to request that you + will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils. + </p> + <p> + Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed + between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since + they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money; no + age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing + which they said, for your especial benefit,—that the learning of + their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear + that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, + as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use + them in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in + venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said + to me by a man of very considerable pretensions—he was a professor + of legal oratory—who came away from you while I was walking up and + down. 'Crito,' said he to me, 'are you giving no attention to these wise + men?' 'No, indeed,' I said to him; 'I could not get within hearing of them—there + was such a crowd.' 'You would have heard something worth hearing if you + had.' 'What was that?' I said. 'You would have heard the greatest masters + of the art of rhetoric discoursing.' 'And what did you think of them?' I + said. 'What did I think of them?' he said:—'theirs was the sort of + discourse which anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and + making much ado about nothing.' That was the expression which he used. + 'Surely,' I said, 'philosophy is a charming thing.' 'Charming!' he said; + 'what simplicity! philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been + present you would have been ashamed of your friend—his conduct was + so very strange in placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what + they say, and fasten upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are + supposed to be the most eminent professors of their time. But the truth + is, Crito, that the study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean + and ridiculous.' Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from + him or from others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the + impropriety of holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess + that, in my opinion, he was in the right. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? + First of all let me know;—What manner of man was he who came up to + you and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the + courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which + they do battle? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever + been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever + man, and composes wonderful speeches. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom + I was on the point of mentioning—one of those whom Prodicus + describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and statesmen—they + think that they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally + esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in + their way; and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the + philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to + the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves really the wisest, + although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, when + they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion which they entertain + of their own wisdom is very natural; for they have a certain amount of + philosophy, and a certain amount of political wisdom; there is reason in + what they say, for they argue that they have just enough of both, and so + they keep out of the way of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of + their wisdom. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something + specious in that notion of theirs. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot + be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or + things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate + in both of them—if one of these two things is good and the other + evil, are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in + a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they + fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of + their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do not + tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now, + if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different + ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then + they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one + be good and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than + the other; only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be + any truth in what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their + two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that + these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the + attainment of their respective ends, and are really third, although they + would like to stand first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this + ambition of theirs—which may be forgiven; for every man ought to be + loved who says and manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all + like wisdom: at the same time we shall do well to see them as they really + are. + </p> + <p> + CRITO: I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty + about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the + younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Critobulus, is getting + on, and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when + I hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties + about our children:—in the first place, about marrying a wife of + good family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for + them—and yet taking no care about their education. But then again, + when I contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am + amazed. To me, if I am to confess the truth, they all seem to be such + outrageous beings: so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to + study philosophy. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the + inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and + beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and + money-making and the art of the general, noble arts? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Certainly they are, in my judgment. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are + ridiculous performers? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself + and refuse to allow them to your son? + </p> + <p> + CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the + teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy + herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to + turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I + believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as + the saying is, and be of good cheer. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthydemus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EUTHYDEMUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1598-h.htm or 1598-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/9/1598/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. + + +</pre> + </body> +</html> diff --git a/1598.txt b/1598.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1702476 --- /dev/null +++ b/1598.txt @@ -0,0 +1,3034 @@ +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthydemus, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Euthydemus + +Author: Plato + +Translator: Benjamin Jowett + +Posting Date: November 23, 2008 [EBook #1598] +Release Date: January 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EUTHYDEMUS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +EUTHYDEMUS + +by Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate +jest, has also a very serious purpose. It may fairly claim to be +the oldest treatise on logic; for that science originates in the +misunderstandings which necessarily accompany the first efforts of +speculation. Several of the fallacies which are satirized in it reappear +in the Sophistici Elenchi of Aristotle and are retained at the end of +our manuals of logic. But if the order of history were followed, they +should be placed not at the end but at the beginning of them; for they +belong to the age in which the human mind was first making the attempt +to distinguish thought from sense, and to separate the universal from +the particular or individual. How to put together words or ideas, how +to escape ambiguities in the meaning of terms or in the structure of +propositions, how to resist the fixed impression of an 'eternal being' +or 'perpetual flux,' how to distinguish between words and things--these +were problems not easy of solution in the infancy of philosophy. They +presented the same kind of difficulty to the half-educated man which +spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a child. It was long before +the new world of ideas which had been sought after with such passionate +yearning was set in order and made ready for use. To us the fallacies +which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are trivial and obsolete +because we are no longer liable to fall into the errors which are +expressed by them. The intellectual world has become better assured to +us, and we are less likely to be imposed upon by illusions of words. + +The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues +of Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by +examples in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, +Theaetetus, Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise +illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a scheme of +categories is found in the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction +is taught, and the fallacy of arguing in a circle is exposed in the +Republic; the nature of synthesis and analysis is graphically described +in the Phaedrus; the nature of words is analysed in the Cratylus; the +form of the syllogism is indicated in the genealogical trees of the +Sophist and Statesman; a true doctrine of predication and an analysis of +the sentence are given in the Sophist; the different meanings of one +and being are worked out in the Parmenides. Here we have most of the +important elements of logic, not yet systematized or reduced to an art +or science, but scattered up and down as they would naturally occur in +ordinary discourse. They are of little or no use or significance to +us; but because we have grown out of the need of them we should not +therefore despise them. They are still interesting and instructive for +the light which they shed on the history of the human mind. + +There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new +ones are constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which +ancient logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not +the analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the +use of the Aristotelian logic any longer natural to us. We no longer put +arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen; the simple use +of language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the +nature of the proposition, nor extract hidden truths from the copula, +nor dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse +the form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or +imagine that any single science furnishes a principle of reasoning to +all the rest. Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to +be invented for our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some +of our great physical philosophers, seem to be quite as good reasoners +as those who have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the +basis of usage and common sense; there is no need to reopen them. No +science should raise problems or invent forms of thought which add +nothing to knowledge and are of no use in assisting the acquisition of +it. This seems to be the natural limit of logic and metaphysics; if they +give us a more comprehensive or a more definite view of the different +spheres of knowledge they are to be studied; if not, not. The better +part of ancient logic appears hardly in our own day to have a separate +existence; it is absorbed in two other sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed +this ancient art be not also fading away into literary criticism; (2) +the science of language, under which all questions relating to words and +propositions and the combinations of them may properly be included. + +To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress +and have no definite sphere, tends to interfere with the prosecution +of living ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and +to render men incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of +appreciating the nature of truth. Nor should we allow the living science +to become confused with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term +logic has two different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and +we vainly try to bridge the gulf between them. Many perplexities are +avoided by keeping them apart. There might certainly be a new science of +logic; it would not however be built up out of the fragments of the +old, but would be distinct from them--relative to the state of knowledge +which exists at the present time, and based chiefly on the methods of +Modern Inductive philosophy. Such a science might have two legitimate +fields: first, the refutation and explanation of false philosophies +still hovering in the air as they appear from the point of view of later +experience or are comprehended in the history of the human mind, as in +a larger horizon: secondly, it might furnish new forms of thought more +adequate to the expression of all the diversities and oppositions +of knowledge which have grown up in these latter days; it might also +suggest new methods of enquiry derived from the comparison of the +sciences. Few will deny that the introduction of the words 'subject' and +'object' and the Hegelian reconciliation of opposites have been 'most +gracious aids' to psychology, or that the methods of Bacon and Mill have +shed a light far and wide on the realms of knowledge. These two +great studies, the one destructive and corrective of error, the other +conservative and constructive of truth, might be a first and second part +of logic. Ancient logic would be the propaedeutic or gate of approach to +logical science,--nothing more. But to pursue such speculations further, +though not irrelevant, might lead us too far away from the argument of +the dialogue. + +The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he +approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, +the irony more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two +Sophists, although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his +writings. Even Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and +becomes a friendly and interested auditor of the great discourse. But +in the Euthydemus the mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of +Socrates continues to the end... + +Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself +taken part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, +are the chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled at +Thurii, but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens +as professors of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To +this they have now added a new accomplishment--the art of Eristic, or +fighting with words, which they are likewise willing to teach 'for a +consideration.' But they can also teach virtue in a very short time and +in the very best manner. Socrates, who is always on the look-out for +teachers of virtue, is interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of +the great Alcibiades, and is desirous that he should have the benefit of +their instructions. He is ready to fall down and worship them; although +the greatness of their professions does arouse in his mind a temporary +incredulity. + +A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two +brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of +his lover Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a +performance as might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and +the Muses. It is agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. +'Cleinias,' says Euthydemus, 'who learn, the wise or the unwise?' 'The +wise,' is the reply; given with blushing and hesitation. 'And yet when +you learned you did not know and were not wise.' Then Dionysodorus takes +up the ball: 'Who are they who learn dictation of the grammar-master; +the wise or the foolish boys?' 'The wise.' 'Then, after all, the wise +learn.' 'And do they learn,' said Euthydemus, 'what they know or what +they do not know?' 'The latter.' 'And dictation is a dictation of +letters?' 'Yes.' 'And you know letters?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn what +you know.' 'But,' retorts Dionysodorus, 'is not learning acquiring +knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you acquire that which you have not got +already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn that which you do not know.' + +Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these +repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the +process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are +not serious; there are jests at the mysteries which precede the +enthronement, and he is being initiated into the mysteries of the +sophistical ritual. This is all a sort of horse-play, which is now +ended. The exhortation to virtue will follow, and Socrates himself (if +the wise men will not laugh at him) is desirous of showing the way in +which such an exhortation should be carried on, according to his +own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias. The result of the +investigation may be summed up as follows:-- + +All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as +wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues +and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is +omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good +fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not +the wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the possession +of goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them which +can only be given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good nor +evil--knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and folly +the only evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can +wisdom be taught? 'Yes,' says Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the +youth delights Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of +discussing one of his great puzzles. 'Since wisdom is the only good, +he must become a philosopher, or lover of wisdom.' 'That I will,' says +Cleinias. + +After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction, +the two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of +quite another sort. + +'You want Cleinias to be wise?' 'Yes.' 'And he is not wise yet?' 'No.' +'Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is?--not +to be--that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!' + +Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement, +thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners. +But he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as +a storm seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and +Ctesippus then says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only +contradicting them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as +contradiction. When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe +one thing and I describe another, how can there be a contradiction?' +Ctesippus is unable to reply. + +Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would +like to be informed by the great master of the art, 'What is the meaning +of this paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? +Then what are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain +that Socrates is ready to answer what they said a year ago, but +is 'non-plussed' at what they are saying now. 'What does the word +"non-plussed" mean?' Socrates is informed, in reply, that words are +lifeless things, and lifeless things have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus +again breaks out, and again has to be pacified by Socrates, who renews +the conversation with Cleinias. The two Sophists are like Proteus in the +variety of their transformations, and he, like Menelaus in the Odyssey, +hopes to restore them to their natural form. + +He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a +philosopher. And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and +knowledge must be of a kind which is profitable and may be used. What +knowledge is there which has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is +required in any particular art; nor again the art of the composer of +speeches, who knows how to write them, but cannot speak them, although +he too must be admitted to be a kind of enchanter of wild animals. +Neither is the knowledge which we are seeking the knowledge of the +general. For the general makes over his prey to the statesman, as the +huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails to the keeper of +quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The two enquirers, +Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a wilderness, +vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last they fix +upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But the +kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil: +and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us +wise? Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only +in itself: or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to +the question, 'good in what?' At length in despair Cleinias and Socrates +turn to the 'Dioscuri' and request their aid. + +Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot +know and not know, he cannot know some things and not know others, and +therefore he knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men +know all things. 'Do they know shoemaking, etc?' 'Yes.' The sceptical +Ctesippus would like to have some evidence of this extraordinary +statement: he will believe if Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth +Dionysodorus has, and if Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of +information about Euthydemus. Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges +in a little raillery at the expense of the brothers. But he restrains +himself, remembering that if the men who are to be his teachers think +him stupid they will take no pains with him. Another fallacy is +produced which turns on the absoluteness of the verb 'to know.' And here +Dionysodorus is caught 'napping,' and is induced by Socrates to confess +that 'he does not know the good to be unjust.' Socrates appeals to his +brother Euthydemus; at the same time he acknowledges that he cannot, +like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and even Heracles, on the approach +of a second monster, called upon his nephew Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus +rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of Heracles than of Socrates. +For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a brother, and a father is +a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of men only, but of dogs +and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the consequences which +follow: 'Much good has your father got out of the wisdom of his +puppies.' + +'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is +a good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much +of them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too much +gold.' And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your +belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?' Ctesippus, +imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not the Scythians reckon +those to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the +inside of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts Euthydemus, 'what has the quality +of vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What has the quality +of vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.' 'Then our garments +have the quality of vision.' A similar play of words follows, which is +successfully retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, +who is rebuked by Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful +things. + +'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the +same or not the same as absolute beauty?' Socrates replies that they are +not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And +are you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more +amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows +the weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are +invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and +laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:-- + +First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus +to public opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such +arguments than use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he +remarks upon their impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as +well as those of other people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which +makes them give away their secret to all the world: they should be more +reserved, and let no one be present at this exhibition who does not pay +them a handsome fee; or better still they might practise on one another +only. He concludes with a respectful request that they will receive him +and Cleinias among their disciples. + +Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise +severely this wisdom,--not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing +such an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious +critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates +understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half +politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves +and a spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. +They are a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his +friends, and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine +themselves to have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both +of politics and of philosophy. They do not understand the principles of +combination, and hence are ignorant that the union of two good things +which have different ends produces a compound inferior to either of them +taken separately. + +Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is +growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to +him the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings. +Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions +are few, and recommends that 'he and his house' should continue to serve +philosophy, and not mind about its professors. + +... + +There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying +out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies +like the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of +the human mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms +which have rooted themselves in language--as troublesome elements +of thought which cannot be either used or explained away. The same +absoluteness which was once attributed to abstractions is now attached +to the words which are the signs of them. The philosophy which in +the first and second generation was a great and inspiring effort of +reflection, in the third becomes sophistical, verbal, eristic. + +It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus. +The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they +were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier +Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to +perplex human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably +received more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously +maintained them. They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to +wonder how any one could ever have been deceived by them; but we must +remember also that there was a time when the human mind was only with +great difficulty disentangled from such fallacies. + +To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a +mental state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during +more than one generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the +conception of rest, and therefore the very word 'this' (Theaet.) from +language; in which the ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved +to be contradictory and imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative +change was a puzzle, and even differences of degree, when applied to +abstract notions, were not understood; in which there was no analysis of +grammar, and mere puns or plays of words received serious attention; +in which contradiction itself was denied, and, on the one hand, every +predicate was affirmed to be true of every subject, and on the other, +it was held that no predicate was true of any subject, and that nothing +was, or was known, or could be spoken. Let us imagine disputes carried +on with religious earnestness and more than scholastic subtlety, in +which the catchwords of philosophy are completely detached from their +context. (Compare Theaet.) To such disputes the humour, whether of Plato +in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the modern world, is the natural +enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times also there is no fallacy +so gross, no trick of language so transparent, no abstraction so barren +and unmeaning, no form of thought so contradictory to experience, which +has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical enquirers at a +certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view only. The +peculiarity of the fallacies of our own age is that we live within them, +and are therefore generally unconscious of them. + +Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De +Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with equal command of their true +nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we +are only struck with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:' +gradually we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. +Here, as everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers +who put words in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who +deny predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to whom ideas +and objects of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual +oscillation and transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly +taught through these fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, +which allows the same words to be used in different meanings, or with +different degrees of meaning: (2) The necessary limitation or relative +nature of all phenomena. Plato is aware that his own doctrine of +ideas, as well as the Eleatic Being and Not-being, alike admit of being +regarded as verbal fallacies. The sophism advanced in the Meno, 'that +you cannot enquire either into what you know or do not know,' is +lightly touched upon at the commencement of the Dialogue; the thesis of +Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it seems to be +true, is satirized. In contrast with these fallacies is maintained the +Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by knowledge. The grammatical +puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes probably contain allusions +to tricks of language which may have been practised by the disciples +of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had more point, if we were +acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is directed. +Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; but we have lost the +clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether, as in the Cratylus, +Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun with his satire. + +The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects +with the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to +the subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly +irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages +the youth, instead of 'knocking him down,' after the manner of the +two Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion--for while +Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they +are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to +teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the +Republic; as the conception of the kingly art is more fully developed in +the Politicus, and the caricature of rhetoric in the Gorgias. + +The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is +Socrates once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in +years, Crito, the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches, +his fellow demesman (Apol.), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once +or twice interrupts with a remark after the manner of