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+The Project Gutenberg EBook of Protagoras, by Plato
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.org
+
+
+Title: Protagoras
+
+Author: Plato
+
+Translator: B. Jowett
+
+Posting Date: November 3, 2008 [EBook #1591]
+Release Date: January, 1999
+
+Language: English
+
+Character set encoding: ASCII
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK PROTAGORAS ***
+
+
+
+
+Produced by Sue Asscher
+
+
+
+
+
+PROTAGORAS
+
+By Plato
+
+
+Translated by Benjamin Jowett
+
+
+
+
+INTRODUCTION.
+
+The Protagoras, like several of the Dialogues of Plato, is put into the
+mouth of Socrates, who describes a conversation which had taken place
+between himself and the great Sophist at the house of Callias--'the
+man who had spent more upon the Sophists than all the rest of the
+world'--and in which the learned Hippias and the grammarian Prodicus had
+also shared, as well as Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom said a
+few words--in the presence of a distinguished company consisting of
+disciples of Protagoras and of leading Athenians belonging to the
+Socratic circle. The dialogue commences with a request on the part of
+Hippocrates that Socrates would introduce him to the celebrated teacher.
+He has come before the dawn had risen--so fervid is his zeal. Socrates
+moderates his excitement and advises him to find out 'what Protagoras
+will make of him,' before he becomes his pupil.
+
+They go together to the house of Callias; and Socrates, after explaining
+the purpose of their visit to Protagoras, asks the question, 'What he
+will make of Hippocrates.' Protagoras answers, 'That he will make him
+a better and a wiser man.' 'But in what will he be better?'--Socrates
+desires to have a more precise answer. Protagoras replies, 'That he will
+teach him prudence in affairs private and public; in short, the science
+or knowledge of human life.'
+
+This, as Socrates admits, is a noble profession; but he is or rather
+would have been doubtful, whether such knowledge can be taught, if
+Protagoras had not assured him of the fact, for two reasons: (1) Because
+the Athenian people, who recognize in their assemblies the distinction
+between the skilled and the unskilled in the arts, do not distinguish
+between the trained politician and the untrained; (2) Because the wisest
+and best Athenian citizens do not teach their sons political virtue.
+Will Protagoras answer these objections?
+
+Protagoras explains his views in the form of an apologue, in which,
+after Prometheus had given men the arts, Zeus is represented as sending
+Hermes to them, bearing with him Justice and Reverence. These are not,
+like the arts, to be imparted to a few only, but all men are to
+be partakers of them. Therefore the Athenian people are right in
+distinguishing between the skilled and unskilled in the arts, and not
+between skilled and unskilled politicians. (1) For all men have the
+political virtues to a certain degree, and are obliged to say that
+they have them, whether they have them or not. A man would be thought
+a madman who professed an art which he did not know; but he would be
+equally thought a madman if he did not profess a virtue which he had
+not. (2) And that the political virtues can be taught and acquired, in
+the opinion of the Athenians, is proved by the fact that they punish
+evil-doers, with a view to prevention, of course--mere retribution is
+for beasts, and not for men. (3) Again, would parents who teach her sons
+lesser matters leave them ignorant of the common duty of citizens? To
+the doubt of Socrates the best answer is the fact, that the education
+of youth in virtue begins almost as soon as they can speak, and is
+continued by the state when they pass out of the parental control. (4)
+Nor need we wonder that wise and good fathers sometimes have foolish and
+worthless sons. Virtue, as we were saying, is not the private possession
+of any man, but is shared by all, only however to the extent of which
+each individual is by nature capable. And, as a matter of fact, even the
+worst of civilized mankind will appear virtuous and just, if we compare
+them with savages. (5) The error of Socrates lies in supposing that
+there are no teachers of virtue, whereas all men are teachers in a
+degree. Some, like Protagoras, are better than others, and with this
+result we ought to be satisfied.
+
+Socrates is highly delighted with the explanation of Protagoras. But he
+has still a doubt lingering in his mind. Protagoras has spoken of the
+virtues: are they many, or one? are they parts of a whole, or different
+names of the same thing? Protagoras replies that they are parts, like
+the parts of a face, which have their several functions, and no one part
+is like any other part. This admission, which has been somewhat hastily
+made, is now taken up and cross-examined by Socrates:--
+
+'Is justice just, and is holiness holy? And are justice and holiness
+opposed to one another?'--'Then justice is unholy.' Protagoras would
+rather say that justice is different from holiness, and yet in a certain
+point of view nearly the same. He does not, however, escape in this way
+from the cunning of Socrates, who inveigles him into an admission that
+everything has but one opposite. Folly, for example, is opposed
+to wisdom; and folly is also opposed to temperance; and therefore
+temperance and wisdom are the same. And holiness has been already
+admitted to be nearly the same as justice. Temperance, therefore, has
+now to be compared with justice.
+
+Protagoras, whose temper begins to get a little ruffled at the process
+to which he has been subjected, is aware that he will soon be compelled
+by the dialectics of Socrates to admit that the temperate is the just.
+He therefore defends himself with his favourite weapon; that is to say,
+he makes a long speech not much to the point, which elicits the applause
+of the audience.
+
+Here occurs a sort of interlude, which commences with a declaration on
+the part of Socrates that he cannot follow a long speech, and therefore
+he must beg Protagoras to speak shorter. As Protagoras declines to
+accommodate him, he rises to depart, but is detained by Callias, who
+thinks him unreasonable in not allowing Protagoras the liberty which he
+takes himself of speaking as he likes. But Alcibiades answers that the
+two cases are not parallel. For Socrates admits his inability to speak
+long; will Protagoras in like manner acknowledge his inability to speak
+short?
+
+Counsels of moderation are urged first in a few words by Critias, and
+then by Prodicus in balanced and sententious language: and Hippias
+proposes an umpire. But who is to be the umpire? rejoins Socrates; he
+would rather suggest as a compromise that Protagoras shall ask and he
+will answer, and that when Protagoras is tired of asking he himself will
+ask and Protagoras shall answer. To this the latter yields a reluctant
+assent.
+
+Protagoras selects as his thesis a poem of Simonides of Ceos, in which
+he professes to find a contradiction. First the poet says,
+
+     'Hard is it to become good,'
+
+and then reproaches Pittacus for having said, 'Hard is it to be good.'
+How is this to be reconciled? Socrates, who is familiar with the poem,
+is embarrassed at first, and invokes the aid of Prodicus, the countryman
+of Simonides, but apparently only with the intention of flattering him
+into absurdities. First a distinction is drawn between (Greek) to be,
+and (Greek) to become: to become good is difficult; to be good is easy.
+Then the word difficult or hard is explained to mean 'evil' in the Cean
+dialect. To all this Prodicus assents; but when Protagoras reclaims,
+Socrates slily withdraws Prodicus from the fray, under the pretence that
+his assent was only intended to test the wits of his adversary. He then
+proceeds to give another and more elaborate explanation of the whole
+passage. The explanation is as follows:--
+
+The Lacedaemonians are great philosophers (although this is a fact which
+is not generally known); and the soul of their philosophy is brevity,
+which was also the style of primitive antiquity and of the seven sages.
+Now Pittacus had a saying, 'Hard is it to be good:' and Simonides, who
+was jealous of the fame of this saying, wrote a poem which was designed
+to controvert it. No, says he, Pittacus; not 'hard to be good,' but
+'hard to become good.' Socrates proceeds to argue in a highly impressive
+manner that the whole composition is intended as an attack upon
+Pittacus. This, though manifestly absurd, is accepted by the company,
+and meets with the special approval of Hippias, who has however a
+favourite interpretation of his own, which he is requested by Alcibiades
+to defer.
+
+The argument is now resumed, not without some disdainful remarks of
+Socrates on the practice of introducing the poets, who ought not to be
+allowed, any more than flute-girls, to come into good society. Men's
+own thoughts should supply them with the materials for discussion. A few
+soothing flatteries are addressed to Protagoras by Callias and Socrates,
+and then the old question is repeated, 'Whether the virtues are one or
+many?' To which Protagoras is now disposed to reply, that four out of
+the five virtues are in some degree similar; but he still contends that
+the fifth, courage, is unlike the rest. Socrates proceeds to undermine
+the last stronghold of the adversary, first obtaining from him the
+admission that all virtue is in the highest degree good:--
+
+The courageous are the confident; and the confident are those who know
+their business or profession: those who have no such knowledge and
+are still confident are madmen. This is admitted. Then, says Socrates,
+courage is knowledge--an inference which Protagoras evades by drawing a
+futile distinction between the courageous and the confident in a fluent
+speech.
+
+Socrates renews the attack from another side: he would like to
+know whether pleasure is not the only good, and pain the only evil?
+Protagoras seems to doubt the morality or propriety of assenting to
+this; he would rather say that 'some pleasures are good, some pains are
+evil,' which is also the opinion of the generality of mankind. What
+does he think of knowledge? Does he agree with the common opinion that
+knowledge is overcome by passion? or does he hold that knowledge is
+power? Protagoras agrees that knowledge is certainly a governing power.
+
+This, however, is not the doctrine of men in general, who maintain that
+many who know what is best, act contrary to their knowledge under the
+influence of pleasure. But this opposition of good and evil is really
+the opposition of a greater or lesser amount of pleasure. Pleasures are
+evils because they end in pain, and pains are goods because they end in
+pleasures. Thus pleasure is seen to be the only good; and the only evil
+is the preference of the lesser pleasure to the greater. But then comes
+in the illusion of distance. Some art of mensuration is required in
+order to show us pleasures and pains in their true proportion. This art
+of mensuration is a kind of knowledge, and knowledge is thus proved
+once more to be the governing principle of human life, and ignorance the
+origin of all evil: for no one prefers the less pleasure to the greater,
+or the greater pain to the less, except from ignorance. The argument
+is drawn out in an imaginary 'dialogue within a dialogue,' conducted by
+Socrates and Protagoras on the one part, and the rest of the world
+on the other. Hippias and Prodicus, as well as Protagoras, admit the
+soundness of the conclusion.
+
+Socrates then applies this new conclusion to the case of courage--the
+only virtue which still holds out against the assaults of the Socratic
+dialectic. No one chooses the evil or refuses the good except through
+ignorance. This explains why cowards refuse to go to war:--because they
+form a wrong estimate of good, and honour, and pleasure. And why are the
+courageous willing to go to war?--because they form a right estimate of
+pleasures and pains, of things terrible and not terrible. Courage then
+is knowledge, and cowardice is ignorance. And the five virtues, which
+were originally maintained to have five different natures, after having
+been easily reduced to two only, at last coalesce in one. The assent of
+Protagoras to this last position is extracted with great difficulty.
+
+Socrates concludes by professing his disinterested love of the truth,
+and remarks on the singular manner in which he and his adversary had
+changed sides. Protagoras began by asserting, and Socrates by denying,
+the teachableness of virtue, and now the latter ends by affirming that
+virtue is knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things, while
+Protagoras has been striving to show that virtue is not knowledge, and
+this is almost equivalent to saying that virtue cannot be taught. He is
+not satisfied with the result, and would like to renew the enquiry with
+the help of Protagoras in a different order, asking (1) What virtue is,
+and (2) Whether virtue can be taught. Protagoras declines this offer,
+but commends Socrates' earnestness and his style of discussion.
+
+The Protagoras is often supposed to be full of difficulties. These
+are partly imaginary and partly real. The imaginary ones are (1)
+Chronological,--which were pointed out in ancient times by Athenaeus,
+and are noticed by Schleiermacher and others, and relate to the
+impossibility of all the persons in the Dialogue meeting at any one
+time, whether in the year 425 B.C., or in any other. But Plato, like
+all writers of fiction, aims only at the probable, and shows in many
+Dialogues (e.g. the Symposium and Republic, and already in the Laches)
+an extreme disregard of the historical accuracy which is sometimes
+demanded of him. (2) The exact place of the Protagoras among the
+Dialogues, and the date of composition, have also been much disputed.
+But there are no criteria which afford any real grounds for determining
+the date of composition; and the affinities of the Dialogues, when they
+are not indicated by Plato himself, must always to a great extent remain
+uncertain. (3) There is another class of difficulties, which may be
+ascribed to preconceived notions of commentators, who imagine that
+Protagoras the Sophist ought always to be in the wrong, and his
+adversary Socrates in the right; or that in this or that passage--e.g.
+in the explanation of good as pleasure--Plato is inconsistent with
+himself; or that the Dialogue fails in unity, and has not a proper
+beginning, middle, and ending. They seem to forget that Plato is a
+dramatic writer who throws his thoughts into both sides of the argument,
+and certainly does not aim at any unity which is inconsistent with
+freedom, and with a natural or even wild manner of treating his subject;
+also that his mode of revealing the truth is by lights and shadows, and
+far-off and opposing points of view, and not by dogmatic statements or
+definite results.
+
+The real difficulties arise out of the extreme subtlety of the work,
+which, as Socrates says of the poem of Simonides, is a most perfect
+piece of art. There are dramatic contrasts and interests, threads of
+philosophy broken and resumed, satirical reflections on mankind, veils
+thrown over truths which are lightly suggested, and all woven together
+in a single design, and moving towards one end.
+
+In the introductory scene Plato raises the expectation that a 'great
+personage' is about to appear on the stage; perhaps with a further view
+of showing that he is destined to be overthrown by a greater still, who
+makes no pretensions. Before introducing Hippocrates to him, Socrates
+thinks proper to warn the youth against the dangers of 'influence,'
+of which the invidious nature is recognized by Protagoras himself.
+Hippocrates readily adopts the suggestion of Socrates that he shall
+learn of Protagoras only the accomplishments which befit an Athenian
+gentleman, and let alone his 'sophistry.' There is nothing however in
+the introduction which leads to the inference that Plato intended to
+blacken the character of the Sophists; he only makes a little merry at
+their expense.
+
+The 'great personage' is somewhat ostentatious, but frank and honest.
+He is introduced on a stage which is worthy of him--at the house of the
+rich Callias, in which are congregated the noblest and wisest of the
+Athenians. He considers openness to be the best policy, and particularly
+mentions his own liberal mode of dealing with his pupils, as if in
+answer to the favourite accusation of the Sophists that they received
+pay. He is remarkable for the good temper which he exhibits throughout
+the discussion under the trying and often sophistical cross-examination
+of Socrates. Although once or twice ruffled, and reluctant to continue
+the discussion, he parts company on perfectly good terms, and appears to
+be, as he says of himself, the 'least jealous of mankind.'
+
+Nor is there anything in the sentiments of Protagoras which impairs this
+pleasing impression of the grave and weighty old man. His real defect
+is that he is inferior to Socrates in dialectics. The opposition between
+him and Socrates is not the opposition of good and bad, true and false,
+but of the old art of rhetoric and the new science of interrogation and
+argument; also of the irony of Socrates and the self-assertion of the
+Sophists. There is quite as much truth on the side of Protagoras as
+of Socrates; but the truth of Protagoras is based on common sense and
+common maxims of morality, while that of Socrates is paradoxical
+or transcendental, and though full of meaning and insight, hardly
+intelligible to the rest of mankind. Here as elsewhere is the usual
+contrast between the Sophists representing average public opinion and
+Socrates seeking for increased clearness and unity of ideas. But to a
+great extent Protagoras has the best of the argument and represents the
+better mind of man.
+
+For example: (1) one of the noblest statements to be found in antiquity
+about the preventive nature of punishment is put into his mouth; (2) he
+is clearly right also in maintaining that virtue can be taught (which
+Socrates himself, at the end of the Dialogue, is disposed to concede);
+and also (3) in his explanation of the phenomenon that good fathers have
+bad sons; (4) he is right also in observing that the virtues are not
+like the arts, gifts or attainments of special individuals, but the
+common property of all: this, which in all ages has been the strength
+and weakness of ethics and politics, is deeply seated in human nature;
+(5) there is a sort of half-truth in the notion that all civilized men
+are teachers of virtue; and more than a half-truth (6) in ascribing
+to man, who in his outward conditions is more helpless than the other
+animals, the power of self-improvement; (7) the religious allegory
+should be noticed, in which the arts are said to be given by Prometheus
+(who stole them), whereas justice and reverence and the political
+virtues could only be imparted by Zeus; (8) in the latter part of the
+Dialogue, when Socrates is arguing that 'pleasure is the only good,'
+Protagoras deems it more in accordance with his character to maintain
+that 'some pleasures only are good;' and admits that 'he, above all
+other men, is bound to say "that wisdom and knowledge are the highest of
+human things."'
