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diff --git a/.gitattributes b/.gitattributes new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6833f05 --- /dev/null +++ b/.gitattributes @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +* text=auto +*.txt text +*.md text diff --git a/1591-h.zip b/1591-h.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..649befd --- /dev/null +++ b/1591-h.zip diff --git a/1591-h/1591-h.htm b/1591-h/1591-h.htm new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9e09df --- /dev/null +++ b/1591-h/1591-h.htm @@ -0,0 +1,3867 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="us-ascii"?> + +<!DOCTYPE html + PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN" + "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd" > + +<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" lang="en"> + <head> + <title> + Protagoras, by Plato + </title> + <style type="text/css" xml:space="preserve"> + + body { margin:5%; background:#faebd0; text-align:justify} + P { text-indent: 1em; margin-top: .25em; margin-bottom: .25em; } + H1,H2,H3,H4,H5,H6 { text-align: center; margin-left: 15%; margin-right: 15%; } + hr { width: 50%; text-align: center;} + .foot { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; text-indent: -3em; font-size: 90%; } + blockquote {font-size: 97%; font-style: italic; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%;} + .mynote {background-color: #DDE; color: #000; padding: .5em; margin-left: 10%; margin-right: 10%; font-family: sans-serif; font-size: 95%;} + .toc { margin-left: 10%; margin-bottom: .75em;} + .toc2 { margin-left: 20%;} + div.fig { display:block; margin:0 auto; text-align:center; } + div.middle { margin-left: 20%; margin-right: 20%; text-align: justify; } + .figleft {float: left; margin-left: 0%; margin-right: 1%;} + .figright {float: right; margin-right: 0%; margin-left: 1%;} + .pagenum {display:inline; font-size: 70%; font-style:normal; + margin: 0; padding: 0; position: absolute; right: 1%; + text-align: right;} + pre { font-style: italic; font-size: 90%; margin-left: 10%;} + +</style> + </head> + <body> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + +The Project Gutenberg EBook of Protagoras, by Plato + +This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with +almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or +re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included +with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org + + +Title: Protagoras + +Author: Plato + +Translator: B. Jowett + +Release Date: November 3, 2008 [EBook #1591] +Last Updated: January 15, 2013 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROTAGORAS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + + + + + +</pre> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h1> + PROTAGORAS + </h1> + <p> + <br /> + </p> + <h2> + By Plato + </h2> + <p> + <br /><br /> + </p> + <h3> + Translated by Benjamin Jowett + </h3> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <h3> + Contents + </h3> + <table summary="" style="margin-right: auto; margin-left: auto"> + <tr> + <td> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_INTR"> INTRODUCTION. </a> + </p> + <p class="toc"> + <a href="#link2H_4_0002"> PROTAGORAS </a> + </p> + </td> + </tr> + </table> + <p> + <br /> <br /> + </p> + <hr /> + <p> + <br /> <br /> <a name="link2H_INTR" id="link2H_INTR"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <h2> + INTRODUCTION. + </h2> + <p> + The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the + mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place + between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias—'the + man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world'—and + in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, + as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words—in + the presence of a distinguished company consisting of disciples of + Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle. The + dialogue commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates + would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn + had risen—so fervid is his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement + and advises him to find out 'what Protagoras will make of him,' before he + becomes his pupil. + </p> + <p> + They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining + the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question, 'What he will + make of Hippocrates.' Protagoras answers, 'That he will make him a better + and a wiser man.' 'But in what will he be better?'—Socrates desires + to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, 'That he will teach him + prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge + of human life.' + </p> + <p> + This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession; but he is or rather would + have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras + had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because the Athenian + people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction between the + skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not distinguish between the + trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest and best + Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue. Will + Protagoras answer these objections? + </p> + <p> + Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, after + Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending Hermes + to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not, like the + arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to be partakers of + them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in distinguishing between + the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and + unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the political virtues to a + certain degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether they + have them or not. A man would be thought a madman who professed an art + which he did not know; but he would be equally thought a madman if he did + not profess a virtue which he had not. (2) And that the political virtues + can be taught and acquired, in the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by + the fact that they punish evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course—mere + retribution is for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents who + teach her sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of + citizens? To the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, that the + education of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and + is continued by the state when they pass out of the parental control. (4) + Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and + worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private possession + of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the extent of which each + individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even the worst + of civilized mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare them + with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that there are + no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a degree. Some, + like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this result we ought to + be satisfied. + </p> + <p> + Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he + has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the + virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different + names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the + parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part is + like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, + is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:— + </p> + <p> + 'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness + opposed to one another?'—'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would + rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain + point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way + from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that + everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; + and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore temperance and + wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already admitted to be nearly + the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with + justice. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to + which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled by + the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He + therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he + makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause of + the audience. + </p> + <p> + Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on the + part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore he + must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to + accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who + thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he + takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two + cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; + will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short? + </p> + <p> + Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then + by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias proposes an + umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather + suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he will answer, and + that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will ask and Protagoras + shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant assent. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he + professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Hard is it to become good,' +</pre> + <p> + and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.' How + is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is + embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman of + Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him into + absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (Greek) to be, and + (Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then + the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean + dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, + Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that + his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then + proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole + passage. The explanation is as follows:— + </p> + <p> + The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which + is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, + which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. + Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who was + jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed to + controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but 'hard to + become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner + that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, + though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the + special approval of Hippias, who has however a favourite interpretation of + his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer. + </p> + <p> + The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of + Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be + allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's own + thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few + soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, + and then the old question is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or + many?' To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the + five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the + fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the + last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission + that all virtue is in the highest degree good:— + </p> + <p> + The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know + their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and are + still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, courage + is knowledge—an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a + futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent + speech. + </p> + <p> + Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know + whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras + seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would + rather say that 'some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,' which is + also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What does he think of + knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is + overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras + agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power. + </p> + <p> + This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that + many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the + influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the + opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils + because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in + pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is + the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes in + the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to + show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of + mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more + to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of + all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the + greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out + in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by Socrates and + Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world on the other. + Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the + conclusion. + </p> + <p> + Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage—the + only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic + dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through + ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:—because + they form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are + the courageous willing to go to war?—because they form a right + estimate of pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. + Courage then is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five + virtues, which were originally maintained to have five different natures, + after having been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The + assent of Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great + difficulty. + </p> + <p> + Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and + remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had changed + sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the + teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue + is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while Protagoras + has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost + equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is not satisfied + with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with the help of + Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) + Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer, but commends + Socrates' earnestness and his style of discussion. + </p> + <p> + The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are + partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are (1) + Chronological,—which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus, + and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the + impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time, + whether in the year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like all writers + of fiction, aims only at the probable, and shows in many Dialogues (e.g. + the Symposium and Republic, and already in the Laches) an extreme + disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him. + (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the Dialogues, and the date of + composition, have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which + afford any real grounds for determining the date of composition; and the + affinities of the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself, + must always to a great extent remain uncertain. (3) There is another class + of difficulties, which may be ascribed to preconceived notions of + commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be + in the wrong, and his adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or + that passage—e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure—Plato + is inconsistent with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has + not a proper beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato + is a dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the + argument, and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent + with freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his + subject; also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and + shadows, and far-off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic + statements or definite results. + </p> + <p> + The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, + which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect piece + of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy + broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over + truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together in a single + design, and moving towards one end. + </p> + <p> + In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great + personage' is about to appear on the stage; perhaps with a further view of + showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes + no pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks + proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,' of which the + invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself. Hippocrates readily + adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn of Protagoras only + the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman, and let alone his + 'sophistry.' There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to + the inference that Plato intended to blacken the character of the + Sophists; he only makes a little merry at their expense. + </p> + <p> + The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He + is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him—at the house of the + rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the + Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly + mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in answer + to the favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received pay. He is + remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout the discussion + under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. + Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the discussion, + he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be, as he says of + himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.' + </p> + <p> + Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this + pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect is + that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him + and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of + the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and argument; + also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. + There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but + the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common maxims of + morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and + though full of meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to the rest of + mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual contrast between the Sophists + representing average public opinion and Socrates seeking for increased + clearness and unity of ideas. But to a great extent Protagoras has the + best of the argument and represents the better mind of man. + </p> + <p> + For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity + about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth; (2) he is + clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which + Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and + also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad + sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the + arts, gifts or attainments of special individuals, but the common property + of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of + ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature; (5) there is a sort + of half-truth in the notion that all civilized men are teachers of virtue; + and more than a half-truth (6) in ascribing to man, who in his outward + conditions is more helpless than the other animals, the power of + self-improvement; (7) the religious allegory should be noticed, in which + the arts are said to be given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas + justice and reverence and the political virtues could only be imparted by + Zeus; (8) in the latter part of the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing + that 'pleasure is the only good,' Protagoras deems it more in accordance + with his character to maintain that 'some pleasures only are good;' and + admits that 'he, above all other men, is bound to say "that wisdom and + knowledge are the highest of human things."' + </p> + <p> + There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an + imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the + Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is + there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical + character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of + virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even + on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere in + Plato, in his intellectual superiority. + </p> + <p> + The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. + In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and knowledge + is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue + can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had + Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian distinction, and + say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to + point out with Aristotle that the same quality may have more than one + opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere + exchange of a greater pleasure for a less—the unity of virtue and + the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be proved by + other arguments. + </p> + <p> + The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when + their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him after + two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part + of the Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any + disadvantage when subjected to 'the question' by Protagoras. He succeeds + in making his two 'friends,' Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; + he also makes a long speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the + manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is only + pretending to have a bad memory, and that he and not Protagoras is really + a master in the two styles of speaking; and that he can undertake, not one + side of the argument only, but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. + Against the authority of the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously + identified himself at the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up + the proverbial philosophers and those masters of brevity the + Lacedaemonians. The poets, the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at + the same time. + </p> + <p> + Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us to + answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of + Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given + by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconcilement offered by + Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were + practised by the Sophists—for the following reasons: (1) The + transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates. (2) + The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are + described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form + of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches. + (3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of (Greek), + which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest of + the poem. The opposition of (Greek) and (Greek) seems also intended to + express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a facetious + commentary on their differences. (4) The general treatment in Plato both + of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he + delights to identify with them. (5) The depreciating spirit in which + Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a substitute for + original conversation, which is intended to contrast with Protagoras' + exaltation of the study of them—this again is hardly consistent with + the serious defence of Simonides. (6) the marked approval of Hippias, who + is supposed at once to catch the familiar sound, just as in the previous + conversation Prodicus is represented as ready to accept any distinctions + of language however absurd. At the same time Hippias is desirous of + substituting a new interpretation of his own; as if the words might really + be made to mean anything, and were only to be regarded as affording a + field for the ingenuity of the interpreter. + </p> + <p> + This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on + the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in + his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts + when applied to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies, + e.g. with the two first speeches in the Phaedrus and with the Menexenus. + Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of + philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the + claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing + set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they + bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really too bad,' that + Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (Greek), because he is addressing a + Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on those who spin + pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments of the Euthydemus and + of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is never withdrawn; and we are left in + doubt at last how far in this interpretation of Simonides Socrates is + 'fooling,' how far he is in earnest. + </p> + <p> + All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like + the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of the scene + should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the + second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters to whom we are + introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a part more or less + conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the + necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending effectual aid to + Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias, + here as always inclining to the Sophists, but eager for any intellectual + repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for displaying his distinctions + of language, which are valueless and pedantic, because they are not based + on dialectic; Hippias, who has previously exhibited his superficial + knowledge of natural philosophy, to which, as in both the Dialogues called + by his name, he now adds the profession of an interpreter of the Poets. + The two latter personages have been already damaged by the mock heroic + description of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that + Protagoras is consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of + moral and political virtue; there is no allusion to the theories of + sensation which are attributed to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or + to his denial of the existence of the gods in a well-known fragment + ascribed to him; he is the religious rather than the irreligious teacher + in this Dialogue. Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much + respect as is consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that + the dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to + a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument, + therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day. + </p> + <p> + But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; + (2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of + pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an + appearance of paradox—they are really moments or aspects of the + truth by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a + higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is + a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew + nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must + be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or + citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues are one + or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of the same + subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be reducible to a + common principle; and this common principle is found to be knowledge. + Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the truth—they + make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature of this + knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and pains, + appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit of Plato + himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only following the historical Socrates as + he is depicted to us in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Like Socrates, he finds on + the surface of human life one common bond by which the virtues are united,—their + tendency to produce happiness,—though such a principle is afterwards + repudiated by him. + </p> + <p> + It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to the + other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely Socratic + works—perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them—is + indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; + and also by the different attitude assumed towards the teaching and + persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The Charmides, + Laches, Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of knowledge to + virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies or sketches of + the more important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The Io + and the lesser Hippias contain discussions of the Poets, which offer a + parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are conceived in a + similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to the Meno is more + doubtful. For there, although the same question is discussed, 'whether + virtue can be taught,' and the relation of Meno to the Sophists is much + the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the question is supplied + out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into + the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall + find that both the paradox and the solution of it appear to have been + retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus offer further + corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of them the doctrine + that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief or only good, is + distinctly renounced. + </p> + <p> + Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of + men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and philosophical + aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as + Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable as the argument, + we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is + an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and + yet has to be recovered by every one for himself who would pass the limits + of proverbial and popular philosophy. The moral and intellectual are + always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception + of them are inseparable. The thesis of Socrates is not merely a hasty + assumption, but may be also deemed an anticipation of some 'metaphysic of + the future,' in which the divided elements of human nature are reconciled. + </p> + <p> + <a name="link2H_4_0002" id="link2H_4_0002"> + <!-- H2 anchor --> </a> + </p> + <div style="height: 4em;"> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </div> + <h2> + PROTAGORAS + </h2> + <p> + PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue to + his Companion. Hippocrates, Alcibiades and Critias. Protagoras, Hippias + and Prodicus (Sophists). Callias, a wealthy Athenian. + </p> + <p> + SCENE: The House of Callias. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask the + question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair Alcibiades. I + saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard like a man,—and + he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought that he was + still very charming. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears'? +</pre> + <p> + And that is now the charm of Alcibiades. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, + and was he gracious to you? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, + for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an argument. + But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him, and + several times I quite forgot that he was present. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you + and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he is; + certainly not in this city of Athens. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes, much fairer. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: What do you mean—a citizen or a foreigner? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: A foreigner. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: Of what country? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Of Abdera. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than + the son of Cleinias? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend? + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are + willing to accord that title to Protagoras. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: What! Is Protagoras in Athens? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; he has been here two days. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him? + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and + tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place to you. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening. + </p> + <p> + COMPANION: Thank you, too, for telling us. + </p> + <p> + SOCRATES: That is thank you twice over. Listen then:— + </p> + <p> + Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of + Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his + staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and + bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep? + </p> + <p> + I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any + news? + </p> + <p> + Good news, he said; nothing but good. + </p> + <p> + Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither at + this unearthly hour? + </p> + <p> + He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come. + </p> + <p> + Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his + arrival? + </p> + <p> + Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening. + </p> + <p> + At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and + then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe + whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as I meant to + have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way;—on my + return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my + brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and + then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me + after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct. + </p> + <p> + I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the + matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything? + </p> + <p> + He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he + keeps from me. + </p> + <p> + But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he + will make you as wise as he is himself. + </p> + <p> + Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all + that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why + I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; + for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when he visited + Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him, Socrates; he is + reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we + should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He + lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: let us start. + </p> + <p> + I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us rise + and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break; when + the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, and + we shall be sure to find him; never fear. + </p> + <p> + Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I + would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and + put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to + Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you + are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had thought + of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him + your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money to your + namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that you give him + money? how would you have answered? + </p> + <p> + I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician. + </p> + <p> + And what will he make of you? + </p> + <p> + A physician, he said. + </p> + <p> + And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the + Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had asked + you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this + money?—how would you have answered? + </p> + <p> + I should have answered, that they were statuaries. + </p> + <p> + And what will they make of you? + </p> + <p> + A statuary, of course. + </p> + <p> + Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to + pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can + gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to + spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are + thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us: Tell + me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you + going to pay him money,—how should we answer? I know that Pheidias + is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to + Protagoras? how is he designated? + </p> + <p> + They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about + yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him? + </p> + <p> + He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to + dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from the + former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me. + </p> + <p> + By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before + the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist? + </p> + <p> + Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am. + </p> + <p> + But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras + is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way that you + learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the + view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, + and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them? + </p> + <p> + Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the + teaching of Protagoras. + </p> + <p> + I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing? + </p> + <p> + And what am I doing? + </p> + <p> + You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a + Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if + not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and + whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil. + </p> + <p> + I certainly think that I do know, he replied. + </p> + <p> + Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is? + </p> + <p> + I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name + implies. + </p> + <p> + And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter + also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person were to ask + us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates to + the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were + further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the + manufacture over which he presides?—how should we answer him? + </p> + <p> + How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but + that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the + answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man + talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk + eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing + the lyre. Is not that true? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him + eloquent in that which he understands? + </p> + <p> + Yes, that may be assumed. + </p> + <p> + And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know? + </p> + <p> + Indeed, he said, I cannot tell. + </p> + <p> + Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you + are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who + might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the + opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to + whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in + question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon + the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all,—about + this you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or + with any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this + foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In + the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to + him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you + ought to intrust yourself to him or not;—you have quite made up your + mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are + prepared to expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in + carrying out at any price this determination, although, as you admit, you + do not know him, and have never spoken with him: and you call him a + Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are + going to commit yourself to his keeping. + </p> + <p> + When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can + be drawn from your words. + </p> + <p> + I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or + retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature. + </p> + <p> + And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? + </p> + <p> + Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, + my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he + sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; + for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are + really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the + exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In + like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the + round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in + want of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my + friend, if many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the + soul; and their customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them + happens to be a physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have + understanding of what is good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of + Protagoras or of any one; but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not + hazard your dearest interests at a game of chance. For there is far + greater peril in buying knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one + you purchase of the wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in + other vessels, and before you receive them into the body as food, you may + deposit them at home and call in any experienced friend who knows what is + good to be eaten or drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and + then the danger of purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the + wares of knowledge and carry them away in another vessel; when you have + paid for them you must receive them into the soul and go your way, either + greatly harmed or greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate + and take counsel with our elders; for we are still young—too young + to determine such a matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and + hear Protagoras; and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take + counsel of others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but + there is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and + several other wise men. + </p> + <p> + To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule + of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a discussion which + had arisen between us as we were going along; and we stood talking in the + vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think + that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at + the great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, + when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled: They + are Sophists—he is not at home; and instantly gave the door a hearty + bang with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without + opening: Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows? But, my + friend, I said, you need not be alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we + are not come to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must + request you to announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the + man was persuaded to open the door. + </p> + <p> + When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and + next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and + Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his + half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him + were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of + Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of + Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his + profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them + appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the + various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, + attracting them his voice, and they following (Compare Rep.). I should + mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing + delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never got + into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned back, + then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was always + in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him in + perfect order. + </p> + <p> + After him, as Homer says (Od.), 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias the + Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and around him + were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the + Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers + whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some + others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical + questions, and he, ex cathedra, was determining their several questions to + them, and discoursing of them. + </p> + <p> + Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus (Od.);' for Prodicus the Cean was at + Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was + a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and + made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped + up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to be a great heap; + and there was sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of + Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly + remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also of a + fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my + suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, + and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the + other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what + Prodicus was saying, for he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired + man; but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep + voice made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible. + </p> + <p> + No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, + as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus. + </p> + <p> + On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then + walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and + I have come to see you. + </p> + <p> + Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the + company? + </p> + <p> + Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard the + purpose of our visit. + </p> + <p> + And what is your purpose? he said. + </p> + <p> + I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; + he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he + is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age. I + believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that + conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And now you can + determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or + in the presence of the company. + </p> + <p> + Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a + stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of + the youth in them to leave company of their kinsmen or any other + acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they + will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great + jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many + enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe, of + great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing this + odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under + that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of hierophants and + prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the + name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently + celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a + first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but + was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were + many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils + or disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur. + But that is not my way, for I do not believe that they effected their + purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by + them; and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat + what their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be + caught in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly + increases the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away + as a rogue, in addition to any other objections which they have to him; + and therefore I take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself + to be a Sophist and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgement + appears to me to be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I + neglect other precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the + favour of heaven that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a + Sophist. And I have been now many years in the profession—for all my + years when added up are many: there is no one here present of whom I might + not be the father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if + you want to speak with me, in the presence of the company. + </p> + <p> + As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and + glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly + show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we + not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us? + </p> + <p> + Very good, he said. + </p> + <p> + Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and + discuss.—This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the + prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and + benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been + already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed + and brought in him and his companions. + </p> + <p> + When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are + assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just now + speaking. + </p> + <p> + I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you + once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is + desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will + happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very + first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on + the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on + the day before. + </p> + <p> + When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing + you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one were + to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no + doubt: but please to answer in a different way—I will explain how by + an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your + acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of + Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as he has + come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that every + day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then + suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what shall I become better, and in + what shall I grow?'—Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And + suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same + thing, and asked him, 'In what shall I become better day by day?' he would + reply, 'In flute-playing.' Now I want you to make the same sort of answer + to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When + you say that on the first day on which he associates with you he will + return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like manner,—in + what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what? + </p> + <p> + When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, + and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes + to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other + Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have + just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these + teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and + music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes to me, + he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in + affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in + the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the + affairs of the state. + </p> + <p> + Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of + politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens? + </p> + <p> + That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake + about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a + doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how + to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion + that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that + the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are esteemed to + be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together + in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders + are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then + the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of + being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice + who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he + be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but + laugh and hoot at him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of + himself; or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables + at the command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about + professors of the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then + everybody is free to have a say—carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, + passenger; rich and poor, high and low—any one who likes gets up, + and no one reproaches him, as in the former case, with not having learned, + and having no teacher, and yet giving advice; evidently because they are + under the impression that this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not + only is this true of the state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of + our citizens are unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for + example, Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent + instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own + department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but + they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope that + they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take another example: + there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom + this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he being in fact under the + apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him + away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be educated; but before + six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, not knowing what to do + with him. And I could mention numberless other instances of persons who + were good themselves, and never yet made any one else good, whether friend + or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these examples before me, am + inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But then again, when I + listen to your words, I waver; and am disposed to think that there must be + something in what you say, because I know that you have great experience, + and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, if possible, show + me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will you be so good? + </p> + <p> + That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as an + elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I + argue out the question? + </p> + <p> + To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself. + </p> + <p> + Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting. + </p> + <p> + Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when + the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them + out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the + interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the + light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to + distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to + Prometheus: 'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed, and + Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength + without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he + armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other + means of preservation, making some large, and having their size as a + protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow + in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate + them with the view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when + he had provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived + also a means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing + them with close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the + winter cold and able to resist the summer heat, so that they might have a + natural bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them + with hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he + gave them varieties of food,—herb of the soil to some, to others + fruits of trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other + animals as food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who + were their prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race was + preserved. Thus did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he + had distributed among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to + give,—and when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was + terribly perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came + to inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were + suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had + neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching when + man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not + knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of + Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have been + acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the + wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had not; + for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not + extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who + moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the + common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to practise + their favourite arts, and carried off Hephaestus' art of working by fire, + and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And in this way man was + supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is said to have been + afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder of Epimetheus. + </p> + <p> + Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only + one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their + kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in + inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses and + clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus + provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But + the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they + were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient + to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry + on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet the art of + government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while the desire of + self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered + together, having no art of government, they evil intreated one another, + and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that + the entire race would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, + bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering principles of cities and + the bonds of friendship and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should + impart justice and reverence among men:—Should he distribute them as + the arts are distributed; that is to say, to a favoured few only, one + skilled individual having enough of medicine or of any other art for many + unskilled ones? 'Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute + justice and reverence among men, or shall I give them to all?' 'To all,' + said Zeus; 'I should like them all to have a share; for cities cannot + exist, if a few only share in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, + make a law by my order, that he who has no part in reverence and justice + shall be put to death, for he is a plague of the state.' + </p> + <p> + And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in + general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical + art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one + else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the + favoured few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when they meet to + deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice + and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is + also natural, because they think that every man ought to share in this + sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I + have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon. + </p> + <p> + And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all + men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of every + other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In + other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good + flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people + either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he + is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some + other political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if + the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, + then, what in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now + deem to be madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether + they are honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says + anything else. Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of + honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not to be in the world. + </p> + <p> + I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a + counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every + man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that + they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow + spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to a + man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be + angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature or + chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what they + are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct + the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason. Because + he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of + chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good qualities which are + attained by study and exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary + evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and punish and reprove him—of + these evil qualities one is impiety, another injustice, and they may be + described generally as the very opposite of political virtue. In such + cases any man will be angry with another, and reprimand him,—clearly + because he thinks that by study and learning, the virtue in which the + other is deficient may be acquired. If you will think, Socrates, of the + nature of punishment, you will see at once that in the opinion of mankind + virtue may be acquired; no one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or + for the reason, that he has done wrong,—only the unreasonable fury + of a beast acts in that manner. But he who desires to inflict rational + punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong which cannot be undone; he + has regard to the future, and is desirous that the man who is punished, + and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from doing wrong again. He + punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue + is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon + others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own + citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they + regard as evil doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of + those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, + Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your + countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise + about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being + taught and acquired. + </p> + <p> + There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the + sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the + knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but + do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish + themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the + argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of + which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? + In the answer to this question is contained the only solution of your + difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this + quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the + potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly + virtue—if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, + and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything else, + and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up + man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes + better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment is either + exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is incurable—if + what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught other things and + not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. + For we have shown that they think virtue capable of being taught and + cultivated both in private and public; and, notwithstanding, they have + their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance of which does not involve the + punishment of death: but greater things, of which the ignorance may cause + death and exile to those who have no training or knowledge of them—aye, + and confiscation as well as death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of + families—those things, I say, they are supposed not to teach them,—not + to take the utmost care that they should learn. How improbable is this, + Socrates! + </p> + <p> + Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and + last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are + vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever + he is able to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say or do + anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is + unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, that is + unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if + not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or + warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them + to see to his manners even more than to his reading and music; and the + teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters + and is beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood + only what was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, + which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many + admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous + men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate + or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers + of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and + gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, + they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the + lyric poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and + rhythms quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may + learn to be more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more + fitted for speech and action; for the life of man in every part has need + of harmony and rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in + order that their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that + they may not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in + war or on any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the + means, and those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to + go to school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with + masters, the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after + the pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just + as in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style + for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him + follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the invention of + good lawgivers living in the olden time; these are given to the young man, + in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying; + and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, or, in other words, + called to account, which is a term used not only in your country, but also + in many others, seeing that justice calls men to account. Now when there + is all this care about virtue private and public, why, Socrates, do you + still wonder and doubt whether virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for + the opposite would be far more surprising. + </p> + <p> + But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is + nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the existence + of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If so—and + nothing can be truer—then I will further ask you to imagine, as an + illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be + assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose + that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as + each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the + art, both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely + and openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing + them as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them—for all + of us have a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and + this is the reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the + laws;—suppose, I say, that there were the same readiness and + liberality among us in teaching one another flute-playing, do you imagine, + Socrates, that the sons of good flute-players would be more likely to be + good than the sons of bad ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up + to be distinguished or undistinguished according to their own natural + capacities as flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn + out to be a bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, all + flute-players would be good enough in comparison of those who were + ignorant and unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I + would have you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of + those who have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be + a just man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who + had no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon + them which compelled them to practise virtue—with the savages, for + example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last + year's Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the + man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with + Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the + rascality of this part of the world. You, Socrates, are discontented, and + why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his + ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who + teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or + you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art + which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have + taught them to the best of their ability,—but who will carry them + further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, + Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty + in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of + virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to promote + virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of + this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the + knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their + money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I + have introduced the following mode of payment:—When a man has been + my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if + he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and take an oath of the + value of the instructions, and he pays no more than he declares to be + their value. + </p> + <p> + Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I + endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion + of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to + wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad + fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the + companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in + comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons of many other + artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus + themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of them. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras ended, and in my ear + </p> + <p> + 'So charming left his voice, that I the while Thought him still speaking; + still stood fixed to hear (Borrowed by Milton, "Paradise Lost".).' + </p> + <p> + At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not + without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, + I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for + having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras + for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men + good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty + which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already + explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our + great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a + discourse; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like + books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the + least particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, + like brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some + one puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only + make a good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a + question he can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the + answer; and this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of + you a little question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite + satisfied. You were saying that virtue can be taught;—that I will + take upon your authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to + trust. But I marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind + set at rest. You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to + men; and several times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, + and holiness, and all these qualities, were described by you as if + together they made up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether + virtue is one whole, of which justice and temperance and holiness are + parts; or whether all these are only the names of one and the same thing: + that is the doubt which still lingers in my mind. + </p> + <p> + There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which + you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one. + </p> + <p> + And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and + eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of + gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being + larger or smaller? + </p> + <p> + I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are + related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole + face. + </p> + <p> + And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man + has one part, must he also have all the others? + </p> + <p> + By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and + not wise. + </p> + <p> + You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of + virtue? + </p> + <p> + Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the + parts. + </p> + <p> + And they are all different from one another? I said. + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face;—the + eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and + the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their + functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison + holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another + in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile + would imply. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, + or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness? + </p> + <p> + No, he answered. + </p> + <p> + Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And + first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, + would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also? + </p> + <p> + Mine also, he said. + </p> + <p> + And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and you, + Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just + or unjust?'—and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or + against me? + </p> + <p> + With you, he said. + </p> + <p> + Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the + nature of the just: would not you? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a thing + as holiness?'—we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing—should we not say so? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + 'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the + nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a question, + and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.' + What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you + saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed + to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one + another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not, as you + imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the + answer.' And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this true, + Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, + and is this your position?'—how would you answer him? + </p> + <p> + I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates. + </p> + <p> + Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he + proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, + nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; + and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the + unjust, and the unjust is the unholy': how shall we answer him? I should + certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that + holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if + you would allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very + nearly the same; and above all I would assert that justice is like + holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me + whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether + you would agree with me. + </p> + <p> + He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that + justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a + difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let + us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. + </p> + <p> + Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will' + sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I + mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.' + </p> + <p> + Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for + there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other + thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and + the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts + of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have + different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one + of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one + another on the same principle that all things are like one another; and + yet things which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, + nor things which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike. + </p> + <p> + And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness + have but a small degree of likeness? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your + view. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take + another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the + existence of folly? + </p> + <p> + I do. + </p> + <p> + And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly? + </p> + <p> + That is true, he said. + </p> + <p> + And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be + temperate? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + And temperance makes them temperate? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not + temperate? + </p> + <p> + I agree, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by + temperance? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is + weakly done, by weakness? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is + done with slowness, slowly? + </p> + <p> + He assented again. + </p> + <p> + And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that + which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + To which the only opposite is the ugly? + </p> + <p> + There is no other. + </p> + <p> + And is there anything good? + </p> + <p> + There is. + </p> + <p> + To which the only opposite is the evil? + </p> + <p> + There is no other. + </p> + <p> + And there is the acute in sound? + </p> + <p> + True. + </p> + <p> + To which the only opposite is the grave? + </p> + <p> + There is no other, he said, but that. + </p> + <p> + Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we + admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one? + </p> + <p> + We did so. + </p> + <p> + And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by + opposites? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the + opposite way to that which was done temperately? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which + was done foolishly by folly? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And in opposite ways? + </p> + <p> + Certainly. + </p> + <p> + And therefore by opposites:—then folly is the opposite of + temperance? + </p> + <p> + Clearly. + </p> + <p> + And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be + the opposite of wisdom? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And we said that everything has only one opposite? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says + that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct + from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they + are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their + functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall + we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they + do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is + assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, + which is one, has clearly the two opposites—wisdom and temperance? + Is not that true, Protagoras? What else would you say? + </p> + <p> + He assented, but with great reluctance. + </p> + <p> + Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness + appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must + finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be + temperate in his injustice? + </p> + <p> + I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which + nevertheless many may be found to assert. + </p> + <p> + And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied. + </p> + <p> + I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you + will. + </p> + <p> + Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are + of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the + argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may + both be put on our trial. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument + was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer. + </p> + <p> + Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that + some men are temperate, and yet unjust? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; let that be admitted. + </p> + <p> + And temperance is good sense? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice? + </p> + <p> + Granted. + </p> + <p> + If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed? + </p> + <p> + If they succeed. + </p> + <p> + And you would admit the existence of goods? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + And is the good that which is expedient for man? + </p> + <p> + Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, + and yet I call them good. + </p> + <p> + I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be + setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, + and gently said:— + </p> + <p> + When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean + inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the + latter good? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things—meats, + drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient + for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither + expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen + only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and + some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, + manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but + utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may + instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most + injurious to the hair of every animal with the exception of man, but + beneficial to human hair and to the human body generally; and even in this + application (so various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that + which is the greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great + evil to his inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid + their patients the use of oil in their food, except in very small + quantities, just enough to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell + in meats and sauces. + </p> + <p> + When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: + Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech + to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been + deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise + your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your + answers shorter, if you would take me with you. + </p> + <p> + What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make + them too short? + </p> + <p> + Certainly not, I said. + </p> + <p> + But short enough? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said. + </p> + <p> + Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to + you to be short enough? + </p> + <p> + I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about + the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with + such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you + talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method. + </p> + <p> + Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had + followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you + want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of + Protagoras would have been nowhere. + </p> + <p> + I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he + would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I + considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so + I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if + you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a + way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said + of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions + in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of + wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. + You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter + as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are + disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to + hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will + depart; although I should have liked to have heard you. + </p> + <p> + Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the + right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He + said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an + end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is + nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and + Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure. + </p> + <p> + Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I + replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your + philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I + could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an + impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, + when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To + such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same of my own + legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison + and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, + for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you + want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten + his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can + there be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an + oration is quite another, in my humble opinion. + </p> + <p> + But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to + speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours. + </p> + <p> + Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true + statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make + a speech—in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be + greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding + and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar + admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative + skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in + argument as well, let him ask and answer—not, when a question is + asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a + speech at such length that most of his hearers forget the question at + issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget—I will be bound for + that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And + Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than Protagoras; that is my + view, and every man ought to say what he thinks. + </p> + <p> + When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one—Critias, I believe—went + on to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan + of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the + other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of + Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up + the discussion. + </p> + <p> + Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who + are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the + speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as + equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal + meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher + meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as + Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, + which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for + friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and + enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way + you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not + praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere + conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere + expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And + thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for + gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but + pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily + delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his words. + </p> + <p> + Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I + reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by + law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of + mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. + How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of + things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together + in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and + most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of + this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the + meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, + Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do + not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, + if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that + your words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, + Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land + into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. + Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer + or president; he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their + proper length. + </p> + <p> + This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias + said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an + arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be + unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or + worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither + would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what + will be the use of choosing him? And if you say, 'Let us have a better + then,'—to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser + than Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and + whom you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an + inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far + as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me + tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and discussion + may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him + ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at the same time how, + as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have answered as many + questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner answer me; and if he + seems to be not very ready at answering the precise question asked of him, + you and I will unite in entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil + the discussion. And this will require no special arbiter—all of you + shall be arbiters. + </p> + <p> + This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his + will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had + put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those + which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as + follows:— + </p> + <p> + I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal + part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what + compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are + to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the + difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have + been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of + virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to + Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian: + </p> + <p> + 'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in + hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.' + </p> + <p> + Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole? + </p> + <p> + There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode,—I + have made a careful study of it. + </p> + <p> + Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, + and true? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, both good and true. + </p> + <p> + But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true? + </p> + <p> + No, not in that case, I replied. + </p> + <p> + And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect. + </p> + <p> + Well, my friend, I have reflected. + </p> + <p> + And does not the poet proceed to say, 'I do not agree with the word of + Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good'? + Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet. + </p> + <p> + I know it. + </p> + <p> + And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent? + </p> + <p> + Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that + there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise? + </p> + <p> + Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as + his own thought, 'Hardly can a man become truly good'; and then a little + further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to + agree with him, when he says, 'Hardly can a man be good,' which is the + very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with + himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first + or his second assertion. + </p> + <p> + Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy + and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert boxer, + when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the + truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really + was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides + is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal + to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by + Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying: + </p> + <p> + 'Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero (Il.).' + </p> + <p> + And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of + Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application + of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish 'will' + and 'wish,' and make other charming distinctions like those which you drew + just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I + am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. + And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, + Prodicus, 'being' is the same as 'becoming.' + </p> + <p> + Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus. + </p> + <p> + Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that 'Hardly can a man + become truly good'? + </p> + <p> + Quite right, said Prodicus. + </p> + <p> + And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating + that which he says himself, but for saying something different from + himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man + become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would + maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they + are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare + say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'On the one hand, hardly can a man become good, + For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil, + But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height, + Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy + —(Works and Days).' +</pre> + <p> + Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, + Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which + you are correcting. + </p> + <p> + Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but + aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure. + </p> + <p> + Such is the fact, he said. + </p> + <p> + How so? I asked. + </p> + <p> + The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that + virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can + be easily retained. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the + right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is + more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides + or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know + nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am + not mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard' (chalepon) in the + sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicus + corrects me when I use the word 'awful' (deinon) as a term of praise. If I + say that Protagoras or any one else is an 'awfully' wise man, he asks me + if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good 'awful'; and then he + explains to me that the term 'awful' is always taken in a bad sense, and + that no one speaks of being 'awfully' healthy or wealthy, or of 'awful' + peace, but of 'awful' disease, 'awful' war, 'awful' poverty, meaning by + the term 'awful,' evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the + Ceans, when they spoke of 'hard' meant 'evil,' or something which you do + not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer + questions about the dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by + the term 'hard'? + </p> + <p> + Evil, said Prodicus. + </p> + <p> + And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is + the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus + with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been + accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural. + </p> + <p> + Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And + have you an answer for him? + </p> + <p> + You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very well + that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean, not + evil, but that which is not easy—that which takes a great deal of + trouble: of this I am positive. + </p> + <p> + I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning + of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he + thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; + for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by + the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot + surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to + say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and + of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to + Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. + And I should like to tell you, I said, what I imagine to be the real + meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of + speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I + will be the listener. + </p> + <p> + To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please;—and Hippias, + Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed. + </p> + <p> + Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this + poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more + cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and + there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the + world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and they + pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought + that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras + was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that if the reason of + their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their + wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the + imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with + their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on + their arms, and are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for they + imagine that these are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians + to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend + and hold free conversation with their wise men, and are no longer + satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they drive out all these + laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen to be in their + country, and they hold a philosophical seance unknown to strangers; and + they themselves forbid their young men to go out into other cities—in + this they are like the Cretans—in order that they may not unlearn + the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon and Crete not + only men but also women have a pride in their high cultivation. And hereby + you may know that I am right in attributing to the Lacedaemonians this + excellence in philosophy and speculation: If a man converses with the most + ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him seldom good for much in general + conversation, but at any point in the discourse he will be darting out + some notable saying, terse and full of meaning, with unerring aim; and the + person with whom he is talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And + many of our own age and of former ages have noted that the true + Lacedaemonian type of character has the love of philosophy even stronger + than the love of gymnastics; they are conscious that only a perfectly + educated man is capable of uttering such expressions. Such were Thales of + Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, + and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the + catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers + and emulators and disciples of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any + one may perceive that their wisdom was of this character; consisting of + short memorable sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met + together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the + first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all + men's mouths—'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing too much.' + </p> + <p> + Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was + the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus + which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, + 'Hard is it to be good.' And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of + wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he + had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm + among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire + poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying. + </p> + <p> + Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the + truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of + the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he inserted + (Greek) 'on the one hand' ('on the one hand to become good is hard'); + there would be no reason for the introduction of (Greek), unless you + suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. + Pittacus is saying 'Hard is it to be good,' and he, in refutation of this + thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, + not joining 'truly' with 'good,' but with 'hard.' Not, that the hard thing + is to be truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there + were others who were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple + observation, and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to + make a trajection of the word 'truly' (Greek), construing the saying of + Pittacus thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides + answering him): 'O my friends,' says Pittacus, 'hard is it to be good,' + and Simonides answers, 'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the + difficulty is not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, + four-square in hands and feet and mind, without a flaw—that is hard + truly.' This way of reading the passage accounts for the insertion of + (Greek) 'on the one hand,' and for the position at the end of the clause + of the word 'truly,' and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A + great deal might be said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a + charming piece of workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would + be tedious. I should like, however, to point out the general intention of + the poem, which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of + the saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on + as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming + good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having + become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, + affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this + blessing; 'but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances + overpowers him.' Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the + command of a vessel?