the interlocutor +in the Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes +a playful allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth +Cleinias, the grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, +Charmides, Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths +Socrates draws his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in +a kindly and sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates +has not improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (compare +Phaedrus). The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as +long dead, (Greek), and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year +404 B.C., suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus +could not have been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue +could not have been composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus, +who is the lover of Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the +Lysis, and seems there too to deserve the character which is here given +him, of a somewhat uproarious young man. But the chief study of all +is the picture of the two brothers, who are unapproachable in their +effrontery, equally careless of what they say to others and of what is +said to them, and never at a loss. They are 'Arcades ambo et cantare +pares et respondere parati.' Some superior degree of wit or subtlety is +attributed to Euthydemus, who sees the trap in which Socrates catches +Dionysodorus. + +The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as +inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar +criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the +variety which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the +abundance of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play, +just as he often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same +time he takes the opportunity of assailing another class of persons +who are as alien from the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and +Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been +apt to have a bad name both in ancient and modern times. The persons +whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue to the Euthydemus are of this +class. They occupy a border-ground between philosophy and politics; they +keep out of the dangers of politics, and at the same time use philosophy +as a means of serving their own interests. Plato quaintly describes them +as making two good things, philosophy and politics, a little worse by +perverting the objects of both. Men like Antiphon or Lysias would be +types of the class. Out of a regard to the respectabilities of life, +they are disposed to censure the interest which Socrates takes in the +exhibition of the two brothers. They do not understand, any more than +Crito, that he is pursuing his vocation of detecting the follies of +mankind, which he finds 'not unpleasant.' (Compare Apol.) + +Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The +concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his +two sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give +up philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a +preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that 'Virtue +cannot be taught because there are no teachers.' + +The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1) +the similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and +Lysis;--the relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of +humorous antagonism, not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of +embittered hatred; and the places and persons have a considerable family +likeness; (2) the Euthydemus belongs to the Socratic period in which +Socrates is represented as willing to learn, but unable to teach; and +in the spirit of Xenophon's Memorabilia, philosophy is defined as 'the +knowledge which will make us happy;' (3) we seem to have passed the +stage arrived at in the Protagoras, for Socrates is no longer discussing +whether virtue can be taught--from this question he is relieved by the +ingenuous declaration of the youth Cleinias; and (4) not yet to have +reached the point at which he asserts 'that there are no teachers.' Such +grounds are precarious, as arguments from style and plan are apt to +be (Greek). But no arguments equally strong can be urged in favour of +assigning to the Euthydemus any other position in the series. + + + + +EUTHYDEMUS + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue. +Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus. + +SCENE: The Lyceum. + + +CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking +yesterday at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could +not get within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, +and I made out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were +talking: who was he? + +SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean? + +CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand +side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has +wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but +he is much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks +younger than he is. + +SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left +hand there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the +conversation. + +CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new +importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, +and what is their line of wisdom? + +SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this +part of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were +driven out of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in +these regions. As to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they +are wonderful--consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was +before; they are simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian +brothers who fight with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes, +besides being perfect in the use of their bodies, are invincible in +every sort of warfare; for they are capital at fighting in armour, and +will teach the art to any one who pays them; and also they are most +skilful in legal warfare; they will plead themselves and teach others to +speak and to compose speeches which will have an effect upon the courts. +And this was only the beginning of their wisdom, but they have at last +carried out the pancratiastic art to the very end, and have mastered the +only mode of fighting which had been hitherto neglected by them; and now +no one dares even to stand up against them: such is their skill in +the war of words, that they can refute any proposition whether true or +false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing myself in their hands; for +they say that in a short time they can impart their skill to any one. + +CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear +that. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the +consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I +covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, +they had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may +bring the two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of +Metrobius, the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the +boys who go to him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him +grandpapa's master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience +similar treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to +receive me; and therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men +to accompany me to them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus, +and I hope that you will make one: and perhaps we had better take your +sons as a bait; they will want to have them as pupils, and for the sake +of them willing to receive us. + +CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish +that you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know +beforehand what we are going to learn. + +SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I +did not attend--I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will +endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone +in the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to +depart; when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so +I sat down again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and +Dionysodorus came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to +be their disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had +not taken more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, +as you truly say, is very much improved: he was followed by a host of +lovers, one of whom was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but +also having the wildness of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as +I was sitting alone, and at once came and sat down on the right hand of +me, as you describe; and Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, +at first stopped and talked with one another, now and then glancing at +us, for I particularly watched them; and then Euthydemus came and +sat down by the youth, and the other by me on the left hand; the rest +anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had not seen for a long time; +and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise men, Euthydemus and +Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a large way of +wisdom, for they know all about war,--all that a good general ought +to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of +fighting in armour: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how +to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured. + +They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they +looked at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus +said: Those, Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; +to us they are secondary occupations. + +Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, +what must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble +study is? + +The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal +occupation; and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than +any man. + +My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was +saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting +in armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you +professed this when you were here before. But now if you really have the +other knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, +and ask you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you +quite sure about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so +vast, that a feeling of incredulity steals over me. + +You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact. + +Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king +is in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you +intend to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do? + +That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only +to exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn. + +But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want +to learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and +Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers +of Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was +sitting at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned +forward in talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who +was between us; and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, +and also because he was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to +us: and all the other admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of +Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the +persons whom I showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all +eager to learn: to which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice +vehemently assented, and bid him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then +I said: O Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do +myself and the company the favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble +in giving the whole exhibition; but tell me one thing,--can you make a +good man of him only who is already convinced that he ought to learn +of you, or of him also who is not convinced, either because he imagines +that virtue is a thing which cannot be taught at all, or that you are +not the teachers of it? Has your art power to persuade him, who is of +the latter temper of mind, that virtue can be taught; and that you are +the men from whom he will best learn it? + +Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both. + +And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now +living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the +study of virtue? + +Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are. + +Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the +exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he +ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will +confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is +I and all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. +His name is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the +old Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, +and we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and +turn his mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, +therefore, is most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial +of the young man, and converse with him in our presence, if you have no +objection. + +These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, +in a manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can +be no objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer +questions. + +He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come +and ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at +home in answering. + +What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the +task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, +I ought to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the +Muses. Now Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O +Cleinias, are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? + +The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity +looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: +Take courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; +for my belief is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their +questions. + +Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch +my ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be +refuted, Socrates. + +While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I +had no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and +he answered that those who learned were the wise. + +Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are +there not? + +The boy assented. + +And they are the teachers of those who learn--the grammar-master and the +lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners? + +Yes. + +And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you +were learning? + +No, he said. + +And were you wise then? + +No, indeed, he said. + +But if you were not wise you were unlearned? + +Certainly. + +You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were +learning? + +The youth nodded assent. + +Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine. + +At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a +chorus at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, +before the youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly +took him in hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master +dictated anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who +learned the dictation? + +The wise, replied Cleinias. + +Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your +last answer to Euthydemus was wrong. + +Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their +wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were +silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere +with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking +another similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of +an expert dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or +what they do not know? + +Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of +the same sort. + +Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good! + +Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied--inevitable. + +I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your +disciples. + +Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn +what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the +same as before. + +Do you not know letters? + +He assented. + +All letters? + +Yes. + +But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters? + +To this also he assented. + +Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know? + +This again was admitted by him. + +Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he +only who does not know letters learns? + +Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn. + +Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters? + +He admitted that. + +Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer. + +The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the +argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the +youth. Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, +is not learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? + +Cleinias assented. + +And knowing is having knowledge at the time? + +He agreed. + +And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time? + +He admitted that. + +And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing? + +Those who have not. + +And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number +of those who have not? + +He nodded assent. + +Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of +those who have? + +He agreed. + +Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who +know. + +Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew +that he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a +respite lest he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You +must not be surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of +speech: this I say because you may not understand what the two strangers +are doing with you; they are only initiating you after the manner of +the Corybantes in the mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, +which, if you have ever been initiated, is, as you will know, +accompanied by dancing and sport; and now they are just prancing and +dancing about you, and will next proceed to initiate you; imagine then +that you have gone through the first part of the sophistical ritual, +which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into the correct use +of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you did not know, +wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two meanings, and +is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some matter of +which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have the +knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something done +or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter +is generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word +'learning' is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, +that the term is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who +know, and of those who do not know. There was a similar trick in the +second question, when they asked you whether men learn what they know +or what they do not know. These parts of learning are not serious, and +therefore I say that the gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing +with you. For if a man had all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he +would not be at all the wiser; he would only be able to play with men, +tripping them up and oversetting them with distinctions of words. He +would be like a person who pulls away a stool from some one when he is +about to sit down, and then laughs and makes merry at the sight of his +friend overturned and laid on his back. And you must regard all that has +hitherto passed between you and them as merely play. But in what is to +follow I am certain that they will exhibit to you their serious purpose, +and keep their promise (I will show them how); for they promised to give +me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, but I suppose that they wanted +to have a game with you first. And now, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, +I think that we have had enough of this. Will you let me see you +explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself to the study of +virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I conceive to be the +nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I desire to hear; and +if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous manner, do not laugh +at me, for I only venture to improvise before you because I am eager +to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and your disciples to +refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let me put a question +to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, perhaps, this is one +of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to ask, and which ought +not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human being is there who +does not desire happiness? + +There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not. + +Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be +happy?--that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many +good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the +first, for there can be no doubt of the answer. + +He assented. + +And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us +this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth +is a good. + +Certainly, he said. + +And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts? + +He agreed. + +Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's +own land, are goods? + +He assented. + +And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, +justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we +shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as +goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you +say? + +They are goods, said Cleinias. + +Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for +wisdom--among the goods or not? + +Among the goods. + +And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods. + +I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. + +Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the +greatest of them all. + +What is that? he asked. + +Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to +be the greatest of goods. + +True, he said. + +On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you +and I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers. + +Why do you say so? + +Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but +repeating ourselves. + +What do you mean? + +I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward +good-fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same +thing twice over. + +He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is +good-fortune; even a child may know that. + +The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said +to him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate +and successful in performing on the flute? + +He assented. + +And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters? + +Certainly. + +Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole +than wise pilots? + +None, certainly. + +And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take +the risk--in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one? + +With a wise one. + +And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a +dangerous illness--a wise physician, or an ignorant one? + +A wise one. + +You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to +act with an ignorant one? + +He assented. + +Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever +err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would +be wisdom no longer. + +We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general +conclusion, that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then +recalled to his mind the previous state of the question. You remember, I +said, our making the admission that we should be happy and fortunate if +many good things were present with us? + +He assented. + +And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they +profited us not, or if they profited us? + +If they profited us, he said. + +And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For +example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal +of drink and did not drink, should we be profited? + +Certainly not, he said. + +Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, +and did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For +example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools +and plenty of wood, if he never worked? + +Certainly not, he said. + +And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now +speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed +them? + +No indeed, Socrates. + +Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good +things, but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely +having them? + +True. + +Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of +good things, is that sufficient to confer happiness? + +Yes, in my opinion. + +And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly? + +He must use them rightly. + +That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse +than the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a +good nor an evil. You admit that? + +He assented. + +Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right +use simply the knowledge of the carpenter? + +Nothing else, he said. + +And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives +the right way of making them? + +He agreed. + +And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first--wealth and +health and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right +use of them, and regulates our practice about them? + +He assented. + +Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that +which gives a man not only good-fortune but success? + +He again assented. + +And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he +have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having +and doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? +Look at the matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer +mistakes? if he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? +and if he had fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? + +Certainly, he said. + +And who would do least--a poor man or a rich man? + +A poor man. + +A weak man or a strong man? + +A weak man. + +A noble man or a mean man? + +A mean man. + +And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man? + +Yes. + +And an indolent man less than an active man? + +He assented. + +And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of +seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? + +All this was mutually allowed by us. + +Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the +goods of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in +themselves, but the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether +they are or are not under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance +of ignorance, they are greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as +they are more able to minister to the evil principle which rules them; +and when under the guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater +goods: but in themselves they are nothing? + +That, he replied, is obvious. + +What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the +result--that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only +good, and ignorance the only evil? + +He assented. + +Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire +happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and +a right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and +good-fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,--the inference +is that everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as +he can? + +Yes, he said. + +And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more +than money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether +citizen or stranger--the eager desire and prayer to them that they would +impart wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any +one to be blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any +man, whether a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree? +I said. + +Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right. + +Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not +come to man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be +considered, and is not yet agreed upon by you and me-- + +But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said. + +Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am +also grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome +investigation as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as +you think that wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man +happy and fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to +love wisdom, and you individually will try to love her? + +Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best. + +I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and +Euthydemus and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of +the sort of exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that +one of you will set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic +style: or at least take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to +show the youth whether he should have all knowledge; or whether there is +one sort of knowledge only which will make him good and happy, and what +that is. For, as I was saying at first, the improvement of this young +man in virtue and wisdom is a matter which we have very much at heart. + +Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted +to see how they would approach the question, and where they would start +in their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and +virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes +were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might +shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, +Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully +persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue. + +Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want +this young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest? + +I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting +when we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them +jest and play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided +in saying that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said: + +Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words. + +I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words. + +Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise? + +Undoubtedly. + +And he is not wise as yet? + +At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is. + +You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant? + +That we do. + +You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is? + +I was thrown into consternation at this. + +Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to +be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty +lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or +to perish! + +When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and +said: Stranger of Thurii--if politeness would allow me I should say, +A plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and +the others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to +perish? + +Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to +tell a lie? + +Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to say anything else. + +And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not? + +You tell the thing of which you speak. + +And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other? + +Yes, said Ctesippus. + +And that is a distinct thing apart from other things? + +Certainly. + +And he who says that thing says that which is? + +Yes. + +And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore +Dionysodorus, if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no +lie. + +Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is +not. + +Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not? + +True. + +And that which is not is nowhere? + +Nowhere. + +And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to +Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere? + +I think not, said Ctesippus. + +Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing? + +Nay, he said, they do something. + +And