+
+There is no reason to suppose that in all this Plato is depicting an
+imaginary Protagoras; he seems to be showing us the teaching of the
+Sophists under the milder aspect under which he once regarded them.
+Nor is there any reason to doubt that Socrates is equally an historical
+character, paradoxical, ironical, tiresome, but seeking for the unity
+of virtue and knowledge as for a precious treasure; willing to rest this
+even on a calculation of pleasure, and irresistible here, as everywhere
+in Plato, in his intellectual superiority.
+
+The aim of Socrates, and of the Dialogue, is to show the unity of
+virtue. In the determination of this question the identity of virtue and
+knowledge is found to be involved. But if virtue and knowledge are
+one, then virtue can be taught; the end of the Dialogue returns to the
+beginning. Had Protagoras been allowed by Plato to make the Aristotelian
+distinction, and say that virtue is not knowledge, but is accompanied
+with knowledge; or to point out with Aristotle that the same quality may
+have more than one opposite; or with Plato himself in the Phaedo to deny
+that good is a mere exchange of a greater pleasure for a less--the unity
+of virtue and the identity of virtue and knowledge would have required
+to be proved by other arguments.
+
+The victory of Socrates over Protagoras is in every way complete when
+their minds are fairly brought together. Protagoras falls before him
+after two or three blows. Socrates partially gains his object in the
+first part of the Dialogue, and completely in the second. Nor does
+he appear at any disadvantage when subjected to 'the question' by
+Protagoras. He succeeds in making his two 'friends,' Prodicus and
+Hippias, ludicrous by the way; he also makes a long speech in defence
+of the poem of Simonides, after the manner of the Sophists, showing, as
+Alcibiades says, that he is only pretending to have a bad memory, and
+that he and not Protagoras is really a master in the two styles of
+speaking; and that he can undertake, not one side of the argument only,
+but both, when Protagoras begins to break down. Against the authority of
+the poets with whom Protagoras has ingeniously identified himself at
+the commencement of the Dialogue, Socrates sets up the proverbial
+philosophers and those masters of brevity the Lacedaemonians. The poets,
+the Laconizers, and Protagoras are satirized at the same time.
+
+Not having the whole of this poem before us, it is impossible for us
+to answer certainly the question of Protagoras, how the two passages of
+Simonides are to be reconciled. We can only follow the indications given
+by Plato himself. But it seems likely that the reconcilement offered
+by Socrates is a caricature of the methods of interpretation which
+were practised by the Sophists--for the following reasons: (1) The
+transparent irony of the previous interpretations given by Socrates.
+(2) The ludicrous opening of the speech in which the Lacedaemonians are
+described as the true philosophers, and Laconic brevity as the true form
+of philosophy, evidently with an allusion to Protagoras' long speeches.
+(3) The manifest futility and absurdity of the explanation of (Greek),
+which is hardly consistent with the rational interpretation of the rest
+of the poem. The opposition of (Greek) and (Greek) seems also intended
+to express the rival doctrines of Socrates and Protagoras, and is a
+facetious commentary on their differences. (4) The general treatment in
+Plato both of the Poets and the Sophists, who are their interpreters,
+and whom he delights to identify with them. (5) The depreciating
+spirit in which Socrates speaks of the introduction of the poets as a
+substitute for original conversation, which is intended to contrast
+with Protagoras' exaltation of the study of them--this again is hardly
+consistent with the serious defence of Simonides. (6) the marked
+approval of Hippias, who is supposed at once to catch the familiar
+sound, just as in the previous conversation Prodicus is represented as
+ready to accept any distinctions of language however absurd. At the same
+time Hippias is desirous of substituting a new interpretation of his
+own; as if the words might really be made to mean anything, and were
+only to be regarded as affording a field for the ingenuity of the
+interpreter.
+
+This curious passage is, therefore, to be regarded as Plato's satire on
+the tedious and hypercritical arts of interpretation which prevailed in
+his own day, and may be compared with his condemnation of the same arts
+when applied to mythology in the Phaedrus, and with his other parodies,
+e.g. with the two first speeches in the Phaedrus and with the Menexenus.
+Several lesser touches of satire may be observed, such as the claim of
+philosophy advanced for the Lacedaemonians, which is a parody of
+the claims advanced for the Poets by Protagoras; the mistake of the
+Laconizing set in supposing that the Lacedaemonians are a great nation
+because they bruise their ears; the far-fetched notion, which is 'really
+too bad,' that Simonides uses the Lesbian (?) word, (Greek), because he
+is addressing a Lesbian. The whole may also be considered as a satire on
+those who spin pompous theories out of nothing. As in the arguments
+of the Euthydemus and of the Cratylus, the veil of irony is
+never withdrawn; and we are left in doubt at last how far in this
+interpretation of Simonides Socrates is 'fooling,' how far he is in
+earnest.
+
+All the interests and contrasts of character in a great dramatic work
+like the Protagoras are not easily exhausted. The impressiveness of
+the scene should not be lost upon us, or the gradual substitution of
+Socrates in the second part for Protagoras in the first. The characters
+to whom we are introduced at the beginning of the Dialogue all play a
+part more or less conspicuous towards the end. There is Alcibiades, who
+is compelled by the necessity of his nature to be a partisan, lending
+effectual aid to Socrates; there is Critias assuming the tone of
+impartiality; Callias, here as always inclining to the Sophists, but
+eager for any intellectual repast; Prodicus, who finds an opportunity
+for displaying his distinctions of language, which are valueless and
+pedantic, because they are not based on dialectic; Hippias, who has
+previously exhibited his superficial knowledge of natural philosophy,
+to which, as in both the Dialogues called by his name, he now adds the
+profession of an interpreter of the Poets. The two latter personages
+have been already damaged by the mock heroic description of them in
+the introduction. It may be remarked that Protagoras is consistently
+presented to us throughout as the teacher of moral and political virtue;
+there is no allusion to the theories of sensation which are attributed
+to him in the Theaetetus and elsewhere, or to his denial of the
+existence of the gods in a well-known fragment ascribed to him; he is
+the religious rather than the irreligious teacher in this Dialogue.
+Also it may be observed that Socrates shows him as much respect as is
+consistent with his own ironical character; he admits that the
+dialectic which has overthrown Protagoras has carried himself round to
+a conclusion opposed to his first thesis. The force of argument,
+therefore, and not Socrates or Protagoras, has won the day.
+
+But is Socrates serious in maintaining (1) that virtue cannot be taught;
+(2) that the virtues are one; (3) that virtue is the knowledge of
+pleasures and pains present and future? These propositions to us have an
+appearance of paradox--they are really moments or aspects of the truth
+by the help of which we pass from the old conventional morality to a
+higher conception of virtue and knowledge. That virtue cannot be taught
+is a paradox of the same sort as the profession of Socrates that he knew
+nothing. Plato means to say that virtue is not brought to a man, but
+must be drawn out of him; and cannot be taught by rhetorical discourses
+or citations from the poets. The second question, whether the virtues
+are one or many, though at first sight distinct, is really a part of
+the same subject; for if the virtues are to be taught, they must be
+reducible to a common principle; and this common principle is found to
+be knowledge. Here, as Aristotle remarks, Socrates and Plato outstep the
+truth--they make a part of virtue into the whole. Further, the nature
+of this knowledge, which is assumed to be a knowledge of pleasures and
+pains, appears to us too superficial and at variance with the spirit
+of Plato himself. Yet, in this, Plato is only following the historical
+Socrates as he is depicted to us in Xenophon's Memorabilia. Like
+Socrates, he finds on the surface of human life one common bond by which
+the virtues are united,--their tendency to produce happiness,--though
+such a principle is afterwards repudiated by him.
+
+It remains to be considered in what relation the Protagoras stands to
+the other Dialogues of Plato. That it is one of the earlier or purely
+Socratic works--perhaps the last, as it is certainly the greatest of
+them--is indicated by the absence of any allusion to the doctrine of
+reminiscence; and also by the different attitude assumed towards the
+teaching and persons of the Sophists in some of the later Dialogues. The
+Charmides, Laches, Lysis, all touch on the question of the relation of
+knowledge to virtue, and may be regarded, if not as preliminary studies
+or sketches of the more important work, at any rate as closely connected
+with it. The Io and the lesser Hippias contain discussions of the Poets,
+which offer a parallel to the ironical criticism of Simonides, and are
+conceived in a similar spirit. The affinity of the Protagoras to
+the Meno is more doubtful. For there, although the same question is
+discussed, 'whether virtue can be taught,' and the relation of Meno to
+the Sophists is much the same as that of Hippocrates, the answer to the
+question is supplied out of the doctrine of ideas; the real Socrates is
+already passing into the Platonic one. At a later stage of the Platonic
+philosophy we shall find that both the paradox and the solution of it
+appear to have been retracted. The Phaedo, the Gorgias, and the Philebus
+offer further corrections of the teaching of the Protagoras; in all of
+them the doctrine that virtue is pleasure, or that pleasure is the chief
+or only good, is distinctly renounced.
+
+Thus after many preparations and oppositions, both of the characters
+of men and aspects of the truth, especially of the popular and
+philosophical aspect; and after many interruptions and detentions by the
+way, which, as Theodorus says in the Theaetetus, are quite as agreeable
+as the argument, we arrive at the great Socratic thesis that virtue is
+knowledge. This is an aspect of the truth which was lost almost as soon
+as it was found; and yet has to be recovered by every one for himself
+who would pass the limits of proverbial and popular philosophy. The
+moral and intellectual are always dividing, yet they must be reunited,
+and in the highest conception of them are inseparable. The thesis of
+Socrates is not merely a hasty assumption, but may be also deemed an
+anticipation of some 'metaphysic of the future,' in which the divided
+elements of human nature are reconciled.
+
+
+
+
+PROTAGORAS
+
+
+PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, who is the narrator of the Dialogue
+to his Companion. Hippocrates, Alcibiades and Critias. Protagoras,
+Hippias and Prodicus (Sophists). Callias, a wealthy Athenian.
+
+SCENE: The House of Callias.
+
+
+COMPANION: Where do you come from, Socrates? And yet I need hardly
+ask the question, for I know that you have been in chase of the fair
+Alcibiades. I saw him the day before yesterday; and he had got a beard
+like a man,--and he is a man, as I may tell you in your ear. But I
+thought that he was still very charming.
+
+SOCRATES: What of his beard? Are you not of Homer's opinion, who says
+
+     'Youth is most charming when the beard first appears'?
+
+And that is now the charm of Alcibiades.
+
+COMPANION: Well, and how do matters proceed? Have you been visiting him,
+and was he gracious to you?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, I thought that he was very gracious; and especially
+to-day, for I have just come from him, and he has been helping me in an
+argument. But shall I tell you a strange thing? I paid no attention to
+him, and several times I quite forgot that he was present.
+
+COMPANION: What is the meaning of this? Has anything happened between
+you and him? For surely you cannot have discovered a fairer love than he
+is; certainly not in this city of Athens.
+
+SOCRATES: Yes, much fairer.
+
+COMPANION: What do you mean--a citizen or a foreigner?
+
+SOCRATES: A foreigner.
+
+COMPANION: Of what country?
+
+SOCRATES: Of Abdera.
+
+COMPANION: And is this stranger really in your opinion a fairer love
+than the son of Cleinias?
+
+SOCRATES: And is not the wiser always the fairer, sweet friend?
+
+COMPANION: But have you really met, Socrates, with some wise one?
+
+SOCRATES: Say rather, with the wisest of all living men, if you are
+willing to accord that title to Protagoras.
+
+COMPANION: What! Is Protagoras in Athens?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes; he has been here two days.
+
+COMPANION: And do you just come from an interview with him?
+
+SOCRATES: Yes; and I have heard and said many things.
+
+COMPANION: Then, if you have no engagement, suppose that you sit down
+and tell me what passed, and my attendant here shall give up his place
+to you.
+
+SOCRATES: To be sure; and I shall be grateful to you for listening.
+
+COMPANION: Thank you, too, for telling us.
+
+SOCRATES: That is thank you twice over. Listen then:--
+
+Last night, or rather very early this morning, Hippocrates, the son of
+Apollodorus and the brother of Phason, gave a tremendous thump with his
+staff at my door; some one opened to him, and he came rushing in and
+bawled out: Socrates, are you awake or asleep?
+
+I knew his voice, and said: Hippocrates, is that you? and do you bring
+any news?
+
+Good news, he said; nothing but good.
+
+Delightful, I said; but what is the news? and why have you come hither
+at this unearthly hour?
+
+He drew nearer to me and said: Protagoras is come.
+
+Yes, I replied; he came two days ago: have you only just heard of his
+arrival?
+
+Yes, by the gods, he said; but not until yesterday evening.
+
+At the same time he felt for the truckle-bed, and sat down at my feet,
+and then he said: Yesterday quite late in the evening, on my return from
+Oenoe whither I had gone in pursuit of my runaway slave Satyrus, as
+I meant to have told you, if some other matter had not come in the
+way;--on my return, when we had done supper and were about to retire to
+rest, my brother said to me: Protagoras is come. I was going to you at
+once, and then I thought that the night was far spent. But the moment
+sleep left me after my fatigue, I got up and came hither direct.
+
+I, who knew the very courageous madness of the man, said: What is the
+matter? Has Protagoras robbed you of anything?
+
+He replied, laughing: Yes, indeed he has, Socrates, of the wisdom which
+he keeps from me.
+
+But, surely, I said, if you give him money, and make friends with him,
+he will make you as wise as he is himself.
+
+Would to heaven, he replied, that this were the case! He might take all
+that I have, and all that my friends have, if he pleased. But that is
+why I have come to you now, in order that you may speak to him on my
+behalf; for I am young, and also I have never seen nor heard him; (when
+he visited Athens before I was but a child;) and all men praise him,
+Socrates; he is reputed to be the most accomplished of speakers. There
+is no reason why we should not go to him at once, and then we shall find
+him at home. He lodges, as I hear, with Callias the son of Hipponicus:
+let us start.
+
+I replied: Not yet, my good friend; the hour is too early. But let us
+rise and take a turn in the court and wait about there until day-break;
+when the day breaks, then we will go. For Protagoras is generally at
+home, and we shall be sure to find him; never fear.
+
+Upon this we got up and walked about in the court, and I thought that
+I would make trial of the strength of his resolution. So I examined him
+and put questions to him. Tell me, Hippocrates, I said, as you are going
+to Protagoras, and will be paying your money to him, what is he to whom
+you are going? and what will he make of you? If, for example, you had
+thought of going to Hippocrates of Cos, the Asclepiad, and were about to
+give him your money, and some one had said to you: You are paying money
+to your namesake Hippocrates, O Hippocrates; tell me, what is he that
+you give him money? how would you have answered?
+
+I should say, he replied, that I gave money to him as a physician.
+
+And what will he make of you?
+
+A physician, he said.
+
+And if you were resolved to go to Polycleitus the Argive, or Pheidias
+the Athenian, and were intending to give them money, and some one had
+asked you: What are Polycleitus and Pheidias? and why do you give them
+this money?--how would you have answered?
+
+I should have answered, that they were statuaries.
+
+And what will they make of you?
+
+A statuary, of course.
+
+Well now, I said, you and I are going to Protagoras, and we are ready
+to pay him money on your behalf. If our own means are sufficient, and we
+can gain him with these, we shall be only too glad; but if not, then we
+are to spend the money of your friends as well. Now suppose, that while
+we are thus enthusiastically pursuing our object some one were to say to
+us: Tell me, Socrates, and you Hippocrates, what is Protagoras, and
+why are you going to pay him money,--how should we answer? I know that
+Pheidias is a sculptor, and that Homer is a poet; but what appellation
+is given to Protagoras? how is he designated?
+
+They call him a Sophist, Socrates, he replied.
+
+Then we are going to pay our money to him in the character of a Sophist?
+
+Certainly.
+
+But suppose a person were to ask this further question: And how about
+yourself? What will Protagoras make of you, if you go to see him?
+
+He answered, with a blush upon his face (for the day was just beginning
+to dawn, so that I could see him): Unless this differs in some way from
+the former instances, I suppose that he will make a Sophist of me.
+
+By the gods, I said, and are you not ashamed at having to appear before
+the Hellenes in the character of a Sophist?