—not the private individual, for he is always + overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, and + only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be laid + prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him who, at + some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at all times + helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the + severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; for the good may + become bad, as another poet witnesses:— + </p> + <p> + 'The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.' + </p> + <p> + But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force + of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, + then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, 'Hard is it + to be good.' Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is + possible: but to be good is an impossibility— + </p> + <p> + 'For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.' + </p> + <p> + But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a + man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of + well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art + of healing the sick. 'But he who does ill is the bad.' Now who becomes a + bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in + the second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but + none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become + physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that + sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly + cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become + deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only + real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never + become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must + previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on + the one hand a man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become + good and may also become bad; and again that + </p> + <p> + 'They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.' + </p> + <p> + All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he + adds:— + </p> + <p> + 'Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in + searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly + faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed + earth: if I find him, I will send you word.' + </p> + <p> + (this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus + throughout the whole poem): + </p> + <p> + 'But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love;—not even + the gods war against necessity.' + </p> + <p> + All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say + that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were + some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow + that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and + dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil + and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never + says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word + 'voluntarily' applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a + good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and to be + the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an involuntary + love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or + country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or country have any + defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find fault with them and + expose and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of + mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of + neglect; and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order + that the odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but + the good man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise + them; and if they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger + and is reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh + and blood. And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had + often had to praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his + will, and he also wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him + because he is censorious. + </p> + <p> + 'For I am satisfied' he says, 'when a man is neither bad nor very stupid; + and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound + mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, + and there are innumerable fools' + </p> + <p> + (implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant + opportunity of finding fault). + </p> + <p> + 'All things are good with which evil is unmingled.' + </p> + <p> + In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good + which have no evil in them, as you might say 'All things are white which + have no black in them,' for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say + that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate + state. + </p> + <p> + ('I do not hope' he says, 'to find a perfectly blameless man among those + who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, I + will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is + moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and + approve every one') + </p> + <p> + (and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, epainemi (approve), because + he is addressing Pittacus, + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Who love and APPROVE every one VOLUNTARILY, who does no evil:' +</pre> + <p> + and that the stop should be put after 'voluntarily'); 'but there are some + whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never + have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do + blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are speaking + falsely about the highest matters.'—And this, I said, Prodicus and + Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem. + </p> + <p> + Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good + explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my + own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me. + </p> + <p> + Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At present + we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and + Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, + Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that + Socrates should ask. + </p> + <p> + I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I + would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, and + come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, + Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets + seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company + have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one + another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and + conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls + in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of + their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among them: but where + the company are real gentlemen and men of education, you will see no + flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense + or games, but are contented with one another's conversation, of which + their own voices are the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in + an orderly manner, even though they are very liberal in their potations. + And a company like this of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not + require the help of another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot + interrogate about the meaning of what they are saying; people who cite + them declaring, some that the poet has one meaning, and others that he has + another, and the point which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort + of entertainment they decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and + put one another to the proof in conversation. And these are the models + which I desire that you and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and + keeping to ourselves, let us try the mettle of one another and make proof + of the truth in conversation. If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to + answer; or if you would rather, do you answer, and give me the opportunity + of resuming and completing our unfinished argument. + </p> + <p> + I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not + distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, + and said:—Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing + to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he + is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly + refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will + be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will + be free to talk with one another. + </p> + <p> + I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of + Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were + superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and + he would answer. + </p> + <p> + So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in + asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I + think that Homer was very right in saying that + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),' +</pre> + <p> + for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; + but if a man + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + 'Sees a thing when he is alone,' +</pre> + <p> + he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may + show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather + hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has + a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to + understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?—who + not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and + yet have not the power of making others good—whereas you are not + only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover + such confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal + their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a + Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded + pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the + examination of these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I + must, indeed. And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by + you about the questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have + your help in considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: + Are wisdom and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names + of the same thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence + and corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being + like any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the + names of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and + that all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the + parts of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, + but as the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts + and one another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like + to know whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to + define your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a + different statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did + only in order to make trial of me. + </p> + <p> + I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, + and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the + fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as + I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly + unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless + remarkable for their courage. + </p> + <p> + Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave + men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are + afraid to approach. + </p> + <p> + In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which + good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher. + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right + mind. + </p> + <p> + And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good? + </p> + <p> + Wholly good, and in the highest degree. + </p> + <p> + Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well? + </p> + <p> + I should say, the divers. + </p> + <p> + And the reason of this is that they have knowledge? + </p> + <p> + Yes, that is the reason. + </p> + <p> + And who have confidence when fighting on horseback—the skilled + horseman or the unskilled? + </p> + <p> + The skilled. + </p> + <p> + And who when fighting with light shields—the peltasts or the + nonpeltasts? + </p> + <p> + The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is + your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who + have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned + than before. + </p> + <p> + And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, + and yet confident about them? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident. + </p> + <p> + And are not these confident persons also courageous? + </p> + <p> + In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of + whom we are speaking are surely madmen. + </p> + <p> + Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere. + </p> + <p> + And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not + courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most + confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon + that view again wisdom will be courage. + </p> + <p> + Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what + was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous + are the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the + courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered 'Not all of them': + and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you + proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than + they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who + have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the same + as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that + strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, + and I should say 'Yes'; and then whether those who know how to wrestle are + not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and + more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And + when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to + prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should + not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, + although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a + difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge + as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a + healthy state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and + courage, that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are + confident, but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be + given to men by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but + courage comes to them from nature and the healthy state of the soul. + </p> + <p> + I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others + ill? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief? + </p> + <p> + He does not. + </p> + <p> + But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that + case have lived well? + </p> + <p> + He will. + </p> + <p> + Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable. + </p> + <p> + And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant + things evil and some painful things good?—for I am rather disposed + to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have + no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they + are bad. + </p> + <p> + I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that + unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. + Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my + life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are + some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful + things which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are + some which are neither good nor evil. + </p> + <p> + And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in + pleasure or create pleasure? + </p> + <p> + Certainly, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and + my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself. + </p> + <p> + According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, 'Let us reflect + about this,' he said; and if the reflection is to the point, and the + result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will + agree; but if not, then we will argue. + </p> + <p> + And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin? + </p> + <p> + You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the + discussion. + </p> + <p> + May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring + into the health or some other bodily quality of another:—he looks at + his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your + chest and back to me that I may have a better view:—that is the sort + of thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion + is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind + to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may + know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the + world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of + rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and + yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or + pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,—just as if knowledge + were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or + do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot + be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of + good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that + wisdom will have strength to help him? + </p> + <p> + I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, above + all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest + of human things. + </p> + <p> + Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world + are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things + which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom + I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to + knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those + affections which I was just now mentioning. + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which + mankind are in error. + </p> + <p> + Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what + is the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by + pleasure,' and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always + do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are + saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and + Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called 'being + overcome by pleasure,' pray, what is it, and by what name would you + describe it? + </p> + <p> + But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the + many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them? + </p> + <p> + I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how + courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to + abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, + our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; but + if not, never mind. + </p> + <p> + You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have + begun. + </p> + <p> + Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What + account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being + overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I + will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking + and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be + evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were + overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I + were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say that they are + evil,—in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or + because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? + Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, + simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever + nature?'—Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of + the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the + after consequences—diseases and the like? + </p> + <p> + I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you + do. + </p> + <p> + And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do + they not cause pain;—they would agree to that also, if I am not + mistaken? + </p> + <p> + Protagoras assented. + </p> + <p> + Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil + for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other + pleasures:—there again they would agree? + </p> + <p> + We both of us thought that they would. + </p> + <p> + And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and + say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean + remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the + physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the + things which are good but painful?'—they would assent to me? + </p> + <p> + He agreed. + </p> + <p> + 'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate + suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and + improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power + over others and wealth?'—they would agree to the latter alternative, + if I am not mistaken? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + 'Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in + pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other + standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?'—they would + acknowledge that they were not? + </p> + <p> + I think so, said Protagoras. + </p> + <p> + 'And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an + evil?' + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + 'Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even + pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it + gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call + pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be + able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.' + </p> + <p> + I do not think that they have, said Protagoras. + </p> + <p> + 'And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a + good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives + pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other + than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a + good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.' + </p> + <p> + True, said Protagoras. + </p> + <p> + Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: 'Why do you spend many + words and speak in many ways on this subject?' Excuse me, friends, I + should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining + the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure'; and the whole + argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in + which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than + pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having a life + of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to + show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the + consequences:—If what you say is true, then the argument is absurd + which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, + because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, when you say + that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at + the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if + only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, + and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names—first, + good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us go on + to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one will + ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what is he + overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able to + reply 'By pleasure,' for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for that + of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. 'By + what?' he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed we + shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of + the swaggering sort, 'That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what he + knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is + that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering + the evil'? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was + not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was + overcome by pleasure, would not have been wrong. 'But how,' he will reply, + 'can the good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good'? Is not + the real explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, + either as greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And + when you speak of being overcome—'what do you mean,' he will say, + 'but that you choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?' + Admitted. And now substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and + evil, and say, not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but + that he does what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by + pleasure, which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the + relations of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means + that they become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in + degree? For if any one says: 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure + differs widely from future pleasure and pain'—To that I should + reply: And do they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can + be no other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into + the balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, + and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh + pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or + if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if + pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which + the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near + or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in which + the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my friends, + that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this. + </p> + <p> + He agreed with me. + </p> + <p> + Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a + question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when + near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the + same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves + equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will + grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the + greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less, what would be the + saving principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be the + saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that + deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one + time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice + of things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with + the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the + soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. + Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes + this result is the art of measurement? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said, the art of measurement. + </p> + <p> + Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd + and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater + or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether + near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? + Would not knowledge?—a knowledge of measuring, when the question is + one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is + of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not? + </p> + <p> + Protagoras himself thought that they would. + </p> + <p> + Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human + life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains,—in + the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, and + the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of + their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other? + </p> + <p> + This is undeniably true. + </p> + <p> + And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and + science? + </p> + <p> + They will agree, he said. + </p> + <p> + The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future + consideration; but the existence of such a science furnishes a + demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and Protagoras. + At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, both of us were + agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, and that + knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over pleasure and + all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got the advantage + even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you + rejoined: O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome + by pleasure if not this?—tell us what you call such a state:—if + we had immediately and at the time answered 'Ignorance,' you would have + laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be laughing at + yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their choice of + pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and evil, from + defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, not only + from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular knowledge + which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the erring act + which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, therefore, is + the meaning of being overcome by pleasure;—ignorance, and that the + greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias declare that + they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are under the mistaken + impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that the art of which I am + speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, nor send your children, + to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these things—you take care + of your money and give them none; and the result is, that you are the + worse off both in public and private life:—Let us suppose this to be + our answer to the world in general: And now I should like to ask you, + Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the argument is to + be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am speaking the truth + or not? + </p> + <p> + They all thought that what I said was entirely true. + </p> + <p> + Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful + evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his + distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, + delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them, I + will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words. + </p> + <p> + Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others. + </p> + <p> + Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable + and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? + The honourable work is also useful and good? + </p> + <p> + This was admitted. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the + idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also + attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to + himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is + wisdom. + </p> + <p> + They all assented. + </p> + <p> + And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about + important matters? + </p> + <p> + To this also they unanimously assented. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to + be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is + compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when + he may have the less. + </p> + <p> + All of us agreed to every word of this. + </p> + <p> + Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, + Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree with + me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and + not terror. + </p> + <p> + Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former + assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not + compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which + has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be + evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to + be evil? + </p> + <p> + That also was universally admitted. + </p> + <p> + Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would + beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at + first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first + statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of + virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a + separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the + assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were + nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed + greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He + said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and + unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most + courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other + parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am + still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I + asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, + and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was + your answer.) + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go—against + the same dangers as the cowards? + </p> + <p> + No, he answered. + </p> + <p> + Then against something different? + </p> + <p> + Yes, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there + is danger? + </p> + <p> + Yes, Socrates, so men say. + </p> + <p> + Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the + courageous are ready to go—against dangers, believing them to be + dangers, or not against dangers? + </p> + <p> + No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous + argument to be impossible. + </p> + <p> + That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly + proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the + want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to + be ignorance. + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about + which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and + the courageous go to meet the same things. + </p> + <p> + And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the + opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is + ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready. + </p> + <p> + And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said. + </p> + <p> + Honourable, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all + honourable actions we have admitted to be good. + </p> + <p> + That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere. + </p> + <p> + True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling + to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing? + </p> + <p> + The cowards, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant? + </p> + <p> + It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, + and better? + </p> + <p> + The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions. + </p> + <p> + But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and + pleasanter, and nobler? + </p> + <p> + That must be admitted. + </p> + <p> + And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence? + </p> + <p> + True, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And if not base, then honourable? + </p> + <p> + He admitted this. + </p> + <p> + And if honourable, then good? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the + contrary, are base? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and + uninstructedness? + </p> + <p> + True, he said. + </p> + <p> + Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice + or courage? + </p> + <p> + I should say cowardice, he replied. + </p> + <p> + And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of + dangers? + </p> + <p> + Assuredly, he said. + </p> + <p> + And because of that ignorance they are cowards? + </p> + <p> + He assented. + </p> + <p> + And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice? + </p> + <p> + He again assented. + </p> + <p> + Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice? + </p> + <p> + He nodded assent. + </p> + <p> + But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice? + </p> + <p> + Yes. + </p> + <p> + Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the + ignorance of them? + </p> + <p> + To that again he nodded assent. + </p> + <p> + And the ignorance of them is cowardice? + </p> + <p> + To that he very reluctantly nodded assent. + </p> + <p> + And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is + opposed to the ignorance of these things? + </p> + <p> + At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent. + </p> + <p> + And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras? + </p> + <p> + Finish the argument by yourself, he said. + </p> + <p> + I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you + still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most + courageous? + </p> + <p> + You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and + therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be + impossible consistently with the argument. + </p> + <p> + My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire + to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were clear, I + am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great + length by both of us—you affirming and I denying that virtue can be + taught—would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears + to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice + would be heard laughing at us and saying: 'Protagoras and Socrates, you + are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue + cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that + all things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,—which + tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were + other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly + virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are + seeking to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being + taught. Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might + be taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; + and if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught.' Now I, + Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great + desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the + discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being + taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in + the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to + your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these + questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no + objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the + enquiry. + </p> + <p> + Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last + man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and your + conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men + whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you + will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the subject at + some future time; at present we had better turn to something else. + </p> + <p> + By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to + have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because + I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the conversation + ended, and we went our way. + </p> + <p> + <br /><br /><br /><br /> + </p> +<pre xml:space="preserve"> + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Protagoras, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROTAGORAS *** + +***** This file should be named 1591-h.htm or 1591-h.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/9/1591/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher, and David Widger + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. 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Jowett + +Posting Date: November 3, 2008 [EBook #1591] +Release Date: January, 1999 + +Language: English + +Character set encoding: ASCII + +*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROTAGORAS *** + + + + +Produced by Sue Asscher + + + + + +PROTAGORAS + +By Plato + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the +mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place +between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias--'the +man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the +world'--and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had +also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a +few words--in the presence of a distinguished company consisting of +disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the +Socratic circle. The dialogue commences with a request on the part of +Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher. +He has come before the dawn had risen--so fervid is his zeal. Socrates +moderates his excitement and advises him to find out 'what Protagoras +will make of him,' before he becomes his pupil. + +They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining +the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question, 'What he +will make of Hippocrates.' Protagoras answers, 'That he will make him +a better and a wiser man.' 'But in what will he be better?'--Socrates +desires to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, 'That he will +teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science +or knowledge of human life.' + +This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession; but he is or rather +would have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if +Protagoras had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because +the Athenian people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction +between the skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not distinguish +between the trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest +and best Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue. +Will Protagoras answer these objections? + +Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, +after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending +Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not, +like the arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to +be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in +distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not +between skilled and unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the +political virtues to a certain degree, and are obliged to say that +they have them, whether they have them or not. A man would be thought +a madman who professed an art which he did not know; but he would be +equally thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had +not. (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in +the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish +evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course--mere retribution is +for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents who teach her sons +lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? To +the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, that the education +of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is +continued by the state when they pass out of the parental control. (4) +Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and +worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private possession +of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the extent of which +each individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even the +worst of civilized mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare +them with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that +there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a +degree. Some, like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this +result we ought to be satisfied. + +Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he +has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the +virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different +names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like +the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part +is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily +made, is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:-- + +'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness +opposed to one another?'--'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would +rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain +point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way +from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that +everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed +to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore +temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already +admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has +now to be compared with justice. + +Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process +to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled +by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. +He therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, +he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause +of the audience. + +Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on +the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore +he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to +accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who +thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he +takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the +two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak +long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak +short? + +Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and +then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias +proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he +would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he +will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will +ask and Protagoras shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant +assent. + +Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which +he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says, + + 'Hard is it to become good,' + +and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.' +How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, +is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman +of Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him +into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (Greek) to be, +and (Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. +Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean +dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, +Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that +his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then +proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole +passage. The explanation is as follows:-- + +The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which +is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, +which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. +Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who +was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed +to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but +'hard to become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive +manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon +Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, +and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a +favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades +to defer. + +The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of +Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be +allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's +own thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few +soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, +and then the old question is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or +many?' To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of +the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that +the fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine +the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the +admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:-- + +The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know +their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and +are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, +courage is knowledge--an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a +futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent +speech. + +Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to +know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? +Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to +this; he would rather say that 'some pleasures are good, some pains are +evil,' which is also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What +does he think of knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that +knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is +power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power. + +This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that +many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the +influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really +the opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are +evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in +pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil +is the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes +in the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in +order to show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art +of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved +once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the +origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, +or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument +is drawn out in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by +Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world +on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the +soundness of the conclusion. + +Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage--the +only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic +dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through +ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:--because they +form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the +courageous willing to go to war?--because they form a right estimate of +pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then +is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which +were originally maintained to have five different natures, after having +been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The assent of +Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty. + +Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, +and remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had +changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, +the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that +virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while +Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and +this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is +not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with +the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, +and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer, +but commends Socrates' earnestness and his style of discussion. + +The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These +are partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are (1) +Chronological,--which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus, +and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the +impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one +time, whether in the year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like +all writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and shows in many +Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium and Republic, and already in the Laches) +an extreme disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes +demanded of him. (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the +Dialogues, and the date of composition, have also been much disputed. +But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for determining +the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they +are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to a great extent remain +uncertain. (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be +ascribed to preconceived notions of commentators, who imagine that +Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his +adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage--e.g. +in the explanation of good as pleasure--Plato is inconsistent with +himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper +beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato is a +dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, +and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with +freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject; +also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and +far-off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or +definite results. + +The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, +which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect +piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of +philosophy broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils +thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together +in a single design, and moving towards one end. + +In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great +personage' is about to appear on the stage; perhaps with a further view +of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who +makes no pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates +thinks proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,' +of which the invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself. +Hippocrates readily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall +learn of Protagoras only the accomplishments which befit an Athenian +gentleman, and let alone his 'sophistry.' There is nothing however in +the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato intended to +blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at +their expense. + +The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. +He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him--at the house of the +rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the +Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly +mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in +answer to the favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received +pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout +the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination +of Socrates. Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue +the discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to +be, as he says of himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.' + +Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this +pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect +is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between +him and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, +but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and +argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the +Sophists. There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as +of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and +common maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical +or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight, hardly +intelligible to the rest of mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual +contrast between the Sophists representing average public opinion and +Socrates seeking for increased clearness and unity of ideas. But to a +great extent Protagoras has the best of the argument and represents the +better mind of man. + +For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity +about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth; (2) he +is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which +Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); +and also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have +bad sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not +like the arts, gifts or attainments of special individuals, but the +common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength +and weakness of ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature; +(5) there is a sort of half-truth in the notion that all civilized men +are teachers of virtue; and more than a half-truth (6) in ascribing +to man, who in his outward conditions is more helpless than the other +animals, the power of self-improvement; (7) the religious allegory +should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus +(who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political +virtues could only be imparted by Zeus; (8) in the latter part of the +Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that 'pleasure is the only good,' +Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain +that 'some pleasures only are good;' and admits that 'he, above all +other men, is bound to say "that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of +human things."' + +There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an +imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the +Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. +Nor is there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical +character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity +of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this +even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere +in Plato, in his intellectual superiority. + +The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of +virtue. In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and +knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are +one, then virtue can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the +beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian +distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied +with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle that the same quality may +have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny +that good is a mere exchange of a greater pleasure for a less--the unity +of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required +to be proved by other arguments. + +The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when +their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him +after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the +first part of the Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does +he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to 'the question' by +Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two 'friends,' Prodicus and +Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long speech in defence +of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as +Alcibiades says, that he is only pretending to have a bad memory, and +that he and not Protagoras is really a master in the two styles of +speaking; and that he can undertake, not one side of the argument only, +but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. Against the authority of +the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously identified himself at +the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up the proverbial +philosophers and those masters of brevity the Lacedaemonians. The poets, +the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at the same time. + +Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us +to answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of +Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given +by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconcilement offered +by Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which +were practised by the Sophists--for the following reasons: (1) The +transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates. +(2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are +described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form +of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches. +(3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of (Greek), +which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest +of the poem. The opposition of (Greek) and (Greek) seems also intended +to express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a +facetious commentary on their differences. (4) The general treatment in +Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters, +and whom he delights to identify with them. (5) The depreciating +spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a +substitute for original conversation, which is intended to contrast +with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them--this again is hardly +consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) the marked +approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the familiar +sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as +ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. At the same +time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of his +own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were +only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the +interpreter. + +This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on +the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in +his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts +when applied to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies, +e.g. with the two first speeches in the Phaedrus and with the Menexenus. +Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of +philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of +the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the +Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation +because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really +too bad,' that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (Greek), because he +is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on +those who spin pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments +of the Euthydemus and of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is +never withdrawn; and we are left in doubt at last how far in this +interpretation of Simonides Socrates is 'fooling,' how far he is in +earnest. + +All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work +like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of +the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of +Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters +to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a +part more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who +is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending +effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of +impartiality; Callias, here as always inclining to the Sophists, but +eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity +for displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and +pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic; Hippias, who has +previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy, +to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the +profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages +have been already damaged by the mock heroic description of them in +the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently +presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue; +there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed +to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of the +existence of the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is +the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue. +Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is +consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that the +dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to +a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument, +therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day. + +But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; +(2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of +pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an +appearance of paradox--they are really moments or aspects of the truth +by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a +higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught +is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew +nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but +must be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses +or citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues +are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of +the same subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be +reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to +be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the +truth--they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature +of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and +pains, appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit +of Plato himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only following the historical +Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Like +Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one common bond by which +the virtues are united,--their tendency to produce happiness,--though +such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him. + +It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to +the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely +Socratic works--perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of +them--is indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of +reminiscence; and also by the different attitude assumed towards the +teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The +Charmides, Laches, Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of +knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies +or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected +with it. The Io and the lesser Hippias contain discussions of the Poets, +which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are +conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to +the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is +discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' and the relation of Meno to +the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the +question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is +already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic +philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it +appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus +offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of +them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief +or only good, is distinctly renounced. + +Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters +of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and +philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the +way, which, as Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable +as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is +knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon +as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself +who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The +moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited, +and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of +Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an +anticipation of some 'metaphysic of the future,' in which the divided +elements of human nature are reconciled. + + + + +PROTAGORAS + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue +to his Companion. Hippocrates, Alcibiades and Critias. Protagoras, +Hippias and Prodicus (Sophists). Callias, a wealthy Athenian. + +SCENE: The House of Callias. + + +COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly +ask the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair +Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard +like a man,--and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I +thought that he was still very charming. + +SOCRATES: What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says + + 'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears'? + +And that is now the charm of Alcibiades. + +COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, +and was he gracious to you? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially +to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an +argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to +him, and several times I quite forgot that he was present. + +COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between +you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he +is; certainly not in this city of Athens. + +SOCRATES: Yes, much fairer. + +COMPANION: What do you mean--a citizen or a foreigner? + +SOCRATES: A foreigner. + +COMPANION: Of what country? + +SOCRATES: Of Abdera. + +COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love +than the son of Cleinias? + +SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend? + +COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one? + +SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are +willing to accord that title to Protagoras. + +COMPANION: What! Is Protagoras in Athens? + +SOCRATES: Yes; he has been here two days. + +COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things. + +COMPANION: Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down +and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place +to you. + +SOCRATES: To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening. + +COMPANION: Thank you, too, for telling us. + +SOCRATES: That is thank you twice over. Listen then:-- + +Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of +Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his +staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and +bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep? + +I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring +any news? + +Good news, he said; nothing but good. + +Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither +at this unearthly hour? + +He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come. + +Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his +arrival? + +Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening. + +At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, +and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from +Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as +I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the +way;--on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to +rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at +once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment +sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct. + +I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the +matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything? + +He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which +he keeps from me. + +But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, +he will make you as wise as he is himself. + +Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all +that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is +why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my +behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when +he visited Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him, +Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There +is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find +him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: +let us start. + +I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us +rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break; +when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at +home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear. + +Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that +I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him +and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going +to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom +you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had +thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to +give him your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money +to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that +you give him money? how would you have answered? + +I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician. + +And what will he make of you? + +A physician, he said. + +And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias +the Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had +asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them +this money?--how would you have answered? + +I should have answered, that they were statuaries. + +And what will they make of you? + +A statuary, of course. + +Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready +to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we +can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we +are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while +we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to +us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and +why are you going to pay him money,--how should we answer? I know that +Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation +is given to Protagoras? how is he designated? + +They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied. + +Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist? + +Certainly. + +But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about +yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him? + +He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning +to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from +the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me. + +By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before +the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist? + +Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am. + +But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of +Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way +that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, +not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part +of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know +them? + +Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the +teaching of Protagoras. + +I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing? + +And what am I doing? + +You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a +Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if +not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and +whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil. + +I certainly think that I do know, he replied. + +Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is? + +I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name +implies. + +And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the +carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person +were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what +relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And +if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what +is the manufacture over which he presides?--how should we answer him? + +How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but +that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent? + +Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the +answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a +man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a +man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is +about playing the lyre. Is not that true? + +Yes. + +Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him +eloquent in that which he understands? + +Yes, that may be assumed. + +And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know? + +Indeed, he said, I cannot tell. + +Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you +are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who +might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask +the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to +whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is +in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, +and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your +all,--about this you never consulted either with your father or with +your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no +sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul +to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the +morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any +one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;--you +have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of +Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself +and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination, +although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with +him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a +Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping. + +When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can +be drawn from your words. + +I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or +retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature. + +And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? + +Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take +care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises +what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food +of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without +knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their +customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may +happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of +knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them +to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I +should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of +their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant, +unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If, +therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may +safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not, then, O +my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game +of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in +buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail +dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive +them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any +experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and +what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them +is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry +them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must +receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or +greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel +with our elders; for we are still young--too young to determine such a +matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras; +and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of +others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there +is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and +several other wise men. + +To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the +vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a +discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along; and we +stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an +understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and +who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must +have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he +opened and saw us, he grumbled: They are Sophists--he is not at home; +and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we +knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that +he is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I said, you need not be +alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias, +but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At +last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the +door. + +When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and +next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, +and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his +half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of +him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son +of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples +of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his +profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them +appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of +the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, +attracting them his voice, and they following (Compare Rep.). I should +mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing +delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never +got into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned +back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was +always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him +in perfect order. + +After him, as Homer says (Od.), 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias +the Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and +around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and +Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there +were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of +Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical +and astronomical questions, and he, ex cathedra, was determining their +several questions to them, and discoursing of them. + +Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus (Od.);' for Prodicus the Cean was at +Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, +was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this +out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in +bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed +to be a great heap; and there was sitting by him on the couches near, +Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite +young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not +mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard +him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved +of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two +Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and +some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for +he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man; but I was not able to +get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the +room which rendered his words inaudible. + +No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the +beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of +Callaeschrus. + +On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then +walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates +and I have come to see you. + +Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the +company? + +Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard +the purpose of our visit. + +And what is your purpose? he said. + +I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; +he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and +he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own +age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks +that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And +now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your +teaching alone or in the presence of the company. + +Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a +stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower +of the youth in them to leave company of their kinsmen or any other +acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they +will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great +jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many +enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe, +of great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing +this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, +some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, +of hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as +I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of +Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria +and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles +pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also +Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as +I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were +afraid of the odium which they would incur. But that is not my way, for +I do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive +the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they +have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased +to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the +very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of +mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to +any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an +entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and +instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgement appears to me to +be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other +precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven +that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I +have been now many years in the profession--for all my years when added +up are many: there is no one here present of whom I might not be the +father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want +to speak with me, in the presence of the company. + +As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and +glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly +show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we +not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us? + +Very good, he said. + +Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit +and discuss.--This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the +prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and +benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been +already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed +and brought in him and his companions. + +When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are +assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just +now speaking. + +I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell +you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, +who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what +will happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say. + +Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very +first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on +the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on +the day before. + +When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing +you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one +were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better +no doubt: but please to answer in a different way--I will explain how +by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your +acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus +of Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as +he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that +every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and +then suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what shall I become better, +and in what shall I grow?'--Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And +suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the +same thing, and asked him, 'In what shall I become better day by day?' +he would reply, 'In flute-playing.' Now I want you to make the same sort +of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his +account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with +you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like +manner,--in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what? + +When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, +and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates +comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other +Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have +just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these +teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, +and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes +to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence +in affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own +house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the +best in the affairs of the state. + +Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art +of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens? + +That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make. + +Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake +about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have +a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not +how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of +opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I +say that the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are +esteemed to be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we +are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to +building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is +one of ship-building, then the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts +which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person +offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill +in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they +will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is +clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged +away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This +is their way of behaving about professors of the arts. But when the +question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a +say--carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high +and low--any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in +the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet +giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this +sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the +state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are +unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, +Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent +instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own +department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but +they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope +that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take +another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend +Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he +being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by +Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be +educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back, +not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other +instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any +one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having +these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be +taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am +disposed to think that there must be something in what you say, because +I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And +I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that +virtue can be taught. Will you be so good? + +That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as +an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I +argue out the question? + +To this several of the company answered that he should choose for +himself. + +Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting. + +Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when +the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned +them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the +interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the +light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and +to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said +to Prometheus: 'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed, +and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave +strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; +some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter +some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their +size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the +air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape. +Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from +becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by +one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against +the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins +sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist +the summer heat, so that they might have a natural bed of their own when +they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and +hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties +of food,--herb of the soil to some, to others fruits of trees, and to +others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some +he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were +very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did +Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed +among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give,--and +when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly +perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to +inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were +suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had +neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching when +man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, +not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts +of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have +been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had +the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had +not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus +did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, +who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into +the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to +practise their favourite arts, and carried off Hephaestus' art of +working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And +in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is +said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder +of Epimetheus. + +Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the +only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their +kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long +in inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses +and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus +provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. +But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, +for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only +sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable +them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet +the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while +the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they +were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated +one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction. +Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he +sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering +principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation. +Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among +men:--Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is +to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual having enough of +medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? 'Shall this be the +manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or +shall I give them to all?' 'To all,' said Zeus; 'I should like them all +to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the +virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he +who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he +is a plague of the state.' + +And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind +in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other +mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and +when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be +not of the favoured few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when +they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by +way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks +of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to +share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this +were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this +phenomenon. + +And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that +all men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of +every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is +this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good +flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, +people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations +think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in +question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is +dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth +about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to +be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought +to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is +out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must +have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not +to be in the world. + +I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a +counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every +man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that +they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow +spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to +a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or +be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature +or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what +they are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise +or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this +reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work +of nature and of chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good +qualities which are attained by study and exercise and teaching, and +has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and +punish and reprove him--of these evil qualities one is impiety, another +injustice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of +political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another, and +reprimand him,--clearly because he thinks that by study and learning, +the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. If you will +think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that +in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes +the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done +wrong,--only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But +he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a +past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is +desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, +may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of +prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being +taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either +privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like +other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil +doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who +think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have +shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are +right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics, +and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and +acquired. + +There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the +sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the +knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, +but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish +themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the +argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality +of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city +at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution +of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality, +and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, +or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, +manly virtue--if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers, +and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything +else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a +grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment +he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment +is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is +incurable--if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught +other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct +would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable +of being taught and cultivated both in private and public; and, +notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance +of which does not involve the punishment of death: but greater things, +of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no +training or knowledge of them--aye, and confiscation as well as death, +and, in a word, may be the ruin of families--those things, I say, they +are supposed not to teach them,--not to take the utmost care that they +should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates! + +Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and +last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are +vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as +ever he is able to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say +or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and +that is unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, +that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and +good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of +bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and +enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and +music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has +learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as +before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the +works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in +these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and +encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart, +in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like +them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their +young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they +have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of +other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set +to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the +children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and +harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action; +for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then +they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies +may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be +compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any +other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and +those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to +school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, +the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the +pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as +in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style +for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes +him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the +invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time; these are given +to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is +commanding or obeying; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected, +or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in +your country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men +to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and +public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue +can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more +surprising. + +But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There +is nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the +existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private +possession. If so--and nothing can be truer--then I will further ask +you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of +knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the +existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we +were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody +was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and +reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches +justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other +arts, but imparting them--for all of us have a mutual interest in the +justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one +is so ready to teach justice and the laws;--suppose, I say, that there +were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one +another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good +flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad +ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished +or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as +flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a +bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players +would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and +unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have +you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who +have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just +man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had +no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them +which compelled them to practise virtue--with the savages, for example, +whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's +Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters +in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and +Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality +of this part of the world. You, Socrates, are discontented, and why? +Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his +ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who +teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or +you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art +which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen +have taught them to the best of their ability,--but who will carry +them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, +Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty +in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true +of virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to +promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A +teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men +to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my +pupils their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess. +And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment:--When +a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no +compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and +take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than +he declares to be their value. + +Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I +endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the +opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are +not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having +bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who +are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are +nothing in comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons +of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus +and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of +them. + +Protagoras ended, and in my ear + +'So charming left his voice, that I the while Thought him still +speaking; still stood fixed to hear (Borrowed by Milton, "Paradise +Lost".).' + +At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, +not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at +Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful +I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the +speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no +human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still +one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily +explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and +consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he +might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question +to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask; +and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they +go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they +are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them; +whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has +already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly; +and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very +rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question, +which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were +saying that virtue can be taught;--that I will take upon your authority, +and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at +one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You +were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several +times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, +and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made +up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, +of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all +these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt +which still lingers in my mind. + +There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of +which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one. + +And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and +eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of +gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being +larger or smaller? + +I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are +related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole +face. + +And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a +man has one part, must he also have all the others? + +By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and +not wise. + +You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of +virtue? + +Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the +parts. + +And they are all different from one another? I said. + +Yes. + +And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the +face;--the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same +functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either +in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the +comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ +from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is +clearly what the simile would imply. + +Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ. + +Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like +justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness? + +No, he answered. + +Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. +And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a +thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also? + +Mine also, he said. + +And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and +you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is +it just or unjust?'