doing is making? + +Yes. + +And speaking is doing and making? + +He agreed. + +Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would +be doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do +what is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is +false; but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what +is. + +Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain +way and manner, and not as they really are. + +Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one +speaks of things as they are? + +Yes, he said--all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons. + +And are not good things good, and evil things evil? + +He assented. + +And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are? + +Yes. + +Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they +are? + +Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give +you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak +evil of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil. + +And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and +warm things of the warm? + +To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid +and cold dialectician. + +You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive! + +Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving +you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor +to say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all +men, to perish. + +I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made +a joke with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the +strangers to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them +about words, but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to +destroy men in such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad +and foolish ones--whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether +they have learned from some one else this new sort of death and +destruction which enables them to get rid of a bad man and turn him into +a good one--if they know this (and they do know this--at any rate +they said just now that this was the secret of their newly-discovered +art)--let them, in their phraseology, destroy the youth and make him +wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do not like to trust +yourselves with them, then fiat experimentum in corpore senis; I will be +the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer my old person to +Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like Medea the Colchian, kill +me, boil me, if he will only make me good. + +Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the +strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well +skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that +of Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here +is Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not +angry at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking +improperly to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O +illustrious Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things. + +Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing. + +Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do +you, Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not? + +You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one +contradicting any one else. + +Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting +Dionysodorus. + +Are you prepared to make that good? + +Certainly, he said. + +Well, have not all things words expressive of them? + +Yes. + +Of their existence or of their non-existence? + +Of their existence. + +Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man +could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not. + +And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all +the same for that. + +But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us +are describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same +thing? + +He assented. + +Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of +us says a word about the thing at all? + +He granted that proposition also. + +But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say +something and you say nothing--is there any contradiction? How can he +who speaks contradict him who speaks not? + +Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you +mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, +this thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples +of Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be +quite wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that +I am most likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that +there is no such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true +or say nothing. Is not that your position? + +He assented. + +But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely? + +No, he cannot, he said. + +Then there is no such thing as false opinion? + +No, he said. + +Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for +is not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact? + +Certainly, he said. + +And that is impossible? + +Impossible, he replied. + +Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously +maintain no man to be ignorant? + +Refute me, he said. + +But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is +impossible? + +Very true, said Euthydemus. + +Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how +can I tell you to do that which is not? + +O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties +and excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand +them, and you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: +if there be no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no +such thing as erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is +acting--that is what you mean? + +Yes, he replied. + +And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such +thing as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of +goodness, do you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying +that you could teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing +to learn? + +And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you +bring up now what I said at first--and if I had said anything last year, +I suppose that you would bring that up too--but are non-plussed at the +words which I have just uttered? + +Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise +men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'nonplussed,' which +you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean +that I cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other +sense. + +No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer. + +What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said. + +Answer, said he. + +And is that fair? + +Yes, quite fair, he said. + +Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise +man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows +when to answer and when not to answer--and now you will not open your +mouth at all, because you know that you ought not. + +You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit +that I am wise, answer as I tell you. + +I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question. + +Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless? + +They are alive. + +And do you know of any word which is alive? + +I cannot say that I do. + +Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? + +Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was +right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, +wise man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all +your wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then +again you are wrong in saying that there is no error,--and this remark +was made by you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, +Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is +not very likely to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, +which is really amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another +and not falling yourself, now any more than of old. + +Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you +call yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to +talking nonsense. + +Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe +Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I +said before to Cleinias--that you do not understand the ways of these +philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian +wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their +enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until +they show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest +their full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech +them to shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the +form in which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will +go on therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I +may touch their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me +deeply serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, +I said, shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that +philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion? + +Yes, he replied. + +And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? + +Yes, he said. + +And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute +truth--A knowledge which will do us good? + +Certainly, he said. + +And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of +the places where most gold was hidden in the earth? + +Perhaps we should, he said. + +But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the +better off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there +is in the earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into +gold, the knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how +to use the gold? Do you not remember? I said. + +I quite remember, he said. + +Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, +or of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use +it when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right? + +He agreed. + +And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, +without giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, +neither would there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy +of the previous instances? + +To all this he agreed. + +Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses +as well as makes? + +True, he said. + +And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that +sort--far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the +art which uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they +are divided: for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre +differ widely from one another. Am I not right? + +He agreed. + +And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only +another of the same sort? + +He assented. + +But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making +speeches--would that be the art which would make us happy? + +I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias. + +And why should you say so? I asked. + +I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do +not know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers +of lyres do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of +themselves unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches +which the others make for them; and this proves that the art of making +speeches is not the same as the art of using them. + +Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art +of making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I +did think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be +discovered in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I +meet them, always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, +and their art is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a +part of the great art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior +to it: and whereas the art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes +and spiders and scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of +their's acts upon dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the +charming and pacifying of them. Do you agree with me? + +Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right. + +Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have +recourse? + +I do not see my way, he said. + +But I think that I do, I replied. + +And what is your notion? asked Cleinias. + +I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which +the possession is most likely to make a man happy. + +I do not think so, he said. + +Why not? I said. + +The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind. + +What of that? I said. + +Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; +and when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but +they hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and +calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make +their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in +them)--they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey, +hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if +they have any sense in them. + +Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true? + +Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp +hands over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know +how to use them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to +the keeper of them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us +blessed, and which is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art +of the general is not the one, and some other must be found. + +CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? + +SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito? + +CRITO: Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs +neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real +answerer. + +CRITO: Ctesippus! nonsense. + +SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not +spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, +that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard +them I am certain. + +CRITO: Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I +should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, +and did you find the art which you were seeking? + +SOCRATES: Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we +were like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, +which was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole +story? At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that +gave and caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when +we thought we were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having +still to seek as much as ever. + +CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the +political. + +CRITO: Well, and what came of that? + +SOCRATES: To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art +of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only +one which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the +very art which we were seeking--the art which is the source of good +government, and which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as +alone sitting at the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing +all things, and utilizing them. + +CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what +followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was +asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything +for us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the +same? + +CRITO: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine +were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and +I were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say--it +produces health? + +CRITO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have +supreme authority over the subject arts--what does that do? Does it not +supply us with the fruits of the earth? + +CRITO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme +power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer? + +CRITO: Indeed I am not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this +is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful. + +CRITO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good? + +CRITO: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that +knowledge of some kind is the only good. + +CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying. + +SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for +example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in +themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart +knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, +and make us happy. + +CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according +to your report of the conversation. + +SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? + +CRITO: Why not, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the +arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them? + +CRITO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with +it? For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor +evil, and gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can +it be, and what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is +the knowledge by which we are to make other men good? + +CRITO: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat +that they will make others good, and that these others will make others +again, without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have +put aside the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, +old song over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, +from the knowledge of the art or science of happiness. + +CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great +perplexity. + +SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, +I lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the +strangers to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; +they were our Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and +show us in sober earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us +to pass the rest of our lives in happiness. + +CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following +effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this +knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you +already have it? + +What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this? + +Indeed I am. + +Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a +knowledge; at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to +learn. + +Then tell me, he said, do you know anything? + +Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance. + +That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, +and at the same time is not what it is? + +Certainly not. + +And did you not say that you knew something? + +I did. + +If you know, you are knowing. + +Certainly, of the knowledge which I have. + +That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know +all things? + +Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not +know. + +And if you do not know, you are not knowing. + +Yes, friend, of that which I do not know. + +Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; +and therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to +the same things. + +A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you +explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do +you mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and +therefore, since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be +knowing and not knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then +I must have the knowledge for which we are seeking--May I assume this to +be your ingenious notion? + +Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said. + +Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I +am only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot +complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not +know others? + +Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. + +What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing? + +Nay, he replied, we do know something. + +Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? + +Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us. + +O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! +And do all other men know all things or nothing? + +Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know +others, and be at the same time knowing and not knowing. + +Then what is the inference? I said. + +They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing. + +O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest; +hardly have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know +all things, including carpentering and leather-cutting? + +Certainly, he said. + +And do you know stitching? + +Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too. + +And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand? + +Certainly; did you think we should say No to that? + +By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give +me some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly. + +What proof shall I give you? he said. + +Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall +tell how many teeth you have. + +Will you not take our word that we know all things? + +Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing, +and then we shall know that you are speak the truth; if you tell us +the number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will +believe the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, +and they refused, and they would only say in answer to each of his +questions, that they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to +throw off all restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he +would ask them if they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild +boars, came rushing on his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. +At last, Crito, I too was carried away by my incredulity, and asked +Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus could dance. + +Certainly, he replied. + +And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he +got to such a height of skill as that? + +He can do anything, he said. + +And did you always know this? + +Always, he said. + +When you were children, and at your birth? + +They both said that they did. + +This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, +Socrates. + +Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to +be wise men. + +But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar +marvels. + +Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be +self-convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never +knew before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known +all things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me. + +Answer then, he said. + +Ask, I said, and I will answer. + +Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing? + +Something, I said. + +And do you know with what you know, or with something else? + +With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul? + +Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked +one? + +Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you +bid; when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer +nevertheless, and not to ask again. + +Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said. + +Yes, I replied. + +Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning. + +Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is +understood and answered by me in another, will that please you--if I +answer what is not to the point? + +That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as +I imagine. + +I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said. + +You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, +because you will be prating, and are an ancient. + +Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, +when he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered +that Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then +he neglected me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was +intending to go to Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better +let him have his way, as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse +to take me. So I said: You are a far better dialectician than myself, +Euthydemus, for I have never made a profession of the art, and therefore +do as you say; ask your questions once more, and I will answer. + +Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with +something, or with nothing. + +Yes, I said; I know with my soul. + +The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, he +said, with what you know, but whether you know with something. + +Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope +that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always +know what I know with something. + +And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one +thing, and sometimes another thing? + +Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this. + +Will you not cease adding to your answers? + +My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble. + +You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know +with this? + +Always; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know.' + +You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things +with this, and some things with something else, or do you know all +things with this? + +All that I know, I replied, I know with this. + +There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous. + +Well, then, I said, I will take away the words 'that I know.' + +Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: +Would you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things? + +Quite impossible. + +And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that +you know all things. + +I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words +'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things. + +And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that +which you know, whether you make the addition of 'when you know them' +or not? for you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known +all things, that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, +and when you were growing up, and before you were born, and before the +heaven and earth existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; +and I swear that you shall always continue to know all things, if I am +of the mind to make you. + +But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, +if you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your +power to make good your words unless you have the help of your brother +Dionysodorus; then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although +in the main I cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am +told so by men of your prodigious wisdom--how can I say that I know such +things, Euthydemus, as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or +not? + +Certainly, you know that. + +What do I know? + +That the good are not unjust. + +Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, +where did I learn that the good are unjust? + +Nowhere, said Dionysodorus. + +Then, I said, I do not know this. + +You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will +be proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not +knowing at the same time. + +Dionysodorus blushed. + +I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not +your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake? + +What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus? + +Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent +Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a +lesson you might at least allow me to learn. + +You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to +answer. + +No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori +I must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not +fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot +up many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw +a second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared +to have newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from +the left, opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing +troublesome he called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably +succoured him; but if my Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles (the +statuary), were to come, he would only make a bad business worse. + +And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said +Dionysodorus, will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of +Heracles any more than he is yours? + +I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you +will insist on asking--that I pretty well know--out of envy, in order to +prevent me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus. + +Then answer me, he said. + +Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at +all, but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother +Patrocles, but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the +brother of Heracles. + +And is Patrocles, he said, your brother? + +Yes, I said, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my +father. + +Then he is and is not your brother. + +Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his +father, and mine was Sophroniscus. + +And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also? + +Yes, I said; the former was my father, and the latter his. + +Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father. + +He is not my father, I said. + +But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone? + +I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid +that you may prove me to be one. + +Are you not other than a stone? + +I am. + +And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than +gold, you are not gold? + +Very true. + +And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father? + +I suppose that he is not a father, I replied. + +For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a +father, then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; +and you, Socrates, are without a father. + +Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in +the same case, for he is other than my father? + +Assuredly not, said Euthydemus. + +Then he is the same? + +He is the same. + +I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, +Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men? + +Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a +father and not a father? + +Certainly, I did so imagine, said Ctesippus. + +And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man? + +They are not 'in pari materia,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had +better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the +father of all. + +But he is, he replied. + +What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other +animals? + +Of all, he said. + +And your mother, too, is the mother of all? + +Yes, our mother too. + +Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then? + +Yes; and yours, he said. + +And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers? + +And yours too. + +And your papa is a dog? + +And so is yours, he said. + +If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract +the same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog. + +Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus. + +And he has puppies? + +Yes, and they are very like himself. + +And the dog is the father of them? + +Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come +together. + +And is he not yours? + +To be sure he is. + +Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the +puppies are your brothers. + +Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly +interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat +this dog? + +Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat +you instead of him. + +Then you beat your father, he said. + +I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could +he have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has +this father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom +of yours. + +But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good. + +And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said. + +Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it +good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; +or to go to war armed rather than unarmed. + +Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your +charming puzzles. + +That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit +medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be +good for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a +cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him? + +Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks +is as big as the statue of Delphi. + +And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as +many spears and shields as possible? + +Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought +to have one shield only, and one spear? + +I do. + +And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you +and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known +better...Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to +the previous answer of Ctesippus and said:-- + +Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing? + +Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better. + +And to have money everywhere and always is a good? + +Certainly, a great good, he said. + +And you admit gold to be a good? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much +as possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who +has three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a +stater of gold in either eye? + +Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have +gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that +is only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and +father), and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their +own skulls gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in +their hands. + +And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of +vision, or that which has not? said Euthydemus. + +That which has the quality of vision clearly. + +And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. [Note: +the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek), +'the speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker +or the subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English.] +Compare Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):-- + +'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:-- + +'I hope that you the enemy may slay. + +'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known +is here affirmed to know. + +'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar +sees. + +'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a +stone you are. + +'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the +speaker are the subject of speech. + +'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is +when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; +the second when one is improper but customary; the third when the +ambiguity arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves +unambiguous, as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are +perhaps separately unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that +the letters are known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are +the modes in which propositions and terms may be ambiguous.' + +Yes, I do. + +Then do you see our garments? + +Yes. + +Then our garments have the quality of vision. + +They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus. + +What can they see? + +Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not +see; and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught +napping when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak +and say nothing--you are doing so. + +And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus. + +Impossible, said Ctesippus. + +Or a speaking of the silent? + +That is still more impossible, he said. + +But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the +silent? + +Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise +and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely +mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when +speaking (I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because +Cleinias was present). + +When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all +things? + +Yes, he said. + +But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are +silent. + +What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent? + +Certainly not, said Euthydemus. + +Then, my good friend, do they all speak? + +Yes; those which speak. + +Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things +are silent or speak? + +Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that +you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer. + +Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he +said, That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is +over with him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus +ten times as uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must +have picked up this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like +theirs in our time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn +and beautiful things? + +Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? + +Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many. + +Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful? + +Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I +thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I +said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have +beauty present with each of them. + +And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you +Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? + +God forbid, I replied. + +But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, +will one thing be another? + +Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their +skill, on which my heart was set. + +Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the +non-existent. + +What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable +and the base base? + +That, he said, is as I please. + +And do you please? + +Yes, he said. + +And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for +surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child +will hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that +you must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you +and your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, +and to do the dialectician's business excellently well. + +What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first +place, whose business is hammering? + +The smith's. + +And whose the making of pots? + +The potter's. + +And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast? + +The cook, I said. + +And if a man does his business he does rightly? + +Certainly. + +And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted +that? + +Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me. + +Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do +his business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the +potter, he would do their business. + +Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have +such wisdom of my own? + +And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has +become your own? + +Certainly, I said, if you will allow me. + +What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own? + +Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and +Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom. + +Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have +in your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, +for example, an ox or a sheep--would you not think that which you could +sell and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own, +and that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think +not to be in your own power? + +Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the +questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such +things only are mine. + +Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings? + +Yes, I said. + +You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have +the power to do all these things which I was just naming? + +I agree. + +Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation +of something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral +Zeus? Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a +net, who gives a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No, +Dionysodorus, I have not. + +What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian +at all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of +gentility. + +Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you +please; in the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and +ancestral, and all that other Athenians have. + +And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus? + +That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether +colonists or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who +is the father of Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of +the phratry, and an Athene guardian of the phratry. But the name of +ancestral Zeus is unknown to us. + +No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, +and Athene. + +Certainly, I said. + +And they are your gods, he said. + +Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors. + +At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that? + +I did, I said; what is going to happen to me? + +And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have +life are animals; and have not these gods life? + +They have life, I said. + +Then are they not animals? + +They are animals, I said. + +And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give +away or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased? + +I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape. + +Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, +can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as +you would with other animals? + +At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus +came to the rescue. + +Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he. + +Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus. + +Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more +of them; the pair are invincible. + +Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and +their words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings +the two men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only +had cheered at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted +with delight until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming +to sympathize in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that +I made a speech, in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like +of their wisdom; I was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and +admiring of them. What marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you +to acquire this great perfection in such a short time? There is much, +indeed, to admire in your words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there +is nothing that I admire more than your magnanimous disregard of +any opinion--whether of the many, or of the grave and reverend +seigniors--you regard only those who are like yourselves. And I do +verily believe that there are few who are like you, and who would +approve of such arguments; the majority of mankind are so ignorant of +their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them in the +refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further +express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all +differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other; +the result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not +excepting your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and +thus all ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to +be more than all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so +admirably contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted +to any one. I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. +Now this quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same +time I would advise you not to have any more public entertainments; +there is a danger that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy +an opportunity of acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if +the discussion were confined to your two selves; but if there must be +an audience, let him only be present who is willing to pay a handsome +fee;--you should be careful of this;--and if you are wise, you will also +bid your disciples discourse with no man but you and themselves. For +only what is rare is valuable; and 'water,' which, as Pindar says, is +the 'best of all things,' is also the cheapest. And now I have only to +request that you will receive Cleinias and me among your pupils. + +Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed +between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, +since they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them +money; no age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat +one thing which they said, for your especial benefit,--that the learning +of their art did not at all interfere with the business of money-making. + +CRITO: Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I +fear that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other +sort, who, as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such +arguments than use them in refutation of others. And though I may appear +ridiculous in venturing to advise you, I think that you may as well hear +what was said to me by a man of very considerable pretensions--he was a +professor of legal oratory--who came away from you while I was walking +up and down. 'Crito,' said he to me, 'are you giving no attention to +these wise men?' 'No, indeed,' I said to him; 'I could not get within +hearing of them--there was such a crowd.' 'You would have heard +something worth hearing if you had.' 'What was that?' I said. 'You would +have heard the greatest masters of the art of rhetoric discoursing.' +'And what did you think of them?' I said. 'What did I think of them?' he +said:--'theirs was the sort of discourse which anybody might hear from +men who were playing the fool, and making much ado about nothing.' That +was the expression which he used. 'Surely,' I said, 'philosophy is a +charming thing.' 'Charming!' he said; 'what simplicity! philosophy is +nought; and I think that if you had been present you would have been +ashamed of your friend--his conduct was so very strange in placing +himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten upon +every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the +most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the +study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous.' +Now censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from +others, appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of +holding a public discussion with such men, there, I confess that, in my +opinion, he was in the right. + +SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? +First of all let me know;--What manner of man was he who came up to you +and censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the +courts, or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which +they do battle? + +CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever +been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a +clever man, and composes wonderful speeches. + +SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, +whom I was on the point of mentioning--one of those whom Prodicus +describes as on the border-ground between philosophers and +statesmen--they think that they are the wisest of all men, and that +they are generally esteemed the wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the +philosophers stands in their way; and they are of the opinion that if +they can prove the philosophers to be good for nothing, no one will +dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, for that they are themselves +really the wisest, although they are apt to be mauled by Euthydemus and +his friends, when they get hold of them in conversation. This opinion +which they entertain of their own wisdom is very natural; for they +have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain amount of political +wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they argue that they have +just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way of all risks and +conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom. + +CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something +specious in that notion of theirs. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot +be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or +things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate +in both of them--if one of these two things is good and the other evil, +are better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in +a mean between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they +fall short of either of their component elements in the attainment of +their ends. Only in the case when the two component elements which do +not tend to the same end are evil is the participant better than either. +Now, if philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to +different ends, and they participate in both, and are in a mean between +them, then they are talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; +or, if the one be good and the other evil, they are better than the one +and worse than the other; only on the supposition that they are both +evil could there be any truth in what they say. I do not think that they +will admit that their two pursuits are either wholly or partly evil; but +the truth is, that these philosopher-politicians who aim at both fall +short of both in the attainment of their respective ends, and are +really third, although they would like to stand first. There is no need, +however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs--which may be forgiven; +for every man ought to be loved who says and manfully pursues and works +out anything which is at all like wisdom: at the same time we shall do +well to see them as they really are. + +CRITO: I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant +difficulty about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is +no hurry about the younger one, who is only a child; but the other, +Critobulus, is getting on, and needs some one who will improve him. +I cannot help thinking, when I hear you talk, that there is a sort +of madness in many of our anxieties about our children:--in the first +place, about marrying a wife of good family to be the mother of them, +and then about heaping up money for them--and yet taking no care about +their education. But then again, when I contemplate any of those who +pretend to educate others, I am amazed. To me, if I am to confess the +truth, they all seem to be such outrageous beings: so that I do not know +how I can advise the youth to study philosophy. + +SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the +inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few +and beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and +money-making and the art of the general, noble arts? + +CRITO: Certainly they are, in my judgment. + +SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many +are ridiculous performers? + +CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true. + +SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself +and refuse to allow them to your son? + +CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the +teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy +herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to +turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I +believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, +as the saying is, and be of good cheer. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthydemus, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK EUTHYDEMUS *** + +***** This file should be named 1598.txt or 1598.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/9/1598/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. Project +Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if you +charge for the eBooks, unless you receive specific permission. If you +do not charge anything for copies of this eBook, complying with the +rules is very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose +such as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and +research. They may be modified and printed and given away--you may do +practically ANYTHING with public domain eBooks. Redistribution is +subject to the trademark license, especially commercial +redistribution. + + + +*** START: FULL LICENSE *** + +THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG LICENSE +PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK + +To protect the Project Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting the free +distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this work +(or any other work associated in any way with the phrase "Project +Gutenberg"), you agree to comply with all the terms of the Full Project +Gutenberg-tm License (available with this file or online at +http://gutenberg.org/license). + + +Section 1. General Terms of Use and Redistributing Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic works + +1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand, agree to +and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual property +(trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to abide by all +the terms of this agreement, you must cease using and return or destroy +all copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in your possession. +If you paid a fee for obtaining a copy of or access to a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the +terms of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or +entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8. + +1.B. "Project Gutenberg" is a registered trademark. It may only be +used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by people who +agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement. There are a few +things that you can do with most Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works +even without complying with the full terms of this agreement. See +paragraph 1.C below. There are a lot of things you can do with Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement +and help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. See paragraph 1.E below. + +1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation ("the Foundation" +or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the collection of Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic works. Nearly all the individual works in the +collection are in the public domain in the United States. If an +individual work is in the public domain in the United States and you are +located in the United States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from +copying, distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative +works based on the work as long as all references to Project Gutenberg +are removed. Of course, we hope that you will support the Project +Gutenberg-tm mission of promoting free access to electronic works by +freely sharing Project Gutenberg-tm works in compliance with the terms of +this agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg-tm name associated with +the work. You can easily comply with the terms of this agreement by +keeping this work in the same format with its attached full Project +Gutenberg-tm License when you share it without charge with others. + +1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also govern +what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most countries are in +a constant state of change. If you are outside the United States, check +the laws of your country in addition to the terms of this agreement +before downloading, copying, displaying, performing, distributing or +creating derivative works based on this work or any other Project +Gutenberg-tm work. The Foundation makes no representations concerning +the copyright status of any work in any country outside the United +States. + +1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project Gutenberg: + +1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other immediate +access to, the full Project Gutenberg-tm License must appear prominently +whenever any copy of a Project Gutenberg-tm work (any work on which the +phrase "Project Gutenberg" appears, or with which the phrase "Project +Gutenberg" is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed, viewed, +copied or distributed: + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + +1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is derived +from the public domain (does not contain a notice indicating that it is +posted with permission of the copyright holder), the work can be copied +and distributed to anyone in the United States without paying any fees +or charges. If you are redistributing or providing access to a work +with the phrase "Project Gutenberg" associated with or appearing on the +work, you must comply either with the requirements of paragraphs 1.E.1 +through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use of the work and the +Project Gutenberg-tm trademark as set forth in paragraphs 1.E.8 or +1.E.9. + +1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg-tm electronic work is posted +with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and distribution +must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 and any additional +terms imposed by the copyright holder. Additional terms will be linked +to the Project Gutenberg-tm License for all works posted with the +permission of the copyright holder found at the beginning of this work. + +1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License terms from this work, or any files containing a part of this +work or any other work associated with Project Gutenberg-tm. + +1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute this +electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without +prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1 with +active links or immediate access to the full terms of the Project +Gutenberg-tm License. + +1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary, +compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form, including any +word processing or hypertext form. However, if you provide access to or +distribute copies of a Project Gutenberg-tm work in a format other than +"Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other format used in the official version +posted on the official Project Gutenberg-tm web site (www.gutenberg.org), +you must, at no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a +copy, a means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon +request, of the work in its original "Plain Vanilla ASCII" or other +form. Any alternate format must include the full Project Gutenberg-tm +License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1. + +1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying, +performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg-tm works +unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9. + +1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or providing +access to or distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works provided +that + +- You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from + the use of Project Gutenberg-tm works calculated using the method + you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The fee is + owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark, but he + has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to the + Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty payments + must be paid within 60 days following each date on which you + prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your periodic tax + returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked as such and + sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation at the + address specified in Section 4, "Information about donations to + the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation." + +- You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who notifies + you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that s/he + does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg-tm + License. You must require such a user to return or + destroy all copies of the works possessed in a physical medium + and discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of + Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +- You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of any + money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in the + electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90 days + of receipt of the work. + +- You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free + distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm works. + +1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project Gutenberg-tm +electronic work or group of works on different terms than are set +forth in this agreement, you must obtain permission in writing from +both the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and Michael +Hart, the owner of the Project Gutenberg-tm trademark. Contact the +Foundation as set forth in Section 3 below. + +1.F. + +1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend considerable +effort to identify, do copyright research on, transcribe and proofread +public domain works in creating the Project Gutenberg-tm +collection. Despite these efforts, Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works, and the medium on which they may be stored, may contain +"Defects," such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual +property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other medium, a +computer virus, or computer codes that damage or cannot be read by +your equipment. + +1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES - Except for the "Right +of Replacement or Refund" described in paragraph 1.F.3, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation, the owner of the Project +Gutenberg-tm trademark, and any other party distributing a Project +Gutenberg-tm electronic work under this agreement, disclaim all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including legal +fees. YOU AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE, STRICT +LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE +PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH F3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE +TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE +LIABLE TO YOU FOR ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE OR +INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH +DAMAGE. + +1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If you discover a +defect in this electronic work within 90 days of receiving it, you can +receive a refund of the money (if any) you paid for it by sending a +written explanation to the person you received the work from. If you +received the work on a physical medium, you must return the medium with +your written explanation. The person or entity that provided you with +the defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu of a +refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or entity +providing it to you may choose to give you a second opportunity to +receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund. If the second copy +is also defective, you may demand a refund in writing without further +opportunities to fix the problem. + +1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set forth +in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you 'AS-IS' WITH NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO +WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY OR FITNESS FOR ANY PURPOSE. + +1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied +warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of damages. +If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this agreement violates the +law of the state applicable to this agreement, the agreement shall be +interpreted to make the maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by +the applicable state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any +provision of this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions. + +1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the Foundation, the +trademark owner, any agent or employee of the Foundation, anyone +providing copies of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works in accordance +with this agreement, and any volunteers associated with the production, +promotion and distribution of Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works, +harmless from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, +that arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do +or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project Gutenberg-tm +work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or deletions to any +Project Gutenberg-tm work, and (c) any Defect you cause. + + +Section 2. Information about the Mission of Project Gutenberg-tm + +Project Gutenberg-tm is synonymous with the free distribution of +electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of computers +including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new computers. It exists +because of the efforts of hundreds of volunteers and donations from +people in all walks of life. + +Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the +assistance they need, is critical to reaching Project Gutenberg-tm's +goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg-tm collection will +remain freely available for generations to come. In 2001, the Project +Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was created to provide a secure +and permanent future for Project Gutenberg-tm and future generations. +To learn more about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation +and how your efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 +and the Foundation web page at http://www.pglaf.org. + + +Section 3. Information about the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive +Foundation + +The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non profit +501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the laws of the +state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by the Internal +Revenue Service. The Foundation's EIN or federal tax identification +number is 64-6221541. Its 501(c)(3) letter is posted at +http://pglaf.org/fundraising. Contributions to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation are tax deductible to the full extent +permitted by U.S. federal laws and your state's laws. + +The Foundation's principal office is located at 4557 Melan Dr. S. +Fairbanks, AK, 99712., but its volunteers and employees are scattered +throughout numerous locations. Its business office is located at +809 North 1500 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887, email +business@pglaf.org. Email contact links and up to date contact +information can be found at the Foundation's web site and official +page at http://pglaf.org + +For additional contact information: + Dr. Gregory B. Newby + Chief Executive and Director + gbnewby@pglaf.org + + +Section 4. Information about Donations to the Project Gutenberg +Literary Archive Foundation + +Project Gutenberg-tm depends upon and cannot survive without wide +spread public support and donations to carry out its mission of +increasing the number of public domain and licensed works that can be +freely distributed in machine readable form accessible by the widest +array of equipment including outdated equipment. Many small donations +($1 to $5,000) are particularly important to maintaining tax exempt +status with the IRS. + +The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws regulating +charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of the United +States. Compliance requirements are not uniform and it takes a +considerable effort, much paperwork and many fees to meet and keep up +with these requirements. We do not solicit donations in locations +where we have not received written confirmation of compliance. To +SEND DONATIONS or determine the status of compliance for any +particular state visit http://pglaf.org + +While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states where we +have not met the solicitation requirements, we know of no prohibition +against accepting unsolicited donations from donors in such states who +approach us with offers to donate. + +International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot make +any statements concerning tax treatment of donations received from +outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp our small staff. + +Please check the Project Gutenberg Web pages for current donation +methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a number of other +ways including checks, online payments and credit card donations. +To donate, please visit: http://pglaf.org/donate + + +Section 5. General Information About Project Gutenberg-tm electronic +works. + +Professor Michael S. Hart is the originator of the Project Gutenberg-tm +concept of a library of electronic works that could be freely shared +with anyone. For thirty years, he produced and distributed Project +Gutenberg-tm eBooks with only a loose network of volunteer support. + + +Project Gutenberg-tm eBooks are often created from several printed +editions, all of which are confirmed as Public Domain in the U.S. +unless a copyright notice is included. Thus, we do not necessarily +keep eBooks in compliance with any particular paper edition. + + +Most people start at our Web site which has the main PG search facility: + + http://www.gutenberg.org + +This Web site includes information about Project Gutenberg-tm, +including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary +Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new eBooks, and how to +subscribe to our email newsletter to hear about new eBooks. diff --git a/1598.zip b/1598.