+
+Indeed, Socrates, to confess the truth, I am.
+
+But you should not assume, Hippocrates, that the instruction of
+Protagoras is of this nature: may you not learn of him in the same way
+that you learned the arts of the grammarian, or musician, or trainer,
+not with the view of making any of them a profession, but only as a part
+of education, and because a private gentleman and freeman ought to know
+them?
+
+Just so, he said; and that, in my opinion, is a far truer account of the
+teaching of Protagoras.
+
+I said: I wonder whether you know what you are doing?
+
+And what am I doing?
+
+You are going to commit your soul to the care of a man whom you call a
+Sophist. And yet I hardly think that you know what a Sophist is; and if
+not, then you do not even know to whom you are committing your soul and
+whether the thing to which you commit yourself be good or evil.
+
+I certainly think that I do know, he replied.
+
+Then tell me, what do you imagine that he is?
+
+I take him to be one who knows wise things, he replied, as his name
+implies.
+
+And might you not, I said, affirm this of the painter and of the
+carpenter also: Do not they, too, know wise things? But suppose a person
+were to ask us: In what are the painters wise? We should answer: In what
+relates to the making of likenesses, and similarly of other things. And
+if he were further to ask: What is the wisdom of the Sophist, and what
+is the manufacture over which he presides?--how should we answer him?
+
+How should we answer him, Socrates? What other answer could there be but
+that he presides over the art which makes men eloquent?
+
+Yes, I replied, that is very likely true, but not enough; for in the
+answer a further question is involved: Of what does the Sophist make a
+man talk eloquently? The player on the lyre may be supposed to make a
+man talk eloquently about that which he makes him understand, that is
+about playing the lyre. Is not that true?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then about what does the Sophist make him eloquent? Must not he make him
+eloquent in that which he understands?
+
+Yes, that may be assumed.
+
+And what is that which the Sophist knows and makes his disciple know?
+
+Indeed, he said, I cannot tell.
+
+Then I proceeded to say: Well, but are you aware of the danger which you
+are incurring? If you were going to commit your body to some one, who
+might do good or harm to it, would you not carefully consider and ask
+the opinion of your friends and kindred, and deliberate many days as to
+whether you should give him the care of your body? But when the soul is
+in question, which you hold to be of far more value than the body,
+and upon the good or evil of which depends the well-being of your
+all,--about this you never consulted either with your father or with
+your brother or with any one of us who are your companions. But no
+sooner does this foreigner appear, than you instantly commit your soul
+to his keeping. In the evening, as you say, you hear of him, and in the
+morning you go to him, never deliberating or taking the opinion of any
+one as to whether you ought to intrust yourself to him or not;--you
+have quite made up your mind that you will at all hazards be a pupil of
+Protagoras, and are prepared to expend all the property of yourself
+and of your friends in carrying out at any price this determination,
+although, as you admit, you do not know him, and have never spoken with
+him: and you call him a Sophist, but are manifestly ignorant of what a
+Sophist is; and yet you are going to commit yourself to his keeping.
+
+When he heard me say this, he replied: No other inference, Socrates, can
+be drawn from your words.
+
+I proceeded: Is not a Sophist, Hippocrates, one who deals wholesale or
+retail in the food of the soul? To me that appears to be his nature.
+
+And what, Socrates, is the food of the soul?
+
+Surely, I said, knowledge is the food of the soul; and we must take
+care, my friend, that the Sophist does not deceive us when he praises
+what he sells, like the dealers wholesale or retail who sell the food
+of the body; for they praise indiscriminately all their goods, without
+knowing what are really beneficial or hurtful: neither do their
+customers know, with the exception of any trainer or physician who may
+happen to buy of them. In like manner those who carry about the wares of
+knowledge, and make the round of the cities, and sell or retail them
+to any customer who is in want of them, praise them all alike; though I
+should not wonder, O my friend, if many of them were really ignorant of
+their effect upon the soul; and their customers equally ignorant,
+unless he who buys of them happens to be a physician of the soul. If,
+therefore, you have understanding of what is good and evil, you may
+safely buy knowledge of Protagoras or of any one; but if not, then, O
+my friend, pause, and do not hazard your dearest interests at a game
+of chance. For there is far greater peril in buying knowledge than in
+buying meat and drink: the one you purchase of the wholesale or retail
+dealer, and carry them away in other vessels, and before you receive
+them into the body as food, you may deposit them at home and call in any
+experienced friend who knows what is good to be eaten or drunken, and
+what not, and how much, and when; and then the danger of purchasing them
+is not so great. But you cannot buy the wares of knowledge and carry
+them away in another vessel; when you have paid for them you must
+receive them into the soul and go your way, either greatly harmed or
+greatly benefited; and therefore we should deliberate and take counsel
+with our elders; for we are still young--too young to determine such a
+matter. And now let us go, as we were intending, and hear Protagoras;
+and when we have heard what he has to say, we may take counsel of
+others; for not only is Protagoras at the house of Callias, but there
+is Hippias of Elis, and, if I am not mistaken, Prodicus of Ceos, and
+several other wise men.
+
+To this we agreed, and proceeded on our way until we reached the
+vestibule of the house; and there we stopped in order to conclude a
+discussion which had arisen between us as we were going along; and we
+stood talking in the vestibule until we had finished and come to an
+understanding. And I think that the door-keeper, who was a eunuch, and
+who was probably annoyed at the great inroad of the Sophists, must
+have heard us talking. At any rate, when we knocked at the door, and he
+opened and saw us, he grumbled: They are Sophists--he is not at home;
+and instantly gave the door a hearty bang with both his hands. Again we
+knocked, and he answered without opening: Did you not hear me say that
+he is not at home, fellows? But, my friend, I said, you need not be
+alarmed; for we are not Sophists, and we are not come to see Callias,
+but we want to see Protagoras; and I must request you to announce us. At
+last, after a good deal of difficulty, the man was persuaded to open the
+door.
+
+When we entered, we found Protagoras taking a walk in the cloister; and
+next to him, on one side, were walking Callias, the son of Hipponicus,
+and Paralus, the son of Pericles, who, by the mother's side, is his
+half-brother, and Charmides, the son of Glaucon. On the other side of
+him were Xanthippus, the other son of Pericles, Philippides, the son
+of Philomelus; also Antimoerus of Mende, who of all the disciples
+of Protagoras is the most famous, and intends to make sophistry his
+profession. A train of listeners followed him; the greater part of them
+appeared to be foreigners, whom Protagoras had brought with him out of
+the various cities visited by him in his journeys, he, like Orpheus,
+attracting them his voice, and they following (Compare Rep.). I should
+mention also that there were some Athenians in the company. Nothing
+delighted me more than the precision of their movements: they never
+got into his way at all; but when he and those who were with him turned
+back, then the band of listeners parted regularly on either side; he was
+always in front, and they wheeled round and took their places behind him
+in perfect order.
+
+After him, as Homer says (Od.), 'I lifted up my eyes and saw' Hippias
+the Elean sitting in the opposite cloister on a chair of state, and
+around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, the son of Acumenus, and
+Phaedrus the Myrrhinusian, and Andron the son of Androtion, and there
+were strangers whom he had brought with him from his native city of
+Elis, and some others: they were putting to Hippias certain physical
+and astronomical questions, and he, ex cathedra, was determining their
+several questions to them, and discoursing of them.
+
+Also, 'my eyes beheld Tantalus (Od.);' for Prodicus the Cean was at
+Athens: he had been lodged in a room which, in the days of Hipponicus,
+was a storehouse; but, as the house was full, Callias had cleared this
+out and made the room into a guest-chamber. Now Prodicus was still in
+bed, wrapped up in sheepskins and bedclothes, of which there seemed
+to be a great heap; and there was sitting by him on the couches near,
+Pausanias of the deme of Cerameis, and with Pausanias was a youth quite
+young, who is certainly remarkable for his good looks, and, if I am not
+mistaken, is also of a fair and gentle nature. I thought that I heard
+him called Agathon, and my suspicion is that he is the beloved
+of Pausanias. There was this youth, and also there were the two
+Adeimantuses, one the son of Cepis, and the other of Leucolophides, and
+some others. I was very anxious to hear what Prodicus was saying, for
+he seems to me to be an all-wise and inspired man; but I was not able to
+get into the inner circle, and his fine deep voice made an echo in the
+room which rendered his words inaudible.
+
+No sooner had we entered than there followed us Alcibiades the
+beautiful, as you say, and I believe you; and also Critias the son of
+Callaeschrus.
+
+On entering we stopped a little, in order to look about us, and then
+walked up to Protagoras, and I said: Protagoras, my friend Hippocrates
+and I have come to see you.
+
+Do you wish, he said, to speak with me alone, or in the presence of the
+company?
+
+Whichever you please, I said; you shall determine when you have heard
+the purpose of our visit.
+
+And what is your purpose? he said.
+
+I must explain, I said, that my friend Hippocrates is a native Athenian;
+he is the son of Apollodorus, and of a great and prosperous house, and
+he is himself in natural ability quite a match for anybody of his own
+age. I believe that he aspires to political eminence; and this he thinks
+that conversation with you is most likely to procure for him. And
+now you can determine whether you would wish to speak to him of your
+teaching alone or in the presence of the company.
+
+Thank you, Socrates, for your consideration of me. For certainly a
+stranger finding his way into great cities, and persuading the flower
+of the youth in them to leave company of their kinsmen or any other
+acquaintances, old or young, and live with him, under the idea that they
+will be improved by his conversation, ought to be very cautious; great
+jealousies are aroused by his proceedings, and he is the subject of many
+enmities and conspiracies. Now the art of the Sophist is, as I believe,
+of great antiquity; but in ancient times those who practised it, fearing
+this odium, veiled and disguised themselves under various names,
+some under that of poets, as Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, some,
+of hierophants and prophets, as Orpheus and Musaeus, and some, as
+I observe, even under the name of gymnastic-masters, like Iccus of
+Tarentum, or the more recently celebrated Herodicus, now of Selymbria
+and formerly of Megara, who is a first-rate Sophist. Your own Agathocles
+pretended to be a musician, but was really an eminent Sophist; also
+Pythocleides the Cean; and there were many others; and all of them, as
+I was saying, adopted these arts as veils or disguises because they were
+afraid of the odium which they would incur. But that is not my way, for
+I do not believe that they effected their purpose, which was to deceive
+the government, who were not blinded by them; and as to the people, they
+have no understanding, and only repeat what their rulers are pleased
+to tell them. Now to run away, and to be caught in running away, is the
+very height of folly, and also greatly increases the exasperation of
+mankind; for they regard him who runs away as a rogue, in addition to
+any other objections which they have to him; and therefore I take an
+entirely opposite course, and acknowledge myself to be a Sophist and
+instructor of mankind; such an open acknowledgement appears to me to
+be a better sort of caution than concealment. Nor do I neglect other
+precautions, and therefore I hope, as I may say, by the favour of heaven
+that no harm will come of the acknowledgment that I am a Sophist. And I
+have been now many years in the profession--for all my years when added
+up are many: there is no one here present of whom I might not be the
+father. Wherefore I should much prefer conversing with you, if you want
+to speak with me, in the presence of the company.
+
+As I suspected that he would like to have a little display and
+glorification in the presence of Prodicus and Hippias, and would gladly
+show us to them in the light of his admirers, I said: But why should we
+not summon Prodicus and Hippias and their friends to hear us?
+
+Very good, he said.
+
+Suppose, said Callias, that we hold a council in which you may sit
+and discuss.--This was agreed upon, and great delight was felt at the
+prospect of hearing wise men talk; we ourselves took the chairs and
+benches, and arranged them by Hippias, where the other benches had been
+already placed. Meanwhile Callias and Alcibiades got Prodicus out of bed
+and brought in him and his companions.
+
+When we were all seated, Protagoras said: Now that the company are
+assembled, Socrates, tell me about the young man of whom you were just
+now speaking.
+
+I replied: I will begin again at the same point, Protagoras, and tell
+you once more the purport of my visit: this is my friend Hippocrates,
+who is desirous of making your acquaintance; he would like to know what
+will happen to him if he associates with you. I have no more to say.
+
+Protagoras answered: Young man, if you associate with me, on the very
+first day you will return home a better man than you came, and better on
+the second day than on the first, and better every day than you were on
+the day before.
+
+When I heard this, I said: Protagoras, I do not at all wonder at hearing
+you say this; even at your age, and with all your wisdom, if any one
+were to teach you what you did not know before, you would become better
+no doubt: but please to answer in a different way--I will explain how
+by an example. Let me suppose that Hippocrates, instead of desiring your
+acquaintance, wished to become acquainted with the young man Zeuxippus
+of Heraclea, who has lately been in Athens, and he had come to him as
+he has come to you, and had heard him say, as he has heard you say, that
+every day he would grow and become better if he associated with him: and
+then suppose that he were to ask him, 'In what shall I become better,
+and in what shall I grow?'--Zeuxippus would answer, 'In painting.' And
+suppose that he went to Orthagoras the Theban, and heard him say the
+same thing, and asked him, 'In what shall I become better day by day?'
+he would reply, 'In flute-playing.' Now I want you to make the same sort
+of answer to this young man and to me, who am asking questions on his
+account. When you say that on the first day on which he associates with
+you he will return home a better man, and on every day will grow in like
+manner,--in what, Protagoras, will he be better? and about what?
+
+When Protagoras heard me say this, he replied: You ask questions fairly,
+and I like to answer a question which is fairly put. If Hippocrates
+comes to me he will not experience the sort of drudgery with which other
+Sophists are in the habit of insulting their pupils; who, when they have
+just escaped from the arts, are taken and driven back into them by these
+teachers, and made to learn calculation, and astronomy, and geometry,
+and music (he gave a look at Hippias as he said this); but if he comes
+to me, he will learn that which he comes to learn. And this is prudence
+in affairs private as well as public; he will learn to order his own
+house in the best manner, and he will be able to speak and act for the
+best in the affairs of the state.
+
+Do I understand you, I said; and is your meaning that you teach the art
+of politics, and that you promise to make men good citizens?
+
+That, Socrates, is exactly the profession which I make.
+
+Then, I said, you do indeed possess a noble art, if there is no mistake
+about this; for I will freely confess to you, Protagoras, that I have
+a doubt whether this art is capable of being taught, and yet I know not
+how to disbelieve your assertion. And I ought to tell you why I am of
+opinion that this art cannot be taught or communicated by man to man. I
+say that the Athenians are an understanding people, and indeed they are
+esteemed to be such by the other Hellenes. Now I observe that when we
+are met together in the assembly, and the matter in hand relates to
+building, the builders are summoned as advisers; when the question is
+one of ship-building, then the ship-wrights; and the like of other arts
+which they think capable of being taught and learned. And if some person
+offers to give them advice who is not supposed by them to have any skill
+in the art, even though he be good-looking, and rich, and noble, they
+will not listen to him, but laugh and hoot at him, until either he is
+clamoured down and retires of himself; or if he persist, he is dragged
+away or put out by the constables at the command of the prytanes. This
+is their way of behaving about professors of the arts. But when the
+question is an affair of state, then everybody is free to have a
+say--carpenter, tinker, cobbler, sailor, passenger; rich and poor, high
+and low--any one who likes gets up, and no one reproaches him, as in
+the former case, with not having learned, and having no teacher, and yet
+giving advice; evidently because they are under the impression that this
+sort of knowledge cannot be taught. And not only is this true of the
+state, but of individuals; the best and wisest of our citizens are
+unable to impart their political wisdom to others: as for example,
+Pericles, the father of these young men, who gave them excellent
+instruction in all that could be learned from masters, in his own
+department of politics neither taught them, nor gave them teachers; but
+they were allowed to wander at their own free will in a sort of hope
+that they would light upon virtue of their own accord. Or take
+another example: there was Cleinias the younger brother of our friend
+Alcibiades, of whom this very same Pericles was the guardian; and he
+being in fact under the apprehension that Cleinias would be corrupted by
+Alcibiades, took him away, and placed him in the house of Ariphron to be
+educated; but before six months had elapsed, Ariphron sent him back,
+not knowing what to do with him. And I could mention numberless other
+instances of persons who were good themselves, and never yet made any
+one else good, whether friend or stranger. Now I, Protagoras, having
+these examples before me, am inclined to think that virtue cannot be
+taught. But then again, when I listen to your words, I waver; and am
+disposed to think that there must be something in what you say, because
+I know that you have great experience, and learning, and invention. And
+I wish that you would, if possible, show me a little more clearly that
+virtue can be taught. Will you be so good?