--and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me +or against me? + +With you, he said. + +Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the +nature of the just: would not you? + +Yes, he said. + +And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a +thing as holiness?'--we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken? + +Yes, he said. + +Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing--should we not say so? + +He assented. + +'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or +of the nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a +question, and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness +is not holy.' What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way? + +Certainly, he said. + +And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you +saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you +seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as +one another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not, +as you imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave +the answer.' And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this +true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike +another, and is this your position?'--how would you answer him? + +I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates. + +Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that +he proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of +justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of +unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore +of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy': how shall we answer him? +I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, +and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your +behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with +holiness, or very nearly the same; and above all I would assert that +justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that +you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your +behalf, and whether you would agree with me. + +He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that +justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be +a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and +let us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is +just. + +Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will' +sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I +mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.' + +Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, +for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every +other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like +soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even +the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and +have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, +and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they +are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one +another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to +be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however +slight, unlike. + +And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and +holiness have but a small degree of likeness? + +Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your +view. + +Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take +another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the +existence of folly? + +I do. + +And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly? + +That is true, he said. + +And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be +temperate? + +Yes, he said. + +And temperance makes them temperate? + +Certainly. + +And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are +not temperate? + +I agree, he said. + +Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately? + +He assented. + +And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by +temperance? + +He agreed. + +And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is +weakly done, by weakness? + +He assented. + +And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is +done with slowness, slowly? + +He assented again. + +And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that +which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite? + +He agreed. + +Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful? + +Yes. + +To which the only opposite is the ugly? + +There is no other. + +And is there anything good? + +There is. + +To which the only opposite is the evil? + +There is no other. + +And there is the acute in sound? + +True. + +To which the only opposite is the grave? + +There is no other, he said, but that. + +Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more? + +He assented. + +Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we +admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one? + +We did so. + +And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by +opposites? + +Yes. + +And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in +the opposite way to that which was done temperately? + +Yes. + +And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that +which was done foolishly by folly? + +He agreed. + +And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites? + +Yes. + +And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly? + +Yes. + +And in opposite ways? + +Certainly. + +And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance? + +Clearly. + +And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be +the opposite of wisdom? + +He assented. + +And we said that everything has only one opposite? + +Yes. + +Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One +says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is +distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and +that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves +and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two +assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly +not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said +to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not +more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two +opposites--wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What +else would you say? + +He assented, but with great reluctance. + +Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness +appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we +must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man +can be temperate in his injustice? + +I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which +nevertheless many may be found to assert. + +And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied. + +I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if +you will. + +Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you +are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the +argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer +may both be put on our trial. + +Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the +argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer. + +Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that +some men are temperate, and yet unjust? + +Yes, he said; let that be admitted. + +And temperance is good sense? + +Yes. + +And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice? + +Granted. + +If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed? + +If they succeed. + +And you would admit the existence of goods? + +Yes. + +And is the good that which is expedient for man? + +Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be +inexpedient, and yet I call them good. + +I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed +to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my +business, and gently said:-- + +When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean +inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the +latter good? + +Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things--meats, +drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient +for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither +expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for +oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for +trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as +for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots +of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young +branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all +plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with +the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body +generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable +is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the +outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and +for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of +oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to +extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces. + +When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: +Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long +speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I +had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have +had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask +you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you. + +What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make +them too short? + +Certainly not, I said. + +But short enough? + +Yes, I said. + +Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to +you to be short enough? + +I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about +the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with +such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if +you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method. + +Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had +followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you +want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name +of Protagoras would have been nowhere. + +I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he +would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I +considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; +so I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you +if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such +a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as +is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have +discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are +a master of wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish +that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought +to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see +that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent +my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another +place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you. + +Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the +right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. +He said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will +be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as +there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you +and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure. + +Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, +I replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love +your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, +if I could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great +an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of +Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course +runners. To such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same +of my own legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want +to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his +speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in +like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must +ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at +first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one +thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion. + +But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to +speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours. + +Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true +statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot +make a speech--in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should +be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of +holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make +a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in +argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a +superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer--not, when +a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of +answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers +forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget--I +will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a +bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than +Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks. + +When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one--Critias, I believe--went on +to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan +of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take +the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of +Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break +up the discussion. + +Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those +who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of +both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the +same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet +an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a +higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well +as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, +which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for +friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and +enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this +way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and +not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere +conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere +expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction. +And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for +gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but +pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily +delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his +words. + +Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I +reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not +by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant +of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against +nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature +of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met +together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the +greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to +show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with +one another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, +Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be +your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and +extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let +go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming +to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail +set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean +observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to +choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your +words and will prescribe their proper length. + +This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; +Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose +an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be +unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or +worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither +would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what +will be the use of choosing him? And if you say, 'Let us have a better +then,'--to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than +Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom +you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an +inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far +as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let +me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and +discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to +answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at +the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have +answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner +answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise +question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you +entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no +special arbiter--all of you shall be arbiters. + +This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against +his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he +had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn +those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions +as follows:-- + +I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the +principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of +knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, +and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the +reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which +you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as +before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides +says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian: + +'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square +in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.' + +Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole? + +There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the +ode,--I have made a careful study of it. + +Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, +and true? + +Yes, I said, both good and true. + +But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true? + +No, not in that case, I replied. + +And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect. + +Well, my friend, I have reflected. + +And does not the poet proceed to say, 'I do not agree with the word of +Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good'? +Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet. + +I know it. + +And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent? + +Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that +there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise? + +Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising +as his own thought, 'Hardly can a man become truly good'; and then a +little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and +refusing to agree with him, when he says, 'Hardly can a man be good,' +which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the +same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in +his first or his second assertion. + +Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first +giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert +boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to +confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of +the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, +I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his +aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when +beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying: + +'Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero (Il.).' + +And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of +Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application +of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish 'will' +and 'wish,' and make other charming distinctions like those which you +drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with +me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of +Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your +opinion, Prodicus, 'being' is the same as 'becoming.' + +Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus. + +Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that 'Hardly can a +man become truly good'? + +Quite right, said Prodicus. + +And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating +that which he says himself, but for saying something different from +himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man +become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would +maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if +they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. +I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says, + + 'On the one hand, hardly can a man become good, + For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil, + But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height, + Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy + --(Works and Days).' + +Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, +Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence +which you are correcting. + +Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but +aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure. + +Such is the fact, he said. + +How so? I asked. + +The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say +that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all +things, can be easily retained. + +Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at +the right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, +is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as +Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear +to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. +And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard' +(chalepon) in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct +you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word 'awful' (deinon) as a +term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one else is an 'awfully' +wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good +'awful'; and then he explains to me that the term 'awful' is always +taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being 'awfully' healthy +or wealthy, or of 'awful' peace, but of 'awful' disease, 'awful' war, +'awful' poverty, meaning by the term 'awful,' evil. And I think that +Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they spoke of 'hard' meant +'evil,' or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus, +for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of +Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term 'hard'? + +Evil, said Prodicus. + +And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is +the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good. + +Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting +Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has +been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural. + +Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? +And have you an answer for him? + +You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very +well that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean, +not evil, but that which is not easy--that which takes a great deal of +trouble: of this I am positive. + +I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning +of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but +he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your +thesis; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly +proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now +he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards +proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the +attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus +would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very +unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you, I said, what I +imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will +test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; +or if you would rather, I will be the listener. + +To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please;--and Hippias, +Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed. + +Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about +this poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more +cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and +there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in +the world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and +they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it +thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom +Protagoras was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that +if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be +practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been +discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, +who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the +caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short +cloaks; for they imagine that these are the practices which have +enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the +Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their +wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they +drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen +to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical seance unknown +to strangers; and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into +other cities--in this they are like the Cretans--in order that they may +not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon +and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high +cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to +the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation: If +a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him +seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the +discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of +meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems +to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former +ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the +love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are +conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such +expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and +Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and +Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the +Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples +of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that +their wisdom was of this character; consisting of short memorable +sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and +dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits +of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men's +mouths--'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing too much.' + +Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity +was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of +Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of +the wise, 'Hard is it to be good.' And Simonides, who was ambitious of +the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, +then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would +carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, +he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging +Pittacus and his saying. + +Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking +the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first +words of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he +inserted (Greek) 'on the one hand' ('on the one hand to become good is +hard'); there would be no reason for the introduction of (Greek), +unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words +of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying 'Hard is it to be good,' and he, in +refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, +is to become good, not joining 'truly' with 'good,' but with 'hard.' +Not, that the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some +truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly +good (this would be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of +Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word +'truly' (Greek), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us +imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): 'O my +friends,' says Pittacus, 'hard is it to be good,' and Simonides answers, +'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not to be good, +but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet +and mind, without a flaw--that is hard truly.' This way of reading the +passage accounts for the insertion of (Greek) 'on the one hand,' and for +the position at the end of the clause of the word 'truly,' and all that +follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be said +in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of +workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would be tedious. I +should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, +which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the +saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on +as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming +good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having +become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, +affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this +blessing; 'but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances +overpowers him.' Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in +the command of a vessel?--not the private individual, for he is always +overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown, +and only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be +laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him +who, at some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at +all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot +helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician; +for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses:-- + +'The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.' + +But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the +force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and +virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, +'Hard is it to be good.' Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and +yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility-- + +'For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.' + +But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes +a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of +well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the +art of healing the sick. 'But he who does ill is the bad.' Now who +becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a +physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a +bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of +doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or +anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician +at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good +may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident +(the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad +man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to +become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the +poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously +good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again +that + +'They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.' + +All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he +adds:-- + +'Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in +searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly +faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed +earth: if I find him, I will send you word.' + +(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus +throughout the whole poem): + +'But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love;--not even the +gods war against necessity.' + +All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to +say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there +were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will +allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil +and dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do +evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides +never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word +'voluntarily' applies to himself. For he was under the impression that +a good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and +to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an +involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or +mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or +country have any defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find +fault with them and expose and denounce them to others, under the idea +that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task +and accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than +they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by +them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and +constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he +is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself +to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is +probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify +a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply +to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is censorious. + +'For I am satisfied' he says, 'when a man is neither bad nor very +stupid; and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and +is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to +finding fault, and there are innumerable fools' + +(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant +opportunity of finding fault). + +'All things are good with which evil is unmingled.' + +In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good +which have no evil in them, as you might say 'All things are white which +have no black in them,' for that would be ridiculous; but he means to +say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate +state. + +('I do not hope' he says, 'to find a perfectly blameless man among those +who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, +I will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is +moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and +approve every one') + +(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, epainemi (approve), +because he is addressing Pittacus, + + 'Who love and APPROVE every one VOLUNTARILY, who does no evil:' + +and that the stop should be put after 'voluntarily'); 'but there are +some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would +never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; +but I do blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are +speaking falsely about the highest matters.'--And this, I said, Prodicus +and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem. + +Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good +explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of +my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me. + +Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At +present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and +Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, +Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that +Socrates should ask. + +I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but +I would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, +and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first, +Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the +poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar +company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or +amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own +voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price +of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a +flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among +them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education, +you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and +they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's +conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they +carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very +liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men +such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or +of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they +are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has +one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in +dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline, +and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the proof +in conversation. And these are the models which I desire that you and I +should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try +the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. +If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, +do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing +our unfinished argument. + +I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would +not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to +Callias, and said:--Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in +refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly +think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, +or distinctly refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and +then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest +of the company will be free to talk with one another. + +I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of +Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were +superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask +and he would answer. + +So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in +asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For +I think that Homer was very right in saying that + + 'When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),' + +for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; +but if a man + + 'Sees a thing when he is alone,' + +he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he +may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would +rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that +no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be +expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, +but you?--who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many +are this, and yet have not the power of making others good--whereas you +are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. +Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other +Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas +that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are +the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than +invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and +consult with you? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have +my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you +at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not +mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage +and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of +the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a +peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you +replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but +that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were +parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like +each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of +the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another, +and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether +this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your +meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different +statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in +order to make trial of me. + +I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of +virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and +that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the +other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are +utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless +remarkable for their courage. + +Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave +men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature? + +Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are +afraid to approach. + +In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which +good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher. + +Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right +mind. + +And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good? + +Wholly good, and in the highest degree. + +Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well? + +I should say, the divers. + +And the reason of this is that they have knowledge? + +Yes, that is the reason. + +And who have confidence when fighting on horseback--the skilled horseman +or the unskilled? + +The skilled. + +And who when fighting with light shields--the peltasts or the +nonpeltasts? + +The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is +your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who +have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned +than before. + +And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, +and yet confident about them? + +Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident. + +And are not these confident persons also courageous? + +In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of +whom we are speaking are surely madmen. + +Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident? + +Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere. + +And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really +not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most +confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon +that view again wisdom will be courage. + +Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of +what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that +the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the +confident are the courageous; if you had asked me, I should have +answered 'Not all of them': and what I did answer you have not proved to +be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge +are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more +courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to +think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you +might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking +whether the strong are able, and I should say 'Yes'; and then whether +those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those +who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had +learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might +use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is +strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than +in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that +the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and +strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or +rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body. +And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not +the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all +the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and +also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from +nature and the healthy state of the soul. + +I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others +ill? + +He assented. + +And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief? + +He does not. + +But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that +case have lived well? + +He will. + +Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil? + +Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable. + +And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant +things evil and some painful things good?--for I am rather disposed to +say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no +consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are +bad. + +I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in +that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful +the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the +whole of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that +there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are +some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and +that there are some which are neither good nor evil. + +And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in +pleasure or create pleasure? + +Certainly, he said. + +Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; +and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself. + +According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, 'Let us reflect +about this,' he said; and if the reflection is to the point, and the +result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will +agree; but if not, then we will argue. + +And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin? + +You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the +discussion. + +May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring +into the health or some other bodily quality of another:--he looks at +his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your +chest and back to me that I may have a better view:--that is the sort of +thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion +is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind +to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may +know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the +world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or +of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, +and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, +or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,--just as if knowledge +were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? +or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which +cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the +difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to +knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him? + +I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, +above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the +highest of human things. + +Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world +are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the +things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most +persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act +contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of +those affections which I was just now mentioning. + +Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which +mankind are in error. + +Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them +what is the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by +pleasure,' and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always +do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and +are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and +Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called 'being +overcome by pleasure,' pray, what is it, and by what name would you +describe it? + +But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the +many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them? + +I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how +courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to +abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, +our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; +but if not, never mind. + +You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have +begun. + +Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What +account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed +being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras +and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and +drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing +them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that +they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose +that you and I were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say +that they are evil,--in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the +moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils +in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil +consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure +of whatever nature?'--Would they not answer that they are not evil +on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on +account of the after consequences--diseases and the like? + +I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as +you do. + +And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty +do they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not +mistaken? + +Protagoras assented. + +Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil +for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of +other pleasures:--there again they would agree? + +We both of us thought that they would. + +And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and +say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean +remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and +the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are +these the things which are good but painful?'--they would assent to me? + +He agreed. + +'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate +suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and +improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states +and power over others and wealth?'--they would agree to the latter +alternative, if I am not mistaken? + +He assented. + +'Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in +pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other +standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?'--they would +acknowledge that they were not? + +I think so, said Protagoras. + +'And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an +evil?' + +He assented. + +'Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even +pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it +gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call +pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be +able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.' + +I do not think that they have, said Protagoras. + +'And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a +good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives +pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other +than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a +good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.' + +True, said Protagoras. + +Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: 'Why do you spend many +words and speak in many ways on this subject?' Excuse me, friends, I +should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining +the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure'; and the whole +argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in +which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than +pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having +a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are +unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, +hear the consequences:--If what you say is true, then the argument is +absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might +abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, +when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he +is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will +be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant +and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call +them by two names--first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. +Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he +does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the +first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to +ask. And we shall not be able to reply 'By pleasure,' for the name of +pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we +shall only say that he is overcome. 'By what?' he will reiterate. By the +good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner +will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, 'That is +too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he +ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because +the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil'? And in answer +to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had +been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not +have been wrong. 