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6e8268 --- /dev/null +++ b/1598.zip diff --git a/LICENSE.txt b/LICENSE.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6312041 --- /dev/null +++ b/LICENSE.txt @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +This eBook, including all associated images, markup, improvements, +metadata, and any other content or labor, has been confirmed to be +in the PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES. + +Procedures for determining public domain status are described in +the "Copyright How-To" at https://www.gutenberg.org. + +No investigation has been made concerning possible copyrights in +jurisdictions other than the United States. Anyone seeking to utilize +this eBook outside of the United States should confirm copyright +status under the laws that apply to them. diff --git a/README.md b/README.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..433e3ad --- /dev/null +++ b/README.md @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +Project Gutenberg (https://www.gutenberg.org) public repository for +eBook #1598 (https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1598) diff --git a/old/uthyd10.txt b/old/uthyd10.txt new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f8430ff --- /dev/null +++ b/old/uthyd10.txt @@ -0,0 +1,2857 @@ +******The Project Gutenberg Etext of Euthydemus, by Plato****** +#8 in our series by Plato + +Copyright laws are changing all over the world, be sure to check +the copyright laws for your country before posting these files!! + +Please take a look at the important information in this header. +We encourage you to keep this file on your own disk, keeping an +electronic path open for the next readers. Do not remove this. + +**Welcome To The World of Free Plain Vanilla Electronic Texts** + +**Etexts Readable By Both Humans and By Computers, Since 1971** + +*These Etexts Prepared By Hundreds of Volunteers and Donations* + +Information on contacting Project Gutenberg to get Etexts, and +further information is included below. We need your donations. + +Euthydemus + +by Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + +January 1999 [Etext #1598] + +******The Project Gutenberg Etext of Euthydemus, by Plato****** +*****This file should be named uthyd10.txt or uthyd10.zip****** + +Corrected EDITIONS of our etexts get a new NUMBER, uthyd11.txt +VERSIONS based on separate sources get new LETTER, uthyd10a.txt + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + +Project Gutenberg Etexts are usually created from multiple editions, +all of which are in the Public Domain in the United States, unless a +copyright notice is included. Therefore, we do NOT keep these books +in compliance with any particular paper edition, usually otherwise. + +We are now trying to release all our books one month in advance +of the official release dates, for time for better editing. + +Please note: neither this list nor its contents are final till +midnight of the last day of the month of any such announcement. +The official release date of all Project Gutenberg Etexts is at +Midnight, Central Time, of the last day of the stated month. A +preliminary version may often be posted for suggestion, comment +and editing by those who wish to do so. To be sure you have an +up to date first edition [xxxxx10x.xxx] please check file sizes +in the first week of the next month. Since our ftp program has +a bug in it that scrambles the date [tried to fix and failed] a +look at the file size will have to do, but we will try to see a +new copy has at least one byte more or less. + +Information about Project Gutenberg (one page) + +We produce about two million dollars for each hour we work. The +fifty hours is one conservative estimate for how long it we take +to get any etext selected, entered, proofread, edited, copyright +searched and analyzed, the copyright letters written, etc. This +projected audience is one hundred million readers. If our value +per text is nominally estimated at one dollar then we produce $2 +million dollars per hour this year as we release thirty-two text +files per month, or xx more Etexts in 1999 for a total of xx +If these reach just 10% of the computerized population, then the +total should reach over 150 billion Etexts given away. + +The Goal of Project Gutenberg is to Give Away One Trillion Etext +Files by the December 31, 2001. [10,000 x 100,000,000=Trillion] +This is ten thousand titles each to one hundred million readers, +which is only 10% of the present number of computer users. 2001 +should have at least twice as many computer users as that, so it +will require us reaching less than 5% of the users in 2001. + +We need your donations more than ever! + +All donations should be made to "Project Gutenberg/CMU": and are +tax deductible to the extent allowable by law. (CMU = Carnegie- +Mellon University). + +For these and other matters, please mail to: + +Project Gutenberg +P. O. Box 2782 +Champaign, IL 61825 + +When all other email fails try our Executive Director: +Michael S. Hart <hart@pobox.com> + +We would prefer to send you this information by email +(Internet, Bitnet, Compuserve, ATTMAIL or MCImail). + +****** +If you have an FTP program (or emulator), please +FTP directly to the Project Gutenberg archives: +[Mac users, do NOT point and click. . .type] + +ftp uiarchive.cso.uiuc.edu +login: anonymous +password: your@login +cd etext/etext90 through /etext96 +or cd etext/articles [get suggest gut for more information] +dir [to see files] +get or mget [to get files. . .set bin for zip files] +GET INDEX?00.GUT +for a list of books +and +GET NEW GUT for general information +and +MGET GUT* for newsletters. + +**Information prepared by the Project Gutenberg legal advisor** +(Three Pages) + +***START**THE SMALL PRINT!**FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS**START*** +Why is this "Small Print!" statement here? You know: lawyers. +They tell us you might sue us if there is something wrong with +your copy of this etext, even if you got it for free from +someone other than us, and even if what's wrong is not our +fault. So, among other things, this "Small Print!" statement +disclaims most of our liability to you. It also tells you how +you can distribute copies of this etext if you want to. + +*BEFORE!* YOU USE OR READ THIS ETEXT +By using or reading any part of this PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm +etext, you indicate that you understand, agree to and accept +this "Small Print!" statement. If you do not, you can receive +a refund of the money (if any) you paid for this etext by +sending a request within 30 days of receiving it to the person +you got it from. If you received this etext on a physical +medium (such as a disk), you must return it with your request. + +ABOUT PROJECT GUTENBERG-TM ETEXTS +This PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext, like most PROJECT GUTENBERG- +tm etexts, is a "public domain" work distributed by Professor +Michael S. Hart through the Project Gutenberg Association at +Carnegie-Mellon University (the "Project"). Among other +things, this means that no one owns a United States copyright +on or for this work, so the Project (and you!) can copy and +distribute it in the United States without permission and +without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth +below, apply if you wish to copy and distribute this etext +under the Project's "PROJECT GUTENBERG" trademark. + +To create these etexts, the Project expends considerable +efforts to identify, transcribe and proofread public domain +works. Despite these efforts, the Project's etexts and any +medium they may be on may contain "Defects". Among other +things, Defects may take the form of incomplete, inaccurate or +corrupt data, transcription errors, a copyright or other +intellectual property infringement, a defective or damaged +disk or other etext medium, a computer virus, or computer +codes that damage or cannot be read by your equipment. + +LIMITED WARRANTY; DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES +But for the "Right of Replacement or Refund" described below, +[1] the Project (and any other party you may receive this +etext from as a PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm etext) disclaims all +liability to you for damages, costs and expenses, including +legal fees, and [2] YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE OR +UNDER STRICT LIABILITY, OR FOR BREACH OF WARRANTY OR CONTRACT, +INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE +OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF THE +POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. + +If you discover a Defect in this etext within 90 days of +receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) +you paid for it by sending an explanatory note within that +time to the person you received it from. If you received it +on a physical medium, you must return it with your note, and +such person may choose to alternatively give you a replacement +copy. If you received it electronically, such person may +choose to alternatively give you a second opportunity to +receive it electronically. + +THIS ETEXT IS OTHERWISE PROVIDED TO YOU "AS-IS". NO OTHER +WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARE MADE TO YOU AS +TO THE ETEXT OR ANY MEDIUM IT MAY BE ON, INCLUDING BUT NOT +LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A +PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + +Some states do not allow disclaimers of implied warranties or +the exclusion or limitation of consequential damages, so the +above disclaimers and exclusions may not apply to you, and you +may have other legal rights. + +INDEMNITY +You will indemnify and hold the Project, its directors, +officers, members and agents harmless from all liability, cost +and expense, including legal fees, that arise directly or +indirectly from any of the following that you do or cause: +[1] distribution of this etext, [2] alteration, modification, +or addition to the etext, or [3] any Defect. + +DISTRIBUTION UNDER "PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm" +You may distribute copies of this etext electronically, or by +disk, book or any other medium if you either delete this +"Small Print!" and all other references to Project Gutenberg, +or: + +[1] Only give exact copies of it. Among other things, this + requires that you do not remove, alter or modify the + etext or this "small print!" statement. You may however, + if you wish, distribute this etext in machine readable + binary, compressed, mark-up, or proprietary form, + including any form resulting from conversion by word pro- + cessing or hypertext software, but only so long as + *EITHER*: + + [*] The etext, when displayed, is clearly readable, and + does *not* contain characters other than those + intended by the author of the work, although tilde + (~), asterisk (*) and underline (_) characters may + be used to convey punctuation intended by the + author, and additional characters may be used to + indicate hypertext links; OR + + [*] The etext may be readily converted by the reader at + no expense into plain ASCII, EBCDIC or equivalent + form by the program that displays the etext (as is + the case, for instance, with most word processors); + OR + + [*] You provide, or agree to also provide on request at + no additional cost, fee or expense, a copy of the + etext in its original plain ASCII form (or in EBCDIC + or other equivalent proprietary form). + +[2] Honor the etext refund and replacement provisions of this + "Small Print!" statement. + +[3] Pay a trademark license fee to the Project of 20% of the + net profits you derive calculated using the method you + already use to calculate your applicable taxes. If you + don't derive profits, no royalty is due. Royalties are + payable to "Project Gutenberg Association/Carnegie-Mellon + University" within the 60 days following each + date you prepare (or were legally required to prepare) + your annual (or equivalent periodic) tax return. + +WHAT IF YOU *WANT* TO SEND MONEY EVEN IF YOU DON'T HAVE TO? +The Project gratefully accepts contributions in money, time, +scanning machines, OCR software, public domain etexts, royalty +free copyright licenses, and every other sort of contribution +you can think of. Money should be paid to "Project Gutenberg +Association / Carnegie-Mellon University". + +*END*THE SMALL PRINT! FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +EUTHYDEMUS + +by Plato + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Euthydemus, though apt to be regarded by us only as an elaborate jest, +has also a very serious purpose. It may fairly claim to be the oldest +treatise on logic; for that science originates in the misunderstandings +which necessarily accompany the first efforts of speculation. Several of +the fallacies which are satirized in it reappear in the Sophistici Elenchi +of Aristotle and are retained at the end of our manuals of logic. But if +the order of history were followed, they should be placed not at the end +but at the beginning of them; for they belong to the age in which the human +mind was first making the attempt to distinguish thought from sense, and to +separate the universal from the particular or individual. How to put +together words or ideas, how to escape ambiguities in the meaning of terms +or in the structure of propositions, how to resist the fixed impression of +an 'eternal being' or 'perpetual flux,' how to distinguish between words +and things--these were problems not easy of solution in the infancy of +philosophy. They presented the same kind of difficulty to the half- +educated man which spelling or arithmetic do to the mind of a child. It +was long before the new world of ideas which had been sought after with +such passionate yearning was set in order and made ready for use. To us +the fallacies which arise in the pre-Socratic philosophy are trivial and +obsolete because we are no longer liable to fall into the errors which are +expressed by them. The intellectual world has become better assured to us, +and we are less likely to be imposed upon by illusions of words. + +The logic of Aristotle is for the most part latent in the dialogues of +Plato. The nature of definition is explained not by rules but by examples +in the Charmides, Lysis, Laches, Protagoras, Meno, Euthyphro, Theaetetus, +Gorgias, Republic; the nature of division is likewise illustrated by +examples in the Sophist and Statesman; a scheme of categories is found in +the Philebus; the true doctrine of contradiction is taught, and the fallacy +of arguing in a circle is exposed in the Republic; the nature of synthesis +and analysis is graphically described in the Phaedrus; the nature of words +is analysed in the Cratylus; the form of the syllogism is indicated in the +genealogical trees of the Sophist and Statesman; a true doctrine of +predication and an analysis of the sentence are given in the Sophist; the +different meanings of one and being are worked out in the Parmenides. Here +we have most of the important elements of logic, not yet systematized or +reduced to an art or science, but scattered up and down as they would +naturally occur in ordinary discourse. They are of little or no use or +significance to us; but because we have grown out of the need of them we +should not therefore despise them. They are still interesting and +instructive for the light which they shed on the history of the human mind. + +There are indeed many old fallacies which linger among us, and new ones are +constantly springing up. But they are not of the kind to which ancient +logic can be usefully applied. The weapons of common sense, not the +analytics of Aristotle, are needed for their overthrow. Nor is the use of +the Aristotelian logic any longer natural to us. We no longer put +arguments into the form of syllogisms like the schoolmen; the simple use of +language has been, happily, restored to us. Neither do we discuss the +nature of the proposition, nor extract hidden truths from the copula, nor +dispute any longer about nominalism and realism. We do not confuse the +form with the matter of knowledge, or invent laws of thought, or imagine +that any single science furnishes a principle of reasoning to all the rest. +Neither do we require categories or heads of argument to be invented for +our use. Those who have no knowledge of logic, like some of our great +physical philosophers, seem to be quite as good reasoners as those who +have. Most of the ancient puzzles have been settled on the basis of usage +and common sense; there is no need to reopen them. No science should raise +problems or invent forms of thought which add nothing to knowledge and are +of no use in assisting the acquisition of it. This seems to be the natural +limit of logic and metaphysics; if they give us a more comprehensive or a +more definite view of the different spheres of knowledge they are to be +studied; if not, not. The better part of ancient logic appears hardly in +our own day to have a separate existence; it is absorbed in two other +sciences: (1) rhetoric, if indeed this ancient art be not also fading away +into literary criticism; (2) the science of language, under which all +questions relating to words and propositions and the combinations of them +may properly be included. + +To continue dead or imaginary sciences, which make no signs of progress and +have no definite sphere, tends to interfere with the prosecution of living +ones. The study of them is apt to blind the judgment and to render men +incapable of seeing the value of evidence, and even of appreciating the +nature of truth. Nor should we allow the living science to become confused +with the dead by an ambiguity of language. The term logic has two +different meanings, an ancient and a modern one, and we vainly try to +bridge the gulf between them. Many perplexities are avoided by keeping +them apart. There might certainly be a new science of logic; it would not +however be built up out of the fragments of the old, but would be distinct +from them--relative to the state of knowledge which exists at the present +time, and based chiefly on the methods of Modern Inductive philosophy. +Such a science might have two legitimate fields: first, the refutation and +explanation of false philosophies still hovering in the air as they appear +from the point of view of later experience or are comprehended in the +history of the human mind, as in a larger horizon: secondly, it might +furnish new forms of thought more adequate to the expression of all the +diversities and oppositions of knowledge which have grown up in these +latter days; it might also suggest new methods of enquiry derived from the +comparison of the sciences. Few will deny that the introduction of the +words 'subject' and 'object' and the Hegelian reconciliation of opposites +have been 'most gracious aids' to psychology, or that the methods of Bacon +and Mill have shed a light far and wide on the realms of knowledge. These +two great studies, the one destructive and corrective of error, the other +conservative and constructive of truth, might be a first and second part of +logic. Ancient logic would be the propaedeutic or gate of approach to +logical science,--nothing more. But to pursue such speculations further, +though not irrelevant, might lead us too far away from the argument of the +dialogue. + +The Euthydemus is, of all the Dialogues of Plato, that in which he +approaches most nearly to the comic poet. The mirth is broader, the irony +more sustained, the contrast between Socrates and the two Sophists, +although veiled, penetrates deeper than in any other of his writings. Even +Thrasymachus, in the Republic, is at last pacified, and becomes a friendly +and interested auditor of the great discourse. But in the Euthydemus the +mask is never dropped; the accustomed irony of Socrates continues to the +end... + +Socrates narrates to Crito a remarkable scene in which he has himself taken +part, and in which the two brothers, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, are the +chief performers. They are natives of Chios, who had settled at Thurii, +but were driven out, and in former days had been known at Athens as +professors of rhetoric and of the art of fighting in armour. To this they +have now added a new accomplishment--the art of Eristic, or fighting with +words, which they are likewise willing to teach 'for a consideration.' But +they can also teach virtue in a very short time and in the very best +manner. Socrates, who is always on the look-out for teachers of virtue, is +interested in the youth Cleinias, the grandson of the great Alcibiades, and +is desirous that he should have the benefit of their instructions. He is +ready to fall down and worship them; although the greatness of their +professions does arouse in his mind a temporary incredulity. + +A circle gathers round them, in the midst of which are Socrates, the two +brothers, the youth Cleinias, who is watched by the eager eyes of his lover +Ctesippus, and others. The performance begins; and such a performance as +might well seem to require an invocation of Memory and the Muses. It is +agreed that the brothers shall question Cleinias. 'Cleinias,' says +Euthydemus, 'who learn, the wise or the unwise?' 'The wise,' is the reply; +given with blushing and hesitation. 'And yet when you learned you did not +know and were not wise.' Then Dionysodorus takes up the ball: 'Who are +they who learn dictation of the grammar-master; the wise or the foolish +boys?' 'The wise.' 'Then, after all, the wise learn.' 'And do they +learn,' said Euthydemus, 'what they know or what they do not know?' 'The +latter.' 'And dictation is a dictation of letters?' 'Yes.' 'And you know +letters?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn what you know.' 'But,' retorts +Dionysodorus, 'is not learning acquiring knowledge?' 'Yes.' 'And you +acquire that which you have not got already?' 'Yes.' 'Then you learn that +which you do not know.' + +Socrates is afraid that the youth Cleinias may be discouraged at these +repeated overthrows. He therefore explains to him the nature of the +process to which he is being subjected. The two strangers are not serious; +there are jests at the mysteries which precede the enthronement, and he is +being initiated into the mysteries of the sophistical ritual. This is all +a sort of horse-play, which is now ended. The exhortation to virtue will +follow, and Socrates himself (if the wise men will not laugh at him) is +desirous of showing the way in which such an exhortation should be carried +on, according to his own poor notion. He proceeds to question Cleinias. +The result of the investigation may be summed up as follows:-- + +All men desire good; and good means the possession of goods, such as +wealth, health, beauty, birth, power, honour; not forgetting the virtues +and wisdom. And yet in this enumeration the greatest good of all is +omitted. What is that? Good fortune. But what need is there of good +fortune when we have wisdom already:--in every art and business are not the +wise also the fortunate? This is admitted. And again, the possession of +goods is not enough; there must also be a right use of them which can only +be given by knowledge: in themselves they are neither good nor evil-- +knowledge and wisdom are the only good, and ignorance and folly the only +evil. The conclusion is that we must get 'wisdom.' But can wisdom be +taught? 'Yes,' says Cleinias. The ingenuousness of the youth delights +Socrates, who is at once relieved from the necessity of discussing one of +his great puzzles. 'Since wisdom is the only good, he must become a +philosopher, or lover of wisdom.' 'That I will,' says Cleinias. + +After Socrates has given this specimen of his own mode of instruction, the +two brothers recommence their exhortation to virtue, which is of quite +another sort. + +'You want Cleinias to be wise?' 'Yes.' 'And he is not wise yet?' 'No.' +'Then you want him to be what he is not, and not to be what he is?--not to +be--that is, to perish. Pretty lovers and friends you must all be!' + +Here Ctesippus, the lover of Cleinias, interposes in great excitement, +thinking that he will teach the two Sophists a lesson of good manners. But +he is quickly entangled in the meshes of their sophistry; and as a storm +seems to be gathering Socrates pacifies him with a joke, and Ctesippus then +says that he is not reviling the two Sophists, he is only contradicting +them. 'But,' says Dionysodorus, 'there is no such thing as contradiction. +When you and I describe the same thing, or you describe one thing and I +describe another, how can there be a contradiction?' Ctesippus is unable +to reply. + +Socrates has already heard of the denial of contradiction, and would like +to be informed by the great master of the art, 'What is the meaning of this +paradox? Is there no such thing as error, ignorance, falsehood? Then what +are they professing to teach?' The two Sophists complain that Socrates is +ready to answer what they said a year ago, but is 'non-plussed' at what +they are saying now. 'What does the word "non-plussed" mean?' Socrates is +informed, in reply, that words are lifeless things, and lifeless things +have no sense or meaning. Ctesippus again breaks out, and again has to be +pacified by Socrates, who renews the conversation with Cleinias. The two +Sophists are like Proteus in the variety of their transformations, and he, +like Menelaus in the Odyssey, hopes to restore them to their natural form. + +He had arrived at the conclusion that Cleinias must become a philosopher. +And philosophy is the possession of knowledge; and knowledge must be of a +kind which is profitable and may be used. What knowledge is there which +has such a nature? Not the knowledge which is required in any particular +art; nor again the art of the composer of speeches, who knows how to write +them, but cannot speak them, although he too must be admitted to be a kind +of enchanter of wild animals. Neither is the knowledge which we are +seeking the knowledge of the general. For the general makes over his prey +to the statesman, as the huntsman does to the cook, or the taker of quails +to the keeper of quails; he has not the use of that which he acquires. The +two enquirers, Cleinias and Socrates, are described as wandering about in a +wilderness, vainly searching after the art of life and happiness. At last +they fix upon the kingly art, as having the desired sort of knowledge. But +the kingly art only gives men those goods which are neither good nor evil: +and if we say further that it makes us wise, in what does it make us wise? +Not in special arts, such as cobbling or carpentering, but only in itself: +or say again that it makes us good, there is no answer to the question, +'good in what?' At length in despair Cleinias and Socrates turn to the +'Dioscuri' and request their aid. + +Euthydemus argues that Socrates knows something; and as he cannot know and +not know, he cannot know some things and not know others, and therefore he +knows all things: he and Dionysodorus and all other men know all things. +'Do they know shoemaking, etc?' 'Yes.' The sceptical Ctesippus would like +to have some evidence of this extraordinary statement: he will believe if +Euthydemus will tell him how many teeth Dionysodorus has, and if +Dionysodorus will give him a like piece of information about Euthydemus. +Even Socrates is incredulous, and indulges in a little raillery at the +expense of the brothers. But he restrains himself, remembering that if the +men who are to be his teachers think him stupid they will take no pains +with him. Another fallacy is produced which turns on the absoluteness of +the verb 'to know.' And here Dionysodorus is caught 'napping,' and is +induced by Socrates to confess that 'he does not know the good to be +unjust.' Socrates appeals to his brother Euthydemus; at the same time he +acknowledges that he cannot, like Heracles, fight against a Hydra, and even +Heracles, on the approach of a second monster, called upon his nephew +Iolaus to help. Dionysodorus rejoins that Iolaus was no more the nephew of +Heracles than of Socrates. For a nephew is a nephew, and a brother is a +brother, and a father is a father, not of one man only, but of all; nor of +men only, but of dogs and sea-monsters. Ctesippus makes merry with the +consequences which follow: 'Much good has your father got out of the +wisdom of his puppies.' + +'But,' says Euthydemus, unabashed, 'nobody wants much good.' Medicine is a +good, arms are a good, money is a good, and yet there may be too much of +them in wrong places. 'No,' says Ctesippus, 'there cannot be too much +gold.' And would you be happy if you had three talents of gold in your +belly, a talent in your pate, and a stater in either eye?' Ctesippus, +imitating the new wisdom, replies, 'And do not the Scythians reckon those +to be the happiest of men who have their skulls gilded and see the inside +of them?' 