+
+That I will, Socrates, and gladly. But what would you like? Shall I, as
+an elder, speak to you as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I
+argue out the question?
+
+To this several of the company answered that he should choose for
+himself.
+
+Well, then, he said, I think that the myth will be more interesting.
+
+Once upon a time there were gods only, and no mortal creatures. But when
+the time came that these also should be created, the gods fashioned
+them out of earth and fire and various mixtures of both elements in the
+interior of the earth; and when they were about to bring them into the
+light of day, they ordered Prometheus and Epimetheus to equip them, and
+to distribute to them severally their proper qualities. Epimetheus said
+to Prometheus: 'Let me distribute, and do you inspect.' This was agreed,
+and Epimetheus made the distribution. There were some to whom he gave
+strength without swiftness, while he equipped the weaker with swiftness;
+some he armed, and others he left unarmed; and devised for the latter
+some other means of preservation, making some large, and having their
+size as a protection, and others small, whose nature was to fly in the
+air or burrow in the ground; this was to be their way of escape.
+Thus did he compensate them with the view of preventing any race from
+becoming extinct. And when he had provided against their destruction by
+one another, he contrived also a means of protecting them against
+the seasons of heaven; clothing them with close hair and thick skins
+sufficient to defend them against the winter cold and able to resist
+the summer heat, so that they might have a natural bed of their own when
+they wanted to rest; also he furnished them with hoofs and hair and
+hard and callous skins under their feet. Then he gave them varieties
+of food,--herb of the soil to some, to others fruits of trees, and to
+others roots, and to some again he gave other animals as food. And some
+he made to have few young ones, while those who were their prey were
+very prolific; and in this manner the race was preserved. Thus did
+Epimetheus, who, not being very wise, forgot that he had distributed
+among the brute animals all the qualities which he had to give,--and
+when he came to man, who was still unprovided, he was terribly
+perplexed. Now while he was in this perplexity, Prometheus came to
+inspect the distribution, and he found that the other animals were
+suitably furnished, but that man alone was naked and shoeless, and had
+neither bed nor arms of defence. The appointed hour was approaching when
+man in his turn was to go forth into the light of day; and Prometheus,
+not knowing how he could devise his salvation, stole the mechanical arts
+of Hephaestus and Athene, and fire with them (they could neither have
+been acquired nor used without fire), and gave them to man. Thus man had
+the wisdom necessary to the support of life, but political wisdom he had
+not; for that was in the keeping of Zeus, and the power of Prometheus
+did not extend to entering into the citadel of heaven, where Zeus dwelt,
+who moreover had terrible sentinels; but he did enter by stealth into
+the common workshop of Athene and Hephaestus, in which they used to
+practise their favourite arts, and carried off Hephaestus' art of
+working by fire, and also the art of Athene, and gave them to man. And
+in this way man was supplied with the means of life. But Prometheus is
+said to have been afterwards prosecuted for theft, owing to the blunder
+of Epimetheus.
+
+Now man, having a share of the divine attributes, was at first the
+only one of the animals who had any gods, because he alone was of their
+kindred; and he would raise altars and images of them. He was not long
+in inventing articulate speech and names; and he also constructed houses
+and clothes and shoes and beds, and drew sustenance from the earth. Thus
+provided, mankind at first lived dispersed, and there were no cities.
+But the consequence was that they were destroyed by the wild beasts,
+for they were utterly weak in comparison of them, and their art was only
+sufficient to provide them with the means of life, and did not enable
+them to carry on war against the animals: food they had, but not as yet
+the art of government, of which the art of war is a part. After a while
+the desire of self-preservation gathered them into cities; but when they
+were gathered together, having no art of government, they evil intreated
+one another, and were again in process of dispersion and destruction.
+Zeus feared that the entire race would be exterminated, and so he
+sent Hermes to them, bearing reverence and justice to be the ordering
+principles of cities and the bonds of friendship and conciliation.
+Hermes asked Zeus how he should impart justice and reverence among
+men:--Should he distribute them as the arts are distributed; that is
+to say, to a favoured few only, one skilled individual having enough of
+medicine or of any other art for many unskilled ones? 'Shall this be the
+manner in which I am to distribute justice and reverence among men, or
+shall I give them to all?' 'To all,' said Zeus; 'I should like them all
+to have a share; for cities cannot exist, if a few only share in the
+virtues, as in the arts. And further, make a law by my order, that he
+who has no part in reverence and justice shall be put to death, for he
+is a plague of the state.'
+
+And this is the reason, Socrates, why the Athenians and mankind
+in general, when the question relates to carpentering or any other
+mechanical art, allow but a few to share in their deliberations; and
+when any one else interferes, then, as you say, they object, if he be
+not of the favoured few; which, as I reply, is very natural. But when
+they meet to deliberate about political virtue, which proceeds only by
+way of justice and wisdom, they are patient enough of any man who speaks
+of them, as is also natural, because they think that every man ought to
+share in this sort of virtue, and that states could not exist if this
+were otherwise. I have explained to you, Socrates, the reason of this
+phenomenon.
+
+And that you may not suppose yourself to be deceived in thinking that
+all men regard every man as having a share of justice or honesty and of
+every other political virtue, let me give you a further proof, which is
+this. In other cases, as you are aware, if a man says that he is a good
+flute-player, or skilful in any other art in which he has no skill,
+people either laugh at him or are angry with him, and his relations
+think that he is mad and go and admonish him; but when honesty is in
+question, or some other political virtue, even if they know that he is
+dishonest, yet, if the man comes publicly forward and tells the truth
+about his dishonesty, then, what in the other case was held by them to
+be good sense, they now deem to be madness. They say that all men ought
+to profess honesty whether they are honest or not, and that a man is
+out of his mind who says anything else. Their notion is, that a man must
+have some degree of honesty; and that if he has none at all he ought not
+to be in the world.
+
+I have been showing that they are right in admitting every man as a
+counsellor about this sort of virtue, as they are of opinion that every
+man is a partaker of it. And I will now endeavour to show further that
+they do not conceive this virtue to be given by nature, or to grow
+spontaneously, but to be a thing which may be taught; and which comes to
+a man by taking pains. No one would instruct, no one would rebuke, or
+be angry with those whose calamities they suppose to be due to nature
+or chance; they do not try to punish or to prevent them from being what
+they are; they do but pity them. Who is so foolish as to chastise
+or instruct the ugly, or the diminutive, or the feeble? And for this
+reason. Because he knows that good and evil of this kind is the work
+of nature and of chance; whereas if a man is wanting in those good
+qualities which are attained by study and exercise and teaching, and
+has only the contrary evil qualities, other men are angry with him, and
+punish and reprove him--of these evil qualities one is impiety, another
+injustice, and they may be described generally as the very opposite of
+political virtue. In such cases any man will be angry with another, and
+reprimand him,--clearly because he thinks that by study and learning,
+the virtue in which the other is deficient may be acquired. If you will
+think, Socrates, of the nature of punishment, you will see at once that
+in the opinion of mankind virtue may be acquired; no one punishes
+the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has done
+wrong,--only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But
+he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a
+past wrong which cannot be undone; he has regard to the future, and is
+desirous that the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished,
+may be deterred from doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of
+prevention, thereby clearly implying that virtue is capable of being
+taught. This is the notion of all who retaliate upon others either
+privately or publicly. And the Athenians, too, your own citizens, like
+other men, punish and take vengeance on all whom they regard as evil
+doers; and hence, we may infer them to be of the number of those who
+think that virtue may be acquired and taught. Thus far, Socrates, I have
+shown you clearly enough, if I am not mistaken, that your countrymen are
+right in admitting the tinker and the cobbler to advise about politics,
+and also that they deem virtue to be capable of being taught and
+acquired.
+
+There yet remains one difficulty which has been raised by you about the
+sons of good men. What is the reason why good men teach their sons the
+knowledge which is gained from teachers, and make them wise in that,
+but do nothing towards improving them in the virtues which distinguish
+themselves? And here, Socrates, I will leave the apologue and resume the
+argument. Please to consider: Is there or is there not some one quality
+of which all the citizens must be partakers, if there is to be a city
+at all? In the answer to this question is contained the only solution
+of your difficulty; there is no other. For if there be any such quality,
+and this quality or unity is not the art of the carpenter, or the smith,
+or the potter, but justice and temperance and holiness and, in a word,
+manly virtue--if this is the quality of which all men must be partakers,
+and which is the very condition of their learning or doing anything
+else, and if he who is wanting in this, whether he be a child only or a
+grown-up man or woman, must be taught and punished, until by punishment
+he becomes better, and he who rebels against instruction and punishment
+is either exiled or condemned to death under the idea that he is
+incurable--if what I am saying be true, good men have their sons taught
+other things and not this, do consider how extraordinary their conduct
+would appear to be. For we have shown that they think virtue capable
+of being taught and cultivated both in private and public; and,
+notwithstanding, they have their sons taught lesser matters, ignorance
+of which does not involve the punishment of death: but greater things,
+of which the ignorance may cause death and exile to those who have no
+training or knowledge of them--aye, and confiscation as well as death,
+and, in a word, may be the ruin of families--those things, I say, they
+are supposed not to teach them,--not to take the utmost care that they
+should learn. How improbable is this, Socrates!
+
+Education and admonition commence in the first years of childhood, and
+last to the very end of life. Mother and nurse and father and tutor are
+vying with one another about the improvement of the child as soon as
+ever he is able to understand what is being said to him: he cannot say
+or do anything without their setting forth to him that this is just and
+that is unjust; this is honourable, that is dishonourable; this is holy,
+that is unholy; do this and abstain from that. And if he obeys, well and
+good; if not, he is straightened by threats and blows, like a piece of
+bent or warped wood. At a later stage they send him to teachers, and
+enjoin them to see to his manners even more than to his reading and
+music; and the teachers do as they are desired. And when the boy has
+learned his letters and is beginning to understand what is written, as
+before he understood only what was spoken, they put into his hands the
+works of great poets, which he reads sitting on a bench at school; in
+these are contained many admonitions, and many tales, and praises, and
+encomia of ancient famous men, which he is required to learn by heart,
+in order that he may imitate or emulate them and desire to become like
+them. Then, again, the teachers of the lyre take similar care that their
+young disciple is temperate and gets into no mischief; and when they
+have taught him the use of the lyre, they introduce him to the poems of
+other excellent poets, who are the lyric poets; and these they set
+to music, and make their harmonies and rhythms quite familiar to the
+children's souls, in order that they may learn to be more gentle, and
+harmonious, and rhythmical, and so more fitted for speech and action;
+for the life of man in every part has need of harmony and rhythm. Then
+they send them to the master of gymnastic, in order that their bodies
+may better minister to the virtuous mind, and that they may not be
+compelled through bodily weakness to play the coward in war or on any
+other occasion. This is what is done by those who have the means, and
+those who have the means are the rich; their children begin to go to
+school soonest and leave off latest. When they have done with masters,
+the state again compels them to learn the laws, and live after the
+pattern which they furnish, and not after their own fancies; and just as
+in learning to write, the writing-master first draws lines with a style
+for the use of the young beginner, and gives him the tablet and makes
+him follow the lines, so the city draws the laws, which were the
+invention of good lawgivers living in the olden time; these are given
+to the young man, in order to guide him in his conduct whether he is
+commanding or obeying; and he who transgresses them is to be corrected,
+or, in other words, called to account, which is a term used not only in
+your country, but also in many others, seeing that justice calls men
+to account. Now when there is all this care about virtue private and
+public, why, Socrates, do you still wonder and doubt whether virtue
+can be taught? Cease to wonder, for the opposite would be far more
+surprising.
+
+But why then do the sons of good fathers often turn out ill? There
+is nothing very wonderful in this; for, as I have been saying, the
+existence of a state implies that virtue is not any man's private
+possession. If so--and nothing can be truer--then I will further ask
+you to imagine, as an illustration, some other pursuit or branch of
+knowledge which may be assumed equally to be the condition of the
+existence of a state. Suppose that there could be no state unless we
+were all flute-players, as far as each had the capacity, and everybody
+was freely teaching everybody the art, both in private and public, and
+reproving the bad player as freely and openly as every man now teaches
+justice and the laws, not concealing them as he would conceal the other
+arts, but imparting them--for all of us have a mutual interest in the
+justice and virtue of one another, and this is the reason why every one
+is so ready to teach justice and the laws;--suppose, I say, that there
+were the same readiness and liberality among us in teaching one
+another flute-playing, do you imagine, Socrates, that the sons of good
+flute-players would be more likely to be good than the sons of bad
+ones? I think not. Would not their sons grow up to be distinguished
+or undistinguished according to their own natural capacities as
+flute-players, and the son of a good player would often turn out to be a
+bad one, and the son of a bad player to be a good one, all flute-players
+would be good enough in comparison of those who were ignorant and
+unacquainted with the art of flute-playing? In like manner I would have
+you consider that he who appears to you to be the worst of those who
+have been brought up in laws and humanities, would appear to be a just
+man and a master of justice if he were to be compared with men who had
+no education, or courts of justice, or laws, or any restraints upon them
+which compelled them to practise virtue--with the savages, for example,
+whom the poet Pherecrates exhibited on the stage at the last year's
+Lenaean festival. If you were living among men such as the man-haters
+in his Chorus, you would be only too glad to meet with Eurybates and
+Phrynondas, and you would sorrowfully long to revisit the rascality
+of this part of the world. You, Socrates, are discontented, and why?
+Because all men are teachers of virtue, each one according to his
+ability; and you say Where are the teachers? You might as well ask, Who
+teaches Greek? For of that too there will not be any teachers found. Or
+you might ask, Who is to teach the sons of our artisans this same art
+which they have learned of their fathers? He and his fellow-workmen
+have taught them to the best of their ability,--but who will carry
+them further in their arts? And you would certainly have a difficulty,
+Socrates, in finding a teacher of them; but there would be no difficulty
+in finding a teacher of those who are wholly ignorant. And this is true
+of virtue or of anything else; if a man is better able than we are to
+promote virtue ever so little, we must be content with the result. A
+teacher of this sort I believe myself to be, and above all other men
+to have the knowledge which makes a man noble and good; and I give my
+pupils their money's-worth, and even more, as they themselves confess.
+And therefore I have introduced the following mode of payment:--When
+a man has been my pupil, if he likes he pays my price, but there is no
+compulsion; and if he does not like, he has only to go into a temple and
+take an oath of the value of the instructions, and he pays no more than
+he declares to be their value.
+
+Such is my Apologue, Socrates, and such is the argument by which I
+endeavour to show that virtue may be taught, and that this is the
+opinion of the Athenians. And I have also attempted to show that you are
+not to wonder at good fathers having bad sons, or at good sons having
+bad fathers, of which the sons of Polycleitus afford an example, who
+are the companions of our friends here, Paralus and Xanthippus, but are
+nothing in comparison with their father; and this is true of the sons
+of many other artists. As yet I ought not to say the same of Paralus
+and Xanthippus themselves, for they are young and there is still hope of
+them.
+
+Protagoras ended, and in my ear
+
+'So charming left his voice, that I the while Thought him still
+speaking; still stood fixed to hear (Borrowed by Milton, "Paradise
+Lost".).'
+
+At length, when the truth dawned upon me, that he had really finished,
+not without difficulty I began to collect myself, and looking at
+Hippocrates, I said to him: O son of Apollodorus, how deeply grateful
+I am to you for having brought me hither; I would not have missed the
+speech of Protagoras for a great deal. For I used to imagine that no
+human care could make men good; but I know better now. Yet I have still
+one very small difficulty which I am sure that Protagoras will easily
+explain, as he has already explained so much. If a man were to go and
+consult Pericles or any of our great speakers about these matters, he
+might perhaps hear as fine a discourse; but then when one has a question
+to ask of any of them, like books, they can neither answer nor ask;
+and if any one challenges the least particular of their speech, they
+go ringing on in a long harangue, like brazen pots, which when they
+are struck continue to sound unless some one puts his hand upon them;
+whereas our friend Protagoras can not only make a good speech, as he has
+already shown, but when he is asked a question he can answer briefly;
+and when he asks he will wait and hear the answer; and this is a very
+rare gift. Now I, Protagoras, want to ask of you a little question,
+which if you will only answer, I shall be quite satisfied. You were
+saying that virtue can be taught;--that I will take upon your authority,
+and there is no one to whom I am more ready to trust. But I marvel at
+one thing about which I should like to have my mind set at rest. You
+were speaking of Zeus sending justice and reverence to men; and several
+times while you were speaking, justice, and temperance, and holiness,
+and all these qualities, were described by you as if together they made
+up virtue. Now I want you to tell me truly whether virtue is one whole,
+of which justice and temperance and holiness are parts; or whether all
+these are only the names of one and the same thing: that is the doubt
+which still lingers in my mind.