'But how,' he will reply, 'can the good be unworthy +of the evil, or the evil of the good'? Is not the real explanation +that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and +smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of +being overcome--'what do you mean,' he will say, 'but that you choose +the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?' Admitted. And now +substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, +not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does +what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, +which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations +of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they +become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? +For if any one says: 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs +widely from future pleasure and pain'--To that I should reply: And do +they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no +other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the +balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance, +and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh +pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or +if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if +pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which +the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near +or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in +which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my +friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this. + +He agreed with me. + +Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me +a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when +near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. +And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in +themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. +They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing +or choosing the greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less, +what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of +measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is +not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and +take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our +actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of +measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing +the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth, +and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge +that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement? + +Yes, he said, the art of measurement. + +Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of +odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the +greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and +whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our +lives? Would not knowledge?--a knowledge of measuring, when the question +is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the +question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not? + +Protagoras himself thought that they would. + +Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human +life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and +pains,--in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and +the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a +consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to +each other? + +This is undeniably true. + +And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and +science? + +They will agree, he said. + +The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future +consideration; but the existence of such a science furnishes a +demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and +Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember, +both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge, +and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over +pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got +the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow +this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning +of being overcome by pleasure if not this?--tell us what you call such a +state:--if we had immediately and at the time answered 'Ignorance,' +you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be +laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their +choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and +evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err, +not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular +knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the +erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This, +therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure;--ignorance, and +that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias +declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are +under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that +the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves, +nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these +things--you take care of your money and give them none; and the result +is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life:--Let us +suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I should +like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for +the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I +am speaking the truth or not? + +They all thought that what I said was entirely true. + +Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful +evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his +distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, +delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them, +I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the +words. + +Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others. + +Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions +honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless +and pleasant? The honourable work is also useful and good? + +This was admitted. + +Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under +the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also +attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man +to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself +is wisdom. + +They all assented. + +And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about +important matters? + +To this also they unanimously assented. + +Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks +to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when +a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the +greater when he may have the less. + +All of us agreed to every word of this. + +Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, +Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree +with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil. + +Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and +not terror. + +Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former +assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is +not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission +which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears +to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he +thinks to be evil? + +That also was universally admitted. + +Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I +would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he +said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his +first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five +parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them +had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to +the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four +were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage, +differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following +proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, +and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most +courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other +parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I +am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you. +So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he +replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that +this was your answer.) + +He assented. + +Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to +go--against the same dangers as the cowards? + +No, he answered. + +Then against something different? + +Yes, he said. + +Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there +is danger? + +Yes, Socrates, so men say. + +Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that +the courageous are ready to go--against dangers, believing them to be +dangers, or not against dangers? + +No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous +argument to be impossible. + +That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly +proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the +want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown +to be ignorance. + +He assented. + +And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about +which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly +and the courageous go to meet the same things. + +And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the +opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is +ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready. + +And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said. + +Honourable, he replied. + +And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all +honourable actions we have admitted to be good. + +That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere. + +True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are +unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing? + +The cowards, he replied. + +And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant? + +It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied. + +And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, +and better? + +The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions. + +But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and +pleasanter, and nobler? + +That must be admitted. + +And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence? + +True, he replied. + +And if not base, then honourable? + +He admitted this. + +And if honourable, then good? + +Yes. + +But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the +contrary, are base? + +He assented. + +And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and +uninstructedness? + +True, he said. + +Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it +cowardice or courage? + +I should say cowardice, he replied. + +And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of +dangers? + +Assuredly, he said. + +And because of that ignorance they are cowards? + +He assented. + +And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice? + +He again assented. + +Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice? + +He nodded assent. + +But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice? + +Yes. + +Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to +the ignorance of them? + +To that again he nodded assent. + +And the ignorance of them is cowardice? + +To that he very reluctantly nodded assent. + +And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and +is opposed to the ignorance of these things? + +At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent. + +And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras? + +Finish the argument by yourself, he said. + +I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether +you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most +courageous? + +You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and +therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be +impossible consistently with the argument. + +My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the +desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were +clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried +on at great length by both of us--you affirming and I denying that +virtue can be taught--would also become clear. The result of our +discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human +voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: 'Protagoras +and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were +saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your +attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and +temperance, and courage,--which tends to show that virtue can certainly +be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras +attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue +is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but +suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other +hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to +prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it +must be quite incapable of being taught.' Now I, Protagoras, perceiving +this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they +should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until +we ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being taught or not, +lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument, +as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your +Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these +questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no +objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the +enquiry. + +Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the +last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy +and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you +above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I +believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come +back to the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn +to something else. + +By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since +to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried +because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the +conversation ended, and we went our way. + + + + + +End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Protagoras, by Plato + +*** END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROTAGORAS *** + +***** This file should be named 1591.txt or 1591.zip ***** +This and all associated files of various formats will be found in: + http://www.gutenberg.org/1/5/9/1591/ + +Produced by Sue Asscher + +Updated editions will replace the previous one--the old editions +will be renamed. + +Creating the works from public domain print editions means that no +one owns a United States copyright in these works, so the Foundation +(and you!) can copy and distribute it in the United States without +permission and without paying copyright royalties. Special rules, +set forth in the General Terms of Use part of this license, apply to +copying and distributing Project Gutenberg-tm electronic works to +protect the PROJECT GUTENBERG-tm concept and trademark. 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FOR PUBLIC DOMAIN ETEXTS*Ver.04.29.93*END* + + + + + +This etext was prepared by Sue Asscher <asschers@aia.net.au> + + + + + +PROTAGORAS + +by Plato + + + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett + + + + +INTRODUCTION. + +The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the +mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place +between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias--'the man who +had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the world'--and in +which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had also shared, as +well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a few words--in the +presence of a distinguished company consisting of disciples of Protagoras +and of leading Athenians belonging to the Socratic circle. The dialogue +commences with a request on the part of Hippocrates that Socrates would +introduce him to the celebrated teacher. He has come before the dawn had +risen--so fervid is his zeal. Socrates moderates his excitement and +advises him to find out 'what Protagoras will make of him,' before he +becomes his pupil. + +They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining +the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question, 'What he will +make of Hippocrates.' Protagoras answers, 'That he will make him a better +and a wiser man.' 'But in what will he be better?'--Socrates desires to +have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, 'That he will teach him +prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science or knowledge +of human life.' + +This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession; but he is or rather would +have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if Protagoras had +not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because the Athenian +people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction between the +skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not distinguish between the +trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest and best +Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue. Will +Protagoras answer these objections? + +Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which, after +Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending Hermes to +them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not, like the +arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to be partakers of +them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in distinguishing between +the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not between skilled and +unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the political virtues to a +certain degree, and are obliged to say that they have them, whether they +have them or not. A man would be thought a madman who professed an art +which he did not know; but he would be equally thought a madman if he did +not profess a virtue which he had not. (2) And that the political virtues +can be taught and acquired, in the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by +the fact that they punish evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course +--mere retribution is for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would +parents who teach her sons lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common +duty of citizens? To the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, +that the education of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can +speak, and is continued by the state when they pass out of the parental +control. (4) Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have +foolish and worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private +possession of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the extent of +which each individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even +the worst of civilized mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare +them with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that there +are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a degree. Some, +like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this result we ought to +be satisfied. + +Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he +has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the +virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different +names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like the +parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part is +like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily made, +is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:-- + +'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness +opposed to one another?'--'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would +rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain +point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way +from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that +everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed to wisdom; +and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore temperance and +wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already admitted to be nearly +the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has now to be compared with +justice. + +Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process to +which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled by the +dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just. He +therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say, he +makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause of +the audience. + +Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on the +part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore he must +beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to accommodate +him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who thinks him +unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he takes himself +of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the two cases are not +parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak long; will Protagoras +in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak short? + +Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and then +by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias proposes an +umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he would rather +suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he will answer, and +that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will ask and Protagoras +shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant assent. + +Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which he +professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says, + +'Hard is it to become good,' + +and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.' How +is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem, is +embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman of +Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him into +absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (Greek) to be, and +(Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy. Then +the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean dialect. +To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims, Socrates slily +withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that his assent was +only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then proceeds to give +another and more elaborate explanation of the whole passage. The +explanation is as follows:-- + +The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which is +not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity, which +was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages. Now +Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who was +jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed to +controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but 'hard to +become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive manner +that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon Pittacus. This, +though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company, and meets with the +special approval of Hippias, who has however a favourite interpretation of +his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades to defer. + +The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of +Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be +allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's own +thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few +soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates, +and then the old question is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or +many?' To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of the +five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that the +fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine the +last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the admission +that all virtue is in the highest degree good:-- + +The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know +their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and are +still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates, +courage is knowledge--an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a +futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent +speech. + +Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to know +whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil? Protagoras +seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to this; he would +rather say that 'some pleasures are good, some pains are evil,' which is +also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What does he think of +knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that knowledge is +overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is power? Protagoras +agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power. + +This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that +many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the +influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really the +opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are evils +because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in +pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil is +the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes in +the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in order to +show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art of +mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved once more +to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the origin of +all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater, or the +greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument is drawn out +in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by Socrates and +Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world on the other. +Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the soundness of the +conclusion. + +Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage--the only +virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic +dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through +ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:--because they +form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the +courageous willing to go to war?--because they form a right estimate of +pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then is +knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which were +originally maintained to have five different natures, after having been +easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The assent of +Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty. + +Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth, and +remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had changed +sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying, the +teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that virtue +is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while Protagoras +has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and this is almost +equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is not satisfied +with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with the help of +Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is, and (2) Whether +virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer, but commends +Socrates' earnestness and his style of discussion. + +The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These are +partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are (1) +Chronological,--which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus, and +are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the impossibility +of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one time, whether in the +year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like all writers of fiction, +aims only at the probable, and shows in many Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium +and Republic, and already in the Laches) an extreme disregard of the +historical accuracy which is sometimes demanded of him. (2) The exact +place of the Protagoras among the Dialogues, and the date of composition, +have also been much disputed. But there are no criteria which afford any +real grounds for determining the date of composition; and the affinities of +the Dialogues, when they are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to +a great extent remain uncertain. (3) There is another class of +difficulties, which may be ascribed to preconceived notions of +commentators, who imagine that Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in +the wrong, and his adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that +passage--e.g. in the explanation of good as pleasure--Plato is inconsistent +with himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper +beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato is a +dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument, +and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with freedom, +and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject; also that +his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and far-off and +opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or definite +results. + +The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work, which, +as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect piece of art. +There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of philosophy broken +and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils thrown over truths +which are lightly suggested, and all woven together in a single design, and +moving towards one end. + +In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great +personage' is about to appear on the stage; perhaps with a further view of +showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who makes +no pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates thinks +proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,' of which the +invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself. Hippocrates readily +adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall learn of Protagoras only +the accomplishments which befit an Athenian gentleman, and let alone his +'sophistry.' There is nothing however in the introduction which leads to +the inference that Plato intended to blacken the character of the Sophists; +he only makes a little merry at their expense. + +The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest. He +is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him--at the house of the rich +Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the Athenians. +He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly mentions his +own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in answer to the +favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received pay. He is +remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout the discussion +under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination of Socrates. +Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue the discussion, +he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to be, as he says of +himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.' + +Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this +pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect is +that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between him +and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false, but of +the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and argument; +also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the Sophists. +There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as of Socrates; but +the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and common maxims of +morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical or transcendental, and +though full of meaning and insight, hardly intelligible to the rest of +mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual contrast between the Sophists +representing average public opinion and Socrates seeking for increased +clearness and unity of ideas. But to a great extent Protagoras has the +best of the argument and represents the better mind of man. + +For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity +about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth; (2) he is +clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which Socrates +himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede); and also (3) +in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have bad sons; (4) +he is right also in observing that the virtues are not like the arts, gifts +or attainments of special individuals, but the common property of all: +this, which in all ages has been the strength and weakness of ethics and +politics, is deeply seated in human nature; (5) there is a sort of half- +truth in the notion that all civilized men are teachers of virtue; and more +than a half-truth (6) in ascribing to man, who in his outward conditions is +more helpless than the other animals, the power of self-improvement; (7) +the religious allegory should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be +given by Prometheus (who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the +political virtues could only be imparted by Zeus; (8) in the latter part of +the Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that 'pleasure is the only good,' +Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain that +'some pleasures only are good;' and admits that 'he, above all other men, +is bound to say "that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of human +things."' + +There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an +imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the +Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them. Nor is +there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical character, +paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity of virtue and +knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this even on a +calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere in Plato, in +his intellectual superiority. + +The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of virtue. +In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and knowledge +is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are one, then virtue +can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the beginning. Had +Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian distinction, and +say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied with knowledge; or to +point out with Aristotle that the same quality may have more than one +opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny that good is a mere +exchange of a greater pleasure for a less--the unity of virtue and the +identity of virtue and knowledge would have required to be proved by other +arguments. + +The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when their +minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him after two +or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the first part of +the Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does he appear at any +disadvantage when subjected to 'the question' by Protagoras. He succeeds +in making his two 'friends,' Prodicus and Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he +also makes a long speech in defence of the poem of Simonides, after the +manner of the Sophists, showing, as Alcibiades says, that he is only +pretending to have a bad memory, and that he and not Protagoras is really a +master in the two styles of speaking; and that he can undertake, not one +side of the argument only, but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. +Against the authority of the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously +identified himself at the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up +the proverbial philosophers and those masters of brevity the +Lacedaemonians. The poets, the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at +the same time. + +Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us to +answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of +Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given +by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconcilement offered by +Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which were +practised by the Sophists--for the following reasons: (1) The transparent +irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates. (2) The ludicrous +opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are described as the true +philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form of philosophy, evidently +with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches. (3) The manifest futility +and absurdity of the explanation of (Greek), which is hardly consistent +with the rational interpretation of the rest of the poem. The opposition +of (Greek) and (Greek) seems also intended to express the rival doctrines +of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a facetious commentary on their +differences. (4) The general treatment in Plato both of the Poets and the +Sophists, who are their interpreters, and whom he delights to identify with +them. (5) The depreciating spirit in which Socrates speaks of the +introduction of the poets as a substitute for original conversation, which +is intended to contrast with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them-- +this again is hardly consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) +the marked approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the +familiar sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is +represented as ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. +At the same time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation +of his own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were +only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the +interpreter. + +This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on the +tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in his own +day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts when +applied to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies, e.g. +with the two first speeches in the Phaedrus and with the Menexenus. +Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of +philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of the claims +advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the Laconizing set in +supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation because they bruise +their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really too bad,' that +Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (Greek), because he is addressing a +Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on those who spin +pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments of the Euthydemus and +of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is never withdrawn; and we are left in +doubt at last how far in this interpretation of Simonides Socrates is +'fooling,' how far he is in earnest. + +All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work like +the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of the scene +should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of Socrates in the +second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters to whom we are +introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a part more or less +conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who is compelled by the +necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending effectual aid to +Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of impartiality; Callias, here +as always inclining to the Sophists, but eager for any intellectual repast; +Prodicus, who finds an opportunity for displaying his distinctions of +language, which are valueless and pedantic, because they are not based on +dialectic; Hippias, who has previously exhibited his superficial knowledge +of natural philosophy, to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his +name, he now adds the profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two +latter personages have been already damaged by the mock heroic description +of them in the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is +consistently presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and +political virtue; there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which +are attributed to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of +the existence of the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is +the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue. Also +it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is consistent +with his own ironical character; he admits that the dialectic which has +overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to a conclusion opposed to +his first thesis. The force of argument, therefore, and not Socrates or +Protagoras, has won the day. + +But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught; +(2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of pleasures +and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an appearance +of paradox--they are really moments or aspects of the truth by the help of +which we pass from the old conventional morality to a higher conception of +virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught is a paradox of the +same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew nothing. Plato means +to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but must be drawn out of him; +and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses or citations from the poets. +The second question, whether the virtues are one or many, though at first +sight distinct, is really a part of the same subject; for if the virtues +are to be taught, they must be reducible to a common principle; and this +common principle is found to be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, +Socrates and Plato outstep the truth--they make a part of virtue into the +whole. Further, the nature of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a +knowledge of pleasures and pains, appears to us too superficial and at +variance with the spirit of Plato himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only +following the historical Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's +Memorabilia. Like Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one +common bond by which the virtues are united,--their tendency to produce +happiness,--though such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him. + +It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to the +other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely Socratic +works--perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of them--is +indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of reminiscence; +and also by the different attitude assumed towards the teaching and persons +of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The Charmides, Laches, +Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of knowledge to virtue, +and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies or sketches of the more +important work, at any rate as closely connected with it. The Io and the +lesser Hippias contain discussions of the Poets, which offer a parallel to +the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are conceived in a similar spirit. +The affinity of the Protagoras to the Meno is more doubtful. For there, +although the same question is discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' +and the relation of Meno to the Sophists is much the same as that of +Hippocrates, the answer to the question is supplied out of the doctrine of +ideas; the real Socrates is already passing into the Platonic one. At a +later stage of the Platonic philosophy we shall find that both the paradox +and the solution of it appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the +Gorgias, and the Philebus offer further corrections of the teaching of the +Protagoras; in all of them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that +pleasure is the chief or only good, is distinctly renounced. + +Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters of men +and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and philosophical +aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the way, which, as +Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable as the argument, +we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. This is +an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon as it was found; and +yet has to be recovered by every one for himself who would pass the limits +of proverbial and popular philosophy. The moral and intellectual are +always dividing, yet they must be reunited, and in the highest conception +of them are inseparable. The thesis of Socrates is not merely a hasty +assumption, but may be also deemed an anticipation of some 'metaphysic of +the future,' in which the divided elements of human nature are reconciled. + + +PROTAGORAS + +by + +Plato + +Translated by Benjamin Jowett. + + +PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: +Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue to his Companion. +Hippocrates, Alcibiades and Critias. +Protagoras, Hippias and Prodicus (Sophists). +Callias, a wealthy Athenian. + +SCENE: The House of Callias. + + +COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly ask +the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair +Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard +like a man,--and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I thought +that he was still very charming. + +SOCRATES: What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says + +'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears'? + +And that is now the charm of Alcibiades. + +COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him, +and was he gracious to you? + +SOCRATES: Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially to-day, +for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an argument. +But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to him, and +several times I quite forgot that he was present. + +COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between you +and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he is; +certainly not in this city of Athens. + +SOCRATES: Yes, much fairer. + +COMPANION: What do you mean--a citizen or a foreigner? + +SOCRATES: A foreigner. + +COMPANION: Of what country? + +SOCRATES: Of Abdera. + +COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love than +the son of Cleinias? + +SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend? + +COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one? + +SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are +willing to accord that title to Protagoras. + +COMPANION: What! Is Protagoras in Athens? + +SOCRATES: Yes; he has been here two days. + +COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him? + +SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things. + +COMPANION: Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down and +tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place to you. + +SOCRATES: To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening. + +COMPANION: Thank you, too, for telling us. + +SOCRATES: That is thank you twice over. Listen then:-- + +Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of +Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his +staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and bawled +out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep? + +I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring any +news? + +Good news, he said; nothing but good. + +Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither at +this unearthly hour? + +He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come. + +Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his +arrival? + +Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening. + +At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet, and +then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from Oenoe +whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as I meant to +have told you, if some other matter had not come in the way;--on my return, +when we had done supper and were about to retire to rest, my brother said +to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at once, and then I thought +that the night was far spent. But the moment sleep left me after my +fatigue, I got up and came hither direct. + +I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the +matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything? + +He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which he +keeps from me. + +But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him, he +will make you as wise as he is himself. + +Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all +that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is why +I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my behalf; +for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when he visited +Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him, Socrates; he is +reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There is no reason why we +should not go to him at once, and then we shall find him at home. He +lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus: let us start. + +I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us +rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break; +when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at home, +and we shall be sure to find him; never fear. + +Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that I +would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him and +put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going to +Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom you +are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had thought +of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to give him +your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money to your +namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that you give him +money? how would you have answered? + +I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician. + +And what will he make of you? + +A physician, he said. + +And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias the +Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had asked +you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them this +money?--how would you have answered? + +I should have answered, that they were statuaries. + +And what will they make of you? + +A statuary, of course. + +Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready to +pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we can +gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we are to +spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while we are +thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to us: Tell +me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and why are you +going to pay him money,--how should we answer? I know that Pheidias is a +sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation is given to +Protagoras? how is he designated? + +They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied. + +Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist? + +Certainly. + +But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about +yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him? + +He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning to +dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from the +former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me. + +By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before the +Hellenes in the character of a Sophist? + +Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am. + +But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of Protagoras +is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way that you +learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer, not with the +view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part of education, +and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know them? + +Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the +teaching of Protagoras. + +I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing? + +And what am I doing? + +You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a +Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if +not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and +whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil. + +I certainly think that I do know, he replied. + +Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is? + +I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name +implies. + +And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the carpenter +also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person were to +ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what relates +to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And if he were +further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what is the +manufacture over which he presides?