'Do you see,' retorts Euthydemus, 'what has the quality of +vision or what has not the quality of vision?' 'What has the quality of +vision.' 'And you see our garments?' 'Yes.' 'Then our garments have the +quality of vision.' A similar play of words follows, which is successfully +retorted by Ctesippus, to the great delight of Cleinias, who is rebuked by +Socrates for laughing at such solemn and beautiful things. + +'But are there any beautiful things? And if there are such, are they the +same or not the same as absolute beauty?' Socrates replies that they are +not the same, but each of them has some beauty present with it. 'And are +you an ox because you have an ox present with you?' After a few more +amphiboliae, in which Socrates, like Ctesippus, in self-defence borrows the +weapons of the brothers, they both confess that the two heroes are +invincible; and the scene concludes with a grand chorus of shouting and +laughing, and a panegyrical oration from Socrates:-- + +First, he praises the indifference of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus to public +opinion; for most persons would rather be refuted by such arguments than +use them in the refutation of others. Secondly, he remarks upon their +impartiality; for they stop their own mouths, as well as those of other +people. Thirdly, he notes their liberality, which makes them give away +their secret to all the world: they should be more reserved, and let no +one be present at this exhibition who does not pay them a handsome fee; or +better still they might practise on one another only. He concludes with a +respectful request that they will receive him and Cleinias among their +disciples. + +Crito tells Socrates that he has heard one of the audience criticise +severely this wisdom,--not sparing Socrates himself for countenancing such +an exhibition. Socrates asks what manner of man was this censorious +critic. 'Not an orator, but a great composer of speeches.' Socrates +understands that he is an amphibious animal, half philosopher, half +politician; one of a class who have the highest opinion of themselves and a +spite against philosophers, whom they imagine to be their rivals. They are +a class who are very likely to get mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, +and have a great notion of their own wisdom; for they imagine themselves to +have all the advantages and none of the drawbacks both of politics and of +philosophy. They do not understand the principles of combination, and +hence are ignorant that the union of two good things which have different +ends produces a compound inferior to either of them taken separately. + +Crito is anxious about the education of his children, one of whom is +growing up. The description of Dionysodorus and Euthydemus suggests to him +the reflection that the professors of education are strange beings. +Socrates consoles him with the remark that the good in all professions are +few, and recommends that 'he and his house' should continue to serve +philosophy, and not mind about its professors. + +... + +There is a stage in the history of philosophy in which the old is dying +out, and the new has not yet come into full life. Great philosophies like +the Eleatic or Heraclitean, which have enlarged the boundaries of the human +mind, begin to pass away in words. They subsist only as forms which have +rooted themselves in language--as troublesome elements of thought which +cannot be either used or explained away. The same absoluteness which was +once attributed to abstractions is now attached to the words which are the +signs of them. The philosophy which in the first and second generation was +a great and inspiring effort of reflection, in the third becomes +sophistical, verbal, eristic. + +It is this stage of philosophy which Plato satirises in the Euthydemus. +The fallacies which are noted by him appear trifling to us now, but they +were not trifling in the age before logic, in the decline of the earlier +Greek philosophies, at a time when language was first beginning to perplex +human thought. Besides he is caricaturing them; they probably received +more subtle forms at the hands of those who seriously maintained them. +They are patent to us in Plato, and we are inclined to wonder how any one +could ever have been deceived by them; but we must remember also that there +was a time when the human mind was only with great difficulty disentangled +from such fallacies. + +To appreciate fully the drift of the Euthydemus, we should imagine a mental +state in which not individuals only, but whole schools during more than one +generation, were animated by the desire to exclude the conception of rest, +and therefore the very word 'this' (Theaet.) from language; in which the +ideas of space, time, matter, motion, were proved to be contradictory and +imaginary; in which the nature of qualitative change was a puzzle, and even +differences of degree, when applied to abstract notions, were not +understood; in which there was no analysis of grammar, and mere puns or +plays of words received serious attention; in which contradiction itself +was denied, and, on the one hand, every predicate was affirmed to be true +of every subject, and on the other, it was held that no predicate was true +of any subject, and that nothing was, or was known, or could be spoken. +Let us imagine disputes carried on with religious earnestness and more than +scholastic subtlety, in which the catchwords of philosophy are completely +detached from their context. (Compare Theaet.) To such disputes the +humour, whether of Plato in the ancient, or of Pope and Swift in the modern +world, is the natural enemy. Nor must we forget that in modern times also +there is no fallacy so gross, no trick of language so transparent, no +abstraction so barren and unmeaning, no form of thought so contradictory to +experience, which has not been found to satisfy the minds of philosophical +enquirers at a certain stage, or when regarded from a certain point of view +only. The peculiarity of the fallacies of our own age is that we live +within them, and are therefore generally unconscious of them. + +Aristotle has analysed several of the same fallacies in his book 'De +Sophisticis Elenchis,' which Plato, with equal command of their true +nature, has preferred to bring to the test of ridicule. At first we are +only struck with the broad humour of this 'reductio ad absurdum:' gradually +we perceive that some important questions begin to emerge. Here, as +everywhere else, Plato is making war against the philosophers who put words +in the place of things, who tear arguments to tatters, who deny +predication, and thus make knowledge impossible, to whom ideas and objects +of sense have no fixedness, but are in a state of perpetual oscillation and +transition. Two great truths seem to be indirectly taught through these +fallacies: (1) The uncertainty of language, which allows the same words to +be used in different meanings, or with different degrees of meaning: (2) +The necessary limitation or relative nature of all phenomena. Plato is +aware that his own doctrine of ideas, as well as the Eleatic Being and Not- +being, alike admit of being regarded as verbal fallacies. The sophism +advanced in the Meno, 'that you cannot enquire either into what you know or +do not know,' is lightly touched upon at the commencement of the Dialogue; +the thesis of Protagoras, that everything is true to him to whom it seems +to be true, is satirized. In contrast with these fallacies is maintained +the Socratic doctrine that happiness is gained by knowledge. The +grammatical puzzles with which the Dialogue concludes probably contain +allusions to tricks of language which may have been practised by the +disciples of Prodicus or Antisthenes. They would have had more point, if +we were acquainted with the writings against which Plato's humour is +directed. Most of the jests appear to have a serious meaning; but we have +lost the clue to some of them, and cannot determine whether, as in the +Cratylus, Plato has or has not mixed up purely unmeaning fun with his +satire. + +The two discourses of Socrates may be contrasted in several respects with +the exhibition of the Sophists: (1) In their perfect relevancy to the +subject of discussion, whereas the Sophistical discourses are wholly +irrelevant: (2) In their enquiring sympathetic tone, which encourages the +youth, instead of 'knocking him down,' after the manner of the two +Sophists: (3) In the absence of any definite conclusion--for while +Socrates and the youth are agreed that philosophy is to be studied, they +are not able to arrive at any certain result about the art which is to +teach it. This is a question which will hereafter be answered in the +Republic; as the conception of the kingly art is more fully developed in +the Politicus, and the caricature of rhetoric in the Gorgias. + +The characters of the Dialogue are easily intelligible. There is Socrates +once more in the character of an old man; and his equal in years, Crito, +the father of Critobulus, like Lysimachus in the Laches, his fellow +demesman (Apol.), to whom the scene is narrated, and who once or twice +interrupts with a remark after the manner of the interlocutor in the +Phaedo, and adds his commentary at the end; Socrates makes a playful +allusion to his money-getting habits. There is the youth Cleinias, the +grandson of Alcibiades, who may be compared with Lysis, Charmides, +Menexenus, and other ingenuous youths out of whose mouths Socrates draws +his own lessons, and to whom he always seems to stand in a kindly and +sympathetic relation. Crito will not believe that Socrates has not +improved or perhaps invented the answers of Cleinias (compare Phaedrus). +The name of the grandson of Alcibiades, who is described as long dead, +(Greek), and who died at the age of forty-four, in the year 404 B.C., +suggests not only that the intended scene of the Euthydemus could not have +been earlier than 404, but that as a fact this Dialogue could not have been +composed before 390 at the soonest. Ctesippus, who is the lover of +Cleinias, has been already introduced to us in the Lysis, and seems there +too to deserve the character which is here given him, of a somewhat +uproarious young man. But the chief study of all is the picture of the two +brothers, who are unapproachable in their effrontery, equally careless of +what they say to others and of what is said to them, and never at a loss. +They are 'Arcades ambo et cantare pares et respondere parati.' Some +superior degree of wit or subtlety is attributed to Euthydemus, who sees +the trap in which Socrates catches Dionysodorus. + +The epilogue or conclusion of the Dialogue has been criticised as +inconsistent with the general scheme. Such a criticism is like similar +criticisms on Shakespeare, and proceeds upon a narrow notion of the variety +which the Dialogue, like the drama, seems to admit. Plato in the abundance +of his dramatic power has chosen to write a play upon a play, just as he +often gives us an argument within an argument. At the same time he takes +the opportunity of assailing another class of persons who are as alien from +the spirit of philosophy as Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The Eclectic, the +Syncretist, the Doctrinaire, have been apt to have a bad name both in +ancient and modern times. The persons whom Plato ridicules in the epilogue +to the Euthydemus are of this class. They occupy a border-ground between +philosophy and politics; they keep out of the dangers of politics, and at +the same time use philosophy as a means of serving their own interests. +Plato quaintly describes them as making two good things, philosophy and +politics, a little worse by perverting the objects of both. Men like +Antiphon or Lysias would be types of the class. Out of a regard to the +respectabilities of life, they are disposed to censure the interest which +Socrates takes in the exhibition of the two brothers. They do not +understand, any more than Crito, that he is pursuing his vocation of +detecting the follies of mankind, which he finds 'not unpleasant.' +(Compare Apol.) + +Education is the common subject of all Plato's earlier Dialogues. The +concluding remark of Crito, that he has a difficulty in educating his two +sons, and the advice of Socrates to him that he should not give up +philosophy because he has no faith in philosophers, seems to be a +preparation for the more peremptory declaration of the Meno that 'Virtue +cannot be taught because there are no teachers.' + +The reasons for placing the Euthydemus early in the series are: (1) the +similarity in plan and style to the Protagoras, Charmides, and Lysis;--the +relation of Socrates to the Sophists is still that of humorous antagonism, +not, as in the later Dialogues of Plato, of embittered hatred; and the +places and persons have a considerable family likeness; (2) the Euthydemus +belongs to the Socratic period in which Socrates is represented as willing +to learn, but unable to teach; and in the spirit of Xenophon's Memorabilia, +philosophy is defined as 'the knowledge which will make us happy;' (3) we +seem to have passed the stage arrived at in the Protagoras, for Socrates is +no longer discussing whether virtue can be taught--from this question he is +relieved by the ingenuous declaration of the youth Cleinias; and (4) not +yet to have reached the point at which he asserts 'that there are no +teachers.' Such grounds are precarious, as arguments from style and plan +are apt to be (Greek). But no arguments equally strong can be urged in +favour of assigning to the Euthydemus any other position in the series. + + +EUTHYDEMUS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: +Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue. +Crito, Cleinias, Euthydemus, Dionysodorus, Ctesippus. + +SCENE: The Lyceum. + + +CRITO: Who was the person, Socrates, with whom you were talking yesterday +at the Lyceum? There was such a crowd around you that I could not get +within hearing, but I caught a sight of him over their heads, and I made +out, as I thought, that he was a stranger with whom you were talking: who +was he? + +SOCRATES: There were two, Crito; which of them do you mean? + +CRITO: The one whom I mean was seated second from you on the right-hand +side. In the middle was Cleinias the young son of Axiochus, who has +wonderfully grown; he is only about the age of my own Critobulus, but he is +much forwarder and very good-looking: the other is thin and looks younger +than he is. + +SOCRATES: He whom you mean, Crito, is Euthydemus; and on my left hand +there was his brother Dionysodorus, who also took part in the conversation. + +CRITO: Neither of them are known to me, Socrates; they are a new +importation of Sophists, as I should imagine. Of what country are they, +and what is their line of wisdom? + +SOCRATES: As to their origin, I believe that they are natives of this part +of the world, and have migrated from Chios to Thurii; they were driven out +of Thurii, and have been living for many years past in these regions. As +to their wisdom, about which you ask, Crito, they are wonderful-- +consummate! I never knew what the true pancratiast was before; they are +simply made up of fighting, not like the two Acarnanian brothers who fight +with their bodies only, but this pair of heroes, besides being perfect in +the use of their bodies, are invincible in every sort of warfare; for they +are capital at fighting in armour, and will teach the art to any one who +pays them; and also they are most skilful in legal warfare; they will plead +themselves and teach others to speak and to compose speeches which will +have an effect upon the courts. And this was only the beginning of their +wisdom, but they have at last carried out the pancratiastic art to the very +end, and have mastered the only mode of fighting which had been hitherto +neglected by them; and now no one dares even to stand up against them: +such is their skill in the war of words, that they can refute any +proposition whether true or false. Now I am thinking, Crito, of placing +myself in their hands; for they say that in a short time they can impart +their skill to any one. + +CRITO: But, Socrates, are you not too old? there may be reason to fear +that. + +SOCRATES: Certainly not, Crito; as I will prove to you, for I have the +consolation of knowing that they began this art of disputation which I +covet, quite, as I may say, in old age; last year, or the year before, they +had none of their new wisdom. I am only apprehensive that I may bring the +two strangers into disrepute, as I have done Connus the son of Metrobius, +the harp-player, who is still my music-master; for when the boys who go to +him see me going with them, they laugh at me and call him grandpapa's +master. Now I should not like the strangers to experience similar +treatment; the fear of ridicule may make them unwilling to receive me; and +therefore, Crito, I shall try and persuade some old men to accompany me to +them, as I persuaded them to go with me to Connus, and I hope that you will +make one: and perhaps we had better take your sons as a bait; they will +want to have them as pupils, and for the sake of them willing to receive +us. + +CRITO: I see no objection, Socrates, if you like; but first I wish that +you would give me a description of their wisdom, that I may know beforehand +what we are going to learn. + +SOCRATES: In less than no time you shall hear; for I cannot say that I did +not attend--I paid great attention to them, and I remember and will +endeavour to repeat the whole story. Providentially I was sitting alone in +the dressing-room of the Lyceum where you saw me, and was about to depart; +when I was getting up I recognized the familiar divine sign: so I sat down +again, and in a little while the two brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus +came in, and several others with them, whom I believe to be their +disciples, and they walked about in the covered court; they had not taken +more than two or three turns when Cleinias entered, who, as you truly say, +is very much improved: he was followed by a host of lovers, one of whom +was Ctesippus the Paeanian, a well-bred youth, but also having the wildness +of youth. Cleinias saw me from the entrance as I was sitting alone, and at +once came and sat down on the right hand of me, as you describe; and +Dionysodorus and Euthydemus, when they saw him, at first stopped and talked +with one another, now and then glancing at us, for I particularly watched +them; and then Euthydemus came and sat down by the youth, and the other by +me on the left hand; the rest anywhere. I saluted the brothers, whom I had +not seen for a long time; and then I said to Cleinias: Here are two wise +men, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, Cleinias, wise not in a small but in a +large way of wisdom, for they know all about war,--all that a good general +ought to know about the array and command of an army, and the whole art of +fighting in armour: and they know about law too, and can teach a man how +to use the weapons of the courts when he is injured. + +They heard me say this, but only despised me. I observed that they looked +at one another, and both of them laughed; and then Euthydemus said: Those, +Socrates, are matters which we no longer pursue seriously; to us they are +secondary occupations. + +Indeed, I said, if such occupations are regarded by you as secondary, what +must the principal one be; tell me, I beseech you, what that noble study +is? + +The teaching of virtue, Socrates, he replied, is our principal occupation; +and we believe that we can impart it better and quicker than any man. + +My God! I said, and where did you learn that? I always thought, as I was +saying just now, that your chief accomplishment was the art of fighting in +armour; and I used to say as much of you, for I remember that you professed +this when you were here before. But now if you really have the other +knowledge, O forgive me: I address you as I would superior beings, and ask +you to pardon the impiety of my former expressions. But are you quite sure +about this, Dionysodorus and Euthydemus? the promise is so vast, that a +feeling of incredulity steals over me. + +You may take our word, Socrates, for the fact. + +Then I think you happier in having such a treasure than the great king is +in the possession of his kingdom. And please to tell me whether you intend +to exhibit your wisdom; or what will you do? + +That is why we have come hither, Socrates; and our purpose is not only to +exhibit, but also to teach any one who likes to learn. + +But I can promise you, I said, that every unvirtuous person will want to +learn. I shall be the first; and there is the youth Cleinias, and +Ctesippus: and here are several others, I said, pointing to the lovers of +Cleinias, who were beginning to gather round us. Now Ctesippus was sitting +at some distance from Cleinias; and when Euthydemus leaned forward in +talking with me, he was prevented from seeing Cleinias, who was between us; +and so, partly because he wanted to look at his love, and also because he +was interested, he jumped up and stood opposite to us: and all the other +admirers of Cleinias, as well as the disciples of Euthydemus and +Dionysodorus, followed his example. And these were the persons whom I +showed to Euthydemus, telling him that they were all eager to learn: to +which Ctesippus and all of them with one voice vehemently assented, and bid +him exhibit the power of his wisdom. Then I said: O Euthydemus and +Dionysodorus, I earnestly request you to do myself and the company the +favour to exhibit. There may be some trouble in giving the whole +exhibition; but tell me one thing,--can you make a good man of him only who +is already convinced that he ought to learn of you, or of him also who is +not convinced, either because he imagines that virtue is a thing which +cannot be taught at all, or that you are not the teachers of it? Has your +art power to persuade him, who is of the latter temper of mind, that virtue +can be taught; and that you are the men from whom he will best learn it? + +Certainly, Socrates, said Dionysodorus; our art will do both. + +And you and your brother, Dionysodorus, I said, of all men who are now +living are the most likely to stimulate him to philosophy and to the study +of virtue? + +Yes, Socrates, I rather think that we are. + +Then I wish that you would be so good as to defer the other part of the +exhibition, and only try to persuade the youth whom you see here that he +ought to be a philosopher and study virtue. Exhibit that, and you will +confer a great favour on me and on every one present; for the fact is I and +all of us are extremely anxious that he should become truly good. His name +is Cleinias, and he is the son of Axiochus, and grandson of the old +Alcibiades, cousin of the Alcibiades that now is. He is quite young, and +we are naturally afraid that some one may get the start of us, and turn his +mind in a wrong direction, and he may be ruined. Your visit, therefore, is +most happily timed; and I hope that you will make a trial of the young man, +and converse with him in our presence, if you have no objection. + +These were pretty nearly the expressions which I used; and Euthydemus, in a +manly and at the same time encouraging tone, replied: There can be no +objection, Socrates, if the young man is only willing to answer questions. + +He is quite accustomed to do so, I replied; for his friends often come and +ask him questions and argue with him; and therefore he is quite at home in +answering. + +What followed, Crito, how can I rightly narrate? For not slight is the +task of rehearsing infinite wisdom, and therefore, like the poets, I ought +to commence my relation with an invocation to Memory and the Muses. Now +Euthydemus, if I remember rightly, began nearly as follows: O Cleinias, +are those who learn the wise or the ignorant? + +The youth, overpowered by the question blushed, and in his perplexity +looked at me for help; and I, knowing that he was disconcerted, said: Take +courage, Cleinias, and answer like a man whichever you think; for my belief +is that you will derive the greatest benefit from their questions. + +Whichever he answers, said Dionysodorus, leaning forward so as to catch my +ear, his face beaming with laughter, I prophesy that he will be refuted, +Socrates. + +While he was speaking to me, Cleinias gave his answer: and therefore I had +no time to warn him of the predicament in which he was placed, and he +answered that those who learned were the wise. + +Euthydemus proceeded: There are some whom you would call teachers, are +there not? + +The boy assented. + +And they are the teachers of those who learn--the grammar-master and the +lyre-master used to teach you and other boys; and you were the learners? + +Yes. + +And when you were learners you did not as yet know the things which you +were learning? + +No, he said. + +And were you wise then? + +No, indeed, he said. + +But if you were not wise you were unlearned? + +Certainly. + +You then, learning what you did not know, were unlearned when you were +learning? + +The youth nodded assent. + +Then the unlearned learn, and not the wise, Cleinias, as you imagine. + +At these words the followers of Euthydemus, of whom I spoke, like a chorus +at the bidding of their director, laughed and cheered. Then, before the +youth had time to recover his breath, Dionysodorus cleverly took him in +hand, and said: Yes, Cleinias; and when the grammar-master dictated +anything to you, were they the wise boys or the unlearned who learned the +dictation? + +The wise, replied Cleinias. + +Then after all the wise are the learners and not the unlearned; and your +last answer to Euthydemus was wrong. + +Then once more the admirers of the two heroes, in an ecstasy at their +wisdom, gave vent to another peal of laughter, while the rest of us were +silent and amazed. Euthydemus, observing this, determined to persevere +with the youth; and in order to heighten the effect went on asking another +similar question, which might be compared to the double turn of an expert +dancer. Do those, said he, who learn, learn what they know, or what they +do not know? + +Again Dionysodorus whispered to me: That, Socrates, is just another of the +same sort. + +Good heavens, I said; and your last question was so good! + +Like all our other questions, Socrates, he replied--inevitable. + +I see the reason, I said, why you are in such reputation among your +disciples. + +Meanwhile Cleinias had answered Euthydemus that those who learned learn +what they do not know; and he put him through a series of questions the +same as before. + +Do you not know letters? + +He assented. + +All letters? + +Yes. + +But when the teacher dictates to you, does he not dictate letters? + +To this also he assented. + +Then if you know all letters, he dictates that which you know? + +This again was admitted by him. + +Then, said the other, you do not learn that which he dictates; but he only +who does not know letters learns? + +Nay, said Cleinias; but I do learn. + +Then, said he, you learn what you know, if you know all the letters? + +He admitted that. + +Then, he said, you were wrong in your answer. + +The word was hardly out of his mouth when Dionysodorus took up the +argument, like a ball which he caught, and had another throw at the youth. +Cleinias, he said, Euthydemus is deceiving you. For tell me now, is not +learning acquiring knowledge of that which one learns? + +Cleinias assented. + +And knowing is having knowledge at the time? + +He agreed. + +And not knowing is not having knowledge at the time? + +He admitted that. + +And are those who acquire those who have or have not a thing? + +Those who have not. + +And have you not admitted that those who do not know are of the number of +those who have not? + +He nodded assent. + +Then those who learn are of the class of those who acquire, and not of +those who have? + +He agreed. + +Then, Cleinias, he said, those who do not know learn, and not those who +know. + +Euthydemus was proceeding to give the youth a third fall; but I knew that +he was in deep water, and therefore, as I wanted to give him a respite lest +he should be disheartened, I said to him consolingly: You must not be +surprised, Cleinias, at the singularity of their mode of speech: this I +say because you may not understand what the two strangers are doing with +you; they are only initiating you after the manner of the Corybantes in the +mysteries; and this answers to the enthronement, which, if you have ever +been initiated, is, as you will know, accompanied by dancing and sport; and +now they are just prancing and dancing about you, and will next proceed to +initiate you; imagine then that you have gone through the first part of the +sophistical ritual, which, as Prodicus says, begins with initiation into +the correct use of terms. The two foreign gentlemen, perceiving that you +did not know, wanted to explain to you that the word 'to learn' has two +meanings, and is used, first, in the sense of acquiring knowledge of some +matter of which you previously have no knowledge, and also, when you have +the knowledge, in the sense of reviewing this matter, whether something +done or spoken by the light of this newly-acquired knowledge; the latter is +generally called 'knowing' rather than 'learning,' but the word 'learning' +is also used; and you did not see, as they explained to you, that the term +is employed of two opposite sorts of men, of those who know, and of those +who do not know. There was a similar trick in the second question, when +they asked you whether men learn what they know or what they do not know. +These parts of learning are not serious, and therefore I say that the +gentlemen are not serious, but are only playing with you. For if a man had +all that sort of knowledge that ever was, he would not be at all the wiser; +he would only be able to play with men, tripping them up and oversetting +them with distinctions of words. He would be like a person who pulls away +a stool from some one when he is about to sit down, and then laughs and +makes merry at the sight of his friend overturned and laid on his back. +And you must regard all that has hitherto passed between you and them as +merely play. But in what is to follow I am certain that they will exhibit +to you their serious purpose, and keep their promise (I will show them +how); for they promised to give me a sample of the hortatory philosophy, +but I suppose that they wanted to have a game with you first. And now, +Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, I think that we have had enough of this. Will +you let me see you explaining to the young man how he is to apply himself +to the study of virtue and wisdom? And I will first show you what I +conceive to be the nature of the task, and what sort of a discourse I +desire to hear; and if I do this in a very inartistic and ridiculous +manner, do not laugh at me, for I only venture to improvise before you +because I am eager to hear your wisdom: and I must therefore ask you and +your disciples to refrain from laughing. And now, O son of Axiochus, let +me put a question to you: Do not all men desire happiness? And yet, +perhaps, this is one of those ridiculous questions which I am afraid to +ask, and which ought not to be asked by a sensible man: for what human +being is there who does not desire happiness? + +There is no one, said Cleinias, who does not. + +Well, then, I said, since we all of us desire happiness, how can we be +happy?