+
+There is no difficulty, Socrates, in answering that the qualities of
+which you are speaking are the parts of virtue which is one.
+
+And are they parts, I said, in the same sense in which mouth, nose, and
+eyes, and ears, are the parts of a face; or are they like the parts of
+gold, which differ from the whole and from one another only in being
+larger or smaller?
+
+I should say that they differed, Socrates, in the first way; they are
+related to one another as the parts of a face are related to the whole
+face.
+
+And do men have some one part and some another part of virtue? Or if a
+man has one part, must he also have all the others?
+
+By no means, he said; for many a man is brave and not just, or just and
+not wise.
+
+You would not deny, then, that courage and wisdom are also parts of
+virtue?
+
+Most undoubtedly they are, he answered; and wisdom is the noblest of the
+parts.
+
+And they are all different from one another? I said.
+
+Yes.
+
+And has each of them a distinct function like the parts of the
+face;--the eye, for example, is not like the ear, and has not the same
+functions; and the other parts are none of them like one another, either
+in their functions, or in any other way? I want to know whether the
+comparison holds concerning the parts of virtue. Do they also differ
+from one another in themselves and in their functions? For that is
+clearly what the simile would imply.
+
+Yes, Socrates, you are right in supposing that they differ.
+
+Then, I said, no other part of virtue is like knowledge, or like
+justice, or like courage, or like temperance, or like holiness?
+
+No, he answered.
+
+Well then, I said, suppose that you and I enquire into their natures.
+And first, you would agree with me that justice is of the nature of a
+thing, would you not? That is my opinion: would it not be yours also?
+
+Mine also, he said.
+
+And suppose that some one were to ask us, saying, 'O Protagoras, and
+you, Socrates, what about this thing which you were calling justice, is
+it just or unjust?'--and I were to answer, just: would you vote with me
+or against me?
+
+With you, he said.
+
+Thereupon I should answer to him who asked me, that justice is of the
+nature of the just: would not you?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+And suppose that he went on to say: 'Well now, is there also such a
+thing as holiness?'--we should answer, 'Yes,' if I am not mistaken?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+Which you would also acknowledge to be a thing--should we not say so?
+
+He assented.
+
+'And is this a sort of thing which is of the nature of the holy, or
+of the nature of the unholy?' I should be angry at his putting such a
+question, and should say, 'Peace, man; nothing can be holy if holiness
+is not holy.' What would you say? Would you not answer in the same way?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+And then after this suppose that he came and asked us, 'What were you
+saying just now? Perhaps I may not have heard you rightly, but you
+seemed to me to be saying that the parts of virtue were not the same as
+one another.' I should reply, 'You certainly heard that said, but not,
+as you imagine, by me; for I only asked the question; Protagoras gave
+the answer.' And suppose that he turned to you and said, 'Is this
+true, Protagoras? and do you maintain that one part of virtue is unlike
+another, and is this your position?'--how would you answer him?
+
+I could not help acknowledging the truth of what he said, Socrates.
+
+Well then, Protagoras, we will assume this; and now supposing that
+he proceeded to say further, 'Then holiness is not of the nature of
+justice, nor justice of the nature of holiness, but of the nature of
+unholiness; and holiness is of the nature of the not just, and therefore
+of the unjust, and the unjust is the unholy': how shall we answer him?
+I should certainly answer him on my own behalf that justice is holy,
+and that holiness is just; and I would say in like manner on your
+behalf also, if you would allow me, that justice is either the same with
+holiness, or very nearly the same; and above all I would assert that
+justice is like holiness and holiness is like justice; and I wish that
+you would tell me whether I may be permitted to give this answer on your
+behalf, and whether you would agree with me.
+
+He replied, I cannot simply agree, Socrates, to the proposition that
+justice is holy and that holiness is just, for there appears to me to be
+a difference between them. But what matter? if you please I please; and
+let us assume, if you will I, that justice is holy, and that holiness is
+just.
+
+Pardon me, I replied; I do not want this 'if you wish' or 'if you will'
+sort of conclusion to be proven, but I want you and me to be proven: I
+mean to say that the conclusion will be best proven if there be no 'if.'
+
+Well, he said, I admit that justice bears a resemblance to holiness,
+for there is always some point of view in which everything is like every
+other thing; white is in a certain way like black, and hard is like
+soft, and the most extreme opposites have some qualities in common; even
+the parts of the face which, as we were saying before, are distinct and
+have different functions, are still in a certain point of view similar,
+and one of them is like another of them. And you may prove that they
+are like one another on the same principle that all things are like one
+another; and yet things which are like in some particular ought not to
+be called alike, nor things which are unlike in some particular, however
+slight, unlike.
+
+And do you think, I said in a tone of surprise, that justice and
+holiness have but a small degree of likeness?
+
+Certainly not; any more than I agree with what I understand to be your
+view.
+
+Well, I said, as you appear to have a difficulty about this, let us take
+another of the examples which you mentioned instead. Do you admit the
+existence of folly?
+
+I do.
+
+And is not wisdom the very opposite of folly?
+
+That is true, he said.
+
+And when men act rightly and advantageously they seem to you to be
+temperate?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+And temperance makes them temperate?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And they who do not act rightly act foolishly, and in acting thus are
+not temperate?
+
+I agree, he said.
+
+Then to act foolishly is the opposite of acting temperately?
+
+He assented.
+
+And foolish actions are done by folly, and temperate actions by
+temperance?
+
+He agreed.
+
+And that is done strongly which is done by strength, and that which is
+weakly done, by weakness?
+
+He assented.
+
+And that which is done with swiftness is done swiftly, and that which is
+done with slowness, slowly?
+
+He assented again.
+
+And that which is done in the same manner, is done by the same; and that
+which is done in an opposite manner by the opposite?
+
+He agreed.
+
+Once more, I said, is there anything beautiful?
+
+Yes.
+
+To which the only opposite is the ugly?
+
+There is no other.
+
+And is there anything good?
+
+There is.
+
+To which the only opposite is the evil?
+
+There is no other.
+
+And there is the acute in sound?
+
+True.
+
+To which the only opposite is the grave?
+
+There is no other, he said, but that.
+
+Then every opposite has one opposite only and no more?
+
+He assented.
+
+Then now, I said, let us recapitulate our admissions. First of all we
+admitted that everything has one opposite and not more than one?
+
+We did so.
+
+And we admitted also that what was done in opposite ways was done by
+opposites?
+
+Yes.
+
+And that which was done foolishly, as we further admitted, was done in
+the opposite way to that which was done temperately?
+
+Yes.
+
+And that which was done temperately was done by temperance, and that
+which was done foolishly by folly?
+
+He agreed.
+
+And that which is done in opposite ways is done by opposites?
+
+Yes.
+
+And one thing is done by temperance, and quite another thing by folly?
+
+Yes.
+
+And in opposite ways?
+
+Certainly.
+
+And therefore by opposites:--then folly is the opposite of temperance?
+
+Clearly.
+
+And do you remember that folly has already been acknowledged by us to be
+the opposite of wisdom?
+
+He assented.
+
+And we said that everything has only one opposite?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then, Protagoras, which of the two assertions shall we renounce? One
+says that everything has but one opposite; the other that wisdom is
+distinct from temperance, and that both of them are parts of virtue; and
+that they are not only distinct, but dissimilar, both in themselves
+and in their functions, like the parts of a face. Which of these two
+assertions shall we renounce? For both of them together are certainly
+not in harmony; they do not accord or agree: for how can they be said
+to agree if everything is assumed to have only one opposite and not
+more than one, and yet folly, which is one, has clearly the two
+opposites--wisdom and temperance? Is not that true, Protagoras? What
+else would you say?
+
+He assented, but with great reluctance.
+
+Then temperance and wisdom are the same, as before justice and holiness
+appeared to us to be nearly the same. And now, Protagoras, I said, we
+must finish the enquiry, and not faint. Do you think that an unjust man
+can be temperate in his injustice?
+
+I should be ashamed, Socrates, he said, to acknowledge this, which
+nevertheless many may be found to assert.
+
+And shall I argue with them or with you? I replied.
+
+I would rather, he said, that you should argue with the many first, if
+you will.
+
+Whichever you please, if you will only answer me and say whether you
+are of their opinion or not. My object is to test the validity of the
+argument; and yet the result may be that I who ask and you who answer
+may both be put on our trial.
+
+Protagoras at first made a show of refusing, as he said that the
+argument was not encouraging; at length, he consented to answer.
+
+Now then, I said, begin at the beginning and answer me. You think that
+some men are temperate, and yet unjust?
+
+Yes, he said; let that be admitted.
+
+And temperance is good sense?
+
+Yes.
+
+And good sense is good counsel in doing injustice?
+
+Granted.
+
+If they succeed, I said, or if they do not succeed?
+
+If they succeed.
+
+And you would admit the existence of goods?
+
+Yes.
+
+And is the good that which is expedient for man?
+
+Yes, indeed, he said: and there are some things which may be
+inexpedient, and yet I call them good.
+
+I thought that Protagoras was getting ruffled and excited; he seemed
+to be setting himself in an attitude of war. Seeing this, I minded my
+business, and gently said:--
+
+When you say, Protagoras, that things inexpedient are good, do you mean
+inexpedient for man only, or inexpedient altogether? and do you call the
+latter good?
+
+Certainly not the last, he replied; for I know of many things--meats,
+drinks, medicines, and ten thousand other things, which are inexpedient
+for man, and some which are expedient; and some which are neither
+expedient nor inexpedient for man, but only for horses; and some for
+oxen only, and some for dogs; and some for no animals, but only for
+trees; and some for the roots of trees and not for their branches, as
+for example, manure, which is a good thing when laid about the roots
+of a tree, but utterly destructive if thrown upon the shoots and young
+branches; or I may instance olive oil, which is mischievous to all
+plants, and generally most injurious to the hair of every animal with
+the exception of man, but beneficial to human hair and to the human body
+generally; and even in this application (so various and changeable
+is the nature of the benefit), that which is the greatest good to the
+outward parts of a man, is a very great evil to his inward parts: and
+for this reason physicians always forbid their patients the use of
+oil in their food, except in very small quantities, just enough to
+extinguish the disagreeable sensation of smell in meats and sauces.
+
+When he had given this answer, the company cheered him. And I said:
+Protagoras, I have a wretched memory, and when any one makes a long
+speech to me I never remember what he is talking about. As then, if I
+had been deaf, and you were going to converse with me, you would have
+had to raise your voice; so now, having such a bad memory, I will ask
+you to cut your answers shorter, if you would take me with you.
+
+What do you mean? he said: how am I to shorten my answers? shall I make
+them too short?
+
+Certainly not, I said.
+
+But short enough?
+
+Yes, I said.
+
+Shall I answer what appears to me to be short enough, or what appears to
+you to be short enough?
+
+I have heard, I said, that you can speak and teach others to speak about
+the same things at such length that words never seemed to fail, or with
+such brevity that no one could use fewer of them. Please therefore, if
+you talk with me, to adopt the latter or more compendious method.
+
+Socrates, he replied, many a battle of words have I fought, and if I had
+followed the method of disputation which my adversaries desired, as you
+want me to do, I should have been no better than another, and the name
+of Protagoras would have been nowhere.
+
+I saw that he was not satisfied with his previous answers, and that he
+would not play the part of answerer any more if he could help; and I
+considered that there was no call upon me to continue the conversation;
+so I said: Protagoras, I do not wish to force the conversation upon you
+if you had rather not, but when you are willing to argue with me in such
+a way that I can follow you, then I will argue with you. Now you, as
+is said of you by others and as you say of yourself, are able to have
+discussions in shorter forms of speech as well as in longer, for you are
+a master of wisdom; but I cannot manage these long speeches: I only wish
+that I could. You, on the other hand, who are capable of either, ought
+to speak shorter as I beg you, and then we might converse. But I see
+that you are disinclined, and as I have an engagement which will prevent
+my staying to hear you at greater length (for I have to be in another
+place), I will depart; although I should have liked to have heard you.
+
+Thus I spoke, and was rising from my seat, when Callias seized me by the
+right hand, and in his left hand caught hold of this old cloak of mine.
+He said: We cannot let you go, Socrates, for if you leave us there will
+be an end of our discussions: I must therefore beg you to remain, as
+there is nothing in the world that I should like better than to hear you
+and Protagoras discourse. Do not deny the company this pleasure.
+
+Now I had got up, and was in the act of departure. Son of Hipponicus,
+I replied, I have always admired, and do now heartily applaud and love
+your philosophical spirit, and I would gladly comply with your request,
+if I could. But the truth is that I cannot. And what you ask is as great
+an impossibility to me, as if you bade me run a race with Crison of
+Himera, when in his prime, or with some one of the long or day course
+runners. To such a request I should reply that I would fain ask the same
+of my own legs; but they refuse to comply. And therefore if you want
+to see Crison and me in the same stadium, you must bid him slacken his
+speed to mine, for I cannot run quickly, and he can run slowly. And in
+like manner if you want to hear me and Protagoras discoursing, you must
+ask him to shorten his answers, and keep to the point, as he did at
+first; if not, how can there be any discussion? For discussion is one
+thing, and making an oration is quite another, in my humble opinion.
+
+But you see, Socrates, said Callias, that Protagoras may fairly claim to
+speak in his own way, just as you claim to speak in yours.
+
+Here Alcibiades interposed, and said: That, Callias, is not a true
+statement of the case. For our friend Socrates admits that he cannot
+make a speech--in this he yields the palm to Protagoras: but I should
+be greatly surprised if he yielded to any living man in the power of
+holding and apprehending an argument. Now if Protagoras will make
+a similar admission, and confess that he is inferior to Socrates in
+argumentative skill, that is enough for Socrates; but if he claims a
+superiority in argument as well, let him ask and answer--not, when
+a question is asked, slipping away from the point, and instead of
+answering, making a speech at such length that most of his hearers
+forget the question at issue (not that Socrates is likely to forget--I
+will be bound for that, although he may pretend in fun that he has a
+bad memory). And Socrates appears to me to be more in the right than
+Protagoras; that is my view, and every man ought to say what he thinks.
+
+When Alcibiades had done speaking, some one--Critias, I believe--went on
+to say: O Prodicus and Hippias, Callias appears to me to be a partisan
+of Protagoras: and this led Alcibiades, who loves opposition, to take
+the other side. But we should not be partisans either of Socrates or of
+Protagoras; let us rather unite in entreating both of them not to break
+up the discussion.
+
+Prodicus added: That, Critias, seems to me to be well said, for those
+who are present at such discussions ought to be impartial hearers of
+both the speakers; remembering, however, that impartiality is not the
+same as equality, for both sides should be impartially heard, and yet
+an equal meed should not be assigned to both of them; but to the wiser a
+higher meed should be given, and a lower to the less wise. And I as well
+as Critias would beg you, Protagoras and Socrates, to grant our request,
+which is, that you will argue with one another and not wrangle; for
+friends argue with friends out of good-will, but only adversaries and
+enemies wrangle. And then our meeting will be delightful; for in this
+way you, who are the speakers, will be most likely to win esteem, and
+not praise only, among us who are your audience; for esteem is a sincere
+conviction of the hearers' souls, but praise is often an insincere
+expression of men uttering falsehoods contrary to their conviction.
+And thus we who are the hearers will be gratified and not pleased; for
+gratification is of the mind when receiving wisdom and knowledge, but
+pleasure is of the body when eating or experiencing some other bodily
+delight. Thus spoke Prodicus, and many of the company applauded his
+words.