--how should we answer him? + +How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but +that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent? + +Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the answer +a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a man talk +eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a man talk +eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is about playing +the lyre. Is not that true? + +Yes. + +Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him +eloquent in that which he understands? + +Yes, that may be assumed. + +And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know? + +Indeed, he said, I cannot tell. + +Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you +are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who +might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask the +opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to whether +you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is in +question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body, and upon +the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your all,--about this +you never consulted either with your father or with your brother or with +any one of us who are your companions. But no sooner does this foreigner +appear, than you instantly commit your soul to his keeping. In the +evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the morning you go to him, +never deliberating or taking the opinion of any one as to whether you ought +to intrust yourself to him or not;--you have quite made up your mind that +you will at all hazards be a pupil of Protagoras, and are prepared to +expend all the property of yourself and of your friends in carrying out at +any price this determination, although, as you admit, you do not know him, +and have never spoken with him: and you call him a Sophist, but are +manifestly ignorant of what a Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit +yourself to his keeping. + +When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can +be drawn from your words. + +I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or +retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature. + +And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul? + +Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take care, +my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises what he +sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food of the body; +for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without knowing what are +really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their customers know, with the +exception of any trainer or physician who may happen to buy of them. In +like manner those who carry about the wares of knowledge, and make the +round of the cities, and sell or retail them to any customer who is in want +of them, praise them all alike; though I should not wonder, O my friend, if +many of them were really ignorant of their effect upon the soul; and their +customers equally ignorant, unless he who buys of them happens to be a +physician of the soul. If, therefore, you have understanding of what is +good and evil, you may safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; +but if not, then, O my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest +interests at a game of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying +knowledge than in buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the +wholesale or retail dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and +before you receive them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home +and call in any experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or +drunken, and what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of +purchasing them is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge +and carry them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must +receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or +greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel with +our elders; for we are still young--too young to determine such a matter. +And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras; and when we +have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of others; for not only +is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there is Hippias of Elis, and, +if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and several other wise men. + +To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the vestibule +of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a discussion which +had arisen between us as we were going along; and we stood talking in the +vestibule until we had finished and come to an understanding. And I think +that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and who was probably annoyed at the +great inroad of the Sophists, must have heard us talking. At any rate, +when we knocked at the door, and he opened and saw us, he grumbled: They +are Sophists--he is not at home; and instantly gave the door a hearty bang +with both his hands. Again we knocked, and he answered without opening: +Did you not hear me say that he is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I +said, you need not be alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we are not come +to see Callias, but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to +announce us. At last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was +persuaded to open the door. + +When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and +next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus, and +Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his half- +brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of him were +Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son of Philomelus; +also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples of Protagoras is the +most famous, and intends to make sophistry his profession. A train of +listeners followed him; the greater part of them appeared to be foreigners, +whom Protagoras had brought with him out of the various cities visited by +him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus, attracting them his voice, and they +following (Compare Rep.). I should mention also that there were some +Athenians in the company. Nothing delighted me more than the precision of +their movements: they never got into his way at all; but when he and those +who were with him turned back, then the band of listeners parted regularly +on either side; he was always in front, and they wheeled round and took +their places behind him in perfect order. + +After him, as Homer says (Od.), 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias the +Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and around him +were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus the +Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there were strangers +whom he had brought with him from his native city of Elis, and some others: +they were putting to Hippias certain physical and astronomical questions, +and he, ex cathedra, was determining their several questions to them, and +discoursing of them. + +Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus (Od.);' for Prodicus the Cean was at Athens: +he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus, was a +storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this out and +made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped +up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed to be a great heap; +and there was sitting by him on the couches near, Pausanias of the deme of +Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite young, who is certainly +remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not mistaken, is also of a fair +and gentle nature. I thought that I heard him called Agathon, and my +suspicion is that he is the beloved of Pausanias. There was this youth, +and also there were the two Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the +other of Leucolophides, and some others. I was very anxious to hear what +Prodicus was saying, for he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man; +but I was not able to get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice +made an echo in the room which rendered his words inaudible. + +No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the beautiful, +as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of Callaeschrus. + +On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then walked +up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates and I have +come to see you. + +Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the +company? + +Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard the +purpose of our visit. + +And what is your purpose? he said. + +I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian; he +is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and he is +himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own age. I +believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks that +conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And now you can +determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your teaching alone or +in the presence of the company. + +Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a +stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower of +the youth in them to leave company of their kinsmen or any other +acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they +will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great +jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many +enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe, of +great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing this +odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names, some under that +of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some, of hierophants and +prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as I observe, even under the +name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of Tarentum, or the more recently +celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria and formerly of Megara, who is a +first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles pretended to be a musician, but +was really an eminent Sophist; also Pythocleides the Cean; and there were +many others; and all of them, as I was saying, adopted these arts as veils +or disguises because they were afraid of the odium which they would incur. +But that is not my way, for I do not believe that they effected their +purpose, which was to deceive the government, who were not blinded by them; +and as to the people, they have no understanding, and only repeat what +their rulers are pleased to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught +in running away, is the very height of folly, and also greatly increases +the exasperation of mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, +in addition to any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I +take an entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist +and instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgement appears to me to be +a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other +precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven +that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I +have been now many years in the profession--for all my years when added up +are many: there is no one here present of whom I might not be the father. +Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want to speak +with me, in the presence of the company. + +As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and +glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly +show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we +not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us? + +Very good, he said. + +Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit and +discuss.--This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the prospect +of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and benches, and +arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been already placed. +Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed and brought in him +and his companions. + +When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are +assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just now +speaking. + +I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell you +once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates, who is +desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what will +happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say. + +Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very +first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on +the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on the +day before. + +When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing +you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one were +to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better no +doubt: but please to answer in a different way--I will explain how by an +example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your +acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus of +Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as he has +come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that every day +he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and then +suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what shall I become better, and in +what shall I grow?'--Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And suppose +that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the same thing, +and asked him, 'In what shall I become better day by day?' he would reply, +'In flute-playing.' Now I want you to make the same sort of answer to this +young man and to me, who am asking questions on his account. When you say +that on the first day on which he associates with you he will return home a +better man, and on every day will grow in like manner,--in what, +Protagoras, will he be better? and about what? + +When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly, +and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates comes +to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other Sophists +are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have just +escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these +teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry, and +music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes to me, +he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence in +affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own house in +the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the best in the +affairs of the state. + +Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art of +politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens? + +That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make. + +Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake +about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have a +doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not how +to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of opinion +that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I say that +the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are esteemed to +be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we are met together +in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to building, the builders +are summoned as advisers; when the question is one of ship-building, then +the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts which they think capable of +being taught and learned. And if some person offers to give them advice +who is not supposed by them to have any skill in the art, even though he be +good-looking, and rich, and noble, they will not listen to him, but laugh +and hoot at him, until either he is clamoured down and retires of himself; +or if he persist, he is dragged away or put out by the constables at the +command of the prytanes. This is their way of behaving about professors of +the arts. But when the question is an affair of state, then everybody is +free to have a say--carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and +poor, high and low--any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, +as in the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and +yet giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that +this sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the +state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are unable +to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example, Pericles, the +father of these young men, who gave them excellent instruction in all that +could be learned from masters, in his own department of politics neither +taught them, nor gave them teachers; but they were allowed to wander at +their own free will in a sort of hope that they would light upon virtue of +their own accord. Or take another example: there was Cleinias the younger +brother of our friend Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the +guardian; and he being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would +be corrupted by Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of +Ariphron to be educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent +him back, not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless +other instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any +one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having these +examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be taught. But +then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am disposed to think +that there must be something in what you say, because I know that you have +great experience, and learning, and invention. And I wish that you would, +if possible, show me a little more clearly that virtue can be taught. Will +you be so good? + +That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as +an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I +argue out the question? + +To this several of the company answered that he should choose for himself. + +Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting. + +Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when +the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned them +out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the interior +of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the light of day, +they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and to distribute to +them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said to Prometheus: +'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed, and Epimetheus +made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave strength without +swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness; some he armed, and +others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter some other means of +preservation, making some large, and having their size as a protection, and +others small, whose nature was to fly in the air or burrow in the ground; +this was to be their way of escape. Thus did he compensate them with the +view of preventing any race from becoming extinct. And when he had +provided against their destruction by one another, he contrived also a +means of protecting them against the seasons of heaven; clothing them with +close hair and thick skins sufficient to defend them against the winter +cold and able to resist the summer heat, so that they might have a natural +bed of their own when they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with +hoofs and hair and hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave +them varieties of food,--herb of the soil to some, to others fruits of +trees, and to others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as +food. And some he made to have few young ones, while those who were their +prey were very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus +did Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed +among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give,--and when +he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly perplexed. Now +while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to inspect the +distribution, and he found that the other animals were suitably furnished, +but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had neither bed nor arms of +defence. The appointed hour was approaching when man in his turn was to go +forth into the light of day; and Prometheus, not knowing how he could +devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts of Hephaestus and Athene, +and fire with them (they could neither have been acquired nor used without +fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had the wisdom necessary to the +support of life, but political wisdom he had not; for that was in the +keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus did not extend to entering +into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt, who moreover had terrible +sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into the common workshop of Athene +and Hephaestus, in which they used to practise their favourite arts, and +carried off Hephaestus' art of working by fire, and also the art of Athene, +and gave them to man. And in this way man was supplied with the means of +life. But Prometheus is said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, +owing to the blunder of Epimetheus. + +Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the only one +of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their kindred; and +he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long in inventing +articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses and clothes and +shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus provided, mankind +at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities. But the consequence +was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts, for they were utterly weak +in comparison of them, and their art was only sufficient to provide them +with the means of life, and did not enable them to carry on war against the +animals: food they had, but not as yet the art of government, of which the +art of war is a part. After a while the desire of self-preservation +gathered them into cities; but when they were gathered together, having no +art of government, they evil intreated one another, and were again in +process of dispersion and destruction. Zeus feared that the entire race +would be exterminated, and so he sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and +justice to be the ordering principles of cities and the bonds of friendship +and conciliation. Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and +reverence among men:--Should he distribute them as the arts are +distributed; that is to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual +having enough of medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? +'Shall this be the manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence +among men, or shall I give them to all?' 'To all,' said Zeus; 'I should +like them all to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share +in the virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that +he who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he +is a plague of the state.' + +And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind in general, +when the question relates to carpentering or any other mechanical art, +allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and when any one else +interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be not of the favoured +few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when they meet to deliberate +about political virtue, which proceeds only by way of justice and wisdom, +they are patient enough of any man who speaks of them, as is also natural, +because they think that every man ought to share in this sort of virtue, +and that states could not exist if this were otherwise. I have explained +to you, Socrates, the reason of this phenomenon. + +And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that all +men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of every +other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is this. In +other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good flute- +player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill, people either +laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations think that he is mad +and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in question, or some other +political virtue, even if they know that he is dishonest, yet, if the man +comes publicly forward and tells the truth about his dishonesty, then, what +in the other case was held by them to be good sense, they now deem to be +madness. They say that all men ought to profess honesty whether they are +honest or not, and that a man is out of his mind who says anything else. +Their notion is, that a man must have some degree of honesty; and that if +he has none at all he ought not to be in the world. + +I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a +counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every man +is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that they do +not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow spontaneously, +but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to a man by taking +pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or be angry with those +whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature or chance; they do not +try to punish or to prevent them from being what they are; they do but pity +them. Who is so foolish as to chastise or instruct the ugly, or the +diminutive, or the feeble? And for this reason. Because he knows that +good and evil of this kind is the work of nature and of chance; whereas if +a man is wanting in those good qualities which are attained by study and +exercise and teaching, and has only the contrary evil qualities, other men +are angry with him, and punish and reprove him--of these evil qualities one +is impiety, another injustice, and they may be described generally as the +very opposite of political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry +with another, and reprimand him,--clearly because he thinks that by study +and learning, the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. +If you will think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at +once that in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes +the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done wrong, +--only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But he who +desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong +which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is desirous that +the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from +doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention, thereby clearly +implying that virtue is capable of being taught. This is the notion of all +who retaliate upon others either privately or publicly. And the Athenians, +too, your own citizens, like other men, punish and take vengeance on all +whom they regard as evil doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the +number of those who think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus +far, Socrates, I have shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that +your countrymen are right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise +about politics, and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being +taught and acquired. + +There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the +sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the +knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that, but do +nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish themselves? +And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the argument. +Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality of which all +the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city at all? In the +answer to this question is contained the only solution of your difficulty; +there is no other. For if there be any such quality, and this quality or +unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith, or the potter, but +justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word, manly virtue--if this +is the quality of which all men must be partakers, and which is the very +condition of their learning or doing anything else, and if he who is +wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a grown-up man or woman, +must be taught and punished, until by punishment he becomes better, and he +who rebels against instruction and punishment is either exiled or condemned +to death under the idea that he is incurable--if what I am saying be true, +good men have their sons taught other things and not this, do consider how +extraordinary their conduct would appear to be. For we have shown that +they think virtue capable of being taught and cultivated both in private +and public; and, notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser +matters, ignorance of which does not involve the punishment of death: but +greater things, of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those +who have no training or knowledge of them--aye, and confiscation as well as +death, and, in a word, may be the ruin of families--those things, I say, +they are supposed not to teach them,--not to take the utmost care that they +should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates! + +Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and last +to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are vying +with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as ever he is +able to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say or do anything +without their setting forth to him that this is just and that is unjust; +this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy, that is unholy; do +this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and good; if not, he is +straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of bent or warped wood. At +a later stage they send him to teachers, and enjoin them to see to his +manners even more than to his reading and music; and the teachers do as +they are desired. And when the boy has learned his letters and is +beginning to understand what is written, as before he understood only what +was spoken, they put into his hands the works of great poets, which he +reads sitting on a bench at school; in these are contained many +admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and encomia of ancient famous +men, which he is required to learn by heart, in order that he may imitate +or emulate them and desire to become like them. Then, again, the teachers +of the lyre take similar care that their young disciple is temperate and +gets into no mischief; and when they have taught him the use of the lyre, +they introduce him to the poems of other excellent poets, who are the lyric +poets; and these they set to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms +quite familiar to the children's souls, in order that they may learn to be +more gentle, and harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech +and action; for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and +rhythm. Then they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that +their bodies may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may +not be compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on +any other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and +those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to school +soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters, the state +again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the pattern which they +furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as in learning to write, +the writing-master first draws lines with a style for the use of the young +beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes him follow the lines, so the +city draws the laws, which were the invention of good lawgivers living in +the olden time; these are given to the young man, in order to guide him in +his conduct whether he is commanding or obeying; and he who transgresses +them is to be corrected, or, in other words, called to account, which is a +term used not only in your country, but also in many others, seeing that +justice calls men to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue +private and public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether +virtue can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more +surprising. + +But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There is +nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the existence +of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private possession. If so +--and nothing can be truer--then I will further ask you to imagine, as an +illustration, some other pursuit or branch of knowledge which may be +assumed equally to be the condition of the existence of a state. Suppose +that there could be no state unless we were all flute-players, as far as +each had the capacity, and everybody was freely teaching everybody the art, +both in private and public, and reproving the bad player as freely and +openly as every man now teaches justice and the laws, not concealing them +as he would conceal the other arts, but imparting them--for all of us have +a mutual interest in the justice and virtue of one another, and this is the +reason why every one is so ready to teach justice and the laws;--suppose, I +say, that there were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching +one another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good +flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad ones? I +think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished or +undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as flute-players, +and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a bad one, and the +son of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players would be good +enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and unacquainted with the +art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have you consider that he who +appears to you to be the worst of those who have been brought up in laws +and humanities, would appear to be a just man and a master of justice if he +were to be compared with men who had no education, or courts of justice, or +laws, or any restraints upon them which compelled them to practise virtue-- +with the savages, for example, whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the +stage at the last year's Lenaean festival. If you were living among men +such as the man-haters in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet +with Eurybates and Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit +the rascality of this part of the world. You, Socrates, are discontented, +and why? Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his +ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who +teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or +you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art which +they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen have taught +them to the best of their ability,--but who will carry them further in +their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty, Socrates, in +finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty in finding a +teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true of virtue or of +anything else; if a man is better able than we are to promote virtue ever +so little, we must be content with the result. A teacher of this sort I +believe myself to be, and above all other men to have the knowledge which +makes a man noble and good; and I give my pupils their money's-worth, and +even more, as they themselves confess. And therefore I have introduced the +following mode of payment:--When a man has been my pupil, if he likes he +pays my price, but there is no compulsion; and if he does not like, he has +only to go into a temple and take an oath of the value of the instructions, +and he pays no more than he declares to be their value. + +Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I +endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the opinion +of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are not to +wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having bad fathers, +of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who are the companions +of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are nothing in comparison +with their father; and this is true of the sons of many other artists. As +yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus and Xanthippus themselves, for +they are young and there is still hope of them. + +Protagoras ended, and in my ear + +'So charming left his voice, that I the while +Thought him still speaking; still stood fixed to hear (Borrowed by Milton, +"Paradise Lost".).' + +At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished, not +without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at Hippocrates, I +said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful I am to you for +having brought me hither; I would not have missed the speech of Protagoras +for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no human care could make men +good; but I know better now. Yet I have still one very small difficulty +which I am sure that Protagoras will easily explain, as he has already +explained so much. If a man were to go and consult Pericles or any of our +great speakers about these matters, he might perhaps hear as fine a +discourse; but then when one has a question to ask of any of them, like +books, they can neither answer nor ask; and if any one challenges the least +particular of their speech, they go ringing on in a long harangue, like +brazen pots, which when they are struck continue to sound unless some one +puts his hand upon them; whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a +good speech, as he has already shown, but when he is asked a question he +can answer briefly; and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and +this is a very rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little +question, which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You +were saying that virtue can be taught;--that I will take upon your +authority, and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I +marvel at one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. +You were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several +times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness, and +all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made up +virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole, of +which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all these +are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt which +still lingers in my mind. + +There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of which +you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one. + +And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and +eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of +gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being larger +or smaller? + +I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are +related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole +face. + +And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a man +has one part, must he also have all the others? + +By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and not +wise. + +You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of virtue? + +Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the +parts. + +And they are all different from one another? I said. + +Yes. + +And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the face;--the +eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same functions; and +the other parts are none of them like one another, either in their +functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the comparison +holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ from one another +in themselves and in their functions? For that is clearly what the simile +would imply. + +Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ. + +Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like justice, +or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness? + +No, he answered. + +Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures. And +first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a thing, +would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also? + +Mine also, he said. + +And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and you, +Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is it just +or unjust?'--and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me or against +me? + +With you, he said. + +Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the +nature of the just: would not you? + +Yes, he said. + +And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a thing +as holiness?'--we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken? + +Yes, he said. + +Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing--should we not say so? + +He assented. + +'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or of the +nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a question, +and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness is not holy.' +What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way? + +Certainly, he said. + +And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you +saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you seemed +to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as one +another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not, as you +imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave the answer.' +And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this true, Protagoras? and +do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike another, and is this your +position?'--how would you answer him? + +I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates. + +Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that he +proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of justice, +nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of unholiness; and +holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore of the unjust, and +the unjust is the unholy': how shall we answer him? I should certainly +answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy, and that holiness is +just; and I would say in like manner on your behalf also, if you would +allow me, that justice is either the same with holiness, or very nearly the +same; and above all I would assert that justice is like holiness and +holiness is like justice; and I wish that you would tell me whether I may +be permitted to give this answer on your behalf, and whether you would +agree with me. + +He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that +justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be a +difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and let +us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. + +Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will' +sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I +mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.' + +Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness, for +there is always some point of view in which everything is like every other +thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like soft, and the +most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even the parts of the +face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and have different +functions, are still in a certain point of view similar, and one of them is +like another of them. And you may prove that they are like one another on +the same principle that all things are like one another; and yet things +which are like in some particular ought not to be called alike, nor things +which are unlike in some particular, however slight, unlike. + +And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and holiness +have but a small degree of likeness? + +Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your +view. + +Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take +another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the +existence of folly? + +I do. + +And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly? + +That is true, he said. + +And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be +temperate? + +Yes, he said. + +And temperance makes them temperate? + +Certainly. + +And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are not +temperate? + +I agree, he said. + +Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately? + +He assented. + +And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by temperance? + +He agreed. + +And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is +weakly done, by weakness? + +He assented. + +And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is +done with slowness, slowly? + +He assented again. + +And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that +which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite? + +He agreed. + +Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful? + +Yes. + +To which the only opposite is the ugly? + +There is no other. + +And is there anything good? + +There is. + +To which the only opposite is the evil? + +There is no other. + +And there is the acute in sound? + +True. + +To which the only opposite is the grave? + +There is no other, he said, but that. + +Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more? + +He assented. + +Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we +admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one? + +We did so. + +And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by +opposites? + +Yes. + +And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in the +opposite way to that which was done temperately? + +Yes. + +And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that which +was done foolishly by folly? + +He agreed. + +And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites? + +Yes. + +And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly? + +Yes. + +And in opposite ways? + +Certainly. + +And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance? + +Clearly. + +And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be +the opposite of wisdom? + +He assented. + +And we said that everything has only one opposite? + +Yes. + +Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One says +that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is distinct +from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and that they +are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves and in their +functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two assertions shall +we renounce? For both of them together are certainly not in harmony; they +do not accord or agree: for how can they be said to agree if everything is +assumed to have only one opposite and not more than one, and yet folly, +which is one, has clearly the two opposites--wisdom and temperance? Is not +that true, Protagoras? What else would you say? + +He assented, but with great reluctance. + +Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness +appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we must +finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man can be +temperate in his injustice? + +I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which +nevertheless many may be found to assert. + +And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied. + +I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if you +will. + +Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you are of +their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the argument; +and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer may both be put +on our trial. + +Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the argument +was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer. + +Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that +some men are temperate, and yet unjust? + +Yes, he said; let that be admitted. + +And temperance is good sense? + +Yes. + +And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice? + +Granted. + +If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed? + +If they succeed. + +And you would admit the existence of goods? + +Yes. + +And is the good that which is expedient for man? + +Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be inexpedient, +and yet I call them good. + +I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed to be +setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my business, +and gently said:-- + +When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean +inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the +latter good? + +Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things--meats, +drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient for +man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither expedient nor +inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for oxen only, and some +for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for trees; and some for the +roots of trees and not for their branches, as for example, manure, which is +a good thing when laid about the roots of a tree, but utterly destructive +if thrown upon the shoots and young branches; or I may instance olive oil, +which is mischievous to all plants, and generally most injurious to the +hair of every animal with the exception of man, but beneficial to human +hair and to the human body generally; and even in this application (so +various and changeable is the nature of the benefit), that which is the +greatest good to the outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his +inward parts: and for this reason physicians always forbid their patients +the use of oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough +to extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces. + +When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said: +Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long speech +to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I had been +deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have had to raise +your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask you to cut your +answers shorter, if you would take me with you. + +What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make +them too short? + +Certainly not, I said. + +But short enough? + +Yes, I said. + +Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to +you to be short enough? + +I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about +the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with +such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if you +talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method. + +Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had +followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you +want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name of +Protagoras would have been nowhere. + +I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he +would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I +considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation; so +I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you if +you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such a way +that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as is said of +you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have discussions in +shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are a master of +wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish that I could. +You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought to speak shorter +as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see that you are +disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent my staying to +hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another place), I will +depart; although I should have liked to have heard you. + +Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the +right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine. He +said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will be an +end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as there is +nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you and +Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure. + +Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus, I +replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love your +philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request, if I +could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great an +impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of Himera, +when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course runners. To +such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same of my own +legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want to see Crison +and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his speed to mine, for +I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in like manner if you +want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must ask him to shorten his +answers, and keep to the point, as he did at first; if not, how can there +be any discussion? For discussion is one thing, and making an oration is +quite another, in my humble opinion. + +But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to +speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours. + +Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true +statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot make +a speech--in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should be +greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of holding +and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make a similar +admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in argumentative +skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a superiority in +argument as well, let him ask and answer--not, when a question is asked, +slipping away from the point, and instead of answering, making a speech at +such length that most of his hearers forget the question at issue (not that +Socrates is likely to forget--I will be bound for that, although he may +pretend in fun that he has a bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be +more in the right than Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to +say what he thinks. + +When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one--Critias, I believe--went on to +say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan of +Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take the +other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of +Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break up +the discussion. + +Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those who +are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of both the +speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the same as +equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet an equal meed +should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a higher meed +should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well as Critias +would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request, which is, +that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for friends argue +with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and enemies wrangle. +And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this way you, who are the +speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and not praise only, among us +who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere conviction of the hearers' +souls, but praise is often an insincere expression of men uttering +falsehoods contrary to their conviction. And thus we who are the hearers +will be gratified and not pleased; for gratification is of the mind when +receiving wisdom and knowledge, but pleasure is of the body when eating or +experiencing some other bodily delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of +the company applauded his words. + +Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I +reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not by +law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant of +mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against nature. +How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature of things, +and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met together in this +city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the greatest and most +glorious house of this city, should have nothing to show worthy of this +height of dignity, but should only quarrel with one another like the +meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you, Protagoras, and you, +Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be your peacemakers. And do +not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and extreme brevity in discourse, if +Protagoras objects, but loosen and let go the reins of speech, that your +words may be grander and more becoming to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, +go forth on the gale with every sail set out of sight of land into an ocean +of words, but let there be a mean observed by both of you. Do as I say. +And let me also persuade you to choose an arbiter or overseer or president; +he will keep watch over your words and will prescribe their proper length. + +This proposal was received by the company with universal approval; Callias +said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose an arbiter. +But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be unseemly; for if +the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or worse ought not to +preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither would that be well; +for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what will be the use of +choosing him? And if you say, 'Let us have a better then,'--to that I +answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than