--that is the next question. Shall we not be happy if we have many +good things? And this, perhaps, is even a more simple question than the +first, for there can be no doubt of the answer. + +He assented. + +And what things do we esteem good? No solemn sage is required to tell us +this, which may be easily answered; for every one will say that wealth is a +good. + +Certainly, he said. + +And are not health and beauty goods, and other personal gifts? + +He agreed. + +Can there be any doubt that good birth, and power, and honours in one's own +land, are goods? + +He assented. + +And what other goods are there? I said. What do you say of temperance, +justice, courage: do you not verily and indeed think, Cleinias, that we +shall be more right in ranking them as goods than in not ranking them as +goods? For a dispute might possibly arise about this. What then do you +say? + +They are goods, said Cleinias. + +Very well, I said; and where in the company shall we find a place for +wisdom--among the goods or not? + +Among the goods. + +And now, I said, think whether we have left out any considerable goods. + +I do not think that we have, said Cleinias. + +Upon recollection, I said, indeed I am afraid that we have left out the +greatest of them all. + +What is that? he asked. + +Fortune, Cleinias, I replied; which all, even the most foolish, admit to be +the greatest of goods. + +True, he said. + +On second thoughts, I added, how narrowly, O son of Axiochus, have you and +I escaped making a laughing-stock of ourselves to the strangers. + +Why do you say so? + +Why, because we have already spoken of good-fortune, and are but repeating +ourselves. + +What do you mean? + +I mean that there is something ridiculous in again putting forward good- +fortune, which has a place in the list already, and saying the same thing +twice over. + +He asked what was the meaning of this, and I replied: Surely wisdom is +good-fortune; even a child may know that. + +The simple-minded youth was amazed; and, observing his surprise, I said to +him: Do you not know, Cleinias, that flute-players are most fortunate and +successful in performing on the flute? + +He assented. + +And are not the scribes most fortunate in writing and reading letters? + +Certainly. + +Amid the dangers of the sea, again, are any more fortunate on the whole +than wise pilots? + +None, certainly. + +And if you were engaged in war, in whose company would you rather take the +risk--in company with a wise general, or with a foolish one? + +With a wise one. + +And if you were ill, whom would you rather have as a companion in a +dangerous illness--a wise physician, or an ignorant one? + +A wise one. + +You think, I said, that to act with a wise man is more fortunate than to +act with an ignorant one? + +He assented. + +Then wisdom always makes men fortunate: for by wisdom no man would ever +err, and therefore he must act rightly and succeed, or his wisdom would be +wisdom no longer. + +We contrived at last, somehow or other, to agree in a general conclusion, +that he who had wisdom had no need of fortune. I then recalled to his mind +the previous state of the question. You remember, I said, our making the +admission that we should be happy and fortunate if many good things were +present with us? + +He assented. + +And should we be happy by reason of the presence of good things, if they +profited us not, or if they profited us? + +If they profited us, he said. + +And would they profit us, if we only had them and did not use them? For +example, if we had a great deal of food and did not eat, or a great deal of +drink and did not drink, should we be profited? + +Certainly not, he said. + +Or would an artisan, who had all the implements necessary for his work, and +did not use them, be any the better for the possession of them? For +example, would a carpenter be any the better for having all his tools and +plenty of wood, if he never worked? + +Certainly not, he said. + +And if a person had wealth and all the goods of which we were just now +speaking, and did not use them, would he be happy because he possessed +them? + +No indeed, Socrates. + +Then, I said, a man who would be happy must not only have the good things, +but he must also use them; there is no advantage in merely having them? + +True. + +Well, Cleinias, but if you have the use as well as the possession of good +things, is that sufficient to confer happiness? + +Yes, in my opinion. + +And may a person use them either rightly or wrongly? + +He must use them rightly. + +That is quite true, I said. And the wrong use of a thing is far worse than +the non-use; for the one is an evil, and the other is neither a good nor an +evil. You admit that? + +He assented. + +Now in the working and use of wood, is not that which gives the right use +simply the knowledge of the carpenter? + +Nothing else, he said. + +And surely, in the manufacture of vessels, knowledge is that which gives +the right way of making them? + +He agreed. + +And in the use of the goods of which we spoke at first--wealth and health +and beauty, is not knowledge that which directs us to the right use of +them, and regulates our practice about them? + +He assented. + +Then in every possession and every use of a thing, knowledge is that which +gives a man not only good-fortune but success? + +He again assented. + +And tell me, I said, O tell me, what do possessions profit a man, if he +have neither good sense nor wisdom? Would a man be better off, having and +doing many things without wisdom, or a few things with wisdom? Look at the +matter thus: If he did fewer things would he not make fewer mistakes? if +he made fewer mistakes would he not have fewer misfortunes? and if he had +fewer misfortunes would he not be less miserable? + +Certainly, he said. + +And who would do least--a poor man or a rich man? + +A poor man. + +A weak man or a strong man? + +A weak man. + +A noble man or a mean man? + +A mean man. + +And a coward would do less than a courageous and temperate man? + +Yes. + +And an indolent man less than an active man? + +He assented. + +And a slow man less than a quick; and one who had dull perceptions of +seeing and hearing less than one who had keen ones? + +All this was mutually allowed by us. + +Then, I said, Cleinias, the sum of the matter appears to be that the goods +of which we spoke before are not to be regarded as goods in themselves, but +the degree of good and evil in them depends on whether they are or are not +under the guidance of knowledge: under the guidance of ignorance, they are +greater evils than their opposites, inasmuch as they are more able to +minister to the evil principle which rules them; and when under the +guidance of wisdom and prudence, they are greater goods: but in themselves +they are nothing? + +That, he replied, is obvious. + +What then is the result of what has been said? Is not this the result-- +that other things are indifferent, and that wisdom is the only good, and +ignorance the only evil? + +He assented. + +Let us consider a further point, I said: Seeing that all men desire +happiness, and happiness, as has been shown, is gained by a use, and a +right use, of the things of life, and the right use of them, and good- +fortune in the use of them, is given by knowledge,--the inference is that +everybody ought by all means to try and make himself as wise as he can? + +Yes, he said. + +And when a man thinks that he ought to obtain this treasure, far more than +money, from a father or a guardian or a friend or a suitor, whether citizen +or stranger--the eager desire and prayer to them that they would impart +wisdom to you, is not at all dishonourable, Cleinias; nor is any one to be +blamed for doing any honourable service or ministration to any man, whether +a lover or not, if his aim is to get wisdom. Do you agree? I said. + +Yes, he said, I quite agree, and think that you are right. + +Yes, I said, Cleinias, if only wisdom can be taught, and does not come to +man spontaneously; for this is a point which has still to be considered, +and is not yet agreed upon by you and me-- + +But I think, Socrates, that wisdom can be taught, he said. + +Best of men, I said, I am delighted to hear you say so; and I am also +grateful to you for having saved me from a long and tiresome investigation +as to whether wisdom can be taught or not. But now, as you think that +wisdom can be taught, and that wisdom only can make a man happy and +fortunate, will you not acknowledge that all of us ought to love wisdom, +and you individually will try to love her? + +Certainly, Socrates, he said; I will do my best. + +I was pleased at hearing this; and I turned to Dionysodorus and Euthydemus +and said: That is an example, clumsy and tedious I admit, of the sort of +exhortations which I would have you give; and I hope that one of you will +set forth what I have been saying in a more artistic style: or at least +take up the enquiry where I left off, and proceed to show the youth whether +he should have all knowledge; or whether there is one sort of knowledge +only which will make him good and happy, and what that is. For, as I was +saying at first, the improvement of this young man in virtue and wisdom is +a matter which we have very much at heart. + +Thus I spoke, Crito, and was all attention to what was coming. I wanted to +see how they would approach the question, and where they would start in +their exhortation to the young man that he should practise wisdom and +virtue. Dionysodorus, who was the elder, spoke first. Everybody's eyes +were directed towards him, perceiving that something wonderful might +shortly be expected. And certainly they were not far wrong; for the man, +Crito, began a remarkable discourse well worth hearing, and wonderfully +persuasive regarded as an exhortation to virtue. + +Tell me, he said, Socrates and the rest of you who say that you want this +young man to become wise, are you in jest or in real earnest? + +I was led by this to imagine that they fancied us to have been jesting when +we asked them to converse with the youth, and that this made them jest and +play, and being under this impression, I was the more decided in saying +that we were in profound earnest. Dionysodorus said: + +Reflect, Socrates; you may have to deny your words. + +I have reflected, I said; and I shall never deny my words. + +Well, said he, and so you say that you wish Cleinias to become wise? + +Undoubtedly. + +And he is not wise as yet? + +At least his modesty will not allow him to say that he is. + +You wish him, he said, to become wise and not, to be ignorant? + +That we do. + +You wish him to be what he is not, and no longer to be what he is? + +I was thrown into consternation at this. + +Taking advantage of my consternation he added: You wish him no longer to +be what he is, which can only mean that you wish him to perish. Pretty +lovers and friends they must be who want their favourite not to be, or to +perish! + +When Ctesippus heard this he got very angry (as a lover well might) and +said: Stranger of Thurii--if politeness would allow me I should say, A +plague upon you! What can make you tell such a lie about me and the +others, which I hardly like to repeat, as that I wish Cleinias to perish? + +Euthydemus replied: And do you think, Ctesippus, that it is possible to +tell a lie? + +Yes, said Ctesippus; I should be mad to say anything else. + +And in telling a lie, do you tell the thing of which you speak or not? + +You tell the thing of which you speak. + +And he who tells, tells that thing which he tells, and no other? + +Yes, said Ctesippus. + +And that is a distinct thing apart from other things? + +Certainly. + +And he who says that thing says that which is? + +Yes. + +And he who says that which is, says the truth. And therefore Dionysodorus, +if he says that which is, says the truth of you and no lie. + +Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but in saying this, he says what is not. + +Euthydemus answered: And that which is not is not? + +True. + +And that which is not is nowhere? + +Nowhere. + +And can any one do anything about that which has no existence, or do to +Cleinias that which is not and is nowhere? + +I think not, said Ctesippus. + +Well, but do rhetoricians, when they speak in the assembly, do nothing? + +Nay, he said, they do something. + +And doing is making? + +Yes. + +And speaking is doing and making? + +He agreed. + +Then no one says that which is not, for in saying what is not he would be +doing something; and you have already acknowledged that no one can do what +is not. And therefore, upon your own showing, no one says what is false; +but if Dionysodorus says anything, he says what is true and what is. + +Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; but he speaks of things in a certain way +and manner, and not as they really are. + +Why, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, do you mean to say that any one speaks +of things as they are? + +Yes, he said--all gentlemen and truth-speaking persons. + +And are not good things good, and evil things evil? + +He assented. + +And you say that gentlemen speak of things as they are? + +Yes. + +Then the good speak evil of evil things, if they speak of them as they are? + +Yes, indeed, he said; and they speak evil of evil men. And if I may give +you a piece of advice, you had better take care that they do not speak evil +of you, since I can tell you that the good speak evil of the evil. + +And do they speak great things of the great, rejoined Euthydemus, and warm +things of the warm? + +To be sure they do, said Ctesippus; and they speak coldly of the insipid +and cold dialectician. + +You are abusive, Ctesippus, said Dionysodorus, you are abusive! + +Indeed, I am not, Dionysodorus, he replied; for I love you and am giving +you friendly advice, and, if I could, would persuade you not like a boor to +say in my presence that I desire my beloved, whom I value above all men, to +perish. + +I saw that they were getting exasperated with one another, so I made a joke +with him and said: O Ctesippus, I think that we must allow the strangers +to use language in their own way, and not quarrel with them about words, +but be thankful for what they give us. If they know how to destroy men in +such a way as to make good and sensible men out of bad and foolish ones-- +whether this is a discovery of their own, or whether they have learned from +some one else this new sort of death and destruction which enables them to +get rid of a bad man and turn him into a good one--if they know this (and +they do know this--at any rate they said just now that this was the secret +of their newly-discovered art)--let them, in their phraseology, destroy the +youth and make him wise, and all of us with him. But if you young men do +not like to trust yourselves with them, then fiat experimentum in corpore +senis; I will be the Carian on whom they shall operate. And here I offer +my old person to Dionysodorus; he may put me into the pot, like Medea the +Colchian, kill me, boil me, if he will only make me good. + +Ctesippus said: And I, Socrates, am ready to commit myself to the +strangers; they may skin me alive, if they please (and I am pretty well +skinned by them already), if only my skin is made at last, not like that of +Marsyas, into a leathern bottle, but into a piece of virtue. And here is +Dionysodorus fancying that I am angry with him, when really I am not angry +at all; I do but contradict him when I think that he is speaking improperly +to me: and you must not confound abuse and contradiction, O illustrious +Dionysodorus; for they are quite different things. + +Contradiction! said Dionysodorus; why, there never was such a thing. + +Certainly there is, he replied; there can be no question of that. Do you, +Dionysodorus, maintain that there is not? + +You will never prove to me, he said, that you have heard any one +contradicting any one else. + +Indeed, said Ctesippus; then now you may hear me contradicting +Dionysodorus. + +Are you prepared to make that good? + +Certainly, he said. + +Well, have not all things words expressive of them? + +Yes. + +Of their existence or of their non-existence? + +Of their existence. + +Yes, Ctesippus, and we just now proved, as you may remember, that no man +could affirm a negative; for no one could affirm that which is not. + +And what does that signify? said Ctesippus; you and I may contradict all +the same for that. + +But can we contradict one another, said Dionysodorus, when both of us are +describing the same thing? Then we must surely be speaking the same thing? + +He assented. + +Or when neither of us is speaking of the same thing? For then neither of +us says a word about the thing at all? + +He granted that proposition also. + +But when I describe something and you describe another thing, or I say +something and you say nothing--is there any contradiction? How can he who +speaks contradict him who speaks not? + +Here Ctesippus was silent; and I in my astonishment said: What do you +mean, Dionysodorus? I have often heard, and have been amazed to hear, this +thesis of yours, which is maintained and employed by the disciples of +Protagoras, and others before them, and which to me appears to be quite +wonderful, and suicidal as well as destructive, and I think that I am most +likely to hear the truth about it from you. The dictum is that there is no +such thing as falsehood; a man must either say what is true or say nothing. +Is not that your position? + +He assented. + +But if he cannot speak falsely, may he not think falsely? + +No, he cannot, he said. + +Then there is no such thing as false opinion? + +No, he said. + +Then there is no such thing as ignorance, or men who are ignorant; for is +not ignorance, if there be such a thing, a mistake of fact? + +Certainly, he said. + +And that is impossible? + +Impossible, he replied. + +Are you saying this as a paradox, Dionysodorus; or do you seriously +maintain no man to be ignorant? + +Refute me, he said. + +But how can I refute you, if, as you say, to tell a falsehood is +impossible? + +Very true, said Euthydemus. + +Neither did I tell you just now to refute me, said Dionysodorus; for how +can I tell you to do that which is not? + +O Euthydemus, I said, I have but a dull conception of these subtleties and +excellent devices of wisdom; I am afraid that I hardly understand them, and +you must forgive me therefore if I ask a very stupid question: if there be +no falsehood or false opinion or ignorance, there can be no such thing as +erroneous action, for a man cannot fail of acting as he is acting--that is +what you mean? + +Yes, he replied. + +And now, I said, I will ask my stupid question: If there is no such thing +as error in deed, word, or thought, then what, in the name of goodness, do +you come hither to teach? And were you not just now saying that you could +teach virtue best of all men, to any one who was willing to learn? + +And are you such an old fool, Socrates, rejoined Dionysodorus, that you +bring up now what I said at first--and if I had said anything last year, I +suppose that you would bring that up too--but are non-plussed at the words +which I have just uttered? + +Why, I said, they are not easy to answer; for they are the words of wise +men: and indeed I know not what to make of this word 'nonplussed,' which +you used last: what do you mean by it, Dionysodorus? You must mean that I +cannot refute your argument. Tell me if the words have any other sense. + +No, he replied, they mean what you say. And now answer. + +What, before you, Dionysodorus? I said. + +Answer, said he. + +And is that fair? + +Yes, quite fair, he said. + +Upon what principle? I said. I can only suppose that you are a very wise +man who comes to us in the character of a great logician, and who knows +when to answer and when not to answer--and now you will not open your mouth +at all, because you know that you ought not. + +You prate, he said, instead of answering. But if, my good sir, you admit +that I am wise, answer as I tell you. + +I suppose that I must obey, for you are master. Put the question. + +Are the things which have sense alive or lifeless? + +They are alive. + +And do you know of any word which is alive? + +I cannot say that I do. + +Then why did you ask me what sense my words had? + +Why, because I was stupid and made a mistake. And yet, perhaps, I was +right after all in saying that words have a sense;--what do you say, wise +man? If I was not in error, even you will not refute me, and all your +wisdom will be non-plussed; but if I did fall into error, then again you +are wrong in saying that there is no error,--and this remark was made by +you not quite a year ago. I am inclined to think, however, Dionysodorus +and Euthydemus, that this argument lies where it was and is not very likely +to advance: even your skill in the subtleties of logic, which is really +amazing, has not found out the way of throwing another and not falling +yourself, now any more than of old. + +Ctesippus said: Men of Chios, Thurii, or however and whatever you call +yourselves, I wonder at you, for you seem to have no objection to talking +nonsense. + +Fearing that there would be high words, I again endeavoured to soothe +Ctesippus, and said to him: To you, Ctesippus, I must repeat what I said +before to Cleinias--that you do not understand the ways of these +philosophers from abroad. They are not serious, but, like the Egyptian +wizard, Proteus, they take different forms and deceive us by their +enchantments: and let us, like Menelaus, refuse to let them go until they +show themselves to us in earnest. When they begin to be in earnest their +full beauty will appear: let us then beg and entreat and beseech them to +shine forth. And I think that I had better once more exhibit the form in +which I pray to behold them; it might be a guide to them. I will go on +therefore where I left off, as well as I can, in the hope that I may touch +their hearts and move them to pity, and that when they see me deeply +serious and interested, they also may be serious. You, Cleinias, I said, +shall remind me at what point we left off. Did we not agree that +philosophy should be studied? and was not that our conclusion? + +Yes, he replied. + +And philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge? + +Yes, he said. + +And what knowledge ought we to acquire? May we not answer with absolute +truth--A knowledge which will do us good? + +Certainly, he said. + +And should we be any the better if we went about having a knowledge of the +places where most gold was hidden in the earth? + +Perhaps we should, he said. + +But have we not already proved, I said, that we should be none the better +off, even if without trouble and digging all the gold which there is in the +earth were ours? And if we knew how to convert stones into gold, the +knowledge would be of no value to us, unless we also knew how to use the +gold? Do you not remember? I said. + +I quite remember, he said. + +Nor would any other knowledge, whether of money-making, or of medicine, or +of any other art which knows only how to make a thing, and not to use it +when made, be of any good to us. Am I not right? + +He agreed. + +And if there were a knowledge which was able to make men immortal, without +giving them the knowledge of the way to use the immortality, neither would +there be any use in that, if we may argue from the analogy of the previous +instances? + +To all this he agreed. + +Then, my dear boy, I said, the knowledge which we want is one that uses as +well as makes? + +True, he said. + +And our desire is not to be skilful lyre-makers, or artists of that sort-- +far otherwise; for with them the art which makes is one, and the art which +uses is another. Although they have to do with the same, they are divided: +for the art which makes and the art which plays on the lyre differ widely +from one another. Am I not right? + +He agreed. + +And clearly we do not want the art of the flute-maker; this is only another +of the same sort? + +He assented. + +But suppose, I said, that we were to learn the art of making speeches-- +would that be the art which would make us happy? + +I should say, no, rejoined Cleinias. + +And why should you say so? I asked. + +I see, he replied, that there are some composers of speeches who do not +know how to use the speeches which they make, just as the makers of lyres +do not know how to use the lyres; and also some who are of themselves +unable to compose speeches, but are able to use the speeches which the +others make for them; and this proves that the art of making speeches is +not the same as the art of using them. + +Yes, I said; and I take your words to be a sufficient proof that the art of +making speeches is not one which will make a man happy. And yet I did +think that the art which we have so long been seeking might be discovered +in that direction; for the composers of speeches, whenever I meet them, +always appear to me to be very extraordinary men, Cleinias, and their art +is lofty and divine, and no wonder. For their art is a part of the great +art of enchantment, and hardly, if at all, inferior to it: and whereas the +art of the enchanter is a mode of charming snakes and spiders and +scorpions, and other monsters and pests, this art of their's acts upon +dicasts and ecclesiasts and bodies of men, for the charming and pacifying +of them. Do you agree with me? + +Yes, he said, I think that you are quite right. + +Whither then shall we go, I said, and to what art shall we have recourse? + +I do not see my way, he said. + +But I think that I do, I replied. + +And what is your notion? asked Cleinias. + +I think that the art of the general is above all others the one of which +the possession is most likely to make a man happy. + +I do not think so, he said. + +Why not? I said. + +The art of the general is surely an art of hunting mankind. + +What of that? I said. + +Why, he said, no art of hunting extends beyond hunting and capturing; and +when the prey is taken the huntsman or fisherman cannot use it; but they +hand it over to the cook, and the geometricians and astronomers and +calculators (who all belong to the hunting class, for they do not make +their diagrams, but only find out that which was previously contained in +them)--they, I say, not being able to use but only to catch their prey, +hand over their inventions to the dialectician to be applied by him, if +they have any sense in them. + +Good, I said, fairest and wisest Cleinias. And is this true? + +Certainly, he said; just as a general when he takes a city or a camp hands +over his new acquisition to the statesman, for he does not know how to use +them himself; or as the quail-taker transfers the quails to the keeper of +them. If we are looking for the art which is to make us blessed, and which +is able to use that which it makes or takes, the art of the general is not +the one, and some other must be found. + +CRITO: And do you mean, Socrates, that the youngster said all this? + +SOCRATES: Are you incredulous, Crito? + +CRITO: Indeed, I am; for if he did say so, then in my opinion he needs +neither Euthydemus nor any one else to be his instructor. + +SOCRATES: Perhaps I may have forgotten, and Ctesippus was the real +answerer. + +CRITO: Ctesippus! nonsense. + +SOCRATES: All I know is that I heard these words, and that they were not +spoken either by Euthydemus or Dionysodorus. I dare say, my good Crito, +that they may have been spoken by some superior person: that I heard them +I am certain. + +CRITO: Yes, indeed, Socrates, by some one a good deal superior, as I +should be disposed to think. But did you carry the search any further, and +did you find the art which you were seeking? + +SOCRATES: Find! my dear sir, no indeed. And we cut a poor figure; we were +like children after larks, always on the point of catching the art, which +was always getting away from us. But why should I repeat the whole story? +At last we came to the kingly art, and enquired whether that gave and +caused happiness, and then we got into a labyrinth, and when we thought we +were at the end, came out again at the beginning, having still to seek as +much as ever. + +CRITO: How did that happen, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: I will tell you; the kingly art was identified by us with the +political. + +CRITO: Well, and what came of that? + +SOCRATES: To this royal or political art all the arts, including the art +of the general, seemed to render up the supremacy, that being the only one +which knew how to use what they produce. Here obviously was the very art +which we were seeking--the art which is the source of good government, and +which may be described, in the language of Aeschylus, as alone sitting at +the helm of the vessel of state, piloting and governing all things, and +utilizing them. + +CRITO: And were you not right, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: You shall judge, Crito, if you are willing to hear what +followed; for we resumed the enquiry, and a question of this sort was +asked: Does the kingly art, having this supreme authority, do anything for +us? To be sure, was the answer. And would not you, Crito, say the same? + +CRITO: Yes, I should. + +SOCRATES: And what would you say that the kingly art does? If medicine +were supposed to have supreme authority over the subordinate arts, and I +were to ask you a similar question about that, you would say--it produces +health? + +CRITO: I should. + +SOCRATES: And what of your own art of husbandry, supposing that to have +supreme authority over the subject arts--what does that do? Does it not +supply us with the fruits of the earth? + +CRITO: Yes. + +SOCRATES: And what does the kingly art do when invested with supreme +power? Perhaps you may not be ready with an answer? + +CRITO: Indeed I am not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: No more were we, Crito. But at any rate you know that if this +is the art which we were seeking, it ought to be useful. + +CRITO: Certainly. + +SOCRATES: And surely it ought to do us some good? + +CRITO: Certainly, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: And Cleinias and I had arrived at the conclusion that knowledge +of some kind is the only good. + +CRITO: Yes, that was what you were saying. + +SOCRATES: All the other results of politics, and they are many, as for +example, wealth, freedom, tranquillity, were neither good nor evil in +themselves; but the political science ought to make us wise, and impart +knowledge to us, if that is the science which is likely to do us good, and +make us happy. + +CRITO: Yes; that was the conclusion at which you had arrived, according to +your report of the conversation. + +SOCRATES: And does the kingly art make men wise and good? + +CRITO: Why not, Socrates? + +SOCRATES: What, all men, and in every respect? and teach them all the +arts,--carpentering, and cobbling, and the rest of them? + +CRITO: I think not, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: But then what is this knowledge, and what are we to do with it? +For it is not the source of any works which are neither good nor evil, and +gives no knowledge, but the knowledge of itself; what then can it be, and +what are we to do with it? Shall we say, Crito, that it is the knowledge +by which we are to make other men good? + +CRITO: By all means. + +SOCRATES: And in what will they be good and useful? Shall we repeat that +they will make others good, and that these others will make others again, +without ever determining in what they are to be good; for we have put aside +the results of politics, as they are called. This is the old, old song +over again; and we are just as far as ever, if not farther, from the +knowledge of the art or science of happiness. + +CRITO: Indeed, Socrates, you do appear to have got into a great +perplexity. + +SOCRATES: Thereupon, Crito, seeing that I was on the point of shipwreck, I +lifted up my voice, and earnestly entreated and called upon the strangers +to save me and the youth from the whirlpool of the argument; they were our +Castor and Pollux, I said, and they should be serious, and show us in sober +earnest what that knowledge was which would enable us to pass the rest of +our lives in happiness. + +CRITO: And did Euthydemus show you this knowledge? + +SOCRATES: Yes, indeed; he proceeded in a lofty strain to the following +effect: Would you rather, Socrates, said he, that I should show you this +knowledge about which you have been doubting, or shall I prove that you +already have it? + +What, I said, are you blessed with such a power as this? + +Indeed I am. + +Then I would much rather that you should prove me to have such a knowledge; +at my time of life that will be more agreeable than having to learn. + +Then tell me, he said, do you know anything? + +Yes, I said, I know many things, but not anything of much importance. + +That will do, he said: And would you admit that anything is what it is, +and at the same time is not what it is? + +Certainly not. + +And did you not say that you knew something? + +I did. + +If you know, you are knowing. + +Certainly, of the knowledge which I have. + +That makes no difference;--and must you not, if you are knowing, know all +things? + +Certainly not, I said, for there are many other things which I do not know. + +And if you do not know, you are not knowing. + +Yes, friend, of that which I do not know. + +Still you are not knowing, and you said just now that you were knowing; and +therefore you are and are not at the same time, and in reference to the +same things. + +A pretty clatter, as men say, Euthydemus, this of yours! and will you +explain how I possess that knowledge for which we were seeking? Do you +mean to say that the same thing cannot be and also not be; and therefore, +since I know one thing, that I know all, for I cannot be knowing and not +knowing at the same time, and if I know all things, then I must have the +knowledge for which we are seeking--May I assume this to be your ingenious +notion? + +Out of your own mouth, Socrates, you are convicted, he said. + +Well, but, Euthydemus, I said, has that never happened to you? for if I am +only in the same case with you and our beloved Dionysodorus, I cannot +complain. Tell me, then, you two, do you not know some things, and not +know others? + +Certainly not, Socrates, said Dionysodorus. + +What do you mean, I said; do you know nothing? + +Nay, he replied, we do know something. + +Then, I said, you know all things, if you know anything? + +Yes, all things, he said; and that is as true of you as of us. + +O, indeed, I said, what a wonderful thing, and what a great blessing! And +do all other men know all things or nothing? + +Certainly, he replied; they cannot know some things, and not know others, +and be at the same time knowing and not knowing. + +Then what is the inference? I said. + +They all know all things, he replied, if they know one thing. + +O heavens, Dionysodorus, I said, I see now that you are in earnest; hardly +have I got you to that point. And do you really and truly know all things, +including carpentering and leather-cutting? + +Certainly, he said. + +And do you know stitching? + +Yes, by the