+
+Hippias the sage spoke next. He said: All of you who are here present I
+reckon to be kinsmen and friends and fellow-citizens, by nature and not
+by law; for by nature like is akin to like, whereas law is the tyrant
+of mankind, and often compels us to do many things which are against
+nature. How great would be the disgrace then, if we, who know the nature
+of things, and are the wisest of the Hellenes, and as such are met
+together in this city, which is the metropolis of wisdom, and in the
+greatest and most glorious house of this city, should have nothing to
+show worthy of this height of dignity, but should only quarrel with
+one another like the meanest of mankind! I do pray and advise you,
+Protagoras, and you, Socrates, to agree upon a compromise. Let us be
+your peacemakers. And do not you, Socrates, aim at this precise and
+extreme brevity in discourse, if Protagoras objects, but loosen and let
+go the reins of speech, that your words may be grander and more becoming
+to you. Neither do you, Protagoras, go forth on the gale with every sail
+set out of sight of land into an ocean of words, but let there be a mean
+observed by both of you. Do as I say. And let me also persuade you to
+choose an arbiter or overseer or president; he will keep watch over your
+words and will prescribe their proper length.
+
+This proposal was received by the company with universal approval;
+Callias said that he would not let me off, and they begged me to choose
+an arbiter. But I said that to choose an umpire of discourse would be
+unseemly; for if the person chosen was inferior, then the inferior or
+worse ought not to preside over the better; or if he was equal, neither
+would that be well; for he who is our equal will do as we do, and what
+will be the use of choosing him? And if you say, 'Let us have a better
+then,'--to that I answer that you cannot have any one who is wiser than
+Protagoras. And if you choose another who is not really better, and whom
+you only say is better, to put another over him as though he were an
+inferior person would be an unworthy reflection on him; not that, as far
+as I am concerned, any reflection is of much consequence to me. Let
+me tell you then what I will do in order that the conversation and
+discussion may go on as you desire. If Protagoras is not disposed to
+answer, let him ask and I will answer; and I will endeavour to show at
+the same time how, as I maintain, he ought to answer: and when I have
+answered as many questions as he likes to ask, let him in like manner
+answer me; and if he seems to be not very ready at answering the precise
+question asked of him, you and I will unite in entreating him, as you
+entreated me, not to spoil the discussion. And this will require no
+special arbiter--all of you shall be arbiters.
+
+This was generally approved, and Protagoras, though very much against
+his will, was obliged to agree that he would ask questions; and when he
+had put a sufficient number of them, that he would answer in his turn
+those which he was asked in short replies. He began to put his questions
+as follows:--
+
+I am of opinion, Socrates, he said, that skill in poetry is the
+principal part of education; and this I conceive to be the power of
+knowing what compositions of the poets are correct, and what are not,
+and how they are to be distinguished, and of explaining when asked the
+reason of the difference. And I propose to transfer the question which
+you and I have been discussing to the domain of poetry; we will speak as
+before of virtue, but in reference to a passage of a poet. Now Simonides
+says to Scopas the son of Creon the Thessalian:
+
+'Hardly on the one hand can a man become truly good, built four-square
+in hands and feet and mind, a work without a flaw.'
+
+Do you know the poem? or shall I repeat the whole?
+
+There is no need, I said; for I am perfectly well acquainted with the
+ode,--I have made a careful study of it.
+
+Very well, he said. And do you think that the ode is a good composition,
+and true?
+
+Yes, I said, both good and true.
+
+But if there is a contradiction, can the composition be good or true?
+
+No, not in that case, I replied.
+
+And is there not a contradiction? he asked. Reflect.
+
+Well, my friend, I have reflected.
+
+And does not the poet proceed to say, 'I do not agree with the word of
+Pittacus, albeit the utterance of a wise man: Hardly can a man be good'?
+Now you will observe that this is said by the same poet.
+
+I know it.
+
+And do you think, he said, that the two sayings are consistent?
+
+Yes, I said, I think so (at the same time I could not help fearing that
+there might be something in what he said). And you think otherwise?
+
+Why, he said, how can he be consistent in both? First of all, premising
+as his own thought, 'Hardly can a man become truly good'; and then a
+little further on in the poem, forgetting, and blaming Pittacus and
+refusing to agree with him, when he says, 'Hardly can a man be good,'
+which is the very same thing. And yet when he blames him who says the
+same with himself, he blames himself; so that he must be wrong either in
+his first or his second assertion.
+
+Many of the audience cheered and applauded this. And I felt at first
+giddy and faint, as if I had received a blow from the hand of an expert
+boxer, when I heard his words and the sound of the cheering; and to
+confess the truth, I wanted to get time to think what the meaning of
+the poet really was. So I turned to Prodicus and called him. Prodicus,
+I said, Simonides is a countryman of yours, and you ought to come to his
+aid. I must appeal to you, like the river Scamander in Homer, who, when
+beleaguered by Achilles, summons the Simois to aid him, saying:
+
+'Brother dear, let us both together stay the force of the hero (Il.).'
+
+And I summon you, for I am afraid that Protagoras will make an end of
+Simonides. Now is the time to rehabilitate Simonides, by the application
+of your philosophy of synonyms, which enables you to distinguish 'will'
+and 'wish,' and make other charming distinctions like those which you
+drew just now. And I should like to know whether you would agree with
+me; for I am of opinion that there is no contradiction in the words of
+Simonides. And first of all I wish that you would say whether, in your
+opinion, Prodicus, 'being' is the same as 'becoming.'
+
+Not the same, certainly, replied Prodicus.
+
+Did not Simonides first set forth, as his own view, that 'Hardly can a
+man become truly good'?
+
+Quite right, said Prodicus.
+
+And then he blames Pittacus, not, as Protagoras imagines, for repeating
+that which he says himself, but for saying something different from
+himself. Pittacus does not say as Simonides says, that hardly can a man
+become good, but hardly can a man be good: and our friend Prodicus would
+maintain that being, Protagoras, is not the same as becoming; and if
+they are not the same, then Simonides is not inconsistent with himself.
+I dare say that Prodicus and many others would say, as Hesiod says,
+
+     'On the one hand, hardly can a man become good,
+     For the gods have made virtue the reward of toil,
+     But on the other hand, when you have climbed the height,
+     Then, to retain virtue, however difficult the acquisition, is easy
+     --(Works and Days).'
+
+Prodicus heard and approved; but Protagoras said: Your correction,
+Socrates, involves a greater error than is contained in the sentence
+which you are correcting.
+
+Alas! I said, Protagoras; then I am a sorry physician, and do but
+aggravate a disorder which I am seeking to cure.
+
+Such is the fact, he said.
+
+How so? I asked.
+
+The poet, he replied, could never have made such a mistake as to say
+that virtue, which in the opinion of all men is the hardest of all
+things, can be easily retained.
+
+Well, I said, and how fortunate are we in having Prodicus among us, at
+the right moment; for he has a wisdom, Protagoras, which, as I imagine,
+is more than human and of very ancient date, and may be as old as
+Simonides or even older. Learned as you are in many things, you appear
+to know nothing of this; but I know, for I am a disciple of his.
+And now, if I am not mistaken, you do not understand the word 'hard'
+(chalepon) in the sense which Simonides intended; and I must correct
+you, as Prodicus corrects me when I use the word 'awful' (deinon) as a
+term of praise. If I say that Protagoras or any one else is an 'awfully'
+wise man, he asks me if I am not ashamed of calling that which is good
+'awful'; and then he explains to me that the term 'awful' is always
+taken in a bad sense, and that no one speaks of being 'awfully' healthy
+or wealthy, or of 'awful' peace, but of 'awful' disease, 'awful' war,
+'awful' poverty, meaning by the term 'awful,' evil. And I think that
+Simonides and his countrymen the Ceans, when they spoke of 'hard' meant
+'evil,' or something which you do not understand. Let us ask Prodicus,
+for he ought to be able to answer questions about the dialect of
+Simonides. What did he mean, Prodicus, by the term 'hard'?
+
+Evil, said Prodicus.
+
+And therefore, I said, Prodicus, he blames Pittacus for saying, 'Hard is
+the good,' just as if that were equivalent to saying, Evil is the good.
+
+Yes, he said, that was certainly his meaning; and he is twitting
+Pittacus with ignorance of the use of terms, which in a Lesbian, who has
+been accustomed to speak a barbarous language, is natural.
+
+Do you hear, Protagoras, I asked, what our friend Prodicus is saying?
+And have you an answer for him?
+
+You are entirely mistaken, Prodicus, said Protagoras; and I know very
+well that Simonides in using the word 'hard' meant what all of us mean,
+not evil, but that which is not easy--that which takes a great deal of
+trouble: of this I am positive.
+
+I said: I also incline to believe, Protagoras, that this was the meaning
+of Simonides, of which our friend Prodicus was very well aware, but
+he thought that he would make fun, and try if you could maintain your
+thesis; for that Simonides could never have meant the other is clearly
+proved by the context, in which he says that God only has this gift. Now
+he cannot surely mean to say that to be good is evil, when he afterwards
+proceeds to say that God only has this gift, and that this is the
+attribute of him and of no other. For if this be his meaning, Prodicus
+would impute to Simonides a character of recklessness which is very
+unlike his countrymen. And I should like to tell you, I said, what I
+imagine to be the real meaning of Simonides in this poem, if you will
+test what, in your way of speaking, would be called my skill in poetry;
+or if you would rather, I will be the listener.
+
+To this proposal Protagoras replied: As you please;--and Hippias,
+Prodicus, and the others told me by all means to do as I proposed.
+
+Then now, I said, I will endeavour to explain to you my opinion about
+this poem of Simonides. There is a very ancient philosophy which is more
+cultivated in Crete and Lacedaemon than in any other part of Hellas, and
+there are more philosophers in those countries than anywhere else in
+the world. This, however, is a secret which the Lacedaemonians deny; and
+they pretend to be ignorant, just because they do not wish to have it
+thought that they rule the world by wisdom, like the Sophists of whom
+Protagoras was speaking, and not by valour of arms; considering that
+if the reason of their superiority were disclosed, all men would be
+practising their wisdom. And this secret of theirs has never been
+discovered by the imitators of Lacedaemonian fashions in other cities,
+who go about with their ears bruised in imitation of them, and have the
+caestus bound on their arms, and are always in training, and wear short
+cloaks; for they imagine that these are the practices which have
+enabled the Lacedaemonians to conquer the other Hellenes. Now when the
+Lacedaemonians want to unbend and hold free conversation with their
+wise men, and are no longer satisfied with mere secret intercourse, they
+drive out all these laconizers, and any other foreigners who may happen
+to be in their country, and they hold a philosophical seance unknown
+to strangers; and they themselves forbid their young men to go out into
+other cities--in this they are like the Cretans--in order that they may
+not unlearn the lessons which they have taught them. And in Lacedaemon
+and Crete not only men but also women have a pride in their high
+cultivation. And hereby you may know that I am right in attributing to
+the Lacedaemonians this excellence in philosophy and speculation: If
+a man converses with the most ordinary Lacedaemonian, he will find him
+seldom good for much in general conversation, but at any point in the
+discourse he will be darting out some notable saying, terse and full of
+meaning, with unerring aim; and the person with whom he is talking seems
+to be like a child in his hands. And many of our own age and of former
+ages have noted that the true Lacedaemonian type of character has the
+love of philosophy even stronger than the love of gymnastics; they are
+conscious that only a perfectly educated man is capable of uttering such
+expressions. Such were Thales of Miletus, and Pittacus of Mitylene, and
+Bias of Priene, and our own Solon, and Cleobulus the Lindian, and
+Myson the Chenian; and seventh in the catalogue of wise men was the
+Lacedaemonian Chilo. All these were lovers and emulators and disciples
+of the culture of the Lacedaemonians, and any one may perceive that
+their wisdom was of this character; consisting of short memorable
+sentences, which they severally uttered. And they met together and
+dedicated in the temple of Apollo at Delphi, as the first-fruits
+of their wisdom, the far-famed inscriptions, which are in all men's
+mouths--'Know thyself,' and 'Nothing too much.'
+
+Why do I say all this? I am explaining that this Lacedaemonian brevity
+was the style of primitive philosophy. Now there was a saying of
+Pittacus which was privately circulated and received the approbation of
+the wise, 'Hard is it to be good.' And Simonides, who was ambitious of
+the fame of wisdom, was aware that if he could overthrow this saying,
+then, as if he had won a victory over some famous athlete, he would
+carry off the palm among his contemporaries. And if I am not mistaken,
+he composed the entire poem with the secret intention of damaging
+Pittacus and his saying.
+
+Let us all unite in examining his words, and see whether I am speaking
+the truth. Simonides must have been a lunatic, if, in the very first
+words of the poem, wanting to say only that to become good is hard, he
+inserted (Greek) 'on the one hand' ('on the one hand to become good is
+hard'); there would be no reason for the introduction of (Greek),
+unless you suppose him to speak with a hostile reference to the words
+of Pittacus. Pittacus is saying 'Hard is it to be good,' and he, in
+refutation of this thesis, rejoins that the truly hard thing, Pittacus,
+is to become good, not joining 'truly' with 'good,' but with 'hard.'
+Not, that the hard thing is to be truly good, as though there were some
+truly good men, and there were others who were good but not truly
+good (this would be a very simple observation, and quite unworthy of
+Simonides); but you must suppose him to make a trajection of the word
+'truly' (Greek), construing the saying of Pittacus thus (and let us
+imagine Pittacus to be speaking and Simonides answering him): 'O my
+friends,' says Pittacus, 'hard is it to be good,' and Simonides answers,
+'In that, Pittacus, you are mistaken; the difficulty is not to be good,
+but on the one hand, to become good, four-square in hands and feet
+and mind, without a flaw--that is hard truly.' This way of reading the
+passage accounts for the insertion of (Greek) 'on the one hand,' and for
+the position at the end of the clause of the word 'truly,' and all that
+follows shows this to be the meaning. A great deal might be said
+in praise of the details of the poem, which is a charming piece of
+workmanship, and very finished, but such minutiae would be tedious. I
+should like, however, to point out the general intention of the poem,
+which is certainly designed in every part to be a refutation of the
+saying of Pittacus. For he speaks in what follows a little further on
+as if he meant to argue that although there is a difficulty in becoming
+good, yet this is possible for a time, and only for a time. But having
+become good, to remain in a good state and be good, as you, Pittacus,
+affirm, is not possible, and is not granted to man; God only has this
+blessing; 'but man cannot help being bad when the force of circumstances
+overpowers him.' Now whom does the force of circumstance overpower in
+the command of a vessel?--not the private individual, for he is always
+overpowered; and as one who is already prostrate cannot be overthrown,
+and only he who is standing upright but not he who is prostrate can be
+laid prostrate, so the force of circumstances can only overpower him
+who, at some time or other, has resources, and not him who is at
+all times helpless. The descent of a great storm may make the pilot
+helpless, or the severity of the season the husbandman or the physician;
+for the good may become bad, as another poet witnesses:--
+
+'The good are sometimes good and sometimes bad.'
+
+But the bad does not become bad; he is always bad. So that when the
+force of circumstances overpowers the man of resources and skill and
+virtue, then he cannot help being bad. And you, Pittacus, are saying,
+'Hard is it to be good.' Now there is a difficulty in becoming good; and
+yet this is possible: but to be good is an impossibility--
+
+'For he who does well is the good man, and he who does ill is the bad.'
+
+But what sort of doing is good in letters? and what sort of doing makes
+a man good in letters? Clearly the knowing of them. And what sort of
+well-doing makes a man a good physician? Clearly the knowledge of the
+art of healing the sick. 'But he who does ill is the bad.' Now who
+becomes a bad physician? Clearly he who is in the first place a
+physician, and in the second place a good physician; for he may become a
+bad one also: but none of us unskilled individuals can by any amount of
+doing ill become physicians, any more than we can become carpenters or
+anything of that sort; and he who by doing ill cannot become a physician
+at all, clearly cannot become a bad physician. In like manner the good
+may become deteriorated by time, or toil, or disease, or other accident
+(the only real doing ill is to be deprived of knowledge), but the bad
+man will never become bad, for he is always bad; and if he were to
+become bad, he must previously have been good. Thus the words of the
+poem tend to show that on the one hand a man cannot be continuously
+good, but that he may become good and may also become bad; and again
+that
+
+'They are the best for the longest time whom the gods love.'
+
+All this relates to Pittacus, as is further proved by the sequel. For he
+adds:--
+
+'Therefore I will not throw away my span of life to no purpose in
+searching after the impossible, hoping in vain to find a perfectly
+faultless man among those who partake of the fruit of the broad-bosomed
+earth: if I find him, I will send you word.'