Protagoras. And if +you choose another who is not really better, and whom you only say is +better, to put another over him as though he were an inferior person would +be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far as I am concerned, any +reflection is of much consequence to me. Let me tell you then what I will +do in order that the conversation and discussion may go on as you desire. +If Protagoras is not disposed to answer, let him ask and I will answer; and +I will endeavour to show at the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to +answer: and when I have answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let +him in like manner answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at +answering the precise question asked of him, you and I will unite in +entreating him, as you entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this +will require no special arbiter--all of you shall be arbiters. + +This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against his +will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he had put +a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn those which +he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions as follows:-- + +I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the principal +part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of knowing what +compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not, and how they are +to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the reason of the +difference. And I propose to transfer the question which you and I have +been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as before of virtue, +but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides says to Scopas the +son of Creon the Thessalian: + +'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square in +hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.' + +Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole? + +There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the ode, +--I have made a careful study of it. + +Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition, +and true? + +Yes, I said, both good and true. + +But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true? + +No, not in that case, I replied. + +And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect. + +Well, my friend, I have reflected. + +And does not the poet proceed to say, 'I do not agree with the word of +Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good'? +Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet. + +I know it. + +And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent? + +Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that +there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise? + +Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising as +his own thought, 'Hardly can a man become truly good'; and then a little +further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and refusing to +agree with him, when he says, 'Hardly can a man be good,' which is the very +same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the same with himself, he +blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in his first or his second +assertion. + +Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first giddy +and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert boxer, +when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to confess the +truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of the poet really +was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus, I said, Simonides +is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his aid. I must appeal +to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when beleaguered by +Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying: + +'Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero (Il.).' + +And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of +Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application +of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish 'will' and +'wish,' and make other charming distinctions like those which you drew just +now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with me; for I am +of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of Simonides. And +first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your opinion, Prodicus, +'being' is the same as 'becoming.' + +Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus. + +Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that 'Hardly can a man +become truly good'? + +Quite right, said Prodicus. + +And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating +that which he says himself, but for saying something different from +himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man +become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would +maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if they +are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself. I dare +say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says, + +'On the one hand, hardly can a man become good, +For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil, +But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height, +Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy (Works +and Days).' + +Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction, +Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence which +you are correcting. + +Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but aggravate +a disorder which I am seeking to cure. + +Such is the fact, he said. + +How so? I asked. + +The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say that +virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all things, can +be easily retained. + +Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at the +right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine, is more +than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as Simonides or even +older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear to know nothing of +this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his. And now, if I am not +mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard' (chalepon) in the sense +which Simonides intended; and I must correct you, as Prodicus corrects me +when I use the word 'awful' (deinon) as a term of praise. If I say that +Protagoras or any one else is an 'awfully' wise man, he asks me if I am not +ashamed of calling that which is good 'awful'; and then he explains to me +that the term 'awful' is always taken in a bad sense, and that no one +speaks of being 'awfully' healthy or wealthy, or of 'awful' peace, but of +'awful' disease, 'awful' war, 'awful' poverty, meaning by the term 'awful,' +evil. And I think that Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they +spoke of 'hard' meant 'evil,' or something which you do not understand. +Let us ask Prodicus, for he ought to be able to answer questions about the +dialect of Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term 'hard'? + +Evil, said Prodicus. + +And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is +the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good. + +Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting Pittacus +with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has been +accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural. + +Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying? And +have you an answer for him? + +You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very well +that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean, not +evil, but that which is not easy--that which takes a great deal of trouble: +of this I am positive. + +I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning +of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but he +thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your thesis; +for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly proved by +the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now he cannot +surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards proceeds to +say that God only has this gift, and that this is the attribute of him and +of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus would impute to +Simonides a character of recklessness which is very unlike his countrymen. +And I should like to tell you, I said, what I imagine to be the real +meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will test what, in your way of +speaking, would be called my skill in poetry; or if you would rather, I +will be the listener. + +To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please;--and Hippias, +Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed. + +Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about this +poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more +cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and +there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in the +world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and they +pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it thought +that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom Protagoras +was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that if the reason of +their superiority were disclosed, all men would be practising their wisdom. +And this secret of theirs has never been discovered by the imitators of +Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities, who go about with their ears +bruised in imitation of them, and have the caestus bound on their arms, and +are always in training, and wear short cloaks; for they imagine that these +are the practices which have enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the +other Hellenes. Now when the Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free +conversation with their wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere +secret intercourse, they drive out all these laconizers, and any other +foreigners who may happen to be in their country, and they hold a +philosophical seance unknown to strangers; and they themselves forbid their +young men to go out into other cities--in this they are like the Cretans-- +in order that they may not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. +And in Lacedaemon and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in +their high cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in +attributing to the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and +speculation: If a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he +will find him seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any +point in the discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse +and full of meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is +talking seems to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and +of former ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has +the love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are +conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such +expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and +Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and Myson the +Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the Lacedaemonian +Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples of the culture of +the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that their wisdom was of this +character; consisting of short memorable sentences, which they severally +uttered. And they met together and dedicated in the temple of Apollo at +Delphi, as the first-fruits of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, +which are in all men's mouths--'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing too much.' + +Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity was +the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of Pittacus +which was privately circulated and received the approbation of the wise, +'Hard is it to be good.' And Simonides, who was ambitious of the fame of +wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying, then, as if he +had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would carry off the palm +among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken, he composed the entire +poem with the secret intention of damaging Pittacus and his saying. + +Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking the +truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first words of +the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he inserted +(Greek) 'on the one hand' ('on the one hand to become good is hard'); there +would be no reason for the introduction of (Greek), unless you suppose him +to speak with a hostile reference to the words of Pittacus. Pittacus is +saying 'Hard is it to be good,' and he, in refutation of this thesis, +rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus, is to become good, not joining +'truly' with 'good,' but with 'hard.' Not, that the hard thing is to be +truly good, as though there were some truly good men, and there were others +who were good but not truly good (this would be a very simple observation, +and quite unworthy of Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a +trajection of the word 'truly' (Greek), construing the saying of Pittacus +thus (and let us imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering +him): 'O my friends,' says Pittacus, 'hard is it to be good,' and +Simonides answers, 'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is +not to be good, but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands +and feet and mind, without a flaw--that is hard truly.' This way of +reading the passage accounts for the insertion of (Greek) 'on the one +hand,' and for the position at the end of the clause of the word 'truly,' +and all that follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be +said in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of +workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would be tedious. I +should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem, which +is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the saying of +Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on as if he meant +to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming good, yet this is +possible for a time, and only for a time. But having become good, to +remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus, affirm, is not +possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this blessing; 'but man +cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances overpowers him.' Now +whom does the force of circumstance overpower in the command of a vessel?-- +not the private individual, for he is always overpowered; and as one who is +already prostrate cannot be overthrown, and only he who is standing upright +but not he who is prostrate can be laid prostrate, so the force of +circumstances can only overpower him who, at some time or other, has +resources, and not him who is at all times helpless. The descent of a +great storm may make the pilot helpless, or the severity of the season the +husbandman or the physician; for the good may become bad, as another poet +witnesses:-- + +'The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.' + +But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the force +of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and virtue, then +he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying, 'Hard is it to be +good.' Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and yet this is +possible: but to be good is an impossibility-- + +'For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.' + +But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes a +man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of well- +doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the art of +healing the sick. 'But he who does ill is the bad.' Now who becomes a bad +physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a physician, and in the +second place a good physician; for he may become a bad one also: but none +of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of doing ill become +physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or anything of that +sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician at all, clearly +cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good may become +deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident (the only real +doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad man will never +become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to become bad, he must +previously have been good. Thus the words of the poem tend to show that on +the one hand a man cannot be continuously good, but that he may become good +and may also become bad; and again that + +'They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.' + +All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he +adds:-- + +'Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in searching +after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly faultless man +among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed earth: if I find +him, I will send you word.' + +(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus +throughout the whole poem): + +'But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love;--not even the +gods war against necessity.' + +All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to say +that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there were +some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will allow +that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil and +dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do evil +and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides never +says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word +'voluntarily' applies to himself. For he was under the impression that a +good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and to be +the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an involuntary +love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or mother, or +country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or country have any +defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find fault with them and +expose and denounce them to others, under the idea that the rest of mankind +will be less likely to take themselves to task and accuse them of neglect; +and they blame their defects far more than they deserve, in order that the +odium which is necessarily incurred by them may be increased: but the good +man dissembles his feelings, and constrains himself to praise them; and if +they have wronged him and he is angry, he pacifies his anger and is +reconciled, and compels himself to love and praise his own flesh and blood. +And Simonides, as is probable, considered that he himself had often had to +praise and magnify a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also +wishes to imply to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is +censorious. + +'For I am satisfied' he says, 'when a man is neither bad nor very stupid; +and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and is of sound +mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to finding fault, +and there are innumerable fools' + +(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant +opportunity of finding fault). + +'All things are good with which evil is unmingled.' + +In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good +which have no evil in them, as you might say 'All things are white which +have no black in them,' for that would be ridiculous; but he means to say +that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate state. + +('I do not hope' he says, 'to find a perfectly blameless man among those +who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him, I will +send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is moderately +good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and approve every +one') + +(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, epainemi (approve), because +he is addressing Pittacus, + +'Who love and APPROVE every one VOLUNTARILY, who does no evil:' + +and that the stop should be put after 'voluntarily'); 'but there are some +whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would never +have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true; but I do +blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are speaking +falsely about the highest matters.'--And this, I said, Prodicus and +Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem. + +Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good +explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of my +own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me. + +Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At present +we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and +Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask, +Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that +Socrates should ask. + +I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but I +would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object, and come +back to the question about which I was asking you at first, Protagoras, and +by your help make an end of that. The talk about the poets seems to me +like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar company have recourse; +who, because they are not able to converse or amuse one another, while they +are drinking, with the sound of their own voices and conversation, by +reason of their stupidity, raise the price of flute-girls in the market, +hiring for a great sum the voice of a flute instead of their own breath, to +be the medium of intercourse among them: but where the company are real +gentlemen and men of education, you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing- +girls, nor harp-girls; and they have no nonsense or games, but are +contented with one another's conversation, of which their own voices are +the medium, and which they carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even +though they are very liberal in their potations. And a company like this +of ours, and men such as we profess to be, do not require the help of +another's voice, or of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the +meaning of what they are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that +the poet has one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point +which is in dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they +decline, and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the +proof in conversation. And these are the models which I desire that you +and I should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us +try the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation. +If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather, do +you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing our +unfinished argument. + +I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would not +distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to Callias, +and said:--Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in refusing to +say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly think that he is +unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument, or distinctly refuse +to proceed, that we may know his intention; and then Socrates will be able +to discourse with some one else, and the rest of the company will be free +to talk with one another. + +I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of +Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were +superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask and +he would answer. + +So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in +asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For I +think that Homer was very right in saying that + +'When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),' + +for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought; but +if a man + +'Sees a thing when he is alone,' + +he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he may +show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would rather +hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that no man has +a better understanding of most things which a good man may be expected to +understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there, but you?--who +not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many are this, and yet +have not the power of making others good--whereas you are not only good +yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others. Moreover such +confidence have you in yourself, that although other Sophists conceal their +profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas that you are a Sophist or +teacher of virtue and education, and are the first who demanded pay in +return. How then can I do otherwise than invite you to the examination of +these subjects, and ask questions and consult with you? I must, indeed. +And I should like once more to have my memory refreshed by you about the +questions which I was asking you at first, and also to have your help in +considering them. If I am not mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom +and temperance and courage and justice and holiness five names of the same +thing? or has each of the names a separate underlying essence and +corresponding thing having a peculiar function, no one of them being like +any other of them? And you replied that the five names were not the names +of the same thing, but that each of them had a separate object, and that +all these objects were parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts +of gold are like each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as +the parts of the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one +another, and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know +whether this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define +your meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different +statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in +order to make trial of me. + +I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of virtue, +and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and that the +fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the other four, as +I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are utterly +unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless remarkable +for their courage. + +Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave +men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature? + +Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are +afraid to approach. + +In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which +good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher. + +Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right +mind. + +And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good? + +Wholly good, and in the highest degree. + +Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well? + +I should say, the divers. + +And the reason of this is that they have knowledge? + +Yes, that is the reason. + +And who have confidence when fighting on horseback--the skilled horseman or +the unskilled? + +The skilled. + +And who when fighting with light shields--the peltasts or the nonpeltasts? + +The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is +your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who +have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned than +before. + +And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things, +and yet confident about them? + +Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident. + +And are not these confident persons also courageous? + +In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of +whom we are speaking are surely madmen. + +Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident? + +Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere. + +And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really not +courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most +confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon that +view again wisdom will be courage. + +Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of what was +said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that the courageous are +the confident; but I was never asked whether the confident are the +courageous; if you had asked me, I should have answered 'Not all of them': +and what I did answer you have not proved to be false, although you +proceeded to show that those who have knowledge are more courageous than +they were before they had knowledge, and more courageous than others who +have no knowledge, and were then led on to think that courage is the same +as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you might come to imagine that +strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking whether the strong are able, +and I should say 'Yes'; and then whether those who know how to wrestle are +not more able to wrestle than those who do not know how to wrestle, and +more able after than before they had learned, and I should assent. And +when I had admitted this, you might use my admissions in such a way as to +prove that upon my view wisdom is strength; whereas in that case I should +not have admitted, any more than in the other, that the able are strong, +although I have admitted that the strong are able. For there is a +difference between ability and strength; the former is given by knowledge +as well as by madness or rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy +state of the body. And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, +that they are not the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, +but not all the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men +by art, and also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to +them from nature and the healthy state of the soul. + +I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others +ill? + +He assented. + +And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief? + +He does not. + +But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that case +have lived well? + +He will. + +Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil? + +Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable. + +And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant +things evil and some painful things good?--for I am rather disposed to say +that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no +consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are +bad. + +I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in that +unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful the evil. +Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the whole of my +life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that there are some +pleasant things which are not good, and that there are some painful things +which are good, and some which are not good, and that there are some which +are neither good nor evil. + +And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in +pleasure or create pleasure? + +Certainly, he said. + +Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good; and +my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself. + +According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, 'Let us reflect about +this,' he said; and if the reflection is to the point, and the result +proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will agree; but +if not, then we will argue. + +And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin? + +You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the +discussion. + +May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring +into the health or some other bodily quality of another:--he looks at his +face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your chest +and back to me that I may have a better view:--that is the sort of thing +which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion is about +good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind to me, +Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may know +whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the world +are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or of rule, +or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge, and yet that +the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger, or pleasure, or +pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,--just as if knowledge were a slave, and +might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view? or do you think that +knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which cannot be overcome, and +will not allow a man, if he only knows the difference of good and evil, to +do anything which is contrary to knowledge, but that wisdom will have +strength to help him? + +I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I, above +all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of +human things. + +Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world +are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the things +which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most persons whom +I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act contrary to +knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of those +affections which I was just now mentioning. + +Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which +mankind are in error. + +Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them what is +the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by pleasure,' +and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always do what is +best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and are saying what +is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and Protagoras, if this +affection of the soul is not to be called 'being overcome by pleasure,' +pray, what is it, and by what name would you describe it? + +But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the +many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them? + +I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how +courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to +abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think, +our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow; but +if not, never mind. + +You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have +begun. + +Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What +account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed being +overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras and I +will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and drinking +and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing them to be +evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that they were +overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose that you and I +were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say that they are +evil,--in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the moment, or +because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils in the future? +Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil consequences, +simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure of whatever +nature?'--Would they not answer that they are not evil on account of the +pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on account of the after +consequences--diseases and the like? + +I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as you +do. + +And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty do +they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not mistaken? + +Protagoras assented. + +Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil +for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of other +pleasures:--there again they would agree? + +We both of us thought that they would. + +And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and +say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean +remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and the +physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are these the +things which are good but painful?'--they would assent to me? + +He agreed. + +'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate +suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and +improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states and power +over others and wealth?'--they would agree to the latter alternative, if I +am not mistaken? + +He assented. + +'Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in +pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other +standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?'--they would +acknowledge that they were not? + +I think so, said Protagoras. + +'And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an +evil?' + +He assented. + +'Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even +pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it +gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call +pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be +able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.' + +I do not think that they have, said Protagoras. + +'And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a +good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives +pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other +than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a good, +you can show what that is. But you cannot.' + +True, said Protagoras. + +Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: 'Why do you spend many +words and speak in many ways on this subject?' Excuse me, friends, I +should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining +the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure'; and the whole +argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in +which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than +pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having a life +of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are unable to +show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain, hear the +consequences:--If what you say is true, then the argument is absurd which +affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might abstain, +because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again, when you say +that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he is overcome at +the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will be evident if +only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant and painful, and +good and evil. As there are two things, let us call them by two names-- +first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful. Assuming this, let us +go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he does evil. But some one +will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the first answer. And by what +is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to ask. And we shall not be able +to reply 'By pleasure,' for the name of pleasure has been exchanged for +that of good. In our answer, then, we shall only say that he is overcome. +'By what?' he will reiterate. By the good, we shall have to reply; indeed +we shall. Nay, but our questioner will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one +of the swaggering sort, 'That is too ridiculous, that a man should do what +he knows to be evil when he ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is +that, he will ask, because the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering +the evil'? And in answer to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was +not worthy; for if it had been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome +by pleasure, would not have been wrong. 'But how,' he will reply, 'can the +good be unworthy of the evil, or the evil of the good'? Is not the real +explanation that they are out of proportion to one another, either as +greater and smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you +speak of being overcome--'what do you mean,' he will say, 'but that you +choose the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?' Admitted. And +now substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say, +not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does +what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure, which is +unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations of pleasure +to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they become greater +and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree? For if any one +says: 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs widely from future +pleasure and pain'--To that I should reply: And do they differ in anything +but in pleasure and pain? There can be no other measure of them. And do +you, like a skilful weigher, put into the balance the pleasures and the +pains, and their nearness and distance, and weigh them, and then say which +outweighs the other. If you weigh pleasures against pleasures, you of +course take the more and greater; or if you weigh pains against pains, you +take the fewer and the less; or if pleasures against pains, then you choose +that course of action in which the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, +whether the distant by the near or the near by the distant; and you avoid +that course of action in which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. +Would you not admit, my friends, that this is true? I am confident that +they cannot deny this. + +He agreed with me. + +Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me a +question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when +near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that. And the +same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in themselves +equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance. They will +grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing or choosing the +greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less, what would be the saving +principle of human life? Would not the art of measuring be the saving +principle; or would the power of appearance? Is not the latter that +deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and take the things at one +time of which we repent at another, both in our actions and in our choice +of things great and small? But the art of measurement would do away with +the effect of appearances, and, showing the truth, would fain teach the +soul at last to find rest in the truth, and would thus save our life. +Would not mankind generally acknowledge that the art which accomplishes +this result is the art of measurement? + +Yes, he said, the art of measurement. + +Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of odd +and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the greater or +less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and whether near +or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our lives? Would +not knowledge?--a knowledge of measuring, when the question is one of +excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the question is of odd +and even? The world will assent, will they not? + +Protagoras himself thought that they would. + +Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human +life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and pains, +--in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and the less, +and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a consideration of +their excess and defect and equality in relation to each other? + +This is undeniably true. + +And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and +science? + +They will agree, he said. + +The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future consideration; +but the existence of such a science furnishes a demonstrative answer to the +question which you asked of me and Protagoras. At the time when you asked +the question, if you remember, both of us were agreeing that there was +nothing mightier than knowledge, and that knowledge, in whatever existing, +must have the advantage over pleasure and all other things; and then you +said that pleasure often got the advantage even over a man who has +knowledge; and we refused to allow this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras +and Socrates, what is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure if not +this?--tell us what you call such a state:--if we had immediately and at +the time answered 'Ignorance,' you would have laughed at us. But now, in +laughing at us, you will be laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted +that men err in their choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their +choice of good and evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted +further, that they err, not only from defect of knowledge in general, but +of that particular knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also +aware that the erring act which is done without knowledge is done in +ignorance. This, therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure; +--ignorance, and that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and +Prodicus and Hippias declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but +you, who are under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, +and that the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go +yourselves, nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers +of these things--you take care of your money and give them none; and the +result is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life:--Let +us suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I should +like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for the +argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I am +speaking the truth or not? + +They all thought that what I said was entirely true. + +Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful +evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his +distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable, +delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them, I +will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the words. + +Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others. + +Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions honourable +and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless and pleasant? +The honourable work is also useful and good? + +This was admitted. + +Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under the +idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also +attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man to +himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself is +wisdom. + +They all assented. + +And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about +important matters? + +To this also they unanimously assented. + +Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks to +be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when a man is +compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the greater when +he may have the less. + +All of us agreed to every word of this. + +Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here, +Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree with +me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil. + +Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and not +terror. + +Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former +assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is not +compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission which +has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears to be evil; +and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he thinks to be +evil? + +That also was universally admitted. + +Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I would +beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he said at +first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his first +statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five parts of +virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them had a separate +function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to the assertion which +he afterwards made that of the five virtues four were nearly akin to each +other, but that the fifth, which was courage, differed greatly from the +others. And of this he gave me the following proof. He said: You will +find, Socrates, that some of the most impious, and unrighteous, and +intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most courageous; which +proves that courage is very different from the other parts of virtue. I +was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I am still more surprised +now that I have discussed the matter with you. So I asked him whether by +the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he replied, and the impetuous or +goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that this was your answer.) + +He assented. + +Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to go-- +against the same dangers as the cowards? + +No, he answered. + +Then against something different? + +Yes, he said. + +Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there is +danger? + +Yes, Socrates, so men say. + +Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that the +courageous are ready to go--against dangers, believing them to be dangers, +or not against dangers? + +No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous +argument to be impossible. + +That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly +proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the +want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown to +be ignorance. + +He assented. + +And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about which +they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly and the +courageous go to meet the same things. + +And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the +opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is +ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready. + +And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said. + +Honourable, he replied. + +And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all +honourable actions we have admitted to be good. + +That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere. + +True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are unwilling +to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing? + +The cowards, he replied. + +And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant? + +It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied. + +And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter, +and better? + +The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions. + +But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and pleasanter, +and nobler? + +That must be admitted. + +And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence? + +True, he replied. + +And if not base, then honourable? + +He admitted this. + +And if honourable, then good? + +Yes. + +But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the +contrary, are base? + +He assented. + +And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and +uninstructedness? + +True, he said. + +Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it cowardice +or courage? + +I should say cowardice, he replied. + +And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of +dangers? + +Assuredly, he said. + +And because of that ignorance they are cowards? + +He assented. + +And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice? + +He again assented. + +Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice? + +He nodded assent. + +But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice? + +Yes. + +Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to the +ignorance of them? + +To that again he nodded assent. + +And the ignorance of them is cowardice? + +To that he very reluctantly nodded assent. + +And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and is +opposed to the ignorance of these things? + +At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent. + +And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras? + +Finish the argument by yourself, he said. + +I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether you +still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most +courageous? + +You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and +therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be +impossible consistently with the argument. + +My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the desire +to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were clear, I +am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried on at great +length by both of us--you affirming and I denying that virtue can be +taught--would also become clear. The result of our discussion appears to +me to be singular. For if the argument had a human voice, that voice would +be heard laughing at us and saying: 'Protagoras and Socrates, you are +strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were saying that virtue cannot +be taught, contradicting yourself now by your attempt to prove that all +things are knowledge, including justice, and temperance, and courage,-- +which tends to show that virtue can certainly be taught; for if virtue were +other than knowledge, as Protagoras attempted to prove, then clearly virtue +cannot be taught; but if virtue is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking +to show, then I cannot but suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. +Protagoras, on the other hand, who started by saying that it might be +taught, is now eager to prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and +if this is true, it must be quite incapable of being taught.' Now I, +Protagoras, perceiving this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great +desire that they should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the +discussion until we ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being +taught or not, lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in +the argument, as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to +your Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these +questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no +objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the +enquiry. + +Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the last +man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy and your +conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you above all men +whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I believe that you will +become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come back to the subject at some +future time; at present we had better turn to something else. + +By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since to +have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried because +I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the conversation +ended, and we went our way. + + + + + +End of this Project Gutenberg Etext of Protagoras, by Plato + diff --git a/old/prtgs10.zip b/old/prtgs10.zip Binary files differnew file mode 100644 index 0000000..43681eb --- /dev/null +++ b/old/prtgs10.zip |