gods, we do, and cobbling, too. + +And do you know things such as the numbers of the stars and of the sand? + +Certainly; did you think we should say No to that? + +By Zeus, said Ctesippus, interrupting, I only wish that you would give me +some proof which would enable me to know whether you speak truly. + +What proof shall I give you? he said. + +Will you tell me how many teeth Euthydemus has? and Euthydemus shall tell +how many teeth you have. + +Will you not take our word that we know all things? + +Certainly not, said Ctesippus: you must further tell us this one thing, +and then we shall know that you are speak the truth; if you tell us the +number, and we count them, and you are found to be right, we will believe +the rest. They fancied that Ctesippus was making game of them, and they +refused, and they would only say in answer to each of his questions, that +they knew all things. For at last Ctesippus began to throw off all +restraint; no question in fact was too bad for him; he would ask them if +they knew the foulest things, and they, like wild boars, came rushing on +his blows, and fearlessly replied that they did. At last, Crito, I too was +carried away by my incredulity, and asked Euthydemus whether Dionysodorus +could dance. + +Certainly, he replied. + +And can he vault among swords, and turn upon a wheel, at his age? has he +got to such a height of skill as that? + +He can do anything, he said. + +And did you always know this? + +Always, he said. + +When you were children, and at your birth? + +They both said that they did. + +This we could not believe. And Euthydemus said: You are incredulous, +Socrates. + +Yes, I said, and I might well be incredulous, if I did not know you to be +wise men. + +But if you will answer, he said, I will make you confess to similar +marvels. + +Well, I said, there is nothing that I should like better than to be self- +convicted of this, for if I am really a wise man, which I never knew +before, and you will prove to me that I know and have always known all +things, nothing in life would be a greater gain to me. + +Answer then, he said. + +Ask, I said, and I will answer. + +Do you know something, Socrates, or nothing? + +Something, I said. + +And do you know with what you know, or with something else? + +With what I know; and I suppose that you mean with my soul? + +Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of asking a question when you are asked one? + +Well, I said; but then what am I to do? for I will do whatever you bid; +when I do not know what you are asking, you tell me to answer nevertheless, +and not to ask again. + +Why, you surely have some notion of my meaning, he said. + +Yes, I replied. + +Well, then, answer according to your notion of my meaning. + +Yes, I said; but if the question which you ask in one sense is understood +and answered by me in another, will that please you--if I answer what is +not to the point? + +That will please me very well; but will not please you equally well, as I +imagine. + +I certainly will not answer unless I understand you, I said. + +You will not answer, he said, according to your view of the meaning, +because you will be prating, and are an ancient. + +Now I saw that he was getting angry with me for drawing distinctions, when +he wanted to catch me in his springes of words. And I remembered that +Connus was always angry with me when I opposed him, and then he neglected +me, because he thought that I was stupid; and as I was intending to go to +Euthydemus as a pupil, I reflected that I had better let him have his way, +as he might think me a blockhead, and refuse to take me. So I said: You +are a far better dialectician than myself, Euthydemus, for I have never +made a profession of the art, and therefore do as you say; ask your +questions once more, and I will answer. + +Answer then, he said, again, whether you know what you know with something, +or with nothing. + +Yes, I said; I know with my soul. + +The man will answer more than the question; for I did not ask you, he said, +with what you know, but whether you know with something. + +Again I replied, Through ignorance I have answered too much, but I hope +that you will forgive me. And now I will answer simply that I always know +what I know with something. + +And is that something, he rejoined, always the same, or sometimes one +thing, and sometimes another thing? + +Always, I replied, when I know, I know with this. + +Will you not cease adding to your answers? + +My fear is that this word 'always' may get us into trouble. + +You, perhaps, but certainly not us. And now answer: Do you always know +with this? + +Always; since I am required to withdraw the words 'when I know.' + +You always know with this, or, always knowing, do you know some things with +this, and some things with something else, or do you know all things with +this? + +All that I know, I replied, I know with this. + +There again, Socrates, he said, the addition is superfluous. + +Well, then, I said, I will take away the words 'that I know.' + +Nay, take nothing away; I desire no favours of you; but let me ask: Would +you be able to know all things, if you did not know all things? + +Quite impossible. + +And now, he said, you may add on whatever you like, for you confess that +you know all things. + +I suppose that is true, I said, if my qualification implied in the words +'that I know' is not allowed to stand; and so I do know all things. + +And have you not admitted that you always know all things with that which +you know, whether you make the addition of 'when you know them' or not? for +you have acknowledged that you have always and at once known all things, +that is to say, when you were a child, and at your birth, and when you were +growing up, and before you were born, and before the heaven and earth +existed, you knew all things, if you always know them; and I swear that you +shall always continue to know all things, if I am of the mind to make you. + +But I hope that you will be of that mind, reverend Euthydemus, I said, if +you are really speaking the truth, and yet I a little doubt your power to +make good your words unless you have the help of your brother Dionysodorus; +then you may do it. Tell me now, both of you, for although in the main I +cannot doubt that I really do know all things, when I am told so by men of +your prodigious wisdom--how can I say that I know such things, Euthydemus, +as that the good are unjust; come, do I know that or not? + +Certainly, you know that. + +What do I know? + +That the good are not unjust. + +Quite true, I said; and that I have always known; but the question is, +where did I learn that the good are unjust? + +Nowhere, said Dionysodorus. + +Then, I said, I do not know this. + +You are ruining the argument, said Euthydemus to Dionysodorus; he will be +proved not to know, and then after all he will be knowing and not knowing +at the same time. + +Dionysodorus blushed. + +I turned to the other, and said, What do you think, Euthydemus? Does not +your omniscient brother appear to you to have made a mistake? + +What, replied Dionysodorus in a moment; am I the brother of Euthydemus? + +Thereupon I said, Please not to interrupt, my good friend, or prevent +Euthydemus from proving to me that I know the good to be unjust; such a +lesson you might at least allow me to learn. + +You are running away, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, and refusing to answer. + +No wonder, I said, for I am not a match for one of you, and a fortiori I +must run away from two. I am no Heracles; and even Heracles could not +fight against the Hydra, who was a she-Sophist, and had the wit to shoot up +many new heads when one of them was cut off; especially when he saw a +second monster of a sea-crab, who was also a Sophist, and appeared to have +newly arrived from a sea-voyage, bearing down upon him from the left, +opening his mouth and biting. When the monster was growing troublesome he +called Iolaus, his nephew, to his help, who ably succoured him; but if my +Iolaus, who is my brother Patrocles (the statuary), were to come, he would +only make a bad business worse. + +And now that you have delivered yourself of this strain, said Dionysodorus, +will you inform me whether Iolaus was the nephew of Heracles any more than +he is yours? + +I suppose that I had best answer you, Dionysodorus, I said, for you will +insist on asking--that I pretty well know--out of envy, in order to prevent +me from learning the wisdom of Euthydemus. + +Then answer me, he said. + +Well then, I said, I can only reply that Iolaus was not my nephew at all, +but the nephew of Heracles; and his father was not my brother Patrocles, +but Iphicles, who has a name rather like his, and was the brother of +Heracles. + +And is Patrocles, he said, your brother? + +Yes, I said, he is my half-brother, the son of my mother, but not of my +father. + +Then he is and is not your brother. + +Not by the same father, my good man, I said, for Chaeredemus was his +father, and mine was Sophroniscus. + +And was Sophroniscus a father, and Chaeredemus also? + +Yes, I said; the former was my father, and the latter his. + +Then, he said, Chaeredemus is not a father. + +He is not my father, I said. + +But can a father be other than a father? or are you the same as a stone? + +I certainly do not think that I am a stone, I said, though I am afraid that +you may prove me to be one. + +Are you not other than a stone? + +I am. + +And being other than a stone, you are not a stone; and being other than +gold, you are not gold? + +Very true. + +And so Chaeredemus, he said, being other than a father, is not a father? + +I suppose that he is not a father, I replied. + +For if, said Euthydemus, taking up the argument, Chaeredemus is a father, +then Sophroniscus, being other than a father, is not a father; and you, +Socrates, are without a father. + +Ctesippus, here taking up the argument, said: And is not your father in +the same case, for he is other than my father? + +Assuredly not, said Euthydemus. + +Then he is the same? + +He is the same. + +I cannot say that I like the connection; but is he only my father, +Euthydemus, or is he the father of all other men? + +Of all other men, he replied. Do you suppose the same person to be a +father and not a father? + +Certainly, I did so imagine, said Ctesippus. + +And do you suppose that gold is not gold, or that a man is not a man? + +They are not 'in pari materia,' Euthydemus, said Ctesippus, and you had +better take care, for it is monstrous to suppose that your father is the +father of all. + +But he is, he replied. + +What, of men only, said Ctesippus, or of horses and of all other animals? + +Of all, he said. + +And your mother, too, is the mother of all? + +Yes, our mother too. + +Yes; and your mother has a progeny of sea-urchins then? + +Yes; and yours, he said. + +And gudgeons and puppies and pigs are your brothers? + +And yours too. + +And your papa is a dog? + +And so is yours, he said. + +If you will answer my questions, said Dionysodorus, I will soon extract the +same admissions from you, Ctesippus. You say that you have a dog. + +Yes, a villain of a one, said Ctesippus. + +And he has puppies? + +Yes, and they are very like himself. + +And the dog is the father of them? + +Yes, he said, I certainly saw him and the mother of the puppies come +together. + +And is he not yours? + +To be sure he is. + +Then he is a father, and he is yours; ergo, he is your father, and the +puppies are your brothers. + +Let me ask you one little question more, said Dionysodorus, quickly +interposing, in order that Ctesippus might not get in his word: You beat +this dog? + +Ctesippus said, laughing, Indeed I do; and I only wish that I could beat +you instead of him. + +Then you beat your father, he said. + +I should have far more reason to beat yours, said Ctesippus; what could he +have been thinking of when he begat such wise sons? much good has this +father of you and your brethren the puppies got out of this wisdom of +yours. + +But neither he nor you, Ctesippus, have any need of much good. + +And have you no need, Euthydemus? he said. + +Neither I nor any other man; for tell me now, Ctesippus, if you think it +good or evil for a man who is sick to drink medicine when he wants it; or +to go to war armed rather than unarmed. + +Good, I say. And yet I know that I am going to be caught in one of your +charming puzzles. + +That, he replied, you will discover, if you answer; since you admit +medicine to be good for a man to drink, when wanted, must it not be good +for him to drink as much as possible; when he takes his medicine, a +cartload of hellebore will not be too much for him? + +Ctesippus said: Quite so, Euthydemus, that is to say, if he who drinks is +as big as the statue of Delphi. + +And seeing that in war to have arms is a good thing, he ought to have as +many spears and shields as possible? + +Very true, said Ctesippus; and do you think, Euthydemus, that he ought to +have one shield only, and one spear? + +I do. + +And would you arm Geryon and Briareus in that way? Considering that you +and your companion fight in armour, I thought that you would have known +better...Here Euthydemus held his peace, but Dionysodorus returned to the +previous answer of Ctesippus and said:-- + +Do you not think that the possession of gold is a good thing? + +Yes, said Ctesippus, and the more the better. + +And to have money everywhere and always is a good? + +Certainly, a great good, he said. + +And you admit gold to be a good? + +Certainly, he replied. + +And ought not a man then to have gold everywhere and always, and as much as +possible in himself, and may he not be deemed the happiest of men who has +three talents of gold in his belly, and a talent in his pate, and a stater +of gold in either eye? + +Yes, Euthydemus, said Ctesippus; and the Scythians reckon those who have +gold in their own skulls to be the happiest and bravest of men (that is +only another instance of your manner of speaking about the dog and father), +and what is still more extraordinary, they drink out of their own skulls +gilt, and see the inside of them, and hold their own head in their hands. + +And do the Scythians and others see that which has the quality of vision, +or that which has not? said Euthydemus. + +That which has the quality of vision clearly. + +And you also see that which has the quality of vision? he said. (Note: +the ambiguity of (Greek), 'things visible and able to see,' (Greek), 'the +speaking of the silent,' the silent denoting either the speaker or the +subject of the speech, cannot be perfectly rendered in English. Compare +Aristot. Soph. Elenchi (Poste's translation):-- + +'Of ambiguous propositions the following are instances:-- + +'I hope that you the enemy may slay. + +'Whom one knows, he knows. Either the person knowing or the person known +is here affirmed to know. + +'What one sees, that one sees: one sees a pillar: ergo, that one pillar +sees. + +'What you ARE holding, that you are: you are holding a stone: ergo, a +stone you are. + +'Is a speaking of the silent possible? "The silent" denotes either the +speaker are the subject of speech. + +'There are three kinds of ambiguity of term or proposition. The first is +when there is an equal linguistic propriety in several interpretations; the +second when one is improper but customary; the third when the ambiguity +arises in the combination of elements that are in themselves unambiguous, +as in "knowing letters." "Knowing" and "letters" are perhaps separately +unambiguous, but in combination may imply either that the letters are +known, or that they themselves have knowledge. Such are the modes in which +propositions and terms may be ambiguous.' + +Yes, I do. + +Then do you see our garments? + +Yes. + +Then our garments have the quality of vision. + +They can see to any extent, said Ctesippus. + +What can they see? + +Nothing; but you, my sweet man, may perhaps imagine that they do not see; +and certainly, Euthydemus, you do seem to me to have been caught napping +when you were not asleep, and that if it be possible to speak and say +nothing--you are doing so. + +And may there not be a silence of the speaker? said Dionysodorus. + +Impossible, said Ctesippus. + +Or a speaking of the silent? + +That is still more impossible, he said. + +But when you speak of stones, wood, iron bars, do you not speak of the +silent? + +Not when I pass a smithy; for then the iron bars make a tremendous noise +and outcry if they are touched: so that here your wisdom is strangely +mistaken; please, however, to tell me how you can be silent when speaking +(I thought that Ctesippus was put upon his mettle because Cleinias was +present). + +When you are silent, said Euthydemus, is there not a silence of all things? + +Yes, he said. + +But if speaking things are included in all things, then the speaking are +silent. + +What, said Ctesippus; then all things are not silent? + +Certainly not, said Euthydemus. + +Then, my good friend, do they all speak? + +Yes; those which speak. + +Nay, said Ctesippus, but the question which I ask is whether all things are +silent or speak? + +Neither and both, said Dionysodorus, quickly interposing; I am sure that +you will be 'non-plussed' at that answer. + +Here Ctesippus, as his manner was, burst into a roar of laughter; he said, +That brother of yours, Euthydemus, has got into a dilemma; all is over with +him. This delighted Cleinias, whose laughter made Ctesippus ten times as +uproarious; but I cannot help thinking that the rogue must have picked up +this answer from them; for there has been no wisdom like theirs in our +time. Why do you laugh, Cleinias, I said, at such solemn and beautiful +things? + +Why, Socrates, said Dionysodorus, did you ever see a beautiful thing? + +Yes, Dionysodorus, I replied, I have seen many. + +Were they other than the beautiful, or the same as the beautiful? + +Now I was in a great quandary at having to answer this question, and I +thought that I was rightly served for having opened my mouth at all: I +said however, They are not the same as absolute beauty, but they have +beauty present with each of them. + +And are you an ox because an ox is present with you, or are you +Dionysodorus, because Dionysodorus is present with you? + +God forbid, I replied. + +But how, he said, by reason of one thing being present with another, will +one thing be another? + +Is that your difficulty? I said. For I was beginning to imitate their +skill, on which my heart was set. + +Of course, he replied, I and all the world are in a difficulty about the +non-existent. + +What do you mean, Dionysodorus? I said. Is not the honourable honourable +and the base base? + +That, he said, is as I please. + +And do you please? + +Yes, he said. + +And you will admit that the same is the same, and the other other; for +surely the other is not the same; I should imagine that even a child will +hardly deny the other to be other. But I think, Dionysodorus, that you +must have intentionally missed the last question; for in general you and +your brother seem to me to be good workmen in your own department, and to +do the dialectician's business excellently well. + +What, said he, is the business of a good workman? tell me, in the first +place, whose business is hammering? + +The smith's. + +And whose the making of pots? + +The potter's. + +And who has to kill and skin and mince and boil and roast? + +The cook, I said. + +And if a man does his business he does rightly? + +Certainly. + +And the business of the cook is to cut up and skin; you have admitted that? + +Yes, I have admitted that, but you must not be too hard upon me. + +Then if some one were to kill, mince, boil, roast the cook, he would do his +business, and if he were to hammer the smith, and make a pot of the potter, +he would do their business. + +Poseidon, I said, this is the crown of wisdom; can I ever hope to have such +wisdom of my own? + +And would you be able, Socrates, to recognize this wisdom when it has +become your own? + +Certainly, I said, if you will allow me. + +What, he said, do you think that you know what is your own? + +Yes, I do, subject to your correction; for you are the bottom, and +Euthydemus is the top, of all my wisdom. + +Is not that which you would deem your own, he said, that which you have in +your own power, and which you are able to use as you would desire, for +example, an ox or a sheep--would you not think that which you could sell +and give and sacrifice to any god whom you pleased, to be your own, and +that which you could not give or sell or sacrifice you would think not to +be in your own power? + +Yes, I said (for I was certain that something good would come out of the +questions, which I was impatient to hear); yes, such things, and such +things only are mine. + +Yes, he said, and you would mean by animals living beings? + +Yes, I said. + +You agree then, that those animals only are yours with which you have the +power to do all these things which I was just naming? + +I agree. + +Then, after a pause, in which he seemed to be lost in the contemplation of +something great, he said: Tell me, Socrates, have you an ancestral Zeus? +Here, anticipating the final move, like a person caught in a net, who gives +a desperate twist that he may get away, I said: No, Dionysodorus, I have +not. + +What a miserable man you must be then, he said; you are not an Athenian at +all if you have no ancestral gods or temples, or any other mark of +gentility. + +Nay, Dionysodorus, I said, do not be rough; good words, if you please; in +the way of religion I have altars and temples, domestic and ancestral, and +all that other Athenians have. + +And have not other Athenians, he said, an ancestral Zeus? + +That name, I said, is not to be found among the Ionians, whether colonists +or citizens of Athens; an ancestral Apollo there is, who is the father of +Ion, and a family Zeus, and a Zeus guardian of the phratry, and an Athene +guardian of the phratry. But the name of ancestral Zeus is unknown to us. + +No matter, said Dionysodorus, for you admit that you have Apollo, Zeus, and +Athene. + +Certainly, I said. + +And they are your gods, he said. + +Yes, I said, my lords and ancestors. + +At any rate they are yours, he said, did you not admit that? + +I did, I said; what is going to happen to me? + +And are not these gods animals? for you admit that all things which have +life are animals; and have not these gods life? + +They have life, I said. + +Then are they not animals? + +They are animals, I said. + +And you admitted that of animals those are yours which you could give away +or sell or offer in sacrifice, as you pleased? + +I did admit that, Euthydemus, and I have no way of escape. + +Well then, said he, if you admit that Zeus and the other gods are yours, +can you sell them or give them away or do what you will with them, as you +would with other animals? + +At this I was quite struck dumb, Crito, and lay prostrate. Ctesippus came +to the rescue. + +Bravo, Heracles, brave words, said he. + +Bravo Heracles, or is Heracles a Bravo? said Dionysodorus. + +Poseidon, said Ctesippus, what awful distinctions. I will have no more of +them; the pair are invincible. + +Then, my dear Crito, there was universal applause of the speakers and their +words, and what with laughing and clapping of hands and rejoicings the two +men were quite overpowered; for hitherto their partisans only had cheered +at each successive hit, but now the whole company shouted with delight +until the columns of the Lyceum returned the sound, seeming to sympathize +in their joy. To such a pitch was I affected myself, that I made a speech, +in which I acknowledged that I had never seen the like of their wisdom; I +was their devoted servant, and fell to praising and admiring of them. What +marvellous dexterity of wit, I said, enabled you to acquire this great +perfection in such a short time? There is much, indeed, to admire in your +words, Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, but there is nothing that I admire more +than your magnanimous disregard of any opinion--whether of the many, or of +the grave and reverend seigniors--you regard only those who are like +yourselves. And I do verily believe that there are few who are like you, +and who would approve of such arguments; the majority of mankind are so +ignorant of their value, that they would be more ashamed of employing them +in the refutation of others than of being refuted by them. I must further +express my approval of your kind and public-spirited denial of all +differences, whether of good and evil, white or black, or any other; the +result of which is that, as you say, every mouth is sewn up, not excepting +your own, which graciously follows the example of others; and thus all +ground of offence is taken away. But what appears to me to be more than +all is, that this art and invention of yours has been so admirably +contrived by you, that in a very short time it can be imparted to any one. +I observed that Ctesippus learned to imitate you in no time. Now this +quickness of attainment is an excellent thing; but at the same time I would +advise you not to have any more public entertainments; there is a danger +that men may undervalue an art which they have so easy an opportunity of +acquiring; the exhibition would be best of all, if the discussion were +confined to your two selves; but if there must be an audience, let him only +be present who is willing to pay a handsome fee;--you should be careful of +this;--and if you are wise, you will also bid your disciples discourse with +no man but you and themselves. For only what is rare is valuable; and +'water,' which, as Pindar says, is the 'best of all things,' is also the +cheapest. And now I have only to request that you will receive Cleinias +and me among your pupils. + +Such was the discussion, Crito; and after a few more words had passed +between us we went away. I hope that you will come to them with me, since +they say that they are able to teach any one who will give them money; no +age or want of capacity is an impediment. And I must repeat one thing +which they said, for your especial benefit,--that the learning of their art +did not at all interfere with the business of money-making. + +CRITO: Truly, Socrates, though I am curious and ready to learn, yet I fear +that I am not like-minded with Euthydemus, but one of the other sort, who, +as you were saying, would rather be refuted by such arguments than use them +in refutation of others. And though I may appear ridiculous in venturing +to advise you, I think that you may as well hear what was said to me by a +man of very considerable pretensions--he was a professor of legal oratory-- +who came away from you while I was walking up and down. 'Crito,' said he +to me, 'are you giving no attention to these wise men?' 'No, indeed,' I +said to him; 'I could not get within hearing of them--there was such a +crowd.' 'You would have heard something worth hearing if you had.' 'What +was that?' I said. 'You would have heard the greatest masters of the art +of rhetoric discoursing.' 'And what did you think of them?' I said. 'What +did I think of them?' he said:--'theirs was the sort of discourse which +anybody might hear from men who were playing the fool, and making much ado +about nothing.' That was the expression which he used. 'Surely,' I said, +'philosophy is a charming thing.' 'Charming!' he said; 'what simplicity! +philosophy is nought; and I think that if you had been present you would +have been ashamed of your friend--his conduct was so very strange in +placing himself at the mercy of men who care not what they say, and fasten +upon every word. And these, as I was telling you, are supposed to be the +most eminent professors of their time. But the truth is, Crito, that the +study itself and the men themselves are utterly mean and ridiculous.' Now +censure of the pursuit, Socrates, whether coming from him or from others, +appears to me to be undeserved; but as to the impropriety of holding a +public discussion with such men, there, I confess that, in my opinion, he +was in the right. + +SOCRATES: O Crito, they are marvellous men; but what was I going to say? +First of all let me know;--What manner of man was he who came up to you and +censured philosophy; was he an orator who himself practises in the courts, +or an instructor of orators, who makes the speeches with which they do +battle? + +CRITO: He was certainly not an orator, and I doubt whether he had ever +been into court; but they say that he knows the business, and is a clever +man, and composes wonderful speeches. + +SOCRATES: Now I understand, Crito; he is one of an amphibious class, whom +I was on the point of mentioning--one of those whom Prodicus describes as +on the border-ground between philosophers and statesmen--they think that +they are the wisest of all men, and that they are generally esteemed the +wisest; nothing but the rivalry of the philosophers stands in their way; +and they are of the opinion that if they can prove the philosophers to be +good for nothing, no one will dispute their title to the palm of wisdom, +for that they are themselves really the wisest, although they are apt to be +mauled by Euthydemus and his friends, when they get hold of them in +conversation. This opinion which they entertain of their own wisdom is +very natural; for they have a certain amount of philosophy, and a certain +amount of political wisdom; there is reason in what they say, for they +argue that they have just enough of both, and so they keep out of the way +of all risks and conflicts and reap the fruits of their wisdom. + +CRITO: What do you say of them, Socrates? There is certainly something +specious in that notion of theirs. + +SOCRATES: Yes, Crito, there is more speciousness than truth; they cannot +be made to understand the nature of intermediates. For all persons or +things, which are intermediate between two other things, and participate in +both of them--if one of these two things is good and the other evil, are +better than the one and worse than the other; but if they are in a mean +between two good things which do not tend to the same end, they fall short +of either of their component elements in the attainment of their ends. +Only in the case when the two component elements which do not tend to the +same end are evil is the participant better than either. Now, if +philosophy and political action are both good, but tend to different ends, +and they participate in both, and are in a mean between them, then they are +talking nonsense, for they are worse than either; or, if the one be good +and the other evil, they are better than the one and worse than the other; +only on the supposition that they are both evil could there be any truth in +what they say. I do not think that they will admit that their two pursuits +are either wholly or partly evil; but the truth is, that these philosopher- +politicians who aim at both fall short of both in the attainment of their +respective ends, and are really third, although they would like to stand +first. There is no need, however, to be angry at this ambition of theirs-- +which may be forgiven; for every man ought to be loved who says and +manfully pursues and works out anything which is at all like wisdom: at +the same time we shall do well to see them as they really are. + +CRITO: I have often told you, Socrates, that I am in a constant difficulty +about my two sons. What am I to do with them? There is no hurry about the +younger one, who is only a child; but the other, Critobulus, is getting on, +and needs some one who will improve him. I cannot help thinking, when I +hear you talk, that there is a sort of madness in many of our anxieties +about our children:--in the first place, about marrying a wife of good +family to be the mother of them, and then about heaping up money for them-- +and yet taking no care about their education. But then again, when I +contemplate any of those who pretend to educate others, I am amazed. To +me, if I am to confess the truth, they all seem to be such outrageous +beings: so that I do not know how I can advise the youth to study +philosophy. + +SOCRATES: Dear Crito, do you not know that in every profession the +inferior sort are numerous and good for nothing, and the good are few and +beyond all price: for example, are not gymnastic and rhetoric and money- +making and the art of the general, noble arts? + +CRITO: Certainly they are, in my judgment. + +SOCRATES: Well, and do you not see that in each of these arts the many are +ridiculous performers? + +CRITO: Yes, indeed, that is very true. + +SOCRATES: And will you on this account shun all these pursuits yourself +and refuse to allow them to your son? + +CRITO: That would not be reasonable, Socrates. + +SOCRATES: Do you then be reasonable, Crito, and do not mind whether the +teachers of philosophy are good or bad, but think only of philosophy +herself. Try and examine her well and truly, and if she be evil seek to +turn away all men from her, and not your sons only; but if she be what I +believe that she is, then follow her and serve her, you and your house, as +the saying is, and be of good cheer. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Euthydemus, by Plato + diff --git a/old/uthyd10.zip b/old/uthyd10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..230f2c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/old/uthyd10.zip |