+
+(this is the vehement way in which he pursues his attack upon Pittacus
+throughout the whole poem):
+
+'But him who does no evil, voluntarily I praise and love;--not even the
+gods war against necessity.'
+
+All this has a similar drift, for Simonides was not so ignorant as to
+say that he praised those who did no evil voluntarily, as though there
+were some who did evil voluntarily. For no wise man, as I believe, will
+allow that any human being errs voluntarily, or voluntarily does evil
+and dishonourable actions; but they are very well aware that all who do
+evil and dishonourable things do them against their will. And Simonides
+never says that he praises him who does no evil voluntarily; the word
+'voluntarily' applies to himself. For he was under the impression that
+a good man might often compel himself to love and praise another, and
+to be the friend and approver of another; and that there might be an
+involuntary love, such as a man might feel to an unnatural father or
+mother, or country, or the like. Now bad men, when their parents or
+country have any defects, look on them with malignant joy, and find
+fault with them and expose and denounce them to others, under the idea
+that the rest of mankind will be less likely to take themselves to task
+and accuse them of neglect; and they blame their defects far more than
+they deserve, in order that the odium which is necessarily incurred by
+them may be increased: but the good man dissembles his feelings, and
+constrains himself to praise them; and if they have wronged him and he
+is angry, he pacifies his anger and is reconciled, and compels himself
+to love and praise his own flesh and blood. And Simonides, as is
+probable, considered that he himself had often had to praise and magnify
+a tyrant or the like, much against his will, and he also wishes to imply
+to Pittacus that he does not censure him because he is censorious.
+
+'For I am satisfied' he says, 'when a man is neither bad nor very
+stupid; and when he knows justice (which is the health of states), and
+is of sound mind, I will find no fault with him, for I am not given to
+finding fault, and there are innumerable fools'
+
+(implying that if he delighted in censure he might have abundant
+opportunity of finding fault).
+
+'All things are good with which evil is unmingled.'
+
+In these latter words he does not mean to say that all things are good
+which have no evil in them, as you might say 'All things are white which
+have no black in them,' for that would be ridiculous; but he means to
+say that he accepts and finds no fault with the moderate or intermediate
+state.
+
+('I do not hope' he says, 'to find a perfectly blameless man among those
+who partake of the fruits of the broad-bosomed earth (if I find him,
+I will send you word); in this sense I praise no man. But he who is
+moderately good, and does no evil, is good enough for me, who love and
+approve every one')
+
+(and here observe that he uses a Lesbian word, epainemi (approve),
+because he is addressing Pittacus,
+
+   'Who love and APPROVE every one VOLUNTARILY, who does no evil:'
+
+and that the stop should be put after 'voluntarily'); 'but there are
+some whom I involuntarily praise and love. And you, Pittacus, I would
+never have blamed, if you had spoken what was moderately good and true;
+but I do blame you because, putting on the appearance of truth, you are
+speaking falsely about the highest matters.'--And this, I said, Prodicus
+and Protagoras, I take to be the meaning of Simonides in this poem.
+
+Hippias said: I think, Socrates, that you have given a very good
+explanation of the poem; but I have also an excellent interpretation of
+my own which I will propound to you, if you will allow me.
+
+Nay, Hippias, said Alcibiades; not now, but at some other time. At
+present we must abide by the compact which was made between Socrates and
+Protagoras, to the effect that as long as Protagoras is willing to ask,
+Socrates should answer; or that if he would rather answer, then that
+Socrates should ask.
+
+I said: I wish Protagoras either to ask or answer as he is inclined; but
+I would rather have done with poems and odes, if he does not object,
+and come back to the question about which I was asking you at first,
+Protagoras, and by your help make an end of that. The talk about the
+poets seems to me like a commonplace entertainment to which a vulgar
+company have recourse; who, because they are not able to converse or
+amuse one another, while they are drinking, with the sound of their own
+voices and conversation, by reason of their stupidity, raise the price
+of flute-girls in the market, hiring for a great sum the voice of a
+flute instead of their own breath, to be the medium of intercourse among
+them: but where the company are real gentlemen and men of education,
+you will see no flute-girls, nor dancing-girls, nor harp-girls; and
+they have no nonsense or games, but are contented with one another's
+conversation, of which their own voices are the medium, and which they
+carry on by turns and in an orderly manner, even though they are very
+liberal in their potations. And a company like this of ours, and men
+such as we profess to be, do not require the help of another's voice, or
+of the poets whom you cannot interrogate about the meaning of what they
+are saying; people who cite them declaring, some that the poet has
+one meaning, and others that he has another, and the point which is in
+dispute can never be decided. This sort of entertainment they decline,
+and prefer to talk with one another, and put one another to the proof
+in conversation. And these are the models which I desire that you and I
+should imitate. Leaving the poets, and keeping to ourselves, let us try
+the mettle of one another and make proof of the truth in conversation.
+If you have a mind to ask, I am ready to answer; or if you would rather,
+do you answer, and give me the opportunity of resuming and completing
+our unfinished argument.
+
+I made these and some similar observations; but Protagoras would
+not distinctly say which he would do. Thereupon Alcibiades turned to
+Callias, and said:--Do you think, Callias, that Protagoras is fair in
+refusing to say whether he will or will not answer? for I certainly
+think that he is unfair; he ought either to proceed with the argument,
+or distinctly refuse to proceed, that we may know his intention; and
+then Socrates will be able to discourse with some one else, and the rest
+of the company will be free to talk with one another.
+
+I think that Protagoras was really made ashamed by these words of
+Alcibiades, and when the prayers of Callias and the company were
+superadded, he was at last induced to argue, and said that I might ask
+and he would answer.
+
+So I said: Do not imagine, Protagoras, that I have any other interest in
+asking questions of you but that of clearing up my own difficulties. For
+I think that Homer was very right in saying that
+
+     'When two go together, one sees before the other (Il.),'
+
+for all men who have a companion are readier in deed, word, or thought;
+but if a man
+
+     'Sees a thing when he is alone,'
+
+he goes about straightway seeking until he finds some one to whom he
+may show his discoveries, and who may confirm him in them. And I would
+rather hold discourse with you than with any one, because I think that
+no man has a better understanding of most things which a good man may be
+expected to understand, and in particular of virtue. For who is there,
+but you?--who not only claim to be a good man and a gentleman, for many
+are this, and yet have not the power of making others good--whereas you
+are not only good yourself, but also the cause of goodness in others.
+Moreover such confidence have you in yourself, that although other
+Sophists conceal their profession, you proclaim in the face of Hellas
+that you are a Sophist or teacher of virtue and education, and are
+the first who demanded pay in return. How then can I do otherwise than
+invite you to the examination of these subjects, and ask questions and
+consult with you? I must, indeed. And I should like once more to have
+my memory refreshed by you about the questions which I was asking you
+at first, and also to have your help in considering them. If I am not
+mistaken the question was this: Are wisdom and temperance and courage
+and justice and holiness five names of the same thing? or has each of
+the names a separate underlying essence and corresponding thing having a
+peculiar function, no one of them being like any other of them? And you
+replied that the five names were not the names of the same thing, but
+that each of them had a separate object, and that all these objects were
+parts of virtue, not in the same way that the parts of gold are like
+each other and the whole of which they are parts, but as the parts of
+the face are unlike the whole of which they are parts and one another,
+and have each of them a distinct function. I should like to know whether
+this is still your opinion; or if not, I will ask you to define your
+meaning, and I shall not take you to task if you now make a different
+statement. For I dare say that you may have said what you did only in
+order to make trial of me.
+
+I answer, Socrates, he said, that all these qualities are parts of
+virtue, and that four out of the five are to some extent similar, and
+that the fifth of them, which is courage, is very different from the
+other four, as I prove in this way: You may observe that many men are
+utterly unrighteous, unholy, intemperate, ignorant, who are nevertheless
+remarkable for their courage.
+
+Stop, I said; I should like to think about that. When you speak of brave
+men, do you mean the confident, or another sort of nature?
+
+Yes, he said; I mean the impetuous, ready to go at that which others are
+afraid to approach.
+
+In the next place, you would affirm virtue to be a good thing, of which
+good thing you assert yourself to be a teacher.
+
+Yes, he said; I should say the best of all things, if I am in my right
+mind.
+
+And is it partly good and partly bad, I said, or wholly good?
+
+Wholly good, and in the highest degree.
+
+Tell me then; who are they who have confidence when diving into a well?
+
+I should say, the divers.
+
+And the reason of this is that they have knowledge?
+
+Yes, that is the reason.
+
+And who have confidence when fighting on horseback--the skilled horseman
+or the unskilled?
+
+The skilled.
+
+And who when fighting with light shields--the peltasts or the
+nonpeltasts?
+
+The peltasts. And that is true of all other things, he said, if that is
+your point: those who have knowledge are more confident than those who
+have no knowledge, and they are more confident after they have learned
+than before.
+
+And have you not seen persons utterly ignorant, I said, of these things,
+and yet confident about them?
+
+Yes, he said, I have seen such persons far too confident.
+
+And are not these confident persons also courageous?
+
+In that case, he replied, courage would be a base thing, for the men of
+whom we are speaking are surely madmen.
+
+Then who are the courageous? Are they not the confident?
+
+Yes, he said; to that statement I adhere.
+
+And those, I said, who are thus confident without knowledge are really
+not courageous, but mad; and in that case the wisest are also the most
+confident, and being the most confident are also the bravest, and upon
+that view again wisdom will be courage.
+
+Nay, Socrates, he replied, you are mistaken in your remembrance of
+what was said by me. When you asked me, I certainly did say that
+the courageous are the confident; but I was never asked whether the
+confident are the courageous; if you had asked me, I should have
+answered 'Not all of them': and what I did answer you have not proved to
+be false, although you proceeded to show that those who have knowledge
+are more courageous than they were before they had knowledge, and more
+courageous than others who have no knowledge, and were then led on to
+think that courage is the same as wisdom. But in this way of arguing you
+might come to imagine that strength is wisdom. You might begin by asking
+whether the strong are able, and I should say 'Yes'; and then whether
+those who know how to wrestle are not more able to wrestle than those
+who do not know how to wrestle, and more able after than before they had
+learned, and I should assent. And when I had admitted this, you might
+use my admissions in such a way as to prove that upon my view wisdom is
+strength; whereas in that case I should not have admitted, any more than
+in the other, that the able are strong, although I have admitted that
+the strong are able. For there is a difference between ability and
+strength; the former is given by knowledge as well as by madness or
+rage, but strength comes from nature and a healthy state of the body.
+And in like manner I say of confidence and courage, that they are not
+the same; and I argue that the courageous are confident, but not all
+the confident courageous. For confidence may be given to men by art, and
+also, like ability, by madness and rage; but courage comes to them from
+nature and the healthy state of the soul.
+
+I said: You would admit, Protagoras, that some men live well and others
+ill?
+
+He assented.
+
+And do you think that a man lives well who lives in pain and grief?
+
+He does not.
+
+But if he lives pleasantly to the end of his life, will he not in that
+case have lived well?
+
+He will.
+
+Then to live pleasantly is a good, and to live unpleasantly an evil?
+
+Yes, he said, if the pleasure be good and honourable.
+
+And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant
+things evil and some painful things good?--for I am rather disposed to
+say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no
+consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are
+bad.
+
+I do not know, Socrates, he said, whether I can venture to assert in
+that unqualified manner that the pleasant is the good and the painful
+the evil. Having regard not only to my present answer, but also to the
+whole of my life, I shall be safer, if I am not mistaken, in saying that
+there are some pleasant things which are not good, and that there are
+some painful things which are good, and some which are not good, and
+that there are some which are neither good nor evil.
+
+And you would call pleasant, I said, the things which participate in
+pleasure or create pleasure?
+
+Certainly, he said.
+
+Then my meaning is, that in as far as they are pleasant they are good;
+and my question would imply that pleasure is a good in itself.
+
+According to your favourite mode of speech, Socrates, 'Let us reflect
+about this,' he said; and if the reflection is to the point, and the
+result proves that pleasure and good are really the same, then we will
+agree; but if not, then we will argue.
+
+And would you wish to begin the enquiry? I said; or shall I begin?
+
+You ought to take the lead, he said; for you are the author of the
+discussion.
+
+May I employ an illustration? I said. Suppose some one who is enquiring
+into the health or some other bodily quality of another:--he looks at
+his face and at the tips of his fingers, and then he says, Uncover your
+chest and back to me that I may have a better view:--that is the sort of
+thing which I desire in this speculation. Having seen what your opinion
+is about good and pleasure, I am minded to say to you: Uncover your mind
+to me, Protagoras, and reveal your opinion about knowledge, that I may
+know whether you agree with the rest of the world. Now the rest of the
+world are of opinion that knowledge is a principle not of strength, or
+of rule, or of command: their notion is that a man may have knowledge,
+and yet that the knowledge which is in him may be overmastered by anger,
+or pleasure, or pain, or love, or perhaps by fear,--just as if knowledge
+were a slave, and might be dragged about anyhow. Now is that your view?
+or do you think that knowledge is a noble and commanding thing, which
+cannot be overcome, and will not allow a man, if he only knows the
+difference of good and evil, to do anything which is contrary to
+knowledge, but that wisdom will have strength to help him?
+
+I agree with you, Socrates, said Protagoras; and not only so, but I,
+above all other men, am bound to say that wisdom and knowledge are the
+highest of human things.
+
+Good, I said, and true. But are you aware that the majority of the world
+are of another mind; and that men are commonly supposed to know the
+things which are best, and not to do them when they might? And most
+persons whom I have asked the reason of this have said that when men act
+contrary to knowledge they are overcome by pain, or pleasure, or some of
+those affections which I was just now mentioning.
+
+Yes, Socrates, he replied; and that is not the only point about which
+mankind are in error.
+
+Suppose, then, that you and I endeavour to instruct and inform them
+what is the nature of this affection which they call 'being overcome by
+pleasure,' and which they affirm to be the reason why they do not always
+do what is best. When we say to them: Friends, you are mistaken, and
+are saying what is not true, they would probably reply: Socrates and
+Protagoras, if this affection of the soul is not to be called 'being
+overcome by pleasure,' pray, what is it, and by what name would you
+describe it?
+
+But why, Socrates, should we trouble ourselves about the opinion of the
+many, who just say anything that happens to occur to them?
+
+I believe, I said, that they may be of use in helping us to discover how
+courage is related to the other parts of virtue. If you are disposed to
+abide by our agreement, that I should show the way in which, as I think,
+our recent difficulty is most likely to be cleared up, do you follow;
+but if not, never mind.
+
+You are quite right, he said; and I would have you proceed as you have
+begun.
+
+Well then, I said, let me suppose that they repeat their question, What
+account do you give of that which, in our way of speaking, is termed
+being overcome by pleasure? I should answer thus: Listen, and Protagoras
+and I will endeavour to show you. When men are overcome by eating and
+drinking and other sensual desires which are pleasant, and they, knowing
+them to be evil, nevertheless indulge in them, would you not say that
+they were overcome by pleasure? They will not deny this. And suppose
+that you and I were to go on and ask them again: 'In what way do you say
+that they are evil,--in that they are pleasant and give pleasure at the
+moment, or because they cause disease and poverty and other like evils
+in the future? Would they still be evil, if they had no attendant evil
+consequences, simply because they give the consciousness of pleasure
+of whatever nature?'--Would they not answer that they are not evil
+on account of the pleasure which is immediately given by them, but on
+account of the after consequences--diseases and the like?
+
+I believe, said Protagoras, that the world in general would answer as
+you do.
+
+And in causing diseases do they not cause pain? and in causing poverty
+do they not cause pain;--they would agree to that also, if I am not
+mistaken?
+
+Protagoras assented.
+
+Then I should say to them, in my name and yours: Do you think them evil
+for any other reason, except because they end in pain and rob us of
+other pleasures:--there again they would agree?
+
+We both of us thought that they would.
+
+And then I should take the question from the opposite point of view, and
+say: 'Friends, when you speak of goods being painful, do you not mean
+remedial goods, such as gymnastic exercises, and military service, and
+the physician's use of burning, cutting, drugging, and starving? Are
+these the things which are good but painful?'--they would assent to me?
+
+He agreed.
+
+'And do you call them good because they occasion the greatest immediate
+suffering and pain; or because, afterwards, they bring health and
+improvement of the bodily condition and the salvation of states
+and power over others and wealth?'--they would agree to the latter
+alternative, if I am not mistaken?
+
+He assented.
+
+'Are these things good for any other reason except that they end in
+pleasure, and get rid of and avert pain? Are you looking to any other
+standard but pleasure and pain when you call them good?'--they would
+acknowledge that they were not?
+
+I think so, said Protagoras.
+
+'And do you not pursue after pleasure as a good, and avoid pain as an
+evil?'
+
+He assented.
+
+'Then you think that pain is an evil and pleasure is a good: and even
+pleasure you deem an evil, when it robs you of greater pleasures than it
+gives, or causes pains greater than the pleasure. If, however, you call
+pleasure an evil in relation to some other end or standard, you will be
+able to show us that standard. But you have none to show.'
+
+I do not think that they have, said Protagoras.
+
+'And have you not a similar way of speaking about pain? You call pain a
+good when it takes away greater pains than those which it has, or gives
+pleasures greater than the pains: then if you have some standard other
+than pleasure and pain to which you refer when you call actual pain a
+good, you can show what that is. But you cannot.'
+
+True, said Protagoras.
+
+Suppose again, I said, that the world says to me: 'Why do you spend many
+words and speak in many ways on this subject?' Excuse me, friends, I
+should reply; but in the first place there is a difficulty in explaining
+the meaning of the expression 'overcome by pleasure'; and the whole
+argument turns upon this. And even now, if you see any possible way in
+which evil can be explained as other than pain, or good as other than
+pleasure, you may still retract. Are you satisfied, then, at having
+a life of pleasure which is without pain? If you are, and if you are
+unable to show any good or evil which does not end in pleasure and pain,
+hear the consequences:--If what you say is true, then the argument is
+absurd which affirms that a man often does evil knowingly, when he might
+abstain, because he is seduced and overpowered by pleasure; or again,
+when you say that a man knowingly refuses to do what is good because he
+is overcome at the moment by pleasure. And that this is ridiculous will
+be evident if only we give up the use of various names, such as pleasant
+and painful, and good and evil. As there are two things, let us call
+them by two names--first, good and evil, and then pleasant and painful.
+Assuming this, let us go on to say that a man does evil knowing that he
+does evil. But some one will ask, Why? Because he is overcome, is the
+first answer. And by what is he overcome? the enquirer will proceed to
+ask. And we shall not be able to reply 'By pleasure,' for the name of
+pleasure has been exchanged for that of good. In our answer, then, we
+shall only say that he is overcome. 'By what?' he will reiterate. By the
+good, we shall have to reply; indeed we shall. Nay, but our questioner
+will rejoin with a laugh, if he be one of the swaggering sort, 'That is
+too ridiculous, that a man should do what he knows to be evil when he
+ought not, because he is overcome by good. Is that, he will ask, because
+the good was worthy or not worthy of conquering the evil'? And in answer
+to that we shall clearly reply, Because it was not worthy; for if it had
+been worthy, then he who, as we say, was overcome by pleasure, would not
+have been wrong. 'But how,' he will reply, 'can the good be unworthy
+of the evil, or the evil of the good'? Is not the real explanation
+that they are out of proportion to one another, either as greater and
+smaller, or more and fewer? This we cannot deny. And when you speak of
+being overcome--'what do you mean,' he will say, 'but that you choose
+the greater evil in exchange for the lesser good?' Admitted. And now
+substitute the names of pleasure and pain for good and evil, and say,
+not as before, that a man does what is evil knowingly, but that he does
+what is painful knowingly, and because he is overcome by pleasure,
+which is unworthy to overcome. What measure is there of the relations
+of pleasure to pain other than excess and defect, which means that they
+become greater and smaller, and more and fewer, and differ in degree?
+For if any one says: 'Yes, Socrates, but immediate pleasure differs
+widely from future pleasure and pain'--To that I should reply: And do
+they differ in anything but in pleasure and pain? There can be no
+other measure of them. And do you, like a skilful weigher, put into the
+balance the pleasures and the pains, and their nearness and distance,
+and weigh them, and then say which outweighs the other. If you weigh
+pleasures against pleasures, you of course take the more and greater; or
+if you weigh pains against pains, you take the fewer and the less; or if
+pleasures against pains, then you choose that course of action in which
+the painful is exceeded by the pleasant, whether the distant by the near
+or the near by the distant; and you avoid that course of action in
+which the pleasant is exceeded by the painful. Would you not admit, my
+friends, that this is true? I am confident that they cannot deny this.
+
+He agreed with me.
+
+Well then, I shall say, if you agree so far, be so good as to answer me
+a question: Do not the same magnitudes appear larger to your sight when
+near, and smaller when at a distance? They will acknowledge that.
+And the same holds of thickness and number; also sounds, which are in
+themselves equal, are greater when near, and lesser when at a distance.
+They will grant that also. Now suppose happiness to consist in doing
+or choosing the greater, and in not doing or in avoiding the less,
+what would be the saving principle of human life? Would not the art of
+measuring be the saving principle; or would the power of appearance? Is
+not the latter that deceiving art which makes us wander up and down and
+take the things at one time of which we repent at another, both in our
+actions and in our choice of things great and small? But the art of
+measurement would do away with the effect of appearances, and, showing
+the truth, would fain teach the soul at last to find rest in the truth,
+and would thus save our life. Would not mankind generally acknowledge
+that the art which accomplishes this result is the art of measurement?
+
+Yes, he said, the art of measurement.
+
+Suppose, again, the salvation of human life to depend on the choice of
+odd and even, and on the knowledge of when a man ought to choose the
+greater or less, either in reference to themselves or to each other, and
+whether near or at a distance; what would be the saving principle of our
+lives? Would not knowledge?--a knowledge of measuring, when the question
+is one of excess and defect, and a knowledge of number, when the
+question is of odd and even? The world will assent, will they not?
+
+Protagoras himself thought that they would.
+
+Well then, my friends, I say to them; seeing that the salvation of human
+life has been found to consist in the right choice of pleasures and
+pains,--in the choice of the more and the fewer, and the greater and
+the less, and the nearer and remoter, must not this measuring be a
+consideration of their excess and defect and equality in relation to
+each other?
+
+This is undeniably true.
+
+And this, as possessing measure, must undeniably also be an art and
+science?
+
+They will agree, he said.
+
+The nature of that art or science will be a matter of future
+consideration; but the existence of such a science furnishes a
+demonstrative answer to the question which you asked of me and
+Protagoras. At the time when you asked the question, if you remember,
+both of us were agreeing that there was nothing mightier than knowledge,
+and that knowledge, in whatever existing, must have the advantage over
+pleasure and all other things; and then you said that pleasure often got
+the advantage even over a man who has knowledge; and we refused to allow
+this, and you rejoined: O Protagoras and Socrates, what is the meaning
+of being overcome by pleasure if not this?--tell us what you call such a
+state:--if we had immediately and at the time answered 'Ignorance,'
+you would have laughed at us. But now, in laughing at us, you will be
+laughing at yourselves: for you also admitted that men err in their
+choice of pleasures and pains; that is, in their choice of good and
+evil, from defect of knowledge; and you admitted further, that they err,
+not only from defect of knowledge in general, but of that particular
+knowledge which is called measuring. And you are also aware that the
+erring act which is done without knowledge is done in ignorance. This,
+therefore, is the meaning of being overcome by pleasure;--ignorance, and
+that the greatest. And our friends Protagoras and Prodicus and Hippias
+declare that they are the physicians of ignorance; but you, who are
+under the mistaken impression that ignorance is not the cause, and that
+the art of which I am speaking cannot be taught, neither go yourselves,
+nor send your children, to the Sophists, who are the teachers of these
+things--you take care of your money and give them none; and the result
+is, that you are the worse off both in public and private life:--Let us
+suppose this to be our answer to the world in general: And now I should
+like to ask you, Hippias, and you, Prodicus, as well as Protagoras (for
+the argument is to be yours as well as ours), whether you think that I
+am speaking the truth or not?
+
+They all thought that what I said was entirely true.
+
+Then you agree, I said, that the pleasant is the good, and the painful
+evil. And here I would beg my friend Prodicus not to introduce his
+distinction of names, whether he is disposed to say pleasurable,
+delightful, joyful. However, by whatever name he prefers to call them,
+I will ask you, most excellent Prodicus, to answer in my sense of the
+words.
+
+Prodicus laughed and assented, as did the others.
+
+Then, my friends, what do you say to this? Are not all actions
+honourable and useful, of which the tendency is to make life painless
+and pleasant? The honourable work is also useful and good?
+
+This was admitted.
+
+Then, I said, if the pleasant is the good, nobody does anything under
+the idea or conviction that some other thing would be better and is also
+attainable, when he might do the better. And this inferiority of a man
+to himself is merely ignorance, as the superiority of a man to himself
+is wisdom.
+
+They all assented.
+
+And is not ignorance the having a false opinion and being deceived about
+important matters?
+
+To this also they unanimously assented.
+
+Then, I said, no man voluntarily pursues evil, or that which he thinks
+to be evil. To prefer evil to good is not in human nature; and when
+a man is compelled to choose one of two evils, no one will choose the
+greater when he may have the less.
+
+All of us agreed to every word of this.
+
+Well, I said, there is a certain thing called fear or terror; and here,
+Prodicus, I should particularly like to know whether you would agree
+with me in defining this fear or terror as expectation of evil.
+
+Protagoras and Hippias agreed, but Prodicus said that this was fear and
+not terror.
+
+Never mind, Prodicus, I said; but let me ask whether, if our former
+assertions are true, a man will pursue that which he fears when he is
+not compelled? Would not this be in flat contradiction to the admission
+which has been already made, that he thinks the things which he fears
+to be evil; and no one will pursue or voluntarily accept that which he
+thinks to be evil?
+
+That also was universally admitted.
+
+Then, I said, these, Hippias and Prodicus, are our premisses; and I
+would beg Protagoras to explain to us how he can be right in what he
+said at first. I do not mean in what he said quite at first, for his
+first statement, as you may remember, was that whereas there were five
+parts of virtue none of them was like any other of them; each of them
+had a separate function. To this, however, I am not referring, but to
+the assertion which he afterwards made that of the five virtues four
+were nearly akin to each other, but that the fifth, which was courage,
+differed greatly from the others. And of this he gave me the following
+proof. He said: You will find, Socrates, that some of the most impious,
+and unrighteous, and intemperate, and ignorant of men are among the most
+courageous; which proves that courage is very different from the other
+parts of virtue. I was surprised at his saying this at the time, and I
+am still more surprised now that I have discussed the matter with you.
+So I asked him whether by the brave he meant the confident. Yes, he
+replied, and the impetuous or goers. (You may remember, Protagoras, that
+this was your answer.)
+
+He assented.
+
+Well then, I said, tell us against what are the courageous ready to
+go--against the same dangers as the cowards?
+
+No, he answered.
+
+Then against something different?
+
+Yes, he said.
+
+Then do cowards go where there is safety, and the courageous where there
+is danger?
+
+Yes, Socrates, so men say.
+
+Very true, I said. But I want to know against what do you say that
+the courageous are ready to go--against dangers, believing them to be
+dangers, or not against dangers?
+
+No, said he; the former case has been proved by you in the previous
+argument to be impossible.
+
+That, again, I replied, is quite true. And if this has been rightly
+proven, then no one goes to meet what he thinks to be dangers, since the
+want of self-control, which makes men rush into dangers, has been shown
+to be ignorance.
+
+He assented.
+
+And yet the courageous man and the coward alike go to meet that about
+which they are confident; so that, in this point of view, the cowardly
+and the courageous go to meet the same things.
+
+And yet, Socrates, said Protagoras, that to which the coward goes is the
+opposite of that to which the courageous goes; the one, for example, is
+ready to go to battle, and the other is not ready.
+
+And is going to battle honourable or disgraceful? I said.
+
+Honourable, he replied.
+
+And if honourable, then already admitted by us to be good; for all
+honourable actions we have admitted to be good.
+
+That is true; and to that opinion I shall always adhere.
+
+True, I said. But which of the two are they who, as you say, are
+unwilling to go to war, which is a good and honourable thing?
+
+The cowards, he replied.
+
+And what is good and honourable, I said, is also pleasant?
+
+It has certainly been acknowledged to be so, he replied.
+
+And do the cowards knowingly refuse to go to the nobler, and pleasanter,
+and better?
+
+The admission of that, he replied, would belie our former admissions.
+
+But does not the courageous man also go to meet the better, and
+pleasanter, and nobler?
+
+That must be admitted.
+
+And the courageous man has no base fear or base confidence?
+
+True, he replied.
+
+And if not base, then honourable?
+
+He admitted this.
+
+And if honourable, then good?
+
+Yes.
+
+But the fear and confidence of the coward or foolhardy or madman, on the
+contrary, are base?
+
+He assented.
+
+And these base fears and confidences originate in ignorance and
+uninstructedness?
+
+True, he said.
+
+Then as to the motive from which the cowards act, do you call it
+cowardice or courage?
+
+I should say cowardice, he replied.
+
+And have they not been shown to be cowards through their ignorance of
+dangers?
+
+Assuredly, he said.
+
+And because of that ignorance they are cowards?
+
+He assented.
+
+And the reason why they are cowards is admitted by you to be cowardice?
+
+He again assented.
+
+Then the ignorance of what is and is not dangerous is cowardice?
+
+He nodded assent.
+
+But surely courage, I said, is opposed to cowardice?
+
+Yes.
+
+Then the wisdom which knows what are and are not dangers is opposed to
+the ignorance of them?
+
+To that again he nodded assent.
+
+And the ignorance of them is cowardice?
+
+To that he very reluctantly nodded assent.
+
+And the knowledge of that which is and is not dangerous is courage, and
+is opposed to the ignorance of these things?
+
+At this point he would no longer nod assent, but was silent.
+
+And why, I said, do you neither assent nor dissent, Protagoras?
+
+Finish the argument by yourself, he said.
+
+I only want to ask one more question, I said. I want to know whether
+you still think that there are men who are most ignorant and yet most
+courageous?
+
+You seem to have a great ambition to make me answer, Socrates, and
+therefore I will gratify you, and say, that this appears to me to be
+impossible consistently with the argument.
+
+My only object, I said, in continuing the discussion, has been the
+desire to ascertain the nature and relations of virtue; for if this were
+clear, I am very sure that the other controversy which has been carried
+on at great length by both of us--you affirming and I denying that
+virtue can be taught--would also become clear. The result of our
+discussion appears to me to be singular. For if the argument had a human
+voice, that voice would be heard laughing at us and saying: 'Protagoras
+and Socrates, you are strange beings; there are you, Socrates, who were
+saying that virtue cannot be taught, contradicting yourself now by your
+attempt to prove that all things are knowledge, including justice, and
+temperance, and courage,--which tends to show that virtue can certainly
+be taught; for if virtue were other than knowledge, as Protagoras
+attempted to prove, then clearly virtue cannot be taught; but if virtue
+is entirely knowledge, as you are seeking to show, then I cannot but
+suppose that virtue is capable of being taught. Protagoras, on the other
+hand, who started by saying that it might be taught, is now eager to
+prove it to be anything rather than knowledge; and if this is true, it
+must be quite incapable of being taught.' Now I, Protagoras, perceiving
+this terrible confusion of our ideas, have a great desire that they
+should be cleared up. And I should like to carry on the discussion until
+we ascertain what virtue is, whether capable of being taught or not,
+lest haply Epimetheus should trip us up and deceive us in the argument,
+as he forgot us in the story; I prefer your Prometheus to your
+Epimetheus, for of him I make use, whenever I am busy about these
+questions, in Promethean care of my own life. And if you have no
+objection, as I said at first, I should like to have your help in the
+enquiry.
+
+Protagoras replied: Socrates, I am not of a base nature, and I am the
+last man in the world to be envious. I cannot but applaud your energy
+and your conduct of an argument. As I have often said, I admire you
+above all men whom I know, and far above all men of your age; and I
+believe that you will become very eminent in philosophy. Let us come
+back to the subject at some future time; at present we had better turn
+to something else.
+
+By all means, I said, if that is your wish; for I too ought long since
+to have kept the engagement of which I spoke before, and only tarried
+because I could not refuse the request of the noble Callias. So the
+conversation ended, and we went our way.
+
+
+
+
+
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